



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Reconstructing the Text of Themistius' Paraphrase of the *De Caelo*

The Hebrew and Latin versions on the three meanings of the term "Heaven"

Elisa Coda*

Abstract

Themistius' paraphrase of Aristotle's *On the Heavens*, which is extant only in the Hebrew and Latin translations, announces at its beginning that the term "Heaven" has three meanings. The same tripartition features at the beginning of Simplicius' commentary: both Themistius and Simplicius depend upon Alexander's lost commentary. However, in the Hebrew version of Themistius' paraphrase only two meanings are given. The Latin version seems *prima facie* to be sound, because there are three meanings listed; however, the second meaning of the Latin is the "fifth body", something which does not match the second meaning in Simplicius. In this article it is argued that the "fifth body" of the Latin version is a commonplace emendation by the translator Moshe Alatino: it has no chances to have been the original reading of Themistius' paraphrase, let alone of Alexander of Aphrodisias' lost commentary, as it has been surmised in recent scholarship.

1. Themistius: the paraphrases, and the paraphrase of Aristotle's De Caelo

Late ancient commentators of Aristotle – all of them of Platonic allegiance¹ – had recourse to Alexander of Aphrodisias' exegeses,² and this tradition predictably continued in later eras, both in the Arabic-speaking world and in the Latin Middle Ages. In Medieval times, also the

* My deepest thanks go to Concetta Luna: her reading of the first draft of this paper saved me from a number of errors. For those which remain I am alone responsible.

¹ Cf. I. Hadot, "Der fortlaufende philosophische Kommentar", in W. Geerlings - Ch. Schulze (eds), *Der Kommentar in Antike und Mittelalter. Beiträge zu seiner Erforschung*, Brill, Leiden - Boston - Köln 2002 (Clavis Commentariorum Antiquitatis et Medii Aevi, 2), pp. 183-99 and G. Karamanolis, *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry*, Oxford U. P., Oxford 2006.

² A comprehensive study of the use of Alexander's commentaries by the Neoplatonic authors writing on Aristotle has not yet been provided. For an overview of the commentary tradition between late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, cf. C. D'Ancona, "Commenting on Aristotle. From Late Antiquity to the Arab Aristotelianism", in Geerlings - Schulze (eds), *Der Kommentar in Antike und Mittelalter*, pp. 201-51. At least some of the Neoplatonic commentators were demonstrably conversant with Alexander's commentaries, a habit prompted in all likelihood by Plotinus' extensive use of his works. This is the case with Syrianus: cf. C. Luna, "Syrianus dans la tradition exégétique de la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote. I. Syrianus entre Alexandre d'Aphrodise et Asclépius", in M.-O. Goulet-Cazé et alii (eds), *Le commentaire entre tradition et innovation. Actes du Colloque international de l'Institut des traditions textuelles, Paris-Villejuif, 22-25 sept. 1999*, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 2000, pp. 301-9; Ead., *Trois études sur la tradition des commentaires anciens à la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, esp. Chapter II, "Le commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise comme source du commentaire de Syrianus", Brill, Leiden 2001 (*Philosophia Antiqua*, 88); Ead., "Alessandro di Afrodisia e Siriano sul libro B della *Metafisica*: tecnica e struttura del commento", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), pp. 39-79. As for Simplicius, he famously refers to Alexander as a path to understand Aristotle's thought in his commentary on the *De Caelo*, p. 297.8-10 Heiberg: this point has been extensively commented upon by H. Baltussen, *Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator*, Duckworth, London 2008, pp. 107-35.

paraphrases³ by Themistius (317-387) were consulted. At variance with the line-by-line exegesis typical of Alexander's commentaries, Themistius accounted for Aristotle's doctrines without quoting the text itself: instead, he rephrased, expanded and summed up, at times rearranging the order of the topics, with an explicit didactical purpose. He presents his exegetical work as a concise presentation of the main Aristotelian doctrines,⁴ saying that his notes (τὰ συγγράμματα) on Aristotle's works, written for the sake of his own memory or as a medicine chest (ἡ ἀποθήκη) of his father's teaching, were meant to preserve the latter and Aristotle's own works from oblivion.⁵

In the prologue of his paraphrase of the *Posterior Analytics* he explains why he did not embark upon detailed commentaries, choosing instead to rephrase Aristotle:

I thought that for me to construct explications (*exégéseis*) of Aristotle's books in succession to so many great men was little short of futile ambition. Not much can be found that my predecessors omitted, and to attempt to construct exhaustive commentaries for the sake of some minor intervention would be like someone wanting to restructure the Athena of Phidias because he thought that he could improve the tassel on her sandal. However to extract the intentions of what is written in his books, and report it quickly in line with the conciseness of the Philosopher, as best I could, seemed both novel and quite beneficial. For I believed that revision by such a method would be convenient for those who had studied Aristotle's [works] once, but who were unable to take them up again because of the length of the [major] commentaries (*hupomnemata*). Many of Aristotle's books seem designed to be cryptic, especially those before us, first, because of his usual brevity of speech (*brakhulogia*), but also because the sequence of the main sections is not separately identified. For this reason you must excuse me if I appear to interpret some matters at rather great length (it was impossible to state them more clearly in an equivalent number [of words]), and with others to make readjustments and rearrangements (*metatithenai*) so that each of the main sections can be clearly demarcated. Also, if I have summarised some items more concisely, that does not merit complaint (trans. Todd).⁶

³ Themistius' exegetical works are labelled παραφράσεις in the *Suda*: cf. *Suidae Lexicon*, ed. A. Adler, Teubner, Leipzig 1931, Θ 122, vol. II, pp. 690.26-691.3. It has been surmised that besides the paraphrases Themistius wrote also commentaries on Aristotle and Plato, but there is no scholarly consensus on this point: cf. C. Steel, "Des commentaires d'Aristote par Thémistius?", *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 71 (1973), pp. 669-80; H.-J. Blumenthal, "Photius on Themistius (Cod. 74): Did Themistius write Commentaries on Aristotle?", *Hermes* 107 (1979), pp. 168-82; J. Vanderspoel, "The Themistius' Collection of Commentaries on Plato and Aristotle", *Phoenix* 43 (1989), pp. 162-4.

⁴ *In An Post.*, pp. 1.2-2.4 Wallies.

⁵ *Or.* 23, 294 D - 295 A. He adds that his συγγράμματα were published without his agreement, but recent scholarship considers the extant paraphrases not as the outcome of personal study, but as that of Themistius' lectures held in an institutional context: cf. J. Vanderspoel, *Themistius and the Imperial Court: Oratory, Civic Duty and Paideia from Constantius to Theodosius*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1995, pp. 19-21. Themistius became a professor in 345-346, as one may infer from *Or.* 31; on his official activity as teacher cf. also *Or.* 24, 302 C - 303 A.

⁶ *In An. Post.*, p. 1.2-12 and pp. 1.19-2.1 Wallies, trans. R.B. Todd, Themistius, *On Aristotle On the Soul*, Duckworth, London 1966, pp. 3-4. According to P. Moraux, *Le Commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise aux Seconds Analytiques d'Aristote*, De Gruyter, Berlin 1979 (Peripatoi, 13), pp. 3-4, it is typical of Themistius' exegesis to provide a general assessment of Aristotle's doctrines without delving into the details which are discussed at length by the commentators.

Themistius' paraphrases were read both by Arabic and Latin authors. To mention only the two prominent examples, both Avicenna⁷ and Thomas Aquinas had recourse to them,⁸ a move that had been made possible by the translations into Arabic and Latin which granted access to them.⁹ Some of the paraphrases have been studied more than others in modern times. That of Book *Lambda* of the *Metaphysics* has mostly attracted the attention of the Arabists,¹⁰ and that of the *De Anima* has been

⁷ Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt* (2), ed. M. Y. Mūsā - S. Dunyā - S. Zāyid, al-Haʾya al-ʿamma li-šūʾn al-maʿābīʾ al-amīriyya, Cairo 1960, p. 393.2-5, English trans. by Michael Marmura: *Avicenna. The Metaphysics of The Healing*. A parallel English-Arabic text translated, introduced, and annotated, Brigham Young U. P., Provo, Utah 2005 (Brigham Young University Middle Eastern Text Initiative), p. 317 (Arabic text, p. ٣١٧.١٣-١٥). As stated by Marmura in the Introduction, pp. XXIV-XXV, the Arabic text is that of the Cairo edition, with some changes indicated in the text; in the passage quoted, there are no changes. “[Another of Aristotle’s followers,] the one who expresses himself well regarding the First Teacher’s books by way of summaries, even though he does not delve deeply into ideas, declares and states that whose meaning is as follows: ‘What is most likely and most true [to affirm] is the existence of a principle of motion belonging specifically to [each sphere] as being an object of love separated [from matter]’.” This passage is commented upon by G. Endress, “Alexander Arabus on the First Cause. Aristotle’s First Mover in an Arabic Treatise attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias”, in C. D’Ancona - G. Serra (eds), *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2002 (Subsidia mediaevalia patavina, 3), pp. 19-74, p. 59 n. 63. Avicenna was obviously not the only one to consult Themistius’ paraphrases: cf. D. Gutas, “Averroes on Theophrastus, through Themistius”, in G. Endress - J.A. Aertsen with the assistance of K. Braun (eds), *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition. Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996)*, Brill, Leiden - Boston - Köln 1999 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 31), pp. 125-44; A. Hasnawi, “Boèce, Averroès et Abū al-Barakāt al-Baġdādī, témoins des écrits de Thémistius sur les *Topiques* d’Aristote”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 17 (2007), pp. 203-65.

⁸ Thomas Aquinas refers twice to Themistius’ paraphrase of the *De Anima* in his *De Unitate intellectus*. He was acquainted with this paraphrase in the Latin version by William of Moerbeke: G. Verbeke, *Thémistius, Commentaire sur le traité de l’âme d’Aristote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, éd. critique et étude sur l’utilisation du commentaire dans l’œuvre de S. Thomas*, Publ. Univ. de Louvain - Béatrice Nauwelaerts, Louvain - Paris 1957 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, 1). First Thomas quotes Themistius’ exegesis of *De An.* I 4, 408 b 25-29: “Si quis autem contra hoc obiiciat, quod Aristoteles dicit in primo *De Anima* (...), patet responsio per dictum Themistii hoc exponentis, qui dicit (...)”: *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia (...), Tomus XLIII, De Principiis naturae. De Aeternitate mundi. De Motu cordis. De Mixtione elementorum. De Operationibus occultis naturae. De Iudiciis astrorum. De Sortibus. De Unitate intellectus. De Ente et essentia. De Fallaciis. De Propositionibus modalibus, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum*, Editori di San Tommaso, Roma 1976, p. 298, col. 2, l. 654-661; then, he quotes a series of passages. The quotations are introduced by the following remark: “Nunc autem considerare oportet quid alii Peripatetici de hoc ipso senserunt. Et accipiamus primo verba Themistii in Commento de anima, ubi sic dicit (...)”, *ibid.*, p. 301, col. 1, l. 1-4. Thomas concludes his quotation as follows: “Patet igitur ex praemissis verbis Themistii, quod non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem partem animae humanae esse dicit, et Aristotelem ait hoc sensisse”, *ibid.*, p. 301, col. 2, l. 59-62.

⁹ Cf. R.B. Todd, “Themistius”, in V. Brown - J. Hankins - R.A. Kaster (eds), *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum: Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries. Annotated Lists and Guides. VIII*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2003, pp. 57-102, and my “Themistius, Arabic”, in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, Springer Science + Business media B.V. 2011, pp. 1260-66.

¹⁰ S. Pines, “Some Distinctive Metaphysical Conceptions in Themistius’ Commentary on Book *Lambda* and their Place in the History of Philosophy”, in J. Wiesner (ed.), *Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung, II. Kommentierung, Überlieferung, Nachleben*, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1987, pp. 177-204 (repr. in *The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines. III, Studies in the History of Arabic Philosophy*, The Magnes Press, Jerusalem 1996, pp. 267-94); R. Brague, *Thémistius. Paraphrase de la Métaphysique d’Aristote*, traduit de l’hébreu et de l’arabe. Introduction, notes et indices, Vrin, Paris 1999 (Tradition de la pensée classique).

studied especially by Latin Medievalists.¹¹ Also the paraphrases of Aristotle's logical works have been studied to some extent.¹²

2. *The Hebrew and Latin versions of Themistius' In De Caelo*

At variance with the works mentioned above, Themistius' paraphrase of the *De Caelo* attracted less attention, something which has much to do with the transmission of this work. The Greek original is lost,¹³ and so is the case with the Arabic version.¹⁴ We know of its existence mainly by the *Kitāb al-Fibrīst*. In his entry on Aristotle's *De Caelo*, Ibn al-Nadīm tentatively credits Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (d. 974) either with the Arabic translation of a commentary (*ṣarḥ*) by Themistius, or with the correction of a previous translation; he also mentions a work by Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq (d. 911) based on it:

Themistius wrote an exposition of the entire book. Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī either translated or corrected it and Ḥunayn wrote something about it [entitled] *The Sixteen Questions* (trans. Dodge).¹⁵

In a subsequent entry, devoted to the translator and learned Aristotelian Abū Biṣr Mattā ibn Yūnus (d. 940),¹⁶ Ibn al-Nadīm points to the latter as the author of the translation corrected by Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī:

Translation of the book which is the commentary of Alexander about the book 'Heaven' [*De caelo*] – Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī corrected it.¹⁷

It is immediately evident that the translation by Abū Biṣr Mattā which was corrected by Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī was that of Alexander's commentary, not that of Themistius' paraphrase; so, we are left with the statement given in the entry on the *De Caelo*, where only the revision is mentioned. This meagre

¹¹ Several studies have been devoted in the past to Thomas Aquinas' use of Themistius' paraphrase in his *De Unitate intellectus*; they are discussed, and to a certain extent superseded, by G. Verbeke in the introductory essay to the critical edition quoted above, n. 6. Four centuries before William of Moerbeke, who translated it from Greek into Latin, Themistius' paraphrase of the *De Anima* had been translated from Greek into Arabic by Ishaq ibn Ḥunayn. This translation is edited: M.C. Lyons, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius' Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, Cassirer, Oxford 1973.

¹² Sh. Rosenberg - Ch. Manekin, "Themistius on Modal Logic. Excerpts from a Commentary on the *Prior Analytics* attributed to Themistius", *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 11 (1988), pp. 83-103; M. Achard, "Themistius' Paraphrase of *Posterior Analytics* 71a17-b8", *Laval théologique et philosophique* 64/1 (2008), pp. 19-34; M. Borgo, "Themistius on Demonstrative Premises: A Reading of His Paraphrase of *Posterior Analytics*, 71b9-72a7", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* (2009), pp. 149-92.

¹³ Fragments of it are doxographically attested in Simplicius' commentary on the *De Caelo*: p. 62.12 Heiberg; see also p. 63.19; p. 68.5-7; p. 70.5; p. 70.9; p. 71.20; p. 131.21-22; p. 131.24; p. 176.28; p. 177.1; p. 177.9; p. 177.12; p. 188.6; p. 188.26; p. 188.30; p. 189.2.

¹⁴ The few traces lost have been studied by M. Türker, "İbnü'ş-Şalah'ın *De Coelo* ve onun şerhleri hakkındaki tenkitleri", *Araştırma* 2 (1964), pp. 1-79; Ead., "Les critiques d'Ibn aṣ-Şalah sur le *De Caelo* d'Aristote et sur ses commentaires", in *La filosofia della natura nel Medioevo. Atti del terzo congresso internazionale di filosofia medievale, Passo della Mendola (Trento), 31 agosto – 5 settembre 1964*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1966, pp. 242-52; G. Endress, *The Works of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, An Analytical Inventory*, Reichert, Wiesbaden 1977, pp. 29-30.


¹⁵ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fibrīst*, I, p. 250.29-30 Flügel = p. 311.13 Tağaddud; Al-Nadim, *The Fibrīst, a Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture*, trans. by B. Dodge, Columbia U. P., New York - London 1970, p. 603. As is often the case with Ibn al-Nadīm's pieces of information about commentaries on Aristotle, it is not clear if they refer to Aristotle's work itself, or to the commentary, or to both.

¹⁶ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fibrīst*, I, pp. 263.22-264.4 Flügel = p. 322.10-17 Tağaddud; cf. C. Martini Bonadeo, "Abū Biṣr Mattā ibn Yūnus", in Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy* (see above, n. 8), pp. 13-14.

¹⁷ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fibrīst*, I, p. 264.1-2 Flügel = p. 322.15-16 Tağaddud, trans. Dodge, p. 630.

piece of information is luckily implemented by another source: the mathematician and physician Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 1153), who still had access to Themistius' paraphrase in Arabic, says that its translator was indeed Abū Biṣr Mattā ibn Yūnus, and that the translation was revised by Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī. Whether Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ elaborates on the information given in the *Fihrist*, or he had access to some information in the copy of the Arabic Themistius he was consulting, we cannot decide. Be this as it may, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ says that the translation into Arabic had been made by Abū Biṣr Mattā ibn Yūnus on the basis of the Syriac version by Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq,¹⁸ something that on the one hand helps to explain Ḥunayn's work mentioned by Ibn al-Nadīm in the entry on the *De Caelo*, and on the other points to the fact that the Greek original was no longer within the reach of the Baghdad Aristotelians already in the age of Abū Biṣr Mattā ibn Yūnus, who, as is known, had no Greek and translated only from Syriac. Then, the Arabic version itself went lost. Only the Hebrew and Latin versions survive. The Hebrew version was made by Zeraḥyah ben Yiṭḥāq ben Šealtiel Ḥen (Gracian) ha-Sefardi on the basis of the Arabic text; it was completed in 1284. The Latin version was made by Moshe Alatino between 1568 and 1573, on the basis of the Hebrew version.¹⁹ This state of affairs obviously discourages consulting a work whose original readings seem to be out of reach. This is particularly regrettable in consideration of the fact that Themistius' paraphrase of the *De Caelo* is the only extant exegesis of this admittedly difficult work, before Simplicius' commentary; hence, the great interest it has for the history of ancient cosmology.

Reconstructing the original wording of this paraphrase proves to be a particularly difficult task, because the documents at our disposal are only two indirect versions. The Hebrew version was made on the basis of the lost Arabic text, and the Latin version was made on the basis of the Hebrew text. Since the Arabic version is lost, its degree of accuracy cannot be evaluated, but one thing is sure: the two pieces of information mentioned above point to an Arabic version made on the basis of the Syriac; hence, the lost intermediaries between the two extant versions amount to two for the Hebrew version, and to three for the Latin one. This state of affairs can be represented as follows:



¹⁸ According to Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, quoted by Türker, "Ibnü'ş-Şalah'in *De Coelo*", pp. 57.24- 58.1 (see above, n. 13) Themistius' paraphrase was first translated into Arabic by Abū Biṣr Mattā from the Syriac version of Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq, then this translation was revised by Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī. Türker, "Les critiques d'Ibn aṣ-Şalah", p. 244-5, accounts for the Arabic translation of the paraphrase as follows: "Les commentaires de Thémistius, dont notre auteur s'est servi, avaient été traduits du grec en syriaque par Ḥunayn b. Iṣḥāq, du syriaque en arabe, par Abū Biṣr Mattā (mort en 940), et revus par Yaḥyā b. 'Adī".

¹⁹ *Themistii In libros Aristotelis De Caelo paraphrasis hebraice et latine* ed. S. Landauer, Berlin 1902 (*CAG* V.4).

The Hebrew version is attested by four manuscripts: (1) Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II.II.528, copied in 1282, ff. 4r-121v²⁰ (*d*); (2) Cambridge, University Library, *Add.* 173, copied by Menaḥem b. Binyamin, 1288, ff. 1v-141r (*c*); (3) London - Beth Din & Beth Hamidrash 42 (ex London, Jews' College 42),²¹ copied by Y. Ben Mošeh Sarfati in San Severino (Marche), in 1424, ff. 52v-108r (*a*); (4) Roma, Biblioteca Casanatense, 3149, second half of the 15th century, ff. 1r-88v (*b*). The learned editor of both translations, Samuel Landauer (1846-1937), did not know the manuscripts *c* and *d*, the most important ones in consideration of their date: his edition is based only on *a* and *b*. As for the Latin version, it is attested only by the text printed in Venice,²² and the Hebrew manuscript which served as its basis is lost. In so far as it is based on the Hebrew version, the Latin one can help to reconstruct the Hebrew text only to the extent in which it can help to reconstruct this lost manuscript.²³ However, the discovery of the manuscripts *d* and *c*, which are contemporary with the translator, substantially plays down the ecdotic value of the Latin version as a testimony of the Hebrew text.

Faced with the difficult or even desperately corrupted readings of the Hebrew,²⁴ and at times of the Latin text, Landauer did not hesitate to correct the text on the basis of Simplicius' commentary, and this especially when he detected in the latter fragments of Alexander's lost commentary which were likely to be the source also of Themistius. Not only, but also Landauer corrected the text of Themistius, when the Hebrew version was corrupted and the Latin provided no help, on the basis of Simplicius' own commentary (always clearly indicating his editorial *iudicium* in the apparatus).²⁵ All this creates a host of problems which I do not pretend to be able to solve; however, I would like to exemplify here the nature and respective value of the two texts, the Hebrew one and the Latin one, in view of the edition and translation of this work which I am currently preparing.²⁶ As a matter of fact, an evaluation of the reliability of the two versions which survive counts as the establishment of one of the basic criteria of the edition. My aim here is to discuss a case in point for the poor reliability of the Latin version.

²⁰ According to M. Zonta, "*Hebraica Veritas*: Temistio, parafrasi del *De Coelo*", *Athenaeum* 82 (1994), pp. 403-28, in part. pp. 412-13, this manuscript is the autograph of Zerahyah.

²¹ I take the opportunity of rectifying the shelfmark of the MS London, Jews' College 42. This manuscript, London - Beth Din & Beth Hamidrash 42, ex London, Jews' College 42, was sold at public auction handled by Christies, New York, on 23 June 1999 as Lot 14. I rely on the microfilmed copy (F 4710) held by the National Library of Israel, Jerusalem.

²² In all likelihood the manuscript copy provided by Moshe Alatino to the publisher Simone Galignano was destroyed at the end of the printing, as the printers used to do at that time. On this practice cf. L. Voet, "Plantin et ses auteurs. Quelques considérations sur les relations entre imprimeurs et auteurs sur le plan typographique-littéraire au XVI^e siècle", in G. Crapulli (ed.), *Trasmissione dei testi a stampa nel periodo moderno*, Centro per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Roma 1985, pp. 61-76, in part. pp. 65-6. Landauer's edition of the Latin translation is based on the copy which is housed in Milano, Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense, B XVI 5980.

²³ Alatino claims he made use of a *vetustissimus codex* (p. XII, l. 20 Landauer), but this claim should not be taken at its face value: cf. Landauer, *Praefatio*, p. VI, n. 1.

²⁴ Given that the MSS of Florence and Cambridge are contemporary with the translator, and the Florence MS might even be the autograph of the translation (cf. above n. 20), they attest a text which remains substantially unaffected by the deterioration implied in a long chain of textual transmission. This implies that the passages corrupted in the Hebrew version have much more chance to be either (1) errors on the part of the translator into Arabic, or (2) errors in the text he made use of, or again (3) errors in the textual transmission of the Arabic version.

²⁵ For a discussion of Landauer's corrections both on the Hebrew and on the Latin text cf. M. Zonta, "*Hebraica Veritas*", pp. 418-8; Zonta also checks Landauer's proposals on the Hebrew text against the readings of the MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II.II.528. I take the liberty of referring also to my article "Alexander of Aphrodisias in Themistius' Paraphrase of the *De Caelo*", *Studia graeco-arabica* 2 (2012), pp. 355-71.

²⁶ Temistio. *Parafrasi del De Caelo di Aristotele*, testo ebraico, traduzione italiana, introduzione e commento, Pisa U. P. (Greco, Arabo, Latino. Le vie del sapere), forthcoming.

3. Themistius on the meanings of "Heaven" in the Hebrew and Latin versions

The very beginning of the paraphrase, which deals with the three meanings of the term "Heaven", will give an idea of the nature of the two translations, the Hebrew and the Latin one, as well as of the kind of problems with which is faced the editor of the Hebrew text.

Following the path laid by the exegetical tradition before him, Themistius discusses the object of Aristotle's inquiry. This equals for him determining the unity of a treatise which seems to touch a variety of different topics. The discussion of Aristotle's intention in writing this treatise turns out to be the establishment of the inner coherence between the *De Caelo* and the rest of Aristotle's works, in particular the *Physics*.

המאמר הראשון מספר השמים והעולם לארסתו עם פירוש תאמסטיאוס העתקת זרחיה בן יצחק הספרדי מלשון ערב אל לשון הקודש: אמר כי הענינים מורה עליהם משם השמים אצל הקדמונים שלשה. וזה שהוא יורה אצלם על גלגל הכוכבים הקיימים לבה. ויורה על העולם בעצמו. ולפי זה הענין השלישי נמצא אריסטוטאליס יע"ש בזה הספר. וכשכיון להגיד העולם בספרו זה. וידיעה זו נכנסת בידיעת הטבעים. ואמר שזה יהיה תחלת מאמרו. ויספר לנו בענינים אשר נהם תהיה ידיעת הטבעים. ואמר שזה יהיה בגדלים והמקומות אשר יקרו בהם. ובהתחלות אשר לזה העצם. כלומר המורגש הטבעי. וכל זה ימצא משלים העולם ונסגר בו. ואמנם השנה במאמרו כי זה ברוב הענינים. כי מחכמת הטבע הוא לחקור על הריקות. ועל מה שאין לו תכלית. ומה שדומה לזה. ואין אנו מוצאים אותו יסגור אלו הענינים. עם מה שמנה. כי הוא אקדים וספר מה שצריך אליו לדעת אותו בספר השמע הטבעי.

The first chapter of Aristotle's Book *On the Heavens and the Universe* accompanied by an exegesis by Themistius, translated by Zerahyah ben Yīḥāq ha-Sefardi from the Arabic language into the Sacred Language. He says that as for the question of what is meant by the term "Heaven", for the Ancients they are three. And indeed for them it means the sphere of the fixed stars only, or the universe in itself. Concerning this third meaning, we find that Aristotle discusses it in this book. As a matter of fact, his intention is to discuss in this book of the universe, and such a science falls within the province of the physical scientists; he says that this is the beginning of his discourse, enumerating for us its parts, which all form the science of nature: he says that it deals with bodies, their dimensions and the affections related to them, as well as with the principles which are at work in this substance, I mean the natural substance which falls under sense perception and all that constitutes the universe with all its contents. As for what is discussed here, he says that "most of it" is devoted to this, because it falls within the province of natural science to investigate about void, infinite and similar, while such items are not comprised in what he has enumerated above. And indeed, he anticipates and expounds what must be known about such items in his book on the *Physics* (p. 1.2-13 Landauer).

Apart from the *incipit* by Zerahyah, what we have here is a prologue whose focus is the title of the work commented upon, namely, *On the Heavens*.²⁷ In doing so, Themistius was by no means

²⁷ Discussing the title is one of the introductory points to be dealt with in the commentary technique: cf. I. Hadot, "Les introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens", in M. Tardieu (ed.), *Les règles de l'interprétation*, Éd. du Cerf, Paris 1987 (Patrimoines. Les religions du Livre), pp. 99-129, esp. pp. 111-19; Ph. Hoffmann, "La problématique des titres des traités d'Aristote selon les commentateurs grecs. Quelques exemples", in J.-C. Fredouille - M.-O. Goulet-Cazé - Ph. Hoffmann - P. Petitmengin, avec la collaboration de S. Déléani (eds), *Titres et articulations du texte dans les œuvres antiques, Actes du Colloque international de Chantilly, 13-15 décembre 1994*, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1997 (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité, 152), pp. 75-103; Id., "La fonction des prologues exégétiques dans la pensée pédagogique néoplatonicienne", in J. Dublois - B. Roussel (eds), *Entrer en matière. Les Prologues*, Éd. du Cerf, Paris 1998, pp. 209-45. The analysis of the title was part and parcel of the "introductory schemes" already in the 3rd century: cf. Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories, Fascicule I, Introduction, première partie* (p. 1-9,3

following in Aristotle's footsteps: the beginning of the *De Caelo* points famously to another issue, that of the subject-matter of physics.

Ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη σχεδὸν ἢ πλείστη φαίνεται περὶ τε σώματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ τούτων οὔσα πάθη καὶ τὰς κινήσεις, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅσαι τῆς τοιαύτης οὐσίας εἰσὶν· τῶν γὰρ φύσει συνεστῶτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα καὶ μεγέθη, τὰ δ' ἔχει σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, τὰ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἐχόντων εἰσὶν (I 1, 268 a 1-6).

We may say that the science of nature is for the most part plainly concerned with bodies and magnitudes and with their changing properties and motions, as also with the principles which belong to that class of substance; for the sum of physically constituted entities consists of (a) bodies and magnitudes, (b) beings possessed of body and magnitude, (c) the principles or causes of these beings (trans. Guthrie).²⁸

Paul Moraux's unparalleled account of the problems raised by this beginning and what follows it – namely an excursus on number three and an assessment of the perfection of the universe, followed by the question of the existence of a body endowed with circular motion – is worth quoting in full:

Avant d'expliquer un ouvrage d'Aristote, les commentateurs grecs avaient coutume de le situer dans l'ensemble de la production du philosophe, puis de chercher à en découvrir l'objet propre. Simplicius nous ayant conservé quelques opinions émises à propos de l'objet du *De Caelo*, nous constatons que les anciens avaient été intrigués, comme nous le sommes encore, par le peu d'unité que présente l'ouvrage. Comment Aristote avait-il pu réunir sous le titre *περὶ οὐρανοῦ* une étude du ciel et des astres, un exposé sur la terre, une longue enquête sur la génération des éléments sublunaires et une monographie sur le léger et le lourd? A quel titre ces thèmes si divers se trouvaient-ils groupés dans un traité unique? Aristote, répondait Alexandre d'Aphrodise, entend se livrer à une étude du monde dans son ensemble. Il manifeste cette intention dans le premier livre, où il traite de l'unicité du monde, de sa finitude, de son éternité. (...) Les Néoplatoniciens voient les choses autrement. Pour Jamblique, Syrien et d'autres membres de l'école, la substance animée du mouvement circulaire ou "corps céleste" constitue l'objet propre du traité. Si Aristote joint à cette étude celle du monde sublunaire, estime Jamblique, c'est parce que le cours des astres régit les changements des êtres générables: le corps céleste est donc étudié d'abord en lui-même, puis dans les êtres qui se trouvent sous sa dépendance. Syrien et ses disciples considèrent, pour leur part, que l'étude des éléments sublunaires sert à préciser les développements relatifs au corps céleste, en montrant que ce dernier n'est ni composé des éléments traditionnels ni fait d'un seul d'entre eux. Simplicius rejette ces deux explications. Il note que, dans le corpus d'Aristote, le *De Caelo* fait suite à la *Physique*, où sont étudiés les principes des corps naturels. Après l'étude des principes doit venir celle des êtres qui naissent immédiatement des principes, c'est-à-dire l'étude des éléments. Les cinq éléments considérés en eux-mêmes, voilà, d'après lui, l'objet du *De Caelo*. C'est le premier et le plus noble d'entre eux, l'élément céleste, qui a donné son nom à l'ensemble de l'ouvrage.²⁹

Kalbfleisch), *Commentaire au premier chapitre des Catégories*, Traduction de Ph. Hoffmann (avec la collaboration de I. Hadot, et P. Hadot), *Commentaire et notes à la traduction par I. Hadot, avec des appendices de P. Hadot et J.-P. Mahé*, Brill, Leiden - New York - København - Köln 1990 (*Philosophia Antiqua*, 50), p. 36.42-43.

²⁸ W.K.C. Guthrie, *Aristotle. On the Heavens*, Harvard U. P., Cambridge Mass. - London 1939, 1953³ (Loeb), p. 5.

²⁹ P. Moraux, *Introduction*, in *Aristote, Du ciel*, Texte établi et traduit par P. Moraux, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1965 (CUF), pp. VII-VIII.

Simplicius points to Alexander's lost commentary on the *De Caelo*, and a comparison between his Prologue and the beginning of Themistius' paraphrase shows that the latter has the same source.³⁰ As we have just seen, Themistius (p. 1.5-7 Landauer) says that:

אמר כי הענינים המורה עליהם משם השמים אצל הקדמונים שלשה. וזה שהוא יורה אצלם על גלגל הכוכבים הקיימים לבה. ויורה על העולם בעצמו. ולפי זה הענין השלישי נמצא אריסטוטלים יע"ש בזה הספר.
As for the question of what is meant by the term "Heaven", for the Ancients they are three. And indeed for them it means the sphere of the fixed stars only, or the universe in itself. Concerning this third meaning, we find that Aristotle discusses it in this book.

This text is obviously corrupted: three meanings are announced, but only two are given. Luckily, Simplicius' passage is sound, and helps understanding not only that the source that Themistius is alluding to by the generic mention of the "Ancients" is Alexander, but also that the three meanings are (1) the sphere of the fixed stars; (2) the whole revolving body, which is divine; (3) the universe:

Τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς Περι οὐρανοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πραγματείας ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος περὶ κόσμου φησὶν· οὐρανὸν γὰρ τριχῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐν τούτοις λέγεσθαι (1) τὴν τε τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν (2) καὶ ὅλον τὸ θεῖον καὶ κυκλοφορικὸν σῶμα, ὅπερ καὶ ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ μετὰ προσθήκης καλεῖ, (3) καὶ ἔτι μέντοι τὸν κόσμον, ὡσπερ καὶ Πλάτων ὠνόμασεν "ὁ δὲ πᾶς οὐρανός", λέγων, "ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τί ποτε κατονομαζόμενος ἂν δέχοιτο" (*In De Caelo*, p. 1.2-8 Heiberg; numbers in brackets added). Alexander says that the subject of Aristotle's treatise *On the Heavens* is the world. He says that "Heaven" is used in three senses by Aristotle in this work, to mean both the sphere of the fixed stars and the whole of the divine revolving body, which in this books he also calls the "furthest heaven" (with the adjective), and additionally "the world", as Plato called it when he said "the whole heaven, or the world, or whatever else it might care to be called" (trans. Hankinson).³¹

Simplicius reports that according to Alexander the σκοπός of Aristotle's treatise is the entire universe, and this because the meanings of "Heaven" listed by Aristotle are three, the last being ὁ κόσμος. This helps explaining why this treatise, albeit entitled *On the Heavens*, deals with the entire universe (and thus includes a development on the sublunary elements). Quoting Plato (*Tim.* 28 B 2-4) in support of the latter meaning, ὁ κόσμος, seems to be Simplicius' own move,³² but the tripartition of the meanings of "Heaven" comes from Aristotle himself, as highlighted by Alexander via Simplicius. Indeed, the tripartition is established by Aristotle in *De Caelo* I 9, 278 b 9-24, where he states that this term means (1) the sphere of the fixed stars, which is defined as "the substance of the outermost circumference of the world" (τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν τῆς ἐσχάτης τοῦ παντὸς περιφορᾶς, trans.

³⁰ P. Moraux, "Kommentar zu *De Caelo*", in Id., *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*, vol. III, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2001 (Peripatoi, 7/1), pp. 181-241, p. 189 n. 42; on the comparison between Themistius and Simplicius as a way to reconstruct Alexander's lost commentary cf. *ibid.*, pp. 185-8.

³¹ R.J. Hankinson, *Simplicius. On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.1-4*, Duckworth, London 2002, p. 19.

³² It is typical of Simplicius to proclaim as often as possible the unity of Plato's and Aristotle's cosmological views, as a response to Philoponus' insistence on the literal meaning of the temporal origin of the cosmos described in the *Timaeus*: cf. Ph. Hoffmann, "Some aspects of Simplicius' polemical writings against John Philoponus: from invective to a reaffirmation of the transcendence of the Heavens", in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, Cornell U. P., Ithaca - London, 1987, 2010², p. 57-83, revised French trans. in I. Hadot (ed.), *Simplicius: sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie*, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1987 (Peripatoi, 15), pp. 183-221.

The three meanings are extracted from *De Caelo* I 9 by Alexander,³³ who placed the tripartition of the meanings at the beginning of the entire exegesis, as a terminological assessment useful to define and circumscribe the overall scope of the treatise, which for him was the cosmos in its entirety: Simplicius says in as many words that τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς Περὶ οὐρανοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πραγματείας ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος περὶ κόσμου φησὶν. The meanings (1) and (2) in Simplicius' list are closely connected to one another by the connective combination τήν τε ... καί, in order to keep them apart from meaning (3), the cosmos in its entirety, as shown by Simplicius' own commentary on the relevant passage of *De Caelo* I 9:

διηρημένως δὲ τήν ὀνομασίαν ἐπὶ τε τοῦ ἀπλανοῦς καὶ τοῦ πλανωμένου παραδοῦς δέδωκεν ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι καὶ πᾶν τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν καὶ αἰδιδιον τὸ πρὸς τὸ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν ἀντιδιηρημένον οὐρανὸν λέγομεν. καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς μίαν ἔχοντος τοῦ ὄλου φύσιν καὶ μίαν κίνησιν τήν κυκλοφορίαν κοινῶς ἀπέδειξε περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλη παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ σελήνην στοιχεῖα πέμπτη τίς ἐστὶν οὐσία τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σώματος οὔτε βάρους ἔχουσα οὔτε κουφότητα, καὶ ὅτι ἀγένητον τοῦτο καὶ ἀφθαρτὸν ἐστὶ, κοινῶς ἔδειξε καὶ πάλιν ἀποδείξει· ὥστε καὶ ἐνὶ ὀνόματι καὶ τὸ ὄλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτὸς καλῶν (*In De Caelo*, pp. 280.32-281.9 Heiberg).

In applying the appellation separately to both the fixed and to the wandering [bodies], he makes it understood that we also call everything which revolves and is eternal 'heaven', by contrast with what is generated and destructible. For he himself demonstrated in a general fashion in regard to it that, since the whole possessed one nature and one revolving motion, there was besides the sublunary elements another fifth substance of the heavenly body, possessing neither weight nor lightness; and he showed in general (and will later demonstrate) that this was ungenerated and indestructible. And do he too evidently calls the whole too by this one name (trans. Hankinson).³⁴

Here Simplicius explains that if Aristotle has labelled *ouranos* both the sphere of the fixed stars and the planets, it is because both items share in the circular motion and are made out of the fifth substance: as such, they stand against the third meaning, the cosmos (which includes the sublunary sphere, made out of the four elements).

Some readers of the Prologue of Simplicius' commentary have been baffled by the relative clause ὅπερ καὶ ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ μετὰ προσθήκης καλεῖ (*In De Caelo*, p. 1.5-6 Heiberg). This clause refers to *De Caelo* I 3, 270 b 15: καθ' ὄλον τὸν ἔσχατον οὐρανόν.³⁵ Given that the expression ἔσχατος οὐρανός *prima facie* fits only with the sphere of the fixed stars, one may wonder how is it possible that Simplicius identifies it, instead, with the second meaning, i.e. the whole revolving body which includes also the planets.

The Latin translation of Simplicius' commentary by William of Moerbeke, completed in 1271, reads:

³³ The move of starting with a classification of the various meanings attributed by Aristotle to a term gives a distinct Alexandrian ring; one may immediately remark the analogy with the beginning of Alexander's *On Intellect*, pp. 106.19-107.29 Bruns: Νοῦς ἐστὶ κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη τρίτος, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τίς ἐστὶ νοῦς ὑλικός (...) Ἄλλος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ ἤδη νοῦν καὶ ἔξιν ἔχων τοῦ νοεῖν (...) Τρίτος δὲ ἐστὶ νοῦς παρὰ τοὺς προειρημένους δύο ὁ ποιητικός. Obviously, in the case of the *De Caelo* the tripartition features in Aristotle's own text, but the fact of beginning by such a terminological remark bears the hallmark of Alexander.

³⁴ R.J. Hankinson, *Simplicius. On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.5-9*, Duckworth, London 2004, pp. 103-4.

³⁵ This passage is the only one in the whole *De Caelo* where the expression ἔσχατος οὐρανός occurs: thus, the identification of the reference of the expression ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ is beyond doubt.

celum enim tripliciter ab Aristotile in hiis dici, videlicet aplanorum speram et totum divinum et circulare corpus quod quidem et extremum celum cum adiectione vocat in hoc libro et adhuc etiam mundum.³⁶

The anonymous author of the Greek retroversion of Moerbeke's Latin translation, in which consists the *editio princeps* of Simplicius' commentary, was unhappy with this text. He moved back ὅπερ – καλεῖ, in order to have these words referring to the sphere of the fixed stars:

τὴν τε τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν, ὅπερ καὶ ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ μετὰ προσθήκης καλεῖ, καὶ ἅπαν τὸ θεῖον καὶ κυκλικὸν σῶμα καὶ προσέτι τὸν κόσμον.³⁷

It has been surmised that it was Bessarion who moved back the sentence ὅπερ – καλεῖ and referred it to the sphere of the fixed stars, but this hypothesis remains speculative.³⁸ The editor of Moerbeke's translation, Fernand Bossier, shows that in the *editio princeps* of this Latin translation, published in 1540, the Latin sentence has been reworked on the basis of the Greek as printed in the Aldina:

celum enim tripliciter ab Aristotile in hiis dici, videlicet aplanorum sphaeram quod quidem et extremum caelum cum adiectione vocat in hoc libro, et totum divinum et circulare corpus et adhuc etiam mundum.³⁹

Hankinson, the translator of this part of Simplicius' commentary into English, although following the text as edited by Heiberg in his translation, sides with the transposition and thinks that the text as it has come down to us is corrupt.⁴⁰ But in fact it is not: the passage of Simpl., *In De Caelo*, p. 1.2-8 Heiberg is sound, as is shown by Simplicius' commentary of Aristotle's passage, *De Caelo* I 3, 270 b 15: καθ' ὅλον τὸν ἔσχατον οὐρανόν, which, as we have seen, is the passage which the sentence ὅπερ – καλεῖ refers to. Commenting upon this expression, Simplicius says:

ἔσχατον δὲ οὐρανὸν τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν εἶπε σῶμα ἀντιδιαστέλλων αὐτὸ πρὸς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον οὐρανὸν καὶ αὐτὸν καλούμενον (p. 118.9-11 Heiberg).

³⁶ Cf. Simplicius, *Commentaire sur le traité Du ciel d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, édition critique par F. Bossier avec la collaboration de Chr. Vande Veire et G. Guldentops, Vol. 1, Leuven U. P., Leuven 2004 (*CLCAG* 8.1), p. 1.1-4.

³⁷ *Simplicii Commentarii in quatuor Aristotelis libros De coelo, cum textu eiusdem*, Venetiis in Aedibus Aldi Romani et Andreae Asulani Soceri 1526 (the passage is also quoted in Heiberg's Introduction: cf. Simpl., *In De Cael.*, pp. x-xi).

³⁸ The hypothesis is advanced by A. Rescigno, *Alessandro di Afrodisia, Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele, frammenti del primo libro*, Hakkert, Amsterdam 2004 (Lexis. Suppl., 26), p. 151.

³⁹ *Simplicii philosophi acutissimi commentaria in quatuor libros De Caelo Aristotelis. Guillermo Morbeto interprete. Quae omnia cum fideissimis Codicibus Graecis collata fuere*, Venetijs apud Hieronymum Scotum 1540. Apropos this transposition, Bossier, *Simplicius, Commentaire sur le traité Du ciel d'Aristote* (quoted above, n. 36), p. xciv, writes: "g [that is, Moerbeke] respecte fidèlement l'ordre des mots de l'original grec; par contre en a [that is, the Aldina], la proposition relative ὅπερ ... καλεῖ est déplacée et rattachée directement à l'expression τὴν τε τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν. Nous croyons que c'est le traducteur même de a qui en est responsable, très probablement parce qu'il estimait que, selon la doctrine d'Aristote (*Du ciel*, I, 9, 278 a 11-15) le terme ἔσχατος οὐρανός convient en propre à la sphère des fixes".

⁴⁰ Hankinson, *Simplicius. On Aristotle's On the Heavens 1.1-4*, p. 107 n. 4, thinks that Simplicius' passage is corrupted and that the solution of the princeps "to move the clause [i.e. ὅπερ – καλεῖ] back to qualify the sphere of the fixed stars" is the good one.

By the “outermost heaven” he means the revolving body, distinguishing it from the whole cosmos, which he also calls “heaven”(trans. Hankinson).⁴¹

Thus for Simplicius, and also for Alexander on the basis of Simplicius' testimony at p. 1.2-8 Heiberg, the expression ἔσχατος οὐρανός does not stand for the sphere of the fixed stars, but for the κυκλοφορητικὸν ... σῶμα, namely meaning (2) in the tripartition quoted above. Simplicius' Prologue, following the lead of Alexander, lists the three meanings of “Heaven” as they are given in *De Caelo* I 9, and Simplicius' exegesis of Aristotle's expression ἔσχατος οὐρανός of *De Caelo* I 3, 270 b 15 rules out the transposition of ὅπερ – καλεῖ.

Let me recall now that Themistius' paraphrasis, in the parallel place, is obviously corrupt: the second meaning, namely “the whole of the divine revolving body” is omitted. That the text is not sound is made evident by the fact that a tripartition of meanings is mentioned twice, at the beginning (“as for the question of what is meant by the term Heaven, for the Ancients they are three”) and at the end (“Concerning this third meaning ...”), while only two meanings are given. If however one turns to the Latin version by Alatino, the sentence seems to be sound: three meanings are promised, and three are listed. The Latin text reads:

Tria veteres caeli nomine appellare consueverunt; etenim (1) inerrantium stellarum orbem tantum, (2) insuper corpus quintum, ac demum (3) mundum ipsum caeli nomine usurparunt. Iuxta vero tertium hunc dicendi modum invenimus Aristotelem hic de eo disseruisse (p. 1.5-7 Landauer).⁴²

It is apparent that in the Latin version there is something that does not feature in the Hebrew: the “fifth body” (insuper *corpus quintum*). According to the Latin version, Themistius maintained that the Ancients labelled “Heaven” the “fifth body”, namely the aether. This strains credulity, because Themistius, albeit repeatedly dealing in the paraphrase with the meanings of “Heaven”, never says that one of them is the “fifth body”.⁴³ The obvious explanation of the presence of the “fifth body” here is that the translator into Latin, Moshe Alatino, introduced it in order to provide the missing meaning, the second one, thus balancing the enumeration. Although keeping the Hebrew text as it stands in the manuscripts, i.e. with the omission – which testifies that in all likelihood the Arabic model was corrupt in this point⁴⁴ – Landauer took into account Alatino's “fifth body” in his apparatus, instead of discarding it as a wrong conjecture.⁴⁵ There are also some who go as far as to

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁴² The reading is the same in the four manuscripts of the Hebrew text (cf. above p. 6).

⁴³ Themistius addresses this question more than once in his paraphrase. He says that the Ancients adopted the term “Heaven” also for (1) the ceaseless, eternal and divine body (*ba-nizhī ha-ttāmīdī hā-biṣṣ'arūt kī hu'elohī*: p. 3(ג) ll. 25-26 Landauer); (2) the ceaseless movement (*ha ttāmīdī ha-tenō'at*, p. 11(א) l. 26 Landauer); (3) the fire or the igneous body (*ha-šoreph / gešem išeī*, p. 11(א) l. 32 Landauer). According to him, the meaning (3) does not meet Aristotle's criteria (cf. Them., *In De Caelo*, I 3, p. 11(א) ll. 31-32 Landauer). He also says that Aristotle adopts the term “Heaven” also for (4) the highest and noblest part of the substances existing in nature (p. 140(מק) ll. 4-5 Landauer), meaning by “nature” the whole natural substance and all the bodies that fall under sense-perception (p. 35(הב) ll. 25-27 Landauer).

⁴⁴ Between the Arabic translation and its version into Hebrew there is a span of time of almost two and a half centuries.

⁴⁵ However keeping the text as it stands in the manuscripts, Landauer tentatively fills the gap in the apparatus *ad loc.*, adding on the basis of the Latin version *we-yōreb 'al 'ezem ha-ḥamīšī* (“or it means the fifth body”). This is even more surprising, in consideration of the fact that Landauer was perfectly aware that Alatino's emendations were nothing but rough conjectures; cf. *Praefatio*, p. vi: “Nam quae Alatinus plura habet, magnam partem ipse addidit, et coniectura eum aberrasse in addendo patet”.

suggest changing Simplicius' sound text on the basis of this late and worse than mediocre conjecture, with the effect of crediting Alexander of Aphrodisias with a tripartition of the meanings of "Heaven" that goes against Aristotle.⁴⁶ One may also remark that neither Themistius nor Simplicius say that the "fifth body" is one of the meanings of the term "Heaven" when commenting upon Aristotle's tripartition in *De Caelo* I 9, 278 b 9-24: Themistius, who does not follow Aristotle's text line by line, limits himself to referring the reader to the prologue of Book I (i.e. the passage discussed above), and adds that he had already explained that by "Heaven" Aristotle meant the cosmos as a whole.⁴⁷ As for Simplicius, he accounts for the three meanings one by one, as we have seen before.

Alatino made up for the lack of the second meaning by mentioning the *corpus quintum*. An eminent intellectual of his times,⁴⁸ he was by no means incapable of advancing emendations about Themistius' text; he was even interested in doing so, in view of the difficulties he met in translating it, and about which he complains. In his prologue to the translation⁴⁹ he discusses the details of the history of the text;⁵⁰ then, apropos his difficulties in translating it, he recounts he consulted various scholars, and even tried to find someone who might have helped him with the Arabic:

sperabam tamen me ope doctissimi alicuius viri adiutum, qui Arabum linguam profiteretur, in explicatione praecipue nonnullarum vocum, quae per hanc paraphrasim arabice dispersae inveniiebantur, posse a tanto onere non nihil sublevari meamque interpretationem interim utcumque prosequi. Sed,

⁴⁶ Rescigno, *Alessandro di Afrodisia, Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele, frammenti del primo libro*, pp. 153-4, maintains that it is Alatino's rendering which preserves the genuine reading of the original Greek (which also counts for him as a silent quotation of Alexander's lost commentary); consequently, it is Rescigno's opinion that the Latin of Themistius helps to correct Simplicius. He goes as far as to attribute the presence of the "fifth body" in the tripartition to Alexander himself: "Si potrebbe pensare ad una lacuna nella tradizione o ad una omissione da parte di Simplicio (...). Ma c'è la testimonianza di Temistio che vieta tale ipotesi e conferma, invece, che Alessandro tripartiva i significati in questo modo: 1) sfera delle fisse; 2) quinto corpo; 3) cosmo. Confermando, in qualche modo, la suddivisione che si ricava da Simplicio e confermando che l' ὄλον τὸ θεῖον καὶ κυκλοφορικὸν σῶμα che Temistio allega come *quintum corpus* corrisponde proprio al secondo dei significati di Alessandro. La problematica causola ὅπερ καὶ ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ μετὰ προσθήκης καλεῖ si spiega come la produzione da parte di Alessandro, di una prova desumibile dal *De Caelo* che il πρῶτον σῶμα (...) fosse stato chiamato, seppure μετὰ προσθήκης, con il termine οὐρανός" (*ibid.*, p. 153). As we have just seen, the clause ὅπερ καὶ ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ μετὰ προσθήκης καλεῖ has a completely different origin with respect to that advanced by Rescigno.

⁴⁷ Cf. Them., *In De Caelo*, p. 35.25-27 Landauer (literal translation of συνεστάναι τοῦ φυσικοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ σώματος, *De Caelo* I 9, 278 b 23).

⁴⁸ On Alatino's life and intellectual activity, see the references in "Alexander of Aphrodisias in Themistius' Paraphrase of the *De Caelo*", quoted above, n. 25, p. 357 n. 11, and p. 362 n. 32.

⁴⁹ Published in Landauer's *Praefatio*, pp. XIII-XV; this *Prologue* follows the dedication letter to Cardinal Luigi d'Este (Aug. 1, 1573) which is published *ibid.*, pp. XI-XIII. As he says in the Preface, Alatino had pupils, to whom he wanted to teach Themistius' doctrines: he complains about the difficulty of the task saying: "necesse quidem fuit, ut tantum ac tale onus subierim, quale certe vobis, o iuvenes amatissimi, nunquam explicare possem" ("It has been necessary, then, to embark upon a task so difficult and heavy that I cannot even tell you, my dear pupils"): *ibid.*, p. XIV.

⁵⁰ Of course, Alatino's information is not sound: according to him, the translation from Greek into Arabic was made in the XIIth century: "Etenim cum ex Graeco Averrois tempore ad Arabas ac inde in Hebraicum idioma eiusmodi paraphrasis fuisset delata, cui in dubium venit ex hac multiplici versione errores aliquos contigisse, qui obscuriores difficilioresque nonnullas orationes reddebant? Quare, quod vulgo fertur, sero sapiunt Phryges" ("In addition, given that the paraphrase was translated from Greek into Arabic in Averroes' time, and then it was in this way that it was translated into Hebrew, who might be surprised if so many translations produced flaws which made several sentences even more obscure and difficult? This is why, as the saying goes, Phrygians knew too late!"), *ibid.*, p. XIV. The saying *sero sapiunt Phryges*, meaning "it is easy to be wise after the event", features also in Erasmus' *Adagia*, n° 461.

bone Deus, nedum talem adire hominem nunquam mihi contigit, sed etiam multos locus inveni, qui ad eorum explicationem diligentissimo atque exercitatissimo homine indigebant (*In De Caelo, Suppl. Praef.*, p. XIV Landauer).

However, I was hoping that, with the help of some learned man proficient in Arabic, I would have been sustained in particular in understanding the few technical Arabic terms interspersed in the paraphrase,⁵¹ and in carrying on my translation. Alas, my God: it never happened to me to meet such a man; not only, but also I found in it many passages whose explanation would have needed someone extremely wise and conversant with the matter at hand.

He also informs the reader that it is a habit with him to check the text against Aristotle's sentences.⁵² All this points to a translator who did not hesitate to mix his own emendations with the authentic text, and warns correcting the Hebrew on the basis of the Latin version: indeed, Alatino's translation often verges on interpretation, and in this case the interpretation was wrong.

⁵¹ Indeed, some terms were left in Arabic in Zerahyah's Hebrew translation, which caused problems to Alatino: cf. Landauer, *Praefatio*, p. VII.

⁵² "At quo ordine in hac versione incessem, nunc audietis. Primo enim cuiusque Aristotelis contextus germanam pro viribus sententiam assecutus nonnulla, quae antea admodum confusa et ambigua erant, mihi perspicua reddebantur, aliqua ob phrasis mutationem agnovimus sensus perspicuitatem amisisse" ("Now listen to what was my procedure in translating. First, following as far as possible the similar sentence in Aristotle's passage, some points which before were quite confused and doubtful have been rendered clear to me, while I realised that other points lost their perspicuousness because of the changes in the wording"), *ibid.*

La question de l'âme dans la tradition philosophique syriaque (VI^e-IX^e siècle)

Henri Hugonnard-Roche*

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of a few Syriac texts, from the 6th to the 9th century, dealing with some questions about the soul. Except for the first treatise, a *Logos peri psychês* translated from Greek into Syriac, all the others were composed in Syriac, by Aḥudemmeḥ (6th century), Jacob of Edessa (7th century), John of Dara and Moshe bar Kēpha (9th century). In this paper we are interested in the properly philosophical aspects of the works, even if the context of their composition was religious. It will emerge that a brief corpus of questions is common to all the authors, – questions about the existence, the incorporeality, the simplicity, the eternity of the soul. Moreover, as it will appear, some authors tried to find harmony between philosophy and theology.

La question de l'âme ne pouvait manquer d'être constamment présente dans la tradition philosophique syriaque, qui s'est élaborée sur les fondements d'une culture chrétienne, dans laquelle le souci de l'âme est un thème majeur de la réflexion religieuse. Il serait d'ailleurs quelque peu vain de vouloir absolument distinguer une tradition philosophique, qui aurait son autonomie propre au sein de la culture syriaque.¹ Toutefois, la question de l'âme peut apparaître dans des ouvrages appartenant à des genres littéraires fort divers, dont la visée peut être orientée vers la pratique religieuse ou vers une réflexion plus théorique. Et le style peut en être de caractère fort divers aussi, plutôt rhétorique, voire poétique,² ou plus argumentatif.³

Même si la distinction entre théologie et philosophie, ou entre dogmatique religieuse et philosophie, est inadéquate pour beaucoup de textes, voire la plupart d'entre eux, nous nous attacherons ici à la tradition des traités sur l'âme en tant qu'ils peuvent être qualifiés de philosophiques, ou que certaines de leur parties peuvent être considérées sous cet angle. Nous ne prétendons pas, d'autre part, couvrir

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¹ On pourrait d'ailleurs en dire autant d'une bonne partie de la tradition grecque, et l'œuvre d'un Grégoire de Nysse, par exemple, témoigne assez du lien qui s'y noue entre culture chrétienne et philosophie: on trouvera une présentation fouillée de la place de la philosophie dans l'œuvre de Grégoire et de ses rapports avec les différentes écoles philosophiques de l'antiquité dans la notice de M. Cassin, "Grégoire de Nysse", dans R. Goulet (éd.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* [abrégé par la suite en *DPhA*], VI, CNRS-Éditions, Paris, à paraître.

² Ainsi, Jacques de Saroug (ca. 451-521), évêque de Baṭnan, composa une homélie métrique sur l'*Hexaëmeron*, dont la partie consacrée au sixième jour de la création contient deux sections, la première ayant pour sujet la création des animaux, et la seconde la création de l'homme. Dans cette dernière section, l'auteur traite successivement de la composition physique de l'être humain, puis de l'âme, de la relation de l'âme au corps, et du thème de "l'homme créé à l'image de Dieu". On peut lire une description du contenu de cette seconde section dans B.M. Boulos Sony, "L'anthropologie de Jacques de Saroug", *Parole de l'Orient* 12 (1984-1985), p. 153-85.

³ Cf. plus loin, n. 52, la citation que nous faisons d'un passage du *De Anima et resurrectione* où Grégoire de Nysse oppose le style métaphorique des propos de Platon sur l'âme au style scientifique d'Aristote.

ici tout le champ des écrits touchant la question de l'âme, mais nous présenterons un survol de quelques textes qui permettent de dessiner certains traits marquants des thématiques présentes dans la tradition syriaque.⁴

La première observation qui s'impose à qui considère le corpus des traités syriaques traitant de l'âme est une rupture apparente avec la tradition grecque. Les ouvrages majeurs qui ont été la source des questionnements sur l'âme dans l'antiquité grecque n'ont pas été traduits aux premiers temps de la tradition syriaque. Dans son ouvrage bio-bibliographique, le *Fibrist*, Ibn al-Nadīm écrit à propos du *Kitāb al-naḥs* (*De Anima*) d'Aristote: "il consiste en trois livres, Ḥunayn en fit une traduction complète en syriaque. Ishāq le traduisit avec omission d'une petite partie. Il en fit une seconde traduction complète et soignée".⁵ Il est notable qu'Ibn al-Nadīm ne mentionne aucune traduction antérieure à celle de Ḥunayn. Sans doute son information à propos du *De Anima* n'est-elle pas pleinement représentative de la tradition du traité d'Aristote au IX^e siècle, en particulier dans le milieu qu'il est convenu d'appeler le "cercle d'al-Kindī": il ne dit rien, en effet, de la version arabe d'une paraphrase alexandrine anonyme (perdue en grec) du *De Anima*, – version arabe rédigée par Ibn al-Bīṭrīq, dans les premières décennies du IX^e siècle.⁶ Il reste cependant qu'aucune version du *De Anima* d'Aristote n'est attestée dans les sources syriaques avant l'époque abbasside. Ce qui ne signifie pas, on le verra, que le contenu de l'œuvre soit totalement ignoré des auteurs syriaques, ou du moins de certains d'entre eux.

Les autres textes fondateurs de la doctrine de l'âme dans l'antiquité grecque, à savoir certains dialogues de Platon, ne sont pas mieux représentés dans la tradition syriaque. On n'y trouve pas de traduction des dialogues qui contiennent les *loci classici* sur l'âme, tels que le *Phédon*, le *Phédre*, le *Théétète*, ou le *Timée*.⁷ Le nom de Platon n'est toutefois pas inconnu, mais lié à des gnomologies, ou à des recueils d'anecdotes ou de définitions, dans lesquels le souci de l'âme est certes assez souvent présent, mais associé à des questions de morale.⁸ Ces ouvrages ne traitent pas de l'âme d'un point de

⁴ Il n'est pas dans notre intention ici de discuter, pour ce qui concerne la théorie de l'âme, l'affirmation péremptoire de D. Gutas: "Syriac speaking scholars [...] did not write, or compose, treatises on metaphysics, the theory of the soul, epistemology, or physics", exprimée dans son article "Geometry and the Rebirth of Philosophy in Arabic with al-Kindī", dans R. Arnzen - J. Thielmann (éd.), *Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea. Studies on the Sources, Contents and Influences of Islamic Civilisation and Arabic Philosophy and Science. Dedicated to Gerhard Endress on his sixty-fifth Birthday*, Peeters, Leuven - Paris - Dudley Ma 2004 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 139), p. 195-209 (à la p. 196). Nous prendrons simplement pour objet d'étude quelques traités écrits en syriaque, en cherchant à les replacer dans la tradition philosophique allant de l'époque tardo-antique à l'époque abbasside.

⁵ Cf. Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fibrist*, I, p. 251.11-12 Flügel; p. 311.24-26 Tagaddud; sur la notice du *Fibrist* et sa reprise dans les bibliographies postérieures, voir les remarques de H. Gätje, *Studien zur Überlieferung der aristotelischen Psychologie im Islam*, Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg 1971 (Annales Universitatis Saraviensis, Philosophische Fakultät, 11), p. 20-7.

⁶ Voir la conclusion de l'étude linguistique du texte arabe de cette paraphrase, par R. Arnzen (éd.), *Aristoteles' De Anima. Eine verlorene spätantike Paraphrase in arabischer und persischer Überlieferung*. Arabischer Text nebst Kommentar, Quellengeschichtlichen Studien und Glossaren, Brill, Leiden - New York - Köln 1998 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 9), p. 174; les connaissances d'Ibn al-Nadīm apparaissent, d'autre part, relativement incertaines et confuses en ce qui concerne la tradition des commentaires du *De Anima*: voir Arnzen, *ibid.*, p. 140-5; à propos, en particulier, du commentaire attribué à Simplicius, voir E. Coda, "Simplicius dans la tradition arabe", *DPhA*, VI, à paraître.

⁷ Sur la connaissance de Platon dans la tradition syriaque, voir H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Platon syriaque", dans M.A. Amir-Moezzi - J.-D. Dubois - Chr. Jullien - F. Jullien (éd.), *Pensée grecque et sagesse d'orient. Hommage à Michel Tardieu*, Brepols, Turnhout 2009 (Bibliothèque de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études, Sciences religieuses, 142), p. 307-22.

⁸ Cf. Hugonnard-Roche, "Platon syriaque"; voir aussi, pour la tradition arabe, D. Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation. A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia*, American Oriental Society, New Haven Co. 1975 (American Oriental Series, 60), en part. p. 116-57, 332-80.

vue “théorétique”, qui est le nôtre, et nous les laisserons de côté. Comme dans le cas du *De Anima* d’Aristote, cependant, les doctrines platoniciennes sur l’âme ne sont pas totalement ignorées de la littérature syriaque sur le sujet, mais connues indirectement à travers des ouvrages de théologiens traduits en syriaque ou par l’intermédiaire de doxographies.

Un Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς en version syriaque

Le premier texte dont nous parlerons illustre précisément certains traits auxquels nous venons de faire allusion: l’absence des auteurs eux-mêmes, mais leur présence indirecte à travers d’autres ouvrages de caractère doxographique ou issus de compilations. Il se trouve, en effet, que l’on connaît depuis longtemps un traité sur l’âme qui est mis sous le nom d’Aristote dans le manuscrit de Londres, British Library, Add. 14658, fol. 122a-124b. Cet petit traité fait partie d’un ensemble de textes philosophiques, dont E. Renan avait signalé l’existence et dont G. Furlani avait souligné l’importance.⁹ Parmi des traductions de l’*Isagoge* de Porphyre et des *Catégories* d’Aristote, ainsi que des œuvres composées par Sergius de Reš‘ainā (un commentaire sur les *Catégories*) ou traduites par lui (le traité d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise *Sur les causes de l’univers*, et le *De Mundo* pseudo-aristotélicien), auxquelles s’ajoutent divers opuscules de philosophie morale,¹⁰ se trouve un traité qui porte le titre: *memro d-Aristuṭalis d-‘al napšo* (“traité d’Aristote sur l’âme”). Renan, qui avait fourni les traductions en latin et en français des titres des chapitres du traité, l’avait identifié comme un traité pseudo-aristotélicien, et W. Wright, dans son catalogue des manuscrits syriaques du British Museum, avait noté à son tour que ce traité n’avait rien à voir avec le *De Anima* d’Aristote, mais sans plus d’information.¹¹ Furlani avait observé aussi, en son temps, que ce même traité avait été édité une vingtaine d’années plus tôt par A.S. Lewis, à partir d’un manuscrit du couvent de Sainte-Catherine du Mont Sinai (Sinai, *syriac*. 16).¹² Et V. Ryssel, qui avait traduit en allemand le texte syriaque de cette dernière édition,¹³ fut le premier à rapprocher le traité syriaque d’un traité conservé en grec et édité dans la *Patrologia graeca*, sous le titre de Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς Τατιανόν, et donné comme l’œuvre de Grégoire le Thaumaturge.¹⁴ Furlani a édité le texte syriaque attribué à Aristote du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης à partir du manuscrit de Londres, en relevant les variantes de l’édition de A.S. Lewis, et en comparant le

⁹ Cf. E. Renan, “Lettre à M. Reinaud, sur quelques manuscrits syriaques du Musée Britannique contenant des traductions d’auteurs grecs profanes et des traités philosophiques”, *Journal Asiatique* 4^e série, 19 (1852), p. 293-333 (aux p. 320-32); G. Furlani, “Contributions to the History of Greek Philosophy in the Orient, Syriac Texts, IV: A Syriac Version of the Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς Τατιανόν of Gregory Thaumaturgus”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 35 (1915), p. 297-317.

¹⁰ Sur le contenu de ce manuscrit, voir H. Hugonnard-Roche, “Éthique et politique au premier âge de la tradition syriaque”, *Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph* 57 (2004), p. 99-119, en part. p. 108-19; D. King, “Origenism in Sixth Century Syria. The Case of a Syriac Manuscript of Pagan Philosophy”, dans A. Fürst (éd.), *Origenes und sein Erbe in Orient und Okzident*, Aschendorff, Münster 2010 (Adamantina: Texte und Studien zu Origenes und seinem Erbe, 1), p. 179-212.

¹¹ Renan, “Lettre à M. Reinaud”, p. 320; W. Wright, *Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts in the British Museum acquired since the year 1838*, III, British Museum, London 1872, p. 1157.

¹² A.S. Lewis, *Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts in the Convent of S. Catharine on Mount Sinai*, C.J. Clay and Sons, London 1894 (*Studia Sinaitica*, 1), p. 19-26.

¹³ V. Ryssel, “Zwei neu aufgefundene Schriften der graeco-syrischen Literatur”, *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 51 (1896), p. 1-20, en part. p. 4-9.

¹⁴ Cf. Τοῦ ἐν ἀγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου τῆς Νεοκαισαρείας Πόντου, ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ Θαυματουργοῦ, Πρὸς Τατιανόν περὶ ψυχῆς λόγος κεφαλαιώδης, avec traduction latine: *Sancti patris Nostri Gregorii, episcopi Neocæsareæ Ponti, cognomento Thaumaturgi, Ad Tatanium de anima per capita disputatio*, dans *PG* 10, col. 1137 A-1146 B.

texte syriaque avec le grec pour conclure que la traduction est libre et a plutôt les caractères d'une paraphrase, et que son style, de plus, est tout à fait différent de celui des œuvres de Sergius de Reš'ainā.¹⁵ Dans le manuscrit de Sainte-Catherine du Mont Sinaï, le texte est précédé de l'attribution vague "un traité composé par les philosophes" (*l-philosope*) et, selon V. Ryssel, cette indication devait se rapporter à l'ensemble des textes rassemblés dans les folios suivants du manuscrit. Furlani, pour sa part, avait fort justement fait remarquer qu'une simple erreur de ponctuation de la part du copiste avait très probablement mis au pluriel le mot qui, une fois correctement orthographié au singulier, désignait selon toute vraisemblance "le Philosophe" par excellence, c'est-à-dire Aristote.¹⁶ Dans un manuscrit plus récemment découvert, Mardin Orth. 404, qui date du XV^e/XVI^e siècle, le traité est également attribué à Aristote, ce qui tend à renforcer la conjecture de Furlani touchant l'erreur de copie du manuscrit de Sainte-Catherine du Mont Sinaï.¹⁷ Le manuscrit Sinaï, *syrr.* 16, que l'érudition moderne date aujourd'hui du VII^e siècle, est d'origine monastique et il contient, à côté de textes patristiques divers et d'homélies de Jean Chrysostome, un ensemble assez cohérent de traités qui, d'une manière ou d'une autre, abordent des questions de philosophie morale et de préparation éthique à la philosophie d'origine grecque.¹⁸ Quant au manuscrit de Londres, BL Add. 14658, qui date également du VII^e siècle, il contient des textes appartenant à la tradition philosophique de sources grecques.¹⁹ Il semble donc qu'à une certaine époque, dans les débuts de la tradition philosophique syriaque, qui a vu le jour au commencement du VI^e siècle, le petit traité dont nous parlons ait pu passer pour une œuvre d'Aristote portant sur l'âme.

Les copistes des deux manuscrits de Londres et de Sainte-Catherine du Mont Sinaï (comme aussi celui du manuscrit beaucoup plus tardif de Mardin) ont vraisemblablement reproduit l'indication d'attribution qu'ils avaient sous les yeux, et il est difficile de savoir à quand elle remonte. De fait, ce petit traité a eu une histoire bien plus complexe que ce qu'on a déjà dit, et nous n'en retiendrons que les aspects qui peuvent intéresser directement la tradition syriaque.²⁰

Le texte du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περι ψυχῆς πρὸς Τατιανόν édité dans la *Patrologia graeca* sous l'attribution à Grégoire le Thaumaturge est, en effet, identique à un Περὶ ψυχῆς, édité dans un autre volume de la même *Patrologia graeca* sous le nom de Maxime le Confesseur, à deux différences près: il manque dans cette dernière version le prologue qui se trouve dans le texte attribué à Grégoire, et il manque de même dans la version attribuée à Maxime deux petits paragraphes du quatrième chapitre. Dans un article fondamental sur ce traité, mais passé souvent inaperçu, J. Lebreton, qui mit le premier en évidence l'identité des deux œuvres, fit état des résultats de ses recherches sur les manuscrits de

¹⁵ Furlani, "Contributions", p. 315; l'édition se trouve *ibid.*, p. 301-5.

¹⁶ Furlani, "Contributions", p. 307.

¹⁷ Sur le manuscrit de Mardin, le peu d'information dont on dispose est fourni par une note à la planche 23 dans R.H. Fischer (éd.), *A Tribute to Arthur Vööbus: Studies in Early Christian Literature and its Environment, Primarily in the Syrian East*, Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, Chicago 1977: cf. S. Brock, "Clavis Patrum Graecorum III, 7717", *Journal of Theological Studies* 32 (1981), p. 176-8, selon qui le texte de ce manuscrit (d'après ce que montre la photographie) ne serait pas différent du texte du manuscrit de Londres, BL Add. 14658 (voir en part. p. 177).

¹⁸ On peut lire une brève description du contenu de ce manuscrit dans Furlani, "Contributions", p. 306. Une description plus détaillée se trouve dans une notice mise en appendice par S. Brock à son article, "The Genealogy of the Virgin Mary in Sinai 16", *Scrinium. Revue de patrologie, d'hagiographie critique et d'histoire ecclésiastique* 2 (2006), p. 58-71, en part. p. 69-71.

¹⁹ Voir Hugonnard-Roche, "Platon syriaque", et Id., "Éthique et philosophie"; voir aussi King, "Origenism".

²⁰ Une étude détaillée de l'histoire des recherches touchant le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περι ψυχῆς πρὸς Τατιανόν depuis le XVII^e siècle a été fournie par F. Celia, "Il λόγος κεφαλαιώδης dello ps.-Gregorio il Taumaturgo. Uno status quaestionis e un primo approccio al problema delle fonti", *Adamantius* 17 (2011), p. 164-89.

ce texte et il observa que dans deux des plus anciens et meilleurs manuscrits collationnés par lui, le traité est intitulé *περὶ ψυχῆς* et *φιλοσοφία περὶ ψυχῆς* respectivement, sans nom d'auteur,²¹ et que dans un troisième il est attribué à Grégoire de Nysse.²² Parmi les onze autres manuscrits collationnés, quatre l'attribuent à Maxime et cinq à Grégoire, tous étant d'ailleurs tardifs (l'un du XIV^e siècle et les autres du XVI^e siècle).²³ Lebreton observa ensuite que les manuscrits présentent deux recensions différentes du texte, avec des traces d'interpolations dans l'une et l'autre, et surtout il pensa avoir montré que certaines parties du traité sont des emprunts au *De Natura hominis* de Némésios d'Émèse ou dépendent de l'ouvrage de Némésios, tandis que d'autres ne lui doivent rien.²⁴ Dans la conclusion de son étude, Lebreton suggère que le traité a été composé par un auteur inconnu qui a utilisé l'ouvrage de Némésios et peut-être aussi un fragment de Grégoire le Thaumaturge. La recherche la plus récente ne retient pas l'attribution du *Λόγος κεφαλαϊώδης* à Grégoire le Thaumaturge, pas plus que celle du *Περὶ ψυχῆς* à Maxime le Confesseur. En revanche, elle a confirmé la parenté entre le *Λόγος κεφαλαϊώδης* et le *De Natura hominis* de Némésios.²⁵

La version du traité mise sous le nom d'Aristote en syriaque se rattache à celle qui, dans la tradition grecque, est dépourvue du prologue et de deux paragraphes dans le chapitre quatrième. Le prologue est constitué d'une adresse à un certain Tatien et l'auteur y fait allusion à la demande qui lui a été faite par ce personnage d'écrire un discours sur l'âme au moyen d'arguments démonstratifs, sans recourir aux témoignages des Écritures, en vue de convaincre non point ceux qui adhèrent déjà aux Écritures

²¹ Il s'agit des manuscrits Paris BnF *grec* 141 A (XI^e siècle) et Paris BnF *suppl. grec* 690 (XII^e siècle): voir J. Lebreton, "Le traité de l'âme de saint Grégoire le Thaumaturge", *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* 8 (1906), p. 73-83 (à la p. 75).

²² Dans le ms de Londres Reg. 16 D I (XII^e siècle), le *Λόγος κεφαλαϊώδης* est inséré entre deux traités de Grégoire de Nysse, avec le titre *Τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς Τατιανὸν περὶ ψυχῆς λόγος κεφαλαϊώδης*: voir Lebreton, "Le traité de l'âme", p. 75-76. Notons que, dans ses versions arménienne (début du VIII^e siècle) et arabe (par Ishāq ibn Hunayn, mort en 910), le *De Natura hominis* de Némésios d'Émèse est attribué à Grégoire de Nysse: voir M. Morani, *La tradizione manoscritta del "De Natura hominis" di Nemesio*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1981, p. 68-71, 90. Toutefois une traduction syriaque, dont le texte est aujourd'hui perdu, est mentionnée dans une lettre du catholico Timothée I^{er}, qui déclare en posséder le début et demande à son correspondant d'en rechercher le texte, dont il désigne l'auteur comme Némésios: cf. Morani, *La tradizione manoscritta*, p. 97; M. Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca: New Fragments from the missing Syriac version of the *De Natura hominis*", *Journal of Semitic Studies* 36 (1991), p. 223-58, en part. p. 225-6; V. Berti, *Vita e studi di Timoteo († 823), patriarca cristiano di Baghdad. Ricerche sull'epistolario e sulle fonti contigue*, Association pour l'avancement des études iraniennes, Paris 2009 (Studia Iranica, cahier 41), p. 330-1. Deux références à une traduction syriaque ont été signalées en marge de la version arménienne par A. Zanolli, "Sur une ancienne traduction syriaque du *Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου* de Némésios", *Revue de l'Orient chrétien* 20 (1915-1917), p. 331-3; Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", p. 226.

²³ Voir la liste dans Lebreton, "Le traité de l'âme", p. 75-6, qui signale que la même diversité d'attribution se retrouve dans les manuscrits de nombreuses bibliothèques, *ibid.* p. 76 n. 1.

²⁴ Lebreton, "Le traité de l'âme", p. 76, remarque par exemple que dans le manuscrit BnF *suppl. grec* 690, après le dernier chapitre du traité (*εἰ λογικὸν ἡ ψυχὴ*), le texte se poursuit (sans nouveau titre et sans indication de changement d'auteur) avec une question *εἰ διανοητικόν* qui correspond à Némésios, *De Nat. hom.* 12, *PG* 40, col. 660 A-B [= M. Morani (éd.), *Nemesii Emeseni De Natura hominis*, Teubner, Leipzig 1987 (Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum Teubneriana), p. 68], et avec des parties *περὶ τοῦ φανταστικοῦ*, qui correspondent à Némésios, *De Nat. hom.* 6 (dont le chapitre est résumé et arrangé), *PG* 40, col. 632 B-637 B [= Morani (éd.), p. 55-57] et *περὶ αἰσθησεως* (qui contiennent des fragments des chapitres 6, 7, 10, 11 de Némésios). D'autres exemples sont donnés à propos d'autres manuscrits par Lebreton, *ibid.*, p. 76-7.

²⁵ A. Whealey, "To Tatian *On the Soul*: a Treatise from the Circle of Tatian the Syrian and Justin Martyr?", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 63 (1996), p. 136-45, a tenté de situer le *Λόγος κεφαλαϊώδης* dans la sphère d'influence du "cercle" de Justin Martyr, mais cette thèse a été réfutée par Celia, "Il *λόγος κεφαλαϊώδης*", p. 179-80, qui suggère par ailleurs que la parenté entre le *Λόγος κεφαλαϊώδης* et le *De Natura hominis* pourrait s'expliquer par une source commune, les *Symmikta Zetemata* de Porphyre, *ibid.*, p. 181-9.

divines, mais ceux qui n’y ajoutent pas foi. L’authenticité du prologue dans la tradition grecque a été mise en question par J. Lebreton,²⁶ mais quoi qu’il en soit de ce point, il est bien clair qu’un texte pourvu d’un tel prologue n’aurait pas pu être attribué à Aristote dans la tradition syriaque. En revanche, le style argumentatif, auquel le prologue fait allusion, pouvait sans doute être associé aisément avec la représentation d’Aristote comme le logicien par excellence. Il vaut sans doute d’être rappelé ici que, dans la compilation de textes contenus dans le manuscrit de Londres BL Add. 14658, se trouve le commentaire de Sergius de Reš‘ainā sur les *Catégories*, dans lequel l’auteur présente Aristote comme le principe de la science de toutes les réalités, et en particulier comme le maître dans l’art de l’argumentation et de la démonstration.²⁷

Le traité, dans sa version syriaque pseudo-aristotélicienne, est organisé sous forme de questions ou de points à examiner, comme dans la version grecque. Nous ne proposons pas une traduction complète du traité, qui allongerait inutilement la présentation, mais nous essaierons de restituer l’essentiel des arguments en respectant leurs articulations.²⁸

1. Le traité s’ouvre sur la question du critère, de ce qui sert à juger de l’âme, du moyen de la connaître. L’auteur développe son argumentation comme suit: tout ce qui est, ou bien est connu par les sens ou bien est saisi par la pensée (*hawno*, en grec νόησις); ce qui tombe sous les sens a comme preuve suffisante le sens; à l’inverse, ce qui est saisi par la pensée (*madd’o*, en grec νόησις) n’est pas saisi immédiatement par soi, mais par son activité (*ma’bdonūto*, en grec ἐνεργεία); l’âme donc est connue par son activité.

Puis donc que l’âme ne peut être saisie directement en elle-même, l’auteur emploiera divers arguments pour établir les différents points à son sujet, c’est-à-dire d’abord qu’elle existe, puis qu’elle est une substance, qu’elle est incorporelle, qu’elle est simple, qu’elle est immortelle, et qu’elle est λογική, c’est-à-dire rationnelle.

2. Le critère étant établi, le deuxième point à examiner est de savoir “si l’âme existe”. Le premier argument est celui-ci: notre corps est mû soit de l’extérieur, soit de l’intérieur; mais il n’est pas mû de l’extérieur, car il n’est pas mû par poussée ni par traction, comme le sont les êtres inanimés; il n’est pas non plus mû de l’intérieur naturellement, comme l’est le feu; donc le corps est mû par l’âme qui lui donne la vie; donc il est connu que l’âme existe, à partir de son activité.

3. Le troisième point qui est établi ensuite est que l’âme est une substance. Un premier argument le montre à partir de la remarque que la définition de la substance, à savoir qu’elle reçoit les contraires tout en restant numériquement une, s’applique à l’âme; en effet, l’âme reçoit des contraires tels que la justice et l’injustice, le courage et la timidité, la tempérance et la luxure, sans être changée dans sa nature. On reconnaît ici un argument tiré des *Catégories* d’Aristote, selon lesquelles c’est le propre de la substance de recevoir les contraires:²⁹ puis donc que l’âme reçoit les contraires, elle est une substance.

Un deuxième argument est le suivant: puisque le corps est une substance, il est nécessaire que l’âme aussi soit une substance; il n’est pas possible, en effet, que l’on dise que ce qui reçoit la vie et le mouvement de quelque autre chose soit une substance, tandis que ce qui les lui donne ne soit pas une

²⁶ Lebreton, “Le traité de l’âme”, p. 77.

²⁷ Cf. le prologue de Sergius à son traité, traduit dans H. Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d’Aristote du grec au syriaque. Études sur la transmission des textes de l’Organon et leur interprétation philosophique*, Vrin, Paris 2004 (Textes et Traditions, 9), p. 167-70.

²⁸ Nous reprenons par commodité la numérotation des points successifs, ou “chapitres” (κεφάλαια), qui figure dans la *Patrologia graeca*, et qui a été reprise dans les études modernes; la numérotation du syriaque s’en écarte du fait que le premier paragraphe n’y est pas numéroté.

²⁹ Arist., *Cat.* 5, 4 a 10-11.

substance, à moins que l'on ne s'aventure à dire que le non-étant est cause de l'étant, ou que ce qui doit son existence à quelque chose sans quoi il ne peut pas être soit cause de ce par quoi il est.

4. Le quatrième point examiné est de savoir si l'âme est incorporelle (*d-lo gšūm*). Un certain nombre d'arguments sont énumérés à ce propos. Le premier est que si l'âme est juxtaposée au corps, comme une pierre le serait à une pierre, le corps tout entier ne serait pas animé, mais seulement le serait la partie qui est juxtaposée à l'âme.

Deuxième argument: si l'âme est mélangée au corps, alors elle est polymère et non simple; mais ce qui est polymère se divise, et ce qui se divise se dissout; ce qui se dissout est composé; ce qui est composé est un corps; un corps ajouté à un corps augmente le poids; or l'âme, dans le corps, n'en augmente pas le poids, mais elle lui donne la vie; donc l'âme n'est pas un corps.³⁰

Suivent encore d'autres arguments, comme celui-ci: si l'âme était un corps, elle se mouvrait soit de l'extérieur soit de l'intérieur; or elle ne se meut pas de l'extérieur par pulsion ou traction comme les êtres inanimés, ni de l'intérieur comme le corps animé, car c'est l'âme elle-même qui meut le corps; on ne peut, en effet, parler de l'âme de l'âme; donc l'âme est incorporelle.

Autre argument encore: si l'âme était un corps, elle posséderait des accidents corporels (*gedšeyh pagrone enun*, en grec τὰς ποιότητας αἰσθητὰς ἔχει), et elle se nourrirait. Mais elle ne se nourrit pas, ou du moins elle ne se nourrit pas charnellement (*lo pagrono'it*, en grec οὐ σωματικῶς), elle se nourrit du verbe (*mellto*); donc l'âme n'est pas un corps charnel mais elle est incorporelle.³¹

5. Un cinquième point à établir est le suivant: l'âme est-elle simple ou composée? La réponse est une conséquence immédiate de ce qui a été dit auparavant: le corps est composé et comporte des parties, mais l'âme n'est pas un corps, elle est donc non-composée et simple.

6. Le sixième point concerne l'immortalité de l'âme. Là encore plusieurs arguments sont présentés. Le premier est le suivant: ce qui se corrompt, se corrompt à partir de son contraire; tout ce qui se corrompt, se dissout; ce qui se dissout, est composé de différentes parties; or l'âme est simple, donc elle n'est pas composée, donc elle ne se dissout pas, donc elle est immortelle.

Le deuxième argument employé pour montrer que l'âme est immortelle est celui-ci: toute chose qui tire son mouvement de quelque autre chose, reçoit la vie non pas de soi-même, mais de son moteur, et ne subsiste que tant que dure l'action de ce qui la meut; or l'âme est mue par elle-même, donc elle est toujours mue, donc elle est non-corruptible, donc elle est immortelle.

Un autre argument encore sert à montrer que l'âme est immortelle, à savoir que ce qui ne se corrompt pas par son propre mal, ne se corrompt pas; or les maux de l'âme ne lui ôtent pas la vie ni ses biens ne la font subsister, donc elle est immortelle.

7. La septième et dernière question à étudier est de savoir si l'âme est rationnelle (*methašbonīto*, en grec λογική). Une fois encore plusieurs arguments sont utilisés pour répondre à cette question. Le premier est que l'âme a inventé les arts utiles aux créatures; l'utile est louable et le louable est constitué par l'organisation et la raison; et donc l'âme est rationnelle.

L'argument suivant part de la remarque que nos sens sont insuffisants pour permettre la saisie des réalités (*šebwoto*, en grec πράγματα). La sensation ne permet pas de distinguer des choses différentes par

³⁰ Observons que la question abordée dans ce quatrième point est celle de savoir si l'âme est ou non un corps, au sens large de corps physique (*gšūm*), mais que dans les deux arguments jusqu'ici énoncés, le terme utilisé pour désigner le corps est *pagro*, qui signifie plutôt le corps charnel: c'est seulement dans la conclusion du deuxième argument que l'auteur emploie à nouveau *gšūm*.

³¹ Il y a d'autres arguments encore dans le texte grec du Λόγος περὶ ψυχῆς, mais ces autres arguments ne se trouvent pas dans le texte syriaque: si l'âme est un corps au sens corporel, elle se divise en animée et inanimée, mais l'âme n'est pas divisée en animée et inanimée; tout corps a couleur, quantité et figure, mais on ne trouve pas dans l'âme couleur, quantité et figure.

nature mais semblables par la figure. Nous les connaissons dans leur nature en saisissant chacune dans son essence, à l'aide de l'intellect (*madd'o*, en grec νοῦς), qui est la partie qui raisonne de l'âme (en grec: νοῦς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ λογικὸν μέρος). Donc l'âme est rationnelle.

Un autre argument encore conduit à cette conclusion, et son point de départ est que nous ne faisons rien sans en avoir eu préalablement le dessein. La connaissance des réalités ne vient pas du dehors, mais c'est l'âme qui les dispose en elle-même et ensuite elle produit l'action. Le principe (*'iqoro*, en grec ἀξίωμα) de l'âme n'est rien d'autre que faire toute chose avec raison (*hūššobo*). Donc l'âme est rationnelle.

La rationalité de l'âme est ainsi établie de deux façons différentes: d'une part, à partir du fait que la sensation est insuffisante pour rendre compte de notre connaissance des réalités – on peut penser à l'exemple fameux du bâton qui, plongé dans l'eau, apparaît comme brisé: il faut l'utilisation de la raison pour établir que le bâton est droit –, et d'autre part, à partir de notre action elle-même qui témoigne de la rationalité de l'âme, puisque nous concevons tout d'abord ce que nous allons faire, et c'est l'organisation par le λόγος qui nous permet d'agir, de mettre en œuvre nos actions.

Ce sont les troisième et quatrième chapitres ("l'âme est une substance" et "l'âme est incorporelle") qui sont d'abord apparus à Lebreton comme contenant des emprunts manifestes à Némésius.³² L'une des preuves de la substantialité de l'âme consiste, en effet, à montrer que la définition de la substance comme ce qui peut recevoir des contraires s'applique à l'âme, puisqu'elle reçoit la justice et l'injustice, le courage et la timidité, la tempérance et la luxure. Et Némésius avait établi que l'âme est une substance à partir du même argument, dont le point de départ se trouve dans la définition aristotélicienne de la substance: Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὃν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν.³³ Reprenant l'étude de cette comparaison, Celia a montré que le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης donne des exemples absents de Némésius, mais surtout que le texte, dans son schématisme même, est le produit d'une élaboration "scolastique", et il rappelle que la même preuve de la substantialité de l'âme à partir de la propriété de recevoir des contraires se trouve déjà chez Alexandre d'Aphrodise, chez Porphyre, et dans les *Solutiones ad Chosroem* de Priscien. Dans la mesure où le *De Natura hominis* de Némésius et les *Solutiones* de Priscien remonteraient aux *Symmikta Zetemata* de Porphyre, ainsi que H. Dörrie s'est efforcé de le montrer, on peut voir dans ce traité de Porphyre une source première de l'élaboration scolastique d'une démonstration reprise dans le Λόγος,³⁴ puis dans sa version syriaque.

Poussant ensuite la recherche sur le quatrième chapitre du Λόγος, à propos des deux arguments qui prennent pour point de départ de la démonstration de l'incorporéité de l'âme, soit que l'âme serait simplement juxtaposée au corps, comme une pierre le serait à une pierre, soit qu'elle serait mélangée au corps, Celia a relevé que le second cas ne se trouve pas dans le texte de Némésius. D'où il conclut que le rapport entre Némésius et le Λόγος serait un rapport de ressemblance plutôt que de dépendance entre les deux textes. D'autres comparaisons encore ont été faites par Celia, mais il n'est pas pertinent pour notre propos de les mentionner toutes ici, car elles visent à reconstruire l'élaboration du Λόγος grec, du moins pour certaines de ses parties. Le résultat qui en revanche nous intéresse est que le Λόγος et le traité de Némésius auraient une source commune néoplatonicienne, probablement les *Symmikta Zetemata* de Porphyre.

On peut certainement donner raison, d'autre part, à Furlani sur le fait que le traité comporte des idées aristotéliciennes.³⁵ On y fait appel, en effet, à des notions physiques aristotéliciennes,

³² Cf. Lebreton, "Le traité de l'âme", p. 78-81.

³³ Arist., *Cat.* 5, 4 a 10-11.

³⁴ Cf. Celia, "Ἦ λόγος κεφαλαιώδης", p. 181-3.

³⁵ Par cette observation, Furlani essaie d'expliquer que le traité ait été attribué à Aristote. La remarque se trouve dans

comme l'opposition entre mouvement d'un corps provoqué de l'extérieur et mouvement produit de l'intérieur, ou comme l'idée qu'un corps soit doué de sensation et apte à se nourrir, ou que toute substance se divise en inanimée et animée, etc. Il s'agit là cependant de notions communes au moment où le Λόγος a été composé et, de plus, les arguments dans lesquels elles sont employées sont mis au service de la démonstration d'une suite d'idées qui ne sont pas conformes à la thèse générale d'Aristote sur l'âme. On ne saurait dire, selon le *De Anima*, que l'âme est une substance ni qu'elle est incorporelle au sens du texte du Λόγος, ni simple, ni immortelle.

Plus pertinente pour nous est une remarque faite par Celia qui a relevé dans le *De Anima et resurrectione* de Grégoire de Nysse un raisonnement semblable à celui du Λόγος, pour montrer qu'un mélange, du fait de son hétérogénéité, ne peut être simple, mais est nécessairement composé, et que tout composé est dissoluble, et qu'il ne peut donc être immortel:

Ἡ οὖν ψυχὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ποῦ ἔσται; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις εἶναι τις λέγει, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι τούτοις κατ' ἀνάγκην συνθήσεται. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτό τις τοῦ ἑτεροφυοῦς πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον μίξις, καί, εἰ ταῦτα εἶη, ποικίλη τις πάντως ἀναφανήσεται ἢ πρὸς τὰς ἐναντίας μεμιγμένη ποιότητος, τὸ δὲ ποικίλον ἀπλοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐν συνθέσει θεωρεῖται πάντως. Πᾶν δὲ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ διαλυτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἡ δὲ διάλυσις φθορὰ τοῦ συνεστῶτός ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ φθειρόμενον οὐκ ἀθάνατον [...].³⁶

Le passage tout entier de Grégoire présente des arguments semblables par le style et la terminologie aux lignes du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης, dans lesquelles sont présentés les attributs du corps, qui sont antithétiques à la nature incorporelle et simple de l'âme. De là Celia conclut que le Λόγος et le texte de Grégoire proviennent d'un matériel philosophique commun, lié aux *Symmikta Zetemata* de Porphyre.³⁷ C'est moins le problème précis de la *Quellenforschung* qui nous intéresse ici, que le fait que Grégoire de Nysse soit associé au problème philosophique de l'âme, dans des termes semblables à ceux du traité "scolastique" qu'est le Λόγος.

Abandonnons donc la *Quellenforschung* pour considérer le traité transposé en syriaque dans son ensemble. Les points principaux établis dans le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης sont: que l'âme existe; qu'elle est une substance; qu'elle est incorporelle; qu'elle est simple et non composée; qu'elle est immortelle; et enfin qu'elle est rationnelle. C'est ainsi une liste des questions fondamentales posées à propos de l'âme qui est énoncée, avec les réponses à ces questions. Certes toutes ces questions ne se rencontrent pas toujours chez tous les auteurs. Némésius, par exemple, ne traite pas explicitement la question de l'immortalité de l'âme, mais l'immortalité découle, dans son traité, de l'argumentation selon laquelle

l'article consacré à l'édition et à la traduction italienne de la version arabe (dite version courte) du Λόγος, que nous mentionnerons plus loin: cf. G. Furlani, "Contributi alla storia della filosofia greca in Oriente. Testi Arabici – I. Pseudo-Aristotele *fi-l-nafs*", *Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei*, Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, Serie quinta, vol. xxiv (Roma 1915), p. 117-37 (à la p. 131).

³⁶ *De Anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, col. 20 C-21 A; trad. Chr. Bouchet dans Grégoire de Nysse, *L'âme et la résurrection*, introd. de B. Pottier, annotation et guide thématique de M.-H. Congourdeau, Migne, Paris 1998 (Les Pères dans la foi, 73), p. 29-30: "Où donc sera l'âme après? Dire qu'elle se trouvera dans les éléments, c'est nécessairement la dire en composition avec eux. En effet, deux éléments étrangers l'un à l'autre ne sauraient se mêler et, si cela était, le mélange apparaîtrait bien bigarré avec des propriétés opposées; or ce qui est bigarré n'est pas simple et c'est dans une composition qu'on l'observe tout à fait. D'autre part, tout ce qui est composé est aussi nécessairement séparable, la séparation étant l'abolition du composé. Or ce qui s'abolit n'est pas immortel [...]"

³⁷ Cf. Celia, "Ἰ λόγος κεφαλαιώδης", p. 185.

l'âme ne peut être mortelle puisqu'elle n'est ni un corps ni une propriété accidentelle, et qu'étant une substance qui se suffit à elle-même, elle doit être immortelle. Le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης ne cite aucune source, et il ne cite non plus aucun des tenants dont les thèses sont récusées. Mais la liste des thèses énoncées est construite manifestement en grande partie sur le rejet de thèses opposées, dont on retrouverait aisément certains auteurs, notamment chez Némésius. Ainsi lorsque, dans le chapitre 2 de son ouvrage, Némésius entreprend de montrer que l'âme humaine est une substance, et qu'elle n'a pas besoin du corps pour subsister, il critique certaines positions antérieures, qui soutenaient, par exemple, comme les Stoïciens, que l'âme est un corps;³⁸ ou bien, comme Galien, que l'âme est un mélange;³⁹ ou bien, comme Aristote, qu'elle est la première entéléchie d'un corps qui possède la vie en puissance;⁴⁰ ou encore, comme Eunome, qu'elle est une substance incorporelle créée dans le corps;⁴¹ ou bien encore, comme Apollinaire de Laodicée, que les âmes naissent les unes des autres à la manière de la procréation corporelle.⁴² On pourrait retrouver aussi dans le traité de Plotin, *Sur l'immortalité de l'âme*, par exemple, la mention de thèses rejetées par l'auteur auxquelles s'oppose de même le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης, telles celles des Épicuriens et des Stoïciens, qui les uns et les autres, à leur manière, concevaient l'âme comme un corps,⁴³ ou telle la conception pythagoricienne qui pensait l'âme comme l'harmonie d'éléments matériels,⁴⁴ ou encore la conception aristotélicienne de l'âme comme entéléchie, c'est-à-dire comme la forme d'un corps naturel organisé qui possède la vie en puissance.⁴⁵

Pourtant la définition, ou description, de l'âme qui ressort du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης est loin d'être plotinienne: l'âme n'y est en aucune manière liée aux entités supérieures, auxquelles son immortalité n'est pas associée. La démonstration de son immortalité reprend les thèses typiques de tout platonisme, qui se trouvent, il est vrai, aussi chez Plotin, mais insérées dans un contexte métaphysique auquel le Λόγος demeure étranger. L'âme n'est pas le terme de la procession qui est issue de l'Un et passe par l'Intellect. Il n'est aucunement question de son rapport avec l'intelligible auquel elle appartiendrait et avec l'Intellect qui serait son géniteur. Il serait certainement plus juste de parler de position platonicienne du Λόγος en un sens assez large, qui englobe les caractères substantiel, incorporel et immortel de l'âme.

³⁸ *De Natura hominis*, 2, p. 18.5-22.18 Morani; trad. R.W. Sharples - P.J. van der Eijk, dans Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*, transl. with an introd. and notes, Liverpool U. P., Liverpool 2008 (Translated Texts for Historians, 49), p. 54-9.

³⁹ *De Natura hominis*, 2, p. 23.24-26 Morani, qui précise que Galien a lui-même déclaré n'avoir rien dit sur ce sujet, mais que, d'après ses écrits, il semble avoir admis que l'âme était un mélange. C'est une autre question de savoir si la thèse que Némésius prête à Galien fut bien la sienne: voir la préface de G. Verbeke, "L'anthropologie de Némésius", p. XLII-XLIII, à l'édition de la traduction latine du *De Natura hominis*, dans G. Verbeke - J.R. Moncho (éd.), Némésius d'Émèse, *De Natura hominis*, trad. de Burgundio de Pise, Brill, Leiden 1975 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, Suppl. 1).

⁴⁰ *De Natura hominis*, 2, p. 26.10-12 Morani; trad. Sharples - van der Eijk, p. 64-6. Toutefois, comme le note Verbeke, "L'anthropologie", p. XLIV n. 47, la manière dont Némésius interprète l'entéléchie d'Aristote n'est pas fondée.

⁴¹ *De Natura hominis*, 2, p. 30.18-23 Morani; trad. Sharples - van der Eijk, p. 69: "Eunome defined the soul as an incorporeal substance created in a body, agreeing with both Plato and Aristotle. He took 'an incorporeal substance' from truth, but 'created in a body' from the teaching of Aristotle: he did not notice, though acute, that he is trying to join incompatible into the same thing. For everything that has a bodily, and thus temporal, origin is perishable and mortal"; Verbeke, "L'anthropologie", p. XLV.

⁴² *De Natura hominis*, 2, p. 32.3-6 Morani; trad. Sharples - van der Eijk, p. 70: "But Apollinaris believes that souls are born from souls, as bodies are born from bodies. For, he holds, soul progresses by transmission from the first man into all his progeny, just like bodily transmission".

⁴³ Plotin, *Enn.*, IV 7[2], 3.1-6, contre la thèse épicurienne, selon laquelle elle est un corps composé de fines parties; *Enn.*, IV, 7 [2], 3.6-35, contre la thèse stoïcienne.

⁴⁴ Plotin, *Enn.*, IV 7[2], 8^a.1-28, contre la thèse pythagoricienne.

⁴⁵ Plotin, *Enn.*, IV 7[2], 8^s.1-51 qui examine la thèse d'Aristote (cf. *De Anima*, II, 1, 412 a 27-28).

On trouverait dans la tradition philosophique platonicienne toute la suite des thèses sur la nature de l'âme reprises dans le Λόγος. L'âme y est constamment conçue comme une substance incorporelle, incomposée, et donc indissoluble, et dès lors indestructible et immortelle. Ces thèses forment un corps de doctrine, dont des éléments se rencontrent déjà dans la tradition médioplantonicienne.⁴⁶ On a vu aussi que le Λόγος est tout spécialement proche du *De Natura hominis* de Némésius, en ses premiers chapitres. Mais l'on pourrait également mentionner l'œuvre de Grégoire de Nysse, en particulier son *De Anima et resurrectione*,⁴⁷ où sont centrales les deux questions de la substantialité et de l'immatérialité de l'âme. Le dialogue entre Grégoire et sa sœur Macrine s'ouvre sur la question de la corporéité ou de l'incorporéité de l'âme, qui inclut la critique des doctrines matérialistes des Épicuriens et des Stoïciens. Et le lien entre incorporéité et simplicité y est clairement énoncé en ces termes, déjà cités plus haut: Πᾶν δὲ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ διαλυτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἡ δὲ διάλυσις φθορὰ τοῦ συνεστῶτός ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ φθειρόμενον οὐκ ἀθάνατον.⁴⁸ Mais le point de départ de l'organisation même de toute l'argumentation du Λόγος se trouve certainement dans le traité de Plotin *Sur l'immortalité de l'âme*, qui est structuré autour des points suivants: (i) réfutation des doctrines adverses sur l'âme, doctrines matérialistes des Épicuriens et des Stoïciens, doctrines épiphénoménistes des Pythagoriciens et des Aristotéliens; (ii) recherche de la véritable nature de l'âme; (iii) immortalité de l'âme.⁴⁹

Dans sa version syriaque, on l'a dit, le Λόγος est dépourvu du prologue que l'on trouve dans les versions grecques, aussi bien celle qui est mise sous le nom de Grégoire le Thaumaturge que celle qui est sous le nom de Maxime le Confesseur. Ce prologue, rappelons-le, demandait que la question de l'âme fût traitée au moyen d'arguments démonstratifs, sans recourir aux témoignages des Écritures, en vue de convaincre non point ceux qui adhèrent déjà aux Écritures divines, mais ceux qui n'y ajoutent pas foi:

Τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς σοι λόγον ἐκέλευσας ἡμῖν, ὃ θαυμάσιε Τατιανέ, μετ' ἐνεργουσῶν ἀποδείξεων διαχαράξασιν ἀποστεῖλαι· καὶ ταῦτα ἡξίου ποιεῖν, μὴ ταῖς τῶν Γραφῶν μαρτυρίαις χρησαμένους· [...] ἔφησι γὰρ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πληροφορίαν τοῦτο ἐπιζητεῖν, πεπαιδευμένος ἦδη ταῖς θείαις προσανέχειν Γραφαῖς καὶ παραδόσεσι [...] ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν τῆς τῶν ἑτεροδόξων γνώμης, οἱ πείθεσθαι ταῖς Γραφαῖς οὐκ ἀνέχονται [...].⁵⁰

Dans sa forme, le traité est bien conforme à ce réquisit: les arguments y sont présentés dans des formes logiques qui font appel à des syllogismes plus ou moins apparents, souvent de forme *tollendo*

⁴⁶ Voir, par exemple, le précis de philosophie platonicienne que donne Alcinoos, dans son *Didaskalikos*, 25 (177.16-24 H), où il décrit l'âme comme une οὐσία ἀσώματος, ἀσύνθετος, ἀδιάλυτος et ἀθάνατος: cf. Alcinoos, *Enseignement des doctrines de Platon*, éd. J. Whittaker et trad. P. Louis, Les Belles Lettres 1990 (CUF), p. 48; on notera toutefois que la séquence démonstrative est, dans le Λόγος, différente de celle d'Alcinoos, qui établit d'abord l'immortalité de l'âme (comme donatrice de vie), et en fait suivre son incorporéité, puis sa simplicité (elle est incomposée) et son indissolubilité. À propos de la tradition des questionnements sur l'âme entre le II^e et le IV^e siècle, on peut lire A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, III, *Les doctrines de l'âme*. Suivi de: Jamblique, *Traité de l'âme*, traduction et commentaire, Porphyre, *De l'animation de l'embryon*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1953 (Collection d'études anciennes), p. 1-26.

⁴⁷ Le traité a été traduit, au moins en partie, en syriaque: voir A. Van Roey, "Le *De anima et resurrectione* de saint Grégoire de Nysse dans la littérature syriaque", *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 12 (1981), p. 203-13. M.F.G. Parmentier, "Syriac Translations of Gregory of Nyssa", *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 20 (1989), p. 143-193, en part. p. 153, n'ajoute aucun fragment à ceux publiés par Van Roey, mais en retranche au contraire le sixième fragment comme pseudo-grégorien.

⁴⁸ Grégoire de Nysse, *De Anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, 20 C-21 A; voir n. 36.

⁴⁹ Plotin, *Enn.*, IV 7[2], *passim*.

⁵⁰ PG 10, col. 1137 A.

tollens. On y montre qu'une thèse opposée à celle que l'on veut établir conduit à une conséquence inacceptable, et l'on doit donc conclure à la thèse souhaitée. Dans son contenu, d'autre part, le traité respecte le réquisit énoncé dans le prologue (ou du moins répond à un tel réquisit, si le prologue est une addition postérieure au traité) que la question de l'âme fût traitée sans référence aux enseignements de l'Église, car il n'y est pas fait allusion à la Création en général, ni au rôle du divin dans la création de l'homme, ni au problème de la relation de l'âme au corps, problème central de l'anthropologie religieuse. Le traité pseudo-aristotélicien sur l'âme, transposition syriaque du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περι ψυχῆς, se caractérise en effet par ce que l'on pourrait appeler son caractère profane.⁵¹

La forme argumentée et le caractère "profane" du Λόγος pseudo-aristotélicien lui permettent de se situer dans un contexte philosophique, et de répondre à sa manière à l'exigence formulée par Grégoire de Nysse lui-même, qui se proposait, dans son traité *In Hexaemeron*, de respecter la signification propre du texte commenté et de la présenter d'une manière logiquement cohérente. À plusieurs reprises dans son ouvrage, Grégoire fait allusion ainsi à sa recherche de la séquence correcte des raisons des choses, qu'il nomme au moyen du terme ἀκολουθία, d'origine aristotélicienne. Il associe d'ailleurs lui-même le terme ἀκολουθία avec le nom d'Aristote dans un passage du *De Anima et resurrectione* où il oppose le style métaphorique des propos de Platon sur l'âme au style scientifique d'Aristote, fondé sur l'étude des phénomènes selon l'ἀκολουθία,⁵² qui répond à l'exigence démonstrative.

En somme, de style philosophique par son argumentation rationnelle, et par les termes et concepts qu'il met en œuvre, le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περι ψυχῆς s'insère convenablement dans un corpus philosophique, comme celui du manuscrit London BL Add. 14658, mais sa visée, implicite (parce que les adversaires ne sont pas nommés), est de critiquer diverses thèses philosophiques, et surtout d'établir une définition de l'âme conforme à la doctrine chrétienne. Par là il peut aussi s'insérer convenablement dans un corpus monastique comme celui du manuscrit de Sainte-Catherine du Mont Sinai, syr. 16. Ce n'est d'ailleurs sans doute pas un hasard si le traité, dans sa version grecque, a pu circuler sous le nom de Grégoire de Nysse:⁵³ il se situe dans une perspective proche de celle de Grégoire de Nysse, dont il représenterait toutefois seulement la partie philosophique, en omettant notamment tout ce qui touche à la relation de l'âme et du corps en l'homme.

⁵¹ M. Chase, "Némésius d'Émèse", dans R. Goulet (éd.), *DPbA*, N 17 = IV [2005], p. 625-54, remarque (p. 628-9) que "rédigé par un évêque", le *De Natura hominis* "est manifestement destiné à un public qui comporte des païens" et qu'on "a l'impression que c'est surtout à ceux-ci que l'auteur s'adresse". Le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περι ψυχῆς semble s'inscrire dans une semblable perspective.

⁵² *De Anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, 49 C-52 A: οὐκοῦν παρέντες τὸ Πλατωνικὸν ἄρμα καὶ τὴν ὑπερφυγμένην αὐτῶ ζυωρίδα τῶν πάλων [...] δι' ὧν ἀπάντων τὰ τοιαῦτα περι ψυχῆς φιλοσοφεῖ δι' αἰνίγματος· ὅσα θ' ὁ μετ' ἐκεῖνον φιλόσοφος ὁ τεχνικῶς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀκολουθῶν [...]; trad. Bouchet, p. 48 (modifiée): "Nous laissons donc de côté le char de Platon et la paire de chevaux qui lui est attelée [...], autant d'énigmes par lesquelles Platon traite de l'âme. Nous laissons aussi de côté tout ce [qu'a démontré] le Philosophe venu après lui, qui se conformant aux phénomènes selon une séquence logique de raisonnement [...]". Sur la notion d'ἀκολουθία chez Grégoire, voir H.R. Drobner, "Gregory of Nyssa as Philosopher: *De Anima et resurrectione* and *De Hominis officio*", *Dionysius* 18 (2000), p. 69-101, en part. p. 83-92; voir aussi les études antérieures de J. Daniélou, "Akoluthia chez Grégoire de Nysse", *Revue des sciences religieuses* 27 (1953), p. 219-49, en part. p. 221, réimpr. dans J. Daniélou, *L'être et le temps chez Grégoire de Nysse*, Brill, Leiden 1970, p. 18-50; M. Alexandre, "La théorie de l'exégèse dans le *De Hominis officio* et l'*In Hexaemeron*", dans M. Harl (éd.), *Écriture et culture philosophique dans la pensée de Grégoire de Nysse. Actes du colloque de Chevetogne (22-26 septembre 1969)*, Brill, Leiden 1971, p. 87-110, en part. p. 95-8.

⁵³ Cf. Lebreton, "Le traité de l'âme", p. 76. De même, les chapitres 2 et 3 du *De Natura hominis* de Némésius, qui furent une source du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης (ou qui eurent une source commune avec lui), ont circulé séparément en grec, sous le titre Περὶ ψυχῆς, dans des manuscrits où ils sont généralement attribués à Grégoire de Nysse: cf. Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", p. 227.

Outre sa survie en grec et dans l'adaptation syriaque, dont il vient d'être question, le traité du Pseudo-Grégoire le Thaumaturge eut également une postérité en arabe, dont il convient de dire ici quelques mots. Furlani lui-même avait trouvé, dans deux manuscrits de Londres (Add. Or. 7453 et Add. Or. 23403), un texte arabe se présentant comme un "Abrégé du livre de l'âme du sage Aristote le philosophe sur l'âme" (*muḥtaṣar min qawl al-ḥakīm Aristūṭālīs al-faylasūfī l-nafs*), qui n'est autre qu'une version arabe partielle de ce qu'il désignait comme le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς Τατιανόν. Selon Furlani, qui a édité le texte,⁵⁴ la version arabe de ce traité n'aurait pas été faite sur la base d'une version syriaque intermédiaire. Du moins elle ne dérive pas de la version syriaque connue, car celle-ci est, selon Furlani, de style lourd et embrouillé, et elle utilise une terminologie obscure, tandis que l'arabe rend parfaitement et très clairement la terminologie grecque. En outre, la version arabe omet à l'occasion quelques éléments par rapport au texte grec, mais elle présente en d'autres cas quelques additions par rapport au grec. Par exemple, lorsqu'il s'agit de dire que l'âme est incorporelle, dans la version arabe il est précisé qu'elle est spirituelle (*rūḥāniyya*),⁵⁵ alors qu'elle est simplement dite ἀσώματος dans le texte grec. Autre exemple: à la fin du traité, il est ajouté dans le texte de la version arabe que l'âme est une forme spirituelle, perfection pour un corps naturel organique vivant en puissance (*wa-annabā šūratun rūḥāniyyatun tamāmu al-ḡasadin ṭabīʿiyyin āliyyin ḥayyin bi-l-quwwa*).⁵⁶ Cette définition empruntée à Aristote est exactement semblable, dans son expression, à celle que l'on trouve dans la pseudo-*Théologie d'Aristote* et dans la paraphrase anonyme arabe du *De Anima* composée dans le cercle d'al-Kindī selon R. Arnzen, qui montre que cette paraphrase est une source des modifications introduites dans l'adaptation du texte syriaque en arabe.⁵⁷ Selon Furlani, cet écrit arabe serait un compendium partiellement amplifié du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης, qui pourrait avoir été rédigé par Qusṭā ibn Lūqā.⁵⁸ L'intitulé de ce texte qui le met sous le nom d'Aristote nous suggère qu'une tradition continue l'a attribué au Philosophe.

Outre la version éditée pour la première fois par Furlani, il existe une autre version arabe plus longue du même ouvrage, qui a également été mise sous le nom d'Aristote et qui est plus proche du grec et de la version syriaque.⁵⁹ Il est donc manifeste que la version syriaque du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς s'est inscrite dans une tradition de longue durée, depuis la version grecque tardo-antique jusqu'aux deux versions arabes de l'époque abbasside, époque à laquelle ce Λόγος rejoint en quelque manière le *De Anima*, par l'intermédiaire de la Paraphrase anonyme du traité aristotélicien, qui elle-même a influencé la version arabe courte du Λόγος.

⁵⁴ G. Furlani, "Contributi", p. 117-37; l'édition est accompagnée d'une traduction italienne. Une autre édition a été faite (avec traduction anglaise) à partir d'un autre groupe de manuscrits par S.H. al-Ma'sūmī, "A Treatise on the Soul ascribed to Ibn Sina", dans S.M. Abdullah (éd.), *Professor Muhammad Shafī Presentation Volume*, The Majlis-e Armughān-e 'Ilmi, Lahore 1955, p. 131-44. Une édition plus correcte, avec traduction allemande, a été procurée par Gätje, *Studien zur Überlieferung*, p. 114-29.

⁵⁵ Cf. Furlani, "Contributi", p. 124.12 (arabe), p. 128 (traduction: "spirituale").

⁵⁶ Cf. Furlani, "Contributi", p. 126.18-127.1.

⁵⁷ Cf. Arnzen, *Aristoteles' De Anima*, p. 131.

⁵⁸ Cf. Furlani, "Contributi", p. 136, qui signale que Qusṭā ibn Lūqā († v. 912) est l'auteur d'une *Risāla fī l-faṣl bayna rūḥ wa-nafs* ("Épître sur la différence entre esprit et âme"), dans laquelle il a utilisé le Λόγος. Par là, Furlani est conduit à suggérer que Qusṭā ibn Lūqā pourrait être l'auteur de la version arabe en question du Λόγος. Cette hypothèse est critiquée par Gätje, *Studien zur Überlieferung*, p. 60-2.

⁵⁹ Cf. Gätje, *Studien zur Überlieferung*, p. 55 et 58. Étude d'ensemble des deux versions arabes du Λόγος par Gätje, *ibid.*, p. 54-62, et édition de la version longue avec traduction allemande p. 95-113. Selon Arnzen, *Aristoteles' De Anima*, p. 131, la version longue serait plus éloignée du grec que la version courte.

Le traité syriaque de Aḥudemmeḥ sur la composition de l'homme

Le traité pseudo-aristotélicien sur l'âme, transposition syriaque du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς, se caractérise par ce que l'on pourrait appeler son caractère profane. En particulier la question de l'âme est traitée sans référence aux enseignements de l'Église, comme le requérait le prologue, absent d'ailleurs du texte syriaque. Mais la culture de langue syriaque est éminemment celle des communautés chrétiennes, et la question de l'âme y est traitée le plus généralement, le cas du Λόγος mis à part, dans un contexte créationniste. Et un lieu textuel où cette question apparaît est évidemment celui des commentaires sur l'*Hexaemeron*, ou les textes qui y sont liés. Un ouvrage majeur, à cet égard, est certainement le *De Opificio hominis* de Grégoire de Nysse. On sait que cet ouvrage a été composé par Grégoire, en 379, après la mort de son frère Basile de Césarée, dans l'intention de compléter les *Homélies* de ce dernier sur l'*Hexaemeron*. Dans ces *Homélies*, il était question des premiers jours de la Genèse, mais la mort n'avait pas permis à Basile d'expliquer la création de l'homme. C'est ce sujet que traite donc Grégoire de Nysse, en fondant ensemble une exégèse biblique et une réflexion anthropologique.

Quand on passe de la philosophie du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς à la problématique des Pères, le questionnement se déplace de la nature de l'âme à la constitution de l'homme et au rapport de son corps à son âme. Le sujet n'est plus simplement περὶ ψυχῆς, pourrait-on dire, mais περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γενέσεως, pour reprendre le titre de l'ouvrage de Grégoire de Nysse⁶⁰, ou περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου, pour reprendre celui de Némésius d'Émèse. C'est dans cette seconde perspective que se situe le traité sur la nature de l'homme de Aḥudemmeḥ, qui va faire maintenant l'objet de nos remarques.

Sans doute à peu près contemporain, ou de peu postérieur, à la version syriaque du Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς, le traité sur la composition de l'homme (*mimro d'All rukobeh d-barnošo*) a été composé par un personnage nommé Aḥudemmeḥ, qui pourrait avoir été l'évêque nestorien de Ninive, mentionné parmi les présents au synode de 554.⁶¹ Aḥudemmeḥ composa en outre un ouvrage ayant pour titre "que l'homme est un microcosme", comme il nous l'apprend lui-même dans le traité susdit sur la composition de l'homme. Ayant à peine mentionné, dans ce dernier ouvrage, la volonté et la liberté comme deux des puissances de l'âme, il ajoute: "Nous avons parlé de la liberté et de la volonté dans l'ouvrage que nous avons composé < sous le titre >: que l'homme est un microcosme".⁶² D'autres ouvrages sont mentionnés par Furlani, notamment un *Livre de*

⁶⁰ Dans les manuscrits, en effet, le traité de Grégoire est intitulé le plus souvent περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γενέσεως et parfois εἰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν; cf. Chase, "Némésius d'Émèse", p. 627.

⁶¹ Édition du texte syriaque du traité et traduction française par F. Nau, "Traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ sur l'homme", dans *Histoires d'Aḥudemmeḥ et de Marouta, métropolitains jacobites de Tagrit et de l'Orient (VI^e et VII^e siècles), suivies du traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ sur l'homme*, textes syriaques inédits publiés, traduits et annotés par F. Nau, Firmin-Didot, Paris 1905, repris dans *PO*, t. III, fasc. 1, n° 11, Brepols, Turnhout 1982, p. 97-115. Trad. italienne par G. Furlani, "La psicologia di Aḥūdhemmēh", *Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* 61 (1926), p. 807-45, en part. p. 808-15. Le traité est inachevé dans le seul manuscrit connu qui le contienne, London BL Add. 14620, fol. 26r-27v. Sur l'auteur, voir S.P. Brock, "Aḥudemmeḥ", dans S.P. Brock *et al.* (éd.), *The Gorgias Encyclopedic Dictionary of Syriac Heritage*, Gorgias Press, Piscataway N.J. 2011, p. 13. L'identification de Aḥudemmeḥ, auteur du traité sur la composition de l'homme avec l'évêque de Ninive portant le même nom a été proposée par Ph. Gignoux, "Anatomie et physiologie humaine chez un auteur syriaque, Aḥūdhemmēh", *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* 142 (1998), p. 231-40 (avec discussion p. 240-2). Auparavant Aḥudemmeḥ avait été identifié avec l'évêque du même nom, nommé au siège de Beth 'Arbaye par le catholicos arménien Christofore I^{er} (538-544), et chargé par le fondateur de l'église miaphysite Jacques Baradée de l'organisation de la nouvelle église dans l'empire sassanide, qui fut décapité par ordre du souverain sassanide Chosroès I^{er}, dont il avait converti le fils au christianisme. Cette dernière identification est celle qui avait été adoptée par Furlani, "La psicologia di Aḥūdhemmēh", p. 807.

⁶² Cf. Nau, "Traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ", p. 107. Nous citerons tout au long de notre étude la traduction de Nau, en la modifiant légèrement au besoin.

définitions, un livre de logique, des discours sur la nature, sur le libre arbitre, mais ce sont là les ouvrages mentionnés dans le catalogue bibliographique de 'Abdišū' de Nisibe († 1318) sous le nom du métropolitain Aḥudemmeḥ, originaire de Balad, mort en 575, qui doit être distingué de l'auteur du traité sur la composition de l'homme.⁶³

Un autre ensemble de textes pourrait être l'œuvre de Aḥudemmeḥ. Dans une notice sur un manuscrit en sa possession, J.-B. Chabot avait trouvé un texte intitulé "Memra sur la composition de l'homme par Mar Aḥudemmeḥ Antipatros", qu'il édita et traduisit en latin. Il attribuait la première partie du texte à un médecin de Rome, du nom d'Antipater, de l'époque de Galien nommé à plusieurs reprises, et que Sergius de Reš'ainā aurait traduit, tandis que la seconde partie aurait été tirée des œuvres de Aḥudemmeḥ.⁶⁴ Reprenant l'étude de cet ensemble, Ph. Gignoux a montré, à partir de l'examen du contenu du texte, que rien n'empêche d'attribuer les deux parties à Aḥudemmeḥ.⁶⁵ Dans cet ouvrage, l'auteur met en relation une longue série de termes appartenant à l'homme et au cosmos, au microcosme et au macrocosme, et il s'intéresse aux facultés de l'âme en relation avec les parties du corps. D'après Gignoux, les descriptions ne sont pas différentes de celles que l'on trouve dans le traité sur la composition de l'homme. Mais la visée des deux textes n'est pas identique, autant que nous avons pu en juger. Le texte édité par Chabot est de caractère nettement anatomique et physiologique,⁶⁶ au lieu que le traité édité par Nau a pour objet la composition de l'homme en un corps et une âme. C'est donc ce dernier ouvrage seul qui retiendra ici notre attention.

Ce traité illustre à sa manière l'autre versant de la tradition des traités sur l'âme, celle des ouvrages liés aux commentaires sur l'*Hexaemeron* et aux recherches sur la composition de l'homme. Il est essentiellement orienté vers la description des facultés de l'âme et de leurs corrélats corporels. L'arrière-plan théologique du traité est important, qui concerne la dualité de l'homme, composé d'une âme et d'un corps, qui forment une "personnalité" unique: le terme ici utilisé est un substantif d'abstraction (*qnūmtonūto*) formé à partir de *qnūmo*, équivalent du grec *πρόσωπον*. La question initiale est, en effet, celle que pose la compréhension – à laquelle il est difficile de parvenir – de la dualité de l'homme, composé d'une âme et d'un corps, et de l'unité de sa personnalité. Citons quelques lignes au début du traité:

Comprendre de manière exacte le prodige de la composition de l'homme est (le privilège) d'un esprit instruit par la grâce divine pour connaître exactement le secret des œuvres de Dieu. Car de ce que l'homme est divisé en deux parties: l'âme et le corps, il y a grande difficulté à s'élever jusqu'à une exacte investigation de la composition de ce prodigieux instrument. Il n'est pas seulement ardu et difficile de le scruter quant à la distinction de ses parties, mais aussi quant à sa personnalité qui est une et unique dans (ses) actes, (ses) œuvres et (ses) paroles. Comment chacune de ces (deux) parties de l'homme est-elle distincte dans cette personne unique, et divisée par les propriétés de leurs opérations, chacune dans son domaine? Comment

⁶³ Cf. Brock, "Aḥudemmeḥ", p. 13.

⁶⁴ J.-B. Chabot, "Notice sur deux manuscrits contenant les œuvres du moine Isaac de Rabban Isho et du métropolitain Aḥudemmeḥ", *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale et autres bibliothèques* 43 (1943), p. 43-76. Le manuscrit, copié en 1904, est une compilation d'ouvrages médicaux, dont Chabot a extrait les deux textes qui font l'objet de son étude. La première partie du texte attribuée par Chabot à Antipater occupe les fol. 29r-36v (éd. p. 53-60, trad. p. 63-70), la seconde partie attribuée à Aḥudemmeḥ occupe les fol. 36v-39r (éd. p. 60-3, trad. p. 70-3).

⁶⁵ Cf. Gignoux, "Anatomie et physiologie", p. 232-4.

⁶⁶ Chabot, "Notice", p. 74, écrit que l'auteur ne fait aucune allusion aux doctrines religieuses, et que "c'est une œuvre purement païenne".

encore, avec concorde et unanimité, avec unité singulière, concourent-elles en un principe unique de toutes les œuvres, des actes et des paroles?⁶⁷

Établissant, de manière implicite contre les thèses matérialistes, que l'âme est une substance incorporelle, simple et immortelle, le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περι ψυχῆς laissait en suspens la question de l'union des deux natures hétérogènes que sont le corps et l'âme. Dans le *De Anima et resurrectione*, Grégoire de Nysse oppose également, par la voix de sa sœur Macrine, aux conceptions matérialistes de l'âme, la thèse de la substantialité incorporelle et immortelle de l'âme. Mais il subsiste la difficulté de comprendre l'union des deux composants. Sur ce point, on peut comparer le texte d'Aḥudemmeh avec un passage du *De Anima et resurrectione*, dans lequel Grégoire de Nysse fait dire à Macrine que, chez les êtres vivants, la composition de l'âme, essence simple et invisible, avec le corps grossier, dépasse la compréhension humaine:

Οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώντων σωμαίων, καθὼς ἤδη προείρηται, οἷς ἡ ὑπόστασις ἐκ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων ἐστὶ συγκράσεως, κοινωνία τις κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον ἐστὶ τῷ ἀπλῶ τε καὶ ἀειδεῦ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν σωματικὴν παχυμερίαν· ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ ἐν τούτοις εἶναι τὴν ζωτικὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλεται, λόγῳ τινὶ κρείττονι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κατανοήσεως ἀνακραθεῖσαν.⁶⁸

La question qui est posée est claire, c'est celle de l'unité de la personne, dont le composé est double. L'homme est composé d'âme et de corps, chacune des parties, âme et corps, est distincte, mais l'homme est une hypostase unique dans ses actes, ses œuvres et ses paroles. Le composé de la personne singulière qu'est l'homme est double, et de ce fait son action et ses mouvements se manifestent par ses actes, œuvres et paroles de deux manières: soit qu'ils tombent sous les sens (*γγεστο*), soit qu'ils soient perçus par la faculté cognitive (*ιδάτο*). Chaque partie de l'unité hypostatique se distingue par les propres de son activité. Comprendre l'unité de ce composé qu'est la personne humaine ne pourra donc se faire qu'en étudiant les facultés (*ἡαυλε* = δυνάμεις) des parties de son composé. Mais au principe de tous les actes, œuvres et paroles, est l'âme, car c'est par elle que viennent au jour les mouvements et les opérations du corps. C'est donc par les facultés de l'âme que l'examen doit commencer.⁶⁹ Tout

⁶⁷ Nau, "Traité d'Aḥudemmeh", p. 101-2.

⁶⁸ *De Anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, col. 44 B-C; trad. Bouchet, p. 43: "À propos des corps vivants, comme il a été déjà dit, dont la subsistance tient au mélange des éléments, il n'y a pas de point commun, sous le rapport de l'essence, entre l'unicité et l'invisibilité de l'âme et la matérialité des corps. Et pourtant on ne peut nier que le principe vital conféré par l'âme se trouve en eux, opération mêlée à eux par une raison qui dépasse l'entendement humain". Sur ce sujet, voir E. Peroli, "Gregory of Nyssa and the Neoplatonic Doctrine of the Soul", *Vigiliae Christianae* 51 (1997), p. 117-39, en part. p. 130-1, qui rappelle que Porphyre déjà qualifiait l'union de l'âme et du corps de "énigmatique" (ἀπορώτερον), cf. Némésius, *De Natura hominis*, 3, p. 38.14 Morani = Porphyre, *Symmikta Zetemata*, p. 41 Dörrie, et de "divine et paradoxale", cf. Porph., *Ad Gaurum* 10, 5, p. 47.20 Kalbfleisch, trad. Festugière, *La Révélation*, III, p. 284: "mélange divin et paradoxal qui est la propriété spéciale des êtres du genre animal"; voir aussi Porphyre, *Sur la manière dont l'embryon reçoit l'âme*, texte grec révisé par T. Dorandi, trad. française par L. Brisson et al., Vrin, Paris 2012 (Histoire des doctrines de l'antiquité classique, 43), texte p. 176.52-53: τὴν θείαν ἐκείνην κρᾶσιν καὶ παράδοξον καὶ τῶν ζωικῶν ἰδίαν δύναμιν, trad. p. 175: "ce mélange divin autant que paradoxal, qui est une puissance distinctive des vivants".

⁶⁹ Dans la tradition doxographique, à la question de savoir ce qu'est l'âme, était associée celle des parties ou des facultés de l'âme: on peut en trouver des exemples dans Festugière, *La Révélation*, III, p. 1-25. Pour la tradition platonicienne en général, voir H. Dörrie † - M. Baltes, *Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Von der Seele als der Ursache aller sinnvollen Abläufe*. Band 6.1: Bausteine 151-168; Band 6.2: Bausteine 169-181. Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt 2002, 6.1, p. 104-23 (textes et traductions), 346-74 (commentaire); en particulier pour Jamblique, voir *De Anima*,

l'ouvrage (incomplet à la fin, mais la description des facultés est complète, puisqu'on arrive jusqu'à des exemples d'action humaine) traite alors de l'âme et de ses facultés, puis du corps, de ses parties et de ses facultés. Comme le traité le mettra d'ailleurs en évidence, c'est dans la relation au corps que l'on peut observer une multiplicité de facultés dans l'âme.

À l'arrière-plan de la question de l'homme – personne une bien que composée de deux parties distinctes –, se trouve évidemment la question théologique de la personne du Christ, de ses deux natures, divine et humaine, et de la manière dont elles concourent à former une personne une, mais cet arrière-plan n'est pas abordé dans le traité d'Aḥudemmeh, qui se place sur un terrain "philosophique".

Selon Aḥudemmeh, l'âme possède deux facultés, la raison (*mlilūto*) ou faculté rationnelle (*ḥaylo da-mlilūto*), et la vie (*ḥayūto*) ou faculté vitale (*ḥaylo ḥayūtono*), qui elle-même consiste en deux facultés, la colère (*hemto*) et le désir (*regto*). Il s'agit clairement là de la fameuse tripartition, d'origine platonicienne, de l'âme en éléments désirant (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), irascible (τὸ θυμοειδές), et rationnel (τὸ λογιστικόν),⁷⁰ réorganisée par l'introduction de la faculté vitale et la subordination à celle-ci des facultés désirante et irascible.⁷¹ Cette réorganisation est commune et se rencontre, par exemple, dans les œuvres de Grégoire de Nysse.⁷² En revanche, les précisions apportées ensuite par Aḥudemmeh ne sont pas habituelles, à savoir que le désir est entre deux autres modes d'activité (*mā bdonwoto*), la modération et le dérèglement, ce que Aḥudemmeh commente en disant que le bien du désir est la modération, tandis que son mal est le dérèglement. Cela ne doit pas s'entendre en un sens purement relatif aux mœurs, bonnes ou mauvaises, mais en un sens plus large où le désir peut conduire à des opérations bonnes, lorsqu'il est dirigé ou réglé en vue du bien, ou à des opérations mauvaises, lorsqu'il n'est pas soumis à de bonnes règles.⁷³ Quant à la colère, elle se trouve, selon Aḥudemmeh, entre la crainte (*dehlto*) et la vaillance (*ganbrūto*), ce qu'Aḥudemmeh commente en disant que l'opération qui est exécutée avec la vigueur de la colère est bonne, tandis que celle qui

fr. 12-24, dans L.I. Martone, *Giamblico, De Anima. I frammenti, la dottrina*, Pisa U. P., Pisa 2014 (Greco, arabe, latino. Le vie del sapere, Studi, 3), p. 106-27 (table des correspondances avec l'édition Finamore-Dillon aux pp. 301-2).

⁷⁰ Cf. par exemple Platon, *Resp.* IV, 439 C - 441 A; IX, 571 D - 572 A. Le terme *mliluto*, formé sur la racine *ml*, d'où vient *mellto* qui sert à traduire le grec λόγος, correspond au grec λογική. La thèse selon laquelle le désir relève de l'âme est introduite par Platon dans le *Phèdre*, 35 B-C.

⁷¹ La réorganisation est conforme à la thèse platonicienne que l'âme apporte la vie au corps et le détermine comme vivant: cf. *Phaedr.*, 105 C-D; voir aussi *Phaedr.* 246 C: ζῶον τὸ ζύμπαν ἐκλήθη, ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα παγόν, "ce qu'on appelle 'vivant', c'est cet ensemble, une âme et un corps fixé à elle", trad. L. Brisson dans Platon, *Phèdre*, trad. inédite, introd. et notes. Suivi de: J. Derrida, *La pharmacie de Platon*, Flammarion, Paris 1992 (GF Flammarion), p. 118.

⁷² Cf. *De Anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, 48 C-D: ἐγὼ δὲ, ἀναλαβὼν τῆς διανοίας τὸν ὀρισμὸν, ὃν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοῦτου λόγοις περὶ ψυχῆς ἐποιήσατο, οὐχ ἱκανῶς εἶπον ἐνδεδεῦχθαί μοι τὸν λόγον ἐκεῖνον τὰς ἐνθωρουμένας τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις· ὅς φησι νοεράν αὐτὴν εἶναι οὐσίαν, καὶ τῶ ὀργανικῶ σώματι ζωτικὴν δύναμιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐνέργειαν ἐμποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν τε καὶ θεωρητικὴν διάνοιαν ἐνεργός ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐν τῶ νοερῶ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐργαζομένη, οὐδὲ τὰ αἰσθητήρια μόνον πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργειαν οἰκονομεῖ· ἀλλὰ πολλὴ μὲν ἡ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίαν, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ θυμὸν κίνησις ἐνθωρεῖται τῆς φύσει. Trad. Bouchet, p. 47: "Réfléchissant de nouveau à la définition qu'elle avait donnée de l'âme juste avant, je déclarai qu'à mon sens son propos n'avait pas assez démontré les facultés que l'on observe dans l'âme. Elle disait que l'âme est une réalité spirituelle et qu'elle produit dans le corps, qui se comporte comme un instrument, une faculté vitale provoquant l'activité des sens. Non seulement notre âme agit sur la pensée, apte à l'instruction et à la contemplation, en produisant cet effet dans la partie spirituelle de son essence, non seulement elle suscite l'activité naturelle des organes sensoriels, mais aussi on observe dans sa nature un grand mouvement de désir et un grand mouvement de colère".

⁷³ Nous pensons donc que les traductions de Furlani, "La psicologia di Aḥūdhemhē", p. 809, par *castigatezza* et *lascivia* sont trop étroitement orientées vers un sens particulier.

faiblit devant les passions et craint la mort est mauvaise.⁷⁴ Cette manière de présenter le désir entre la modération et le dérèglement évoque évidemment la manière aristotélicienne de décrire certaines vertus comme des médiétés entre un excès et un défaut. On reconnaît, en effet, un procédé de classification utilisé par Aristote, dans ses ouvrages d'éthique, par exemple dans l'*Éthique à Eudème*, où il l'emploie dans l'analyse des vertus et où il affirme qu'il est "nécessaire que la vertu éthique porte sur des intermédiaires et qu'elle soit une certaine médiété": le courage, par exemple, est présenté comme une vertu médiane entre la crainte et la témérité.⁷⁵ Toutefois, ce procédé classificatoire est utilisé différemment par Aḥudemmeḥ, qui ne définit pas le bien du désir comme intermédiaire entre la modération et le dérèglement, mais comme situé du côté de la modération.⁷⁶

Aḥudemmeḥ étend ensuite ce procédé d'analyse, de manière systématique, à la faculté rationnelle de l'âme. La faculté rationnelle est d'abord subdivisée en quatre facultés: la connaissance (*madd'o*, γνῶσις), le raisonnement (*ḥūššobo*, λογισμός), l'intelligence ou intellect (*hawno*, νοῦς), et la pensée (*tar'ito*, ἐννοια).⁷⁷ Puis il organise de la manière suivante le classement de ces facultés entre elles, et en relation avec d'autres facultés: le raisonnement est entre le désir et la colère; la connaissance est entre l'intelligence et le raisonnement; l'intelligence est entre le calme et l'agitation: la pensée est entre l'obéissance et la désobéissance.

Cette répartition, à première vue tout à fait étrange, voire incohérente, prendra son sens, du point de vue de l'auteur, quand nous aborderons les facultés du corps et le concours que celles-ci apportent aux facultés de l'âme dans la réalisation des actions humaines. Une première ébauche de la description du rôle des facultés dans la réalisation d'une action est décrite par Aḥudemmeḥ de la façon suivante:

Le désir et la colère nous poussent à tous les actes pour nous en rapprocher ou pour nous en éloigner; chacun d'eux, en effet, est situé entre deux opérations: le désir nous rapproche et la colère (*rūgzo*) nous éloigne. Cela a lieu aussi chez les animaux qui sont privés de la parole et du raisonnement (*ḥūššobo*, λογισμός). Le raisonnement nous pousse à l'accomplissement des opérations; quand il a été mis en mouvement par une puissance cognitive (*idū'ono*)⁷⁸ vers quelque une des opérations, la pensée (*re'ono*) retient et l'intelligence (*hawno*) modère cette puissance, car chacune d'elles effectue seulement ce qui lui est propre vers l'une en particulier des opérations, par exemple vers la sagesse, ou vers la science, ou la prudence, ou les œuvres, ou l'acte.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Comme le désir donc, la colère peut s'exercer en bonne ou en mauvaise part, selon la manière dont se règle son action: il s'agit d'une ardeur morale, proche du principe que Platon nomme θυμοειδής, qui peut contribuer au bienfait d'une action ou à son défaut.

⁷⁵ Arist., *Eth. Eud.*, III 1, 1228 a 23 - 1229 a 12.

⁷⁶ On comparera la description des deux modes du désir selon Aḥudemmeḥ avec le passage du *Phaedr.*, 237 D - 238 C, dans lequel Platon distingue deux tendances du désir, l'une qui sous la conduite d'une opinion rationnelle mène vers ce qui est le meilleur, l'autre qui entraîne déraisonnablement vers le plaisir: dans le premier cas, la domination du désir reçoit le nom de tempérance (σωφροσύνη); dans le second cas, le désir qui gouverne reçoit le nom de démesure (ὑβρις).

⁷⁷ Les équivalents grecs des termes syriaques que nous donnons entre parenthèses sont ceux qui ont été proposés par Nau, "Traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ", p. 104 n. 1 à 4, et, dans la mesure où ils nous semblent raisonnablement appropriés, nous les reprenons à notre compte. Il faut cependant prendre avec une certaine prudence les traductions des termes syriaques, car il n'est pas toujours facile de préciser la traduction des mots qui désignent chacune des facultés distinguées par Aḥudemmeḥ. Ainsi, dans la suite du texte, il lui arrivera de désigner par le terme *re'ono* ce que nous comprenons ici sous *tar'ito* (ἐννοια).

⁷⁸ Le mot *idū'ono* étant formé sur la même racine que *madd'o*, que nous traduisons par "connaissance", nous nous efforçons de conserver en français une semblable parenté lexicale, ce pourquoi nous rendons ici *idū'ono* par "cognitive".

⁷⁹ Nau, "Traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ", p. 104.

De cet ensemble un peu confus, on retiendra que dans la réalisation d'une opération, au sens le plus général, le désir (ou son antonyme, la colère) joue un premier rôle initiateur, mais que plusieurs facultés rationnelles sont mises en œuvre pour parvenir au but: le raisonnement, la connaissance et la pensée, chacune dans sa fonction propre, qui sera précisée dans la suite du texte. Outre qu'elles ont chacune leur rôle propre, les facultés sont organisées selon une hiérarchie, dans laquelle telle faculté sert telle autre. Citons un passage du traité:

La connaissance (*madd'o*), par son opération sur l'âme, l'emporte sur le raisonnement (*hūššo*), l'intelligence (*hawno*) et la pensée (*re'yono*). [...] L'intelligence règle le raisonnement et sert (à diriger) la connaissance vers une œuvre de perfection, de sagesse et de prudence. Par un jugement prudent, la volonté est fortifiée et affermie contre les passions et les mouvements de la nature; elle sert l'intelligence et fortifie le raisonnement et, par son opération, elle les réunit tous deux dans sa puissance pour recevoir l'opération de la connaissance (*madd'o*) et frayer un beau sentier à la raison (*mlilūto*) vers la science, la sagesse, la prudence et toutes les œuvres de perfection [...].⁸⁰

Les fonctions exercées par chaque faculté sont décrites de manière à vrai dire assez confuse, répétons-le, par Aḥudemmeḥ, qui fait appel pour cela, de manière croisée, à plusieurs des autres facultés à propos de chacune de celles qu'il décrit. À ces facultés, il ajoute, en outre, la raison (*mlilūto*), sans toutefois préciser immédiatement son rôle, puis la volonté:

Comme la raison, la connaissance, le raisonnement, la pensée et l'intelligence dépendent de la volonté comme des serviteurs sous le pouvoir (du maître); par leur opération elle accomplit et fait les deux (contraires): les biens et les maux, la sagesse et la folie, car les biens et les maux, la sagesse et la folie, ne sont pas des puissances de l'âme mais des actes et l'expression des puissances.⁸¹

Nous ne chercherons pas à introduire à toute force un ordre dans le désordre des descriptions de Aḥudemmeḥ, mais nous venons à la partie où il traite des puissances du corps dans leur relation à celles de l'âme. Aḥudemmeḥ introduit les puissances du corps en relation avec les sens de la manière suivante:

Parlons aussi des sens du corps et des puissances naturelles du corps lui-même. Il possède la vie animale et la faculté de discerner (*porūšūto*). La puissance vitale a le désir et la colère, pour s'approcher ou s'éloigner; comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, cela appartient aussi aux animaux, le corps humain n'en est pas privé. La puissance de discernement a cinq sens: cinq puissances les desservent et agissent sur eux: la vue, l'ouïe, le toucher, le goût et l'odorat. Le sage Créateur a donné à celles-ci des membres du corps qui les reçoivent et qui agissent sur elles sous (l'empire) de la puissance de discernement du corps lui-même et aussi de la puissance de l'âme, selon qu'elles sont mises en mouvement du dehors par les objets rencontrés, ou du dedans par l'opération des puissances de la partie rationnelle de l'âme; par leur opération les deux parties de l'âme en arrivent à une unité.⁸²

Ainsi la partie irrationnelle de l'âme est mise en relation avec le corps par les facultés fondamentales que sont le désir et la colère, facultés "primitives" d'attraction et de répulsion. En outre, les cinq

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 109 (traduction légèrement modifiée).

sens sont liés à la faculté de discernement. Reste encore à préciser les relations entre les facultés et les membres directeurs du corps, à établir une “physiologie animale des facultés”. Aḥudemmeḥ la présente dans les termes suivants:

Les membres principaux et directeurs du corps sont: le cerveau, le foie, le cœur, l'estomac (στόμαχος) et les reins; les puissances qui y résident sont: le discernement (*porūšūto*), le désir (*regto*), la colère (*rūgzo*), la concupiscence (*metyabonūto*) et la sensibilité (*rgešto*). La sensibilité est dans le cerveau, le discernement dans le cœur, le désir dans l'estomac, la concupiscence dans les reins, et la colère dans le foie.⁸³

Il existe une longue tradition d'association des facultés ou des parties de l'âme avec des parties du corps. Ainsi, dans le *Timée*, Platon expose comment le dieu façonna le corps de l'être humain en distribuant les différentes parties de l'âme humaine aux différentes parties du corps, localisant par exemple le courage et l'ardeur dans le thorax, la colère (ou plus exactement le θυμός) dans le cœur, le désir dans le foie, etc.⁸⁴ La localisation des facultés est un thème largement répandu chez les auteurs tardo-antiques. Elle peut se situer dans une perspective génétique, issue du *Timée*, où les parties de l'homme sont créées avec leur finalité propre. Ainsi, par exemple, dans le Διδασκαλικός τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων, Alcinoos décrit le façonnage de l'homme et de ses parties par les dieux, à partir de la terre, du feu, de l'air et de l'eau, avant de parler des parties (μέρη) de l'âme, auxquelles sont assignés des lieux (οἴκησις) qui leur sont propres: la partie divine et immortelle au sommet du corps dans la tête, la partie irascible (τὸ θυμικόν) dans le cœur, la partie concupiscible (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) “dans la région qui s'étend entre la limite de l'ombilic et le diaphragme”.⁸⁵ Il y est fait de très brèves allusions aux relations entre parties du corps et puissances (δυνάμεις) de l'âme, telle que “le foie est destiné à exciter la partie concupiscible de l'âme et à l'apaiser, car il contient à la fois de la douceur et de l'amertume”,⁸⁶ mais sans vue systématique sur des processus conjoints. On trouverait dans les œuvres de Galien aussi, bien évidemment, des descriptions des parties du corps et des localisations des parties de l'âme en certaines de ces parties, notamment dans le traité *Que les mœurs de l'âme sont la conséquence des tempéraments des corps*, où il écrit: “Nous avons démontré ailleurs, d'une part, qu'il y a trois espèces d'âmes, et que c'est le sentiment de Platon; d'une autre part, que ces trois âmes habitent l'une dans le foie, l'autre dans le cœur, la troisième dans l'encéphale”.⁸⁷ Le principe d'explication des puissances de l'âme est le tempérament, lequel est expliqué lui-même à partir des mélanges des qualités élémentaires.⁸⁸ Par conséquent la puissance de l'âme est liée à l'organe qui est son siège, par l'intermédiaire du tempérament de cet organe. Galien en donne pour exemple l'âme rationnelle: “J'ai démontré que les puissances de l'âme sont la conséquence de son essence, puisque ses actes en sont eux-mêmes la conséquence. Si donc la partie rationnelle (ou *pensante*) de l'âme est une espèce d'âme, cette espèce sera mortelle, car elle est elle-même un certain tempérament de l'encéphale”.⁸⁹ Laissons de côté le problème de la mortalité de l'âme, le point à noter ici est le lien établi entre une partie de l'âme – Galien écrit: une espèce d'âme – et une fonction physiologique. Dans la conception

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁸⁴ Plat., *Tim.* 69 C-72 D.

⁸⁵ Cf. Alc., *Didaskalikos*, 23 (176.11-22 H); Alcinoos, *Enseignement des doctrines de Platon*, éd. Whittaker, trad. fr. Louis, p. 45-6.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 23 (176.26-28 H), trad. Louis, p. 46.

⁸⁷ Galien, *Œuvres anatomiques, physiologiques et médicales*, trad. Ch. Daremberg, vol. 1, J.-B. Baillièrre, Paris 1854-1856, p. 52: il s'agit respectivement de l'âme désirante, de l'âme irascible et de l'âme rationnelle.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 54-5.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

galénique, par conséquent, le mouvement volontaire a comme principe le cerveau et il est accompli par les instruments qui sont les nerfs et les muscles. Dans cette même tradition s'inscrit Némésius qui, dans un chapitre consacré à la physiologie du mouvement volontaire et intitulé *Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὄρμην ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεως, ἥτις ἐστὶ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ*, écrit:

Ἔστιν οὖν τῆς κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ καθ' ὄρμην κινήσεως ἀρχὴ μὲν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος καὶ ὁ νωτιαῖος μυελός, ἐγκεφάλου μέρος ὣν καὶ αὐτός, ὄργανα δὲ τὰ ἐκ τούτων πεφυκότα νεῦρα καὶ οἱ σύνδεσμοι καὶ οἱ μύες.⁹⁰

Dans cette description ne sont pas prises en compte toutes les parties du corps que Aḥudemmeḥ nomme “membres principaux et directeurs”, avec les facultés diverses qui leur sont attribuées, mais c'est une description générale qui engloberait tous ces “membres” que vise l'auteur syriaque, comme on va le voir.

Plotin, dans la première partie des *Difficultés relatives à l'âme* (*Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποριῶν πρῶτον*), énonce la formule générale selon laquelle chaque partie du corps participe de l'âme en fonction de l'aptitude de chaque organe:

Quand le corps pourvu d'une âme est illuminé par l'âme, une partie de ce corps participe de cette âme d'une façon et une autre partie d'une autre façon. Et c'est en fonction de l'aptitude de tel organe à réaliser telle fonction – car l'âme donne à chaque organe la faculté qui convient à son activité – que la faculté qui se trouve dans les yeux est appelée la faculté de voir, [...] et que la faculté de toucher est présente dans tout le corps, car pour ce type de perception le corps dans sa totalité sert d'organe à l'âme. Étant donné d'une part que les organes du toucher sont associés aux premiers nerfs, qui ont aussi le pouvoir de mettre en mouvement le vivant, parce que c'est par leur intermédiaire que se communique le pouvoir de se mouvoir, étant donné par ailleurs que ces nerfs ont leur point de départ dans le cerveau, on a rapporté au cerveau et placé là le point de départ de la sensation, de l'impulsion et en général du vivant dans sa totalité, en posant que ce qui allait en faire usage se trouvait là où étaient de toute évidence les points de départ des organes.⁹¹

Les localisations de Aḥudemmeḥ ne sont pas celles de Platon ou de Plotin, pas plus d'ailleurs que celles d'Aristote. Mais s'il décrit une organisation des facultés autre que celle de Plotin, que nous venons de lire, le principe général qui sous-tend sa thèse est le même: les diverses puissances qui résident dans le corps sont liées à l'organisation du corps. Ce sont les propriétés naturelles des parties du corps qui sont les supports des puissances qui s'expriment dans la sensibilité, la colère ou le désir.⁹²

⁹⁰ Nemesius, *De Natura hominis*, 27, p. 88.3-5 Morani; trad. Sharples - van der Eijk, p. 158: “The brain and the spinal cord, which is itself part of the brain, are the origin of movement according to choice or to impulse: the organs which grow from these are the nerves, the ligaments and the muscles”. On trouvera dans cette traduction, *ibid.* p. 158, n. 803 et 804, les lieux où Galien expose ces mêmes idées en plusieurs de ses ouvrages. À propos de la dépendance de Némésius vis-à-vis de Galien sur ces sujets, voir A. Debru, “Christianisme et galénisme: le mouvement volontaire chez Némésius d'Émèse”, dans V. Boudon-Millot - B. Pouderon (éd.), *Les Pères de l'Église face à la science médicale de leur temps*, Beauchesne, Paris 2005 (Théologie historique), p. 89-103.

⁹¹ Plot., *Enn.*, IV 3[27], 23.1-15; nous citons la traduction de L. Brisson, dans Plotin, *Traité 27-29, Sur les difficultés relatives à l'âme, trois livres*, présentés, traduits et annotés, Éditions Flammarion, Paris 2005 (GF Flammarion), p. 98-9. Plotin connaît la localisation des fonctions de l'âme par Galien et doit comparer cette théorie, qui a pour lui la force d'une preuve scientifique, avec sa propre doctrine de l'omniprésence de l'âme dans le corps: voir à ce propos T. Tieleman, “Plotinus on the Seat of the Soul. Reverberations of Galen and Alexander in *Enn.* IV 3[27], 23”, *Phronesis* 43 (1998), p. 306-25.

⁹² Cf. par exemple Plot., *Enn.*, IV 4 [28], 28.15-35: “Et il faut considérer que l'origine du désir se situe dans la région du

Aḥudemmeḥ cependant ne s'en tient pas à la première description du rôle des membres directeurs, rapportée ci-dessus. Il ajoute aussitôt après:

Pour ce qui regarde l'âme, le cerveau sert l'intelligence (*hawno*); cinq sens l'ouvrent: la vue, l'ouïe, l'odorat, le goût et le toucher; le cœur sert la connaissance. Sont proches de lui: le foie, l'estomac, la membrane de séparation qui est appelée membrane du cœur et les reins qui sont enveloppés et retenus par les lombes. La membrane de séparation sert la volonté [...]. Les reins servent les raisonnements; ils reçoivent aussi des mouvements du cœur lui-même par les veines qui circulent dans les lombes et s'y entrelacent; le désir est dans l'estomac et la colère dans le foie.⁹³

Il semble donc qu'il y ait deux niveaux où s'exercent les puissances. Au niveau du corps, elles résultent des propriétés des parties du corps et de leur organisation: le cerveau, par exemple, est le siège de la sensibilité, en tant qu'il est le réceptacle des cinq sens. La raison de cette description n'est pas donnée par Aḥudemmeḥ, mais on pourrait la trouver dans la formulation plotinienne, que nous avons mentionnée ci-dessus: "étant donné par ailleurs que ces nerfs [i.e. ceux auxquels sont associés les organes du toucher] ont leur point de départ dans le cerveau, on a rapporté au cerveau et placé là le point de départ de la sensation".⁹⁴ À un autre niveau, celui qui est introduit dans la citation ci-dessus par l'expression "pour ce qui regarde l'âme", il est indiqué que "le cerveau sert l'intelligence", que "le cœur sert la connaissance", et encore que "les reins servent les raisonnements". Pour comprendre cette nouvelle étape dans le discours d'Aḥudemmeḥ, il peut être utile de se reporter au texte de Plotin, dont nous avons cité une partie plus haut.⁹⁵ Plotin poursuivait (nous sautons quelques lignes):

[...] la bile ou le sang, agissant comme un principe d'animation, produisent les mouvements correspondant à la colère, de sorte que, dès que le corps vivant est affecté, le sang et la bile sont mis en mouvement, et que, lorsqu'il y a sensation, la représentation intervient pour mettre en relation l'âme et la disposition du corps vivant, qui est déjà prête à attaquer ce qui cause la douleur. Mais, à l'inverse, le processus peut venir d'en haut: lorsqu'elle repère une injustice, même si ce n'est pas une injustice qui concerne son corps, l'âme, qui fait usage de raisonnement (*τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν λογισμῶν χρωμένην*),⁹⁶ a toute prête cette puissance agressive dont on vient de parler et en fait son alliée [...].⁹⁷

foie, parce que c'est là surtout qu'est actif le végétatif, qui communique sa trace psychique au foie et au corps: c'est là, parce que c'est là que son activité trouve son origine. [...] Mais quand on considère que la prédisposition à la colère dépend des dispositions du corps – ce qui explique que ceux qui ont le sang et la bile en ébullition sont enclins à se mettre en colère, tandis que ceux qui ne sont pas des "bilieux", comme on dit, et "qui ont le sang froid", ne sont pas portés à la colère, et cela explique aussi que chez les bêtes la colère vient du tempérament qui est le leur et non du fait qu'il leur semble qu'elles ont été maltraitées –, quand on considère cela, dis-je, on peut être tenté une fois de plus de rapporter la colère à ce qu'il y a de plus corporel, c'est-à-dire à ce qui assure la cohésion de l'organisme du vivant". (trad. Brisson, dans Plotin, *Traité 27-29*, p. 157-58).

⁹³ Nau, "Traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ", p. 110-11.

⁹⁴ Cf. Plot., *Enn.*, IV 3[27], 23.12-14; voir plus haut le texte cité en référence à la note 91. Ainsi que le note L. Brisson, dans Plotin, *Traité 27-29*, p. 238 n. 418, les découvertes des nerfs par les médecins Hérophile de Chalcédoine et Érasistrate de Céos (dans la première moitié du III^e siècle avant notre ère) ont été reprises et exploitées par Galien, dans son traité *Sur les doctrines d'Hippocrate et de Platon*, VII 8, 4 et VIII 1, 4. Aḥudemmeḥ ne mentionne pas les nerfs pour expliquer que la sensation se trouve dans le cerveau, mais il reproduit l'opinion devenue commune après Galien.

⁹⁵ Voir le texte cité en référence à la note 91.

⁹⁶ Nous traduisons *λογισμῶν* par "raisonnement" pour souligner le parallélisme entre le mot grec et son correspondant syriaque *huššo*.

⁹⁷ Plotin, *Enn.*, IV 4[28], 28.38-47; trad. Brisson, dans Plotin, *Traité 27-29*, p. 158, légèrement modifiée.

Selon l'analyse de Plotin, la colère a son siège premier dans l'organisation physiologique du corps, comme le rend manifeste l'exemple des animaux: la colère, chez eux, vient du tempérament et non d'un jugement sur un dommage subi; et une autre source se trouve dans l'âme usant de raisonnement (λογισμός) face à l'injustice repérée. Par analogie avec cette distinction de deux processus dans l'analyse plotinienne, on peut essayer de rendre compte des deux manières par lesquelles Aḥudemmeḥ entreprend de décrire les puissances ou facultés, selon qu'il considère l'âme ou les parties du corps: pour ce qui regarde les parties directrices du corps en tant que tel, le cerveau, point de départ des nerfs – racine des nerfs dira Aḥudemmeḥ dans le texte que nous citons plus bas –, est le siège de la sensation; mais pour ce qui regarde l'âme, il est le siège de l'intelligence, ou plutôt il est au service (par les informations qu'il recueille grâce aux sens, sans doute, mais Aḥudemmeḥ ne le précise pas) de l'intelligence, c'est-à-dire de la puissance rationnelle, comme on le verra plus loin. Une fois que l'on a admis cette prémisse, que les puissances ou facultés sont susceptibles de deux types de descriptions, du point de vue du corps et de celui de l'âme, on peut sans doute concevoir aussi que le cœur dans lequel réside le discernement soit au service de la connaissance. Il est plus difficile, assurément, de comprendre comment les reins, siège de la puissance de concupiscence, peuvent être au service des raisonnements, mais la suite apportera un éclairage sur ce point, même s'il restera contestable. Le foie et l'estomac conservent leur même rôle dans la nouvelle classification, le premier comme siège de la colère, le second comme siège du désir.

Pour expliquer alors le fonctionnement du corps humain dans sa totalité, il faut prendre en compte l'interaction de ses diverses puissances ou facultés, en termes dynamiques si l'on peut dire. Aḥudemmeḥ donne alors la description suivante, qui résume ce qui a trait aux puissances du corps:

Le cœur est donc la racine des veines et des artères et leur donne le mouvement à tous; il fait couler la vie par tout le corps et met en mouvement les muscles placés à côté des artères. Le cerveau est la racine des nerfs et envoie le sens (du toucher) dans tout le corps et le principe vital dans les nerfs et dans les membres. Le foie répand la chaleur par le moyen du sang, par la vessie enflammée qui est près de lui. L'estomac conduit les reins à la concupiscence et (conduit) le foie au désir; quant au reste des membres, (l'estomac) gère, comme un intendant, l'administration de leurs désirs, c'est de lui que tout le corps reçoit le désir.⁹⁸

Tel est le niveau premier de l'organisation du corps et de ses puissances. C'est sur ce niveau premier que vient se greffer l'organisation des facultés de l'âme qui, conjointement avec celles du corps, conduisent à la réalisation des actes, dont on rappelle que c'était l'objet de la question initiale posée par l'auteur au début de son opusculé. La réponse à cette question est donnée d'abord en termes généraux, puis à l'aide de deux exemples. Nous commencerons par ceux-ci, qui semblent plus propres à faire comprendre l'explication de l'auteur. Citons le premier exemple:

Si une femme rencontre un homme et que le regard de celui-ci tombe sur la beauté du visage et qu'il soit amené aussitôt au désir, pendant que les raisonnements tendent à l'accomplissement, la connaissance conduit aux projets, l'intelligence prépare leur réalisation, l'esprit s'empporte vers les actes, la volonté est vaincue à cause de sa faiblesse, les sens sont enflammés par les chauds mouvements du désir et l'acte de péché est terminé et accompli par l'union une et personnelle de l'homme.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Nau, "Traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ", p. 112 (traduction légèrement modifiée).

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

Retenons de cet exemple que les quatre parties de la faculté rationnelle que Aḥudemmeḥ a distinguées au début de son texte sont à l'œuvre dans la réalisation d'un acte. À l'origine de l'acte se trouve le désir, dont le siège est l'estomac, qui conduit les reins à la concupiscence (selon ce qu'a écrit Aḥudemmeḥ), qui trouve là le siège corporel de sa faculté. Mais les reins sont aussi, non plus du point de vue de l'organisation physiologique du corps, mais du point de vue des facultés de l'âme, le lieu où s'élaborent les "raisonnements" tendant à l'accomplissement, par quoi il faut entendre sans doute les mises en œuvre de stratégies conduisant à l'accomplissement (ce que pourrait signifier le terme syriaque *ḥuṣṣobo* correspondant au grec λογισμός). Mais le projet de conquête, en l'occurrence, ne peut être mené à bien par les seuls raisonnements, il doit être pris en charge par la connaissance (*madd'o, γνῶσις*) siégeant dans le cœur pour être conçu comme projet, et ensuite la réalisation est préparée par l'œuvre de l'intelligence (*hawno, νοῦς*), tandis que l'acte même est conclu par l'esprit (*re'gono, ἔννοια*).¹⁰⁰

Le second exemple est celui-ci:

De même pour un acte de justice, les puissances agissent l'une sur l'autre par les mouvements conjoints du cœur serviteur de la connaissance, et le raisonnement est amené au désir des perfections et il excite la puissance appétitive à l'accomplissement de l'acte, pendant que la pensée fortifie les raisonnements et que l'intelligence prépare prudemment l'acte de perfection comme puissance rationnelle, sous le pouvoir de la volonté.¹⁰¹

Il est assurément difficile de spécifier la place et le rôle des diverses facultés de l'âme, qui ne sont d'ailleurs pas toutes énumérées dans ce dernier exemple: la connaissance, le raisonnement, l'intelligence contribuent chacune à l'accomplissement de l'acte, tout comme la volonté qui joue un rôle dans le présent exemple, au lieu que dans le précédent elle était vaincue, impuissante à s'opposer aux mouvements de la concupiscence. Il reste que la visée de l'auteur est la même. Il s'agit de montrer que les diverses facultés de l'âme interagissent entre elles, d'une part, et que les facultés de l'âme et les puissances du corps sont toutes à l'œuvre ensemble et conjointement dans la réalisation d'un acte, que toute la personne, corps et âme, est impliquée dans tout acte humain. C'est ce que Aḥudemmeḥ exprime dans sa conclusion, ou ce que l'on peut tenir pour tel, même si l'ouvrage est inachevé:

Il surgit une seule personne hypostatique des puissances de l'âme et du corps, parce que même ces membres qui sont les directeurs et les agents efficients de toutes les opérations, se donnent les uns aux autres une même puissance en vue de mettre en mouvement les actes, et les puissances de l'âme sont mises en mouvement avec eux par ce mouvement dont nous avons parlé plus haut, et la direction et la réalisation des actes sont réunies dans une seule personne humaine, qu'elles soient mises en mouvement du dehors par les choses qui surviennent ou (qu'elles le soient) du dedans par les passions propres à la puissance naturelle du désir et de la colère. [...] Le désir est comme le commencement de tous les actes, c'est de lui que prend naissance le mouvement dans le cœur qui sert la connaissance, puissance excellente de la raison, puis (le mouvement) progresse et descend dans la concupiscence des reins en vue du raisonnement et la pensée est fortifiée par son opération, par cette membrane qu'on appelle "pensée", (le mouvement ?) se fortifie et monte dans la puissance du foie, par ce même

¹⁰⁰ Nous reproduisons entre parenthèse, avec prudence, les équivalents grecs des mots syriaques, tels qu'ils avaient été suggérés lors de la première division des puissances de l'âme par Aḥudemmeḥ, ci-dessus n. 77.

¹⁰¹ Nau, "Traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ", p. 113-14 (traduction modifiée).

mouvement commun et simultané, vers la colère, puis l'intelligence met en mouvement les pensées et dispose les manières d'agir [...].¹⁰²

C'est tout un parcours anatomo-physiologique que suit la genèse de l'acte dans le corps, cependant qu'en parallèle et simultanément les diverses facultés de l'âme tour à tour participent à cette même genèse. Ainsi c'est la personne humaine tout entière dans l'unité du corps et de l'âme qui produit l'acte. Dans l'étude qui accompagnait sa traduction, Furlani notait qu'il lui était impossible de désigner aucun texte grec qui pût être le modèle du traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ. Il avait suggéré des rapprochements avec le discours métrique syriaque d'un Isaac d'Antioche sur les facultés de l'âme, dont le titre traduit par Furlani se lit: *Discorso trentatreesimo sul discernimento naturale del ragionamento naturale*, avec pour sous-titre (*Discorso*) *sul ragionamento e sul discernimento*. Isaac mentionne, en effet, diverses facultés, telles que la pensée, le raisonnement, le jugement et la prudence, ainsi encore que la connaissance, la volonté et la liberté, en ajoutant qu'elles sont en étroite interdépendance et concourent à former l'action humaine.¹⁰³ C'est là l'énoncé d'un principe d'interaction des facultés proche de celui que décrit Aḥudemmeḥ, mais il y manque une ébauche de description de cette interaction, comme celle que l'on trouve chez Aḥudemmeḥ, et surtout il n'est pas fait allusion à la participation des facultés corporelles à la production de l'action. Un autre texte est mentionné par Furlani, qui offrirait des éléments comparables à ceux du traité de Aḥudemmeḥ, à savoir le Περὶ κριτηρίου καὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ de Ptolémée.¹⁰⁴ À la fin de son traité, en effet, Ptolémée énonce clairement l'idée d'une connexion entre les diverses facultés de l'âme et les parties différentes du corps, en ces termes: [...] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰς διαφορὰς πρὸς τὰς τῶν οὐσιῶν τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ μέρος δυνάμεις συμβάλλεσθαι τι.¹⁰⁵ Et l'on peut tout particulièrement rapprocher de ce que nous avons lu chez Aḥudemmeḥ deux exemples que donne Ptolémée:

[...] τὸ ὄρητικόν· οὗ καὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ὄρεκτικόν καὶ ἀεροειδέστερον περὶ τὴν γαστέρα καὶ τὸ ἥτρον πῶς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν καὶ πυροειδέστερον περὶ τὰ σπλάγχνα καὶ τὴν καρδίαν.¹⁰⁶

Les localisations de ces facultés de l'âme par Ptolémée sont comparables à celles que l'on trouve chez Aḥudemmeḥ, tout comme est semblable chez les deux auteurs le principe d'une connexion entre une faculté de l'âme et une partie organique du corps qui est appropriée à l'exercice de cette faculté.

Mais pas plus chez Ptolémée ou Galien que chez les autres auteurs que nous avons mentionnés, on ne trouve une description de la genèse de l'acte humain comme produit d'un processus tout à la fois

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 114-15 (traduction modifiée).

¹⁰³ Furlani, "La psicologia di Aḥūdhemmeḥ", p. 833-5; le discours métrique d'Isaac d'Antioche a été édité dans P. Bedjan, *Homiliae S. Isaaci Syri Antiocheni*, Harrassowitz, Paris - Leipzig 1903, p. 399-408.

¹⁰⁴ *Claudii Ptolemaei opera quae exstant omnia*, III, 2, éd. F. Lammert - Ae. Boer, Teubner, Leipzig 1961 (Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum Teubneriana). Le texte a été reproduit (avec quelques variantes), avec une traduction anglaise, dans P. Huby - G. Neal (éd.), *The Criterion of Truth. Essays written in honour of George Kerferd*, together with a text and translation (with annotations) of Ptolemy's *On the criterion and hegemonikon*, Liverpool U. P., Liverpool 1989, p. 182-213.

¹⁰⁵ Éd. Lammert, p. 20.10-12; trad. (Huby-Neal éd.), p. 207: "A further consequence will be that bodily differences will have some effect on the particular natural capacities of soul".

¹⁰⁶ Éd. Lammert, p. 21.3-6; trad. (Huby-Neal éd.), p. 209: "Within the faculty of impulse itself, the appetitive part, which has more air in its composition, revolves, so to speak, around the stomach and abdomen, while the emotive part, which has more fire, is located round the liver and the heart".

organique, ou physiologique, et “mental”, si l’on peut regrouper sous ce terme les diverses puissances ou facultés de l’âme dont la conjonction est nécessaire à l’action, selon la description qu’en donne Aḥudemmeḥ.

Le commentaire de Jacques d’Édesse sur l’Hexaemeron

L’un des lieux où se traite la question de l’âme, dans la tradition chrétienne, est, nous l’avons dit, le texte de l’*Hexaemeron* dans sa partie touchant la création de l’homme, qui est, en quelque sorte, la contrepartie de ce que fut le *Timée* pour la tradition philosophique d’inspiration platonicienne. Il vaut la peine de considérer ici le commentaire sur l’*Hexaemeron* de Jacques d’Édesse († 708), savant illustre de la tradition syriacque. Formé à l’école du monastère de Qenneshre, haut lieu des études grecques sous la direction de Sévère Sebokht au VII^e siècle, Jacques traduisit les *Catégories* d’Aristote et composa un bref traité sur les diverses expressions de l’être en syriacque, où il fit montre de sa connaissance de la *Métaphysique* du même Aristote.¹⁰⁷ Éminent représentant de la culture gréco-syriacque, Jacques composa un commentaire sur l’*Hexaemeron*, dont la partie “scientifique” touchant la cosmographie et l’étude de la terre est largement modelée sur celui de Basile de Césarée, qu’il utilisa vraisemblablement à la fois dans l’original grec et dans sa traduction syriacque, tout en le corrigeant.¹⁰⁸ Jacques utilisa aussi le *De Opificio mundi* de Jean Philopon qui s’inspirait lui-même des *Homélie*s sur l’*Hexaemeron* de Basile.¹⁰⁹

Dans la partie de son commentaire qui concerne la création de l’homme, Jacques d’Édesse décrit la figure du corps humain, tel que Dieu l’a créé pour être la maison où puisse habiter en sécurité l’esprit (*hawno*) avant qu’il ne soit dissous.¹¹⁰ Il énumère ainsi diverses particularités morphologiques du corps humain, telles que la station droite, la bipédie, la préhension par les mains, la position des mamelles sur le buste, la position de la tête au-dessus de tous les membres, par lesquelles l’homme se différencie des animaux.¹¹¹ Au terme de cette énumération à laquelle, dit-il, d’autres pourraient ajouter d’autres caractères encore par lesquels l’homme se distingue des animaux, Jacques reprend le

¹⁰⁷ Cf. H. Hugonnard-Roche, “Le vocabulaire philosophique de l’être en syriacque, d’après des textes de Sergius de Resh’aina et Jacques d’Édesse”, dans J.E. Montgomery (éd.), *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank*, Leuven, Peeters 2006 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 152), p. 101-25. Pour une vue générale sur Jacques d’Édesse, lire la notice de A.G. Salvesen, “Ya’qub of Edessa”, dans S.P. Brock et al. (éd.), *The Gorgias Encyclopedic Dictionary*, p. 432-3; on peut aussi consulter les études réunies par B. ter Haar Romeny (éd.), *Jacob of Edessa and the Syriac Culture of His Day*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2008 (Monographs of the Peshitta Institute Leiden, 18).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. M. Wilks, “Jacob of Edessa’ Use of Greek Philosophy in His *Hexaemeron*”, dans B. ter Haar Romeny (éd.), *Jacob of Edessa*, p. 223-38, en part. p. 224.

¹⁰⁹ Sur l’emploi par Philopon du traité de Basile, voir la partie consacrée au *De Opificio mundi* dans la notice de G.R. Giardina, “Philopon (Jean -)”, dans R. Goulet (éd.), *DPhA P 164 = Va* [2012], p. 487-9, en part. p. 487; sur l’emploi par Jacques d’Édesse du traité de Philopon, voir Wilks, “Jacob of Edessa”, p. 227-8.

¹¹⁰ Le texte syriacque du traité a été édité par J.-B. Chabot, *Iacobi Edesseni Hexaemeron seu in opus creationis libri septem*, e Typographeo Reipublicae, Paris 1928 (CSCO 92, Scriptorum Syri 44). Pour la commodité du lecteur, nous citerons la traduction latine du texte syriacque par A. Vaschalde, *Iacobi Edesseni Hexaemeron seu in opus creationis libri septem*, Secrétariat du Corpus SCO, Louvain 1932 (CSCO 97, Scriptorum Syri 48), p. 258: “Sic Deus factor figuram corporis humani formavit illudque posuit ut sit domus atque domicilium securum vero homini, menti, quae in illo ad tempus habitat donec iubeat illud dissolvi qui creavit”.

¹¹¹ *Hex.*, p. 303-6 (syriacque), p. 259-61 (trad. Vaschalde). Les thèmes de la stature droite de l’homme et de ses mains ont été traités par Grégoire de Nysse, *Hex.*, VIII, PG 44, 144 B-C, mais le développement de Jacques d’Édesse n’est pas une simple reprise du texte de Grégoire. Sur l’origine de ce thème, cf. notamment Plat., *Tim.*, 90 A-B et Arist., *De Partibus animalium* II, 10, 656 a 12-13: μόνον γὰρ ὀρθόν ἐστι τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπος.

thème traditionnel selon lequel Dieu a créé l'homme à son image, comme le dit la Genèse: "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram et ad similitudinem nostram, et dominetur piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli, et iumentis, et universae terrae, et omnibus reptilibus que reptant super terram".¹¹² Toutefois, précise Jacques, ce n'est pas la nature corporelle et matérielle qui est à l'image de Dieu, mais la nature intellectuelle et incorporelle de son âme invisible. S'inspirant alors des attributs que nous pouvons reconnaître à Dieu, l'auteur en déduit les attributs de l'âme faite à son image: l'âme, ou plus exactement la *mens* (*hawno*) est intellectuelle, invisible, incorporelle; elle possède bonté, justice, force, miséricorde, science, sagesse, pureté; elle est éloignée de toute tache et pollution de la chair et de l'esprit. Dieu lui a donné le libre arbitre et la liberté d'elle-même; créée, elle est immortelle et incorruptible, sans fin et pour l'éternité.¹¹³

Toutefois, l'Écriture enseigne autre chose à propos de l'homme: "Et formavit Deus hominem pulverem de terra et spiravit in faciem eius halitum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem".¹¹⁴ La nature humaine est donc composée de contraires:

Sic natura hominis ex his contrariis composita est, ex pulvere et spiritu, ex anima et corpore, ex visibili et invisibili, ex sensibili et intellectuali, ex corporali et spiritali, ex dissolubili et ex immortalis sempiternoque.¹¹⁵

C'est le mystère de la composition de l'homme, conclut Jacques, que cette union de l'âme et du corps, dont les attributs sont ainsi contraires. À la suite de cet exposé, fidèle en somme à la doctrine des Écritures et aux enseignements des Pères,¹¹⁶ Jacques d'Édesse introduit un nouvel exposé, d'un tout autre caractère, portant sur ce que les "profanes" disent de l'animation.¹¹⁷ En fait, Jacques ne dit rien du problème précis que désigne généralement ce vocable, c'est-à-dire celui de la manière dont l'âme s'unit au corps de l'embryon, de l'ένσωμάτωσις de l'âme, et du moment où a lieu cette union. Ce que Jacques expose, ce sont les diverses âmes propres aux diverses classes d'êtres vivants, qu'il décrit selon un point de vue conforme dans l'ensemble à la conception aristotélicienne en la matière, si l'on met de côté toutefois le rôle de Dieu dans la création. Les profanes, dit-il en effet, prédisent une "animation" de tout ce qui a vie nutritive et augmentative, et ils disent que tous ont une âme. Cela est donc vrai des arbres, des plantes et de tout ce qui a la faculté de germer dans la terre et de produire la semence constituant son propre genre. Par cette faculté de se nourrir et de croître, les plantes se distinguent des pierres et autres corps dépourvus d'âme. Elles se distinguent aussi des

¹¹² Cf. Gn., 1, 27-28, cité par Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 309 (syriaque), p. 263 (trad. Vaschalde).

¹¹³ Cf. *Hex.*, p. 312-13 (syriaque), p. 266-67 (trad. Vaschalde).

¹¹⁴ Cf. Gn., 2, 7, cité par Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 314 (syriaque), p. 267 (trad. Vaschalde).

¹¹⁵ Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 320 (syriaque), p. 273 (trad. Vaschalde).

¹¹⁶ Selon Jacques, ce ne sont pas seulement les Écritures qui témoignent que Dieu a créé l'âme comme rationnelle, intellectuelle et incorporelle, mais aussi "vir quidam ex Hebraeis, homo disertus et sapiens et celebris" (*Hex.* p. 315 [syriaque], p. 268 [trad. Vaschalde]), dans lequel il faudrait voir sans doute Philon d'Alexandrie, selon Vaschalde, p. 268 n. 1. Jacques, d'autre part, cite un passage de Grégoire (de Nazianze), touchant la création de l'homme comme composé d'une âme et d'un corps: Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.* p. 320-321 (syriaque), p. 273-274 (trad. Vaschalde); cf. Grégoire de Nazianze, *Oratio in sanctum Pascha*, PG 36, 629 D-631 B, où l'auteur oppose les natures visible et invisible, corporelle et spirituelle, qui composent l'homme.

¹¹⁷ L'expression syriaque *hōlen da-lbar* (*Hex.*, p. 322, col. a, ligne 21, littéralement: "ceux de l'extérieur") est celle qui est usuellement utilisée pour désigner les auteurs profanes. Ce n'est pas le mot signifiant âme (*napšo*) qui est utilisé dans le texte de Jacques à propos de ce qu'ont à dire les auteurs profanes, mais le mot signifiant le fait d'être animé (*mnapšūto*) (*Hex.*, p. 322, col. a, ligne 20), rendu par *animatio* dans la traduction de Vaschalde, p. 274.

animaux de toutes sortes,¹¹⁸ dont deux facultés animatrices sont prédiquées, celle de la nutrition et de la croissance d'une part, et en outre celle de la sensation et de la locomotion. L'âme des animaux, toutefois, n'est pas complète, mais elle possède cependant les puissances de la colère et du désir, par lesquelles ils recherchent leur nourriture et assouissent leur colère.¹¹⁹

De l'homme enfin les profanes prédiquent trois facultés: la faculté nutritive et augmentative comme les plantes, la faculté sensitive et locomotrice comme les animaux, et la faculté rationnelle (*mlilo*) et cogitative (*ħaššūbtono*), qui lui a été conférée par Dieu, en tant qu'il a été créé à l'image de son créateur. L'âme de l'homme est ainsi complète, en ce que lui appartiennent la colère et le désir, ainsi que la cogitation rationnelle. Par cette description des facultés de l'âme humaine, Jacques d'Édesse combine donc la thèse aristotélicienne des trois états des facultés, celui de l'âme des végétaux, celui de l'âme des animaux et celui de l'âme de l'homme, avec la "tripartition" platonicienne, comme le souligne l'affirmation qui suit immédiatement, à savoir que la description ainsi donnée n'est pas étrangère à l'interprétation de l'image du char de Platon, avec ses deux poulains et son aurige:

Quapropter dicimus animam completam esse homini, et statuimus tres facultates esse animae eius, et affirmamus iram et concupiscentiam esse animae cum cogitatione rationali. Ideo non a nobis alienum dicimus de illa interpretari currum illum Platonis, et duos pullos et aurigam qui est super illos.¹²⁰

Le désir pousse à la recherche de la nourriture et à la procréation, cependant que la colère s'insurge contre l'injustice et induit à se défendre contre les maux. Telles sont les deux facultés, qui comme les deux poulains sont conduits avec prudence et force par le moyen des rênes que tient la cogitation rationnelle et intelligente. Toutes deux sont les facultés auxiliaires qui ont été données par Dieu à l'homme pour le soutien et la conservation de tout le composé animal qu'est l'homme. Ainsi composé par le créateur, à partir de deux contraires, le corps et l'âme, l'homme, composé un, tient le milieu entre les animaux irrationnels et mortels et les vertus rationnelles, spirituelles, intellectuelles et immortelles:

Sic formata est anima cum omnibus praestantibus et manifestata est ut similitudo Dei creatoris sui, et sic conflatus est homo ex duobus contrariis, ex anima et corpore, et constitutus est unum animal compositum, in medio prope omnia positum, inter animalia irrationalia et mortalia et virtutes rationales (*mlile*, gr. λογικαί), spirituales (*rūhone*, gr. πνευματικαί), intellectuales (*methawnone*, gr. νοητικαί) et immortales.¹²¹

Le passage sur les facultés prédiquées de l'âme que Jacques d'Édesse déclare tirer des auteurs profanes est, en somme, la contrepartie philosophique du récit de la formation de l'homme selon l'histoire sacrée, que raconte Macrine dans le *De Anima et resurrectione* de Grégoire de Nysse, de la manière suivante:

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συνέστη τὸ πᾶν, καθὼς ἡ ἱστορία φησὶν, οὐκ εὐθὺς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῇ γῆ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τούτου μὲν ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων προηγέσατο φύσις· ἐκείνων δὲ τὰ βλαστήματα. Δείκνυσιν, οἶμαι, διὰ

¹¹⁸ La mention particulière des oiseaux et des reptiles est évidemment une reprise de Gn., 1, 20-21.

¹¹⁹ Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 322-3 (syriaque), p. 275 (trad. Vaschalde).

¹²⁰ Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 323 (syr.), p. 275-6 (trad. Vaschalde); Vaschalde, p. 276 n.1, signale que la métaphore platonicienne se trouve chez Grégoire de Nysse, *De Anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, col. 52 (et non 47, comme il est écrit par erreur); cf. Plat., *Phaedr.*, 246 A-B, 253 C-E.

¹²¹ Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 324 (syr.), p. 276 (trad. Vaschalde).

τούτων ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἡ ζωτικὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθία τινὶ τῇ σωματικῇ καταμίγνυται φύσει, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἀναισθητοῖς ἐνδύουσα, κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν προῖοῦσα, εἴθ' οὕτως πρὸς τὸ νοερόν καὶ λογιστικὸν ἀναβαίνουσα.¹²²

Dans le *De Opificio hominis*, encore, Grégoire de Nysse explique le récit biblique de la Genèse, 1, 1-27, en faisant référence de même à une philosophie de l'âme, à laquelle il emprunte des enseignements qui ne sont autres que ceux du *De Anima* d'Aristote pour les interpréter dans le cadre des Écritures:

[...] Τάχα γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου νοούμενον διὰ τούτου μανθάνομεν, ὅτι τῶν ζώων ἕνεκεν ἡ πόα χρησιμὸς ἐφάνη τῷ κτίσαντι, διὰ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰ βοτά· οὐ χάριν πρὸ μὲν τῶν βοσκομημάτων, ἐκείνων τροφή, πρὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ὑπηρετεῖν μέλλον τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ζωῇ. Ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δόγμα τι τῶν κεκρυμμένων παραδηλοῦν διὰ τούτων ὁ Μωϋσῆς, καὶ τὴν περὶ ψυχῆς φιλοσοφίαν δι' ἀπορρήτων παραδιδόναι, ἣν ἐφαντάσθη μὲν καὶ ἡ ἔξωθεν παιδευσίς, οὐ μὴν τηλαυγῶς κατενόησε. Διδάσκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς διὰ τούτων ὁ λόγος, ἐν τρισὶ διαφοραῖς τὴν ζωτικὴν καὶ ψυχικὴν δύναμιν θεωρεῖσθαι. Ἡ μὲν γάρ τις ἐστὶν αὐξητικὴ τε μόνον καὶ θρεπτικὴ [...], ἡ φυσικὴ λέγεται [...]. Ἐτερον δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο ζωῆς εἰδὸς ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, καὶ τὸ κατ' αἴσθησιν οἰκονομῆσαι προσειληφεν, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀλόγων ἐστίν. [...] Ἡ δὲ τελεία ἐν σώματι ζωὴ ἐν τῇ λογικῇ, τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ λέγω, καθορᾶται φύσει, τρεφομένη τε καὶ αἰσθανομένη, καὶ λόγου μετέχουσα, καὶ νῶ διοικουμένη.¹²³

Sans doute inspiré par la démarche de Grégoire de Nysse, Jacques d'Édesse est probablement plus prompt que lui cependant à recevoir la contribution de l'éducation païenne à l'élucidation de la question de "l'animation", comme le suggère le texte précédent qui tend à minimiser l'apport de la philosophie païenne. Cela se remarque aussi à propos de la manière différente que les deux auteurs ont de traiter la métaphore du char de Platon. Jacques d'Édesse la reprend à son compte, comme on l'a vu. En revanche, Grégoire de Nysse critique clairement l'insuffisance de la philosophie païenne, et recommande d'abandonner ses énigmes pour se placer dans la ligne de l'Écriture:

Ἡμῖν δὲ εἰ μὲν ἰκανὴ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῶς ἦν ἡ ἔξω φιλοσοφία, ἡ τεχνικῶς περὶ τούτων διαλαβοῦσα, περιττὸν ἂν ἦν ἕως τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον προτιθέναι τῷ σκέμματι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ τὸ φανὲν

¹²² Grégoire de Nysse, *De Anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, col. 60 A; trad. Bouchet, p. 54: "après la création de l'univers, selon le récit [biblique] (cf. Gn. 1, 1-27), l'homme n'apparut pas aussitôt sur la terre; la nature animale l'a précédé, et avant elle il y eut les végétaux. L'Écriture montre ainsi, je pense, que la faculté vitale est liée selon une certaine progression à la nature des corps: elle entre d'abord dans les éléments dépourvus de sensibilité, avance ensuite vers les créatures sensibles, puis s'élève de la sorte vers l'être doué d'esprit et de raison".

¹²³ Grégoire de Nysse, *De Opificio hominis*, PG 44, 144 D-145 A; trad. J. Laplace, dans Grégoire de Nysse, *La création de l'homme*, introd. et trad. par Jean Laplace, notes par J. Daniélou, Éd. du Cerf, Paris 1943, réimpr. revue et corrigée 2002 (Sources chrétiennes, 6), p. 107-8: "Bien sûr, nous apprenons par là – ce qui est à la portée de tout le monde – que le Créateur a fait l'herbe en vue des vivants et les bêtes des champs en vue de l'homme: avant les animaux, il crée leur nourriture et, avant l'homme, tout ce qui doit servir à sa vie. Mais je soupçonne Moïse d'avoir voulu donner à entendre par là une doctrine mystérieuse et, sous des mots cachés, de livrer une philosophie de l'âme que les 'philosophes de l'extérieur' ont entrevue, sans la saisir clairement. Par ces mots, l'Écriture nous enseigne que la force qui est dans les vivants et les êtres animés est de trois sortes: premièrement, celle qui permet aux êtres de s'accroître et de se nourrir [...]. On l'appelle 'naturelle' [...]. Deuxièmement, il y a une autre forme de vie, qui possède la première et qui a en plus un organisme sensoriel. C'est le cas des animaux sans raison [...]. Enfin la perfection de la vie corporelle se trouve dans la nature rationnelle, c'est-à-dire la nature humaine: elle se nourrit, a des sens, participe de la raison et se gouverne par l'esprit".

ἀκόλουθον κατ' ἐξουσίαν προῆλθεν ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρία· ἡμεῖς δὲ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἄμοιροι ταύτης ἐσμέν, τῆς λέγειν φημί ἄπερ βουλόμεθα, κανόνι παντός δόγματος καὶ νόμῳ κεχρημένοι τῇ ἀγία Γραφῇ· ἀναγκασίως πρὸς ταύτην βλέποντες, τοῦτο δεχόμεθα μόνον, ὅτι περ ἂν ᾗ συμφωνοῦν τῷ τῶν γεγραμμένων σκοπῷ. Οὐκοῦν παρέντες τὸ Πλατωνικὸν ἄρμα, καὶ τὴν ὑπεζευγμένην αὐτῷ ζυνοῦσαν τῶν πάλων, οὐχ ὁμοίως ταῖς ὀρμαῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐχόντων, καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἡνίοχον, δι' ὧν ἀπάντων τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς φιλοσοφεῖ δι' αἰνίγματος· ὅσα θ' ὁ μετ' ἐκεῖνον φιλόσοφος ὁ τεχνικῶς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀκολουθῶν, καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμῶν προκείμενα δι' ἐπιμελείας κατεξετάζων, θνητὴν εἶναι διὰ τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεφάνητο [...] σκοπὸν τοῦ λόγου τὴν θεόπνευστον Γραφήν ποιησάμεθα [...].¹²⁴

Grégoire de Nysse rejette donc, non seulement la démarche d'Aristote qui s'en tient aux apparences, mais aussi les "mythes" platoniciens, et il veut prendre pour seul guide l'Écriture, en ne retenant de la philosophie païenne que ce qui est conforme à celle-là. Trois siècles plus tard, Jacques d'Édesse accorde une place plus importante à la philosophie païenne dans l'étude de l'âme, comme le montre tout le passage qu'il lui consacre à propos de l'animation des êtres vivants.

Cela étant dit, il reste à montrer, selon Jacques, ce qu'est l'âme (*napšo*) et ce qu'est l'intellect (*hawno*), si l'intellect est ou non autre chose que l'âme, et quelles sont les propriétés qui appartiennent à l'âme seule. Grammairien et connaisseur de la langue grecque, Jacques commence par des remarques étymologiques. Selon lui, le mot *napšo*, utilisé en araméen (ou mésopotamien, c'est-à-dire en syriaque pour nous), est un emprunt à la langue hébraïque ancienne, mais il dit ne pas savoir ce qu'il signifie (c'est-à-dire ce que signifie la racine, ou quel est le sens premier de la racine). Il critique au passage l'explication étymologique délirante et inepte, selon ses propres termes, qui tire du mot grec signifiant le froid (*ψυχρος*), à partir de la ressemblance vocale avec celui qui désigne l'âme (*ψυχή*), l'idée que les âmes sont appelées ainsi, c'est-à-dire froides, et auraient été bannies par le Dieu créateur et séparées des esprits immatériels, intellectuels et ardents, pour être envoyées dans le monde d'ici-bas où elles sont damnées dans l'union avec la chair, pleine de passions et de douleurs, dissoluble et mortelle.¹²⁵ Jusqu'à présent l'âme de l'homme a été caractérisée, selon le mode aristotélicien, par la possession qui est sienne des trois types de facultés, la faculté nutritive et augmentative, la faculté sensitive et locomotive, la faculté rationnelle et cogitative, à quoi se combinaient, selon le mode platonicien, les puissances colérique et désirante. Mais l'âme n'a pas été définie, c'est ce qu'exprime Jacques qui reprend alors la définition traditionnelle en la complétant: "Anima est substantia creata, vivens, et ex se mobilis quae, dum est absque corpore et intellectualis, ad unionem cum carne a creatore suo formata est".¹²⁶ Substance automotrice et incorporelle: c'est là une représentation traditionnelle, que l'on trouvait, par exemple, dans le

¹²⁴ Grégoire de Nysse, *De Anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, col. 49 B-52 A; trad. Bouchet, p. 48 (modifiée): "Si la philosophie païenne, qui a débattu de cela avec sa propre démarche, nous apportait une démonstration suffisante en vérité, il serait sans doute superflu de mettre à notre programme la question de l'âme. Mais ces philosophes ont orienté leur étude de l'âme à leur guise, selon un enchaînement apparent. Nous au contraire, nous ne partageons pas cette liberté, j'entends celle de dire ce que nous voulons: nous utilisons la sainte Écriture comme une règle, une loi pour tout enseignement. L'ayant nécessairement sous les yeux, nous ne pouvons admettre que ce qui est en harmonie avec le propos des Écritures. Nous laissons donc de côté le char de Platon et la paire de chevaux qui lui est attelée, chevaux dont les élans sont différents l'un de l'autre; nous laissons aussi le cocher qui les dirige, autant d'énigmes par lesquelles Platon traite de l'âme. Nous laissons aussi de côté tout ce [qu'a démontré] le Philosophe venu après lui, qui se conformant aux phénomènes selon une séquence logique de raisonnement, et faisant un examen minutieux du sujet qui nous occupe aujourd'hui, a tenté de montrer, par là, que l'âme était mortelle. [...] Plaçons notre réflexion dans la ligne de l'Écriture inspirée de Dieu [...]."

¹²⁵ Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 324-5 (syr.), p. 277 (trad. Vaschalde).

¹²⁶ Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 325 (syr.), p. 277 (trad. Vaschalde).

Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περι ψυχῆς. À cela Jacques ajoute: “vivante”, une caractéristique dont on a vu qu'elle était introduite, par exemple, par Aḥudemmeḥ dans la tripartition platonicienne; il ajoute aussi “formée par le créateur pour l'union avec la chair”, une caractéristique étrangère aux “profanes”, dont il était censé rapporter les opinions.

Mais cette définition ne dit rien de la question de l'intellect. Jacques ajoute alors la précision suivante:

Mens¹²⁷ autem non est aliquid aliud praeter illam [= animam], nec natura diversa ei aliena, sed est, ut verbo quantum possibile est definiamus, animae oculus intellectualis, qui lucem intellectualem recipit animamque dirigit, qui phantasia et repraesentatione exploranti remota sicut praesentia videt. Etenim mens id animae est quod sensus videndi aut audiendi est toti corpori, nam per illam anima videt et per illam audit, et per illam gustat aut odoratur aut palpat ea quae tangit. Et quemadmodum oculus et auris non sunt diversi natura nec alieni ab ipso corpore, sic et mens non est aliquid alienum aut diversum a natura animae, etsi propter copiam vocabulorum et significationum, appellationibus animae et mentis utimur ob maiorem clarioremque notitiam.¹²⁸

Ainsi donc Jacques reprend à son compte le lieu commun de la métaphore platonicienne de l'intellect comme œil de l'âme,¹²⁹ en expliquant sa fonction par une analogie: cet intellect est à l'âme ce que les sens sont au corps, il est à la source de l'activité proprement rationnelle de l'âme.

Jacques énumère ensuite les propriétés de l'âme humaine rationnelle. En premier lieu, parmi tous les intellects créés rationnels, elle seule utilise le raisonnement délibératif (*maḥṣabto mbahnonito*),¹³⁰ car les autres êtres rationnels, anges ou démons, connaissent immédiatement sans délibération ce qu'ils doivent faire, tandis que la délibération et l'investigation n'appartiennent qu'à l'âme humaine. En second lieu, l'âme imagine et voit et se figure toutes choses par la *phantasia* du raisonnement (*phantāsia d-maḥṣabto*), elle voit ce qui est loin, et se déplace pour ainsi dire dans les cieux et sous terre, saisissant toutes les œuvres de Dieu. Ainsi la *phantasia* est instrument de la connaissance.

Retenons encore ce trait particulier: Dieu a donné à l'intellect de l'âme la capacité d'inventer les sciences des choses utiles, commodes, ou nécessaires, par quoi l'homme imite l'activité créatrice de son propre créateur: “Deus, creator mentis animae, cum excellentia imaginis suae, ei dedit quod sit sponte sua inventrix scientiarum rerum utilium, commodarum et necessariorum – et hac in re pro viribus exemplar suum, Deum creatorem et factorem, imitatur – ex creaturis quas Deus propter eam prius creavit”.¹³¹ Et Jacques énumère alors nombre de ces arts que Dieu a conféré à l'intellect la capacité d'inventer, tels les arts des constructions, des métaux, des machines, des vêtements, de l'agriculture, et aussi les arts plastiques, et l'art de la musique. Jacques conclut son éloge des arts en rappelant le leitmotiv de la composition de l'homme:

Sic creator mentem humanam condidit eique in sevit sapientiam et scientiam imitatricem et intelligentem intellectu, et commiscuit eam cum luto composito, mutabili scilicet et dissolubili, et ex

¹²⁷ Le mot *mens* est employé par Vaschalde pour traduire le mot syriaque *hawno*, dont l'équivalent, dans la division des puissances ou facultés de l'âme, est le mot grec νοῦς. Il faut donc garder à l'esprit que *mens* signifie ici “intellect”.

¹²⁸ Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 325-6 (syr.), p. 277-8 (trad. Vaschalde).

¹²⁹ Cf. Plat., *Resp.* VII, 518 B-D, 533 D.

¹³⁰ Le premier de ces deux termes est formé sur la même racine que le mot *hūššobo*, qui est l'équivalent habituel du grec λογισμός, et le second des deux termes est formé à partir de la forme verbale *bahen*, qui signifie examiner.

¹³¹ Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 327.21-328.8 (syr.), p. 279 (trad. Vaschalde).

eorum compositione hominem hunc visibilem et invisibilem, qui dicitur similitudo et imago creatoris sui, constituit et sic condidit ut paulatim crescat et proficiat et perficiatur dum transit per aetates diversas et cum istis manifestationes scientiae et sapientiae sibi insitae profert.¹³²

À ce passage, inspiré par la philosophie profane touchant les trois sortes d'âmes et complété par l'affirmation que l'intellect n'est en rien distinct de l'âme, fait suite un exposé qui ordinairement se rattache au problème de l'animation: il s'agit de la description des différents âges de la vie depuis le fœtus, et de l'apparition progressive des diverses facultés de l'âme: après 40 jours, apparaît la faculté sensible et locomotrice, puis après la naissance, avec l'éducation progressive de l'enfant, se manifeste graduellement l'âme rationnelle et douée de raisonnement, dont une étape est la parole vers l'âge de quatre ans; puis vers sept ans se manifestent tous les pouvoirs naturels de l'âme rationnelle et douée de raisonnement, qui sont ceux de l'âme intellectuelle de l'homme.¹³³

Laissons là cette énumération des âges de la vie, pour passer à la question de l'union de l'âme et du corps, à laquelle vient ensuite Jacques, pour affirmer que l'âme est conservée, en toutes choses qui sont les siennes, dans sa nature sans mélange et sans confusion (*sine mixtione et sine confusione*),¹³⁴ cependant que le corps aussi est conservé dans sa nature sans mélange et sans confusion et sans mutation, tous deux pourtant œuvrant ensemble de manière indivise et égale. L'âme assume les passions du corps, et le corps fait siennes les propriétés de l'âme. Encore qu'ils fussent éloignés l'un de l'autre par leur nature et leurs propriétés, l'âme et le corps ont été conjoints d'une union vraie, en sorte que chacun d'eux assume ce qui appartient à l'autre. Et cette union du corps et de l'âme en l'homme préfigure l'union hypostatique de la divinité et de l'humanité dans la personne du Christ:

Etenim quemadmodum anima simplex et intellectualis et corpus compositum et sensibile simul coniuncta sunt unione naturali sine mixtione et sine confusione, et unumquodque sua facit quae sunt alterius, et nemo litem de hoc movet aut dubitat, quia tum consuetudo tum Scriptura testantur et assentiuntur sicut ostendimus, sic divinitas simplex et intellectualis, aeterna scilicet et increata, cum naturaliter et vere unita est humanitati compositae et sensibili, factae et creatae, unione naturali et hypostatica, mirabili et indivisibili, absque mixtione et sine confusione et sine mutatione, sua dedit humanitati suaque fecit quae sunt humanitatis.¹³⁵

Dans son commentaire sur l'*Hexaëmeron*, Jacques a donc introduit une brève dissertation sur l'âme qu'il dit emprunter aux auteurs profanes. On y a reconnu des divisions de l'âme dont l'inspiration remonte clairement à Aristote et à Platon. Par ces emprunts, la question de l'âme se

¹³² Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 331.19-332.4 (syr.), p. 283 (trad. Vaschalde).

¹³³ Jacques d'Édesse décrit les étapes de la croissance au long de quatre hébdomades, tandis que Basile de Césarée la présente en trois hebdomades, cf. Basile de Césarée, *Sur l'origine de l'homme* (*Hom. X et XI de l'Hexaëmeron*), introd., texte critique, trad. et notes par A. Smets et M. Van Esbroeck, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris 1970 (Sources Chrétiennes, 160), p. 196-201. Depuis Philon, il était habituellement question des sept âges de la vie, cf. Philon d'Alexandrie, *De Opificio mundi*, 103, trad. R. Arnaldez, Éd. du Cerf, Paris 1961, p. 210-12. Grégoire de Nysse ne traite pas de la question dans son *De Opificio hominis*.

¹³⁴ C'est encore une fois le thème de l'union de l'âme avec le corps ἀσυγχύτως – *inconfuse*, attesté par Nemésius et Priscien (voir H. Dörrie, *Porphyrus' Symmikta Zetemata, ihre Stellung in System und Geschichte des Neuplatonismus nebst einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten*, C.H. Beck, München 1959 [Zetemata, 20], p. 62) et remontant, probablement à travers les *Symmikta Zetemata* de Porphyre, à Plotin. On reconnaît, d'autre part, dans l'expression *sine mixtione et sine confusione* la fameuse formule de la christologie miaphysite de Sévère d'Antioche; cf. F. Nau, "Dans quelle mesure les Jacobites sont-ils monophysites", *Revue de l'Orient chrétien* 10 (1905), p. 113-34, en part. p. 128-9.

¹³⁵ Jacques d'Édesse, *Hex.*, p. 339.18-340.10 (syr.), p. 289 (trad. Vaschalde).

trouve insérée dans la science naturelle, conformément à la manière aristotélicienne de traiter le sujet. De même, le développement sur les différents âges de l'homme conduit à insérer, au moins partiellement, la question de l'âme dans la science naturelle, en l'occurrence celle de l'ontogénèse humaine. Quant au passage sur les aptitudes aux arts et aux sciences de l'intellect, conférées par Dieu à l'homme, il place la question de l'intellect dans une perspective plus épistémologique. Néanmoins, la visée finale de Jacques d'Édesse, dans son commentaire, paraît bien celle d'une *συμφωνία* – pour reprendre un terme utilisé par les néoplatoniciens voulant concilier Aristote et Platon – entre les conceptions profane et chrétienne de l'âme de l'homme, qui sont subsumées dans l'analogie finale entre la composition de l'homme et l'union de la divinité et de l'humanité dans le Christ.

Le traité sur l'âme de Jean de Dara

On ne sait rien des circonstances de la vie de Jean de Dara (cité dont le nom grec fut Anastasiapolis, située entre Mardin et Nisibe, au pied du Tour 'Abdin), sinon qu'il fut actif dans la première moitié du IX^e siècle. Le *Chronicon Syriacum* de Barhebraeus nous apprend qu'il est en vie en 837,¹³⁶ et selon les termes d'Arthur Vööbus, il occupa "a very important place in the history of intellectual culture in the 9th century in the lands of the Euphrates and Tigris".¹³⁷

Jean de Dara a écrit sur la liturgie et sur des sujets de doctrine religieuse tels que le Paradis, la Création, la Résurrection du Christ, ainsi qu'un commentaire sur les "Hiérarchies célestes et ecclésiastiques" du Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagyte. Pour ce qui nous intéresse ici, il a écrit un traité sur l'âme, encore inédit, qui n'est connu jusqu'à présent que par la traduction italienne faite par Furlani à partir des fragments conservés dans une compilation anonyme, elle-même conservée dans le manuscrit Vat. sir. 147 (fol. 133r-168v).¹³⁸ Le texte, en son début, est explicitement attribué à Jean de Dara par l'auteur des extraits:

Avec l'aide de Dieu nous entreprenons, en procédant par ordre, d'écrire des discours choisis et requérant l'étude, tirés du traité connu de Monseigneur Jean de la ville de Dara. Tout d'abord du traité de l'âme de ce saint homme, du livre huit, chapitre premier, qui montre que Platon, Pythagore et Porphyre ont déclaré que les âmes passent de corps en corps, après qu'elles sont parties d'ici.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ L'allusion de Barhebraeus à Jean, évêque de Dara (*Chronicon Syriacum*, Par. 2, fol. 285), est rapportée par J.S. Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis Clementino-Vaticana*, II, Typis Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide, Romae 1721, p. 218-19, d'où il ressort que Jean de Dara était en relation avec l'historien Denys de Tell-Mahré. Voir aussi la brève notice de M. Le Quien, *Oriens Christianus in quatuor Patriarchatus digestus*, II, Ex typographia regia, Paris 1740, col. 1429-1430, qui donne comme *terminus ante quem* pour la vie de Jean de Dara la date de 845. Sur ces références, voir Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", p. 229. On peut lire aussi la brève notice de S.P. Brock, "Iwannis of Dara", dans S.P. Brock *et al.* (éd.), *The Gorgias Encyclopedic Dictionary*, p. 224.

¹³⁷ A. Vööbus, "Important Manuscript Discoveries on Iwannis of Dārā and His Literary Heritage", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 96 (1976), p. 576-8.

¹³⁸ Cf. G. Furlani, "La psicologia di Giovanni di Dārā", *Rivista degli studi orientali* 11 (1928), p. 254-79. Vööbus, "Important Manuscript", p. 577 n. 13, signale trois autres manuscrits qui contiendraient le traité sur l'âme, que nous n'avons pas vus, et dont nous reproduisons ici les cotes données par l'auteur: Mosul Orth. O; Harvard Har. 35; Atšaneh 111. Des fragments du traité ont été édités, d'après le manuscrit Vat. sir. 147, par Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", pour les besoins des comparaisons qu'il a effectuées entre l'ouvrage de Jean de Dara et, d'une part, le texte grec du *De Natura hominis* de Némésius d'Émèse (dans l'édition de Morani) et, d'autre part, le texte grec du *De Opificio hominis* de Grégoire de Nysse (dans la *Patrologia Graeca*), respectivement p. 231-8 et p. 250-3.

¹³⁹ Vat. sir. 147, fol. 133r; avec Furlani, "La psicologia di Giovanni", p. 256 n. 3, nous suggérons de corriger le texte et de lire *ppirris* (Porphyre) au lieu de *prmiris* (Parménide?).

L'ouvrage se présente en effet dans le manuscrit comme une suite d'extraits de chapitres divers du traité de Jean de Dara, introduits par la mention *kephalaion* (en transcription du grec), suivie de l'objet de l'extrait, et éventuellement de son lieu dans le traité. Par exemple, le titre du second extrait se lit ainsi: "Du même <auteur>, du livre trois, chapitre premier, qui montre subtilement les opinions des anciens à propos de l'âme et de l'intellect qui est en elle, et qui examine ce que nous chrétiens croyons à ce sujet [...]"¹⁴⁰ Puis d'autres titres intermédiaires scandent le texte, indiquant l'objet des extraits et parfois leur provenance. Au fol. 154r, enfin, on lit l'*explicit*: "fin du traité sur l'âme composé par Monseigneur Jean de Dara". La partie du texte qui suit jusqu'au fol. 168v, où il s'interrompt au milieu d'une phrase,¹⁴¹ n'est pas explicitement attribuée à Jean de Dara dans les intertitres, mais le mode d'écriture est le même que celui des parties précédentes, et il pourrait bien être aussi du même auteur: c'est ce que pensait Furlani qui s'exprimait toutefois avec prudence.¹⁴² Du moins le texte supplémentaire présente-t-il un témoignage sur des discussions sur l'âme, analogues aux précédentes.

Du point de vue de sa forme rhétorique, l'œuvre est organisée comme une suite d'apories et de réponses, ou comme une suite d'expositions de thèses diverses sur une même question. Le texte a les apparences d'un ouvrage scolaire, au moins dans la forme conservée par le manuscrit. Outre les titres de chapitres déjà mentionnés, diverses mentions rubriquées marquent le texte, qui mettent en évidence les questions ou objections soulevées dans tel ou tel chapitre, ou telle partie du texte. Et il n'est pas rare que les diverses thèses ou positions de divers auteurs sur un sujet soient numérotées à l'aide des lettres syriaques, elles-mêmes parfois rubriquées. En outre les diverses divisions des facultés de l'âme ou de leurs sous-parties sont fréquemment résumées dans des schémas, spécialement dans la seconde partie du texte qui suit l'*explicit* du folio 154r, cette seconde partie semblant toutefois avoir été composée ou écrite avec moins de soin que la première.

L'état du texte présent dans le manuscrit suggère de distinguer deux, voire trois, niveaux d'écriture, celui de Jean de Dara lui-même, celui de l'auteur des extraits et celui du copiste du manuscrit Vat. sir. 147. Rien n'assure, en effet, que le copiste (qui a écrit en 1234) soit l'auteur du choix des extraits. Toutefois la formulation même de la suscription, "nous entreprenons (*nosbinan*), en procédant par ordre, d'écrire des discours choisis et requérant l'étude (*lmesrat melle mgabyoto w-metba'yonyoto*), tirés du traité connu de Monseigneur Jean de la ville de Dara", plus précise que la formule courante "nous copions" (*kotbinan*), pourrait suggérer que le copiste fût l'auteur du choix, ce qui constituerait un témoignage intéressant sur la survie de l'œuvre en plein XIII^e siècle, soulignée d'ailleurs par l'épithète "connu". L'ordre des extraits ne correspond certainement pas à celui qui était le leur dans l'ouvrage de Jean de Dara, comme le montre le début du texte, où la première section (*kephalaion*) est empruntée au huitième livre, alors que la seconde est tirée du troisième livre du traité de Jean de Dara. Dans ces conditions, on doit admettre que les extraits ne donnent pas une vue juste de l'organisation d'ensemble de l'ouvrage original. Mais on ne peut pas dire non plus que l'ordre nouveau, dans le manuscrit, paraisse toujours répondre à une nouvelle et claire ordonnance des sujets traités, même si l'intention de suivre un ordre défini semble affirmée dans la suscription du texte.

Sans pouvoir ici détailler toutes les parties, donnons une idée générale des principales d'entre elles, que nous numérotions pour notre propre usage, afin de faciliter les références que nous y ferons. Les deux

¹⁴⁰ Vat. sir. 147, fol. 135r; trad. Furlani, "La psicologia di Giovanni", p. 258.

¹⁴¹ Les folios contenant la fin du texte manquent dans le manuscrit.

¹⁴² Cf. Furlani, "La psicologia di Giovanni", p. 255-6. Une semblable opinion est exprimée par Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", p. 243.

premières sections concernent successivement, on l'a vu, (1) la question de la métempsychose des âmes, et (2) la définition de l'intellect en rapport avec l'âme; puis deux autres sections concernent encore l'intellect, (3) la première qui montre que la nature de l'intellect est d'être invisible, (4) la seconde qui enseigne ce que l'on doit penser du lieu où est l'intellect. La section suivante (5) traite de l'animation selon les philosophes "profanes"; la suivante (6) montre comment l'âme a été conjointe au corps; puis une autre (7) interroge sur le sort qui sera fait, lors de la résurrection, à ceux qui pour une raison ou une autre, dès la naissance ou par suite de maladie, ont été dépourvus d'intelligence lors de leur vie terrestre; enfin une autre (8) traite des facultés de l'âme. Ici s'achève la partie explicitement attribuée à Jean de Dara. De ce qui suit, nous ne mentionnerons que trois brèves sections, où il est question (9) des plaisirs qui proviennent du corps ou de la connaissance, (10) à nouveau des facultés de l'âme, et (11) des rapports de l'âme et du corps.

On ne peut pas lire à travers la suite de ces sections, comme on l'a dit, l'organisation même du traité de Jean de Dara. Mais on ne peut pas non plus lire dans ces fragments une œuvre en tous points originale. En effet, on a pu montrer que plusieurs de ces sections reprennent, voire citent purement et simplement, des passages d'œuvres antérieures. Ainsi M. Zonta a montré que le début de la section (2) reprend un fragment du premier chapitre d'une version syriaque du *De Natura hominis* de Némésius d'Émèse, et que les sections (9) et (10) reprennent des fragments des chapitres 18 et 16 respectivement du même traité.¹⁴³ De même, Zonta a découvert que la section (4) est composée d'extraits du *De Opificio hominis* de Grégoire de Nysse.¹⁴⁴ Enfin, à la suite d'une observation de Furlani, M. Zonta a établi la correspondance entre le texte de la section (8) et une partie du "Traité sur l'homme" de Aḥudemmeḥ.¹⁴⁵ À cela, nous pouvons ajouter nous-même que la section (5) est très proche d'un passage du commentaire de Jacques d'Édesse sur l'*Hexaemeron*, dont nous avons parlé plus haut.

Nous n'avons certes pas la possibilité d'examiner ici tous les extraits réunis dans le manuscrit Vat. sir. 147, et nous prendrons en considération seulement quelques apories soulevées dans les passages retenus par le compilateur. Le premier extrait qui retiendra notre attention est celui de la section (2) qui se rapporte à la question de savoir quel est le rapport de l'intellect et de l'âme, et quel rôle l'un ou l'autre a dans la composition de l'homme. Jean de Dara cite d'abord un fragment du *De Natura hominis* de Némésius, où celui-ci rapporte l'opinion d'Apollinaire de Laodicée, selon lequel l'âme (*napšo*) et l'intellect (*hawno*) sont distincts et l'homme est composé de trois éléments, âme, intellect et corps; puis l'opinion d'Aristote selon lequel l'intellect en puissance a été formé avec l'homme, et l'intellect en acte entre en nous de l'extérieur et ne complète pas l'essence de l'homme, mais le fait progresser vers la connaissance; puis enfin l'opinion de Platon, selon qui l'âme se sert du corps.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", p. 231-8, qui donne les correspondances précises entre les folios et lignes du ms Vat. sir. 147, et les pages et lignes de l'édition Morani. La version syriaque ancienne du *De Natura hominis*, dont l'existence est attestée par les sources indirectes, n'est pas conservée, sinon par des citations dans le traité sur l'âme de Moshe bar Kephā, dont il sera question plus loin; cf. Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", p. 225-8.

¹⁴⁴ Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", p. 250-4, qui donne encore les correspondances précises entre les folios et lignes du ms Vat. sir. 147, et les pages et lignes de l'édition de la *Patrologia Graeca*, 44. Zonta note, en outre (p. 253), que les passages extraits de Grégoire de Nysse sont tirés de divers lieux de la source, et parfois abrégés, sans que l'on puisse cependant discerner si les omissions sont dues à Jean de Dara ou à sa source; il remarque aussi (p. 253-4) que, dans le texte attribué à Jean de Dara, le texte de Grégoire est cité dans une version différente de la traduction syriaque connue par ailleurs du traité de Grégoire, conservée dans le manuscrit Vat. sir. 106 (fol. 42v-74r), dont la version est libre, et parfois paraphrastique.

¹⁴⁵ Furlani, "La psicologia di Aḥūdhemmēh", p. 819-20 se borne à signaler l'emprunt de Jean de Dara au texte de Aḥudemmeḥ; la correspondance précise entre les paragraphes de la traduction du traité de Aḥudemmeḥ par Furlani et les folios et lignes du manuscrit est donnée par Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", p. 244-5.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Furlani, "La psicologia di Giovanni", p. 258-9, et Zonta, "Nemesiana Syriaca", p. 231-3, pour la comparaison du texte syriaque avec le texte grec de Némésius, avec les remarques sur cette comparaison, p. 239.

L'énoncé des diverses opinions est suivi de la solution de l'aporie, selon les Docteurs de l'Église: l'homme n'est pas composé de trois natures, mais l'âme est dite aussi esprit (*rūho*) et intellect (*hawmo*). Elle est une seule hypostase, qui est dite âme en tant qu'elle donne la vie et le souffle au corps, esprit en tant qu'elle est incorporelle, simple et légère, et intellect en tant qu'elle se meut rationnellement comme les intellects célestes. Jean de Dara ajoute la comparaison traditionnelle, que nous avons déjà rencontrée plus haut chez Jacques d'Édesse: de même que l'œil est comme la lampe du corps, de même l'intellect est l'œil de l'âme, et par lui elle voit et entend et connaît, comme le corps le fait par les instruments des sens. Rappelons que Jacques déclarait déjà que l'intellect est à l'âme ce que le sens de la vision et de l'audition est au corps, et que par lui l'âme voit, entend, goûte, sent les odeurs et perçoit par le toucher. Et il ajoutait que l'intellect n'est rien d'autre que l'âme, même si à cause de l'abondance des mots et des significations nous utilisons les appellations d'âme et d'intellect. De manière parallèle, Jean de Dara note que par l'abondance des concepts, des noms, des mots et des paroles nous parlons de l'intellect comme de quelque chose de différent de l'âme, encore qu'il ne soit rien d'autre que l'âme. Sans doute le texte de Jean de Dara, dans le manuscrit, n'est-il pas une citation littérale du commentaire de Jacques sur l'*Hexaemeron*, mais il paraît vraisemblable que Jean s'en soit inspiré, car il semble avoir connu ce texte comme nous le verrons, à moins qu'il ne faille penser à une source commune aux deux auteurs.

Une question parallèle à la précédente, qui touchait le rapport entre âme et intellect, se pose dans la suite du texte de Jean de Dara, à propos de l'appellation "esprit" (*rūho*). En effet, y est-il dit, le terme s'emploie pour nommer les âmes des justes, qui sont appelées "esprits", en raison de leur pureté. Et une gradation s'exprime dans l'appellation des âmes en relation avec la plus ou moins grande pureté des hommes: "Les âmes des pécheurs sont appelées âmes, celles des justes esprits, celles des parfaits intelligences. Quand <l'âme> mène une vie terrestre, elle est dite âme, mais quand elle se conduit avec pureté, elle est appelée esprit, et quand elle est plus encore liée à la pureté, elle est appelée intellect".¹⁴⁷ Retenons seulement de cette partie de l'exposé, qui ne relève pas proprement de la tradition philosophique rationnelle, qu'il est affirmé à nouveau que l'intellect n'est pas autre chose que l'âme, mais qu'il se dit d'une certaine manière de l'âme.

La section (2) sur le rapport de l'intellect à l'âme est donc composée comme une doxographie qui emprunte d'abord à la partie doxographique du traité de Némésius (chapitre 1), à quoi fait suite une doxographie des opinions des Docteurs de l'Église: le tout étant destiné à montrer que l'intellect n'est pas distinct de l'âme.

Ce point établi, le compilateur des chapitres, ou sections, réunis dans le manuscrit Vat. sir 147, introduit une nouvelle question sous l'intitulé "chapitre (*kephalaion*) qui examine ce que l'on doit penser du lieu où est l'intellect".¹⁴⁸ Cette section (4) est composée d'extraits des chapitres 12 et 15 du *De Opificio hominis* de Grégoire de Nysse, écrit en 379. Le titre de cette section ne mentionne pas le nom de Jean de Dara, et il n'est pas certain qu'elle fût déjà composée comme telle chez ce dernier (même si cela nous paraît probable) et que les extraits ne fussent pas réunis par le compilateur lui-même. Dans le texte cité, Grégoire de Nysse critique ceux qui placent l'intellect dans le cœur au prétexte que, puisqu'il est ainsi situé au milieu du corps, l'activité volitive se répand dans tout le corps et produit l'acte; en témoigneraient le souci et la colère, passions qui meuvent le cœur à la compassion. Grégoire critique aussi ceux qui placent l'intellect dans le cerveau, parce que celui-ci serait comme le chef de la cité qui administre tout ce qui est au-dessous de lui, et qui en apportent

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Furlani, "La psicologia di Giovanni", p. 260. Nous traduisons d'après le texte du manuscrit Vat. sir. 147, fol. 138r-v.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Furlani, "La psicologia di Giovanni", p. 261.

pour preuve que ceux dont le cerveau est lésé ou qui sont pris de boisson perdent le raisonnement. Selon Grégoire, la faculté de l'intellect n'est contenue en aucune partie du corps, sans quoi elle ne serait pas incorporelle, mais elle est diffuse dans tout le corps et elle touche toutes les parties. Elle est apte à agir avec son activité cognitive sur toutes les parties du corps, elle ne les contient pas du dehors et n'est pas contenue à l'intérieur d'elles. En somme, l'intellect touche la nature selon un mode insaisissable et impensable.¹⁴⁹

Aussitôt après le passage qui porte la marque des emprunts faits à Grégoire de Nysse, vient dans le manuscrit une section (5) sous l'intitulé: "Chapitre sur le nom 'animation', qui montre qu'il n'est pas simple ni unique dans son mode d'emploi". Nous traduisons cette section:

Le <nom> d'animation, les gens de l'extérieur le disent des hommes, des animaux, des plantes et, pour le dire brièvement, de tout ce qui a la faculté nutritive et augmentative, et qu'ils jugent avoir une âme. Des arbres et des plantes et de tout ce qui croît, ils disent qu'ils ont une faculté seulement, la faculté nutritive et augmentative, parce qu'ils ont par nature une faculté qui attire et porte au <corps> la nourriture à partir des quatre éléments par lesquels, lorsqu'ils pénètrent le corps, celui-ci augmente et grandit. Ils les appellent animés, non point parce qu'est en eux une âme complète, mais parce qu'ils possèdent une faculté, la faculté nutritive et augmentative. Des animaux, des oiseaux et des reptiles, ils disent qu'ils ont deux facultés d'animation, la nutritive et l'augmentative, celle qui appartient aussi aux plantes, et celle de la sensation et du mouvement, par laquelle ils sont appelés animaux. Mais celle-ci non plus n'est pas complète, si ce n'est qu'elle possède aussi la colère et le désir, et c'est pourquoi ils désirent et se mettent en colère, et se portent vers la passion. De l'homme, ils disent qu'il a trois facultés d'animation, la nutritive et l'augmentative, comme celle des plantes, la sensitive et la motrice comme celle des animaux, et la rationnelle et la cogitative par laquelle l'homme fut honoré par Dieu. C'est pourquoi nous disons que l'homme a une âme complète, et nous jugeons qu'il a trois facultés, et qu'il a la colère et le désir avec le raisonnement rationnel. L'homme désire en effet le bien, le coït et la nourriture, et il se met en colère contre les scélératesses; sans le désir il n'acquiert pas le bien et sans la colère il ne châtie pas le mal, et sans le raisonnement il ne se comporte pas de manière louable.¹⁵⁰

Cette description des diverses facultés est extrêmement proche de celle que l'on pouvait lire sous la plume de Jacques d'Édesse, dans son commentaire sur l'*Hexaemeron*, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, sans qu'il s'agisse d'une pure copie du texte de Jacques. Cependant, comme chez Jacques, elle est attribuée aux "gens de l'extérieur", c'est-à-dire aux "profanes", et elle est désignée au moyen d'un terme spécifique, celui de *mnapšūto* (ici traduit par "animation"). Comme chez Jacques aussi, il ne s'agit pas du problème proprement dit de l'ἐνσωμάτωσις de l'âme, c'est-à-dire de la manière dont l'âme s'unit au corps de l'embryon, mais d'une esquisse de division des modes d'animation des êtres vivants en trois classes: plantes, animaux, homme. Plus loin (section 8), l'âme de l'homme, à son tour, fait l'objet d'un exposé dont le compilateur du manuscrit Vat. sir. 147 prétend tirer la matière d'un chapitre du traité de Jean de Dara, qui portait sur la question traditionnelle des puissances ou facultés de l'âme, de leur classification et de leur rôle. Sous l'intitulé "Chapitre sur l'âme du même Monseigneur Jean

¹⁴⁹ On a vu plus haut que, dans le *De Anima et resurrectione*, Grégoire de Nysse exprime par la voix de Macrine la difficulté de comprendre la composition de l'âme et du corps. À plusieurs reprises, il est revenu, dans le *De Opificio hominis*, sur cette idée que le lien entre le νοῦς et le corps est indicible et impensable (ἀφραστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητον PG col. 177 B), inexplicable et impénétrable (ἀμήχανόν τε καὶ ἀκατανόητον, PG col. 177 C): cf. Peroli, *Il platonismo*, p. 194-5.

¹⁵⁰ Ms. Vat. sir. 147, fol. 141r l. 12-142r l. 10; cf. Furlani, "La psicologia di Giovanni", p. 262-3.

de la cité de Dara”, on trouve en réalité une longue citation du traité de Aḥudemmeḥ sur l’homme, dont nous avons parlé plus haut.¹⁵¹ Il s’agit du passage dans lequel Aḥudemmeḥ expose que l’âme a deux facultés, la raison et la vie, cette dernière ayant à son tour deux puissances, la colère et le désir. Jean de Dara (ou le compilateur) omet la présentation de ces facultés dans les termes des médiétés que nous avons signalées plus haut, et il reprend la description des divisions de la faculté rationnelle en connaissance, raisonnement, intelligence et pensée, et de leurs relations, en citant littéralement le texte de Aḥudemmeḥ, sans apporter de lumière dans la confusion de ces relations (ou du moins de ce qui nous apparaît comme manifestement confus). La citation, notons-le, est faite avec soin, car l’auteur omet deux brefs passages dans lesquels Aḥudemmeḥ faisait allusion au fait qu’il avait déjà traité de la liberté et de la volonté dans son ouvrage intitulé “que l’homme est un microcosme” et qu’il avait aussi traité dans le même ouvrage de ce que “la nature excite le désir et la colère, pour s’approcher de ce qui lui est utile, comme pour s’éloigner de ce qui lui est nuisible, <et que> cela se trouve aussi chez les animaux”.¹⁵² La citation se termine avec la description des sens du corps. Mais il est remarquable que Jean de Dara ne cite pas plus avant ce qui touche, chez Aḥudemmeḥ, aux membres directeurs du corps et à l’association de ces membres avec les facultés de l’âme, à l’influx des membres directeurs les uns sur les autres, ni à la genèse de l’acte humain telle qu’elle était décrite par Aḥudemmeḥ. En somme, Jean de Dara, ou le compilateur, omet la partie la plus originale du traité de Aḥudemmeḥ, celle où l’auteur construit une psycho-physiologie de l’acte humain.

La citation de Aḥudemmeḥ est immédiatement suivie dans le manuscrit, sans aucune solution de continuité, d’une énumération des parties, ou facultés, de l’âme, qui est différente de celle de Aḥudemmeḥ et peu compatible avec elle. Rappelons que dans la citation de Aḥudemmeḥ sont explicitement mentionnés, comme “parties” de l’âme, le désir et la colère, ainsi que la connaissance (*madd’o*), le raisonnement (*ḥuṣṣobo*), la pensée (*tar’ito*) et l’intelligence (*hawno*). La nouvelle énumération se rapporte aux cinq parties de l’âme connaissante qui sont: l’intellect (*hawno*), la pensée (*tar’ito*), l’opinion (*msabronūto*), le sens (*rgeṣto*) e l’imagination (*phanṭāsīa*).¹⁵³ Cette division, d’origine grecque, se trouve par exemple chez Philopon, comme on va le voir ci-dessous, et elle est en relation implicite avec la classification qui suit immédiatement dans le manuscrit.

Le texte offre ensuite, en effet, une classification de ces parties selon divers critères, selon que les choses connues sont universelles ou particulières: si elles sont particulières, elles sont connues par les sens ou l’imagination; si elles sont universelles, alors si elles sont connues avec la cause, la pensée les connaît, mais si elles sont connues sans la cause, alors à nouveau soit elles sont connues mieux qu’avec la cause, et c’est l’intelligence qui les connaît, soit elles sont connues moins bien qu’avec la cause, et c’est l’opinion qui les connaît. Ainsi s’établit une hiérarchie ascendante de la connaissance et une hiérarchie parallèle des facultés, allant de l’opinion, qui connaît le moins bien, à la pensée, puis à l’intelligence, qui connaît le mieux. Parmi les cinq facultés, ajoute l’auteur, deux ne forment pas de syllogismes, le sens et l’intelligence, parce qu’ils connaissent sans intermédiaire, tandis que les trois autres font usage de syllogismes.¹⁵⁴

Ce nouveau passage s’inspire clairement de la tradition proprement philosophique, de source aristotélicienne en particulier. Cette division se rencontre en effet, par exemple, dans le commentaire d’Ammonius sur le *Peri Hermeneias* d’Aristote:

¹⁵¹ Cf. Furlani, “La psicologia di Giovanni”, p. 266-8.

¹⁵² Cf. Nau, “Traité d’Aḥudemmeḥ”, p. 107 et 109 respectivement.

¹⁵³ Ms. Vat. sir., fol. 147r; cf. Furlani, “La psicologia di Giovanni”, p. 268.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Furlani, “La psicologia di Giovanni”, p. 268-9.

ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας διττὰς ἐχούσης δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς τὰς καὶ ὁρεκτικὰς λεγομένας (λέγω δὲ γνωστικὰς μὲν καθ' ἃς γινώσκομεν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον νοῦν διάνοιαν δόξαν φαντασίαν αἴσθησιν, ὁρεκτικὰς δὲ καθ' ἃς ὁρεγόμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων ἢ τῶν δοκούντων, οἷον βούλησιν λέγω προαίρεσιν θυμὸν ἐπιθυμίαν [...]).¹⁵⁵

Dans son commentaire sur les *Premiers Analytiques*, d'autre part, Ammonius mentionne d'abord trois facultés de l'âme, la dianoétique (τὸ διανοητικόν), la doxastique (τὸ δοξαστικόν) et l'imaginative (τὸ φανταστικόν),¹⁵⁶ ajoutant ensuite que la faculté noétique a été laissée de côté parce qu'elle ne connaît pas par le syllogisme, mais par appréhension directe (ἀπλατῆς ἐπιβολῆς)¹⁵⁷ et il omet de parler du sens. Jean Philopon, au contraire, dans son commentaire sur les *Premiers Analytiques*, énonce une division de ce qui connaît (τὸ γινῶσκον), qui comporte cinq facultés: τὸ γινῶσκον ἢ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἢ διάνοια ἢ δόξα ἢ φαντασία ἢ αἴσθησις.¹⁵⁸ Il précise aussi que ni l'intellect ni le sens ne procèdent par syllogisme, le premier parce qu'il est plus fort que le raisonnement syllogistique, le second parce qu'il est plus faible: ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν νοῦς καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις οὐ συλλογίζονται, ὁ μὲν νοῦς ὡς κρείττων ὢν τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι [...], ἡ δὲ γε αἴσθησις ὡς χειρόνως ἔχουσα τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι οὐ συλλογίζεται.¹⁵⁹ Philopon ajoute toutefois encore que ni la φαντασία ni la δόξα ne forment des syllogismes, parce que la première est le lieu d'arrêt et de garde des apparences reçues de la sensation, tandis que le syllogisme est mouvement d'un donné vers ce qui ne l'a pas été, et que la δόξα ne forme pas non plus de syllogisme, car elle n'est rien d'autre qu'une conclusion obtenue par la διάνοια. Seule celle-ci produit donc les syllogismes.¹⁶⁰ Quoi qu'il en soit, cependant, de cette différence avec Jean de Dara, on constate que le passage de ce dernier mentionné plus haut s'insère dans la tradition dont Ammonius et Philopon, entre autres, sont les représentants. La source de cette liste de cinq facultés est tout naturellement le passage du *De Anima*, dans lequel Aristote distingue et analyse les diverses facultés que sont la sensation (αἴσθησις), l'imagination (ou représentation) (φαντασία), la science (ἐπιστήμη), l'opinion (δόξα) et l'intelligence (νοῦς), et notamment le récapitulatif qu'il formule, au cours de son exposé, des facultés en vertu desquelles nous exerçons notre discernement:

εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία καθ' ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμα τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἶ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, <ἄρα> μία τις ἐστὶ τοῦτων δυνάμεις ἢ ἕξις καθ' ἃς κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα; τοιαῦται δ' εἰσὶν αἴσθησις, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς.¹⁶¹

Cette division des facultés de l'âme a été reprise dans la tradition grecque des commentateurs d'Aristote, et l'on en trouve un témoignage particulièrement intéressant dans le commentaire de

¹⁵⁵ Ammon., *In De Int.*, p. 5.1-6 Busse (*CAG IV.5*). Le rapprochement entre la division des cinq facultés de l'âme connaissante mentionnée dans le manuscrit et le commentaire d'Ammonius, *In De Int.*, est signalé par Furlani, "La psicologia di Aḥūdhemmēh", p. 840-1, qui ne pousse pas plus loin la recherche.

¹⁵⁶ Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.31-3.2 Wallies (*CAG IV.6*).

¹⁵⁷ Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 3.17-19 Wallies.

¹⁵⁸ Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 1.19-20 Wallies (*CAG XIII.2*).

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.20-2.2.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2. 2-13.

¹⁶¹ Arist., *De An.* III 3, 428 a 1-5. Le point de départ pour cette énumération est naturellement Plat., *Parm.*, 142 A 3-6, où ces modes de connaissance sont incompatibles avec l'"un": οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα.

David, conservé en version arménienne. Au début du commentaire, où David expose que le traité d'Aristote porte sur le syllogisme et en particulier sur le syllogisme démonstratif, on peut lire:

And one should know that there are five species of syllogism: demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical and poetical, that is, fictitious. [...] But some people say that there are only three species of syllogism: demonstrative, dialectical and sophistical; for they unite the rhetorical with the dialectical and the poetical with the sophistical. And they establish this as follows: there are only three species, because all [the capacities] by which we cognize and know something are five: perception, imagination, opinion, thought and reason. For the knowable is either outside or inside, but certainly particular, because it is natural for the senses to grasp particulars. Imagination, too, grasps particulars, for it retains what it takes from the senses. This is why it is called "imagination," which means "placement of appearances." And opinion knows universals, as thought and reason [do], but opinion [does so] without knowing the causes, while reason is superior to causes, and thought is based on causes.¹⁶²

On retrouve dans ce texte de David les deux critères de classification présents dans l'extrait de Jean de Dara, que nous avons mentionnés plus haut. Le premier est la distinction entre particuliers et universels: les particuliers sont connus par les sens et par l'imagination. Quant aux universels, ils sont connus par les trois autres facultés, mais de manière diverse eu égard à la saisie de la cause: la pensée connaît par la cause, tandis que l'opinion connaît sans la cause et que la raison (entendons l'intellect) connaît mieux que par la cause (selon l'expression de Jean de Dara) ou est supérieure à la cause (selon l'expression de David). Il est manifeste que le passage en question de Jean de Dara est directement inspiré par une source elle-même issue de la tradition grecque, celle des commentaires tardifs des *Premiers Analytiques*.

La pénétration des commentaires alexandrins sur l'*Organon* dans la culture syriaque est bien attestée, par l'œuvre de Sergius de Reš'ainā dès le début du VI^e siècle, par celle de Paul le Perse dans la seconde moitié du siècle ou encore par celle de Proba.¹⁶³ Ce dernier composa un commentaire, sous forme de résumé, des *Premiers Analytiques* d'Aristote, dans lequel on trouve la mention des cinq facultés aristotéliennes de l'âme: l'intelligence (ou plutôt l'intellect *hawno*) qui n'a pas besoin de connaître par le syllogisme, la pensée discursive (*tar'ito*) qui fait le syllogisme apodictique, la puissance efficiente qui fait le syllogisme dialectique, l'imagination (*phantāsia*) et la sensation (*regšo*) qui font le syllogisme sophistique.¹⁶⁴ Les fonctions attribuées à ces facultés sont différentes de celles que leur attribue généralement la tradition grecque, mais du moins le texte de Proba atteste l'introduction de cette question des facultés de connaissance en milieu syriaque.

Dans le *De Fide orthodoxa* de Jean Damascène, par exemple, on trouve également la division des cinq facultés de l'âme:

Χρη γινώσκειν ὅτι ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ διττὰς ἔχει τὰς δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς.
Καὶ γνωστικαὶ μὲν εἰσι νοῦς, διάνοια, δόξα, φαντασία, αἰσθησις· ζωτικαὶ δὲ ἦγρον ὀρεκτικαὶ

¹⁶² Nous citons la traduction de A. Topchyan dans David the Invincible, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics. Old Armenian Text with an English Translation, Introduction and Notes, Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca, Davidis Opera*, 2, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2010 (Philosophia Antiqua, 122), p. 35-7.

¹⁶³ Voir, par exemple, Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d'Aristote*, et Id., "Sur la lecture tardo-antique du *Peri Hermeneias* d'Aristote: Paul le Perse et la tradition d'Ammonius", *Studia graeco-arabica* 3 (2013), p. 37-104.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. A. van Hoonacker, "Le traité du philosophe syrien Probus sur les *Premiers Analytiques* d'Aristote", *Journal Asiatique* 16 (1900), p. 70-166, en part. p. 88 (texte syriaque) et p. 128 (trad. française).

βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις. Ἴνα δὲ σαφέστερον γένηται τὸ λεγόμενον, λεπτολογήσωμεν τὰ περὶ τούτων. Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν γνωστικῶν εἵπωμεν.¹⁶⁵

Mais les relations de ces facultés entre elles, et leur rôle dans la connaissance sont toutes différentes de celles que l'on rencontre dans les commentaires grecs susmentionnés et dans le texte de Jean de Dara. On lit, en effet, l'explication suivante chez Jean Damascène:

Λιὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τοίνυν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνίσταται πάθος, ὃ καλεῖται φαντασία· ἐκ δὲ τῆς φαντασίας γίνεται δόξα. Εἴτα ἡ διάνοια ἀνακρίνασα τὴν δόξαν, εἴτε ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν εἴτε ψευδῆς, κρίνει τὸ ἀληθές· ὅθεν καὶ διάνοια λέγεται ἀπὸ τοῦ διανοεῖν καὶ διακρίνειν. Τὸ οὖν κριθὲν, καὶ ὀρισθὲν ἀληθὲς νοῦς λέγεται.¹⁶⁶

Revenons au texte de Jean de Dara dans le manuscrit Vat. sir. 147. Après le passage sur les parties de l'âme qui participent à la connaissance, les lignes suivantes sont directement empruntées à nouveau à Aḥudemmeḥ, dont elles reprennent un passage déjà cité auparavant où s'exprime confusément la description des quatre facultés de la raison en termes de médiétés (en intervertissant l'ordre des facultés): "La connaissance (*madd'o*) est entre l'intellect (*hawno*) et le raisonnement (*ḥuṣṣobo*), le raisonnement est entre le désir et la colère, l'intellect est entre le calme (*rmisūto*) et l'agitation (*ṣagsūto*), la pensée (*tar'ito*) est entre l'obéissance et la désobéissance."¹⁶⁷ Ce nouvel emprunt à Aḥudemmeḥ invite à considérer avec prudence la composition du texte par le compilateur, voire l'attribution qui est la sienne de parties du texte à l'ouvrage de Jean de Dara, dont on peut douter qu'il juxtaposât des thèses aussi peu compatibles, et dans un tel désordre.

Nous arrêtons là notre esquisse de description du traité de Jean de Dara, lu à travers la compilation du manuscrit Vat. sir. 147, pour en tirer quelques observations générales. La première est que la compilation conservée dans le manuscrit Vat. sir. 147 ne donne qu'une image très partielle, et certainement faussée, du traité. Image partielle, la chose est évidente de soi, puisque les intertitres mêmes signalent que des extraits seulement sont copiés, et que le texte copié ne représente manifestement qu'une partie minime des huit livres (au moins) du traité original – rappelons que le premier extrait est tiré du huitième livre, d'après son intitulé. Image faussée, puisque l'ordre original de composition n'est pas respecté et que, plus grave encore, des parties dont les contenus sont incompatibles sont parfois juxtaposées sans solution de continuité, ce qui semble fort improbable de la part de l'auteur.

¹⁶⁵ PG 94, 941 C; 36 (II, 22), 35-40, p. 88-89 Kotter [*Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, II, "Εκδοσις ἀκριβῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως, *Expositio fidei*, besorgt von P. Bonifatius Kotter, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1973 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 12)]. Même énumération des facultés, à quelques différences près, chez Denys le ps.-Aréopagite, dans le contexte de la théologie négative issue du passage du *Parménide* de Platon cité à la n. 161: voir *De Div. Nom.* I 5, p. 116.4-5 Suchla: οὔτε αἰσθησις αὐτῆς ἐστὶν οὔτε φαντασία οὔτε δόξα οὔτε ὄνομα οὔτε λόγος οὔτε ἐπαφή οὔτε ἐπιστήμη.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 36 (II, 22), 42-47, p. 89 Kotter; trad. P. Ledrux, avec la collab. de V. Kontouma-Conticello - G.M. de Durand, dans Jean Damascène, *La foi orthodoxe*, 1-44, Éd. du Cerf, Paris 2010 (Sources chrétiennes, 535), p. 333: "Or donc, c'est par la sensibilité qu'une passion s'établit dans l'âme, passion qu'on appelle 'imagination'; puis de l'imagination naît une opinion. Ensuite la pensée discursive porte un jugement sur l'opinion: est-elle vraie, est-elle fausse? Elle juge du vrai et c'est de ce fait qu'on l'appelle 'pensée discursive' (*dianoia*): cette pensée discerne (*dianoein*) et juge. Ce qui a été jugé et défini comme vrai s'appelle intellect."

¹⁶⁷ Ms Vat. sir. 147, fol. 153r; cf. Furlani, "La psicologia di Giovanni", p. 269; Nau, "Traité d'Aḥudemmeḥ", p. 104; Furlani, "La psicologia di Aḥudemmeḥ", p. 809. Ce passage n'est pas signalé par Zonta, "*Nemesiana Syriaca*", p. 245, parmi les emprunts de Jean de Dara à Aḥudemmeḥ. En fait, il reprend un texte déjà cité auparavant au début de la citation longue de Aḥudemmeḥ, cf. ci-dessus n. 151.

Autre observation générale: pour en rester encore à la constitution du texte, le traité de Jean de Dara se composait, d'après la source qu'est la copie du manuscrit, d'apories touchant l'âme et les questions qui se posaient à son sujet, et de divers exposés sur ces questions faisant état de diverses réponses et de diverses conceptions. Ce n'est donc pas seulement la compilation du manuscrit Vat. sir. 147, mais le traité original lui-même qui se présentait vraisemblablement comme une sorte de somme doxographique. Une partie des sources au moins auxquelles l'auteur faisait appel pour exposer les problèmes et rapporter quelques-unes des solutions peut se lire à travers la compilation du manuscrit. On y trouve Grégoire de Nysse, Némésius d'Émèse et Aḥudemmeḥ cités textuellement. On y trouve aussi la tradition profane représentée par un chapitre proche du commentaire de Jacques d'Édesse sur l'*Hexaemeron*. Des éléments présents dans le traité sont probablement à mettre en relation avec la période où l'ouvrage a été écrit: ainsi, à propos des différentes facultés de l'âme, Jean de Dara donne comme exemple la faculté de faire des syllogismes, qu'on ne trouve pas dans les autres traités précédemment cités. Mais, avant d'aller plus loin, nous voudrions considérer brièvement le traité d'un auteur de peu postérieur à Jean de Dara, celui de Moshe bar Kepha.

Le Livre sur l'âme de Moshe bar Kepha

Évêque de Beth Raman, localité située au nord de Tagrit, Moshe Bar Kepha (vers 833-903) composa de nombreux ouvrages portant sur la Bible, la théologie et la liturgie.¹⁶⁸ Son traité de l'âme, encore inédit, a fait l'objet d'une traduction allemande par Oskar Braun à partir du texte syriaque conservé dans le manuscrit Vat. sir. 147 (fol. 1v-92r), qui contient aussi les extraits du traité de Jean de Dara, dont nous avons parlé ci-dessus.¹⁶⁹

Nous avons écrit, à propos du texte de Jean de Dara, qu'il se présente dans le manuscrit comme un ouvrage d'étude, ou scolaire, et cela est vrai également de la partie qui contient le traité de Moshe bar Kepha. Ce traité, composé de 40 chapitres (chacun nommé à l'aide de la transcription à partir du grec *kephalaun*), contient nombre de tableaux récapitulatifs, sous forme de divisions de diverses notions, qui ponctuent le texte. Les arguments présentés dans tel ou tel chapitre, en faveur d'une thèse, ou les points à critiquer, dans d'autres lieux, sont fréquemment numérotés à l'aide des lettres syriaques, elles-mêmes souvent rubriquées. Cette présentation correspond d'ailleurs au contenu même du traité qui procède souvent par accumulation d'arguments dans la critique ou la démonstration des thèses énoncées. Plus généralement l'ouvrage apparaît comme une compilation, dont les sources toutefois ne sont pas indiquées, et resteraient à chercher, même si quelques-unes ont été signalées par Braun ou d'autres érudits, comme nous le signalerons. Sans doute l'un des buts de l'auteur était-il de mettre en correspondance, sinon en accord, des éléments tirés de la littérature patristique ou des Écritures et d'autres éléments provenant de sources philosophiques. Selon Braun, Moshe bar Kepha était familier des écrits des Pères, comme le montrent les citations assez nombreuses qu'il

¹⁶⁸ Voir la notice de J.F. Coakley, "Mushe bar Kipho", dans Brock *et al.* (éd.), *The Gorgias Encyclopedic Dictionary*, p. 300, où le nom est écrit avec la vocalisation syro-occidentale. Nous adoptons ici, pour simplifier les références, celle qui est utilisée par le traducteur du traité sur l'âme (où le nom Moshe toutefois est orthographié sous la forme Moses): cf. O. Braun, *Moses Bar Kepha und sein Buch von der Seele*, Herdersche Verlagshandlung, Freiburg im Breisgau 1891. On trouvera dans la première partie de cet ouvrage une biographie de Moshe bar Kepha et une liste détaillée de ses écrits, que l'on mettra à jour avec les informations bibliographiques de la notice de J.F. Coakley. Voir aussi l'introduction de L. Schlimme, *Der Hexaemeronkommentar des Moses bar Kepha*, Einleitung, Übersetzung und Untersuchungen, 2 vol., Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1977 (Göttinger Orientforschungen, I. Reihe: Syriaca, 14), p. 1-25. Ce commentaire sur l'*Hexaemeron* ne contient pas de développement sur l'âme.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Braun, *Moses Bar Kepha*, qui donne, dans l'introduction à sa traduction, le sommaire des chapitres du traité (p. 26-8).

en fait: on y trouve, en vérité, les noms des principaux d'entre eux, tels que Grégoire de Nazianze, Grégoire de Nysse, Jean Chrysostome, Cyrille d'Alexandrie, le Pseudo-Denys, ainsi que Sévère d'Alexandrie, Philoxène de Mabboug et Jacques d'Édesse.¹⁷⁰ Au contraire, Moshe bar Kepha ne maîtrise pas toujours les sources philosophiques, comme nous en verrons un exemple. Il ne peut être question ici de parcourir l'ensemble du traité, et nous nous arrêterons seulement sur quelques points pour souligner la continuité des questions posées à propos de l'âme, tout en suggérant par quelques exemples l'adaptation du traitement de ces questions à un contexte savant nouveau.

Auteur d'un manuel d'étude qui réunit de matière diffuse un grand nombre de questions, Moshe bar Kepha ne semble pas avoir eu pour première préoccupation l'ordonnement de ces questions, sauf en quelques portions de l'ouvrage, notamment dans les premiers chapitres. Le traité se compose, selon Braun, de deux parties (qui ne sont pas distinguées comme telles par Moshe bar Kepha): la première traite de questions philosophiques à propos de l'âme, tandis que la seconde est un traité des passions, plutôt théologique, mais il s'agit là d'une division assez grossière, comme le reconnaît Braun lui-même. On pourrait distinguer un premier ensemble de questions touchant la définition de l'âme et sa nature, puis d'autres portant sur la relation de l'âme et du corps, et d'autres encore concernant le statut de l'âme après sa séparation du corps. Mais, dans tel ou tel chapitre pris dans ces ensembles, on peut trouver aussi bien des éléments philosophiques que d'autres théologiques. Le tout, en outre, est souvent traité selon un mode de présentation aporétique, qui souligne le caractère "scolaire" de la compilation.

Les chapitres 2 à 11, qui forment une suite relativement bien ordonnée, ont pour objet de montrer que l'âme existe, qu'elle est une substance, incorporelle et simple, et d'exposer ce qu'est sa nature. On retrouve là le corpus des questions traditionnelles posées à propos de l'âme, comme on l'a vu dès le *Λόγος κεφαλιώδης*. Mais la manière d'aborder les questions témoigne, en certains cas, du nouveau contexte culturel ou philosophique dans lequel se trouve l'auteur. Ainsi, dès le premier chapitre introductif, intitulé "De combien de manières 'âme' se dit et quelle est l'âme qui est notre but dans ce traité", Moshe bar Kepha introduit une division sémantique des emplois du mot "âme", et il distingue sept significations, dont les quatre premières se réfèrent à des textes bibliques – leur détail ne nous important pas ici –, et dont les trois dernières se rapportent respectivement aux âmes végétative, animale et rationnelle – où l'on rencontre donc la division aristotélicienne. Arrêtons-nous aussi au chapitre 2 du traité, où la question posée est celle de l'existence de l'âme. La première discussion est tout à fait différente de ce qu'on a trouvé dans les traités précédemment mentionnés: elle est ici encore présentée en termes sémantiques. Il y est dit, en bref, que "âme" est un nom, et que tout nom désigne quelque chose, et donc que le nom "âme" désigne quelque chose; si l'on objecte qu'il y a certes des noms qui ne désignent pas quelque chose, comme "bouc-cerf" (*εζο αἰλο*, traduction littérale des deux éléments du mot grec *τραγέλαφος*), on répond qu'un tel nom ne désigne pas une chose naturelle, qui serait composée d'un bouc et d'un cerf, mais qu'il désigne néanmoins la composition de deux concepts simples, car les noms désignent des concepts, comme le dit Aristote; ainsi donc un nom désigne bien quelque chose, et le nom "âme" désigne quelque chose, et par suite l'âme existe. Par l'exemple du bouc-cerf, Moshe bar Kepha se réfère clairement au texte du *Peri Hermeneias*, dans lequel Aristote déclare en effet que l'expression "bouc-cerf" signifie bien quelque chose, mais il n'en déduit évidemment pas que le bouc-cerf existe.¹⁷¹ C'est le lieu de rappeler une information livrée par Barhebraeus dans son *Chronicon Ecclesiasticum*, à savoir que Moshe bar

¹⁷⁰ Voir la liste des auteurs et les références de leurs citations dans Braun, *Moses bar Kepha*, p. 24-5.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Arist., *Peri Hermeneias* 1, 16 a 16-18.

Kepha avait expliqué les “Livres de logique”.¹⁷² On ne saurait douter que cette expression désignât les livres d’Aristote, c’est-à-dire une partie au moins de l’*Organon*. Mais l’usage que Moshe bar Kepha fait du *Peri Hermeneias*, dans le cas présent, n’est nullement conforme à la doctrine du Philosophe. Ainsi que l’explique Ammonius, en effet, le nom “bouc-cerf” signifie une chose posée dans la pensée seulement (ἐν μόνῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ), et ce nom forme avec l’addition du verbe “n’existe pas” un énoncé vrai, et avec l’addition du verbe “existe” un énoncé faux.¹⁷³

Un autre argument reprend la preuve traditionnelle tirée du mouvement du corps humain, laquelle peut se ramener à ceci, que le corps n’est pas mû de l’extérieur et n’est pas mû non plus de l’intérieur par un mouvement naturel comme celui de la lumière:¹⁷⁴ le corps est donc mû par l’âme. On retrouve là un argument semblable à l’un de ceux qui figuraient dans le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς, que nous avons présenté en commençant. Mais c’est aussi l’occasion pour Moshe bar Kepha d’introduire une double distinction entre âme animale et âme rationnelle d’un côté, mouvement non-rationnel et mouvement rationnel de l’autre: l’âme animale qui est une puissance sensitive et motrice, est cause du mouvement non-rationnel du corps des animaux, tandis que l’âme rationnelle est cause du mouvement rationnel des êtres humains. L’argument s’appuie sur la tripartition aristotélicienne, comme le montre la suite du texte où l’auteur déclare que l’homme est semblable aux pierres et au fer, quant à sa corporéité, mais s’en distingue par la sensation, et qu’il est semblable aux animaux par le mouvement et la sensation, et par la colère et le désir, mais s’en distingue par l’âme rationnelle.

Un autre argument tire parti de la division des accidents en ceux qui se rapportent aux sens et ceux qui se rapportent à l’intellect. Le noir et le blanc sont simplement dans les corps (entendons par là qu’ils sont dans tout type de corps, inanimé ou animé), la santé et la maladie sont dans les corps animés, mais alors qu’en est-il du bien et du mal, de la justice et de la méchanceté ? Si le blanc et le noir, en tant qu’accidents perceptibles par les sens, sont dans des substances perceptibles par les sens, la justice et la méchanceté, en tant qu’accidents perceptibles par l’intellect, sont dans des substances perceptibles par l’intellect. Il existe donc une âme.

Parmi d’autres arguments encore tirés des activités humaines, signalons-en deux. L’un s’appuie sur l’invention des arts, comme preuve de l’existence de l’âme: ces arts sont l’architecture, la géométrie, l’astronomie, l’arithmétique, la musique (c’est-à-dire des arts relevant de la discipline mathématique, qui met en jeu l’activité raisonnante de l’âme). Un autre part du fait que l’homme forme des syllogismes, et que par là il distingue le vrai du faux et le bien du mal; l’argument fait donc allusion à deux fonctions traditionnellement attribuées au syllogisme:¹⁷⁵ distinguer le vrai du faux dans la connaissance, et distinguer le bien du mal dans l’action. Après avoir apporté des preuves

¹⁷² *Gregorii Barhebraei Chronicon ecclesiasticum*, ed. J.B. Abbeloos - Th.J. Lamy, Maisonneuve - Peeters, Paris - Louvain, 3 tomes en 2 vol. 1872-1877, section 2 [tome 3 = vol 2], col. 215 (syriaque), col. 216 (trad. latine): “Eo tempore claruit in ecclesiastica scientia ac profanorum sapientia religiosissimus Moyses Barcepha, Beth-Ramani episcopus, qui interpretatus est totum volumen bibliorum antiqui et novi testamenti, necnon libros dialecticæ [*ktobe da-milûto*], sermone prolixo et admirabili, præter alia quæ composuit scripta”.

¹⁷³ Ammon., *In De Int.*, p. 29.8-10 Busse (*CAG IV.5*).

¹⁷⁴ Ici la lumière remplace l’exemple traditionnel du feu.

¹⁷⁵ Voir par exemple Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 10.15-11.1 Busse: “Ἐλέγομεν δὲ ὀλίγον ἐμπροσθεν ὅτι τῆς φιλοσοφίας δύο ἐστὶ μέρη, τὸ τε θεωρητικὸν καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν ἔχει περὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ ψευδοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν περὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ. ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τούτων ἐκάτερον ὑποδέεται τινα μὲν ὡς ἀληθῆ μὴ ὄντα ἀληθῆ, τινὰ δὲ ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθὰ, ἕνα μὴ ἀπατώνται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, δεῦ αὐτοῖς τινος ὀργάνου διακρίνοντος αὐτοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἕνα ὡς περὶ γνώμονι τινα καὶ κανόνι χρώμενοι τὰ μὴ ἐφαρμόζοντα ἀπωθῶνται· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις. ἡ δὲ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶ [...] (*CAG IV*); la même idée est développée par Philop., *In Cat.*, p. 10.9-25 Busse (*CAG XIII.1*).

philosophiques de l'existence de l'âme, Moshe bar Kepha passe à l'énumération d'un certain nombre de preuves tirées de l'Écriture, ainsi qu'il le dit explicitement: "Diese Untersuchungen ergeben sich aus der Natur (der Dinge) und aus der Vernunft; wir beweisen aber die Existenz der Seele aus der heiligen Schrift".¹⁷⁶ Suivent dix-huit citations bibliques.

Moshe bar Kepha consacre ensuite deux chapitres à un exposé doxographique des opinions des philosophes païens sur l'âme et à la réfutation de ces opinions. Dans l'exposé des opinions, au chapitre 3, il reprend pour une part des éléments que l'on trouve dans le chapitre du *De Natura hominis*, où Némésius exposait semblablement les opinions des philosophes païens. De même, au chapitre 4, Moshe bar Kepha reprend des critiques, dont l'équivalent se rencontre dans les réfutations adressées par Némésius aux thèses païennes.¹⁷⁷ Le texte de Moshe bar Kepha ne reproduit pas toutefois, de manière exacte, la source némésienne, à supposer que le traité de Némésius soit bien la source de l'auteur plus tardif. De plus, les éléments parallèles à ceux de Némésius sont fondus dans un ensemble plus vaste, car l'écriture de Moshe bar Kepha procède par accumulation d'arguments. Il ne peut donc être ici question d'en faire l'analyse, pas plus que nous ne pourrions le faire pour les autres chapitres du traité.

Dans les trois chapitres suivants, Moshe bar Kepha s'attache à montrer successivement que l'âme est une substance, qu'elle est incorporelle, et qu'elle est simple. Ce faisant, il se conforme à l'organigramme des questions à poser à propos de l'âme, dont nous avons vu des exemples dans le Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης et dans les ouvrages de Grégoire de Nysse. Sans reprendre les arguments avancés par Moshe bar Kepha, nous relèverons une remarque qui revient dans les deux chapitres touchant l'incorporéité et la simplicité de l'âme: à la fin de l'exposé philosophique sur l'incorporéité, l'auteur écrit: "Tels sont les syllogismes qui montrent l'incorporéité de l'âme", et à la fin de l'autre exposé, il écrit: "Tels sont les trois syllogismes de la première figure, qui montrent la simplicité de l'âme". Nous lisons dans ces remarques un nouveau témoignage de la formation de l'auteur en matière de logique aristotélicienne, et en même temps de son désir de rigueur philosophique. Notons aussi qu'après l'exposé philosophique sur l'incorporéité, l'auteur ajoute une liste de témoignages tirés des Écritures pour confirmer la thèse défendue.

Les chapitres 8 et suivants portent sur la nature de l'âme: il y est affirmé que l'âme est vie, et qu'elle est immortelle, et cela est encore conforme au questionnaire traditionnel portant sur l'âme. Puis l'auteur énumère les puissances (ou facultés, *hayle*) et actes (*ma'bdonwoto*) de l'âme (au chapitre 12), qu'ils répartit en deux classes: les unes, naturelles, sont la connaissance (*madd'o*), la pensée discursive (*tar'ito*), l'intelligence (*yadū' tonūto*), la raison (*mlilūto*) et la mémoire (*'ūbdono*); les autres, accidentelles, sont la colère (*hemmtto*), le désir (*regto*), la sensation (*rgešto*) qui est dans les cinq sens, l'imagination (*phantāsiā*). Le vocabulaire syriaque des facultés de l'âme est certes assez incertain, mais il est notable cependant que le terme le plus couramment utilisé pour signifier l'intellect (*hawno*), qui correspond habituellement au grec νοῦς, est absent de cette liste. Quant à la division entre puissances naturelles et puissances accidentelles, elle a une source néoplatonicienne: selon Porphyre déjà, les facultés de l'âme lui sont accidentelles en ce qu'elles n'appartiennent pas à son essence, mais

¹⁷⁶ Faute de posséder la copie du texte syriaque pour ce passage, nous citons la traduction de Braun, *Moses Bar Kepha*, p. 38.

¹⁷⁷ Voir le tableau des correspondances entre les pages et lignes des textes de Moshe bar Kepha et de Némésius, établies par J. Reller, "Iwannis von Dara, Mose bar Kepha und Bar Hebraeus über die Seele, traditions-geschichtlich untersucht", dans G.J. Reinink - A.C. Klugkist (éd.), *After Bardaisan: Studies on Continuity and Change in Syriac Christianity in Honour of Professor Han J.W. Drijvers*, Peeters, Leuven 1999 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 89), p. 253-68 (p. 260): l'auteur donne les correspondances entre pages et lignes de la traduction de Moshe bar Kepha par Braun et celles de l'édition du *De Natura hominis* par Morani, mais il n'indique pas quel est le contenu des passages semblables, à l'exception d'un exemple se rapportant à la critique de l'entéléchie aristotélicienne (*ibid.*, p. 261).

lui adviennent quand elle est jointe à un corps. Cette conception est reprise par Grégoire de Nysse notamment, qui considère que l'âme vraie et parfaite est par nature intelligible et sans matière, liée à la nature matérielle par les sensations:

Ἄλλ' ἢ μὲν ἀληθῆς τε καὶ τελεία ψυχῆ, μία τῆ φύσει ἐστίν, ἢ νοερά τε καὶ ἄυλος, ἢ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῆ ὑλικῆ καταμιγνυμένη φύσει,¹⁷⁸

et que les autres facultés sont dites ainsi par homonymie:

Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ νοερῷ τε καὶ λογικῷ τὸ τέλειον ἐχούσης, πᾶν ὃ μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὁμώνυμον μὲν εἶναι δύναται τῆ ψυχῆ, οὐ μὴν καὶ ὄντως ψυχῆ, ἀλλὰ τις ἐνέργεια ζωτικῆ, τῆ τῆς ψυχῆς κλήσει συγκεκριμένη.¹⁷⁹

La faculté spéculative est propre à l'âme et naturelle, tandis que les facultés qui sont traditionnellement classées comme désirante ou colérique n'appartiennent pas à l'essence de l'âme, mais lui adviennent de l'extérieur:

Φαμὲν γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν μὲν θεωρητικὴν τε καὶ διακριτικὴν καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐποπτικὴν δύναμιν οἰκείαν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν [...] Ὅσα δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν μεθορίῳ κεῖται πρὸς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιρρεπῶς κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχοντα [...], οἷον τὸν θυμὸν, ἢ τὸν φόβον [...] ταῦτα ἕξωθεν ἐπιγενέσθαι αὐτῆ λογίζομεθα [...].¹⁸⁰

Restent deux points essentiels du questionnaire à traiter: montrer que l'âme est rationnelle, et qu'elle est automotrice. Ces sujets sont abordés dans plusieurs chapitres qui suivent. L'âme y est dite tantôt rationnelle (*mlilo*), tantôt cogitative (*methasbonito*). Le premier qualificatif renvoie au substantif *mliluto*, qui a pour correspondant en grec le terme λόγος, et qui se rapporte à la capacité de discerner les pensées, selon une définition attribuée par Moshe aux philosophes, sans plus de précision. Le second qualificatif (dont un équivalent grec pourrait être λογιστικός) se rapporte à la capacité de l'âme qui s'exerce dans les sciences et les arts (au sens du mot grec τέχνη). Quant à la question de l'automotricité de l'âme, son examen donne lieu à un exposé des six manières dont se dit le mouvement selon Aristote dans son traité des *Catégories*. Passant en revue ces mouvements, Moshe note que le mouvement local, et les mouvements de croissance et décroissance se disent des corps et ne peuvent se dire de l'âme incorporelle. La génération non plus ne saurait se dire de l'âme, qui est déjà là et ne peut se comparer à une semence qui devient un corps. Reste le mouvement d'altération qui se dit de l'âme qui passe du mal au bien, ou de l'ignorance au savoir. Mais pour définir de manière

¹⁷⁸ Grégoire de Nysse, *De Op. hom.*, PG 44, 176 B; trad. Laplace, p. 147: "En réalité l'âme, dans sa vérité et sa perfection, est une par nature, étant à la fois spirituelle et sans matière et, par les sens, se trouvant mêlée à la nature matérielle".

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 176 D-177 A; trad. Laplace, p. 149: "Ainsi donc comme l'âme a sa perfection dans ce qui est intelligent et doué de raison, tout ce qui ne réalise pas cette qualité peut recevoir par similitude le nom d'âme, mais ne l'est pas réellement: il ne s'agit alors que de quelque énergie vitale, mise par appellation en parallèle avec l'âme".

¹⁸⁰ Grégoire de Nysse, *De Anima et resurrectione*, PG 46, 57 B-C; trad. Bouchet, p. 53: "Nous disons que la faculté de l'âme qui contemple, qui juge et qui voit le monde, lui est propre et naturelle [...]. Or, toutes les facultés de l'âme se trouvant sur les confins penchent, selon leur propre nature, vers l'un ou l'autre des contraires [...]: c'est le cas de la colère ou de la peur. [...] Nous considérons alors que ces mouvements viennent dans l'âme de façon extrinsèque [...]". Nous empruntons ces références à Peroli, *Il platonismo*, p. 249-50.

générale le mouvement de l'âme, Moshe bar Kepha déclare qu'il est le passage de la puissance à l'acte: en effet, l'intellect est une puissance de l'âme qui est actualisée, lorsque l'on connaît les choses sans démonstration ni langage, mais par un savoir simple et secret, et tel est le mouvement de l'âme. Dans le quinzième chapitre, "qui montre quelle est la définition de l'âme et ce qu'elle est",¹⁸¹ et qui paraît conclure l'étude menée dans les chapitres précédents, Moshe bar Kepha définit l'âme comme une substance vivante, immortelle, connaissante (*mmadd'oto*), douée de pensée (*metre'yonito*), et douée de cognition (*yadū tonīto*), douée de mémoire, mue par elle-même. À vrai dire, nos traductions par "connaissante", "douée de pensée", et "douée de cognition", sont très incertaines, et Moshe bar Kepha ne précise aucunement en quoi se différencient les facultés désignées par les mots qu'il utilise.¹⁸² L'accumulation des termes, en ce cas, paraît tenir lieu d'analyse. C'est là un cas particulier du mode d'écriture général de l'auteur, comme on l'a déjà dit.

Aussitôt après ce chapitre apparemment conclusif, le suivant a pour but de montrer, derechef, que l'âme est immortelle, à partir d'arguments que l'on pourrait dire rhétoriques pour les opposer aux arguments que l'auteur voulait syllogistiques dans les chapitres précédents, et qui sont souvent circulaires ou supposent en réalité la conclusion cherchée parmi leurs prémisses. Donnons-en un exemple presque caricatural: "Die Seele ist ihrer Natur nach Leben, das heisst: ihre Natur ist Leben und stirbt nicht; also ist die Seele unsterblich". À la fin du chapitre, après ces arguments que nous disons rhétoriques, l'auteur fait appel à divers passages des Écritures pour soutenir son propos. Et le chapitre suivant encore revient également sur la question de l'incorporéité et de l'immortalité, selon le mode que nous avons qualifié de rhétorique.

Nous avons suggéré plus haut que le traité de Moshe bar Kepha partageait quelque chose de la présentation scolaire de celui de Jean de Dara, dans le manuscrit Vat. sir. 147. Sans doute serait-il préférable de parler de forme doxographique pour les deux ouvrages. Il convient ici de signaler que l'attribution de plusieurs traités mis sous le nom de Jean de Dara pose problème, du fait qu'ils peuvent se trouver dans les manuscrits aussi sous le nom de Moshe bar Kepha, ou bien du fait que des traités semblables, voire presque identiques, sont attribués à l'un et à l'autre des deux auteurs.¹⁸³ Dans le cas des traités sur l'âme, il s'agit bien de deux ouvrages distincts. Tous deux semblent cependant viser un but semblable, celui de procurer une somme plus ou moins étendue des questions concernant l'âme, en exposant les arguments qui ont été présentés et les solutions qui ont été données à ces questions, et en prenant en compte pour une part les apports de la philosophie profane. Ce qui, à cet égard, n'est qu'ébauché dans l'ouvrage de Jean de Dara (tel qu'il nous est conservé), est traité de manière plus systématique chez Moshe bar Kepha: les éléments empruntés à la philosophie profane y sont bien plus présents, et il n'est pas rare que dans un même chapitre le traitement philosophique d'une question soit suivi des citations de textes empruntés aux Écritures ou aux Pères, qui sont censés confirmer les résultats obtenus précédemment. En bref, c'est à l'instauration d'une véritable *συμφωνία* entre discours philosophique et discours théologique que paraît s'attacher Moshe bar Kepha.

¹⁸¹ La traduction de Braun, *Moses Bar Kepha*, p. 64: "welches die Definition der Seele sei und was ihre logische Differenz" est une extrapolation qui nous semble abusive.

¹⁸² Les traductions de Braun, *Moses Bar Kepha*, p. 64, par "intelligente, rationable, intelligirende" ne nous semblent pas plus satisfaisantes. Nous passons sous silence les autres qualificatifs qui s'appliquent à l'âme, en tant qu'elle se distingue du corps, et qui sont traduits par Braun, *ibid.*, par "leuchtend, dünne, reine, mit Urteil begabte, unsichtbare".

¹⁸³ Voir sur ce point les remarques de Schlimme, *Der Hexaameronkommentar*, p. 14-25, sous le titre "Das Problem Iwannis von Dara / Moses bar Kepha".

Conclusion

Notre projet était de présenter un aperçu de la tradition philosophique concernant la question de l'âme dans un ensemble de textes appartenant à la littérature syriaque et nous avertissions, en commençant, qu'il était vain de vouloir distinguer une tradition proprement philosophique dans cette littérature. Les références constantes que nous avons faites, au cours de l'exposé, aux œuvres de Némésius d'Émèse, de Basile de Césarée, et surtout à celles de Grégoire de Nysse, attestent qu'il est en effet fort difficile de distinguer une littérature proprement philosophique dans le champ culturel syriaque, dès lors qu'il s'agit de l'âme.

Nous avons proposé quelques exemples seulement de textes et nous sommes bien conscients que ceux-ci ne représentent pas toute la tradition syriaque, même limitée aux traités d'orientation philosophique ou comportant des parties ainsi orientées. L'étude que nous avons faite des traités retenus, si rapide soit-elle,¹⁸⁴ montre la permanence d'un corpus textuel de sources, dont quelques-uns des éléments principaux sont le *Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς*, le *De Natura hominis* de Némésius d'Émèse, le commentaire sur l'*Hexaemeron* de Basile de Césarée, le *De Opificio hominis* de Grégoire de Nysse – tous textes d'origine grecque –, auxquels on peut ajouter le traité syriaque de Aḥudemmeḥ sur l'homme. Tous les ouvrages d'origine grecque ne sont pas nécessairement cités textuellement, mais ils appartiennent au fond commun auquel les auteurs de traités sur l'âme en syriaque ont accès soit directement, soit éventuellement par l'intermédiaire de doxographies, le *Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς* n'étant déjà, par lui-même, pas autre chose qu'une sorte de doxographie.

Si l'on s'intéresse non plus seulement à l'aspect littéraire de la tradition syriaque des traités sur l'âme, mais à son contenu philosophique, il apparaît que le problème de l'âme est traité à l'intérieur d'un champ conceptuel défini par une liste standard de questions: il s'agit de savoir si l'âme existe, et de montrer ensuite qu'elle est incorporelle, simple, immortelle et rationnelle. À l'époque tardoa antique, des auteurs comme Plotin et Porphyre ont joué un rôle fondamental dans la constitution de ce corpus de questions et dans leur étude philosophique. Mais les voies d'accès principales au corpus, pour les auteurs syriaques, semblent avoir été le *De Natura hominis* de Némésius ainsi que des œuvres comme le *De Anima et resurrectione* et le *De Opificio hominis* de Grégoire de Nysse.

Le contexte dans lequel se situent les ouvrages que nous avons rapidement cités et commentés est principalement théologique et religieux, et pour l'essentiel étranger aux questionnements du *De Anima* d'Aristote. En outre, la question de l'âme chez les auteurs syriaques n'est pas liée, comme dans la tradition philosophique grecque, plotinienne notamment, à une cosmologie d'Êtres divins, mais elle se développe sur le fond de la question christologique: à cet égard, est fondamentale l'analogie entre la composition du corps et de l'âme en l'homme, et l'union de l'humanité et de la divinité dans le Christ.

Il reste que des éléments de la philosophie "profane" sont bien présents dans la tradition syriaque, et notamment chez les Pères que nous citons, Basile et surtout Grégoire, ainsi que chez Némésius. L'arrière-plan platonicien est clairement visible chez les auteurs syriaques, chez qui l'on trouve des références implicites (ou parfois explicites) aux passages clés des dialogues de Platon touchant la question de l'âme. Surtout, le corpus des questions qui encadrent le savoir sur ce sujet et son ordonnancement ont été élaborés par Plotin et Porphyre. D'ailleurs les "acquets" de la philosophie profane sont implicitement revendiqués dans le *Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς*, et plus ouvertement dans le commentaire de Jacques d'Édesse sur l'*Hexaemeron*. Et au IX^e siècle, chez Jean de Dara et surtout chez Moshe bar Kepha, la recherche d'un accord entre philosophie profane et théologie devient manifeste.

¹⁸⁴ Chacun de ces textes aurait pu, et devrait encore, faire l'objet d'une étude particulière.

Kalām and Falsafa Integrated for Divine Unity

Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz's (5th/11th century) Risāla fī l-Tawḥīd

Veysel Kaya*

Abstract

This study is an attempt to set the backdrop for an Arabic manuscript which was copied in the second half of the 5th/11th century. It contains a treatise by a certain Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, whose name does not feature in any biographical source whatsoever. Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz wrote the treatise upon receiving a request from a friend to write on *tawḥīd* (unity), a fundamental theme in classical Islamic theology and philosophy. The treatise, like the other works by the author in the same *maḡmū'a*, does not mention any title or a name, although it is clear that the author depends upon many sources belonging to different discourses in Islamic thought. In order to elucidate the character and method of the *R. Fī l-Tawḥīd*, both *falsafa* and *kalām* must be taken into account. As for his philosophic affiliation, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz belongs to the tradition of al-Kindī (d. after 252/866), and gets especially close to Abū l-Ḥasan al-Āmirī (d. 381/992), as shown by his quotations of Greek sources typical of the circle of al-Kindī. In *kalām*, as shown by his discussion of the origin of the world and God's attributes, he strictly follows Mu'tazilite theology. All in all, the treatise exhibits a combination of the two disciplines as they developed in the 4th/5th century AH. In this paper, I only address the aspects which help to contextualize the main topics of the treatise, without providing the full survey which I am planning for a future extensive study of Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz and his work.

1. The Making of Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz

The İnebey Manuscripts Library in Bursa, a province in Turkey which was the first capital of the Ottoman Empire, houses an Arabic *maḡmū'a* which contains several treatises (*risālāt*) authored by a certain Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz.¹ It has been copied by an anonymous scribe in 471/1079 and, according

* I am indebted to several people for their contribution. Cristina D'Ancona has encouraged me and gave me guidance since I started working on my draft. Wilferd Madelung took the trouble to read the Arabic text and shared his valuable insights with me. Cecilia Martini Bonadeo and M. Cüneyt Kaya provided me with important materials that turned out to be essential. Kenan Özçelik helped me to "boost up" my Persian. Osman Nuri Solak helped me to acquire the copies of the manuscripts in İnebey Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi. Lastly, I would like to thank the two anonymous referees who significantly contributed to the draft.

¹ The *maḡmū'a* which contains the treatises is catalogued under the collection of Ulucami, no: 1543. The binding is of the typical "Çaharküşe"-style with marbled paper (*ebri*) covering the boards. The style of *ebri* is called *battal* or *tarz-ı kadim*, and the fading colour of the *ebri* on the front and the back boards shows that the bookbinder did not use the *lâke* technique. This indicates a later repair, probably in the 19th century (I am indebted to Hicabi Gülgen for this information). The writing support is paper, and the page dimension is 198 x 155. The folios are numbered with both Arabic numerals (1, 2...) and Eastern Arabic numerals (١, ٢...); the latter is the correct one. The name of the copyist is not mentioned anywhere. Two dates are given in the colophon: "25 Ramaḡān 471", and "Rüz-i İsfandārmud Māh-i Ardibihīšt 469" (f. 75 v); see *infra*. The *waqf* seal, on the folios 2 r, 2 v, 77 v, 91 r and 119 r, reads, "لا اله إلا الله محمد رسول الله واقف الكتاب الحاج السيد عبد الله في البروسة في الجامع الكبير سنة مئتين بعد ألف" (Bursa-Ulucami-1200). The script is naskh and the diacritics are frequent, although not always present. There is one column for each page, containing mostly 16, but sometimes 17 lines. There are no catchwords. The marginal notes are occasional, by the same hand as the main text, and it is clear that the copyist uses them to correct the main text and not to comment on it. In addition to the three treatises of Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, the *maḡmū'a* contains two texts which are written by two different hands. The first (ff. 76 r - 90 r) is the treatise '*Uyüb al-Nafī*' by the *šūfi* Abū 'Abd al-Raḡmān Muḡammad al-Sulamī (d. 412/1021) and the

to the shelfmark of the manuscript, it once belonged to the famous Ottoman *reisülküttab* (the chief of the secretaries/clerks) Abū Bakr Rustam b. Aḥmad al-Širwānī (d. 1135/1723), whose personal library allegedly housed rare books on diverse subjects.² The guard-leaf of the codex, which records all the titles of the *maǧmūʿa*, attributes three treatises to Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz: a *Risāla fī Fadl al-āḥira ʿalā l-dunyā*, *Treatise on the Superiority of the Hereafter over this World* (f. 2 v - 37 r), a *Risāla fī l-Nafs wa-l-rūḥ*, *Treatise on Soul and Spirit* (f. 37 v - 52 r), and a *Risāla fī l-Tawḥīd wa-l-ḥikma al-ʿāliya*, *Treatise on Unity and High Wisdom* (f. 53 v - 76 r),³ which is the subject of this study.⁴ What attracts attention from the outset is the unusual name of the author, “Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz”. First, the name is not accompanied by any *nisba* pointing to his origins. Second, while the first item is a very common Arabic name, that of his father is rather peculiar, implying a non-Arabic genealogy. In fact, the name دادهرمز points to the pre-Islamic Sasanian era.⁵ Studies on the pre-Islamic Sasanian names prove that it was commonly used in the Middle-Iranian language (Pahlavi).⁶ As for the classical Arabic sources, the name notably surfaces in Ibn al-Nadīm’s *K. al-Fihrist*, in the section on Manichaeism (*al-Mānawīyya*). According to the information given by Ibn al-Nadīm, in the time of caliph Walīd I (r. 86-96/705-715), a certain Zād-hurmuz (زادهرمز) separated from his community and caused a schism because of his views on leadership.⁷

scribe is Muḥammad b. ʿUṭmān al-Waḥšī al-Kamīnī; no date is given. The other work and the last item of the whole *maǧmūʿa* is the *Kitāb al-Ādāb li-ulī l-Albāb* by a certain Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb al-Dahabī (ff. 91 r - 120 v). The scribe and the date of *istinsāḥ* are unknown.

² B.M. Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, Matbaʿa-i ʿĀmiri, I-III. Istanbul 1333/1914, I, p. 233: “Mütenevvi’ ve nefid kitāblara mâlik idi”.

³ It was Hellmut Ritter who first drew attention to these treatises, although he said he could not identify the author: H. Ritter, “Philologika. XIII. Arabische Handschriften in Anatolien und Istanbul (Fortsetzung)”, *Oriens* 3 (1950), pp. 31-107, in part. pp. 61-2. On the basis of Ritter’s article, Fuat Sezgin enlists Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz among “the writers on theology in the Abbasid times”: F. Sezgin, *Tārīḥ al-Turāt al-ʿArabī*, Idāra al-Ṭaqāfa wa-l-Našr, Riyadh 1991, IV, p. 54. Along with the three treatises by Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz mentioned above, the guard-leaf, which lists the contents of the *maǧmūʿa*, also gives the titles of other works, which are not present in the *maǧmūʿa* itself. Apparently these were extracted from the original codex to which the guard-leaf belonged, and were replaced by the two works which feature in the *maǧmūʿa* as it has come down to us. The titles listed in the guard-leaf include (i) al-Kindī’s *Ṭabīʿat al-Falak muḥalifa li-ṭabāʿī al-anāšir* [n. 121 in Atiyeh’s list, see below]; (ii) al-Kindī’s *Qawl al-Hudūd* [n. 29 in Atiyeh’s list]; (iii) the Arabic version of Aristotle’s *De Sensu et sensato*, labelled *Kitāb fī l-Hiss wa l-maḥsūs li-Šāḥib al-mantiq* (see the article by R. Hansberger in this volume, pp. 301-14); (iv) the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, whose translation is erroneously ascribed to Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq: *Kitāb fī l-Rubūbiyya al-musammā bi-l-rūmiyya bi-Tʿulūḡiyyā tarḡama Ḥunayn b. Iṣḥāq*. These titles were struck out in the guard-leaf. Some additional information on titles (i) and (ii) may be useful. (i) G.N. Atiyeh, *Al-Kindī: the Philosopher of the Arabs*, Islamic Research Institute, Rawalpindi 1966 (Publications of the Islamic Research Institute, 6), p. 180, lists as n. 121 an *Epistle on the Exposition that the nature of the heavens is contrary to that of the four elements* (*Risāla fī l-Ibāra ʿan inna ṭabīʿat al-falak muḥalifa li-ṭabāʿī al-anāšir al-arbāʿa*). This text is edited: *Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-falsafīyya*, ed. M.ʿA. Abū Rīda, Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, I-II, Cairo 1950-53, II, pp. 40-6; English trans. by H. Khatchadourian, “Al-Kindī’s *Treatise on the Distinctiveness of the Celestial Sphere*”, *Islamic Studies* 4 (1965), pp. 45-54. (ii) This text is the well-known *Epistle on the Definitions of the things and their descriptions* (*Risāla fī l-ḥudūd al-ašyāʾ wa-rusūmihā*), ed. Abū Rīda, I, pp. 165-80; edition, accompanied by a French translation, also in al-Kindī, *Cinq Épitres*. Centre d’Histoire des sciences et des doctrines. Histoire des sciences et de la philosophie arabes, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 1976, pp. 1-69. If the list of the guard-leaf can be traced back to the original collection, this points to the school of al-Kindī: typically, both the pseudo-*Theology* and the *K. al-Hiss wa-l-maḥsūs* originated in that circle, and the two works by al-Kindī tell the same story.

⁴ Throughout this article, I refer to the sections of the *R. Fī l-Tawḥīd* with numbers between curly brackets.

⁵ The *Lughat-nāma* of Dehkhoda gives the brief information: “Dādhurmuz, one of the judges in the Sasanian period. His fame and judicial views are told in the book *Mātikān-i Hazār Dātestān* (*The Book of a Thousand Judgments*)”.

⁶ S. Zimmer, “L’interprétation des noms propres moyen-iraniens: questions de méthode”, in W. Skalmowsky - A. van Tongerloo (eds), *Medioiranica. Proceedings of the International Colloquium organized by the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven from the 21st to the 23rd of May 1990*, Peeters, Leuven 1993, pp. 193-206, in part. 195; 196; 201 (as “Dād-Ohrmazd”).

⁷ Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, ed. R. Taǧaddud, Marvi, Tehran 1971, pp. 397-8. For another interesting figure belonging to

There are no biographical data on Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, nor any reference is given to his name in the well-known *ṭabaqāt* or *mu' ḡam* genre that I have been able to consult during my research for this paper.⁸ The only certain date which we have is that of *istinsāḥ* in the colophon of the *R. Fī l-Tawḥīd*, namely 471 AH. We also know that in his *R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira 'alā l-dunyā* the author quotes tacitly some passages from Ibn al-Miskawayh's (d. 421/1030) *Tahdīb al-Aḥlāq*, which is thought to have been written *circa* 375 AH.⁹ This leaves us with a span of approximately one hundred years in our attempt to locate the writings of Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz in a particular point in time. However, the contents of the treatises of Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz do not provide any clue whatsoever in order to relate them to any historical event. Early in the *R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira 'alā l-dunyā*, when he explains the motive behind the composition of this work, he relates he heard someone arguing for an unacceptable theory in a debate session (*maḡlis al-munāzara wa-l-mudakara*).¹⁰ That person, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz narrates, had contended that all sciences, no matter if religious or secular, are in fact sought for worldly wishes such as wealth, ostentation, charisma etc., something which was true also for books in any discipline or science, even when the author indulged in boasting that his only wish was to achieve the contentment of God. Then, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz goes on to explain why the afterlife surpasses the worldly life.

The overall tone of the writings of Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz is noticeably mystic, that is, pertaining to *ṣūfī* literature. He occasionally draws on the interpretations given by major *ṣūfī* figures when he quotes Quranic verses.¹¹ The *ṣūfīs* are included in the category of the *ḥukamā'* (sages)¹² in the "hierarchy" of the followers of the true path – a phrase which occurs several times in his writings – namely prophets (*anbiyā'*), sages (*ḥukamā'*), devotees (*ṣālihūn*) and scholars (*'ulamā'*).¹³ Nonetheless, if one takes into account the whole picture that his writings portray, it appears that to lavishly link him to any particular school of thought would be a mistake. Close examination of the treatises uncovers many instances in which the author relies upon a vast array of literature that was available to him. Some Quranic verses that he cites are accompanied by the interpretations of the scholars of *tafsīr*.¹⁴

Zoroastrianism in Abbasid times, bearing a similar name (Day-Ohyrmazd), see A. Tafazzoli, "Abāliš", <http://www.iraniconline.org/articles/abalis>.

⁸ I was very hopeful of finding something in Ya'qūt al-Ḥamawī's (d. 627/1229) *Mu' ḡam al-Udabā'*, since Ya'qūt lived one century after Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz and had more chances than any other biographer to access information on Iranian writers. But I have found nothing. There are, however, some similar Iranian-origin personalities with whom we can compare him. For instance, there is Sa'īd b. Ḥamīd b. al-Baḥtikān, whom Ya'qūt describes as follows: "secretary, poet, and letter-writer, he has an ancient Iranian origin; he is a fanatic of [Persians] against Arabs, and has a collection of *risālas*": Ya'qūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu' ḡam al-Udabā'*, I-VII, ed. I. 'Abbās. Dār al-Garb al-Islāmī, Beirut 1993, III, p. 1366.

⁹ M. Arkoun, *L'humanisme arabe au IV^e-X^e siècle: Miskawayh, philosophe et historien*, Vrin, Paris 1982, p. 116.

¹⁰ Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, *Risāla fī Faḍl al-āḥira 'alā l-dunyā*, ff. 3 r - 3 v. For information on the nature of these debate sessions and those attending them, see J.L. Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam*, Brill, Leiden 1986, p. 58.

¹¹ For instance, apropos the verse 3:79 (كُونُوا رِبَانِيّينَ), he follows the *tafsīr* of al-Sulamī and cites the words of al-Wāsiṭī and Ḡunayd: see Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira 'alā l-dunyā*, f. 10 r, and cf. Abī 'Abd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamī (d. 412/1021), *Tafsīr al-Sulamī wa huwa Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr*, ed. S. 'Umrān, Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, I-II, Beirut, I, p. 104.

¹² According to Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, the sages are the holders of a godly wisdom; thus, their words of wisdom must be regarded as noble speeches. For instance, he quotes from one of those sages (*bā ḍ al-ḥukamā'*) saying: "There are servants of God in this world. When they look, they reflect. When they reflect, they understand. When they understand, they know. When they know, they practise. And when they practise, they benefit. When they benefit, they help. When they help, God draws the curtain between Him and them, thus, with the eyes of their heart they observe the Knower of the Unseen". After this quotation, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz comments: *ḥādīth kalām šarīf*, namely, "this is a noble speech" (*R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira 'alā l-dunyā*, f. 12 r). This saying is attributed to the well-known mystic Ḍunnūn al-Miṣrī: see Abū Nu'aym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038), *Ḥilya al-awliyā'*, Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, I-X, Beirut 1988, IX, p. 374.

¹³ Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira 'alā l-dunyā*, f. 6 r; *R. fī l-Tawḥīd*, f. 54 v: see {2} below.

¹⁴ Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira 'alā l-dunyā*, f. 10 r: "One of the *mufasssīrūn* said..." Judging from the similarities between the texts, this *mufasssīr* might be al-Sulamī, or al-Wāsiṭī, from whom al-Sulamī quotes.

As to the field of *adab*, the poems of renowned Arab poets such as ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661), Ṣālih b. ‘Abd al-Quddūs (d. *circa* 167/783), and Abū Nuwās (d. *circa* 198/813) are mentioned in due contexts.¹⁵ Moreover, quotations from the works of Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ (d. *circa* 139/756), an eminent man of belles-lettres in the second century AH, are used to buttress the nobility of reason in religious matters.¹⁶ Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz does not limit himself to referring to the Islamic sources: indeed, he benefits from the literary heritage of other cultures. For example, he uses a part of the story of *Bilawhar and Būdāsif* (قصة بلوهر وبوذاسف), an Islamic version of the Buddhist tale which records a conversation between a king and a sage on the meaning of life.¹⁷ He proves to be familiar with the vocabulary of the secular sciences, as shown by his enumeration of the tools used by engineers and astrologists, that is, compass (البركار), ruler (المسطرة), triangle (الكونيا), astrolabe (الأصطرلاب), globe (الكرة), and armillary sphere (ذات الحلق).¹⁸

All this points to multifarious and erudite knowledge, as one would expect from an ideal intellectual and polymath of an age that has been labelled “Renaissance of Islam”.¹⁹ Still, if there was one school of thought where to locate our author more properly, it would be that of the followers of al-Kindī’s tradition. As will be seen in the present inquiry into the philosophical background of the *R. Fī l-Tawhīd*, Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz joins “the Kindīan project” in demonstrating the fundamental truth of Islamic theological dogma, i.e. *tawhīd*, with the help of Greek philosophical texts.²⁰ In our endeavour to contextualize his writings in the general course of Islamic thought, we are lucky enough to find other sources of inspiration which are much closer to his time: Ibn Miskawayh, and especially Abū l-Ḥasan al-‘Āmirī. The similarity of Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz’s style of writing to that of al-‘Āmirī is very noticeable; in particular, those who are acquainted with his works might easily recognise in Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz terms and sentences which are reminiscent of al-‘Āmirī’s special vocabulary. This vocabulary includes *ḥāṣṣiyya*,²¹ *al-ḡawhar al-insiyy*,²² *al-kamāl al-insiyy*,²³ *al-sā‘āda al-abadiyya*,²⁴ *al-lā-wuḡūd*,²⁵ etc. In many cases, Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz appears to be a commentator of the philosophical writings of al-‘Āmirī, a conclusion which is not reached only on the grounds of his quotations from the latter’s works that will be discussed below: indeed, the main philosophical and theological stances that he adopts on several crucial issues show his close relationship with al-‘Āmirī. Thus, we can surely add the name of Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz to the list given by Mojtaba Minovi in his famous article on the followers and transmitters of al-‘Āmirī.²⁶

¹⁵ Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira ‘alā l-dunyā*, ff. 22 r, 28 r, 29 r respectively.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 34 r (*qāla ba‘ḍ al-ḥukamā*). The quotation is from *al-Adab al-Ṣaḡīr*.

¹⁷ Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fī l-Nafs wa-l-rūḥ*, 37 r. Cf. D. Gimaret, *Le Livre de Bilawhar et Būdāsif selon la version arabe ismaélienne*, Dar al-Machreq, Beirut 1986, p. 12.

¹⁸ Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira ‘alā l-dunyā*, f. 19 v.

¹⁹ To get an idea of such ideal types and general atmosphere of the age, see Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam*, pp. 1-30.

²⁰ P. Adamson, *Al-Kindī*, Oxford U. P., New York 2007 (Great Medieval Thinkers, 9), p. 25; C. Martini Bonadeo, *‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baḡdādī’s Philosophical Journey. From Aristotle’s Metaphysics to the Metaphysical Science*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2013 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 88), pp. 45-8; 58.

²¹ Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira ‘alā l-dunyā*, ff. 16 r, 32 v; *R. Fī l-tawhīd*, f. 56 r: see {5} below.

²² Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fī Faḍl al-āḥira ‘alā l-dunyā*, ff. 15 v, 32 r.

²³ *Ibid.*, f. 23 v.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 36 v.

²⁵ Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. Fī l-Tawhīd*, f. 56 v: see {5} below.

²⁶ M. Minovi, “Az Ḥazāin-i Turkiyya-2”, *Maḡalla-i Dāniškada-i Adabiyyāt* 4/3 (1957), pp. 53-89; in part. pp. 68 f. For an up-to-date biographical study on al-‘Āmirī, see E. Wakelnig, “Die Weiterführung der neuplatonischen Ansätze”, in U. Rudolph - R. Würsch (eds), *Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt. 1 8.-10. Jahrhundert*, Schwabe, Basel 2012, pp. 170-85.

Below are the comparison tables between Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz's *R. fī l-Tawhīd* and one of al-Āmirī's works, which indicate how the former's text evolves into a commentary of the latter. Further parallels between the two authors will be shown in the following pages.

<i>R. fī l-Tawhīd</i>	al-Āmirī, <i>K. al-Amad' alā l-abad</i>
وقال بعض الحكماء ما زلت أشرب فلم أرو حتى عرفت الباري تعالى فرويت من غير شرب وقال غيره إذا حسبت أنك عرفت كل شيء فاعلم أنك لم تعرف شيئا ما لم تعرف الله تعالى حق المعرفة وقال غيره عرفت ربي بربي ولو لا ربي ما عرفت ربي أراد به نور الهادي له إليه	من الحكايات المشهورة عن أفلاطون أنه كان يقول لأصحابه إنكم إن عرفتم كل شيء فلا تحسبوا أنكم عرفتم شيئا ما لم تعرفوا الله عز وجل ثم من الحكايات المشهورة عن أرسطاطاليس أنه كان يقول كنت قبل اليوم أشرب وأظمأ حتى إذا عرفت الله عز وجل فرويت بلا شرب ²⁷
ولا يشك أن وحدانية الباري تعالى لن تكون شبيهة بواحدة من الوجدانيات الأخر إذ هي بأسرها مخترعة بأمره تعالى جده فمن الواجب إذن أن نعلم أن وحدانيته تعالى مباينة للوجدانيات الأخر لانتفاء عامة جهات الكثرة عنها	كذا أيضا وحدانيته ليست تشبه وحدانيات شيء من موجودات العالم إذ الوجدانيات العالمية معرضة للتكثير إما بأجزائها وإما بمعانيها وإما بنظائرها ²⁸
ثم علم أن كل واحد منها ذو أجزاء متصورة وذو أبعاد متناسقة وذو شكل مصور وكل ما تعلق وجوده بشيء من هذه الأفعال فمن الممتنع أن يكون أزليا وإجب الذات فهي إذا محدثة مصنوعة فالموجود المحض إذا هو الذات المتعالي عن انطلاق اللاوجود عليه	وإن معنى الحق أن وجوده بحيث يمتنع انطلاق أن لا وجود عليه ²⁹

Another citation comes from Ibn Miskawayh's *Tabdīb al-Ahlāq*:

<i>Risāla fī Faḍl al-āhira 'alā l-dunyā</i> ³⁰	Ibn Miskawayh ³¹
وقد قال الحكماء إن آخر المراتب في الفضائل أن تكون أفعال الإنسان كلها إليها وهذه الأفعال هي الخير المخض والفعل إذا كان خيرا مخضا فليس يفعله فاعله من أجل شيء آخر غير الفعل نفسه وذلك أن الخير المخض هو غاية متوخاة لذاتها أي هو الأمر المطلوب نفسه المقصود إليه لذاته والأمر الذي هو غاية ولا سيما غاية في نهاية النفاسة ليس يكون من أجل شيء آخر	وآخر المراتب في الفضيلة أن يكون أفعال الإنسان كلها أفعال إلهية وهذه الأفعال هي خير محض والفعل إذا كان خيرا محضا فليس يفعله فاعله من أجل شيء آخر غير الفعل نفسه وذلك أن الخير المخض هو غاية متوخاة لذاتها أي هو الأمر المطلوب المقصود لذاته والأمر الذي هو غاية في نهاية النفاسة ليس يكون من أجل شيء آخر

²⁷ Al-Āmirī, *K. al-Amad' alā l-abad*, ed. Y. Kara, Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, İstanbul 2013, pp. 41-3.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 47. The uniqueness of God's oneness if compared to other degrees of unity which appear in created things is similarly emphasized in the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*: see 'A. Badawī (ed.), *Aflūṭīn'ında l-'Arab, Plotinus apud Arabes*. *Theologia Aristotelis et fragmenta quae supersunt*, Dār al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, Cairo 1966 (repr. Kuwait 1977), p. 148.

²⁹ Al-Āmirī, *K. al-Amad' alā l-abad*, p. 47 Kara.

³⁰ Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fī Faḍl al-āhira 'alā l-dunyā*, f. 37 r.

³¹ Ibn Miskawayh, *Tabdīb al-Ahlāq*, Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, Beirut 1985, p. 74.

A question remains open about the author. What was his geographical, historical, and social affiliation? In what follows, I lay out some reasons why I tend to include him among the officials – bureaucrats, courtiers, or secretaries – active in Northern/Eastern Iran under one of the dynasties at the dawn of the Seljuq state. Naturally, far from having any kind of certainty, this is only an educated guess.

i. As stated before, there are two dates given in the colophon: “25 Ramaḍān 471” and “Rūz-i Isfandārmud Māh-i Ardībihīšt 469” (f. 75 v). The first is the hijri date, and the second is the Persian one. The years do not correspond to each other, but the months and dates do. In this case, it is very likely that the scribe is using a tax (*haraḡī*) calendar. We know that in ‘Abbāsīd chancery tax collection was regulated by the Persian calendar, not according to the Zoroastrian eras, but according to the hijri years. So, there were cases in which the taxational years were regulated and corrected for practical purposes. This may suggest that the treatises came from the pen of a secretary official.³²

ii. The variety of the sources the author draws on in his writings indicates that he had a rich library ready to hand. It is very likely that this library, rather than being a personal one, was that of a patrician, a vizier, or a ruler.³³

iii. The author uses a meticulous and careful language when he aims at criticizing the views that are even the most opposite to his own opinions. For instance, when he hears too extreme a view which was voiced in a debate session, e.g. that “every science, whether it is religious or secular, is sought to gain worldly wishes”, he initially interprets these words as “figurative speech and careless words” of his speaker (*wa-in kāna rubbamā ṣadara dālika ‘an qā’ilihī ‘alā sabīl al-maḡāz wa-l-tasāhul fi l-kalām*),³⁴ in an evident attempt not to offend anyone. This might be a sign that he is not a *ṣūfī* writing in isolation, away from the élite of the community: on the contrary, this is the behaviour of a person with close ties to those attending the session, that he must maintain in the future. This attitude is comparable to the intellectual mysticism of Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023). Moreover, Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz’s statement in the foreword of the treatise, “...the sciences such as lexicography, grammar, poetry, prosody, letter writing, secretariat, stories, narratives, tales, calculation, which are being used by secretaries and bookkeepers in *maḡlises* and *dīwāns*, are [valuable because they are] helpful to acquire religious sciences, even if they are not sought for themselves...”³⁵ looks like a self-defence of the author to legitimize his own profession.

iv. We must bear in mind that the pioneers of the literary genre to which our author belongs – al-‘Āmirī, Ibn Miskawayh, and al-Tawḥīdī – were all secretaries, courtiers, or so. It is reasonable to assume that their writings were found and spread in an environment of the same kind. It might be regarded as a meaningful coincidence that the last owner of Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz’s writings in the Ottoman period was al-Širwānī, himself a secretary.

v. In pre-Islamic Sasanian society, a social class called *dibīrs* (scribes and secretaries) held important positions with different duties. There were special schools to train them, and they were expected to be prominent in various sciences. Thus, scribes and copyists usually remained unknown, their names being

³² I owe this explanation to Prof. François de Blois and Eleonora Bacci. For further information, see F. de Blois, “Ta’rīkh”, in *Encyclopedia of Islam* II, Brill, Leiden 2000, X, pp. 257-302.

³³ For more information on the scientific activities provided by the patrons, see R.W. Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nišapur. A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History*, Harvard U. P., Cambridge Mass. 1972; see p. 194 for an example of a library of this kind, founded by a member of the Bāhirī family.

³⁴ Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz, *R. fi Faḍl al-āḡira ‘alā l-dunyā*, f. 3 r.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 3 r. For more information on *dīwāns* and the positions of secretaries thereof, see H. Busse, *Chalif und Grosskönig. Die Buyiden im Iraq (945-1055)*, Steiner, Wiesbaden 1969, pp. 227-327.

rarely mentioned.³⁶ Due to this general fact, except for monumental figures such as Ibn al-Muqaffa', Ibn Miskawayh etc., other "average" secretaries like our author might have been forgotten in the depths of history.

vi. It was customary for secretaries (*kuttāb*) to lean toward Mu'tazilite thought, although this started to fade away from the 5th/11th century onwards in the Buwayhid period.³⁷ As will be made clear below, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz had strong mu'tazilite tendencies, to the point that he labelled the Aš'arites *abl al-bid'a*, because of their views on the attributes of God. It is known that Seljuqs promulgated Sunnism from the beginning of their rule. In the *Siyāsatnāma*, the famous Seljuq vizier Nizām al-Mulk states: "In the days of Mahmud, Ma'sūd, Tughril, and Alp-Arslan no Zoroastrian or Jew or Rafidi would have had the audacity to appear in a public place or to present himself before a great man. Those who administrated the affairs of the Turks were all professional civil servants and secretaries from Khurasan, who belonged to the orthodox Hanafi or Shafi'i sects. The heretics of Iraq were never admitted as secretaries and tax collectors; in fact the Turks never used to employ them at all; they said, 'these men are of the same religion as the Dailamites and their supporters; if they get a firm footing they will injure the interests of the Turks' (...)".³⁸ According to this setting, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz perfectly fits to be identified as a Dailamite of the 5th/11th century.

2. Philosophical Background

Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz's acquaintance with philosophical literature is evident at a first glance, and is shown by several quotations. Often introduced with the Arabic phrase "it has been said that..." (*qīla*), the passages quoted are so skilfully absorbed in the general flow of the discussion that they do not constitute some abrupt insertions into the text. In this regard, the quotations from the writings of al-Kindī (*Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*), the Pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias – in fact, Proclus (*Mā stabraḡahū al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī min kitāb Aristūṭālīs al-musammā bi Uṭūlūḡiyyā*)³⁹ – and the Pseudo-Aristotle – once again, Proclus (*Kitāb al-Īdāh fī l-ḡayr al-mahḡd*) – can be detected only through close inspection.⁴⁰

1. al-Kindī, *Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, in *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-falsafiyya*, ed. M. 'A. Abū Rīda, Dār al-Fikr al-'arabī, I-II, Cairo 1950-53, I, p. 162.

Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, <i>R. fī l-Tawḡīd</i> , p. 100.20-21	al-Kindī, <i>Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā</i> , p. 162.10-11 Abū Rīda
فبالوحدة قوام الكل ولو فارقته الوحدة التي بينا معناها وهو الوجود العام لهذا الكل لدثر وعدم مع مفارقتة الوحدة بلا زمان	فبالوحدة قوام الكل لو فارقت الوحدة عادت ودثرت مع الفراق معا بلا زمان

³⁶ A. Tafazzolī, *Sasanian Society*, Bibliotheca Persica Press, New York 2000, pp. 18-37. Tafazzolī states: "after the Arab conquest of Iran, the Muslim rulers did not dispense with Iranian secretaries, who continued their service in different government offices. Islamic sources abound with the names of such Iranian secretaries enjoying admiration and esteem" (p. 37).

³⁷ R. Sellheim - D. Sourdel, "Kātib", in *Encyclopedia of Islam* II, Brill, Leiden 1997, IV, pp. 754-7.

³⁸ A. Bausani, "Religion in the Saljuk Period", in J.A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*. Volume 5. *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 1968, p. 292 (quoting from *Siyāsatnāma*).

³⁹ During the translation movement of Greek works into Arabic, some of Proclus' texts were attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, as highlighted by G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Übersetzung*, Imprimerie Catholique, Wiesbaden-Beirut 1973.

⁴⁰ To see the context in which these works are produced and for further studies on the subject, see C. D'Ancona, "Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation", in P. Adamson - R.C. Taylor (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2004, pp. 10-31; Ead., "Greek Sources in Arabic and Islamic Philosophy", <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-greek/>.

2. M. Arkoun, "Textes inédits de Miskawayh (m. 421)", *Annales Islamologiques* 5 (1963), pp. 181-205, in part. p. 201; quoted here after the edition of the Arabic version of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* by G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Übersetzung*, Imprimerie Catholique, Wiesbaden-Beirut 1973:⁴¹

Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, <i>R. fī l-Tawhīd</i> , p. 100.22-25	<i>Proclus Arabus</i> , p. 19.1-5 Endress
كل شرح ومرتبة إنما يبدأ من واحد ويأتى إلى كثرة ملائمة لذلك الواحد وكل شرح ومرتبة ذات كثرة فهي صاعدة مترقية إلى واحد فاذا الواحد هو بدء مخرج الكثرة الملائمة له فلذلك صار إلى كثرة نظما واحدا وشرحا واحدا فإن لم يكن الواحد متميزا لم يكن كثرة ولا نظم ولا شرح البتة	كل شرح ومرتبة إنما يبدأ من واحد وينتهي إلى الكثرة الملائمة لذلك الواحد وكل شرح ومرتبة ذات كثرة فيه صاعدة مترقية إلى واحد ونقول أيضا إن الواحد هو بد ومخرج الكثرة الملائمة له فلذلك صار للكثرة نظم واحد وشرح واحد فإن لم يكن الواحد متميزا لم تكن الكثرة ولا شرح البتة

3. *Kitāb al-Īdāh li-Aristūṭālīs fī l-ḥayr al-mahd*, in 'A. Badawī (ed.), *al-Aflātūniyya al-muḥḍaṭa 'inda l-'arab*, Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, Cairo 1955 (repr. Kuwait 1977), pp. 8-9:⁴²

Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz, <i>R. fī l-Tawhīd</i> , p. 104.1-10	<i>K. fī l-ḥayr al-mahd</i> , pp. 8.11-9.7 Badawī
الواحد الأول والحق المحض تعالى اسمه أعلى من الصفة وإنما عجزنا عن صفته لتفرده بالوحدانية المحضة لأنها فوق كل الوحدانية وإنما وصفت العلة الثواني التي استنارت من فوق من العلة الأولى وذلك أن العلة الأولى لا يستنير من نور آخر ولا يستمد من حق آخر لأنها هي الحق الأول والنور المحض الذى ليس فوقه نور ولا حق ومنها تفيض النور على ما دونه من العلة الثواني فمن أجل ذلك صار الأول وحده يفوت الصفة وإنما كان كذلك لأنه ليس فوقه علة يعرف بها وكل شيء إنما يعرف ويوصف من تلقاء علة فإذا كان الشيء علة فقط وليس بمعلول لم يعلم بعلة أولى ولا يوصف لأنه أعلى من الصفات وليس يبلغه المنطق وذلك أن الصفة إنما تكون بالمنطق والمنطق بالعقل والعقل بالفكر والفكر بالوهم والوهم بالحواس والعلة الأولى فوق الأشياء كلها لأنها علة لها فلذلك صارت لا تقع تحت الحس والوهم والفكر والعقل والمنطق فليست إذا بموصوفة	إن العلة الأولى أعلى من الصفة وإنما عجزت الألسن عن صفتها من أجل وصف أنيتها لأنها فوق كل علة واحدة وإنما وصفت العلة الثواني التي استنارت من نور العلة الأولى وذلك أن العلة التي تنير أولا تنير معلولها وهي لا تستنير من نور آخر لأنها هي النور المحض الذي ليس فوقه نور فمن ذلك صار الأول وحده يفوت الصفة وإنما كان كذلك لأنه ليس فوقه علة يعرف بها وكل شيء إنما يعرف ويوصف من تلقاء علة فإذا كان الشيء علة فقط وليس بمعلول لم يعلم بعلة أولى ولا يوصف لأنه أعلى من الصفات وليس يبلغه المنطق وذلك أن الصفة إنما تكون بالمنطق والمنطق بالعقل والعقل بالفكر والفكر بالوهم والوهم بالحواس والعلة الأولى فوق الأشياء كلها لأنها علة لها فلذلك صارت لا تقع تحت الحس والوهم والفكر والعقل والمنطق فليست إذا بموصوفة

⁴¹ See Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, p. 19 (of the Arabic section); the title runs: *Mā stabra ḡahū al-Iskandar al-Afrūdīsī min Kitāb Aristūṭālīs al-musammā bi-Uṭūlū ḡīyā*; see also Y. 'A. Kordfiruzjāyī, "Risāla-ay Muntashir Na-Shodah Az Iskandar", *Ma'ārif-i 'Aqlī* 2 (<http://maarefeaqli.nashriyat.ir/node/401>).

⁴² See also *Risāla li-Aflātūn al-ilāhī fī l-radd 'alā man qāla inna al-insān talaṣā wa-funiya*, in 'A. Badawī (ed.), *Aflātūn fī l-Islām*, Dār al-Andalus, Beirut 1982, p. 339.

4. ‘Abd al-Laṭīf b. Yūsuf al-Baġdādī, *Min Kitāb fi ‘ilm mā ba’d al-ṭabī‘a*, in ‘A. Badawī (ed.), *Aflūṭīn ‘inda l-‘arab. Plotinus apud Arabes. Theologia Aristotelis et fragmenta quae supersunt*, Dār al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, Cairo 1966 (repr. Kuwait 1977), p. 233:⁴³

Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz, <i>R. fi l-tawḥīd</i> , p. 104.13-14	‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, p. 233.14-17 Badawī
إن الأشياء التي قد بلغت النهايات فليس ينبغي أن يسمى باسم الأشياء الواقعة تحت النهايات، والموصوف إذا بلغ أقصى نهايته لا يمكن أن يرد، فيوصف بنهايته	الأشياء التي قد بلغت نهايتها ليس ينبغي أن تسمى باسم الأشياء الواقعة تحت النهايات فإن من أراد أن يمدح الخير ليس يقدر أن يقول إنه خير ومن أراد أن يمدح اللذة التي هي خير لا يقدر أن يقول إنها لذة خير لأنها نهاية الشيء الموصوف فالموصوف إذا بلغ أقصى نهايته لم يمكن أن يزيد فيوصف بنهايته

This list can easily increase, given that there are at least six more sections which similarly start with the verb *qīla* – a task which awaits future studies. Nevertheless, the very fact that the author uses the sources mentioned above gives the impression that he has close ties with what some call “Kindī’s metaphysics file”,⁴⁴ i.e. the Arabic philosophical texts which were used or produced in the circle of al-Kindī to foster his project of intertwining the Greek philosophical tradition and Islamic monotheism. In particular, Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz’s ties with al-Kindī himself can be ascertained by several facts, such as his use of al-Kindī’s distinction between human knowledge into the two categories of “sensory items” (*wuġūd ḥissī*) and “intellectual items” (*wuġūd ‘aqlī*),⁴⁵ or his adoption of al-Kindī’s definitions for some terms,⁴⁶ or again, last but not least, the fact that the scribe of our manuscript lists Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz’s works together with other titles which mostly belong to al-Kindī (see above, p. 66 with n. 3). Nonetheless, we should not leave out the possibility that the author might have got acquainted with al-Kindī’s ideas through al-‘Āmirī.

As happens with his predecessors al-Kindī and al-‘Āmirī, an interesting feature in Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz’s attitude towards the philosophical background of his time is his selective approach. We do not see him fully immersed in Neoplatonic ideas and concepts in every item dealt with in the *R. fi l-Tawḥīd*. For instance, the treatise completely discards Neoplatonic cosmology, which posits a hierarchical scheme of beings starting from the first Intellect to the tenth, the Agent Intellect (*al-‘aql al-fā‘āl*). As is known, the idea of divine intellects was a theory which neither al-Fārābī nor Avicenna abandoned in their philosophical systems,⁴⁷ in spite of the obvious contradiction between this theory and Quranic views about the universe. It might be also for this reason that Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz does not lay emphasis on another substantial concept of Neoplatonic philosophy, that is, *nafs* (soul).

⁴³ For an analysis of the relevant chapter in al-Baġdādī’s book see Martini Bonadeo, *Al-Baġdādī’s Philosophical Journey*, pp. 266 f.

⁴⁴ The expression has been coined by F.W. Zimmermann, “The Origins of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*”, in J. Kraye - W.F. Ryan - C.B. Schmitt (eds), *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages: the Theology and Other Texts*, The Warburg Institute, London 1986, pp. 110-240; see also Martini Bonadeo, *Al-Baġdādī’s Philosophical Journey*, pp. 267-8.

⁴⁵ Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz, *Faḍl al-āhira ‘alā l-dunyā*, f. 6 r. Cf. al-Kindī, *Fi l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, pp. 106-7 Abū Rīda (quoted above, n. 3).

⁴⁶ For instance, his definition of *yaqīn* (certainty) is the same as al-Kindī’s: *Faḍl al-āhira ‘alā l-dunyā*, f. 8 v; cf. al-Kindī, *Fi Ḥudūd al-aṣyā wa-rusūmiḥā*, p. 171 Abū Rīda (quoted above, n. 3).

⁴⁷ H.A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes, On Intellect*, Oxford U. P., Oxford 1992.

There is only a weak allusion to it, yet in its relation to the faculty of human intellect: see {27} below. Be this as it may, one should not underestimate some other Neoplatonic tones of the treatise, like the notion of Intellect as the first creation and the first effect of God: see {23; 27}.⁴⁸ The author does not provide a detailed explanation of the issue. The only idea which is emphasized is that the Intellect is a single substance of absolute simplicity, so that its essence, its act of intelligence and its intelligibility are all the same.⁴⁹ Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz's familiarity with philosophical works reveals itself mostly when he discusses the topics he regards as substantial parts of the issue of the unity of God, such as God as the First Being, God's uniqueness in the qualities of "thatness" (*anniyya*) and "oneness" (*wahdāniyya*), and the kinds of the "one" (*al-wāhid*).

Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz brings forward his treatment of the concept of *anniyya* as he posits that there is necessarily a creator who has brought the universe into existence: see {6}. According to his reasoning, accepting such a fundamental fact is not enough: everyone must deepen his/her knowledge of the *anniyya*. The first principle of such knowledge is that every single being has its own *anniyya*, distinct from the *anniyya* of others. This necessarily entails that *anniyya* should not be taken as a common quality that is predicated upon all beings. For the same reason, God too has His own *anniyya*, which substantially differs from all other beings. In order to be aware of this distinctive characteristic of the *anniyya* of God, one must have knowledge of the *anniyya* of all beings. What distinguishes the *anniyya* of God from that of other beings is that His *anniyya* exists eternally by His essence; thus, it necessarily continues to exist forever by His essence. Therefore, for the First Creator, existence is something that comes from, or is necessitated by His essence (*fa-l-wuḡūd idan dātīyyun li l-mubdi' al-awwal*).

At this point, our author makes his stance clearer about what connotation he has specifically in mind by using *anniyya*, when this word is tellingly replaced by a more "Arabic" word, that is, *wuḡūd* (existence).⁵⁰ The First Creator does not receive His *wuḡūd* from others; rather, He is the one who grants *wuḡūd* to other beings. After all, He, the Exalted, is the *wāḡib al-wuḡūd* (necessary Being). The author reaffirms his views about *anniyya*, applying them this time to *wuḡūd*: the *wuḡūd* of any other being cannot be the same as His *wuḡūd*, or even at the same level (*rutba*) of His *wuḡūd*. Hence, from the treatise of Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz on unity one gets the idea that the term *anniyya* has a more defined meaning than it had in the formative period of the Graeco-Arabic translations.⁵¹ In this context, there is textual evidence which connects the stance of our author to the writings of Abū l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī, whose ideas on the issue seem to be conveyed by Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz. In his treatise *Faḍl al-āḫira ʿalā l-dunyā*, the latter relates that according to some scholars knowledge about the Creator falls into three parts. First, there is the knowledge of His *anniyya*, and this kind of knowledge

⁴⁸ Cf. Badawī (ed.), *Aflūṭīn ʿinda al-ʿArab*, p. 209.

⁴⁹ This tenet is reminiscent of the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, p. 22.3-4 Badawī, which is also quoted by al-Fārābī in the *K. al-ḡamʿ* as a statement by Aristotle: see al-Fārābī, *L'armonia delle opinioni dei due sapienti, il divino Platone e Aristotele*, Introduzione, testo arabo, traduzione e commento di C. Martini Bonadeo, prefazione di G. Endress, PLUS, Pisa 2008 (Greco arabo, latino. Le vie del sapere, 3), p. 74.8. With this tenet, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz gets closer to the ideas on the Intellect of the Ismaili thinker Abū Ya'qūb al-Siḡistānī: see P.E. Walker, *Early Philosophical Shiism. The Ismaili Neoplatonism of Abu Yaqub al-Sijistani*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 1993, pp. 87-94, esp. p. 90. For a comparison of al-ʿĀmirī's ideas about Intellect with the Arabic version of Proclus see E. Wakelnig, *Feder, Tafel, Mensch. Al-ʿĀmirī's Kitāb al-Fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim al-ilāhiya und die arabische Proklos-Rezeption im 10. Jh.*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2006 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 67), p. 302.

⁵⁰ Elsewhere Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz clearly states that "thatness signifies the very existence (*al anniyya allatī hiya dālla ʿalā naḡs al-wuḡūd*)": {20}.

⁵¹ For an up-to-date discussion of the term, considering its earliest usage in Arabic, see C. D'Ancona, "Platonic and Neoplatonic Terminology for Being in Arabic Translation", *Studia graeco-arabica* 1 (2011), pp. 23-45.

enables people to avoid atheism (*taʿtīl*); second, the knowledge of His oneness (*waḥdāniyya*) enables people to avoid polytheism (*širk*), and lastly, the knowledge of His attributes (*ṣifāt*) enables them to avoid anthropomorphism (*tašbīh*). This account which Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz relates as such is almost identical to a quotation of Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī from one of al-ʿĀmirī’s works.⁵² However, at variance with al-Tawḥīdī,⁵³ Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz provides a more detailed account of al-ʿĀmirī’s argumentation. He continues: “if someone does not thoroughly know the first item among these principles of belief, he or she may not proceed to the second, or third item. For instance, if he or she does not fully understand the existence (*anniyya*) of God, he or she does not need to look into the issue of oneness. Unless he or she knows His oneness, he or she is not in the position to delve into the issue of His being above parts or resemblances.”⁵⁴

Our author’s usage of the term *anniyya*, then, is intrinsically related to his usage of *waḥdāniyya*. Both terms are conditioned by their application to the essence of God, and only afterwards are they compared to the meaning they have in other beings. The consequence is the distinction between the *anniyya* and the *waḥdāniyya* of things in general. Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz draws attention to the fact that the knowledge about the *waḥdāniyya* is similar to the knowledge about the *anniyya*: see {9} below. Accordingly, every single worldly being has its own special oneness and, undoubtedly, the oneness of God cannot be similar to any of those onenesses. This is because their onenesses are totally created by the command of God. The characteristic of the createdness entails another aspect which constantly attaches to their essences, that is, multiplicity (*katra*). Every existent meaning or thing, even though oneness might be predicated of them, cannot have the “oneness” in the true sense, an attribute which only belongs to the True One (*al-ḥad al-ḥaqq*).

As regards the existences and onenesses of things, if we look at the whole picture of the *Risāla fī l-Tawḥīd*, the First Creator is the only being who grants them these two essential qualities.⁵⁵ An ontological approach to beings in general as such suggests a distinction between their essence and existence. To put it in a rough formula, the Kindian school appears to hold that the essence/identity of things is expressed by words such as *waḥda*, *waḥdāniyya*, while their existence is expressed by *anniyya* and *wuḡūd*.⁵⁶ As a matter of fact, the topic of God and His creating act as the donor of both the essence of things and their existence is taken especially by some *mutakallimūn* who come after the 5th/11th

⁵² *Rasāʾil Abi l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmiri wa ṣaḍarātuhū al-falsafiyya*, ed. by S. Ḥalifāt, Manšūrāt al-Ġamiʿa al-Urdunniya, Amman 1988, p. 473 (quoting from al-Tawḥīdī’s *al-Baṣāʾir*).

⁵³ In his quotations from al-ʿĀmirī, al-Tawḥīdī frequently omits the contexts. See *Rasāʾil Abi l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmiri*, p. 75 Ḥalifāt.

⁵⁴ Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz, *Faḍl al-āḥira ʿalā l-dunyā*, f. 16 r-v. In his *al-Taqrīr li-awḡub al-taqdīr* al-ʿĀmirī states: “we had spoken in great detail about God’s *anniyya*, *waḥdāniyya* and attributes (*ṣifāt*) in our work called *al-Irṣād li taṣḥīḥ al-ʿitiqād*”. Thus, it is very likely that Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz quotes directly from this lost work of al-ʿĀmirī. See *Rasāʾil Abi l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmiri*, p. 305; 472 Ḥalifāt.

⁵⁵ This general idea, which is omnipresent in the treatise, is stated in as many words: ... *al-muḥaqqiq li-anniyyāt al-ʿālam wa-waḥadātihā* {15}. On the contrary, God receives neither His oneness nor His existence from others: *al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq bi l-ḍāt alladī lam yastafid al-waḥda wa-l-wuḡūd min ḡayrihi*: see {16} below, and compare *Kitāb al-Īdāḥ li-Aristūtālīs fī l-ḥayr al-maḥd*, in ʿA. Badawī (ed.), *al-Aflātūniyya al-muḥdaṭa ʿinda l-ʿarab*, Maktabat al-Naḥḍa al-Miṣriyya, Cairo 1955 (repr. Kuwait 1977), pp. 32.5-33.2, and al-Kindī, *Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, pp. 161.5-162.4 Abū Rīda (quoted above, n. 3); that al-Kindī depends upon the Arabic Proclus on this point has been demonstrated by Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, pp. 244-5 (quoted above, n. 38); see also C. D’Ancona, “Al-Kindī et l’auteur du *Liber de Causis*”, in Ead., *Recherches sur le Liber de Causis*, Vrin, Paris 1995 (Études de philosophie médiévale, 72), pp. 156-94.

⁵⁶ A.L. Ivry points out that the term *waḥda* in the vocabulary of al-Kindī indicates the identity and being of things: Ivry, “Al-Kindī and the Muʿtazila. A Philosophical and Political Reevaluation”, *Oriens* 25/26 (1976), pp. 69-85, in part. p. 79.

century, as a criterion to classify the different positions in the issue of the essence-existence distinction. Hence, the problem of the essence-existence distinction is addressed in the context of the classical kalāmīc discussions on the non-existent (*ma'dūm*). As stated by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1206), there are mainly two stances on the issue of the non-existent: (1) most *mutakallimūn* hold that the non-existent is neither a thing, nor self (*ʿayn*) nor an entity: it is pure nothingness, and God is the giver of existences and essences to the things He creates. (2) al-Šaḥḥām (d. circa 270/883) and his followers among the Muʿtazila hold that the possible (*mumkin*) non-existents are things, selves and entities even before they acquire their existence: the agent (*fāʿil*) has nothing to do with making them entities; its effect consists only in giving them their existences. Their famous statement “the non-existent is a thing” clearly depends upon this doctrine.⁵⁷ As appears from al-Rāzī’s exposition, most theologians are of the opinion that things are amenable to acquiring both their existences and essences from the Creator, a position that makes them closer to the position of philosophers in general, as well as to that of al-ʿĀmirī and Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz in particular. With his studies on the distinction between essence and existence in Avicenna, Robert Wisnovsky has already demonstrated that Avicenna is very close to the Sunnite *mutakallimūn* of the 4th/10th century in his views on the relationship between things and their existences.⁵⁸ In a nutshell, both Avicenna and the Sunnite *mutakallimūn* hold that things and their existences are co-implicated (*mutalāzīm*), that is, one cannot be found without the other. The Muʿtazila part company both with the *mutakallimūn* of the *Ahl al-Sunna* and the Muslim philosophers, because of their most-used principle “the essential qualities of a thing may not come from an outside agent”.⁵⁹ According to this Muʿtazilite understanding of creation *ex nihilo*, God’s creating effect only consists in giving to the things their existences, setting Himself free from dealing with their essences which are already achieved at the time of their creation. In consequence, complying with al-Rāzī’s scheme, the whole range of views can be grouped as follows:

1. Those who oppose the creation *ex nihilo* and hold that God is the giver to things their existences and essences (Avicenna).
2. Those who support the creation *ex nihilo* and hold that God is the giver to things their existences and essences (al-Kindī, al-ʿĀmirī, Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz; the Sunnī *mutakallimūn*).
3. Those who support the creation *ex nihilo* and hold that God is the giver to things only their existences, not their essences (the Muʿtazila).

⁵⁷ Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Riyāḍ al-mūniqa fī ʿarāʾiḥ al-ʿilm*, ed. A. Ğumʿa, Markaz al-Našr al-ġāmīʿī, Kairouan 2004, pp. 128-9.

⁵⁸ R. Wisnovsky, “Notes on Avicenna’s Concept of Thingness (*šayʿiyya*)”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 10 (2000), pp. 181-221. However, Wisnovsky’s assumption that al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) was the inventor of the term *šayʿiyya* (p. 195) is probably wrong: the term most likely has an earlier Muʿtazilite history. Dādhurmuz includes *šayʿiyya* in the essential attributes of beings, such as existence, occupation, prevention, volume and place (see {47} below), and this is due to his Muʿtazilite background.

⁵⁹ What I refer to as “essential qualities” is understood by the Muʿtazila as those qualities which make things be as they are. In the Muʿtazilite literature, these are generally referred to as *ṣifāt al-aġnās* (literally “the attributes of genera”). Thus, they set the ontological rule that “the attributes of genera are not bound by the effect of the agent” (صفات الأجناس لا تحصل بالفاعل), or that “the attributes of genera are not caused” (صفات الأجناس لا تعلق بغير معلل). See al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Ġabbār, *al-Muġnī: al-Maḥlūq* (VIII), ed. by T. al-Ṭawīl - S. Zāyid, al-Muaʿssasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma, Cairo 1965, p. 68; al-Buḥḥānī (d. 424/1033), *Ziyādāt*, in C. Adang (ed.), *Baṣran Muʿtazilite Theology: Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad b. Khallād’s Kitāb al-uṣūl and its Reception. A Critical Edition of the Ziyādāt Sharḥ al-uṣūl by the Zaydī Imām al-Nāṭiq bi-l-ḥaqq Abū Ṭālib Yahyā b. al-Ḥusayn b. Hārūn al-Buḥḥānī*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2011 (Islamic History and Civilization, 85), p. 43; Ibn Mattawayh, *al-Taḍkira fī Ahkām al-ġawābir wa l-ʿarād*, ed. by S.M. Luṭf - F.B. ʿŪn, Dār al-Ṭāqāfa, Cairo 1975, p. 81.

The most intriguing aspect of these discussions is the unique position of Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz who, parting company with his predecessors, strives to maintain the stance of the Kindīan tradition (along with al-Āmirī), but at one and the same time wants to keep himself as close as possible to the Mu'tazilite *kalām*, as will be shown in what follows. No matter how he achieves merging two conflicting attitudes, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz is neither so Mu'tazilite as to hold that the non-existent is a thing, nor is he so much a philosopher as to hold the eternity of the world.

While going deeper into his argumentations on the unity of God, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz's analysis of the issue continues to follow the Aristotelian tradition in the form given to it within the circle of al-Kindī. The main concern of the author is to demonstrate that God is the only being who deserves to be called "the True One" (*al-wāḥid al-ḥaqīqī*) in the real sense of the word. Basing himself on this precept, the author engages in a lengthy discussion on how we should perceive the uniqueness in His unity: see {8; 13-19} below. Similar to al-Kindī, he emphasizes that the One must be the First (*awwal*), and by no means "one" as a number (*'adad*).⁶⁰ The One must be in the position of a donor (*mufīd*), not of a receiver (*mustafīd*). All that exists beside Him has the trait of afterness and otherness. His oneness is of necessity related to the fact that He is pure existence (*wuġūd faqat*). All in all, His unity does not resemble any other beings whose unity is relative in any given aspect.⁶¹

Within the Arabic philosophical literature of the 3rd and 4th centuries AH, it was customary to list the different senses of "one" (*wāḥid*), in order to ascertain to which sense of oneness the True One belongs. It was, without doubt, Aristotle's discussions of the issue in several places of his works that gave grounds for these texts.⁶² Among such authors who tackled the issue of the "senses of the one" are al-Kindī⁶³, al-Fārābī⁶⁴ (d. 339/950), al-Āmirī⁶⁵, Abū Sulaymān al-Siġistānī⁶⁶ (d. circa 391/1001), Hamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī⁶⁷ (d. circa 411/1020). Among these, al-Siġistānī and al-Āmirī are unsurprisingly closer to Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz. The latter initially mentions four senses of "one", i.e. homonymy (*istirāk*), connection (*ittiṣāl*), negation of the equal (*salb al-miṭl*) and indivisibility (*imtinā' al-taġazzī*): see {13, 14} below. These senses are basically those indicated by al-Siġistānī, in spite of some differences in the wording due to the contexts. For instance, what Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz refers to as *ittiṣāl* occurs as *al-muttaṣil* in al-Siġistānī, and what he labels *imtinā' al-taġazzī* occurs as *wāḥid bi-mā nā annahū ġayr mutaġazzī*. Furthermore, some parallels exist in the examples of the senses of "one". For instance, as to the type of "one in genus", Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz mentions the statement "the man and the horse are one thing in animality" (*al-insān wa-l-faras fī l-ḥayawāniyya*

⁶⁰ Cf. al-Kindī, *Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, pp. 146-7 and 149 Abū Rīda.

⁶¹ This attitude was very common in al-Kindī's age: see Ivry, "al-Kindī and the Mu'tazila", p. 75: "... while Davidson has shown in detail (...) the striking similarities between al-Kindī and Saadia, it is worth noting the parallels with Job's few but important physical remarks [in the *Book of Treasures*]. Thus Job contrasts the 'true unity' of God, due to His unique infinite nature, which admits of no increase or decrease, with the 'relative unity' of everything else, which is finite (...)"

⁶² An essential discussion to consider for our study is Arist., *Metaph.*, Δ 6, 1015 b - 1017 b. For other places in Aristotle and their comparison with the Graeco-Arabic literature, see Kraemer, *Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam*, pp. 181-4.

⁶³ Al-Kindī, *Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, pp. 143-62 Abū Rīda.

⁶⁴ Al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Wāḥid wa-l-waḥda*, ed. M. Mahdi. Les Éditions Toubkal, Casablanca 1989.

⁶⁵ Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, *al-Imtā' wa l-mu'ānasa*, ed. by A. Amīn - A. al-Zayn, Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt, I-III, Cairo 1953, II, pp. 88-9.

⁶⁶ Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, *al-Muqābasāt*, ed. M.T. Ḥusayn, Dār al-Adab, Baghdad 1989, pp. 253-6 (from a dictation of al-Siġistānī to his students *anno* 371 AH, which was recorded by al-Tawḥīdī). For an in-depth analysis of al-Siġistānī's view on this issue, see Kraemer, *Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam*, pp. 179-84; 219-22.

⁶⁷ S.H. Nasr - M. Aminrazavi - M.R. Jozi (eds), *An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia*, I-IV, I.B. Tauris, London - New York 2008, II, pp. 203-4 (From al-Kirmānī's *al-Risāla al-Durriyya*).

šay' wāḥid), and the same example features in al-Siğistānī (*al-insān wa l-faras wāḥid fī l-ḥayawāniyya*). Again, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz's example "the now and the unity" (*al-nuqtā wa-l-waḥda*), which is placed by him as regards to the "oneness in indivisibility", is mentioned, this time, in relation to "oneness *per analogiam*" (*fī l-munāsaba*) in al-Siğistānī's text. Afterwards, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz's discussion turns towards the quotation by al-Tawḥīdī from one of al-ʿĀmirī's works. The explanation that our author provides after having outlined the senses of "one" is reminiscent of al-ʿĀmirī's: see {14} below.⁶⁸ Consequently, we must not miss the main reason for the Muslim followers of Aristotle, which lies behind placing so much emphasis on the senses of "one", that is, to demonstrate what kind of "unity" fits to the First Being and His sublime entity. This is the common interest shared by al-Kindī and his followers such as al-ʿĀmirī, al-Siğistānī and, finally, Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz. The way in which Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz deals with this tradition shows that he makes conscious decisions to amalgamate the Aristotelian heritage to the Islamic sphere.

3. Kalāmīc Background

Early in the *R. fī l-Tawḥīd* the author states that knowledge about God the Creator (*al-ʿilm bi-l-bārī*) is the noblest knowledge one can acquire. Then, with the help of some mystic narrations about the noble status of the knowledge of God, emphasis is placed on the idiom *mā rifatullāh*, a term whose usage is even attributed to the Prophet himself, who had purportedly described it as "the ability/strength of the human soul": see {1, 2} below. Addressing the question of how one acquires knowledge about God, the author places at the same level the prophets and all other wise people who imitate them, that is, sages (*ḥukamā*), the pious and scholars: all these are the privileged people who are granted by God a special light (*nūr*): see {2} below. Thus, it is a necessary task for other people to seek for different ways to obtain their shares in this high wisdom. In principle, the author posits three causes of knowledge: (i) the five senses, (ii) the rational faculties (*al-quwā al-aqliyya*), and (iii) argumentation (*istidlāl*) and demonstration (*burhān*). The *mā rifatullāh* is attainable either with the special light that is not available to common people, or through the method of argumentation and demonstration, the way which remains open for those who have nothing but the power of their reasoning in their hands: see {3} below. This is surely a methodological manoeuvre to enable the author to continue his discussion towards the construction of his own *kalām*.

Readers of Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz's *risāla* will notice a shift of approach in dealing with the subject, when the author undertakes to elaborate more on the issue of the temporality and the origination (*ḥudūt*) of the world. Even though this intention reveals in itself that something 'kalāmīc' will go on in what follows, the 'Mu'tazilite spirit' does not leave the reader at the end of the treatise, even a single moment. The topics which are addressed by the author are, in broad strokes, such primary issues of classical Islamic theology as [several forms of] the argumentation from design, the origination of the world, the theory of generations (*akwān*), the attributes of God, and the permanence of the hereafter. As a matter of fact, one may be misguided by the negative approach of the author towards the method of *kalām* in the *Risāla fī Faḍl al-āḥira 'alā al-dunyā* mentioned above. In that *risāla*, Dadhurmuz mentions three types of knowledge: (i) the knowledge by imitation (*taqlīdī*), (ii) the knowledge by conviction (*iqnā'ī*), and (iii) the knowledge by demonstration (*burhānī*). While it is only demonstrative knowledge that provides certainty, the knowledge by conviction, which Sa'īd b.

⁶⁸ Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz says: *إن الوحدة الجنسية متكررة بأنواعها والوحدة النوعية متكررة بأشخاصها*; al-ʿĀmirī says: *ويوصف بأنه واحد بالجنس وهو كثير بالأنواع ويوصف بأنه واحد بالنوع وهو كثير بالشخص* (n. 65).

Dādhurmuz attributes to the method of *ġadal* and *kalām*, gives but “a high opinion” and is unstable.⁶⁹ This critical stance on *kalām* was widespread among the *falāsifa*, especially in Dādhurmuz’s *milieu*.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the unique eclectic position of our author seems to provide him with sufficient mechanisms to come up with an amalgamation of two conflicting discourses in the history of Islamic thought, as is apparent in his engagement with the classical issues of Islamic theology.

As an example, Sa’id b. Dādhurmuz’s vocabulary for naming God exhibits a vast array of descriptions of God in relation to the function of the name in the given theological/philosophical context. To go into detail, these names can be grouped as follows: *al-Hāliq*, *al-Bārī*, *al-Ṣānī* (Creator), *al-Azalī*, *al-Qadīm* (Eternal), *al-Mubdī al-awwal* (The First Creator), *al-Anniyya al-mahḍa* (the Pure Thatness), *al-Huwiyya al-mahḍa* (The Pure Identity), *al-Awwal* (The First), *al-Awwal al-ḥaqq* (The True First), *al-Wāhid al-ḥaqq*, *al-Aḥad al-ḥaqq* (The True One), *al-Wāhid al-awwal* (The First One), *al-Ḥaqq al-mahḍ* (The Pure Truth), *al-Ḥaqq al-awwal* (The First Truth), *al-Nūr al-mahḍ* (The Pure Light), *al-Ḥayr al-mahḍ* (The Pure Good), and *al-‘Illa al-ūlā* (The First Cause). Although all these names directly connote the essential aspects of the Divine, there is only one name that the author uses in a direct reference to the concept of existence, that is, *Wāġib al-wuġūd* (The Necessary Being). This name deserves attention, because it is one of the key terms for setting the character of the *risāla* in its proper kalāmīc background. In fact, as is often the case in classical *mutakallimūn*,⁷¹ Sa’id b. Dādhurmuz has several divisions of beings in mind. First and foremost, he divides beings into two parts: that which can be apprehended only by sense-perception, and that which is only apprehended when an action is produced: see {4} below.⁷² It is apparent that the criterion of this distinction is our perception of beings, rather than beings *per se*. However, the author reminds readers of a fundamental precept of the contemporary philosophy, that is, all beings fall into two categories: the “necessary” and the “possible”: see {4} below.⁷³ As a

⁶⁹ Sa’id b. Dādhurmuz, *Risāla fī Faḍl al-ābhira ‘alā al-dunyā*, f. 7 v. Cf. al-‘Āmirī, *al-Taqrīr li Awġub al-Taqdīr*, in Ḥalīfāt, *Rasāil*, p. 329. Here, al-‘Āmirī talks about three ways (*ṭariqa al-taqlīd*, *ṭariqa al-iqnā*, *ṭariqa al-burbhān*) through which one can acquire the primal concepts (*al-mā’āni al-awwalīyya*).

⁷⁰ R.M. Frank, “*Kalām* and Philosophy. A Perspective from One Problem”, in P. Morewedge (ed.) *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, SUNY Press, Albany 1979 (Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science), pp. 71-95, in part. pp. 72-4.

⁷¹ No doubt, the most known division of beings in early theologians is that between “eternal” and “originated” (*qadīm-ḥādīt*). For an early example which belongs to an Ibādī writer, see Baṣīr b. Muḥammad b. Maḥbūb (d. 290/908?), *Kitāb al-Raṣf*, in A. al-Salimi - W. Madelung (eds), *Ṭalāt Rasā’il Ibādīyya*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2011, p. 8: “Beings are divided into two parts; eternal (*qadīm*) and originated (*ḥādīt*); *ḥādīt* is the one which came to existence out of nothing (*mā kāna ba’da id lam yakun*); *qadīm* is God, the Originator”.

⁷² This might also be inspired from al-‘Āmirī’s writings. At the very beginning of a work which in the manuscript bears the title *al-Maġālis al-Sab’ bayna l-Ṣayḥ wa-l-‘Āmirī*, a text which in all likelihood is based on al-‘Āmirī’s oeuvre, the *muġib* contends: “a thing manifests itself either through itself, such as the perceptible things (*al-aṣyā’ al-mahsūsa*), or through actions that come out of it (*āṭār ṣādīra’ anḥū*). Then, the First Truth manifests itself through these kinds of actions, since it is impossible for it to do that through perceptible things”. See *al-Maġālis al-Sab’ bayna l-Ṣayḥ wa-l-‘Āmirī*, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye, Raġp Paṣa 1461, ff. 150 r-v. This notion is also stressed by Sa’id b. Dādhurmuz: see {4} below.

⁷³ In his commentary on Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione*, al-Fārābī explicitly states the distinction of beings as “necessary” (*ḍarūrī*) and “possible” (*mumkin*), among other types of distinctions, such as actuality and potentiality: al-Fārābī, *Sharḥ al-Fārābī li-Kitāb Aristūtālīs fī al-‘Ibāra*, eds. W. Kutsch - S. Marrow, Dār al-Maṣriq, Beirut 1986, p. 164. It is apparent from this that later authors such as Avicenna and al-Ġazālī, when they categorise beings in a more systematical scheme, depend upon al-Fārābī: see for instance Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī, *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, ed. S. Dunyā, Dār al-Ma’ārif, Cairo 1961, p. 134. According to al-Ġazālī’s presentation of the views of the philosophers, such ontological divisions as “substance-accident”, “universal-particular”, “one-many”, “cause-effect”, “actuality-potentiality”, and finally “necessity-possibility” apply to all beings.

consequence of this division, “necessary being” suits God, because there is not even the possibility to think of a state in which He does not exist. This entails the consequence that God’s existence is eternal and everlasting. At this particular point, the notion of “necessary existence” comes to terms with the conception of God in the Islamic theology of the time. The kalāmīc works which belong to the 4th/10th century unanimously tend to see God’s attribute of eternal (*qadīm*) and necessary existence (*wāğīb al-wuğūd*) as correlative terms,⁷⁴ an idea which is formulated in the ontological rule “if the eternity is established for something, it is impossible for it to become non-existent” (*mā ṭabata qīdamuhū imtanā ‘a ‘adamuhū*).⁷⁵ Accordingly, Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz points to the necessity of the existence of God in terms of His independence from any condition that endows His existence: see {32; 47}. Furthermore, he adds that it is because of this that God differs from any other being. In other words, the “necessity of existence” is a criterion which singles out God from other existent beings. As is expected, this also exhibits a well-known tendency shared among theologians and the philosophers of the age as well.⁷⁶

Apart from such a sublime understanding about the concept of God, Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz is aware that all existent beings except God have been subdivided into a sort of ontological ramification, i.e. that ‘*ālam* (the world) must fall under one of these three categories. (1) The world is eternal as it is, and as has always been; (2) the world has originated itself; and (3) there is something outside of it which has brought it into existence.⁷⁷ In fact, all the three possibilities are taken into account in the

⁷⁴ Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Ġabbār, *al-Muḥtaṣar fī Uṣūl al-dīn*, in *Rasā’il al-‘adl wa-l-tawḥīd*, ed. M. ‘Ammāra, Maṭba‘a Muṣṭafā Bābī al-Ḥalabī, I-II, Cairo 1961, p. 175; Buṭḥānī, *Ziyādāt Sharḥ al-Uṣūl*, in Adang (ed.), *Başran Mu‘ tazilite Theology* (quoted above, n. 58), pp. 41-2; 44; Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, ed. H.P. Linss, al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāt, Cairo 2003, p. 20. The list could have surely been extended, if more works of the Aš‘arite *mutakallimūn* of the 4th century AH were available to us. As a matter of fact, al-Ġuwaynī frequently stresses the point that the previous Aš‘arite leaders (*‘imma*) agreed on the precept that God is necessarily existent while other beings are possible. See for example Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Ġuwaynī, *al-Šāmil fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*, eds. F.B. ‘Ūn - S.M. Muḥtār, Munša‘āt al-Ma‘ārif, Alexandria 1969, pp. 535; 540; 609.

⁷⁵ For a discussion of the subject, see R. Wisnovsky, “One Aspect of the Avicennian Turn in Sunnī Theology”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 14 (2004), pp. 65-100, in part. p. 81.

⁷⁶ For an early instance in which God’s necessary existence is taken as a distinguishing feature of God, see al-Kātib al-Ḥwārazmī (d. 387/997), *Maḥāṭib al-‘ulūm*, Maktabat al-Kulliyāt al-Azhariyya, Cairo 1981, p. 81: “His special attribute is that He is necessarily existent while other beings are possibly existents”. It is of particular importance that al-Ḥwārazmī mentions this point when outlining the views of the philosophers on the divine science (*al-ilm al-ilāhī*) and this is of course in the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic sense of the *falsafa* from its origins. In the same milieu, the necessary existence as God’s characteristic attribute is also attributed to Empedocles, credited by al-‘Āmirī, *al-Amad*, p. 47, with the following doctrine: “God’s existence does not resemble the existences of others [because] God’s entity is necessarily existent while other beings exist by a contingent (*imkānī*) existence”. On the Neoplatonic roots of the Arabic “Empedocles” see U. Rudolph, *Die Doxographie des pseudo-Ammonius. Ein Beitrag zur neuplatonischen Überlieferung im Islam*, Steiner, Stuttgart 1989, pp. 37-39 (Arabic text); 130-42 (commentary), and D. De Smet, *Empedocles Arabus. Une lecture néoplatonicienne tardive*, Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Brussel 1998. Besides, the contemporary theologians such as al-Bāqillānī and al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Ġabbār were also aware of this point. In the context of the kalāmīc issue of the endurance of substances (*baqā al-ğawāhir*), both al-Bāqillānī and al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Ġabbār address the question as to whether substances should be regarded as necessarily existent, once taken for granted that God is the only one who deserves to be called “necessary being”. See al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Ġabbār, *al-Muğnī* XI, eds. M. al-Nağğār - A. al-Nağğār, al-Dār al-Miṣriyya, Cairo 1965, p. 432; cf. S. Schmidtke, “Early Ash‘arite Theology: Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (403/1013) and his *Hidāyat al-Mustarshidin*”, *Bulletin d’Études Orientales* 60 (2011), pp. 39-71, in part. p. 50.

⁷⁷ This categorization, which is typical of the kalāmīc understanding about the creation of the world, can be found in Muṭahhar b. Ṭahir al-Maqdisī (d. after 355/966), *al-Bad’ wa-l-tārīḥ*, ed. C. Huart, I, Leroux, Paris 1899 (repr. Maktaba al-Ṭāqāfa al-dīniyya, I-VI, Cairo, s.d.), I, p. 64.

risāla. First and foremost, as is expected from a committed *mutakallim*, the author explicitly excludes the option of the eternity of the world: see {34} below. Being an aggregate of bodies (*aḡsām*) and accidents (*ʿarād*), the world fully bears the feature of origination (*ḥadt, ḥudūt*) in any aspect: see {30}. As to substances, it is evident that they continuously subsist with interchangeable qualities that the classical kalām calls “the four generations” (*al-akwān al-arbaʿa*), i.e., motion, rest, compositeness and division. At this point, what makes bodies subject to origination is that they do not possibly happen to exist free from these four generations. Consequently, the world inevitably comes under the category of “originated beings”, according to the kalāmīc rule that what does not precede an originated being is likewise originated.⁷⁸ Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz contends that one needs to elaborate more on the qualities of the above-mentioned “four generations” in order to strengthen his/her conviction that the world is not eternal. Accordingly, after a section devoted to the discussion of the origination of the generations (*ḥudūt al-akwān*), he tries to eliminate any doubt about the existence of these qualities: see {31}. Mere observation indicates that a body changes, and becomes another one: this is only possible if it is taken for granted that there are “meanings” which occupy bodies in order to make them change, i.e., to make them rest while they move etc. In fact, the ontologically unstable character of bodies which emerges as a result of their being subject to these generations is the corollary of the existence of an Unchangeable, Eternal Being. Hence, the notion of the four generations presented in the *risāla*, an idea which can be traced back to as early as the Muʿtazilite theologian Abū l-Hudayl al-ʿAllāf (d. circa 235/849), serves to set created beings apart from the distinctive status of God.⁷⁹ We must remember that in Muʿtazilite literature Abū l-Hudayl was credited with the formulation of the classical argumentation of the origination of the world based on four judgments, whose first includes the above-mentioned “four generations”.⁸⁰ In the age of our author, this theory is established as the most secure way to prove the origination of the world, as is clear in the relevant literature of the milieu.⁸¹

The reason behind putting so much emphasis on the temporality of the world is, without doubt, to pave the way for another crucial kalāmīc principle (which was stated above, in the third category), namely that there must be an Originator apart from the universe, who has brought

⁷⁸ This kalāmīc rule, which is also phrased as *muqārana al-ḥawādīt*, is one of the well-known precepts of the early *kalām*. The Muslim philosophers point to its critical role in kalām’s idea of the origination of the world: see Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Qiyās al-Ṣaḡīr*, in *al-Manṭiq ʿinda l-Fārābī*, II, ed. R. al-Aḡam, Dār al-Maṣriq, Beirut 1986, p. 46; Ibn Ruṣd, *al-Kaṣf ʿan Manābiḡ al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla*, ed. M. ʿĀ. al-Ġābirī, Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, Beirut 1998, p. 103.

⁷⁹ R.M. Frank, *The Metaphysics of Created Being According to Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf*, Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut, Istanbul 1966, pp. 16-23. Frank, p. 18 n. 15, observes that “with both the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿāʿira, *al-akwān* is used almost universally to indicate the ‘accidents’ classed under *ḥaraka, sukūn, iḡtimāʿ* and *iftirāq*”.

⁸⁰ Ṣaḡdīw Mānakdim, *Taʿliq ʿalā ṣarḥ al-usūl al-ḥamsa*, ed. ʿA. ʿUṭmān, Maktabat al-Wahba, Cairo 1965, pp. 95 f.

⁸¹ See for instance al-Māwardī’s (d. 450/1058) exposition of the argument, which is reminiscent of the method of Dādhurmuz: Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Māwardī, *ʿĀlām al-Nubuwwa*, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, Beirut 1989, pp. 9-10. Al-Māwardī briefly emphasizes that the body cannot be separated from all four accidents at one time, and that their coming to be from existence to non-existence (*li-wuḡūdihā baʿda ʿadamihā*) is a sign of their origination, a topic which seems to have inspired Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz. For more information, see H.A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Kalam*, Harvard U. P. Cambridge Mass. 1976, p. 397. For another contemporary argumentation, which deals in the same manner with the origination of the four generations, see Ibn Bābawayh al-Qummī, *al-Tawḥīd*, ed. al-Sayyid Ḥāsim al-Ḥusaynī, Dār al-Maʿrifa, Beirut s.d., pp. 299 f. For this part of Ibn Bābawayh’s book, see also: H. Ansari, “Yak Matn-i Muʿtazili ba Riwayat Sheikh Ṣadūq”, <http://ansari.kateban.com/entryprint1862.html>. As to Ibn Bābawayh’s possible source, Ansari points to the Muʿtazilites within the circle of the famous Buwayhid vizier Ṣāhib b. ʿAbbād (d. 385/995).

all beings into existence. To prove the existence of such a creator, the classical kalām relies on an idea which is known as the argument from design (*niẓām*). In the *risāla*, the first instance in which Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz introduces the argument is when he talks about a group of people (*qawm*) who content themselves to investigate the sensible world: see {5}. In the words of Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz, those people hold that the observable universe with all the celestial bodies has emerged as the work of an intelligent, voluntary creator. The key word to establish this feature of the universe is *ḥāṣṣiyya*, a term which means that something is particularly fashioned by the agent to fulfil a purpose.⁸² Therefore, all the things in the universe must depend upon the creative power of God – who is not subject to such particularization – in order to come into existence and stay in it in the way they are now. The consequence is the world as we observe it, that is, the fashioned particles, well-ordered portions, and formed shapes in the world. The second place in which the author presents a more sophisticated and focused analysis of the argumentation is where he discusses which one of the two sources of knowledge, i.e. tradition and reason, enables us to prove the existence of the Creator: see {28, 29}. First he rules out the two extreme opinions on the subject, that which supports the necessity of relying merely on transmitted knowledge (the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth) and refusing any engagement of reason and its procedures (inference, syllogism and speculation), while the other gives rise to a methodology which is fully based on independent rational thinking. To deal with the situation, our author presents a way which champions the middle position (*al-maḍhab al-mutawassiṭ*), a stance which is reminiscent of the attitude of al-Māwardī’s (d. 450/1058) in his *ʿĀlām al-Nubuwwa*.⁸³ Believing in the harmony of religion and philosophy like his contemporaries,⁸⁴ he explicitly states that human beings become ready to achieve the true sciences and certainty by transmitted knowledge and rational speculation together – they should not exclude each other. Once this general methodological rule is established, one must embark on his/her journey to the knowledge of God by thoroughly thinking of the most available kind of creature, that is, the human body. Thus, Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz draws the reader’s attention to the biological aspects of the human body which highlight the meticulous action of its Creator. In doing that, he uses the well-known vocabulary of the ‘argument’ from design typical of the kalām, such as *tarkīb*, *ihkām*, *taʿlīf* etc. Moreover, he specifically points to the fact that eyes are designed for seeing and ears for hearing etc., in order to prove that they must have been deliberately created this way. This is undoubtedly true at the micro-level; at the macro-level, the principle of particularization (*ihṭiṣās*) is also at work in that all celestial beings are organized and formed in due proportions. All these explanations by Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz are surely meant to converge into the contemporary literature of the “argument from design”.⁸⁵

⁸² Readers of al-ʿĀmirī are quite familiar with the term *ḥāṣṣiyya*, which frequently occurs in his works. In his *al-Tabṣīr li-awḡūb al-taʿbīr*, a book on the interpretation of dreams, al-ʿĀmirī sets *ḥāṣṣiyya* against *ʿammiyya*, detailing what he means by this: for him, *ḥāṣṣiyya* means the state of singularity and particularity (*infirād*), while *ʿammiyya* means commonality (*iṣṭirāk*). Thus, the usage of the word in proving the existence of God amounts to alluding to the uniqueness of the creation of the universe, a situation which necessitates the existence of a creator. See al-ʿĀmirī, *al-Tabṣīr li-awḡūb al-taʿbīr*, MS Konya, Bölge Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi, 15 Hk 187/2, f. 80 r (The date of *istinsāh* is 848/1443). The colophon of the MS reads (369) مائة وثلاث وستين وتسع سنة بنيسابور. During my study for this article, I have been lucky enough to come across this work of al-ʿĀmirī, which seemed to be lost. I am indebted to Mrs Mukaddes Demirci for helping me to get a copy of the manuscript.

⁸³ See al-Māwardī, *ʿĀlām al-Nubuwwa*, pp. 5-12.

⁸⁴ Kraemer, *Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam*, pp. 230 f.

⁸⁵ B. Abrahamov, “Al-Kāsim b. Ibrāhīm’s Argument from Design”, *Oriens* 29 (1986), pp. 259-84.

Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz's leaning towards Muʿtazilite theology becomes even more evident when he moves on to discuss the attributes of God. Due to an interruption in the manuscript, we have only the part of his discussion that addresses the attributes of action (*ṣifāt al-fīʿl*). However, given that the author compares the attributes of action with the attributes of essence/entity (*ṣifāt al-dāt*) {37}, we can infer that he supports the division of the attributes as “the attributes of entity” and “the attributes of action”, a common classification in early kalām.⁸⁶ Then, as we follow the *risāla*, the most crucial aspect which the author brings forward as to the issue of divine attributes is whether the attributes are identical to God's essence or not. In fact, Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz seems to be a strong supporter of the idea of “the negation of the attributes” (*nafy al-ṣifāt*), since he occasionally repeats the maxim “negation of the attributes from God is an affirmation as He is”: see {7; 22}. This is arguably to be seen in the light of the negative theology of Neoplatonism, which entails that all the additional qualities must be removed from the essence of God.⁸⁷ Nonetheless, the text specifically exhibits a kalāmī character in that it aims at defining God as knowing, powerful, living etc. only by virtue of His essence, not by any meaning attached to His essence. The main concern of the author is to avoid the consequence that attributes might be conceived of as eternal as God. To stress the fundamental kalāmī doctrine, God is the only being that is eternal, and there simply cannot be any other eternal being, or meaning, like Him, even if related to the divine entity. In consequence, all attributes are “predicated of the same meaning and the same truth”: see {38}. By this all-inclusive understanding of the attributes of God, Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz carefully advances solutions to other theological problems which arise from the linguistic similarity between the divine attributes and the human actions, particularly in terms of the qualities of “knowledge” (*ʿilm*) and “power” (*qudra*). God is knowing and powerful by Himself (*ʿālim/qādir li-nafsihi*), that is, He needs nothing apart from His essence in order to know things and have power over them. On the contrary, human beings can be knowing and powerful only by means of a knowledge and power which are not identical to their entities. This categorical distinction about the divine and human means that God's knowledge is relevant for all the things that are knowable, and His power is applicable to all the things that are subject to power. This surely provides an answer to the thorny discussion of the scope of God's knowledge between the *mutakallimūn* and the *falāsifa* of the age.⁸⁸ More importantly, Saʿīd b. Dādhurmuz's kalāmī stance reaches its peak when he considers those who hold that God's attributes are neither Him nor other than Him, nor part of Him as the heretics (*ahl al-bidʿa*) do: see {42} below. In the author's milieu, the Aṣʿarites – or the Kullābites, as they are sometimes called by the Muʿtazilites – were identified with such a position in the issue of the attributes of God.⁸⁹ Besides, given

⁸⁶ J.R.T.M. Peters, *God's Created Speech. A Study in the Speculative Theology of the Muʿtazilī Qāḍī l-Quḍāt Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār bn Aḥmad al-Hamadānī*, Brill, Leiden 1976, pp. 248-9.

⁸⁷ R.M. Frank, “The Neoplatonism of Ḡahm b. Ṣafwān”, *Le Muséon* 78 (1965), pp. 395-424, in part. p. 402; P. Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus. A Philosophical Study of the “Theology of Aristotle”*, Duckworth, London 2002, pp. 165-6.

⁸⁸ The best known aspect of the discussion of God's knowledge is the problem which Avicenna brought about, that is, God's knowledge of particulars (*ḡuzʿiyyāt*). Besides, Avicenna himself is aware of the discussions on God's knowledge in the Muʿtazilite theology inasmuch as he narrates the view of a particular Muʿtazilite viewpoint: Ibn Sīnā, *al-Mubāḥaṭāt*, ed. M. Bīdārfār, Intiṣārāt Bīdār, Tehran 1413/1992, p. 699. The parallels between the Muʿtazilite understanding of God's attributes and that of the *falāsifa* are well known. In the case of the attribute of “knowledge, *ʿilm*”, the *Proclus Arabus* states that “God's knowledge of things is not by an attribute, as is in the case of other beings which have knowledge [separate from their entities]. On the contrary, God knows things only by virtue of being Himself (*bal yaʿlamu l-aṣyā bi-annihī faḡaṭ*)”. See Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, pp. 36-7 (Arabic text).

⁸⁹ A concise example of the Muʿtazilite discussion of the problem can be seen in al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār, *al-Muḥtaṣar fī Usūl al-Dīn*, in *Rasāʾil al-ʿAdl wa-l-tawḥīd*, ed. M. ʿAmmāra, Dār al-Hilāl, I-II, Cairo 1971, I, pp. 182-3. In this section, which is against the *Kullābiyya*, ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār addresses issues that seem to have inspired Dādhurmuz.

the ambiguity of their theory of attributes the Aš'arites are lucky to be classified as heterodox, because those who explicitly claim that there are eternal entities other than God are in pure disbelief (*kufr*), as Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz states: see {41}.

Although the points examined above can be seen as sufficient to identify the kalāmīc and particularly the Mu'tazilite character of the *risāla*, one may draw further clues that show more interaction with Mu'tazilite literature. One of these occasions is the author's usage of the maxim "to share the attribute which is most peculiar to a thing entails sharing all attributes that belong to that thing" (*al-ištirāk fi l-waṣf al-aḥaṣṣ yūḡību al-ištirāk fi ḡamī' al-awṣāf*): see {40}. Sa'īd b. Dādhurmuz adopts this principle to prevent God from having any similarity with created bodies (*aḡsām*). Be this as it may, this proposition, as is known, was one of the common principles of the Mu'tazila that were used to distinguish God from creatures, a necessary postulate for them in order to apply their strict understanding of the *tanzīh* of God. Thus, an Aš'arite theologian who was also a connoisseur of the Mu'tazilite literature of his time, al-Ġuwaynī, frequently mentions this principle in his *al-Šāmil* and regards it as a fundamental precept for the followers of the school of Abū 'Alī al-Ġubbā'ī (d. 303/916). Al-Ġubbā'ī was the first Mu'tazilite to hold that God's eternity (*qidam*) is the most distinctive attribute of God which He does not share with others. This means that any eternal attribute would cause Him to have partners in His quality of being eternal – a result that any follower of al-Ġubbā'ī would dissent from, due to the above-mentioned principle of the *ištirāk*.⁹⁰ Moreover, not only did the early *mutakallimūn* consider the relationship between God and His attributes in order to establish the uniqueness of the divine essence, but they also depended on the difference between the acts of the agent, that is, whether they come from a powerful and skilful agent or proceed from the cause as a natural consequence. This was, again, one of the points of clash between the *mutakallimūn* and their nemesis, the materialist philosophers. The *mutakallimūn* had always held the view that God must be a voluntary agent, that is, that His actions do not necessarily come out of His essence. Meanwhile, for the "people of the nature" (*aṣḡāb al-ṡabī'a*), all the actions from the small scale of daily events to the biggest scale of the universe have not departed from natural determination, since they obey the rule of cause and effect.⁹¹ To put it simply, God is able to produce different results, but there is only one way for a cause to perform its action, producing the effect. This is the backdrop of our author's emphasis on the terms such as "choice" (*iḡtiyār*), "divergence" (*iḡtilāf*) and "substantification" (*taḡannus*), since all these words testify to God's sovereignty in terms of His agency: see {44}.

Conclusion

The author of *R. fi l-Tawḡīd* edited and analysed in this article turns out to be a follower of the school of al-Kindī, and especially a commentator of the works of al-Āmirī. His engagement in the movement of the translation of Greek sources into Arabic must be addressed and evaluated

⁹⁰ al-Ġuwaynī, *al-Šāmil fi Usūl al-Dīn* (quoted above, n. 74), p. 252. Cf. also Id., *ibid.*, pp. 131; 576. The usage of this principle can be seen in Buḡḡānī, *Ziyādāt* (quoted above, n. 58), p. 72: "*inna al-ištirāk fi ṡifati min ṡifāt al-dāt yūḡību al-ištirāk fi ḡamī' al-ṡifāt al-dātīyya*".

⁹¹ This was the main reason which prevented the *mutakallimūn* from naming God as the cause (*'illa*), because the cause necessitates its effect. On the contrary, for the kalām God can only act by free choice (*iḡtiyār*). The dichotomy between the necessary act of nature and the free act of God was regularly highlighted in the early literature of kalām and in the *usūl al-fiqḡ* as well. See for instance Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī (d. 430/1038), *Taqwīm al-Adilla fi Usūl al-fiqḡ*, ed. H.M. al-Mays, Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, Beirut 2001, p. 14. For further information, see J. Thiele, *Kausalität in der Mu'tazilitischen Kosmologie. Das Kitāb al-Mu'atṡirāt wa-miftāḡ al-muṡkilāt des Zayditen al-Ḥasan ar-Raṡṡās* (st. 584/1188), Brill, Leiden - Boston 2011 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 84) in part. p. 84.

within the context of the influence of the above-mentioned major figures of Islamic philosophy. After al-Kindī, whose oeuvre he combines with the Mu‘tazilite literature of his time, Sa‘īd b. Dādhurmuz testifies in the *R. fī l-Tawhīd* a new phase in the history of the interaction between Islamic theology and philosophy. He attempts to update and enhance this interaction in accordance with the contemporary development of the Mu‘tazilite *kalām* typical of the 4th/5th centuries AH. This attitude seems to be unique among his well-known contemporaries. Besides, his lack of interest towards the philosophical system of Avicenna (d. 428/1037) is particularly intriguing.

Notes on the Arabic Text

Arabic words that lack the *hamza* at the end in the original text are printed according to standard Arabic, e.g. تلقاء instead of تلقاء or قدما instead of قدما. Subheadings in curly brackets and punctuation marks are added to facilitate the reading.

رسالة عملها سعيد بن دادهرمز في التوحيد من أقاويل الأنبياء عليهم السلام
والحكماء رضي الله عنهم
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وبه نستعين

53r

53v

رسالة في التوحيد

عملها سعيد بن دادهرمز لبعض أصدقائه حرسهم الله

5

{1} إن من الواجب على الإنسان أن يعلم أن جميع ما يناله من الخيرات إنما يناله عند معرفة الله تبارك وتعالى . وأن أشرف العلوم وأعلاها العلم بالباري جلت عظمته وهو الغرض الأقصى والفوز الأكبر، وأن الوصول إلى رؤية الحق الأول تقدست أسمائه إنما يكون بالنور الإلهي كما ينطق به كتاب الله في عدة من الآيات مثل قوله « نور يهدي به من يشاء »، « نور على نور يهدي الله لنوره من يشاء » [24:35] . وقد خص الله بهذا النور الأنبياء عليهم السلام والحكماء والصالحين من عباده 10 ووصلوا بنور ربهم إلى معرفة ربهم تعالى اسمه . وذلك من أعظم المعجزات التي جعلها الله تعالى للرسول عليهم السلام ففرق به بينهم وبين جميع البشر وهو أمر الهي يقصر عنه إلا من يؤهله الله له، وهو شأن يوجب على الخلق الخضوع لمن خصه الله به وميزه عنهم بمرتبه ويلزمهم المسارعة إلى الطاعة له وقبول أحكام الدين والملة . وقد قال بعض أفاضل الحكماء : عرفت ربي بربي ولو لا ربي ما عرفت ربي . | أراد به النور المشار اليه . وقالوا : إذا عرفت كل شيء فاعرف أنك لم تعرف شيئا 15 ما لم تعرف الله تعالى .

{2} وهذه حالة للروح عالية يجد الإنسان فيها لنفسه كأن لها وجودا آخر يقترب بالوجود الدائم والنعيم الأبدي . ومن خصه الله بهذه الرتبة العلية وأهله لهذه الموهبة السنية فقد أمن الأمن الذي لا يكون عليه فيه خوف وغني الغنى الذي لا يكون معه فقر، وهو يهدأ عن حركة الطلب، لأنه يرى ربه بعين عقله ونور ربه . ومن رأى ربه هذه الرؤية لم يخش بعدها عمى عنه ولا ضلالا فيه . 20 ومن لم يعم عن خالقه تعالى لم يزل بصيرا بما دونه . لأن تلك العين وذلك النور لم يصل إليه إلا وقد مرت بجميع الموجودات وعبرت سائر المبدعات والمخلوقات . ولهذا ما قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه : لا تزال النفس مضطربة حتى يحرز قوتها وإذا أحرزت قوتها سكنت . قيل : وما قوتها قال :

54r

ms المصالحين : scripsi الصالحين || ms السلم : scripsi السلام 10 ms أسماوه : scripsi أسمائه 8
ms ففرق : scripsi ففرق || ms السلم : scripsi السلام 12 ms فصلوا : scripsi ووصلوا 11
ms تحرز : scripsi يحرز 23 عبرر corr. ms et del. عبرت 22 ms يحش : scripsi يخش 20 ms بمرتبه : scripsi بمرتبه 13

[Knowledge of God]¹

{1} It is incumbent upon human beings to know that all they achieve regarding good things is achieved by them thanks to the knowledge of God – may He be blessed and exalted – and that the noblest and highest of the sciences is the knowledge of the Creator – may His majesty be great –, a knowledge which is the ultimate aim and the biggest achievement, and that the vision of the First Truth – may His names be glorified – is only reached by the divine light. Hence God’s Book says this in many verses, such as “... light by which He guides whom He wills”,² “light upon light, Allah guides whom He wills to His light” [Q 24:35]. God bestowed this light upon the prophets – may peace be upon them – the sages and His good servants, and thanks to the light of their Lord, they reached the knowledge of their Lord – may His name be exalted. This is one of the greatest miracles that God the Exalted made for the prophets – may peace be upon them. With this miracle, God differentiated them from the rest of mankind. It is a divine state that can be reached only by those whom God appointed for this, and a condition that obliges people to respect the one upon whom God bestowed it. By this rank, God distinguishes the one who has it from others and urges them to be solicitous in their obedience to him and the acceptance of the rules of faith and religion. Accordingly, one of the eminent sages said, “I knew my Lord by my Lord, had my Lord not existed, I would not have known Him”. By this, he means the light we have mentioned above. They said: “when you know everything, know also that you do not know anything unless you know God the Exalted”.³

{2} This is a high state for the spirit, in which human beings find themselves as if they possess a different existence that is connected with eternal existence and everlasting blessing. Those who receive this high rank from God and whom He qualifies for this sublime gift get such a peace that they will never fear, and such richness that they will never become poor. Moreover, they stop to go in search, because they see their Lord with the eyes of their intellect and thanks to the light of their Lord. Whoever sees his Lord with this vision does not fear to be blind in front of Him or to be wrong about Him, and those who are not blind in front of their Creator the Exalted do not fail to reach what is below Him. This is because this eye and this light reach Him only after going through all beings and proceed through other beings, which are created. Accordingly, the Prophet – may God bless him – said, “the soul continues to be troubled unless it gains its power. When it gains its power, it rests”. He was asked, “what is its power?”. He responded,

معرفة الله تبارك وتعالى . وقال بعض الحكماء: ما زلت أشرب فلم أرو حتى عرفت البارى تعالى فرويت من غير شرب . وقال غيره: إذا حسبت أنك عرفت كل شيء فاعلم أنك لم تعرف شيئاً ما لم تعرف الله تعالى حق المعرفة . وقال غيره: عرفت ربي بربي ولو لا ربي ما عرفت ربي . أراد به نور الهادي له إليه . وقد جاء في الوحي القديم: | من عرفني حق المعرفة سقيته ماء الحياة الأبدية . 54v
ومن بلغ هذا المبلغ فإنه يطلع على الأمور كلها الاطلاع الروحاني فيلوح له جميع الأشياء تلوحاً أعلى وأنور مما يكون بالاستدلال وبالقياس وبالاستنباط، فينظر إلى الحق الأول عز وجل بالنظرة الأولى والفطرة الأولى . لأنه قد امتلأ نوراً وتنهأ صفاء وخلوصاً . وهذه هي حال الأنبياء عليهم السلام ومن شاكلهم واقتدى بهم من الحكماء والصالحين والعلماء . فأما من قصر عن هذه الرتبة ولم يبلغ هذه المنزلة، فإنه إذا نظر إلى الحق الأول الخالص المحض تعالى اسمه لحق عقله ونوره من الكلال والحسور ما يلحق عين الخفاش من الضعف والعجز إذا نظر إلى الشمس وذلك لقوة نور الحق المحض وعظم جلاله ولانهاية تعاليه فيما عليه هويته عن الإدراك وعن أن تقع الإحاطة به فيحتاج حينئذ إلى التدرب بالعلوم والحكم حتى يمكنه أن يلحظه بنحو ما يستطيع المخلوق أن يلحظ خالقه جل وتعالى .

{3} فإذاذن من الواجب على كل من تاقت نفسه إلى ارتفاع هذه الرتبة الجُد في الطلب والانكماش في السعي والارتياض بالعلوم الحقيقية والتدرب بالحكمة العالية التي هي السبب في الوصول إليها والسبيل إلى نيلها وإدراكها بعون الله تعالى . وقد قيل: إن معرفة الأشياء تكون بثلاثة أوجه: إما بإحدى المشاعر الخمسة الحساسة التي هي البصر والسمع والشم والذوق واللمس، وإما بإحدى القوى العقلية التي هي الفكر والروية والتمييز والوهم الصادق والذهن الصافي، وإما بطريق الاستدلال والبرهان الضروري . فأما معرفة البارى تعالى فهو إما أن يكون بالنور المذكور وإما أن يكون بطريقتين: أحدهما خاص وهو طريق الاستدلال والبرهان الضروري والآخر عام، وهو المعرفة الغريزية التي في طباع الخلائقة لجمع هويته تعالى وهو فطرة الله التي فطر الناس عليها، وذلك من لطيف صنعه تعالى لعباده . لأنه جلت عظمته لم يُعَرَّ أحدًا من الأخذ بحظ من المعرفة به تقدست أسمائه إلا أن الحظوظ متفاوتة جدا بالكثرة والقلة والضعف والقوة . وهذه المعرفة إنما هي جزء النبوة الذي أومأنا إليه . وبين الدرجة العليا من هذه المعرفة وهذا النور والدرجة السفلي مراتب كثيرة لا يأتي عليها عد وإحصاء . ومن أعجب أحوال الإنسان وأطرفها أن صاحب الحظ الأدنى من هذه 20 55v الموهبة السنية يحسب في نفسه أنه أوفر الناس حظاً منها حتى إنك ربما ترى | أنقصهم نصيباً من ذلك يترشح لهداية الناس ولا يخشع من ادعاء منزلة صاحب الحظ الأعلى منها، فيرد عليهم صوابهم بخطائهم وهو لا يعلم ولا يعلم أنه لا يعلم بل عنده أنه يعلم . وهذه هي الآفة الكبرى في اقتناع أهل النقص بنقصهم وإعراضهم عن طلب الكمال بجدهم وسعيهم . ولهذا ما قيل: إن المنقوص مستور عليه نقصه ولو عرف نقصه لتقطعت نفسه حسرة . 30

ms السلم : scripsi السلام 8 || ms الاستنباط : scripsi بالاستنباط 6 || ms الحيوه : scripsi الحياة 4
ms للبصر : scripsi البصر 17 || ms الإحاطة : scripsi الإحاطة || ms ونهاية : scripsi ولانهاية 11 || scripsi الكلال-الشمس 10 || ms اتقيدي : scripsi اقتدى
ms للإحاطة : scripsi للإحاطة || scripsi الكلال-الشمس 10 || ms اتقيدي : scripsi اقتدى
ms للبصر : scripsi البصر 17 || ms الإحاطة : scripsi للإحاطة || ms ونهاية : scripsi ولانهاية 11 || scripsi الكلال-الشمس 10 || ms اتقيدي : scripsi اقتدى
ms للإحاطة : scripsi للإحاطة || scripsi الكلال-الشمس 10 || ms اتقيدي : scripsi اقتدى
ms للبصر : scripsi البصر 17 || ms الإحاطة : scripsi للإحاطة || ms ونهاية : scripsi ولانهاية 11 || scripsi الكلال-الشمس 10 || ms اتقيدي : scripsi اقتدى

“the knowledge of God the Blessed and the Exalted”. A sage said, “I have kept drinking till now without quenching my thirst. Now I knew God the Exalted and was satisfied without drinking”.⁴ Another one said, “If you suppose to have known everything, know that you do not know anything unless you know God the Exalted, with a true knowledge”. Another one said, “I knew my Lord by my Lord, had my Lord not existed, I would not have known Him”. By this, he means that he has the light of the Guide for him. It is stated in the ancient revelation that “who truly knows me, I will give them the water of eternal life”.⁵ Those who reach this rank become acquainted with all matters in the spiritual way. Thus, for them all things come to the light in a way which is higher and more luminous than that which is achieved by argumentation, syllogism, and deduction. Hence, they look into the First Truth, the Mighty and the Exalted, with the first contemplation and the first disposition, because they are full of light and at the outmost of purity and sincerity. This is the situation of the prophets – may peace be upon them –, their imitators and followers among sages, the pious, and scholars. However, things are different for those who fell short of this rank and do not reach this destination: when they contemplate the first, simple and pure Truth – may His name be glorified –, their reason and light are overtaken by fatigue and weakness, like the weakness and inability of bats’ eyes when they look at the sun. This is due to the power of the light of pure Truth and to the greatness of His glory. The infinity of His greatness consists in that His being is beyond the reach of understanding and comprehension. Thus, they need to practise sciences and wisdom in order to see as much as possible for a creature when it tries to see its Creator, the Highest and the Exalted.

{3} Therefore, it is necessary for everyone who inclined to reach this rank to strive earnestly in its pursuit, to be absorbed in its effort, to exercise in the true sciences, and to practise the high wisdom which is the cause of reaching this rank and the only way to achieve it and to grasp it, with the help of God the Exalted. It was said that the knowledge of things is acquired in three ways: either (1) by one of the five senses, which are sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch; or (2) by one of the rational faculties, which are thinking, reflection, judgment, true estimation, pure mind; or (3) by the way of argumentation and necessary demonstration. Moreover, knowledge of the Creator the Exalted is acquired either by the light mentioned above, or in the other two ways. The first of these ways is special and it is the way of argumentation and necessary demonstration. The second way is common; it is the innate knowledge that in the natures of created beings brings them to grasp the existence of God the Exalted: this is the natural disposition of God, according to which He brought into being mankind.⁶ This is an example of the delicate creation of God for His servants, because He – may His greatness be glorified – does not impede anyone from the reception, as partial as it might be, of His knowledge – may His names be sanctified. However, the parts are really different regarding their multitude or scarceness, weakness or power. This kind of knowledge is indeed a part of the prophecy, as we have mentioned before. Between the highest degree of this knowledge and light and the lowest degree there are many ranks that cannot be counted. Among the peculiar and curious states of human beings is that the one who has the smallest portion of this sublime gift is persuaded to have the biggest portion of it among other people, so that sometimes you see the least gifted one presenting himself to the guidance of people, without any fear of pretending the status of the most gifted one, thus leading unwittingly to the wrong those who are right. Indeed, he does not know even the fact that he does not know, while he supposes to know. This is the biggest obstacle, because it makes people be content with their mistakes and turn away from the search for perfection with seriousness and endeavour. For this reason, it was said, “the one with fault is not aware of his fault; if he had known that, he would have been overwhelmed by deep regret”.⁷

- {4} ولما كانت الموجودات في ذواتها تفتنّ إلى قسمين: منها ما يجوز أن يوقف عليه بإدراك الحس إياه ومنها ما لا يوقف عليه إلا بظهور الفعل منه. ومثاله أن بدن الإنسان وإن لم يوجد مبرزا لشيء من الأفعال فإن إثباته لمجرد قوة الإحساس ممكن. فأما عقل الإنسان ونفسه فمن الممتنع أن يخلص العلم بوجودهما لو لا ما صدر من الأفعال الظاهرة عن ذاتيهما، وإذا صح هذا لما كان ذات الباري جل جلاله غير مطلوب معرفته من جهة الإدراك الحسي والضبط العياني، فليس فيه 5 ما يوجب امتناع تحققه، لأن الشيء قد يصح إثباته من طريق ظهور أفعاله، وقد ينبغي لنا أن نعلم أن طريقة البرهان متعلقة باستيضاح الحكم الأستر عنا بتوسط الحكم الأظهر لنا. فمن الواجب أن 56r نعلم يقينياً أن الفاعل يكون سابقاً لمفعوله بالذات، بل هو السبب الموجد لنفس | المفعول. إلا أن الإحاطة بالمفعول أنه مفعول قد يجوز أن يكون أقرب إلى عقولنا من الإحاطة بالفاعل من حيث هو فاعل. فإذا العقول الصحيحة متى عثرت على آثار الصنعة على الحقيقة صارت لا محالة مضطرة 10 إلى العلم بوجود الصانع لها. وإذا تقرر هذا وقد علم أن الموجودات كلها محصورة بين حقيقتي الوجود والإمكان ولا يشذ عنهما شيء في الحال ثابتاً، ومهما فرض في شيء من الحالات أنه ليس فقد لزم منه المحال فهو إذن لا محالة أزلي الذات غير موصوف بالبدء والنهاية.
- {5} وقد اقتصر قوم في إثبات الصانع تعالى اسمه على تعرف الحكم الواحد وهو البحث عن العالم الحسي، وأنه محدث وله محدث هو الله تعالى وقالوا: إن العالم المحسوس من السماوات 15 والأفلاك والكواكب متعلقٌ حصولهاً بخاصية الصنعة، قد علم يقينياً أن وجودها وقوام أُنبياتها وبقاء ذواتها متعلق بخاصية التأليف الذي هو صنعة للمولف وخاصية التركيب الذي هو صنعة للمركب وخاصية التشكيل الذي هو صنعة للمشكل، ثم علم أن كل واحد منها ذو أجزاء متصورة وذو أبعاد متناسقة وذو شكل مصور، وكل ما تعلق وجوده بشيء من هذه الأفعال فمن 56v الممتنع أن يكون أزلياً واجب الذات، فهي إذا | محدثة مصنوعة. فالموجود المحض إذا هو الذات المتعالي عن انطلاق اللاوجود عليه. وهو جل جلاله القادر على الإيجاد لكل ما لم يكن حصوله ممتنعاً. لأن قدرة الله لا ينقض حكمته.
- {6} فهو تعالى الموجد لكل ما سواه على الترتيب الذاتي والنظام الحكمي ولكن ليس يكفي هذا العذر من المعرفة بالأنية وإن يحصل الإقرار بأن للعالم صانع ويقع الاقتصار عليه فقط. بل ينبغي لطالب هذه الرتبة السنية أن يعلم أن لكل واحد من أجناس الموجودات وأنواعها أنية 25 تختص به على حدة، وليست الأشياء كلها ذوات أنية واحدة، بل كانت في أنفسها ذوات أنيات مختلفة، وأن يعلم أيضاً أن أنية الباري تعالى متعالية على أنيات سائر الموجودات. إذ هي بأسرها صارت موجودة بأمره جل جلاله وحاصلة تأخرها عنه. فإذا لا يتم المعرفة بأنيته جل اسمه إلا بالإحاطة بأنية الأشياء كلها واليقين بأن أنية الباري تعالى مباينة للأنيات كلها. لأن أنيته أزلية الثبات بنفسها واجبة الديمومة بذاتها. وقد صدرت الأنيات كلها عنه جل جلاله اختراعاً لها على 30

mg || من الذوات الموجودة // صلا (...) الواجب 8f.56r ms ظهور: scripsi ظهور 6 ms تفين: scripsi تفتنّ 1

ms. متناسفة: scripsi متناسقة 19 ms اتياتها: scripsi أنياتها || ms يقينا: scripsi يقينياً || ms. add. قد 16 ante

{4} Beings in themselves are divided into two categories: what can be apprehended by sense perception as such, and what can be apprehended only when an action comes out of them. The body of a human being is an example. Even if the human body does not manifest any kind of action, one can still prove its existence through the faculty of sensation. But as to the human intellect and soul, it is impossible to know of their existence if an action does not come out of their essences. Once this is established, it follows that the knowledge of the essence of the Exalted Creator is not investigated by means of sense perception and visual inspection, but this does not necessarily entail that it is impossible to reach the true knowledge of Him, since the existence of a thing can be proved by means of the manifestation of its actions. We should know that the method of demonstration is related to examination of the judgment which is more obscure for us through the judgment which is more evident for us.⁸ Thus, it is necessary for us to know without doubt that the agent precedes its effect by virtue of its essence; rather, it is the cause of the existence of the effect itself. Nevertheless, it may be the case that knowledge of the effect as an effect is clearer to our intellect than the knowledge of the agent as an agent. Therefore, whenever sound intellects find the true signs of creation, they are inevitably compelled to accept the existence of its creator. Once this is established, it is known that all beings fall into the two categories of the reality of necessity and that of contingency, and no being escapes this division as to its permanent status. With respect to these two categories, the thing whose not-existence, once supposed, leads to impossibility must be eternal in its essence and cannot be described as having a beginning or an end.

[The Proof for the Existence of God]

{5} In the issue of proving the existence of the Creator – may His name be exalted –, some limited themselves to acknowledging only one judgment, namely the investigation about the sensible world, maintaining that it is originated and thus it has an originator, who is God the Exalted. They say that the emergence of the sensible world including heavens, celestial spheres, and stars depends upon the particularity of creation. We undoubtedly know that the existence of all these beings, the maintenance of their thatnesses,⁹ and the endurance of their essences are related to the particularity of the composition which is a creation of the Composer, to the particularity of the assembling which is a creation of the Assembler, and to the particularity of the forming which is a creation of the Former. Then we know that every single being has fashioned particles, well-ordered portions, and formed shapes. Everything whose existence is related to any of these actions cannot be eternal and necessary in its essence. Therefore, all these are originated and created. The pure Being, consequently, is the Essence which is far from being related to non-existence. He the Exalted is capable of bringing into existence those whose existence is not impossible. For the power of God does not contradict His wisdom.

{6} God the Exalted is the Originator of all except Himself according to essential order and wise design. However, this does not [completely] exclude need for the knowledge of the thatness, even though it has already been established that there is a creator for the universe and the method for this has been briefly described. Moreover, who wants to reach this high rank should know that, for every single genus and species of beings there is one single thatness special to it. Not all things possess the same thatnesses, on the contrary, they possess different thatnesses. It should also be known that the thatness of God the Exalted is superior to the thatnesses of other beings. This is because all of them came into existence by His command – may He be exalted – and they came into being after Him. Accordingly, knowledge of the thatness of God – may His name be exalted – cannot be complete without thoroughly knowing the thatness of things altogether, and without knowing in certainty that the thatness of the Creator – may He be exalted – is distinct from all other thatnesses. For the continuity of His thatness is eternal in itself and necessary in itself. All the thatnesses emanated from Him the Exalted, and are created by Him in regular and continuous ranks. As a result, existence is essential for the First Creator the Exalted,

مراتب منتظمة متتالية. فالوجود إذاً ذاتي للمبدع الأول تعالى، لأنه لم يقبله من غيره، ومنه فاض الوجود على جميع الأشياء التي دونه جوداً منه تعالى به عليها وبه قوام صور | الموجودات كلها، فهو تعالى إذاً واجب الوجود وما كان واجب الوجود فهو دائم الوجود وما كان دائم الوجود فهو أزلي، فهو جل وعز من الوجود في أعلى رتبة ووجود سائر الأشياء ناقص عنه مستفاد منه جل اسمه، ولا يجوز أن يكون لموجود سواه وجود مثل وجوده ولا في رتبة وجوده، لأنه المبدع لكل موجود سواه وهو تعالى التام الكامل الأزلي القديم.

{7} وإذا حصل المعرفة بالإنية المحضة والهوية الخالصة واليقين لها والإقرار بها فمن الواجب السعي في معرفة الوحدانية لله تعالى. ونحن نصرّف القول إلى ذلك ونذكر نبذاً منه على سبيل الإيجاز والاختصار. فنقول: التوحيد هو تخليص الواحد من كل ما يكون سبباً للكثرة والتكثير والإيجاز والتكثير والإكثار والاستكثار. وهذا التخليص هو صورة تنال من هذا الواحد في نفس هذا الموحد فتكون ذريعة إلى التخليص البشري واليقين العقلي، وفي هذا المعنى السعادة المطلوبة بكل قول وعمل ورجاء وأمل. ومن أجل هذه السعادة سبق النصح والإرشاد والسعي والاجتهاد من الأنبياء عليهم السلام والحكماء والصالحين بضروب من اللغات وأنواع من الإشارات، فأي ثمرة أجلى من ثمرة التوحيد، أي غاية أبعد من غاياته وأي إنسان أسعد ممن عرف الله تعالى فاشتاقه | ووجدّه فوفّي حقه واقتدى به فحاز رضوانه واستنار بنوره وأتار عباده. والتوحيد معتقد على 15 نفى الشوائب بالتخليص والتنزيه والتعرية والتجريد. والمراد بهذا الاسم الصفة التي في الغاية اللائقة بهذا الموصوف المتعالي عن الصفات. ولهذا ما قيل: نفى الصفات عنه إثبات له من حيث هو. فالتوحيد أشرف جزئي الحكمة النظري والعملية، وكما ينال بأشرف العمل مرضاة الله تعالى كذلك ينال بأشرف العلم الاتصال بالله جل وعز. وبالتوحيد يصح كل عمل وإليه ينتهي كل علم. وإذا كان الإنسان يشرف بأن يعلم العالم وما فيه على مراتبه وحقائقه وآثاره وصفاته فما ظنك بمن 20 يعرف إلهها وربها وخالقها ومخترعها ومقتدرها ومصرفها ومركبها ومؤلفها وجامعها ومفرقها. فبالتوحيد يصح المعرفة وبالمعرفة يزكو العمل والجمع بين التوحيد والتفرقة لسان التوحيد والرياسة لا تتم إلا بالوحدانية. وكلما كان عدد الرؤساء أكثر كان الحلل في أسباب الرياسة أكثر. ولهذا ما جاء في كتاب الله تعالى: لو كان فيهما آلهة إلا الله لفسدتا [21:22]. وقيل: إن الواحد بالاطلاق غير محتاج إلى الثاني، فمتى فرضت الثاني قرينا للواحد كنت كواضع ما لا يحتاج إليه البتة إلى 25 جانب ما لا بد منه البتة.

{8} والدليل على أن الله تعالى واحد هو أن في الواحد اتفاق | وفي الأكثر اختلاف، والأخذ بالاتفاق أولى من الأخذ بالاختلاف. وكما أنه ليس في الحساب قبل الواحد شيء، فاعلم أنه ليس في الموجودات قبل الواحد المحض شيء. ولما كان الواحد لا بدء له صار نهاية كل متناه وصار هو بذاته لا نهاية له. لأنه لا يتناهى إلى شيء، وهو نهاية كل متناه، وإنما صار الواحد لا نهاية له،

since He does not acquire existence from any other than Himself. From Him existence emanates towards all things that are under Him, as an act of generosity towards them. The maintenance of the forms of all beings is due to God. Then, He the Exalted is the necessary being,¹⁰ and if something is necessary being, it is also perennial being, and if something is perennial, it is also eternal. It follows that God the Exalted is at the highest rank in existence, so that other things are deficient in existence compared to Him and they derive their existences from Him – may His name be exalted. The existence of any other thing cannot be identical to His existence, nor can it be at the same level as His existence, because He is the creator of all beings except Himself and He the Exalted is the perfect, the complete, the eternal and everlasting.

[Unity of God]

{7} When the knowledge of the pure thatness and the true Being is achieved and thus the certainty about it and the confirmation of it are established, it is necessary to search for the knowledge of the oneness of God the Exalted. Here we change the course of the speech towards this subject and only address a part of it in brief. We say that oneness consists in purifying the “one” from everything that causes multiplicity, increasing, multiplication, multiplying etc.¹¹ This purification is a form which is received by this “one” in the soul of those who perform the unification, so that it turns out to be a path to human purification and intellectual certainty. In this sense, [it is] the happiness which is looked for in every speech, deed, hope and wish. For the sake of that happiness, the prophets – peace be upon them – sages and the pious advised people, guided them, and strove to walk in this way with many kinds of languages and pointers. Which benefit is clearer than the profit of unification? Which goal is more distant than its goals? Which human being is happier than the one who knows God the Exalted, the one who yearns for Him and finds Him, so that he acknowledges His right and follows Him, obtains His approval, is enlightened by His light, and enlightens His servants? Oneness is achieved by holding that impurities must be removed with purification, transcendence, removal, and abstraction. What is meant by this label is the attribute which is [found] at the outmost, which is appropriate for that reality which is above the attributes. In this sense it has been said, “the removal of the attributes from Him is in fact the affirmation of Him in the way appropriate to Him”.¹² Moreover, Oneness is the noblest of the two parts of wisdom, i.e., the theoretical and the practical. As well as one acquires the approval of God the Exalted by the noblest action, in the same way one acquires conjunction with God – may He be Exalted – by the noblest knowledge. Every action is valid thanks to Oneness and every science leads to it. If human beings become noble by knowing the world and what is in it, such as its ranks, realities, signs and attributes, what do you think about those who know its God, Lord, Creator, Omnipotent, Ruler, Composer, Author, Collector and Separator? Thus, only through Oneness knowledge is valid, and through knowledge action is purified. Combining Oneness with separation is the language of Oneness. Even leadership is not complete without Oneness. The more numerous the leaders are, the more deficiencies will be found in the causes of leadership. Accordingly, it is written in the Exalted God’s book that “if there were in the heavens and the earth other gods besides God, there would have been corruption in both” (21:22). It has been said, “the absolute One does not need a second. If you assume the second as connected with the One, you would be like those who add an unnecessary thing to the necessary one”.¹³

{8} The proof of the unity of God is that there is agreement in the one and disagreement in the multiple. Choosing agreement is better than choosing disagreement. As well as in calculation there is not anything before the one, in the same way you should know that as to beings there is nothing before the Pure One. Given that the One has no beginning, He becomes the end of everything that ends, and in His essence He does not have an end. For He does not come to an end, rather, He is the end of everything that ends. Indeed, the One becomes endless,

لأنه لا بدء له، لأنه لا نهاية له، لأن الآخر معتبر بالأول وليس الأول معتبر بالآخر. لأن ههنا أولاً لا آخر له وليس ههنا آخر لا أول له. وهذه شهادة العقل الذي إليه المفروغ وبقوته يعتقد ما يعتقد ثابتاً ومنفياً وواجباً وممكناً وحسناً وقبيحاً. فإذن لا شهادة أقوى من شهادة العقل ولا حد العقل أصح مما حده به رسول الله صلى الله عليه حين سئل عنه فقال: العقل نور في القلب يميز به بين الحق والباطل. وكل شيء يعرف بشيء أول كذلك هو الواحد، ولذلك كان الواحد أولاً ولم يكن 5 عدداً، لأن العدد إنما هو بالواحد فهو أول مفيد ومنه نشأ العدد وبه نظامه وليس هو بعدد. لأنه من باب الوجود. فإن قال قائل: والثاني أيضاً واحد وكذلك الثالث، فإن أخرجت الواحد من العدد فأخرج الثاني أيضاً منه. قلنا: إن الثاني إنما يكون بعداً وغيراً، والأول لم يكن فيه بعدية ولا غيرية 58v وإنما كان وجوداً فقط. والواحد مفيد والثاني مستفيد، والواحد صورته من ذاته والثاني يستفيد صورته من الواحد الأول والوجود الحق هو الواحد وهو العدد وهو المعدود ولا يكون هناك غيرية. 10 وهو سبب الكثرة. فالواحد قبل الأشياء وهو الحق المحض وهو العلة الأولى والأشياء كلها معلولة منه فتبارك الله أحسن الخالقين.

{9} ومن الواجب أن نعلم أن الحال في معرفة وحدانية البارئ تعالى شبيهة بالحال في معرفة الأنية. لأنه ليس كل من أطلق القول بأن صانع العالم واحد فقط فقد صار هذا القدر من الإطلاق كافياً له في معرفة وحدانيته. إذ قد علم أن من الناس من يزعم أن معنى قولنا «أنه واحد» أي ليس 15 ذاته بذي كمية محتملة للانقسام. ومنهم من يزعم أن صفاته كلها قد اتحدت به اتحاداً لا يجوز ولا على شيء منها أن يزايله أو يوجد بالذات حلول منه. ومنهم من يزعم أن معناه أنه لا يوجد له مثل وشبه. هذا وقد علم أن وحدانيات الموجودات العالمية كلها مختلفة متباينة ولا يشك أن وحدانية البارئ تعالى لن تكون شبيهة بواحدة من الوحدانيات | الأخر. إذ هي بأسرها مخترعة بأمره تعالى 59r جده، فمن الواجب إذن أن نعلم أن وحدانيته تعالى مباينة للوحدانيات الأخر لانتفاء عامة جهات الكثرة عنها. وكل واحد من المعاني الموجودة وإن وصفت بالوحدانية فإنه في الحقيقة لن ينفك عن كثرة يتعلق بها ذاته. والواحد الموصوف بهذا النوع من الوحدانية لا يجوز أن يعتقد فيه أنه واحد حقيقي. فإذن الوحدانية الحقيقية هي وحدانية الأحد الحق الذي لا يجوز أن يشاركه فيها شيء من الوحدانيات الأخر ولا بجهة من الجهات.

{10} ومن لم يعرف الله تعالى حق معرفته في الأنية والوحدانية فليس يمتنع أن ينصرف مع 25 الظنون فيحيط به إلى محل واحد من مخلوقاته، أعني أن يعتقد في ذاته تعالى أنه على تلك الأنية أو على تلك الوحدانية. فأما من عرف الله تعالى حق معرفته في الأنية والوحدانية فلا يمكنه أن يرفع شيئاً من مخلوقاته إلى مثل ما اعتقده فيه، أعني أن يعتقد فيما سواه أنه على مثل أنيته أو على مثل وحدانيته، وذلك أن من سوس العقل أن يتدرج من النقص إلى الكمال وليس من سوسه

ms ها هنا scripsi : ههنا 2 ms ها هنا scripsi : ههنا || لا أنه لا بدء له ms add. لأنه لا بدء له 1 post

ms ها هنا scripsi : ههنا 7 ms لا أن scripsi : لأن 6 ms للعقل scripsi : العقل 4

ms سوس scripsi : سوس 29 ms فيحيطه scripsi : فيحيط به 26 ms فالواحد scripsi : والواحد 9

since He has neither beginning nor end. This is because it is the one that is considered as criterion for the other, not vice versa. Hence, we can talk about a beginning without end, but not about an end without beginning. This is the witness of the intellect by which the argument is settled. It is only by the power of the intellect that we believe what we believe as affirmed-negated, necessary-possible, and good-evil. Therefore, no witness is more powerful than the witness of the intellect. Nobody has given a definition of the intellect more exact than the definition of the Prophet – may peace be upon him. When he was asked [to define the intellect] he said, “Intellect is a light in the heart by which human beings distinguish between true and false”. Everything is known by means of a first thing, and this is the One. Thus, the One is the first, and is not a number, for there are numbers only if there is the one. Consequently, the One is the First Giver. From it emerges the number and only through the one the number continues to exist. Yet the One is not a number, since it is in the category of existence. If someone says, “the second is one, too, and so the third. If you remove the one from number, then you should remove also the second from it”, then we say: the ‘second’ signifies ‘what comes after’ and ‘what is different’; but the First has neither the quality of ‘coming after’ nor that of ‘otherness’. As a matter of fact, the First is only Being.¹⁴ The One is giver and the second is receiver. The form of the One comes from His essence while the second receives it from the One, the First. The True Being is the one, it is the number and the numbered, and there is no otherness in it. Rather, it is the cause of multiplicity. The One precedes things; it is the Pure Truth and the First Cause. All things are caused by Him. May He be blessed, the best of creators!

{9} We should know that the case of the knowledge of the unity of God the Exalted is similar to the case of the knowledge of the thatness. This is because not everyone who openly states that “the Creator of the universe is only one” is entitled to know His unity in a proper and adequate sense. It is well known that, according to some, our expression “He is one” means that “His essence does not have any quantity that is likely to be divided”. Among them, some claim that all His attributes are united with Him in a unity with respect to which it is absolutely impossible that any of these attributes is separate from Him, or that there is in the essence a separation from Him. Still, some claim that its meaning is that there is neither resemblance nor similarity to Him. What is more, it is well known that the unities of all beings in the world are different, and that the Oneness of God the Exalted is not similar to any other unities. For all the other unities are created by His command – may His glory be sanctified. Then, we should know that His Oneness differs from any other unity because of the lack of every aspect of multiplicity from His unity. All the available meanings [except God], even if they are described through unity, are not separated from the multiplicity which is essentially inherent in them. Whatever bears this kind of unity cannot be acknowledged as being the true “one”. So true unity is the unity of the True One, a feature that God cannot share with other unities in any sense.

{10} It is impossible that those who do not truly know God the Exalted as to thatness and oneness prevent their minds from associating God with other created beings, that is, they consider that the essence of God is such thatness or such oneness. On the contrary, it is impossible that those who truly know God the Exalted as to thatness and oneness attribute to God the features that they consider as something which belongs to other creatures. This means that these true knowers do not hold the opinion that any other thatness or oneness resembles His own. This is because it belongs to the nature of the intellect to advance gradually from imperfection to perfection, while it does not belong to its nature

أن يتراجع إلى النقص من الكمال . ولهذا ما يمكن الإنسان أن يتعلم ما هو جاهل به على حقيقة
 59v وليس يمكنه أن يجهل | ما هو عالم به على الحقيقة . ويمكنه أن يعلم الشيء علما برهانيا أعني
 علم ضرورة اليقين بعد أن كان يعلمه علما جدليا أعني علم أغلب الرأي، وليس يمكنه عكس
 ذلك . وبحسب هذا الاعتبار قد يمكن الإنسان أن يصير معتقدا للتوحيد الصحيح بعد طول
 اعتقاده للتشبيه المحض ولا يمكن أن يصير معتقدا للتشبيه المحض بعد استحكام عقيدته للتوحيد
 5 الصحيح .

{11} فإذا ذات الباري تعالى متعال عن أن يوصف بصفة من الصفات الموجودة في مبدعاته،
 وليس في الإمكان عبارة عنه بلفظ قول أو عقد ضمير . وذلك لكون المتعالى سبحانه على أمر عظيم
 عن الإدراك وعن إحاطة العقل به . فإذا العقول تقصر عن إدراكه مثل قصور أبصارنا عن مقابلة
 الشمس لا لنقصان في الأبصار عن الإدراك بل لكون الشمس فيما عليه هويتها على أمر يختطف
 10 الأبصار إذا قابلتها فتعجز الأبصار عن الإدراك الحقيقي وتنقلب خاسرة وهي حسيرة . فذاته جل
 جلاله إذن متعال عن الأشباه والأنداد ولا يجوز أن يكون كمثل شيء ولا يمكن أن يكون للأشياء
 الكائنة كلها نظمٌ ولا شرح إن لم يكن قبلها شيءٌ واحدٌ دائمٌ باق مابين لجميع الأشياء، وذلك هو
 الواحد الحق المحض الذي هو سبب | وجود الأشياء وسبب بقائها وشرحها ونظمها النظام الحكمي
 60r الحقيقي وتكامل فضيلة الواحد الحق تعالى اسمه هو إبداع العالم ونظمه .

{12} وقد ينبغي للإنسان إذا اعتقد وعلم أن لهذا العالم صناعا أن يتأمل الموجودات كلها هل
 لكل واحد منها سبب وعلّة أم لا؟ فإنه يجد عند الاستقراء لكل واحد منها سببا وعلّة عنها وجد،
 ثم ينظر إلى تلك الأسباب هل لها أسباب أيضا أم لا . فإنه يجد لها عند التأمل أسبابا ثم ينظر
 هل الأسباب ذاهبة إلى ما لا نهاية أم هي واقفة عند غاية أم بعض الموجودات أسباب للبعض على
 20 سبيل الدور . فإنه يجد القول بأنها ذاهبة إلى غير نهاية محالا ويجد القول بأن بعضها سبب
 للبعض على التعاقب محالا أيضا . فيبقى أن يكون الأسباب متناهية وأقل ما يتناهى إليه الكثير
 هو الواحد، فسبب الأسباب إذا موجودٌ وهو واحد ولا يجوز أن يكون ذات السبب وذات المسبب
 واحدا . فمسبب أسباب العالم إذن واحد وهو الله رب العالمين لا يتكثرت بتةً بجهة من الجهات
 بذاته، بل يوصف بالكثرة من جهة مبدعاته، لأنه فاعل محض لا منفعل بتةً، وإنما يكثر صفات
 الباري تعالى من جهة مبدعاته ومخلوقاته ومفعولاته . فيقال فاعل إذ هو مبدع المفعولات ومبدع
 25 60v إذ هو علّة الموجودات وقوي إذ هو علّة | القويات . وكذلك يشتق له الأسماء من جهة كل واحد
 من مفعولاته الحسنى في عقولنا أو ظنوننا تمجيدها له وتحميدها من العارفين بربوبيته . وهو جل
 اسمه لا يشبه شيئا من خلقه . إذ هو حق لا علّة لهويته، ولا ثبات لخلقه إلا بالهوية المحضة المهوية
 المسلك بالوحدة الخالصة لسائر المخلوقات . وهو تعالى إنما يوصف من جهة مفعولاته إذا ظهرت،

to move backwards from imperfection to perfection. Taken this for granted, it follows that human beings can learn what they have truly ignored, but they cannot ignore what they have truly known. It is also possible for them to acquire the knowledge of something by means of a demonstrative knowledge, i.e. the necessary knowledge of certainty, after they had known it by means of a dialectic knowledge, i.e. the knowledge acquired by the most probable opinion. But the other way is impossible. For that reason, human beings can acquire the belief of the true Oneness after they have held the pure anthropomorphism for a long time, while it is not conceivable that they turn to the pure anthropomorphism after their belief in the true Oneness has been settled.

{11} As a consequence, the essence of God the Exalted is far from being described by any attribute which is present in His creatures.¹⁵ Besides, it is impossible to address His essence by a word or an opinion, because His glory is too far for the senses of perceiving it, and for reason to fully comprehend it. Thus, intellects fall short to perceive Him.¹⁶ This is similar to the inability of our sight when we cast our gaze towards the sun, because the sun is at such a high level in its being that sight is dazzled in seeing it, so that it falls short of truly perceiving the sun and gets lost, being fatigued. Therefore, God's essence – may His glory be sanctified – is higher than [having] resemblances and equals.¹⁷ It is impossible that there is anything like unto Him. It would also be impossible for all the generated things to have order and arrangement, if one everlasting thing did not precede them, apart from all things. This is the Pure, True One who is the cause of the existence of things and the cause of their endurance, arrangement and true, wise order. The creation of the world and its design is the completion of the perfection of the True One – may His name be exalted.

{12} Human beings, if they believe and know that there is a creator of the universe, must consider about all beings whether everyone of them has a cause or not. By induction, they eventually realize that for every single being there is a cause by which it came to exist. Then, they look into these causes, whether they have in turn other causes or not. Upon scrutiny, they find out that these also have causes, then again, they consider whether these causes regress to the infinite or they come to an end, or again if some of these beings are causes for others in cycle. In conclusion, they find impossible the opinion that all causes regress to the infinite, and consider as impossible also the opinion that some of them are the cause of others in succession. It remains that the causes are finite, and the minimum of multiplicity that they can reach is the one. Hence the cause of all the causes is existent and it is one. The essence of the cause and the essence of the effect cannot be the same. So the cause of the causes of the world is one, and it is God, the Lord of the Worlds. Indeed, He does not multiply in any way by virtue of His essence; rather, He can only be attributed to multiplicity in so far as the many are His creation. For He is the pure agent, not passive indeed. The attributes of the Exalted Creator multiply in terms of His creations, deeds and actions. Therefore, it has been said that He is the agent because He is the creator of the actions, creator because He is the cause of beings, and powerful because He is the cause of powers. In the same way, from every one of His good deeds names can be derived for Him in our intellects, and assumptions to glorify Him and praise Him by those who know His sovereignty. He – may His name be exalted – is not like any of His creatures. For He is the Truth and has no cause for His being. His creatures would not endure without the pure Being which is the giver of other beings and the holder of sheer unity for all the other creatures.¹⁸ It follows that He the Exalted is attributed to the aspects of His actions when they occur.

كالحكمة إذا ظهرت مفعولةً سمي حكيمًا أي مبدع الحكمة، وإذا ظهرت القوة مفعولة سمي قويا أي مبدع القوة، وإذا ظهر الجود مفعولا سمي جوادا أي مبدع الجود. وكذلك كل ما يوصف به لا يوجب أنه تعالى تغير من حال إلى حال، لأنه عز وجل واحد لا يتكثر بحال وهو علة الكثرة. فإذن صفاته تتكثر من جهة مبدعاته لا من جهة ذاته. ولا يلحقه الشبه بشيء من معلولاته ومبدعاته. فهو مبدع المبدعات وموجد الموجودات بالحقيقة. وهو يتعالى عنها كلها فسبحان الله الواحد الحق 5 الخالص المحض عما يصفه الواصفون.

{13} وقد قال الحكماء إن الأقسام التي تُفتن إليها لفظة الواحد توجد أربعة: أحدها الاشتراك 61r والثاني الاتصال والثالث سلب المثل والرابع امتناع التجزي. أما الاشتراك | فقد يكون في الجنس نحو قولنا «الإنسان والفرس في الحيوانية شيء واحد». وأما الاتصال فقد يكون طبيعيا نحو اتصال أعضاء الشخص الواحد، وقد يكون صناعيا نحو اتصال الخشبات في السرير الواحد. وأما سلب 10 المثل فقد يكون ذاتيا نحو قولنا «الشمس واحدة»، وقد يكون وصفيا نحو قولنا «فلان نسيج وحده». وأما امتناع التجزي فقد يكون بمعنى عرضي نحو الهبة التي امتنع لفرط الصغر عن احتمال التجزي وكحجر الألماس الذي امتنع لفرط صلابته عن التجزي، وقد يكون لا بمانع عرضي بل بحقيقة ذاته نحو النقطة والوحدة والآن.

{14} ونقول إن الوحدة الجنسية متكررة بأنواعها والوحدة النوعية متكررة بأشخاصها. وأما 15 الوحدة الاتصالية طبيعية كانت أو عرضية فإن وجود أكثره فيها ظاهر وكذلك الوحدة السالبة للمثل. فإن الشمس وإن كانت واحدة بالذات، فإنها في الحقيقة ذات جرم وطينة وذات فصل وصورة. فالكثرة إذاً في طباعها موجودة. وهكذا الحال في قولنا «فلان نسيج وحده». فأما الواحد الموصوف بامتناع التجزي عنه، إما لفرط صغره وإما لصلابة جوهره، فإن كان جوهرًا قائم الذات فإنه يكون ذا صورة متكررة بالمادة ويكون امتناع التجزي فيه من علائق المعنى الطارئ عليه وهو الصغر 20 والصلابة من دون خاصية طباع الجوهر في نفسه. وإن كان عرضيا قائما بالغير فمن الواجب | أن يكون ذاته متكررا بالموضوع. وأما الواحد الموصوف بامتناع التجزي عنه لا بمعنى عرضي كالنقطة 61v والوحدة والآن فقد يسبق إلى بعض الظنون أنه هو الواحد. إذ ليس يوجد طباعه معلقا بشيء من الكثرة، إلا أنه لما كان في الحقيقة نهاية لشيء آخر أعني أن النقطة نهاية للخط والوحدة مبدأ للعدد والآن حد للزمانين الماضي والآتي، وليس يشك أن النهاية والمتناهي يقعان تحت المضاف 25 ووجود كل واحد منهما يمتنع إلا بوجود صاحبه. فمن الواجب إذاً أن نعلم أن وجودهما خلواً عن الكثرة أمرٌ في نهاية الامتناع.

{15} وإذا كانت الوحدة المستفيضة في موجودات العالم مقرونة بالكثرة ثم لا يشك أن من حقيقة الوحدة أن يكون في طباعها منافية للكثرة، فمن الواجب أن نعلم أن الوجدانية السارية في

Take the example of wisdom: when wisdom occurs as His action, He is called “wise”, meaning “the creator of wisdom”. When power occurs as His action, He is called “powerful”, meaning “the creator of power”. When “generosity” occurs as His action, He is called “generous”, meaning “the creator of generosity”. Thus, any attribute of His does not necessarily entail His changing from one state to another. For He the Exalted is one and is not subject to multiplicity in any way whatsoever. On the contrary, He is the cause of multiplicity. Therefore, His attributes multiply in terms of actions, not as to His essence. Any resemblance coming from His effects and creatures does not attach to Him. He is the creator of the creations and beings in truth while he is high above them all. Glory to God the Pure and Sheer One and Truth! High is He above what they attribute to Him!

[The Parts of the One]

{13} Sages said that the “one” can be said in four ways: (1) homonymy, (2) continuity, (3) negation of the equal, and (4) indivisibility. As to homonymy, it may be found in genus, such as our statement “the man and the horse are one thing in animality”. As to continuity, it may be natural such as the continuity between the bodily organs of a person, or it may be artificial such as the connection of pieces of wood in a bed. As to the negation of the equal, it may be essential such as our statement “the sun is one”, or attributive such as our statement “that person is unique in his kind”. Finally, as to indivisibility, it may be in an accidental manner such as dust, which cannot be subdivided due to its excessive smallness, and such as the diamond stone, which also cannot be subdivided due to its excessive solidity, or it may be not in an accidental manner but in its true essence, such as the point, the unit, and the now.¹⁹

{14} We say that the unity in genus is many as to its species, and the unity in species is many as to its individuals. As to the unity in continuity, be it natural or accidental, it is clear that there is multiplicity in it, and so it is as to the unity in the “negation of the equal”. For instance, the sun, even if it is one in its essence, has a body, a matter, a difference, and a form. Thus, in the nature of the sun there is multiplicity. Multiplicity also appears, for example, in our statement “that person is one of his kind”. As to the one which is characterized by indivisibility either for its excessive smallness or for the solidity of its substance, there are two options. (1) If it is a subsistent substance, it possesses a form which is many as to the matter. In this case, its indivisibility stems from a contingent meaning, smallness or solidity, not from the peculiar nature of the substance in itself. (2) If it is an accident which exists thanks to something different from itself, its essence must necessarily be many as to the subject. Concerning the one which is characterized by indivisibility but not in an accidental manner, such as the point, the unit and the now, someone assumed that it is the “one”, because no multiplicity whatsoever attaches to its nature. However, it is indeed the limit of another thing, I mean that the point is the limit of the line, the unit is the principle of number, and the now is the limit between past and future time. There is no doubt that the end and that which ends fall under the category of the correlative, and the existence of each of them is only possible given the existence of the other. Therefore, we should know that the existence of both of them without the multiplicity is absolutely impossible.²⁰

{15} Given that the unity which permeates the beings of the universe is always associated with multiplicity, and given that unity, in itself, is incompatible with multiplicity, we should know that the unity that permeates

الموجودات كلها ليست بحقيقية محضة وإن كانت الوحدة موجودة فيها، ثم إذا لم يكن ذاتيته حقيقية، فمن الواجب أن نعلم أنها طارئة عرضية ولن يعرض الشيء للشيء إلا وهو في الحقيقة أثر من الغير. فالوحدة العارضة إذن تجب أن يكون عن الواحد الحق تعالى اسمه. فالوحدة العرضية التي اقتترنت بالجواهر الموجودة تجب أن تكون من الضرورة صادرة عن الواحد الفرد الأحد الحق الذي ليس بجنس ولا نوع ولا فصل ولا خاصة ولا عرض ولا جوهر ولا كمية ولا كيفية ولا إضافة 5 62t ولا وضع ولا كل | ولا جزؤ ولا بعض ولا جميع ولا نهاية ولا متناه ولا بالجملة شيء من المقولات. بل هو الأول الحق المبدع الأزلي المخترع لهذه المعاني المحقق لأنيات العالم ووحداتها والكثرات المجتمعة عنها لا من شيء تقدمها، بل هي مخترعة أوجدها مبدعها تعالى.

{16} وقيل: إن الوحدة إذا لحظت من حيث هي مبدأ ومكيال يعد به الأشياء سميت بهذه الاسماء وإذا لحظت في ذاتها فهي الأنية المطلقة فقط. وإذا كانت الوحدة في جميع الأشياء التي 10 شرحناها بالعرض وغير حقيقي وجب أن يكون معرضها فيها هو الشيء الذي له الوحدة الحقيقية الذاتية. لأن كل شيء وجد في شيء بالعرض فهو في شيء آخر بالذات وبالْحَقِيقَةُ. وأما الذي بالذات فليس يمكن أن يكون من شيء آخر، لأنه يلزم أن يكون الأشياء بلا نهاية بالفعل. فعلة الوحدة في الموجودات كلها الواحد الحق بالذات الذي لم يستفد الوحدة والوجود من غيره. لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون المفيدات بلا نهاية. فكل قابل للوحدة فهو معلول بالوحدة. فكل واحد من 15 المحسوسات وما يلحق المحسوسات فيها الكثرة والوحدة معا والوحدة فيها عارضة، وهي أثر من مؤثر. 62v ولما كانت الكثرة جماعة وحدانيات فباضطراب إن لم يكن وحدة | لم يكن كثرة. فإذا علة وجود كل محسوس ومعقول هو الواحد الحق الذي لم يقبل الوجود والوحدة من شيء آخر، والذي لم يتقدمه شيء آخر بوجه من الوجوه هو الذي لم يزل. فالأزلي إذن مبدع كل موجود. وإذا لم يكن شيء موجود إلا بما فيه من الوحدة فبالوحدة قوام الكل. ولو فارقت الوحدة التي بينا معناها 20 وهو الوجود العام لهذا الكل لدثر وعدم مع مفارقتة الوحدة بلا زمان.

{17} وقيل: كل شرح ومرتبة إنما يبدأ من واحد ويأتي إلى كثرة ملائمة لذلك الواحد وكل شرح ومرتبة ذات كثرة فهي صاعدة مترقية إلى واحد. فإذا الواحد هو بدء مخرج الكثرة الملائمة له. فلذلك صار إلى كثرة نظما واحدا وشرحا واحدا. فإن لم يكن الواحد متميزا لم يكن كثرة ولا نظم ولا شرح البتة.

{18} فالواحد هو الحد الصحيح المحض الذي لا يقبل زيادة ولا نقصانا. لأنه لا يراد به العدد، ولكنه يراد به هويته بسيطة ليس لها تكثر بنوع من الأنواع. فإذا خرجت من الواحد إلى ذكر الإثنين فقد صرت إلى العدد وصرت إلى ما لا يتناهى. لأن العدد تقبل الزيادة والنقصان. فالواحد إذا أضفته إلى الأشياء كان أولا لعدد الأشياء وإذا ذكرته لنفسه ولذاته كان وجودا فقط.

all beings is not pure in any way, and even if there is a unity, it is not true in its essence. Then we should know that this unity is contingent and accidental, and is a thing that adheres to another, so that it is nothing else if not an effect of another thing. The accidental unity, therefore, must come from the True One – may His name be exalted.²¹ In other words, the accidental unity which is associated with existent substances must necessarily originate from the One, the unique and single Truth. His high essence cannot be regarded as anything among the following: genus, species, differentia, property, accident, substance, quantity, quality, relation, position, whole, part, some, all, limit, and that which is limited. Overall, He does not fall under any category; on the contrary, He is the First, the Truth, the Creator, the Eternal, the Creator of all these meanings, the Realizer of the thatnesses and units of the world. He is also the creator of the multiplicities which consist of these units. He did not create all these out of a thing that precedes them. Rather, they are wholly created beings that were brought into existence by the Creator the Exalted.²²

{16} It has been said that the unit, if it is taken in terms of its being the principle and the measure with which the things are numbered, is called by these names. But if it is taken in its essence, then it is only the absolute thatness. Moreover, if the unity in all the things that we have explained is accidental and not true, it is necessary that the one who makes this accident happen in these places is the thing which possesses the essential, true unity. Everything that accidentally happens in a thing must be found truly and essentially in another thing.²³ That which is by essence cannot come from another thing, for this would entail the existence of an actual infinite. Thus, the cause of the unity in all beings is the One, the Truth by essence. He does not acquire either His unity or His being from anything else than itself. For the givers cannot be infinite. Everything that is subject to unity is caused by unity. Every single thing among sensible things possesses both multiplicity and unity together. Thus, the unity in them is accidental, and it is an effect coming from an active principle. Given that the multitude is composed of a group of units, it follows that if the unit does not exist, the multiplicity does not exist, either. So the cause of every sensible and intelligible thing is the True One, who does not acquire either His unity or His being from something different from Himself. That which is not preceded by another thing in any sense is the One who eternally exists. The Eternal, therefore, is the creator of all beings. If a thing is different from the unity that it possesses, the unity must be regarded as the maintenance of all [beings]. If things departed from the unity whose meaning we have explained, that is, the common being for all these beings, they would revert and perish at the departure of the unity in no time.²⁴

{17} It has been said that every arrangement and rank starts from the one and then proceeds to the multiplicity which is coordinated with this one, and every arrangement and rank which is multiple ascends to the one.²⁵ Thus, the one is the starting point of the formation of the multiplicity which is coordinated with it. For this reason the one becomes many as one order and one arrangement. If the one were not separate, there would be neither many nor order or arrangement at all.

{18} Thus, the one is the pure, exact limit which does not accept either addition or subtraction, since it does not mean a number. On the contrary, it signifies the simple being which is not subject to multiplicity of any sort. If you leave the one and start mentioning the two, you enter the level of number, and that will lead you to infinity. The reason is that the number accepts both addition and subtraction. If you attach the one to the things, it turns out to be the first in number for the things; but if you mention it *per se* and in its essence, it is only being.

- 63r وكل شيء يعرف بشيء أول، فذلك هو الواحد وهو مكيفه | ولذلك كان الواحد أولا للعدد ولم يكن هو عددا. لأن العدد أيضا يعرف بالواحد، فهو أول له. فالواحد مكيف كل جنس من الأجناس عاد لها. لأنه مكيف للجواهر وللكمية والكيفية وسائر النعوت. وذلك أنه يقال جوهر واحد وجوهران وثلاثة جواهر. ويقال في الكمية إثنان وهو أول العدد والواحد مكيف للإثنين وهو أول له والعدد الإثنان. ويقال في الكيفية بياض واحد. فإن كان الواحد واقعا على هذه الأشياء التي ذكرنا فلا محالة أنه في باب ذاته هو غير هذه الأشياء. فإذا قلنا واحدا ونحن نريد به عددا هيولانيا فهو غيره. وإذا قلنا واحدا ولا نريد به عددا هيولانيا كان مذكورا بباب ذاته. لأننا إذا قلنا بياض واحد فهو غير البياض إذا ذكر بباب نفسه. وإذا قلنا حركة واحدة فهو غير الحركة إذا ذكر بباب نفسه. وكذلك إذا قلنا فكر واحد أو علم واحد أو علة واحدة فهو غيرها إذا ذكر بباب نفسه. فالواحد الذي هو مكيف لسائر الأشياء ومن أجله سميت الأشياء واحدا فواحدا فهو 10 الواحد بالإضافة كما يقال درهم واحد أو دينار واحد أو بياض واحد أو حركة واحدة. والواحد المحض الذي لا يضاف إلى حركة ولا إلى فكرة ولا إلى علم ولا إلى علة فهو وجود فقط. | فالواحد لا يعد، لأنه وجود فقط. ولا بد من محض قبل المشوب وواحد قبل الكثرة.
- {19} وقيل: الأنية المحضة صفة للباري تعالى لا اسم والمراد به تنزيه ذات الباري تعالى وأن ينفي عنه الصفات المضافة إلى الأشياء المخلوقة التي أوجدها الباري جل اسمه. وأنيات هذه الأشياء مبتد له 15 متغيرة لم يستحقها بذواتها بل بإفادتها إياها مفيد وهو الباري جل جلاله. وهكذا الحكم في الهوية المحضة، فإن معنى هذه اللفظة هو بعينه معنى الأنية وإنما اختلفا في العبارة فقط والمعنيان واحد. وذلك أن لفظة الهوية إنما هي إشارة إلى الوجود وكذلك الأنية. وقيل: إنها الأنية المحضة من جهة أن الهويات الأخر قوامها ليس بذواتها بل بموجد أوجدها، وإن انقطع عنها قبض موجدتها تلاشت وهدمت على المكان. فليس إذا شيء منها هوية محضة. وقول القائل إن الأنية صفة كالمائية وغيرها من نظائرها 20 فالمراد بذلك أن هذه كلها صفات وأبحاث عن الشيء الموجود وهي الأنية والمائية والكيفية واللمية. والأشياء المركبة تبحث عنها بهذه المعاني الأربعة أو بعضها مما يزيد على الأنية.
- {20} وأما الباري تعالى وإنما يبحث بالأنية التي هي دالة على نفس الوجود. فالأنية إذا أبسط الصفات وأعلها وأبعدها | عن التركيب. فالأنية معبرة عن الوجود لا كالإسم، لأن الإسم لا يقتضي إلا الإشارة إلى موجود، والأنية صفة لأنها تعبر عن الوجود بتصويرها في أنفسنا حالا 25 للشيء المعتقد، وهذه الحال هي البساطة والوجود.
- {21} وقيل: إن أفعال الله تعالى راجعة بأجمعها إلى الحكمة والمصلحة وهما أمران مقترنان لا يجوز التفرقة بينهما في العقل مع وجود الخلائق، والحكمة تضاف إلى الله تعالى لأنها من صفاته الذاتية كالعلم والجود والرحمة، والمصلحة تضاف إلى المخلوقين وهي نتيجة الحكمة. وهو تعالى لا يفعل إلا ما هو أصلح لخلائقه وذلك الأصلح معلول بالحكمة.
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Everything is known by means of a first thing, and this is the “one” for that thing and its measure. It follows that the one is the first for the number while it is not a number, since the number too is known by means of the one; thus the one is the first with respect to the number. The one is the measure of all genera, and it is that which numbers them. This is because it is the measure for substance, quantity, quality and the other attributes, and for this reason one can say “one substance”, “two substances”, “three substances”. One can also say “two” according to the quantity, for the two [in this case] is the first number and the one is [regarded as] the measure of the two. So, the one is the first with respect to it, and the two is a number. Moreover, one can say, according to quality, “one white”. If the one is referred to all the things that we have mentioned above, there is no doubt that it is different from these things taken in its essence. If we say “one” [for a thing] and we mean by this the “hylic number”, then it is different from that thing. But if we say “one”, and do not mean by this the “hylic number”, then it is mentioned *per se*. Similarly, if we say “one white”, then it is different from the “white” when it is mentioned *per se*. If we say “one motion”, then it is different from the motion when it is mentioned *per se*. Thus, if we say “one idea”, “one knowledge”, or “one cause”, then it is different from them when it is mentioned *per se*. Consequently, the one which is the measure of all the other beings, and the principle of the fact that the things are called “one” and “one” is the one according to the relation, as when we say “one dirham”, “one dinar”, “one white”, or “one motion”. But the Pure One is not related to motion, nor to any idea, knowledge, or cause: it is only Being.²⁶ It follows that the One cannot be numbered because it is only Being. It is necessary that what is pure exists before what is impure, and the one before the many.

{19} It has been said that pure thatness is an attribute of God the Exalted, not a name. This attribute is meant to de-anthropomorphize the essence of the Creator, the Exalted, and to remove from Him the attributes which are related to the created things which have been brought into existence by the Creator – may His name be exalted. The thatnesses of these things, which have been created as changeable, do not owe their thatness to their essence, but to a donor who gives it to them. This donor is the Creator, the Exalted. The same is true for the pure being, because the meaning of this expression is the same as the meaning of thatness. They differ from each other in utterance while the meaning is the same. For the word “being” is an identification of the existence, and so is “thatness”. It has been said that [the pure being] is the pure thatness, considering that the maintenance of other beings is not by their essence but by a creator who brings them into existence. Should their Creator lose His hold on them, they would disappear and perish in their existence. Therefore none of the things is pure being. There is the statement “thatness is an attribute such as whatness and their like”. What is meant by this statement is that all these are attributes and investigations of the existent thing. These investigations are thatness, whatness, quality and why-ness. These four meanings, or some of them plus thatness, are investigated in composite things.

{20} Concerning the Exalted Creator, He is investigated as to the thatness which signifies the very existence. Thus, thatness is the simplest and the highest of the attributes, and the farthest from composition. Hence, thatness denotes existence, but not as a name, because a name must only signify an existent; rather, thatness is an attribute because it denotes existence by describing this attribute in us as a state of the believed thing. This state is simplicity and existence.

{21} It has been said that the actions of the Exalted God are all rooted in wisdom and benefit. These two are connected to each other in that one cannot rationally distinguish one from another regarding the existence of creatures. The explanation is that wisdom is attributed to God the Exalted because it is among His essential attributes such as knowing, benevolence and compassion, while benefit is attributed to creatures because it is the result of wisdom. God the Exalted only does what is the most advantageous for His creatures, and this advantage is caused by wisdom.

- {22} وقيل: الواحد الأول والحق المحض تعالى اسمه أعلى من الصفة وإنما عجزنا عن صفته لتفرده بالوحدانية المحضة لأنها فوق كل الوحدانية، وإنما يوصف العلل الثواني التي استنارت من فوق من العلة الأولى. وذلك أن العلة الأولى لا يستنير من نور آخر ولا يستمد من حق آخر لأنها هي الحق الأول والنور المحض الذي ليس فوقه نور ولا حق. ومنها تفيض النور على ما دونها من العلل الثواني فمن أجل ذلك صار الأول وحده يفوت الصفة وكل شيء إنما يعرف من تلقاء علته ويوصف من تلقاء ما فوقه وليس فوقه شيء. وإذا كان الشيء علة فقط وليس بمعلول لم يعلم صفته. فالعلة إذا لا يوصف 64v لأنها أعلى من الصفة. وليس يبلغها المنطق، وذلك أن الصفة لا يكون إلا بالمنطق، ولا يكون المنطق إلا بالعقل والعقل بالفكر والفكر بالوهم والوهم بالحس، والحق الأول والواحد المحض فوق هذه الأشياء كلها. لأنه علتها ومبدعها ولذلك صار غير واقع تحت الحواس والوهم والفكر والمنطق، فليس إذا بموصوف، فنفي الصفات إذن عنه تعالى إثبات له من حيث هو، فتبارك الله أحسن الخالقين. 10
- {23} وكل ما هو للمعلول الأول أعني العقل الذي هو أول موجود أوجده الباري تعالى فهو للعلة الأولى الحق الأول إلا أن ذلك لها بنوع أرفع وأعلى وأكرم.
- {24} وقيل: إن الأشياء التي قد بلغت النهايات فليس ينبغي أن يسمى باسم الأشياء الواقعة تحت النهايات، والموصوف إذا بلغ أقصى نهايته لا يمكن أن يرد، فيوصف بنهايته، ولهاذا ما قيل إن الباري تعالى هو الخير لأن الخير نهاية كل فضيلة، وكل ما يوصف بفضيلة فهو دون الحق الأول 15 الذي هو الخير المحض، ولما كان كذلك فليس يمكننا أن نمجده بالعقل الذي هو دونه لأنه تعالى نهاية النهايات. ولذلك ينبغي أن نذكره تعالى جده بالتمجيد والتقدیس ونعلم مع ذلك أننا لم نبلغ مقدار قدره وإنما استوجب العقل اسم الفضل والمدح، لأنه نال جميع ما ناله من الفضائل من الله تعالى بلا واسطة، إذ هو أول مبدع أبدعه وهو دونه وتكامل فضيلة الواحد الحق تعالى وهو 65r إبداع العالم على النظام الحقيقي الذي أوجبه حكيمته العالية التامة.
- {25} وقيل: إن الأشياء الموجودة بذاتها وهي الأوائل التي ليس لها متوسط ولا يثبت خارجة عن ذاتها إنما يكون تحديدها بالاستقراء والتصديق وبالقياس الطوبيقي، وأصحاب العلوم يستعملون تلك الأوائل مسلمة ويأخذون حدودها أنها كذلك ويجعلونها مبادئ لبراهينهم في علومهم. وقد تبين لنا إحالة طلب البرهان على إثبات المبادئ وذلك كقول القائل إن الله جل ذكره هو <ليس> المبدأ الحق، فإنه لا يمكنه أن يبين ما هو ولا يمكنه إقامة البرهان عليه بالماهية لتقدمه جميع الأسباب 25 ولأن النعوت والأوصاف التي يظن أنها حد لها فارقة بينه وبين خلقه هي ذاته ومأخوذة من جوهره وليست هي أسباب متقدمة لوجوده، إذ الأشياء الذاتية هي معاً وليست بعضها أسباباً لبعض وإن سمى الإنسان أمثال ذلك حداً له فلا مانع يمنع عنه كقوله إنه تعالى الحي بذاته الأزلي وكقوله هو تعالى ولي كل إحسان وسبب كل خير، إذ ليس كل حد هو سبب خارج وإنما الحد الخارج هو المحيط بالموضوع وأما المثبت لذات الشيء بلا برهان ولا سبب من خارج فقد يسمى حداً داخلاً. 30

ms هو المبدأ : scripsi هو <ليس> المبدأ 24 || ms. إذن : scripsi إذا 6

{22} It has been said that the First One and the Pure Truth – may His name be exalted – transcends description. We fail in describing it because of His being the only one who possesses the pure oneness. For [the Pure Oneness] is above any oneness. The First One is described only through the second causes which are illuminated by the light of the First Cause. This is so because the First Cause is not itself illuminated by any other light and not aided by any other truth, since it is itself the First Truth and the Pure Light above which there is neither light nor truth. From it, light emanates through other second causes. As a result, the First Cause alone became that for which description fails. Every thing is known and described only from its cause. Yet there is no cause above it. Therefore, when a thing is only a cause and is not an effect, its description is not known. Therefore, the cause is not described for it is above description; nor does speech reach it. For description comes about only through speech, and speech through intelligence, and intelligence through thought, and thought through estimation, and estimation through sense. But the First Truth and the Pure One is above all things because it is cause and creator of them. Due to this, it happens that it does not fall under sense, estimation, thought or speech. Therefore it is not describable. Rather, negation of the attributes from God the Exalted is an affirmation for God as He is. So blessed be God, the best of creators!²⁷

{23} Among all the effects, the first effect, that is Intellect, which is the first being created by God the Exalted, depends upon the First Cause, the First Truth. However, as to the First Cause, it is said in a higher and nobler way.²⁸

{24} It has been said that the things that reach the end are not necessarily called “things which fall under the end”. That which is described, if it has reached its complete end, cannot turn back and be described by its end.²⁹ Thus, it has been said that God the Exalted is the Good itself because the good is the end of every virtue. Everything that is described by a virtue is different from the First Truth, who is the Pure Good. Once this is established, we cannot sanctify Him with [the power of] intellect, which is below Him. For God the Exalted is the end of the ends. Therefore, we must mention Him – may His greatness be exalted – with glorification and sanctification; nonetheless, we must know that even if we do so, we do not reach the level of His glory. However, Intellect deserves the name of virtue and praise because intellect achieves what it achieves thanks to the virtues which derive from God the Exalted, without any intermediary.³⁰ This is because Intellect is the first creation of God, even though it is below God and strives to reach the perfection of the One, the Truth – may He be exalted –, a perfection which means the creation of the world by a true design, as is required by His high, full wisdom.

{25} It has been said that the things that exist by their essence – and which are [called] “primaries” in so far as they do not have intermediaries nor are they established out of their essence³¹ – are defined by induction, assent and dialectic syllogism. Scientists regard these “primaries” as accepted premises, and define them so; they make them the principles for their demonstrations in their sciences. That being so, it has already become clear to us that seeking for the demonstration of principles in order to prove them is impossible, since it would be like to say that God – may His Name be exalted – is <not> the true Principle. In fact, one cannot explain what He is nor can he demonstrate Him in His essence, because He precedes all the causes, and the properties and the attributes which are assumed to be His definition which distinguishes Him from His creatures, are actually His essence, and are taken from His substance. These properties and attributes are not causes which precede His existence. For the essential things are together, and some of them are not causes for the others. If human beings take similitudes of this kind as definitions of God, there is nothing that prevents them from doing so. This is similar to saying that “God the Exalted is eternally living by His essence”, and to saying that “He the Exalted is the donor of every benevolence and the cause of every good”. This is because not every definition is given by an external cause. In fact, the external definition is the one which covers the subject. However, that which proves the essence of a thing without any demonstration or any external cause is called an “inner definition”.

65v | لأن الحد يقال على أنحاء شتى ولهذا ما حكم الأنبياء عليهم السلام والروحانيون من الحكماء رحمة الله عليهم أن الله يعرّف بنور الله، وقالوا: إنا نعرف جميع الأشياء بالله ولا نعرف الله بالأشياء، وهذه هي المعرفة العالية المقترنة باليقين الخالصة عن شوائب الظنون. فأما استعمال القياس والبرهان والاستدلال بالظاهر على الباطن وبالجلي على الخفي وبالمصنوع على الصانع وبالمؤلف على المؤلف وبالمركب على المركب، فهو الصناعة التي استخرجها أهل النور المقدم ذكره بقوة نورهم الذي هو 5 أمر الهي يقصر عنه إلا من أهله الله له، وهي من أشرف الصناعات الإنسانية وهو السبيل إلى معرفة حقائق الموجودات. ثم الارتقاء من ذلك إلى معرفة خالقها وموجدها ومبدعها وهو بالحقيقة أثر من النور المشار إليه.

{26} وينبغي أن نعلم أن البرهان على أنية الشيء يكون على أنحاء مختلفة. فمنها ما يكون من أعراض الشيء ومن أشياء غريبة عن جوهره ومنها ما يكون من ذات الشيء ومن جوهره. وهذا 10 أيضا قسمان: قريب وبعيد. ومثال ذلك في إثبات الباري تعالى فكالتقربانات والعبادات والندور والصدقات. وأما من الأشياء الذاتية البعيدة فكالمبدع وكالشافى والحىي. ومن الأشياء الذاتية القريبة فكدوام تحريكه وفعله للمختلفين في الحركات والانفعالات، فمن أثبت أنية الشيء | من الأعراض 66r لن يضح مائيته ولا وجوده بالاضطرار، ومن أثبت أنيته من أشياء ذاتية له جوهره سهل عليه الخروج من بيان أنيته إلى بيان مائيته، لأن بمقدار ما يجتمع لنا من أسباب علم أنيته نصل إلى علم مائيته. 15 {27} ومما يوضح لنا أن العقل هو المقتنى للمقدمات الأولى أن القوى النفسانية المدركة منها ما ليس بدائم الصدق كالفكر والظن، لأن الموضوع لمطلبهما الأمور الممكنة وهذا العنصر يمكن أن يختلف ويكون بخلاف ما يفكر ويظن. ومنها ما هو دائم الصدق كالعقل والعلم. وليس إدراك المبادئ والمقدمات الأولى للعلم، لأن العلم الصحيح هو البرهان فقد بقي أن يكون إدراك مبادئ البرهان واقتنائها ومعرفتها للعقل فقط. وإذا كان الشيء الذي به يعرف غيره أعرف من غيره 20 والمبادئ هذه حالها، فالمبادئ إذن أعرف مما يعرف بالمبادئ ويجب أن يكون معرفتنا بالمبادئ أصح من معرفتنا بما هي له مبادئ ولا شيء أصح من العلم إلا العقل. فالعقل إذا هو الذي يعرف المبادئ وهو نفسه مبدأ فاعل لمبادئ البرهان. وهو العقل الذي يسوق إليه الباري تعالى بالحيوان الناطق ويجعله غايته. ومنزلة هذا العقل من النفس منزلة البصر من العين ومعما أنه نهاية الحيوان الناطق 66v فهو أيضا المبدأ الفاعل له وهو جوهر فرد في غاية البساطة | حتى إن ذاته وتعقله ومعقوله واحد. 25 وهو أول موجود أوجده الباري تعالى اسمه. فالعقل إذن هو مبدأ العلم وهو مبدأ البرهان لأن العلم الصحيح هو الذي يكون بالبرهان ومنزلته من مبدأ البرهان منزلة كله من كل مبدأ البرهان. فإن جميع العقل يطابق جميع المعقول.

{28} وإذا قد بلغ بنا القول هذا المبلغ فينبغي أن نذكر سطرًا في الاستدلال بالمحدث على المحدث وبالمصنوع على الصانع. فإن بعض الناس يقولون إن الاعتماد في المعارف كلها على السماع والخبر و 30

|| ما ms add. et del. علم post 15 || sub lineam أنية⁽¹⁾ 13 || ms دونها : scripsi أنية 9

ms اقتناوها : scripsi اقتنائها 20 || ms الأوله : scripsi الأولى 16

For the definition is said in various ways. This is why the prophets – may they be blessed – and the spiritual among the sages – may God’s mercy be upon them – judged that God is known only through the light of God. And they said, “Indeed we know all the things thanks to God, not that we know God thanks to the things”. This is the noble knowledge which is connected to certainty, which, in turn, is free from the impurities of opinions. However, the use of syllogism, inference, and demonstration, of the inference of the invisible from the visible, and of the hidden from the apparent, of the Creator from the creation, of the author from the authored, of the composer from the composed, is the art which the “people of light” mentioned above draw, with the power of their light. This light is a divine reality which only those who are allowed by God can understand. This art is among the noblest human arts, and it is the path to the knowledge of the realities of beings. Then the ascension from this to the knowledge of the Creator of beings, and of the One who brought them into existence is indeed a sign of the light mentioned above.

{26} We should know that we can get the demonstration of the thatness of a thing in several ways. One way is that which is taken from the accidents of that thing, and from the things which are close to its substance. Another way is that which is taken from the essence of that thing and from its substance. In turn, this is subdivided into two parts: close and far. The example of this consists in proving the existence of God the Exalted, such as sacrifices, worships, vows and charities. Concerning the essential things which are far, it is like “the Creator”, “the Healer” and “the Resurrector”. Concerning the essential things which are close, it is like the continuity of His moving and acting for the things that change in movements and affections. Anyone who proves the thatness of a thing from accidents does not clearly understand the whatness nor the existence of that thing, without a doubt. However, anyone who proves the thatness of a thing from its essential features and from its substance easily proceeds from the explanation of its thatness to the explanation of its whatness. This is because we reach the knowledge of His whatness, as much as we collect the causes of the knowledge of His thatness.

{27} One of the things that clarify for us the fact that intellect receives the first premises is that among the perceiving faculties of the soul there are (1) those which are not always right, such as cogitation and opinion, for the subjects of their search are possible matters, and such things can be either subject to change, or turn out to be different from what is thought and assumed. (2) Then there are those faculties which are always right, such as intellect and science. To grasp the principles and the first premises does not belong to science, because the right science is [the act of] demonstration itself. Thus, only one option is left, that is, that the grasp of the principles of the demonstration, their reception, and their knowledge belong only to intellect. Given that the thing by which another is known is more knowable than others – and we know that the principles are so –, the principles are more knowable than what is known through the principles. It follows that our knowledge of the principles is more right than our knowledge of the things they are the principles of. And nothing is more right than science if not the intellect. So, the intellect is that which knows the principles, and it is in itself the principle which produces the principles of demonstration. It is the intellect³² which God the Exalted gave to rational animal, namely to human beings, and set it as their goal. The rank of this intellect with respect to soul is like the rank of sight with respect to the eye. While intellect is the goal of the rational animal, it is its active principle. It is a separate substance of absolute simplicity, to a degree that its essence, its intellection and its intelligible are all the same thing. Intellect is the first being created by God – may His name be exalted.³³ Consequently, Intellect is the principle of the knowledge and the principle of the principle of demonstration. For the right science is that which is obtained through demonstration, and its rank with respect to the principle of demonstration is like the rank of the whole science with respect to all the principles of demonstration. This is because the whole intellect in its entirety conforms with the whole intelligible in its entirety.

[Inferring the Originator from the Originated]

{28} Since we have reached this point, it is necessary for us to mention a couple of lines in the argumentation which moves from the originated to the Originator and from the created to the Creator. This is because some people hold that one must completely depend on tradition and transmitted knowledge, denying the inference,

يدفعون الاستدلال ويبطلون القياس والنظر وبعضهم يميلون كل الميل إلى حجج العقول وفضيلة النظر وتصحيح المقاييس والأدلة ويقولون: لو كان العلم بخلق السماوات والأرضين وما فيهما وأن لها خالقا خلقها ومنشأ أنشأها لا ينال إلا بالسمع والأخبار لما أمر الله عباده بالنظر في آياته والتفكير في خلق مخلوقاته من أرضه وسماواته. وقد قال الله تعالى « أفلم ينظروا إلى السماء فوقهم كيف بنيناها وزيناها وما لها من فروج والأرض مددناها وألقينا فيها رواسي وأنبتنا فيها من <كل> زوج بهيج تبصرةً 5 وذكري لكل عبد منيب ». وقال « وفي الأرض آيات للموقنين وفي أنفسكم أ فلا تبصرون ». « ومن آياته أن خلقكم من تراب ثم إذا أنتم بشر تنتشرون ». « إن في ذلك لآيات لقوم يتفكرون ». 67r « ومن آياته أن تقوم السماء والأرض بأمره ثم إذا دعاكم دعوة من الأرض إذا أنتم تخرجون ».

{29} وأقول إن المذهب المتوسط بين هذين المذهبين هو الطريقة المثلى التي ينبغي للعاقل أن يسلكها لأن النظر لا يكون إلا بعد الخبر وفي الخبر من الفوائد ما لا مدفع له. لأن البراهين الصادقة التي اعتمدها 10 الحكماء في تصحيح عقائدهم الحكمية مطابقة للحجج التي أوردها أهل الأديان في تأكيد مذاهبهم الدينية. وبالجملة فإن الكلام الصحيح منه يكون تصديقه ومعه تحقيقه وإتما تهيئاً للإنسان الوصول إلى العلوم الحقيقية والمعارف اليقينية بالخبر والنظر جميعاً. وإذا كان ذلك كذلك فمن أول ما يجب على المفكر أن يتفكر في بدنه وعجب تركيبه وإحكام بنيته ويتأمل حق التأمل آثار حكمة الله تعالى في تأليف أعضائه الظاهرة والباطنة واشتمال كل عضو منه على قوة يظهر بها أفعاله واختصاص كل واحد 15 منها بفعل على حدة لا يشاركه فيه غيره، مثل اختصاص العين بالبصر والأذن بالسمع والأنف بالشم والفم بالذوق والجلد باللمس ومثل اختصاص القلب بالتفكير واللسان بالتعبير واليد بالمشق والتجريب والدماغ | بالتخيل والتصور والذهن والذكاء. ثم يتفكر في عظم الآيات في تركيب الأفلاك المحيطة 67v بعضها ببعض ونظم الكواكب فيها وتصرف أحوالها في الاتصالات والافتراقات واختصاص كل فلك وكل كوكب بنوع من التأثير في العالم مثل إضاءة الشمس والقمر وغيرهما من الكواكب، كما قال الله تعالى « ومن آياته خلق السماوات والأرض واختلاف ألسنتكم وألوانكم ». « إن في خلق السماوات والأرض واختلاف الليل والنهار لآيات ». وقال « تسبح له السماوات السبع والأرض ومن فيهن وإن من شيء إلا يسبح بحمده ولكن لا تفقهون تسبيحهم إنه كان حليماً غفوراً ». لأنه إذا تأمل ذلك علم أن هذا كله من صنع صانع حكيم وفعل قادر عليم. وذلك أن الإنسان إذا رجع إلى الأشياء القائمة في عقله التي بعضها بديهة وضرورة وهو أن البناء لا بد له من بان والكتابة لا بد لها من كاتب والصورة لا بد لها 20 من مصور والمؤلف لا بد له من مؤلف، ثم رأى فعلاً من الأفعال التي لا يجوز أن يكون بحسب قدرة العباد مثل خلقه الإنسان والسماوات والأرض التي هي مبنية أعجب البناء ومؤلفه أتقن التأليف علم أن لها بانياً ومؤلفاً وصانعاً ومنشئاً، | ثم يتفكر فيعلم أنه لا بد من أن يكون بانيتها ومؤلفها يشبهها أو لا 68r

cf. Q. 51:20-21 وفي الأرض-تبصرون 6 || addidi كل 5 || cf. Q. 850:6 أ فلم-منيب 4-6
 cf. Q. 30:25 ومن آياته-تخرجون 8 || cf. Q. 30:21 إن في-يتفكرون 7 || cf. Q. 30:20 ومن آياته-تنتشرون 6-7
 cf. Q. 30:22 ومن آياته-ألوانكم 21 || إن في ذلك ms add. et del. وألوانكم 21 post || supra lineam تأليف 15
 cf. Q. 17:44 تسبح-غفوراً 22-23 || ms لايق [...] : conieci لآيات 22 || cf. Q. 3:190 إن في خلق-لآيات 21-22
 mg. الإنسان 27 || الأصلب ms add. رأى supra || ms لها scripsi له 26

invalidating syllogism and speculation, whereas some others entirely base themselves on the proofs of their reason, the virtue of speculation and the correction of syllogisms and conclusions. The first group says: if the knowledge about the creation of the heavens and the earth and that which is found between them, and the knowledge that there is a Creator who created them and a builder who built them was acquired only by tradition and transmitted knowledge, God would have not recommended His servants to look into His verses and to reflect on the creation of His creatures on His earth and in His heavens. Indeed, God the Exalted stated [in the Qur'ān]: “Do they not look at the heaven above them? How we have made it and adorned it, without any flaws in it? And the earth we have spread it out and set thereon mountains standing firm, and produced therein every kind of beautiful growth in pairs. This is to be observed and commemorated by every servant who turns to God” (50:6-8). “On the earth are signs for those of assured faith, as also in your own selves: will you not then see?” (51:20-21). “Among His signs is this that He created you from dust and then, you are human beings scattered far and wide!” (30:20). “Verily in that are signs for those who reflect” (30:21). “And among His signs is this, that heavens and earth stand by His command. Then when He calls you by a single call, you come forth straightway from the earth” (30:25).

{29} Hence, I say that the middle position between these two views is the exemplary method, a way which an intelligent man should follow. This is because speculation comes only after transmitted knowledge, and there are many benefits in transmitted knowledge – one cannot deny this. The correct demonstrations upon which sages depend in correcting their philosophical beliefs are in accordance with the arguments put by the people of religion, as a confirmation of their religious views. Overall, the correct statement can be affirmed, and with this comes its verification. Human beings become ready for achieving the true sciences and certain knowledge by both transmitted knowledge and speculation. If this is so, the first obligation for the thinker is to observe his body, the wonder of its composition and the soundness of its structure, and to really reflect on the traces of the wisdom of God the Exalted in the composition of its external and internal organs. He will see that every organ has a power with which the actions of a person come out, and every organ is designed specifically for an action that other organs do not share, such as the eye is specialized in seeing, the ear in hearing, the nose in smelling, the mouth in tasting, and the skin in touching; moreover, the heart is specialized in thinking, the tongue in expressing, the hand in extending and pulling, the brain in imagining and conceptualizing, in mind and intelligence. Then he reflects on the great signs in the composition of the celestial spheres which are surrounding each other, the order of the stars therein, the conduct of their states in connections and disconnections, the particularization of every sphere and star to a kind of influence on the world, such as the illumination of the sun, the moon and other stars. Thus God said: “And among His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the diversity of your languages and your colors” (30:22). “Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and the day are signs [for those who understand]” (3:190). “The seven heavens and the earth and whatever is in them exalt Him. And there is nothing that does not exalt Him by the praise of Him, but you do not understand their way of exalting. He is, indeed, ever Forbearing and Forgiving” (17:44). When he considers that, he knows that this is so because of the creation of a wise Creator, and the action of a knowing powerful Being. The explanation is that human beings turn to the things which are found in their intellects and find that some of them are evident and necessary, such as the knowledge that a building must have a builder, a writing must have a writer, a shape must have a shaper, a composition must have a composer. And then they see such an action that no human being is capable of, such as the creation of the human being, of the heavens and earth; they become aware that they were created in the most wonderful way and composed in the most proficient way. So they immediately know that there is a builder, a composer, a creator and a founder. Then, they continue to contemplate and they realize that the builder and composer either resembles these creatures or not;

يشبهها وفي حكمها أو خارج من حكمها، فإنه إن كان حكمه حكمها، وَجَبَ أن يكون له بان ومؤلف ثم كذلك إلى ما لا نهاية له . وهذا فاسدٌ، فصح أن بانيها ومؤلفها لا يشبه المبنى المؤلف وإلا كان الأمر يفسد فلا يصح بان ولا مبنى ولا مؤلف ولا مؤلف .

{30} والدليل على حدث العالم أن العالم أجسام وأعراض، والأجسام كلها لا تخلوا من أن يكون ساكنة أو متحركة أو مؤلفة أو مفترقة والسكون هو المقام في الموضع والتحريك هو الانتقال 5 عنه . فلما لم يخل الجسم من الحركة والسكون والتأليف والتفريق ووجدنا هذه الأشياء محدثات ووجدنا الجسم لم يسبقها قضينا على الجسم أنه محدث . لأن كل ما لم يسبق الحدث ولم يكن موجودا قبله متعريا منه فهو محدث مثله . إذ كان المحدث ما لم يكن فكان القديم ما سبق المحدثات . ولما رأينا أجزاء الجسم لا تخلوا من أن تكون مجتمعة أو مفترقة أو ساكنة أو متحركة وأن الاجتماع والافتراق حدثان، وما لم يسبق الحدث ولم يكن موجودا قبله متعريا عنه فلا يكون 10 إلا حدثا، وما كان حدثا يجوز أن يحدث ويجوز أن لا يحدث، | فلا بد له من محدث لا يشبهه ولا يكون إلا قديما .

{31} ونجد أيضا جسما يستحيل فيصير جسما آخر لا الذي كان والجسم الثاني محدث وحكم الأول حكمه، وإذا كان جزء الجسم محتملا للسكون كان كل جزء منه كذلك . وإذا صح أنه يتحرك جزء منه صححت الحركة على كل جزء، ومحال أن يوجد ساكنا ومتحركا معا، فقد علم 15 أن معنى حله به تحرك وسكن . والفصل بين الحركة والسكون هو كون أحدهما على حال وكون الآخر على خلافها فلا بد من القول بأن الفصل بين المتحرك والساكن والكائن في هذا المكان بعد أن كان في غيره يحصل باضطرار ليتوصل به إلى إثبات الأكوان، ووجه التوصل به إلى ذلك أنا إذا علمنا الجسم كائنا في مكان وقد كان كائنا في غيره وعلمنا أنه لا وقت يشار إليه إلا ويجوز عليه أن يكون في واحد من المكانين بدلا من الآخر، لأنه لا اختصاص له بأحدهما إلا مثل ما له بالآخر . 20 ثم علمنا أن وجوب كونه في أحدهما دون الآخر، وعلمنا أن كونه فيه متجدد فلا بد من شيء لأجله وجب كونه في هذا المكان سوى نفسه ووجودها وحدوثها، لأن ذلك أجمع كان حاصله له قبل كونه في هذا المكان وهذا يقتضي ثبات الأكوان . فإذا | صح بالنظر حدوث الأكوان التي لا تنفك منها الأجسام ولا تعرى منها، فقد علم أنها تقتضي الوجود بعد العدم وأنها لو كانت قديمة 69r لكانت بالوجود أولى منها بالعدم وكان لا يجوز أن تعدم وهي قديمة . فيحصل العلم عند ذلك 25 أنها ليست بالوجود أولى منها بالعدم إلا عند قصد قاصد وإرادة مريد . إذا كان عالما بذلك فيعلم أنها موجودة ليست بقديمة، وليس بين القديم والمحدث منزلة ثالثة، فيعلم بذلك أنها محدثة .

ms. لأحدهما : scripsi أحدهما 21

either the builder is in the same position as the created beings or it is in a different position. If their position is the same, then there must be another builder and composer [who would create them], and this proceeds ad infinitum, a result which is false. Therefore the conclusion is that the builder and composer does not resemble the thing which has been built and composed. Otherwise, the conclusion leads to falseness: there would be neither builder nor building, or composer or composition.

{30} The proof for the origination of the world is that the world consists of bodies and accidents. All the bodies are either motionless or in movement, either composite or separate. Rest is the position in the place, while motion is the departure from it. Given that body is not free from motion and rest, and compositeness and separation, we find that the things possessing these qualities are originated beings. We also find that the body does not precede these qualities. Therefore we judge that the body is originated. This is because everything which neither precedes origination nor exists before it without it, is likewise originated. For the originated is “that which did not exist and then came into existence”. On the contrary, the eternal is that which precedes the originated beings. We observe that the parts of the body are either in juxtaposition or separated, either in rest or motion, that juxtaposition and separation are both originated. That which neither precedes origination nor exists before it without it being originated, and what is originated can occur or not. Thus, there must be an Originator which does not resemble it, and is eternal.

{31} Furthermore, we observe that a body changes and becomes another body which is not what it was before. The second body is originated, and the same applies to the first body. If the part of the body is subject to rest, every part in it will be that way. When it is established that a single part is subject to motion, motion occurs in all the parts. However, it is impossible to be motionless and in movement at the same time. Therefore, it is known that there is a meaning which prevails in it, and according to which the thing either moves or rests. The distinction between motion and rest consists in that a thing is in one state while the other is in the opposite. In this case, there is no doubt in the discourse which states the distinction between the body which is in motion and the motionless, and between that which is in this place after having been in another place, is achieved by necessity, in order to acquire the proof for the generations.³⁴ The way of this acquisition is that, when we observe a body that comes to be in a place after having been in another place, we know that in any given moment it is possible that it is in one of these two places instead of in the other. For it is impossible to single out one place excluding the other. Then, we know that it necessarily comes to be in a place instead of the other, and that the fact that it comes to be there is a change. Therefore, there must be something whose coming to be, whose existence and origination necessarily occur in that particular place, and it cannot be the thing itself. This is because all these properties were ready for that body before it came to be in that place, and this necessitates the existence of the generations. By reflecting on this, we know that when the origination of such generations is established, the bodies, which are neither separated nor independent from these generations need to exist after having been non-existent. If the generations were eternal, they would have been more suitable for existence than for non-existence, and it would have been impossible that they cease to exist, hence they would have been eternal. Therefore, we get the knowledge that the generations are no more suitable for existence than for non-existence, and that they depend upon the intention of someone who intends and by the will of someone who wills. When this is established, we also know that the generations are existent beings but they are not eternal. Consequently, it is known that the generations are originated, since there is no third position between the eternal and the originated.

{32} والوجود حالة معقولة للموجود في أنه يجب له الوجود بالفاعل الموجد له أو لما هو عليه في نفسه وذاته. فإذا استحال كون القديم موجودا بالفاعل وجب أن يكون موجودا لما هو عليه في ذاته، فلذلك وجب له الوجود أبدا دائما واستحال عدمه. والعدم ليس بحالة معقولة يجب للمعدوم بالنفس، بل الرجوع بالعدم هو إلى نفي الوجود عنه فقط. فثبت أن ما جاز أن يعدم ليس بقديم، فإذا لم يكن قديما جاز القضاء بحدوثه. فإذا صحت المعرفة بحدوث الأكوان وحدوث 5 الأجسام التي لا يجوز أن تخلوا منها وأن تسبقها، وقد علم أن المحدث ليس بالوجود أولى منه بالعدم إلا عند قصد قاصد وإرادة مريد، إذا كان | عالما بذلك وكانت المحدثات مع اختلاف 69v أجناسها مشتركة في أنها ليست بالوجود أولى منها بالعدم إلا عند قصد قاصد وإرادة مريد وجب أن يكون سبيل الجسم هذا السبيل في أنه ليس بالوجود أولى منه بالعدم وعلم أن للجسم محدثا كما لسائر المحدثات محدثا.

10 {33} ويعلم أيضا أنه لم يحدث نفسه. إذ قد علم أن المحدث لا يكون محدثا، إلا وهو على أحوال: منها أن يكون قادرا وأنه إذا فارقه بعض ما فيه خرج من أن يكون قادرا. ومنها أن يكون موجودا، فإذا كان معدوما فأجرى ألا يكون قادرا. فإذا لم يكن قادرا لم يكن فاعلا ولا محدثا. فيعلم أن الشيء الذي أحدثه هو غيره. ولو كان الجسم أحدث نفسه لوجب كونه قادرا قبل أن يكون فاعلا. وقد علمنا أنه في حال عدمه يستحيل كونه قادرا، ولو صح أن يحدث نفسه في 15 حال عدمه لَصَحَّ أن يحدث غيره من الأجسام في حال وجوده. لأنه لا يمكن أن يختص في حال عدمه بما ليس يحصل له في حال وجوده. فلا بد من إثبات محدث له أحدثه وأخرجه من العدم إلى الوجود، ولو كان محدثا لا من محدث لكان مراد لا من مريد ومعلوم | لا عالم له ومفعول لا 70r فاعل له. وقول القائل «إن الأشياء بعضها من بعض ولم يزل يحدث» متناقض. لأن قوله «لم يزل» يوجب أن لا ابتداء له وقوله «يحدث» يوجب أنه كان بعد أن لم يكن وقد نفى ما ظن أنه أثبت. 20 وذلك هو غاية الجهل والغباوة.

{34} وقد قال قوم بقدم الجوهر وحدث الأعراض، وذلك أيضا باطل. لأنه لو كان الجوهر قديما لم يجز أن يتغير عما هو به في الأزل. إذ لا يجوز أن يتغير القديم عن صفة القدمة كما لا يجوز أن يتغير المحدث عن حقيقة الحدث، ولو جاز ذلك كان يكون القديم محدثا والمحدث قديما وفيه إبطال حقائق الأشياء. والقديم ينفي عنه صفات الحدث وهي الحركة والسكون والاجتماع والافتراق 25 والتماسة والمباينة والتناهي والحدود والكون والأماكن والهيئة والصورة. وهذه كلها صفات دالة على حدث ما وصف بها. والعالم هو أجسام وأعراض فوجب أن فاعل العالم ليس بجسم ولا عرض، لأنه فاعل الأجسام والأعراض وخالقها ومنشؤها. واسم العالم يدل على تقدير وإتقان، ولا يكون التقدير والإتقان إلا من مدبر متقن.

sub lineam. من (1) 18

{32} Existence is an intelligible state for being, in so far as existence is necessary for being either because of the agent which creates it, or because of what this being is *per se* and in its essence. When the option that the eternal exists by the agent is eliminated, it necessarily follows that the eternal exists only by what it is *per se* and in its essence. Thus, existence is necessary for the eternal everlastingly. Besides, non-existence is impossible for it. Non-existence is not an intelligible state which is necessary for the non-existent *per se*. On the contrary, the coming back to non-existence is only the negation of existence from the thing. Then, it is established that that which can become non-existent is not eternal. If it is not eternal, one can judge about its origination. After having established the knowledge of the origination of generations and the origination of bodies, which cannot be independent from and anterior to generations, is established, and after having acquired the knowledge that the originated is no more suitable for existence than for non-existence were it not for the intention of someone who intends and for the will of someone who wills, it is also known that all of the originated beings – no matter if their genera differ – share the characteristic of not being more suitable for existence than for non-existence, were it not for the intention of someone who intends and for the will of someone who wills. Therefore the situation of the body must be the same in that it is no more suitable for existence than for non-existence. As a result, the body needs an originator, just like the other originated beings do.

{33} Furthermore, it is known that the body does not originate itself. This is because there is this established knowledge that the originator is an originator under certain conditions. One of them is its being powerful. If some parts of the originator are separated from the essence of the originator, it will not be a powerful being anymore. One of the conditions is its being existent. If it were non-existent, how could it be powerful? If it is not powerful, then it is neither an agent nor an originator. Thus we know that the thing that has originated the body is different from the body. If the body originated itself, it should have been powerful before being an agent. However, we have already established that it could not have been powerful, were it non-existent. If it might have originated itself while it was non-existent, it might have originated other bodies when it was existent. This is because it is impossible to distinguish, while it was non-existent, what does not occur to it when it exists. Consequently, there must be an originator for the body, in order to bring it from non-existence to existence. If the body were originated without an originator, it would be intended without anyone who intends, known without a knower, made without a maker. If someone states that the things come one from another, and that the origination eternally goes back ad infinitum, this statement is contradictory. This is because the expression “eternally” requires that there is no beginning for it, whereas his statement “origination” requires that it came to be after it was not. By doing so, this person negates what he thinks to prove. This is absolute ignorance and stupidity!

{34} Some people held the view of the eternity of substance and the origination of accidents. This is also false. If the substance were eternal, it would not have changed from the state in which it is was for eternity. This is because the eternal cannot change from the attribute of eternity. Similar to that, the originated being cannot change from the true nature of origination. Were it so, the eternal would be originated, and the originated eternal. To state that is to invalidate the true nature of things. The attributes of origination must be negated apropos the eternal, that is, motion, rest, conjunction, dissolution, contiguity, separation, finitude, limits, generation, locations, disposition, and form. All these are attributes which show the origination of a thing which is characterized by them. Thus, the world is an aggregate of bodies and accidents. Therefore, it necessarily follows that the Maker of the world is neither a body nor an accident. For it is the maker of the bodies and accidents, and it is the one who brought them into existence. Besides, the very name of the world connotes choice and perfection. Choice and perfection only come from who rules and brings to perfection.

- 70v {35} ولما وجدنا أجزاء العالم مختلفة في جهاتها من تحت وفوق | وقدام ووراء ويمين وشمال واختصاص كل جزء من أجزائه بجهة مخصوصة علمنا أن الأمر فيه لا يخلوا من أحد وجهين: إما أن يكون اختصاصه بجهة من الجهات لذاته وإما لمعنى آخر زائد على الذات. ولو كان ذلك لذاته لما جاز التنقل عليه وأن يكون مرة تحتاً ومرة فوقاً وهو في كلتا الحالين موجود الذات، لأن الأوصاف الذاتية لا تتبدل على الذات والذات على حالها، ولو كان كذلك صار موجوداً لا موجوداً ويتأدى 5 ذلك إلى إبطال الإثبات والنفي والإيجاب والسلب، ولو كان العلة في تنقله وجوده لكان عند التنقل بطلان وجوده، لأن تبدل العلة يوجب زوال المعلول ولا يخلوا ذلك من وجهين: إما أن يكون قديماً أو حادثاً، ولا يصح أن يكون قديماً لأنه يؤدي إلى جواز التبدل على الذات ولا يجوز ذلك لاستحالة العدم على القديم، فقد صح أن يكون حادثاً. وإذا ثبت أنه حادث فقد وجب أن يكون له محدث، إذ لا يصح حدوث الشيء إلا عن محدث. 10
- {36} وقد علمنا أيضاً أن العالم مؤلف مركب والتأليف والتركيب حادث ولا بد للحادث من المحدث. فإن قيل: «لم قلت إن التأليف حادث». قلنا: الدليل عليه أن يكون الكل حادثاً، لأننا وجدنا بعض التأليفات حادثاً. وإذا كان البعض حادثاً وجب أن يكون الكل حادثاً، لأن 71r التأليفات كلها متماثلة لا اشتراكها في جميع الأوصاف. |
- {37} والآخ صفات الفعل وهي التي يوصف بالقدرة عليها وعلى ضدها، كقولك رحيم وغفور 15 وكريم وحليم وما أشبه ذلك. لأنه يرحم المؤمنين يعذب الكافرين ولا يطرد ذلك في صفات الذات. والفعل لا يصح إلا من قادر ولا قادر إلا والفعل جائز منه، والفعل المحكم المتقن لا يكون إلا من حق قادر عالم. وإذا وجد الإنسان العالم الذي يشاهده على غاية الإتيان والإحكام علم أنه من فعل حي عالم قادر وهو تعالى قادر لنفسه. والواحد منا لا يقدر إلا بقدرة تحله. وحكم الأجسام كلها في صحة هذه الطريقة فيها حكم واحد. فجميع الأجسام القادرة قادرة بقدرة تحلها وحد القادر 20 هو الذي يصح منه الفعل إذا لم يكن هناك مانع وأن الفعل لا يتعذر منه والله تعالى قادر لنفسه.
- {38} والدليل على أنه لا يجوز أن يكون قادراً بقدرة وعالم بعلم وحيًا بحياة هو أنه تعالى لو كان كذلك لم يخل ما صار به حياً قادراً عالماً من أحد وجهين: إما أن يكون هذه الصفات قديمة أو محدثة. فلو كانت قديمة لم يكن | بأن تصير علوماً وحيوة وقدرة أولى من أن تكون عالمة 71v قادرة حية. إذ القديم يجب أن يكون مثل القديم لنفسه، ولو كانت محدثة لكان يجب أن يكون قبل أن يحدثها غير عالم ولا حي ولا قادر. فقد صح أن الله تعالى عالم قادر حي لنفسه وذلك كله خبر عن معنى واحد وحقيقة واحدة. وصح أيضاً أن القديم لما كان عالماً لنفسه لم يكن عالماً بعلم يختص ببعض المعلومات دون بعض. ولما كان قادراً لنفسه لم يكن قادراً بمعنى يختص

ms. لأن أن : scripsi لأن || mg. لأننا وجدنا-حادثاً 13 || del. ms أن يكون الكل حادثاً 12

{35} When we find the parts of the world that differ in their directions such as “below”, “above”, “front”, “behind”, “left” and “right”, and we know the particularization of every part to a special direction, we know that there are two options in this case. First, the particularization of a part to any direction depends upon the essence of that part. Second, it depends upon another meaning outside essence. If the first option were correct, that part would not move from the first direction, and it would not be sometimes below and sometimes above; instead, that part would always be in one or another place by its essence. For the essential attributes do not change with respect to essence, while essence stays on its state. If that were so, it would have been existent and not existent at the same time, and this would lead to the falsification of [the rule of] affirmation and negation. If the cause of its movement were its being, its being would perish while moving, since the change of the cause entails the vanishing of the effect. There are also two options in this case. Either it is eternal, or it is originated. It is impossible that it is eternal because this entails the possibility that the essence is changed. This is not possible, either, because the eternal is not subject to non-existence. Consequently, the part must be originated. If this is established, it needs an originator by necessity. The origination of a thing must only come from an originator.

{36} We have already established also that the world is composite. If the composition is originated, there must be an originator for the originated. If one says, “why do you say that the composition is originated?”, we say that the proof for it is that the whole is originated because we find that some compositions are originated. If some are originated, the whole is necessarily originated. For all compositions are equal in that they share all of the attributes.

[On Attributes]

{37} (...) ³⁵ and the other is the attributes of action, that is, those attributes over which God has power, or their contraries, such as your statement “[He is] compassionate, merciful, benevolent, gentle” etc. For instance, He shows mercy to believers while He punishes unbelievers, and His power of doing these two contrary actions cannot be conceived of in the attributes of essence. Action is only possible if it comes out of a powerful agent, in other words, for every powerful agent the action is possible. The action which is firm and perfect comes out of a powerful and knowing being. When human beings find extreme perfection and stability of the world which they observe, they know that it is the action of a living, knowing and powerful being. Moreover, God the Exalted is powerful *per se*, while everyone of us is powerful only by a power which is placed in us. This is because all bodies share the same rule regarding the validity of this method. Accordingly, all powerful bodies are powerful by a power that is placed in them, since the definition of the powerful is “that out of which the action can proceed if there are no obstacles”, and “that for which the action is not impracticable”. Therefore, God the Exalted is powerful *per se*.

{38} The proof of the fact that God cannot be powerful by a power, knowing by a knowledge and living by a life is that, if He the Exalted were so, the attribute by which God became living, powerful and knowing would not escape one of these two possibilities: either these attributes are eternal, or they are originated. If they were eternal, their becoming knowledge, life and power would not be more preferable than their being knowing, powerful and living. ³⁶ This is because the eternal must be like the eternal *per se*. If these attributes were originated, God, in this case, should have been not-knowing, not-living, and not-powerful before the attributes were created. Then it follows that God the Exalted is knowing, powerful and living *per se*. Furthermore, all of these attributes are predicated of the same meaning and the same truth. It also follows that the Eternal, given that He knows *per se*, is not knowing by a knowledge which is related

- بعض المقدورات دون بعض، صار عالما بكل المعلومات قادرا على ما يصح أن يكون مقدورا عليه. وإنما جاز أن يقدر العباد على شيء ويعجزوا عن شيء مما هو من جنسه، لأنهم قادرون بقدرة هي غيرهم. وحق كل قدرة أن يقدر بها على جزء من المقدور في جزء من المحل من الجنس الواحد أن يفعل ذلك في الوقت الواحد، ولهذا ما يتعاون إثنان على حمل ما لا يطيقه الواحد. وقد ثبت بذلك أن العالم لنفسه عالما بأشياء مختلفة وأنه لا يجب أن يكون مختصا بأن يعلم شيئا من الأشياء لما يكون العلم مختصا به. فليس بأن يكون عالما بأشياء على سبيل التفصيل | أولى منه 72r بأن يكون عالما بكل المعلومات على سبيل التفصيل، لأن تعلقه بالمعلومات مفارق لحال العلم الذي يختص بشيء في صحة تعلقه بمعلوم دون معلوم. والمراد بهذا القول التمييز بين العالم لنفسه والقادر لنفسه وبين العالم بعلم والقادر بقدرة.
- {39} ولا يصح أن يكون القديم تعالى ذكره عالما بعلم يحدثه. فإذا هو عالم لنفسه. والقدرة 10 إمكان الفعل وصحة الفعل وحصول الفعل يقتضي شرطا آخر وهو الإرادة، ومن شرط القادر المختار أن يقدر على الفعل وعلى تركه وأن يكون أحد البدلين منه جائزا ممكنا، ولا يجوز أن لا يفعل أحدهما أصلا ولا يجوز الخروج من كونه قادرا إن لم يفعل. والفعل المحكم المنسق على نظام يدل على أن فاعله عالم به، وقد صح أن القديم تعالى عالم لنفسه، فهو إذن عالم بكل معلوم.
- {40} ولا يجوز أن يقال إنه تعالى جسم. لأن حد الجسم أن يكون له حجم ومقدار وحيز وامتداد 15 في الأقطار الثلاثة ولو شاركه في هذه الصفة لشاركه في سائر أوصاف الجسم. لأن الاشتراك في الوصف الأخص يوجب الاشتراك في جميع الأوصاف. والقديم تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا.
- {41} والدليل أيضا على أن الله تعالى | عالم لنفسه أنه لو كان عالما بالعلم لم يخل ذلك العلم من أن يكون هو هو أو هو غيره أو هو بعضه. فإن كان هو هو وجب أن نعبد العلم ونشكره ونستغفره، وإن كان بعضه وجب أن يكون متجزئا والمتجزء محدود مصنوع. وإن كان غيره فلن يخلوا من أن يكون 20 قديما معه أو محدثا لم يكن فكان. فإن كان قديما معه وجب أن يكون غير الله قديما معه وكذلك حال الصفات الأخر. وهذا كفر ومحال. بينا استحالاته في غير موضع. وإن كان محدثا، وكان الله به يكون عالما، وجب أن يكون الله تعالى قبل حدوث العلم غير عالم. فلما بطلت هذه الوجوه كلها بطل أن يكون عالما بعلم ووجب أن يكون عالما لنفسه ولا يحتاج إلى علم به يعلم.
- {42} وزعم قوم من أهل البدعة أن الله عالم بعلم وقادر بقدرة لا هما هو ولا غيره ولا بعضه. 25 وقالوا إن القائل منا إذا قال هو هو ثم قال هو غيره فقد ناقض. فقيل لهم: كذلك إذا قال ليس هو هو ثم قال | ليس هو غيره فقد ناقض.
- {43} وزعموا أيضا أن الله عالما وقدرة اعتبارا بأنهم لم يشاهدوا عالما إلا بعلم. فيقال لهم: إذا جاز الاعتبار بالشاهد في ذلك فقد جاز في غيره. وقالوا أيضا «ما شاهدنا فعلا إلا جسما» فيقال

only to some parts of the whole knowable things and not to others. So, given that He is powerful *per se*, He is not powerful by a meaning which is related only to some parts of the whole potential things and not to others. Hence, He knows all the knowable things and has power over all that can undergo a power. Human beings may have power over one action and not over another one which arises from the same kind of action. This is due to the fact that they are powerful by a power which is distinct from them. It is in the nature of every power that one holds power over any particular potential in any particular place for the same kind of action, in order to perform that action in a given moment. For that reason, two people help each other to lift a weight, an action which one is not capable of doing alone. Therefore, it has been now established that the knower *per se* knows different things, and that it is not necessary for him to be singled out for knowing a particular thing, just because his knowledge is related to that. For him, to know things in detail is not necessarily better than to know all the knowable things in detail. This is because his relation to knowable things is different from the state of knowledge, a state which is particularly related to a thing inasmuch as the relation is possible to be established for one certain knowable thing rather than the other. Our purpose by all these explanations is to state the difference between the knower or powerful *per se* and the knower or powerful by a knowledge or a power.

{39} Furthermore, it is not possible that the Eternal – may His glory be sanctified – knows through a knowledge which He creates, since He is knowing *per se*. Power connotes the possibility of the action, and the actualization of the action entails another condition, which is will. It is among the conditions of the powerful and choosing agent to have the power to perform the action and to leave it as well. Besides, one of the options must be possible for him, while it is impossible that he does not perform one of these two, and that he comes out to be powerful, if he does not act. The masterly and designed action indicates that its agent knows it. It has been established that the Eternal the Exalted is knowing *per se*. Therefore, he knows everything that can be known.

{40} It is not possible to say that He the Exalted is a body, because body is defined as having volume, measure, space and extension in three dimensions. If He shares this attribute with body, then He would share all the other attributes which belong to body. This is because to share the attribute which is most specific for a thing entails sharing all the attributes that belong to that thing. The Eternal is above all this, Exalted and Great beyond measure!

{41} Moreover, the proof that God the Exalted is knowing *per se* is that, were He be knowing by a knowledge, this knowledge, in that case, would be either Him or other than Him, or even a part of Him. Were it part of Him, we would necessarily worship, praise and apologize to the knowledge! Were it part of Him, He would inevitably be divisible, and a divisible thing is limited and created. Were the knowledge other than Him, it would be either eternal with Him, or originated, that is, coming into existence from nothing. Were it eternal with Him, this would entail that there be other eternal beings other than God, and also other attributes would be so. This is such unbelief and absurdity which we have pointed out elsewhere. Were the knowledge originated, and if God became knowing by it, God the Exalted would not be knowing before the origination of the knowledge. When the falsity of all these options is shown, the falsity of the idea that God is knowing by a knowledge is also shown. Therefore, it follows that He must be knowing *per se* and does not need any knowledge by which He knows.

{42} Some people of heterodoxy claimed that God is knowing by a knowledge, powerful by a power, and that these two attributes are neither Him, nor other than Him, nor part of Him. They said, “when one of us say that it is Him, and then that it is other than Him, he contradicts himself”. We reply to these heterodox people that “similarly, when he says that it is not Him, and then that it is not other than Him, he contradicts himself, too”.

{43} Likewise they claimed that God has knowledge and power [different from His essence], inferring from the fact that they see that everyone knows by knowledge. Therefore it has been said to them, “If you can infer from what you see regarding this issue, you can also use this method in other issues, and thus say ‘we see that an agent is only a body’”. So we reply

- لهم في الجواب: لو كان الفعال فعلا من أجل أنه جسم لكان لا جسم إلا والفعل منه صحيح. والموت أجسام ولا يصح منها الفعل. ومن قال إنه جسما اعتبارا بأنهم لم يشاهدوا فعلا إلا جسما فليقل أيضا إنه مؤلف ومركب وغير ذلك من صفات الجسم وذلك محال. ومعلوم أن حدوث الشيء لا يصح إلا من جهة القادر وبنفس القدرة فقد ثبت أن صحة الفعل معلقة بكون القادر قادرا، فلا يصح صدر الفعل إلا عن قادر، لأن طرد العلة وعكسها واجب.
- 5 {44} والفرق بين الفعل الصادر عن القادر والأثر الصادر عن الطبع هو الاختيار والاختلاف والتجنس، والأفعال المختلفة المتجنسة لا يصح إلا عن القادر المختار العالم الحكيم. ومعلوم أن صورة الإنسان وخلقته السماوات والأرضين وما فيهما أفعال محكمة متقنة مختلفة متجنسة متأدية إلى الغرض الصحيح وهذا الجنس من الأفعال لا يصح إلا من قادر عالم مختار حكيم.
- 10 {45} | والدليل عليه الاعتبار بالشاهد وذلك أن زيدا في حال كونه قادرا صح منه هذا النوع من الأفعال. فسيرنا أحواله وقلنا «لماذا صح منه ذلك؟» فلم يكن إلا لكونه قادرا مختارا، فلا يجوز صدور الأفعال المختلفة المتجنسة المتأدية إلى الغرض الصحيح إلا عن قادر مختار عالم. ووجود الفعل من الفاعل لا يخلو من وجهين: إما أن يكون على طريق الجواز وإما أن يكون على طريق الوجوب، فوجب أن يكون الفعل من القادر على طريق الجواز، لأنه قادر على الفعل وعلى تركه. ولو كان الفعل منه على طريق الوجوب لوجب أن لا يسبق على الفعل، ولو سبقه لا يسبقه إلا 15 بأدنى حال وأدنى مدة. ولو كان كذلك للزم حدوثه، لأن ما لا يسبق الحادث إلا بأدنى مدة فهو حادث كالنار. لأنه لما كان موجبا للإحراق لم يسبقه.
- {46} وقد قال قوم: إن الفاعل فاعل لوقوع الفعل منه، لأن اسم الفاعل مشتق من الفعل ولا يصح إطلاق اسم الفاعل عليه إلا عند وقوع الفعل منه. قال آخرون: إن الفاعل فاعل | لإمكان 74r الفعل منه واسم الفاعل إنما هو مشتق من الصفات التي تناسب الفعل مثل قول القائل: «فلان كاتب أو حكيم أو سيف صارم أو دواء مسهل أو غذاء مشبع» وإن لم يحصل منه في وقته ذلك شيء من الفعل، وكذلك إطلاق اسم الفاعل على القادر إذا صح منه الفعل قبل وقوعه. لأن فائدة القدرة صحة وجود الفعل منه، ولما كان صحة الفعل معللة بكون القادر قادرا استحال حصوله إلا عن القادر. والفرق بين الفعل الصادر عن القادر والأثر الصادر عن الطبع هذا النوع من الأفعال، أعني الاختيار والاختلاف والتجنس. لأن الفعل الطبيعي جنس واحد. وقد تقدم 20 القول في ذكر الجواهر وأنها ليست بأزلية، لأنها لا تخلو من الحوادث وما لا يخلو من الحوادث فهو حادث. ونقول: إن الجوهر من حيث هو جوهر لا يجوز خلوه عن الاجتماع والافتراق والحركة والسكون. والقابل للشيء لا يجوز خلوه عنه أو عن بدله. دليله المتحرك والسكن والأبيض والأسود وسائر الألوان وكذلك المعاني المتقابلة كما نشاهده. ثم إن الجوهر يقبل الزيادة والنقصان،

to them by stating that, if the agent is an agent because he is a body, every body would possibly act. But [it is apparent] that the dead are bodies; nevertheless, they cannot act. Those who say that God is a body, judging from the fact that they see that there is no agent without a body, must admit also that God is composite, as this is another characteristic of bodies. However, this statement is also absurd. Hence, there is no doubt that things originate only if they come out of a powerful agent. Considering the power itself, the possibility of the action is related to the fact that the powerful is powerful. Thus, the action can come out only from a powerful agent. This is because the extension of the cause and its reversion are necessary.

{44} The difference between the action which comes out of the powerful agent and the effect which proceeds from nature is choice, variety, and substantification. The actions which are various and substantiated can only come from the powerful, choosing, knowing, and wise agent. It is evident that the form of the human being and the creation of the heavens and the earth and that which is between them are all well-established, perfect, various and substantiated actions, which lead to the proper purpose. This kind of action only comes from a powerful, knowing, choosing and wise agent.

{45} The proof of this is the inference from what is observable. Thus, when we see someone who is in the state of being powerful, we know that it is possible for him to do this kind of action. Then we investigate his states and ask, “why is this possible for him?”. It is obvious that this action is possible for him only because he is a powerful and choosing agent. Therefore, all various and substantiated actions which lead to the proper purpose only come from a powerful, choosing, and knowing agent. The production of the action from the agent is either in the way of possibility, or in the way of necessity. Thus, the action must come from the powerful agent in the way of possibility. For it is powerful to do the action and its contrary at the same time. If the action is produced by the agent in the way of necessity, the agent would not precede the action, without doubt. And even if the agent precedes the action, it does that at the last state and time. If so, the origination of the agent would be inevitable. For what which precedes the originated only at the last time is originated, too. Fire can be taken as an example: even if it necessitates the burning, it does not precede it.

{46} Some people said, “the agent is agent only if the action comes out of it, because the name of the agent [in Arabic] is grammatically derived from “action”. Thus, the attribution of the name of “agent” is possible only if the action comes out of it”. Some others said, “The agent is agent because of the possibility of the action out of it, and the name of the agent is indeed grammatically derived from the attributes which are related to the action”, as the statements like “this person is a secretary, or a judge”, or “a sharp sword”, or “a laxative medicine”, or “a satisfying food”. These things are still called by these attributes even if they do not perform in this moment the actions which are attributed to them. Similarly, the name of “agent” is attributed to the powerful being, if the action is possible for it before the moment of the action. This is because the purpose of the power is the possibility of production of the action. If the possibility of the action is caused by the fact that the powerful is powerful, the action is only possible out of the powerful. The difference between the action which comes out of the powerful agent and the effect which proceeds from the nature is these kinds of actions, I mean, choice, variety, and substantification. For the natural action is only of one and the same kind [while the act of the agent is not so]. We have stated earlier that substances are not eternal. This is due to the fact that they are not free from originated events, and that which is not free from originated events is originated, too. And we say now that the substance in so far as it is substance cannot be free from conjunction, division, motion and rest. If something is capable of an action, it cannot be free from this action and its opposite at the same time. The proof of this consists in the examples of moving-resting, white-black and other colours. And this is true also for other opposite meanings, as we can see. Furthermore, substance is subject to addition and subtraction.

- والزيادة على الشيء وجود بعض بعد العدم والنقصان عنه عدم بعض بعد الوجود. وما وجد عن العدم | وانتفى بعد الوجود لا يكون إلا حادثا. وإذا ثبت حدوث البعض ثبت حدوث الكل، لأن الجواهر متماثلة، ومن حكم المثليين أن ما جاز على أحدهما جاز على الآخر، وما استحال على أحدهما يستحيل على الآخر. وقد بينا أن القديم لا يجانس الحادث.
- 5 {47} والدليل على أن الجوهر يقبل الزيادة والنقصان الاعتبار بالمشاهدات مثل الحيوان والنبات. والدليل على أن الجواهر متماثلة أنها قد اشتركت في جميع الأوصاف الذاتية والأحكام النفسية مثل الوجود والشيئية والشغل والمنع والحجم والتحيز. والدليل أيضا على حدوثها أنها يجوز عليها التغيير، وما جاز عليه التغيير والتبدل وجب أن يكون حادثا. لأنه لو كان قديما لما جاز أن يتغير وجواز التغيير يختص بالحادث واستحالة التغيير بالقدم والقديم ما وجب وجوده لذاته من غير نسبة إلى شرط، وما وجب وجوده لذاته استحاله عدمه. وبهذه الحقيقة يمتاز القديم عن غيره من المحدثات.
- 10 {48} ومن الدليل على أن هذا العالم محدث ولم يكن في الأزل على هذه الصورة | والهيئة التي هو عليها الآن أن هيئة العالم وتركيبه خبر عن وقوع التأليف والتركيب على وجه مخصوص مثل التدوير والتثليث والتربيع وغير ذلك من الأشكال، ووقوع التأليف والتركيب على وجه مخصوص حادث. لأن ذلك يقبل التزايد والتناقص والتحول والتبدل، وما كان على هذه الصفة فهو حادث لاستحالة هذه الأوصاف على ما هو قديم.
- 15 {49} ومن الدليل عليه أيضا أن الأيام والليالي متناهية فيما قبل، لأنها موجودات على سبيل النظم والتوالي، والموجودات التي هي على سبيل النظم والتوالي تقتضي أولا اعتبارا بأيام الشهر والسنة ولياليها. ألا ترى أنها لما كانت موجودات على سبيل الترتيب والتوالي اقتضت أولا. وكذلك الحال في أيام العالم، وكما أن أيام الشهر والسنة ولياليها داخله تحت عد العادّ ولهذا يقتضي أولا كذلك أيام العالم داخل تحت عد العادّ من أجل أنها موجودات على سبيل النظم والترتيب والتوالي.
- 20 {50} | فإن قال قائل «إذن ينبغي أن يكون أحوال أهل الجنة وسرورها متناهية فيما بعد. وذلك أنها موجودات على سبيل الترتيب والتوالي، وهي تقتضي آخرا كما تقتضي أولا». قلنا: إنها تقتضي أولا ولا تقتضي آخرا بدليل أن الثاني والثالث يقتضيان أولا ولا يقتضيان آخرا. لأنه لو كانا يقتضيان آخرا كما تقتضيان أولا لاستحال وجودهما دون وجود آخرها كما استحال وجودهما دون وجود أولهما. فقد صح أن الثاني والثالث يقتضيان أولا ولا يقتضيان آخرا بعينه.
- 25 والكلام في هذا المعنى الشريف طويل إلا أن الاقتصار وقع على هذا القدر. وهو كاف لمن كان الحق طلبته ولم يكن المرء آفته والتعصب شيمته والله الموفق للخيرات لمّته.

فرغ من كتابته في الخامس والعشرين من شهر رمضان سنة إحدى وسبعين بأربعمئة بالفارسية
روز اسفندارمد ماه اردیبهشت سنة تسع وستين بأربعمئة.

|| scripsit et del. ms هيا : supra lineam هيئة 12 || ms أنه : scripsi أنها 7 || عند ms add. et del. عنه 1 post

ms. أنه : scripsi عليه 16

Addition means the existence of something after non-existence whereas subtraction means the non-existence of something after existence. That which comes to be out of non-existence and ceases to exist after existence is originated only. When the origination of the part is established, the origination of the whole is established, too. This is because substances are similar. It is a kind of similarity such “that which is possible for one thing is also possible for the other, which is similar to the former”. And that which is impossible for one thing is also impossible for the other. We have explained that the eternal does not resemble the originated.

{47} The proof for the proposition that substance accepts addition and subtraction is the inference from what is observable, such as animals and plants. The proof for the proposition that substances are similar runs as follows: they share all of the essential attributes and natural judgments such as existence, thing-ness, occupation, prevention, volume and place. The proof for the origination of these attributes is that they are liable to alteration. That which is liable to alteration and change is originated. If it were eternal, it would not be subject to alteration. The possibility of alteration is typical of origination, whereas the impossibility of alteration is typical of eternity. The eternal is that whose existence is necessary by itself, without any relation to a condition, and that whose existence is necessary by itself cannot be non-existent. By this nature, the eternal differs from the other created beings.

{48} Among the proofs of the proposition that this world is originated and has not eternally been in the form it has now is that the form and composition of the universe indicates that it has been composed in a particular way, such as shapes like circle, triangle, and square etc. The occurrence of the composition in a particular way is originated, because it is subject to addition, subtraction, alteration and change. Therefore, that which happens with this attribute is originated because these attributes are impossible for that which is eternal.

{49} Again, among the proofs of the proposition that this world is originated is that days and nights are finite backwards, because they are beings which happen in order and succession. The beings which happen in order and succession entail a beginning, judging from the days and nights of a month and a year. Do you not see that they entail a beginning, because they are beings which happen in order and succession? This is also relevant when it comes to the days of the universe. Just like the days and nights of month and year are countable and thus entail a beginning, the days of the universe are countable, too, because they are beings which happen in order and succession.

{50} If someone says “then, the state of the people of heaven and their happiness is finite forwards. For they are beings which happen in order and succession and they will get an end, as they have had a beginning”, we reply, “they have had a beginning, but will not get an end, because the numbers two and three have had a beginning [which is the one] but they will not get an end. This is because, if they get an end as they have had a beginning, their existence would have been impossible, because of the lack of that end. On the contrary, their existence would be impossible, if there were no beginning. Thus, it is now established that the numbers two and three have had a beginning and will not get an end *per se*. The discourse on this noble meaning is long, while the way which we have taken here is short. However, it is sufficient for those whose wish is the truth, and for those whose weakness is not hypocrisy, and habit is not bigotry. God is He Who helps with good things by His grace.

Notes to the Translation

¹ I have tried to maintain a gender-neutral language by making slight adjustments that I think do not harm the meaning. For example, I have changed the word “man” (*al-insān*) to the plural form, to escape masculine pronouns such as him/his. Otherwise, I have stayed with the masculine forms.

² This is not from the Qur’ān. For similar verses, see 6:88, 39:23.

³ This saying is attributed to Plato: al-‘Āmirī, *al-Amad*, p. 41 Kara (quoted above, p. 69 n. 27).

⁴ This saying is attributed to Aristotle: al-‘Āmirī, *al-Amad*, p. 43 Kara.

⁵ This saying comes from the Gospel: John 4, 14.

⁶ Allusion to Qur’ān, 30:30.

⁷ The saying is attributed to Socrates: Abū l-Wafā’ b. Mubaššir b. Fātik, *Muhtār al-ḥikam wa maḥāsīn al-kalīm*, ed. ‘A. Badawī, al-Mu’assasa al-‘arabiyya li l-dirāsa wa l-našr, Beirut 1980, p. 120 (slightly modified).

⁸ An echo of the Aristotelian distinction between what is better known to us and what is better known in itself. Aristotle maintains that, even though the latter is higher in rank, we can reach it only by means of the former: *An. Post.* I 2, 71 b 33 - 72 a 4.

⁹ In Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz’s usage, the term *annīyya* indicates ‘existence’, as he explicitly states that in following pages. To prevent its confusion with the more common term *wuḡūd*, and in order to point to its special place in the relevant terminology of Islamic philosophy, I have chosen to stay with ‘thatness’ throughout the text, no matter if *prima facie* it might sound quite odd. The *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* defines ‘thatness’ as “the condition of being an existent thing apart from whatever may be known or stated about that thing”, a definition that is suitable for this context.

¹⁰ The expression *wāḡib al-wuḡūd* adopted here by Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz is reminiscent of Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-Šifā’. Ilāhiyyāt*, I, VI, pp. 37-42 Anawati - Zāyid.

¹¹ The author enumerates here some derivative forms of the Arabic root *k ṭ r*, namely *katra*, *takattur*, *taktīr*, *iktār*, *istiktār*.

¹² This is the key principle of the negative theology, typical of the Neoplatonic tradition and expressed by Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite in a way which is reminiscent of the saying quoted by Sa’īd b. Dādhurmuz: *On the Divine Names*, I 5, p. 117.1-4 Suchla: “The divinely formed intellects (...) celebrate it most fittingly through the denial of all beings”, English trans. by J.D. Jones, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, *The Divine Names and Mystical Theology*, Translated from the Greek with an Introductory Study, Marquette U. P., Milwaukee 1980 (Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation, 21), p. 113.

¹³ This saying is attributed to Socrates: see al-Šahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, ed. A.‘A. Muhannā - ‘A.Ḥ. Fā’ūr, Dār al-Ma’rifa, I-II, Beirut s.d., I, p. 405.

¹⁴ Cf. Endress, *Proclus Arabus* (quoted above, p. 71 n. 39), pp. 269-70; 276; 278; *Kitāb al-Īdāḥ li-Aristūṭālis fī l-ḥayr al-maḥḍ*, p. 12.15 Badawī (quoted above, p. 72 n. 41).

¹⁵ Cf. *Kitāb al-Īdāḥ li-Aristūṭālis fī l-ḥayr al-maḥḍ*, pp. 8.10-9.1 Badawī.

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 9.1-7 Badawī.

¹⁷ Allusion to Q 67:4.

¹⁸ The term *wahda* is rendered sometimes as ‘unit’, and sometimes as ‘unity’ depending upon the context.

¹⁹ Cf. al-Kindī, *Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, in *Rasā’il al-Kindī al-falsafīyya*, ed. M. ‘A. Abū Rīda, Dār al-Fikr al-‘arabī, I-II, Cairo 1950-53, I, pp. 126-7.

²⁰ Cf. al-Kindī, *Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, pp. 127-8 Abū Rīda.

²¹ Compare al-Kindī, *Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, pp. 131-2 Abū Rīda: “The unity in everything which we have defined is not true unity. (...) The unity in them is in an accidental manner, and that which occurs accidentally to something is not a part of its essence. That which occurs accidentally to a thing comes from something else, and therefore an accident in something which receives an accident is an acquisition from something else, and is an acquisition from a donating agent. (...) Since we have explained that the unity in all these things is by accident, no part being by essence but rather by accident, the unity which occurs in a thing by accident is acquired from that in which it occurs by essence. Thus there is a one, true, of necessity uncaused unity (...).”, trans. A.L. Ivry, *Al-Kindī’s Metaphysics. A Translation of Ya’qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī’s Treatise On First Philosophy (fī al-Falsafah al-ūlā)*, SUNY Press, Albany 1974, p. 84.

²² This is a summary of the argument expounded by al-Kindī in Chapter Four of his *Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, pp. 143-62 Abū Rīda, whose conclusion is echoed quite literally: “The True One, therefore, has neither matter, form, quantity, quality, or relation, is not described by any of the remaining intelligible things, and has neither genus, specific difference, individual property, common accident or movement; and it is not described by any of the things which are denied to be one in truth. It is, accordingly, pure and simple unity, i.e., (having) nothing other than unity, while every other one is multiple. Unity, therefore, when an accident in all things, is not the True One, as we stated previously: the True One being the one *per se* which is never multiple in any way, or divisible in any kind (of divisibility), neither by way of its essence nor by way of

something other than it, neither time, place, subject, predicate, all or part, and neither into substance nor into accident, nor ever by any kind of divisibility or multiplicity” (trans. Ivry, pp. 112-13).

²³ See above, n. 21.

²⁴ Compare al-Kindī, *Fi l-Falsafa al-ūlā*, pp. 161-2 Abū Rīdā: “Consequently the first cause of unity in unified things is the True One which does not acquire unity from another, as it is impossible for there to be things giving, one to another, without an initial limit. The cause of unity in unified things is accordingly the True One, the First, and everything which receives unity is caused, every one other than the One in truth being one metaphorically and not in truth. (...) Inasmuch as unity and multiplicity together are in every sensible object and that which is attached to it, and the unity in it is entirely an effect from an agent which occurs accidentally in it and not through its nature, and multiplicity is, necessarily, a group of single units; then it is necessary that there would never be multiplicity if there were not unity. Accordingly every multiplicity comes to be through unity, and if there were no unity the multiple would never have being. Hence every coming to be is simply an affection which brings into existence what did not exist; and consequently the emanation of unity from the True One, the First, is the coming to be of every sensible object and what is attached to the sensible object; and (the True One) causes every one of them to exist when it causes them to be through its being. Therefore the cause of coming to be is due to the True One, which does not acquire unity from a donor but is rather one through its essence. Moreover, that which is made to be is not eternal, and that which is not eternal is created, i.e., it comes to be from a cause; consequently that which is made to be is created” (trans. Ivry, pp. 112-13).

²⁵ This saying is reminiscent of prop. 1 of Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*, whose Arabic translation is extant: see Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, pp. 3-4 (Arabic text), 253-4 (German translation).

²⁶ See above, n. 14.

²⁷ This passage comes from prop. 5 of the *Kitāb al-Īdāh li-Aristūṭālīs fi l-ḥayr al-mahḍ*, pp. 8.10-9.12 Badawī (quoted above, p. 72 n. 41). I have mainly followed the translation by R.C. Taylor, in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Book of Causes*, translated by V.A. Guagliardo - Ch.R. Hess - R.C. Taylor, The Catholic Univ. of America Press, Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 45-6.

²⁸ This sentence comes from the conclusion of prop. 5 of the *Liber de Causis* mentioned in the preceding note: see *Kitāb al-Īdāh li-Aristūṭālīs fi l-ḥayr al-mahḍ*, p. 9.13-14 Badawī: “The First cause is signified only from a second cause, which is an intelligence and is referred to by the name of its first effect, but only in a higher and better way because the effect has, further, what belongs to the cause, but in a more sublime, better and nobler way, as we have shown” (trans. Taylor, p. 46).

²⁹ This might be a summary, with some misunderstandings, of prop. 15 of the *Liber de Causis*: see *Kitāb al-Īdāh li-Aristūṭālīs fi l-ḥayr al-mahḍ*, pp. 16.14-18.3 Badawī.

³⁰ See the final part of prop. 8 of the *Liber de Causis*: cf. *Kitāb al-Īdāh li-Aristūṭālīs fi l-ḥayr al-mahḍ*, p. 12.5-17 Badawī.

³¹ This is an echo of Proclus’ definition of the self-subsisting substances: see *Kitāb al-Īdāh li-Aristūṭālīs fi l-ḥayr al-mahḍ*, p. 26.1-12 Badawī.

³² The key word in this passage, ‘*aql*’, is rendered as ‘reason’ and ‘intellect’ depending upon the context.

³³ See *Kitāb al-Īdāh li-Aristūṭālīs fi l-ḥayr al-mahḍ*, p. 23.9 Badawī.

³⁴ Several terms in English are used to render *kawn*, a key term for the physical theory of the Mu‘tazilite Kalām. In J. van Ess, *The Flowering of Muslim Theology*, Harvard U. P., Cambridge Mass. 2006, it is rendered by “location” (p. 92). Frank, *The Metaphysics of Created Being* (quoted above, p. 81 n. 79), p. 16, translates “becoming”. I have chosen “generation”, a word that, I think, is more fitting to our text.

³⁵ Both the syntax and the flow of the reasoning seem to be interrupted here. The manuscript does not bear any marginal note or mark in the text, and there is no trace of physical damage in it. Hence, one may surmise that it has been copied from a defective exemplar, or also that the copyist had a complete exemplar, and he made a mistake.

³⁶ Active participles.

Il Monobiblon di Proclo sull'immortalità dell'anima

Atene, Ctesifonte, Corbie, Bagdad: secoli V-X

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Abstract

An extremely interesting case of the Graeco-Latin and Graeco-Arabic transmission of philosophical texts is represented by Proclus' monograph on the Platonic proofs for the immortality of the human soul. Lost in Greek, this text has come down to us only indirectly, both in Latin and in Arabic. We can read it as embedded in Priscianus' *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, extant in the Latin version of the 9th century, and as embedded in Miskawayh's *Kitāb al-fawz al-aṣḡar*. This article is devoted to the comparison of these two texts.

Scopo di questo articolo è descrivere un caso forse unico nella ricezione della filosofia greca della tarda antichità in arabo e in latino, attraverso la storia di uno scritto di Proclo sulle prove platoniche dell'immortalità dell'anima il cui originale greco è perduto, ma che è ricostruibile a partire dalle *Solutiones ad Chosroem* di Prisciano Lido e dal *Kitāb al-fawz al-aṣḡar* di Miskawayh.

1. Il Monobiblon di Proclo sull'immortalità dell'anima

Assente dalla voce su Proclo della *RE*,¹ è invece esaminata in quella del *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*² una monografia sulle prove platoniche dell'immortalità dell'anima che non compare nella lista antica delle opere di Proclo fornita dalla *Suda*.³ La monografia, perduta ma attestata da autori greci, è citata nella voce su Proclo del *Kitāb al-Fihrist (Libro del Catalogo)*,⁴ composto da Ibn al-Nadīm alla fine del X secolo. Tra le opere di Proclo che Ibn al-Nadīm elenca compare un *Kitāb ṣarḥ qawl Falāṭūn anna al-nafs ḡayr mā'ita, ṭalāt maqālāt (Libro dell'esposizione della dottrina di Platone circa il fatto che l'anima è immortale, tre capitoli)*.⁵ Ibn al-Nadīm non parla di una traduzione araba, ma essa dev'essere esistita, perché lo scritto è utilizzato da Miskawayh (m. 1030), un letterato persiano con spiccati

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¹ R. Beutler, "Proklos", in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, XXIII, 1 (1957), col. 186-247.

² C. Luna - A.-Ph. Segonds, s.v. "Proclus de Lycie", in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* (in ciò che segue abbreviato in: *DPhA*), CNRS-Éditions, Paris 2012, Vb, P 292, pp. 1546-657, in part. p. 1590.

³ *Suda*, Π 2473, t. IV, p. 210.5-22 Adler. I problemi sollevati da questa voce sono discussi da Luna - Segonds, "Proclus de Lycie", p. 1553.

⁴ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel - J. Roediger - A. Müller, Vogel, Leipzig 1871-1872; *Kitāb al-Fihrist li-n-Nadīm*, ed. R. Taḡaddud, Marvi Offset, Tehran 1971; *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. A. F. Sayyid, Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, London 2009; trad. inglese: B. Dodge, *al-Nadīm. The Fihrist, a Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture*, Columbia U.P., New York - London 1970. Nelle note seguenti cito dall'edizione Flügel.

⁵ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, p. 252.15-16. Per le opere di Proclo conservate e attestate in arabo, cf. G. Endress, s.v. "Proclus de Lycie, œuvres transmises par la tradition arabe", in *DPhA*, P 292 = Vb [2012], pp. 1657-74.

interessi filosofici⁶ che nel *Piccolo libro della vittoria* (*Kitāb al-fawz al-aṣḡar*)⁷ riporta tre argomenti per dimostrare l'immortalità dell'anima e cita esplicitamente Proclo.⁸ F. Rosenthal,⁹ che ha attirato per primo l'attenzione sul passo di Miskawayh, ha sollevato il problema della fonte a cui egli attinge:

It distinctly appears, from what sources the whole discussion originates, which reveals clearly enough its pure Greek descent. The quotations from Plato are quite inaccurate and belong to the best known and most frequently quoted passages. An argument of Proclus is expressly cited. We hear about a particular work of Proclus, about views of Galen and views of Plato himself about which our author surely should not have been able to give any further information. According to the context, this particular work of Proclus should refer to the problem of good and evil; but such a work is apparently nowhere mentioned.¹⁰

La risposta, tre decenni dopo, è stata data da L.G. Westerink.¹¹ Confrontando le prove dell'immortalità dell'anima citate da Miskawayh con quelle riassunte da Prisciano Lido¹² nelle *Solutiones ad Chosroem* – conservate solo in traduzione latina¹³ – Westerink ha potuto provare che la fonte di Miskawayh è uno scritto di Proclo sull'immortalità dell'anima. Prisciano Lido, infatti, elenca le stesse prove di Miskawayh e all'inizio delle *Solutiones* cita la sua fonte: un *Monobiblon* di Proclo su questo tema.¹⁴ In seguito, A. Hasnawi¹⁵ ha mostrato che altri due scritti arabi sulla posizione di Platone circa l'immortalità dell'anima dipendono dal *Monobiblon* di Proclo: *Ḥuḡaḡ Aflātūn 'alā baqā' al-nafs* (*Prove di Platone sulla permanenza dell'anima*) e *T amara laṭīfa min maqāyīs Aflātūn fī anna l-nafsa lā tafsud* (*Frutto sottile dei sillogismi di Platone sul fatto che l'anima non è corruttibile*). Giunte a noi in forma anonima, queste due opere sono state pubblicate da 'A. Badawī in *Aristū 'inda l-'arab*¹⁶ e nella raccolta *Platon en pays d'Islam*.¹⁷ È proprio a proposito dell'uso del *Monobiblon* di Proclo da parte di Miskawayh che G. Endress ha osservato:

⁶ La biografia di Miskawayh è lungamente analizzata da M. Arkoun, *L'humanisme arabe au IV^e-X^e siècle. Miskawayh philosophe et historien*, Seconde édition revue, Vrin, Paris 1982 (Études musulmanes, 12). Per una visione d'insieme cf. E. Wakelnig, "Miskawayh, Abū 'Alī", in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, Springer Science + Business media B.V. 2011, pp. 797-9.

⁷ *Al-Fawz al-aṣḡar li-Miskawayh*, ed. Ṣ. 'Uḏayma, Maison Arabe du Livre, Tunis 1987 (Collection Patrimoine Philosophique), in part. pp. 81-5.

⁸ Cf. *infra* pp. 133-4.

⁹ F. Rosenthal, "On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy in the Islamic World", *Islamic Culture* 14 (1940), pp. 384-422, in part. pp. 398-401, rist. in Id., *Greek Philosophy in the Arab World. A Collection of Essays*, Variorum, Aldershot-Brookfield (VE) 1990 (Collected Studies, 322): cf. G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Übersetzung*, Imprimerie Catholique, Wiesbaden-Beirut 1973, pp. 28-29.

¹⁰ Rosenthal, "On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy", p. 401.

¹¹ L.G. Westerink, "Proclus on Plato's Three Proofs of Immortality", in *Zetesis. Album Amicorum door vrienden en collega's aangeboden aan Prof. Dr. E. de Strycker*, Nederlandsche Boekhandel, Antwerpen-Utrecht 1973, pp. 296-306 (rist. in Id., *Texts and Studies in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Literature*, Hakkert, Amsterdam 1980, pp. 345-55).

¹² Cf. M. Perkams, s.v. "Priscien de Lydie", in *DPhA*, P 280 = Vb [2012], pp. 1514-21.

¹³ *Prisciani Lydi Solutiones eorum de quibus dubitavit Chosroes Persarum rex*, ed. I. Bywater, Reimer, Berlin 1886 (Supplementum Aristotelicum I.2), pp. 39-104; le prove si trovano alle pp. 47-9.

¹⁴ Cf. qui sotto p. 130 e nota 46.

¹⁵ A. Hasnawi, "Deux textes en arabe sur les preuves platoniciennes de l'immortalité de l'âme", *Medioevo* 23 (1997), pp. 395-408.

¹⁶ 'A. Badawī, *Aristū 'inda l-'arab*, Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-miṣriyya, Cairo 1947 (Dirāsāt Islāmiyya, 5), pp. 73.15-74.

¹⁷ 'A. Badawī, *Platon en pays d'Islam. Textes publiés et annotés*, Mc Gill University, Montreal-Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran Branch, Tehran 1974, pp. 331-2.

Indeed, the question may be put forward to an Arabist who will face the challenge of historians of Neoplatonism, and of Hellenistic thought in general: What can students of Ancient and Hellenistic philosophy expect to learn from the Arabic tradition? Not many texts lost in the original Greek have been retrieved from Arabic translations. The most important discoveries in this respect, some of which are remarkable indeed, are in the fields of medicine and the mathematical sciences. The text discussed by Westerink might be regarded as a case in point. But would scholars have taken it seriously, or even identified its source, on the evidence of Miskawayh's Arabic quotation alone? (...) [T]he most direct and illuminating evidence that may indeed be gleaned from the Arabic versions and from the works of their Arabic readers concerns what Westerink calls 'the vicissitudes of Greek philosophical texts in the Islamic tradition'. (...) In many respects, these texts are the only witnesses left to us for reconstructing what happened to Greek philosophy after the time of the last Alexandrian commentators of Aristotle.¹⁸

In questa prospettiva, l'analisi dell'eredità medievale (latina e araba) del *Monobiblon* deve iniziare da una sintesi delle scarse notizie che abbiamo su di esso nella tradizione filosofica greca della tarda antichità.

La monografia di Proclo si ricollega all'esegesi del *Fedone*, perché uno degli argomenti riassunti sia in latino che in arabo è l'ultima prova dell'immortalità dell'anima, *Phaed.* 102 B 3 - 106 E 2. Proclo ha commentato il *Fedone*, ma l'opera non è conservata; nel *Proclus*, Marino di Neapoli afferma che Plutarco di Atene¹⁹ nella sua estrema vecchiaia lesse il *De Anima* e il *Fedone* con il giovane Proclo, incoraggiandolo a prendere degli appunti in vista della redazione di un commento.²⁰ Non è possibile determinare che rapporto ci sia tra il commento perduto e l'insegnamento di Plutarco di Atene a cui allude Marino di Neapoli;²¹ che Proclo abbia scritto sul *Fedone* è attestato da ciò che egli stesso afferma nelle dissertazioni (ὑπομνήματα) sulla *Repubblica*.²² Nella prima dissertazione Proclo allude genericamente a ciò che ha detto "altrove",²³ mentre nella dissertazione "Sul mito della *Repubblica*" dice di aver scritto "sulla *Nekya* del *Fedone*"²⁴ e ripete la stessa cosa poco oltre, precisando di avere scritto "molto" sull'argomento.²⁵ Inoltre, un frammento del commento perduto è stato trasmesso nei *Prolegomena philosophiae*²⁶ di Elia.²⁷ Infine, nel *Fibrist* di Ibn al-Nadīm si parla della traduzione di una

¹⁸ G. Endress, "The New and Improved Platonic Theology. Proclus Arabus and Arabic Islamic Philosophy", in *Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne. Actes du Colloque International de Louvain (13-16 mai 1998) en l'honneur de H.D. Saffrey et L.G. Westerink †*, édité par A.-Ph. Segonds et C. Steel, avec l'assistance de C. Luna et A.F. Mettraux, Leuven U. P. - Les Belles Lettres, Leuven - Paris 2000 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy - De Wulf-Mansion Centre Series I, 26), pp. 553-70, in part. pp. 554-5.

¹⁹ Cf. C. Luna - A.-Ph. Segonds, s.v. "Plutarque d'Athènes", in *DPhA*, P 209 = Vb [2012], pp. 1076-96.

²⁰ Marinus, *Proclus ou sur le bonheur*, texte établi, traduit et annoté par H.D. Saffrey et A.-Ph. Segonds avec la collaboration de C. Luna, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2001 (CUF), § 12.9-15.

²¹ Cf. Marinus, *Proclus ou Sur le bonheur*. I frammenti del commento al *Fedone* di Plutarco di Atene sono stati raccolti da D.P. Taormina, *Plutarco di Atene. L'Uno, l'Anima, le Forme*, Università di Catania, Catania 1989 (Symbolon, 8), pp. 137-8.

²² *Procli Diadochi In Platonis Rem Publicam commentarii*, ed. G. Kroll, I-II, Teubner, Leipzig 1899.

²³ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 12.25-13.6 Kroll. L.G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, I Olympiodorus*, North-Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam - Oxford - New York 1976 (Verhand d. Kon. Ned. Ak. v. Wetenschappen N.R. 92), p. 18, ha mostrato che l'espressione ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις διείλομεν usata in questo passo da Proclo allude al commento al *Fedone*: cf. Luna - Segonds, "Proclus de Lycie", p. 1569.

²⁴ Procl., *In Plat. Remp.*, II, p. 179.9-24 Kroll.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 183.16-25 Kroll.

²⁶ *Eliae In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categoriae commentaria*, ed. A. Busse, Reimer, Berlin 1900 (CAG XVIII.1).

²⁷ Elia afferma che Proclo aveva sostenuto nel suo commento al *Fedone* che anche gli esseri irrazionali sono capaci di memoria: ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος Πρόκλος βούλεται ἐν τοῖς εἰς Φαίδωνα ὑπομνήμασιν ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ἀνάμνησιν. "Il filosofo Proclo sostiene, nel suo commento al *Fedone*, che anche gli esseri irrazionali possiedono la memoria" (p. 2.10-25 Busse).

parte di questo commento fatta da ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa (m. 1008).²⁸ L'interesse dei neoplatonici tardi per la dottrina platonica dell'immortalità dell'anima è testimoniato dai commenti al *Fedone* di Damascio (465 ca. - 538 ca.)²⁹ e Olimpiodoro (505 ca. - ?).³⁰ Si tratta di tre raccolte frammentarie di note di lezioni: due sono versioni differenti di un corso tenuto da un anonimo, identificato da Westerink con Damascio;³¹ una riporta un corso di Olimpiodoro.³² Entrambi dipendono dal perduto commento di Proclo. Damascio aggiunge abbondanti critiche a Proclo; Olimpiodoro utilizza Proclo come fonte quasi esclusiva, sia direttamente, sia indirettamente, attraverso Damascio. È dunque possibile che l'opera di Proclo non si sia conservata proprio perché inclusa in quelle dei suoi successori. Infine, l'esistenza di una monografia sull'immortalità dell'anima in cui sono presenti anche prove che non derivano dal *Fedone* dimostra che per Proclo l'argomento non era esaurito dalla sola esegesi di questo dialogo.

2. *Le Solutiones ad Chosroem di Prisciano Lido*

Nel 529, alla chiusura della scuola di Atene, sette filosofi neoplatonici tra cui Dasmascio, Simplicio e Prisciano Lido accettarono l'offerta di asilo dell'imperatore Cosroe I³³ e si recarono a Ctesifonte alla corte sassanide.³⁴ Cosroe I, ventesimo sovrano sassanide dell'Iran, soprannominato Anūshirwān ("anima immortale"), regnò dal 531 al 578. Descritto come sovrano saggio e giusto, e noto amante della filosofia e delle scienze, la sua fama di protettore di filosofi e saggi di tutte le origini e confessioni è attestata da diverse fonti; la sua autobiografia è nota dal *Tağārib al-Umam* (*Le esperienze delle nazioni*) di Miskawayh.³⁵

Sono conservati tre scritti di filosofia dedicati a Cosroe: il *Trattato sull'opera logica di Aristotele il filosofo, per il re Cosroe* di Paolo di Persia, in siriano;³⁶ dello stesso autore, un'introduzione generale alle opere di Aristotele, pervenuta in una versione araba contenuta nel *Tartīb al-sādāt wa-manāzil al-'ulūm* (*I gradi di felicità e le classificazioni delle scienze*) di Miskawayh,³⁷ e le *Solutiones ad Chosroem* di Prisciano Lido,

²⁸ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 252.22-23 Flügel: "Libro di Proclo, commento al *Fedone* sull'anima, siriano; Abū 'Alī ibn Zurʿa ne ha tradotto una parte in arabo". Cf. Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, p. 28; Endress, "Proclus de Lycie, œuvres transmises par la tradition arabe", p. 1672. Su Ibn Zurʿa cf. C. Martini Bonadeo, "Ibn Zurʿa, 'Īsā ibn Ishāq", in Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 536; C. Haddad, "Īsā ibn Zurʿa, philosophe arabe et apologiste chrétien, Dār al-kalima, Beirut 1971. Questo medico cristiano giacobita era anche un apprezzato traduttore di Aristotele; probabilmente si interessò al commento di Proclo perché aveva intenzione di scrivere un trattato sull'immortalità dell'anima: lo afferma Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, 'Uyūn al-anbāʿ fi ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ, ed. A. Müller, Cairo - Königsberg 1882-1884 (rist. F. Sezgin, Frankfurt a.M. 1995, Islamic Medicine, I-II, I, p. 319).

²⁹ Ph. Hoffmann, s.v. "Damascius", in *DPhA*, D 3 = II [1994], pp. 541-93.

³⁰ H.D. Saffrey, s.v. "Olympiodoros d'Alexandrie", in *DPhA*, O 17 = IV [2005], pp. 769-71.

³¹ I commenti di Damascio erano stati editi sotto il nome di Olimpiodoro: *Olympiodori philosophi in Platonis Phaedonem commentaria*, ed. W. Norvin, Teubner, Lipsiae 1913 (rist. Olms, Hildesheim 1968). Per l'attribuzione a Damascio cf. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, (citato sopra, n. 23), pp. 15-17.

³² Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*.

³³ M. Tardieu, s.v. "Chosroès", *DPhA*, C 113 = II [1994], pp. 309-18.

³⁴ L'unica fonte è lo storico bizantino Agazia: cf. Hoffmann, "Damascius", p. 560. Gli eventi che nella vita di questi filosofi, e soprattutto in quella di Simplicio, seguirono il soggiorno in Persia hanno suscitato molte discussioni fra gli studiosi; cf. C. Luna, recensione a R. Thiel, *Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen* (1999), *Mnemosyne* 54 (2001), pp. 482-504; R.L. Fox, "Appendix: Ḥarrān, the Sabians and the late Platonist 'movers'", in A. Smith (ed.), *The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity. Essays in Honour of Peter Brown*, The Classical Press of Wales, Swansea 2005, pp. 231-44.

³⁵ Su quest'opera di Miskawayh cf. M. Arkoun, *L'humanisme arabe*, pp. 120-7.

³⁶ Cf. H. Hugonnard-Roche, s.v. "Paul le Perse", in *DPhA*, P 61 = Va [2012], pp. 183-7.

³⁷ Per una sintesi del suo contenuto cf. Arkoun, *L'humanisme arabe*, pp. 107-8; il testo di Paolo di Persia è stato parzialmente tradotto in francese da Arkoun, *ibid.*, pp. 228-33 e studiato, con particolare attenzione alle fonti, da D. Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the Classification of the Parts of Aristotle's Philosophy: a Milestone between Alexandria and Baghdad", *Der Islam* 60 (1983), pp. 231-67, il quale giunge alla conclusione che "There can be thus little doubt that the entire second part of Miskawaih's *Tartīb*

in latino. In quest'ultimo scritto il filosofo neoplatonico risponde a questioni disparate, che mostrano l'interesse di Cosroe nei confronti della filosofia e delle scienze: la natura dell'anima, il sonno e i sogni, il clima e le stagioni, le maree, i fenomeni atmosferici, la formazione di vegetali e animali nei diversi paesi.

Due manoscritti latini delle *Solutiones*, risalenti alla seconda metà del IX secolo, si trovano a Parigi.³⁸ Uno è il manoscritto Paris, BnF *lat.* 13386, proveniente dall'abbazia di Corbie. Esso contiene il *Commonitorium* di Vincenzo di Lérins (ff. 1r-42v); una raccolta di epistole (ff. 42v-100r); l'*Omilia sancti Augustini episcopi de studio caritatis* (ff. 100r-102v); il *De Praedestinatione* di Giovanni Scoto Eriugena (ff. 103r-158r); seguono le *Solutiones* (ff. 160r-207v). Il testo delle *Solutiones* è mutilo: c'è una lacuna tra il f. 199 e il f. 200, che corrisponde a gran parte del capitolo VII dell'opera (p. 77-85 Bywater) e manca la parte finale del trattato (p. 94 Bywater). Il secondo è il manoscritto BnF *lat.* 2684. Contiene il *De Nominibus locorum Hebraicorum* (ff. 1r-54r) e il *De Nominibus Hebraicis* (ff. 54r-81v) di San Girolamo e le *Solutiones* (ff. 82r-115r). Un'altra copia antica delle *Solutiones* si trovava nel XII secolo presso l'abbazia di Saint-Amand.³⁹ Gli altri manoscritti sono tutti più tardi: quelli utilizzati da Bywater per la sua edizione si trovano in Inghilterra e datano della fine del XIII - inizio XIV secolo; vi sono infine tre manoscritti del XV secolo.⁴⁰

La traduzione latina è stata effettuata certamente dal greco; dunque è ragionevole pensare che le *Solutiones* siano state scritte originariamente in questa lingua, per poi essere forse tradotte in medio-persiano per Cosroe. Con ogni probabilità la traduzione latina delle *Solutiones* fu opera di Eriugena (810-880 ca.).⁴¹ Molti elementi fanno propendere per quest'attribuzione. Il vocabolario, lo stile e il metodo di traduzione sono i suoi: M.-Th. d'Alverny è giunta alla conclusione che "même si Jean Scot n'en était pas responsable, ce n'est guère que dans son entourage immédiat que l'on pourrait situer le traducteur".⁴² La studiosa ha mostrato che tanto nelle traduzioni eseguite certamente da Eriugena⁴³ quanto nelle *Solutiones* il testo greco è tradotto secondo il modello del *verbum de verbo*; benché l'originale greco sia perduto, ciò è provato dall'uso di neologismi che sembrano essere stati conati per aderire fedelmente al modello greco. Vi sono anche delle concordanze nella scelta dei termini: nelle traduzioni di Eriugena, il termine *substantia* traduce ὑπόστασις; *intellectualis* traduce νοερός; *intellegentia*, νόησις; *intelligibilis*, νοητός; *ratio*, λόγος; *irrationalis*, ἄλογος: questi termini latini si trovano tutti nelle *Solutiones*. Oltre a ciò, la triade *essentia*, *operatio* e *virtus* (in corrispondenza di οὐσία, ἐνέργεια e δύναμις) commentata a più riprese da Eriugena nel *Periphyseon*,⁴⁴ è presente nella traduzione di Prisciano. Ancora, si deve

as-sâdât (...) is an Arabic translation of an introductory work composed by Paul the Persian (in Pehlevi?) on the philosophy of Aristotle, modeled on the late Alexandrian prolegomena to Aristotle, and used by both al-Fârâbî and Miskawayh" (p. 244).

³⁸ Tutte le informazioni sulla tradizione manoscritta delle *Solutiones* che ho riassunto sono tratte dallo studio di riferimento su questa traduzione: M.-Th. d'Alverny, "Les *Solutiones ad Chosroem* de Priscianus Lydus et Jean Scot", in R. Roques (ed.), *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 1977 (Colloques internationaux du CNRS, 561), pp. 145-60, in part. pp. 147-55. Cf. inoltre É. Jeuneau, "Jean Scot Érigène et le grec", *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 41 (1979), pp. 5-50. Dopo un bilancio degli studi sulle traduzioni dal greco di Eriugena, Jeuneau dedica una certa attenzione alle *Solutiones*, facendo riferimento allo studio di M.-Th. d'Alverny e aggiungendo un riferimento alle *Solutiones* presente "dans une collection de gloses philosophiques où l'influence érigénienne est évidente: 'Priscianus ad regem Osdromem (*sic*) dixit...' (Ms Paris, BN Lat. 12949, fol. 25 ter (v))" (p. 7), per concludere però che "Il reste que Jean Scot lui-même semble avoir peu utilisé les *Solutiones* de Priscien. Les auteurs grecs qu'il cite sont avant tout les Pères de l'Église" (*ibid.*).

³⁹ M.-Th. d'Alverny, "Les *Solutiones ad Chosroem*", pp. 149-50.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-3.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 155-60.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 158.

⁴³ Giovanni Scoto Eriugena ha tradotto il *Corpus Aeropagiticum* nell'858, gli *Ambigua* di Massimo il Confessore e il *De Opificio hominis* di Gregorio di Nissa nell'864. Per le edizioni di queste opere cf. la nota successiva.

⁴⁴ Le opere di Eriugena sono editate nella *PL*, vol. 122. Il *Periphyseon* è stato edito da É. Jeuneau: *Joahnnis Scotti seu*

notare che il traduttore delle *Solutiones* utilizza *virtus* per rendere sia ἀρετή che δύναμις, tratto, questo, caratteristico di Eriugena. Un altro tratto comune al traduttore delle *Solutiones* e a Eriugena è l'impiego di *artificialis*, anziché *artificialis*, per rendere il greco τεχνικός.⁴⁵ Inoltre, i due manoscritti carolingi gli sono contemporanei e provengono dalla regione in cui egli visse.

Nel Proemio Prisciano elenca le sue fonti, e tra queste menziona la monografia di Proclo: *et Proclus in omnibus differentes singulos libros componens et maxime de Tribus sermonibus per quos apud Platonem animae immortale ostenditur*⁴⁶ (καὶ Πρόκλος ὁ τὰ ἐν πᾶσι διαφέροντα μονόβιβλα συνθείς, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ περὶ τῶν τριῶν λόγων δι' ὧν παρὰ Πλάτωνι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον ἀποδείκνυται).⁴⁷ Il passo tratto dalla monografia sulle prove platoniche dell'immortalità dell'anima si trova alle pp. 47-9 dell'edizione Bywater. Esso inizia con le parole: *Tres autem sunt maxime rationes secundum animam immortalitatis et incorruptionis*.⁴⁸ Segue la discussione delle tre prove: la dimostrazione finale del *Fedone* (102 B 3 - 106 E 2), l'argomento di *Repubblica* X (608 B 4 - 611 A 2) e infine la prova del *Fedro* (245 C 5 - 246 A 2).

3. Il Kitāb al-fawz al-aṣḡar di Miskawayh

Il *Monobiblon* di Proclo è stato tradotto in arabo all'incirca nello stesso periodo in cui è stata effettuata la traduzione latina delle *Solutiones*. Il *Fibrist*, infatti, è stato composto entro la fine del X secolo, e in esso, come si è visto, è menzionato un *Libro dell'esposizione della dottrina di Platone circa il fatto che l'anima è immortale, tre capitoli*.⁴⁹ Naturalmente questo potrebbe significare soltanto che il *Monobiblon* è noto a Ibn al-Nadīm, senza che ciò implichi l'esistenza di una traduzione araba, tanto più che, come si è già notato, egli non ne fa cenno; ma il fatto che sia utilizzato da Miskawayh nel *Kitāb al-fawz al-aṣḡar* dimostra che nel X secolo il *Monobiblon* esisteva in arabo.

Il *Kitāb al-fawz al-aṣḡar* è stato composto da Miskawayh probabilmente negli anni 976-983, quando egli si trovava a Bagdad alla corte di 'Aḡud al-Dawla.⁵⁰ È citato dal suo autore due volte, nel *Kitāb al-hawāmil wa-l-ṣawāmil*,⁵¹ semplicemente come *al-fawz*, ma le fonti attestano due opere con lo stesso titolo: un *Kitāb al-fawz al-aṣḡar* e un *Kitāb al-Fawz al-akbar* (ovvero *Kitāb al-fawz al-ṣaḡīr* e *Kitāb al-fawz al-kabīr*), e lo stesso Miskawayh al termine del *Fawz al-aṣḡar* dice che svilupperà meglio i problemi sollevati troppo rapidamente in un trattato più esteso: il *Fawz al-akbar*.⁵² Quest'ultimo testo però non ci è pervenuto.⁵³ E. Wakelnig ha tentato una ricostruzione del *Fawz al-akbar* a partire da due manoscritti che contengono circa la metà del *Fawz al-aṣḡar* in una versione differente da quella che è giunta sino a

Eriugena *Periphyseon* curavit E.A. Jeauneau, voll. CLXI-CLXV, Brepols, Turnhout 1996.

⁴⁵ Tutte queste osservazioni terminologiche sono di M.-Th. d'Alverny, "Les *Solutiones ad Chosroem*".

⁴⁶ Prisc. Lyd., *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, p. 42.19-21 Bywater.

⁴⁷ La prima parte della retroversione è di Bywater; la seconda parte, di Westerink.

⁴⁸ Prisc. Lyd., *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, p. 47.2-3 Bywater.

⁴⁹ Cf. la n. 5.

⁵⁰ Arkoun, *L'humanisme arabe*, pp. 76-7.

⁵¹ Miskawayh non è in realtà l'unico autore del *Kitāb al-hawāmil wa-l-ṣawāmil* (*Libro delle questioni disparate e delle risposte esaurienti*): l'opera contiene gli scambi di questioni disparate (*al-hawāmil*) sollevate dal letterato-filosofo al-Tawhīdī (m. 1023) e le risposte esaurienti (*al-ṣawāmil*) di Miskawayh: per una presentazione del contenuto cf. Arkoun, *L'humanisme arabe*, pp. 110-12; su al-Tawhīdī cf. E. Cottrell, "Al-Tawhīdī, Abū Ḥayyān", in Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 1247-50.

⁵² Miskawayh, *Al-Fawz al-aṣḡar li-Miskawayh*, p. 144.11 'Uḡayma.

⁵³ F. Rosenthal, "On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy", p. 398, n. 1, pensa che il *Kitāb al-fawz al-akbar* potrebbe essere il *Tabḏīb al-ablāq*, cioè l'opera di etica filosofica che è in un certo senso il 'manifesto' di Miskawayh (cf. più avanti la n. 77): "Sometimes I have the feeling that this work [il *Tabḏīb al-ablāq*] is identical with the *Fawz al-akbar* which is not found up to now and which is always mentioned, but of course this is a mere conjecture". Arkoun, *L'humanisme arabe*, p. 101, n. 1 esprime la stessa opinione.

noi nella maggior parte dei manoscritti.⁵⁴ La stessa studiosa ha anche mostrato che gli estratti del *Fawz al-asghar* presenti nell'anonima compilazione di estratti filosofici conservata in un codice della Bodleian Library di Oxford reso celebre da Rosenthal, il *Marsh* 539 – compilazione che contiene molto materiale neoplatonico – derivano da una versione del *Fawz* leggermente differente da quella edita da 'Uḏayma.⁵⁵

Il *Fawz* è suddiviso in tre parti e ciascuna parte è composta da dieci capitoli. La prima questione che viene esaminata è quella dell'esistenza del Creatore, la seconda parte affronta la questione dell'anima e la terza parte, infine, tratta della profezia. Le prove platoniche dell'immortalità dell'anima si trovano nella seconda parte, nella quale Miskawayh, dopo aver stabilito in base ad argomenti di ispirazione aristotelica che l'anima si trova in tutti gli esseri esistenti, secondo una scala di complessità crescente che arriva fino all'uomo, afferma che l'anima umana si distingue dalle altre in quanto razionale. L'anima razionale non è né corpo né accidente di un corpo; essa non è una forma materiale, ma una sostanza autonoma ed indipendente. Miskawayh passa quindi a dimostrare perché l'anima è immortale.

4. Le tre prove in latino e in arabo

Nelle *Solutiones* scritte per Cosroe, Prisciano riporta i tre argomenti con i quali Proclo ha provato che l'anima è immortale: (1) essa lo è per la sua stessa essenza; (2) non perisce né per il male suo proprio né per il male proprio del corpo; (3) muove se stessa, e ciò che muove se stesso è immortale. Per mettere in luce somiglianze e differenze tra gli argomenti di Proclo nella versione che ne attesta Prisciano e in quella attestata da Miskawayh, riporto qui sotto ciascun argomento nella formulazione latina e in quella araba.

1. Primo argomento

Prisc. Lyd., *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, p. 47.2-24 Bywater:

Tres autem sunt maxime connexae rationes secundum animam immortalitatis et incorruptionis. Et prima quidem quae ab operatione acquiritur animae habens sic: anima cuicumque adest corpori, vitam semper ei infert; omne autem vitam semper inferens non contrarium receperit vitae; etenim si semper eam infert, semper eam habet secundum essentiam et naturaliter: nullum autem eorum quae sunt quidem ab eo quod vere est potest accipere corruptivum secundum essentiam et connaturaliter sibi unum existentis;⁵⁶ contrarium vero omnino contrarii corruptivum est: anima igitur contrarium eius quam semper infert vitae nunquam receperit. Contrarium autem vitae mors: non ergo recipit anima mortem; ac per hoc immortalis. Addidit autem quidam quondam sapientium, magnus inquam Plotinus, et quod eo maius: si igitur neque ipsam quam infert vitam anima potest iterum recipere, multo magis contrarium vitae, ipsam mortem. Habens enim eius causam connaturalem nihil indiget vitae quam corpori dat, dum sit umbra eius quam in se ipsa secundum essentiam habet vitae. Etenim omnino nihil causalium indigens est causativi, meliores habens semper virtutes his quas causativo largitur: quoniam et ignis non iterum receperit caliditatem quam a se calefactis infert (connaturale enim habet), ac per hoc multo magis neque frigiditatem quae est contraria et gravitate etiam connaturali caliditati: et omnino omne quod semper infert qualemcumque speciem neque quod infert receperit neque contrarium illius.

⁵⁴ E. Wakelnig, "A New Version of Miskawayh's *Book of Triumph*: an alternative recension of *Al-fawz al-asghar* or the lost *Fawz al-akbar*?", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 19 (2009), pp. 83-119.

⁵⁵ *A Philosophy Reader from the Circle of Miskawayh*, edited and translated by E. Wakelnig, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2014, in part. p. 31.

⁵⁶ È impossibile tradurre *sibi unum existentis*. Bywater in apparato propone la retroversione: οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ὄντων γε ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος δύναται δέχσθαι τὸ φθαρτικὸν τοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ συμφυῶς αὐτῷ ἐνυπάρχοντος. Eriugena deve avere letto ἐνυπάρχοντος come ἐν ὑπάρχοντος.

Ci sono tre argomenti strettamente connessi riguardo all'immortalità e all'indistruttibilità relative all'anima. Il primo, che deriva dall'attività dell'anima, è il seguente: a qualunque corpo sia presente un'anima, essa sempre gli apporta la vita. Ciò che sempre apporta la vita è incapace di ricevere l'opposto della vita; ora, ciò che sempre la apporta, sempre la possiede, per sua essenza e naturalmente. Nessuna cosa di quelle che derivano da ciò che è veramente può ricevere ciò che distrugge una proprietà che le appartiene per essenza e come parte della sua natura. Ora, un contrario distrugge necessariamente il suo contrario; perciò l'anima non può mai ricevere il contrario della vita che essa sempre apporta. Ora, il contrario della vita è la morte; di conseguenza, l'anima non riceve la morte, e quindi è immortale. Inoltre, uno dei sapienti – intendo il grande Plotino – ha aggiunto un argomento persino più forte: se l'anima non può nemmeno ricevere di nuovo la vita che essa apporta, a maggior ragione non potrà ricevere il contrario della vita, cioè la morte. Dato che essa possiede la causa della vita come parte della sua natura, non ha bisogno della vita che apporta al corpo, poiché questa è solo un'ombra della vita che essa possiede in se stessa per essenza. Infatti, nessuna causa ha bisogno del suo effetto, poiché sempre possiede facoltà superiori a quelle che conferisce al suo effetto: il fuoco non può ricevere di nuovo il calore che conferisce agli oggetti da esso riscaldati, dato che ha questo calore come parte della sua natura, e per questo a maggior ragione non può ricevere il freddo che è contrario al calore. In generale, qualsiasi cosa che sempre apporta qualche forma particolare non può ricevere né ciò che apporta né il suo contrario.

Questo argomento riprende la dimostrazione finale⁵⁷ del *Fedone* (102 B 3 - 106 E 2), articolata nelle seguenti tappe: un contrario non può accogliere il suo contrario (102 B 3 - 103 C 8), ma anche tutte le cose che, pur non essendo il contrario di nulla, partecipano sempre e necessariamente di un'idea – ad esempio il fuoco del caldo – non potranno partecipare dell'idea contraria a quella che è in loro (103 C 10 - 105 B 4); ora, l'anima rientra tra queste realtà: essendo ciò che apporta la vita, partecipa sempre e necessariamente dell'idea della vita, e quindi non potrà accogliere la morte (105 B 5 - E 7); sarà quindi immortale e indistruttibile (105 E 10 - 106 E 2). Fra gli argomenti del *Fedone*, questo solo è considerato dai neoplatonici una dimostrazione completa ed indipendente; gli altri sono considerati provvisori ed imperfetti.⁵⁸ Il fatto stesso che nelle *Solutiones* questo sia il solo argomento tratto dal *Fedone* dimostra che la fonte alla quale attinge Prisciano è pienamente inserita nell'interpretazione del dialogo tipica del neoplatonismo tardo. Egli collega a questo argomento uno sviluppo che attribuisce a Plotino: l'anima non può trarre la vita da un grado d'essere inferiore, il corpo, che è appunto ciò a cui essa ha dato la vita; a maggior ragione non potrà recepire il suo opposto, la morte. Questo argomento non si trova come tale nelle *Enneadi*.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Riassumo gli argomenti precedenti: il primo è quello detto dei "contrari" (69 E 6 - 72 E 1): se da ogni cosa nasce il suo contrario, dalla morte sorgerà la vita; segue l'argomento dell'anamnesi (72 E 3 - 78 B 3): ogni nostro apprendimento non è altro che reminiscenza di ciò che la nostra anima sapeva prima di congiungersi con un corpo; tuttavia, come è sottolineato dall'obiezione di Simmia e Cebete (77 B 2 - C 5), questo argomento prova la preesistenza dell'anima ma non la sua sopravvivenza rispetto al corpo. Socrate replica che quest'ultima potrà essere provata se anamnesi e argomento ciclico saranno combinati (77 C 6 - D 5). L'argomento successivo è detto "dell'affinità" (78 B 4 - 84 B 8): l'anima deve essere immortale in virtù della sua affinità con ciò che è invariabile, divino e immortale. Viene poi introdotta la dottrina delle Idee (100 B 5): solo in questa prospettiva, infatti, si può dimostrare l'immortalità dell'anima.

⁵⁸ Cf. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, I. Olympiodorus*, 10 § 1, 11 § 2, 11 § 3, 13 § 4 e Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, II. Damascius*, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam-Oxford-New York 1977 (Verhand d. Kon. Ned. Ak. v. Wetenschappen N.R. 93), § 207.

⁵⁹ Nel commento al *Fedone* di Olimpiodoro (§ 7.3-9) esso è attribuito a Giamblico. Secondo Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, I. Olympiodorus*, pp. 144-5, note 8 e 9, "Proclus may have known it from Iamblichus' com-

Nel *Fawz* i tre argomenti si incontrano, con lo stesso ordine, nei capitoli 6 e 7.⁶⁰ Il primo argomento, quindi, dipende dal *Fedone*.

Miskawayh, *Al-Fawz al-aşğar*, pp. 81.9-82.4 'Uđayma

في اقتصاص مذاهب الحكماء، والوجوه التي أثبتوا منها إن النفس لا تبطل ولا تموت. إعتد أفلاطن في بقاء النفس على ثلاث حجج إحداها: أن النفس تعطي كل ما توجد فيه حياة، والثانية: إن كل فاسد فإتما يفسد من قبل رداءة فيه، والثالثة: أن النفس متحركة من ذاتها. فأما الحجة الأولى فسياقتها على هذا: النفس تعطي الحياة أبدا كل ما توجد فيه فالحياة جوهرية لها، ولما كانت الحياة جوهرية لها فلن يمكن أن يقبل ضدها، وضد الحياة الموت، فالنفس إذا لا يمكن أن تقبل الموت. وقد أطنب أصحاب أفلاطن في تفسير هذا الفصل وأكثروا شرحه، وبينوا صحة مقدماته وتركيبها وصحة النتيجة منها، وسنذكر بعض ذلك إذا فرغنا من إيراد الحجج الثلاث.

Sul resoconto delle dottrine dei sapienti e sui modi in cui hanno stabilito che l'anima non si distrugge e non muore. Per dimostrare che l'anima è perpetua Platone si è appoggiato su tre prove: (1) l'anima apporta la vita a tutto ciò in cui si trova; (2) tutte le cose corruttibili sono corruttibili solo a causa del male che è in esse; (3) l'anima è mossa da se stessa. La prima prova è esposta come segue: l'anima apporta la vita a tutto ciò in cui si trova; dunque la vita per lei è sostanziale. Poiché la vita per lei è un carattere sostanziale, non è possibile che riceva il suo contrario. Ora, il contrario della vita è la morte; quindi è impossibile che l'anima riceva la morte. I Platonici hanno accuratamente interpretato questa sezione e ne hanno moltiplicato le spiegazioni rendendo chiara la verità delle sue premesse e la loro composizione, e l'esattezza della conclusione che ne deriva. Ne ricorderemo una parte quando avremo finito di esporre le tre prove.

Il primo argomento è quello del *Fedone*, e innanzitutto Miskawayh ne riassume il contenuto. Afferma, poi, che i Platonici hanno svolto un'accurata analisi di questa prova e promette di presentare le loro argomentazioni al termine della sua esposizione delle tre prove nel loro complesso. L'analisi di questo primo argomento si trova più avanti, alla fine del sesto capitolo, ed è attribuita esplicitamente a Proclo: la morte, che è contraria alla vita del corpo, è contraria anche alla vita dell'anima, ossia del principio che apporta la vita al corpo. Infatti la forma che apporta la vita e quella della vita conferita coincidono.

Miskawayh, *Al-Fawz al-aşğar*, p. 83.9-84.3 'Uđayma

وأما ما أورده برقلس في بيان الحجة الأولى الذي وعدنا بذكره فهو هذا: كل أمر ضاد أمرا صادرا عن قوة ما فهو مضاد القوة التي عنها صدر ذلك الأمر مثال ذلك البرودة فإنها مضادة الحرارة الصادرة عن النار وهي أيضا مضادة لما صدرت عنه الحرارة أعني النار فإذا كان هذا هكذا قلنا أن الموت إذا كان مضادا للحياة التي في البدن فهو مضاد أيضا لحياة النفس التي عنها صدرت حياة البدن فإذا

mentary on the *Phaedo* [...]”; un'altra spiegazione possibile è che “in this particular sentence Priscianus depends directly on Iamblichus, *De Anima*, which he cites as another of his sources”. Nelle *Solutiones*, p. 42.17 Bywater, si legge: “Iambliquusque de Anima scribens”. Su quest'opera di Giamblico cf. ora L.I. Martone, *Giamblico, De Anima. I frammenti, la dottrina*, Pisa U. P., Pisa 2014 (Greco, arabo, latino. Le vie del sapere. Studi, 3).

⁶⁰ Gli argomenti del *Fawz* si trovano anche, in forma quasi identica, nel *Kitāb al-ḥikma* contenuto nel manoscritto Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Esad Efendi* 1933, ff. 63r19-64r14, e nel manoscritto Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Marsh* 539, ff. 52v7-54r5, studiati da Wakelnig, “A New Version of Miskawayh's *Book of Triumph*”, e Ead., *A Philosophy Reader from the Circle of Miskawayh*, pp. 166-71 e p. 400.

كانت النفس العاقلة غير قابلة للموت – الذي هو ضد الحياة التي للبدن على ما تبين فيما مضى – كانت أيضا غير قابلة للموت الذي هو ضد الحياة التي لها، لأن المضاد لحياة البدن هو مضاد لحياتها أيضا كما بينا. فالنفس غير قابلة للموت المضاد للحياة التي فيها، فهي إذا غير مائة ولا فانية.

Ciò che Proclo ha portato come spiegazione della prima prova e che avevamo promesso di esporre è questo: ogni cosa che è contraria ad una cosa derivata da una potenza è contraria anche alla potenza dalla quale proviene la cosa. Un esempio è quello del freddo: esso è contrario al caldo che proviene dal fuoco, ed è contrario anche a ciò da cui proviene il caldo, cioè il fuoco. E se è così, diciamo che la morte, che è contraria alla vita che è nel corpo, è contraria anche alla vita dell'anima da cui proviene la vita del corpo. Se, inoltre, l'anima intellettuale non accoglie la morte che è contraria alla vita del corpo, come si è dimostrato sopra, essa non accoglie neppure la morte che è contraria alla sua vita, perché ciò che è contrario alla vita del corpo è contrario anche alla sua vita, come abbiamo spiegato. Dunque l'anima non accoglie la morte che è contraria alla vita che è in essa, e quindi essa è immortale e incorruttibile.

Questo è il vero e proprio argomento: nella parte precedente, tanto nel passo delle *Solutiones* che in quello di Miskawayh, viene solo riassunto il passo del *Fedone*. Si nota innanzitutto che mentre nelle *Solutiones* l'argomento viene attribuito a Plotino, Miskawayh lo attribuisce a Proclo. Anche la formulazione, benché riconducibile a una fonte comune, è leggermente differente. Mentre Plotino *apud* Prisciano sostiene che l'anima non può recepire dal corpo – realtà di grado inferiore – la vita, e quindi a più forte ragione non può recepire da esso la morte, Proclo *apud* Miskawayh afferma che l'anima non può recepire quella morte che è tipica del corpo (“contraria alla vita del corpo”) e quindi non può recepire neppure un'altra morte, che sarebbe quella contraria alla sua vita di sostanza intellettuale: inattaccabile da ogni tipo di morte, essa è dunque immortale. Queste differenze sono un forte indizio del fatto che Prisciano e Miskawayh hanno avuto accesso direttamente e indipendentemente al *Monobiblon*: Miskawayh non dipende dalle *Solutiones*, che pure in teoria avrebbe potuto conoscere.⁶¹ I due testi derivati, infatti, sviluppano in modo diverso un tema comune, ed è Miskawayh che attribuisce a Proclo la vera e propria argomentazione che amplia il passo del *Fedone*. La spiegazione più plausibile del riferimento a Plotino nel passo latino mi sembra quella di un'allusione alla dottrina plotiniana presente nel testo di Proclo e ripresa dal solo Prisciano.⁶²

Il secondo argomento è tratto dal libro X della *Repubblica*, 608 B 4 - 611 A 2.

II. Secondo argomento

Prisc. Lyd., *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, pp. 47.25-48.9 Bywater:

Secunda vero ratio: annon oportet tale proloquium prius accipere? Omne quod sua malitia non corruperit, hoc ab alterius cuiusdam corrumpi impossibile est. Non enim, ubi proprium bonum est, ipsum corruperit unumquodque: nam quod a continente est, ipsum salutare est, neque medium ambobus, quod quidem est neque bonum neque malum. Relinquitur dicere sic: solummodo uniuscuiusque corruptiuium uniuscuiusque malum. Et hoc autem accipiendum sic: animae malitia maior est morte corporis: malitiae autem animae sunt indisciplina, intemperantia, iniustitia, timor et quodcumque tale; anima vero has habens malitias non corrumpitur ab eis, neque eius macerant vitam, quod quidem est in corporibus corruptibilibus: sed irrationale quidem magis in eis vivit et tenetur; rationale vero

⁶¹ Cf. sopra, p. 129, sulla probabile traduzione in medio-persiano dello scritto di Prisciano, che fu composto certamente in greco.

⁶² Cf. n. 59.

vivit quidem similiter in se, quae autem sunt propter indisciplinationem minus cognoscit. Itaque qui omnem habent qualemcumque malitiam, non infirmantur, sed magis quasi a se ipsis infirmati et ad actiones commoti sunt magis contrariorum. Non igitur animae malitiae corrumpunt eam. Omne autem quod non corrumpitur a sua malitia, incorruptibile est. Igitur anima incorruptibilis est.

Quanto al secondo argomento, non dovremo per prima cosa essere d'accordo sul seguente preliminare? Ciò che non è corrotto dal suo proprio male, non può essere corrotto dal male di qualche altra cosa. Una qualunque cosa, infatti, non sarà corrotta proprio da quella cosa nella quale si trova il suo bene proprio: infatti, ciò che deriva dal principio conservatore è giovevole; e non [sarà corrotta neppure] da ciò che è intermedio fra i due, il che appunto non è né bene né male. Resta da dire così: la sola causa che può distruggere una cosa è il suo proprio male. E questo va inteso così: il male dell'anima è peggiore della morte del corpo. Ora, i mali dell'anima sono l'ignoranza, l'intemperanza, l'ingiustizia, il timore e le cose simili; ora, un'anima che soffre di questi mali non è distrutta da essi, né essi consumano la sua vita, come è nel caso dei corpi corruttibili; al contrario, la parte irrazionale è persino più animata e sostenuta da essi, mentre la parte razionale rimane ugualmente viva in se stessa, benché a causa dell'ignoranza abbia una conoscenza diminuita delle realtà. Perciò, coloro che hanno ogni tipo di malvagità certo non si ammalano, ma, quasi come se fossero resi ancora più malati da se stessi, sono ancora più pronti alle azioni di quelli a loro contrari. Di conseguenza, il male dell'anima non la distrugge; ora, qualsiasi cosa che non è distrutta dal suo proprio male è indistruttibile; dunque l'anima è indistruttibile.

Il male proprio di una cosa la distrugge; se invece si tratta di un male, ma non del male proprio di quella cosa, non le reca alcun danno. Ora, il male proprio dell'anima è l'ingiustizia, ma essa non causa la distruzione dell'anima; inoltre, l'anima non può essere intaccata dal male proprio del corpo al quale è unita, perché nessuna cosa perisce se non per il male che ad essa soltanto è connaturato. Dunque, dal fatto che l'anima non perisce né per il male suo proprio, né per il male proprio del corpo, segue che essa è immortale. Per illustrare la ragione per la quale l'anima non è distrutta neanche dai mali che le sono propri è utilizzata la stessa spiegazione fornita da Proclo nella X dissertazione del suo commento alla *Repubblica*.⁶³ Qui Proclo sostiene che i mali dell'anima sono conformi alla sua natura (κατὰ φύσιν) per quanto riguarda la parte irrazionale dell'anima, ma contrari alla natura (παρὰ φύσιν) per quanto riguarda la parte razionale. Ciò spiega perché la parte irrazionale non soltanto non è distrutta dai mali che le sono propri, ma anzi ne resa più forte e quindi più restia a

⁶³ Cf. Procl., *In Plat. Rem Publicam*, II, pp. 90.19-91.14 Kroll: εἰ δέ τις ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἄλογον μεταβάς, ὅπερ ὁ Τίμαιος λέγει θνητὸν εἶδος ζωῆς σαφῶς, ἀποροῦ, πῶς οὐχὶ κάκεῖνο ἀθάνατον, ὅπερ οὐ φθείρεται ὑπὸ ἀδικίας καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἀκολασίας, μεγίστων ὄντων κακῶν, εἴπερ μὴ θανάσιμα [...] ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι ταῦτα μέγιστα μὲν ἐστὶ κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν λογικῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀλόγων τρόπον τινὰ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ. [...] εἰ δέ τις ἐπιζητεῖ, πῶς δὲ ὅλως οὐ φθείρει τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ αὐτῆς πονηρία, εἴπερ ὀρισμός ἐστιν τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ φθαρτικὸν οὐ ἐστὶν κακόν, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀδικία φθείρει καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς τὰς νοεράς καὶ διανοητικὰς καὶ τὰς ὀρθὰς δόξας, ὥστερ αὐξοῖ τὰς τῶν ἀλόγων. διὸ καὶ ἐλέγομεν ἐκείναις εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν ἐναντίως γὰρ ἔχοντες ἢ τε λογικῆ ψυχῆ καὶ <ἢ> ἄλογος, καὶ τὸ τῆ ἑτέρα κατὰ φύσιν τὴν λοιπὴν διατίθησιν παρὰ φύσιν (Se, invece, passando alla considerazione della parte irrazionale stessa, che Timeo chiama "una specie mortale di vita", ci si domanda come questa parte non sia anch'essa immortale, dato che non è distrutta dall'ingiustizia, dalla viltà e dall'intemperanza, che sono i mali più grandi, dal momento che essi non sono mortiferi [...] diremo che questi sono i peggiori dei mali, ma per la parte razionale, poiché per la parte irrazionale sono in un certo modo conformi alla natura [...] se ci si chiede come, in maniera generale, la malvagità dell'anima non ne causa la distruzione, se è vero che il male si definisce per il potere di distruggere ciò di cui è il male, diremo che l'ingiustizia e l'intemperanza corrompono, ma solo le attività intellettive e dianoetiche dell'anima razionale e le opinioni corrette, così come peraltro accrescono le attività della parte irrazionale. Per questa ragione dicevamo che per quella parte essi sono conformi alla natura. Infatti, anima razionale e anima irrazionale sono contrarie, e ciò che per una è conforme alla natura mette l'altra in uno stato contro natura).

sottomettersi alla ragione. Tuttavia nemmeno la parte razionale dell'anima è distrutta da questi mali: essi ne corrompono le attività (ἐνέργειαι), ma non l'essenza, e ciò prova che l'anima è indistruttibile. Nel *Fawz*, Miskawayh riporta come secondo argomento il seguente:

Miskawayh, *Al-Fawz al-aṣḡar*, pp. 82.4-83.7 'Uḡayma

وأما الحجة الثانية فإنها مبنية على أنه لا رداءة في النفس، فينبغي أن نشرح حقيقة الرداءة وما يراد بها لتتم لنا سياقة البرهان بعد ذلك، فنقول إن الرداءة مقترنة بالفساد والفساد مقترن بالعدم والعدم مقترن بالهيوولى، فالرداءة مقترنة بالهيوولى، وبيان هذا الكلام أنه حيث لا هيوولى فلا عدم وحيث لا عدم فلا فساد وحيث لا فساد فلا رداءة، فالهيوولى معدن الرداءة وينبوع الشر وأصله الذي منه يتفرع ومقابل هذه الرداءة الجودة مقترنة بالبقاء والبقاء مقترن بالوجود والوجود هو أول صورة أبدعها البارى تعالى، فلذلك هو خير محض لا يشوبه شر ولا عدم واختص به العقل الفعال، وذلك أن الوجود الحق الذي ليس فيه هيوولى البتة ولا معنى الانفعال هو العقل الأول، وفي تبين الخير والشر الذي هو لا خير ولا شر كلام طويل يخرج بنا عن حد ما نخن فيه. ومن قرأ كلام أفلاطن فيه وكتابا لبرقلس خصه به، وكلاما لجالينوس فيه تبين له طوله وحاجته إلى الشرح، إلا أنني قد اجتهدت في اختصاره وإيراده مع ذلك مشروحا، ونعود الآن فنقول: إن النفس صورة يكمل البدن بوجودها فيه وليست إذا هيوولى، وقد بينا أيضا أنها ليست صورة هيوولانية أي محتاجة إلى الهيوولى في وجودها، فالنفس ليس فيها شيء من رداءة، فالنفس ليس لها فساد، فالنفس ليس لها عدم، فالنفس إذا باقية. فأما سياقة البرهان فهكذا: النفس ليس فيها شيء من الرداءة وكل ما ليس فيه شيء من الرداءة فليس بفساد فالنفس إذا ليست بفسادة.

Quanto alla seconda prova, essa è basata sul principio che nell'anima non c'è il male. Quindi dobbiamo spiegare la vera natura del male e che cosa si intende con esso per avere una dimostrazione completa. Dopo ciò diciamo che il male è legato alla corruzione, e la corruzione è legata al non-essere, e il non-essere alla materia. Quindi il male è legato alla materia. Da ciò risulta evidente che dove non c'è materia non c'è nemmeno non-essere. Ora, dove non c'è non-essere non c'è nemmeno corruzione, e dove non c'è corruzione non c'è il male. Quindi la materia è l'origine della malvagità, la fonte del male e la radice da cui si origina. Il contrario di questa malvagità è il bene. Il bene è legato alla permanenza, la permanenza è legata all'essere, e l'essere è la prima forma creata dal Creatore Altissimo. Dunque esso è bene puro, non commisto al male e al non-essere. Da lui si distingue l'Intelletto Agente: infatti l'essere vero, nel quale non c'è assolutamente traccia di materia e nessuna nozione di passività: è l'Intelletto Primo. L'esposizione del bene, del male e di ciò che non è né bene né male richiede un lungo discorso che ci farebbe oltrepassare i limiti del nostro discorso presente. Chi ha letto i discorsi di Platone su questo argomento e il libro in cui Proclo tratta questo argomento, e anche i discorsi di Galeno su questo, sa bene quanto sia lungo e quanto abbia bisogno di spiegazione. Tuttavia, mi sono sforzato di riassumerlo e di farlo comprendere attraverso una spiegazione. Adesso ricapitoliamo e diciamo: l'anima è una forma, grazie alla cui esistenza nel corpo questo diviene perfetto; quindi non è una materia. Abbiamo già spiegato anche che essa non è una forma materiale, cioè qualcosa che ha bisogno della materia per esistere. Perciò nell'anima non c'è affatto il male. Di conseguenza, l'anima non ha né corruzione né non-essere. Quindi l'anima è perenne. Così, la prova deve essere formulata come segue: nell'anima non c'è assolutamente il male; tutto ciò in cui non c'è assolutamente il male non è corrottile; quindi l'anima è incorrottile.

Miskawayh presenta l'argomento in modo diverso rispetto a Prisciano. Anziché sostenere che l'anima non è distrutta né dal male che le è proprio, né dal male del corpo al quale è unita, Miskawayh

afferma che nell'anima non è presente alcun tipo di male perché essa non è materiale, mentre il male è legato alla materia. A questo punto Miskawayh introduce una digressione per spiegare che cos'è il male e qual è la sua vera natura: esso ha origine dalla materia, mentre il contrario del male è il bene, che è legato alla permanenza; essa a sua volta è legata all'essere, che è la prima forma creata da Dio. Il bene, dunque, è l'essere vero. La chiara dipendenza terminologica e concettuale dai testi neoplatonici arabi prodotti nel "circolo di al-Kindi" esclude che questa parte dell'argomento si trovasse nel *Monobiblon* di Proclo.⁶⁴

L'argomento tratto dalla *Repubblica* è presente anche in uno dei due testi analizzati da Hasnawi,⁶⁵ la *Tamara laṭīfa min maqāyīs Aflātūn fī anna al-naḥsā lā tafṣud*. Se è vero, come nota Hasnawi, che "il faut reconnaître que MA – cioè la *Tamara* – et Priscien ne se superposent pas non plus exactement",⁶⁶ è altrettanto vero che, in maniera diversa, entrambi i testi commentano la prova del X libro della *Repubblica* attraverso l'argomento per il quale i mali dell'anima non ne corrompono l'essenza, ma soltanto le attività. Quest'idea è formulata esplicitamente dall'autore della *Tamara*:⁶⁷

وهذه لا تفسد جوهر النفس، لكن تضرّ بها .

Questi [i mali] non corrompono la sostanza dell'anima, ma la danneggiano.

فالشّرور المذكورة مضرّة بالأفعال، لا بالذات .

I mali che abbiamo ricordato nuocciono alle azioni, non all'essenza.⁶⁸

Come si è visto a proposito del secondo argomento così come esso è riportato nelle *Solutiones*, la ragione per la quale neanche i mali propri dell'anima ne causano la distruzione è la stessa che viene adottata da Proclo nel commento alla *Repubblica*. Prisciano però distingue l'anima razionale da quella irrazionale, mentre questa distinzione è assente nella *Tamara*.

Il terzo argomento è tratto essenzialmente dal *Fedro*.

III. Terzo argomento

Prisc. Lyd., *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, p. 48.10-49.36 Bywater:

Tertia autem ex causali circumfulsam approbationem habet. Quod enim a se ipso movetur, causale immortalitatis ostenditur animabus secundum essentiam in eis existens et quasi factuum immortalitatis causale. Quia vero a se movetur anima ostendendum sic: anima et vita est quasi aliis eam tradens, et per totam se ipsam vivit, quippe in se ipsam operans et ad se conversa. Quod enim aliis vitam praestat, illud prius per se ipsum vivit et secundum quod est vita movet (omnis enim hoc vitae proprium, quoquo modo movere) secundum vero quod vivit movetur. Omne enim participans vitae eo vivere movetur. Ex utrisque ergo factum est anima movens et motum, et ut totum ambo. Per totam igitur se ipsam et vivens est et vita. Eandem enim essentiam habens et operationem totum est operatio prius in se ipsam operans; et tota in totam se ipsam intrans, dum sit ipsum quod per se movetur et operans – et est sic simul utrumque operatio una; operatur enim in se ipsam et causa aliis est motus – se ipsam primo

⁶⁴ Sia l'espressione "Bene puro, *al-ḥayr al-mahḍ*" che l'identificazione di questo principio con l'Essere puro, cioè il primo principio, sono frequenti nel Plotino arabo e nel Proclo arabo. L'espressione *al-ḥayr al-mahḍ* è caratteristica del *Liber de Causis*, il cui titolo originale è appunto *Libro dell'esposizione del Bene Puro*.

⁶⁵ Hasnawi, "Deux textes en arabe".

⁶⁶ Hasnawi, "Deux textes en arabe", p. 404.

⁶⁷ Badawī, *Platon en pays d'Islam*, p. 331.10.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 331.15-16.

movet: separato enim causalia primum suimet sunt causa, et sic causatiuorum. Anima igitur vitalem habens motum simul movet essendo vita et simul movetur vivendo. Quod vero movet se et movetur a se ipso, pure est a se ipso motum: quod quidem in solis est incorporalibus et separatis essentiis, quale est anima; ipsa enim est ut vere quod a se movetur. Dat vero partecipanti corpori phantasiam per se motae vitae, ac per hoc animae nota figurativa et veluti quaedam diffinitio, ipsa per se motio, quippe per se subsistens et per se cognoscens. Dicendum ergo in brevi collective: omne animae partecipans vivens est; omne vivens proprium motum partecipat: omne igitur animae partecipans proprium motum partecipat. Sed quoniam animae ratio est praestare propriam motionem quibus assit; omne autem quod quandam formam efficit ipsum primo est quod partecipantibus infert: anima igitur primo est quod per se ipsum movetur. Hoc autem dicimus de sola rationali: irrationalis enim, quasi phantasiam propriae motionis habens, cum alio et non per semet ipsam est a se mota. Si enim esset per se ipsam a se mota nihil in movendum se ipsam indigens corporis, haberet separatam corporibus essentiam, sicut habet operationem separatam. Omne enim quod sine corpore operatur, et corpore est separatum, ut non quod est inseparatum habeat meliorem operationem essentia. Non igitur per se ipsam irrationalis, sed cum corpore est a se mota: et ex eo ergo quod movet se ipsam rationalis anima et movetur in se ipsam, a se mota approbata est; et nota figurativa sit et veluti quaedam diffinitio ipsius est, per se mota subsistentia. Movetur autem et movet et intelligens et tractans et aestimans. Etenim motus a se motus nullus passivorum est motuum: illi enim eorum quae ab alio moventur sunt; hic vero subsistentiae incorporalis. Movetur quidem et in motus corporales rationalis anima non corporaliter, sed et eos per se mutabiliter, utpote in generationem et corruptionem, augmentum et minorationem, et mutationem et eam quae secundum locum est transmutationem [*sic*]: fieri enim videtur ab eo quod non est, quod quidem est sensibilium, in id quod est prolata per meliorum et intelligibilium notitiam et susceptionem. Videtur quoque corruptionem partecipare ab eo quod est in id quod non est translata: meliorum enim notitiam perdit infirmata, et corporalibus criminibus data videtur partecipare per hoc corruptionem. Atqui et bono et pulcro et sapienti dicimus augeri animae oculus conversum; malo vero et turpi et contrariis corrumpi. Et mutationibus subsistit, per malitiam et virtutem qualitatibus transmutata, locales etiam motus. Nunc quidem enim in terra corpori cum sit connaturalis alligatur; ab eo vero alienata ad ordinatos ei locos redit. Sic igitur facit et corporales motus a se ipsa mota [*motata Bywater*]. Sequitur autem propriae rationis motionem et perfectum esse et per se sufficiens, quasi suimet solius indigens, non autem alterius, ad motum.

Il terzo [argomento], invece, ha la sua conferma chiara dalla causalità. Infatti, ciò che è mosso da se stesso si mostra essere la causa dell'immortalità per le anime, esistendo in esse per essenza, ed essendo, per così dire, la causa efficiente dell'immortalità. Ora, che l'anima muova se stessa deve essere provato così: l'anima è sia "vita", in quanto essa la apporta alle altre cose, sia "completamente viva", in quanto agisce su se stessa e si converte a se stessa. Infatti, ciò che conferisce la vita ad altro è in primo luogo vivo in virtù di se stesso, e nella misura in cui è vita impartisce il movimento (questo è proprio di ogni vita: impartire il movimento in qualunque modo); nella misura in cui vive, si muove. Infatti tutto ciò che partecipa della vita si muove in virtù del suo essere vivo. Quindi, da queste due considerazioni è dimostrato che l'anima muove ed è mossa, ed è entrambe le cose come un tutto. Dunque, essa stessa è sia viva che vita nella sua totalità. Infatti, dato che la sua essenza è identica alla sua attività, essa è interamente attività che agisce in primo luogo su se stessa e penetra nella sua interezza la sua propria totalità, nello stesso tempo è essa stessa ciò che si muove da sé e agisce, così che entrambe siano un'azione simultanea. Infatti essa agisce su se stessa ed è la causa del movimento per le altre cose – essa muove in primo luogo se stessa: infatti, le cause separate sono prima cause di se stesse, e solo in seguito dei loro effetti. L'anima, quindi, avendo un movimento vitale, nello stesso tempo impartisce il movimento in

quanto è vita, ed è in movimento in quanto è viva. Ora, ciò che muove se stesso ed è mosso da se stesso è puramente l'auto-movente, il che si trova nelle sole essenze incorporee e separabili, come l'anima; infatti, essa è veramente ciò che è mosso da se stesso. Ora, essa impartisce al corpo che ne partecipa un'apparenza di vita auto-mossa; così, per questo, la caratteristica specifica e, per così dire, una certa definizione dell'anima è l'auto-movimento, in quanto essa sussiste e conosce da se stessa. Dunque, riassumendo: qualunque cosa partecipa dell'anima è viva; qualunque cosa vivente partecipa di un proprio movimento; quindi, qualunque cosa partecipa dell'anima partecipa di un proprio movimento. Ma poiché l'essenza dell'anima è di impartire il movimento proprio a quelle cose nelle quali è presente, e tutto ciò che apporta una certa forma è primariamente esso stesso ciò che apporta ai partecipanti, ne risulta che l'anima è primariamente ciò che è mosso da se stesso. Inoltre, diciamo questo della sola parte razionale: la parte irrazionale, infatti, ha come l'apparenza di un proprio movimento, è automotrice insieme ad altro e non da se stessa soltanto. Infatti, se essa fosse automotrice da se stessa, non avendo bisogno del corpo per muoversi, avrebbe l'essenza separata dal corpo, così come ha un'attività separata. Infatti, qualunque cosa agisce senza il corpo, è anche separato dal corpo, di modo che ciò che non è separato non ha un'attività superiore alla sua essenza. Dunque, la parte irrazionale è automotrice non da se stessa, ma con il corpo. Quindi, sia dal fatto che muove se stessa, sia dal fatto che è mossa in se stessa, si è dimostrato che l'anima razionale è automotrice; dunque, la caratteristica specifica e, per così dire, una certa sua definizione è "sostanza che muove se stessa". Ora, essa è mossa e muove pensando, esaminando e giudicando, perché il movimento auto-movente non è nessuno dei movimenti passivi: infatti, essi appartengono alle cose che sono mosse da altro, mentre questo [movimento è proprio] della sostanza incorporea. In verità, l'anima razionale è mossa nei movimenti corporei non in maniera corporea, ma compie anche questi in maniera mutevole da sé, come nella generazione e nella corruzione, nell'aumento e nella diminuzione, nel cambiamento e nel moto locale: infatti, sembra essere generata da ciò che non è, il che è proprio delle cose sensibili, verso ciò che è, attraverso la conoscenza e la percezione delle cose migliori e degli intelligibili. Essa sembra anche partecipare della corruzione, quando passa da ciò che è a ciò che non è: infatti, indebolita, perde la conoscenza delle cose migliori e, abbandonata alle colpe corporee, sembra partecipare per questo alla corruzione. Eppure, diciamo che grazie a ciò che è bene, bello e saggio, la visione dell'anima è accresciuta, mentre a causa del male, del brutto e delle cose contrarie [a quelle enumerate], essa si corrompe. Essa è soggetta ai cambiamenti perché attraverso il vizio e la virtù è trasformata qualitativamente; vi sono poi i movimenti locali. Ora, certamente sulla terra essa è legata al corpo al quale è connaturale; ma, quando ne è separata, ritorna al suo luogo stabilito. Così, dunque, compie anche i movimenti corporei mossa da se stessa. Ora, all'auto-movimento segue l'essere perfetto e autosufficiente, poiché per muoversi essa ha bisogno solo di se stessa, e non anche di altro.

Il punto di partenza del terzo argomento è il passo del *Fedro*, 245 C 5 - 246 A 2: l'anima è quel principio che muove se stesso (245 E 2-6); ciò che muove se stesso è immortale (245 C 5 - E 2); quindi l'anima è immortale (246 A 1-2). L'anima è detta auto-movente in base alla distinzione tra ciò che ha un principio di movimento interno e ciò che riceve il movimento dall'esterno; invece la dimostrazione del fatto che ciò che muove se stesso è immortale si basa sull'argomento per cui ciò che muove se stesso non cessa mai di essere in moto ed è principio di movimento per le altre cose. Ora, il "principio" non è generato ed è quindi immortale; ciò che muove se stesso sarà quindi ingenerato e immortale. Nel passo di Prisciano sembra presente anche l'eco della classificazione dei movimenti che si trova nelle *Leggi*. Qui (894 B - 899 D) Platone discute dell'anima e del movimento: l'errore dei filosofi naturalisti consiste nel considerare l'anima una realtà materiale e nel negare la sua anteriorità rispetto al corpo. Credere che l'anima sia anteriore e superiore al corpo è invece la premessa indispensabile per asserire l'esistenza degli dei. Esistono dieci specie di movimento, e quello con il quale qualcosa muove se stesso

e anche le altre cose è prioritario. L'anima è "quel movimento che è capace di muovere se stesso" (896 A 2), "la piú antica di tutte le cose, in quanto è principio di movimento" (896 B 3-4), e dunque ha il primato rispetto al corpo da essa governato. L'anima dimora in tutte le cose e le governa; quella migliore guida il moto circolare dell'universo, nel quale sono presenti molti corpi celesti, tutti dotati di anima. Queste considerazioni sull'eccellenza dell'anima mostrano che "tutto è pieno di dei" (899 B 10). In questo modo la confutazione dell'ateismo può considerarsi compiuta. Il punto di partenza dell'argomento riassunto da Prisciano è il passo del *Fedro*, se non altro perché questa dimostrazione è piú chiaramente diretta a provare l'immortalità delle anime individuali⁶⁹ rispetto a quella delle *Leggi*. Ma il riferimento ai vari tipi di movimento fa pensare alle *Leggi*; la combinazione dei due passi platonici era una prassi nei commenti neoplatonici sul *Fedro*, come dimostra il commento di Ermia:⁷⁰ una testimonianza importante, in quanto costituito da una raccolta di note di lezione prese dall'autore durante un corso di Siriano al quale aveva partecipato anche Proclo.⁷¹ Se quindi nelle *Solutiones* c'è l'eco delle *Leggi*, ciò porta a pensare che Proclo avesse ripreso nel *Monobiblon* un tipico modo di combinare i due testi platonici.⁷² Ancora, nel passo di Prisciano si sottolinea che l'automovimento caratterizza la sola anima razionale. L'anima irrazionale si muove con il corpo, mentre l'anima razionale si muove da se stessa tramite il pensiero ed il ragionamento; essa sola dunque è immortale, perché la sua attività, e di conseguenza la sua essenza, sono separate dalle attività del corpo.

Nel *Fawz* l'argomento è dapprima brevemente enunciato; segue il passo già citato sopra, nel quale Miskawayh torna a parlare della prima prova;⁷³ inizia poi un nuovo capitolo, il settimo, con il titolo "Sull'essenza dell'anima e la sua vita, e su ciò che è questa vita e come si conserva in tale modo, cosí da avere una durata perpetua ed essere eterna". Qui si trova lo svolgimento vero e proprio dell'argomentazione.

Miskawayh, *Al-Fawz al-asğar li-Miskawayh*, pp. 83.7-9 e 84.5-85.15 'Uđayma

وأما الحجة الثالثة فهي هذه: النفس متحركة من ذاتها، وكل ما كانت حركته من ذاته فهو غير فاسد فالنفس غير فاسدة [...] في مائة النفس والحياة التي لها وما تلك الحياة؟ وما الذي يحفظها عليها حتى تكون دائمة للبقاء سرمدية؟ إن الحكماء لما لحظوا النفس من حيث كانت متممة للبدن محيية له قالوا: هي حياة ولم

⁶⁹ Bisogna notare, tuttavia, che la logica dell'argomento richiede che vi sia un unico principio di movimento; nel passo di Plat., *Phaedr.* 245 D 6 - E 2 si legge infatti: οὕτω δὲ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίνεσθαι δυνατὸν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γῆν εἰς ἓν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὔθις ἔχειν ὄθιν κινήθεται γενήσεται. "Ciò che muove se stesso è principio di movimento, esso non può né morire né nascere, altrimenti l'intero universo e tutto ciò che è in movimento, cadendo in rovina, si fermerebbe e mai piú potrebbe trovare donde riprendere moto e vita" (trad. it. di P. Pucci). Alla base della prova del *Fedro* sta dunque l'impossibilità di un collasso totale dell'universo, ma l'argomento vale solo se esiste un unico principio di movimento.

⁷⁰ *Hermiae Alexandrini In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, ed. P. Couvreur, Bouillon, Paris 1901; rist. Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim - New York 1971, pp. 102.9-120.16; Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, ed. C. M. Lucarini - C. Moreschini, De Gruyter, Berlin 2012 (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), pp. 107.26-125.23. Cf. R. Goulet, s.v. "Hermeias d'Alexandrie", in *DPhA*, III [2000], pp. 639-41.

⁷¹ Ermia (Herm. Alex., *In Plat. Phaed. Scholia*, p. 92.6-7 Couvreur = p. 96.24-26 Lucarini-Moreschini) riporta un'obiezione sollevata da Proclo durante il corso di Siriano a proposito di *Phaedr.* 224 A 8 - 245 C 1: Ἡπόρησεν ὁ ἑταῖρος Πρόκλος πῶς, εἰ ἐκ διαρέσεως λαμβάνονται αἱ μανίαι, δυνατὸν ἄλλην εἶναι παρὰ ταύτας. (Il nostro compagno Proclo ha sollevato la seguente difficoltà: se i tipi di follia si ottengono per divisione, come può essercene ancora un altro oltre a quelli risultanti dalla divisione?).

⁷² Cf. Westerink, "Proclus on Plato's Three Proofs of Immortality", p. 302.

⁷³ Cf. sopra, pp. 133-4. Nelle citazione presente, il passo citato a pp. 133-4 è sostituito da [...].

irridono perché non vogliono che l'anima sia immortale, e che si muova da sé, e che sia incorruttibile. Per questo dicono che l'anima è una sostanza che si muove da sé, e che è incorruttibile. [...] Sull'essenza dell'anima e la sua vita, e su ciò che è questa vita e come si conserva in tale modo, così da avere una durata perpetua ed essere eterna. Quando i sapienti hanno osservato l'anima, in quanto essa perfeziona e vivifica il corpo, hanno detto che è la vita. Ma con questo non volevano dire che quella è la forma della vita, perché questo si è già dimostrato falso. Essi volevano dire che l'anima è la causa della vita per i corpi, perché è più prossima alla vita di quanto non lo siano i corpi. E quando hanno osservato l'anima in se stessa, indipendentemente dalla sua relazione con il corpo, hanno detto che essa muove se stessa. Platone, parlando in generale di essa, ha detto che è movimento, quando ha detto nel libro delle *Leggi*: "La sostanza di ciò che muove se stesso è movimento". Dobbiamo dunque considerare questo movimento che appartiene all'anima, poiché abbiamo già detto che l'anima è sostanza e non corpo. Ora, nessuno dei movimenti che abbiamo enumerato, cioè i sei movimenti del corpo, si addice alla sostanza. Quindi diciamo: questo movimento è il movimento della riflessione ed esso è la rotazione dell'anima che esiste per esso perpetuamente. Infatti, troviamo che l'anima non è esente da questo movimento in nessuna situazione. In quanto non è corporeo, questo movimento non è spaziale, e, in quanto non è spaziale, non è esterno all'essenza dell'anima. Perciò Platone ha detto: "La sostanza dell'anima è il movimento, e questo movimento è la vita dell'anima". In quanto è essenziale, la vita è essenziale per esso. Colui che è capace di osservare questo movimento in quanto è fisso nella sua essenza, non cade sotto il tempo e muove se stesso, e ha contemplato la sostanza dell'anima. Con l'espressione "sotto il tempo" intendo che tutti i diversi generi di movimento naturale cadono sotto il tempo. Ora, ciò che è nel tempo è vero solo nel passato o nel futuro; ma il passato temporale è già stato

La terza prova è la seguente: l'anima muove se stessa; ciò che muove se stesso non è corruttibile; dunque l'anima è incorruttibile. [...] Sull'essenza dell'anima e la sua vita, e su ciò che è questa vita e come si conserva in tale modo, così da avere una durata perpetua ed essere eterna. Quando i sapienti hanno osservato l'anima, in quanto essa perfeziona e vivifica il corpo, hanno detto che è la vita. Ma con questo non volevano dire che quella è la forma della vita, perché questo si è già dimostrato falso. Essi volevano dire che l'anima è la causa della vita per i corpi, perché è più prossima alla vita di quanto non lo siano i corpi. E quando hanno osservato l'anima in se stessa, indipendentemente dalla sua relazione con il corpo, hanno detto che essa muove se stessa. Platone, parlando in generale di essa, ha detto che è movimento, quando ha detto nel libro delle *Leggi*: "La sostanza di ciò che muove se stesso è movimento". Dobbiamo dunque considerare questo movimento che appartiene all'anima, poiché abbiamo già detto che l'anima è sostanza e non corpo. Ora, nessuno dei movimenti che abbiamo enumerato, cioè i sei movimenti del corpo, si addice alla sostanza. Quindi diciamo: questo movimento è il movimento della riflessione ed esso è la rotazione dell'anima che esiste per esso perpetuamente. Infatti, troviamo che l'anima non è esente da questo movimento in nessuna situazione. In quanto non è corporeo, questo movimento non è spaziale, e, in quanto non è spaziale, non è esterno all'essenza dell'anima. Perciò Platone ha detto: "La sostanza dell'anima è il movimento, e questo movimento è la vita dell'anima". In quanto è essenziale, la vita è essenziale per esso. Colui che è capace di osservare questo movimento in quanto è fisso nella sua essenza, non cade sotto il tempo e muove se stesso, e ha contemplato la sostanza dell'anima. Con l'espressione "sotto il tempo" intendo che tutti i diversi generi di movimento naturale cadono sotto il tempo. Ora, ciò che è nel tempo è vero solo nel passato o nel futuro; ma il passato temporale è già stato

e il futuro temporale ancora non è, di conseguenza il tempo non esiste che nel divenire e il movimento naturale non esiste che nel divenire. Per questo Platone nel *Timeo* ha chiesto: “Qual è la cosa che ha il divenire e non ha l’essere? E qual è la cosa che ha l’essere e non ha il divenire?” Con “ciò che diviene e non ha l’essere” intendeva il movimento spaziale e temporale, perché non lo giudica degno del nome di “essere”, dato che la misura della sua esistenza è soltanto nell’adesso, e l’adesso sta al tempo come il punto sta alla linea. Dato che la sua partecipazione all’essere non è costante né nel passato né nel futuro, ma si trova soltanto quando corrisponde all’adesso, il nome di “essere” non gli si addice, ma è detto perpetuamente in divenire. Per quanto riguarda “l’essere che non ha il divenire”, è ciò che è al di sopra del tempo; e ciò che è al di sopra del tempo è anche al di sopra del movimento naturale, e ciò che è al di sopra del movimento naturale è anche al di sopra della natura. Ciò che ha un’esistenza di questo tipo non cade sotto il passato o sotto il futuro, ma la sua esistenza somiglia all’eternità, cioè la perpetuità e la durata.

La terza prova è presentata nella forma di un sillogismo: l’anima si muove attraverso un movimento essenziale; ciò che si muove per essenza non è corruttibile; dunque l’anima è incorruttibile. La discussione dell’argomento continua nel capitolo successivo dove, come in Prisciano, vengono esaminati i movimenti di cui è questione nelle *Leggi* X, 893 B 6 - 894 C 9, letti alla luce dello schema aristotelico delle *Categorie*. Questa parte corrisponde alla parte finale del resoconto di Prisciano. In ambedue i testi, latino e arabo, si tratta di esaminare in che modo i tipi di movimento distinti nelle *Leggi* siano applicabili all’anima, ma è solo nel passo *apud* Miskawayh che le *Leggi* sono citate esplicitamente: un altro indizio del fatto che Miskawayh ha avuto accesso al *Monobiblon* di Proclo indipendentemente dalle *Solutiones* di Prisciano. Segue, nel *Fawz*, un’esposizione della dottrina platonica dell’eternità e del tempo e della differenza tra realtà temporali e realtà eterne, la cui ispirazione originale è naturalmente il *Timeo* (27 D 5 - 28 A 1 e 37 D - 38 B) e che, come ha osservato Westerink, non doveva fare parte della monografia di Proclo.⁷⁴ Si può aggiungere anche la fonte più verosimile: il *Liber de Causis*, con la sua gerarchia di gradi dell’essere comparati con l’eternità e con il tempo.⁷⁵

5. Conclusione

Un breve testo di Proclo sulle prove platoniche dell’immortalità dell’anima, perduto nella sua versione originale, è giunto sino a noi in due traduzioni: latina e araba. Proclo morì nel 485 d.C.; nei primi decenni del secolo successivo, Prisciano Lido portò con sé il *Monobiblon* durante il suo soggiorno a Ctesifonte e se ne servì nelle risposte alle questioni sollevate dall’imperatore Cosroe. Lo scritto di Prisciano fu tradotto in latino nel IX secolo. Nel X secolo, il *Monobiblon* fu utilizzato da Miskawayh nel *Kitāb al-fawz al-asġar*. Per il momento non è possibile dire se Miskawayh ebbe accesso al *Monobiblon* di Proclo come scritto indipendente o se trovò le tre prove già incluse in un repertorio dossografico, ma il confronto fra le *Solutiones* e il *Fawz* suggerisce almeno un dato, minore ma praticamente certo: le due traduzioni, latina e araba, sono indipendenti.

La storia dello scritto di Proclo sulle prove platoniche dell’immortalità dell’anima è un caso particolarmente interessante della storia più ampia della circolazione dei testi filosofici fra la tarda

⁷⁴ Westerink, “Proclus on Plato’s Three Proofs of Immortality”, p. 306, nota che questo passo “apart from the fact that Proclus usually takes such fundamental notions for granted, goes astray where it identifies soul with real existence and its motion with eternity”.

⁷⁵ Cf. C. D’Ancona, “Esse quod est supra eternitatem. La Cause première, l’être et l’éternité dans le *Liber de Causis* et dans ses sources”, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 59 (1992), pp. 41-62.

antichità e il Medioevo, cioè di quella “comunità epistemica” mediterranea della quale parla Gerhard Endress per descrivere l'acquisizione della scienza dimostrativa nell'intellettualità arabo-islamica.⁷⁶

La prospettiva nella quale Miskawayh utilizza la monografia di Proclo è quella ereditata da al-Kindī (m. 870 ca.), filosofo e scienziato enciclopedico convinto della possibilità di conciliare la filosofia e il Corano. Sulla scorta della tradizione della tarda antichità, al-Kindī ha trasmesso ai letterati dell'Oriente musulmano l'idea della reciproca coerenza dei sistemi di pensiero di Platone e Aristotele e, insieme, della loro piena conciliabilità con la religione islamica.⁷⁷ La questione dell'immortalità è una dottrina che si pone all'incrocio tra la religione rivelata e la scienza: enunciata in un contesto religioso essa è oggetto di fede, ma in un contesto scientifico può essere verificata o falsificata, e solo il metodo dimostrativo può farlo. Miskawayh, nella sua indagine intorno all'anima umana e al suo destino, ha tentato di evitare la contrapposizione tra la scienza e il Corano, unendo idee platoniche ad elementi aristotelici:⁷⁸ ha fatto ricorso alla monografia di Proclo proprio per dotarsi delle prove scientifiche delle quali aveva bisogno per fornire la dimostrazione di una verità creduta per fede. La storia della duplice sopravvivenza del *Monobiblon*, latina e araba, testimonia che il lavoro dei traduttori ha creato un comune sistema di riferimento, sostenuto dalla tradizione di insegnamento praticata nelle scuole filosofiche della tarda antichità.

⁷⁶ G. Endress, “La via della felicità. Il ruolo della filosofia nell'Islam medievale”, in C. D'Ancona (a cura di), *Storia della filosofia nell'Islam medievale*, Einaudi, Torino 2005, pp. xxiii-lII.

⁷⁷ Cf. G. Endress, “La ‘concordance entre Platon et Aristote’, l'Aristote arabe et l'émancipation de la philosophie en Islam médiéval”, in B. Mojsisch - O. Pluta (ed.), *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag*, Grüner, Amsterdam - Philadelphia 1991, pp. 237-57.

⁷⁸ Lo stesso metodo è seguito da Miskawayh nella sua opera più celebre, il *Tabḍīb al-ablāq* (*Riforma dei costumi*); *Tabḍīb al-ablāq li-Abi 'Alī Aḥmad ibn Miskawayh*, ed. Q. Zurayk, al-Ġāmi'a al-Amirikyya, Beirut 1966; trad. inglese: C.K. Zurayk, *The Refinement of Character: A Translation from the Arabic of Ahmad ibn Muhammad Miskawayh Tabḍīb al-ablāq*, American University of Beirut Centennial Publications, Beirut 1968; trad. francese: *Traité d'Éthique (Tabḍīb al-ablāq wa taḥrīr al-'arāq)*, traduction française avec introduction et notes par M. Arkoun, Institut Français de Damas, Damas 1969 (rist. Vrin, Paris 2010). Cf. R. Walzer, “Some Aspects of Miskawaih's *Tabḍīb al-ablāq*”, in Id., *Greek into Arabic. Essays on Islamic Philosophy*, Cassirer, Oxford 1963² (*Oriental Studies*, 1), pp. 220-35.

Editio princeps *del Liber qui uocatur Suda di Roberto Grossatesta*

Tiziano Dorandi, Michele Trizio*

Abstract

The *Liber qui uocatur Suda* in the Latin translation by Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1168-† 8/9 October 1253) is transmitted in an incomplete form in two manuscripts housed in London (R) and Oxford (D) respectively. The *Liber* results from Grosseteste's selection and Latin translation of a few entries from the Byzantine *Suda*. The present text is the *editio princeps* of this translation and counts as a preliminary step to a wider editorial project, in which the whole of the *Suda* as translated by the Bishop of Lincoln will be edited critically. The introduction to the present edition, based on mss. R and D, lists fifteen witnesses preserving chapter 2 (the entry Ἰησοῦς in the *Suda*). The relationship between these witnesses and the double redaction of this chapter is also discussed. The authors investigate the composition and features of the *Liber* and provide the first edition of the text, accompanied by the account of the ecdotic criteria adopted.

Introduzione

Roberto Grossatesta (vescovo di Lincoln dal 1235), uomo di chiesa eminente, studioso di scienza e filosofo, è ben conosciuto anche per la sua attività di traduttore dal greco in latino di opere non solo patristiche (il *corpus* dello pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita o i *Testamenta duodecim patriarcharum*), ma anche filosofiche (l'*Ethica Nicomachea* di Aristotele e l'insieme dei suoi commentatori tardo-antichi e bizantini).¹ Nell'ambito di questa attività, poca attenzione ha ricevuto, forse a causa della difficoltà di reperirne le tracce, forse anche per il soggetto alquanto peregrino, la traduzione di una scelta assai limitata di voci del lessico bizantino *Suda* (X sec.) che Roberto preparò in tempi e con fini diversi.

Da alcuni anni, mi sono interessato a questa traduzione e a una raccolta dei frammenti in vista di una sua edizione il più possibile completa con la collaborazione di Michele Trizio.²

* L'articolo esce a due nomi ed è il frutto di una stretta collaborazione. Più nei dettagli, Michele Trizio ha fatto una prima trascrizione dei codici **D** e **R**; questa è stata rivista da Tiziano Dorandi e in seguito verificata di nuovo da M. Trizio. Le trascrizioni dei codici della traduzione della voce Ἰησοῦς sono state eseguite da Dorandi, che ha anche potuto utilizzare le collazioni e l'edizione (allora inedita) preparata dal Professore Jeroen De Keyser (Leuven). Dorandi ha poi curato una prima redazione dell'edizione del testo e degli apparati critici. Questa è stata riletta e postillata da Trizio e infine preparata per la stampa nella versione finale dai due autori. A Dorandi riviene la stesura dell'Introduzione. Un ringraziamento sincero e cordiale rivolgiamo a J. De Keyser per avere messo a disposizione il suo materiale e per le proficue discussioni; a Guy Guldentops (Köln) per l'attenta lettura dell'intero testo; a Cristina D'Ancona per avere ospitato l'articolo nella rivista; a Elisa Coda e Gloria Giacomelli infine per la pazienza infinita con la quale hanno seguito tutte le fasi di stampa.

¹ La ricerca pionieristica di E. Franceschini, "Roberto Grossatesta e le sue traduzioni latine", in *Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti* 93 (1933-1934), pp. 1-138 (= Id., *Scritti di filologia latina medievale*, Antenore, Padova 1976, pp. 409-544) resta indispensabile. Più di recente, il soggetto è stato indagato con ottimi risultati da A.C. Dionisotti, "On the Greek Studies of Robert Grosseteste", in A.C. Dionisotti - A. Grafton - J. Kraye (ed.), *The Uses of Greek and Latin*, The Warburg Institute - University of London, London 1988, pp. 19-39 e Ead., "Robert Grosseteste and the Greek Encyclopaedia", in J. Hamesse - M. Fattori (ed.), *Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale*, Université Catholique de Louvain - Università degli Studi di Cassino, Louvain-la-Neuve - Cassino 1990, pp. 337-53.

² Per una presentazione dei primi risultati, vedi T. Dorandi, "*Liber qui uocatur Suda*. La traduction de la *Souda* de Robert Grosseteste", *Aevum* 87 (2013), pp. 391-440.

A quanto sembra, Grossatesta si era accostato alla *Suda* come a un documento che gli offriva facile accesso a una immensa raccolta di materiale quantomai utile per la compilazione in particolare delle *notulae* che accompagnano e glossano le sue opere di erudizione e quelle di divulgazione in latino di testi greci.³ Della sua traduzione della *Suda* conserviamo tracce consistenti in due manoscritti del XIV secolo (uno a Londra, sigla **R**, e uno a Oxford, sigla **D**) che tramandano parti di una medesima raccolta che riuniva diverse decine di voci di quel lessico, accorpate non sappiamo bene né da chi né quando. È probabile che la raccolta fosse stata organizzata, se non dallo stesso Roberto, da qualcuno a lui vicino recuperando quel materiale nelle carte del Vescovo.

Quattordici ulteriori testimoni (oltre a **R**) tramandano inoltre la versione dell'unica voce della *Suda* intitolata Ἡσοῦς, in due redazioni distinte.

Numerose occorrenze indipendenti della traduzione sono sparse anche in scritti di Grossatesta e nelle *notulae* alla sua versione dei *Commentari* greci all'*Etica Nicomachea*.

Tracce probabili della traduzione si recuperano infine nel cosiddetto *Lexicon Arundelianum*, un dizionario bilingue greco-latino (scritto essenzialmente in caratteri latini) compilato all'origine in Italia del Sud e di lì passato in Inghilterra. Ne conserviamo una sola copia della fine del XIII secolo, trasmessa dal codice *Arundel*. 9 del College of Arms o Herald's College di Londra. Un esemplare del lessico (forse il modello dell'*Arundel*. 9) appartenne a Grossatesta o circolò nel suo *milieu* culturale.

Una caratteristica di estremo interesse della redazione di alcune voci della traduzione è la "contaminazione" del loro testo con elementi recuperati nel lessico che conosciamo oggi col titolo *Etymologicum Gudianum*, una cui copia dovette essere a disposizione di Grossatesta.⁴

Di tutte le testimonianze ho preparato una lista senza dubbio né esaustiva né definitiva.⁵

La *versio Lincolniensis* della *Suda* dovette avere una diffusione assai limitata (e forse solo indiretta). Sono riuscito a delinearne alcuni momenti in scrittori dei secoli XIII e XIV: John of Wales, Alberto Magno, John Ridevall e Richard of Bury.⁶

Una rapida conclusione del progetto di pubblicazione dell'insieme dei frammenti della traduzione è ostacolata soprattutto dalla mancanza totale di edizioni di numerosi testi del medesimo Grossatesta, che siano le traduzioni del *corpus* pseudo-dionisiano o quella dei libri V-VI dei commenti all'*Ethica Nichomachea*. Né meno grave è la realtà che quasi due terzi del *Lexicon Arundelianum* restano tuttora inediti.⁷

³ La forma e la struttura delle *notulae* è bene indagata da H.P.F. Mercken, *The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln (†1253)*. Vol. I: *Eustratius on Book I, and the Anonymous Scholia on Books II, III, and IV*, Brill, Leiden 1973, pp. 45*-47*.

⁴ Vedi Dionisotti, "On the Greek Studies", pp. 35-6. Ulteriore materiale è disponibile in Dorandi, "La traduction", pp. 412-15.

⁵ Nel mio articolo "La traduction", pp. 434-8.

⁶ Vedi Dorandi, "La traduction", pp. 422-6.

⁷ A. Garzya ha pubblicato l'insieme delle lettere A, B, Γ, Z, H, X, Ψ, Ω del *Lexicon Arundelianum*: "La lettera A del lessico greco-latino del College of Arms di Londra", *Rendiconti Accademia di Archeologia e Belle Lettere Napoli* n.s. 70 (2001), pp. 115-231; "Dal Lessico greco-latino del College of Arms. Lettera B", *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 44 (1994), pp. 105-124; "Dall'inedito Lessico greco-latino del College of Arms. Lettera Γ", *Rendiconti Accademia di Archeologia e Belle Lettere Napoli* n.s. 65 (1995), pp. 117-30 = *Do-ra-ge pe-re. Studi in memoria di Adriana Quattordio Moreschini*, F. Serra, Pisa 1998, pp. 201-11; "Per l'*editio princeps* del Lessico greco-latino del College of Arms di Londra: le lettere Z, H, X, Ψ, Ω", *Atti Accademia Pontaniana Napoli* n.s. 49 (2000), pp. 235-60 = "Dall'inedito Lessico greco-latino del College of Arms. Lettere Z e H", in L. Torraca (a. c. di), *Studi I. Gallo*, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Napoli 2002, pp. 329-36 e "Per l'*editio princeps* del Lessico Greco-Latino del College of Arms di Londra. Le lettere X Ψ Ω", in *Τιμητικὸν ἀπιέρωμα εἰς τὸν καθηγητὴν Α.Δ. Κομίνην, Ἐπετηρὶς Ἐταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* 51 (2003), pp. 187-203.

Di fronte a questa situazione, abbiamo preso la decisione di divulgare in anteprima l'*editio princeps* di almeno quel gruppo di voci della *Suda* che ci sono giunte con il titolo *Liber qui uocatur Suda*, nei due codici di Londra e Oxford.

*I manoscritti London, BL Royal 8 B. IV (R) e Oxford, Bodleian Digby 11 (D)*⁸

R = London, British Library, *Royal 8 B. IV*, XIV s.

Codice pergameneo appartenuto all'Abbazia di Bury-St.-Edmund (contea di Suffolk) per la quale era stato acquistato da Henry de Kirkestede.

Limite le mie osservazioni alla sezione che tramanda la traduzione di Grossatesta.

Sul f. 1r-v si legge un elenco dei settantuno capitoli che costituivano, all'origine, l'insieme del *Liber qui uocatur Suda*. Va subito notato che alcuni capitoli raggruppano piú unit  testuali separate nella *Suda*. Questo indice   stato aggiunto in un secondo momento su un foglio rimasto bianco da un anonimo contemporaneo di Kirkestede, che non   lo stesso che ha copiato otto estratti della traduzione ai ff. 73r - 80r. I passi trascritti corrispondono ai capitoli 2, 6, 3, 24, 33, 23, 10 e 34 dell'indice del f. 1r-v. Essi sono riuniti sotto il titolo (f. 73r) *narracio libri de suda quem robertus episcopus lincoln(iensis) de greco transtulit in latinum*, e preceduti da una breve introduzione, che riproduce in forma abbreviata e assai scorretta il "proemio" che apre la *Suda*.⁹ Al f. 80r, di seguito all'ultimo estratto, leggiamo (di mano di Henry di Kirkestede): *non plus habetur apud len(n)ia(m). sed residuum est oxonie*.¹⁰

D = Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Digby 11*, XIII e XIV s.

Manoscritto pergameneo. Gli estratti della traduzione della *Suda* occupano, vergati da una mano del XIV s., i ff. 33r - 43v. Vi sono ricopiati 39 capitoli (computati in margine dalla stessa mano) che corrispondono ai numeri da 32 (*incipit mutilus*) a 71 della lista iniziale di **R**. Ancora una volta, alcuni capitoli raggruppano piú unit  separate nella *Suda*.

I due manoscritti hanno in comune solo la traduzione delle due voci "Hermes" = *Suda*, s.u. Ἑρμῆν,   3037 (II, p. 413.21-31) e s.u. Ἑρμῆς,   Τρισημέγιστος,   3038 (II, p. 413.32-414.10) e "Orpheus" = *Suda*, s.u. Ὀρφεύς,   654 (III, p. 564.23-565.11) e s.u. Ὀρφεύς,   660 (III, p. 565.24-566.11). Il confronto fra le loro varianti risulta assai istruttivo per la storia del testo della *versio Linconlniensis*.¹¹

Ll. 314-315 *uelud armis subiugatorum hominum* **D**: *uelud armis subiugatis hominibus* **R**; l. 322 *natura* **R** (φύσει *Su*): *potentia* **D**; l. 324 *firmauit* ( στρηξ ετο *Su*) **R**: *formaui* **D**; l. 335 *tronizaciones* **D**: *tronismos* **R**; l. 336 *rete seu rethe* **D**^{p.c.} (*reticulum?* **D**^{ac.}): *dictuon* **R**, ut uid.; l. 352 *miserabiliter* ( θλ ως *Su*) **D**: *insatiabiliter* **R**.

La scomparsa del Professore Garzya lascia aperta e incerta la successione editoriale di questo importante documento. L'edizione dei libri V e VI dei *Commentari* all'*Etica a Nicomaco*   affidata a M. Trizio.

⁸ Per maggiori dettagli sui manoscritti, vedi Dorandi, "Traduction", pp. 396-400.

⁹ Lo stesso testo si ritrova con varianti grafiche a introduzione della traduzione della voce Ἱησο ς (ll. 14-17) nei testimoni di un ramo della tradizione. Vedi *infra*, pp. 148-54, in part. p. 154.

¹⁰ *Lennia*, oggi Lynn in Norfolk. Il manoscritto di Oxford cui si fa accenno   l'attuale **D**.

¹¹ I rimandi sono alle linee della nostra edizione (pp. 159-90).

Alle ll. 314-315 *uelud armis subiugatorum hominum* (**D**) è traduzione letterale del genitivo assoluto ὡς τοῖς ὅπλοις ὑποταττομένων ἀνθρώπων della *Suda*, mentre in **R** la frase appare trasformata nel più elegante ablativo assoluto *uelud armis subiugatis hominibus*. L. 335 *tronismos* e l. 336 *dictuon* di **R** sono la semplice traslitterazione delle forme greche Θρονησμούς e Δίκτυον, mentre **D** è testimone di forme ormai latinizzate *tronizaciones* e *rete*; infine (l. 352), **D** trasmette la traduzione letterale *miserabiliter* e **R** di nuovo un ritocco formale *insatiabiliter*. La variante della l. 322 *puer* (παῖς *Su*) **D**: *pater* **R** mi sembra sia nata piuttosto per un semplice errore di lettura.

Alla luce di questi esempi, è lecito supporre che i due testimoni **D R** restituiscono tracce di una revisione (almeno parziale) della traduzione effettuata forse dal medesimo Roberto. È difficile dire, a causa della scarsità degli esempi, se si tratta di interventi puntuali, se le modifiche erano trasmesse da modelli distinti oppure da un solo, inserite *supra lineas* o già del testo,¹² e recepite in maniera diversa da **R** e **D** e quali ne erano i limiti spazio-temporali.¹³

La traduzione della voce Ἰησοῦς e la sua diffusione

La traduzione della voce Ἰησοῦς della *Suda* (ι 229: II, p. 620, 22-625, 3 = ll. 18-132)¹⁴ conobbe anche una trasmissione indipendente rispetto a quella di **R**. A oggi ho recensito altri quattordici manoscritti della traduzione latina di Grossatesta e uno che tramanda una parafrasi in anglo-normanno della fine del XIII secolo del medesimo testo esemplata su quella latina, ma con tagli e rimaneggiamenti. Tutti questi testimoni furono copiati in ambiente anglosassone e ebbero una circolazione limitata a quella specifica regione geografica.¹⁵

Di seguito, una lista dei manoscritti accompagnati dalle sigle che ho loro attribuite:¹⁶

B = Basel, Öffentliche Bibliothek der Universität, F. III. 34, ff. 83ra-84va, XIII s.

C = Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, cod. 179, ff. 21v-24r, XV s.

¹² Una tipologia palese nella traduzione della voce “Abraham” (solo in **R**) dove leggiamo *in textu*: 176 “stat seu finitur” (ἴσταται *Suda*); 183 “tempus annum” (χρόνον *Suda*).

¹³ La pratica di revisioni anche profonde delle proprie traduzioni di Aristotele è frequente in Guglielmo di Moerbeke come ha provato in più occasioni G. Vuillemin-Diem. Per una breve presentazione della questione mi sia consentito rimandare a T. Dorandi, “Manuscripts de la ‘Collection Philosophique’ entre Orient et Occident. Livres, lecteurs et traducteurs de Platon et d’Aristotele à l’âge du pré-humanisme occidental”, in stampa negli Atti del Convegno *La ‘Collection philosophique’ face à l’histoire. Péripiétés et tradition*, a c. di F. Ronconi - D. Bianconi, Paris 10 et 11 juin 2013. Ci sono comunque, almeno nel caso della traduzione della *Suda* di Grossatesta, alcune differenze sostanziali rispetto a Moerbeke e, in particolare, il fatto che Roberto disponeva di un solo codice greco e che non esistevano precedenti traduzioni.

¹⁴ Si tratta di un testimone della recensione intermedia di un apocrifo greco che conobbe una larga circolazione nell’Oriente greco cristiano e nell’Occidente medievale. Il testo greco è trasmesso da una cinquantina di manoscritti in tre recensioni: 1) una recensione abbreviata, pubblicata da A. Vassiliev, *Anecdota Graeco-Byzantina. Pars prior*, Sumptibus et typis Universitatis Caesariae, Mosquae 1893, pp. 58-60; 2) una recensione intermedia conosciuta nelle due versioni pubblicate da Vassiliev, *Anecdota Graeco-Byzantina*, pp. 60-72 e in quella della *Suda*, e 3) una recensione lunga pubblicata da G. Ziffer, “Una versione greca inedita del *De Sacerdotio Christi*”, in *Studi per Riccardo Ribaudi*, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 1986, pp. 141-73. Si tramandano redazioni in georgiano, arabo (attraverso il copto), paleoslavo. Le traduzioni in lingue volgari sono esemplate su un intermediario in latino. Cf J. De Keyser, “Early Modern Latin Translations of the Apocryphal *De Sacerdotio Christi*”, *Lias – Journal of Early Modern Intellectual Culture and its Sources* 40 (2013), pp. 29-32.

¹⁵ Ripropongo (con qualche ripensamento e correzione) alcuni risultati che ho raggiunti nella prima parte del mio contributo, “Il *De probacione virginittatis Beate Marie et sacerdotio Iesu* di Roberto Grossatesta e Matteo Paris”, *Sileno* 39 (2013), pp. 151-66 (= *Omaggio a S. Timpanaro*, a c. di W. Lapini), pp. 151-9. Ringrazio gli editori di *Sileno* per avermi autorizzato a riprodurre qui questi risultati parziali.

¹⁶ Dorandi, “Traduction”, pp. 400-6.

- J** = Cambridge, St John's College, cod. 184, ff. 345va-347rb, XIV s.
T = Cambridge, Trinity College, B. 15. 38 (373 James), ff. 79v-81v, XIII s.
E = Canterbury, Christ Church, E 10, ff. 124v-136r, XIII/XIV s.
F = Dublin, Trinity College, E. I. 29 (519 Colker), ff. 93va-94vb, XV s.
A = London, British Library, *Add.* 18210, ff. 48rb-49vb, XIII s.
G = London, British Library, *Arundel* 52, ff. 72rb-73va, XIII s.
H = London, British Library, *Royal* 4 D. VII, ff. 246vb-248rb, poco dopo il 1253
L = London, British Library, *Royal* 8 A. IV, ff. 203v-205v, XV s.
R = London, British Library, *Royal* 8 B. IV, ff. 73r-75v, XIV s.
M = Lucca, Biblioteca Statale, 3540, f. 125ra-127rb, XV s.
O = Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Douce* 88, ff. 126v-129v, XIII/XIV s.
I = San Marino, California, Huntington Library, HM 183, ff. 2v-3v, XV s.
S = Shrewsbury, Shrewsbury School, MS 21 (3), ff. 108r-110r, XV s.

La versione anglo-normanna è conservata nel codice:

- P** = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, n.a. fr. 10176, ff. 1r-2r, ca. 1275.¹⁷

Uno studio delle varianti di questi testimoni ha consentito di classificare i codici in due gruppi principali.

Il primo gruppo, che conta un più gran numero di codici (**BCEGIJLORT** e **P**), conserva una redazione preceduta in particolare da una frase introduttiva (ll. 14-17) con funzione proemiale che ripropone, con tagli e in una forma spesso alterata, la lista di nomi che il compilatore anonimo della *Suda* elenca come proprie fonti a inizio del lessico:¹⁸

Narracio ex libro qui grece dicitur Suda quem composuerunt uiri sapientes isti: Eudemus rethor, Helladius, qui fuit tempore Theodosii iuuenis, Eugenius Frigiuis, Zosimus Gazeus, Cecillius Siculus, Longinus Kasimus, Lupercus Bericius, Iustinus Iulius sophista, Pakatus, Pamphilus, Zopirion et Polion.

I rapporti fra i manoscritti di questo gruppo, che tramandano una versione della traduzione più letterale e probabilmente più antica, ha indagati De Keyser dopo avere collazionato per la prima volta la quasi totalità dei testimoni (non ha avuto accesso a **F S**). Lo studioso giunge alle seguenti conclusioni, che ho potuto confermare come provano gli esempi riportati più in basso:¹⁹

Among these witnesses, **B** and **I** are by far the soundest. They share a few errors (mostly transpositions) that point to a common intermediary source. In the *constitutio textus* their consensus is therefore to be weighed against the one offered by the other testimonia. [...] ²⁰ None of the other witnesses has any other than documentary value. Most of them are rather corrupt, and there seems to be a fair number of secondary interventions (with or without a Greek source text at hand) and several layers of

¹⁷ R.J. Dean, "An Anglo-Norman Version of Grosseteste: Part of his *Suidas* and *Testamenta XII Patriarcharum*", *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*, 51 (1936), pp. 607-20.

¹⁸ Vol. I, p. 1, 1-15 Adler. **B** (f. 83ra); **C** (f. 21v); **E** (f. 124v); **G** (f. 72rb); **I** (f. 2v); **J** (f. 345ra); **L** (f. 203v); **O** (f. 126v); **R** (f. 73r); **P** (f. 1r). Il paragrafo manca anche in **T**, ma, a quanto si deduce dalla frase iniziale (f. 79v: *incipit quedam narracio ex libro qui uocatur suda, quem librum composuerunt uiri sapientissimi*), l'omissione è probabilmente volontaria.

¹⁹ De Keyser, "Early Modern Latin Translations", p. 38.

²⁰ Nella parte omissa De Keyser discute dei due principali testimoni del secondo gruppo da me individuato (**HA**) e sul modello greco di Grossatesta. Vedi *infra*, pp. 152-5.

contamination, which makes a stemmatic reconstruction all but unfeasible. It can be noted, though, that **E** and **J** are twins; the latter seems also the source of **C**.

To the same group belong the late and corrupt witness **L**, and maybe also **T**, which is the product of particularly drastic deliberate interventions. **G**, on the other hand, seems to have a contaminated twin in **R**. **M** is a worthless rewrite. **O** is fairly sound, but also bears traces of secondary intervention and would offer nothing beyond its particular errors, if it were to be included in the critical apparatus.

It seems unlikely that the two unseen [*i.e.* **F S**], late manuscripts – both stemming from the fifteenth century – would be relevant for the *constitutio textus* either.


La discendenza **B** e **I** da un modello comune è provata da un *error coniunctiuus*:²¹

60 reliquis sacerdotibus (τῶν λοιπῶν ἐρεῶν *Su*) reliquis *deest in B I*.

Cronologicamente, **I** potrebbe essere copia (diretta o indiretta) di **B**, ma alcuni *errores separatiui* portano a considerare i due testimoni come gemelli derivati da un modello comune α (senza escludere una contaminazione di **I** con un altro manoscritto perduto, β):

19 et ipsi memorato fideli imperatori *deest in B* || 20 quidam homo **I**: homo *deest in B* || 35 multi **I** (πολλῆς *Su*): mihi **B** || 67 ipsum *om. B* || 120 pamphili *deest in B*.

Il tutto potrebbe essere rappresentato sotto forma di uno schema (che, come quelli che seguono, non è, bene inteso, uno *stemma codicum*)



Per quanto riguarda i restanti manoscritti di questo gruppo, le frequenti divergenze fra singoli testimoni o gruppi di testimoni sono presenti già in codici del XIII secolo come **T** e **O**. Esse possono spiegarsi come tracce di probabili interventi redazionali non solo di Grossatesta, ma anche di ignoti copisti/redattori dotti che erano intervenuti sul testo senza troppo rispetto per il modello originario. Questa ultima eventualità è resa probabile dalle numerose *lectiones singulares* che distinguono singoli (o gruppi di) codici.

²¹ Nel mio articolo “Il *De probatione virginitatis Beate Marie et sacerdotio Iesu*”, p. 154, seguendo De Keyser, “Early Modern Latin Translations”, p. 40 (l. 62) avevo tenuto conto anche di 68 *inuidi* **B I** supponendo che la lezione corretta fosse *ut uiderunt* sul fondamento di *ut uiderunt quidam* di **H A** (la *Suda* ha ὡς τῷ δοκεῖν). Oggi credo che *inuidi* sia piuttosto un errore di traduzione di Grossatesta che deve pertanto essere rispettato.

Tra gli interventi di **T**, segnalo:

21 iste] ipse uero **T** || ad ipsum saluans] cum ipso habens **T** || 25 recusas] quomodo ergo recusas **T** || 28 et gratiarum acciones ipsi easque per uerba adduxit et] gratias ipsi referens **T** || 29 quoniam] mihi dicis quoniam || 34 reprehendens] reprehendo **T** || 62 et existimo *om.* **T** || 64 sermonem hunc *om.* **T** || 79 peperit²] concepit **T** || 80 utique hoc omnibus] omnibus igitur hoc **T** || 114-115 fideli quidem imperatori iustiniano hunc sermonem fecit] imperatori non manifestauit **T** || 124 liber et] liber ad legendum et **T**.

Tra le *lectiones singulares* di **O**:²²

21 cognitus *om.* **O** || 24 ipsi] ipsis **O** || 33 confisus, ut ad familiaritatem et ea **O** || 36 fruicione] institutione **O** || 58 inepti] indigni **O** || 59 debente] debere **O** || 68 testificabantur] testificabant inuidiam **O** || 119 <neque> conscriptorem **O** || 126-127 apud iudeos *om.* **O**.

C E J sembrano formare un gruppo compatto, con piú stretti legami fra **C** e **J**:


42 et abscondito] est et abscondito **CEJ** || 45 enumeramus] enumerauimus **CEJ** || 62 aliquando] aliquem **CEJ** || 84 inuenientes *om.* **CEJ** (**T**) || 103 terram] terra **CEJ**.

E inoltre:

20 philippus *om.* **CJ** || 32 qui a lege *om.* **CJ** || 35 et honoris multi *om.* **CJ** || 36 existimo] estimo **CJ** || 45 constitui] constituti **CJ** || 68 testificabantur] testificantur **CJ** || 76 si filius ipsorum est] sed et filiorum ipsorum **CJ** || 92 filius ipsius est] ipsius est filius **CJ** || 100 capcionis] captationis **CJ** || 103 et prophetis *om.* **CJ** || 103 adoratur *om.* **CJ**.

Ne dedurrei che **CEJ** derivano probabilmente da un medesimo modello perduto (γ), **E** direttamente, mentre **CJ** attraverso un ulteriore intermediario anch'esso perduto (δ).

Il che potrebbe essere rappresentato in uno schema del tipo



²² Su questo manoscritto e la sua storia vedi anche *St. Augustine's Abbey, Canterbury*, ed. by B.C. Barker-Benfield, British Library in Association with the British Academy, London 2008 (Corpus of British Medieval Library Catalogues, vol. 13), BA1.870.

Alla luce di questi risultati crediamo, come già De Keyser, che il testo della traduzione di questa voce può essere stabilito sul fondamento dei soli codici **B** e **I**.²³ Laddove il latino sia erroneo e sia da escludere un errore di Grossatesta, esso è stato corretto con il confronto del modello greco (il codice **V** della *Suda*) o *ope ingenii*.

Il secondo gruppo di manoscritti (**H A F M S**), uniti fra loro da stretti legami di parentela, tramanda una redazione della traduzione rivista e parzialmente rielaborata del medesimo testo. Questa redazione fu approntata da Grossatesta riutilizzando la sua versione della voce della *Suda* (quella di cui abbiamo traccia nel precedente insieme di testimoni) e prese la forma di un opuscolo autonomo. Il nuovo testo venne in un secondo momento ritoccato e rielaborato probabilmente dal benedettino inglese, cronista, miniaturista e cartografo, Matthew Paris (ca. 1200-1259) e circolò col titolo *De probacione uirginitatis beate Marie et sacerdocio Iesu*.

Tra i codici di questo gruppo, merita la massima attenzione **H**, autografo di Matthew Paris che lo copiò poco dopo la morte di Grossatesta (8/9 ottobre 1253), come si ricava dalle parole finali della sottoscrizione (f. 248rb)²⁴

explicit tractatus quem episcopus lincolniensis robertus ii (ii s.l.)²⁵ transtulit de greco in latinum de probacione uirginitatis beate marie et sacerdocio ihesu cuius noticia ad doctores nostros non peruenit antiquos. absconditus enim extitit per multa ex inuidia iudeorum blasphemantium et dicentium ihesum non fuisse uirginis filium. hoc quoque scriptum adquisiuit frater matheus parisiensis ab episcopo memorato, et ad usum claustralium manu sua scripsit. cuius anima in pace requiescat. amen.

Ritroviamo il medesimo testo con qualche errore supplementare in **F M S**. In essi l'erroneo numerale *ii* che segue *robertus* non è più *supra lineam*, ma *in textu*, il che dimostra la loro discendenza diretta o indiretta da **H**.

Differente è il caso di **A**. L'appartenenza di **A** al medesimo gruppo è provata (in mancanza della *subscriptio*) dall'identica *inscriptio* (f. 48rb) *aliud scriptum translatum a praedicto episcopo roberto lincolniensi de greco in latinum in quo recitatur narracio qualiter probata fuit uirginitas beate marie matris domini nostri iesu christi* e soprattutto da numerose lezioni comuni peculiari a **A** e **H** che confermano il legame di parentela fra i due testimoni. Non ci sono prove sostanziali per determinare se **H** e **A** sono copia l'uno dell'altro.

Il solo errore separativo che ho reperito e che potrebbe portare a escludere che **A** sia copia di **H** (l. 30, *agonizans A: ignoras* (-ras e *correctione*) **H**) non è dirimente. L'erronea lezione di **A** *agonizans*, che presuppone la forma corretta *agonizas* è calco di ἀγωνίζη della *Suda*, mentre *ignoras* di **H** può bene essere spiegato come un ritocco formale (una variante d'autore o di altri, forse Matthew Paris) per migliorare il dettato latino. A Matthew Paris risalgono con buona probabilità anche le numerose *lectiones singulares* di **H**. In tutti questi casi, **A** si accorda con testimoni dell'altro ramo tradizionale, più che a contaminazione di **A** con uno o più testimoni di questo gruppo, è possibile che **A** sia un

²³ De Keyser, "Early Modern Latin Translations", pp. 37-42 ne ha pubblicato una prima edizione. Lo studioso (pp. 43-79) ha divulgato anche le altre traduzioni latine rinascimentali della medesima voce della *Suda*: quella attribuita a Ambrogio Traversari, le due di Francesco Filelfo, quella di Lauro Quirini e quella anonima posteriore a Quirini.


²⁴ Per l'autografia del codice, vedi F.S. Stevenson, *Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln. A Contribution to the Religious, Political and Intellectual History of the Thirteenth Century*, Macmillan and Co, London - The Macmillan Company - New York 1899, p. 226 n. 0; Franceschini, "Roberto Grossatesta", p. 451 e Dean, "An Anglo-Norman Version", p. 609.

²⁵ Sulla genesi dell'errore, vedi Dean, "An Anglo-Norman Version", p. 613 n. 19.

codice che tramanda una copia di una prima redazione dell'opuscolo *De Probacione uirginitatis beate Marie et sacerdocio Iesu* elaborata da Grossatesta a partire dal testo trasmesso da quella famiglia e che servì a Matthew Paris come modello nella sua rielaborazione di quel testo.

Tali elementi possono eventualmente accordarsi con la possibilità che **A** **H** siano gemelli e che derivino dunque da un modello comune (**ε**) che **A** avrebbe riprodotto più fedelmente e **H** (cioè Matthew Paris) riadattato alle sue esigenze di preparare e scrivere di propria mano quel testo a uso e profitto degli ordini monastici (*ad usum claustralium manu sua scripsit*). In questo caso, **ε** assumerebbe il ruolo che avevo in precedenza attribuito a **A**.

Il tutto può essere così rappresentato nel seguente schema



A favore di un intervento redazionale di Matthew Paris su **H** possiamo prendere in conto anche un ulteriore elemento. Alla fine del testo, leggiamo in **H** una aggiunta (comune anche a **F**, ma omessa, a quanto sembra in maniera volontaria, da **A M S**) *disponente hoc domino deo ueritatis qui noluit (uoluit F) hoc memorabile penitus subcinerari, cui est honor et gloria in secula seculorum amen* (amen om. **F**) e di cui non è traccia nei rimanenti testimoni.

In questa frase, Giuseppe Mercati scorgeva una variante singolare che lo portava a presupporre che Grossatesta avesse avuto a disposizione un testo greco diverso da quello trasmesso da tutti i manoscritti della *Suda* finora conosciuti: “sarebbe impossibile mantenere che Roberto tradusse dal V(ossiano 2) o da un altro dei codici superstiti, nessun ms. della Adler presentando quella chiusa”.²⁶

Credo si tratti piuttosto di un intervento personale di Matthew Paris. A conferma della *Autorschaft* di Matthew richiamo la lunga postilla che costui appose alla fine della copia della traduzione di Grossatesta dei *Testamenta duodecim patriarcharum*, che precede il nostro testo in **H** (f. 246va-b), e che presenta significativi punti di accordo con la chiusa del *De Probacione uirginitatis*

²⁶ G. Mercati, “Sull’opuscolo *De Sacerdotio Christi* attribuito al Traversari”, in *Ultimi contributi alla storia degli Umanisti*. Fascicolo I: *Traversariana*, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1939, p. 80. Cf. anche p. 71 n. 3.

beate Marie et sacerdocio Iesu e con la sottoscrizione di **H** (*disponente hoc domino deo ueritatis qui noluit hoc memorabile penitus subcinerari e absconditus enim extitit per multa tempora ex inuidia iudeorum blasphemantium et dicentium ihesum non fuisse uirginis filium*) nonché con un passo dei *Chronica Maiora* del medesimo Matthew Paris.²⁷

Questo il testo di parte della postilla ai *Testamenta*:

hec (sc. Testamenta duodecim patriarcharum) abscondita et celata fuerunt per longa tempora ita quod numerosi doctores et antiqui interpretes hec non poterant inuenire. et hoc factum est per inuidiam iudeorum propter manifestas de christo prophecias que in ipsis scripturis inueniuntur. uerum greci, omnium ueterum scripturarum diligentissimi exploratores, hec omnia inuenierunt et de ebraeo in grecum transtulerunt. que diu quasi igniculus subcineratus in grecia latuerunt. [...] et sic manifeste et expresse prophecie que in hoc libello reperiuntur in maiorem confusionem iudeorum {iudeorum} et omnium hereticorum et uniuersorum ecclesie inimicorum ad honorem dei in lucem feliciter proruperunt.

Il testo trasmesso da **HA** si distingue da quello dei testimoni del primo gruppo non solo per ritocchi formali di vocabolario e dell'*ordo uerborum*, ma soprattutto per l'omissione (comune anche a **FMS**) delle parole che introducono, con varianti ortografiche, la traduzione nei codici **BCEGIJLORP**.²⁸ La presenza di quel paragrafo a inizio della narrazione non aveva più ragione d'essere una volta che Grossatesta o Matthew Paris avevano deciso di fare del testo in questione un opuscolo a sé e la frase poteva quindi essere omessa senza difficoltà.

Il modello greco della traduzione di Grossatesta

Una serie conseguente di lezioni e di concordanze in errore fra i resti della traduzione e il greco dell'originale mi hanno portato a ritenere corretto e a confermare il suggerimento di James²⁹ e della Adler che il manoscritto greco utilizzato da Grossatesta è con tutta probabilità l'attuale *Vossianus* gr. F 2 del XII secolo (siglato **V** dalla Adler).³⁰

Le mie conclusioni si fondano su un esame di tutti i passi della *uersio latina* che condividono incontestabili *errores coniunctiui* con **V** (o con **S**, laddove **V** sia perduto) confrontati con quelli della tradizione greca sul fondamento degli apparati dell'edizione della Adler, verificando, quando necessario, **V** e il suo più antico apografo **S**. Ho preso anche in considerazione un paio di *lectiones singulares* che avrebbero potuto, all'apparenza, rimettere in discussione l'idea che il modello della traduzione di Grossatesta fosse uno dei manoscritti della *Suda* conservati.

²⁷ Cf. G.F. Warner - J.P. Gilson, *Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King's Collections*, I, British Museum, London 1921, p. 90: "At the end (f. 246 b) is a paragraph with reference to the work and Grosseteste's translation of it, substantially identical with that which appears in Paris' *Chronica Maiora* under i 242 (ed. Luard, IV, p. 232), but somewhat longer". Il rimando è a *Matthaei Parisiensis [...] Chronica Majora* ed. by H. R. Luard, IV, Longman & Co., London 1877, pp. 232-3.

²⁸ Riprodotta *supra*, p. 149.

²⁹ M.J. James, "Greek Manuscripts in England before the Renaissance", *The Library (Transactions of the Bibliographical Society)* 7 (1927), p. 342.

³⁰ T. Dorandi, "Il modello greco della traduzione latina della *Suda* di Roberto Grossatesta", in G. Bastianini - W. Lapini - M. Tulli (a c. di), *Studi A. Casanova*, Firenze U. P., Firenze 2012, pp. 329-38 e Id., "La traduction", pp. 426-33. Per le parti in cui il *Vossianus* è perduto fa fede il suo apografo diretto antico, il codice *Vaticanus* gr. 1296 vergato da un certo Matteo e datato al 1205 (siglato **S** dalla Adler). L'edizione della *Suda* è quella di A. Adler, *Suidas Lexicon* (Teubner, Lipsiae 1928-1938) dalla quale riprendo anche le sigle dei manoscritti greci. I due codici **V** e **S** sono stati da me collazionati sull'originale e su microfilm in modo da completare i dati registrati nell'apparato dell'edizione della Adler.

La scoperta di un foglio della parte finale di **V** nell'Archivio della Cattedrale di Canterbury (Additional Manuscript 128/45) conforta infine la presenza di quel codice in Inghilterra in un momento piú o meno lungo della sua storia.³¹

Criteri di edizione

Viene presentata per la prima volta l'edizione del *Liber qui uocatur Suda* quale trasmesso dai codici **D R** seguendo la successione dei capitoli quale indicata nell'*index anonymus* che leggiamo nel f. 1r-v di **R**.³²

Nei casi in cui la traduzione di uno o piú capitoli è oggi perduta, ho segnalato la loro possibile (o probabile) corrispondenza con l'originale greco. Uno di questi (ll. 216-231), che corrisponde al capitolo 22 nell'indice di **R** intitolato "Brachman" e che corrisponde a *Suda*, s.u. Βραχμάνες (β 524: I, pp. 493.28-494.26), è tramandato in maniera indipendente in una redazione ritoccata e decurtata nello *Hexaëmeron* del medesimo Grossatesta (pr. 32, 34-35, p. 25, 26-27, 15 Dales-Gieben) conservato in una copia autografa nel codice *Bodleian*. lat. th. c. 17. In questo singolo caso, ho riproposto il testo del capitolo quale edito da Dales e Gieben.

L'edizione infine della traduzione della voce Ἰησοῦς (ll. 18-132) qui nella redazione dei codici del primo gruppo, è fondata sui codici **B** e **I** scelti secondo i principi sopra esposti.³³

Il testo latino è spesso corrotto e talora lacunoso (ll. 287, 367, 569, 624, 835). In alcuni luoghi è difficile stabilire se siamo di fronte a errori tradizionali o a fraintendimenti che risalgono a Grossatesta; in questo ultimo caso, l'errore è evidentemente mantenuto (p. es., l. 68 *inuidi*). Nei (pochi) casi in cui abbiamo creduto vi siano tracce di interventi di autore, abbiamo optato per mantenere la lezione che appariva essere espressione della volontà ultima del traduttore, relegando l'altra in apparato.³⁴

Per la ricostruzione, nei limiti del consentito, della forma originaria della traduzione si sono tenute ben presenti le peculiarità del metodo versorio di Grossatesta quasi sempre pedissequamente letterale e fedele all'*ordo uerborum* del greco che il traduttore non esita, almeno in un primo momento, di fronte alla mancanza di corrispondenza lessicale in latino, a traslitterare (in particolare nella resa dei nomi di persona e dei titoli di opere).³⁵ Né è stata trascurata l'eventualità che Roberto abbia modificato, anche se non in maniera sistematica, espressioni, aggiunto particelle e riveduto o ritoccato l'*ordo uerborum* e la sintassi di alcuni passi per migliorare lo stile latino. È altresí risultato utile e talora dirimente il confronto con il testo greco del modello **V** (**S**).

Nella sezione che corrisponde al capitolo 35 dell'indice di **R** (ll. 353-422), che riunisce le due voci su Platone filosofo della *Suda*, s.u. Πλάτων (π 1707: IV, pp. 140.26-141.25) e s.u. Πλάτων (π 1709: IV, pp. 142.2-144.5), un paio di luoghi corrotti in **D**, sono stati in parte restaurati grazie al

³¹ N.G. Wilson, "Two Greek Fragments in Canterbury", *Scriptorium* 30 (1976), pp. 46-7. **V** è mutilo all'inizio e alla fine e alcuni fogli sono perduti anche al suo interno. Vedi K.A. de Meyier, *Codices Vossiani Graeci et miscellanei*, In Bibliotheca Universitatis, Lugduni-Batavorum 1965, p. 3.

³² Per questo capitolo, ho tenuto conto di A. Glibert-Thirry, *Pseudo-Andronicus de Rhodes Περί παθῶν. Édition critique du texte grec et de la traduction latine médiévale*, Brill, Leiden 1977, pp. 216-17 e di Mercken, *The Greek Commentaries*, pp. 127*-9*.

³³ *Supra*, pp. 148-52.

³⁴ Per il caso della l. 68, vedi *supra*, p. 150 n. 21.

³⁵ Il modo di tradurre di Grossatesta è stato indagato nei dettagli da Franceschini, "Roberto Grossatesta", pp. 479-530 e piú di recente da H.P.F. Mercken, "Robert Grosseteste's Method of Translating: A Medieval Word Processing Programme?", in R. Beyers - J. Brams - D. Sacré - K. Verrycken (éd.), *Tradition et traduction. Les textes philosophiques et scientifiques grecs au Moyen Âge latin. Hommage à F. Bossier*, Leuven U. P., Leuven 1999, pp. 323-70.

contributo della “tradizione indiretta” rappresentata qui dalle pagine del *Compendiloquium* di John of Wales su Platone.³⁶ Egli ebbe a disposizione la traduzione di Grossatesta in una redazione più corretta di quella trasmessa da **D**. Il suo contributo è comunque limitato sia perché il francescano ne estrasse solo poche frasi talora compendiandole o rielaborandole nel proprio tessuto narrativo sia perché non disponiamo di un’edizione moderna e affidabile del *Compendiloquium*.

Qualche parola, per concludere, sull’ortografia. Questo aspetto è, in tutta coscienza, quello che continua a creare più problemi e su questi criteri sarà forse necessario ritornare in occasione della riproposizione dell’edizione dell’insieme della traduzione della *Suda*.

È sicuro che il testo quale tramandato (e non solo quello dei due codici **D** e **R**) aveva subito revisioni e alterazioni sul piano ortografico rispetto alle abitudini di Grossatesta (quali attestate nelle redazioni autografe di scritti come lo *Hexaëmeron*). Questo è reso evidente, in particolare, ma non solo, nel caso dei nomi propri e dei titoli dal confronto delle due sezioni (ll. 316-352) che **D** e **R** hanno in comune.

La pratica di uniformare secondo i criteri dell’ortografia classica quella dei codici latini medievali è una scelta di comodo, ma che rischia di oscurare le peculiarità dell’autore. A essa si sono comunque uniformati la Glibert-Thirry e il Mercken e ora anche il De Keyser.

Poiché una scelta era necessaria, nella nostra edizione, abbiamo preferito in generale mantenere l’ortografia dei codici anche laddove ci siano discrepanze. Questa decisione ha come presupposto che tali divergenze avrebbero potuto corrispondere a usi peculiari di Grossatesta o a una sua non troppo accurata uniformazione. Anche per quanto riguarda l’ortografia delle parole e dei nomi propri greci, spesso semplicemente traslitterati, abbiamo adottato lo stesso criterio. Questo pur nella piena consapevolezza di quanto faceva notare Franceschini: “per la grafia dei nomi greci, [...] nelle versioni di Grossatesta, vi sono regole ben definite: η ed ω conservano sempre la forma greca; θ = th; κ = k; χ = ch; φ = ph; υ = y”.³⁷

Si deve infine notare lo strano sistema grafico proprio a Grossatesta (ma presente anche nel *Lexicon Arundelianum*) che dà vita a parole ibride che mescolano caratteri greci e latini.³⁸ Esempi significativi si trovano alle ll. 338 (ωothitica uel ωoskopica), 621 (staseωs), 622 (kekoryfōstay) e 827 (Hchos e Hcheo).

L’edizione è accompagnata da tre livelli di apparato. Il primo contiene i rimandi alle voci greche della *Suda* (ma anche dell’*Etymologicum Gudianum*) e ai testimoni della tradizione “indiretta” (in particolare, il *Compendiloquium* di John of Wales), tali informazioni sono fornite in corsivo; il secondo registra le *uariae lectiones* del codice (o dei codici) latino(i). Il terzo è l’apparato greco-latino che contiene due tipi di dati critici: quando la tradizione greca è unitaria, le divergenze della versione latina rispetto al testo greco; quando la tradizione greca presenta varianti, le affinità della versione latina con l’una o con l’altra variante greca.

Alla fine dell’edizione, a mo’ di appendice, sono trascritti i *marginalia* apposti su alcuni fogli del codice **D**.

Come in ogni *editio princeps*, difetti, errori e imprecisioni anche gravi non mancheranno di essere segnalati. Di ogni proposta di correzione e miglioramento si terrà conto nel momento in cui essa sarà ripresa e integrata con le altre testimonianze della *translatio Sudaе Roberti* della quale vogliamo offrire un assaggio, che speriamo non risulterà troppo deludente.

³⁶ *Comp.* III iv 2 (f. 191r), 4 (f. 192r), 6 (f. 193r) e 13 (f. 194v). In mancanza di una edizione moderna del *Compendiloquium*, tramandato da un numero enorme di manoscritti, ho utilizzato l’incunabulo *Summa Joannis Valensis de regimine uite humane, seu Margarita doctorum [...]*, G. de Arrivabenis, Venetiis 1496. Per una analisi dettagliata dei quattro passi in rapporto alla traduzione di Grossatesta, rimando a Dorandi, “Traduction”, pp. 422-4.

³⁷ Franceschini, “Roberto Grossatesta”, pp. 491-2.

³⁸ Cf. Dionisotti, “On the Greek Studies”, p. 25.

Sigla

Notae

<aaa>	uerba ab editore addita
{aaa}	uerba ab editore deleta
[aaa]	uerba ab editore suppleta
<...>	lacuna ab editore statuta
***	fenestra in codice/codicibus

Compendia

a.c.	ante correctionem
add.	addidit
cf.	confer
cod.	codex
des.	desinit
f./ff.	folium/folia
fort.	fortasse
hab.	habet
i.e.	id est
iter.	iterauit
lac.	lacuna
om.	omisit
p.c.	post correctionem
r	recto
rec.	recentior
s.l.	supra lineam
s.u.	sub uoce
scr.	scripsit
tit.	titulus
v	verso
vid.	videa(n)tur

Codices translationis Roberti

D = Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Digby* 11, ff. 33r-43v, s. XIV

R = London, British Library, *Royal* 8 B. IV, ff. 73r-80r, s. XIV

R^{ind} codicis R index f. 1r-v seruatus

Codices translationis unius capituli Ἰησοῦς

- A = London, British Library, *Add.* 18210, ff. 48rb-49vb, s. XIII
B = Basel, Öffentliche Bibliothek der Universität, F. III. 34, ff. 83ra-84va, s. XIII
C = Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, cod. 179, ff. 21v-24r, s. XV
E = Canterbury, Christ Church, E 10, ff. 124v-136r, s. XIII/XIV
F = Dublin, Trinity College, E. I. 29 (519 Colker), ff. 93va-94vb, s. XV
G = London, British Library, *Arundel* 52, ff. 72rb-73va, s. XIII
H = London, British Library, *Royal* 4 D. VII, ff. 246vb-248rb, *paulo post* 1253.
I = San Marino, California, Huntington Library, HM 183, ff. 2v-3v, XV s.
J = Cambridge, St John's College, cod. 184, ff. 345va-347rb, s. XIV
L = London, British Library, *Royal* 8 A. IV, ff. 203v-205v, s. XV
M = Lucca, Biblioteca Statale, 3540, ff. 125r-127r, s. XV
O = Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Douce* 88, ff. 126v-129v, s. XIII
P = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, n.a. fr. 10176, ff. 1r-2r, *ca.* 1275
R = London, British Library, *Royal* 8 B. IV, ff. 73r-75v, s. XIV
S = Shrewsbury, Shrewsbury School, MS 21 (3), ff. 108r-110r, s. XV
T = Cambridge, Trinity College, B. 15. 38 (373 James), ff. 79v-81v, s. XIII

Codices Graeci Suda

- A = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, *gr.* 2625 (litterae A-Θ), s. XIII et *gr.* 2526 (litterae K-Ψ), s. XII-XIII
B = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, *gr.* 2622, s. XIII
F = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, *Plut.* 55, 1, a. 1422
G = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, *gr.* 2623, s. XV
I = Roma, Biblioteca Angelica 75, s. XV
M = Venezia, Biblioteca Marciana, *Marc. gr.* 448, s. XIII
S = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, *Vat. gr.* 1296, a. 1205
T = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, *Vat. gr.* 881, a. 1434 finitus
V = Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, *Voss. gr.* F 2 + Canterbury, Cathedral Archives, Additional Manuscript 128/45, s. XII (*exemplar translationis Roberti*)
Exc. = Excerpta Constantini Porphyrogeneti.

*Liber qui vocatur Suda**Translatio Sudaē Roberti Lincolniensis*

Liber qui uocatur Suda continet 71 capitula, qui sic incipit ex libro interpretatorio parciū orationis grecarum qui grece uocatur Suda. Primum caput sic incipit deus etc., secundum temporibus, tertium Adam, quartum Seth, quintum Lamech, sextum Abraham, septimum Seruch, octauum Iohannes, nonum Pafnutius, decimum Leoncius, 11 Mares, 12 Diodorus, 13 Sancto confessori, 14 Grisogonus, 15 Helena, 16 Aidesia, 17 Antiope, 18 Semiramis, 19 Iustinianus, 20 Traianus, 21 Marcellinus, 5
22 Brachman, 23 Alexander, 24 Augustus, 25 Efestus, 26 Thulis, 27 Oidepous, 28 Gaius, 29 Iohannes, 30 Iohannes grammaticus, 31 spado, 32 hunc fecit, 33 Hermes, 34 Orpheus, 35 Plato, 36 Anaxagoras, 37 Anaximandrus, 38 Protagoras, 39 Apolonius, 40 Iustinus, <41 Prometheus>, 42 Porphirius, 43 Sophocles, 44 iste, 45 Ibicus, 46 Palamedis, 47 Tholomeus, 48 Thelephus, 49 legum, 50 contempnentibus, 51 Nomus, 52 Polidomas, 53 Glaucus, 54 Libernus, 55 Euthimius, 10
56 shiapodes, 57 Latini, 58 Senatores, 59 Canopus, 60 Gaius, 61 Medusa, 62 sirenas, 63 skytale, R 1v | 64 piladium, 65 Iouis, 66 huius, 67 echo, 68 nomos, 69 kosmos, 70 pan, 71 hoc nomen passio. Finis libri thimos autem ira principatus.
R 73r | Narracio ex libro qui grece uocatur Suda quem composuerunt uiri sapientes isti: Eudemus rethor, Helladius, qui tempore Theodosii iuuenis, Eugenius Frigius, Zosimus Gazeus, Cecillius 15 Siculus, Longinus Kasimus, Lupercus Bericius, Iustinus Iulius sophista, Pakatus, Pamphilus, Zopirion et Polion.

2 deus] Suda, s.u. θεός (θ 178-180: II, pp. 698.27-699.16) *deest* || 3 Seth] Suda, s.u. Σήθ (σ 295: IV, p. 348.16-28) *deest* || lamech] Suda, s.u. Λάμεχ (83: III, p. 231.15-33) *deest* || seruch] Suda, s.u. Σερούχ (σ 253-254: IV, p. 343.5-37) *deest* || iohannes] *cf.* Suda, s.u. Ἰωάννης (ι 461-463 et 465-469: II, pp. 647.21-649.14 et 649.21-650.23) *deest* || 4 pafnutius] Suda, s.u. Παφνούτιος (π 828: IV, p. 72.3-24) *deest* || mares] Suda, s.u. Μάρεις (μ 201: III, p. 325.2-22) *deest* || diodorus] Suda, s.u. Διόδωρος (δ 1149-1152: II, p. 103.1-32) *deest* || sancto confessori] Suda, s.u. Ἐπιστολὴ Ἀναστασίας τῆς μάρτυρος πρὸς Χρυσόγονον (χ 574: IV, p. 831.13-833.6) *deest* || grisogonus] Suda, s.u. Ἐπιστολὴ Ἀναστασίας τῆς μάρτυρος πρὸς Χρυσόγονον (χ 574: IV, p. 831.13-833.6) *deest* || 5 helena] Suda, s.u. Ἑλένη (ε 789: II, pp. 242.26-243.11) *deest* || aidesia] Suda, s.u. Αἰδεσία (αι 79: II, pp. 161.18-162.21) *deest* || antiope] Suda, s.u. Ἀντιόπη (α 2689: I, p. 238.25-36) *deest* || semiramis] Suda, s.u. Σεμίραμις (σ 220: IV, p. 339.1-31) *deest* || iustinianus] Suda, s.u. Ἰουστινιανός (ι 446-447: II, pp. 644.29-645.23) *deest* || traianus] Suda, s.u. Τραϊανός (τ 902: IV, p. 582.20-31) *deest* || marcellinus] Suda, s.u. Μαρκελλῖνος (μ 202: III, p. 325.23-30) *deest* || 6 brachman] *deest in RD, sed uide infra* 216-231 || efestus] Suda, s.u. Ἐφαιστος (η 661: II, p. 598.19-28) *deest* || thulis] Suda, s.u. Θούλις (θ 415: II, pp. 721.27-722.6) *deest* || oidepous] Suda, s.u. Οἰδίπους (οι 34: IV, p. 616.2-26) *deest* || gaius] Suda, s.u. Γάϊος (γ 10-12: I, pp. 503.6-504.4) *deest* || 7 iohannes] *Cf.* Suda, s.u. Ἰωάννης (ι 461-463 et 465-469: II, pp. 647.21-649.14 et 649.21-650.23) *deest* || iohannes grammaticus] Suda, s.u. Ἰωάννης (ι 464: II, p. 649.15-20) *deest* || spado] Suda, s.u. περὶ σπαδῶνων ἤτοι ἀποκόπων (σ 897: II, pp. 412.7-414.24) *deest* || 14-17 *cf.* Suda, prooem. (I, p. 1.1-15).

4 *pro* 11 *hab.* 12 *R* || *capita 13-14 in R^{ind.} falso disiuncta, uni capiti (ut uidetur) tribuenda sunt* || 8 41 Prometheus *add.* S.H. Thompson, *The Writings of R. G. Bishop of Lincoln, Cambridge 1940, p. 63 ex D* || 9 iste] <Athenes> iste Thompson p. 63 ex D, ubi reuera Iachenes iste legitur.

14 isti] οὔτοι *Su^{S.} om. Su^{GTB}* || 15 Κεκιλλιος *Su^{GSB.} Κεκιλλιος Su^A* || 16 Κάσιμος *Su^{GTSMB.} Κάσιμος Su^A* || Ἰουστῆνος *Su^{GTB.} Οὔστῆνος Su^{S.} Οὐη- Su^A*.

Temporibus piissimi imperatoris Iustiniani fuit homo quidam, princeps Iudeorum, Theodosius nomen ipsi, qui pluribus Christianorum cognitus extitit et ipsi memorato fideli imperatori. 20 Secundum autem tempora illa erat quidam homo Christianus (Philippus nomen ipsi) secundum artem argentarius. Iste cognitus et familiaris Theodosio et multam ad ipsum saluans familiaritatem prouocabat ipsum et suadebat fieri Christianum. In una igitur dierum predictus Philippus ad dictum Theodosium talia quedam dicebat: quid utique sapiens uir existens et certe sciens legis et prophetarum predicta de dominatore non credis ipsi et fias Christianus? Credo enim de te quoniam non ignorans 25 a deo inspiratis predicta de communis nostri dominatoris Christi aduentu recusas fieri Christianus. Festina igitur saluare tui ipsius animam, credens in saluatorem et dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, ut non immanens infidelitati iudicii eterni obnoxium te constituas. Hec audiens Iudeus a Christiano dicta ad ipsum acceptauit ipsum et gratiarum acciones ipsi eas que per uerba adduxit et talia ipsi respondit: accepto eam que secundum deum tui dileccionem quoniam que pro salute anime mee 30 studens agonizas Christianum me fieri prouocans. Propter quod ut in deo abscondita cordium sciente et uidente sine dolo et sine simulacione et cum omni ueritate ad te sermones faciam. Quoniam quidem igitur aduenit qui a lege et prophetis predictus est, a uobis Christianis adoratus, | certificatus sum et confiteor confisus, ut ad familiarem meum amicum, ut et ea que ad beneficium michi semper studentem; sed humana cogitatione detentus non fio Christianus et in hiis reprehendens meipsum. 35 Nunc autem Iudeus existens princeps sum Iudeorum et honoris multi et donorum multorum et omnium ad uitam hanc aptorum in fruicione existens. Existimo autem quoniam neque si patriarcha catholice ecclesie fiam uel principatus maiores et excellencias accipiam a uobis, tanto famulatu dignificabor. Ut igitur non ab hiis que uidentur delectabilia esse in uita hac excidam, contempno futuram uitam male hoc faciens. Ut autem sermones meos ueros tue dileccioni manifestem, 40 confidenter dico tibi secretum quod est apud nos Hebreos absconditum, ex quo certe scimus quoniam qui a uobis Christianis adoratur Christus ipse est qui a lege et prophetis predictus est: non solum ex hiis que ab ipsis prescripta sunt, sed et ex eo quod apud uos non scriptum et abscondito secreto. Est autem sermo misterii talis. Secundum antiqua tempora, quando in Ierosolimis templum fundabatur, consuetudo erat apud Iudeos equales numero hiis que apud nos literis uiginti duobus existentibus 45 sacerdotes in templo constitui. Unde et a deo inspiratos libros uiginti duos enumeramus. Codex igitur adiacebat in templo, in quo inscribatur uniuscuiusque sacerdotis ipsorum XXII appellacio et nomen patris et matris. Uno igitur decedente sacerdotum reliqui conueniebant in templo et ex communi sententia constituebant pro eo qui decesserat alterum sacerdotem, adimplentes numerum XXII sacerdotum. Et inscribatur in codice quoniam tali die decessit ille sacerdos, filius talis uiri et 50 talis mulieris, et pro ipso ordinatus est ille talis. Hac igitur consuetudine tenente in gente Iudeorum,

R 73v

18-132 Suda, s.u. Ἰησοῦς (ι 229: II, pp. 620.22-625.3). Vide T. Dorandi, "Il De probatione uirginitatis beate Marie et sacerdotio Iesu tra Roberto Grossatesta e Matteo Paris", *Sileno* 39 (2013), pp. 151-66 (= *Omaggio a S. Timpanaro a c. di W. Lapini*) et J. De Keyser, "Early Modern Latin Translations of the Apocryphal De sacerdotio Christi", *Lias – Journal of Early Modern Intellectual Culture and its Sources* 40 (2013), pp. 29-82: pp. 37-42. De principiis editionis huius capituli, supra, pp. 148-54.

18 homo quidam (τις ἄνθρωπος) B: quidam I || 19 et—imperatorī om. B || 20 autem tempora] tempora autem BI || homo om. B || 21 familiaris erat B || multam (πολλήν) multum BI || 22 ipsum om. B || 23 et¹ om. I || 28 ipsi I: ei B || 29 que om. B || deum I: domini B || 30 me om. I || 31 sine² om. B || ad te om. B || 35 multi I: mihi B || 38 non om. I || hac uita B || non excidam I || 39 dileccioni tue I || 40 ex om. B || 42 uos B: nos I || et B: etiam I || 44 his I.

24 post dominatore deest Χριστοῦ cum solo Su^V || 25 post inspiratis deest γραφῶν cum solo Su^V || 32 post est deest Χριστός cum solo Su^V || 34 reprehendens] καταγινώσκων Su^V: -σκω Su^{GMI} || 35 autem] δὲ Su^V: γὰρ Su^{GMI} || 42 uos] ὑμῶν Su^{Vp.c.}: ἡμῶν Su^{GMI} || ἀνεπιγράψου καὶ ἀνυποκεχυμένον Su^V: ἐναπογράφου καὶ ἀπο- Su^{GMI}.

R 74r accidit secundum tempora illa secundum que Iesus in Iudea conuersabatur, decedere unum ex XXII
 sacerdotibus, | antequam inciperet manifestare seipsum Iesus et docere credere homines in ipsum.
 Conuenerunt igitur reliqui sacerdotes ad faciendum pro sacerdote qui decesserat alterum sacerdotem;
 et unoquoque proponente existimatum ipsi dignum fieri reliqui hunc ut deficienter habentem ad
 uirtutem ex qua debet constitui sacerdos reprobabant. Si enim sapiens erat et moribus et uita bonus, 55
 in ignorantia autem legis et prophetarum existebat, ineptus sacerdocio iudicabatur. Sic igitur multis
 ad sacerdocium nominatis et omnibus reprobatis, unus quidam sacerdos surgens stetit in medio et
 dixit reliquis: ecce, multi a nobis nominati inepti inuenti sunt ad sacerdocium; suscipite igitur et me
 dicentem de uno homine debente ordinari pro mortuo sacerdote. Existimo enim quoniam nullus ex
 uobis dissenciet ei que a me facte sententiae. Prouocantibus autem sacerdotibus dixit: quoniam uolo 60
 ego fieri pro mortuo sacerdote Iesum, filium Ioseph fabri; qui quidam iuuenis quidem etate est,
 sermone autem et uita et moribus bonis ornatus est, et existimo nullum aliquando hominum
 apparuisse in sermone uel uita uel moribus talem, ut est iste; et existimo et uobis omnibus habitantibus
 in Ierusalem hoc cognitum et incontradicibile existere. Audientes autem sermonem hunc reliqui
 sacerdotes acceptauerunt uirum et confirmauerunt sententiam, aptum esse super omnem hominem 65
 ad sacerdocium Iesum dicentes. Dicebant autem quidam de ipso non esse ex tribu Leui, sed ex tribu
 Iuda existere, ipsius Ioseph filium ipsum existimantes esse (sic enim apud Iudeos famosum erat),
 Ioseph ex tribu Iuda, non ex tribu Leui testificabantur omnes. Et huius gratia inuidi non existentem
 ipsum ex tribu Leuitica, prohibebant fieri sacerdotem. Qui autem ipsum nominauerat sacerdos
 respondens ad ipsos dixit mixtum esse genus ipsius; quondam enim in generacionibus antiquis 70
 R 74v mixtio | quedam facta est duarum tribuum et inde deduci genus ipsius Ioseph. Hoc igitur audientes
 reliqui sacerdotes annuerunt sententiae; et communi consilio omnibus ingredientibus sacerdotibus
 placuit pro mortuo sacerdote Iesum constituere. Consuetudine autem habente non solum nomen
 facti sacerdotis ascribi in codice, sed et patris et matris ipsius, dicebant quidam ipsorum debere ipsos
 primum uocare parentes ipsius et ab ipsis discere nomina ipsorum, accipere autem et confessionem 75
 ipsorum, si filius ipsorum est qui ad sacerdocium prae manibus habetur; et placuit hoc omnibus. Qui
 igitur prenominauerat Iesum fieri sacerdotem dixit mortuum esse Ioseph patrem Iesu, solam autem
 ipsius uiuere matrem. Concordauerunt igitur omnes ducere matrem ipsius in concilium et discere ab
 ipsa si mater extitit Iesu et si ipsa peperit ipsum, et nomen uiri ipsius audire, de quo peperit Iesum; et
 utique hoc omnibus placente uocauerunt matrem Iesu et dixerunt ad ipsam: quia ille sacerdos 80
 mortuus est, filius illius uiri et illius mulieris, et uolumus pro illo facere filium tuum Iesum, consuetudo
 autem est ascribi nomen patris et matris: dic nobis si Iesus filius tuus est et tu peperisti ipsum. Maria
 autem audiens hec respondit dicens ad sacerdotes: quoniam quidem filius meus est Iesus, confiteor;
 ego enim genui ipsum, et testes sunt michi inuenientes uiri et inuenientes mulieres parientem me
 ipsum; quoniam autem non habet in terra patrem, certitudinem accipite a me, ut uultis. Virgine 85
 enim me existente et in Galilea conuersante me, angelus dei, uigilante me non dormiente, ingrediens
 in eam in qua eram domo, annunciauit michi ex spiritu sancto parere filium; cuius nomen precepit

52 credere homines *I*: h. cr. *B* || 57 quidam (*τις*) *B*: quidem *I* || 59 dicente *I* || 60 facte *I*: facta erit *B* || 61 quidam
 iuuenis quidem *B*: quidem iu. quidam *I* || 63 iste *I*: ille *B* || 67 ipsum *om. B* || 74 dicebat *B* || 78 deducere *B* || 81 pro ipso
 uolumus *I* || 83 meus *om. B* || 87 domum *B*.

57 ad sacerdocium] *ἱερέων Su* || 60 sacerdotibus] *τῶν λοιπῶν ἱερέων Su* || 68 inuidi] *ὡς τῶ δοκεῖν Suda* || 72 ingredi-
 bus] *εἰσελθούσιν Su^V: συνελθ- Su^{GMI}* || 74 ipsorum] *αὐτῶν Su^V: -οῦ Su^{GMI}* || 81 illius uiri et illius mulieris] *τοῦδε καὶ τῆσδε
 Su* || 82 et tu peperisti] *καὶ σὺ ἔτεκες Su^V: καὶ εἰ σὺ ἔ. Su^{GMI}* || 84 inuenientes ... inuenientes] *εὐρεθέντες ... εὐρεθεῖσαι
 Su* || 86 me¹] *μου Su^V: om. Su^{GMI}*.

uocare Iesum; uirgo igitur existens, hanc uidens uisionem concepi et genui Iesum, manens uirgo
 usque hodie et post parere me. Hec audientes sacerdotes iusserunt uenire obstitrices fideles et
 90 iusserunt ipsis perscrutari si adhuc uere uirgo est Maria. | Hee autem ex rebus sumentes certitudinem R 75r
 confirmauerunt uirginem ipsam existere. Aduenerunt autem et que inuente erant et uiderant ipsam
 parientem, testificantes quoniam filius ipsius est Iesus. Stupefacti autem sacerdotes in dictis de Maria
 et testificantibus de partu ipsius, respondentes dixerunt Marie: dic nobis cum fiducia et libera
 95 propalacione ut ex ore tuo audiamus cuius est et cuius filius, ut sic ascribamus ipsos; quos enim dixeris
 nobis parentes hos nos et non alteros ascribemus. Ipsa autem respondens dixit: quoniam in ueritate
 ego ipsum genui, patrem ipsius in terra non sciens, sed ab angelo audiui filium dei esse ipsum. Filius
 igitur mei uocate Marie est et filius dei, et non corrupta uirgo existo. Hec audientes sacerdotes
 attulerunt codicem et subscripserunt sic: tali die obiit sacerdos ille, filius talis et talis, et factus est pro
 ipso communi sententia omnium nostrum sacerdos Iesus, filius dei uiuentis et Marie uirginis. Et iste
 100 codex saluatus est a templo studio eorum qui prima ferebant apud Iudeos secundum tempus capcionis
 templi et Ierosolimorum et repositus est in Tyberiadem; et secretum hoc paucis ualde et fidelibus gentis
 nostre cognitum est. Propter quod et michi ut principi et doctori gentis Iudeorum reuelatum est.
 Non solum enim ex lege et prophetis certificati sumus quoniam qui a uobis Christianis adoratur
 Christus ipse est filius dei uiuentis, qui pro salute mundi uenit in terram, sed et ex inscripcione que
 105 et saluata est usque hodie et reposita est in Tyberiadem. Hec audiens Christianus a Iudeo ad ipsum
 dicta, diuino zelo motus dixit Iudeo quoniam statim et uelociter referam fideli et pio imperatori a te
 dicta, ut mittat in Tyberiadem et manifestet codicem, quem dicis, ad redarguicionem infidelitatis
 Iudeorum. Iudeus autem ad Christianum dixit: quid uis condempnacionem tue ipsius anime
 adducere et referre imperatori et non potiri eo quod intendis? Si enim aliquid tale fiat, prelium
 110 magnum constituetur, et homicidia consequentur | et tunc, si uideant se ipsos labore fessos, incendunt R 75v
 locum in quo reponitur codex, et uane laborabimus intento a nobis non directo, solum effusionis
 sanguinis causa effecti. Hec enim ut familiari amico manifesta feci tue dileccioni ut credere te facerem
 quoniam non ex ignorantia renuo Christianitatem, sed ex uana gloria. Hec audiens a Iudeo
 Christianus et uera esse credens dicta ab ipso, fideli quidem imperatori Iustiniano hunc sermonem
 115 non manifestum fecit ut non diuino zelo fidelis ille et magnus imperator motus effusionem sanguinis
 prepararet fieri, et tunc neque intento directo; multis autem cognitis et amicis sermonem hunc fecit
 manifestum; quem nos ab audientibus a prenominato Philippo argentario discentes curam non
 paruam apposuimus, cognoscere uolentes, si uere sermones hos Iudeus dixit de tali scriptione.
 Inuenimus igitur Iosephum, conscriptorem capcionis Ierosolomorum, cuius memoriam multam
 120 Eusebius Pamphili in ecclesiastica ipsius historia facit, manifeste dicentem in captiuitatis ipsius
 commemoracionibus quoniam Iesus in templo cum sacerdotibus sanctificauit. Hoc igitur inuenientes
 dicentem Iosephum, uirum antiquum existentem et non post multum tempus apostolorum factum,
 quesiuimus inuenire et ex scripturis a deo inspiratis talem sermonem confirmatum. Inuenimus igitur
 in euangelio secundum Lucam quoniam intrauit Iesus in synagogam Iudeorum et datus est ei liber et
 125 legit Ysaïam prophetam dicentem: spiritus domini super me; propter quod unxit me, euangelizare
 pauperibus misit me. Recogitauimus autem quoniam nisi ordinem aliquem administratorium apud
 Iudeos habuisset Christus Iesus, non utique in synagoga datus fuisset liber ipsi ad legendum in

89 parere me *I*: partum *B* || 91 uirginem *om. B* || 94 cuius est et cuius est *B* || ipsos *I*: eos *B* || 97 hoc *I* || 101 ualde *om. I* ||
 102 et principi *I* || 110 incendunt *B* || 112 causa *om. B* || 116 neque directo *B* || 117 quem *B*: quod *I* || 120 pamphili *I*:
om. B || 123 domino *I*.

92 de Maria] παρὰ τῆς Μαρίας *Su*. || 94 αὐτοῦς *Su*^{Vp.c.} (-ὸς *supra* ν): αὐτὸν *codd. vell.* || 95 quoniam] ὅτι *Su*^V: *om. Su*^{GMI}.

auditum populi. Neque enim apud nos Christianos in ecclesia decet aliquem legere populo libros a deo inspiratarum scripturarum, nisi aliquis qui in clero connumeratur. Et ex hiis itaque que a Iosepho scribuntur et ex hiis que ab euangelio Luce historizantur cognouimus quoniam Theodosius Iudeus predictam narrationem dicens memorato Philippo argentario non finxit hanc, sed uere ut familiari amico Philippo apud Iudeos absconditum secretum propalauit. 130

Adam: primus homo, manu dei plasmatus et secundum ymaginem et similitudinem formatus conditoris et creantis et honorificatus ea que in paradiso habitacione. Iste iuste utique primus uocatus est sapiens ut primo creata ymago, ut gratiis totis existens repletus et omnes puros et incoinquinos ferens eos qui anime et corporis sensus. Candores quidam enim, ut est dicere, ex istius anima coruscantes et diuinis operacionibus et intelligenciis impleti secundum omnem incurrebant naturam. Qui non ab hominibus approbatus est iudicia multociens fallibiliter facientibus, sed ab uniuersorum deo omnem cognitionem et iudicium recte faciente et firmiter. Et fecit deus omnia pecora et bestias et reptilia et uolatilia et duxit ea ad Adam ut uideret, quid uocaret ipsa. Et quod uocauit Adam, hoc nomen ipsi. Quid uoce hac et testimonio manifestius? Quid sapientia hac et cognitione excelcius? Vocauit nomine naturam ipsam et ypostasym unicuique animalium. Et multis et innumerabilibus generacionibus transcurrentibus non potuit aliquis mutare cuiuscumque animalis nomen. Sed et seminum et plantarum differencias radicumque et herbarum uirtutes, et quecumque nature congruunt uniuscuiusque animalium diiudicauit et discreuit et manifestauit. Iste et mulierem primo uidens non ut ex ore humano locutus est, sed ut ex quadam diuina uisione insonans bene coniecturabiliter multipliciter laudabile illud et admirabile enunciauit eloquium: hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro ex carne mea. Hec uocabitur uirago quoniam ex uiro ipsius sumpta est. Iste est qui probauit singula et omnibus regulas et pondera certa et terminos incontradictibiles coaptauit. Huius artes et litere, sciencie et racionales et irracionales, huius prophetie, sacrificaciones et purificationes et leges scripte et non scripte, huius omnes adinuenciones et dogmata, et quecumque secundum uitam necessarie utilitates et conuersaciones. Ista est prima ymago, a deo uocata agalma, a quo quidem diriguntur omnes hominum agalmaturgie, id est agalmatum operaciones, et ad minus et magis excidunt ab illa beata et deiformi similitudine nullam habente | occasionem, qua utique deprehendatur post illam plasmatus uel formatus, usque quo homicida et apostata et seductor diabolus hunc euoluit ex propria firmitudine et stacione et aduersus deorsum fecit ferri ad baratralia quedam et obscura loca et usque ad tristia inferni tenebrosa. Et hinc incepit natura hominum deformari et inquinari et figurari formacionibus et figuracionibus. Hinc spuria sapientia occasiones accepit, diuina fugiente et ad celum reuolante. Unde seductor dei approprians sibi nomen in multa diuisit, Saturnos et Ioues et Neptunos se ipsum nominans; et quod utique omnium execratissimum, 160

R 77r

133-173 Suda, s.u. Ἀδάμ. (α 425: I, pp. 43.3-44.36).

128 uos *I* || 129 domino *I* || aliquem *B* || 135 totis (ὅλων) totus *R* || 141 ipsi (αὐτῶ) | ipsis *R* || 147 insonante *R* || 156 ferri (φέρεσθαι) fieri *R* || 158 formacionibus (μορφώμασι) fornicacio- *R*.

135 *post* ymago *deest* καὶ εἰκὼν οὐσα θεόγραφος (p. 43.6) *cum solo* *Su*^S || 138 *post* naturam *deest* p. 43.11 (εὐστόχως)-12 (φθάνουσαι) *cum solo* *Su*^S || 139 et firmiter] καὶ ἀσφαλῶς *Su*^S: *om. Su*^{AGITM} || *deest* p. 43.14 (πρὸ)-16 (γρᾶφή) *cum solo* *Su*^S || et³] καὶ *Su*^S, *om. rell.* || 142 nomine] ὀνόματι *Su*^S: -τα *Su*^{AGTI} || unicuique animalium] ἐκάστων τῶν ζώων *Su*^S: ἐκάστου ζώου *Su*^{AGTI} || *deest* p. 43.21 (ὥσπερ)-23 (ἄνθρωποι) *cum solo* *Su*^S || 144 *post* nomen *deest* p. 43.24 (οὐδὲ)-28 (ἄξιωμα) *cum solo* *Su*^S || 146 *post* humano *deest* περὶ ταύτης *cum solo* *Su*^S || 149 *ante est hab.* τοίνυν *Su* || 151 dogmata] διδάγματα *Su* || 153 et] καὶ *Su*^S: καὶν *Su*^{AGTIM} || 157 usque ad tristia inferni tenebrosa] μέχρι τῶν ἀμειδίτων τοῦ ἄδου κευθμῶνων ἐγγίζοντας *Su* || 159 *post* reuolante *deest* p. 44.16-17 ὅθεν τὸ πρότερον ἦν ἀφορησασα *cum solo* *Su*^S.

in nomina feminea et inhonesta beatam et ineffabilem comprehendere naturam deceptor ausus est, et in deas illas et Veneres et Dianas et alias decem mille et extraneas irrationalium ydeas et formas, quas malicie conditor et secundum apostasiam egrotans colorauit et caracterizauit. Hinc Egiptorum que circa Osiryne et Thyphona et Ysidem perniciose narrationes et Persarum insane diuinationes et Brachmanorum Gymnosophistie et uane fantasie et admirata Scitharum locutio et Thracum orgia et Frigum fistule et Corybantes et Caldeorum deceptrix et multi doloris astronomia. Hinc mendacii pariens poesis, Gentilium deliramentorum. Hinc et Orpheus et Homerus et nephariorum filiorum descriptor Esiodus. Hinc Thaletis opinio et gloriosus Pictagoras et sapiens Socrates et Plato, Atheniensium Akademie famosum semnologicima. Hinc Parmenide et Protagore et Zenones, 170 Stoe et Ariopagi et Epicuri et tragedorum luctus et komikorum ludi et derisiones et omnis pacti inconuenientis et alieni adinuencio. Ratio horum autem ipse Adam occasio in tantum in quantum omnis †promisse omnibus offensus est exemplum per omnem ipsius in corpore commemoracionem, lugens et plangens mandati transgressionem et a paradysi deliciis exterminacionem et alienacionem. | Abraham: primus in patriarchis. Iste motus est ex terra Caldeorum, qui circa metheora et R76r 175 astra uitam consumpserunt. Exercitatione edoctus igitur secundum patriam legem celestium astrorum motus et coniectans quod non in hiis stat seu finitur magnum opus apparentis istius modi creacionis, sed habet aliquem conditorem qui et mouet et dirigit astrorum armonicam incessionem et totius mundi constitutionem, et per magnitudinem et pulchritudinem creaturarum generacionis operatorem ipsarum, ut possibile erat, speculans non stetit usque ad ipsas, neque desiderium ad 180 has consumpsit, sed celestibus absidibus superelatuus et omnem transcendens intellectualem et supermundanam confixionem non recessit a quesito, usque quo desideratus se ipsum ipsi manifestauit et tipis et formacionibus. Et transitum ipsum ex patria accipiens in Cananeam constituit, nonagesimum et nonum iam tempus annum trahentem. Iste Abraham adinuenit sacras scripturas et linguam machinatus est, qua Ebreorum pueri in scientia usi sunt, ut huius discipuli et pronepotes. 185 Ex isto et Grecorum littere occasiones acceperunt, quamuis aliter et aliter se ipsos deludant. Et huius testimonium ea que huius littere alpha uox primi elementi ab aleph ebreo accipientis uocacionem beato et primo et immortalis nomine. Ex isto et somniorum libros assumpserunt et appropriauerunt sibi Greci. Et testis Ioseph huius pronepos, qui Pharahonis sompnia ut futurum erat accidere exposuit. Narrat autem et Philon, de quo aiunt quidam: Philon platonizat, et Plato philonizat. Quoniam 190 incepit ydolatria a Seruch usque ad tempora Tharre patris Abraham. Abraham a quatuordecim

174-194 Suda, s.u. Αβραάμ (α 69: I, pp. 9.17-10. 35).

164 insane *add. R^{rec.}* || 165 gymnosophistie *R* || 167 parens *R^{a.c.}* || 172 promisse *R* ut uidetur, an penitentie? || comeracionem *R^{a.c.}* || 177 armoniam *R* || 182 transtitutum *R* || ipsum *s.l. add. R¹* || 184 quam *R*.

162 deas] 'Ρέας *Su* || 163 caracterizauit] διεχάραξεν *Su* || 164 insane diuinationes] μαγικά μαγγανεύματα *Su*. *An leg. μαγικά μαγ. Robertus?* || 166 et Caldeorum] ἐντεῦθεν ἢ Χαλδ. *Su* || 167 post deliramentorum *hab.* σεμνομοθία *Su*. || 169 post Zenones *hab.* ἐνθεῦθεν *Su* || 170 Epicuri et] Ἐπικούρειοι. ἐνθεῦθεν *Su* || luctus] θρήνοι *Su^s*, omissis καὶ κοπετοὶ || post derisiones *hab.* ἐντεῦθεν τὰ δολερὰ τοῦ Λοξίου καὶ ψευδηγόρου (κ. ψ. *deest in Su^s*) θεσπίσματα (p. 44.36-37) *Su*. *Hic desinit Su^s. Quae sequuntur addidit Robertus, suo Marte, ut uidetur* || 174 post patriarchis *deest p. 9.17 (εἰς ὄν)-20 (ἐπισπάσασθαι) cum solo Su^s* || 175 uitam] τὸν βίον ὄλον *Su*. || 176 stat seu finitur] ἴσταται *Su* (*uide infra l. 183*) || 182 post formacionibus *hab.* οὔς ἐαυτὸν ἐμφανίζει· ὁ ἀφανής καὶ ἀόρατος *Su* || 183 tempus annum] χρόνον *Su* (*uide supra l. 176*) || post trahentem *deest p. 9.34 (καὶ ἄπαιδα)-10.5 (δημοουργήσαντος) cum solo Su^s* || adinuenit] εὔρε μὲν *Su* || 185 deludant] διαπαίζωσι *Su^s*: ζῶντες *Su^{AGITMB}* || *deest ἀναγράφωσιν Ἑλληνας cum solo Su^s* || 186 post elementi *deest καὶ ἄρχοντος cum solo Su^s* || 188 post Ioseph *deest ὁ πανθαύμαστος cum solo Su^s* || 189 (narrat—platonizat) *summatim ex Su p. 10.14-16* || 190 post Abraham² *deest ὑπάρχων ἐτῶν et καὶ cum solo Su^s*.

annis diuina cognicione dignificatus suasit patri dicens: quid errari facis homines propter lucrum dampnosum? Non est alius deus nisi qui in celis. Ydola igitur patris hec quidem fragens, hec autem incendens, recessit cum patre ex terra Caldeorum et uenit in Charram ubi mortuus est pater eius.

R 76v Illinc | autem verbo diuino venit cum nepote Loth in debitam Canaan.

Leontios, Tripoleos Lidie episcopus, Mysius genere, eorum qui apud Istrum habitantium, 195 quos Achemachos Homerus uocat. Iste puerum unum habens, quia non bonam spem ipsum manifestantem ad uirtutem uidit, orans, ut aiunt, adhuc puerulum existentem mori fecit. Regulam autem ipsum uocabant ecclesie. Erat autem liber secundum sententiam equaliter ad omnes et libere propalacionis. Et aliquando synodo facta, Eusebia Constantini uxor in tumorem eleuata proprii spiritus et ab episcopis adorata, solus iste prauam ipsam ponens domi mansit. Ea autem propter hoc 200 succensa furoribus et secundum mentem inflammata mittit ad ipsum, causans et promissionibus blandiens, quod ecclesiam tibi maximam erigam et pecunias largiar, si uenias ad me. Hic autem respondit: horum quidem si quid uolueris perficere, o regina, non mihi magis quam tue anime scias gratiosa esse. Si autem uolueris quod ueniam ad te, ut episcopis decente ueneracione obseruata, ut intrauero quidem ego, tu autem confestim a trono descendens cum ueneracione obuies michi et 205 caput supponas meis manibus, benedictionibus dignificata et deinde sedeam quidem ego, tu autem stes reuerens, cum autem iubeam, sedeas reuerens quando fecero signum. Si sic elegeris, ueniam ad te; si secundum alterum modum, non sic multa dabis neque sic multa poteris. Hec autem ut annunciata sunt, accensa est secundum mentem et multum inflata et passa et multum ex muliebri extrema R 79v iracundia et leui minans mente et uiro enarrans, ad puni|cionem mouebatur. Hic autem magis 210 laudauit liberum sententiae et uxorem remittit in mulierum domum. Et aliquando in intermedio presedente imperatore Constantino episcoporum et dominari ecclesiis uolente, multi quidem omne quodcumque diceret applaudebant, optime dictum esse determinantes; hic autem silebat. Ut autem interrogauit cum imperator quid silet: admiror, ait, qualiter altera disponere ordinatus, altera conaris. Et sic suasit recedere ab ecclesiasticis rebus. 215

195-215 Suda, s.u. Λεόντιος (λ 254: III, pp. 245.2-246.7). Vide Dorandi, *Modello*, pp. 332-3.

195 Istrum (τῷ Ἰστρω) istarum R || 201 et *iter.*, *sed exp.* R || 210 punicionem *iter.* R || 212 precedente R.

191 *post* patri *deest* αὐτοῦ *cum solo* Su^S || 192 *post* dampnosum? *deest* (τουτέστι τὰ εἰδωλα) *cum solo* Su^S || *post* celis *deest* p. 10.21 (ὁ καὶ)-30 (σου) *cum solo* Su^S || igitur] γοῦν Su^S: om. Su^{AGITM} || 194 illinc autem] ἐκεῖ δὲ Su^S: ἐκεῖθεν Su^{AGITM} || cum nepote Lot—Canaan] σὺν τῷ ἀνεψίῳ Λὼτ εἰς τὴν ὀφειλομένην γῆν Χαναάν Su^S: σὺν τῇ γυναικὶ Σαρραῖ καὶ τῷ ἀν. Λ. μετὰ πάσης αὐτῶν τῆς ἀποσκευῆς εἰς τ. ὄφ. γ. X. Su^{AGITM} || Canaan] *hic desinit* Su^S || 196 iste] οὗτος Su^{GVM}: ὅς Su^A || 197 *post* fecit *deest* p. 245.8 (κἀλλιστον)-9 (γενόμενον) *cum solo* Su^V || 199 Constantini] Κωνσταντίνου Su^{GV}: -τίου Su^{AM} || 203 tue] σῆ Su^{GVM}: σαυτοῦ Su^A || 205 a trono] τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ ὑψηλοῦ Su || 206 sedeam quidem ego] καθεσθείην μὲν ἐγὼ Su^V: καθ. μ. αὖ ἐγὼ Su^{AGM} || 208 *post* poteris *deest* ὡς ἡμᾶς—θεσμόν (p. 245.26-28) *cum solo* Su^V || 209 *post* mentem *deest* p. 245.28 (οὐκ)-29 (λόγους) *cum solo* Su^V || 211 liberum] ἐλευθρον Su^V: ἐλευθερίαν Su^{AGM} || *post* uxorem *deest* παρήνεγκε τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ *cum solo* Su^V || 213 *post* applaudebant *deest* καὶ ἐθαύμαζον *cum solo* Su^V || 214 *post* silet *deest* μόνος τῶν πάντων; *cum solo* Su^V || qualiter] ὅπως Su^{GVM}: ὅτι εἰς Su^A || 215 et sic—rebus] καὶ οὕτως ἔπεισεν ἀπέχειν τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν πραγμάτων Su^V: στρατιωτικῶν μὲν καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων προστηκώς, ἐπισκόποις δὲ περὶ τῶν εἰς μόνους ἐπισκόπους ἡκόντων διαταττόμενος. τὸν δὲ βασιλέα καταιδεσθέντα παύσασθαι τῆς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἤδη διακελεύσεως. τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ Λεόντιος ἐλευθέριος Su^{AGM}.

(32) Bragman uero fuit rex genti et regioni dans appellationem [...] et, ut scribunt Greci, idem rex propria lingua leges scripsit et conuersacionem eiusdem populi. [...]

(34) In quodam greco libro inueni scripta plura de predictis, et insuper adiectum quod isti Bragmanes inhabitant quandam insulam oceani quam acceperunt a deo in hereditatem. Ad quem
220 locum cum uenisset Alexander macedo, erexit columpnam, et scripsit in ea: ego magnus Alexander rex istam erexi. (35) In insula quam inhabitant longeuī, uiuunt enim CL annos propter mundiciam et bonam complexionem aeris. Apud quos non est animal quadrupes, non ferrum, non ignis, non aurum, non argentum, non panis, non uinum. Hii uenerantur familiariter deum, et indeficienter orant. Mulieres uero eorum seorsum manent, interfluente Gangco fluuio, ubi decidit in oceanum.
225 Viri autem transfretant ad uxores suas mense iulio et augusto in quibus sunt frigidiores, sole appropinquante ad septemtrionem et elongato ab eis, utpote habitantibus sub circulo equinoxiali. Conmanent autem cum uxoribus per XL dies, et iterum remeant. Cum autem uxor duo pueros genuerit non amplius accedit ad eam uir eius, neque illa alii uiro approximat propter multam eorum religiositatem. Si uero contigat sterilem inter ipsas esse usque ad V annos transit ad eam uir eius; et
230 cognoscens quod usque ad quinquenium non parit, non amplius accedit ad eam. Propter hoc nec multitudinem hominum habet regio ipsorum. |

Alexander, Philippi et Olimpiadis filius, regnauit super Macedones ab annis octodecim, mortuus est autem annorum triginta trium. Iste erat tunc secundum corpus pulcherrimus et amantissimus laborum et acutissimus, secundum ingenium maxime uirilī et amantissimus honoris et amantissimus
235 periculorum et de deo curiosissimus, a uoluptatibus quidem corporis continentissimus, eorum autem qui a scientia laudati erant simplicissimus; conspiciere autem oportunū, in immanifesto ens, prudentissimus et ex manifestis conueniens componere fortunatissimus et ordinare exercitus et armare sapientissimus. Et ad omne bonum aptissimus. Cum hiis erat mansuetus et dei uenerator. Iratus enim aliquando Thebeis in tantum ut et habitatores quidem in seruitudinem redigere,
240 ciuitatem autem ad fundamentum suffodere, eum quidem qui ad deos cultum non neglexit ad comprehensionem ciuitatis; sed plurimam fecit prouidenciam pro neque inuoluntarium peccatum circa sacra. Magniloquum Alexandri non supertumidum magis quid quam audax in periculis apparebat. Roxanem amauit filiam Oxiarti qui Bactriani, quam utique et pulcherrimam Asiarum mulierum dicunt apparuisse cum Alexandro militantes post Darii uxorem. Et hanc uidentem
245 Alexandrum in amorem uenire; amantem autem non uoluisse iniuriari quemadmodum captiuam, sed ducere in uxorem non dedignari. Et hoc ego Alexandri laudo. Et quidem eius que Darii uxoris, que pulcherrima utique dicebatur earum que in Asia mulierum, uel non uenit in concupiscentiam

R 78 r

216-231 Suda, s.u. Βραχμῶνες (β 524: I, pp. 493.28-494.26). *Caput hoc in R et D nunc deperditum (tit. brachman Rind.) legitur (ex aliqua parte) in ipsius Roberti opere quod Hexaameron inscribitur, pr. 32 et 34-35 (pp. 25.26-27.15 Dales/Gieben). Cod. autographus Bodleian. lat. th. c. 17. Cf. Dionisotti, p. 23 adn. 11 et Dorandi, Traduction, pp. 410-1 || 232-276 Suda, s.u. Ἀλέξανδρος (α 1121: I, pp. 101.17-103.13).*

242 supertimidum R || 243 Asiarum (τῶν Ἀσιανῶν) aliarum R || 246 que] qui R || 247 Asia (τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ) alia R.

221 istam erexi] ἔφθασα μέχρι τούτου Su || 222 post quadrupes hab. οὐ γεώργιον Su || post ferrum hab. οὐκ οἰκοδομή Su || 223 post uinum hab. οὐ κρεωφαγία—ἀπολαύοντες (p. 494.6-8) Su || 224 post orant hab. καὶ οἱ—προσπαροικοῦσιν (p. 494.9-10) Su || post oceanum hab. ἐπὶ τὸ μέρος τῆς Ἰνδίας (p. 494.12) Su || 226 utpote habitantibus sub circulo equinoxiali add. ipse Robertus? || post equinoxiali hab. οὐ γε—ἀπέχοντος (p. 494.14-19) Su || 235 deo] θείου Su || 241 pro neque inuoluntarium peccatum] ἀκούσιον ἀμάρτημα γενέσθαι Su || 242 post sacra hab. καὶ καθόλου τὰ τέμνα Su || 243 post Roxanem deest δέ et post amauit ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος cum solo Su^s || 246 post laudo deest μᾶλλον τι ἢ μέφομαι cum solo Su^s || ante Darii deest γε cum solo Su^s.

uel {maxime} fortior se ipso factus est, et iuuenis existens et maxime in incremento bone fortune, quando iniuriantur homines. Hic autem et uerecundatus est et pepercit et castitate multa utens et gloria, simul bona non inconueniente desiderio. Et igitur et sermo continet, fugientem uenire apud 250 Darium eunuchum costodem ipsius uxoris. Et hunc ut uidit Darius, primo quidem interrogare si uiuunt ipsius pueri et uxor et mater. Ut autem et uiuentes didicit, et quoniam regine uocantur, et de famulatu, et quod | caste uiuit ipsius uxor; in hiis extendere Darium manus et orasse sic: sed o Iupiter R 78 v rex, cui permissum est res regales distribuere in hominibus, tu nunc maxime quidem michi custodi et Persarum et Medorum principatum, quemadmodum et dedisti; si autem ego non amplius tibi rex Asiae, 255 tu autem nulli alii nisi Alexandro trade meam potentiam. Sic neque ab oppugnantibus negleguntur quecumque casta opera. Sic ait Arrianus. Nearchus autem ait quoniam difficiles ipsi amicorum facti sunt, quicumque offerebant sibi egrotantem quoniam ipse ante exercitum periclitabatur; non enim ducis exercitus hec, sed militis esse. Et michi uidetur contristari Alexander <hiis> rationibus quoniam ueros existentes cognouit et se ipsum causam increpacioni. Et tamen ab audacia que in bellis et amore 260 glorie, quemadmodum qui ab alia aliqua uoluptate dominati, non paciens erat abstinere a periculis. Alexander macedo admirabilem uitam uixit; fidem autem dictis firmam agonum tribuit accio. Neque enim est inuenire in omni mundi circulo unum uirum tantis direccionibus habundantem. Et enim cum optimis existens uiris in sermones non minor hiis qui in summum laudatis inuentus est; et ad bellica transiens admiranda magis quam fide digna operatus est. Et ad Darium Persarum regem 265 committens bellum, hunc potenter uincit. Et ille petit in reconciliaciones uenire, et dare ipsi Roxanem filiam Oxiarthis ad nupciarum comunicacionem. Ipse omnes gentes triumphans corruptus est posterius et ad corporis uoluptates dilapsus est, Persicamque stolam indutus, decem milibus autem iuuenibus stipatus, concubinis quidem utens, ut macedonicam omnem consuetudinem in Persas transmutans et priorum quosdam accusatos interficere. Posterius autem in Indiam peragens a Candace regina comprehensus est in ydiote forma. Et dixit ipsi: Alexander rex, mundum cepisti et a muliere comprehensus es? Et pacem ad ipsam fecit et regionem illius illesam custodire promisit. 270 Idem octingentis uiris obuiauit a Persis quondam in Ellade captis, mutilatis manibus, quos magnis donis honorauit et consolatus est. In stagnum autem Alexandrie pergens diadema deposuit, imbre multa irruente et uix ad terram natauit. Et a Cassandro proprio duce | exercitus farmacum accipiens 275 diruptus est; et sic in tantis direccionibus uitam commutauit.

Augustus Cesar, qui et Sebastus et Octauianus cognominatus, scripsit De propria uita et actibus libros tredecim et tragediam de Aiace et Achille. Quoniam Augustus Cesar gloriam ipsi quesiiuit omnes

277-280 Suda, s.u. Αὐγούστος Καῖσαρ (α 4412: I, p. 410.16-21).

248 maxime fortior R: maxime *deleuimus* (ex sequentibus hic irrepsit, ut uidetur), *deest in Su* || 250 inconuenientis R || 253 manus manum R || 259 alexandrum R || hiis *addimus* (τοῦσδε) || 264 laudatus R || 271 est et R || 278 de Aiace (Αἰάντος) dericiace R.

248 fortior καρτερός *Su*SM: καρτερῶς *Su*^{AGIT} || 253 *post* Darium *hab.* ἐς τὸν οὐρανὸν *Su* || 254 res regales βασιλεια *Su*^{GITSM}: βασιλείων *Su*^{A.Myp} || 255 *post* quemadmodum *hab.* οὖν *Su* || *post* autem *hab.* δὴ *Su* || 256 *post* potentiam *hab.* οὕτως— ἔργα (p. 102.18-19) *Su* || 258 sibi αὐτῷ *Su*^{AS}: αὐτὸν *Su*^{GITM} || 266-267 Roxanem filiam Oxiarthis] τὴν θυγατέρα Ῥωξάνην *Su*. *Vide supra l.* 243 || 267 triumphans κατατροπωσάμενος *Su*SM: -στρεψάμενος *Su*^{AGIT} || 268 posterius (ὑστερον?) τὸν νοῦν *Su* || 269 concubinis ταῖς τε παλλακαῖς *Su*^S: τ' τε π. *Su*^{GITM}: τῷ τε π. *Su*^A || 270 transmutans μεταρριθμίσας *Su*^S: -θμίσαι *Su*^L: μεταρριθμίσαι *Su*^{GM}: -θμίσαι *Su*^A || 271 et *deest in Su* || 272 custodire promisit] διαφυλάττεσθαι ὑπέσχετο *Su*^S: διεφύλαξεν *Su*^{AGITM} || 273 octingentis] ὀκτακοσίοις *Su*^S: om. *Su*^{AGITM} || 277 scripsit de] ἔγραψε περὶ *Su*^V: ἔγραψε *deest in Su*^{AGITM} || 278 quesiiuit *deest in Su*.

habitatores Romanorum secundum faciem numerari fecit, uolens cognoscere quanta est multitudo. Et
 280 inuenti sunt in Roma habitatores quadriginte et decem miriades | uirorum et mille et septedecim uiri.

Augustus Cesar, nepos Iulii Cesaris; a quo et mensis Augustus cognominatus est. Augusta autem
 dicuntur preciosa et magna et insignia. Sub ipso enim dominus Iesus natus est. Augustus Cesaris
 sacrificans interrogauit Phitonissam, quis post ipsum regnaret; et ipsa dixit: puer Ebreus iubet me, diis
 285 beatis imperans, hanc domum relinquere et sine carmine rursus uenire. Iam recede silens ex delubris
 nostris. Et exiens Augustus statuit in Capitolio aram primogeniti dei, in qua scripsit Romanis litteris:
 ara ista est primogeniti dei.

| <...> aliquando dixit suaderi ipsum sociari alteri uiro; aliterque et quando senuit, non adhuc D 33r
 descendere crebro a sua domo; habitare autem solum in domicula parua uere ueritate, secundum
 uitam decentem, ad magis necessaria utentem uicinorum quibusdam. Oratum quidem igitur esse
 290 Serapionem excellenter dixit et in ydiote figura undique circuire sacra loca, ubi duxit lex festiuitatis.
 Multa autem in domo permanentem uiuere, non quandam humanam uitam, sed simpliciter dicere
 diuinas oraciones semper et uirtutes ad se ipsum uel ad diuinum loquentem, magis autem silencio
 cogitantem. Inquisitiuus autem erat ueritatis et natura speculatiuus non circa magis artificialia
 philosophie dignum ducebat studere, sed obscurioribus et diuiniioribus intelligenciis innaturabatur.
 295 Propter quod solum fere Orphea possidebat et legebat, interrogans in singulis semper incidentibus
 questionibus Ysidorum, supremam, ut dicere, scienciam in theologia indutum; quem tantummodo
 familiarem cognouit existentem et acceptauit. Et utique in ipso uideri uidebatur fabulatam
 Saturninam uitam. Nichil enim aliud quid perficiebat operans et dicens ille quam conducens se ipsum
 semper et congregans, ut possibile, ad equale et magis impartibile. Qui sic contempnebat pecunias
 300 ut possidere nihil aliud quicquam quam solos duos uel tres libros; quorum erat et Orphey poema;
 sic autem delicias contempnebat, ut et ex principio necessaria et sola conferre corpori, ueneris
 etiam immaculatus erat per uitam omnem. Neque autem curabat honorem qui ab hominibus, ut et
 neque nomen ipsius esset in ciuitate. Neque utique cognitus erat, nisi deorum quis uellet exemplum
 hominibus tribuere Saturnine uite. Chyron quidem enim dictus in confinio magis stabat Saturni et
 305 Iouis principatus, unde duplicis nature. Serapion autem iste a philosopho cognitus describatur talis:
 qui herede Ysidoro utebatur, nullum a genere habens, neque dignum alium suspicans esse sui ipsius
 substantia, duobus dico uel tribus libris.

Hermen, id est Mercurium: hunc filium Iouis dicunt et Maye, uelut intellectus et prudencie.
 Ex intellectu enim et prudencia sermo gignitur propter hoc et alatum ipsum faciunt, ut uelocem;
 310 nihil enim sermone uelocius. Et Homerus uerba pennata. Omnibus autem iuniorem ipsum faciunt

281-286 Suda, s.u. Αὐγούστος (α 4413; I, pp. 410.22-411.8) || 287-307 Suda, s.u. Σαραπίων (σ 116, IV, pp. 323.28-325.3) || 308-315 Suda, s.u. Ἐρμῆν (ε 3037, II, p. 413.21-31).

281 augustus¹ ex agustus R^{p.c.} (augustus iter. s.l. R^{rec.}) || 284 silens (σιγῶν) | alens R || 287 inc. mutilus (p. 324.8 ποτὲ ἔφη πείσεσθαί) || 296 dicere ex discere D || 300 ut ni D || 309 alatum (πτερωτόν) ipsum] altum ipsum D: ipsum R.

282 post natus est hab. Χριστός—διέθετο (pp. 410.24-411.2) Su || 285 post exiens deest ἐκ τοῦ μαντείου cum solo Su^V || 286 primogeniti deest in Su, sed uide l. 285 || 289 post decentem deest μόνον cum solo Su^V || 292 diuinas] θείας Su^V: θεῖαν Su^{AGM} || 293 erat] ἦν Su^V: ὦν Su^{AGM} || 298 nichil] οὐδὲν Su^{GVM}: οὐδὲ Su^A || 299 equale] ἴσον Su^V: εἶσω Su^{AGM} || post sic deest μὲν cum solo Su^V || contempnebat] κατεφρόνει Su^V: τῶν περὶ τῷ σώματι Su^{AGM} || 301 post principio deest εὐθὺς cum solo Su^V || 302 immaculatus erat] ἄχραντος ἦν Su^{GVM}: ἄχραντον εἶναι Su^A || neque] οὔτε Su^V: οὔτω Su^{AGM} || 303 post cognitus erat deest μετὰ ταῦτα cum solo Su^V || 304 post uite deest ἔνα—ἱστορίαν (p. 324.33-34) cum solo Su^V || 310 iuniorem] νεώτερον Su^V: -τατον Su^{AGM}.

propter non senescere sermonem; sed et tetragonum ipsum faciunt propter firmitudinem ueri sermonis. Dicunt autem ipsum et lucri causam et negociacionum custodem; unde ymaginem ipsius statuunt portantem marsupium. Sed et Phenices deos ipsorum plasmant ferentes marsupia, ut auro signo existente potentatus; gentiles autem ferrum ferentes ipsos formant, uelut armis subiuugatis hominibus. 315

D 33v Hermes qui Trismegistus: iste erat Egiptius sapiens; adoleuit autem ante Pharaonem. Vocabatur autem Trismegistus, quasi ter maximus, quia de trinitate locutus est dicens, in trinitate unam esse deitatem sic: erat lumen intelligibile ante lumen intelligibile, et erat semper intellectus intellectus illuminatiuus, et nichil aliud erat huius unio quam spiritus omnia continens. Extra hunc non deus, non angelus, non substantia aliqua alia. | Omnium enim dominus et pater et deus, et omnia sub ipso et in ipso sunt. Verbum enim ipsius omniperfectum existens et generatiuum et conditiuum, in generatiua natura puer existens et generatiua aqua, parturientem aquam fecit. Et cum hec dixisset orauit dicens: adiuro te celum dei magni sapiens opus; adiuro te uocem patris, quam locutus est primam, quando omnem mundum firmauit; adiuro te per unigenitum ipsi<us> uerbum et spiritum continentem omnia, propicius, propicius esto. 320 325

Orpheus, Lybetherorum eorum qui in Thrace, ciuitate sub Pyeria, filius Yagri et Calliopis. Yagros autem quintus erat ab Athlante, secundum Alcionem unam filiarum ipsius. Extitit autem ante undecim generationes Troicorum, et aiunt discipulum fuisse ipsum Lini; uiuere autem generationes nouem, alii autem aiunt undecim. Scripsit Triasmus, qui dicuntur esse Ionis tragici; in hiis autem Ierostolica uocata; Declamaciones mundanas; Neoteuktica; scripsit Sacros sermones in rapsodiis uigintiquattuor; dicuntur autem esse Theogneti Thessaly, alii autem dicunt eos Kerkonis; scripsit etiam Pythagorii diuinaciones, que referuntur ad Onomacritum; scripsit Teletas; similiter autem aiunt et has Onomacriti; in hiis autem est de lapidum scultura, que Ogdoycontalithos inscribitur; scripsit Salutaria: hec Tymoklei Siracusii dicuntur et Persini Milesii; scripsit Crateras: hec Zopiri aiunt; scripsit Tronizaciones Maternas et Bacchica: hec Nikii Eleati aiunt; scripsit In infernum descencionem: hec Erodicti Pyrinthii; scripsit Peplum et Rete: hec Zopiry 330 335

316-325 Suda, s.u. Ἑρμῆς, ὁ Τρισμέγιστος (ε 3038, II, pp. 413.32-414.10) || 326-339 Suda, s.u. Ὀρφεύς (ο 654: III, pp. 564.23-565.11).

312 ipsum et (αὐτὸν καὶ) et ipsum DR || 314 ferrum ferentes (σιδηροφοροῦντας) D: sertum f. R || 314-315 armis subiuugatis hominibus (ὡς τοῖς ὄπλοις ὑποταττομένων ἀνθρώπων) R: a. -atorum -um D || 316 iste (οὗτος) D: ille R || enim erat D || 317 ter] tres DR || 318 ante lumen intelligibile om. R propter homoeoteleuton || semper (ἀεὶ) D: om. R || intellectus intellectus (νοῦς νοός) D: intellectus R || 319 quam D: qua R || 320 aliqua (τις ἄλλη) R: om. D || dominus (κύριος) R: deus D || 321 omniperfectum (παντέλειος) D: omnino perfectum R || 322 natura (φύσει) D: potentia R || puer (παῖς) D: pater R || aqua D: -am R || parturientem R: parto- D || hec (ταῦτα) D: hoc R || 324 firmauit (ἔστηρίξατο) R: for- D || unigenitum R D^{p.c.}, id quod scr. D^{a.c.} non liquet || ipsius (αὐτοῦ) ipsi D: eius R || 326 Lybetherorum scripsimus: lydetherorum D: -thorum R^{p.c.}: -corum R^{a.c.} || 328 troycorum R || 330 ierostolica (Ἱεροστολικὰ) R: yera- D || neoteuktica (Νεοτευκτικά) R: neontaktica D || scripsit R: scr. etiam D || 331 rapsodiis R^{a.c.} || 332 scripsit R: scr. etiam D || 334 Ogdoycontalithos (Ὀγδοηκοντάλιθος) ogdoytantalithos D: -lithus R || tymoklei D: timoclei R || persini R: perusii D || per. scripsit mil. DR || 335 sopiri D: zophirii R || tronizaciones D: tronismos R || nikii D: nichei R || 336 pyrintii D: pirinchii R || rete seu rethe D^{p.c.}, id quod scripserat D^{a.c.} incertum, an reticulum?: dictuon R ut uidetur || zopiry D: zopii R.

319 quam] καὶ Su || spiritum i.e. τοῦ πνεύματος] τοῦ πατρός Su || 326 Λιβηθρῶν Su^{AFS}: Ληβήθρων Su^{GM}: Λειβήθρων Gaisford ex Su λ 359 || 330 scripsit deest hic et infra in Su || 332 Κέρκωνος Su^S: Κέρκωπος Su^{AGFM} || Κέρκωνος τοῦ Πυθαγορείου· Χρησμούς Su || 333 post aiunt deest εἶναι cum solo Su^S || 334 hec] ταῦτα Su^S: καὶ ταῦτα Su^{AGM}.

Eracleoti; scripsit Nominatium sermones mille ducentos, Deorum generationem sermones mille ducentos, Astronomiam, Amocopia, Thyepolicon, ωothitica uel ωoskopica. Katizosticon, Ymnos; Korybanticum; et Naturalia, que Brotini aiunt.

340 Orpheus: in tempore eorum qui apud Iudeos Iudicum, uastato regno Atheniensium, cognosce-
batur, sapiens optimus existens, et multa mysteria edoctus; narrantur enim ipsius et de dei
cognitione sermones, ex quibus dixit hec quoniam a principio ostensus est ether a deo conditus; et hinc
et | in etheris erat chaos et nox terribilis omnia continebat et uelauit sub ethere; significans noctem
precedere; dicens incomprehensibilem quemdam et omnium supremum esse et preexistentem et
345 conditorem omnium et supremum ethera; et terram dixit inuisibilem. Dixit autem quoniam lumen
rumpens ethera illuminauit terram et omnem creaturam, illud dicens lumen supremum Plato,
inaccessibile, omnia continens; quod nominauit consilium, lumen, uitam. Hec tria nomina unam
uirtutem annunciauit et unam potenciam conditoris omnium dei, omnia ex non ente adducentis
in esse, et inuisibilia et uisibilia. De genere autem hominum dixit quoniam et ipsum <a> conditore
350 omnium et deo plasmatum est et animam accepit rationalem, sequens ea que Moysi; et miserum
dicens genus hominum et multis subiectum passionibus, animalibus et corporalibus, susceptiumque
bonorum et malorum operum et ad uiuere miserabiliter dispositum.

Plato, Aristonis filius filii Aristocleis et Perictiones uel Potones, genus trahentis a Solone; sexta
enim erat ab illo, filia existens Dropydi poete fratris Solonis. Solon enim ad Nelea reducit genus.
355 Sed et Ariston Platonis pater ex genere Codri descendit, Melanthii filii. Historizatur autem quod ex
quadam diuina uisione mater Platonis pregnans facta est apparente ipsi Apollyne. Et quando peperit
Platonem, tunc ad ipsam uir aduenit. Natus est autem in Aygine in octogesima octaua Olympiade
post incepciones Peloponysiacy belli, et uixit annos octoginta duos. Mortuus est autem in
centesima octaua Olympiade, neque nupcias aliquas neque copulam omnino corporis in experientiam
360 suscipiens; conuiuatus autem est in solemnitate et dormiens mortuus est. Sed et alteri sunt post ipsum
nati Aristoni, scilicet Adeymantus et Glaucon et Potone filia. Et primas quidem litteras edoctus
est a quodam Dyonisio, exercitatus est autem que in palestram apud Aristonem Argium; deinde
discens poeticam scripsit dythyrambos et tragedias, relinquens autem hec philosophatus est Plato
apud Socratem annos uiginti. Et sermo est uidere Socratem in qua die traditus est ipsi Plato, cignum
365 ipsius genibus supersedentem. Appellabatur autem Aristocles, propter latum autem esse pectus Plato

R 80r

340-352 Suda, s.u. Ὀρφεύς (o 660: III, pp. 565.24-566.11) || 353-372 Suda, s.u. Πλάτων (π 1707: IV, pp. 140.26-141.25) ||
353-366 cf. *Iohannes Gallensis, Compend. III iv 2 (f. 191r)* Plato, inquit, Aristidis filius, a Solone trahentis genus. Hystoriatum
est et quod ex quadam uisione diuina mater Platonis pregnans facta peperit Platonem. Philosophatus est autem (*l.* apud
Socratem. Et sermo est uidere Socratem, nocte qua traditus est ei Plato, cygnum ipsius genibus supersedentem. Appellabatur
autem Aristotiles, sed propter latum autem pectus Plato nominatus est; alii tamen dicunt propterea latum esse in sermonibus.

338 ωothitica (Ὠοθητικά) *D*: mochtitica *R* || ωoskopica (Ὠοσκοπικά) *D*: mostopica *R* || 340 orpheus enim *D* || 341
cognoscebatur *D*: -bantur *R* || multoa *D* || 343 nox *R*: uox *D* || 344 (esse)-345 (supremum) *om.* *R* propter homoeoteleuton ||
346 omni creatura *R* || illud *R*: id *D* || plato autem *D* || 347 hec enim *D* || unam *R*: una *D* || 348 unam *D*: una *R* || 349 a
(ὑπό) *addimus* || 351 susceptiectum *R* || 352 miserabiliter (ἀθλίως) *D*: insatia- *R* || 353 perictiones *D* || 354 enim (δέ) etiam
D || 355 historizatur (ιστόρηται) *]* historiozant *D*.

338 *post* ωoskopica *hab.* ἐπικῶς *Su* || καταζωστικόν *Su*^{AGM}: ζωτικόν *Su*^S || 342 ex—quoniam] ἐξ ὧν εἶπε ταῦτα ὅτι *Su*^S:
ἐξ ὧν εἶσι ταῦτα *Su*^{AGM} || 343 *post* uelauit *deest* τὰ *cum solo* *Su*^S || 346 Plato] Πλάτων *Su*^S: πάντων *Su*^{AGFM} || 348 ex non ente]
τοῦ μὴ ὄντος *Su*^{GS}: τῶν μὲν ὄντων *Su*^{AFM} || 349 ὄρατῶν τε καὶ ἀόρατων *Su*^{AFS, Mac.}: ὄρατά τε καὶ ἀόρατα *Su*^{G, Mpc.} || 354 poete
fratris] τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἀδελφοῦ *Su*^V: π. τοῦ ἀδ. *Su*^{AGFM} || 355 Melanthii] Μελανθίου *Su*^V: Μελάνθου *Su*^{AGFM} || 364 annos] ἔτη
Su^V: ἐπὶ ἔτη *Su*^{AGFM}.

nominatus est, alii autem propter latum esse in sermonibus Platonem dicunt uocari. Ter autem in Ciciliam Plato uenit ad tyrannos Dyonisios; et uenditus est <a tyranno. ...> autem in Achademia docens; et susceperunt scolam ipsius secundum unum hii: Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, Cranthor, Crates. Hii autem Socratici Arkesylaus, Lakydes, Euandrus Focaius, Lamon Leonteus, Moskyon, Euandrus Atheniensis, Eginus, Carneades, Armadas. Sunt autem proprii ipsius omnes 370 dyalogi 56, quorum hii quidem physiologici, hii autem ethici, hii autem dyaletici. Et Politia quidem diuiditur in libros 10, Leges autem in 12. Tetralogie autem relique 9.

Ipse autem philosophus pauper erat et solum eum qui in Achademia possedit ortum, qui pars minima erat successorum. Ortus quidem enim prope tria aurea numismata reddebat, totus autem questus posterius mille uel et plura parum. Augmentatus est autem hic secundum iuniora tempora, 375 hominum et sacrorum et philologorum alias aliis morientibus et secundum testamenta relinquentibus philosophantibus occasionem eius que in philosophica uita scole et quietis. Ait autem Plato in Legibus quoniam libera est anima et domina passionum. Vincere quidem ipsum se ipsum omnium uictoriarum prima et optima, uinci autem ipsum | a se ipso et turpissimum et pessimum. Scimus enim quoniam 380 passiones in nobis uelut nerui et funes quidam existentes et auellunt nos et adinuicem attrahunt, contrarii quidem existentes in contrarias acciones. Et non utique determinata uirtus et malicia ponitur; unam enim ait sermo oportere dictionum sequentem semper et nequaquam defficientem illis attrahere aliis mensuris unumquodque, hanc autem esse rationis direccionem. Ostendit igitur sapiens quod uoluntati anime attribuit meliorum et deteriorum diuisionem. Idem et Plato ait theologizans: quid ens quidem semper, generationem autem non habens, et quid quod fit semper, ens autem 385 numquam? Hoc quidem utique intelligencia rationis comprehensibile semper secundum idem ens, hoc autem sensu irracionali opinabile adueniens quidem et recedens, uere autem numquam ens. Hec

366-368 cf. *Iohannes Gallensis, Compend. III iv 4 (f. 192r)* Et de hoc (*sc. de triplici aduentu Platonis in Sicilia*) in dicto libro, qui dicitur Suda habetur quod ter Plato uenit in Siciliam ad tyrannos Dionysios, et uenditus est a tyranno || 373-422 Suda, s.u. Πλάτων (π 1709: IV, pp. 142.2-144.5) || 373-377 cf. *Iohannes Gallensis, Compend. III iv 6 (f. 193r)* Unde in dicto libro qui dicitur Suda dicitur quod Plato conuersatus est in Achademia docens, sed ipse Plato pauper erat et solum in Achademia possedit ortum, qui pars minima erat successorum. Ortus autem prope ante atria aurea tria numismata reddebat, totus autem questus posterius mille uel plura parum. Augmentatus est hic secundum uiuorum (*l. iuniorum*) tempora, hominum et successorum philosophorum aliis morientibus et per testamenta relinquentibus philosophantibus occasione eius que in philosophica uita est scole et quietis || 377-381, 393-398, 419-420 cf. *Id., ibid. III iv 13 (f. 194v)* De multis uero dictis eius habetur in libro qui dicitur Suda, ubi dicitur: ait Plato in legibus quoniam libera est anima et domina passionum. uincere autem se ipsum omnium uictoriarum prima et optima, uinci autem a seipso et turpissimum et pessimum. Scimus enim quoniam passiones in nobis uelut nerui et funis quidam existentes ut auellant nos et ad inuicem attrahant, contrarii quidem existentes in contrarias acciones scilicet debemus esse. Quasi dicat contrariari debemus passionibus reluctantis. Ibidem ait Plato bonus quidem deus et quidem deus causa bonorum, malorum autem omnium non causa. Ibidem ait in legibus deus utique principium et finem omnium habens derelinquentibus diuinam legem adest ultor puniens, obseruantibus uero et felicitati futuris humilis et ornatus. Idem ait in Phedone: imperfectus quidem et immundus in infernum abiens; perfectus et purgatus hic transiens cum deo habitat. *Vide Dorandi, Traduction, pp. 422-4.*

366 ter (τρίς) tres *D* || 368 doces *D* || 369 Focaius (Φωκαεύς) ffotacus *D*^{a.c.}, -cis *D*^{p.c.} || 372 teratologie *D* || 375 iuniorum *D*.

366 nominatus est] ὀνομάσθη *Su*^V: ἐπ- *Su*^{AGFM} || propter latum—uocari] διὰ τὸ πλατὺν εἶναι ἐν λόγοις Πλάτων λέγουσι κληθῆναι *Su*^V: ὡς πλ. ἐν λ. Πλάτωνα κλ. *Su*^{AGFM} || 367 post uenditus est *lac. statuimus et partim suppleuimus (cf. Ioh. Gall., Compend. III iv 4, f. 192r)* ὑπὸ τοῦ τυράννου. ἐπρίατο δὲ αὐτὸν Ἀννίκερις τις Λίβυν καὶ ἀφῆκε. διέτριβε δὲ ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ *Su* || 368 susceperunt] ἐδέξαντο *Su*^V: διε- *Su*^{AGFM} || 369 Lamon] Λάμων *Su*^V: Δάμων *Su*^{AGFM} || 381 et?] ἢ *Su An* uel? || 382 dictionum] λέξεων *Su*^{GVM}: ἔλξεων *Su*^A || illis] ἐκείνοις *Su*^{GVM}: -ης *Su*^A.

autem omnia pars temporis quod erat et erit, que utique ferentes obliuiscimur eternam naturam, non recte; dicimus enim utique, quod erat, est et erit. Est autem solum secundum ueram rationem eterno
 390 conuenit, erat autem et erit circa eam que in tempore generacionem existentem decet dici, quod autem semper secundum idem immobiliter neque magis nouum neque magis uetus oportet dici. Et enim quod semper et ante est generacioni est omni superius, quod autem fit et alteraciones multas suscipit conuenienter dixit nequaquam esse. Et rursus idem dixit Plato: bonus quidem deus uere et quidem dicendum causa bonorum, malorum autem omnium non causa. Idem et in Legibus ostendens nobis
 395 eum qui omnium dispositorem uniuersi gubernacula apprehendentem ait. Deus utique principium et finem et medium omnium habens recta terminat secundum naturam circumiens, derelinquentibus enim diuinam legem adest ultor punicionis, obseruantibus uero et felicitari futuris adest humilis et ornatus, hic autem aliquis elatus a cordis magnitudine uel pecuniis superbus uel honoribus uel corporis formositate cum iuuentute et insipientia inflammatur cum contumelia, ut utique neque
 400 principe neque rursus duce indigens, sed et aliis sufficiens ens existimari, relinquitur desolatus a deo, relictus autem et adhuc tales alios accipiens, exultat turbans omnia simul et multis quibusdam uisus est esse aliquis, post tempus autem suscipiens punicionem non uituperabilem ulcione et se ipsum et domum et ciuitatem simul corruentem fecit. Per hec philosophus et uniuersi ostendit curatorem et eam que in quibusdam longanimitatem <et> hinc insensatis adueniens detrimentum et in postremum
 405 illatam ipsis omnimodam perdicionem. Idem in Gorgia et punicionis ostendit causas dicens sic: conuenit autem omni sub punicione existenti ab alio recte puniente uel meliorem fieri et per hoc iuari uel exemplum aliis fieri ut illi uidentes patientem que patitur, meliores fiant. Sunt autem adiuti quidem et uindictam dantes a deo et hominibus isti qui insanabilia peccata peccant. Quod per penas et dolores fit ipsis utilitas et hic et in inferno. Non enim possibile aliter ab iniusticia liberari. Hii autem
 410 si extrema iniuste agant et per tales iniusticias insanabiles omnino fiant, hinc exempla fiunt, et isti quidem non adhuc adiuuantur qui hos aspiciunt propter talia pena dolorosissimas et crudelissimas passiones | patientes et per omne tempus manifeste exempla perfectos. Hec autem uidetur extraxisse D 35r ex diuinis scripturis per Moysen a deo ad Pharaonem dicentem: in hoc ipsum suscitaui te ut ostendam in te potenciam meam ut annuncietur nomen meum in omni terra. Perniciosissimo enim effecto illi
 415 omnimodas puniciones intulit deus, non ut ostenderet meliorem (sciuit enim ipsius et intellectum induratum et passionem insanabilem), sed ut de illo enarraciones omnibus utilitatis fierent exempla quemadmodum ciuitates nutriunt spiculatores, non laudantes quidem ipsorum eleccionem, sustinentes autem horum ministracionem. Idem de quietibus et hereditacionibus animarum in

388 obliuiscimur (λανθάνομεν) obliuiscuntur *D* || 392 et² (καί) in *D* || 396 recta (εὐθέα) recte *D* || 398 hinc *D* || 399 inflammatur (φλέγεται) inplasmatur *D* || 400 ens uolens *D* || 404 et (καί) *addimus* || 407 uid [fenestra] uidentes *D* || 411 talia pena dolorosissima (τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμαρτίας ὀδυνηρότατα) alia p. dolorissima *D* || 414 perniciosissimo] -me *D*^{p.c.} || 415 ostenderem *D*.

388 naturam] φησιν *Su*^V: οὐσίαν *Su*^{AGM}: *legisse uidetur Robertus φύσιν* || 389 est] ἔστι *Su*^V: ἦν *Su*^{GM}: *Su*^A *deest* || eterno] θεῷ *Su*^{AGM}: *om. Su*^V || 391 secundum idem] κατὰ ταύτων *Su*^{GM}: κατ' αὐτόν *Su*^V: *om. Su*^A || 393 et rursus idem dixit Plato] καὶ πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς Πλάτων φησὶν *Su*^{AGM}: ἄλλως καὶ πᾶσιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔλεγε Πλ. *Su*^V || 394 et] καὶ *Su*^V: ἐν *Su*^{AGM} (*uide infra l. 419*) || 396-398 *corrupta esse uidetur* (cf. *Ioh. Gall.*, *Compend. III iv 13, f. 194v*) τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ξυνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θεοῦ νόμου τιμωρός· ἦς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων ἐχόμενος ξυνέπεται ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος *Su* || 405 illatam ipsis] ἐπιφερομένην αὐτοῖς *Su*^{GM}: αὐ. ἐπιφ. *Su*^A || 406 sub punicione] ὑπὸ τιμωρίας *Su*^V: τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ *Su*^{AGM} || meliorem] βελτίων *Su*^V: βελτίους *Su*^{AGM} || per hoc] τούτω *Su*^V: τι τῷ ὄντι *Su*^{AGM} || 407 post patitur *deest* φοβούμενοι *cum solo Su*^V || 408 dantes] δόντες *Su*^V: διδόντες *Su*^{AGM} || insanabilia] ἀνιάσιμα *Su*. *Legisse uidetur Robertus ἀνιάσιμα* || 411 post qui *deest* οὐδέν—δὲ ὄνινανται (p. 143.23) *cum solo Su*^V || 418 post ministracionem *deest* διὰ—δῆλα (p. 143.34-35) *cum solo Su*^V.

Fedone dicit. Imperfectus quidem et immundus in infernum abiens, et gurgiti imponetur, perfectus autem et purgatus hic transiens cum deo habitabit. Et rursus: iuste quidem uitam pertranseuntem et sancte, ex quo utique finiet in beatorum insulis habitari in omni felicitate absque malis, iniuste autem et impie in condemnacionis carcere, que utique tartarum uocant, ire. Hec ex hiis que Egipti didicit. 420

Anaxagoras, sophistes, Egesibuly filius, Clazomenius. Intellectus autem uocabatur, quia materiam et mentem omnium custodem dixit. Iste est qui solem dixit mydron igneum, hoc est igneum lapidem. Fugit autem ex Athenis, Pericleo ipsum consequente, et ueniens in Lampsaco illic perseuerans finiuit uitam. Eduxit autem uiuere se ipsum annorum septuaginta, quia ab Atheniensibus portatus est in carcerem, uelut quandam nouam opinionem de deo introducens. Quoniam Anaxagoras Olympiadibus, quando nequaquam pluuit, procedens sub corio in stadium in prorupcione pluuię dicitur hoc fecisse. Et alia plura predicens. Iste, Clazomenius existens, in gregibus et camelis que sui ipsius dimisit. De isto enim dixit Apollonius Tyaneus ouibus magis quam hominibus philosophari. Thebeus autem Crates submersit substantiam, neque ouibus iuuaturam neque hominibus. 425 430

Ascendens autem super locum eleuatum dixit: liberat Cratetem Thebeum Crates. Idem Crates dixit: erota quietat fames, si non tempus, sin autem mors.

Anaximandrus, Praxiadi filius, Milesius, philosophus, cognatus et discipulus et successor Thaletis. Primus autem equinoctium inuenit et solsticia et orologia et terram in medio poni. Et gnomonem induxit et totaliter geometrie subfiguraciones ostendit. Scripsit De natura, Terre peryodum, et De non errantibus et speram et alia quedam. 435

Anaximandrus, Anaximandri filius, Milesius, historicus, iunior. Exstitit autem secundum Artaxerxi tempora eius qui melior uocabatur. Scripsit Symbolorum pythagoricorum expositionem: id est hoc iugum non transcendere, machera ignem non mouere, ab integro pane non comedere, et reliqua huiusmodi. 440

Protagoras, Abderites, filius Arthemonis uel et Meandridi. Quidam autem ipsum kauteyon esse scripserunt. Iste primus erat onerum portator, potitus autem Democrito desiderauit rationes et philosophans ad rethoricam conuersus est. Et uocatus est iste primus sophistes, primus | iste litigatiuos sermones inuenit et agonem sermonum fecit et pro mercede recepit a discipulis centum mnas; propter quod uocatus est Sermo locatus. Doctor factus est et rethoris Ysocratis. Diuisitque omnes sermones prius iste in 4: deprecacionem, interrogacionem, responsionem, preceptum; post hunc autem alii diuiserunt in 7 hec: enarracionem, interrogacionem, responsionem, preceptum, annunciacionem, deprecacionem, uocacionem. Alcidamas autem 4 esse ait ydeas sermonum: affirmacionem, negacionem, interrogacionem, appellacionem. Prothagorę autem libri ab Atheniensibus combusti sunt quia sermonem aliquando dixit sic incipiens: de diis non habeo scire, neque quod sunt neque quod non sunt. Et senior est recte Platone philosopho; doctor autem Prodicı Keii et aliorum multorum. 435 445 450

423-431 Suda, s.u. Ἀναξαγόρας (α 1981: I, p. 178.1-14) || 432-433 Suda, s.u. Κράτης (κ 2341: III, p. 182.19-21) || 434-437 Suda, s.u. Ἀναξίμανδρος (α 1986: I, p. 178.25-30) || 438-441 Suda, s.u. Ἀναξίμανδρος (α 1987: I, p. 179.1-5) || 442-453 Suda, s.u. Πρωταγόρας (π 2958: IV, pp. 246.27-247.15).

430 Tyaneus (Τυανεύς) | tyrannus *D* || 435 orologiam *D* || 439 pythagoricarum *D* || 442 kanteyon *D* || 444 et² *D*^{sl}

419 et²] καὶ *Su*^V: ἐν *Su*^{AGM} (*uide supra l. 394*) || 422 *post* carcere *add.* τε καὶ δίχης *Su* || 425 illic] ἐκεῖ *Su*^{VM}: ἐκεῖσε *Su*^{AGITF} || 433 sin] εἰ *Su*^{VGM}: ἔν *Su*^F || *post* autem *deest* μηδὲ τοῦτω δύνασαι *cum solo Su*^V || 438 historicus, iunior] ὁ νεώτερος, ἱστορικός *Su* || 442 *post* Meandridi *deest* ἢ Νεανδρίου *cum solo Su*^V || kauteyon] καυτήιον *Su*^V: καὶ Τήιον *Su*^{AGFM} || 448 diuiserunt in 7] διεῖλον εἰς ζ' *Su*^V: εἰς ζ' δ. *Su*^{AGFM} || 452 recte *deest in Su*.

Appolonyius, Tyaneus, philosophus, filius Apolonii et politidis matris illustrium, quem pariens
 455 mater astantem demonem uidit dicentem, quod ipse erit quem parit, esse autem Prothea Egipcium;
 unde suspicari ipsum Prothy esse filium. Et adoleuit quidem sub Claudio et Gayo et Nerone et usque
 Neruam, sub quo et transmutauit. Siluit autem secundum Pythagoram annos quinque. Deinde abiuit
 in Egiptum, deinde in Babyloniam ad magos, et inde ad Arabes, et congregauit ex omnibus plurima
 et de ipsis famosa machinamenta. Coordinauit autem: Theletas uel de sacrificiis, Dispositionem,
 460 Diuinaciones, Epistulas, Pythagore uitam. Iste etiam superexcessit in castitate Sophoclea ut
 Philostratus Lemnius ait de ipso. Hic quidem enim rabidum dixit et agrestem dominum aufugere,
 uenientem in senectutem, Apolonyus autem a uirtute et castitate neque in puericia uictus est ab
 isto. Quoniam Apolonyus Tyaneus magis Babyloniorum et Indorum Bragmanibus et hiis qui in
 Egipto exercitatis associatus est, magum existimant ipsum et detrahunt ut non sapientem, male
 465 existimantes. Et enim Empedocles et Pythagoras et Democritus associati magis et multa sapiencialia
 dicentes nequaquam subducti sunt magice arti. Plato autem uadens in Egiptum et multa eorum
 qui illic et prophetarum et sacerdotum immiscens sui ipsius sermonibus quemadmodum pictor
 umbraliter depictis superponens colores nequaquam magice agere uisus est, quamuis plurimam ab
 hominibus inuidiam passus in sapientia. neque enim sentire multa et precognoscere detraheret utique
 470 Apolonyum, in quibus predixit, in sapientiam hanc, ut detraheretur et Socrates in quibus predixit,
 et Anaxagoras, qui Olympiadibus, quando nequaquam pluit, procedens in corio in stadium in
 prorupcione pluuiæ. Et alia quedam super Anaxagoram apponentes auferunt Appolonium secundum
 sapientiam precognoscere. Videtur igitur michi non defficere secundum multorum insipientiam, sed
 diligenter perscrutari uirum et per tempora, secundum que dixit quid et egit et per sapientie modos, a
 475 quibus attigit existimari et sapiens et diuinus. | Collecta sunt autem michi hec quidem de ciuitatibus, D 36r
 quecumque ipsum amabant, hec autem ex sacris, quecumque ab ipso reducta sunt, hec autem ex
 quibus alteri ad ipsum uel ipse ad alios scripsit. Misit autem regibus, sophistis, philosophis, Eleys,
 Delphis, Indis, Egipciiis, de diis, de moribus, de legibus; certiora autem a Damide audiens.
 Damis autem uir non insipiens antiquam habitans *** Appolonii discipulus qui et animalium
 480 sciebat uoces discens per Arabios progrediens.
 Iustinus, philosophus, et figura philosophorum utens, de <Ne>apolitarum principatu Palestino,
 ex patre Prisco qui Brachii. Iste pro cultura Christianorum omnino laborauit, ut et Antonino
 cognominato Pio, et huius filiis et hiis qui de senatu Romanorum librum Aduersus gentes
 compositum daret, obprobrium crucis non erubescens. Scripsit etiam et alterum librum, quem dedit
 485 Antonini successoribus, hoc est Marco Antonino et Lucio Aurelio et Comodo. Est etiam et alius
 ipsius liber aduersus gentes, in quo de natura demonum disputat; et quartus liber similiter aduersus

454-478 Suda, s.u. Ἀπολλώνιος Τυανεύς (α 3420: I, pp. 307.11-308.19). 460-463 *uide infra l. 522-530* || 466-469 *cf. Iohan. Gall., Compend. III iv 13 (f. 194v)* Plato autem uadens in Egiptum et multa eorum qui illic et prophetarum et sacerdotum immiscens sui ipsius sermonibus quemadmodum pictor umbraliter depictis superponens colores nequaquam magice agere uisus est quamprimum ab hominibus inuidiam passus in sapientia || 479-480 Suda, s.u. Δάμις (δ 46: II, p. 419.30-31) || 481-493 Suda, s.u. Ἰουστῆνος (ι 448: II, pp. 645.24-646.5).

468 plurimum D || 470 ut uel D || 479 *hiat D*: Νῦνον Su, *i.e.* Niniuem || 481 Neapolitarum (Νεαπολιτῶν).

459 de ipsis] αὐτοῦ Su || *post* autem *add.* τοσαῦτα Su || 462-463 ab isto] τούτου SuSM: τούτων Su^{AGIT} || 467 et² *om.* Ioh. Gall. || 468 superponens] ἐπιβαλὼν Su^{GIM}: -βαλλὼν Su^A: -λαβὼν Su^S || 476 *post* reducta sunt *deest* παραλελυμένα τοὺς θεσμοὺς ἡδῆ, *cum solo* Su^S || 478 *post* legibus *deest* παρ' οἷς ὁ τι ἂν πρόττοι *cum solo* Su^S || *Hic desinit* Su^S || 483 hiis] τοῖς Su^V: τῆ Su^{AI}: τῆς Su^{GM} || de senatu] συγκλήτου Su^{GMV}: -τω Su^{AI} || 485 Lucio Aurelio et Comodo] Λουκίῳ Ἀρρηλίῳ (-ίου Su^{AGIM}) Κομώδῳ Su^V || 486 natura] φύσεως Su^V: φύγῆς Su^{AGIM}.

gentes, quem inscripsit Elenchus; et alium De dei monarchia. Et alium, quem nominauit Psaltyn, et alium De anima; et dyalogum contra Iudeos, quem ordinauit contra Triphonem, ducem eorum qui in Epheso Iudeorum. Et non solum hos, sed et aduersus Marcinonem insignia uolumina edidit; et alium librum contra omnes hereses, cuius mencionem facit in Apologetico, quod tradidit Antonino 490 Pio. Iste enim in Roma habens conuersaciones, iuxta Criskyn Cinicum aduersus Christianos blasphemantem et uocans ipsum gulosum prodigum et luxuriosum et mortem timentem, in fine huius operacione et insidiis ut Christianus pro Christo passus est.

Prometeus: quoniam sub iudicibus Iudeorum apud Ellynes famosus erat Prometheus enim, qui inuenit primum grammaticam philosophiam. De quo dicunt, quod homines formauit, secundum 495 quod quosdam ydiotas existentes fecit cognoscere sapienciam. Et Epimetheus, qui adinuenit musicam; et Atlas, qui astronomiam interpretatus est; propter quod dicunt quoniam celum portat. Et multorum oculorum Argus, quia circumspectus erat, per quod artificialem scienciam ipse excogitauit primus. Erat autem et deuinatrix Sibilla. Regnante apud Egipcios Pharaone Paco, apud Ellynes in Athenis regnauit Kecrops, qui uocatus est Duplicis nature propter corporis magnitudinem, uel 500 quoniam legem posuit, ut et mulieres uirgines adhuc existentes uni tradi uiro, uocans eas nimphas; prius enim regionis illius mulieres secundum bestialem mixtionem miscebantur; nullius enim erat uxor, sed dabat se ipsam in fornicacionem unicuique. Nullus enim sciuit, cuius erat filius uel filia, sed ut utique uidebatur | matri, dicebat et dabat partum cui uolebat uiro. Hoc autem fecit Kecrops, ut ex Egypto deductus et legislacionem Efesti regnantis illic non ignorans. Dicebat enim quoniam 505 propter talem luxuriam Actica submersa est. A tunc igitur castificati sunt habitantes Ellynum regionem. Regnauit autem Kecrops annos nonaginta. Dicebatur autem Duplicis nature et propter hoc ab Egypto natum esse et ad Elladem uenire et regnare.

D 36v Porphyrius, qui aduersus Christianos scripsit; qui proprie uocabatur Rex; Tyrius, philosophus, discipulus Amelii discipuli Plotini, et Longini auditor, doctor autem Iamblici, qui extitit in 510 temporibus Aureliani et attigit usque ad Dyoclecianum imperatorem. Scripsit autem libros quamplurimos, et philosophicos et rethoricos et grammaticos. Unum De diuinis nominibus, unum De principiis duos, De materia sex, De anima ad Boethum quinque, De exanimacione animarum quatuor, De hoc Gnothisauton, id est Cognosce te ipsum, quatuor, De incorporeis, De unam esse Platonis et Aristotelis heresim septem, In Iuliani qui Caldey philosophicam historiam libros 515 quatuor, De Omeri philosophia. Aduersus Aristotelem de esse animam entelichiam, De philologa historia libros decem, De commixtis questionibus septem, In Tukydidis prohemium, Ad Aristidem septem, In Minuciani artem, et alia plurima, et maxime astronomica; in quibus et Introduccio astronomicorum in libris tribus; et Gramaticas dubitaciones. Iste etiam est Porphyrius qui aduersus Christianos contumeliosam linguam mouit. 520

494-508 Suda, s.u. Προμηθεύς (π 2506: IV, p. 214.2-22) || 509-520 Suda, s.u. Πορφύριος (π 2098: IV, p. 178.14-32).

497 Atlas (Ἄτλας)] atbas D || 499 deuinatrix (μάντις)] deriuatrix D || 514 Gnothisauton (Γνωθι σουτόν)] gnethisanton D || 518 Minuciani (Μυνικιανού)] minuciam D.

489 Marcinonem] Μαρκίνωνος Su^V: Μαρκίωνος Su^A: -ονος Su^{GIM} || 491 iuxta] εὐθύν Su^{GIVM}: εὐθύνων Su^A || 494 enim deest in Su || 495 primum] πρῶτον Su^V: -ος Su^{AGFM} || 499 Παχῶ Su^V: καὶ Παραχῶ Su^{AGFM} || 500 regnauit] ἐβασίλευσε Su^V: -εσε Su^{AGFM} || 502 enim] οὖν Su || 506 luxuriam] ἀσελγεσίαν Su^V: τῆς ἀ. συνήθειαν Su^{AGFM} || 507 nonaginta] ἐνετήκοντα Su^V: ν' (i.e. πεντέκοντα) Su^{AGFM} || 510 et Longini auditor] ἦν δὲ καὶ Λογγίνου ἀκροασάμενος hic cum solo Su^V: ἦν δὲ καὶ Λ. τοῦ κριτικοῦ ἀκρ. post μαθητοῦ (p. 178.15 = discipulus, l. 2) Su^{AGM} || 513 examinacione] ἀποψυχῆς Su^V: ἀποχῆς Su^{AGM} || 516 post quatuor deest Κατὰ Χριστιανῶν λόγους ε' cum solo Su^V || 517 post historia deest p. 178.25 (βιβλία)-27 (βασιλέων) cum solo Su^V || 518 Introduccio] Εἰσαγωγῆ Su^V: -ήν Su^{AGM}.

Christianorum oppugnator, a Phenice ciuitate Tyri.

Sophocles, Aristonis filius, nepos autem Sophocley senioris, Atheniensis, tragicus. Docuit autem dragmata quadriginta, quidam autem aiunt undecim; uictorias accepit septem. Scripsit elegias. Quoniam Apollonyus in castitate superextollit Sophoclea; hic quidem enim rabidum
525 dixit et agrestem dominum aufugere, uenientem ad senectutem. Tyaneus et a uirtute et castitate neque in puericia uictus est ab istis, sed et iuuenis existens et superabat et rabido dominabatur. Sed tamen calumpniantur quidam de ueneris ipsum, ut peccato amatiuo utentem et hoc obuiantem in Scitarum gentem; igitur neque Eufrates aliquando accusauit de ueneris uirum, quamuis mendacia dragmata contra ipsum componens; aduersabatur enim ad Apolonyum, quia omnia super pecuniis
530 ipsum operantem conuiciabatur iste abnuebat ditari et sapienciam uendere.

Iachenes: iste enim extitit Egipcus, uir dei amicus et ad multa utilis. Erat autem sub Senio rege Egipciorum, de se presumencium et incantatorum aduersarius et in doloribus et egritudinibus sapiens summus. Qui pestilenciarum epydemiam extinxit et eam que circa canem Syrium primam missionem et impetum igneum mitigauit stelle. Propter quod et multum preciose sepultus est. Et
535 si aliquando publica egritudo immineret, ad templum huius uenientes sacri scribe et conuenientes | sacras operationes perficientes ex altari ignem accendunt, et accendentes piras secundum ciuitates et fetentis aeris corruptiuam illam egritudinem marcescere facientes, secundum hoc itaque maxime nouum, egritudinem extinxerunt igne.

Ibycus: Ficii filius, secundum quosdam autem Pelixili Messinii historiographus, secundum
540 quosdam autem Cordantis filius; genere Reginus. Inde autem in Samum uenit, quando ipsius principatum tenuit Policrates tyranni pater. Tempus autem erat istud quod sub Creso, Olympias quinquaginta quarta. Extitit autem Ibycus amantissimus circa pueros et primus inuenit uocatam sambucam; species autem est cithare triangularis. Sunt autem ipsius libri septem in Dorico ydiomate. Comprehensus autem a latronibus in solitudine dixit, saltem grues, quas contigit superuolare, ultrices
545 fieri. Et ipse quidem interfectus est; post hec autem latronum unus uidens grues, dixit: uide, Ibici ultrices. Audiente autem quodam et enarrante quod dictum est et factum confessus est, et uindictas dederunt latrones; ut ex hoc et prouerbium fieret, Ibici grues.

Palamedes, Nauplii et Clymenes filius, Argiuis, epicorum uerborum <factor>. Erat autem ipse nepos regis Agamenonis a matre. Habuit autem se bene naturaliter ad philosophiam et poeticam
550 et inuentor extitit horum elementorum zitta, et <pi et> phi, id est p et fi et p aspirati, et chi, id est c aspirati, et calculacionum et scaccorum et alearum et taxillorum et mensurarum et ponderum.

521 Suda, s.u. Πορφύριος (π 2099: IV, p. 179.1-2) || 522-530 Suda, s.u. Σοφοκλής (σ 816: IV, p. 402.7-20) || 524-525 uide supra l. 460-463 || 531-538 Suda, s.u. Ἰαχίν (ι 73: II, p. 606.17-27) || 539-547 Suda, s.u. Ἴβυκος (ι 80: II, p. 607.15-26) || 548-557 Suda, s.u. Παλαμήδης (π 44: IV, pp. 5.26-6.10).

525 ad (ἐς)] et D || 526 istis (τούτων)] isto D || rabido (λυτῶντος)] rapido D || 527 in (ἐς)] et, ut uidetur, D || 534 ante mitigauit scr. et D, sed del. || 537 illa D || 543 dorico (Δωρίδι)] droico D || 548 uerborum factor (ἐποποιός) addimus || 550 pi et (τοῦ π καὶ τοῦ φ) addimus.

522 ante Sophocley deest τοῦ προτέρου cum solo Su^V || 523 post scripsit deest καὶ cum solo Su^V || 525 Tyaneus] ὁ δὲ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Τυανεύς Su || 526 post existens deest καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐρρωμένος cum solo Su^V || 527 post et deest διὰ cum solo Su^V || 529 dragmata δράματα Su^V: γράμματα Su^{AGFMB} || 530 post iste deest καὶ cum solo Su^V || 531 enim deest in Su || 532 incantatorum] ἐπωδῶν Su^V: ἐπαιδῶν Su^{AFGTM} || 534 missionem] ἐπιστολήν Su^V: ἐπιτολήν Su^{AFGTM} || 539 Pelixili Πολυζύλου Su^V: Ζήλου Su^{AFGTM} || ἱστοριογράφος Su^{GI}, comp. Su^{VM}: -φου Su^{AFT} || 540 Cordantis] Κόρδαντος Su^V: Κέρδ. Su^{AFGTM} || autem deest in Su || 541 erat] ἦν Su^V: om. Su^{AFGTM} || 546 et enarrante quod dictum est] καὶ ἐπεξεληθόντος τῷ εἰρημένῳ Su || 551 et taxillorum deest in Su.

D 37r

Poemata autem ipsius exterminata sunt ab Agamenonis pronepotibus propter inuidiam. Suspicio autem quod poeta Homerus neque unam huius uiri mencionem fecit. Quoniam exterminata sunt Palamedis poemata propter inuidiam ab Homero. Tangit autem et maximos uiros inuidia; que utique non subingressa esset hanc uitam, uel subingressa circa me non esset; destruat et abeat. 555
Secundum quanta enim morsus sum corde, et qualia uidi longo tempore. Sed sit michi uita omnino sufficiens. Oculum autem numquam ponat in nostra spe inuidia; ait quidam ueterum.

Ptolomeus, Claudius existens, Alexandrus, philosophus, effectus in temporibus Marci regis. Iste scripsit Mechanicos libros tres, De enunciacionibus et signacionibus astrorum non errancium libros duos, Expansionem superficiēi spere, Regulam promptam, et Magnam astronomicam, id est 560
Coordinacionem, et alia.

Ptholomeus, Ascalonites, grammaticus, qui docuit in Roma. Scripsit Prosodyam Homericam, De grecismo, id est de recta pronunciacione libros quindecim, De metris, De ea que in Udissea Aristarchi direccione, De differencia dictionis. Et altera gramatica.

D 37v Ptholomeus, Philopator. Iste singula rerum pigritanter acceptans propter indecentes amores | et 565
irracionales, continuas ebrietates conuenienter in ualde breui tempore et principatus simul et anime insidiatores inuenit et plures, de quibus factus est Cleomenes et Theodotus et alii multi.

Ptholomeus, rex Egypti. Hyrcano cenante cum Ptolomeo rege et omnibus simul recumbentibus et carnes comedentibus et <...> Hyrcano congregantibus, Tripho ioculator regis, uidens, inquit, domine, circumiacencia Hyrcano ossa? Ex hoc coniecta quoniam et pater ipsius Syriam omnem 570
circumligauit, ut iste hec ossa carnibus denudauit. Ridente autem rege et interrogante Hyrcanum, qualiter tanta ipsi circumiacent ossa; conuenienter, dixit, domine; canes quidem enim ossa cum carnibus deuorare, quemadmodum isti; ad simul recumbentes dicens quoniam nihil coram iacebat; homines autem carnes comedunt, ossa autem proiciunt; quod homo existens et ego feci. Admiratur autem respensionem eius rex et omnes iussit applaudere, eutrapelie acceptans ipsum. 575

Ptholomeus, Kyterius, uerborum factor. Iste scripsit de psalacante. In quo scripto ait quoniam herba est quandam admirabilissimam uirtutem habens.

Ptholomeus, dux exercitus apud Cyprum; qui nequaquam Egyptiacus exiit, sed sapiens et actiuus; accipiens enim insulam adhuc paruulo rege existente sollicitus quidem effectus est circa congregacionem pecuniarum, dabat autem simpliciter nichil alicui, quamuis expetitus multociens 580
a regalibus ministris et detractus amare in nichil expendere. Rege autem in etate adueniente,

558-561 Suda, s.u. Πτολεμαῖος (π 3033: IV, p. 254. 4-8) || 562-564 Suda, s.u. Πτολεμαῖος (π 3038: IV, p. 254.27-30) || 565-567 Suda, s.u. Πτολεμαῖος (π 3039: IV, p. 254.31-35) || 568-575 Suda, s.u. Πτολεμαῖος (π 3040: IV, p. 255.1-14) || 576-577 Suda, s.u. Πτολεμαῖος (π 3032: IV, p. 254.1-3) || 578-585 Suda, s.u. Πτολεμαῖος (π 3041: IV, p. 255.15-23).

557 quidam (τις) | quedam D || 558 in (ἐπι) | et D || 559 et et D || 566 in (ἐν) | et D || tempori D.

552-553 suspicio—fecit] ὑπολαμβάνω δὲ καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν Ὅμηρον αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεπονθέναι καὶ μηδεμίαν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτο μνήμην ποιήσασθαι Su || 558 existens] χρηματίσας Su || 569 lac. statuimus, fort. <ossa coram> τὰ ὅσα ἔμπροσθεν Su || 570 circumiacencia] περικείμενα Su^V: παρα-Su^{AGFM} || 571 circumligauit] περιέδησεν Su^V: -δυσεν Su^{AGFM} || post ridente autem rege deest πρὸς τὸν τοῦ Τρύφωνος λόγον cum solo Su^V || 572 circumiacent] περικειται Su^V: παρα-Su^{AGFM} || 573 post coram habet αὐτῶν Su || 575 rex] ὁ βασιλεὺς Su^V: σοφὴν οὕτω γενομένην Su^{AGFM}.

componens multitudinem pecuniarum emisit ut et Ptholomeum ipsum et hii qui circa eam que prius parcatatem ipsius obstupescebant posterius laudareret.

De isto enim Ptholomeo dicitur quod nequaquam Egipciacus extitit, quia nichil astute et
585 maliciose agebat neque malum machinabatur.

Egipciazein, enim, est callide et maliciose agere et malum machinari. Tales enim Egipcii unde est prouerbium: Egipcius laterum portator. Isti detrahunt semper onerum portatores.

Egipcius autem nomen proprium. Et nomen regionis. Quoniam quando uenit Mercurius, filius Pyci, id est Iouis illuc. Mestrem regnauit super eos qui illic; quod transnominauit Egiptum, a quo et
590 Egiptus regio. Erat autem de genere Noe.

Debet autem scribi prima sillaba Egipti, secundum Grecos per ai, secundum Latinos ae, diptongon, et dicere Aigiptus, quasi eiggipotos, ab eggis quod est prope et potos quod est potus, quasi appropinquans potu, id est potui, uel appropinquans potamo, id est fluuiio, uel dicere Aigiptus ab aito quod est ardeo, quia qui in Egipto existunt exusti sunt ex uehementi solis lacione. Ethymologizatur
595 autem Egiptus ab aigas pyonas, hoc <est> capras pingues habere.

| Telephus, Pergamenus, grammaticus. Scripsit ipse inter quos posuit quanta oportet scire D 38r grammaticum. Scripsit et ipse De hiis que apud Homerum figuris rethoricis libros duos, De constructione oracionis Attice libros quinque, De ea que secundum Homerum rethorica, De ea que Omeri et Platonis consonancia, Varie amoris discipline libros duos, Vitas tragicorum et comicorum,
600 De librorum experientia libros tres, in quibus docet qui possessione digni libri quoniam solus Homerus antiquorum ellinizat, Enarracionem Pergami, De eo qui in Pergamo templo libros duos, De hiis que apud Athenienses iudiciis, De hiis qui inter Athenienses legibus et consuetudinibus, De Pergami regibus libros quinque, De usu id est nominibus uestium et aliis quibus utimur. Adhuc autem de Ulixis errore; Secundum alphabetum, Okytokyon: hoc est possessione dignum et desiderabilem congregacionem
605 adiectiuorum in eandem rem conueniencium ad promptam habundanciam locucionis libros decem.

Legum scriptores: apud Romanos CCC et primo anno post cohabitacionem ciuitatis dissoluto in regimen constitutorum principatu decem legum scriptores ad communium conceduntur

586-587 Suda, s.u. Αἴγυπτιάζειν (αι 75: II, p. 160.26-28) || 588-590 Suda, s.u. Αἴγυπτος (αι 77: II, p. 161.5) || 592(dicere)-595 Etym. Gud., s.u. Αἴγυπτος (pp. 37.13-16.18 De Stefani). Cf. Hexaem. pr. 12 (p. 21.5-9 Dales-Gieben) Egiptus uero regio est quam inundat Nilus fluuius, et dicitur Egiptus secundum grecam linguam quasi 'appropinquans flumini'. Eggizo enim idem est quod 'appropinquo', potamos uero idem quod fluuius. Ethimologizatur autem ab aygas pionas, hoc est 'capras pingues habere'. Vide Dorandi, Traduction, pp. 412-13 || 596-605 Suda, s.u. Τήλεφος (τ 495: IV, pp. 539.20-540.3) || 606-615 Suda, s.u. νομογράφοι (ν 469: III, p. 476.4-18).

599 uarie amoris discipline (Ποικίλης φιλομαθείας) uaria amoris discipline D || 601 que] qui ut uidetur D.

582 post multitudinem deest ἰκανόν cum solo Su^V || 582-583 και τοὺς περὶ τὴν πρότερον συστολῆ αὐτοῦ διαπορουμένους ὕστερον αὐτὸν ἐπαινεῖν Su^V: περὶ τὴν ... εὐ. ... Su^A: περὶ τὴν αὐλήν εὐ. Su^{Exc.}: ἐπὶ Su^{GM} || τῆ περ. Su^{GM, Exc.}: τοὺς et lac. Su^A, ἐπὶ τῆ in lac. add. Su^{Af} || αὐτοῦ συστολῆ Su^{AGM, Exc.} || και τῶ μηδὲν προῖεσθαι Su^{A, Exc.}: διαλοιδορουμένους ὕστερον αὐτὸν ἐπαινεῖν Su^{GM}, et delete και—προῖεσθαι ss. Su^{Af} || 596-597 Τήλεφος, Περργαμενός, γραμματικός ἐν οἷς παρατίθεται πόσα χρῆ εἰδέναι τὸν γραμματικὸν ἔγραψε και αὐτός Su^V: Τ., Π., γραμ. ἔγραψε και αὐτός ἐν οἷς παρατ. πόσα χρῆ εἰδέναι τὸν γραμ. Su^{AGFM} || 604 Secundum alphabetum (κατὰ στοιχεῖον) hic Su^V: post χρώμεθα (p. 540.1) Su^{AGFM} || 604-605 Ὠκυτόκιον Τηλέφου· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἄξιον και κτήσεως πρὸς εὐπορίαν φράσεως και ἐράσμιον Su^V in textu: Ὠκυτόκιον· ἐστὶ δὲ συναγωγὴ ἐπιθέτων εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα ἀρμοζόντων πρὸς ἔτοιμον φράσεως, βιβλία ι' in textu Su^{AGFM} in margine Su^V || 606 CCC et] τριακόσιοι τῶ και Su^{AV}: τριακόσιοι τῶ Su^{GM} || 607 in regimen constitutorum] τῶν ὑπάτων Su.

preceptionem; qui secundum tempus aliquod ad utile et delectabile politicorum ductores moderati uidebantur et principari maxime omnium apti; isti enim alicubi et decem tabulas et indigenis et gentilibus legibus rescribentes in uocatas kyrbeis reposuerunt. Secundo autem anno ducatus grauitatis tyrannice causam inferentes dissoluti sunt, Appio maxime multitudinem ad inimicitiam decharchie mouente; qui Verenii cuiusdam uiri non ignobilis generis bellica filiam corrumpere uirginem excogitabat, amore effectus calido puelle detentus; quam pater propria manu interfecit timens Appii potestatem uerecundare puellam ad uiolenciam moti. In quo motum militare totum abstulit illis decem ea que potestatis et uindictas reddere secundum principatum delictorum coegit.

Similiter autem kyrbeis: trigone tabule, in quibus que de sacris leges inscripte erant et politice. Sed et axones uocabantur tabule que de propriis leges habuerunt et tetragone.

Et ipso nomine uocauerunt Athenienses Solonis leges, propter inscribi ipsas in ligneis figuris tetragonis.

D 38v Kyrbeis autem ait Apollodoros inscriptas habere leges; esse autem | lapides rectos stantes, ut apo staseōs, id est a stacione, quidem stile uocentur, ab ea autem que in alta eleuacione propter kekoryfōstay, id est uertitantes esse, kyrbeis quemadmodum et

Kyrbasian: id est galli cristam, eam que in capite positam.

<...>. Contempnentibus quibusdam Appollynem <et> in templo ipsius egerentibus Pysistratus scripsit legem, captum in hoc mori. Deridentibus autem scripturam et pluribus magis hoc facientibus constituit custodes. Comprehenso autem quodam instituit ligantes ipsum iuxta uiam flagellare, clamantes; hic uir punitus morietur quoniam contempnit scripturam. Interfecto autem, sic retentum est hoc factum Atheniensibus, ut et adhuc nunc ad punitos uel poenis detentos propter aliquod ipsorum delictum dicatur: in uaso profundo melius erat ipsum egerere.

Nomus et Ianuarius legum moderacione et iusticia ciuibus supereminentes, existimo, et aliis fere omnibus hominibus nunc quidem uiuentibus et in rebus politicis conuersantibus, laudabantur et diligebantur et a ciuibus et peregrinis; et enim patrie utilissimi extiterunt et acceptissimi ad extraneos. Eligentes quietam et tranquillam uitam minorari magis propria desiderabant quam plus aliquid habere ab alienis. Communia quidem igitur hec ipsis; proprie autem Nomus quidem magis bene naturatus erat et magis amator discipline et in racionibus, et philosophiam gustare suadentibus et quicumque predocent iuuenes. Erat autem et discretissimus eorum qui apud nos eloquencium uirorum, et poematum omnium et conscripcionum racionabiliter scripte uirtutis et malicie. Ut igitur dicatur totum, neque Seberianum neque Agapium philosophum dixerim utique fuisse tales circa racionum iudicium. Ianuarius autem expertus in negociis erat et prudens in politicis in plus et sobrius magis et secundum alia magis ordinatus quam ipsius <frater> Nomus.

616-617, 620-622 Suda, s.u. κύρβεις (κ 2744: III, p. 217.15-22) || 618-619 Suda, s.u. ἄξονες (α 2833: I, p. 255.30-32) || 623 Suda, s.u. κυρβασίαν (κ 2741: III, p. 217.10) || 624-629 Suda, s.u. ἐν Πυθίῳ κρεῖττον ἦν ἀποπατήσαι (ε 1428: II, p. 291.13-21) || 630-640 Suda, s.u. Νόμος καὶ Ἰαννουάριος (ν 477: III, pp. 476.32-477.13).

609 alicubi (που)] alicui D || 621 apo staseōs] ex aposaseōs, t supra eo addito D || eleuacione eleuacione D || 624 et (καὶ) addimus || 630 Ianuarius (Ἰαννουάριος)] iannarius D || 634 proprie (ιδίᾳ)] propria D || 635 naturatus] n s.l. D || 639 Ianuarius (Ἰαννουάριος)] iannarius D || 640 frater (ὁ ἀδελφός) addimus.

608 politicorum] πολιτικῶν Su^V: πολιτῶν Su^{AGFM} || 621 eleuacione] πετάσεως Su^V: παρατάσεως Su^{AGFM} || 624 Lac. statuimus, deest translatio uerborum Ἐν Πυθίῳ κρεῖττον ἦν ἀποπατήσαι: οἶον κινδυνεῦσαι (p. 291.12) || 640 ἢ ὁ ἀδελφός αὐτοῦ Νόμος hic Su^V: post πλέον (magis¹) Su^{AGFM}.

Polydamas, Skotuseos, omnino fortis; qui factus est maximus eorum qui temporis ipsius omnium hominum; qui et iuuenis existens occidit leonem in Olympo Macedoniae, nullis munitus armis. Ad armentum autem bouum adueniens ipse maximum et ferocissimum thaurum accipiens per alterum posteriorum pedum ungula detinuit extrema et non quieuit; thaurus saliens donec dimisit Polydamanti
 645 unquam. Ipse idem uirum aurigam impellentem cum festinatione carrum detinuit ab anteriori, incipiens altera manuum carrum et stare faciens equos. Huius Darius Nothus Artaxerxis filius audiens opera donis uenire ad eum suavit. Tres autem Immortalium uocatorum secundum appellationem singulariter pugnancium Polydamas occidit. Hec opera in statua manifestabantur in Olympia. Facturum erat autem a sui ipsius robore perdi, ut et alii in fortitudine magnum sentientes; ut Homerus
 650 de Hectore dicit, demonie, perdet te audacia tua. Ingrediens in speluncam tempore messis simul cum conuinantibus | et uertice spelunce fortuito dirupto et mortem minante, alii quidem cursu fugiunt, ipse D 39r uero remansit, manus protendens, ut suscepturus supercadentem speluncam; et ibidem mortuus est.

Glaucus genere Caristius. Pugil, uiginti et quinque Olympiis coronatus et in festis Apolynis que uocantur Pythia et Delia, a Delos insula, ter, et in festis Gentilium que uocatur Ysthmia decies
 655 coronatus, uiriliter toto corpore.

Isto terram excolente, quia accidit uomerem ex aratro cadere, adaptauit manu pro malleo. Videns autem quod productum est pater duxit ipsum ad Olympiam pugnancem. Ille autem, non expertus, uulnerabantur ab antagonistis. Clamante autem patre, percute uomerem in aratro, ille uiolencius inferens ad antagonizantem habuit uictoriam.

Liberius: nomen loci; a quadam historia. In Roma enim dominante Kointo Seruilio chasma in medio foro diuisa terra factum est. Cognoscentes autem Romani ex Sibille sermonibus quoniam coniungetur terra, si preciosissimum inter homines imponatur chasmati, inferebant hii quidem aurum, hii autem argentum, hii autem fructus, hii uero quodcumque maxime preciosissimum et contingere a dictis sacris suspicabatur. Manente autem nichil minus chasmate, Curtius uir et ad uidendum pulcherrimus et secundum animam
 665 optimus, dixit se intelligere melius aliis Sibillynum: preciosissimam enim esse possessionem ciuitati uiri uirtutem et hanc requirere ex dictis manifesta. Et hoc dicens et arma indutus est et bellicosum equum ascendit. Omnibus autem admirantibus quod factum est, {et} inuertibiliter currit aduersus casma. Conueniente autem terra, heroycos honores uiro in medio foro Romani per singulos <annos> perficere decreuerunt et locum Liberum uocauerunt, aram edificantes; ex quo utique et Virgilius principium fecit.

Euthymus, Locrensis Epizephirorum, qui agonizauit pugno aduersus Theagenem Thasium. Et uictus est quidem Theagenes, ledens Euthymum, nequaquam tamen ab agonisterio accipere potuit coronam, deuictus ab Euthymo. Vicit autem Euthymus eas que deinceps Olympiadas tres et

641-652 Suda, s.u. Πολυδάμας (π 1949: IV, p. 163.7-24) || 653-655 Suda, s.u. Γλαῦκος (γ 280: I, p. 526.7-9). Cf. Suda, s.u. Πύθια καὶ Δήλια (π 3128: IV, p. 268.2-3) || 656-659 Suda, s.u. Γλαῦκος (γ 281: I, p. 526.10-16) || 660-669 Suda, s.u. Λίβερνος (λ 491: III, pp. 267.31-268.14) || 670-681 Suda, s.u. Εὐθύμος (ε 3510: II, pp. 451.19-452.3).

648 in¹ (ἐπί)] et D || 649 roboris D || 650 dicit *incerto compendio, an dixit?* || *post* ingrediens, *add.* autem *s.l.* D || 651 et¹ (καί)] in D || et² (καί)] in D || 656 malleo *e correctione* || 657 ille] illuc D || 660 Kointo (Κοίντου)] konko D || 668 annos (ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος) *addimus* || 669 aram (βωμόν)] animam, *ut uidetur*, D || 670 Euthymus (Εὐθύμος)] euthynus D || Theagenem (Θεαγένην)] theaginem D || 672 Euthymo (Εὐθύμου)] euthyno D.

641 Skotuseos] Σκοτουσαῖος Su^V: Σκοτουσσαῖος Su^{AGFM} || 648 singulariter pugnancium] μονομαχησάντων Su^V: -σάντας Su^{AGFM} || 650 ingrediens] ἐσελθόντων γάρ Su || 653 Olympiis] Ὀλυμπίους Su^V: Ὀλυμπιάδι Su^{G,TPC,FM}: -δου Su¹: *comp.* Su^A || 654 καὶ Πύθια τρίς, Ἰσθμια δεκάκις Su. *De Pythia et Delia*, cf. Su π 3128 || 658 *post* antagonistis *deest* καὶ ἀπαγορεύειν ἔμελλεν ὑπὸ τῶν πλῆγῶν *cum solo* Su^V || 659 *Hic des.* Su^V || 667 et *deest* in Su || 669 Liberum] Λίβερνον Su^{GVM}: Λίβερνον Su^{AF} || 671 accipere] λαβεῖν Su^{AGFM}: λαλεῖν Su^V.

coronatus, Thasio non contrastante ipsi in pugna, sed aliis. Iste Euthymus agonyzauit et aduersus eum qui in Themesa heroa Alybanta. Themesa autem Ytalie est, in quam Ulixes errans circa Ciciliam uenit. Ubi unus nautarum inebriatus et uirginem opprimens lapidatus est ab indigenis. Isto autem mortuo demon non permisit quiescere eos, qui in Themesa homines superueniens et occidens, ut et moti essent ad fugiendum delinquentes ciuitatem, nisi diuinacio ipsos detinuisset, heroa propicium facere templum operantes et secundum annum pulcherrimam | existentem uirginem in uxorem tradentes. Hec enim multis annis facta discens Euthymus intrauit in templum et uirginem uidens et implorans, cum hoc et in amorem ueniens preparauit se ut pugnaturus cum demone, et ipsum de nocte apparente <m> deuicit et expulit, uirginem autem in uxorem duxit.

Skiapodes: in Lybia gens, latos habens pedes; qui in feruore umbram ex pedibus sibi ipsis faciunt. Iuxta occidentalem oceanum, in torrida zona. Hos habere aiunt uestigia omni reliquo corpore maiora; propter autem non habere domos, sed a caumate consumi, quadrupedaliter ambulantes, erigere alterum pedum et obumbrare reliquum corpus. Dura existente terra et non habente subintroitus. Hoc enim ipsis tribuit natura in diffugam caumatis.

Hii pedes ut anseres habent admodum carte latas, et quando feruor est, supini recidentes, leuantes tibias obumbrantur pedibus.

Dicitur autem hoc nomen skiapodes a skya, quod est umbra, et podos, quod est pes.

Latini: qui nunc Romani; Thelephus enim filius Herculis, uocatus Latinus, transnominauit quondam Cetios dictos Latinos. Italy autem isti rursus uocati sunt a quodam Ytalo dominante super regionem; Enea autem accipiente occidentem uocati sunt Eneade; post quem Romani omnes cognominati sunt a Romulo accipientes cognominacionem.

Senatores: Romulus post fratris Remy interfeccionem ex circumhabitantibus ciuitatibus numerum uirorum attraxit et horum seniores et sapientes centum eligens et preconiliatores ipsos et presidentes communium pronunciauit rerum, et senatores et consiliatores propter etatem ipsos uiros nominans. Ex hiiis autem decem optimos eligens, patricios ipsos uocauit ex patrum methaphora, et ad populi constituit dispositionem, trecentos autem equites et tres mille pedites ad ciuitatis custodiam ordinauit. Fecit autem et senatum, id est consiliatorium.

Canopus: qui in Egipto. Aliquando, ut sermo habet, Caldey proprium deum, qui est ignis, magnificantes ubique circumferebant, ut et diis omnium prouinciarum conferrent et uincentem illum ab omnibus existimabant deum. Aliarum quidem igitur prouinciarum dii ex ere uel argento uel ligno uel lapide uel alia tali materia existebant firmati, talis autem materia faciliter ab igne

682-686 Suda, s.u. Σκιάποδες (σ 600: IV, p. 378.20-27) || 687-688 Suda, s.u. Σκιάποδες (σ 601: IV, p. 378.29-30) || 689 *Haec uerba addidit Robertus suo Marte, ut uidetur* || 690-693 Suda, s.u. Λατῖνοι (λ 144: III, p. 237.7-12) || 694-699 Suda, s.u. Σενάτορες (σ 231: IV, p. 341.5-14) || 700-713 Suda, s.u. Κάνωπος (κ 320: III, p. 27.5-25).

687 anseres (χῆνες)] ance, *ut uidetur*, D || 695 seniores (τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους)] seniorum D.

674 Ἀλύβαντα *Su*^{AGFM}: -τε *Su*^V || 675 *post* indigenis *deest* καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς—ἔπλει (p. 451.27-28) *cum solo Su*^V || 677 diuinacio] Πυθία *Su* || 680 *post* ipsum *deest* μὲν *cum solo Su*^V || 681 *post* expulit *deest* ὡς μηκέτι αὐτόθι φανῆναι *cum solo Su*^V || 682 umbram] *hic Su*^{VF}: ante ποιῶσι (p. 378.21) *Su*^{AGM} || 683 *post* zona *habet Su* Σκιάποδες || aiunt uestigia] φασὶ βήματα *cum solo Su*^V || reliquo *deest in Su* || 685-686 τραχείας οὔσης τῆς γῆς καὶ μὴ ἐχούσης καταδύσεις, τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐχαρίσατο ἢ φύσις *Su*^V: τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐχαρίσατο ἢ φύσις, ἴσης οὔσης τῆς γῆς αὐτῶν καὶ τραχείας καὶ καταδύσιν μὴ ἐχούσης καὶ ἀποφυγῆν τοῦ καύματος *Su*^{AGM} || 697 *post* patricios *deest* τε *cum solo Su*^V || uocauit (ἐκάλεσε) *hic Su*^V: *post* πατέρων (p. 341.11) *Su*^{AGFM} || 699 ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ σέννατον ἦγουν βουλευτήριον *Su*^V: ἀπεγράψατο στρατιώτας· εἰς φυλὰς δὲ δ' τοῦ δήμου διένειμε πλῆθος *Su*^{AGFM}.

corrumpebatur, ut et ubique ignis necessarie uinceret. Hoc autem audiens Canopy sacerdos
 705 callidum quid tale excogitabat. Ydrie in partibus Egipci consueuerunt fieri latericie perforaciones
 habentes subtiles contiguas, ut per perforaciones illas turbata aqua defecata redderetur purissima.
 Ex hiis enim ydriis unam accipiens sacerdos Canopy et perforaciones illas obstruens cera et diuersis
 depingens | coloribus, adimplens aqua statuit ut deum, et abscondens ueteris statue capud, que D 40r
 dicebatur Menelai cuiusdam gubernatoris extitisse, curiose apponens, coaptauit ipsum statue, id
 710 est ydrie. Post hec autem aduenerunt Caldei, accensus est ignis, et cera, per quam perforaciones
 extiterant obstruite, dissoluebatur. Ydria autem sudante, et aquam <per> perforaciones emittente,
 extinctus est ignis. Sicque calliditate sacerdotis Canopus Caldeorum uictor ostensus est et a tunc
 in posterum ut deus honorabatur.

Gayus Lautorius, Marcus secundum uocacionem. Ex isto ostenditur oditium mali Romanorum
 715 et ad transgredientes communia et legale humane nature seuerum. Iste enim chyliarchus monstratus
 in Samnitico bello iuuenem quedam commilitancium differentem per aspectum ab alteris
 usquequaque quidem suasit sibi ipsi donari corporis pulchritudinem uolentem, ut autem neque
 donis neque alia philanthropia iuuenem seduxit, continere concupiscenciam impotens existens
 uiolenciam afferre apposuit. Circumclamata autem honestate uiri omnibus in exercitu existentibus,
 720 communem iniusticiam ciuitatis esse existimantes populi principes scripturam afferunt aduersus
 ipsum publice, et populus omnibus sentenciis uirum reprehendit mercedem ulcionis mortem
 determinans. Aliud admirabilissimum, quamuis circa seruuum corpus facta contumelia. Ab uno
 enim tradencium Samnitis exercitum chyliarcorum et sub iugo ueniencium Popilii filius existens, in
 multa penuria comprehensus, mutuuum coactus est accipere, ut redimendus a cognatis. Defraudatus
 725 autem a spe abductus est ad debitum dilacione pertranseunte, multum iuuenis existens et uisu
 pulcher. Iste alia quidem ministrans, quecumque seruos dominis lex erat, sustinebat; corporis autem
 pulchritudinem donari iussus contristabatur et usque ad omne oppugnabat. Multas autem propter
 hoc flagellationum accipiens plagas excurrit in forum et stans in excelso quodam et impudiciam
 creditoris enarrabat et flagellationum cicatrices ostendit. Indignante autem populo et publica ira
 730 dignam existimante rem, accusantibus annunciacionem populi principibus, redidit morti ulcionem.
 Et propter illam passionem omnes in seruitute redacti ad debita Romani lege roborata antiquam
 liberatam afferebant.

Medusa: que et Gorgone uocata. Perseus, Danae et Pici filius, edoctus omnes misticas fantasias,
 proprium uolens sibi ipsi constituere regnum contempsitque id quod Medorum; et per multam
 735 transiens terram uidit puellam uirginem et terribilem et deformem, et aspiciens in ipsam interrogat,
 que uocatur; illa autem dixit, Medusa, et abscondens ipsius | caput ut edoctus erat, portabat, omnes D 40v
 obstupefaciens et interficiens uidentes, quod capud uocauit Gorgonem, propter uelocitatem
 operacionis. Inde autem ueniens in regionem super quam regnabat Cepheus inuenit puellam

714-732 Suda, s.u. Γάϊος Λαυτώριος (γ 13: I, p. 504.5-34) || 733-750 Suda, s.u. Μέδουσα (μ 406: III, pp. 346.15-347.5).

704 necessarie (ἀναγκαίως) necessaria D || 707 Canopy (τοῦ Κανόπου) conopi D || 709 menelas D || 711 per *ad-*
dimus || 712 a tunc (ἀπὸ τότε) accio D || 713 honorabitur D || 716 samnitico (Σανυτικῶ) sanitico D || 720 afferunt
 (ἀποφέρουσι) affuerunt D.

704 autem *deest in Su* || 707 enim *deest in Su* || 710 autem *deest in Su* || 716 samnitico Σανυτικῶ *Su* || 719 existentibus
 γενομένοις *Su*^V: -ης *Su*^{AGITEM} || 722 *post* determinans *hab.* οὐκ ἀξιῶν—ὑβρεις *Su* (p. 504.16-18) || 736 *post* caput *deest*
 ἐτέλεσεν αὐτήν *cum solo Su*^V || 738 *post* inuenit *add.* ἐν ἱερῶ *Su*.

uirginem dictam Andromedam, quam desponsauit; et fundauit ciuitatem in uilla, uocata Amandra, constituens etiam colupnam portantem Gorgonem. Hec etiam ciuitas postea uocata est Yconium, 740 propter ymaginem Gorgonis. Pugnauit autem cum Ishauris et Ciliciis, et fundauit ciuitatem, quam uocauit Tharsum, dictam Andrasum. Oracula autem accipiens quoniam post uictoriam in quo loco descendens ab equo plantam pedis deponit, illic pro uictoriis fundaret ciuitatem, et hanc uocauit Tharsum. Vincens autem et Medos commutauit nomen regionis et uocauit ipsam Persida. Docuit autem et sordidum sacrificium quod in Gorgone quosdam Persarum, quos uocauit magos. 745 Secundum que tempora et spera ignis deorsum ducta ex celo, ex qua colebat ignem Perseus et tradidit hiis qui illius gentis custodire et honorare, ut ex celo descendentem. Committens autem bellum cum Cepheo, eo autem propter senectutem non uidente et capite non operante, existimans ipsum inutile esse, conuersus ad se ipsum Perseus et hoc aspiciens mortuus est. Hoc posterius conbussit filius ipsius Merrus. 750

Gorgones autem erant tres mulieres, que tantum habebant terribiles facies, ut aspicientes interficerent. Quarum unam interfecit lancea falcata Perseus.

Gorgos autem grece est facile mobilis, uelox latine.

Tarsos quoque grece est planta pedis latine, et eycon grece est ymago latine.

Syrenas: mulieres quasdam bone uocis exitisse dicunt, secundum fabulas tamen gentiles, que in 755 insula parua sedentes sic delectabant transnauigantes per euphonyam, ut detinerent illuc usque ad mortem. Habebant autem a thorace quidem et superius speciem strucionum, inferius mulierum. Mithology autem, id est fabularum sermocinatores, Syrenas aiunt muliebrium facierum quasdam auis esse, seducentes nauigantes, cantibus quibusdam meretriciis alicientes auditus audiencium. Et finem habet delectacionis cantus mortem. Verus autem sermo hoc uult, loca esse quedam marina, montibus 760 quibusdam coangustata, in quibus constrictum fluctum dulcem quandam uocem reddit; quam audientes iuxta nauigantes credunt sui ipsorum animas fluxui et ipsi uiri cum nauibus perduntur. Apud Ysaiaem autem dicte Syrene et Onocentauri demones quidam sunt existentes in desolacione ciuitatis, que ira dei fit. Syri autem cignos esse aiunt. Et enim isti abluti et uolantes ex aqua et aere dulce quoddam melos cantant. Iob igitur dicit super illum: <frater> factus sum Syrenarum, socius 765 autem strucionum. Hoc est canto mei ipsius calamitates, quemadmodum Syrenes. Strucionem dicit eum qui apud grecos strutocamelon, auem quidem existentem, pedes autem et collum asini habentem. Et in epigrammatibus: et loquela illa Syrenarum dulcior.

Syrenes: anime consonantes et musice uirtutes.

D 41r | Skytale: epistola Laconica. Erat autem skytale lignum dolatum oblongum. Due autem apud 770

751-752 Suda, s.u. Γοργόνες (γ 390: I, p. 536.3-5) || 753 *Haec uerba inseruit Robertus suo Marte, ut uidetur. Cf. Lex. Arund. γ 310 Garzga (RAAN 65, 1995, p. 127) Gorgós: Velox* || 754 Suda, s.u. ταρσός (τ 130: IV, p. 505.16). *Cf. Etym. Gud. s.u. ταρσός, σθητος ποδός (col. 523.5 Sturz)* || 755-768 Suda, s.u. Σειρήνας (σ 280: IV, pp. 346.17-347.5) || 769 Suda, s.u. Σειρήνας (σ 281: IV, p. 347.7) || 770-779 Suda, s.u. σκυτάλη (σ 718: IV, pp. 390.26-391.11).

739 Amandra (Ἀμανδραν)] amandea D || 755 gentiles] est gentilis D || 760 quedam (τινάς)] quidem D || 765 frater *addimus ex Iob 30, 29 (ἀδελφός).*

742 *post* Tharsum *deest* τὸρπὶν *cum solo* Su^V || 743 *post* hanc *add.* οὖν Su || 746 *colebat*] ἐλάτρευε Su^V: ἔλαβε Su^{AGFM} || 755 *secundum*—gentiles] μῦθος πλὴν Ἑλληνικός Su^V: μ. πρὶν Ἑλ. Su^{AGFM} || 759 *nauigantes*] πλέοντας Su^V: παραπλ- Su^{AGFM} || 760 *mortem*] θάνατον Su^V: ἕτερον μὲν οὐδὲν χρηστόν, θάνατον δὲ μόνον Su^{AGFM} || *loca esse*] τόπους εἶναι Su^{GVM}: εἶναι τ. Su^{AF} || 765 *super illum deest in* Su || 766-767 *Strucionem*—strutocamelon] στρουθὸν λέγει τὸν παρ' ἡμῶν στρουθοκάμηλον Su^V: στρουθοῦς δὲ λέγει, ὃν ἡμεῖς στρ. λέγομεν Su^{AGFM}.

Lacedemones extiterunt skytale; et unam quidem retinebant custodes Lacedemoniorum, alteram autem tribuebant emisso duci exercitus ab ipsis. Et quando uolebant aliquid mittere ipsi, sumentes corigiam albam et uolentes circa skytalem et in corigia scribebant. Et auferentes tradebant corigiam deferenti. Hoc autem faciebant, ut non discerent ferentes manifestum in ipsa. Dux autem exercitus
 775 suscipiens corigiam sui ipsius skytale circumuoluit et legebat sic scripta. Dicitur in epistola, et ipsum lignum, a quo et epistola. Dyoscorides autem in hiis que De legalibus accommodantes secundum lineam diuidere skytalem, duobus presentibus testibus, et scribere pactum in utraque diuisione; et hanc quidem uni testium tradere, et hanc autem per se ipsum habere. Utebatur autem et ipsa alieno modo, ut Aristoteles in ea que Ythakesiorum policia 42^a.

780 Skytalides: ignimissua instrumenta. Erant autem talia skytalia lignea, hec quidem pedalia, hec autem cubitalia; omnia preparacionibus erant secundum extrema acuta. Hec cuspidibus ferreis inuoluta habebant capita; per cuspides autem circumplicabantur stuppa et tede, et super hec pix superfundebatur. Et hec quidem accendebant, et iaciebant cum fortitudine ad primas domos; quibus cadentibus cum uolencia et cuspidibus tabulis infixis, immanebat ignis, et uelociter ardebat.

785 Palladium: hoc enim erat animal paruum et ligneum, quod dicebant esse factum, custodiens regnum Troie; datum est autem Troy regi qui fundauit ciuitatem ab Asia quodam philosopho et factore ipsius; propter quod utique in honorem Asii eam super quam regnauit regionem prius Epeyron dictam Asiam uocauerunt. Poetice autem scribentes ex aere dicebant Palladium hoc defferri Troy regnanti super Friges. Hoc Dyomedes et Ulixes, quando legacionem fecerunt ad Priamum, ex templo

790 rapuerunt, tradente ipsum Theane Anthenoris uxore, sacra existente et custodiente ipsum; erant enim ab oraculo et Anthenore discentes quoniam usquequo manet Palladium in Troia, inconcussum erit regnum Frigiorum. Multa igitur inter Aiace et Ulixem mota est contencio, quis hoc in propriam afferret patriam, sedentibus autem ipsis pro iudicibus multis magnatibus et pugnatoribus. Multis igitur motis, et facto uespere, uidebatur ipsis reponere ydolum apud Dyomedem, usquequo utique
 795 fieret mane. Et hoc facto per noctem inuentus est Ajax occisus immanifeste. Suspiciabantur autem dolo occidisse ipsum Ulixem. Et contendentes ad inuicem nauigauerunt.

Iouis: ymaginem historizant eius sedentem, nuda habentem superiora, inferiora autem cooperta, tenentem quidem sinistra sceptrum, dextra autem aquilam protendentem. Et sedere quidem firmum potencie enigmatizat, superiora autem nuda habere quoniam manifestans | deus intellectualibus et
 800 celestibus mundi partibus. Reliqua autem cooperiuntur quia infimis deus incognitus. Sinistra autem sceptrum tenere, significat potestatem; altera autem manus protendere aquilam, quod aere latorum spirituum dominatur, sicut aquila alte uolancium uolucrum. D 41v

Iuppiter autem dicitur in greco Zeus, a zeyn quod est uiuere, ipse enim sicut dixit Plato est per quem uiuimus.

780-784 Suda, s.u. σκοταλίδες (σ 719: IV, p. 391.12-19) || 785-796 Suda, s.u. Παλλάδιον (π 34: IV, p. 4.17-5.2) || 797-802 Suda, s.u. Ζεύς (ζ 39: II, p. 503.9-17) || 803-804 Etym. Gud., s.u. Ζεύς (col. 230, 16, 26-27 Sturz). Vide Dorandi, *Traduction*, p. 415.

773 et¹ D^{s1} || tradebant (παρεῖχον) tradentes D || 774 manifestum (τὸ δηλούμενον) manufactum D.

776-777 accommodantes secundum lineam (i.e. σπάρτη) τοὺς δανείζοντες ἐν Σπάρτη Su || 778 utebatur ἐχρῶντο Su || 783 hec] ἡ Su^v: οἱ Su^{AGFM} || accendebant] ἀνάπτοντες Su^v, Mp.c.: ἐν- Su^{AGF, Mac.} || 787 ipsius deest in Su || 788 uocauerunt] ἐκάλεσαν Su || 793 multis¹] ἄλλων Su || 793-794 multis igitur motis] cf. πολλῶν καὶ προμάχων τοίνυν μεταξύ κινήθόντων Su^s || 799 deus deest in Su || 801 post aquilam deest δηλοῦ cum solo Su^v.

Serapis: huius in Alexandria destruxit Theophylus archiepiscopus statuum sub Theodosio 805 magno. Hunc autem hii quidem Iouem esse dixerunt, hii autem Neylum a modium habere in capite et cubitum, id est aque mensura, alii autem Ioseph, alii uero Apym quendam extitisse hominem habundantem et regem in Memphide ciuitate Egipti. Fame autem facta Alexandrinis cibum tribuit, mortuo autem ipsi templum erexerunt, in quo bos nutriebatur, simbolium ferens agricolae, sed et quedam habens in colore insignia, que ex appellacione ipsius et ipse Apis uocabatur. Soron, id est 810 sepulcrum, huius Apis, in quo corpus iacebat ipsius, in Alexandriam transtulerunt et a soro et Api compositum nomen facientes uocabant ipsum Sorapim, hii autem post hec Serapim. Huius autem templum ab Alexandro fundatum est ualde magnum et preclarum.

Echo: quoniam fit echo secundum refraccionem eam que ab obiectis et planis corporibus, maxime autem concauis, percussi a uoce aeris. Loquens enim impellit quidem fere omnem qui circum aera, 815 maxime autem eum qui ante; propter quod magis audimus ad nos aspicientes loquentem quam ad ipsum. Iste autem qui ante aer impulsus, quando inducitur in quodam obiecto habente concauitatem, qualia sunt antra, continuus existens et indiffusus manens propter contineri a concauitate, incidens ipsi obiecto existenti corpori impellitur in contrarium, quemadmodum proiecta contra parietem spera, et sicut reuertitur spera, et reuertitur ad percipientem, operante uidelicet aere per utrumque 820 secundum delatiuam ipsius uirtutem. Non solum enim propter non permitti a concauo loco diffundi, qualis inductus erat ab obiectione duri corporis in contrarium repellitur, sed quoniam et concauo illi cui incidit, non uacuo existenti incidit, sed aere pleno, quemadmodum aer continuus est et unitus propter continens. Secundum hunc igitur modum a loquente percussus aer et sonum diuidens lacione et prohibitus ab ipso, continuo existente et unito, diffundi incidit duro corpori, et non potens in antea 825 incidere refrangit in retro cum propria operatione, dico autem sono, et sic accidit reuertere sonum.

In greco autem hoc nomen Hchos, id est quod sonus ut clamor et inde dicitur Hcheo, quod nos dicimus ekcho, quod et multi pronunciant per duplex c, sic eccho.

Nomos, id est lex, est enim citharizandi modus melodye, concordiam habens et rithmum determinatum. Erant autem septem modi qui a Terpandro, eorum unus ortheus, trocheus, tetradius, 830 D 42r oxis. Dores autem in numismate utuntur hac dictione. Nomos | et Romani peruertentes nummum dicunt. Attici diuisas partes terre, ut et in Egipto. Et iusticiam scripserunt. Darius enim habuit nomon, id est legem, et Frigium et Lidium et Ionicum.

Iterum nomos, id est lex, est ordo et consuetudo. Et secundum Sophoclea natura generantis et consuetudo. Et historia et nomon, id est legem, <...> determinauit esse rectam rationem in salute 835 utentium.

805-813 Suda, s.u. Σάραπις (σ 117: IV, p. 325.10-23) || 814-826 Suda, s.u. Ἡχώ (η 685: II, pp. 599.23-600.14) || 827-828 Cf. Etym. Gud., s.u. ἦχος (col. 252.34-36 Sturz) ἦχος [...] ἢ παρὰ ἄχος, ὃ σημαίνει τὸν θόρυβον [...]. Vide Dorandi, Traduction, p. 415 || 829-833 Suda, s.u. νόμος (ν 478: III, p. 477.14-20) || 834-836 Suda, s.u. νόμος (ν 480: III, p. 477.22-23 ἱστορία; 25-26).

817 obiecta D || 835-836 corrupta esse uidetur. Νόμος καὶ ἡ ἱστορία ὁ Ἀποστόλος· ὑπὸ νόμον θέλοντες εἶναι τὸν νόμον οὐκ ἀκούετε. ὅτι τὸν νόμον σπουδαῖον δεικνύομεν ἄν, εἰ ὀρισάμεθα αὐτὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν χρωμένων Su.

808 post Alexandrinis hab. ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων Su || 816 aspicientes] ὀρῶντες Su^V: -ος Su^{AFGITMB} || 817 autem] δὲ Su^V: δὴ Su^{AFGITMB} || in quodam] τινι Su^V: τι Su^{AFGITMB} || habente] ἔχων Su^V: ἔχον Su^{AFGITMB} || 820 et sicut—percipientem καὶ οὕτω χωρεῖ ἐπὶ τὸν πλήξαντα Su || 830 trocheus deest hic in Su, sed vide ο 575 (III, p. 558.15-16) ὀρθιον νόμον καὶ τροχαῖον || 831 nomos deest in Su || 832 scripserunt (i.e. ἔγραφον)] ἔγραφον Su.

Iterum nomos, id est lex, una est quando sine litteris per creacionem data est hominibus; inuisibile enim dei facturis dei intellectum conspicitur. Et rursus: cum gentes enim legem non habentes, isti ipsis sunt lex. Et alia que in litteris per Moysen transgrediencium gracia data. Et tertia que per
840 gratiam. Lex enim spiritus uite liberauit me a lege peccati et mortis.

Iterum hec dicio nomos, siue lex, polyonimum est. Et enim lex est que optimam policiam ordinat et disponit. Et lex dicitur testimonia, ut aduersus peccantes testificans et transgressionis punicionem ostendens; dicitur et iustificantes, ut docens iustum et prohibens iniustum et dirigentes ostendens iustos; mandatum quoque dicitur ut faciendum mandans et iubens dominatiue; et pro
845 iudicia quoque dicitur, ut sentencias ostendens et docens, quibus quidem bonis custodiens potietur, quibus autem transgrediens punicionibus tradetur.

Legispositores autem antiqui, Moyses, deinde autem Christus.

Apud Athenienses autem primus factus est Dracon et post ipsum Solon et Thales et post hunc Eschylus.

850 Terpanrus autem lyricus: qui primus septem cordarum fecit lyram et leges lyricas primus scripsit; quamuis quidam Phylammona uolunt scripsisse.

Sunt autem in cithara tres ordines cordarum. Primi autem et infimi ordinis quelibet corda dicitur ypate, ab ypacia, quod est ducatus. Medii autem ordinis quelibet dicitur mese, id est media. Tercii uero ordinis quelibet dicitur neate, siue secundum alios nete, id est extrema, ad distincionem ypates et
855 meses. Reddit nete sonum acutum, et mese medium, ypate uero grauem. Sunt autem orthius, trocheus, <tet>radius, oxis, frigijs, lydijs et ionicis modi melodiarum et leges dicti, uelud orchius Thymothei.

Thymotheus enim fistulator fistulauit aliquando Dyane orthyon nomon uocatum et in tantum obstupet Alexandrum regem, ut interim audiens prosiliret ad arma. Thymotheus autem dixit quoniam tales oportet esse regales melodias.

860 Ortheum autem et trocheum: a rythmis nominauit Terpanrus. Extensi autem erant <et> fortes hii modi.

Kosmos, id est mundus: ex celo et terra et hijs que in medio et constitucio et connexio. Qui plenitudo est specierum. Quia autem oportuit nullam specierum corrumpi, ut non imperfectum esset omne, impossibile autem erat eadem manere numero, et generabilia existencia et corruptibilia,
865 participant et hec sempiternitate ut potuerunt, quia et omnia appetunt primi sempiternitatem ut proprium principium | et participant hanc unumquodque secundum sui ipsius mensuram. Et hoc est intensissimum opus nature, naturalium unumquodque generare aliud, quale est ipsum. Et quia indigemus generacione, generatiua autem uirtus in determinata fit magnitudine, et propter hoc indigemus augmentacione. Quia autem augmentacio per nutrimentum fit, rursus nutritiua
870 indigemus uirtute. Propter hoc igitur participamus naturalibus uirtutibus et nos et irrationalia.

D 42v

837-840 Suda, s.u. νόμος (ν 481: III, p. 477.27-33) || 841-846 Suda, s.u. νόμος (ν 484: III, p. 478.3-10) || 847 Suda, s.u. νομοθέται (ν 471: III, p. 476.20) || 848-849 Suda, s.u. νομοθέται (ν 472: III, p. 476.21-22) || 850-851 Suda, s.u. Τέρπανδρος (τ 354: IV, p. 527.21-23) || 852-856 *Haec uerba addidit Robertus suo Marte, ut uidetur, cf. Su ν 165 (IV, p. 643.27) et ν 119 (III, p. 444.22-23)* || 857-859 Suda, s.u. ὄρθιος νόμος (ο 573: III, p. 558.8-12) || 860-861 Suda, s.u. ὄρθιον νόμον καὶ τροχᾶϊον (ο 575: III, p. 558.15-16) || 862-875 Suda, s.u. κόσμος (κ 2147: III, pp. 162.28-163.16).

839 terciam D || 851 uolunt (θέλουσι) uoluit D || 854 id est extrema iter. D || 855 othius D || 856 radius D || 858 interim (μεταξὺ) iterum D.

838 dei²] τοῦ θεοῦ cum solo Su^V || 843 iustificantes] δικαιώματα Su || 844-845 pro iudicia] κρίματα δέ Su || 845 bonis] hic Su^V: post τεύξεταί (potietur) Su^{AGMB}: om. Su^F || 848 post et² deest μετὰ τοῦτον cum solo Su^V || 857 Dyane] Ἀθηνᾶς Su || 858 regem] τοῦς μέλεσιν Su || prosiliret] ἀΐξει Su^{AGEM}: ἄρξει Su^S.

Quare quando quidem operamur secundum uirtutes has, ut plante operamur, quando autem secundum iram et concupiscenciam, ut irrationalia animalia; ut homines autem operamur, quando ratione utimur. Propter quod et sapienter Plotynus dixit, quod quicumque perseueranter secundum nutritiuas uirtutes operantur, isti periclitantur arbores fieri. Significat autem kosmos, id est mundus, quattuor: decenciam siue ornatum, et hoc omne, et ordinem et multitudinem apud scripturam. 875

Stoyci autem kosmon, id est mundum, tripliciter esse dicunt: et ipsum deum uniuerse substantie proprie factiuum; qui utique incorruptibilis est et ingenuus, conditor ens adornacionis, secundum temporis facturas peryodos consumens in se ipsum uniuersam substantiam, et rursus ex ipsis generans; sed et ipsam adornacionem stellarum kosmon esse dicunt; et tercio quod constitutum est ex ambobus. Et est kosmos proprie factiuus uniuersorum substantie; uel constitucio ex celo et terra et hiis que in ipsis naturis; uel constitucio ex elementis et hominibus et hiis que in unoquoque. Kosmon autem, id est mundum, dicunt habitari secundum intellectum et prudentiam, in omnem ipsius partem pertranseunte intellectu, quemadmodum in nobis anima, per quedam quidem magis, per quedam autem minus. Per quedam quidem ut habitus incessit, ut per ossa et neruos; per quedam autem ut intellectus, ut per principatium. Sic utique totum kosmon, id est mundum, ut animal existentem principatium habere 885 ethera et incedere per ea que in aere et per animalia omnia et plantas secundum habitum; et unum esse mundum et hunc terminatam figuram habentem speriformem. In intimo autem ipsius centrum esse circumfusum ipsi, infinitum, quemadmodum incorporeum. In mundo autem nichil esse uacuum, sed unitum esse ipsum; hoc enim cogit celestium ad terrestria contentio et conspiracio.

Pan, cuius genitiuus panos. Aysopus, Mitridati lector, scripsit de Helena; in quo ait pana 890 piscem uocari de genere cetorum. In hoc autem pisce asteriten lapidem inueniri, qui lapis sub sole accenditur, facit autem ad amorem.

Iterum Pan, cuius genitiuus Panos, nomen est dei Gentilis. Hircinas tibias habens. Amator heremi, ociosus et habens uirgam pastorem et fistulam.

Pan iterum, cuius genitiuus pantos, est quando significat mundum et secundum alterum 895 modum eam que ex mundo et exterius uacuo constitucionem. Mundus quidem igitur terminatus est, uacuum autem infinitum. Stellarum autem non errantes quidam simul ferri cum celo dicunt errantes autem secundum proprios motus moueri. Solem autem obliquum incessum facere per zodyacum circulum, similiter autem lunam cornubiformem. Esse autem solem sincerum ignem et maiorem terra et speriformem, similiter mundo. Ignem quidem igitur esse solem dicunt 900 quoniam que ignis omnia facit; maiorem autem terra quoniam ab ipso omnia illuminantur, sed etiam celum. Et quoniam terra coniformem | umbram proicit sed quoniam undique uidetur.

D 43r

876-889 Suda, s.u. κόσμος (κ 2148: III, p. 163.18-38) || 890-894 Suda, s.u. Πάν (π 148 et 147: IV, p. 16.25-30) || 895-913 Suda, s.u. πᾶν (π 149: IV, pp. 16.31-17.24).

887 terminatum *D* || 889 terrestria *D* || 891 asteriten (ἀστερίτην) astericen *D* || 893 gentili *D* || 897 ferri (συμφέρεσθαι) fieri *D* || 901 sed (ἀλλὰ) et *D*.

872 secundum] κατὰ *deest in Su^V* || *post operamur deest τότε cum solo Su^V* || 873 *post sapienter deest λίαν cum solo Su^V* || 878 ipsis] αὐτῶν *Su^V*: αὐτοῦ *Su^{AFGM}* || 881 in unoquoque] ἐνεκά του *Su*. || 887 *post speriformem deest πρὸς—τοῦτο* (p. 163.33-34) *cum solo Su^V* || 888 *post incorporeum deest ἀσώματον—κατεχόμενον* (p. 163.35-36) *cum solo Su^V* || 890-894 π 148 *praecedat π 147 cum solo Su^V* || 894 *post ociosus habet καὶ πόνον ἔχων νεβρίδιον Su* || 895 iterum—*pantos add. ipse Robertus* || 897 uacuum autem infinitum] τὸ κενὸν δὲ ἀπειρον *Su^V*: τὸ δὲ κ. ἄ. *Su^{AM}*: ἄ. δὲ τὸ κ. *Su^G* || 898 obliquum] λοξὴν *Su^{GM}*: λοξὴν *Su^V*: λοξείαν *Su^A* || 899 autem¹] δὲ *Su^{V,Mac.}*: τε *Su^{AG, Mp.c.}* || 900 *uerba solem dicunt desunt in Su* || 901 omnia²] πάντα *Su^V*: πᾶσαν *Su^{AGM}* || 902 *post proicit hab. τὸ μερίζονα εἶναι σημαίνει Su* || *post uidetur hab. διὰ τὸ μέγεθος Su*.

Terrestriorem autem lunam dicunt, seu propinquiore[m] terre existentem. Nutriri autem ignea
 hec et alia astra dicunt, solem quidem ex magno mari, tardum existentem †inpotabili†; lunam ex
 905 aquis potabilibus, aeri mixtam et prope terram existentem; alia autem a terra. Videtur autem ipsis
 speriformia esse et astra et terram immobilem existentem. Lunam autem non proprium habere
 lumen, sed a sole accipere illuminationem. Eclipsari autem solem, apponente luna secundum eam
 que ad nos partem. Apparet enim superpugnans coniunctionibus et abscondens ipsum et rursus
 permutans; cognoscitur autem hoc per concam aquam habentem. Lunam autem incidentem in
 910 terre umbram dicunt eclipsari, et quidem secundum dyametrum stantem contra solem quoniam
 aduersus obliquum ut ad solem mota commutat latitudinem, uel septentrionalior uel australior
 facta. Quando quidem latitudo ipsius aduersus solaris et ea que per media fit, deinde secundum
 dyametrum opponitur soli, et tunc eclipsatur.

Hoc nomen passio dupliciter dicitur: uel enim quod in corruptionem ducit uel in perfectionem.
 915 Dicitur enim pati lignum ab igne, <ut> in corruptionem ductum, dicitur quoque pati et sensus a
 sensibilibus, pro perfici, et ex potencia in operationem duci. Quoniam autem ex passionibus corporis
 pertransit quid ad animam; dolenti enim condolet et gaudenti congaudet. Quoniam et impedimentum
 dat ipsi corpus taliter uel taliter dispositum, nullus ignorat, quod neque utique fieret, nisi pertransiret
 ab ea que ad ipsum habitudine compassio quedam ad animam sic ut uentre cerebri posteriori paciente
 920 memoratiuum contingat pati. Anime autem partes quinque sensus, sonatiua particula et intellectiua
 siue mens. Ex falsis autem superfieri conuersionem ad mentem, a qua multas passiones germinare et
 inconstancie causas. Est autem ipsa passio irrationabilis et preter naturam anime motus uel impetus
 superhabundans. Passionum autem superiorum genera quattuor, scilicet tristitia, timor, concupiscencia,
 delectacio. Videtur autem passiones iudicia esse; et enim phylargiria suspicio est huius argentum bonum
 925 esse. Et ebrietas et luxuria et alia similiter. Et tristitia quidem esse constriccione[m] irrationalem, species
 autem ipsius miseria, inuidia, zelus, zelotipia, acthos, enochlisis siue turbacio, anoya, id est insipencia,
 odine, id est dolor, confusio. Misericordiam quidem ut de indigne malum paciente, inuidiam autem
 tristitiam de alienis bonis, et zelum autem tristitiam de alii adesse que et ipse habet, acthos uero tristitiam
 grauantem, turbacionem tristitiam anxiantem et difficultatem preparantem; anoyan tristitiam ex
 930 cogitationibus manentem uel intensam, odyne[m], seu dolorem, tristitiam laboriosam, confusionem
 tristitiam irrationabilem, claudentem et prohibentem presencia conspicere.

Timor autem est expectatio mali. Ad timorem autem reducuntur hec: deyma, oknos, ayschine,
 ekplexis, thoribos, agoniam. Deyma quidem est timor horrorem faciens, oknos autem timor future
 operationis, aischine timor ingloriacionis, ekplexis autem timor ex fantasia inconsuete rei, thoribos
 935 | est timor cum festinacione uocis; agoniam autem timor immanifeste rei. Genus autem ekplexeos D 43v
 admiracio, yperbole autem, id est superhabundancia, diferencia; admirancium autem hii quidem
 secundum superhabundanciam admirantur, ut obstupefacti, hii autem moderate. Admiracio itaque
 secundum yperbole ekplexis. Timor autem apud Homerum, fuga.

914-931 Suda, s.u. πάθος (π 27: IV, p. 3.1-26) || 932-938 Suda, s.u. φόβος (φ 559: IV, p. 747.7-17).

907 lunam *D* || 915 ut (ὤς) *addimus* || 919 ut ut *D* || 927 indigne *iter. D*.

903 autem] δὲ *Su*^{AGM}. τε *Su*^V || *post seu deest καὶ cum solo Su*^V || 904 inpotabili] ἀναμμο *Su* || 907 *post* apponente *deest*
 αὐτῷ τῆς *cum solo Su*^V || 908 superpugnans] ὑπερμαχομένη *Su*^V: ὑπερχομένη *Su*^{AGM} || 910 *post* dicunt *hab.* ὅθεν καὶ ταῦς
 πανσέληνοις *Su* || *post* stantem *hab.* κατὰ μῆνα *Su* || 920 *post* pati *hab.* περὶ παθῶν ὅτι *Su* || *post* sensus *deest καὶ cum solo Su*^S ||
 935 *post* rei *hab.* ἔστι δὲ γένος ἡ θαυμασιότης τῆς ἐκπλήξεως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπερβολή· *Su*.

Concupiscencia est irrationalis appetitus, sub qua ordinantur hec: spanis, mysos, id est odium, phyloneikia, orge, id est ira, εἶδος, menis, thimos, id est furor. Est autem spanis quedam concupiscencia 940 in deffraudacione et uelud a re separata, ordinata autem uane ad ipsam et circumtracta. Mysos autem est quedam concupiscencia malefaciendi alicui cum affeccione aliqua et aduersitate. Phyloneikya autem est concupiscencia litis et contumeliarum. Orge autem concupiscencia pene eius qui uidetur iniustum fecisse non conuenienter, εἶδος autem concupiscencia non de uirtuosa re; est enim apposicio <amoris> laboris propter pulchritudinem apparentem. Menis autem est ira 945 quedam inueterata, inuida et insidiatiua. Timos autem ira principatiua.

939-946 Suda, s.u. ἐπιθυμία (ε 2341: II, pp. 357.25-358.2). *Quae l. 943 (Philoneikia—contumeliarum) leguntur addidit Robertus suo Marte, ut uidetur. Vide Dorandi, Traduction, p. 432.*

945 amoris laboris (φιλοπονία) || 946 post principatiua *hab.* explicit liber suda *D.*

Marginalia codicis D praeter titulationes capitum

- 33r 26 — de mercurio
 33r 29-30 — hic erat uerissimus | in sermone
 33r 33-34 — de herme tris|megisto
 33r 36-37 — nota istius uerba | de trinitate benedicta
 33v 12-13 — nota scripturas | istius orphei
 34r 6-8 — nota de pl[a]|tone et e[ius] | nati(uita)te bene *[]
 34r 20 — de nominibus e[ius]
 34r 23 — de discipulis eius
 34r 26 — de libris suis
 34r 36-38 — nota optime de | dominio animae secundum | platonem
 35r 8-9 — nota quod plato [di]|cit de anima *[]
 35v 1-2 — iste primus erat | sophista
 35v 28 — nota platonem
 36r 10-12 — iste philosophus | multum labor[a]|uit pro christiani[s]
 36r 26-28 — de quibusdam | inuentoribus | philosophie
 37r 10 nota ibici grues
 37r 16-18 — iste inuentor | fuit allearum et | taxillorum et h[
 37r 23 — nota inuidiam
 37r 29-30 — de quattuor ptholo|meis
 37r 34 — 2
 37r 37 — 3
 37v 3 — 4
 37v 6-7 — quo modo tripho (?) | ioculator
 37v 14 — 5
 37v 17 — 6
 37v 31-32 — quo modo debet scribi | hoc nomen egipcius
 38v 7-8 — de lege py|sistrati
 38v 29-30 — nota de for|tidutine istius
 39r 6-7 — nota fortitu|dinem istius
 39r 12 — de curtio
 39r 17 — nota
 39v 7-8 — nota gentem | mirabilem
 42r 28-29 — nota quid fecit | melodia istius
 42r 11-12 — nota kosmon | per stoicos
 43r 24 — quattor genera passionum
 43r 27 — species tristicie
 43r 36 — species timoris
 43v 5 — species concupiscencie

The “Perfect King” and his Philosophers

Politics, Religion and Graeco-Arabic Philosophy in Safavid Iran: the case of the Utūlūgiyā

Marco Di Branco*

Abstract

During the long span of time which divides the age of Avicenna and Suhrawardī on the one hand, and that of the Safavid empire on the other, the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* seems *prima facie* to have sunk into oblivion in Persia. Closer study of the manuscripts of this work housed in the libraries of Iran, and of their readers, permits us to ascertain that this is not the case. This article, issued from the missions conducted within the context of the ERC Project 249431 “Greek into Arabic”, narrows the focus on the early Safavid era and shows the background of the interest in the pseudo-*Theology* of some scholars of that milieu. In particular, the discovery of a Prologue to the pseudo-*Theology* by Ġiyāṭ al-Dīn Maṣūf Daṣṭakī (d. 949/1541) is accounted for, and some implications of this text are discussed.

1. Searching for a method

In the last decade, studies concerning philosophy in Iran during the Safavid period have experienced a significant increase: several works (of uneven quality) have been published, focusing on individual figures of thinkers linked to the political and cultural milieus of Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz.¹ Most of these contributions consist of publishing unedited texts, an approach that has the great merit of making available new materials. What I would like to do in this paper is to narrow the focus on the historical-philosophical context of the circulation of what is in all likelihood the most important among the Graeco-Arabic works widespread in Safavid Iran: the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*.² Rula Jurdi Abisaab,

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¹ The most important contributions are the following: S.H. Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shirāzī. His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy*, Oxford U. P., Oxford-New York 2007 (Journal of Semitic Studies, Suppl. 18); R. Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran. Najm al-Dīn Maḡmūd al-Nayrizī and his Writings*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2011 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 82); J. Pfeiffer (ed.), *Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th-15th Century Tabriz*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2014 (Iran Studies, 8).

² The pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* is the focus of the ERC Project AdG 249431 “Greek into Arabic. Philosophical Concepts and Linguistic Bridges”, whose support has permitted my research missions in Tehran, Qom, Isfahan and Mashhad which lay in the background of this article. I am especially grateful to Gerhard Endress for his continued assistance in the preparation of these missions, whose first results are presented here. The main surveys on the scholarship on the pseudo-*Theology* include M. Aouad, “La Théologie d’Aristote et autres textes du Plotinus Arabus”, in R. Goulet (ed.) *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, I, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 1989, pp. 541-90; C. D’Ancona, “Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation”, in P. Adamson - R.C. Taylor (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2005, pp. 10-31; Ead., “Plotinus. Arabic”, in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, Springer

Colin P. Mitchell, and Andrew J. Newman have shown how promising is to contextualize the doctrines in their ground-breaking studies on the dissemination of Shi'ism in Iran promoted by Ismā'īl I and his successors,³ on the epistolography produced by the Persian chancellery between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,⁴ and on the society, history, politics and culture of the Safavid Iran.⁵ The two pillars of the studies on Safavid philosophy are represented by volume IV of *En Islam iranien* by Henry Corbin⁶ and by the path-breaking essay by Gerhard Endress "Philosophische Ein-Band Bibliotheken aus Isfahan".⁷ The latter shows how this topic is best approached, namely through an integrated analysis which takes into account not only the philological, codicological, and prosopographical aspects, but also the philosophical, theological, and political implications of the texts discussed. In fact, during the Safavid era both the transmission and the fruition of philosophical texts are closely connected to the political and religious sphere. As Endress has it, "von Ideologen der Schia – die ihre Theologie mit dem Instrumentarium des rationalistischen Kalām schmiedete und die zur Integration der *falsafa* fand – wurde solche Philosophie als Paradigma eines universalen Führungsanspruchs in religiösen Staat der Safawiden erneuert und systematisch formuliert".⁸

In this paper, I will discuss a case in point of the cross-pollination between philosophy and political theology, namely the circulation of the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* at the Safavid court. Setting the scene for this implies first to survey the interplay among political activity, religious doctrine and philosophical speculation during the time frame which spans from the Safavid rise to power in Iran (907/1501) to the Kingdom of Shāh 'Abbās, the most important ruler of the dynasty. It is in his reign (1052/1077-1642/1667) that the so called "School of Isfahan" flourished. The interest of the Safavid intellectuals for Graeco-Arabic philosophy is directly connected with specific political and religious issues; hence, the study of the reception of Graeco-Arabic philosophical texts in Persia must include an analysis of its historical context, if one wants to dig out the causes of a cultural and ideological nature which determined the popularity of such texts.

2. *The dialectic between Sufism and Shi'ism in the age of Shāh Ismā'īl I (r. 907-930/1501-1524)*

As is well known, the rise to power of the Safavid dynasty originated from a political and religious movement which took advantage of the religious syncretisms widespread in Anatolia and Persia, which combined elements coming not only from Shi'ism and the Sunni messianism, but also from Buddhism and Mazdeism.⁹ This movement also created an effective hierarchical and militarized organization, which led it to the conquest and unification of Iran.¹⁰ However, once his leadership was

Science + Business media B.V. 2011, pp. 1030-8. Cf. also Ead., "La *Teologia* neoplatonica di 'Aristotele' e gli inizi della filosofia arabo-musulmana", in R. Goulet - U. Rudolph (eds), *Entre Orient et Occident. La philosophie et la science gréco-romaines dans le monde arabe*, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique, vol. 57, Fondation Hardt, Vandœuvres - Genève 2011, pp. 135-90.

³ R.J. Abisaab, *Converting Persia. Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire*, Tauris, London-New York 2004.

⁴ C.P. Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran. Power, Religion and Rhetoric*, Tauris, London-New York 2009.

⁵ A.J. Newman (ed.), *Society and Culture in the Early Modern Middle East: Studies on Iran in the Safavid Period*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2003 (Islamic History and Civilisation, Studies and Texts, 46); Id., *Safavid Iran. Rebirth of a Persian Empire*, Tauris, London-New York 2006.

⁶ H. Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, IV, *L'école d'Ispahan, l'école Shaykhi, le douzième Imâm*, Gallimard, Paris 1972 (Bibliothèque des idées).

⁷ G. Endress, "Philosophische Ein-Band Bibliotheken aus Isfahan", *Oriens* 36 (2001), pp. 10-58.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁹ Cf. M. Mazzaoui, *The Origins of the Šafawids: Šī'ism, Sūfism, and the Ġulāt*, Steiner, Wiesbaden 1972.

¹⁰ On the initial phases of Shāh Ismā'īl's political-religious project cf. Newman, *Safavid Iran. Rebirth of a Persian Empire*, pp. 13-25; cf. also A.H. Morton, "The Early Years of Shah Ismā'īl in the *Afzal al-tavārikh* and Elsewhere", *Pembroke*

consolidated, Shāh Ismā'īl, the first ruler of the dynasty, had to face the inevitable tensions between the populist and millenarist agenda of the Qizilbāsh, i.e. the mystical traditions pervading Azerbaijan and Anatolia, and the need for stability and order implied in the establishment of the reign.¹¹

Ismā'īl, who was still under the influence of the apocalyptic propaganda of sufi origin, initially portrayed himself as a reincarnation of 'Alī and as a manifestation of the divine light granting the royal investiture (*farr*).¹² Nevertheless, already during the first years of his reign, the king invited to Persia some famous Shi'ite '*ulamā*' coming mainly from the area of Ġabal 'Amil in Syria, and placed them in key positions with administrative and religious duties, in order to spread the Twelver Shi'ism through the country.¹³ This situation led to the establishment of an articulated dialectic relation between Shi'ism and Sufism, as is apparent in the documents of Ismā'īl's chancellery.¹⁴ A synthesis of mysticism and millenarist views was predictably the outcome of such a move, a mix which incorporates elements of the Shi'ite Sufism and of the juridical and religious doctrines deriving from the 'orthodox' Twelver Shi'ism. As has been pointed out, at the court of Ismā'īl "we encounter a visual use of Shi'ite icons and slogans that, on the face of it, belied the lack of sophisticated appreciation of any legal and theological doctrines at these early dates (...). In those days men knew not of the Ja'fari faith and the rules of the 12 imāms".¹⁵ As a consequence, the first Safavid ruler did not hesitate to react energetically against some heterodox aspects of Sufism: in particular, the cult of Abū Muslim (d. 138/755), the celebrated hero of the 'Abbasid revolution who was an object of extraordinary veneration in the extremist mystical milieu of Anatolia and Persia.¹⁶ It thus appears, already at this early stage of the Safavid rule, one of the most typical features of the relationship between power and religion as it was conceived of by the members of this dynasty: the habit of identifying and selecting

Papers 4 (1996), pp. 27-51, also in C. Melville (ed.), *Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society*, University of Cambridge, London-New York 1996, pp. 27-51.

¹¹ On the relationships between the Safavids and the the mystical brotherhoods of eastern Anatolia and Azerbaijan cf. S. Bashir, *Messianic Hopes and Mystical Visions: the Nūrbakshīya between Medieval and Modern Islam*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia 2003, and L. Lewisohn, "An Introduction to History of Modern Persian Sufism, I, The Nīmatullāhī Order: Persecution, Revival and Schism", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61 (1998), pp. 437-64. Cf. also Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran*, pp. 30-9.

¹² Cf. J. Calmard, "Popular Literature under the Safavids", in Newman (ed.), *Society and Culture in the Early Modern Middle East* (quoted above, n. 5), pp. 315-40, p. 317. Cf. also V. Minorsky, "The Poetry of Shāh Ismā'īl", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 10 (1940-43), pp. 1006-53, p. 1047.

¹³ See in particular Abisaab, *Converting Persia* (quoted above, n. 3), pp. 8-10; Ead., "The 'Ulama of Jabal 'Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501-1736: Marginality, Migration and Social Change", *Iranian Studies* 27 (1994), pp. 103-22; R. Ja'fariyān, "The Immigrant Manuscripts: A Study of the Migration of Shi'i Works from Arab Regions to Iran in the Early Safavid Era", in Newman (ed.), *Society and Culture in the Early Modern Middle East*, pp. 315-70. On the contrasts existing in the Twelver community in this period cf. A.J. Newman, "The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Safavid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition to 'Alī al-Karakī and Safavid Shiism", *Die Welt des Islams* 33 (1933), pp. 66-112.

¹⁴ See for example Bashir, "Messianic Hopes and Mystical Visions" (quoted above, n. 11), pp. 38-41.

¹⁵ Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 4), p. 48. Cf. also Newman, *Safavid Iran. Rebirth of a Persian Empire* (quoted above, n. 5), p. 24, and the interesting hypothesis advanced by D. Morgan, "Rethinking Safavid Shi'ism", in L. Lewisohn - D. Morgan (eds), *The Heritage of Sufism, III, Late Classical Persianate Sufism (1501-1750). The Safavid & Mughal Period*, Oneworld, Oxford 1999, pp. 19-27.

¹⁶ See in particular I. Mélikoff, *Abū Muslim: le 'Porte-Hache' du Khorassan dans la tradition épique turco-iranienne*, Maisonneuve, Paris 1962. Cf. also K. Babayan, "The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamate Shi'ism", *Iranian Studies* 27 (1994), pp. 135-61, p. 144, and Ead., "Sufis, Dervishes and Mullas: the Controversy over Spiritual and Temporal Dominion in Seventeenth-Century Iran", *Pembroke Papers* 4 (1996), pp. 117-38, also in C. Melville (ed.), *Safavid Persia* (quoted above, n. 10), pp. 117-38.

leading personalities within the theological, mystical or philosophical circles, in order to co-opt them in the juridical apparatus; to this, it should be added the talent to replace them with personalities of even radically different leanings, depending on the political needs of the moment.

3. *Shāh Ṭahmāsp (r. 930-984/1524-1576) and the transition from 'popular' to 'doctrinal' Shi'ism*

The year 938/1532 is that of the great religious change of Shāh Ṭahmāsp, son and successor of Ismā'īl, which the same king defined as *tawba* (repentance) – a word of Qur'ānic origin very common both in Sufi and in Shi'ite tradition.¹⁷ The effects of this “repentance” are visible in two royal decrees: the first is dated 939/1533; the second, while bearing no precise date, came a bit later. These documents attest Shāh Ṭahmāsp's endorsement to some Twelver '*ulamā'*,¹⁸ among them, the prominent figure was 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Karakī, the greatest jurist of the Safavid court in the period from the end of the reign of Ismā'īl to 940/1533, when he died.¹⁹ Karakī was the author of works written originally in Arabic and soon translated into Persian which had an amazing circulation and which formed the doctrinal basis of a large-scale campaign in order to spread Shi'ism in the Persian land. This campaign, inaugurated by Shāh Ismā'īl I, was continued with much greater determination by Shāh Ṭahmāsp:²⁰ under Karakī's guidance the Shi'ite clergy, often marginalized in their areas of origin, reached remarkable power not only in the religious sphere but also in economic and administrative activities.²¹ In addition, Karakī became the promoter of a renewed attack against the Sufi brotherhoods and the popular cults, reaching the goal of establishing himself as the unique reference authority for legal and doctrinal issues.²² According to him, Shāh Ṭahmāsp was a Shi'ite political and spiritual leader, no longer a Sufi, as Shāh Ismā'īl was.

Nevertheless, not all the Twelver '*ulamā'* supported Karakī. Rather, many of them openly challenged his leadership. As a consequence, showing a complete lack of ethical and religious scruples, he did not hesitate to make agreements with the Qizilbāsh against his Shi'ite opponents.²³ According to Mitchell,

¹⁷ See F.M. Denny, “Tawba”, in *EF*, X, p. 384.

¹⁸ Translated by S.A. Arjomand, “Two Decrees of Shāh Ṭahmāsp concerning Statecraft and the Authority of Shaykh 'Alī al-Karakī”, in Id. (ed.), *Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism*, State University of New York Press, Albany 1988, pp. 250-66. Cf. also Newman, *Safavid Iran. Rebirth of a Persian Empire* (quoted above, n. 5), p. 37.

¹⁹ On this prominent Shi'ite scholar see Abisaab, *Converting Persia. Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire* (quoted above, n. 3), pp. 15-22; S.A. Arjomand, *The Shadow of God & the Hidden Imam. Religion, Political Order and Social Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London 1984, pp. 132-7 and 177-90; Id., “Religious Extremism (*Guluww*), Sufism, and Sunnism in Safavid Iran: 1501-1722”, *Journal of Asian History* 15 (1981), pp. 1-35; Newman, “The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Safavid Iran” (quoted above, n. 13); W. Madelung, “al-Karakī”, in *EF*, IV, p. 610.

²⁰ See Abisaab, *Converting Persia* (quoted above, n. 3), pp. 16-22. On the Persian translations of al-Karakī's works see *ibid.*, p. 28 with n. 142. On Shāh Ṭahmāsp's patronage of the most important Persian Shi'ite shrines see K. Rizvi, *The Safavid Dynastic Shrine. Architecture, Religion and Power in Early Modern Iran*, British Institute of Persian Studies, London-New York 2010 (BIPS Persian Studies Series, 5), in part. pp. 75-101.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

²² For the political aims of al-Karakī cf. S.A. Arjomand, *Conceptions of Authority and the Transition of Shi'ism from Sectarian to National Religion in Iran*, in F. Daftary - J.W. Meri (eds), *Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in Honour of Wilferd Madelung*, Tauris, London 2003, pp. 388-409, in part. pp. 393-4.

²³ Cf. R.M. Savory, “The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Isma'īl I (907-30/1501-24)”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23 (1960), pp. 91-105 (repr. in Id., *Studies on the History of Safavid Iran*, Variorum, London 1987 [Collected Studies, 256]); Id., “The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Ṭahmāsp (930-84/1524-76)”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 24 (1961), pp. 65-85 (repr. in Id., *Studies on the History of Safavid Iran*). Interestingly, also in the second of the two decrees of Shāh Ṭahmāsp's mentioned above there is no explicit prohibition of Sufi practices or philosophy; on the contrary, as noticed by Arjomand, “Two Decrees of Shāh Ṭahmāsp” (quoted above, n. 18), p. 256, the decree states that the officials of the court, when not attending their duties, can

in the epoch of Shāh Ṭahmāsp we can observe a kind of 'bifurcation' in the Safavid intelligentsia: on the one hand, there was the 'orthodox' Shi'ite clergy, in part of Arab origin; on the other, the Persian notables, generally devoted to philosophy, hermeneutics and devotional mysticism.²⁴ "Although these network were entangled and shifting constantly – Mitchell states – it would be reasonable to suggest that sixteenth-century Safavid epistemology was defined roughly by two broad intellectual camps: the juridically minded Shi'ite émigrés and their Iranian supporters and those Neoplatonic influenced Persian scholastics who focused on logic, mathematics, and theosophy".²⁵ In fact, some 'Neoplatonic' (*iṣrāqī*) scholars would soon become key players in the philosophical-political scene of the Safavid court. However, some doubts can be cast on the radical division drawn by Mitchell: the sources suggest a more nuanced assessment, because it was often the case that members of both trends did belong to the same family (in some cases, they were father and son), not to mention the fact that various matrimonial alliances were soon established between Arab emigrants and Persian *asyād*.²⁶

After Karakī's death, the role of the first jurisconsult of the empire was assumed by Qāḍī-i Ġahān Qazvīnī (d. 961/1554). The scion of a prominent family of Qazvin, he studied logic, philosophy and astronomy with the famous theologian and philosopher Ġalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (b. 830/1426) at the Madrasa-i Maṣūriyya of Shiraz, one of the most important cultural centres of Persia since pre-Safavid times.²⁷ Thanks also to his training, Qāḍī-i-Ġahān proved to be able to discuss with those milieus, which had been severely marginalized in the period marked by Karakī's hegemony; he established good relations with both philosophers and theosophists and with the Sufis of the influential brotherhood Nūrbaḥsiyya. Nevertheless, at his death, the Shi'ite theological-bureaucratic apparatus regained the control of the situation, resuming hostile actions against the Sufis: eventually the Nūrbaḥsiyya decided to abandon Persia.²⁸ Among the most zealous opponents of Sufism and philosophy there is Šayḥ Ḥasan,

"read the books of the masters of Sufism and sincerity, like the books of ethics which are spiritual medicine", a label which is evocative if not directly of Rhazes' *al-Ṭibb al-rūḥānī*, at least of the literary genre of the "Refinement of Character", famously combining Neoplatonism and Aristotelian ethics. On the various works of Persian authors of the XIth and XIIth centuries bearing the title *Spiritual Medicine* cf. R. Brague, *Muhammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī (Rhazès), La médecine spirituelle*. Traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et bibliographie, Flammarion, Paris 2003, p. 37 with n. 95.

²⁴ Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 4), pp. 70-71.

²⁵ *Ibid.* Cf. also Abisaab, *Converting Persia* (quoted above, n. 3), p. 14 with n. 36; D.J. Stewart, "The First Shaykh al-Islām of the Safavid Capital Qazvin", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 116 (1996), pp. 387-405; L. Lewisohn, "Sufism and the School of Iṣfahān: *Taṣawwuf* and *Irfān* in Late Safavid Iran ('Abd al-Razzāq Lāhijī and Fayḍ-i Kāshānī on the Relation of *Taṣawwuf*, *Ḥikmat* and *Irfān*)", in *The Heritage of Sufism*, III (quoted above, n. 15), pp. 63-134, in part. pp. 79-80; J. Cooper, "Some Observations on the Religious Intellectual Milieu of Safavid Persia", in F. Daftary (ed.), *Intellectual Traditions in Islam*, Tauris, London-New York 2000, pp. 146-59, and A. Newman, "The Role of the *Sādāt* in Safavid Iran: Confrontation or Accommodation?", *Oriente Moderno* 18 (1999), pp. 577-96.

²⁶ Cf. *infra*, p. 196.

²⁷ Cf. Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 4), pp. 88-95; Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 1), pp. 5-16. On the Madrasah-yi Maṣūriyya see V. Minorsky, "A *Soyūrgḥāl* of Qāsim b. Jahāngir Aq-Qoyūnlū (903/1498)", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 9 (1939), pp. 927-60, in part. p. 953, with n. 4. On al-Dawānī see also A.J. Newman, "Dawānī", in *Enc. Ir.*, VII, pp. 132-3; G. Endress, "Reading Avicenna in the *madrasa*: Intellectual Genealogies and Chains of Transmission of Philosophy and the Sciences in the Islamic East", in J. Montgomery (ed.), *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank*, Peeters, Leuven 2006 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 152), pp. 371-422, in part. p. 418; Endress highlights al-Dawānī's place in the history of science and philosophy in post-Mongol Persia as follows: "from al-Abharī, al-Shahrāzūrī and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī [al-Dawānī] took the fusion of Ibn Sīnā's rational and al-Suhrawardī's mystical philosophy into the Sunnī *madrasa*".

²⁸ Cf. Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran*, pp. 95-103, and Bashir, *Messianic Hopes and Mystical Visions* (quoted above, n. 11), pp. 198-243.

the author of a treatise against the mystics and ‘gnostics’ (*‘arifān*), the *‘Umdat al-maḳāl fī kufr abl al-dalāl* (*Best Arguments Regarding the Infidelity of the Misguided*).²⁹ Although strongly influential at court, he still had to face fierce opposition, coming fully to light only after Shāh Ṭahmāsp’s death. The last years of the latter’s reign were in fact characterized by a further rigorous change (the so-called “Second Repentance”: 963/1556), during which Ṣayḥ Ḥasan issued a new series of decrees on ethical and religious matters which were allegedly inspired by ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib himself in a dream.³⁰

It is quite evident that Shāh Ṭahmāsp’s choice of relying on the more rigorous Shi’ite clergy, modelling in this sense the *madrassa* system and using only bureaucrats from that milieu, is linked to the desire to maintain through the Twelver hierarchies a strong control on those provincial areas that had not yet fully integrated into the Safavid state. It should be stressed that this decision of Shah Ṭahmāsp – as well as similar, or even contrary decisions by other Safavid rulers – is based on exclusively political, ideological and religious criteria, and has no social or ‘ethnic’ justifications. An example which sheds light on this is the matrimonial alliance established by Karakī, the implacable opponent of Sufis and philosophers, with an important family of the region of Astarābād:³¹ this same family also gave birth to one of the most important *isrāqī* thinkers of Safavid Persia, Mīr Dāmād, who was the son of the son-in-law of the same Karakī.³² This circumstance highlights once again the ideological lack of scruples which characterizes not only the Safavid rulers, but also the members of the social and intellectual aristocracy of the *asyād*: the rulers were always ready to seek support in the speculations of the various juridical and philosophical schools and of the various Sufi orders, depending upon the political needs of the moment; the aristocrats were always ready to diversify their ideological profile, thanks to their copious philosophical and religious interests.

4. *Shāh Ismā‘īl II* (r. 984-985/1576-1577): restoration of the sunna or recomposition of the élites?

The death of Shāh Ṭahmāsp marks a profound crisis in the structure of the Safavid rule: in 984/1576 a putsch of the powerful tribe of the Afšār enthroned Mīrzā Ismā‘īl (r. 984/1576 - 985/1577), the rebel son of Ṭahmāsp, who had languished in prison for twenty years for plotting a conspiracy against his father.³³ Scholars often describe the policy of Ismā‘īl II as “crypto-Sunnism”, ascribing to him the desire to restore the *sunna* in Persia.³⁴ However, Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti remarks that “Ismā‘īl II’s Sunnism was in its turn an invocation to the Sharī‘a, with the intention of providing himself with a weapon which would enable him to undermine the power of the shī‘ī *‘ulamā* by establishing a new balance of power between the Iranian aristocracy and the Qizilbāsh tribes still active in the political field, since, owing to their mutual rivalry, both these elements were not unwilling to give him a sure degree of support”.³⁵ Ismā‘īl II decided to put a stop to the political

²⁹ Cf. Abisaab, *Converting Persia* (quoted above, n. 4), p. 26, with n. 127, and K. Babayan, *Mystics, Monarchs and Messiahs. Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern Iran*, Harvard University Press, Chicago-London 1984, p. 407, with n. 9.

³⁰ On Shāh Ṭahmāsp’s dream and on the meaning of his decrees cf. Babayan, *Mystics, Monarchs and Messiahs*, pp. 319-20.

³¹ On this marriage alliance see for example Newman, *Safavid Iran. Rebirth of a Persian Empire* (quoted above, n. 5), p. 24. On the importance of the *sayyids* and theologians from Astarābād and other Māzandarānī centres, cf. Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 4), p. 106-10, and Babayan, *Mystics, Monarchs and Messiahs*, pp. 377-378.

³² On Mīr Dāmād see *infra*, pp. 212-13.

³³ Cf. R.M. Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge-New York 1980, p. 68.

³⁴ Cf. for example Arjomand, *The Shadow of God & the Hidden Imam* (quoted above, n. 19), p. 120; Abisaab, *Converting Persia* (quoted above, n. 3), pp. 41-4; Newman, *Safavid Iran. Rebirth of a Persian Empire* (quoted above, n. 10), p. 46.

³⁵ B. Scarcia Amoretti, “Religion in the Timurid and Safavid Period”, in P. Jackson (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, VI, *The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 1986, pp. 610-55, in part. p. 643.

power of the Shi'ite élite that shaped the outline of the bureaucratic empire of Shāh Ṭahmāsp; this is reflected in the ideological-religious aspiration to return to the conditions that had brought Ismā'īl I to the throne through a resolute struggle against the Shi'ite rigorism that characterized the last phase of the reign of Ṭahmāsp. However, Mitchell's careful examination of the documentation produced by the chancellery of Ismā'īl II has shown unequivocally that this ruler, despite his will to undermine the structure of power represented by the Twelver hierarchy at the service of his predecessor, never challenged the Safavid's allegiance to Shi'ism.³⁶ "By attempting to halt the trajectory of jurist notables like Mīr Sayyid Ḥusayn al-Karakī – states Mitchell – and instead privilege networks of scribes, accountants, *adībs*, and scholar-bureaucrats, Ismā'īl II established a dynamic that characterized the Safavid court and chancellery politics for the next two decades".³⁷ After all, Ismā'īl II's attempt lays the foundation of the administrative 'revolution' of Shāh 'Abbās.³⁸

5. *Khudābandah* (r. 985-996/1577-1588) and his 'sublime group'

The reform of Ismā'īl II contains in itself the main elements, political and bureaucratic, that will appear clearly only later, but it was the short reign of his brother Muḥammad Khudābandah which represented a *grand tournant* of Safavid history, in particular for what concerns the ideological and doctrinal aspects of the élite of the government. Khudābandah studied at the school of one of the most prestigious and controversial scholars of the early Safavid era, Šayḥ Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Šamad.³⁹ One of the key texts for understanding the importance of this turning point is a short letter of Khudābandah to a famous scholar of Shiraz, Mīr Fath Allāh Širāzī, who emigrated to India in the early '80s of the sixteenth century.⁴⁰ From this epistle we learn not only that Khudābandah, when he was governor of Shiraz, attended the circle of Mīr Fath Allāh Širāzī, but also that the king considered its members as "the most exalted group (*zumrah-i 'ālī al-šā'n*)" and "the most perfect kind of humanity (*ḥulāṣah-i anwā'-i insān*)".⁴¹ As Mitchell explains, Khudābandah alludes here to the circle of scholars which loosely coalesced around the Madrasa-i Manšūriyya: consequently, Mitchell rightly concludes that "the later intellectual accomplishments and the resurgence of *isbrāqī* philosophy under the banner of Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Šadrā would appear to owe its roots, at least partly, to Khudābandah's gubernatorial sponsorship and support of this 'most exalted group'".⁴² But the appreciation of Khudābandah for "the most exalted group" is not confined to the intellectual and doctrinal sphere. In fact it has, as usual, political implications: those of a real challenge to the Qizilbāsh – still very powerful in spite of Ismā'īl II's attempts to limit their authority – and of further consolidation of the Twelver hierarchy through the support offered to prominent members of the Gnostic and Sufi

³⁶ Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 4), pp. 151-8.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

³⁸ Cf. K.M. Röhrborn, "Staatskanzlei und Absolutismus im safawidischen Persien", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 127 (1977), pp. 313-43, in part. pp. 314-15. On the reactions of the Shi'ite religious establishment to the religious policy of Ismā'īl II see in particular D.J. Stewart, "The Lost Biography of Baha' al-Dīn al-'Amīli and the Reign of Shah Isma'īl II in Safavid and Afsharid Iran", *Iranian Studies* 31 (1998), pp. 177-205.

³⁹ On this interesting personality see Stewart, "The First Shaykh al-Islām of the Safavid Capital Qazvin".

⁴⁰ 'A. al-Ḥusayn Navā'ī (ed.), Shāh 'Abbās, *Maǧmū' a-yi asnād va mukātibāt-i tāriḥi-yi hamrah bā yāddāst-hā-yi tafṣīl*, I, Intiṣārāt-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Irān, Teheran 1974 (Manābī-i tāriḥ va ġuǧrāfiyā-yi Irān, 61), pp. 113-6. Cf. Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 4), pp. 172-3. On Mīr Fath Allāh Širāzī see S. Husein Qasemi, "Fath Allāh Širāzī, Sayyed Mīr", in *Enc.Ir.*, IX, p. 421.

⁴¹ Navā'ī (ed.), Shāh 'Abbās, *Maǧmū' ah-yi*, pp. 113-14.

⁴² Cf. Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran*, p. 173.

milieus, co-opted in his chancellery.⁴³ It is precisely this milieu that elaborated the absolutist theology of the “perfect man” embodied by the Shāh, which would become a central element of the Safavid ideology starting from the reign of Shāh ‘Abbās.

6. *A flexible élite*

From this survey a conclusion imposes itself: the Shi‘ite élite proved to possess the great ability to remain at the centre of the political stage, meeting the ever-changing needs of the rulers who followed one another on the throne. Even though from a theological and doctrinal point of view this élite had internal conflicts, a prosopographical analysis shows that all its prominent members did belong to a limited number of family circles, which in many cases were linked by ties of kinship. In this regard, Devin J. Stewart argued that the crisis which exploded during the reign of Ismā‘il II “galvanized Shi‘ite scholars and brought together within this category several groups, that in earlier times, had had quite different concerns and agenda and had often opposed each other”.⁴⁴ For example, two very different figures like the Shi‘ite rigorist ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Karakī and the ‘Neoplatonic’ Mīr Dāmād were members of the same family, and the same is true for lesser known but equally important figures such as Šayḥ ‘Izz al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. ‘Abd al-Šamad (918/984-1512/1576)⁴⁵ and his son Bahā’ al-Dīn al-‘Amilī (953/1030-1547/1629).⁴⁶ This comes as no surprise in Islamic Persia: a study by Richard W. Bulliet on the city of Nishapur between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries pointed out similar ideological and juridical divisions at the heart of the aristocracy, divisions that caused a state of permanent opposition, giving rise also to impromptu outbursts of violence. As in the Safavid context, the two rival groups belonged to the same social class, very different from the popular strata which adhered to mystical-social movements such as the so-called *ḥurramiyya*. However, their ideological divisions were no less radical and concerned especially teaching, namely the possibility of forming society in their own image and likeness: this conflict ended only with the advent of the Seljuks, who just took away from the Persian aristocracy the monopoly of juridical-religious teaching and put it under the control of their new state.⁴⁷ As for the Safavid era, it is often stated that the main turning point in relations between the ruler and the religious and bureaucratic élite of the empire would have occurred in the era of Shāh ‘Abbās (996/1038-1588/1629), when the king promoted a revolutionary alliance between ‘throne and altar’, so to say “an alliance in which the orthodox Shi‘i clergy underwrote the Shah’s claim to a special Shi‘i legitimacy and declared obedience to him to be ordained by God, while the Shah in return did everything in his power to support and promote orthodox Shi‘ism and the Shi‘i clerical establishment”.⁴⁸ In the light of what we have seen so far, the ‘revolutionary’ conduct of Shāh ‘Abbās should certainly be reconsidered, since it seems to have its roots in the

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-6.

⁴⁴ Cf. Stewart, “The Lost Biography of Baha’ al-Din al-‘Amili” (quoted above, n. 38), p. 203.

⁴⁵ On Šayḥ ‘Izz al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. ‘Abd al-Šamad see above all Stewart, “The First Shaykh al-Islām of the Safavid Capital Qazvin” (quoted above, n. 25), *passim*.

⁴⁶ On Bahā’ al-Dīn al-‘Amilī cf. Stewart, “The Lost Biography of Baha’ al-Din al-‘Amili”, *passim*; Endress, “*Philosophische Ein-Band Bibliotheken aus Isfahan*” (quoted above, n. 7), p. 28; A.J. Newman, “Towards a Reconsideration of the Isfahan School of Philosophy: Shaykh Bahai and the Role of the Safawid Ulama”, *Studia Iranica* 15 (1986), pp. 165-99.

⁴⁷ R. Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur, a Study in Medieval Islamic Social History*, Harvard U. P., Cambridge Mass. 1972 (Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, 16), pp. 28-60.

⁴⁸ D. Blow, *Shah Abbas. The Ruthless King who became an Iranian Legend*, Tauris, London-New York 2009, p. 181; cf. H. Nahavandi - Y. Bomati, *Shah Abbas Empereur de Perse (1587-1629)*, Perrin, Paris 1998, pp. 175-9.

policy of his predecessors. For example, it should be pointed out that two of the most important members of Shāh 'Abbās's court, Bahā' al-Dīn al-'Amilī and Mīr Dāmād, exercised an important role in the chancellery of both Ismā'īl II and Khudābandah.⁴⁹ What distinguishes the relationship of Shāh 'Abbās with the religious and bureaucratic élite of his empire from that entertained by the previous rulers is his inclination, albeit not exclusive, for the *isrāqī* milieu,⁵⁰ and his hostile attitude towards the Qizilbāsh and the proliferation of popular Sufism, which was always dangerous to the established order.⁵¹ We will see, however, that the choice of 'Abbās to put in the hands of renowned *isrāqiyyūn* philosophers (who were, at least in part, already active at the court of Ismā'īl II and Khudābandah) some of the most important religious and bureaucratic offices of the Safavid state is mainly linked to a precise ideological project: to create the doctrinal framework for the new conception of kingship elaborated by Shāh 'Abbās, and at one and the same time to reject the accusations of the Shi'ite scholars towards the Safavid monarchy.⁵²

7. The 'Perfect King' and his philosophers: the 'ilm isrāqī and absolutism

As is known, the Persian-Islamic model of kingship adopted by the Safavid dynasty is connected from its beginning with the idea of a special *status* of the monarch, not only from the socio-political point of view, but also in the more committal sense of the ontological nature, so to say, of the man who embodies kingship. Even in the pre-Islamic age Persian culture took for granted that "subject and a sovereign were clean different things".⁵³ In the Islamic world, the elaboration of this point is rooted in the Platonic-shaped political thought of al-Fārābī⁵⁴ and, in Persia, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274). The latter is the author of the *Ahlāq-i Nāsiri*, a mirror for princes deeply influential on many Timurid and Safavid scholars, including the already mentioned Ġalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, Ġiyāṭ al-Dīn Maṣṣūr Daṣṭakī (d. 948/1541), who was the scion of a noble and cultivated family of Shiraz,⁵⁵ and especially

⁴⁹ Cf. Newman, *Safavid Iran. Rebirth of a Persian Empire* (quoted above, n. 5), pp. 43-4, with n. 23.

⁵⁰ As Mitchell rightly underlines, "Abbās was careful to avoid any undue accruing of power by a particular hierocrat or group of clerics" (*The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran*, quoted above n. 4, p. 192).

⁵¹ On the vehement attacks of the famous philosopher *isrāqī* Mullā Ṣadrā Ṣhīrāzī against the alleged "Sufis", whom he sees as unlearned charlatans and pretenders, see Babayan, "Sufis, Dervishes and Mullas" (quoted above, n. 16), pp. 127-30, and Ead., *Mystics, Monarchs and Messiahs* (quoted above, n. 29), pp. 417-22.

⁵² On the religious dissenters who openly criticized the Safavid monarchy see for example Babayan, *Mystics, Monarchs and Messiahs*, pp. 404-7.

⁵³ P. Crone, *God's Rule: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought*, Columbia U. P., New York 2004, p. 154. Cf. also A.K. Lambton, "Quis custodiet custodes? Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government. Part I", *Studia Islamica* 5 (1955), pp. 125-48; "Part II", *Studia Islamica* 6 (1956), pp. 125-46; L. Marlow, "Kings, Prophets and the Ulama in Medieval Islamic Advice Literature", *Studia Islamica* 81 (1995), pp. 101-20, and above all C.P. Mitchell, "Am I my Brother's Keeper? Negotiating Corporate Sovereignty and Divine Absolutism in Sixteenth-Century Turco-Iranian Politics", in Id. (ed.), *New Perspectives on Safavid Iran. Empire and Society*, Routledge, London-New York 2011 (Iranian Studies), pp. 33-58.

⁵⁴ The features of the true *imām* as given by al-Fārābī in his *Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Perfect City* leave no doubt on the fact that in his opinion the *vexata quaestio* of legitimacy must be answered via the Platonic model of the Philosopher-King; at one and the same time, the very fact that the ruler of the perfect city is called *imām* reveals his leanings, by no means hostile to the Ṣī'a (one may recall that in 942 he joined the retinue of the Būwayhid Sayf al-Dawla). Cf. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Mabādi' arā'ī abī al-madīna al-fāḍila*, A revised text with introduction, translation and commentary by R. Walzer, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1985, revised edition by G. Endress, Great Books of the Islamic World, Chicago 1998, pp. 246.5-248.14; H. Daiber, *The Ruler as Philosopher: A New Interpretation of al-Fārābī's View*, North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam - New York 1986.

⁵⁵ On Ġalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī see *supra*, p. 195, n. 27. On Ġiyāṭ al-Dīn Maṣṣūr Daṣṭakī and his family see Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 1), pp. 24-32, and *infra*, pp. 207-11.

Muẓaffar al-Ḥusaynī al-Ṭabīb al-Kašānī (d. 963/1556), who wrote for Shāh Ṭahmāsp the *Ahlāq-i šifāʿī*, a sort of reworking of Ṭūsī's *Ahlāq-i Nāsiri*.⁵⁶ The focus of this political theory is an idea of kingship based on holiness and messianism. As Ahmed Afzar Moin writes in his foundational study *The Millennial Sovereign*, “there developed in this period an ensemble of rituals and knowledge to make the body of the king sacred and to cast it in the mold of a prophesied savior, a figure who would set right the unbearable order of things and inaugurated a new era of peace and justice – the new millennium. Undergirded by messianic conceptions and rationalized by political astrology, this style of sovereignty attempted to bind courtiers and soldiers to the monarch as both spiritual guide and material lord”.⁵⁷

This ideological orientation enjoyed considerable popularity during the entire Safavid period, continuing through the end of the dynasty, as shown by its reappearance in the philosophical and political treatises of the Qağār age.⁵⁸ For what concerns the Safavids, two political treatises published by William C. Chittick are worth mentioning, which date from the time of Shāh ‘Abbās II (r. 1052/1077 - 1642/1667) and of Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusayn (r. 1105/1135 - 1694/1722).⁵⁹ Apart from some doctrinal differences, the two writings share in a vision of kingship basically inspired by that of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. The philosophical basis of such a vision can be traced back to one of the greatest philosophers of Medieval Persia, Šihāb al-Dīn Yaḥya al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), the founder of the “science of illumination” (*ḥikmat al-išrāq*).⁶⁰ It comes as no surprise that Suhrawardī's *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-išrāq* had a great revival during the Timurid and Safavid ages, especially in Central Asia, Persia, and India.⁶¹ Illuminationism sprung from Isfahan, where Avicenna had lived for a long time and where Suhrawardī got acquainted for the first time with the Avicennian tradition.⁶²

As already noticed by Corbin,⁶³ another important centre of Illuminationism especially in the early Safavid period was Shiraz, the city of the great *išrāqī* scholar Quṭb al-Dīn al-Širāzī (d. 710/1311), who wrote a commentary on Suhrawardī's *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-išrāq*.⁶⁴ These two ‘schools’ represent

⁵⁶ Cf. Lambton, “*Quis custodiet custodes? Part II*” (quoted above, n. 53), p. 126.

⁵⁷ A. Afzar Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign. Sacred Kingship & Sainthood in Islam*, Columbia U. P., New York 2012, p. 1. On the idea of “sublime absolutism” in the Muslim medieval and pre-modern world cf. also A. al-Azmeh, *Muslim Kingship. Power and Sacred in Muslim, Christian and Pagan Polities*, Tauris, London-New York 2001, pp. 154-200.

⁵⁸ Cf. for example M. Van den Boos, *Mystic Regimes. Sufism and the State in Iran, from the Late Qajar Era to the Islamic Republic*, Brill, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002 (S.E.P.S.M.E.A., 83), pp. 31-72; R. Gleave (ed.), *Religion and Society in Qajar Iran*. Proceedings of the conference held on 4-6 September 2000 in Bristol (...), Routledge Curzon, New York 2005 (Persian Studies Series, 4), and J. De Groot, *Religion, Culture and Politics in Iran from the Qajars to Khomeini*, Tauris, London - New York 2007, pp. 113-66.

⁵⁹ W. C. Chittick, “Two Seventeenth-Century Persian Tracts on Kingship and Rulers”, in Arjomand (ed.), *Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism* (quoted above, n. 18), pp. 267-304.

⁶⁰ For a useful and up-to-date assessment on Suhrawardī and Illuminationism see H. Ziai, “Illuminationism”, in *Enc. Ir.*, XII, pp. 670-2, and XIII, pp. 1-2. Cf. also C. Martini Bonadeo, “Seguaci e critici di Avicenna”, in C. D’Ancona (ed.), *Storia della filosofia nell’Islam medievale*, Einaudi, Torino 2005 (PBE, 286), II, pp. 627-68, in part. pp. 637-45.

⁶¹ Afzar Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign* (quoted above, n. 57), pp. 49-50.

⁶² Cf. H. Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, II, *Sohrawardī et les platoniciens de Perse*, Galimard, Paris 1971, pp. 13-29; Id., *Avicenne et le récit visionnaire*, I, Verdier, Téhéran-Lagrasse 1954 (Bibl. Iranienne, 4), pp. 315-20; cf. also G. Endress, “Athen - Alexandria - Bagdad - Samarkand. Übersetzung, Überlieferung und Integration der griechischen Philosophie im Islam”, in P. Bruns (ed.), *Von Athen nach Bagdad. Zur Rezeption griechischer Philosophie von der Spätantike bis zum Islam*, Borengässer, Bonn 2003, pp. 42-62, in part. pp. 59-62.

⁶³ Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, II, pp. 346-61. Cf. now Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 1), pp. 1-44.

⁶⁴ On Quṭb al-Dīn al-Širāzī see H. Corbin, *Le livre de la sagesse orientale (Ḥikmat al-išrāq) de Sohrawardī: commentaires de Quṭboddin Shīrāzī et Mollā Šadrā Šīrāzī*, Verdier, Lagrasse 1986 (Islam spirituel), and J. Walbridge, *The Science of Mystic Lights: Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī and the Illuminationist Tradition in Islamic Philosophy*, Cambridge Mass. 1992.

the two sides of the same *iṣrāqī* coin, as shown, among other things, by the continuous exchange between the scholars of the two cities.⁶⁵

Although often overlooked in the histories of philosophical thought, Illuminationism, due to its Platonist connotations, has significant political implications. According to Suhrawardī, rulers should bear a sort of hallmark of divine revelation, which seals the relationship existing between them and the invisible source of their authority. In this sense, rulers represent the connection between the world of sense-perception and that of the pure enlightening essence from which everything originates, including political authority. In the *iṣrāqī* view, this is not an abstract idea: rulers, divinely inspired, reside in a separate realm, the "eight clima (*al-iqlīm al-tāmin*)" from which they receive the authority necessary to rule,⁶⁶ as pointed out by Hossein Ziai in his account of the transcendent foundation of power in Illuminationism.⁶⁷ Suhrawardī himself did not refrain from dealing with kings and princes, in the attempt to put into practice his ideal of a Platonic-Islamic utopia.

As shown by Corbin, it is possible to identify a proper 'chain' of *iṣrāqī* philosophers, from Šams al-Dīn Šahrazūrī to Sa'd ibn Maṣṣūr ibn Kammūna, from Quṭb al-Dīn al-Širāzī to Mīr Ḥaydar Amulī, from Šā'in al-Dīn Turka Iṣfahānī to Ibn Abī Ġumhūr,⁶⁸ whose circles appear to be more and more connected to one another from the Timurid period onwards, in parallel with the rise of absolute monarchs such as Tamerlane and Akbar. On the other side, the Safavids themselves were openly inspired by the model of the mystical and illuminationist authority that appeared first under the Timurids, identifying the latter as their direct predecessors.⁶⁹ As a matter of fact, the Safavid era experienced a true *iṣrāqī* revival reaching its peak in the era of Shāh 'Abbās (r. 996-1038/1588-1629), and of Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Šadrā in the field of speculative thought. This revival remained as a philosophical and political element recurring well beyond the end of the reign of Shāh 'Abbās. As Endress has it,

The Šafavid philosopher-theologians of the school of the Mīr-i Dāmād and Šadr al-Dīn al-Širāzī (Mullā Šadrā) from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century not only read Avicenna and his commentators, but retraced the chain of transmitters and commentators of their spiritual and intellectual traditions, to its

⁶⁵ Cf. Endress, "Reading Avicenna in the *madrasa*", p. 420.

⁶⁶ H. Ziai, "Source and Nature of Authority: A Study of Suhrawardī's Illuminationist Political Doctrine", in Ch. Butterworth (ed.), *The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Muhsin S. Mahdi*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge (MA) 1992, pp. 304-44. On *al-iqlīm al-tāmin* see for example H. Corbin, *Corps spirituel et Terre céleste: de l'Iran mazdéen à l'Iran shī'ite*, Buchet-Chastel, Paris 1979², *passim*.

⁶⁷ Ziai, "Source and Nature of Authority", p. 307: "One can be a legitimate ruler only by the command of God; thus governance or actual political dominion is justified in the strict sense if and only if it is by and through linkage with the divine, i.e., by the command of God. One of the primary pillars of the illuminationist view of politics, then, is the way living rulers develop the capacity to become recipients of divine command. In addition, they must demonstrate that they have had authority divinely conferred on them, that is, that they control qualities their subjects commonly associate with divine inspiration". Cf. also Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, II (quoted above, n. 62), pp. 94-6.

⁶⁸ On these personalities see especially Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, II, pp. 346-61; S.J. Ashtiyani, *Anthologie des philosophes iraniens depuis le XVII^e siècle à nos jours*, I-II, Maisonneuve - Département d'Iranologie de l'Institut franco-iranien de recherche, Paris-Téhéran 1972-1975, *passim*; R. Pourjavady - S. Schmidtke, *A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad. 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and his Writings*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2006 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, Texts and Studies, 65), *passim*.

⁶⁹ On the association between Timurids and Safavids in the Safavid historical sources see S.H. Quinn, *Historical Writing during the Reign of Shah 'Abbas. Ideology, Imitation and Legitimacy in Safavid Chronicles*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City (UT) 2000, pp. 86-91 and 130-6. On the relationship between power and religion during the Timurid period see B. Forbes Manz, *Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2007 (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilisation), pp. 208-44.

origins in the various fields of theology, philosophy, mysticism, and – depending on their professional competence – of mathematics and astronomy. Beyond their immediate curricular traditions, however, they fell back on the texts of gnostic and Neoplatonic *ḥikma* from the first period of reception and translation of the original Greek sources (...) Here, the tradition recorded in our manuscripts and in a library of biographical testimonies of a living and variegated practice, can be traced as a continuous, coherent and widely disseminated teaching tradition from the generation of Ibn Sīnā's disciples until the eighteenth century.⁷⁰

As is well known, and has been established by a series of scholars with the decisive contribution of Endress himself,⁷¹ it was precisely in the “first period of reception and translation of the original Greek sources” that Plotinus' *Enneads* IV-VI became the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*.⁷² Thus, following the transmission of this text from Baghdad to Safavid Persia amounts to retracing one of the paths of the dissemination of Greek science and philosophy in the Muslim East, and indeed the most important one in the field of metaphysics.

8. *The pseudo-Theology of Aristotle as a foundational text of the ḥikmat al-iṣrāq*

In the elaboration of the *ḥikmat al-iṣrāq* a foundational role is played by Greek philosophy transmitted to the Islamic world via the translation movement of the 'Abbāsīd era.⁷³ In a well known passage of his *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-iṣrāq* Suhrawardī acknowledges the contribution of Greek philosophers to the “Science of Illumination”:

⁷⁰ Endress, “Reading Avicenna in the *madrasa*”, p. 421.

⁷¹ G. Endress, “The Circle of al-Kindī. Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy”, in G. Endress - R. Kruk (eds), *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences dedicated to H.J. Drossaart Lulofs on his ninetieth birthday*, CNWS School, Leiden 1997, pp. 43-76.

⁷² The translation of Plotinus' *Enneads* IV-VI dates from the first half of the IXth century: the *terminus ante quem* is the revision of the translation made by al-Kindī for his pupil Aḥmad, the son of the caliph al-Mu'taṣim (r. 218-227/833-42). This piece of information is given, together with the name of the translator, 'Abd al-Masiḥ ibn Na'ima al-Ḥimṣī and other important items, at the beginning of the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*: cf. 'A. Badawī, *Aflūṭīn 'inda l-'arab. Plotinus apud Arabes. Theologia Aristotelis et fragmenta quae supersunt*, Dār al-Nahḍat al-Miṣriyya, Cairo 1955, 1966² (Dirāsāt Islāmiyya, 20), p. 3.4-9, and *infra*, p. 210.

⁷³ Cf. J. Walbridge, *The Leaven of the Ancients: Suhrawardī and the Heritage of the Greeks*, State University of New York Press, Albany 2000, and Id., *The Wisdom of the Mystic East. Suhrawardī and Platonic Orientalism*, State University of New York Press, Albany 2001. Parting company with Corbin's account of the *ḥikmat al-iṣrāq* as the direct heir of the wisdom of ancient Persia, Walbridge casts Suhrawardī as a “reviver of pre-Aristotelian Greek philosophy” and as “the champion of Plato and Presocratic divine philosophy. The Persian Sages appear as confirmation of these ancient philosophical views, particularly the doctrine of the Platonic Forms. (...) Suhrawardī was primarily a self-conscious Platonist, a reviver not of Iranian but of Platonic wisdom” (*The Wisdom of the Mystic East*, pp. 13-15). Even though one can readily agree on the fact that this was the intention of Suhrawardī, the latter's claims should be taken with qualification. Discussing this point would exceed the limits of the present paper; I limit myself to remarking that the “pre-Aristotelian Greek philosophy” (in particular Empedocles' doctrine mentioned by Suhrawardī in the passage quoted above) has little to do with genuine Presocratic thought, coming as it does from doxographical sources reworked in al-Kindī's times, such as the “Doxography” of the pseudo-Ammonius (cf. U. Rudolph, *Die Doxographie des pseudo-Ammonius. Ein Beitrag zur neuplatonischen Überlieferung im Islam*, Steiner, Stuttgart 1989 [Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 49/1]). In particular on the Neoplatonized Empedocles see D. De Smet, *Empedocles Arabus. Une lecture néoplatonicienne tardive*, Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Brussel 1998. Walbridge is not unaware of Suhrawardī's acquaintance with the Neoplatonic works produced in the formative period of *falsafa*: cf. *The Wisdom of the Mystic East*, pp. 53 and 82.

That there are dominating lights, that the Creator of all is a light, that the archetypes are among the dominating lights – the pure souls have often beheld this to be so when they have detached themselves from their bodily temples. They then seek proof of it for others. All those possessing insight and detachment bear fitness to this. Most of the allusions of the prophets and the great philosophers point to this. Plato, Socrates before him, and those before Socrates - like Hermes, Agathodaemon, and Empedocles – all held this view. Most said plainly that they had beheld it in the world of light. Plato related that he himself had stripped off the darkness and beheld it.⁷⁴

Behind this remarkable though generic assessment, inspired by al-Šahrastānī's outline of the history of Greek philosophy,⁷⁵ one can detect a source which counts as the true starting point of the *ḥikmat al-išrāq*: the Arabic Plotinus, transmitted under the label of "Aristotle's" *Theology* (*Kitāb Utūlū ġiyā ay al-rubūbiyya*).⁷⁶ It is well known that the pseudo-*Theology* had been commented upon by Ibn Sīnā,⁷⁷ and his Notes may count as one of the main conduits that transmitted the text to Central Asia; but Suhrawardī was also directly acquainted with the pseudo-*Theology*, independently of Ibn Sīnā's intermediation. In his *Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt* (*Book of Intimations*), providing a first account of the 'ilm *išrāqī*, he explicitly mentions "Aristotle". The latter, he says, appeared to him in a dream and, entering into a dialogue with him, explained the principles of Illumination in the language of the *Theology*.⁷⁸ Obviously, the "Aristotle" of Suhrawardī's dream is nobody if not the "Aristote

⁷⁴ J. Walbridge - H. Ziai (eds), Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination. A New Critical Edition of the Text of Hikmat al-išrāq with English Translation, Notes, Commentary, and Introduction*, Brigham Young U. P., Provo (UT) 1999 (Islamic Translation Series), pp. 107-8.

⁷⁵ M.F. Allāh Badrān (ed.), Šahrastānī, *Kitāb al-milal wa-l-niḥal*, Maṭba'at al-Azhar, II, Miṣr, 1375/1955, p. 757-66; 823-35, and 864-77; cf. D. Gimaret - G. Monnot - J. Jolivet, Šahrastānī, *Livre des religions et des sectes*, II, Peeters et UNESCO, Leuven 1993 (Collection UNESCO d'œuvres représentatives, série arabe, 25), pp. 153-8; 193-200 and 213-20, cf. also C. Baffioni, *Sulle tracce di Sofia: tre divini nella Grecia classica*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1990.

⁷⁶ In addition to the studies mentioned above, n. 2, cf. C. D'Ancona, "Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, Chapter I: Structure and Composition", *Oriens* 36 (2001) pp. 78-112; Ead., "The Greek Sage, the Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* and the Arabic Plotinus", in R. Arnzen - J. Thielmann (eds), *Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea. Studies on the Sources, Contents and Influences of Islamic civilization and Arabic Philosophy and Science dedicated to Gerhard Endress on his sixty-fifth Birthday*, Peeters, Leuven 2004 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 139), pp. 159-76.

⁷⁷ It was P. Kraus, "Plotin chez les arabes. Remarques sur un nouveau fragment de la paraphrase arabe des *Ennéades*", *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte* 23 (1940-41), pp. 263-95 (repr. in Id., *Alchimie, Ketzerei, Apokryphen im frühen Islam. Gesammelte Aufsätze hrsg. u. eingeleitet von R. Brague, G. Olms, Hildesheim - Zürich - New York* 1994, pp. 313-45) who called attention on the Notes by Avicenna on the pseudo-*Theology*. Then, the Notes have been edited by 'A. Badawī, *Ariṣṭū 'inda l-'arab. Dirāsāt wa-nuṣūṣ ġayr manšūra*, Maktabat al-nahḍa al-miṣriyya, Miṣr 1947 (*Dirāsāt islāmiyya*, 5), pp. 35-74, and translated into French by G. Vajda, "Les notes d'Avicenne sur la *Théologie d'Aristote*", *Revue thomiste* 51 (1951), pp. 346-406; see also L. Gardet, "En l'honneur du millénaire d'Avicenne: l'importance d'un texte nouvellement traduit: les gloses d'Avicenne sur la pseudo-*Théologie d'Aristote*" *ibid.*, pp. 333-45, reprinted with the title "Avicenne commentateur de Plotin" in Id., *Études de philosophie et de mystique comparées*, Vrin, Paris 1972 (Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie), pp. 135-46.

⁷⁸ H. Corbin (ed.), Suhrawardī, *Opera metaphysica et mystica*, I, Maarif Matbaasi, Istanbul 1945 (Bibliotheca Islamica, 16), pp. 70-72 and 115. Cf. Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, II (quoted above, n. 62), pp. 61-3; Walbridge, *The Leaven of the Ancients* (quoted above, n. 73), pp. 133-7, cf. also G. Fowden, "Pseudo-Aristotelian Politics and Theology in Universal Islam", in S.M.R. Darbandi - A. Zournatzi, *Ancient Greece and Ancien Iran. Cross-Cultural Encounters*, 1st International Conference Athens, 11-13 November 2006, National Hellenic Research Foundation, Athens 2008, pp. 65-81 [repr. in P.F. Bang - D. Kołodziejczyk (eds), *A Comparative Approach to Imperial Culture and Representation in Eurasian History*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2012, pp. 130-48].

virtuel” outlined by Gerhard Endress in a famous essay,⁷⁹ the “Aristotle” who emerges from Ibn Sīnā’s reading and re-working of the Aristotelian tradition: a character, created by the Arab *falāsifa* who combined, both in the formative period of *falsafa* and in its mature developments, some genuine elements of Aristotle’s own thought and some fundamentally Neoplatonic traits.

Suhrawardī’s dream is modelled on the legendary dream of al-Ma’mūn,⁸⁰ the paradigmatic act of foundation of the translation movement. As shown by Corbin, explicit references to the pseudo-*Theology* are embedded also in the *Kitāb Hikmat al-īsrāq*,⁸¹ not to say that the passage of the *Kitāb al-Talwihāt* quoted above ends with an echo of one of the most famous items of the Arabic Plotinus, the narrative of the author’s ascension to the intelligible realm⁸² – with the difference that the ascension, in Suhrawardī’s allusion, was performed by Plato and not by Aristotle, as is the case in the pseudo-*Theology*:⁸³

Often I have been alone with my soul and have doffed my body and laid it aside and become as if I were naked substance without body, so as to be inside myself, outside all other things. Then I do see within myself such beauty and splendour as I do remain marvelling at and astonished, so that I know that I am one of the parts of the sublime, surpassing, lofty, divine world, and possess active life. When I am certain of that, I lift my intellect up from that world into the divine world and become as if I were placed in it and cleaving to it, so as to be above the entire intelligible world, and seem to be standing in that sublime and divine place. And there I see such light and splendour as tongues cannot describe nor ears comprehend (pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, Chapter I, trans. Lewis).⁸⁴

It is therefore not a coincidence that, during the Safavid era, when an extraordinary revival of the ‘ilm *īsrāqī* took place bringing with it a renewed interest for *falsafa*, the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* was widely read and repeatedly copied at court. According to Christian Jambet, the pseudo-*Theology* was conceived of as the model for the order established by divine sovereignty itself, thus providing the philosophical basis of the theory of the rule of the Perfect Man.⁸⁵ More importantly, the pseudo-

⁷⁹ G. Endress, “L’Aristote arabe. Réception, autorité et transformation du Premier Maître”, *Medioevo* 23 (1997), pp. 1-42.

⁸⁰ On this *topos* cf. D. Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ‘Abbāsīd Society (2nd-4th/8th-10th Centuries)*, Routledge, London - New York 1998, pp. 95-104, and J.W. Watt, “The Strategy of the Baghdad Philosophers. The Aristotelian Tradition as Common Motif in Christian and Islamic Thought”, in J.J. Ginkel - H.L. Murre Van den Berg - T.M. Van Lint (eds), *Redefining Christian Identity. Cultural Interaction in the Middle East since the Rise of Islam*, Peeters, Leuven 2005 (*Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta*, 134), pp. 151-65. Cf. also Walbridge, *The Leaven of the Ancients*, pp. 165-71.

⁸¹ Cf. for example Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, pp. 110-11; Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, II, pp. 97-8.

⁸² For a survey of the quotations of or inspirations for this passage by later authors from al-Fārābī to Ibn Ṭufayl and beyond, cf. P. Fenton, “The Arabic and Hebrew Versions of the *Theology of Aristotle*”, in J. Krayer - W.F. Ryan - C.-B. Schmitt (eds), *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages: the “Theology” and Other Texts*, The Warburg Institute, London 1986 pp. 241-64, n. 2 (p. 260) and C. D’Ancona et alii, Plotino. *La discesa dell’anima nei corpi (Enn. IV 8[6]). Plotiniana Arabica (pseudo-Teologia di Aristotele, capitoli 1 e 7; “Detti del Sapiante Greco”)*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2003 (*Subsidia mediaevalia patavina*, 4), pp. 282-8, with a detailed commentary on this passage and its Plotinian source.

⁸³ See below, Appendix II.

⁸⁴ Badawī, *Aflūṭīn ‘inda l-‘arab* (quoted above, n. 72), p. 22.2-9; English trans. by G. Lewis, in *Plotini Opera* II, *Enneades* IV-V, ediderunt P. Henry et H.-R. Schwyzer. *Plotiniana Arabica* ad codicum fidem anglice vertit G. Lewis, Desclée de Brouwer - L’Édition Universelle, Paris-Louvain 1959 (*Museum Lessianum. Series philosophica*, 34), p. 225.

⁸⁵ According to Ch. Jambet, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie islamique?* Gallimard, Paris 2011 (*Collection Folio Essais*), p. 288, “La souveraineté divine fonde (...) le gouvernement légitime de l’homme intelligible, la légitimité de l’autorité

Theology found quite naturally its place in the new landscape of the "universal competence in all of the disciplines of the intellectual and the religious learning" described by Endress as the hallmark of the theologian-scientists who, following the path laid by al-Ṭūṣī, combined science (mostly astronomy and mathematics) with Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī: in their works "not only theology is clad in the language of philosophy, but all of the rational sciences are put under the aegis of *ḥikma*. Indeed, the merging of the paradigms of rational knowledge left permanent traces in the final integration of the Greek traditions of rational science with the Islamic view of the First Cause".⁸⁶

But Plotinus had been translated into Arabic in 9th century Baghdad, and it was from Baghdad that the pseudo-*Theology* spread, directly or indirectly,⁸⁷ in the East of the Islamic world. As for the direct circulation of the text, The Notes by Ibn Sīnā show by themselves that it was available in Persia within 1030, namely the date of the sack of Isfahan. In fact, they were part and parcel of Ibn Sīnā's *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*, which went lost during this sack.⁸⁸ Ibn Sīnā was in all likelihood acquainted with the pseudo-*Theology* already in his youth, because this text is alluded to in the *Compendium on the Soul*,⁸⁹ and there is evidence that it was available in Persia even before Ibn Sīnā: echoes of it feature in the works of the Persian philosopher al-ʿĀmirī (d. 382/992).⁹⁰ Thus, it comes as no surprise that there

dévolue au plus haut degré de l'existence humaine, celui de l'Anthropos parfait. Il suffira aux théories eschatologiques de projeter cette gouvernance intellectuelle sur le cours de l'histoire, sur la personne du Guide, pour transformer la théologie mystique en théorie des grades et pouvoirs spirituels. Le parallèle avec l'œuvre du Pseudo-Denys est frappant. Au lieu de la hiérarchie dionysienne des grades ecclésiastiques, nous aurons la hiérarchie des 'dignitaires' ou celle des fonctionnaires de la Cité parfaite. Mais, *a contrario*, il suffira aux théories de l'ascension spirituelle de situer ce pôle intelligible au terme de l'évolution de la substance de l'homme singulier pour en faire la base d'une eschatologie personnelle, d'une gnose, guidant la conversion de l'homme sensible en l'homme de l'intelligence. [...] Nous pouvons donc dire que la *Théologie* a une fonction paradigmatique." This obviously should not be taken in the sense that the pseudo-*Theology* actually contains a theory of the "rule of the Perfect Man", which does not feature among the topics dealt with in it: Jambet's claim should be understood as an account of what the Ismāʿīli readers saw, or were looking for, in a text whose focus is metaphysics with a special emphasis on the destiny of the soul.

⁸⁶ Endress, "Reading Avicenna in the *madrasa*", pp. 418-9.

⁸⁷ One of the main conduits for the circulation in Persia of the doctrines held in the pseudo-*Theology* was predictably the collection of the *Epistles* of the Iḥwān al-Ṣafā' (for some examples of topics and terms of the pseudo-*Theology* embedded in them, cf. S. Diwald, *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie. Kitāb Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafā', III. Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt*, O. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1975, pp. 23, 55, 138-9, 179). Another source of knowledge of the doctrines of the pseudo-*Theology* is represented by the doxographical tradition which transmits the "Sayings of the Greek Sage", which are part and parcel of the Arabic translation of Plotinus produced within the "Circle of al-Kindī" (cf. E. Wakelnig, *A Philosophy Reader from the Circle of Miskawayh* edited and translated, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2014) and which are quoted also by al-Ṣahrastānī, who was in his turn a source of Suhrawardī (cf. above, n. 75).

⁸⁸ Cf. D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Brill, Leiden, 1988 (Islamic Philosophy and Theology. Texts and Studies, 4), p. 136: "The *Fair Judgment* was drafted approximately between 19 December 1028 and 7 June 1029, and this first draft was destroyed by Ma'sūd's soldiers who pillaged Avicenna's saddlebags in January 1030".

⁸⁹ The *Compendium on the Soul* is one of Avicenna's first works; here, he states that the part of the theoretical science dealing with divine matters establishes "the First Creator, the First Created, and the universal soul; the way in which creation occurs; the rank of the Intellect with respect to the Creator, of the soul to the Intellect, of sublunar matter and the forms to the soul, and of the spheres, stars and generated beings to matter and form" (trans. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 19): this enumeration lists the topics dealt with in the pseudo-*Theology*.

⁹⁰ Before Avicenna, this Persian philosopher was demonstrably acquainted with the pseudo-*Theology*: cf. E.K. Rowson, *A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and Its Fate: al-ʿĀmirī's Kitāb al-Amad' alā l-abad*, American Oriental Society, New Haven 1988 (American Oriental Series, 70), p. 84.12-18 (Arabic text), and 85 (English trans.); pp. 140.12-15 and 141. Cf. also C. D'Ancona, "The Topic of the 'Harmony Between Plato and Aristotle': Some Examples in Early Arabic Philosophy", in A. Speer - L. Wegener (eds), *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter*, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York

are so many manuscripts of the pseudo-*Theology* coming from Persia.⁹¹ However, one should notice from the outset that most of them date from a much later age than al-‘Āmirī’s or Ibn Sīnā’s.

That a group of the manuscripts of the pseudo-*Theology* are of Iranian origin had been noticed as early as in the 30s of the 20th century by Andrei Borisov⁹², to whom we owe also the discovery of the so-called “Longer Version” of this work.⁹³ In all likelihood, Borisov’s idea that the textual tradition of the pseudo-*Theology* splits into an “Iranian branch” and a “Judaic branch” cannot be held any longer at its face value,⁹⁴ but what remains true is that a consistent group of manuscripts share the common feature of having been produced in Persia. Nowadays, thanks to the missions conducted within the context of the ERC project “Greek into Arabic”, one can specify that they were produced mostly during the Safavid and Qağār ages.⁹⁵

The relationship existing among them will be discussed in the philological introduction to the critical edition of the pseudo-*Theology*; it is my duty now, in this preparatory essay, to pave the way for the history of the reception of this foundational text in Persia. Following the path laid by Endress in the two essays mentioned above,⁹⁶ I will provide in the next paragraph an outline of the

2006 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 33), pp. 379-405; al-‘Āmirī was conversant not only with the Arabic Plotinus, but also with the Arabic Proclus, as shown by E. Wakelnig, *Feder, Tafel, Mensch. Al-‘Āmirī’s Kitāb al-fuṣūl fi mā ‘alim al-ilāhīya und die arabische Proklos-Rezeption im 10. Jh.*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2006 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 47).

⁹¹ Cf. Endress, “Philosophische Ein-Band Bibliotheken aus Isfahan” (quoted above, n. 7), p. 20.

⁹² A. Treiger, “Andrei Iakolevič Borisov (1903-1942) and his Studies of Medieval Arabic Philosophy”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 17 (2007), pp. 159-95, p. 168: “On the basis of this survey Borisov comes to the conclusion that the textual tradition of the *ThA* can be divided into two secondary branches – Iranian and Judaic – to which all known manuscripts of the text belong. Manuscripts of the latter are more ancient, since the oldest known Iranian manuscript goes back to the 16th century at the earliest, whereas the oldest manuscript of the Judaic branch (...) seem to belong to the 13th century. Furthermore, all Iranian manuscripts contain the Short Version of the *ThA*, whereas all Judaic manuscripts (and the Latin translation) contain the Long Version of the text. Borisov explains the interest accorded to the *ThA* in the Iranian milieu as a consequence of the spread of the Ismā‘īliyya and related religious and philosophical teaching”.

⁹³ There are two versions of the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*: (i) the Arabic text as it has come down to us, which was edited in 1882 by F. Dieterici (F. Dieterici, *Die sogenannte Theologie des Aristoteles aus dem arabischen übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen versehen*, J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig 1883 (Reprographischer Nachdruck der Ausgabe Leipzig 1883, Druckerei Lokay, Reinheim, s.d.), and in 1955 by Badawī (see above, n. 72); (ii) the so-called “Longer Version”, a text which exists only fragmentarily in Judaeo-Arabic script, and which seems to have some features in common with the Latin translation, edited in 1519. It was Andrei Borisov who discovered the existence of these fragments, in a series of articles in Russian analyzed by Treiger, “Andrei Iakolevič Borisov (1903-1942)”, quoted above. The main studies on the “Longer Version” include S. Pines, “La Longue Recension de la *Théologie d’Aristote* dans ses rapports avec la doctrine ismaélienne”, *Revue des études islamiques* 22 (1954), pp. 7-20 (repr. in *The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines. Studies in the History of Arabic Philosophy*, The Magnes Press, Jerusalem 1996, pp. 390-403); S.M. Stern, “Ibn Ḥasday’s Neoplatonist. A Neoplatonic Treatise and its influence on Isaac Israeli and the Longer Version of the *Theology of Aristotle*”, *Oriens* 13-14 (1961), pp. 58-120; P. Fenton, “The Arabic and Hebrew Versions of the *Theology of Aristotle*” (quoted above, n. 82); D. De Smet, “Les bibliothèques ismaéliennes et la question du néoplatonisme ismaélien”, in C. D’Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network “Late Antiquity and Arabic Thought. Patterns in the Constitution of European Culture”, Strasbourg, March 12-14, 2004*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2007 (Philosophia Antiqua, 107), pp. 481-92.

⁹⁴ The critical edition of the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* which is currently being prepared by the team of “Greek into Arabic” includes, as an individual volume prepared by Prof. Paul Fenton, also the critical edition of the “Longer Version”, with an assessment of the relationship between the manuscript tradition of the latter and that of the standard version of the pseudo-*Theology*.

⁹⁵ I have particularly benefited from the seminar held by Rüdiger Arnzen, “Some dates for the – allegedly or truly – undated manuscripts of the *Theology*” during the 2nd Workshop of the project “Greek into Arabic”, Pisa, November 12-14, 2012.

⁹⁶ Cf. Endress, “Philosophische Ein-Band Bibliotheken aus Isfahan” (quoted above, n. 7); “Reading Avicenna in the *madrasa*” (quoted above, n. 27).

circulation of the pseudo-*Theology* during the pre-Safavid and Safavid age. After the conclusion of the missions that I am conducting within the context of "Greek into Arabic", a complete picture will become possible. Through an in-depth examination of the dates and places of the production of the manuscripts, of the prosopographical aspects related to copyists and patrons, of the circumstances in which the pre-Safavid, Safavid and Qağār copies of the pseudo-*Theology* were commissioned and produced, and taking into account also the other texts associated with it in the manuscripts, new and decisive data will be obtained not only on the dissemination of Graeco-Arabic philosophy in Iran, but also on the philosophical-political attitudes of the Persian élite up to the threshold of modern times.

9. *Pre-Safavid and Safavid manuscripts of the pseudo-Theology of Aristotle and their readers: Ġiyāṭ-al-Dīn Maṣṣūr Daštakī, and after*

During the long span of time which divides the age of Avicenna and Suhrawardī on the one hand, and that of the Safavid empire on the other, the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* seems *prima facie* to have sunk into oblivion in Persia. In fact, this phenomenon is only apparent: analysis of the "chains of transmission" concerning philosophers like Dawānī and Daštakī reveals that the illuminationist strand was lively also during the pre-Safavid period.⁹⁷ Therefore, the lack of information about readers and copies of the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* is due in all likelihood to the poor preservation of the manuscripts written before the foundation of the Safavid empire.⁹⁸

After Suhrawardī, the first Persian philosopher to have an explicit recourse to the pseudo-*Theology* is the already mentioned Ġiyāṭ al-Dīn Maṣṣūr Daštakī (d. 948/1541), who was one of the most esteemed scholars during the reign of Shāh Ismā'īl I, spending various periods of time in his military camps,⁹⁹ although preserving on doctrinal matters an independent stance which led him eventually to leave the court under the reign of Shāh Ṭahmāsp.¹⁰⁰ During one of my missions to Iran, I was lucky enough to find in the manuscript Tehran, Kitābhāna-i Markazī-i Dānišgāh-i Tihṛān 5392 (hereafter: T) the text of the pseudo-*Theology* preceded by a Prologue by one "Ġiyāṭ, known as al-Manṣūr", who is none other than our Daštakī. Here he announces a commentary on the pseudo-*Theology*. The same Prologue features also in the manuscript Princeton, University Library, *Garrett Yahuda* 1029 (hereafter: P).¹⁰¹ The importance of these two manuscripts is heightened by the fact that both trace back to Daštakī's own era: P is dated 1620, and T, albeit undated as for the main text, contains indications that point to an even earlier date.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ Cf. Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 1), pp. 5 ff. and 17 f.

⁹⁸ Cf. Endress, "Philosophische Ein-Band Bibliotheken aus Isfahan", p. 18.

⁹⁹ Cf. Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran*, p. 24-32, in part. p. 27.

¹⁰⁰ The dispute with the influential jurist 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Karakī (cf. above, p. 194) about what is the discipline which is entitled to establish the *qibla*, whether mathematics or jurisprudence, is brilliantly described by Pourjavady, *ibid.*, p. 28; cf. below, p. 209.

¹⁰¹ Cf. below, Appendix I, for details on these two manuscripts. I have been substantially helped in the codicological and historical analysis of these and of the other manuscripts described in Appendix I by Gerhard Endress, to whom I would like to express once again my sincere thanks. I am also indebted to Issam Marjani for his support and generous help in the examination of all the colophons and *marginalia* of the Iranian manuscripts of the pseudo-*Theology*: my sincere thanks go also to him.

¹⁰² Cf. below, Appendix I.

In both manuscripts (T: f. 1 r 1-19; P: f. 111 r 1-19) the Prologue says:

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
 أَللَّهُمَّ يَا مَتَمَّ الْأَنْوَارِ وَمُنْزَلَ السَّكِينَةِ عَلَى ذَوِي الْأَسْرَارِ نَوَّرْنَا بِأَنْوَارِكَ وَكَمَّلْنَا بِمَعْرِفَةِ أَسْرَارِكَ أَسَدُّ
 بَابِ الْبُعْدِ عَنْ بَابِكَ وَافْتَحْ دَرَبَ الْقُرْبِ إِلَى جَنَابِكَ. بَصَّرْ أَنْظَارَنَا إِلَى مَعَايِنَةِ نُورِ جَمَالِكَ دَلِّلْ
 مَشَاهِدَةَ آثَانِكَ، صَيِّرْ أَهْلَ النُّورِ وَالْإِشْرَاقِ مَنْصُورًا وَمَشْهُودَكَ فِي مَشَاهِدِ الْأَنْوَارِ مَسْرُورًا وَبَارِكْ فِيهِمْ
 وَقَدِّسْهُمْ سَيِّمًا سَيِّدِنَا سَيِّدِ الْوَرَى دَلِيلِ الْهُدَى غِيَاثِ أُمَّةٍ أَزَاحَ غِيَاظَ الظُّلَامِ بِتَبَاشِيرِ صَبِيحِ نُورِ
 الْكَلَامِ فَنَجِّنَا بِأَنْوَارِ الْهُدَايَةِ عَنِ ظُلُمَاتِ الضَّلَالَةِ وَالْغَوَايَةِ وَآلِهِ أَكَامِلِ ذَوِي الْمَعَارِفِ وَالْحُكْمِ وَأَكْرَمِ
 ذَوِي الْمَكَارِمِ وَالْكَرَمِ، وَبَعْدُ:

فَإِنَّ الْفَقِيرَ الْحَقِيرَ غِيَاثَ الْمَشْهُورِ بِمَنْصُورٍ يَقُولُ إِنَّ غَرَضَنَا فِي كِتَابِنَا هَذَا هُوَ مَطْلَعُ الْعُرْفَانِ وَفَاتِحَةُ
 الْبَيَانِ وَخَاتِمَةُ الْبِرْهَانِ الَّذِي هُوَ رَابِعُ مَنَاظِرِ رَابِعِ أَرْكَانِ رِيَاضِ الرِّضْوَانِ هُوَ الْإِتْيَانُ بِحَقِّ
 الْبَيَانِ لِكَشْفِ أَثُولُوجِيَا الَّذِي نَظَّمَهُ رَأْسُ أَعْظَمِ الْعُرْفِ الْفِيلَسُوفِ الْعَظِيمِ أَرْسَطَاطَالِيْسِ الْحَكِيمِ
 فَإِنَّهُ وَضَعَهُ بِلْسَانِ يُونَانَ الْقَدِيمِ فَنَقَلَهُ وَتَرَجَمَهُ مِنْ عَرَفِهِ وَتَعَرَّفَهُ. وَإِنِّي أَوْرَدْتُ أَوْلَا رِوَايَةَ عِبَارَتِهِ
 وَحِكَايَةَ كَلَامِهِ وَمَقَالَتِهِ ثُمَّ اسْتَعْنَيْتُ بِمَا أَرَدْتُ مِنْ أَمْرٍ أَوْ كَلَامٍ بِحَسَنِ الْمَرَامِ فِي كُلِّ مَقَامٍ سَيِّمًا
 فِيهَا، أَنَّهُتِ الْقَوْلَ وَصَارَ الْقُلُوبَ فِيهِ صَرَعَى. وَبِالْجُمْلَةِ مُؤَلِّفَ هَذَا الْكِتَابِ الْكَرِيمِ هُوَ الْفِيلَسُوفُ
 الْعَظِيمُ أَرْسَطَاطَالِيْسِ الْحَكِيمِ وَمَفْسَّرَهُ فَرْفُورِيُوسُ الصُّورِيَّ وَمَتْرَجَمَهُ عَبْدُ الْمَسِيحِ الْحَمْصِي
 وَمُصَلِّحَهُ يَعْقُوبُ الْكَنْدِي. وَمُرْتَبَهُ وَمَرَضِفَهُ وَمَحْرَرَهُ وَمَهْدِبَهُ وَمَحْقَقَهُ وَمَقْرَرَهُ الرَّاضِي رَحِمَهُ رَبُّهُ
 الْغَفُورُ الْغَنِيِّ أَبُو عَلِيٍّ بِنِ مُحَمَّدٍ مَنْصُورِ الْحَسِينِيِّ أَحْسَنَ اللَّهُ حَالَهُ وَأَنْجَحَ أَمَالَهُ وَكَشَفَ بِالْمَعَارِفِ
 الْإِلَهِيَّةِ بِهِ.

om. T. بالمعارف || om. T. منصور 16 || om. P. إن 7 || T ودل : P ددل || T أنوار : P نور 2

Thou my God, Perfection of the lights, You who effuse quietness on those who know the secrets: illuminate us with Your light, make us perfect by the knowledge of Your secrets, close the door on separation from You and open for us the way to the proximity to Your presence. Illuminate our sight towards the understanding of the light of Your beauty, and guide the contemplation of your people. Make the people of Light and Illumination be victorious and let them share in the contemplation of lights, make them happy and bless and sanctify them, in particular our Master, the Master of mankind who is the guide to the right path, the rescuer of the community who has removed the darkness of the gloom through the beginning of the dawn of the light of the Word; he who has effused on us the lights of the guide to the right path, away from the darkness of both reprobation and seduction. And his family is the most perfect among those who possess knowledge and wisdom and the noblest among those who possess nobility and magnanimity.

Then, the poor and humble Ġiyāt, known as al-Manšūr, says: "Our aim in this book of ours is the introduction to knowledge, the opening of the exposition, the seal of the demonstration, and the secret of the explanation, that is the fourth vision of the fourth of the pillars of the garden of rejoicing, which consists in the pursuit of the truth of knowledge in view of the unveiling of the Theology that has been put together by the leader of the great wise men, the great philosopher, Aristotle the wise. He composed it in the ancient language of Greece; then one who knew and understood it interpreted and

translated it. Then I first occupied myself with the interpretation and the literal quotation of his speech and of his treatise; then, I turned to what I needed, items or discourses which help to refine items in all steps, especially about it [i.e. the treatise]; I have accomplished the discourse, and in this hearts became tired". In sum, the author of this noble book was the great philosopher Aristotle the wise, and its commentator was Porphyry of Tyre; its translator was 'Abd al-Masīḥ al-Ḥimṣī, and its corrector was Ya'qūb al-Kindī. The one who prepared, adorned, corrected, verified and rectified it was the blessed Abū 'Alī ibn Muḥammad Maṣṣūr al-Ḥusaynī, may his Lord be merciful towards him, may the much-forgiving and generous God nobilitate his state and grant success to his deeds, may He reveal him the divine kinds of knowledge.

This Prologue is interesting on various counts. First and foremost, it provides the first attestation of the renewed interest in the pseudo-*Theology* at the very beginning of the Safavid era. The "noble book" is cast from the outset as part and parcel of the doctrine shared by the *ahl al-nūr wa-l-iṣrāq*. One may wonder what was the intended readership of a commentary on the pseudo-*Theology*. In all likelihood Daṣṭakī occupied himself with commenting upon the pseudo-*Theology* for an *iṣrāqī* circle at the court of Shāh Ṭahmāsp, who at the beginning of his reign was evidently on very good terms with the "people of Light and Illumination": in 936/1529 he appointed Daṣṭakī, the most important *iṣrāqī* philosopher of the time, *ṣadr* at the Safavid court, and in the same period Daṣṭakī supported, among other things, the practice of prostration to the Shāh, which he found analogous to the angels' prostration to Adam when God ordered them to do so: a clear sign of his emphasis on the preternatural qualities of the emperor.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, for Daṣṭakī and the *iṣrāqī* milieu the situation changed very quickly. In fact, shortly after his appointment as *ṣadr*, Daṣṭakī challenged the powerful jurist Karakī about a number of legal questions, among which the problem of the calculation of the *qibla*. A council was convened in the presence of Shah Ṭahmāsp to settle the disagreement, and Karakī triumphed: in 938/1531-1532 Daṣṭakī was dismissed and returned to Shiraz.

The Prologue contains two distinct items: an account of the circumstances of the composition of the commentary on the pseudo-*Theology* by Daṣṭakī, and a quotation of his own words, which ends when the scribe resumes his account and specifies that the work is indeed by "Aristotle", but the one who has spent so much effort in polishing it is Ġiyāt: the formulae adopted by the scribe show that when the Prologue was composed, he was already deceased. The whole text is rich in allusions not only to the *iṣrāqī* movement, but also to Sufism: the desire to become *muṣāhid al-anwār*, the heartfelt request to be kept in the vicinity (*qurb*) of God, the appellation of *faqīr* for Daṣṭakī, are as many hints to Sufi spirituality. An evident wordplay connects the first part of the Prologue to the quotation of Daṣṭakī's passage. The Master, the *sayyid al-warā* (the Prophet himself) is designated as *ġiyāt ummati*, and Daṣṭakī is presented as the poor, humble "Ġiyāt"; God is asked to grant victory (*naṣara*) to the *iṣrāqī* community, and Daṣṭakī has "al-Manṣūr" as one of his names.¹⁰⁴

The Prologue shows that both Daṣṭakī and its author are totally reliant on the pseudo-*Theology* itself as for the pieces of information given about the work and its history. That the pseudo-*Theology* is authored by Aristotle lies beyond doubt for them, and what the Prologue says about the "commentary" by Porphyry, the translation by Ibn Nā'ima al-Ḥimṣī, and the revision by al-Kindī, is taken from the *incipit* of the pseudo-*Theology*, upon which Daṣṭakī elaborates:

¹⁰³ Cf. Abisaab, *Converting Persia* (quoted above, n. 3), p. 18.

¹⁰⁴ "al-Manṣūriyya" was also the name of the *madrassa* founded by Ṣaḍr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Maṣṣūr Širāzī Ḥusaynī, the father of Daṣṭakī: cf. Minorsky, "A *Soyūrghāl* of Qāsim b. Jahāngir", quoted above n. 27.

pseudo- <i>Theology</i> , pp. 3.3-9, 4.3-5 Badawī	Prologue
<p>الميمر الأول من كتاب أرسطاطاليس الفيلسوف المسمى باليونانية أثولوجيا وهو قول علي الربويّة، تفسير فروريوس الصوري ونقله إلى العربية عبد المسيح بن عبد الله بن ناعمة الحمصي وأصلحه، لأحمد بن المعتصم بالله، أبو يوسف يعقوب ابن إسحاق الكندي رحمه الله.</p> <p>قال الحكيم: أول البغية آخر الدرك، وأول الدرك آخر البغية. فالذي انتهينا إليه من أول الفن الذي تضمّنه كتابنا هذا هو أقصى غرضنا وغاية مطلوبنا في عامّة ما تقدّم من موضوعاتنا.</p>	<p>إنّ غرضنا في كتابنا هذا هو مطلع العرفان وفتحة البيان وخاتمة البرهان سر التبيان الذي هو رابع مناظر رابع أركان رياض الرضوان هو الإتيان بحق البيان لكشف أثولوجيا الذي نظّمه رأس أعظم العرف الفيلسوف العظيم أرسطاطاليس الحكيم فإنه وضعه بلسان يونان القديم فنقله وترجمه من عرفه وتعرّفه. وإني أوردت أولا رواية عبارته وحكاية كلامه ومقالته ثم استعنت بما أردت من أمر أو كلام بحسن المرام في كل مقام سيّما فيها. أنهيت القول وصرار القلوب فيه صرعى. وبالجملة مؤلف هذا الكتاب الكريم هو الفيلسوف العظيم أرسطاطاليس الحكيم ومفسره فروريوس الصوري و مترجمه عبد المسيح الحمصي ومصلحه يعقوب الكندي. ومرتبّه ومرصفه ومحرّره ومهدبه ومحققه ومقرره الراضي رحّمه ربّه الغفور الغني أبو علي بن محمد منصور الحسيني أحسن الله حاله وأنجح آماله وكشف بالمعارف الالهية باله.</p>
<p>The First Chapter of the book of <i>Aristotle the Philosopher</i>, called in Greek <i>Theologia</i>, being the discourse on Divine Sovereignty: <i>the interpretation of Porphyry of Tyre, translated into Arabic by ‘Abd al-Masīḥ ibn Nā’ima al-Ḥimṣī and corrected for Aḥmad ibn al-Mu’tasim billāh by Abū Yūsuf Ya’qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī</i>, may God grant him peace (...).</p> <p>The Philosopher said: First desired last attained and first attained last desired. Where we finish, in the branch of knowledge contained in <i>this book of ours</i>, is the limit of our aim and the extreme of our desire in the whole of our previous works (trans. Lewis slightly modified, quoted above n. 72, p. 486).</p>	<p>Then, the poor and humble Giyāt, known as al-Manṣūr, says: “Our aim in <i>this book of ours</i> is the introduction to knowledge, the opening of the exposition, the seal of the demonstration, and the secret of the explanation, that is the fourth vision of the fourth of the pillars of the garden of rejoicing, which consists in the pursuit of the truth of knowledge in view of the unveiling of the <i>Theology that has been put together by the leader of the great wise men, the great philosopher, Aristotle the wise. He composed it in the ancient language of Greece; then one who knew and understood it interpreted and translated it.</i> Then I first occupied myself with the interpretation and the literal quotation of his speech and of his treatise; then, I turned to what I needed, items or discourses which help to refine items in all steps, especially about it [i.e. the treatise]. I have accomplished the discourse, and in this hearts became tired”. In sum, <i>the author of this noble book was the great philosopher Aristotle the wise, and its commentator was Porphyry of Tyre; its translator was ‘Abd al-Masīḥ al-Ḥimṣī, and its corrector was Ya’qūb al-Kindī.</i></p>

More importantly for the purposes in hand here, the Prologue reveals the clear intention of connecting the pseudo-*Theology* with the philosophical tradition Daštakī belongs to: that of the Avicennian-Illuminationist thought. This is shown by a detail which sheds light on the intentions of the promised commentary. We are told that its aim is to provide the “seal of the demonstration, *ḥātimat al-burhān*” and to open the way to the “unveiling of the *Theology, kašf Uṭūlūḡiyā*”: two

expressions which are clearly reminiscent of one of the early works by Daštakī, the *Mir'āt al-ḥaqāiq wa-muǧlī al-daqa'iq*, on which Pourjavady has called attention:

In the epilogue to this work, he explains that he once underwent an extraordinary inner experience in 895/1490-91, as a result of which solutions to some philosophical problems became clear to him. Thus explanations in this work are based not on demonstrative proof (*burhān*) but rather on the evidence of a spiritual unveiling (*kašf*).¹⁰⁵

This narrative is modelled upon a passage of Ibn Sīnā's autobiography, in which he recounts how the sudden intuition of the solution to a theoretical problem came to him in a dream, after he had completed all the steps of demonstrative reasoning.¹⁰⁶ Daštakī's narrative follows in Ibn Sīnā's footsteps, and it is telling that the commentary announced in the Prologue counts for him precisely as the *kašf* of the work labelled *Theology*, which was written in Greek, an ancient language, by the *rāis* of the philosophers and wise men of the past, Aristotle. Such an "unveiling" marks the turning point between demonstrative science, *burhān*, and intuitive knowledge leading to the spiritual peak of Illumination, *išrāq*. That the pseudo-*Theology* is framed against the background of Daštakī's Avicennian and Illuminationist readings is suggested by the twin allusion to Ibn Sīnā's autobiography and to Suhrawardī's heritage as it appears in the *Promenade of Souls and Garden of Rejoicings in the History of Philosophy* by al-Šahrazūrī (d. between 1288 and 1304), with its climactic account of Suhrawardī at the end of the chain of transmission of *ḥikma*.¹⁰⁷

It is worth noticing that the two manuscripts of Tehran and Princeton do not contain the promised commentary, but only the text of the pseudo-*Theology*. Further research will ascertain whether or not the commentary is extant as an independent work, and in this case the *Tahrīr Utūlūǧiyā* mentioned by the editor of Daštakī's works 'Abd Allāh Nūrānī, and listed also by Pourjavady,¹⁰⁸ is the best candidate. Be this as it may, the Prologue attests in and by itself that the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* features already at the beginning of the Safavid revival of the *ḥikma al-išrāq* as the pinnacle of man's knowledge: demonstrative science paves the way for the ascension to the direct, intuitive vision of truth itself, and it is "Aristotle" who performs this ascension, providing guidance to it by his *Theology*.

Another reference to the pseudo-*Theology* is contained in a work of Naǧm al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī (d. after 943/1536), a pupil of Daštakī who had close relationships with prominent personalities of the newly established Safavid regime.¹⁰⁹ In his *Šarḥ Hidāyat al-*

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran*, p. 27 with n. 156.

¹⁰⁶ The passage of Ibn Sīnā's *Autobiography* is translated into English and commented upon by Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* (quoted above, n. 88), pp. 27-8: "Every time I was at loss about a problem, concerning which I was unable to find the middle term in a syllogism, I would repair on its account to the mosque and worship, praying humbly to the All-Creator to disclose to me its obscurity and make its difficulty easy. At night I would return home, set the lamp before me, and occupy myself with reading and writing. Whenever I felt drowsy or weakening, I would turn aside to drink a cup of wine to regain my strength, and then I would go back to my reading. Whenever I fell asleep, I would see those very problems in my dream: and many problems became clear to me while asleep".

¹⁰⁷ Also in this case the allusion is quite concealed, and the terminology is not exactly the same: al-Šahrazūrī's "Garden of Rejoicings" is the *rawḍat al-afṛāḥ* and Daštakī's one is the *riyād al-riḍwān*, but the allusion was undoubtedly clear for the addressees. On al-Šahrazūrī cf. the excellent entry by E. Cottrell, "al-Shahrazūrī, Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd Shams al-Dīn", in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, Springer Science + Business media B.V. 2011, pp. 1190-4.

¹⁰⁸ Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran*, p. 31 n. 199.

¹⁰⁹ As Pourjavady rightly underlines (*ibid.*, p. 57), Nayrīzī had been under the patronage of rulers who have been appointed by the Shāh: he may even have been sponsored by the Shāh himself. This fact "indicates that he was on good terms

ḥikma, an unedited commentary on the *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* of the philosopher, mathematician and astronomer Aṭīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. ca. 663/1265), completed in Shiraz in 905/1595-6, al-Nayrīzī lists the various sources which he used for his commentary: among them, he mentions the *Theology*, which he attributes to Aristotle.¹¹⁰ Pourjavady has the great merit of calling attention to this passage of the *Šarḥ Hidāyat* which, along with Daštakī's commentary, is one of the first attestations of the renewed interest in the *Theology*.

Further references to the *Theology* in Safavid philosophical literature feature in the works of Mīr Dāmād (d. 1041/1631), who was an eminent member of the "School of Isfahan"¹¹¹ and an intimate of the Safavid court during the reign of both Shāh 'Abbās and Shāh Šafī.¹¹² As Corbin, Endress, Ian R. Netton and Sajjad H. Rizvi have noticed, in Mīr Dāmād's *Kitāb al-Ġadawāt, Kitāb al-Qabasāt* and *Risālat al-Ḥal'īya* the quotations of and allusions to the *Theology* are numerous.¹¹³ In particular, in his *Kitāb al-Ġadawāt* Mīr Dāmād mentions a Persian version of the *Theology*, which may have been prepared by Abū l-Ḥayr Muḥammad Taqī al-Dīn b. Muḥammad al-Fārisī, a pupil of Daštakī;¹¹⁴ in the *Risālat al-Ḥal'īya* his vocabulary is reminiscent of that of the pseudo-*Theology*.¹¹⁵

As for Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. Yaḥyā al-Qawāmī al-Širāzī, also known as "Šadr al-muta'allihīn" and popularly as "Mullā Šadrā", he famously was a reader of the *Theology*. Mullā Šadrā was born in one of the noblest families of Shiraz; he studied philosophy and theology with Mīr Dāmād in Isfahan, and taught in his native-city at the bequest of the family of Shiraz's Safavid governors.¹¹⁶ In

with the new government. He was directly linked to the court, perhaps through Shāh Mīr, the son of Malik Maḥmūd Ġān, who had studied with Nayrīzī for a while and was later on appointed by the Shah as vizier". Cf. also H. Corbin, *Philosophie iranienne et philosophie comparée*, Bucher-Chastel, Tehran-Paris 1977, pp. 96 f.

¹¹⁰ Al-Nayrīzī, *Šarḥ Hidāyat al-ḥikma*, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Carullah* 1327, f. 211, quoted by Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran*, p. 113 with n. 26.

¹¹¹ On the presence of the pseudo-*Theology* in the so-called "School of Isfahan" see Endress, "Philosophische Ein-Band Bibliotheken aus Isfahan" (quoted above, n. 7), pp. 20-21; for an outline of this "School" cf. S.H. Nasr, "The Place of the School of Isfahan in Islamic Philosophy and Sufism", in L. Lewisohn - D. Morgan (eds), *The Heritage of Sufism*. III, *Late Classical Persianate Sufism (1501-1750)*, Oneworld, Oxford 2007, pp. 3-15; S.H. Rizvi, "Isfahan School of Philosophy", in *Enc.Ir.*, XIV, pp. 119-25.

¹¹² Among other things, he prepared a number of theological texts for the imperial chancellery to be sent as official correspondence to the Ottoman court. On the life and works of Mīr Dāmād cf. 'A. Awḡabī, *Mīr Dāmād: Bunyān-guzār-i ḥikmat-i yamānī*, Anjuman-i Ātār va Mafāḥir-i Farhangī, Tehran 2002; A.J. Newman, "Mīr Dāmād", in *Enc.Ir.*, VI, pp. 623-36, and Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, IV (quoted above, n. 6), pp. 9-53. On Mīr Dāmād's relationships with both Shāh 'Abbās and Shāh Šafī cf. Mitchell, *The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran* (quoted above, n. 4), p. 193.

¹¹³ Cf. Endress, "Philosophische Ein-Band Bibliotheken aus Isfahan", pp. 28-9, 'A. Awḡabī (ed.), Mīr Dāmād, *Kitāb al-Ġadawāt*, Anjuman-i Ātār va Mafāḥir-i Farhangī, Tehran 1380 h.š./2001, pp. 15; 27, and 49; M. Mohaghegh - T. Isutzu - A. Mūsavī Bihbahānī - I. Dībāḡī (eds), Mīr Dāmād, *Kitāb al-Qabasāt*, McGill University Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran 1977 (Wisdom of Persia Series, 7), p. 3 (cf. also the edition by M. Muḥaqiq, Danišgah-i Tihṙān, Tihṙān 1367 h.š./1988, Index, p. 493); and Mīr Dāmād's *Risālat al-Ḥal'īya*, ed. H. Corbin in *Confessions extatiques de Mīr Dāmād, maître de théologie à Ispahan (ob. 1041/1631-1632)*, in *Mélanges Louis Massignon*, I, Institut Français de Damas, Damas 1956, pp. 331-78, in part. pp. 365-8. Cf. also Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, IV, pp. 45 f.; I.R. Netton, "Suhrawardī's Heir? The Ishrāqī Philosophy of Mīr Dāmād", in Lewisohn - Morgan (eds), *The Heritage of Sufism*. III, pp. 225-46, in part. p. 237, and S.H. Rizvi, *Mullā Šadrā Shīrāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy*, Oxford U. P., Oxford 2007 (Journal of Semitic Studies Supplement, 18), p. 151.

¹¹⁴ A Persian translation of the *Theology* is also quoted by the late seventeenth century philosopher 'Aliqulī b. Qaraḡghay Ḥān: cf. Rizvi, *Mullā Šadrā Shīrāzī*, p. 151 f.

¹¹⁵ Mīr Dāmād, *Risālat al-Ḥal'īya*, pp. 365-8 Corbin (see above, n. 113); cf. Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, IV, p. 46.

¹¹⁶ On Mullā Šadrā's biography see Rizvi, *Mullā Šadrā Shīrāzī* (quoted above, n. 113), pp. 5-30.

his autograph notes concerning his works, edited in 1998 by Muḥammad Barakat, there is a list of books that he possessed in his personal library, and this list includes a *Mağmū'a rasā'il* containing the *Uṭūlūḡiyā*,¹¹⁷ which Mullā Ṣadrā quotes and repeatedly comments upon in his philosophical works.¹¹⁸

The last milestone in the history of the Safavid reception of the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* is represented by the commentary by the philosopher, theologian, jurist and politician Qāḏī Sa'īd Qummī (d. 1103/1691), who was appointed as *qāḏī* in Qom by 'Abbās II.¹¹⁹ His unfinished *Tā'liqāt* (Glosses) on the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise mark the main exegetic effort concerning the *Theology* implemented during the Safavid era.

Appendix I

Tehran, Kitābhāna-i Markazī-i Dānišgāh-i Tihṙān 5392.

Muṣṭafā Dirāyatī, *Fibristwāra-i dastniwištḥā-i Īrān*, Kitābhāna, Mūza wa-Markaz-i Asnād-i Maḡlis-i Šurā-i Islāmī, Tihṙān 1389 h.š./2010, vol. 1, p. 184, n° 5117. – Muḥammad Taqī Dānišpažūh, *Fibrist-i nuṣḥabā-i ḥaṭṭī Kitābhāna-i Markazī-i Dānišgāh-i Tihṙān*, vol. 15, Čāpḥāna-i Dānišgāh-i Tihṙān, Tihṙān 1345 h.š./1966, p. 4234.

73 ff., paper, 7 × 13 cm, 19 lines on 12 × 17.5 cm. – *Nasta'liq*. A fine old copy, but suffering from worm-damage. – Not dated, ca. 10th/11th cent. h. Reader's note on first end paper, dated Ġumādā I 1067; *waqf* notice of the family of Mullā Muḥammad Ismā'īl Astarābādī dated 1249 h; further information, also on the seals, is given in the catalogue.

Uṭūlūḡiyā.

The manuscript contains an 'edition' of the ps.-Aristotelian *Theology*, with a prologue by Ġiyāṭ al-Dīn Maṣṣūr Daštakī (d. 948/1541) announcing a *Tabḏīb* of the text, but without the promised commentary. No marginal annotations.

Princeton, University Library, *Garrett Collection, Yahuda* 1029.

R. Mach, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda section) in the Garrett Collection, Princeton University Library*, Princeton University, Princeton (N.J.) 1977, p. 255, n° 2990. – Princeton University Digital Library, URL: <http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/g732d9035>.

196 ff., paper; 192 × 122 (110-130 × 55-70) mm. bound to 194 × 132 mm. – Dated (*Uṭūlūḡiyā*) on 14 Šafar 1030/1620 (colophon, f. 195r).

¹¹⁷ M. Barakat, *Yaddāšt ḥā-i Mullā Ṣadrā hamrā ba fibrist-i kitābhāna-i ṣaḡṣī-i Mullā Ṣadrā*, Intiṣārāt-i Bidār, Qum 1377 h.š./1998, pp. 65-73. Cf. Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā Shirāzī*, pp. 117-13 and p. 130; M. Rustom, *The Triumph of Mercy. Philosophy and Scripture in Mullā Ṣadrā*, State University of New York Press, Albany 2012, p. 184 with n. 86.

¹¹⁸ For a list of Mullā Ṣadrā's quotations from the *Theology* see H. Daiber, "Mullā Ṣadrā on the Problem of Creation and the Role of Greek Philosophers. New Light on Mullā Ṣadrā as Historian of Greek Philosophers", *Spektrum Iran* 13 (2000), pp. 1-22, in part. p. 17 with n. 39; cf. also, from a theoretical point of view, S.H. Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics. Modulation of Being*, Routledge, Oxon - New York 2009 (Culture and Civilization of the Middle East).

¹¹⁹ See Corbin, *En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques*, IV (quoted above, n. 6), pp. 123-201, and S. Rizvi, (Neo)Platonism Revived in the Light of the Imams: Qāḏī Sa'īd Qummī (d. AH 1107/ AD 1696) and his Reception of the *Theologia Aristotelis*, in P. Adamson (ed.), *Classical Arabic Philosophy: Sources And Reception*, N. Aragno Editore, Torino 2007 (Warburg Institute Colloquia, 11), pp. 176-207. For the edition of Qummī's *Glosses* see S.J. Aṣṭiyānī, *Plotinus, Enneads* ("Theology"). *The Arabic Translation of Ibn Nā'imah al-Ḥimṣī. With the Glosses of Qāḏī Sa'īd Qummī*, Tehran 1396 h.š./1976.

1.-4. ff. 1r-108v: A treatise on arithmetics, and (2.-4.) treatises of philosophical theology by ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Īḡī, al-Ġurġānī, and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.

5. ff. 111r-195v: *Kitāb Utūlūḡiyā*.

Preceded (f. 111r) by a preface by Ġiyāṭ al-Dīn Maṣṣūr Daštakī announcing his *Tahdīb* of the *Utūlūḡiyā*. This is followed by the standard text of the ps.-Aristotelian *Theology*, as ‘edited’ by Daštakī, but without the promised commentary.

Tehran, Maḡlis-i Šura-i Islāmī, 1174 Ṭ[abāṭabā’ī].

Dirāyatī, *Fihristwāra-i dastniwištā-i Īrān*, vol. 1, p. 184, n° 5126. – ‘Abd-al-Husayn Ḥā’irī, *Fihrist-i Kitābhāna-i Maḡlis-i Šūrā-i Islāmī*, 23 (Tihṙān Čāpḡāna-i Maḡlis, Tihṙān 1376 h.š./1997), p. 668.

99 ff. (paginated, pp. 1-197) – *Nasta’līq*. – Dated (p. 195) 1129 h by Ibn Muḡammad Raḡīm Isfandyār.

1. pp. 1-127. *Utūlūḡiyā*.

2. pp. 130-195. Šadr-al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī: *Iksīr al-‘arīfīn fī ma’rifat ṭariq al-ḡaqq al-yaqīn*.

Expl. p. 195.9ff.:

وكتب هذه السطور بيده الجانية الفانية في هذه الأيام والشهور من عام الف وإحدى وثلثين مؤلفها ومترجمها المسكين المستكين محمد المعروف بصدر الدين الشيرازي حامدا لله مستغفرا لذنبه ومصليا ومسلما على نبيه وآله غفر الله له ولوالديه ولسائر المؤمنين حيثما كانوا في البلاد نجاهم الله عن مولات يوم المعاد والله ولي الرشاد. سيبقي خطي برهنة من زمانه وكتبه تحت الجنادل مدفون يوم الاثنين ٢٩ شهر رمضان فاضت بركاته على اهل الايمان من شهور سنة ١١٢٩ من الهجرة المقدسة ابن محمد رحيم اسفنديار غفى عنهما.

The second text, an Arabic adaptation of a treatise written in Persian by Afḡal al-Dīn (Bābā Afḡal) al-Kāšānī (d. ca. 610/1213-14), ends with an apograph of the author’s and translator’s colophon, i.e. Šadr al-Dīn (Mullā Šadrā) Muḡammad al-Šīrāzī (d. 1050/1640): “Muḡammad, also known as Šadr ad-Dīn aš-Šīrāzī, wrote these lines by his guilty and ephemeral hand in the days and months of the year 1031, compiler and translator [of this treatise], humble and submissive, praising God and asking for His forgiveness through the intercession of His Prophet, praying and blessing His Prophet, may God forgive him, his parents and all the believers wherever they may be in the lands, and God save them from the pains of the Day of Return; God is the one who grants the right way. – Survive will my writing as a token of this temporal existence, while its writer will be buried beneath the stones. [Dated on] Monday, the 29th Ramaḡān, may its [*scil.* the holy month’s] blessings come down on the people of faith, in the year 1129 of the sacred Hiḡra, [by] Ibn Muḡammad Raḡīm Isfandyār, may God forgive both [father and son].”

On the text, see R. Mach, *Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts (new series) in the Princeton University Library*, Princeton 1987, p. 78 n° 338, ms. Princeton n° 2003 (a collection of *Rasā’il* by Mullā Šadrā), ff. 9v-37r, dated 7th Šā’bān, 1034 h, copied by M. Bāqir b. Zayn-al-‘Ābidīn Yazdī, where the same colophon is copied from the author’s autograph.

Princeton University Digital Library URL: <<http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/2514nk55z>>.

(The treatise was first printed in *Rasā’il Ahbūd Mullā Šadrā, Kārḡāna-i Aqā Mīrā’ Abbās*, Tihṙān 1302/1885, n° 7: pp. 278-340).

There is no direct evidence that the exemplar of the *Utūlūḡiyā* was also transcribed from Mullā Šadrā’s copy, even though the book was found in his personal library; see M. Barakat, *Yāddāštḡā-i Mullā Šadrā hamrā bā fihrist-i kitābhāna-i šaḡṣī-i Mullā Šadrā*, Intišārāt-i Bīdār, Qum 1377 h.š./1998, pp. 65-73; cf. Rizvi, *Mullā Šadrā Šīrāzī*, pp. 117-13, in part. p. 130, and Rustom, *The Triumph of Mercy* (quoted above, n. 117), p. 184, n. 86.

Appendix II

Suhrawardī, the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, "Plato", and "Aristotle"

As mentioned above (p. 203 and n. 77), the passage of the *Kitāb Hikmat al-iṣrāq* which alludes to the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* is puzzling: while in the latter the statement "Often I have been alone with my soul and have doffed my body (...)" is attributed to Aristotle,¹²⁰ Suhrawardī attributes the saying to Plato, and this not only in the passage quoted above, p. 203, but also in another passage,¹²¹ while in the *K. al-talwihāt* he occasionally remarks that the narrative of the mystical ascension has been attributed also to Aristotle.¹²² This mention of Plato attracted first the attention of Carlo Alfonso Nallino. In the 20s of the 20th century, in his book-length review article of the Italian translation published in 1917 by Ignazio Di Matteo of the mystical poem by Ibn al-Fāriḍ (d. 632/1235), apropos a verse which is clearly reminiscent of the topic of the ascension, Nallino remarked:

Par di sentire qui una eco fedele delle prime parole colle quali Plotino (*Enneadi* IV, VIII, 1) descrive le estasi da lui sperimentate (...), descrizione ben nota agli Arabi, che sogliono attribuirle ad Aristotele, trovandosi essa inserita nella *Teologia* del pseudo-Aristotele. (...) La visione è riferita per intero nella *Teologia* (...) e nel trattatello d'al-Fārābī sull'accordo fra Platone e Aristotele (...). Ad essa accenna pure as-Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl (m. 587 eg.), *Hikmat al-iṣrāq*, 378, ma attribuendola a Platone; il commentatore ash-Shirāzī la riferisce per intero (pp. 378-379), togliendola dal *K. al-talwihāt* dello stesso as-Suhrawardī, dove ancora figura Platone in luogo dello pseudo-Aristotele (Plotino).¹²³

¹²⁰ Cf. above p. 204 with n. 84. The narrative in the first person is preceded by the words "*kalām labū*, Discourse of the author", p. 22.1 Badawī. There is no scholarly consensus about the author who is alluded to: according to F.W. Zimmermann, "The Origins of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*", in J. Kraye, W. F. Ryan, C.-B. Schmitt (eds), *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages: the "Theology" and Other Texts*, The Warburg Institute, London 1986, pp. 110-240, in part. pp. 143-9 and 217-21, it is Plato, while C. D'Ancona *et al.*, Plotino. *La discesa dell'anima nei corpi* (quoted above, n. 82), pp. 280-2 point to Aristotle. Given that in the standard version of the pseudo-*Theology* the book is attributed to Aristotle, and that there is no mention of Plato at this point, I think that the speech in the first person is referred to Aristotle: the mention of Plato occurs only in indirect testimonies (Suhrawardī and the Latin version) which cannot prevail over the direct testimony of the pseudo-*Theology* itself.

¹²¹ "The faith of Plato and the master visionaries is not built upon such rhetorical arguments, but upon something else. Plato said: 'When freed from my body I beheld luminous spheres'. These that he mentioned are the very same highest heavens that some men will behold at their resurrection "On the day when the earth will be changed to other than this earth and the heavens, and will appear before God, The One, the 'Triumphant'. Plato and his companions showed plainly that they believed the Maker of the universe and the world of intellect to be light when they said that the pure light is the world of intellect. Of himself, Plato said that in certain of his spiritual conditions he would shed his body and become free from matter. Then he would see light and splendour within his essence. He would ascend to that all-encompassing divine cause, and would seem to be located and suspended in it, beholding a mighty light in that lofty and divine place. The passage of which this is a summary ended with the words 'but thought veiled that light from me' ". Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*. A New Critical Edition of the Text of *Hikmat al-iṣrāq* with English Translation, Notes, Commentary, and Introduction by J. Walbridge - H. Ziai, Brigham Young University Press, Provo (UT) 1999 (Islamic Translation Series), pp. 110-11.

¹²² *Kitāb al-talwihāt*, ed. H. Corbin, in Shihaboddin Yahya Sohravardi, *Œuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, Académie impériale iranienne de philosophie - A. Maisonneuve, Tehran - Paris 1976 (Bibliothèque Iranienne, n.s., 1), pp. 1-192, in part. pp. 112.10-113.6.

¹²³ C.A. Nallino, "Il poema mistico arabo d'Ibn al-Fāriḍ in una recente traduzione italiana", *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 8 (1919-1921), pp. 1-106, repr. in Id., *Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti*, vol. II. *L'islām. Dogmatica - Šūfismo - confraternite*, a cura di M. Nallino, Istituto per l'Oriente, Roma 1940 (Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto per l'Oriente), pp. 191-288, in part. p. 279 with n. 1.

Ten years later, in his review of Massignon's *Recueil de textes inédits concernant l'histoire de la mystique en pays d'Islam* (1929) Nallino noticed that in the Latin version of the pseudo-*Theology* the same attribution to Plato occurs. Here is the Latin passage:

Atque hoc idem opinatus est Plato de anima universali dicens: Ego pluries speculando secundum animam relictis corporis exuviis visus sum mihi frui summo bono cum gaudio admirabili, unde restiti quodammodo attonitus; tum, agnoscens me esse partem mundi superioris adeptusque vitam aeternam, sub luce magna inenarrabili inaudibilisque ac incogitabili, lassitudine autem delapsus ab ista speculatione intellectus ad imaginationem lux illa deferuit, unde remansi tristis. Rursum relicto corpore reversus inveni animam luce plenam, et tum corpori influentem, tum supra elevatam. Inquit igitur Plato: qui conatus mundum supremum ascendere intellexerit substantias divinas causasque universales, profecto maximum consequetur praemium.¹²⁴

The hypothesis advanced by Nallino was that two versions circulated in the Arab world, one with Aristotle as the speaker, and another with Plato:

A p. 176 [of Massignon's book] è riportato il famoso racconto dell'estasi di Plotino (*Enneadi* IV 8, 1) secondo la cosiddetta *Teologia d'Aristotele* in arabo: estasi che, narrata in prima persona nella *Teologia*, è quindi considerata dagli Arabi come estasi d'Aristotele. Mi sia permesso qui di osservare che dieci anni or sono (...) avevo rilevato che il racconto si trova anche in due opere del famoso mistico eterodosso as-Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl, ma attribuito a Platone anziché ad Aristotele; aggiungo ora che questa stessa attribuzione a Platone ricorre anche nel rimaneggiamento latino, attraverso versione ebraica, della predetta *Teologia di Aristotele*, fatta fare intorno al 1515 dal ravennate Francesco Roseus o De Roseis e stampato per la prima volta a Roma nel 1519 (...). Ciò fa supporre che effettivamente corressero fra gli Arabi due diverse redazioni della *Teologia*, almeno per quel che riguarda questo capitolo, e che il "Platone" d'una delle due sia una confusione, facilmente spiegabile presso gli Arabi, in luogo di "Plotino".¹²⁵

This explanation did not meet the approval of Geoffrey Lewis, the translator of the Arabic Plotinus into English: since the "discourse of the author" is said to be an allegory (*ramz*), Lewis suggested that the translator into Latin was spontaneously led to refer the speech to Plato, who famously expresses himself allegorically.¹²⁶ When he discovered the so-called "Longer Version" of the pseudo-*Theology*, Andrei Borisov¹²⁷ also noted that it expands the text with respect to the standard version; the comparison with the Latin version convinced him not only that the Latin version had been made on the basis of the "Longer Version", but also that the latter was the original version of the pseudo-*Theology*, while the standard version was, in his eyes, an abridgement.

¹²⁴ *Sapientissimi Philosophi Aristotelis Stagiritae Theologia sive mystica philosophia secundum Aegyptios noviter reperta et in latinum castigatissime redacta*, Romae 1519, Liber Primus, caput quartum, fol. 3 r. The text is identical also in the edition published by Francesco Patrizi da Cherso at the end of his *Nova de universis philosophia* under the title *Mystica Aegyptiorum et Chaldaeorum a Platone, voce tradita, ab Aristotele excepta et conscripta philosophia*, Ferrariae, apud Benedictum Mamarellum, 1591, Liber primus, Caput quartum, p. 5 r.

¹²⁵ C.A. Nallino, review of L. Massignon, *Recueil de textes inédits concernant l'histoire de la mystique en pays d'Islam* (1929), *Oriente Moderno* 10 (1930), pp. 47-50, repr. in Id., *Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti*, pp. 466-72, in part. pp. 470-1.

¹²⁶ G. Lewis, *A Reexamination of the so-called Theology of Aristotle*, PhD Thesis, St. John Baptist College, Oxford 1949, p. 256.

¹²⁷ Cf. above p. 206 and n. 92.

If so, one may think that in the original version the speaker was Plato: this is the hypothesis advanced by Zimmermann.¹²⁸ According to D'Ancona, the mention of Plato by Suhrawardī and in the Latin translation is best accounted for by the presence in the standard version of the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, at the end of the first chapter (where the narrative of the ascension is located), of a long passage where the author, "Aristotle", praises "the noble divine Plato, *Aflātūn al-šarīf al-ilāhī*" for his doctrines.¹²⁹ Finally, Garth Fowden thinks that Suhrawardī substituted Plato for Aristotle on his own devising:

Al-Suhrawardī's so-called 'illuminationist' philosophy was in part inspired by the Arabic version of Plotinus' *Ennead* 4.8.1 on the experience of shedding the body and beholding "the sublime light high in that divine place" – though, realizing al-Kindī's "Aristotle" could not possibly have said this, al-Suhrawardī reattributed the idea to Plato.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Zimmermann, "The Origins of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*", thinks that it was Ibn Nā'ima al-Ḥimšī, the translator of Plotinus into Arabic, who substituted Plato for Plotinus (p. 145). Fenton, "The Arabic and Hebrew versions of the *Theology of Aristotle*" (quoted above, n. 82), p. 260, sides tentatively with the opinion that Plato stands for Plotinus in Suhrawardī's source.

¹²⁹ D'Ancona, "The Greek Sage" (quoted above, n. 76).

¹³⁰ Cf. Fowden, "Pseudo-Aristotelian Politics and Theology in Universal Islam" (quoted above n. 78), p. 71 (= p. 143).

خط عثمان
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

اللهم يا مقيم الأنوار ومُنزل السكينة عياد ذي الأسرار نوراً يا مفضل المشرك
 لمع فواسرارك أسد دباب البعد عن بابك واقف در القرب والتمس
 الي جناتك بقرا طارنا الى المعانية في نور جمالك وول ما هده
 صير اهل النور ولا شراوق مشهورا ومشهورك في هدا نور مشهورا
 وبارك فيهم وقد ستم ستمنا سيد الوصي دليل الهدى على
 امته از اح غيايب الظلام تبا شير صبح نور الكلام فجاءنا بانوار الهداية
 ظلمات الضلالة والغواية وآله اكامل ذوي المعارف والحكم واکرام
 ذوي المحارم والكرم وبعده فان العول كوعنا المشهور المشهور
 غرضنا في كتابنا هذا هو مطلع العرفان وفتح البيار وخاتمة البرهان
 سر البيان الذي هو اربع مناظر اربع ارکان رياض الرضوان
 بحق البيان لكشف الوجود الجيا الذي نظره واس اعلم العرفاء العالمة
 العظيم ارسطاطلس اكيمن فانه وضعه لسان يونان القدم ففقه ورحمه
 من عمره وعره واني اوردت اولار واية عبارته وحكاية كلامه ومقالته
 ثم اشعلت ما اردت من اراد كلام محمو المرام وكل معاني تبا فيها الميتة القو
 وصار القلوب فيه صرعى وبالجملة هو لوف هذا الكتاب الكرم هو الفيلسوف
 العظيم ارسطاطلس اكيمن ومنه في فوروس الصورى وقدر محمد المبع
 المحصى ومصلحة يعقوب الكندي ومعرفة ومرصفة ومحمود
 ومحققه ومقرره الرافى رحمه ربه العفور الفنى ابو علي محمد
 الحسين احسن الله حاله واغنا الله اولاد
 كاتبه
 ٧

Tab. 1. Tehran, Kitābhāna-i Markazī-i Dānišgāh-i Tihṙān 5392, f. 1r. © Tehran, Kitābhāna-i Markazī-i Dānišgāh-i Tihṙān.

The International Centre “Incontro di culture” (GrAL)

Università di Pisa
Università degli Studi di Padova
École Pratique des Hautes Études - Paris

The Lectures of the Centre “Incontro di culture”

La trasmissione dei testi filosofici e scientifici dalla tarda antichità al medioevo islamico e cristiano (dal greco al siriano, all'arabo e al latino)

“Incontro di culture” (GrAL) is an International Centre dedicated to the advanced study of the transmission of philosophical texts. Founded in 2006 as a joint programme of the two Universities of Pisa and Padua, it is located in Pisa, Italy. A distinguished Medievalist, Prof. Gianfranco Fioravanti was its Director from 2006 to 2012. The Centre is currently chaired by Prof. Mauro Tulli, former President of the International Plato Society. The École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris, is supportive of the activities of the Centre, thanks to the participation of its scholars as teachers and chairpersons of the annual workshops organised by the Centre.

“Incontro di culture” attracts senior and younger scholars from the Università degli Studi di Padova, the École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris, the Université Saint-Joseph (Beyrouth), and the Université Cadi Ayyad (Marrakesh). A vibrant community of research has been created in these years, which is not limited to France, Italy, Lebanon and Morocco, but also includes PhD students from various European countries.

“Incontro di culture” pays special attention to top research training in the field of the Graeco-Arabic, Graeco-Syriac, Graeco-Latin and Arabic-Latin translations. An annual meeting is organised, especially for PhD students from Italy and abroad. Sessions take place either in Pisa or in Padua. The meetings provide a research-oriented instruction on the translations into Arabic and Latin, and their focus is each year on a different work, or corpus, of classical or late antique Greek philosophy (website: www.gral.unipi.it). The topics dealt with to date (2006-2013) include:

- 1st meeting (February 2006): *Costituzione e diffusione del corpus aristotelico dalla tarda antichità al mondo di lingua araba*
- 2nd meeting (February 2007): *Formazione e diffusione del corpus platonico dall'antichità al mondo di lingua araba*
- 3rd meeting (February 2008): *Il De Anima di Aristotele: esegesi greche, arabe e latine*
- 4th meeting (May 2009): *Dal greco all'arabo e al latino: i Parva Naturalia di Aristotele*
- 5th meeting (April 2010): *Il Timeo. Esegese greche, arabe, latine*
- 6th meeting (May 2011): *Metodi, obiettivi e contesti della formazione intellettuale tra tarda antichità e primo Medioevo a Roma, Seleucia-Ctesifonte e Bagdad*
- 7th meeting (May 2012): *L'Etica Nicomachea: ricezione tardo-antica, araba, bizantina e medievale*
- 8th meeting (May 2013): *La Retorica di Aristotele e la dottrina delle passioni*

At the end of each meeting, the participants are awarded a diploma that is acknowledged from the PhD programme of most of the original Universities.

It is our privilege to present to the readership of *Studia graeco-arabica* a selection of the lectures given within the context of the meetings.

Studia graeco-arabica gratefully acknowledges the valuable help provided by the Libraries mentioned at pp. 218 and 239-63. Their Directors granted us the permission, and their staff substantially helped us to publish the tables of the above-mentioned pages.

Fonti manoscritte primarie del testo platonico dall'antichità al Rinascimento

(Tetralogie I-II)

Antonio Carlini

Abstract

Lecture held on (February 13th, 2007), Pisa, Santa Croce in Fossabanda, 2nd meeting of the programme "GrAL", *Formazione e diffusione del corpus platonico dall'antichità al mondo di lingua araba*.

Nell'incontro dello scorso anno è stato fatto un esame delle varie fasi della tradizione del *corpus* platonico e si è parlato di 'strettoie', di 'filtri' attraverso cui i testi sono passati dall'antichità all'epoca bizantina. Abbiamo considerato le edizioni alessandrine, il passaggio da rotolo a codice, la fondazione della Biblioteca di Costantinopoli, con la rinascita dei grandi autori ma anche degli autori minori. Abbiamo visto al riguardo il testo di Temistio che celebra questo evento e richiama l'importanza del ruolo pubblico della Biblioteca per garantire la sopravvivenza soprattutto degli autori 'minori'. Siamo poi giunti a vedere come il IX secolo segni una svolta decisiva, perché con la traslitterazione dalla maiuscola alla minuscola gli esemplari in minuscola, copiati da quelli più antichi in maiuscola, diventavano il punto di partenza della tradizione successiva. Si è infine considerata la rinascenza dei Paleologi e l'età rinascimentale.¹

Quest'oggi vorrei far parlare alcune fonti testuali 'primarie' (cioè portatrici di tradizione) del testo platonico. Queste fonti devono essere sempre considerate da due punti di vista: uno paleografico e bibliologico,² l'altro filologico. La storia del testo platonico si costruisce fino al IX secolo grazie agli apporti dei papiri e alle testimonianze della tradizione indiretta. Ci sono 'testimonianze' (citazioni più o meno estese) di passi platonici in vari autori (filosofi pagani e cristiani, ma anche grammatici, antologisti, raccoglitori di proverbi), che vanno messe a confronto con la tradizione manoscritta. Non si possono però trascurare gli apporti dei papiri (di tradizione diretta, ma purtroppo frammentari) che vanno dal III secolo a.C. al VI secolo d.C. Si collocano convenzionalmente tra i papiri anche i frammenti pergamenei antichi. Per Platone, come per gran parte dei classici, non c'è una continuità piena di tradizione diretta tra antichità (o tardo-antichità) e Medioevo, come invece c'è per il testo biblico e il testo virgiliano. Del *Vecchio* e *Nuovo Testamento* sono conservati per esempio due codici del IV secolo, il Sinaitico e il Vaticano, di Virgilio sono superstiti i codici Mediceo e Palatino del V secolo e il codice Romano del primo VI secolo. Per Platone una testimonianza complessiva l'abbiamo solo con i codici medievali a partire dal IX secolo. Per fare l'edizione critica del testo di Platone dobbiamo passare dall'"attestazione plurima" dei testimoni medievali (c'è una pluralità di fonti da confrontare tra loro)

¹ Il titolo della lezione tenuta nel corso della prima Settimana di formazione dottorale a Pisa nel 2006 era "Tradizione di opere filosofiche: fattori di conservazione e cause di perdita".

² Per aspetto 'bibliologico' si intende tutto ciò che concerne l'aspetto esterno dei manufatti (materia, struttura, tecniche di fattura): dei rotoli di papiro come dei codici di papiro e di pergamena. È un termine più comprensivo di 'codicologico' che ovviamente mal si applica ai *volumina*.

all'unità del testo 'critico';³ ci si potrà giovare, quando se ne presenti l'occasione, propiziata da fortunati ritrovamenti in Egitto e da sistematici controlli della tradizione letteraria greca e latina, anche di quegli sporadici contributi aggiuntivi che vengono dai frammenti papiracei e dalle testimonianze indirette.

I papiri Flinders Petrie scoperti nel 1889 ed editi nel 1891-1892 sono frammenti di rotoli del *Fedone* e del *Lachete* di importanza straordinaria (III secolo a.C.). Sono emersi in un'età in cui trionfava il metodo di Lachmann ed hanno avuto un effetto shock perché era la prima volta che si poteva 'saggiare' il valore del testo trasmesso dai codici medievali.

Per capire questo dobbiamo richiamare la serie di edizioni del testo di Platone che si sono susseguite dall'Ottocento ad oggi. L'edizione di Immanuel Bekker (1818 ss.), basata su un manipolo di codici, non si occupa del problema della genealogia dei testimoni (che assicurerebbe, per esempio, l'eliminazione di quelli dipendenti da altri conservati) e presenta un testo 'eclettico' prendendo il meglio dai manoscritti conosciuti. Johann Gottfried Stallbaum (1821-1825) ha invece costruito un testo valorizzando i codici della Biblioteca Laurenziana, ignorati da Bekker, ma anche qui senza un criterio-guida che distinguesse fonti indipendenti ed apografi. Abbiamo poi l'edizione di Gottfried Hermann (1851-53) che era ottimo conoscitore della lingua e dello stile di Platone, ma poco interessato all'accertamento, in ogni punto, dei fondamenti del testo e, più avanti nel tempo, quella di Martin Schanz (1875 ss.), la prima costruita con criteri filologici che tenevano conto della 'lezione' lachmanniana, con la severa selezione del materiale trasmesso dalla tradizione testuale. La successiva edizione oxoniense di John Burnet (1901 ss.), più volte ristampata, deve molto a quella di Schanz; è stata per molti decenni l'edizione platonica di riferimento, ma i suoi criteri metodologici vennero messi in discussione nel 1959 da Eric Dodds, autore di una splendida edizione del *Gorgia*.⁴ In questa edizione si riconsiderano le reali fondamenta, antiche e medievali, del testo platonico: si mostra come alcuni testimoni manoscritti, indipendenti, siano stati trascurati, come altri, apparentemente portatori di buona tradizione, siano frutto di revisioni dotte, come sia necessario dedicare particolare attenzione alle testimonianze indirette, distinguendo le citazioni letterali dalle parafrasi o dai richiami sommari a passi platonici. Alla luce di queste critiche si imponeva una 'nuova' edizione oxoniense che, solo per fare un esempio, considerasse sempre in una sezione speciale dell'apparato, le testimonianze indirette, ben individuate con l'indicazione dell'inizio e della fine del passo platonico citato. Questo è di grande aiuto perché chi legge J. Burnet non sa dove inizia e finisce, ad esempio, la testimonianza molto rilevante e a volte estesa di Stobeo. La nuova edizione oxoniense (1995) è frutto del lavoro di una équipe di filologi sotto la direzione di William S.M. Nicoll, comprende le prime due tetralogie⁵ e garantisce un'informazione precisa sulla tradizione indiretta, anche se lo fa in una forma dispersiva, relegando la serie dei *testes* alla fine del volume e collocando invece all'inizio il *compendium auctorum et operum* (da cui si traggono i dati relativi alle edizioni degli autori che citano Platone).

Vi dicevo dello shock causato dalla comparsa dei papiri Flinders Petrie. In essi in molti casi il testo di Platone appare diverso da quello dei manoscritti. Si sono creati due fronti di filologi: alcuni a favore dei papiri, come Friedrich Blass, che si è sforzato di dimostrare la plausibilità delle varianti attestate, altri contrari, e fedeli invece alla tradizione dei codici medievali. Occorre qui sottolineare che nella

³ "Attestazione plurima" è terminologia continiana: cf. G. Contini, *Breviario di ecdotica*, Ricciardi, Milano-Napoli 1986 (rist. Einaudi, Torino 1990), p. 25. La prima forma di "riduzione nell'attestazione plurima" è *l'eliminatio codicum descriptorum*, cioè l'eliminazione dei testimoni che non portano tradizione autonoma, in quanto sono derivati da altri, conservati.

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*, ed. E.R. Dodds, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1959.

⁵ *Platonis Opera*, T. I (*Tetralogias I-II continens*), ed. E.A. Duke - W.F. Hicken - W.S.M. Nicoll - D.B. Robinson - J.C.G. Strachan, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995.

valutazione di un testimone si deve considerare la linea di tradizione di cui è portatore, distinguendola da quanto si può addebitare al singolo scriba che ha vergato il testo e che può avere sbagliato, visto male, saltato parti. Sono stati individuati nei papiri Petrie molti errori del genere (da addebitare a scrivani poco attenti), ma questo non inficia il valore della 'linea' di testimonianza di cui i papiri Petrie sono portatori. Si è fatta presto strada una valutazione molto più equilibrata. Questi primi papiri platonici non vanno trattati come testimoni 'selvaggi', ma possono essere messi a confronto con i codici medievali. Sappiamo che sono anteriori all'edizione Alessandrina. Se questa ha incanalato il testo platonico verso una tradizione uniforme, è importante poter vedere quale tipo di testo rechino testimoni che non sono stati influenzati da quella edizione.⁶ Vorrei vedere due casi di queste varianti: uno per mostrare come si debba fare i conti con la ricostruzione 'fisica' del testo riportato dal manufatto, l'altro per sottolineare l'importanza che anche piccoli frammenti possono avere nella ricostruzione del testo. È importante tenere presente che i papiri Petrie (che ricoprono solo una parte, ridotta, del *Fedone* e del *Lachete*) hanno un potenziale dimostrativo che si estende, entro certi limiti, alla parte di testo non coperta.

C'è un'unità di fondo della tradizione che i papiri e i codici consentono di ricostruire. Il testo di Platone è 'uno'. Può sorgere, è vero, anche il problema che ora i nostri editori oxoniensi sollevano a proposito del *Cratilo* (437 D - 438 B) cioè della possibile esistenza di versioni alternative entrambe originali (varianti d'autore). Ma il fenomeno è in ogni caso limitato a singoli luoghi, non investe certo l'intero testo platonico. Non tutti poi sono d'accordo nel riconoscere come originalmente platonica la versione alternativa che sarebbe stata fortunatamente recuperata dal solo codice Vindob. Suppl. gr. 7; il problema peraltro merita la discussione scientifica che si è accesa.⁷

Possiamo vedere la Tavola 1 (P. Petrie I 5-8) in cui sono riprodotti alcuni dei dodici frammenti, alcuni a più colonne, del papiro Petrie del *Fedone*. Che siano conservate più colonne in successione si vede dal frammento maggiore. È una scrittura che sebbene abbia ancora residui epigrafici, è senz'altro più morbida e fluente di altre più o meno coeve e segna un grande progresso nell'evoluzione della scrittura libraria.⁸ Ci sono *paragraphoi* e anche trattini orizzontali per la divisione delle battute dialogiche, che rivelano il desiderio di presentare il testo in una forma corretta e che sia di aiuto al lettore. Vorrei soffermarmi sui primi due frammenti in alto che sembrano in una condizione disperata: (1a) 67E e (1b) 68A. Il testo di riferimento riportato nella Tavola 2 è il testo dell'edizione di Strachan nell'ambito della nuova oxoniense. Siamo nel punto in cui nel *Fedone* si parla della conquista della perfetta e vera sapienza che è opera dell'anima e non del corpo: quest'ultimo anzi è d'ostacolo e non permette di conquistare la sapienza; il filosofo disprezza il corpo e solo la morte con la liberazione dell'anima permetterà di giungere alla piena sapienza. La vita del filosofo è una preparazione alla morte. Dice Socrate: "Sarebbe allora ridicolo che chi si prepara per tutta la vita ad essere quanto più vicino possibile al morire e così viva, quando arriva la morte si rammaricasse di questo". La risposta è: γελοῖον· πῶς δ' οὐ; In apparato si legge: γελοῖον P, sed Socrati trib.: Simmiae trib. Burnet: inter ἀγανακτεῖν (ε 2) et τῷ (ε 5) desunt non amplius xiii litt. in Π₂: οὐ γελοῖον β TWQA Socrati tribuentes.

Se consideriamo il frammento (1a) 67 E al rigo quarto possiamo vedere che si ricostruisce τοῦ] του ἀγανακτεῖν. Abbiamo la fortuna che il papiro Petrie (Π₂) non ha la preoccupazione di far rientrare

⁶ Per i due papiri Petrie di Platone, cf. A. Carlini, in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini (CPF), Testi e lessico nei papiri di cultura greca e latina. Parte I. Autori noti*, vol. 1*** (Nicolaius Damascenus – Zeno Tarsensis), Olschki, Firenze 1999, pp. 100-13 (*Laches*); pp. 159-93 (*Phaedo*).

⁷ Cf. ad es. V. Valenti, "Una variante d'autore: Plat. *Crat.* 437 d 10 - 438 a 2", *Studi Classici e Orientali* 46/3 (1998), pp. 769-831; D. Sedley, *Plato's Cratylus*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2003.

⁸ Cf. G. Cavallo, *Le scritture greca e latina dei papiri. Una introduzione*, Serra Editore, Pisa - Roma 2008 (Studia erudita, 8), pp. 23-5.

l'inizio del rigo precedente con la battuta di Simmia. Sotto abbiamo: τῶι ὄντι ἄρα. L'editore dice che non c'è spazio per più di tredici lettere e γελοῖον· πῶς δ' οὐ; è il testo della battuta di risposta di Simmia, accolto dalla nuova oxoniense e già da Burnet. Sarebbe interessante questo accordo del papiro con il solo P (Vat. Palat. gr. 173)⁹, ma in realtà tutti i codici, compreso P, a differenza di quanto indica Strachan in apparato, riportano οὐ γελοῖον (che è la fine della battuta di Socrate) e, a sé, πῶς δ' οὐ; (battuta di risposta di Simmia). Ma il testo, ricostruibile, del papiro che prospetta un assetto diverso dai codici, è ben difendibile. Perché questa scelta fatta sulla base numero mancante delle lettere nel papiro che porta anche a una diversa divisione delle battute? Si tratta di una scelta giusta che corrisponde all'*usus scribendi* di Platone di riprendere una parola-chiave della battuta dell'interlocutore (Socrate in questo caso), rinforzandola con πῶς δ' οὐ; (cf. *Fedone* 82 A; *Repubblica* 416 A). È un caso in cui il papiro, qui in lacuna, ha suggerito già a Burnet una correzione del testo tradito nei manoscritti medievali, riportandolo all'*usus* di Platone.

L'altro frammento 1b (68 A) fa ancora discutere perché le scelte degli editori sono state diverse. Dice Socrate che se molti hanno voluto andare nell'Ade per raggiungere l'oggetto del loro amore, a maggior ragione il filosofo desidererà morire perché sa che solo nell'Ade potrà raggiungere pienamente la φρόνησις (*Phaed.* 68 A 3 - B 2). "Se per amori umani e di donne e di figli morti, molti vollero deliberatamente scendere nell'Ade guidati dalla speranza di trovarli...". Se prendiamo il rigo 2 del frammento troviamo: γυναικῶν ἢ παίδων ἔνεκα, che è riportato correttamente nell'apparato critico dall'editore oxoniense Strachan. Qui nel papiro la situazione è diversa perché non sono più i figli ma gli amanti. Il sostegno alla lezione del papiro viene da un passo del *Simposio* (181 B 2-3) dove vanno insieme γυναικες e παῖδες, e παῖδες non è nel senso di 'figli' ma di 'amanti'. Burnet e Strachan accettano καὶ υἱῶν dei manoscritti medievali, invece l'editore della Collection des Universités de France Paul Vicaire (1980) preferisce accogliere ἢ παίδων ἔνεκα, perché, muovendosi sulle orme di Ernst Bickel, ritiene che υἱῶν sia nato in un'età ben posteriore in cui l'eros attico non era riconosciuto nel suo pieno significato.¹⁰ Si è andati alla caccia di esempi mitici sul valore esemplare del sacrificio verso i figli: senza successo. Non è una variante banale, ma deve essere considerata. Il papiro è solo, è l'unico testimone del testo alternativo; ma fa riflettere.

Analizziamo un esempio di tradizione indiretta su papiro. La Tavola 7 e la Tavola 8 riportano i sigla *codicum* dell'edizione oxoniense, del *Fedone*, del *Teeteto* e del *Critone*.¹¹ Nella Tavola 7 relativa al *Fedone*, compare un papiro, diviso in due tronconi, Π₄ e Pap. Monac.¹² Che in realtà i due papiri debbano essere ricongiunti, come frammenti provenienti da uno stesso rotolo, si ricava dall'esame della scrittura e del contenuto. Non c'è qui il testo del *Fedone*, ma una discussione sul testo del dialogo. Possono essere i frammenti di un commento o di un'opera autonoma che cita Platone. Quando abbiamo frammenti e in questi viene citato il testo di un autore possiamo aver a che fare con l'opera di un commentatore che ha l'intenzione di discutere quel punto oppure con l'opera autonoma di uno studioso che, costruendo il proprio testo, ha solo occasione di citare il testo del filosofo più antico. Il

⁹ Per questo manoscritto, cf. più avanti, p. 236 e Tav. 21.

¹⁰ Platon, *Cœuvres complètes*, tome IV - 1^{ère} partie: *Phédon*, Notice de L. Robin, texte établi et traduit par P. Vicaire, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1983 (CUF), p. 20 e n. 2. Ma si può vedere già E. Bickel, "Das platonische Schriftenkorpus der 9 Tetralogien und die Interpolation im Platontext. Zu *Phaidon* 68 a", *Rheinisches Museum* 92 (1943), pp. 94-96; A. Carlini, "Note critiche al testo del *Fedone*", *Bollettino del Comitato per la preparazione dell'Edizione Nazionale dei Classici Greci e Latini*, n.s. XVI (1968), pp. 14-15.

¹¹ Un merito di questa edizione è l'esistenza di un *conspectus siglorum* per ogni dialogo, perché i problemi di trasmissione del testo variano da dialogo a dialogo.

¹² Questo papiro, non individuato da un numero nell'edizione oxoniense, è in realtà il P. Graec. Monac. 21.

fatto che questi due frammenti abbiano le stesse caratteristiche bibliologiche (stessa scrittura, stessa impostazione delle colonne, stesso modo di dividere, citare, usare le *paragraphoi* etc.) dice che devono andare insieme e non fa specie che appartengano a due collezioni diverse (Monaco e Heidelberg). Quello che esaminiamo è un *cartonnage* di mummia che poi è stato riutilizzato per la copia di questo testo. La Tavola 3 (P. Graec. Monac. 21 + P. Heid. G. inv. 28) presenta a sinistra il frammento di Monaco, che ha la forma di un piede ed è forse stato impiegato per rinforzare una suola di sandalo. Le condizioni del ritrovamento dei due frammenti sono oscure.

I due frammenti, che sono parte di uno stesso rotolo, riguardano passi del *Fedone*. È difficile pensare, secondo me, che entrambi non facciano parte di uno stesso commento al testo platonico.¹³ Ma, a rigore, potrebbe anche trattarsi, come dicevo, di un autore che espone la tesi di Platone per poi contrapporre la propria. E questa è precisamente la proposta interpretativa di David Sedley.¹⁴ Qui si parla della dottrina dell'anima armonia. Nel senso della epitome o del commento al *Fedone* andrebbe, secondo me, la schematicità della presentazione nel testo. Nel frammento di Heidelberg, al rigo 5-6, dopo una breve pausa, segnata da spazio bianco, abbiamo un εἶτα ψυχῆ, al r. 11, sempre dopo uno spazio bianco, ancora ἔπειτα: si può ben vedere come siano riassunte e ridotte a secche enunciazioni le obiezioni che Socrate fa alla tesi dell'anima-armonia: "L'anima in quanto anima – si legge – è peggiore o migliore ed in questo è diversa dall'armonia, che invece non è né migliore né peggiore" (*Phaed.* 92 E - 93 E). Ricorrono queste formule introduttive delle singole sezioni (εἶτα, ἔπειτα) che rivelano un uso scolastico, da epitome o da commento piú che da vera e propria opera originale. Il passo del *Fedone* a cui si fa riferimento presenta infatti una complessità e ricchezza di argomentazione che qui è assente. Tutto è reso schematicamente. Ma la ricostruzione alternativa di Sedley che propone anche il nome di un autore come il peripatetico Stratone di Lampsaco (che sappiamo formulò una critica articolata della dottrina dell'anima-armonia) è molto ingegnosa e non può essere lasciata cadere.

Il papiro della Tavola 4 (P. Leiden inv. 22) è testimone di un maggior allineamento con la tradizione medievale. È un papiro di Leida del secolo II d.C. in cui non si vedono varianti significative. Si può dire che già c'è stata una canalizzazione della tradizione dovuta all'edizione alessandrina, che si è affermata paralizzando altre tradizioni testuali. Questo testo papiraceo è un palinsesto: esistevano infatti anche i palinsesti di papiro (la superficie del papiro veniva lavata e riscritta). Qui il testo sottostante non è stato lavato perfettamente e a volte riemerge. È il papiro indicato nell'edizione con Π₁ che copre una porzione poco estesa del *Fedone*: 65 A 8 - 66 B 3. Abbiamo in questa parte del testo una variante che non è nel papiro ma che ricaviamo dalla tradizione indiretta. "Che dire – si legge a 65 B – della capacità di attingere la saggezza? È di impedimento il corpo se qualcuno lo assume con sé nella ricerca?". Vorrei proporvi la traduzione latina che Tertulliano fa di questo passo nel suo *De Anima*.¹⁵ Se leggiamo la traduzione di Tertulliano possiamo ricavare una variante del testo che sembra raccomandarsi: "Quid tum erga ipsam prudentiae possessionem? Vtrumne impedimentum erit corpus, an non, si quis illud socium assumpserit in quaestionem? Tale quid dico: habetne ueritatem aliquam uisio et auditio hominibus? An non etiam poetae haec nobis semper obmussant, quod neque

¹³ Cf. A. Carlini, "Commentarium in Platonis 'Phaedonem' (?)" (PHeid G inv. 28 + PGraecMon 21)", in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini*, Parte III: *Commentari*, L.S. Olschki Firenze, 1995, pp. 203-20.

¹⁴ D. Sedley, "Plato's *Phaedo* in the third Century B.C.", in M.S. Funghi (ed.), *Ἄδοι διζήσιος. Le vie della ricerca, Studi in onore di Francesco Adorno*, Leo S. Olschki, Firenze 1996, pp. 447-55.

¹⁵ Gli autori oxoniensi non hanno incluso le testimonianze 'latine'; ma sarebbe difficile non far conto, ad es., di testimonianze come quella di Cicerone: nelle *Tuscolane* (I 53) e nella *Repubblica* (VI 27) è contenuta una fedele traduzione dell'intera dimostrazione dell'immortalità dell'anima (che si legge nel *Fedro* 245 C) con varianti importanti che fanno discutere: cf. P. Maas, *Textkritik*, 4. Auflage, Teubner, Leipzig 1960, pp. 23-4 (trad. it. di N. Martinelli, Le Monnier, Firenze 1952, pp. 48-9).

audiamus certum neque uideamus?”.¹⁶ La traduzione, fedele, di Tertulliano invita a chiedersi se il testo originario fosse ἡ οὐ τὰ γε τοιαῦτα (con integrazione di οὐ mancante nella tradizione diretta) in luogo di ἡ τὰ γε τοιαῦτα. Il rinvio è qui a un passo di Epicarmo (fr. 12 Diels-Kranz) o di Omero (*Il.* V 127), che parlano della nebbia che copre la vista della realtà delle cose. Direi che il testimone trascurato, perché latino, suggerisce una lezione migliore, piú corrispondente all’uso di Platone.

Al IV secolo d.C. risale una pergamena vindobonense riprodotta nella Tavola 5 (P. Vindob. gr. 39846). È un esemplare della maiuscola biblica. È una scrittura solenne che si impone per la sua regolarità ed eleganza, definita da Guglielmo Cavallo “canonica” perché risponde ad un canone nel tratteggio delle lettere: i tratti discendenti sono marcati, quelli orizzontali filiformi, quelli obliqui di medio spessore. È una scrittura che ha una evoluzione che occupa tre secoli (II-IV): ha una fase iniziale di formazione, poi raggiunge la piena maturità e infine subisce la decadenza.¹⁷ Il frammento attesta un bellissimo esemplare del Platone dei dialoghi spuri. Nel quarto secolo, in cui trionfa questa scrittura (abbiamo ad esempio i codici Vaticano e Sinaitico per la Bibbia), si è ormai pienamente affermata la forma libraria del *codice* rispetto al *rotolo*. I testi classici fino a tutto il III secolo sono generalmente su rotolo, mentre i testi cristiani già dal II secolo sono con larga prevalenza su codice. È una scelta deliberata, quella fatta nel mondo cristiano, di scegliere la forma del codice e si possono richiamare ragioni storico-religiose: secondo l’interpretazione di Theodor Skeat, il codice è stato adottato perché era il piú adatto contenitore dei testi ‘canonici’ (che dovevano essere preservati da intrusioni esterne), *in primis* dei quattro Vangeli: l’unità e la compattezza dei Vangeli canonici, che erano a rischio se il testo era ospitato in piú *volumina*, meglio potevano essere difese, nel codice, dall’aggiunta arbitraria di scritti apocrifi.¹⁸ Però anche testi classici sono scritti in questa scrittura solenne, come si può vedere da vari esempi e come dimostra la pergamena di Vienna. Può sorprendere che il testo identificato di questa pergamena sia di dialoghi spuri di Platone: *Erissia* e *Demodoco*. Sappiamo che gli spuri sono già ricordati in Diogene Laerzio, che, dopo aver elencato i dialoghi di Platone, inserisce una scheda sul modo di iniziare la lettura di Platone. In questo passo laerziano (III 62) si elencano i dialoghi “considerati per comune consenso spuri” (νοθεύονται... ὁμολογουμένως). Da notare che *homologoumena* è la definizione che si dà dei testi biblici riconosciuti dalle Chiese cristiane. Qui si tratta invece del consenso laico e profano dei dotti e dei filosofi antichi.¹⁹ Questi dialoghi spuri continuano nella tradizione manoscritta del *corpus*. È impressionante che un’edizione così lussuosa comprendesse gli spuri. Doveva essere un codice di grandi dimensioni, come lo sono i codici del Vecchio e Nuovo Testamento di questa stessa epoca. Conteneva forse l’*opera omnia* di Platone, in oltre 700 fogli con una impostazione della pagina su tre colonne di scrittura, come afferma acutamente Jagoda Luzzatto? Possibile, ma resta una costruzione ipotetica.²⁰

¹⁶ Tert., *De An.*, 18, 1 (l’edizione di riferimento è quella di J.H. Waszink, Meulenhoff, Amsterdam 1947).

¹⁷ G. Cavallo, *Ricerche sulla maiuscola biblica, con 115 tavole separate e in apposita custodia*, Le Monnier, Firenze 1967; P. Orsini, *Manoscritti in maiuscola biblica. Materiali per un aggiornamento*, Edizioni dell’Università, Cassino 2005.

¹⁸ Th. Skeat, “The Origin of the Christian Codex”, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 102 (1994), pp. 263-8: in part. pp. 267-8: “Of course other Gospels still circulated freely, and continued to be read and quoted. But inevitably the selection of the Four and their physical unity in the Codex gave them, right from the start, an authority and prestige which no competitor could hope to rival. The Four-Gospel Canon and the Four-Gospel Codex are thus inseparable”.

¹⁹ Cf. A. Carlini, “Alcune considerazioni sulla tradizione testuale degli scritti pseudoplatonici”, in K. Döring - M. Erler (ed.), *Pseudoplatonica. Akten des Kongresses zu den Pseudoplatonica von 6.-9. Juli 2003 in Bamberg*, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2005, (*Philosophie der Antike*, 22), pp. 25-35, in part. p. 28.

²⁰ M.J. Luzzatto, “Codici tardoantichi di Platone e i cosiddetti *Scholia Aretae*”, *Medioevo greco* 10 (2010), pp. 77-110, in part. pp. 87-92.

All'età tardo-antica risalgono i due frammenti di codice pergameneo di Antinoe del *Teeteto* riprodotti nella Tavola 6 (P. Antin. 78, secoli V/VI). Si parla sempre scherzosamente del supplizio di Tantalò dei papirologi, per cui sul piú bello a chi è intento a decifrare un testo viene meno il supporto fisico del documento: la testimonianza del papiro o della pergamena si interrompe proprio nel punto in cui si sa che il testo dei codici medievali era tormentato o magari offriva varianti. È questo il caso qui considerato. Il *Teeteto* ha un prologo che è il dialogo 'diretto' fra Euclide e Terspione che si immagina avvenuto a Megara presso la casa di Euclide; ad un certo punto Euclide dice di avere sentito da Socrate un giudizio molto buono su Teeteto: in occasione di un incontro ad Atene, Socrate gli aveva riferito estesamente il contenuto di un dialogo da lui avuto con Teeteto; per non perdere nulla di quei sottili ragionamenti Euclide aveva pensato bene di stendere un preciso resoconto scritto. Terspione lo invita a darne lettura ed Euclide incarica un giovane servo di leggere il testo con questa avvertenza: il dialogo non era stato trascritto come Socrate lo raccontava; era stato reso in forma 'diretta' per eliminare tutte le ingombranti formule di passaggio come: "e io dissi", "e lui rispose", etc.

Bene. Allarghiamo per un momento il quadro. Nel 1901 fu acquistato al Cairo un *volumen* trovato nelle rovine di una casa di Hermupolis Magna (P. Berol. Inv. 9782). Il *volumen* così recuperato conteneva un commento antico al *Teeteto* risalente al II secolo d.C., che fu pubblicato da Diels-Schubart nei *Berliner Klassikertexte* (II, 1905) e ripubblicato nel *Corpus dei papiri filosofici* (1995) da Bastianini-Sedley;²¹ è un'opera di grande interesse. L'importanza si misura già nella ricostruzione testuale, perché il papiro presenta per esteso i lemmi del testo del dialogo, evidenziati con *diploi*, le quali fanno vedere fin dove continua la citazione precisa del testo di Platone che poi viene commentato. Nella terza colonna superstite (rr. 28-37) si legge un accenno interessante che il commentatore fa ad un altro prologo (ἄλλο προοίμιον), che circolava al suo tempo; l'inizio di questo era diverso da quello (che anche noi conosciamo) tra Euclide e Terspione. Questo anonimo studioso del *Teeteto* era quindi a conoscenza di un'altra 'redazione' del proemio del dialogo. Si è pensato che questo diverso testo possa essere stato scritto da Platone in omaggio alla memoria di Teeteto, dopo la sua morte avvenuta in uno scontro all'istmo di Corinto nel 369 a.C. Il commentatore afferma peraltro decisamente che il testo da lui adottato (che si rivela in tutto corrispondente a quello dei nostri codici medievali) è quello piú autorevolmente trasmesso e che l'altro "è piuttosto insipido". Sorprende che gli editori oxoniensi, che hanno accolto a testo le due versioni alternative (*versio A*, *versio B*) del *Cratilo* 437 D - 438 B, sulla base della testimonianza di un codice del XI secolo (W), non diano alcuna notizia in apparato dell'esistenza e circolazione, attestata da una fonte del II secolo d.C., di un prologo alternativo del *Teeteto*.

Torniamo alla pergamena di Antinoe: nel lato-carne è conservato proprio l'inizio del dialogo 'letto' con la prima battuta di Socrate. L'editore della pergamena nella prima riga della colonna (dove sono rimaste solo poche tracce) ha ricostruito λαβῆ] τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε (143 B 8), ma il testo non è così sicuro. Siamo qui al punto in cui si passa dal prologo dialogico tra Euclide e Terspione al dialogo in forma drammatica letto dal giovane servo. Questo passaggio con l'introduzione dei nuovi protagonisti era indicato in qualche modo nel papiro? Nei manoscritti medievali spesso c'è, nel margine, per i dialoghi, l'elenco dei personaggi (τὰ τοῦ διαλόγου πρόσωπα); nei papiri non si trova, ma bisogna notare che nel dialogo filosofico il lettore ha sempre in genere la possibilità di scoprire i personaggi che vengono conosciuti grazie ai vocativi con cui fin dalle battute iniziali sono chiamati in

²¹ Si veda l'ampia introduzione (con bibliografia), il testo e il commento di P. Berol. inv. 9782 a firma di G. Bastianini - D. Sedley, in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici*, Parte III: *Commentari*, pp. 227-562.

causa. Nei dialoghi raccontati la presentazione dei personaggi è fatta di volta in volta dal narratore.²² Purtroppo nel caso del *Teeteto*, la pergamena, per lo stato materiale del frammento, non ci dice niente su come il lettore era aiutato a capire che si passava al dibattito filosofico vero e proprio.

Vorrei illustrare un poco le caratteristiche di questa pergamena, che secondo Cavallo imita dei modelli grafici precedenti. Questo papiro è stato attribuito all'età tardo-antica (V-VI secolo d.C.). Imita una scrittura, la "maiuscola rotonda", che era molto diffusa nel II secolo e secondo Cavallo questa mimesi grafica ha anche un valore ideologico, non solo di mera copiatura di modelli antichi, per un gusto arcaizzante. Si tratterebbe di una voluta ripresa di una scrittura genuinamente 'laica', da collocare nel contesto del tentativo di rinascita pagana: ci si vuole ricollegare ad un periodo glorioso come l'età degli Antonini, saltando l'età cristiana e bruciando l'evoluzione della scrittura libraria.²³ Se questa pergamena venisse da Alessandria o fosse in relazione con Alessandria, dove ferveva l'interesse per il testo platonico, allora potremmo pensare di avere di fronte un testimone dell'attività editoriale dei tardi alessandrini, lettori ed esegeti di Platone. Tuttavia non si può dire nulla di sicuro. Invece questa ripresa di modelli anteriori di scrittura abbandonati ha anche altri, illustri, esempi.

Vanno notati *paragraphoi* e doppio punto per la divisione delle battute, a differenza del papiro Petrie, che adottava, come abbiamo visto (p. 223), un segno diverso (un trattino orizzontale tra fine di una battuta e inizio della nuova) che non ha avuto nel seguito molto successo.

Passiamo ora alla tradizione manoscritta medievale (secolo IX in avanti), quando dalla maiuscola (cioè dalla scrittura tendenzialmente 'bilineare') si è passati alla minuscola (scrittura 'quadrilineare': ogni lettera ha un nucleo centrale – tra le due immaginarie linee mediane – ed eventualmente tratti aggiuntivi che dal nucleo partono verso la linea superiore o verso la linea inferiore).²⁴ Questo passaggio da maiuscola a minuscola, noto con il nome di "traslitterazione", è un momento cruciale nella trasmissione degli autori greci e ha un valore storico culturale.²⁵ Trascrivere un testo in minuscola, una volta recuperato un modello tardo-antico, significava apporre sistematicamente spiriti e accenti (prima normalmente assenti) dividendo correttamente le parole e facilitando la lettura; e ancora determinava l'affermarsi di una linea tradizionale rispetto ad altre (dato che la nuova presentazione dei testi, piú agevole da consultare e da leggere, era destinata ad ottenere un successo). Nella Tavole 7 e 8, come già si è visto, sono riprodotti i *conspectus siglorum* della nuova edizione oxoniense, riferiti a tre dialoghi. Va subito notato che in questa edizione, quando possibile, i codici sono riuniti in famiglie, contrassegnate da una sigla in grassetto. Si vede, per esempio, sia nella Tavola 7, relativa al *Fedone*, che nella 8 relativa al *Teeteto* e al *Critone* che nell'apparato **β** è la sigla che contraddistingue la famiglia BCD ed esprime il loro consenso. Questo significa che in tutti i punti in cui si può ricostruire

²² Su questi problemi, si veda J. Andrieu, *Le dialogue antique. Structure et présentation*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1954 (Coll. d'Études latines 29).

²³ G. Cavallo, "Considerazioni di un paleografo per la data e l'origine della 'Iliade Ambrosiana'", *Dialoghi di Archeologia* 7 (1973), pp. 70-85; Id., *Libri, editori, pubblico nel mondo antico. Guida storica e critica*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1975, pp. 90-1.

²⁴ J. Irigoien, "Structure et évolution des écritures livresques de l'époque byzantine", in *Polychronion. Festschrift Franz Dölger zum 75. Geburtstag*, Winter, Heidelberg 1966 (Corpus der griechischen Urkunden des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit. Reihe D. Beihefte: Forschungen zur griechischen Diplomatik und Geschichte, Band. I), pp. 253-65. Quello fatto da Irigoien è uno studio genetico del sistema grafico della minuscola greca. Il nucleo della maggior parte delle lettere si riporta a un ristretto numero di forme fondamentali e le appendici (superiore o inferiore) hanno la funzione, rispetto a queste forme, di segni diacritici (p. 260).

²⁵ F. Ronconi, *La translitterazione dei testi greci. Una ricerca tra paleografia e filologia*, CISAM, Spoleto 2003.

il capostipite di BCD con il criterio della maggioranza (BC contro D o BD contro C o CD contro B) si può usare la sigla β . È una ricostruzione ‘meccanica’, ispirata a criteri lachmanniani, che sacrifica però informazioni critiche importanti. È mia convinzione che per Platone si debbano considerare le singole testimonianze e le singole attestazioni dei codici, come fanno quasi tutti gli editori di Platone. Quella adottata dagli editori oxoniensi è certo una misura di ‘economia’ che però lascia ogni tanto dei dubbi, soprattutto per la famiglia terza, δ ; tra i testimoni rappresentativi, in quanto portatori di tradizione, sono indicati anche il *vetus corrector codicis* B² e il *vetus corrector codicis* T². È chiaro che in base al criterio editoriale adottato i due *correctores* B² e T² non vengono menzionati quando consentono con la maggioranza della famiglia e quindi possono essere rappresentati dalla sigla δ . Ma questi due correttori sono molto importanti per sé stessi, perché il loro testo ha radice nel IX secolo; essi desumono le loro correzioni o varianti da un testo ‘dotto’; si deve riflettere sul fatto che in questa età, per esempio, a Leone il filosofo, una delle grandi personalità del primo rinascimento bizantino, colui che si affiancò a Bardas nella riorganizzazione dell’Università di Costantinopoli, viene attribuita esplicitamente una “recensione”, una revisione critica del testo delle *Leggi*. Se correzioni e varianti di questi *correctores* non vengono nell’apparato citati autonomamente sempre, indipendentemente dal fatto che siano o meno in accordo con la maggioranza dei testimoni della famiglia δ , viene a mancare una informazione precisa sui punti specifici del testo scelti dai correttori per i loro interventi. Avrei regolarmente citato B² e T², come fa, del resto, Paul Vicaire nell’edizione Budé del *Fedone*.

Troppo impegnativo appare l’uso di un termine tecnico come ‘iparchetipo’, ricorrente nella *Praefatio*, perché lascerebbe pensare ad uno stemma della tradizione platonica che ha il suo coronamento in un archetipo di origine medievale. Non credo che per Platone si possa parlare di archetipo in senso lachmanniano. Ci sono casi in cui il testo corretto è conservato in una sola delle famiglie. Quello a cui si può arrivare nella ricostruzione non è un archetipo come esemplare fisico, ma un tipo di ‘testo comune’ con una sua unitarietà,²⁶ originatosi nella rinascita dei testi antichi con la fondazione della biblioteca di Costantinopoli. Che non si possa parlare di “archetipo medievale” di Platone, si ricava anche da questo, che le singole famiglie hanno varianti comuni spiegabili solo come errori di lettura e traslitterazione da maiuscola. Questo significa che poteva esistere un modello comune nel senso che si è detto, ma risalente all’età tardo-antica. Non ci sono viceversa errori, comuni a tutti i manoscritti, di trascrizione da minuscola; solo in questo caso si potrebbe parlare dell’esistenza di un comune capostipite in minuscola.

Nel caso del *Fedone*, nella famiglia δ , che è la più ricca di componenti, è stato inserito (perché giudicato testimone indipendente) anche il codice *Par. gr.* 1813 (Q). Ho dubbi sul fatto che si tratti di una fonte autonoma; è più probabile che le buone lezioni che pur presenta siano frutto di recupero di lezioni antiche, nell’ambito di un’attività di revisione del testo. Q appartiene a un’epoca (XIII secolo avanzato) nella quale si manifesta quella ‘curiosità’ che porta a esplorare nuove fonti testuali. Nella famiglia δ figura anche l’esemplare greco utilizzato da Enrico Aristippo per la traduzione del *Fedone*, indicato con la sigla Λ . È un esemplare che si può ricostruire in ogni punto dal testo latino. Alla Tavola 9 avete l’edizione critica curata da Lorenzo Minio Paluella della traduzione di Enrico Aristippo, portata a termine alla metà del XII secolo a Palermo (che era allora un centro di cultura greca, latina e araba); l’aveva iniziata durante una campagna militare. Questa traduzione è utilizzabile quasi come un testimone greco, perché Aristippo

²⁶ J.H. Waszink, “Osservazioni sui fondamenti della critica testuale”, *Quaderni Urbinati di cultura classica* 19 (1975), pp. 7-24, in part. pp. 15-16: “La realtà è piuttosto che in molti casi le corrottele presenti in tutti o in quasi tutti i manoscritti possono e debbono derivare da un certo tipo di testo, cioè da uno o da parecchi esemplari – quid refert? – di una certa redazione di quel testo che era presente nel Medioevo e che era stata fatta [...] nel corso dell’attività libraria della fine dell’antichità”. Al termine “un po’ presuntuoso” di archetipo, Waszink preferirebbe sostituire quello di “paleotipo”.

traduceva, come in genere i traduttori medievali, parola per parola.²⁷ Minio Paluello ha dimostrato che due sono le redazioni di Enrico Aristippo, e riporta in due sezioni separate dell'apparato le varianti della prima e della seconda redazione del testo. Minio Paluello presenta anche una terza sezione dell'apparato per il confronto con il testo greco. Vediamo che inserisce W per indicare il testo greco di riferimento, confermando l'appartenenza alla famiglia δ del codice greco utilizzato per la traduzione.

Alla Tavola 10 (Bodleianus MS E.D. Clarke 39) è riportato un foglio del primo manoscritto della famiglia β , il Bodleiano Clarkiano 39. La tavola riproduce la fine del *Critone* e l'inizio del *Fedone*. È uno dei manoscritti databili; risale all'895 ed è stato scritto per conto di Areta dal calligrafo Giovanni. Vedete come si presenta il testo: in modo molto più ricco di informazioni rispetto ai papiri. Nei papiri è certo possibile trovare autore e titolo dell'opera: queste indicazioni si collocavano in genere alla fine. Abbiamo ad esempio un papiro dell'*Alcione*, uno degli spuri del *corpus* platonico, che ritroviamo anche nel *corpus* di Luciano: un raro caso di scritto che ha una doppia copertura tradizionale, perché tramandato sia nei codici platonici che nei codici luciani. In un papiro del II secolo (P. Oxy. 3683) si conserva il colofone e si legge Πλάτωνος Ἀλκυών: era ancora attribuito a Platone, mentre in epoca successiva deve essere migrato nel *corpus* di Luciano. Nei codici medievali, a differenza dei papiri, i titoli possono essere, come qui, molto dettagliati. In questo manoscritto leggiamo la lettera *delta*, che indica (per il *Fedone*) il quarto dialogo della prima tetralogia. Non tutti i codici, ma quelli che trasmettono sistematicamente l'opera platonica seguono l'ordine tetralogico. Ci sono viceversa sillogi di dialoghi, selezioni di dialoghi che, rispondendo a finalità diverse, hanno un ordine di successione diverso. Qui invece c'è una piena volontà di riprodurre il *corpus* tetralogico che ha radici antichissime, risalendo a Trasillo, come testimonia Diogene Laerzio (III 56), ma forse addirittura all'Accademia di mezzo. Si legge il titolo, *Fedone*, il sottotitolo "sull'anima" e il qualificativo, ἡθικός. È sorprendente che gli editori oxoniensi non abbiano riportato il sottotitolo nella loro edizione, dal momento che questo ha una antichissima tradizione. Lo stesso Aristotele cita p. es. (in *Rhetor.* III 14, 1415 b30) il *Menesseno* servendosi del sottotitolo (ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ); Callimaco (*Epigr.* 23, 3) richiama il *Fedone* con la formula τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς γράμμα. Una mano più recente ha introdotto i nomi (abbreviati) dei personaggi del dialogo diretto iniziale (Echecrate e Fedone), ma, grazie ai vocativi delle prime due battute, questo si rivela superfluo. C'è poi il titolo finale del dialogo precedente, il terzo della prima tetralogia: il *Critone*, con il sottotitolo περὶ πρακτοῦ. È importante riportare i sottotitoli perché ci sono, talvolta, differenze fra la tradizione medievale di questi sottotitoli e quanto riportato da Diogene Laerzio (es. *Alcib. II* περὶ εὐχῆς Diog. Laert. III 59 *recte*, περὶ προσευχῆς i codici).

I due codici apparentati con il Bodleiano sono qui presenti nella Tavola 11 e nella Tavola 12: il Marciano gr. 185 (generalmente datato al XII secolo, ma da Jean Irigoien retrodatato al secolo XI)²⁸ che ha i titoli dei dialoghi molto in evidenza e, nello spazio rimasto, per il *Fedone*, propone un τὰ τοῦ διαλόγου πρόσωπα - Ἐξηκράτης etc. Si tratta di una notazione aggiunta successivamente, come quella del *Critone*. Anche il Tubingense Mb. 14 dell'XI secolo ha un titolo aggiunto successivamente, nel margine alto. I margini dei manoscritti non sempre sono serviti per ospitare scolii o varianti o note comunque legate al testo, ma talvolta sono stati utilizzati per ospitare le più svariate annotazioni che non hanno alcun rapporto con il testo principale. Ad esempio il *Par. gr.* 1808 (datato al XIII secolo, ma probabilmente più antico) ha addirittura uno sticherario²⁹ in antico slavo a margine del *Fedone*.

²⁷ Su Enrico Aristippo, A. Carlini, *Vigilia greca normanna: il Platone di Enrico Aristippo*, I, Le Lettere, Firenze 2007 (Quaderni petrarcheschi, XII-XIII 2002-2003), pp. 51-73.

²⁸ J. Irigoien, *Tradition et critique des textes grecs*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1997 (Histoire), p. 155.

²⁹ Sticherario è una raccolta di sticheri (composizioni poetico-musicali intercalate da versetti biblici da cantare al mattino). Per casi di questo tipo, Armando Petrucci parlava di "scritture avventizie", scollegate dal testo base.

Testimone molto rilevante è poi il Marciano append. class. IV 1 (Tavola 13), retrodatato al X secolo (la sigla è T), solitario rappresentante della seconda famiglia. È un caso che mostra l'aiuto dato dalla paleografia alla filologia. In passato generalmente si faceva la collazione del testo senza occuparsi del codice in sé e della sua storia, delle note marginali e del resto. La sottolineatura dell'importanza di questi dati anche sul piano filologico costituisce un apporto prezioso dei paleografi. Bisogna cercare di essere attenti alle considerazioni paleografiche per finalizzarle alla costituzione del testo. Avremo modo di parlare di un caso interessante che ha contrapposto a Pisa paleografi e filologi per un problema di datazione. Credo sia inscindibile il lavoro del filologo da quello del paleografo. Se uno si isola nella sua disciplina rischia di non vedere cose importanti.

Il testo che qui consideriamo può essere attribuito allo *scriptorium* del monaco Ephrem.³⁰ Scritto su due colonne, presenta il titolo e il sottotitolo del *Critone*, ma c'è una variante marginale aggiunta successivamente, secondo cui il *Critone* sarebbe un dialogo "sull'opinione vera e sul giusto". Il codice è del X secolo ma è stato giustamente messo in relazione con il Paris. gr. 1807 (IX secolo) che contiene il secondo tomo delle tetralogie platoniche (VIII e IX): T deriverebbe dal codice perduto, gemello del Paris. gr. 1807, che conteneva la prima parte del *corpus* (tetralogie I-VII); le caratteristiche di impostazione della pagina (su due colonne), l'assetto e il contenuto, al margine, dell'apparato di scolii sono decisamente simili. Questa ben diversa distribuzione del contenuto fra i due tomi del *corpus* platonico è facile da spiegare: nella VIII e IX tetralogia sono compresi i dieci libri della *Repubblica* e i dodici delle *Leggi*. Il *corpus* platonico difficilmente poteva essere compreso in un unico tomo. Solo due codici laurenziani (Laur. 59, 1 e Laur. 85, 9) del XIV secolo e un marciano (Marc. gr. 184) del secolo XV raccolgono in un solo volume tutti i dialoghi; questi tre codici, che appartengono a un'epoca più tarda, sono frutto dell'assemblaggio dei due tomi a formare un "tutto Platone".

Se volete un esempio di 'storia' di un manoscritto, si può subito citare il lavoro del padre Henri Dominique Saffrey proprio sul Paris. gr. 1807 che è un 'racconto' critico esemplare delle vicende vissute da un manoscritto che occupa un posto eminente all'interno della cosiddetta "Collezione filosofica" (un gruppo di codici di argomento filosofico, copiati da modelli in maiuscola provenienti probabilmente da Alessandria, che vede la luce in un ambiente dotto, legato forse alla nuova Università di Costantinopoli riorganizzata da Bardas con il concorso di Leone il filosofo): presto emigrato da Costantinopoli in Armenia dove serve da modello per la traduzione (che ancora si conserva) di alcuni dialoghi (tra cui le *Leggi*) in armeno, viene poi precocemente (XIII secolo) trasferito in Occidente e finisce nelle mani di Francesco Petrarca che poteva solo abbracciare il suo Platone greco, ma non leggerlo direttamente per la sua ben scarsa conoscenza della lingua greca. La conoscenza della dottrina platonica gli derivava dalla lettura di testimoni latini come Cicerone e Sant'Agostino e, per quanto riguarda il *Fedone* e il *Menone*, dalla traduzione di Enrico Aristippo. L'identificazione è stata possibile grazie alla descrizione sommaria del contenuto che il Petrarca nel 1367 fa di questo manoscritto nel *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia* (165-167); in una lettera di alcuni anni prima a Nicola Sygeros che stava in Grecia il Petrarca aveva detto che il manoscritto di Platone era venuto nelle sue mani dall'Occidente (*ex occasu*), a differenza, evidentemente, del codice di Omero che il suo corrispondente era riuscito a procurargli dalla Grecia. Sappiamo che alla morte del Petrarca, i libri della sua biblioteca, dopo varie vicende, finirono nelle mani dei Visconti Sforza a Pavia nel corso del '400: il Paris. gr. 1807 è menzionato in due inventari della Biblioteca Visconti-Sforza; l'approdo finale del nostro manoscritto, già nel '500, fu nella Bibliothèque

³⁰ B.L. Fonkič, "Notes paléographiques sur les manuscrits grecs des bibliothèques italiennes", *Θησαυρίσματα* 16 (1979), pp. 153-69.

du Roi di Fontainebleau (che continua a vivere nella Bibliothèque Nationale de France).³¹ Naturalmente a noi interesserebbe anche sapere qualcosa sulle vicende del codice ‘gemello’ del Parigino, contenente le prime sette tetralogie; ma su questo gemello nulla si sa se non che ha lasciato un discendente, cioè T, come si diceva. Il Marciano T è un manoscritto che ha avuto una grande importanza nella storia ‘critica’ del testo platonico perché è rimasto l’unica fonte primaria della seconda famiglia, nonostante i ripetuti tentativi di Dodds (ma dallo stesso Dodds riconosciuti vani) per dimostrare l’indipendenza da T del Par. gr. 1808.³² È in realtà il capostipite di una ricchissima discendenza.³³

La Tavola 14 presenta il capofila della terza famiglia: il ms Vindob. Suppl. gr. 7 (W): è un bell’esemplare dell’XI secolo, che ha al suo interno cose sorprendenti come la redazione alternativa del *Cratilo* (437 D - 438 B) di cui si è parlato. Anche questo manoscritto ha una storia interessante. Si trovava a Firenze nel ’400 nelle mani di Donato Acciaiuoli; fu poi donato alla Certosa e quindi venduto alla biblioteca imperiale di Vienna, con dei contrasti, perché i monaci non volevano privarsi del manoscritto. Il manoscritto potrebbe essere stato portato in Italia dall’Argiropulo, che fu chiamato ad insegnare il greco a Firenze e si impegnò soprattutto con le sue celebrate lezioni su Aristotele. Sappiamo però che durante la sua permanenza a Firenze, in forma meno ufficiale, insegnava anche Platone, che faceva letture guidate anche di dialoghi platonici³⁴. Perché questo rapporto con l’Argiropulo? Perché da W fu tratto un apografo (il Guelferbytanus 44 Gud. graec. conservato a Wolfenbüttel), nei cui *marginalia* è stata riconosciuta la mano dell’Argiropulo; questo apografo contiene il *Cratilo* (con la doppia redazione a 437 D - 438 B propria di W), nonché l’orazione Πρὸς τοὺς νέους di Basilio. Quindi è ben possibile che W sia arrivato a Firenze tramite l’Argiropulo. Non si trovano invece tracce di un uso di W da parte di Ficino, che pure era un grande indagatore delle fonti platoniche e proprio in quegli anni era impegnato nella traduzione di tutto Platone. Ficino si servì come testo-base del Laur. 85, 9 ma è stato dimostrato che aveva la possibilità di collazionare altri manoscritti presenti a Firenze al suo tempo (come, per esempio, i codici della Badia fiorentina), con cui integrare le lacune del testo-base.³⁵ Bisogna fare attenzione nell’uso del testo della traduzione di Ficino; se si vuol considerare l’autentico Ficino bisogna risalire all’edizione del 1484 (e considerare, in più, gli esemplari manoscritti ‘di dedica’),³⁶ ma non si può partire dalle edizioni del ’500, molto alterate da successivi interventi degli editori-stampatori. Se uno prendesse un’edizione del

³¹ H.D. Saffrey, “Retour sur le *Parisinus graecus* 1807, le manuscrit A de Platon”, in C. D’Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2007 (Philosophia Antiqua, 107), pp. 3-28.

³² Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 49-53. Dice Dodds (p. 53): “[...] it is safest to accord their readings no higher status than that of simple conjectures”.

³³ Questa discendenza è stata studiata già da M. Schanz, *Über den Platocodex der Markusbibliothek in Venedig, Append. Class. 4, Nr. 1, den Archetypus der zweiten Handschriftenfamilie*, B. Tauchnitz, Leipzig 1877. Ma si può vedere, specificamente per il *Critone*, E. Berti, “I manoscritti del *Critone* di Platone. Gli apografi del Venetus Append. Cl. IV, 1, Coll. 542”, *Hermes* 97 (1969), pp. 412-31; per il *Parmenide* e il *Fedro*, C. Moreschini, “Studi sulla tradizione manoscritta del *Parmenide* e del *Fedro*”, *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa S. II* 34 (1965), pp. 169-85, in part. pp. 178-85; per il *Simposio*, Ch. Brockmann, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung von Platons Symposion*, Reichert Verlag, Wiesbaden 1992 (Serta graeca 2), pp. 150-67. Dovranno naturalmente essere prese in considerazione anche le Introduzioni dedicate alla tradizione testuale, nelle edizioni critiche di vari dialoghi uscite in questi anni.

³⁴ A. Carlini, “Le vicende storico-tradizionali del Vindob. W e i suoi rapporti con il Lobcoviciano e il Ven. gr. Z 185, Il Lobcoviciano sotto analisi paleografica e filologica”, in *Studi su codici e papiri filosofici. Platone, Aristotele, Ierocle*, L.S. Olschki, Firenze 1992 (Studi e testi per il Corpus dei papiri filosofici, 6), pp. 11-35, in part. pp. 17-19.

³⁵ Sulle fonti di Ficino si può vedere *infra*, pp. 236.

³⁶ Si veda, p. es., E. Berti, “Osservazioni filologiche alla versione del *Filebo* di Marsilio Ficino”, in P. Cosenza (ed.), *Il Filebo di Platone e la sua fortuna, Atti del Convegno (Napoli, 4-6 novembre 1993)*, D’Auria, Napoli 1996 (Collectanea, 11), pp. 93-172, in part. p. 105 e n. 24.

Platone ficiniano della seconda metà del '500, 'trattato' da Symon Grynaeus dovrebbe dire, ad esempio, che Ficino aveva avuto davanti a sé W, perché risulta tradotta la redazione alternativa del *Cratilo*, cosa che invece non è nell'edizione originale della traduzione del 1484. Si tratta di un'aggiunta, meglio di una interpolazione. James Hankins ha fatto un grosso lavoro sulle edizioni cinquecentesche di Platone.³⁷

Si parla spesso in filologia di 'contaminazione'. Paul Maas osservava che: "Contro la contaminazione non è cresciuta nessuna erba medicinale" ("Gegen die Kontamination ist kein Kraut gewachsen"):³⁸ non c'è alcun rimedio. Vorrei farvi vedere (Tavola 15) un caso di contaminazione in atto che riguarda proprio due manoscritti che abbiamo già visto, cioè il Marciano gr. 185 (D) che appartiene alla prima famiglia β e il Vind. Suppl. gr. 7 che appartiene alla famiglia δ . Nel manoscritto Marciano è presente una mano recente (d¹), che interviene a integrare interi fogli andati perduti. Una parte del *Fedone* che era andata perduta è stata reintegrata da d¹. Questo lavoro di reintegrazione di fogli perduti, su un piano sistematico, è stato fatto anche alla Laurenziana, al momento dell'apertura al pubblico nel 1571, con Cosimo I, quando si passò dalla biblioteca 'domestica' dei Medici alla biblioteca 'pubblica'. Furono rilegati molti codici con legature uniformi munite di una catena che li legava saldamente ai plutei disegnati da Michelangelo, ma prima furono restaurati se avevano perduto dei fogli. C'è ad esempio un codice di Diogene Laerzio (il Laur. 69, 13 del XIII secolo) che ha fascicoli reintegrati chiaramente da mano del XVI secolo. La stessa cosa è accaduta, in diversa epoca, con il Marciano. Uno scriba successivo del XIV secolo (d¹) ha reintegrato vari fogli; non solo, ma ha messo in margine di altri fogli delle varianti. Quando si trovava di fronte ad un punto problematico cercava un altro testimone e ne registrava a margine le varianti. Il codice da cui attingeva era precisamente il Vindobonense W. Questo legame tra i due manoscritti si può dimostrare attraverso la presenza, nei margini di D (per intervento di d¹) proprio della redazione alternativa del *Cratilo*, tant'è che Burnet informa nel suo apparato della redazione alternativa esclusivamente a partire da questa aggiunta marginale della mano d¹. Se non che, la stessa mano correttrice si trova poi anche nei margini del Vindobonense, dove riporta varianti tratte dal Marciano. È dunque un mutuo scambio di varianti, correzioni, integrazioni.³⁹ Qui siamo fortunati, perché abbiamo la possibilità di riconoscere le fonti e le derivazioni, ma quando queste fonti non sono conosciute e le lezioni alternative vengono accolte direttamente a testo da qualche scriba si genera una contaminazione "senza rimedio". Nel caso dello scambio di varianti, operato da uno scriba dotto, $W > d^1$ e $d^1 > W$, si tratta di un fenomeno avvenuto certamente a Costantinopoli prima dell'arrivo del codice Vindob. Suppl. gr. 7 in Italia. I due manoscritti D e W hanno poi avuto storie diverse: l'uno lo troviamo nella biblioteca del Bessarione, l'altro a Firenze con l'Acciaiuoli e poi alla Certosa.

Un altro caso in cui occorre prudenza è quello di un codice che presenta molte lezioni buone che vanno accolte a testo, ma che ad un esame più approfondito non si rivela 'portatore' di tradizione diretta, ma piuttosto 'importatore' di varianti, che sono frutto di una revisione critica. Alla Tavola 16 (anche qui la parte finale del *Critone* e l'inizio del *Fedone*) è presentato il Vind. Phil. gr. 21 (Y), del XIII-XIV secolo, dovuto ad una pluralità di mani. Se si prende l'edizione Budé di Léon Robin del *Fedone* (precedente a quella di Vicaire), Y viene considerato come fonte primaria del testo, sulla base di precedenti lavori come quello di Alline, che, mettendo a frutto i risultati di ricerche di Immisch, aveva ritenuto che Y fosse da considerare una fonte autonoma, un manoscritto indipendente, perché in molti punti conservava

³⁷ J. Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, I – II, Brill, Leiden-New York-Kobenhavn-Köln 1990 (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, 17). Il primo volume è stato tradotto in italiano: Id., *La riscoperta di Platone nel Rinascimento italiano*, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa 2009.

³⁸ P. Maas, *Textkritik*, 4. Auflage (citato sopra, n. 15), p. 30.

³⁹ A. Carlini, "Le vicende storico-tradizionali" (citato sopra, n. 34), pp. 19-21.

un testo che sembrava essere preferibile a quello degli altri testimoni.⁴⁰ Studiando da un punto di vista codicologico e paleografico il manoscritto, è emersa non solo la pluralità di mani; anche le fonti del testo tenute presenti per la trascrizione del testo sono molteplici. Sono state contate addirittura nove mani. Una è sicuramente quella di Planude, un'altra di Niceforo Moscopulo che con Planude fu il coordinatore di questa trascrizione, da più fonti, di una selezione di dialoghi platonici.⁴¹ Le fonti possono cambiare addirittura all'interno di un dialogo. Il *Fedone*, per esempio, ha una fonte della prima famiglia nella prima parte che però poi cambia nel resto del dialogo. Ci sono lezioni buone che possono essere frutto di congettura o essere dovute a recupero da codici a noi sconosciuti di lezioni antiche. Questo testo (per i dialoghi delle prime tetralogie; diverso è il caso del *Timeo*) non può essere considerato come fonte autonoma, perché è una 'recensione' dotta, ma continuano giustamente ad esserne citate in apparato alcune buone lezioni. Questo manoscritto è una dimostrazione dell'attività straordinaria di Planude anche sul testo di Platone. Utilizzando il Par. gr. 1808, Planude ha realizzato anche una raccolta di *excerpta* platonici, con grande ricchezza di scelta. Naturalmente, alcuni dialoghi sono molto rappresentati altri meno. È interessante vedere anche quali criteri hanno guidato Planude nella sua selezione.⁴²

Il Paris. gr. 1808, abitualmente datato al XIII secolo, è stato retrodatato all'XI-XII secolo.⁴³ Deriva dal Marciano T, ma è all'origine di una ricca discendenza e anche i due manoscritti della Laurenziana, già richiamati, che contengono tutto Platone dipendono per la prima parte da questo codice. L'edizione integrale del *corpus* platonico che si trova nel Laur. 59, 1 e nel Laur. 85, 9 presenta una curiosa anomalia: i dialoghi spuri sono non alla fine dell'intero *corpus* platonico, ma dopo la settima tetralogia, proprio perché per tutta questa parte hanno la loro fonte nel Paris. gr. 1808 il cui contenuto è tetralogie I-VII più gli spuri. Brockmann (la Tavola 17 è ricavata dall'imponente apparato illustrativo del suo studio sul *Simposio*) ha selezionato la fine del *Simposio* e l'inizio del *Fedro* che è numerato IB¹: è il 12° dialogo (cioè il quarto dialogo della terza tetralogia). Sia pure in caratteri molto piccoli, c'è uno scolio interessante che fa vedere la precisa dipendenza degli scolii filosofici a Platone dai commentari neoplatonici. Lo scolio cita Olimpiodoro sulla questione di quale sia il dialogo da cui iniziare lo studio di Platone. L'edizione degli scolii platonici di Greene (1938) è utile e presenta un buon materiale di confronto.⁴⁴ È in corso di stampa una nuova edizione fatta a Pisa da Domenico Cufalo che unisce gli *scholia* presenti nel Bodl. Cl. 39 e gli *scholia vetera* di T e W.⁴⁵ Gli scolii platonici non hanno origini tanto antiche quanto, ad esempio, quelli aristofanei. Ci sono scolii mitologici, grammaticali, ma la fonte principale è l'attività di esegesi filosofica tardoantica. C'è un codice della stessa "Collezione filosofica" a cui appartenevano all'origine il Paris. gr. 1807 e il suo gemello perduto di tetral. I-VII, che contiene una serie di commentari neoplatonici, di Damascio e Olimpiodoro, a dialoghi platonici (*Fedone*, *Gorgia*, *Alcibiade I*, *Parmenide*): è il

⁴⁰ H. Alline, *Histoire du texte de Platon*, Honoré Champion, Paris 1915, pp. 226-35. Va riconosciuto però che Alline si dimostra un po' sconcertato di fronte al manoscritto di Vienna, tanto che dice (p. 235) che non può essere utilizzato "qu'avec une grande prudence". Il lavoro di Immisch era uscito alcuni anni prima: O. Immisch, *Philologische Studien zu Plato. II: De recensioneis platonicae praesidiis atque rationibus*, Teubner, Leipzig 1903.

⁴¹ E. Gamillscheg, "Eine Platonhandschrift des Nikephoros Moschopoulos (Vind. Phil. Gr. 21)", in *Byzantios. Festschrift für Herbert Hunger zum 70. Geburtstag*, Becvar, Wien 1984, pp. 95-100; A. D'Acunto, "Su un'edizione platonica di Niceforo Moscopulo e Massimo Planude, il Vindobonense Phil. Gr. 21 (Y)", *Studi Classici e Orientali* 45 (1995), pp. 261-79.

⁴² Un'edizione (con ricca introduzione) di questa *Συναγωγή* platonica, a cura di Lorenzo Ferroni, sta per vedere la luce.

⁴³ Ch. Brockmann, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung*, pp. 162-77, in part. p. 162.

⁴⁴ W.Ch. Greene, *Scholia Platonica*, Societas Philologica Americana, Haverford 1938 (Philological Monographs published by the American Philological Association, VIII).

⁴⁵ L'edizione nel frattempo è uscita: *Scholia Graeca in Platonem*, ed. D. Cufalo, *Scholia ad dialogos tetralogiarum I-VII continens*, Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2007 (Pleiadi, 5.1).

Marc. gr. 196. Si discute quando sia stato creato questo apparato di scolii: per alcuni studiosi è frutto del primo 'umanesimo' bizantino (secolo IX), per altri risale già all'età tardoantica. Il problema più generale della costituzione dell'apparato di scolii dei codici medievali è stato studiato da Nigel Wilson che ha preso in considerazione anche le testimonianze che vengono dai papiri. Egli osserva che già in età tardoantica si è passati da un commento a sé, circolante separatamente dal testo commentato (ὑπόμνημα legato a un ἔκδοσις di riferimento), ad una sequenza di annotazioni marginali, magari attinte a fonti diverse, apposte al testo stesso. In alcuni casi si può seguire il processo per cui dagli *hypomnemata* sono stati ricavati singoli scolii che sono stati poi apposti nel margine del testo oggetto del commento.⁴⁶ C'è un famoso papiro di Callimaco (P. Oxy. 2258) scritto in maiuscola alessandrina (un'altra scrittura 'canonica' caratterizzata da un'alternanza tra lettere larghe, alcune molto larghe, e lettere strette), che ha nei margini del testo (era ovviamente un codice) scolii nella stessa scrittura ma con caratteri di un modulo più piccolo. È dunque la stessa mano che interviene anche per gli scolii. È un manufatto datato al VII secolo e già compare un testo con il corredo di scolii. Per spiegare l'origine degli scolii nei margini dei testi classici, si fa ricorso anche alle 'Catene' bibliche che raccolgono i vari commenti dei Padri ad uno stesso versetto biblico. Per Platone l'opinione prevalente è che gli scolii siano dovuti ad un'attività della prima rinascenza bizantina.⁴⁷ Quando si è programmato nel IX secolo di trascrivere in minuscola il *corpus* di Platone si è pensato anche di fare un grosso lavoro di estrazione dai commentari neoplatonici delle note di commento più importanti e interessanti per corredare i dialoghi con questa cornice di scolii.

Ecco qui l'indice completo dei dialoghi di Platone contenuti, che apre il Laurenziano 85, 9 (ff. 2 r, 2 v, 3 r). È la Tavola 18 che assembla parti dei tre fogli. Ho voluto dare un'idea della sontuosità di questa impresa, che raggruppa in un codice solo tutto Platone nonché gli scritti antichi preparatori alla lettura del testo di Platone che vedete nelle prime quattro righe: Albino, Alcino, Diogene Laerzio, Teone. Sono testi dettagliatamente descritti con titolo, numero d'ordine, sottotitolo e *incipit*. Si dà anche il numero dei fogli che ogni dialogo occupa nel codice, questo per favorire il reperimento di passi e citazioni. Il codice ad ogni foglio presenta il titolo corrente relativo al dialogo. Si può voler andare a cercare, ad esempio, un passo del *Fedone* che si trova nel foglio 2 di 12 (che è il numero complessivo dei fogli occupati dal dialogo). Sono ben tre le pagine dedicate alla descrizione del contenuto, il *pinax*. Poi addirittura per le *Lettere* ci sono i nomi dei corrispondenti di Platone con la formula di saluto εὖ πρόπτερον. In seguito (quando il codice era già giunto a Firenze), è stato aggiunto un quarto foglio con un *pinax* in latino chiaramente derivato da questi tre fogli greci, come dimostrano alcuni errori che si trovano pari pari nella traduzione latina (es. *Theagenes* che rende il greco Θεαγέννης in luogo del corretto *Theages* corrispondente a Θεάγης). Il *pinax* latino deve essere stato aggiunto ad uso di Cosimo il Vecchio che non conosceva il greco. Questo è il manoscritto portato a Firenze dal seguito dell'imperatore Giovanni VIII Paleologo venuto per il Concilio di Ferrara-Firenze (1438-1439). Ambrogio Traversari fa riferimento, in una lettera indirizzata da Ferrara all'amico ser Ugolino Peruzzi, a tre "praestantissima volumina" portati dall'imperatore fra cui un "tutto Platone" *venuste scriptum* (e non si può dire che il Laur. 85, 9 non sia un manoscritto elegante e nell'impostazione della pagina e nella scrittura). Il manoscritto fu con ogni probabilità acquistato da Cosimo e poi messo a disposizione di

⁴⁶ Per un inquadramento generale sull'origine degli scolii medievali, cf. N.G. Wilson, "A Chapter in the History of Scholia", *The Classical Quarterly* 17 (1967) pp. 244-56; Id., "Two Notes on Byzantine Scholarship", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 12/4 (1971), pp. 557-8; Id., recensione di "G. Zuntz, Die Aristophanes-Scholien der Papyri", *The Classical Review* (New Series) 27/2 (1977), p. 271; Id., "Scolia e commentatori", *Studi classici e orientali* 33 (1983), pp. 83-112, in part. pp. 90-1 [trad. ingl. ampliata Id., "Scolia and Commentators", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 47 (2007), pp. 39-70].

⁴⁷ *Scholium Graeca in Platonem*, pp. CV-CVI Cufalo.

Ficino per la sua traduzione. Ed è questo il codice che sta alla base della traduzione ficiniana, ma non è il solo. Il codice Conv. Soppr. 180 della Laurenziana è stato utilizzato, p. es., per colmare vistose lacune del Laur. 85, 9. Per fare un esempio: ad un certo punto, al f. 333 *recto* (corrispondente a *Leggi* 865 e) infatti lo scriba ha saltato un intero foglio del modello che trascriveva. Ficino ricorre a questo altro manoscritto per poter reintegrare il testo e tradurlo. Nel manoscritto Conv. Soppr. 180 si vedono ancora i segni, tipici di Ficino, che indicano inizio e fine della sezione delle *Leggi* mancante nel Laur. 85, 9 e che doveva essere reintegrata per poter dare completezza alla traduzione.⁴⁸ In altri casi fa correzioni o integrazioni a margine con la sua scrittura, che è inconfondibile. Alla Tavola 19 è consegnato l'inizio della trascrizione ficiniana del *Simposio*, così come ne esiste una, conservata all'Ambrosiana, del *Fedone*: si può pensare che Ficino abbia costituito un "suo" testo di Platone, attingendo a più fonti, ma intervenendo anche con personali correzioni che si riflettono nella sua traduzione.⁴⁹ È bene ricordare ancora che per ricostruire il lavoro di Ficino 'traduttore' occorre studiare l'*editio princeps* del 1484 e i codici di dedica. Splendidi sono i due esemplari di dedica, decorati da Attavante, a Lorenzo il Magnifico: Laur. 82, 6 e 82, 7.

La Tavola 20 presenta un altro manoscritto con l'intero testo di Platone, il Marc. gr. 184 dovuto al calligrafo di fiducia di Bessarione, Giovanni Rhosos, che ha trascritto tutto Platone da varie fonti tutte riviste e corrette da Bessarione. Lo scriba ha avuto l'incarico di costruire un testo di tutto Platone dopo che Bessarione aveva fatto un grosso lavoro di correzione del testo mettendo a frutto anche la collazione di altri esemplari di Platone della sua biblioteca (es. Marciano gr. 189, Marciano gr. 186). Era il modo abituale di lavorare di Bessarione: confrontava un testo-base con altre fonti manoscritte, ricavava varianti e correzioni. Quando credeva di essere arrivato ad uno stato accettabile chiamava lo scriba di fiducia per mettere il testo in bella copia, che risultava così depurata da errori e omissioni. È curioso che nel primo tomo dell'edizione platonica di Martin Schanz questa copia finale del Marc. gr. 184 venga trattata come testimone primario, come fonte da citare nell'apparato accanto alle altre, mentre è chiaro che si tratta di una copia di copie da scartare come il Vind. Phil. gr. 21, perché è il frutto di un lavoro congetturale, non portatrice di tradizione. Ma Schanz si è presto ricreduto e ha rimediato nei successivi tomi. Rhosos ha adottato lo stesso sistema del Laur. 85, 9 per i titoli correnti e ha anche indicato il numero progressivo dei fogli che contengono ciascuno dei dialoghi per favorire il recupero di un passo.

La Tavola 21 presenta il Vat. Pal. gr. 173 (P), un codice che ha una sua precisa collocazione nella tradizione e una sua storia. Lo si è già ricordato prima (*supra*, p. 224) perché figura nell'apparato dell'edizione oxoniense come preteso unico portatore della lezione accolta in un caso dubbio. Si è visto che non è così perché anche questo codice si allinea con gli altri. Ma P è un codice molto rilevante, trascurato da Burnet e recuperato per la prima volta da Dodds per il *Gorgia*. È un codice il cui contenuto abbraccia l'intero *corpus* platonico, cioè il primo e il secondo dei due tomi del *corpus*, e, per quanto riguarda la datazione, siamo in età alta (X secolo); mentre si è visto che, tranne poche eccezioni, la prima e la seconda parte del *corpus* sono nettamente separate tra loro. Tuttavia P non dà la trascrizione integrale di tutti i dialoghi. Di alcuni dialoghi dà l'intero testo, di altri dà solo una selezione di passi, un po' come farà Planude nei suoi *excerpta*. Altri dialoghi sono presenti addirittura

⁴⁸ S. Gentile, "Note sui manoscritti greci di Platone utilizzati da Marsilio Ficino", in *Scritti in onore di Eugenio Garin*, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa 1987 (Pubblicazioni della Classe di lettere e filosofia, 1), pp. 51-84, in part. p. 73; A. Carlini, "Marsilio Ficino e il testo di Platone", *Rinascimento* 39 (1999), pp. 3-36, in part. pp. 20-21 (ripubblicato con aggiunte in S. Gentile - S. Toussaint (ed.), *Marsilio Ficino. Fonti, testi, fortuna. Atti del Convegno Internazionale (Firenze, 1-3 Ottobre 1999)*, Storia e letteratura, Roma 2006 (Studi e testi del Rinascimento europeo, 30), pp. 25-64, in part. pp. 43-4.

⁴⁹ E. Berti, "Marsilio Ficino e il testo greco del *Fedone* di Platone", in J. Hamesse (ed.), *Les traducteurs au travail : leurs manuscrits et leurs méthodes. Actes du Colloque international organisé par le Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture, Erice, 30 septembre - 6 octobre 1999*, Brepols, Turnhout 2001 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge, 18), pp. 349-543, in part. pp. 422-3.

soltanto con il testo di qualche scolio.⁵⁰ Al f. 114r possiamo leggere due *excerpta* del *Simposio*: 197 B 2 - 197 E 5 e immediatamente dopo (a partire dal r. 16) 206 B 7- 207 A 1. È interessante che nel X secolo chi ha sovrinteso alla confezione di questo manoscritto mostri di avere davanti a sé l'intero *corpus*. L'altra particolarità è la sua ricchezza di abbreviazioni e di compendi tachigrafici. Era uno scriba dotto, che voleva economizzare e scriveva per chi era addestrato nella lettura di una scrittura con abbreviazioni. Non si arriva però ad un vero e proprio sistema tachigrafico, come nel caso di testi di Dionigi l'Areopagita redatti per una comunità di dotti in grado di leggere queste forme tachigrafiche.⁵¹ In alcuni casi gli *excerpta* platonici sono poi contrassegnati da una indicazione di contenuto, quasi un titolo, ad esempio, "sulla libertà", "sulla teocrazia". Altre volte lo scriba interviene con *notabilia* a margine per indicare l'argomento del passo. Si può pensare (ma è solo una congettura) all'opera di un dotto che redigeva un lavoro preliminare in vista della raccolta di passi riguardanti specifici temi, come sono stati realizzati per gli storici antichi nel X secolo sotto Costantino Porfirigenito (*Excerpta Constantiniana*).

Il codice Vaticanus gr. 225 (V) è stato a lungo discusso per la sua cronologia (Tavola 22). Credo si possa riconoscere (con gli editori oxoniensi) che è un testimone autonomo, ma veniva datato XII secolo e così è datato anche dall'edizione oxoniense. Studi recenti di paleografi mostrano che si tratta invece di un testimone più recente, del XIII-XIV secolo, perché si rivela un prodotto di imitazione. Lo studio di Giancarlo Prato elenca tutta una serie di testimoni di questa epoca che, come nel caso di Platone, sono frutto di mimesi grafica.⁵² Ci sono dei cedimenti dello scriba che era impegnato e tutto teso ad imitare modelli più antichi, ma viveva pur sempre nella sua età e in questa età era molto di moda una scrittura in cui certe lettere sono enormi rispetto alle altre; non per nulla è una scrittura da Herbert Hunger detta "a occhi di grasso nel brodo" (*Fettaugenstil*).⁵³

Un caso inverso di asserita, ma non valida retrodatazione riguarda invece il codice di Praga (Lobkovicianus VI Fa 1). Una retrodatazione che la paleografa Lidia Perria aveva autorevolmente proposto, con il consenso iniziale di altri studiosi (Tavola 23). Questo codice, abitualmente datato al XIV secolo, è stato considerato dalla studiosa recentemente scomparsa come strettamente imparentato con W, anzi scritto proprio dalla stessa mano, quindi assegnato al XI secolo. In questo caso sarebbe stata una fonte testuale da utilizzare pienamente in sede critica.⁵⁴ Si può però dimostrare che in questo manoscritto c'è la stessa volontà arcaizzante di altri codici. Il codice Vind. Suppl. gr. 7 è stato in realtà preso a modello, è stato considerato come un manoscritto 'antico', degno di essere imitato. È un 'caso' che è stato discusso in un confronto seminariale sereno ma serrato fra filologi e paleografi avvenuto qui a Pisa nel marzo 1992. Si è visto alla fine che bisognava considerarlo come

⁵⁰ M. Menchelli, "Il Vaticano Palatino gr. 173 (P) di Platone e il Parigino gr. 1665 di Diodoro", *Bollettino dei Classici* Serie III 12 (1991), pp. 93-117.

⁵¹ S. Lilla, *Il testo tachigrafico del "De divinis nominibus"* (Vat. gr. 1809), Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1970 (Studi e testi, 263); si veda anche, più in generale, N.P. Chionidis - S. Lilla (ed.), *La tachigrafia italo-bizantina*, Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1981 (Studi e testi, 290).

⁵² G. Prato, "I manoscritti greci dei secoli XIII e XIV: note paleografiche", in D. Harlfinger - G. Prato *et alii* (ed.), *Paleografia e codicologia greca: atti del II colloquio internazionale, Berlino-Wolfenbüttel, 17-21 ottobre 1983*, Edizioni dell'Orso, Alessandria 1991 (Biblioteca di Scrittura e Civiltà, 3), I, pp. 139-40 (= *Studi di Paleografia greca*, Centro italiano di studi sull'Alto medioevo, Spoleto 1994, pp. 122-3).

⁵³ H. Hunger, "Griechische Paläographie", in *Die Textüberlieferung der antiken Literatur und der Bibel*, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München 1988, pp. 72-107, in part. pp. 101-3.

⁵⁴ L. Perria, "Note paleografiche, II. Altre testimonianze sul copista di W", *Rivista di Studi bizantini e Neoellenici*, n. s. 22-23 (1985-1986), pp. 82-90.

una copia, sebbene di eccellente livello, anche perché, altra osservazione, ci sono cedimenti nel tracciato di alcune lettere che escono dal modulo.⁵⁵ Nigel Wilson ha mostrato che ci sono scoli che contengono riferimenti storici di epoca più tarda;⁵⁶ ma si può vedere anche la rigidità della mano nel proporre le stesse lettere. Quindi è stato un caso aperto e chiuso,⁵⁷ come io credo si possa considerare chiuso quello del Vat. gr. 225, che si compone di due parti, perché il contenuto platonico continua con il Vat. gr. 226. Si tratta di un caso di codice diviso in due tomi.

Prima di chiudere, vorrei proporvi alle Tavole 24 (*incipit* del *Gorgia*) e 25 (*incipit* del primo libro della *Repubblica*) un codice che ha un contenuto complessivo che abbraccia dialoghi della sesta, della settima, dell'ottava e della nona tetralogia (quindi a cavallo tra i due tomi del *corpus* platonico), cioè il Vind. Suppl. gr. 39 (F), appartenuto all'umanista Francesco Barbaro. Vale la pena di occuparsi di questo esemplare che contiene il *Gorgia*, il *Menone*, i due *Ippia*, il *Menesseno*, lo *Ione* e poi il *Clitofonte*, la *Repubblica*, il *Timeo*, il *Crizia*, il *Minosse* (cioè dialoghi che appartenevano alla parte finale del primo tomo (ordinato secondo il sistema tetralogico) e alla parte iniziale del secondo tomo (ordinato sempre secondo il sistema tetralogico). Ma questo è un codice recente, del XIII-XIV secolo. Appartiene alla prima età dei Paleologi, dopo l'esperienza non felice dell'impero latino (1204-1261) in cui c'è stata una ben ridotta attività di trascrizione di testi. Con i Paleologi si recuperano testimoni antichi e nuovi delle opere conosciute. F deve essere considerato fonte primaria, come ha diffusamente mostrato Eric Dodds.⁵⁸ Mostra sensibili convergenze con papiri antichi e con *testimonia* di tradizione indiretta. Sembra trattarsi di un testimone che continua in piena età bizantina una tradizione del tutto indipendente rispetto agli altri codici. Questo manoscritto per Dodds sarebbe il portatore di una tradizione antichissima, che potrebbe risalire al II secolo d.C.⁵⁹ È molto interessante, a commento del famoso motto pasqualiano "recentiores, non deteriores".⁶⁰ Su questa linea non è Paul Maas, se dice, in conclusione di un capitoletto della *Textkritik*, che certi codici recenti vanno bruciati e non collazionati.⁶¹ Canfora ha dimostrato, nel suo articolo sulla genesi della stemmatica maasiana, che la strategia maasiana tende a liberarsi troppo facilmente dei codici più recenti.⁶² Pasquali non parla del Vindob. Suppl. gr. 39, ma ha avuto il merito di mostrare con larghezza di altri esempi che un codice recente può portare del nuovo ed essere indispensabile per la ricostruzione di un testo.

⁵⁵ Le relazioni dei filologi e dei paleografi intervenuti a questo confronto sono state pubblicate nel volume: *Studi su codici e papiri filosofici. Platone, Aristotele, Ierocle*, Leo S. Olschki, Firenze 1992 (Studi della Colombaria 129), pp. 7-143 (con 14 Tavole fuori testo).

⁵⁶ N. Wilson, "The Prague Manuscript of Plato", *Studi Classici e Orientali* 44 (1994), pp. 23-32 (con otto Tavole fuori testo). Importanti in generale anche gli interventi di J. Irigoien, "La datation du manuscrit L de Platon (Pragensis VI Fa 1): une aporie paléographique?", *Bollettino della Badia greca di Grattaferrata*, n.s. 51 (1997), pp. 27-35 e di E. Berti, "Ancora sul Locoviciano di Platone", in *Ὅδοι διζήσιος*, cit. n. 14, pp. 95-107.

⁵⁷ La chiusura definitiva del caso (con riconoscimento della recenziarietà del Lobcoviciano) è venuta in occasione del V Colloquio di Paleografia greca del 1998 con l'intervento di Giancarlo Prato che presiedeva la Tavola rotonda *Per la datazione e la localizzazione delle scritture greche*, in *I manoscritti greci tra riflessione e dibattito. Atti del V Colloquio Internazionale di Paleografia greca (Cremona, 4-10 ottobre 1998)*, Gonnelli, Firenze 2000 (Papyrologica Florentina 31), p. 671.


⁵⁸ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 41-7.

⁵⁹ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 46-7.

⁶⁰ È questo il titolo del quarto capitolo del volume G. Pasquali, *Storia della tradizione e critica del testo*, Le Monnier, Firenze 1952, pp. 41-108.

⁶¹ P. Maas, *Textkritik*, pp. 31-2. Sui due motti di Pasquali e di Maas, si può vedere A. Carlini, "Recentiores, non deteriores. Comburendi, non conferendi", in *Μοῦσα. Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Morelli*, Pàtron, Bologna 1997, pp. 1-9.

⁶² L. Canfora, "Origine della 'stemmatica' di Paul Maas", *Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione classica* 110 (1982), pp. 362-79.



Tav. 1. P. Petrie I 5-8. © The British Library, London.

Φαίνεται.

Ὀυκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελῶτον ἂν εἴη ἀνδρα-
 πασασκευάζονθι' ἕαυτον ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυράτω ὄντα τοῦ
 τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κάπειθι' ἤκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγα-
 ε νακτεῖν;

Γελῶτον· πῶς δ' οὐ;

e 4 γελῶτον P, sed Socrati trib.: Simmiae trib. Burnet: inter ἀγα-
 νακτεῖν (e 2) et τῷ (e 5) desunt non amplius xiii litr. in Π₂: οὐ γελῶτον
 βΤWQVNA Socrati tribuentes

ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἴεων ἀπο-
 5 θανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες ἠθελήσαν εἰς Αἴδου μετα-
 θεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀρόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὀψεσθαι τε
 ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ συνέσσεσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις
 τῷ ὄντι ἐβῶν, καὶ λαβῶν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐπίπεια,
 μῆδαιμοῦ ἀλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν
 b Αἴδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐχ ἄσμενος
 εἶσιν αὐτόσε; οἰεσθαί γε γρη, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ἦ, ὧ ἐτάρασε,
 φυλάσσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μῆδαιμοῦ
 ἀλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ
 5 τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρατι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὰ ἂν ἀλογία
 εἴη εἰ φοβόιτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος:
 Πολλὰ μὲντοι γῆ Δία, ἦ δ' ὄς.

a 4 καὶ γυναικῶν βΤδ Ol. et ut vid. fuerat in Π₂: secl. Ver-
 denius καὶ ἴεων βΤδ: ἦ παιδῶν ἐνεκα Π₂: secl. Verdenius
 a 5 ὀη om. Π₂ μεταθεῖν TB?: ἐλθεῖν βWPQVAT²Π₂ a 6 τε
 β: τι Τδ b 2 γε² β Π₂: om. Τδ
 b 3-4 μῆδαιμοῦ... φρονήσει βΤδ:] θαυαῦ ἀλλοθι [... spat fere xiv
 litr. ...] θαρῶς φρονήσει ἐν Π₂: ἀλλοθι θύνατον εἶναι καθαρῶς γρ. B
 ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ om. Π₂ ut vid. b 5 ἀν ἀλογία βΤδ: ἀλογία ἂν Π₂

Tav. 2. Plato, *Phaedo* 67 D 11 - E 4; 68 A 3 - B 7, ed. J.C.G. Strachan. Cf. *Platonis Opera*, tomus I tetralogias I-II continens, recognoverunt brevique adnotatione critica instruxerunt Duke, Hieken, Nicoll, Robinson, Strachan, Oxonii 1995.

Tav. 4. P. Leiden inv. 22. © Papyrologisch Instituut Universiteit Leiden.





Tav. 5. *P.Vindob. G 39846*. © Papyrussammlung, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Wien.



Tav. 6. *P. Antin.* 78. © Egypt Exploration Society, London.

SIGLA CODICUM

- FAMILIA I β
- B Cod. Bodl. MS E. D. Clarke 39 anno 805
 - C Cod. Tub. gr. Mb 14 saec. XI
 - D Cod. Ven. gr. 185 saec. XII
- FAMILIA II T
- T Cod. Ven. app. cl. 4. 1 saec. X
- FAMILIA III δ
- W Cod. Vind. suppl. gr. 7 saec. XI
 - P Cod. Vat. Pal. gr. 173 saec. X-XI
 - Q Cod. Par. gr. 1813 saec. XIII
 - S Cod. Par. suppl. gr. 668 (imit.-60a; 106e-fn.) saec. XI
 - V Cod. Vat. gr. 225 saec. XII?
- A exemplar Graecum quo usus est Henricus Aristippus, quantum apparet ex interpretatione Latina anno 1156 incohata quam typis expressam in lucem edidit L. Mino-Paluello (*Plato Latinus*, Vol. II, Lond. MCML), monendum tamen est hunc fontem non in omnibus locis restitui posse. itaque quotiens δ citatur non licet concludere A semper adesse. huius versionis existunt duae editiones ab Aristippo ipso confectae. lectiones prioris editionis in secundo apparatu (h) a Mino-Paluello commemoratas siglo A¹ distinximus.
- B¹ vetus corrector codicis B (sed vid. praef. p. xi n. 17)
- T¹ vetus corrector codicis T (sed vid. praef. p. xii) saec. IX fin.
- saec. X fin.?

86

PAPYRI

- Π₁ Pap. Lugd. Bat. 22 in *Mnemos.* ser. IV, vol. XIX (1962) a P. J. Sijpestein vulgat.: 65a8-c3; 65e3-66b3 saec. I p. Chr.

SIGLA CODICUM

- Π₂ Pap. Petrie vulgo Arsinoitica vocat., P. Lit. Lond. 145 (Pack' 1388), et nunc vide A. Carlini, C. Strachan, *Studi dell' Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere* 129, (1992), pp. 147-67; 67b6-69a8; 79b13-81d7; 82a4-84b2 saec. III ante Chr.
 - Π₃ Pap. Oxy. 2181 (Pack' 1389), et nunc vide D. D. von Dornum et M. W. Haslam, *ZPE*, vol. 89 (1991), pp. 1-14; disiecta fragmenta 75a-117d saec. II p. Chr.
 - Π₄ Pap. Heidelberg. sine num. (Pack' 2561) in *Actes du Ve Congrès International de Papyrologie* 1937 a Fr. Bilabel vulgat.: 92e5-93a2 saec. III ante Chr.
 - Π₅ Pap. Soc. Ital. (vol. XIV) 1393 (Pack' 1390); 96d8-97a1 saec. I-II p. Chr.
 - Π₆ Pap. Oxy. 1809 (Pack' 1391); 102e2-103a4; 103b5-c7 saec. II p. Chr.
 - Π₇ Pap. Oxy. 3676; 107d4-7; 108b4-c1; 108e3-109b2; 109d1-110a1 saec. II p. Chr.
 - Π₈ Pap. Oxy. 229, P. Lit. Lond. 146 (Pack' 1392); 109c1-d8 saec. II p. Chr.
- Pap. Monac. sine num. (Pack' 2560) frustula 106b-e continentem nullo loco citavimus.

TESTIMONIA

de auctoribus Platonem citantibus et de locis excerptorum singulorum vide Compendium Auctorum et Indicem Locorum.

CODICES RECENTIORES

codd. recentiores interdum nominatim laudantur; de quibus vide indices a Post et Wilson confectas (cf. Praef. p. xvii n. 28).

bdtw = manus recentiores in BDTW.

in *Phaedonis* apparatu β = hyparchetypus BCD; δ = hyparchetypus WPQSVΛ (quoad licet exemplar Aristippi restituere; vide supra); correctores B¹T¹ cum δ consentientes separatim commemorare supersedimus.

87

Tav. 7. Plato, *Phaedo*. Cf. *Platonis Opera*, tomus I retralogias I-II continens, recognoverunt Duke, Hicken, Nicoll, Robinson, Strachan, Oxonii 1995, p. 86-87.

SIGLA CODICUM

SIGLA CODICUM

FAMILIA I β

B	Cod. Bodl. MS E. D. Clarke 39	anno 895
D	Cod. Ven. gr. 185	saec. XII

FAMILIA II T

T	Cod. Ven. app. cl. 4. 1	saec. X
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FAMILIA III δ

W	Cod. Vind. suppl. gr. 7	saec. XI
P	Cod. Vat. Pal. gr. 173 (excerpta)	saec. X-XI
B ²	vetus corrector codicis B (sed vid. praef. p. xi n. 17)	saec. IX fin.
T ²	vetus corrector codicis T (sed vid. praef. p. xii)	saec. X fin.?

PAPYRI

PI	Pap. Antin. 2. 78 (Pack ² 1394): 143c-e; 144d-145a	saec. VI p. Chr.
PI ₂	Pap. Oxy. 3680: 190e-191a	saec. II
PI ₃	Pap. Oxy. 3682: 209a-c	saec. II

TESTIMONIA

de auctoribus Platonem citantibus et de locis excerptorum singulorum vide Compendium Auctorum et Indicem Locorum.

CODICES RECENTIORES

codd. recentiores interdum nominatim laudantur; de quibus vide indices a Post et Wilson confectas (cf. Praef. p. xvii n. 28).

bdt — manus recentiores in BDT

in *Theaeteti* apparatu β — hyparchetypus BD

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FAMILIA I β

B	Cod. Bodl. MS E. D. Clarke 39	anno 895
C	Cod. Tub. gr. Mb 14	saec. XI
D	Cod. Ven. gr. 185	saec. XIII

FAMILIA II T

T	Cod. Ven. app. cl. 4. 1	saec. X
---	-------------------------	---------

FAMILIA III δ

W	Cod. Vind. suppl. gr. 7	saec. XI
S	Cod. Par. suppl. gr. 668	saec. XI
V	Cod. Vat. gr. 225	saec. XIII?
P	Cod. Vat. Pal. gr. 173 (excerpta perpaucal)	saec. X-XI
B ²	vetus corrector codicis B (sed vid. praef. p. xi n. 17)	saec. IX fin.
T ²	vetus corrector codicis T (sed vid. praef. p. xii)	saec. X fin.?

TESTIMONIA

de auctoribus Platonem citantibus et de locis excerptorum singulorum vide Compendium Auctorum et Indicem Locorum.

CODICES RECENTIORES

codd. recentiores interdum nominatim laudantur; de quibus vide indices a Post et Wilson confectas (cf. Praef. p. xvii n. 28).

b — manus recentiores in B.

in *Criton*i apparatu β — hyparchetypus BCD; δ — hyparchetypus WSV, quotiens lectiones codicis P adducuntur, separatim siglo P laudantur; correctores B² T² cum δ consentientes separatim commemorare supersedimus.

PLATONIS FEDON

SIVE DE ANIMA

DIALOGI PERSONE:

ECHECRATES FEDON APOLLODORUS SOCRATES
 CEBES SIMMIAS CRITON UNDECIM MINISTER

5

57 **ECHECRATES.** Ipse, o Fedon, affuisti Socrati illa die qua bibit
 farmacum in carcere, sive ab aliquo alio audivisti?

FEDON. Ipse, o Echecrate.

ECHECRATES. Que igitur sunt que dixit vir ante mortem? Et quomodo
 obiit? Libenter enim ego audirem; namque neque civium Flasiolorum nemo 10
 penitus frequentat nunc Athenas, neque quis peregrinus adventavit a
 b tempore crebro ab inde, qui equidem nobis certum quid nunciare quiret de
 hiis, preter quam farmacum cum bibisset expiravit; ceterorum profecto
 nichil habuit referre.

58 **FEDON.** Neque de iudicio igitur percunctatus es, quo pacto fuit? 15

ECHECRATES. Ne; hec nempe nobis retulit quidam, et miramur
 equidem quoniam, pridem lato eo, multo posterius visus est mori. Quid
 igitur erat hoc, o Fedon?


FEDON. Fors quedam ipsi, o Echecrate, contigit. Accidit enim
 pridie causam puppis laureata navigii, quod in Delum Athenei mittunt 20
 quotannis.

H 1 Incipit fedon platonis L: Fedron platonis de morte socratis (rubrica in marg. sup.), et Incipit
 fedron platonis de morte Socratis. Rubrica (sic) M: om. SV 2-3 sive de anima et dialogi persone om.
 4-5 Echecrates ... minister om. VM 5 crito LS 6 Echecrates om. VM . 16 quiddam SV


h 1 Platonis Fedon om. (sed alia manus add. Fedron platonis) F 2-3 sive de anima et dialog.
 persone om. F 5 undecim minister om. 6 ipse] tu add. 7 carcere*] ergastulo (arg. O) 7 alio
 aliquo transp. (? resti) O 8 ipse] ego add. 8 echecrates 9 igitur] equidem add. 10 enim]
 utique add. 11 Athenas*] atticam provinciam 12 quid om. 13 preter (cf. O')] verumptamen
 utique 13 quam] quoniam O 13 expiraverit O 14 referre] edisserere 15 percunctatus
 es*] didicisti 17 lato*] facto 17 mori*] moriens 19 fors quedam (cf. O')] casus quidam
 20 laureata*] coronata

W 1 Platonis om. 3-5 dialogi ... minister (τὰ τοῦ διαλόγου . . . ὑπὸ τῆς W*) om. 15 percunctatus
 es] ἐπέθεσθε 16 miramur] ἐθαυμάζομεν


Tav. 9. Phaedo interprete Henrico Aristippo, edidit L. Minio Paluella, Londini 1950.




Tav. 11. Marcianus gr. 185 (coll. 576), f. 25r. © Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venezia.




Tav. 13. *Marcianus Append. Class. IV 1* (coll. 542). © Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venezia.




Tav. 14. Vindobonensis Suppl. gr. 7. © Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Wien.



Tav. 15. *Marcianus gr. 185* (coll. 756), f. 71r, Marginalia attribuiti alla mano d¹. © Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venezia.




Tav. 16. Vindobonensis Phil. gr. 21, f. 16v. © Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Wien.



Tav. 17. Parisinus gr. 1808, f. 181v. © Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Département des manuscrits, Paris.




Tav. 18a. *Laurentianus Plut.* 85, 9 f. 2r (particolare). © Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Firenze.




Tav. 18b. *Laurentianus Plut.* 85, 9 f. 2v (particolare). © Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Firenze.




Tav. 18c. *Laurentianus Plut.* 85, 9 f. 3r (particolare). © Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Firenze.



Tav. 19. Autografo di Marsilio Ficino, Riccardianus 92, f. 1r. © Biblioteca Riccardiana, Firenze.



Tav. 20. Marcianus gr. 184 (coll. 326), f.130r <Ioannes Rhosos>. © Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venezia.



Tav. 21. *Vaticanus Palatinus* gr. 173, f. 114r. © Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Città del Vaticano.

ἔλεγε γὰρ τίς τὸς τὴν βροχὴν
 ἔσται ἀλλὰ βεῖν δειμλόγον καί
 τὸ δὲ γὰρ μὲν τοῦτο αἰκρούμεν
 εἰ γὰρ γὰρ ἀκκατὸν αἰκρούμεν
 διελήλυθα καὶ ἀναχέρας αἰσ
 πὸν Φίλην δὲ μολόγον, εὐμόνον
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκκατὸν παλαιόσι μὴ
 ρίον εἰπερὸς ἡδὲ μολόγον, μολ
 εἰ ἡ ἀκκατὸν ἀκκατὸν ἔμπερ καί
 ἀμεινον τοῦ τὸν μολόγον ἡ
 ἡ τῶν τῶν ὑποπύου δὲ γὰρ
 καὶ ἀλλὰ εἰ μὴ παλαιόσι εἰπο
 ὡς εἰ φανείη τὸ τὸν τὸν μολόγον
 ἀκκατὸν ὑποπύου δὲ γὰρ
 μολ ἡδὲ μολ δὲ γὰρ ἀκκατὸν
 ἀκκατὸν εἰπο γὰρ ὡς καὶ
 μολ τῶν τῶν γὰρ τῶν τῶν
 τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
 εἰ φανείη αἰληθεύματα οὐκ
 παλαιόσι παλαιόσι τῶν τῶν
 καί μολ δὲ γὰρ ἀκκατὸν καὶ ἡδὲ
 μολ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
 τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
 αὐτὰρ κείσασ καὶ τῶν τῶν
 καὶ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
 φανείη τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἀκκατὸν
 κρείττονος τῶν τῶν τῶν
 μολ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
 ὅτερον καὶ προσφύεσθρον
 φανείη μολ τῶν τῶν τῶν
 ἴδεα: πῶς γὰρ οὐ: οὐκ
 ποικατὸν τῶν κρείστων ἡ
 λῶσ δὲ γὰρ ἡδὲ μολ τῶν
 ἡδὲ μολ ἡδὲ μολ τῶν τῶν


πρὸς τὸν δὲ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἰκίον
 μολ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
 εἰ μὴ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
 χαίρειν δὲ γὰρ οἰκίον
 ὡς πρὸς μολ τῶν τῶν τῶν
 κρείστων τῶν τῶν τῶν
 ἡδὲ μολ τῶν τῶν τῶν
 τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
 κρείστων εἰ μὴ τῶν τῶν
 ἡδὲ μολ τῶν τῶν τῶν
 με μολ τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
 γον: αἰληθεύματα ὡς
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 ἀκκατὸν: οὐκ ὡς καὶ
 σμὶ κρείστων τῶν τῶν
 οὐ γὰρ ἡδὲ μολ τῶν τῶν
 πρὸς τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν
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ΤΕΛΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΝ ΒΟΣ Η ΠΗ ΔΟΜΗ
 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΕΝ ΔΕΙΜΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ

Δοκῶμαι πρὸς τὸν τῶν τῶν
 οὐκ ἀκκατὸν τῶν τῶν τῶν
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 βουλόμην ὅς δὲ τῶν τῶν
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φανείη
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Tav. 23. Lobkovicianus VI Fa 1, p. 424. © Lobkovicka Roudnicka Knihovna.



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Percezione e conoscenza nei *Parva Naturalia*

Maria Michela Sassi

Abstract

Lecture held on May 11th, 2009, Pisa, Santa Croce in Fossabanda, 4th meeting of the programme “GrAL”, *Dal greco all’arabo e al latino: i Parva Naturalia di Aristotele*.

In questo intervento mi propongo di delineare sinteticamente i principali nodi concettuali che si presentano al lettore e studioso dei *Parva Naturalia*, che considero come una raccolta ispirata a un progetto sostanzialmente unitario.¹ Vedo che su questo punto la mia prospettiva converge con quella che la relazione di Luciana Repici² ha offerto relativamente alla concezione dell’anima nutritiva che emerge da questi scritti, ed è ad essa complementare, in quanto argomenta l’unità di fondo della visione aristotelica per quanto riguarda la funzione e le modalità operative dell’anima sensitiva. Anch’io farò dunque riferimento, per cominciare, al preambolo del *De Sensu*, che è lo scritto che normalmente inaugura la sequenza dei *Parva* nella tradizione manoscritta: questo passo svolge in realtà funzione di preambolo per l’intera raccolta (si è potuto pensare che introduca anche al *De Motu animalium*, che in molti manoscritti segue il *De Divinatione*, e addirittura al complesso delle opere biologiche),³ ed è preziosa via d’accesso non solo ad una valutazione dell’organicità del progetto che Aristotele vi porta avanti, ma anche – e insieme – ad una comprensione del suo rapporto con il *magnum opus* psicologico, il *De Anima*.

1. L’agenda dei *Parva Naturalia*

Il *De Sensu* si apre con una netta dichiarazione di continuità fra le ricerche che si stanno annunciando e la trattazione “precedente” sull’anima e le sue facoltà: questa è presentata dunque come preliminare all’plorazione delle attività caratteristiche della vita animale e animata in genere, con particolare attenzione per quelle “comuni ad anima e corpo”, che si snoderà nelle pagine successive. Fra le attività comuni o proprie agli esseri animali (direttamente connesse con il possesso dell’anima sensitiva), ne vengono menzionate alcune che, come la sensazione e la memoria, saranno di fatto argomento di due scritti appositi (lo stesso *De Sensu*, e il *De Memoria*); altre (piacere e dolore,

¹ I riferimenti bibliografici in nota saranno, analogamente, abbastanza selettivi.

² Il testo della lezione di L. Repici, “Funzioni dell’anima e processi fisiologici nei *Parva Naturalia*”, è consultabile online nel sito web del Centro Incontro di Culture (GrAL) fra i *Materiali* afferenti alla Settimana di Formazione 2009 [URL: <<http://www.gral.unipi.it/uploads/materiali/relazioni/repici%20copia-1.pdf>>].

³ Cf. Th.K. Johansen, “What’s New in the *De Sensu*? The Place of the *De Sensu* in Aristotle’s Psychology”, in R.A.H. King (ed.), *Common to Body and Soul. Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 2006, pp. 140-64, in part. p. 141, n. 4; inoltre P.-M. Morel, “‘Common to Soul and Body’ in the *Parva Naturalia* (Aristotle, *Sens.* 1 436 b 1-12)”, in King, *Common to Body and Soul*, pp. 121-39. Per il nodo di problemi che stringe, in particolare, il *De Motu animalium* al complesso dei *Parva Naturalia*, cf. P.-M. Morel, “Les *Parva Naturalia* d’Aristote et le mouvement animal”, *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* 20 (2002), pp. 61-88.

appetito, desiderio ed emozioni in genere) non trovano una trattazione corrispondente, e si può pensare che siano menzionate qui come correlati naturali dei processi di *aisthesis* e *mneme* (come tali emergono occasionalmente, infatti, nell'esposizione dei *Parva Naturalia* come anche nel *De Anima*).

Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς καθ' αὐτὴν διώρισταί καὶ περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐκάστης κατὰ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἐχόμενον ἔστι ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν περὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ζῶν ἐχόντων ἀπάντων, τίνες εἰσὶν ἴδιαι καὶ τίνες κοιναὶ πράξεις αὐτῶν. Τὰ μὲν οὖν εἰρημένα περὶ ψυχῆς ὑποκείσθω, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν πρώτων. Φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῶν ζώων, κοινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα καὶ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον αἴσθησις καὶ μνήμη καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὅλως ὄρεξις, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἡδονὴ τε καὶ λύπη [...] (Arist., *De Sensu* 1, 436 a 1-10).

Avendo definito precedentemente l'anima in se stessa e, parte per parte, ognuna delle sue facoltà, facciamo seguire l'esame intorno agli animali e a tutti gli esseri che hanno vita, chiedendoci quali siano le loro attività proprie e quali quelle comuni. Si presuppongano dunque le cose dette intorno all'anima e soffermiamoci sulle altre questioni, e anzitutto sulle più importanti. Sembra che le attività più importanti, comuni a tutti gli animali o proprie di alcuni, siano **comuni ad anima e corpo**: per esempio sensazione, memoria, ira, passionalità, desiderio e in generale appetito, e oltre a questi piacere e dolore [...].⁴

Il passo continua con la menzione di una serie di attività dell'anima nutritiva, per gran parte proprie anche delle piante (con la vistosa eccezione del sonno e dei sogni, cui facoltà nutritiva e sensitiva cooperano), che troveranno puntualmente attenzione in altri *Parva Naturalia*: veglia e sonno (*De Somno*, *De Insomniis*, *De Divinatione per somnum*), giovinezza e vecchiaia (*De Iuventute et Senectute*), inspirazione ed espirazione (*De Respiratione*), vita e morte (*De Vita et morte*). Non mancherà un riferimento (*De Sensu*, 1, 436 a 17 sgg.) alla pertinenza di salute e malattia, in quanto proprietà coestensive con il campo stesso della vita, all'ambito dello scienziato della natura (*physikòs*), competente a conoscerne i "principi primi" (*protas ... archàs*): si potrebbe vedere qui il rinvio a uno scritto apposito, programmato o, se scritto, ovviamente perduto (comunque mai menzionato altrove), o piuttosto all'indagine delle cause di vita e morte presente nel *De Longitudine et brevitate vitae*.

Non vi è dubbio, in ogni caso, che questo preambolo sia dettato dall'intento di sancire una precisa unità tematica della raccolta nella sua relazione con i contenuti del *De Anima*. Tale operazione risale probabilmente, se non ad Aristotele stesso, a sue indicazioni accolte da un suo discepolo più o meno diretto. Essa sembra appartenere infatti a quella prima fase di intervento editoriale sui libri di Aristotele (la seconda essendo rappresentata dal riordinamento di Andronico) che inizia già negli ultimi anni della carriera di Aristotele e comunque nel quadro dell'attività didattica del Liceo. Durante questa fase, in base alla ricostruzione di David M. Balme,⁵ ha avuto luogo un'immissione massiccia di riferimenti intertestuali, la cui rete si fa particolarmente fitta proprio nell'ambito degli scritti biologici, atti a fornire indicazioni, se non dell'ordine di composizione dei libri, sí dell'ordine di insegnamento nella scuola di Aristotele.

Mette conto, dunque, chiedersi se la direzione di lettura suggerita da questo testo sia fruibile e fruttuosa. Nel tentare una risposta, faremo anzitutto riferimento a un fatto di storia degli studi

⁴ Qui e oltre le traduzioni sono normalmente di chi scrive, ma va rammentato che tutti i *Parva Naturalia* si trovano utilmente raccolti, in edizione bilingue, in Aristotele, *L'anima e il corpo*, a cura di A. Carbone, Bompiani, Milano 2002. Da tenere presente anche Aristotele, *Petits traités d'histoire naturelle*. Trad. et Présentation de P.-M. Morel, Flammarion, Paris 2000.

⁵ Cf. D.M. Balme, "The Place of Biology in Aristotle's Philosophy", in A. Gotthelf - J.G. Lennox (ed.), *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 1987, pp. 9-20.

che può essere utile richiamare per definire più nettamente le linee del nostro problema: mi riferisco al cosiddetto “paradigma storico-genetico”, inaugurato a suo tempo da Werner Jaeger, che ha lungamente governato (sia che fosse accettato, sia che incontrasse obiezioni e correzioni) l’interpretazione del pensiero aristotelico almeno fino agli anni ’70 del secolo scorso. Non vorrei ripetere qui la breve storia di questa congiuntura di studi, che ho già ricordato in una pagina della relazione presentata l’anno scorso, nel quadro della settimana di studio sul *De Anima*.⁶ Devo però rammentare nuovamente quali siano state le importanti ripercussioni del modello “evoluzionistico” di Jaeger negli studi sulla psicologia di Aristotele, a partire da una dibattuta ricostruzione di François Nuyens.⁷

Secondo Nuyens c’è una divaricazione teorica cruciale fra la concezione del dualismo anima-corpo e dell’immortalità dell’anima che si troverebbe espressa nell’*Eudemo* (come già rilevato da Jaeger, che vi aveva visto i segni di quel ‘platonismo’ caratteristico, a suo vedere, del giovane Aristotele) e la concezione sviluppata nel *De Anima*, che trova il suo fulcro nella definizione di *psychè* come forma di un corpo dotato di organi, che avendo vita in potenza abbisogna di un principio formale di attualizzazione delle sue *dynamis* vitali. In base a questa concezione, che riflette con grande chiarezza uno stadio più maturo di ilemorfismo, forma e corpo, lungi dall’opporli, non sono distinguibili se non concettualmente. Ma questo esito, da vedersi come finale, secondo Nuyens presuppone una lunga fase di riflessione intermedia, alla quale appartengono non solo *De Motu*, *De Partibus animalium* e *De Historia animalium*, ma anche alcuni dei *Parva Naturalia* (tutti tranne *De Memoria* e *De Sensu*): scritti nei quali corpo e anima non sono più considerati in opposizione, che anzi collaborano alla realizzazione delle funzioni vitali, ma restano tuttavia distinti. “Strumentismo vitalistico” è l’espressione fortunata con cui Nuyens contrassegna questa posizione, in base alla quale il corpo funziona come strumento dell’anima nutritiva, e l’anima è legata a un organo determinato (il cuore, o un organo corrispondente negli animali non sanguigni): una posizione che lo studioso giudica incompatibile con la definizione dell’anima “forma del corpo”, benché ne costituisca una necessaria preparazione.

La proposta di Nuyens si è rivelata assai produttiva, non tanto perché sia stata pacificamente accettata⁸ quanto, al contrario, perché ha suscitato negli anni successivi perplessità e argomentazioni, per lo più in senso contrario, in una discussione via via più approfondita che ha dato risultati che si possono ormai ritenere acquisiti.⁹ In particolare si è osservato che non vi è incompatibilità, in linea

⁶ Il testo è consultabile online nel sito web del Centro Incontro di Culture (GrAL) fra i Materiali afferenti alla Settimana 2008 <URL: http://www.gral.unipi.it/uploads/materiali/relazioni/1._Sassi.pdf>.

⁷ Cf. F.J.Ch.J. Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, Éd. de l'Institut supérieur de Philosophie - Nijhoff - Vrin, Louvain-La Haye-Paris 1948.

⁸ Notevole comunque che l’abbia accolta fra gli altri W.D. Ross, estendendo per di più a *De Memoria* e *De Sensu* la datazione “intermedia”, sia nella sua edizione dei *Parva Naturalia* (cf. Aristotle, *Parva Naturalia*, ed. W.D. Ross, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1955), che in quella del *De Anima* (cf. Aristotle, *De Anima*, ed. W.D. Ross, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961).

⁹ Da ricordare almeno I. Block, “The Order of Aristotle’s Psychological Writings”, *American Journal of Philology* 82 (1961), pp. 50-77; W.F. Hardie, “Aristotle’s Treatment of the Relation between the Soul and the Body”, *Philosophical Quarterly* 14 (1964), pp. 53-72; Ch. Lefèvre, “Sur le statut de l’âme dans le *De Anima* et les *Parva Naturalia*”, in G.E.R. Lloyd - G.E.L. Owen (ed.), *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 1978 (Cambridge Classical Studies), pp. 21-67 (va notato che Lefèvre non è convinto, come invece gli altri studiosi citati, dell’omogeneità della raccolta). I buoni frutti di questa discussione si sono visti più recentemente in D.W. Modrak, *Aristotle. The Power of Perception*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1987, nonché nella *Introduction* di P.-M. Morel a Aristotele, *Petits traités d’histoire naturelle*. Un tentativo particolare di sostenere l’unità della psicologia aristotelica, identificando in un’anima pneumatica lo strumento mediatore fra anima e corpo, è stato compiuto

di principio, fra la localizzazione dell'anima in una parte corporea determinata e la teoria dell'anima come forma dell'intero corpo, e del resto vi sono prove che Aristotele stesso non ritenesse le due prospettive incompatibili. Per esempio, un ruolo importante del cuore emerge anche in trattati come il *De Generatione animalium*, che Nuyens assegnava allo stadio ileomorfo, né soprattutto mancano nel *De Anima* accenni di localizzazione del principio psichico.¹⁰ In altre parole, il fatto che il cuore sia presentato come il centro o principio (*archè*) delle funzioni vitali non significa che nutrizione, percezione e locomozione siano *nel* cuore, ma che esso è l'organo da cui queste funzioni dipendono maggiormente, e che più direttamente esercita un ruolo causale (cf. *De Somn.* 456 a 5, *De Iuv.* 469 a 7, 469 b 15-18, *De Resp.* 474 b 10-14, e anche *De Part. anim.* 665 a 12, 678 b 2-3).

Inoltre né negli scritti biologici né nei *Parva Naturalia*, in cui il ruolo del cuore ha maggiore rilievo, si dice mai che il corpo sia una sostanza e l'anima un'altra. Nei *Parva* Aristotele ama sí parlare di una *koinonia*, di un "agire in comune" di anima e corpo, ma non è affatto ovvio che stia pensando a due entità distinte (oltre all'inizio del *De Sensu*, 436 a 7-9, 436 b 1-3, si veda *De Somn.* 1, 453 b 11-14), e almeno in un punto afferma che la "comunanza" dell'anima con il corpo è simile a quella che la scienza (*episteme*) ha con l'anima (è dunque accidentale piuttosto che naturale, ma comunque non come quella di due sostanze distinte: *De Long.* 2, 465 a 26-32). Quel che più gli preme, evidentemente, è sottolineare che le funzioni dell'essere vivente sono portate avanti in *congiunzione* dell'anima con il corpo. Anche in tal senso il *De Anima* offre utile riscontro in contesti in cui compare il lessico della *koinonia*, senza che ciò implichi l'idea che l'anima sia una sostanza e il corpo un'altra. È da tenere presente, in particolare, un passo del primo capitolo ove colpisce l'affinità, più che non il contrasto, con il prologo del *De Sensu*:

ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἔστι τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ ῥάδιον δέ. φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὄλως αἰσθάνεσθαι, μάλιστα δ' εἰσικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχεται ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴθὲν ἐστὶν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, [...] ἀχώριστον γὰρ, εἴπερ αἰεὶ μετὰ σώματός τινος ἐστίν. εἰσικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. (Arist., *De An.* I 1, 403 a 3-12, 15-19).

Fanno problema anche le affezioni dell'anima, in questo senso: **sono tutte comuni anche a ciò che ha l'anima, o ve ne sarà qualcuna che è propria della sola anima?** Cogliere questo punto è necessario, anche se non facile. Ora, è evidente che nella maggior parte dei casi [l'anima] non subisce né opera nulla indipendentemente dal corpo: è il caso dei moti d'ira, di coraggio, di desiderio, e di tutto ciò che è sentire. È il pensare che assomiglia maggiormente a qualcosa di proprio [della sola anima]: ma neanche questo, se è una sorta di *phantasia* o non si produce senza *phantasia*, è possibile che faccia a meno del corpo. [...] A quel che pare tutte le affezioni dell'anima sono legate al corpo: **passionalità, mitezza, paura, pietà, coraggio, e inoltre gioia, e l'amare e l'odiare: nello stesso tempo, infatti, anche il corpo subisce delle affezioni.**

da A.P. Bos, *The Soul and its Instrumental Body. A Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Philosophy of Living Nature*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2003 (Studies in Intellectual History, 112).

¹⁰ Si ricordi almeno la definizione della collera come "ribollire di sangue e calore attorno al cuore" (ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ) in *De An.* I 1, 403 a 31 - 403 b 1.

Ma va ricordata anche la spiegazione del movimento animale, nel terzo libro del *De Anima*, come un'attività "comune", ancora, ad anima e corpo:

ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὄργανῳ ἢ ὄρεξις, ἤδη τοῦτο σωματικόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ. νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τὸ κινουῖν ὀργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτὸ οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· (Arist., *De An.* III 10, 433 b 19-22)

[nel processo appetitivo la facoltà è il motore mosso, l'animale è ciò che è mosso] quanto allo strumento con cui l'appetizione mette in movimento, esso è senz'altro corporeo, per cui questa [funzione] va esaminata **nell'ambito delle funzioni comuni al corpo e all'anima**: ma, per dire in questo momento le cose in breve, ciò che muove come strumento si trova là dove il principio e la fine coincidono, come ad esempio la giuntura [...].

Dopo aver constatato l'accordo generale fra *De Anima* e *Parva Naturalia* per quanto riguarda la configurazione del rapporto anima-corpo, possiamo chiederci in che misura, e su quali punti, le due trattazioni si differenzino e/o si completino. Vedremo (anche su questo gli studiosi ormai concordano) che c'è fra di esse un rapporto di complementarità: su questo ci fermeremo nelle prossime pagine, puntando l'attenzione sull'ambito tematico delle funzioni cognitive (dunque su *De Sensu*, *De Memoria*, e gli scritti su sonno e sogni) e sui tratti che si possono ritenere, in generale, più caratterizzanti della riflessione aristotelica.

2. Una fisiologia della conoscenza

In primo luogo, va osservato che in nessuno dei *Parva* la trattazione del problema della conoscenza va oltre i confini segnati dalla funzione percettiva: il pensiero intellettuale, che tanta attenzione trova nel *De Anima*, non vi trova alcun posto, e il motivo di questa esclusione è chiaro. Come infatti si legge in *De Anima* 403 a 12 (citato qui sopra), fra le funzioni psichiche quella intellettuale assomiglia più di ogni altra (*malista*) a qualcosa che è proprio (*idion*) dell'anima, nel senso che almeno sul piano più elevato (quello su cui agisce l'intelletto "attivo") sembra indipendente da qualsiasi organo corporeo: questo problema non rientra, in altre parole, nell'agenda dei *Parva Naturalia*.

In secondo luogo, qui Aristotele si concentra su aspetti non necessariamente connessi con la definizione generale dell'anima e delle sue facoltà (perché, evidentemente, tale definizione è data come presupposta). Di pari passo con una significativa estensione delle *praxeis* che vanno riportate all'operazione congiunta di corpo e anima (dalle funzioni della facoltà nutritiva a quelle della facoltà percettiva), l'accento posa sul versante corporeo delle affezioni psichiche, con un'attenzione peculiare per dettagli di tipo fisico o fisiologico, e peculiare frequenza di riferimenti al mondo animale. Ma questo quadro risulta perfettamente complementare a quello presentato nel *De Anima*, costituendone un'importante integrazione. Pensiamo all'accurata argomentazione teorica che ha luogo nel secondo libro del *De Anima* relativamente alla natura del *processo* percettivo, spiegato come un'alterazione dell'organo di senso, tale da attualizzarne la particolare potenza a diventare (assumendo la forma dell'oggetto senza la materia) come il sensibile in atto. Per contro, il *De Sensu* insiste sulla costituzione fisica degli *oggetti* sensibili (colori, sapori, odori, nei capitoli 3-5), al fine di fondarne quella priorità causale che si trova asserita, per l'appunto, nel *De Anima*. Per fare un esempio, la definizione del colore quale "limite del diafano", tale che lo spettro dei colori è prodotto dalla mutevole proporzione di bianco e nero (massimo e minimo di luce) nei corpi, giustifica il trasmettersi della qualità sensibile, attraverso un mezzo trasparente, fino all'occhio che è pronto ad assumerla. Ma anche la composizione materiale dell'*organo* di senso è oggetto di indagine approfondita: ogni organo viene infatti ricondotto

all'elemento di volta in volta piú adeguato a renderlo ricettivo delle qualità sensibili. Perciò l'occhio è fatto di acqua, materiale trasparente e dunque atto a ricevere i vari colori; l'orecchio di aria, attraverso cui si trasmettono le vibrazioni auditive; il naso ancora di aria per recepire gli odori che si propagano attraverso l'aria, e così via. È vero che Aristotele tocca la questione della correlazione organi-elementi anche nel *De Anima* (III 1, 425 a 5-6), ma la risolve con una serie differente di corrispondenze e, soprattutto, la finalizza a un obiettivo teorico piú generale, quello di mostrare che non esiste un altro senso oltre ai cinque di cui ha trattato. Quale sia invece, nel *De Sensu*, l'insistenza sul versante fisiologico del problema percettivo può indicare un passo che togliamo, non a caso, dal capitolo che tratta della percezione visiva: perché la vista costituisce, come sempre, il senso piú scandagliato fra i cinque, e il contesto presenta inoltre un bell'esempio di osservazione empirica, che dà l'occasione per rammentare che un altro tratto distintivo dei *Parva* può essere visto in uno spiccato "empirismo".¹¹

Καὶ εὐλόγως τὸ ἐντὸς ἐστὶν ὕδατος· διαφανὲς γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ. ὁρᾶται δὲ ὡσπερ καὶ ἔξω οὐκ ἄνευ φωτός, οὕτως καὶ ἐντὸς· διαφανὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι. καὶ ἀνάγκη ὕδωρ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἄήρ. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ὀμματος ἢ ψυχῆ ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντὸς· διόπερ ἀνάγκη διαφανὲς εἶναι καὶ δεκτικὸν φωτός τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ ὀμματος. καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων δῆλον· ἤδη γὰρ τισὶ πληγεῖσιν ἐν πολέμῳ παρὰ τὸν κρόταφον οὕτως ὥστ' ἐκτμηθῆναι τοὺς πόρους τοῦ ὀμματος, ἔδοξε γενέσθαι σκότος ὡσπερ λύχνου ἀποσβεσθέντος, διὰ τὸ οἷον λαμπτήρᾳ τινὰ ἀποτμηθῆναι τὸ διαφανές, τὴν καλουμένην κόρην. ὥστ' εἴπερ τούτων τι συμβαίνει, καθάπερ λέγομεν, φανερόν ὡς εἰ δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτειν ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐνὶ τῶν στοιχείων, τοῦ μὲν ὀμματος τὸ ὁρατικὸν ὕδατος ὑποληπτέον, ἀέρος δὲ τὸ τῶν ψόφων αἰσθητικόν, πυρός δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν. (Arist., *De Sens.* 2, 438 b 6-15).

È ragionevole che l'interno dell'occhio sia d'acqua, perché l'acqua è trasparente e, come senza luce non si vede all'esterno, così anche all'interno: occorre dunque che vi sia del trasparente, ed è necessario che questo sia acqua, dal momento che non è aria. È chiaro infatti che l'anima, o la parte sensibile dell'anima, non si trova sull'estremità dell'occhio, ma all'interno, e perciò è necessario che l'interno dell'occhio sia trasparente e atto a ricevere la luce. Ciò è chiaro anche in base a quanto accade: infatti alcuni colpiti in guerra alla tempia in modo tale che i passaggi oculari fossero recisi hanno avuto l'impressione che calasse la tenebra, come per lo spegnersi di una lanterna, per il fatto che era stata recisa la parte diafana, la cosiddetta pupilla, che è una sorta di lanterna. Se dunque questi eventi hanno luogo come si è detto, è chiaro che se dobbiamo spiegare le cose in questo modo e **collegare ogni organo di senso a uno degli elementi**, bisognerà supporre che quel che percepisce dell'occhio sia d'acqua, quel che percepisce i suoni sia d'aria, e che l'olfatto sia di fuoco.

Significativamente, si può intravedere nell'organizzazione della raccolta una linea di complessità crescente dei contenuti, che pure non esulano dai confini dell'ambito percettivo. Già all'interno del *De Sensu*, la trattazione degli oggetti e degli organi di sensi specifici è seguita da due questioni che rinviano a operazioni percettive piú complesse della sensazione elementare. Dopo il cap. 6, che affronta la questione della divisibilità delle proprietà sensibili, il cap. 7 pone il problema se due oggetti di sensi diversi possono essere percepiti allo stesso tempo:

¹¹ Per una valutazione di questo aspetto cf. G.E.R. Lloyd, "The empirical basis of the physiology of the *Parva Naturalia*", in Lloyd - Owen, *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses*, pp. 215-40. Sugli altri temi qui toccati cf. S. Everson, *Aristotle on Perception*, Clarendon Press - Oxford U. P., Oxford-New York 1997, spec. pp. 139-86; T.K. Johansen, *Aristotle on the Sense Organs*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 1998 (Cambridge Classical Studies).

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκὺ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, εἰ μὴ χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον ἐκάστω. ὁμοίως τοίνυν θετέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν εἶναι ἀριθμῷ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων, τῷ μέντοι εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον τῶν μὲν γένει τῶν δὲ εἶδει. ὥστε καὶ αἰσθάνοιτ' ἄν ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐνί, λόγῳ δ' οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ (Arist., *De Sens.* 7, 449 a 15-22).

La stessa cosa, infatti, una di numero, può essere bianca e dolce e tante altre cose: se, in effetti, le proprietà sensibili non sono separabili le une dalle altre, ma l'essenza di ciascuna è diversa. Analogamente, dunque, anche a proposito dell'anima bisogna ammettere che la facoltà di percepire tutte le cose è la stessa e una di numero, e che tuttavia la sua essenza è diversa, ed è diversa secondo i suoi oggetti, sia per genere sia per specie. Ne consegue che **si può percepire più cose insieme con qualcosa che è medesimo e uno, ma non trova sempre la medesima definizione.**

Per spiegare la percezione simultanea di due diverse proprietà di un medesimo oggetto, che non esercitiamo mediante un senso specifico (perché i sensi specifici sono capaci di cogliere solo il loro sensibile proprio), occorre postulare un principio capace di distinguere e comparare diverse serie di dati sensibili: un principio unitario, dunque, ma al tempo stesso capace di articolarsi in più “canali” percettivi. Tale principio non trova qui un nome, ma coincide sicuramente con quello che Aristotele chiama altrove “senso” o “sensazione comune” (*aisthesis koiné*): una nozione cui non viene mai riservata da Aristotele una riflessione sistematica, ma che in più contesti sia del *De Anima* che dei *Parva Naturalia* viene chiamata in causa per spiegare operazioni percettive complesse. Fra queste figurano il processo del ricordo e l'attività del sonno e dei sogni, oggetto di scritti che, nel disegno “ascendente” riconoscibile nell'ordinamento della prima parte della raccolta, seguono il *De Sensu*.

3. “Sensazione comune” e phantasia

La “sensazione comune” è nozione tanto versatile quanto difficilmente contornabile, e qui ci limiteremo a menzionare ordinatamente i vari contesti in cui essa compare.¹² Aristotele la richiama, come si è appena visto, per spiegare la sintesi percettiva, in quanto questa richiede una discriminazione e coordinazione delle proprietà sensibili pertinenti al medesimo oggetto: aggiungiamo che l'esistenza di un principio unitario con questa funzione è menzionata anche nel *De Anima* (III 2, 426 b 8 - 427 a 14), anche qui senza che gli venga dato un nome. Nello stesso *De Anima* si fa però riferimento esplicito ad una *koiné aisthesis* deputata alla percezione dei sensibili comuni (III 1, 425 a 27), problema che peraltro non viene toccato nei *Parva Naturalia*. Tuttavia è nei *Parva Naturalia* che l'idea di un principio percettivo comune trova ripetuta attenzione, in connessione con problemi di grande rilievo teorico.

L'espressione *koiné dynamis* compare per esempio a indicare quel principio unitario e coincidente con la stessa facoltà percettiva che va invocato per spiegare la coscienza di percepire, come argomentato ampiamente nell'importante secondo capitolo del *De Somno* sulla base dell'osservazione che proprio il sonno esibisce (come anche lo svenimento) la sospensione di tutte le sensazioni simultaneamente (2, 455 a 15 - b 13). Quest'osservazione rinvia appunto all'esistenza di una *dynamis* anteriore alla divisione della percezione in sensi specifici, come una sorta di capacità originaria e non specializzata, e si connette poi strettamente con l'identificazione di un organo sensitivo primario collocato nella regione del cuore (cf. *proton aisthetikòn* in *De Som.* 1, 454 a 23-24; di un principio *kyrion ton aistheseon* si parla

¹² Rinviando, per una trattazione più approfondita, almeno a J. Brunschwig, “Les multiples chemins aristotéliciens de la sensation commune”, *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 96/4 (octobre-décembre 1991), pp. 455-74; Id., “En quel sens le sens commun est-il commun?”, in G. Romeyer Dherbey, *Corps et âme - Sur le De Anima d'Aristote.* Études réunies par C.Viano, Vrin, Paris 1996 (Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie. Nouvelle série), pp. 189-218.

anche in *De Iuv.* 3, 469 a 11). È da notare che nel *De Anima*, invece, l'appercezione (assimilabile alla coscienza di percepire assunta da *De Somno*) è attribuita al medesimo senso che avverte di percepire, e il problema del correlato corporeo rimane in secondo piano (III 2, 425 b 12-25).

La "sensazione comune" viene inoltre in primo piano in connessione con una delle più importanti attività psichiche, la *phantasia* o "rappresentazione", che è fondamentale per la spiegazione tanto della memoria che del processo onirico. Cominciamo dal *De Memoria* dove, dopo un rinvio esplicito alla sezione dedicata alla *phantasia* nel maggiore trattato psicologico (il notorio *De An.* III 3) e all'idea che "non è possibile pensare senza un *phantasma*" (449 b 31 - 450 a 1), Aristotele afferma che anche la memoria, anche di entità di pensiero (*noetà*), non si dà senza un *phantasma*. Quest'ultimo, in quanto dotato di estensione spaziale, è un'affezione della "sensazione comune" (*koinè aisthesis*), alla quale va riportata anche la percezione del tempo (che, come la grandezza, è un continuo): dunque la memoria afferisce a un "principio primario della percezione" (*proton aisthetikòn*) e solo accidentalmente alla funzione intellettuale, tant'è vero che appare prerogativa non solo degli uomini, ma anche di alcuni fra gli animali non dotati di ragione:¹³

αἰεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῆ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ἤσθητο ἢ ἐνόησεν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἰσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, ὅταν γένηται χρόνος. τοῦ δὲ νῦν ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι μνήμη, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος αἰσθησις, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γενομένου μνήμη. διὸ μετὰ χρόνου πᾶσα μνήμη. ὡσθ' ὅσα χρόνου αἰσθάνεται, ταῦτα μόνα τῶν ζώων μνημονεύει, καὶ τούτῳ ᾧ αἰσθάνεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος· συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν [...] καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν· ὥστε τοῦτο φανερόν ὅτι τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητικῷ τούτων ἢ γινῶσις ἐστίν· ἢ δὲ μνήμη καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἐστίν· ὥστε τοῦ νοητικοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ. διὸ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶν ὑπάρχει τῶν ζώων, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν ἢ φρόνησιν. (Arist., *De Mem.* 1, 449 b 22 - 450 a 16)

Infatti, quando si esercita l'attività della memoria, ci si dice sempre nell'anima che si è precedentemente udito o percepito o pensato quell'oggetto. La memoria, dunque, non è né una percezione né un giudizio, ma il possesso o affezione di una di queste cose, quando sia trascorso del tempo. Non vi è memoria del presente nel presente, come si è detto, ma vi è del presente percezione, del futuro attesa, del passato memoria. Perciò la memoria si accompagna sempre al [senso del] tempo (trascorso), per cui solo gli animali che hanno percezione del tempo possono ricordare, e lo fanno con la medesima facoltà con cui percepiscono il tempo. Della *phantasia* si è già discusso nel trattato *Sull'anima*, e non è possibile pensare senza *phantasma* [...] **il *phantasma* è un'affezione della facoltà percettiva comune, per cui è chiaro che la conoscenza di queste cose è di pertinenza della facoltà percettiva primaria.** E la memoria, anche degli oggetti di pensiero, non si dà senza *phantasma*, cosicché appartiene all'intelletto in modo accidentale, mentre di per sé è propria della facoltà percettiva primaria: per questo è presente anche ad alcuni altri animali, e non soltanto agli uomini e a quanti sono dotati di opinione e intelligenza.

Propriamente il processo mnemonico scatta (e il *phantasma* si fa *mnemoneuma*, 450 b 27) allorché l'individuo riconosce l'immagine mnemonica come copia (il termine chiave qui è *eikon*, a 450 b 22,

¹³ Sul *De Memoria* in generale si vedano R.A.H. King (ed.), *Aristoteles. De Memoria et reminiscencia*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2004; D. Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory and Recollection. Text, Translation, Interpretation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2007 (Philosophia Antiqua, 110).

24, 27, 30, 451a 2) ovvero si rende conto (dicendoselo “nell’anima”, 449 b 23) di un rapporto di connessione e insieme di una sfasatura temporale fra il *phantasma* impresso nell’anima e la percezione attuale dell’oggetto, o la nozione una volta appresa, che ne sono all’origine. Tale processo è perciò possibile solo ad alcuni animali superiori e all’uomo, capaci di innestare sul possesso della facoltà percettiva operazioni più complesse, di natura linguistico-razionale.

Aristotele fa un uso fruttuoso della metafora del ricordo come traccia inscritta nell’anima, già sviluppata da Platone sulla base di indicazioni della riflessione di età presocratica,¹⁴ che fra l’altro gli è utile a integrare nella spiegazione della funzione mnemonica una tipologia di variazioni dipendenti dalla diversità delle costituzioni individuali (condizionata dalle qualità opposte dell’umido e del secco). Non hanno memoria, per esempio, gli individui “molto agitati per una qualche passione o per l’età, come se il cambiamento e il sigillo si abbattessero in acqua corrente ... né gli individui troppo svelti né quelli troppo lenti, gli uni perché più fluidi del dovuto, gli altri perché più duri, sì che nei primi l’immagine non permane nell’anima, nei secondi non aderisce” (*De Mem.* 1, 450 a 27-b 11). Il processo mnemonico resta tuttavia il prodotto di un’interazione fra ragione e *phantasia*, e su questo punto sostanziale se ne distingue l’attività onirica, la quale deriva piuttosto da un agire incontrollato della *phantasia* stessa, in un quadro di sospensione completa del principio unitario della percezione. I sogni infatti si formano allorché, in concomitanza con le variazioni termiche dell’organismo durante il sonno, riaffiorano le tracce di impressioni sensibili rimaste inavvertite nella veglia, e però fermatesi negli organi anche dopo la cessazione dello stimolo sensibile, così da riattivarsi grazie alla mediazione dell’immaginazione e muoversi verso il cuore. Da questi movimenti il dormiente, indotto a scambiare le immagini oniriche per oggetti reali, è inevitabilmente ingannato, ma l’effetto illusorio è più forte in particolari situazioni psicofisiche in cui la *phantasia* procede più sbrigliata e le immagini, la cui natura è aerea, si prestano più facilmente a essere deformate (*De Ins.* 3, 460 b 28 - 461a 25, e *passim*).¹⁵

Il *phantasma* onirico, costitutivamente legato alla dimensione del sonno, essendo semplice residuo di una sensazione in atto sfugge a qualsiasi spiegazione in termini di finalità, e costituisce una vistosa eccezione nel quadro della teleologia aristotelica. A ciò corrisponde però un particolare impegno di Aristotele nell’esplorare le cause materiali e meccaniche del sogno, in funzione polemica contro la credenza diffusa che i sogni siano messaggi inviati dalla divinità, con funzione di premonizione rispetto al futuro (cui è specificamente dedicato il denso scritto *Sulla divinazione nel sonno*): ricondurre l’immagine onirica a un oggetto che è ad essa antecedente, e vi giunge anzi deformato, equivale a destituirlo di ogni valore obiettivo e predittivo. D’altronde, tanto il modello fisico della connessione sonno-sogno quanto quello della memoria come pittura nell’anima rientrano in un discorso che Aristotele costruisce, con coerenza e consapevolezza, attorno all’idea che il principio unitario della sensazione (che è anche quello della *phantasia*) abbia un preciso correlato corporeo: un’idea che possiamo considerare, a questo punto, come il fulcro dell’intera operazione condotta nei *Parva Naturalia*, sotto il segno della “comunanza di anima e corpo”.

¹⁴ Si vedano gli studi riuniti in M.M. Sassi (ed.), *Tracce nella mente. Teorie della memoria da Platone ai moderni*, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa 2007 (Seminari e convegni, 9); mi permetto anche di rinviare al mio saggio “Aristotele fenomenologo della memoria”, pubblicato nel medesimo volume alle pp. 25-46, per una lettura più dettagliata dell’indagine aristotelica sui meccanismi fisiologici della memoria.

¹⁵ Per una lettura circostanziata del complesso *De Somno*, *De Insomniis* e *De Divinatione per somnum* vi sono ottimi strumenti: Aristotle, *On Sleep and Dreams. A Text and Translation with Introduction, Notes and Glossary* by D. Gallop, Aris & Phillips, Warminster 1996 (I ed. Broadview Press, Peterborough 1991); Aristoteles, *De insomniis, De divinazione per somnum*, ed. Ph. van der Eijk, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1994; Aristotele, *Il sonno e i sogni. Il sonno e la veglia, I sogni, La divinazione durante il sonno*, a cura di L. Repici, Marsilio, Venezia 2003 (Letteratura universale Marsilio. Convivio).

Per finire si potrebbe avanzare il sospetto (senza certo spingerci a valutazioni di cronologia) che la particolare valorizzazione del “senso comune” nei *Parva Naturalia* indichi, addirittura, una riflessione sul problema percettivo piú sofisticata di quella delineata nel *De Anima*. La posterità ha sicuramente giudicato che la nozione di senso comune fosse fra le piú filosoficamente interessanti della teoria aristotelica della percezione.¹⁶

¹⁶ La centralità di questa nozione nella psicologia aristotelica era già intuita da Ch.H. Kahn in un lavoro la cui lettura resta assolutamente consigliabile: Ch.H. Kahn, “Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology”, *Archiv für Geschichte der Psychologie* 48 (1966), pp. 43-81 (rist. in J. Barnes - M. Schofield - R. Sorabji (ed.), *Articles on Aristotle, IV: Psychology and Aesthetics*, Duckworth, London 1979 [Paperduck], pp. 1-31). A diversi aspetti della ricezione dei *Parva Naturalia* è dedicato il volume recente di C. Grellard - P.-M. Morel (ed.), *Les Parva Naturalia d’Aristote. Fortune antique et médiévale*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 2010 (Série Philosophie, 28). Sulla ricezione di questo tema nel mondo arabo si veda la lezione tenuta da R. Hansberger, “The Arabic Adaptation of the *Parva Naturalia* (*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-mahsūs*)”, nell’ambito della settimana di formazione 2009 organizzata dal Centro Interuniversitario “Incontro di culture” (GrAL) e pubblicata in questo volume, pp. 301-14.

Alessandro di Afrodisia interprete del *De Anima* di Aristotele

Paolo Accattino

Abstract

Lecture held on February 12th, 2008, Pisa, Santa Croce in Fossabanda, 3rd meeting of the programme “GrAL”, *Il De Anima di Aristotele: esegesi greche, arabe e latine*.

1

Tra i testi giunti nel *corpus* degli scritti di Alessandro, quelli utili a ricostruire la sua interpretazione della psicologia aristotelica sono sostanzialmente due, ossia *De Anima* e *De Anima II*; lascerei infatti qui da parte il *Commento al De Sensu. De Anima II*, meglio noto col nome di *Mantissa*, è in realtà una raccolta di venticinque brevi scritti che solo in parte (grossomodo la maggioranza dei primi sedici) hanno a che fare con tematiche psicologiche; qui parleremo soltanto del secondo scritto, intitolato *De Intellectu*.¹ Oltre al *De Anima*, che è un trattato continuo, e alla *Mantissa* noi sappiamo dalle citazioni che ne fanno i commentatori posteriori (Temistio, Filopono, pseudo-Filopono e Simplicio) che Alessandro aveva anche redatto un commentario al *De Anima* che però non ci è giunto.² Ora, proprio quelle citazioni dal commento perduto registrate da questi autori e che trovano un riscontro puntuale nel *De Anima* personale di Alessandro ci permettono di precisare il carattere di questo trattato. Si può con buona verosimiglianza affermare che Alessandro ha concepito il suo trattato personale come una esposizione continua e sistematica dei risultati acquisiti col lavoro di esegesi.³

Questo è d'altronde perfettamente in linea con la dichiarazione programmatica che egli ha posto all'inizio del trattato: “Poiché, come nelle altre questioni noi ci facciamo portavoce delle teorie

¹ *De Anima* e *De Anima II* sono editi in *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora: De Anima liber cum Mantissa* ed. I. Bruns, Reimer, Berlin 1887 (Supplementum aristotelicum II, 1), rispettivamente alle pp. 1-100 e 101-185. Traduzione italiana e commento del *De Anima* in Alessandro di Afrodisia, *L'anima*, trad., introd. e commento a cura di P. Accattino - P.L. Donini, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1996); trad. it. e commento del *De Intellectu* in Alessandro di Afrodisia, *De Intellectu*, introd., testo greco rivisto, trad. e commento di P. Accattino, Thélème, Torino 2001; trad. it. della *Mantissa* in Alessandro di Afrodisia, *De Anima II (Mantissa)*, premessa, testo rivisto, trad. e note di P. Accattino, con la collaborazione di P. Cobetto Ghiggia, Edizioni dell'Orso, Alessandria 2005; trad. inglese con commento in Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Supplement to On the Soul*, transl. by R.W. Sharples, Duckworth, London 2004 (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle). Dopo la stesura finale di questo saggio (agosto 2008) sono comparse una nuova traduzione francese del *De Anima*: Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *De l'âme*, texte grec introduit, traduit et annoté par M. Bergeron - R. Dufour, Vrin, Paris 2008 (Textes et Commentaires) e una nuova edizione del testo della *Mantissa*: Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *De Anima libri mantissa, A New Edition of the Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary* by R.W. Sharples, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2008 (Peripatoi, 21).

² Una ricostruzione dei temi del Commento è in P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*, vol. III, *Alexander von Aphrodisias*, ed. by J. Wiesner, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2001, pp. 320-53.

³ Cf. P.L. Donini, “Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica”, in I. Temporini - W. Haase (eds), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* II 36,7, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1994, pp. 5027-100, spec. pp. 5045-56 e Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen...* vol. III, *Alexander von Aphrodisias*, p. 338.

di Aristotele ritenendo le opinioni da lui trasmesse più vere di quelle espresse dagli altri, così la pensiamo anche nel caso dell'anima, il nostro proposito sarà compiuto qualora esponiamo con tutta la chiarezza possibile le affermazioni che Aristotele fece sull'anima e offriamo le spiegazioni adeguate a mostrare che ciascuna di esse è stata fatta bene" (p. 2.4-9 Bruns). Alessandro concepisce quindi ed esercita la propria attività filosofica come esegesi della eredità dottrinale del maestro: le dottrine più vere sono quelle di Aristotele, si tratta soltanto di risporle con la maggiore chiarezza possibile e di trovare gli argomenti idonei a confortare la loro bontà. Esporre con la maggiore chiarezza possibile significa anzitutto per Alessandro offrire un resoconto ordinato e sistematico della dottrina aristotelica e, in secondo luogo, offrire di quella stessa dottrina una esposizione esaustiva e coerente che tenga conto di tutto quanto Aristotele dice del tema *x* nell'intera sua opera. La regola che governa la sua lettura e la sua interpretazione di Aristotele è quella che egli condivide coi suoi contemporanei, che aveva avuto origine nella filologia alessandrina e che sarebbe stata codificata più tardi da Porfirio per l'interpretazione omerica: "Ὁμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν (*Quaest. Hom.* II, p. 297.16 Schrader).⁴

Vediamo ora come il programma di rispondere in modo chiaro e ordinato la dottrina aristotelica dell'anima e di fornirne la giustificazione la più coerente possibile, spiegando Aristotele con Aristotele stesso, sia stato realizzato nel *De Anima* personale di Alessandro. Ciò può essere osservato a diversi livelli. A un livello più immediato e superficiale si può notare che questo trattato è scandito in tre parti. Vi è una prima parte, che occupa le pp. 1-26 Bruns, che è volta a mostrare quale sia l'essenza dell'anima e a giustificare in modo sistematico e coerente la definizione formale dell'anima di Aristotele, *De An.* II 1, come "entelechia prima di un corpo naturale munito di organi". Su questa prima parte – molto importante per l'interpretazione alessandrista della psicologia aristotelica – ritorneremo fra poco. La seconda parte, che occupa le pp. 27-94.6 Bruns, segue più da vicino l'ordine dell'originale aristotelico dal cap. 3 del II libro a tutto il libro III. Vi è infine una terza parte, una sorta di appendice che occupa le pp. 94.7-100.17 Bruns, dove Alessandro affronta un tema che non ha un parallelo preciso nel *De Anima* aristotelico, ma che era diventato tipico nella letteratura filosofica, almeno dal *Peri psyches* di Crisippo, e cioè quale sia la sede dell'*hegemonikon* all'interno del corpo. Di questa parte non ci occuperemo qui, se non per dire che anche lì Alessandro mobilita e compendia diversi testi aristotelici, tratti dai *Parva naturalia*, *De Motu*, *De Partibus* e *De Generatione animalium*, per provare la tesi che tutte le facoltà psichiche – compresa la facoltà intellettuale – mettono capo al cuore.⁵

È nella seconda parte che meglio si può notare l'intento di Alessandro di offrire una esposizione ordinata e sistematica della dottrina aristotelica, tenendo conto di tutto quanto Aristotele dice anche in altre opere a proposito dei temi via via trattati. La falsariga è certamente costituita da *De An.* II 3-III, ma intanto c'è un caso vistoso di riordino nella successione degli argomenti. In *De An.* III, dopo aver parlato dell'immaginazione nel cap. 3, Aristotele parla prima della funzione teoretica dell'intelletto (cap. 4-8) e successivamente della funzione motrice e pratica (cap. 9-11). Alessandro (pp. 73.14-80.15 Bruns) inverte l'ordine e fa seguire la trattazione della facoltà appetitiva e del movimento alla trattazione della *phantasia*, perché la facoltà appetitiva dipende dalla facoltà immaginativa ed è comune a tutti gli animali, senza essere esclusiva dell'uomo, come è invece la facoltà intellettuale teoretica. In questa stessa sezione dedicata alla facoltà appetitiva e motoria si possono notare altri due tratti tipici dell'esegesi alessandrista. Il rinvio di *De An.* III 10, 433 b 19-21 a un'indagine in altre opere sullo strumento

⁴ Sui metodi di esegesi di Alessandro cf. P.L. Donini, "Alessandro di Afrodisia e i metodi dell'esegesi filosofica", in C. Moreschini (ed.), *Esegesi, parafrasi e compilazione in età tardoantica. Atti del terzo Convegno dell'Associazione di Studi Tardoantichi*, D'Auria, Napoli 1995 (Collectanea 9), pp. 107-29.

⁵ Cf. il commento di Accattino - Donini in Alessandro di Afrodisia, *L'anima*, pp. 300-10.

corporeo del movimento (il pneuma) offre ad Alessandro l'occasione per riesporre in pp. 76.18-78.2 Bruns la dottrina di *De Motu animalium*, cap. 7-8. Il secondo punto è invece molto più interessante. Come si sa, in *De An.* I 3-4 Aristotele nega che l'anima possa muoversi, ma in III 10, 433 b 16-17 (e così anche in *M.A.* 6, 700 b 35 sg.) afferma esplicitamente che la facoltà appetitiva (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) è motore e mosso: mosso dall'oggetto di appetizione (che funge da motore immobile), e motore dell'animale, che è invece semplicemente mosso. Ebbene, Alessandro in pp. 79.21-80.2 Bruns trova modo di rimuovere completamente dalla sua esposizione la nozione centrale in Aristotele, tanto in *De An.* quanto in *M.A.*, dell'anima come motore mosso. Forse vi vedeva una contraddizione con quanto sostenuto chiaramente in *De An.* I 3-4, e abbracciato con convinzione da Alessandro stesso nella prima parte del trattato.

Mettere ordine, fornire completezza e dare coerenza – espungendo eventualmente quanto non torna nel conto totale – sembrano essere state le parole d'ordine di Alessandro. Il risultato è un aristotelismo unificato. Si potrebbero moltiplicare gli esempi di questa strategia interpretativa operante nella parte centrale del suo *De Anima*, sia nella sezione dedicata alla funzione vegetativa (dove il *De Generatione et Corruptione* viene utilizzato a integrazione del *De Anima*), sia nella sezione dedicata alla facoltà sensitiva, specialmente nella trattazione del senso dell'udito con la doppia spiegazione del fenomeno dell'eco, la seconda delle quali è ripescata dai *Problemi*; del senso del tatto, dove Alessandro trova modo, attraverso l'utilizzazione del *De Partibus animalium* di 'normalizzare' anche il senso del tatto rispetto agli altri sensi, rintracciando nella carne non il semplice intermediario (come voleva Aristotele *De An.* II 11), ma anche l'organo periferico del tatto, salvando così una perfetta analogia con gli altri quattro sensi.⁶ Osservazioni analoghe potremmo fare per la trattazione della κοινὴ αἴσθησις, ma forse a questo punto è meglio concentrarsi su quegli aspetti per i quali Alessandro è più noto e che ne hanno fatto un termine di confronto forte dalla tarda antichità al Rinascimento. Mi riferisco alla tesi della totale mortalità dell'anima, intelletto compreso, e alla sua interpretazione della dottrina aristotelica dell'intelletto.

2

La tesi della completa mortalità di qualsiasi anima legata a un corpo generabile e corruttibile (per Alessandro le uniche anime immortali sono quelle dei corpi celesti)⁷ ci offre l'occasione di riprendere il discorso sulla prima parte del trattato (pp. 1-26 Bruns), dove essa trova fondamento. Questa parte corrisponde grossomodo ad *De An.* I-II 2, ma con una vistosa differenza: Aristotele parte dalla ricognizione e dall'esame critico delle opinioni dei predecessori, per passare in *De An.* II 1-2 ai fondamenti della teoria della sostanza e concludere con la definizione generale di anima come "entelechia prima di un corpo naturale munito di organi". Alessandro parte invece dai fondamenti della teoria della sostanza, per approdare alla definizione generale di anima e difendere infine, in polemica con le scuole rivali – i platonici e gli stoici – le proprietà che appartengono all'anima in quanto entelechia prima: la sua inseparabilità dal corpo, la sua incorporeità e la sua immobilità.⁸ Alla definizione dell'anima come "entelechia prima di un corpo naturale munito di organi" Alessandro perviene dopo una lunga trattazione volta a sviscerare tutte le pieghe della nozione aristotelica di forma. Ora, questa trattazione sulla forma nasce in un contesto preciso e ha un obiettivo mirato che egli esplicita nelle prime pagine del

⁶ Cf. rispettivamente p. 34.18-26 Bruns, p. 48.8-21 e pp. 55.15-59.24 col commento di Accattino - Donini in Alessandro di Afrodisia, *L'anima*, pp. 167-68; 195-98; 211-22.

⁷ Cf. P. Accattino, "Alessandro di Afrodisia e gli astri: l'anima e la luce", *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino - Cl. Sc. mor.* 126 (1992), pp. 39-62, spec. p. 47.

⁸ Quel che segue immediatamente riprende e compendia P. Accattino, "Generazione dell'anima in Alessandro di Afrodisia *De Anima* 2.10-11.13?", *Phronesis* 40 (1995), pp. 182-201, che è da vedere per una più puntuale argomentazione.

trattato (p. 2.15-18 Bruns): alcuni pensano che le capacità e le attività dell'anima siano più divine e più ampie delle capacità del corpo. Come si sa, costoro sono Platone e i platonici (si pensi a *Theaet.* 185 C e *Leg.* 892 A sgg., ma anche ad Attico fr. 7, 57-63 D.P.). Si tratta allora di mostrare che l'anima, al pari di qualsiasi altra forma, non è altro che l'insieme delle capacità del corpo di cui è forma, per cui essa, essendo identica alle capacità del corpo, non le può mai eccedere; queste capacità peraltro non possono esprimersi indipendentemente dal corpo e vengono meno col venir meno del corpo. Per giungere a questo obiettivo Alessandro parte dalla dottrina aristotelica della composizione ilemorfica di tutte le sostanze sensibili generabili e corruttibili. Le sostanze naturali sensibili o sono corpi semplici o sono corpi composti dai corpi semplici. Entrambe sono dei complessi di materia e forma e in entrambe la forma ha lo stesso statuto e svolge lo stesso ruolo, quello di essere responsabile delle operazioni di cui quelle sostanze sono capaci e che da esse procedono. Ma qual è la forma del corpo semplice? È qui che Alessandro offre un saggio di vera e propria esegesi creativa. In *De Gen. et corr.* II 2 (ma anche in *De Part. an.* II 2 e in *Meteor.* I 2) egli poteva leggere che le quattro qualità elementari (caldo, freddo, secco e umido) costituiscono gli εἴδη dei quattro elementi e ancora che le altre proprietà tangibili, tra cui peso e leggerezza, derivano dalle quattro qualità elementari. Alessandro compendia e risponde queste affermazioni aristoteliche e afferma (p. 5.4-7 Bruns) che la forma del corpo semplice 'fuoco' è la leggerezza, la quale deriva dal caldo e dal secco. Lo stesso vale per la forma semplice del corpo semplice 'terra', ossia il peso, il quale deriva dal freddo e dal secco. Sarebbe difficile trovare simili affermazioni esplicite in Aristotele, ma ad Alessandro servono per provare che già al livello dei corpi semplici è possibile stabilire una stretta connessione tra il sostrato del corpo semplice (la materia prima), la forma del corpo semplice (peso o leggerezza), e il movimento semplice dei corpi semplici (verso il centro o verso l'alto) del quale la forma è responsabile. Non v'è dubbio che Alessandro abbia elaborato una teoria delle forme dei corpi semplici con l'occhio rivolto alle forme dei viventi. Dopo aver affermato che la leggerezza è la forma del corpo semplice 'fuoco', precisa infatti che essa è all'origine del movimento senza essere essa stessa in movimento: guarda caso, esattamente com'è notoriamente l'anima secondo la concezione aristotelica. Lo stesso ruolo svolge l'affermazione (pp. 6.29-7.3 Bruns) che la forma di una cosa si identifica con la sua perfezione: essa pone le basi per la successiva (p. 9.19-22 Bruns) distinzione dei due gradi della perfezione, il primo dei quali sarà poi (p. 16.4-10 Bruns) identificato con la prima entelechia.

Un punto della teoria della forma semplice (e cioè che la forma semplice degli elementi deriva in realtà da forme ancora più semplici rappresentate dalle quattro qualità elementari) viene utilizzata nell'analisi delle forme dei corpi composti. Quando infatti (pp. 7.21 sgg. Bruns) egli passa a parlare di queste, ma avendo presenti quei composti che sono i viventi, mostra come la molteplicità di capacità di movimento esibite dai viventi deve dipendere da una forma che sia principio di una molteplicità di movimenti. Orbene, la forma di un corpo composto è in realtà una forma in cui sono compendiate le forme e le capacità di movimento dei corpi semplici che compongono il sostrato del corpo composto. Non soltanto la forma dei corpi composti è una forma complessa, ma i corpi composti presentano nel loro insieme una varietà di forme complesse che trova una spiegazione ragionevole nel fatto che 1) le forme dei corpi semplici sono più d'una; 2) esiste una svariata possibilità di combinazione dei corpi semplici. Senza dubbio la tesi per cui la forma dei corpi composti è una 'forma comune', risultante dalle forme dei corpi semplici, per cui essa è in realtà una 'forma di forme', così come la dottrina che riconduce la differenza delle forme dei composti alle varie possibilità di combinazione dei corpi semplici, costituiscono tesi peculiari dell'aristotelismo di Alessandro prive di riscontro in Aristotele. Ciò non significa però – come invece credeva Moraux –⁹ che qui Alessandro sostenesse la generazione della forma dalla materia e in

⁹ Cf. P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, exégète de la noétique d'Aristote*, Droz, Liège-Paris 1942.

particolare la generazione dell'anima dalla pura e semplice mescolanza degli elementi.¹⁰ Alessandro non sta qui delineando un processo spontaneo di generazione che attraverso l'aggregazione dei corpi semplici nei composti metterebbe capo niente meno che all'anima, ma disegna un dittico. Nel primo quadro colloca i corpi semplici, nel secondo i corpi composti e evidenzia la costante corrispondenza tra il grado di complessità delle forme e il grado di complessità dei sostrati cui le forme ineriscono. Il suo obiettivo è di mostrare che in quei corpi composti che sono i viventi, l'anima non è né più né meno che la *dynamis* espressa dal corpo. Nei vegetali a una composizione più rudimentale del corpo e a un limitato numero di organi corrisponde un'anima che svolge soltanto le funzioni vegetative. Rispetto al vegetale qualsiasi animale ha una composizione del corpo più complessa e un maggior numero di organi, quindi un'anima più complessa che, oltre alle funzioni vegetative, ha almeno le facoltà sensitive del tatto e del gusto. Altri animali infine presentano una struttura corporea più complessa e un numero maggiore di organi in grado di svolgere anche le funzioni percettive dei sensi superiori e la funzione della locomozione. Insomma, c'è una proporzione diretta tra i tipi di corpo e le forme che si presentano su questi corpi, e le forme stanno tra loro nella stessa relazione in cui stanno i rispettivi sostrati.

È degno di nota che Alessandro, dopo aver parlato di vegetali e animali, non estenda la sua argomentazione anche all'uomo. Certo gli sarebbe stato difficile individuare al livello dell'organismo corporeo umano il corrispettivo della facoltà razionale. Ma è altrettanto chiaro che egli non era disposto a fare alcuna eccezione per l'anima umana rispetto a qualsiasi altra anima e a qualsiasi altra forma. Le incertezze e i dubbi di Aristotele a proposito della facoltà intellettuale sono da Alessandro semplicemente cancellati. Rispetto ai passi del *De Anima* in cui Aristotele lasciava aperta la possibilità che l'anima intellettuale potesse costituire un'eccezione, Alessandro assume invece come normativa a tutti i livelli la definizione generale di anima come entelechia prima del corpo e privilegia (p. 12.7 sgg. Bruns) quei passi, come ad es. *De An.*I 1, 403 a 5 sgg., in cui Aristotele stesso legava al corpo lo svolgimento di tutte le facoltà, comprese le facoltà superiori tipicamente umane. Se nessuna attività psichica può prescindere dal corpo, – conclude Alessandro (p. 12.21-24 Bruns) – “l'anima è qualcosa che appartiene al corpo e ne è inseparabile. Sarebbe inutile infatti che fosse separata, perché non potrebbe esercitare da sé nessuna delle attività a lei proprie”. All'inseparabilità dell'anima dal corpo Alessandro dedica un ampio tratto (pp. 20.26-21.24 Bruns) della prima parte del trattato. L'argomentazione è volta a smentire l'ipotesi che l'anima sia forma del corpo nel senso di essere una sostanza autonoma, come lo è il pilota rispetto alla nave. Questa ipotesi ha sicuramente origine da un oscuro passo di Aristotele *De An.* II 1, 413 a 6-9, dove, dopo aver messo in conto che alcune parti dell'anima siano separabili perché non sono entelechia di nessun corpo, si avvanza l'ipotesi che l'anima possa essere entelechia come il pilota lo è della nave. Aristotele non chiarisce la questione e non sappiamo cosa ne dicesse Alessandro nel commentario perduto. Sappiamo invece che alcuni tra gli stessi aderenti al Peripato come Senarco (cf. Aezio IV 3, 10 = *DDG* 388, 16-20) avevano fatto propria l'interpretazione dell'anima come entelechia separata. Tale tesi doveva apparire ad Alessandro un pericoloso compromesso col platonismo, al quale reagisce sostenendo la totale inseparabilità dell'anima dal corpo e la sua completa mortalità (p. 21.22-24 Bruns).¹¹ Filopono nel suo *Commento al De Anima*¹² ricorda che Alessandro sosteneva che l'anima umana è interamente inseparabile dal corpo e quindi mortale.

¹⁰ Cf. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise*, pp. 29-34, 37-43 e in modo più sfumato Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. III, *Alexander von Aphrodisias*, p. 356. Sull'impossibilità di attribuire ad Alessandro la tesi della derivazione della forma dalla materia cf. Accattino, “Generazione dell'anima in Alessandro”, p. 200 e Accattino - Donini in Alessandro di Afrodisia, *L'anima*, pp. 114-17.

¹¹ Cf. Accattino - Donini in Alessandro di Afrodisia, *L'anima*, pp. 140-3.

¹² Cf. *Ioannis Philoponi In Aristotelis De Anima libros commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck, Reimer, Berlin 1897 (*CAG* XV), p. 10.1 sgg.

In questa occasione Filopono riporta tutti quei passi in cui Aristotele avrebbe affermato chiaramente la separabilità dell'anima razionale e la sua immortalità e nel seguito del suo commento ci dice qualcosa di come Alessandro interpretasse uno di quei passi. In *De An.* I 4, 408 b 29 Aristotele afferma che "forse l'intelletto è un qualcosa di più divino e impassibile". Alessandro spiegava che qui si fa parola dell'intelletto divino. Al che Filopono aveva buon gioco a chiedergli il perché del "forse"; l'intelletto divino non è forse divino e impassibile, lo è per certo (Philop., *In De An.*, p. 159.14-17 Hayduck). L'*escamotage* che qui adottava Alessandro è in linea con la sua interpretazione della noetica di *De An.* III 5. Il solo intelletto separato e incorruttibile è il dio aristotelico di *Lambda*. L'intelletto umano, in quanto facoltà di un'anima corruttibile perché forma inseparabile di un corpo corruttibile, è anch'esso corruttibile.

3.1

Siamo così arrivati al secondo tema su cui dobbiamo soffermarci un po' più nel dettaglio, ossia l'interpretazione alessandrista della teoria aristotelica dell'intelletto. Forse già anche per la teoria che equiparava l'anima alle *dynameis* dei corpi semplici, che abbiamo appena esaminata, Alessandro aveva avuto un precedente nel peripatetico Boeto di Sidone, allievo di Andronico, ma non siamo certi che Porfirio si riferisse esclusivamente a lui (e non anche ad Alessandro stesso) in un passo riportato da Eusebio, *Praep. ev.* XV 11, 2.¹³ Invece, per quel che riguarda la teoria dell'intelletto possiamo dire con certezza che Alessandro è debitore alla tradizione esegetica precedente. Come si sa, nella sua interpretazione egli mette insieme tre testi: *De An.* III 4-5, *Metafisica* Λ e *De Gen. anim.* II 3, 736 b 27-29, dove Aristotele accenna alla possibilità che il solo νοῦς, a differenza delle facoltà vegetativa e sensitiva veicolate dal seme paterno, si introduca dall'esterno (θύραθεν) e che sia il solo ad essere divino. Il collegamento tra il testo di *De An.* e quello di *G.A.* è molto antico e risale già a Teofrasto,¹⁴ mentre il collegamento di *De An.* III 4-5 con *Lambda* doveva essere diffuso anche fuori della cerchia degli aristotelici se lo ritroviamo nel *Didaskalikos* X, 164.16 sgg. Peraltro Alessandro stesso ci riferisce nel *De Intellectu* (pp. 112.5 sgg. Bruns) una versione bizzarra della noetica aristotelica, che presupponeva un collegamento tra quei tre testi e identificava l'intelletto agente col dio che pensa sempre e che, essendo dappertutto, si introduce dall'esterno in noi fin dal concepimento e si serve strumentalmente delle facoltà umane, diventando in realtà il vero protagonista del pensiero umano. Alessandro la attribuisce a un qualcuno di cui non ci dice il nome. Io credo che costui sia quello stesso Aristotele citato in precedenza (p. 110.4 Bruns), da non confondersi con lo Stagirita (citato in p. 110.5 Bruns), e cioè sia quell'Aristotele che certamente è stato maestro diretto di Alessandro e che potrebbe essere identico all'Aristotele di Mitilene di cui ci parla Galeno *De Consuet.*, pp. 11.4-12.12 Müller. Non possiamo soffermarci qui su questa versione della noetica aristotelica, vigorosamente criticata da Alessandro.¹⁵ Concentriamoci ora invece sulle due versioni della noetica alessandrista, quella del *De Intellectu* e quella del *De Anima*, che, come vedremo, divergono tra loro in punti non secondari. Le tratteremo qui in successione. Il *De Intellectu*, che nell'edizione di Bruns leggiamo come un piccolo trattato continuo, è in realtà il collage di tre frammenti che contengono – a mio modo di vedere¹⁶ – appunti personali di Alessandro; non si tratta quindi verosimilmente di uno scritto rifinito per la pubblicazione. La terza parte riferisce la bizzarra noetica alla quale abbiamo appena

¹³ Cf. H.B. Gottschalk, "Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD", in I. Temporini - W. Haase (eds), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II 36.2, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1987, pp. 1079-174, spec. p. 1118.

¹⁴ Cf. *Themistii In libros Aristotelis De Anima paraphrasis*, ed. R. Heinze, Reimer, Berlin 1899 (*CAG* 5.3), pp. 107.30 sgg.

¹⁵ Sull'Aristotele maestro di Alessandro e sulla sua interpretazione della noetica aristotelica cf. Alessandro di Afrodisia, *De Intellectu*, pp. 9; 13-15; 55-58.

¹⁶ *Ivi*, pp. 14-15.

accennato, cui Alessandro fa seguire le sue critiche. Nei primi due frammenti è invece Alessandro a parlare in prima persona: nel primo immediatamente; nel secondo dopo aver riferito una tradizione interpretativa sui motivi che avevano indotto Aristotele a introdurre il νοῦς θύραθεν. Vediamo allora qual è l'interpretazione della noetica che Alessandro propone in queste due parti.

Sulla scorta di *De An.* III 4-5, ma utilizzando una terminologia di scuola ormai consolidata e che non compare in quanto tale in Aristotele, Alessandro distingue tre tipi di intelletto: l'intelletto materiale (p. 106.19 Bruns: νοῦς ὑλικός) o potenziale, l'intelletto che possiede l'abito (p. 107.21 Bruns: ἔξις ἐχών, ma cfr. anche p. 109.4 Bruns: ὁ ἐν ἔξει νοῦς) e l'intelletto agente (p. 107.29 Bruns: νοῦς ποιητικός). La potenzialità dell'intelletto è qui presentata come la potenzialità rispetto agli oggetti di conoscenza: è la potenzialità di pensare che equivale a recepire le forme, le quali costituiscono i pensieri. Insomma l'intelletto materiale è la pura possibilità di esercitare il pensiero e di recepire i pensieri, ossia le forme (εἴδη); esso è l'analogo della possibilità che tutti gli uomini hanno di apprendere un'arte. Il secondo intelletto è la capacità effettiva di esercitare il pensiero, ossia di recepire le forme ed è l'analogo di coloro che hanno imparato un'arte e sono quindi in grado di praticarla. Come avviene il passaggio dal primo al secondo tipo di intelletto, ossia dalla pura possibilità alla capacità effettiva di pensare e di mettere in atto il pensiero? Su questo punto il *De Intellectu* è chiarissimo: tale trasformazione è opera del terzo tipo di intelletto, l'intelletto agente: "questo terzo intelletto, rende l'intelletto in potenza e materiale intelletto in atto, producendo in esso l'abito che lo fa pensare" (p. 107.32-34 Bruns); "è produttore del pensare ed è lui a condurre all'atto l'intelletto materiale" (p. 108.1-2 Bruns). Il problema è di capire *come e quando* avviene questo intervento e prima ancora *chi* è l'intelletto agente. Vediamo per primo questo punto. "Questo intelletto è ciò che è intelligibile per sua natura e tale in atto" – dice Alessandro in p. 107.34 Bruns. Ora, a essere intelligibile per sua natura è soltanto la forma immateriale. Vi sono infatti due classi di forme: le forme insite nella materia e la forma immateriale (qui parla di un'unica forma immateriale, ma più tardi parlerà di φύσει νοητά al plurale; il problema tuttavia non cambia e, parlando del *De Anima*, spiegheremo il perché di questa oscillazione). Le forme insite nella materia, che sono intelligibili soltanto in potenza, diventano intelligibili e diventano pensiero ad opera dell'intelletto umano. "Siccome è l'intelletto a separarle dalla materia in unione con la quale esse hanno esistenza, è lui a renderle intelligibili in atto, e ciascuna di esse, quando è pensata, allora diventa intelligibile in atto e intelletto, laddove anteriormente e per loro natura non erano tali" (p. 108.3-7 Bruns). Ricordo soltanto brevemente perché le forme insite nella materia, oltre a diventare intelligibili diventano anche intelletto. Per Aristotele (cf. *De An.* III 4, 430 a 2-5; 19-20; III 7, 431 a 1) la conoscenza teoretica si riduce e si identifica totalmente col proprio oggetto. In altri termini, nel caso del pensiero si ha identificazione di pensante e pensato. Ma se questa identificazione è totale, deve valere anche la reciproca. È questa la tesi – assente in Aristotele – fatta valere qui da Alessandro ed esplicitata a chiare lettere in p. 108.12-13 Bruns: il contenuto dell'intelletto è esso stesso intelletto, per cui le forme insite nella materia, una volta pensate dall'intelletto e rese intelligibili in atto, diventano esse stesse intelletto. Questo è anche ciò che consente di dire che l'intelletto umano, quando pensa i propri oggetti, pensa se stesso. Se infatti esso stesso non è altro che i propri oggetti, quando pensa, pensa se stesso (cf. p. 109.4-10 Bruns). Alessandro spiega così le affermazioni di Aristotele in *De An.* III 4, 429 b 9 e 430 a 2-5.

Le proprietà di essere intelligibile e di essere intelletto, che appartengono per via mediata e transitoriamente alle forme insite nella materia, appartengono invece *di per sé e sempre* all'altro tipo di forma, la forma immateriale. La forma immateriale è per sua natura e di per sé intelligibile perché non ha bisogno di essere separata dalla materia per diventare tale e – data l'identità di intelligibile e intelletto in atto – sarà anche un intelletto sempre in atto: "ora, se un ente è per sua natura intelligibile e ha di per sé l'essere tale perché è privo di materia, e non lo è ad opera di un intelletto che lo separi dalla materia, tale ente è sempre un intelletto in atto. L'intelligibile in atto è infatti un intelletto" (p. 108.16-19 Bruns).

A questo punto incomincia a essere chiaro che quella forma immateriale che è anche un intelletto che può fungere da intelletto agente, altri non è che il dio di *Lambda*. Questo diventa ancora più chiaro nel tratto successivo del testo, dove Alessandro spiega anche – nell'inciso delle l. 20-22 (qui sotto in corsivo) – un altro dei nostri quesiti, ossia *in che modo* l'intelletto agente è causa dell'abito dell'intelletto materiale.

Orbene questo intelligibile per sua natura e intelletto in atto – *che diventa causa per l'intelletto materiale del fatto che, grazie al riferimento a una forma di quel tipo, separi, riproduca e pensi anche ciascuna delle forme insite nella materia e la renda intelligibile* – è l'intelletto agente, detto *intelletto che viene dall'esterno*, il quale non è una qualche parte e facoltà della nostra anima, ma viene a essere in noi dal di fuori, quando lo pensiamo, se appunto il pensare ha luogo con la ricezione della forma ed esso è di per sé una forma immateriale, che non è mai congiunta a materia e che non ne viene separata nel momento in cui è pensata. Ovviamente, essendo siffatto, è *separato* da noi, giacché non gli avviene di essere intelletto per il fatto di essere pensato da noi, ma è tale per sua natura ed è intelletto in atto e intelligibile in atto. Ma la forma di questo tipo è anche *la sostanza incorruttibile priva di materia*. Quindi quello che è in atto all'esterno la forma siffatta è anche intelletto agente: giustamente è chiamato da Aristotele intelletto *immortale* (pp. 108.19-109.1 Bruns).

Il dio di *Lambda* è l'intelletto agente di cui Aristotele parla in *De An.* III 5 ed è anche il $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\theta\upsilon\rho\alpha\theta\epsilon\nu$ di *G.A.* II 3, il quale giunge al nostro intelletto quando lo pensiamo. Quindi “la sostanza incorruttibile priva di materia” – altra chiara ripresa di *Lambda* 6, 1071 b 20-21 – è anche quello che in *De An.* III 5 Aristotele chiama intelletto separato (430 a 17) e immortale (430 a 23).

Vediamo ora in che modo esso è causa dell'abito dell'intelletto materiale, ossia come consente all'intelletto umano di operare una volta che vi si sia introdotto come forma pensata e torniamo allora all'inciso di p. 108.20-22 Bruns. Sono linee particolarmente enigmatiche, ma a me pare che vogliano dire questo: una volta che abbia pensato la forma immateriale, il nostro intelletto la assume come modello e cerca di costruire qualcosa di simile ad essa a partire dagli enti sensibili nei quali forma e materia esistono indissolubilmente legate. Per ottenere ciò, separa la forma dalla materia e così *riproduce* la forma (questo mi pare il senso da dare a $\mu\mu\epsilon\tilde{\sigma}\theta\alpha\iota$).¹⁷ Si tratta di una riproduzione fatta dall'intelletto la quale, se paragonata alla forma immateriale, è imperfetta come tutte le riproduzioni; non esiste infatti come forma separata dalla materia fuori dall'intelletto e sussiste soltanto per il tempo in cui viene pensata (cf. *supra*, p. 108.3-7 Bruns).

Come abbiamo visto, l'intelletto agente può giungere nell'intelletto umano e diventare causa dell'abito a patto di essere pensato. *Quando* capita questo evento? È questo il terzo punto che ci resta ancora da chiarire e che nel *De Intellectu* compare a pp. 110.29-111.2 Bruns: “[...] esiste bensì qualcosa che è anche intelligibile di per sé perché è tale per sua propria natura. Orbene, l'intelletto in potenza, mentre va perfezionandosi e crescendo, pensa proprio questa cosa. Come infatti la facoltà di camminare che l'uomo ha fin dalla nascita viene messa in attività col procedere del tempo mentre esso viene perfezionandosi e senza subire alcunché, allo stesso modo anche l'intelletto, una volta giunto a perfezione, pensa gli intelligibili per natura e rende intelligibili a se stesso le cose sensibili, proprio perché è attivo”.

Esiste quindi per il *De Intellectu* uno sviluppo naturale dell'intelletto che mette capo al pensiero del dio aristotelico. Esso è analogo allo sviluppo della capacità di camminare che l'uomo possiede fin dalla nascita, ma mette in atto solo a partire da una certa età. Allo stesso modo anche l'intelletto, una volta che si sia perfezionato ($\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omega\theta\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma$, p. 111.1 Bruns), pensa gli intelligibili per natura e rende a se stesso

¹⁷ Cf. *LSJ* s.v. $\mu\mu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ II, nonché l'uso aristotelico in *Arist., Poet.* 2, 1448 a 1 e 18, dove $\mu\mu\epsilon\tilde{\sigma}\theta\alpha\iota$ x non vuol dire assumere x a modello di qualcos'altro, bensì raffigurare, ricostruire direttamente x ; cf. anche *Eth. Nic.* III 5, 1113 a 8.

intelligibili gli oggetti sensibili. In che cosa consista lo sviluppo dell'intelletto è difficile dire. L'analogia con l'esplicarsi della capacità di camminare, che in *De Fato*, p. 198.9 Bruns, Alessandro equipara alla crescita dei denti e della barba, lascia intendere che si tratta di un evento che si produce naturalmente ad una certa età dell'uomo (che il testo non precisa), ma che non comporta alcun impegno da parte dell'uomo.¹⁸ Come vedremo, il *De Anima* registra in proposito la tesi opposta. L'idea che l'intelletto umano vada incontro a una crescita e a un perfezionamento e che, una volta che si sia perfezionato, pensi sia gli intelligibili per natura che gli intelligibili da lui stesso costruiti, è ribadita più oltre (p. 112.2-4 Bruns) a conclusione di un parallelo tra facoltà intellettuale e percezione visiva (cf. pp. 111.32 sgg. Bruns) che può forse suggerire una spiegazione di come Alessandro doveva rappresentarsi la cosa. Egli deve aver qui pensato alla facoltà intellettuale potenziale come all'analogo di una facoltà visiva latente che, per una sorta di immaturità sua, resta immersa nelle tenebre. Quando giunge a maturità vede la luce e grazie alla luce diventa capace di cogliere insieme anche gli oggetti sensibili. Analogamente quando l'intelletto vede la luce (cf. *De An.* III 5, 430 a 15) diventa capace di cogliere le forme intelligibili degli oggetti sensibili. Convieni a questo punto riassumere brevemente i termini della noetica del *De Intellectu*. L'intelletto umano, che all'inizio è una semplice possibilità di recepire le forme e i pensieri (p. 107.17-19 Bruns), al termine di uno sviluppo naturale e spontaneo recepisce con un atto di pensiero quella forma che non ha bisogno di essere separata dalla materia perché sussiste di per sé separata. È questa forma pura, la quale essendo intelligibile è anche intelletto, a fungere da intelletto agente, ossia a conferire all'intelletto umano l'abito, la capacità consolidata di pensare, la quale consiste essenzialmente nel riprodurre, a partire dagli enti sensibili e sul modello delle forme immateriali, le forme intelligibili in atto, separandole dalla materia con la quale esistono. Nello sviluppo dell'intelligenza umana quindi il pensiero che ha per oggetto il dio è il primo pensiero e la condizione indispensabile per concepire tutti gli altri pensieri.

Forse alla base della tesi per cui il primo pensiero è nientemeno che il pensiero del dio aristotelico c'è quanto si può leggere in *De An.* III 4, 429 a 29 sgg., dove Aristotele, continuando il confronto tra sensazione e pensiero, afferma che, a differenza della facoltà sensitiva, la quale dopo aver percepito un sensibile troppo intenso non è in grado di percepirne uno meno intenso della stessa specie, "l'intelletto, quando ha pensato una cosa fortemente intelligibile, non pensa peggio ma anzi meglio quelle di rango inferiore". Alessandro deve aver identificato *tout court* la cosa fortemente intelligibile con l'oggetto più alto della realtà e della conoscenza, il dio di *Lambda* e, soprattutto, deve avere letto nell'affermazione aristotelica la condizione necessaria da soddisfarsi per poter pensare gli intelligibili di rango inferiore. Il risultato alquanto ingenuo e paradossale è che il primo pensiero dell'uomo debba essere niente meno che il dio. Anche su questo punto il *De Anima* vede le cose diversamente.

3.2

La noetica del *De Anima* utilizza gli stessi ingredienti del *De Intellectu*, ma li riordina in modo diverso. Dopo aver esaminato le facoltà irrazionali dell'anima, Alessandro affronta qui (pp. 80.16 sgg. Bruns) il tema della facoltà propria dell'uomo, la facoltà razionale. Seguendo il testo di *Eth. Nic.* VI 2, 1139 a 8-11 – che riproduce quasi alla lettera a partire da p. 81.2 Bruns – Alessandro afferma che la funzione razionale si rivolge a due campi: il campo dell'azione, caratterizzato dalla contingenza, e il campo della conoscenza degli aspetti necessari ed eterni della realtà. La facoltà razionale è quindi duplice e, a seconda che si indirizzi all'uno e all'altro campo, si potrà parlare di intelletto pratico o di intelletto teoretico (cf. pp. 80.16-81.13 Bruns).

¹⁸ Cf. anche *Aspasii In Ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt commentaria*, ed. G. Heylbut, Reimer, Berlin 1889 (*CAG* XIX.1), p. 38.11-14.

Alla nascita l'uomo non possiede l'intelletto pratico o teoretico come facoltà da cui possa venire *tout court* l'attività. Se, ad es., la facoltà sensitiva alla nascita è una capacità effettiva che si può tradurre nell'attività sensitiva, ciò non vale per la facoltà intellettiva. Alla nascita l'uomo ha soltanto una semplice potenza e attitudine (*δύναμιν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοτητα*) ad acquistare la capacità effettiva da cui procede l'attività. Per descrivere le tappe dello sviluppo della facoltà intellettiva Alessandro ricorre alla celebre distinzione di Aristotele (si veda soprattutto *De An.* II 5, 417 a 21 sgg.), distinzione che è per altro presupposta anche da *De An.* III 4, 429 b 5-9 e che abbiamo già vista operante nel *De Intellectu*, tra: 1) l'uomo che ha l'attitudine ad apprendere un sapere, 2) l'uomo che ha appreso un sapere ma che non lo esercita in atto e 3) l'uomo che esercita in atto il sapere che ha appreso (faccio notare per inciso che questo terzo stadio non si identifica col terzo tipo di intelletto di cui parlava il *De Intellectu*, ossia l'intelletto agente). L'attitudine naturale è anche qui chiamata da Alessandro intelletto potenziale o materiale (*νοῦς δυνάμει – ὑλικὸς νοῦς*); è chiamato materiale nel senso in cui, per analogia, si può dire materia di una cosa tutto ciò che ha l'attitudine a ricevere quella cosa. Questa semplice attitudine è anche chiamata da Alessandro intelletto naturale (p. 81.26 Bruns), in quanto essa è posseduta, seppur in maniera differente, da tutti gli uomini che non hanno menomazioni congenite. Vi saranno quindi persone più o meno ben dotate per sviluppare la facoltà intellettiva. La capacità di pensare si sviluppa a partire da questa attitudine grazie all'insegnamento e alle abitudini. In questo senso Alessandro chiama la seconda tappa dello sviluppo dell'intelletto 'intelletto acquisito' (p. 82.1 Bruns, *ἐπίκτητος*), questo è l'abito (*ἔξις*), la perfezione dell'intelletto naturale. A differenza di quest'ultimo, l'intelletto come abito non si trova più in tutti gli uomini, ma soltanto "in coloro che si sono esercitati e hanno imparato nel modo che è anche proprio delle scienze" (cf. pp. 81.13-82.3 Bruns). Si incontra qui una prima grande differenza col *De Intellectu*, dove lo sviluppo dell'intelletto era visto come un processo spontaneo al pari dello sviluppo della facoltà del camminare. Qui lo stesso esempio è utilizzato per provare la tesi opposta. "Nel caso delle scienze e dell'intelletto in atto le cose non stanno come per il camminare: nel caso del camminare, infatti, come la facoltà di camminare è presente in noi per natura e la possediamo subito, non appena generati, così anche l'attività sopraggiunge naturalmente in noi con il procedere degli anni e dello sviluppo; invece per la scienza e l'intelletto le potenze sono sí presenti naturalmente, ma né gli abiti, né le attività sono ancora per natura. Perciò questo intelletto non diciamo più che l'hanno tutti, ma soltanto dell'uomo educato diciamo che ha intelligenza" (p. 82.5-11 Bruns).

Ma come si produce allora l'acquisizione della facoltà intellettiva come abito, ossia come una vera capacità che si può tradurre in atto? Bisogna dire anzitutto che in quel che segue Alessandro studia soltanto l'intelletto teoretico e non dice più nulla dell'intelletto pratico. L'uomo – scrive Alessandro a partire da p. 83.2 Bruns – possiede dalla nascita i sensi, grazie alla attività dei quali riceve delle immagini (*φαντασίαι*). Le sensazioni ripetute lasciano tracce, impronte. L'uomo si abitua quindi anzitutto a ricordare, conservando queste impronte, "poi, sulla base della memoria (*μνήμη*) e della continua attività dei sensi intorno agli oggetti sensibili, si produce in lui una sorta di passaggio, grazie all'esperienza (*ἐμπειρία*) dal 'questo qui individuale' (*τόδε τε καὶ καθέκαστον*) a ciò che è 'del tal genere e in universale' (*τοιοῦνδε καὶ καθόλου*)". Per esempio, dopo molte percezioni ripetute di oggetti bianchi, l'uomo arriva a cogliere l'universale 'bianco'. "Questa comprensione, ovvero l'afferrare l'universale mediante la somiglianza degli oggetti sensibili individuali, è pensare (*νόησις*) perché il riunire insieme i casi simili è ormai opera dell'intelletto" (p. 83.11-13 Bruns). La facoltà intellettiva si costituisce dunque a partire dalla facoltà conoscitiva più semplice, la percezione, e si sviluppa grazie alla memoria e all'esperienza, come aveva detto Aristotele in *Metaph.* A 1 e in *An. Post.* II 19, che sono senza dubbio i testi di riferimento di Alessandro.

Cogliere l'universale – dirà in seguito Alessandro – non è altro che cogliere la forma intelligibile indipendentemente dalla materia. "Colui che afferra la forma di qualcosa separatamente dalla materia ottiene quel che è comune e universale, giacché chi afferra la forma dell'uomo separatamente dalle

circostanze materiali ottiene ciò che è comune nell'uomo. Infatti la differenza dei singoli uomini fra di loro viene dalla materia, poiché almeno le loro forme, grazie alle quali essi sono uomini, non hanno alcuna differenza; e d'altra parte chi abbraccia con lo sguardo ciò che è comune al di sopra dei casi individuali afferra la forma separatamente dalla materia: quella infatti è ciò che vi è in essi di comune e di identico" (p. 85.14-20 Bruns). Anche la sensazione coglie una forma, ma la forma sensibile (per esempio la forma sensibile 'bianco' colta dalla vista) è in primo luogo la forma di un oggetto particolare e inoltre è sempre accompagnata da altre proprietà sensibili, quali la grandezza e la figura. L'intelletto viceversa coglie le sole forme, spogliandole da ogni supporto sensibile e contemplandole nella loro essenza. Quando l'intelletto pensa la forma intelligibile 'bianco', ossia l'essenza del bianco, non pensa una forma accompagnata da una grandezza e da una figura (cf. pp. 83.13-84.10 Bruns).

Una volta trovati gli oggetti propri dell'intelletto nelle forme intelligibili, Alessandro può allora ridefinire le prime due tappe dello sviluppo della facoltà intellettuale rispetto ai loro oggetti; e qui egli può seguire più da vicino ciò che trovava in Aristotele *De An.* III 4. Se in precedenza l'intelletto materiale, o intelletto in potenza, era visto come lo stadio anteriore all'acquisizione della facoltà, ora il νοῦς ὑλικός è presentato come la disponibilità ad accogliere tutte le forme intelligibili senza possederne alcuna. Da questo punto di vista "l'intelletto materiale è soltanto una sorta di attitudine a ospitare le forme e somiglia a una tavoletta non scritta, o meglio al 'non essere scritta' della tavoletta, ma non alla tavoletta stessa. Perché la tavoletta è già, di per sé, una cosa esistente" (p. 84.24-26 Bruns). Alessandro crede di dover precisare meglio il celebre paragone di Aristotele *De An.* III 4, 429 b 31 - 430 a 2 tra l'intelletto in potenza e 'la tavoletta sulla quale non c'è niente di scritto in atto'. Se come vuole Aristotele, 429 a 18 sgg., l'intelletto per essere ricettivo di tutte le forme non ne deve avere alcuna sua propria, perché sarebbe di ostacolo alla ricezione delle altre forme, allora non può essere paragonato a una tavoletta che è un oggetto con una materia e una forma. L'intelletto in potenza sarà allora l'analogo dell'assenza di scrittura o ancora l'analogo della attitudine della tavoletta ad essere scritta (cf. pp. 84.27-85.6 Bruns).

Come si è già visto, l'intelletto come abito è una facoltà che si acquisisce a partire dalla facoltà sensitiva. Grazie alla costante attività sugli oggetti sensibili l'intelletto acquisisce gradualmente una sorta di capacità viva che lo conduce a contemplare l'universale (cf. p. 85.20-25 Bruns). Quando l'intelletto arriva a cogliere l'universale anche senza l'aiuto della facoltà sensitiva, allora esso ha acquisito l'abito a pensare ed è in grado di pensare da solo. L'attività del pensiero è allora la terza tappa dello sviluppo della facoltà intellettuale: si ha così l'intelletto in atto (ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοῦς) che è l'analogo dell'uomo che esercita in atto il sapere che ha appreso. In rapporto a questa tappa ultima la tappa precedente dell'intelletto come abito può allora essere vista come una sorta di ripostiglio di pensieri in riposo (cf. pp. 85.25-86.6 Bruns).

Ma poiché gli oggetti del pensiero non sussistono in quanto pensieri fuori dall'intelletto che li pensa, l'atto dell'intelletto si identifica coi propri pensieri. "L'intelletto in atto non è nient'altro che la forma pensata", dice Alessandro (p. 86.14 Bruns). Se poi l'intelletto nel momento in cui pensa diviene ciò che pensa, ossia se nell'atto del pensiero c'è identità del soggetto col proprio oggetto, allora all'intelletto in atto avviene di pensare se stesso, perché esso stesso non è nient'altro che la forma pensata. Alessandro spiega così, come già aveva fatto nel *De Intellectu*, le affermazioni di Aristotele in *De An.* III 4, 429 b 9 e 430 a 2-5.

Lo sviluppo e il funzionamento della facoltà intellettuale che Alessandro ha descritto fino a questo punto del suo trattato sono assolutamente autonome rispetto all'intervento dell'intelletto agente; sono frutto dell'insegnamento e dell'impegno del singolo, insomma sono frutto di iniziativa esclusivamente umana. L'intelletto acquisisce gradualmente, appoggiandosi alla facoltà sensitiva, la capacità di astrarre le forme insite nella materia. Con le sue sole forze l'intelletto come abito arriva poi a pensare da solo queste forme anche senza l'aiuto del senso. Appare chiaro che nel *De Anima*, diversamente dal *De Intellectu*, l'intelletto agente non interviene direttamente nella costituzione

dell'abito della facoltà. Certamente non è il responsabile diretto e immediato della trasformazione dell'intelletto materiale nell'intelletto come abito. Come si vedrà, la causalità dell'intelletto agente opera a un altro livello più remoto.

Già sappiamo dal *De Intellectu* che gli oggetti possibili del pensiero non sono soltanto le forme insite nella materia, che l'intelletto umano arriva ad isolare spogliando le cose sensibili da tutti i loro supporti materiali per coglierne la sola essenza sostanziale. Oltre agli ἔνυλα εἶδη – che esistono con la materia delle cose in cui sono insite e che diventano intelligibili in atto nella misura in cui sono pensate dal pensiero umano in atto – esistono forme che sussistono come tali indipendentemente da ogni sostrato materiale e che sono quindi intelligibili per loro propria natura, ossia sono intelligibili indipendentemente dal fatto di essere pensate. Ma se questi intelligibili sono tali per loro natura, sono intelligibili sempre in atto. Inoltre l'identità di intelligibile e intelletto, che, come si è visto, si realizza per l'intelletto umano quando pensa, varrà *a fortiori* per questi intelligibili sempre in atto, che saranno quindi degli intelletti sempre in atto. Dunque, la forma immateriale (ἄϋλον εἶδος) – conclude Alessandro – sarà l'intelletto in senso proprio e sempre in atto (cf. pp. 87.24-88.3 Bruns).

Chi siano questi intelletti sempre in atto Alessandro non dice chiaramente nel passo che ho appena riassunto; viceversa aggiunge una difficoltà, perché prima ne parla al plurale (p. 87.25-29 Bruns), poi passa al singolare (un solo ἄϋλον εἶδος; p. 88.2-3 Bruns), per tornare infine al plurale (p. 88.6 Bruns). La stessa oscillazione compare, come si è visto, nel *De Intellectu*. La soluzione del problema è fornita in parte da ciò che segue, quando Alessandro identifica l'intelligibile per propria natura col νοῦς ποιητικός, il quale a sua volta è identificato con la causa prima, ossia col νοῦς di *Lambda* e cioè il dio di Aristotele, come già sappiamo dal *De Intellectu*. Ma la prova più sicura che la forma immateriale è il dio di *Lambda* è fornita dalla *Quaestio* I 25, dove questa identificazione è esplicita. Inoltre questa stessa *Quaestio* affronta anche il problema dell'unità o della pluralità delle forme prive di materia, ricorrendo a un argomento che si trova in Aristotele, *Lambda* 8, 1074 a 31-38: le sostanze prive di materia non soltanto sono specificamente identiche ma sono anche numericamente identiche, perché, a differenza delle sostanze materiali, che sono specificamente identiche ma numericamente diverse, esse non hanno quelle differenze di cui è responsabile la materia (cf. *Quaest.* I 25, p. 40.3-8 Bruns). In realtà questo argomento dovrebbe impedire di parlare di una pluralità di ἄϋλα εἶδη, ma Aristotele in *Lambda* 8 continuava nonostante tutto a parlare di una pluralità di motori immobili. È questa, probabilmente, anche la ragione dell'incertezza di Alessandro tra il singolare e il plurale.

A partire da p. 88.17 Bruns, Alessandro mostra che l'intelletto agente di cui Aristotele parla in *De An.* III 5, deve essere identificato con l'intelligibile in senso proprio. Apparentemente Alessandro segue molto da vicino l'inizio del testo di Aristotele, *De An.* III 5, 430 a 10 sgg., tuttavia se ne discosta su un punto molto delicato. Mentre per Aristotele la distinzione tra il fattore 'materia' e il fattore 'causa agente' è all'interno dell'anima (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, *De An.* III 5, 430 a 13), per Alessandro questa differenza si trova nel caso dell'intelletto (ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ; p. 88.22 Bruns), cioè si tratta di una differenza all'interno della specie 'intelletto', dove si potrà distinguere tra un intelletto umano simile alla materia e un intelletto divino che opera come intelletto agente. Questo *escamotage* permette ad Alessandro di fornire una spiegazione plausibile di molte altre proprietà che Aristotele attribuisce al "νοῦς che fa tutto". Gli aggettivi χωριστός, ἀπαθής, ἀμιγής che qualificano questo intelletto; il fatto di essere per sua essenza atto (τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὡν ἐνέργεια, *De An.* III 5, 430 a 17-18); l'attività di pensiero ininterrotta (ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ; *De An.* III 5, 430 a 22) e infine la sua immortalità ed eternità (cf. *De An.* III 5, 430 a 23) sono tutte proprietà che possono soltanto appartenere all'intelletto divino (cf. p. 89.11-18 Bruns). Queste caratteristiche non possono appartenere alla facoltà intellettuale umana, la quale, in quanto entelechia di un corpo corruttibile, ne condivide il destino, come Alessandro ha mostrato nella prima parte del trattato (si veda la conclusione di p. 21.22-24 Bruns).

Ma cosa fa l'intelletto agente? Alessandro comincia col dire che esso è la causa della $\xi\xi\iota\zeta$, dell'abito, dell'intelletto materiale (p. 88.24 Bruns), senza aggiungere altro. Sarebbe tuttavia temerario da parte nostra concludere che l'intelletto agente opera direttamente sull'intelletto materiale conferendogli la facoltà di pensare. Come abbiamo visto sopra, la facoltà di pensare l'uomo la acquisisce da solo a partire dalla facoltà sensitiva, esercitandosi e impegnandosi. In effetti nelle linee che seguono immediatamente, invece di spiegare nei particolari come l'intelletto agente causa l'abito dell'intelletto materiale, Alessandro enuncia un principio generale della causalità. Leggiamo anzitutto il testo di pp. 88. 24-89.11 Bruns:

Questo [*scil.* l'intelletto agente] sarà la forma in senso proprio e massimamente intelligibile e tale è quella che è separata dalla materia. In tutti i casi, infatti, ciò che possiede in massimo grado e in senso proprio una qualche proprietà è causa anche per le altre cose del possedere esse tale proprietà. Ciò che è massimamente visibile (e tale è la luce) è causa dell'essere visibili anche per gli altri oggetti visibili; ma anche ciò che è massimamente e in senso primo bene è causa anche per gli altri beni di essere tali: infatti gli altri beni sono giudicati in ragione del loro contributo a questo. Dunque è ragionevole che anche ciò che è massimamente e per la propria natura intelligibile sia causa dell'intellezione degli altri intelligibili. Ma se ha una natura tale, dovrà essere l'intelletto agente (\acute{o} ποιητικὸς νοῦς). Infatti, se non esistesse un intelligibile per natura, nemmeno una delle altre cose diventerebbe intelligibile, come si è detto: giacché in tutti i casi in cui c'è qualcosa che ha in senso proprio una data proprietà e un'altra cosa che la ha in secondo grado, ciò che è in secondo grado ha l'essere tale da ciò che è in senso proprio. Inoltre, se siffatto intelletto è la causa prima, che è causa e principio dell'essere per tutte le altre cose, sarà agente anche in questo senso, in quanto è lui la causa dell'essere per tutte le cose pensate.

Questa è una delle pagine più discusse del *De Anima*. Il saggio già ricordato di P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, exégète de la noétique d'Aristote*,¹⁹ inaugurò una interpretazione poi ripresa da Merlan,²⁰ secondo la quale Alessandro adottava qui un principio di causalità proprio del platonismo, diventato poi specificamente neoplatonico, e che implicherebbe la nozione di partecipazione. Estendendo inoltre il paragone tra l'intelletto agente e la luce che trovava in Aristotele fino a comprendervi il bene (che non compare nel *De Anima*) Alessandro sarebbe stato suggestionato dalla pagina platonica di *Resp.* VI 508 C sgg. Non sono mancate reazioni a tale interpretazione. A.C. Lloyd²¹ ha fatto notare che il principio di causalità enunciato da Alessandro è già presente in Aristotele (cf. *Metaph.* α 1, 993 b 24-26 e *An. Post.* I 2, 72 a 29-30). Sharples²² ha suggerito che Alessandro poteva indurre anche da *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 a 26-b 1; b 18-9; 10, 1075 a 12 sgg. che Aristotele ammetteva l'esistenza di un *malista agathon*, da identificarsi proprio col motore immobile, e che non è quindi necessario pensare alla *Repubblica*. Così per il rapporto bene-beni, la cui descrizione nel testo ("gli altri beni sono giudicati in ragione del loro contributo, $\sigma\upsilon\nu\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$, al primo") risulterebbe incongruente con la partecipazione, è invece congruente con *Eth. Eud.* I 8, 1218 b 7 sgg., dove il bene primo rappresenta la causa finale degli altri beni che ad esso contribuiscono – come hanno fatto notare Accattino e Donini.²³ Ma allora il principio di causalità enunciato qui da Alessandro è tanto generale da essere

¹⁹ Cf. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise*, pp. 89-92.

²⁰ Cf. Ph. Merlan, *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness: Problems of the Soul in the Neoplatonism and Neoplatonic Tradition*, M. Nijhoff, The Hague 1963, p. 39.

²¹ Cf. A.C. Lloyd, "The Principle that the Cause is greater than its Effect", *Phronesis* 21 (1976), pp. 146-56, spec. pp. 149-51.

²² Cf. R.W. Sharples, "Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation", in Temporini - Haase (eds), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*, p. 1206, n. 97.

²³ Cf. Accattino - Donini in Alessandro di Afrodisia, *L'anima*, p. 291.

utilizzabile in piú sensi: esso si limiterebbe ad affermare la dipendenza di ciò che ha la proprietà x in modo derivato da ciò che ha quella stessa proprietà in grado sommo e primo.

Per proporre una spiegazione plausibile del senso in cui l'intelletto agente può essere causa dell'abito dell'intelletto materiale si può partire dal fondo del testo riferito, dove si legge che "se siffatto intelletto è la causa prima, che è causa e principio dell'essere per tutte le altre cose, sarà agente anche in questo senso, in quanto è lui la causa dell'essere per tutte le cose pensate". Sviluppando spunti già presenti in Moraux²⁴ e in Sharples,²⁵ Donini e io abbiamo avanzato l'ipotesi che Alessandro si richiamasse anche in questo caso alla celebre dottrina di *De Gen. et corr.* II 10 per far dipendere dalla regolarità dei movimenti dei corpi celesti, e particolarmente del sole, la continuità dei processi di generazione e corruzione e la permanenza delle forme ($\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$) nel mondo sublunare (cf. *Quaest.* I 25, p. 41.4-19 Bruns; II 19, p. 63.22-28; III 5, p. 89.20-22). La causa prima del movimento degli astri, l'intelletto divino, è quindi la causa prima dell'eternità delle forme legate alla materia. Se questa interpretazione è plausibile, è allora in un senso molto remoto, ma pur sempre primo, che l'intelletto agente è la causa dell'abito dell'intelletto materiale. Esso è la causa prima della permanenza delle forme e dunque dell'intelligibilità degli esseri che, in ragione della loro struttura composta di materia e forma, potranno essere oggetto di pensiero da parte dell'uomo che vi coglie la forma astraendola dalla materia.²⁶

Volgiamoci ora rapidamente all'ultimo aspetto della noetica alessandrista e vediamo le sue dichiarazioni a proposito del $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\theta\upsilon\rho\alpha\theta\epsilon\nu$. piú volte nel suo *De Anima* (cf. p. 88.5-11 Bruns; p. 89.21-91.6) Alessandro afferma che il nostro $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\zeta\epsilon\iota$ e cioè la nostra facoltà di pensare pienamente sviluppata (il che esclude automaticamente che il $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\theta\upsilon\rho\alpha\theta\epsilon\nu$ abbia il ruolo di formare l'abito come avveniva invece nel *De Intellectu* e che costituisca addirittura il primo pensiero) quando arriva a pensare in atto la forma immateriale, che è intelligibile per propria natura ed è un intelletto sempre in atto, allora per tutto il tempo in cui pensa in atto questo intelletto, si identifica con lui. La ragione è sempre la stessa: il nostro intelletto in atto non è altro se non il proprio oggetto. Quando dunque il suo oggetto è quell'intelletto incorruttibile che è il dio aristotelico, allora diventa egli stesso quell'intelletto incorruttibile. Ma si tratta beninteso di una incorruttibilità transitoria che dura soltanto per il tempo in cui dura in atto il pensiero di tale oggetto. "Questo intelletto – dice Alessandro p. 90.19-20 Bruns – è quello che in noi viene dall'esterno ed è incorruttibile", ma la sua incorruttibilità, Alessandro ha cura di precisarlo, non tocca la facoltà intellettiva umana che in quanto facoltà di un'anima inseparabile dal corpo perisce col corpo (cf. p. 90.14-16 Bruns; 91.2-4). Concludendo la sua esposizione della teoria della facoltà intellettiva Alessandro sottolinea che la possibilità di raggiungere una sorta di immortalità e di divinità è un obiettivo cui il filosofo aristotelico deve mirare nella sua vita: "coloro cui preme di avere in sé qualcosa di divino – scrive a p. 91.5-6 Bruns – dovranno aver cura di riuscire a pensare qualcosa del genere". La nostra anima muore quando si separi dal corpo, ma finché è unita al corpo la sua facoltà intellettiva formata (e quindi chi ha studiato e si è impegnato – sostanzialmente il filosofo aristotelico) può sforzarsi di raggiungere momenti di immortalità pensando al dio. È superfluo sottolineare la distanza di tali espressioni dalle vedute ingenuie del *De Intellectu*. Ed è per questo che, contro l'opinione di Bazán,²⁷ penso che il *De Anima* ci offra la versione piú matura della noetica alessandrista.²⁸

²⁴ Cf. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, passim*.

²⁵ Cf. Sharples, "Alexander of Aphrodisias.", *passim*.

²⁶ Cf. Accattino - Donini in Alessandro di Afrodisia, *L'anima*, pp. 292-3.

²⁷ Cf. B.C. Bazán, "L'authenticité du *De Intellectu* attribué à Alexandre d'Aphrodise", *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 71, pp. 468-87.

²⁸ Così si esprime anche Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. III, *Alexander von Aphrodisias*, pp. 392-3.

Interprétations néoplatoniciennes du De Anima

Philippe Hoffmann

Abstract

Lecture held on February 12th, 2008, Pisa, Santa Croce in Fossabanda, 4th meeting of the programme “GrAL”, *Il De Anima di Aristotele: esegesi greche, arabe e latine*.

J’ai donné très prudemment à ma conférence un titre général, “Interprétations néoplatoniciennes du *De Anima*”, mais je dois tout d’abord solliciter votre bienveillance: c’est que je n’ai pas la compétence pour faire un panorama ‘général ou synthétique’ correspondant à ce sujet. De manière plus modeste, je voudrais vous inviter à un travail qui est plutôt un travail de séminaire, c’est-à-dire à un parcours des textes. Vous avez deux ensembles de documents: d’une part des textes classiques d’Aristote auxquels il a été fait allusion à plusieurs reprises, *De Anima* livre III, chapitres 4 et 5, et d’autre part le texte plus célèbre encore de *Métaphysique* Λ 9, 1074 b 15 - 1075 a 10; d’autre part, j’ai constitué un dossier de textes dans lequel vous trouverez trois pages de Proclus, *Éléments de théologie*,¹ deux pages provenant du commentaire attribué à Philopon sur le livre III du *De Anima*,² un lemme assez long du commentaire attribué à Simplicius,³ et d’autre part, ce qui est le but de la promenade à laquelle je vous convie, un long texte extrait du Proème du commentaire de Simplicius aux *Catégories*.⁴

D’une certaine manière, je voudrais que cet exposé converge vers une lecture commentée de ce dernier texte, qui est un panorama général du système de la réalité selon l’orthodoxie néoplatonicienne. Il s’agit d’un texte de Simplicius exposant la procession du réel depuis l’union intellectuelle jusqu’au langage humain. Et ce que je voudrais vous montrer, c’est que ce texte de Simplicius, au terme d’une très longue assimilation d’une doctrine centrale du *De Anima* d’Aristote, est le fruit également d’une convergence de trois références aristotéliennes, *De Anima*, *Métaphysique* Λ 9, et d’autre part, *De l’interprétation*. Je vous convie donc, si vous voulez, à défaire en quelque sorte un tissage de textes assez complexe. Je commencerai par un rappel qui peut nous permettre de repérer des termes très importants. Ce rappel, c’est le corpus des passages du *De Anima* III dans lesquels est exposée une doctrine appelée à une très grande célébrité dans le néoplatonisme, la doctrine selon laquelle dans le cas des réalités immatérielles il y a identité de la science et de son objet. C’est du moins sous cette forme qu’à plusieurs reprises Plotin fait allusion à cette doctrine: par exemple, en *Enn.* VI 6, 20 il

¹ Procl., *El. Theol.*, prop. 167-168, p. 144.22-146.23 Dodds. Cf. Proclus, *The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text with Translation, Introduction, and Commentary*, ed. E.R. Dodds, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1933, 2^e éd. 1963.

² ps.-Philop., *In De An.* III 4, pp. 533.20-534.7 Hayduck. Cf. *Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De Anima libros commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck, Reimer, Berlin 1897 (CAG XV).

³ ps.-Simpl., *In De An.* III 4, p. 237.5-35 Hayduck. Cf. *Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De Anima commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck, Reimer, Berlin 1882 (CAG XI).

⁴ Simpl., *In Cat.* (Prooemium), p. 12-13 Kalbfleisch. Cf. *Simplicii in Aristotelis Categoriae commentarium*, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, Reimer, Berlin 1907 (CAG VIII).

adopte la formulation suivante, qui est tout à la fois une citation et un résumé de la doctrine du *De Anima*: dans le cas des réalités immatérielles ταυτό ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι, c'est la même chose, la science est identique à son objet. C'est le type de formulation qui revient à plusieurs reprises dans le corpus plotinien. Mais commençons par reprendre le texte d'Aristote lui-même. Le texte le plus long,⁵ sinon le plus important, est un passage du chapitre 4 du livre III, 429 b 30 - 430 a 5. Je suis le découpage qui a été adopté par le ps.-Jean Philopon⁶ dans son commentaire:

[ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον.] ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεία οὐδὲν, πρὶν ἂν νοῆ· δυνάμει δ' οὕτως ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ἐνυπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γεγραμμένον· ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητὸς ἐστὶν ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά. Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν (*De An.* III 4, 429 b 30 - 430 a 5 éd. Ross).

C'est ici que s'arrête le lemme du ps.-Philopon. Une autre formule, qui revient à plusieurs reprises dans le *De Anima*, fait intervenir un mot extrêmement important, qui sera appelé à un grand usage dans les textes néoplatoniciens: le mot *πρᾶγμα*.

Le premier texte est situé dans le chapitre très célèbre sur la distinction des deux intellects: τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι, il y a identité entre la science en acte et l'objet. Cette formule se trouve en *De Anima* III 5, 430 a 19-20, et elle est reprise textuellement au début du chapitre 7, 431 a 1-2.⁷ Le mot *πρᾶγμα* au pluriel apparaît encore dans un passage du *De Anima* III 7, 431 b 17 où Aristote dit d'abord de manière générale: ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα. Ici on n'a plus τὸ αὐτό, mais une simple construction prédicative. L'intellect, je veux dire l'intellect en acte, ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα, est ses objets.

À cet ensemble de textes classiques – qui sont le centre à partir duquel s'est d'abord constituée la noétique néoplatonicienne, à partir d'une lecture faite par Plotin – il faut ajouter un autre passage, quelques lignes du *De Anima* III 4, 429 b 5-10. Il s'agit d'un passage dans lequel on peut relever deux points: d'une part, Aristote évoque la doctrine selon laquelle l'intellect, lorsqu'il est en acte, devient chacun de ses objets, et d'autre part, dans cet état, conclut Aristote, il cause lui-même sa pensée: on relève alors (429 b 9-10), la formule réflexive. Comme vous le savez, Aristote lui-même a suggéré dans le livre Λ, chapitre 9 de la *Métaphysique*, dans le grand passage 1074 b 33 - 1075 a 5, un lien entre – je dirais – sa théologie et d'autre part les analyses des chapitres 4, 5, 7 du *De Anima*, puisque au moment d'expliciter ce qu'est la pensée de soi-même, la νόησις νοήσεως, c'est-à-dire au moment d'expliciter ce que pense l'intellect divin, il fait allusion au fait que dans le cas des sciences théorétiques il y a identité du savoir et de son objet. Autrement dit, l'affirmation du *De Anima* III est en quelque sorte convoquée par Aristote lui-même pour résoudre une aporie soulevée dans *Métaphysique* Λ 9 et, bien qu'évidemment, dans le passage que j'ai rappelé du *De Anima*, Aristote ne songe pas à la théologie, la liaison sera clairement établie entre la théologie et la thèse noétique chez son lecteur Plotin.

Ce que je voudrais faire maintenant, c'est examiner très simplement avec vous l'état des commentaires néoplatoniciens sur ce passage singulier d'Aristote. La première observation est que

⁵ Cf. Arist., *De An.* III 4, 429 b 30 - 430 a 5.

⁶ Sur l'attribution à Philopon du commentaire au livre III du *De Anima* d'Aristote, ainsi que sur l'attribution de ce texte à Étienne d'Alexandrie, cf. G.R. Giardina, section "In Aristotelis *De Anima*", in R. Goulet (éd.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* (abrégé par la suite en *DPhA*), CNRS Éditions, Paris 2012, P 164 = V a (2012), p. 475-81, en part. p. 475-6.

⁷ Arist., *De An.* III 7, 431 a 1-2: Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι.

les textes principaux dont nous disposons sont fort différents dans leur contenu. J'ai pris comme spécimen d'une part le commentaire du ps.-Philopon, sur le lemme correspondant au *De Anima* III, 4, 429 b 30 - 430 a 5, le découpage étant différent chez le ps.-Simplicius.⁸ Je laisse tout à fait de côté la question de savoir quel est véritablement l'auteur de ce commentaire. La question a un grand intérêt philologique et historique, mais elle n'est pas à traiter aujourd'hui.

La première chose qu'il faut rappeler est que nous avons affaire à deux commentaires qui correspondent à deux genres littéraires différents. Le commentaire du ps.-Philopon au *De Anima* est un commentaire ἀπὸ φωνῆς relevant évidemment du genre "oral",⁹ si vous voulez, du cours, et il ne faut pas attendre de ce commentaire un degré de scientificité dans tous les détails comparable à ce que nous trouvons dans le commentaire du ps.-Simplicius, ce dernier étant, vous le verrez, d'une technicité beaucoup plus grande. Il n'empêche que – et je commencerai par là – le commentaire du ps.-Philopon nous révèle quelques éléments tout à fait intéressants.

Premièrement, le commentaire du ps.-Philopon se fait l'écho de l'explication de Jamblique. Donc il semble que l'auteur faisait son cours avec une sorte de fiche dans laquelle étaient consignés les éléments du commentaire de Jamblique. Et ce qui est assez curieux, c'est l'importance qui est donnée aux "realia", c'est-à-dire à la comparaison de l'intellect et d'une tablette à écrire non pourvue d'écriture. Là, nous sommes en plein dans la réalité du livre antique, c'est-à-dire que le commentateur fait remarquer qu'Aristote a parlé d'une tablette de cire à écrire, γραμματεῖον, et non pas d'une feuille de papier, χάρτιον, et cela est significatif.¹⁰ Or on ne parle pas d'une tablette à écrire (γραμματεῖον) si elle ne comporte pas de lettres (γράμματα). C'est un point qui va être développé pour expliquer la possibilité d'une présence en puissance des connaissances dans l'âme, et notamment dans l'âme des petits enfants. Le terme ἄγραφον – qui n'est pas employé par Aristote, mais qu'on peut extraire sans difficulté de la lettre même du texte d'Aristote – doit être interprété comme signifiant κακόγραφον, c'est-à-dire qu'il s'agit d'une tablette de cire qui n'est pas complètement vierge, une tablette de cire sur laquelle il y aurait déjà des lettres, qualifiées de λεπτά καὶ ἀφανῆ,¹¹ c'est-à-dire petites, ou en tout cas mal tracées, ou quasiment effacées.¹² Cela fait sans doute allusion à une technique d'apprentissage de l'écriture attestée dans l'Égypte hellénistique, consistant à distribuer aux enfants une tablette sur laquelle en quelque sorte le maître a déjà légèrement tracé les lettres pour obliger les enfants à repasser par-dessus ces lettres. Il existe des reproductions photographiques de tels documents. C'est, si vous voulez, de manière assez savoureuse, un élément d'explication qui nous fait entrer dans la vie quotidienne de la fin de l'Antiquité. Alors, où voulait en venir Jamblique? Si, selon Jamblique, Aristote s'est ainsi exprimé, c'est parce qu'il voulait que l'âme des enfants, c'est-à-dire l'intellect en puissance, possède les notions des réalités, de

⁸ Cf. *infra*, p. 292.

⁹ Cf. M. Richard, "Ἀπὸ φωνῆς", *Byzantion* 20 (1950), p. 191-222 (repris sous le n° 60 dans E. Dekkers - M. Geerard - A. van Roey - G. Verbeke (éd.), Marcel Richard, *Opera Minora*, t. III, Brepols-Leuven U. P., Turnhout-Leuven 1977). C'est sous la forme de reportations (commentaires ἀπὸ φωνῆς) que nous sont parvenus nombre de commentaires tardo-antiques, notamment alexandrins, par exemple les commentaires d'Ammonius (à l'exception, on le sait, du *Commentaire au De Interpretatione*, rédigé par Ammonius lui-même). Il faut ajouter une autre dimension de l'acte d'écrire, la pratique des "exercices spirituels": voir P. Hadot, *La Citadelle intérieure. Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle*, Fayard, Paris 1995, 2005², en part. p. 64-7.

¹⁰ ps.-Philop., *In De An.*, p. 533.26-27 Hayduck: γραμματεῖον δὲ οὐ λέγεται (...).

¹¹ ps.-Philop., *In De An.*, p. 533.30-32 Hayduck.

¹² *Ibid.*: εἰ δὲ ἀγράφω, ἀντὶ τοῦ κακογράφω, διὰ τὸ λεπτά καὶ ἀφανῆ ἔχειν γράμματα; et Jamblique ajoute ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄφωνον λέγομεν τραγῶδον τὸν κακόφωνον (puisque dans le cas aussi d'un auteur tragique on le dit aphone quand simplement sa voix est abîmée ou médiocre, p. 533.30-32 Hayduck).

même que la tablette possède des lettres (εἰ γραμματεῖω αὐτὴν ἀπέικασε, *In De An.*, p. 533.28-29 Hayduck).¹³

Le deuxième point est le φησί de la p. 533.32 Hayduck, qui a pour sujet Jamblique;¹⁴ c'est que dans l'interprétation de ce passage développée par ce dernier, c'était un moyen de prouver l'harmonie de Platon et d'Aristote.¹⁵ C'est un témoignage au fond très intéressant sur une tendance de la méthode du commentaire de Jamblique: une tendance à l'harmonisation qui, vous le savez, sera surtout thématifiée et en quelque sorte rigidifiée comme une sorte de dogme plus tardivement. Ce sont là les deux éléments les plus intéressants dans le commentaire du lemme.

Le troisième élément, qui correspond plus clairement à l'explication de *De An.* III 4, 430 a 2-5, est un peu plus décevant. Nous avons en effet une paraphrase, et évidemment il n'y a aucun "dérageage théologique", mais il n'y a pas non plus une grande doctrine psychologique.¹⁶ Puis, vous avez à nouveau une citation presque textuelle d'Aristote, ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη θεωρητική, τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν (cf. 430 a 4-5). Aristote veut dire qu'il n'y a rien d'absurde, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, à ce que τὸ αὐτὸ νοοῦν εἶναι καὶ νοούμενον (cf. 430 a 3-4); encore une fois on reprend d'une manière très simple la doctrine d'Aristote et ensuite il y a une explication qui porte sur l'adverbe κυρίως, "au sens propre", de manière à distinguer les νοητά des entités des théorèmes mathématiques. C'est tout ce que l'on trouve dans le commentaire de ce lemme.

Je passe rapidement à l'autre texte du ps.-Philopon dans le dossier, c'est-à-dire l'explication de *De An.* III 7, 431 a 1. Ce qu'est intéressant ici, c'est la méthode de commentaire paraphrastique essentiellement concentrée sur l'explication des mots. Donc vous avez l'explication du mot πρᾶγμα, qui signifie τὸ ἐπιστητὸν (l'objet de connaissance), et d'autre part une explication soignée du mot ἐπιστήμη. À cela se limite l'explication du lemme.

En revanche, lorsque l'on passe au texte du commentaire du ps.-Simplicius au *De Anima*, ce que l'on trouve est bien différent. Le texte, examiné à la lettre, est parfois délicat à traduire; je veux essentiellement vous en présenter la structure. Nous avons tout d'abord une citation d'Aristote.¹⁷ Il y a probablement une correction à faire, sinon le reste du texte n'est pas cohérent; il faut rétablir à la ligne 5 ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης, puisque dans les cas des réalités immatérielles τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ [...] τὸ νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον. D'autant plus que l'auteur qui commente justifie précisément l'emploi par Aristote de la conjonction de coordination γὰρ.¹⁸ Aristote en utilisant la conjonction causale nous donne la raison pour laquelle l'intellect est intelligible. Suit un développement qui de manière très étrange, à première vue, est consacré à une modalité épistémologique particulière qui est la πίστις, comprise ici

¹³ ps.-Philop., *In De An.*, p. 533.27-28 Hayduck: τοῦτο δὲ εἶπεν βουλόμενος τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν παιδῶν, ὃ ἐστὶν ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς, ἔχειν τοὺς λόγους τῶν πραγμάτων.

¹⁴ Alors que εἶπεν (ligne 27) revenait à Aristote, ici le sujet est Jamblique.

¹⁵ ps.-Philop., *In De An.*, p. 533.32-34 Hayduck: ὥστε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, φησί, δοξάζει εἶναι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ νοητά, ὡς Πλάτων, καὶ τοὺς λόγους πάντων, καὶ ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, οὐ μάθησιν (litt. "De telle sorte qu'Aristote lui aussi a dit que les intelligibles sont dans l'âme, comme Platon, c'est-à-dire les notions de toutes choses, et qu'il y a réminiscence et non pas apprentissage"). Aristote ici se trouve hériter de la doctrine de la réminiscence; ταῦτα δὲ εἶπεν, ἵνα δείξῃ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην ὁμόδοξον αὐτῷ (*ibid.*, lignes 34-35), et s'il a dit cela, c'est afin de démontrer qu'Aristote était de la même opinion que Platon.

¹⁶ ps.-Philop., *In De An.*, p. 534.1-2 Hayduck: ὅτι πᾶν νοητὸν κυρίως ὄν νοητὸν νοῦς ἐστὶν (Parce que tout intelligible, s'il est intelligible au sens propre, est l'intellect).

¹⁷ Arist., *De An.*, III, 430 a 3-4 Hayduck: ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον; cf. ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.5-6 Hayduck.

¹⁸ ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.6-7 Hayduck.

comme conviction. On a une analyse, vous allez le voir, assez fine qui consiste en quelque sorte en une réévaluation très néoplatonicienne de la notion de *πίστις*.¹⁹

Nous avons ensuite une description très intéressante d'une forme de conviction qui n'est pas la *πίστις* de dernier rang de la tradition platonicienne (celle de la *République* et du *Timée*), mais qui est une forme de conviction de très bonne allure correspondant à "l'assentiment qui est donné à une opinion lorsque l'on considère que celle-ci est vraie".²⁰ La *πίστις* est donc l'assentiment qui est donné à une opinion vraie, c'est un assentiment qui se réalise, qui s'effectue, "selon la conversion de l'opinion vers elle-même (*κατὰ τὴν τῆς δόξης πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ... ἐπιστροφῆν*), de l'opinion qui juge que la compréhension qu'elle a des réalités est vraie (*κρινούσης ὡς ἀληθῆ τὴν ἑαυτῆς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σύνεσιν*)".²¹

Ensuite, deuxième unité du texte à partir de la ligne 12. Il y a jusqu'à la ligne 14, un développement sur l'identité du sujet pensant et de l'objet pensé, c'est-à-dire sur le point de doctrine central exprimé par le texte d'Aristote qui est ici commenté.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ νοῦς ἄυλος, πάντως καὶ νοητὸς ὡς ἑαυτὸν νοῶν· ἐν δὲ τῷ κατ'ἐνέργειαν νῷ καὶ εἶδει τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, διότι πᾶσα γνωστικὴ ἐνέργεια τῷ γνωστῷ ὀρίζεται καὶ ἔστιν ὅπερ τὸ γνωστόν, ἤδη μὲν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, μειζρόνως δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη (ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.12-15 Hayduck).

Puisque l'intellect est immatériel, de toute nécessité il est aussi intelligible en tant qu'il se pense lui-même. Dans l'intellect en acte, et dans la forme [i.e. si l'on considère l'intellect en acte et la forme], ce qui pense et ce qui est pensé sont la même chose, parce que toute activité cognitive est déterminée par le connu [ou le connaissable], et est ce qu'est précisément le connu [ou le connaissable]. Ceci vaut déjà pour la sensation, mais plus encore pour la science.

Un autre point est souligné, c'est-à-dire que plus élevée est la connaissance, plus intense est l'union de la connaissance avec l'objet connu (*ὅσω κρείττων ἡ γνῶσις, τοσούτω κρείττων καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν αὐτῆς ἔνωσις*):²² l'expression *ἡ πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν αὐτῆς ἔνωσις* est utilisée notamment par Simplicius à la p. 55.16-17 du commentaire sur le *De Caelo*²³ dans un passage extrêmement important où il commente une triade des *Oracles Chaldaïques* (p. 55.1-24 Heiberg), la triade *ἔρωσις-ἀλήθεια-πίστις*, et il développe une doctrine de la foi, de la *πίστις* conçue comme la conviction qui accompagne la démonstration scientifique (*ἀπόδειξις*) portant sur des réalités divines. C'est une *πίστις* qui est méta-apodictique, qui va au-delà de la démonstration rationnelle, et qui s'accomplit en quelque sorte en une *συμπάθεια* avec l'objet connu: c'est très probablement à ce type de doctrine qu'il est fait ici allusion; l'expression *τοσούτω κρείττων*, utilisée par le ps.-Simplicius à

¹⁹ Cf. ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.7-9 Hayduck. L'auteur dit que "en effet, tout intellect est immatériel [...] même s'il assure la cohésion d'un corps, et que ce corps est difficile à façonner (*καὶ εἴ τι συνέχει σῶμα καὶ πλάσαι χαλεπόν*)". Nous avons ensuite la description d'une forme de conversion: "Et il se convertit en direction de lui-même (*καὶ ἐπιστρέφων πρὸς ἑαυτὸν*), du moins lorsque l'opinion qui est par ailleurs le terme dernier du 'discours' de l'âme, est dans tous les cas suivie par la conviction (*πίστις*)". Je pourrais mettre ceci en relation avec des textes sûrement de Simplicius, qu'on trouve dans le commentaire au traité *Du Ciel*.

²⁰ ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.9-10 Hayduck: *ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ ἀληθεῖ οὐσίᾳ συγκατάθεσις*. Il faut sous-entendre: *ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ ἀληθεῖ οὐσίᾳ scil. δόξῃ συγκατάθεσις*.

²¹ ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.10-11 Hayduck.

²² ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.15-16 Hayduck.

²³ Cf. Simplicii *In Aristotelis De Caelo commentaria*, ed. I.L. Heiberg, Reimer, Berlin 1884 (*CAG VII*).

la p. 237.16 Hayduck, suggère que lorsque la connaissance porte sur des réalités théologiques il y a une νόησις particulièrement “intégrée” avec l’objet même de la connaissance, ce qui correspond très exactement à la conception de la foi dans le sens religieux revêtu par ce terme dans le néoplatonisme tardif.²⁴

Le quatrième élément que présente ce texte à partir de la ligne 19 est aussi quelque chose de typiquement néoplatonicien, avec un arrière-plan proclien très net: c’est l’idée selon laquelle, dans le cas de la connaissance dans son état le plus haut – c’est-à-dire telle qu’elle se réalise dans l’union de la science et de son objet dans l’intellect –, on est en quelque sorte au niveau de la connaissance des causes. Et “connaissance des causes” signifie anticipation de la connaissance des réalités causées, des effets. L’idée développée ici est que la connexion qui s’établit entre la connaissance et les causes se poursuit en quelque sorte dans la dégression.²⁵ Donc, même si elle passe (καὶν οὖν μεταβαίνη, p. 237.20-21 Hayduck) ἐπὶ τὴν σύστοιχον τῶν αἰτιατῶν γνῶσιν (p. 237.21 Hayduck) à la connaissance corrélatrice des réalités causées – c’est à dire, lorsque l’on passe de la connaissance des causes à la connaissance des réalités causées qui sont déjà présentes κατ’αἰτίαν dans leurs causes, l’anticipation primordiale des effets dans leurs causes (τὴν προηγουμένην αὐτῶν ἀντίληψιν τὴν κατὰ τὰ αἴτια) assure que la science est la même que les objets de la science (τοῖς ἐπιστητοῖς). C’est-à-dire que l’identité de la science et de ses objets se maintient à travers la dégression lorsque l’on passe des causes aux réalités causées, lorsque l’on passe de la science des causes à la connaissance des réalités causées (c’est-à-dire des effets), parce que d’une certaine manière l’anticipation des réalités causées dans les causes s’accompagne parallèlement d’une anticipation de la science des réalités causées dans la science des causes.²⁶ L’identité primordiale se maintient à travers ce qu’on appellera dans d’autres textes ὑφ᾽ἑσῆς, la détente, la dégression, la descente. L’auteur insiste sur le fait que la science est, et reste, identique à ses objets (les ἐπιστητά), dans une fin de phrase extrêmement brachylogique, mais qui ne doit pas être corrigée, car il est sous-entendu que c’est aux objets connaissables qui sont en elle qu’elle est identique – objets qui sont les connaissables pour elle, et au sens propre (κυρίως), et au sens premier (πρώτως).

La cinquième unité que l’on trouve dans ce commentaire, à partir de la ligne 25, est une description de ce qu’est la science, en tant qu’elle est identique à ses objets. La *forma mentis* néoplatonicienne se laisse voir ici à travers l’usage du schème de la conversion. La proposition ou plutôt le discours scientifique s’étant converti vers lui-même, établit la connaissance (ἔστησι τὴν γνῶσιν, lignes 27-28) en possédant en lui-même l’objet de la connaissance (le connaissable, τὸ ἐπιστητόν), en étant

²⁴ Voir notre article “La triade chaldaique ἔρως, ἀλήθεια, πίστις de Proclus à Simplicius”, dans A.-Ph. Segonds - C. Steel (éd.), *Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne. Actes du Colloque International de Louvain (13-16 mai 1998) en l’honneur de H. D. Saffrey et L.G. Westerink*, Les Belles Lettres, Leuven-Paris 2000 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre. Series I, 26), p. 459-89; Id., “*Erôs, Alêtheia, Pistis... et Elpis*. Tétrade chaldaique, triade néoplatonicienne (Fr. 46 des Places, p. 26 Kroll)”, dans H. Seng - M. Tardieu (éd.), *Die Chaldaeischen Orakel. Kontext, Interpretation, Rezeption*, Universitätsverlag Winter, Heidelberg 2010 (Bibliotheca Chaldaica, 2), p. 255-324; Id., “Science théologique et foi selon le *Commentaire* de Simplicius au *De Caelo* d’Aristote”, dans E. Coda - C. Martini Bonadeo (éd.), *Études de logique et de cosmologie offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche*, Vrin, Paris 2014 (Études musulmanes)].

²⁵ ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.19-20 Hayduck: ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη προηγουμένως τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστιν εἰδῶν τε καὶ λόγων θεωρητική, ἵνα καὶ τὰ αἰτιατὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰτίων θεωρῆ (“La science réalise la connaissance de manière primordiale, la contemplation des formes et des notions qui sont en elle, de telle sorte qu’elle connaît également les causés à partir des causes”).

²⁶ ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.21-23 Hayduck: ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν προηγουμένην αὐτῶν ἀντίληψιν τὴν κατὰ τὰ αἴτια ἐν αὐτῇ ὄντα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστι τοῖς ἐπιστητοῖς (“selon l’anticipation primordiale des effets relativement aux causes qui sont en elle, elle est identique aux objets de science”). La connaissance des réalités causées est donc parallèle à la série des causes et des réalités causées.

défini par lui dans cette activité même, et par la définition du connaissable, de telle sorte qu'il y a un seul et identique discours (ou énoncé, ou proposition, λόγος) du connaissable en acte et de la science en acte, c'est-à-dire la définition ou la détermination (ὄρος) du connaissable.²⁷ Le lemme se termine sur ce thème. Je vous signale la formule finale, à la ligne 35, "l'identité de la science et de l'objet de science entre eux" (ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν ... ταὐτότητα). Il y a donc dans ce commentaire des éléments de doctrine qui ont une forte marque néoplatonicienne. Mais comme application de la thèse épistémologique de ce lieu aristotélicien à d'autres questions théologiques, nous ne trouvons rien; c'est-à-dire que lorsque un professeur néoplatonicien commente ce passage du *De Anima*, lorsqu'il s'en tient notamment à la méthode qui consiste à suivre la lettre du texte: nous avons, si vous voulez, quelque chose qu'on a presque envie de qualifier d'assez raisonnable.

Pour trouver une véritable infusion de la thèse selon laquelle, dans le cas des réalités immatérielles il y a identité de la science et de ses objets, dans le champ théologique, il faut suivre une tout autre voie. Les grandes étapes, évidemment, doivent être cherchées chez Plotin, Proclus, et les derniers néoplatoniciens. Pour Plotin, les choses sont assez bien connues, mais je crois que quelque rappel ou quelques observations sont tout à fait utiles. Il y a tout d'abord l'article fondamental de Arthur H. Armstrong, publié en 1960 dans le volume issu du colloque de la Fondation Hardt consacré aux *Sources de Plotin*, sur l'arrière-plan de la doctrine selon laquelle les intelligibles ne sont pas en dehors de l'intellect.²⁸ Cet article, qui est très connu, mérite d'être constamment relu, étant donné la prolifération de références qui y sont rassemblées. Il y a aussi le livre de Thomas A. Szlezák, sur la présence d'Aristote dans la doctrine plotinienne du νοῦς, *Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins*, publié en 1979.²⁹ Je voudrais attirer aujourd'hui votre attention sur une autre étude, dont le mérite principal est à mon avis d'avoir suivi une observation de Szlezák, tout en complétant de manière très centrale l'article fondamental de Armstrong. C'est un petit article de Pierre Hadot, qui a été publié dans un livre collectif sur le *De Anima* d'Aristote en 1996: "La conception plotinienne de l'identité entre l'intellect et son objet. Plotin et le *De Anima* d'Aristote".³⁰ Je ne veux pas reproduire les analyses et conclusions de cet article, mais simplement attirer votre attention sur un certain nombre d'observations faites par Pierre Hadot. Il est parti d'un corpus assez limité de textes qui n'avait pas la prétention d'épuiser toute la noétique plotinienne (notamment Plot., *Enn.* VI 6, 6; V 9, 5; V 4, 2). Il a observé que Plotin ne fait pas de citations exactes du *De Anima*, et, de manière presque systématique, réduit la doctrine exposée dans la partie du *De Anima* qui nous retient ici à une formule, presque toujours la même: dans le cas des réalités dépourvues de matière, "il y a identité entre la science et ses objets", ou bien, "entre l'intellect et ses objets" (i.e. l'intellect est ses objets). Ceci indique qu'il y a probablement allusion à une doctrine, plus qu'une citation des textes eux-mêmes. C'est le premier point.

Le deuxième point, qui est aussi très connu, c'est que cette transposition à l'intellect plotinien de la thèse du *De Anima* est très certainement l'ingrédient aristotélicien le plus important, c'est-à-dire que la conjonction de la thèse du *De Anima* et de *Métaphysique*, Λ 9, détermine les éléments constitutifs les plus puissants de la doctrine plotinienne du νοῦς: ils permettent de décrire la pensée,

²⁷ ps.-Simpl., *In De An.*, p. 237.25-29 Hayduck.

²⁸ A.H. Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine 'That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect'", dans *Les Sources de Plotin*, Fondation Hardt, Vandœuvres-Genève 1960 (Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique, 5), p. 391-413.

²⁹ Th.A. Szlezák, *Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins*, Schwabe, Basel 1979.

³⁰ P. Hadot, "La conception plotinienne de l'identité entre l'intellect et son objet. Plotin et le *De Anima* d'Aristote", dans G. Romeyer Dherbey - C. Viano (éd.), *Corps et âme: sur le De Anima d'Aristote*, Vrin, Paris 1996 (Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie. Nouvelle série), p. 367-76, repris in Id., *Plotin et Porphyre: études néoplatoniciennes*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1999 (L'âne d'or, 10).

le contenu de l'intellect divin, c'est-à-dire l'identité de l'Intellect divin et de ses objets (les Formes-intellects). C'est le deuxième point.

Le troisième point – et là je vous renvoie à la lecture de l'article de Pierre Hadot – c'est qu'il a détecté dans la manière de citer Aristote et d'utiliser la doctrine du *De Anima* une volonté de critique à l'égard de certaines tendances du médio-platonisme, et notamment à l'égard de certaines thèses, illustrées par exemple chez Alcinoos, dans le *Didaskalikos*,³¹ sur les Formes intelligibles comme pensées de Dieu. C'est un élément très profond dans l'article de Pierre Hadot: dans l'emploi qu'il fait de la doctrine du *De Anima*, ce que Plotin veut montrer c'est que ce n'est pas la pensée qui produit ses objets, mais c'est l'être qui produit la pensée: l'être et les objets de pensée sont présentés comme les traces de l'Un, qui sont en quelque sorte les principes constitutifs de l'intellect divin lui-même pour autant qu'il se convertit et qu'il se constitue en prenant comme objets les Formes intelligibles. L'être et la Forme, traces de l'Un, sont antérieurs à la pensée.

Je voudrais simplement, sans entrer davantage dans le corpus plotinien, remarquer que cette référence au *De Anima* apparaît dès le début de la période littéraire de Plotin, puisqu'on trouve cela dans le Traité 5 (Plot., *Enn.* V 9 *passim*), ou dans le Traité 7 (Plot., *Enn.* V 4, 2.43-48), et que la doctrine elle-même, à défaut que l'on puisse trouver une allusion textuelle au *De Anima*, est très présente dans le Traité 10 (Plot., *Enn.* V 1). Je rappellerai simplement dans le Traité 10 (Plot., *Enn.* V 1, 4) la célèbre image de l'intellect comme Kronos, qui résume à mon avis très bien l'ensemble de la doctrine plotinienne: l'Intellect divin est Kronos, le Dieu qui dévore ses propres enfants, qui tout à la fois produit, retient en lui-même les formes intelligibles – c'est le thème de l'autarcie divine.

Kronos est satiété et en même temps pureté (selon la double signification que Plotin, travaillant les références hésiodique et platonicienne, assigne au mot grec κορόος). Les formes sont protégées de toute descente dans la matière et le dieu autarcique est bienheureux.

On peut dire que l'intuition centrale de la noétique plotinienne est devenue un invariant de la doctrine de l'intellect et de l'intelligible, à travers toutes les formes de néoplatonisme qui se sont ensuite succédées jusqu'à la fin de l'Antiquité, même lorsque, avec Syrianus et Proclus, le système se complexifie et se hiérarchise. Une section des *Éléments de théologie* de Proclus, à partir de la proposition 166, est consacrée aux intellects; ce qui est évidemment déconcertant pour un lecteur habituel de Plotin, c'est qu'on ne se trouve plus face à un seul niveau d'intellect, c'est-à-dire à une sorte d'unité simple de l'intellect et des intelligibles, pensée finalement sur le modèle du *De Anima* III, mais qu'on se trouve face à un 'diacosme' qui est hiérarchiquement structuré, avec ce que Proclus appelle un νοῦς πρώτιστος. Le νοῦς qui est qualifié de πρώτιστος, de 'tout premier', est celui qui peut être qualifié de 'cause principielle' (ἀΐτιον ἀρχικόν) de l'ensemble de la série, par rapport à l'ensemble des intellects constituant le 'diacosme' des intellects, cause monadique qui tout à la fois anticipe et produit une pluralité qui dépend de lui. Au cœur de cette section on retrouve une présence, avec modification, de la thèse aristotélicienne du *De Anima*, qui demeure toujours extrêmement puissante.

Au début de la proposition 167 des *Éléments de théologie*,³² dans l'intellect "tout premier" de Proclus, nous avons une situation qui est structurellement identique à la situation de l'intellect plotinien.

³¹ Cf. Alcinoos, *Enseignement des doctrines de Platon*. Texte introduit, établi et commenté par J. Whittaker, trad. par P. Louis, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1990 (CUF); maintenant cf. aussi Alkinoos, *Didaskalikos: Lehrbuch der Grundsätze Platons*, ed. O.F. Summerell et al., De Gruyter, Berlin 2007.

³² Procl., *El. Theol.*, prop. 167, p. 144.22-23 Dodds: πᾶς νοῦς ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν πρώτιστος ἑαυτὸν μόνον, καὶ ἔν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἐν τούτῳ νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν (Tout intellect s'intelligit lui-même, mais l'intellect tout premier s'intelligit lui-même seulement et en lui l'intellect et l'intelligible sont numériquement un).

Par la suite, pour tous les intellects qui procèdent de l'intellect premier nous allons avoir le schéma suivant: chaque intellect, d'une certaine manière, reproduit lui aussi cette structure, puisque chaque intellect réalise également l'identité de ce qu'il est en lui-même comme intellect et de l'intelligible qui lui est coordonné, c'est-à-dire de l'intelligible qui est en lui. Donc, d'une certaine manière, on peut dire que dans chaque intellect aussi, comme dans le tout premier intellect, il y a identité de l'intellect et du νοητόν. Mais les intellects dérivés intelligent non seulement leur propre contenu intelligible (leur propre contenu intelligible étant aussi à chaque fois un contenu total, πᾶς νοῦς πάντα νοεῖ): mais chacun intelli-ge aussi un intelligible qui lui est antérieur, et qui lui est, d'une certaine manière extérieur, et qui est en dernière instance l'intelligible intrinsèque à l'intellect πρώτιστος. Cette structure est fondamentale pour Proclus, et la suite de la proposition l'exprime très bien: ἕκαστος δὲ τῶν μετ' ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ νοητόν νοεῖ ἅμα καὶ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ (p. 144.22-23 Dodds).

L'intellect dérivé reproduit donc la structure d'identité de l'intellect et de son objet, qui est la structure paradigmatique de l'intellect πρώτιστος, mais ce qui est intelligible pour lui c'est aussi ce à partir de quoi il est.³³ Regardons rapidement le théorème de la proposition 168, comme si c'était une sorte de commentaire de *Métaphysique* Λ 9:

πᾶς νοῦς κατ' ἐνέργειαν οἶδεν ὅτι νοεῖ· καὶ οὐκ ἄλλου μὲν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν, ἄλλου δὲ τὸ νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ (Procl., *El. Theol.*, prop. 168, p. 146.16-17 Dodds, commentaire p. 287-8).

Tout intellect en acte connaît qu'il intelli-ge. Et il n'y a pas de distinction entre ce à quoi appartient en propre le fait d'intelli-ger, et ce à quoi appartient le fait d'intelli-ger qu'il intelli-ge.

Nous retrouvons, de proposition en proposition, l'idée de l'identité de l'intellect, de son objet, et de l'intellection elle-même. C'est une doctrine très importante dans les *Éléments de Théologie*, mais aussi dans d'autres textes de Proclus.

Je vous propose, pour terminer, de venir à mon but, qui était la lecture d'un extrait du commentaire de Simplicius sur les *Catégories*, qui au terme de ce parcours beaucoup trop rapide reprend toute sa signification. Il s'agit d'un long passage qui se trouve aux pages 12-13 du Proème du *Commentaire aux Catégories*, dans le contexte de l'explicitation du 'but' de cet ouvrage aristotélicien. Il s'agit de démontrer que les *Catégories* sont le premier traité de l'*Organon*, et aussi la porte d'entrée, ἰσχυρή, de la philosophie tout entière; qu'il relève de la logique, et que donc le traité des *Catégories*, comme avant lui d'ailleurs l'*Isagogé* de Porphyre, ne peut porter que sur des mots signifiants, des φωνὰὶ σημαντικαί. Le commentateur est donc obligé de proposer une théorie générale de la signification. C'est, je dirais, la métaphysique d'une théorie générale de la signification, structurée selon le triangle des mots signifiants (φωνὰὶ σημαντικαί), des notions (νοήματα), et des signifiés ou référents, les πράγματα. D'une certaine manière, c'est ce que fait ici l'auteur.³⁴

L'idée est de montrer que la triade des mots signifiants, des notions et des πράγματα, cette triade de termes séparés dans le langage humain, s'explique comme le point ultime d'une διάκρισις qui se

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 144.23-25 Dodds: ἕκαστος δὲ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἑαυτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ νοητόν ἐστι τούτῳ τὸ μὲν ὅ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἄφ' οὗ ἐστιν ("Mais chacun des intellects qui viennent ensuite, s'intelli-ge lui-même et intelli-ge à la fois aussi les réalités qui sont avant lui. Et ce qui est intelligible pour lui, c'est d'une part ce qu'il est lui-même, d'autre part ce dont il vient"). Voir aussi le commentaire, p. 285-7.

³⁴ Je dis "l'auteur" parce que je ne suis pas sûr que la doctrine soit de Simplicius: la matière philosophique elle-même peut faire penser, pour certains aspects, à Jamblique, et je n'exclus pas qu'il s'agisse d'un écho d'une leçon orale de Damascius; disons qu'il s'agit d'une doctrine néoplatonicienne très élaborée dont la rédaction est due à Simplicius.

déploie à partir d'une sortie de l'union indistincte (ἔνωσις ἀδιάκριτος), qui est l'état de l'intellect. Autrement dit, dans ce texte une philosophie du langage est présentée, et plus particulièrement une sémantique, qui présente les trois termes de la triade comme des étapes de la διάκρισις. D'une certaine manière, les ingrédients théoriques principaux que l'on trouve dans ce texte sont d'une part *Métaphysique* Λ 9, comme étant le centre d'une noétique néoplatonicienne – invariante depuis Plotin –, puis le petit corpus des textes du *De Anima* par lesquels j'ai commencé mon exposé, puisque nous trouvons notamment un emploi du mot πράγματα et l'affirmation centrale selon laquelle il y a identité des πράγματα et des notions qui portent sur les réalités, les νοήματα portant à leur tour sur les réalités. L'idée de l'identité de la science et de son objet est absolument présente, et d'autre part, tout ceci est structuré par le premier chapitre du *Peri Hermeneias*, parce que c'est la lecture du premier chapitre du *Peri Hermeneias* qui donne fondamentalement l'armature de la sémantique triadique.

Autrement dit, ce que je trouve extrêmement intéressant au terme de la longue histoire d'interprétation et d'assimilation de ce texte aristotélicien, c'est que l'exposé typiquement néoplatonicien que nous lisons dans le commentaire de Simplicius aux *Catégories* est essentiellement constitué du tissage de trois fils, qui nous renvoient à trois textes d'Aristote: *Métaphysique* Λ 9, *Peri Hermeneias*, chap. 1, *De Anima* III, 4 et ailleurs.³⁵ Avant de lire ce texte, je voudrais vous donner des éléments introductifs. Ce texte doit être lu non seulement comme une philosophie du langage, en ce qu'il fait apparaître le langage signifiant (φωνή), comme la limite (πέρας), de la procession – et comme le point précis à partir duquel la procession s'arrête, et où commence une conversion. Ce texte est aussi une philosophie de la communication pédagogique, une philosophie de la communication professorale. L'idée d'ensemble est de montrer comment le discours, le λόγος διδασκαλικός fondamentalement caractérisé par un rapport hiérarchique entre celui qui enseigne et celui qui est enseigné – ce discours qui est tenu par l'âme qui a contemplé les vérités en direction d'âmes inférieures – doit être régi par des lois. D'une part, la proposition énoncée par le professeur doit être vraie, et d'autre part, elle doit être régie par l'univocité, car il faut que tout le monde s'entende et se comprenne sans ambiguïté. Ce qui apparaît en filigrane dans ce texte, c'est un idéal de communication à l'occasion de laquelle le discours véridatif d'un professeur déclenche une sorte d'anamnèse dans l'âme de tous ses auditeurs et fait en sorte que les âmes séparées se convertissent à ce que Simplicius appelle ici une κοινή νόησις, c'est-à-dire une intellection 'commune' ou une intellection 'universelle'. Le discours véridique, qui en tant que λόγος προφορικός est tributaire de la séparation triadique (séparation des φωναὶ σημαντικάί, des νοήματα et des πράγματα), est ordonné à une abolition du langage lui-même. Une fois rétablie ce que Simplicius appelle l'ὁμόνοια, c'est-à-dire la commune intellection de tous les 'enseignés', au niveau de l'âme puis au niveau de l'intellect, l'identité des notions et de leurs objets sera en quelque sorte rétablie, et le mouvement de "descente" et de "remontée" – au centre duquel se situe l'acte de communication pédagogique – trouve son point de départ et son point d'arrivée dans une référence essentielle au *De Anima*.

Lisons la traduction de ce texte: "Les expressions signifiantes ne sont pas complètement détachées de la nature des êtres, les êtres ne sont pas séparés des mots dont la fonction naturelle est de les signifier et les notions elles-mêmes ne restent pas en dehors de la nature des expressions et des êtres" (Simpl.,

³⁵ Voir notre article "Catégories et langage selon Simplicius. La question du *skopos* du traité aristotélicien des *Catégories*", dans I. Hadot (éd.), *Simplicius: sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Actes du Colloque international "Simplicius". Paris, Fondation Hugot du Collège de France, 28 septembre-1^{er} octobre 1985*, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1987 (Peripatoi, 15), p. 61-90, en part. p. 83 sqq.

In Cat., p. 12.13-15 Kalbfleisch). Ce génitif absolu très long décrit une relation (qui, un peu plus loin, va être désignée par le mot ἀλληλουχία, p. 13.11 Kalbfleisch), entre les trois pôles de la structure sémantique. Ces trois types de réalité étaient un antérieurement, et se sont distingués ultérieurement. Donc, trois éléments de la triade de la signification sont posés comme le résultat d'une διάκρισις qui maintient une connexion à partir d'une situation d'unité fondamentale. "L'intellect en effet", là nous allons reconnaître le *De Anima*, "étant les réalités elles-mêmes et l'intellection elle-même, possède à la fois les êtres et les notions des êtres qui sont en lui une seule et même réalité (ταυτόν), en vertu de l'union sans discrimination" – une expression néoplatonicienne typique – "et là-bas il n'y a point besoin du langage".

Dans l'intellect nous avons l'unité des νοήματα et des πράγματα, c'est-à-dire la réalisation de l'union aristotélicienne. Ensuite vient l'âme: "L'âme, lorsqu'elle se convertit vers l'intellect, possède les mêmes réalités sous un mode second (δευτέρως), à partir du moment où elle possède en elle des raisons qui sont non seulement cognitives mais aussi génératrices" (p. 12.19-21 Kalbfleisch), donc les λόγοι qui sont en l'âme sont non seulement des λόγοι γνωστικοί, c'est-à-dire des "notions cognitives" qui sont des images de la cognition de l'intellect, mais ils sont aussi des λόγοι producteurs des réalités mêmes de la nature. "En revanche, lorsqu'elle s'est détournée de l'intellect, et qu'elle a séparé des êtres les raisons qui sont en elle, et que, ainsi, elle a fait d'elles" – c'est-à-dire de ses raisons, de ses λόγοι – "des images qui remplacent les modèles, elle a introduit une distance entre l'intellection et les réalités. Et ce d'autant plus qu'elle s'est plus écartée de la ressemblance avec l'intellect, et désormais elle se contente de produire des notions qui sont simplement en accord avec les réalités (ἀγαπᾷ σύμφωνα τοῖς πράγμασιν προβάλλεσθαι τὰ νοήματα, *In Cat.*, p. 12.21-25 Kalbfleisch)". Il faut remarquer l'emploi du verbe προβάλλεσθαι (ligne 25), emploi que je dirais fréquent dans le lexique néoplatonicien à partir notamment de Jamblique. Ensuite un passage de coloration platonicienne, dans lequel on reconnaît évidemment le *Phèdre* et la *République*.

"Une fois tombée dans le devenir, et remplie d'oubli, elle a eu besoin de la vue, et elle a eu besoin de l'ouïe pour se ressouvenir" (*In Cat.*, p. 12.25-26 Kalbfleisch). Nous avons ici une interprétation très fine de la doctrine platonicienne de la réminiscence qui va être en quelque sorte réduite à une réminiscence dont l'élément déclencheur majeur est la parole pédagogique: ce qui déclenche la réminiscence, ce n'est plus, dans un choc amoureux, la vue d'un beau corps, mais c'est la vérité de la parole du professeur: "[...] elle a eu besoin de l'ouïe pour se ressouvenir" (ligne 26). Elle a besoin en effet de quelqu'un qui, ayant vu la vérité ("celui qui a vu la vérité", c'est le professeur de philosophie), met aussi en mouvement, par la parole proférée à partir de la notion qui est en lui, la notion qui jusque-là était refroidie, ou étouffée en cette âme. Nous avons ici une description très précise de la communication. Il y a dans l'âme de l'enseigné une notion étouffée ou refroidie, et la "notion" est presque comparée ici à un vivant qui a besoin d'air pour respirer. Dans l'âme du professeur qui a vu la vérité, et qui commence par concevoir le λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, vous avez une notion vivante et véridique. Par l'intermédiaire du λόγος προφορικός la notion, la vérité qui est dans l'âme du professeur, peut agir sur la notion qui est étouffée ou refroidie dans l'âme de son destinataire, de manière à déclencher en celui-ci une sorte de réactivation et de réminiscence. L'arrière-plan c'est l'idée selon laquelle l'acte d'enseignement est "le bien dans la catégorie de l'agir et du pâtre". Vous avez ici la description d'un couple agent-patient, et le vocabulaire de la mise en mouvement (κινεῖν), que nous avons ici, est structurellement homologue du couple ποιεῖν-πάσχειν. Ici il faut remarquer qu'un professeur comme Proclus est célébré comme "image parfaite du Bien" par son disciple Marinus,³⁶ c'est-à-dire

³⁶ Cf. Marinus, *Proclus ou Sur le bonheur*, texte établi, traduit et annoté par H.D. Saffrey - A.-Ph. Segonds avec la collaboration de C. Luna, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2001 (CUF), p. 32.

que dans la psychologie des néoplatoniciens il n’y avait absolument aucun doute qu’un professeur qui réalise sa fonction de professeur réalise véritablement “le bien dans les catégories de l’agir et du pâtir”, et nous avons ici la description de ce qui se produit.

Procédant des notions qui sont dans le maître (ce sont celles qui relèvent du λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), les notions qui sont dans le langage (là nous sommes au niveau du λόγος προφορικός) meurent elles aussi sans intermédiaire les notions de celui qui apprend, et elles les relient aux notions de celui qui enseigne, en se faisant médiations entre les unes et les autres. Les notions ainsi mises en mouvement de manière appropriée – donc il s’agit de notions innées qui se trouvent dans l’âme des enseignés, en quelque sorte “réveillées” ou “ranimées” – viennent s’ajuster aux réalités. Ici se produit tout un mouvement de conversion dont le point d’aboutissement s’exprimera à nouveau selon des termes qui sont directement inspirés par le *De Anima*. Ainsi se produit la connaissance des êtres, et le désir inné de l’âme pour le savoir est satisfait.

La dernière unité de ce texte porte sur le langage, et ceci nous intéresse plus encore dans la perspective du *De Anima*. “Le langage est la limite de l’activité de l’âme, et le propre des limites est de convertir vers les principes. C’est pourquoi le langage rassemble en une communauté de pensée (ὁμόνοια) les âmes qui se sont écartées de l’intellect et des êtres, et qui se sont distinguées les unes les autres; il les fait s’ajuster aux réalités (τοῖς πράγμασιν συναρμόζειν), il les fait remonter vers l’intellect et les prépare non seulement à vouloir être sans langage (ἄφώνους) [...]” (*In Cat.*, p. 13.7-9 Kalbfleisch) – autrement dit: la finalité de tout art d’enseignement, c’est le silence qui accompagne la restauration de l’identité de pensée et de ses objets, – “mais même à posséder des notions qui ne soient plus différentes des réalités” (*In Cat.*, p. 13.9 Kalbfleisch) – et là nous retrouvons Aristote.

Tout au long de ce texte nous avons remarqué l’emploi récurrent du terme προᾶγμα, qui est un écho du vocabulaire d’Aristote dans le *De Anima*. Ce mot s’est chargé dans le lexique néoplatonicien d’une signification très précise: les πράγματα sont les réalités intelligibles, les réalités au sens propre. C’est une signification éminemment platonicienne et néoplatonicienne, comme l’a montré Pierre Hadot: ces réalités intelligibles sont les Réalités qui ont la plénitude de l’existence, c’est à dire qui ont le statut d’οὐσίαι.

La conclusion de ce texte va nous renvoyer à la situation métaphysique qui est la nôtre lorsque nous communiquons scientifiquement et philosophiquement: “Ainsi donc l’âme a morcelé ce qui dans l’intellect est contenu de manière unifiée” (*In Cat.*, p. 13.10-11 Kalbfleisch). Ici le vocabulaire est très intéressant. Nous avons tout à l’heure l’emploi du mot πρόληψις (προλάμβανω): c’est un verbe assez fréquent pour désigner l’anticipation unitive de ce qui est sur le mode de l’ἄδιάκριτος ἔνωσις. Quant à l’adverbe formé sur le participe parfait “ἠνωμένως” (ligne 10), il nous renvoie aussi, dans le vocabulaire proclien et dans le vocabulaire des successeurs de Proclus, à un mode d’union qui apparaît avec le diacosme des intellects. Cette conclusion est techniquement très fine. “[...] non toutefois sans conserver dans la division même la connexion mutuelle de ce qui se trouve dans l’intellect” (*In Cat.*, p. 13.10 Kalbfleisch): l’ἀλληλουχία est la liaison maintenue entre les φωναί, les νοήματα, et les πράγματα dans le langage humain. Cette ἀλληλουχία est comme le dernier écho, la dernière trace dans le langage humain de l’union primordiale, ἀδιάκριτος ἔνωσις.

Je voulais simplement vous présenter ce document en insistant sur le fait que, au point de départ comme au point d’arrivée – au point de départ de la procession comme au point d’arrivée de la conversion – Simplicius atteste l’assomption profonde dans la noétique néoplatonicienne de la thèse du *De Anima* selon laquelle dans le cas des réalités immatérielles il y a identité de la science et de son objet.

The Arabic Adaptation of the Parva Naturalia (Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs)

Rotraud Hansberger

Abstract

Lecture held on May 12th, 2009, Pisa, Santa Croce in Fossabanda, 4th meeting of the programme “GrAL”, *Dal greco all’ arabo e al latino: i Parva Naturalia di Aristotele*.¹

As many of you may know, the Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia* has long been shrouded in some mystery. Scholars of Arabic thought knew that a medieval Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia* must have existed, because it was referred to and quoted by several medieval Arabic authors, by Muslim as well as Jewish thinkers. The best example is Ibn Rushd’s *Talḥīṣ*, on which Marc Geoffroy will speak later on.

While scholars were aware of this, the text of the Arabic version itself had not come to light. This was all the more tantalizing as it was clear from the secondary witnesses that the Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia* could not really have been a straightforward translation of the Greek version we know, but must have contained quite different ideas.

This rather unsatisfactory situation changed in 1985 when Professor Hans Daiber discovered the text of the Arabic *Parva Naturalia* in a manuscript in India. Now, after another few decades, we will hopefully have an edition available in print soon. Nevertheless the mystery will not be disappearing entirely or with immediate effect. The text of the Arabic *Parva Naturalia* – *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*, as it is known in Arabic – still holds a multitude of questions. Or rather, while it answers some of our questions, it also brings up a whole barrage of new ones.

To start with, the situation regarding the textual transmission is not exactly satisfactory. There is currently still only one manuscript available, Ms Arab 1752 in the Raza Library in Rampur, India. To make matters worse, this manuscript is not only quite late, dating (probably) from the 17th century, but moreover also incomplete: the beginning of our text is missing. Furthermore it does not reveal any names or dates of any people involved in the production of the text, i.e. the translator or adaptor. All this means that we are not very well informed about the process of the textual transmission of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*. This is again particularly unfortunate as the text itself is not homogeneous, not very clear, and not clearly structured. This means that there is a distinct possibility that the process of transmission may have had an impact on the way the text looks today.

¹ This lecture is based on material that I have discussed elsewhere in more detail. For a more extensive presentation and full references, see my “*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*. Aristotle’s *Parva Naturalia* in Arabic Guise”, in Chr. Grellard - P.-M. Morel (eds), *Les Parva Naturalia d’Aristote*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 2010, pp. 143-62; “How Aristotle Came to Believe in God-Given Dreams: The Arabic Version of *De Divinatione per somnum*”, in L. Marlow (ed.), *Dreaming Across Boundaries. The Interpretation of Dreams in Islamic Lands*, Ilex Foundation - Harvard U. P., Washington D.C. 2008, pp. 50-77; “The Transmission of Aristotle’s *Parva Naturalia* in Arabic”, D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007.

However, even if we disregard those problems of transmission and focus on parts of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* which we can reasonably argue to be core passages of the text, we will still encounter enough interesting problems.

As already mentioned, there has long been the suspicion that the Arabic version of the *Parva Naturalia* was not an exact counterpart of the Greek text. In fact, *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* is much more of an adaptation than a translation, and a very free adaptation at that. It does use bits and pieces from the Aristotelian text, which after all it purports to represent, but it also includes large amounts of other material, featuring theories and ideas originating in Neoplatonic philosophy and in late ancient medical thought generally associated with the name of Galen.

The text furthermore seems to have been produced in several stages of adaptation. I think there was one main stage of adaptation in which most of those ‘alien’ ideas were introduced. But there also appear to be some later glosses that have been incorporated into the text.

Most importantly, though, the translation from Greek into Arabic seems to represent a separate stage that predates the adaptation; which means that the main adaptor used the Aristotelian text in translation, i.e. he produced his text working with that translation. This of course also implies that the adaptation was not written in Greek and then translated into Arabic, but that it was produced in Arabic to start with.

This does not mean that there ever was a full, complete, fine and faithful Arabic translation of the *Parva Naturalia*. In fact, this is rather unlikely. We cannot say much about the translation itself, because only precious little of it is left in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*. But as far as I can tell it was not a very good translation, it was not very complete, and it certainly was not faithful. It is possible that the first translator himself was already in the business of adapting the text, but it is also very likely that he simply struggled with the text and faced serious difficulties in translating it. This again might be due to several factors. Perhaps his skills were not up to scratch; or perhaps the Greek manuscript he was working from was defective.

Although there are no fixed dates available for the text, the translation appears to be relatively early: it probably was produced early in the 9th century. The overall adaptation, on the other hand, shares features with some texts produced by translators working for the philosopher al-Kindī (the so-called Kindī Circle), notably the Arabic Plotinus. Therefore it can be dated to the 9th century. As some of you will know, such adaptations are not uncommon amongst the works of the Kindī Circle. Take the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, where passages of Plotinus’ *Enneads* in a somewhat tendentious Arabic translation are expanded upon by added material, putting a certain spin on the text and thus resulting in an altered general interpretation of Plotinus’ ideas.²

But even in comparison with texts like the *Theology of Aristotle*, *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* must be regarded as an extreme case. Therefore I hesitate somewhat to declare that it is a work of the Kindī Circle plain and simple. There is indeed a strong link, but *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* does not resemble any single one of the known Kindī Circle texts closely enough to enable us to say that it was authored by the same person who, e.g., produced the *Theology of Aristotle* or Pseudo-Ammonius’ *Doxography*.³

Now let us have a closer look at the text itself. It is important to keep in mind that *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* does present itself as the Arabic translation of the *Parva Naturalia* and claims to be

² See e.g. P. Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical Study of the Theology of Aristotle*, Duckworth, London 2002.

³ U. Rudolph, *Die Doxographie des Pseudo-Ammonios: ein Beitrag zur neuplatonischen Überlieferung im Islam*, Steiner, Wiesbaden - Stuttgart 1989.

authored by Aristotle. There is no mention of it being a summary, an adaptation or a commentary or anything of the kind, so if you read it without any background knowledge, you would think it was indeed a book by Aristotle.

Its title, *Book on Perception and the Perceived*, refers to the first of the six treatises that are reflected in the text: *De Sensu et sensato*, which is represented in the first part (*Maqāla* 1). As I said, most of this part is unfortunately missing in the only available manuscript.

The second part or *maqāla* comprises *De Memoria et reminiscentia* on the one hand, and the three books *De Somno et vigilia*, *De Insomniis* and *De Divinatione per somnum* on the other. The latter three are integrated in one chapter, the *Chapter on Sleep and Waking*. The third and last *maqāla* is equivalent to *De Longitudine et brevitae vitae*.

- Maqāla 1: *Fī l-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs** (“On sense-perception and the perceived”: ~ *De Sensu et sensato*)
- Maqāla 2: *Fī l-Ḍikr wa-l-taḍakkur* (“On memory and recollection”: ~ *De Memoria et reminiscentia*)
Bāb al-Nawm wa-l-yaqāza (“Chapter on sleep and waking”: ~ *De Somno et vigilia*,
De Insomniis, *De Divinatione per somnum*)
- Maqāla 3: *Fī ṭūl al-ʿumr wa-qīṣarībī* (“On length and shortness of life”: ~ *De Longitudine et brevitae vitae*)

Having listened to the previous speakers, this structure will look familiar to you by now. It is interesting to note that the three books on sleeping and dreaming are represented by one chapter, which is furthermore taken together with *De Memoria* to make up one tract – especially since we have heard of a similar case in Professor Hoffmann’s presentation earlier. This way of combining the treatises is also indicated in a list of Aristotle’s works that was compiled in Late Antiquity by a person called Ptolemy (today only extant in Arabic). It hence seems that there was a certain tradition of ordering the treatises in this way.

On the face of it the structure may look quite neat, but in reality not much of these Aristotelian treatises is left within the Arabic text. It is in fact the additional material that makes up the biggest part of the text. And this added material is not clearly separated from passages of translation: we do not get first a section of translated text and then a section of something else, be it a commentary or a piece of a different text added to the translation. Instead, translation and added material are woven closely together, so that it is at times hard to identify translated Aristotelian text with any degree of certainty. In order to know what is going on in the text one therefore needs to pick things apart, as it were, and compare it closely with the relevant sections of the Greek text of the *Parva Naturalia*.

To give you a rough quantitative estimate, on the whole at best 30% of the Greek text shows up in the Arabic text in some way or other. We can say that about 30% of *De Memoria* and *De Somno* are somehow represented in the Arabic, in the case of *De Longitudine* it is more, about 40%. In case of *De Sensu* there is nothing left that could count as relating to Aristotle (which will be due to its defective textual transmission), and of *De Insomniis* and *De Divinatione* we only find traces in the Arabic.

Conversely, about 30% of the Arabic text of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* can be said to represent Aristotelian text (again varying between the individual treatises); the majority of the text, however, consists of other material.

The distribution of the Aristotelian segments within the Arabic text follows a curious pattern. At the beginnings of the Arabic *maqālas* and chapters the Aristotelian text is reproduced relatively faithfully, with a few explicative comments thrown in. The further a chapter progresses, however, the

shorter the Aristotelian sentences become, and the more non-Aristotelian material is added, until we find whole pages of added material with only the occasional keyword that may – or may not – stem from the Aristotelian text, as well as long passages that do not refer at all to anything in Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*. Of course, at this point one can never be entirely sure whether such words actually refer to the Aristotelian text or whether the similarity is just accidental. However, in some cases one can still see that a single word must stem from Aristotle's text, even if it appears in a strange context.

All this means that *Kitāb al-Hiss wa-l-mahsūs* does not convey much of Aristotle's thought; instead it is the preferred theories of the adaptor, represented in the added material, that dominate the whole text. This is so not only because of the overwhelming quantity of added material, but also because these theories are often presented in a more cohesive manner than the fragments of Aristotelian text, and in fact also influence the way in which whatever is left of the Aristotelian text is interpreted in the overall context.

Let us now have a look at the first textual example.⁴ It is the very beginning of the second *maqāla*, corresponding to *De Memoria*.

1)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 10 r 9-25 (*Fī l-Dīkr*)

المقالة الثانية من الحسّ والحسوس في الذكر والرؤيا والعبارة (1) قد يجب علينا أن نتكلم في الذكر والتذكر وما سببهما (2) وفي أيّ قوى من قوى النفس يعرض هذا الألم حتى يذكر الشيء الذي قد فات ومضى (3) وليس هذا لازماً للعام بل هو لازم للأكثر من أجل أنه ليس الكل حافظاً ولا الكل ذاكراً (4) وأن نعلم أيضاً لم صار البطيء الحركة أذكر للأشياء والسريع الحركة أحفظ لها (5) لنقول إن الذي يذكر الأشياء ليس كالذي يحفظها (6) لأن الذي يحفظ ليس يحتاج إلى الذكر لأن الحفظ دائم متصل والذي يذكر الأشياء إنما يذكرها بعد نسيان فلذلك صار الذكر الحفظ المنقطع [...].

Second Treatise of [the Book on] Sense-Perception and the Perceived: on Memory, Dream-vision and [its] Interpretation. – (1) **We will have to speak about memory and recollection and [about] what their cause is;** (2) **and [we must discuss] to which of the soul's faculties this affection occurs, so that something that has passed and gone will be remembered.** (3) This does not pertain to everyone, but it in fact pertains to most, since not all people are retaining [things in their memory], nor are all people recollecting. (4) We also [need] to know why **a person of slow movement is better at recollecting things while a person of quick movement is better at retaining them [in memory]**, (5) so that we say **that the person who recollects things is not like the person who retains them in memory.** (6) For the person who retains them does not need [recollective] memory, because retentive memory is permanent and continuous, whereas the person who recollects things does so only after forgetting [them]. This is why [recollective] memory is discontinuous retentive memory [...]

Arist., *De Memoria*, I 449 b 4-9 (Aristotle, *Parva Naturalia*, ed. by W.D. Ross, Oxford U. P., Oxford 1955) (Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως)

(1) Περὶ μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν λεκτέον τί ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν γίγνεται (2) καὶ τίνι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων συμβαίνει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἀναμνησθεσθαι· (5) οὐ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσι μνημονικοὶ καὶ ἀναμνηστικοί, (4) ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μνημονικώτεροι μὲν οἱ βραδεῖς, ἀναμνηστικώτεροι δὲ οἱ ταχεῖς καὶ εὐμαθεῖς.

⁴ The textual examples are based on my edition and translation of *Kitāb al-Hiss wa-l-mahsūs* (in preparation).

(On memory and recollection)

(1) In discussing memory and remembering, it is necessary to say what they are, (2) and how their occurrence is to be explained, and to which part of the soul this affection, and recollecting, belong. (5) For it is not the same people who are good at remembering and recollecting. (4) Rather, for the most part, slow people are better at remembering, while those who are quick and learn well are better at recollecting (trans. R. Sorabji, *Aristotle. On Memory*, Duckworth, London 1972, p. 47).

I have numbered the sentences in order to indicate corresponding sentences in the Arabic text and in the Greek *Parva Naturalia*. Furthermore, in the English translation of the Arabic text words that have a counterpart in the Greek are printed in bold face – this does not mean that it is a correct translation, it just means that it reflects something in the Greek, be it right or wrong.

So you can see quite easily that there are correspondences in sentences 1, 2, 4, and 5. The Greek is translated reasonably faithfully. There are, obviously, some additions, clauses we do not find in Aristotle's text – 3, 6 –; but they do not introduce new ideas but just try to explicate further what has been said. One little mistake, however, can be found in sentence 4: the Arabic translation confuses the connection between slow movement and remembering and fast movement and recollecting respectively, saying instead that the slow person recollects well and the fast person remembers well. In this case, I think we are looking at a honest mistake, without any 'ideological' reasons looming in the background; the text does not come back in any way to this question.

Incidentally, this mistake is indirectly reflected in Ibn Rushd's *Talḥīṣ*; it seems to me that in the relevant section⁵ Ibn Rushd is trying to find a way of avoiding to say this plainly, and of associating slowness with recollection and fastness with remembering in a more complicated way – probably because he did not find the way in which it was mentioned in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* at all convincing.

This, then, is an example from one end of the spectrum, giving us a reasonable representation of Aristotelian text in the Arabic. However, if you look over the next 3 examples – 2 to 4 – you see that there is no bold print at all, i.e. no correspondence to the Aristotelian text whatsoever. They are taken from the middle of *Bāb al-Nawm*, the chapter on sleep, dreams, and divinatory dreams. Here we do not have many references to the Greek any more: instead, the preferred theory of the Arabic adaptor comes to the fore.

The three examples represent the core of the adaptor's theory. The topic he is most concerned with is that of divinatory dreams. Now, you all know that Aristotle expresses himself rather sceptically with regard to divinatory dreams. Although he does say that people have veridical dreams that foretell future events, he denies that such dreams are sent by God and instead strives to find physical and physiological explanations for such phenomena.

Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs, on the other hand, does not cast the shadow of a doubt on the assumption that veridical dreams are sent by God, it takes that as a given. What it then does is to provide an explanation of how such dreams can happen: in terms of psychology, and in terms of the necessary metaphysical framework. This theme takes over much of *Bāb al-Nawm*; it seems that the whole chapter, and partly also the first chapter of the second *maqāla*, the equivalent to *De Memoria*, is geared towards this theory.

At the heart of the psychological part of the explanation is a theory of the mental faculties that is derived from late ancient medicine. It involves the three faculties called formative faculty or imagination, faculty of thought, and faculty of memory. Though not possessing corporeal organs,

⁵ Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rushd, *Talḥīṣ Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*, ed. H. Blumberg, Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge Mass. 1972 (Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, vers. arab. 7), pp. 49-51.

these faculties are located in the ventricles of the brain and are supposed to function by virtue of the 'animal spirit', which the medics supposed to be made of the finest possible matter.⁶

The normal functions of these faculties have to do with the processing of sense-perceptions that are conveyed to them through the sensitive faculty, the common sense. In *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-mahsūs*, this is seen and presented not so much in terms of what it means to imagine or remember something, as in terms of a kind of abstraction process which rids a perception more and more of its corporeal elements, making it increasingly 'spiritual'. This process starts with the perception of the perceptible object through the sense faculty; the next step is the storing of this perception, or 'form', in the formative faculty; then follows the step in which the faculty of thought distinguishes between this form and its *ma'nā*; the *ma'nā* is, as it were, the 'noetic core' of the form; it is the particular thing in so far as it is represented by *thought* only, without any sensitive aspect. (I deliberately do not translate the term because the usual translations, e.g. 'intention', would be anachronistic and unsuitable for the way in which it is used in this particular text). This *ma'nā* is, finally, what the faculty of memory will store.

Let us look at example (2), then.

2)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 40 v 1-26 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)

فإذا كان في حدّ النوم أحضر ذلك المعنى مع الصورة فيرى النائم صور أشياء وتعبّر له بذلك المعنى الذي كان عند الفكر فيظنّ حينئذ صاحب الرؤيا أنّ تلك الرؤيا صادقة وذلك الشيء الذي يراه حقّ وهو باطل أجمع لا معنى له وإنما يكون ذلك من أجل هذه القوى الروحانيّة أعني المصوّر والفكر والذكر لأنّ هذه القوى لا تسكن حركتها في حدّ النوم ولا فعلها فإذا سكنت الطبيعة وصارت مستبطنة نحو النفس سكن البدن فإذا سكن البدن سكنت الحواسّ فإذا سكنت الحواسّ رجع الحسّ المشترك إلى المصوّر فينظر إلى صور الأشياء التي رآها في حدّ الجسمانيّة نظراً روحانياً وقد كان ينظر إليها وهي جسمانيّة متحرّكة وهو ينظر إليها عند المصوّر ساكنة ولا حركة لها فهي في حدّ السكون أتقن وأحسن منها وهي متحرّكة.

For when [the person] is in the realm of sleep he makes that *ma'nā* present together with the form. Hence the sleeper sees forms of things, and their interpretation is given to him through that *ma'nā* which has [already] been in [the faculty of] thought. Then the person who is having the dream-vision will believe that dream-vision to be veridical, and the thing which he is seeing to be a reality; whereas it is entirely vain, and does not have any *ma'nā*. This occurs due to nothing but these spiritual faculties – I mean the formative [faculty], [the faculty of] thought and [the faculty of] memory – as neither the movement, nor the activity of these faculties rest in the realm of sleep. For when the nature rests and is absorbed in the soul, then the body rests; and when the body rests the senses rest, and when the senses rest, the common sense resorts to the formative [faculty], and looks with a spiritual gaze at the forms of things which it has seen in the realm of corporeality. [Before], it used to look at them when they were corporeal and in motion, whereas [now] it looks at them being at rest and motionless in the formative [faculty], with them being more perfect and excellent when at rest than when they are moving.

In the second example, we see how the three faculties, the formative faculty, the faculty of thought and the faculty of memory, are involved in dreaming and veridical dreaming: while the body rests in sleep, they stay active, as they are not corporeal. They occupy themselves with earlier perceptions that

⁶ Cf. e.g. R.E. Harvey, *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, Warburg Institute, London 1975, pp. 4-8.

are stored in memory; and they also assign interpretations – *mā'ānī* – to such perceptions. When they do that, the sleeper will think that he has a veridical dream, even if that is not the case.

However, there *are* true dream-visions, dreams that predict the future. This is what we find addressed in the next example, text (3).

3)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 41 r 5-11 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)

فأما الرؤيا الصحيحة الروحانية فهي التي تكون من نحو معقولات العقل الكلي لا من نحو معقولات العقل المكتسب التي لم يطلع الحس المشترك عليها ولم يصورها المصور ولم يعرف الفكر معناها ولا هي مستودعة عند الذكر فهذه الصور إذا ظهرت في حد الرؤيا ونظر إليها الحس المشترك والمصور وسائر القوى علمت أن الصور التي تأتيها من المحسوسات الجسمانيات باطل

As for the sound, spiritual dream-vision, it is the one which comes about from intelligibles of the universal intellect, not from intelligibles of the acquired intellect, [i.e. it comes from intelligibles] which are unknown to the common sense and have not been imagined by the formative [faculty]; the *mā'nā* of which [the faculty of] thought does not know, and which are not deposited in [the faculty of] memory. When these forms appear in the realm of dream-vision, and when the common sense, the formative [faculty] and all other faculties look at them, they know that the forms coming to them from corporeal objects of perception are something vain.

In this case, of course, the forms and *mā'ānī* cannot go back to previous perceptions – because we could not have seen the events in question yet. This means: The forms must come from outside, and from a credible source. This source is identified as the 'universal intellect'.

Now we have arrived at the metaphysical and cosmological framework of the theory. It is essentially Neoplatonic in character, but has been adjusted so as to fit the requirements of scriptural religion. This we can observe in text (4).

4)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 42 r 2-15 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)

فهذه الرؤيا الحق التي سببها وعلتها الإله الحق جل ثناؤه بتوسط العقل لأن كل ما أراد الإله جل ثناؤه أن يظهر في هذا العالم صورته في العقل بدفعة واحدة وصورة صورته في هذا العالم معما يلزمها من المنطق في دفعة واحدة فأظهر العقل للنفس ولكل قوة من قوى النفس على قدر ما بتت النفس ما للقوة أن تقبله على أن العلة العظمى أعني الإله جل ثناؤه هكذا أبدع حيث أبدع العقل في ذلك الوقت لإظهار ما عنده لأن الإله حركه في ذلك الوقت لإظهار ما عنده

Such [is] the true dream-vision, the cause and reason of which is the true Deity, great be His praise, through the mediation of the intellect. For whatever the Deity, great be His praise, wanted to become manifest in this world He represented in the intellect in one stroke, and represented its forms in this world in one stroke, together with their logical implications. The intellect then made [them] manifest to the soul and to each one of its faculties, according to the measure in which the soul decided that [each] faculty should receive [them]; although the Supreme Cause, I mean the Deity, great be His praise, created [them] in this way, when He created the intellect at that time, in order to make manifest what is in it; because the Deity moved [the intellect] at that time in order to make manifest what is in it.

God creates everything there is first in the universal intellect, in one single act of creation; only then are things created in the forms in which they appear in this world. This means that the things

exist within the universal intellect before they appear in corporeal form, and over time, in this world; hence the intellect can reveal them to human souls before they occur in the world. This is also how the phenomenon of dream interpretation can be explained: the universal intellect can reveal something to one person in form of a dream – as a spiritual form – while to another person it reveals its *mā' nā*, its noetic core, as it were, without the 'visualised' dream image.

Associated with this is a hierarchy of forms: the 'intellectual form' in the intellect; the *mā' nā*, i.e. the thing as it is thought of in the human mind; the spiritual form, which is revealed as dream and therefore has a sensual aspect, and lastly the corporeal form of the actual, created event happening in the world.

Much of this theory the adaptor will have found in his sources; he did not make it up from scratch. The involvement of these mental faculties in divinatory dreams, for example, is a topic that is already mentioned in late ancient Greek authors like Nemesius of Emesa⁷ – divinatory dreams were an acknowledged fact of life in Christianity and Judaism as well as Islam. What he does is to weave them together with bits and pieces of the Aristotelian text, and thus, in the end, to present the result as Aristotle's theory.

However, he also has his very own contribution to make. There are certain elements in the theory that we can see him emphasise specifically.

First, he is very fond of hierarchy and linear hierarchical order; secondly, he advocates a clear dichotomy between corporeality and spirituality, where spirituality seems to lose its interim position and becomes equated with absolute incorporeality, and hence with the divine world. This does not always work out well within context and therefore creates inconsistencies at times.

Thus we find a strong emphasis on hierarchies that are played out in terms of spirituality and corporeality. For example, the processing of perceptual forms by the three faculties is described as a process of increasing spirituality, and of purification; the adaptor here also attaches a moralistic, evaluating overtone.

How do we know, though, that this tendency was not already found in his sources but is the adaptor's own contribution? The answer is that there are certain passages where one can see the adaptor at work, as it were. These are passages where he links Aristotelian text and added material together. At such points we know that he was not working from one particular source but had to be creative in order to join two different sources together.

We will examine this aspect with the help of the remaining textual examples.

5)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, ff. 10 v 25 – 11r 12 (*Fī l-Dīkr*)

(1) وأقول أيضاً إنَّ كلَّ ما رآه المرء أو سمعه أو أحسَّه أو أبصره أو لمسه فإنَّه إذا فعل فعلاً بالذِّكر فإنَّه لا يقول في نفسه إنِّي قد حسيت هذا أو سمعته [أو] أبصرته (2) بل إنما يطلبه بنوع وجود آخر هو أشرف من وجود الحسِّ (3) لأنَّ الذِّكر ليس هو حسّاً (4) تدرك به الأشياء لأنَّه لا يمكن أن يدرك الحسِّ الأشياء إلا بجرم (5) فأما الذِّكر فإنَّه قوَّة غريزيَّة تدرك الأشياء مجردة (6) وليس تدركها إلا بعد زمان (7) فأما أن يدركها زمان وجودها أو في الزمان الآتي فهذا ليس فعل الذِّكر ولا يجوز أن يقال في الذِّكر

(1) I also say that **whatever** a man sees, hears, senses, looks at or touches, **when he acts** [on it] **with [his] memory, he will not say in his soul: 'I have sensed this' or 'I have heard it' or 'I have seen it'**

(2) but he will search for it in another way which is more noble than finding it by sense-perception.

⁷ Cf. e.g. Nemesius of Emesa, *De Natura hominis*, ed. M. Morani, Teubner, Leipzig 1987 (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), pp. 40, 68.

(3) **For memory is not sense-perception**, (4) by which things are perceived, because sense-perception can perceive things through a body only. (5) As for memory, it is an **innate** faculty which perceives things [in] abstracted [form], (6) and it perceives them only **after time [has passed]**. (7) As for perceiving them at the time of their existence or in the time to come, this is not the function of memory, nor can it be attributed to memory.

Arist., *De Memoria*, 449 b 22-25 (ed. Ross).

(1) ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῆ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ἤσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν. (3) ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἰσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, (5?) ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, (6) ὅταν γένηται χρόνος.

(1) For whenever someone is actively engaged in remembering, he always says in his soul in this way that he heard, or perceived, or thought this before. (3) Therefore memory is not perception or conception, (5) but a state or affection connected with one of these, (6) when time has elapsed (trans. Sorabji, *Aristotle. On Memory*, p. 48).

Text (5) is a seemingly harmless example from the first part of *Maqāla 2 (De Memoria)*. As you can see from the bold print, there are correspondences in clauses 1, 3, 5 and 6 (disregard the one in 5, which is a special case).

However, does the Arabic text say the same as the Greek? No: due to the negation in sentence 1 it actually says the exact opposite. So what has happened? Are we looking at a mistake? Or is there something more behind it?

After all, the result fits in with the adaptor's theory: memory is more noble than sense-perception, it does not have anything to do with impure sensibles or with bodily organs. This agrees with his idea of memory being the highest of the three mental faculties, dealing with *ma'ānī* only. So, did the adaptor 'smuggle in' the negation to be able to make that point? This could be a tempting suggestion.

There is, however, a simpler explanation. The word οὕτως may have been misread – or, in fact, misspelt in the Greek manuscript – as οὐπὼς. This is something that could easily have happened; hence it is a rather convincing explanation. Furthermore, it is hard to see why the adaptor would have wanted to insert a negation into this first sentence: *Kitāb al-Hiss wa-l-mahsūs* does emphasise several times in other places that one can only remember what one has perceived earlier. Thus there must have been better ways to make the point about the difference between memory and sense-perception than producing this rather counterintuitive negation.

It therefore makes sense to assume that this was an innocent mistake to begin with. But we also have to note that the adaptor makes the most of it, and uses it very efficiently to make a point that fits in very well with his own theory. Of course one has to bear in mind that unclarities as presented by this rather odd negative sentence would in any case invite an adaptor to comment, explain and improve.

6)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, ff. 21 v 6 – 22 r 24 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)

(1) وقد يصحّ هذا ويعرف من اليقظان والنائم وذلك أنّ النائم قد يحسّ بأشياء كثيرة وهو لا يشكّ أنّ تلك الأشياء التي يحسّها في نومه أنّها في يقظته (2) والفصل الذي بين حسّ اليقظان والنائم أنّ النائم إنّما يحسّ من داخل وحسّه ذلك من غير حركة منه واليقظان يحسّ من خارج وذلك الحسّ بحركة (3) فنقول إذا قد استبان فصل ما بين حسّ النائم واليقظان أيّ الحسّين أوفق وأصوب

ومن الواجب أن يُعرف هذا ويعلم (4) فنقول إنَّ حسَّ النائم حسَّ بالقوَّة وحسَّ اليقظان حسَّ بالفعل (5) وكلُّ ما هو بالقوَّة فإنَّه عسر إدراكه وما كان بالفعل فإنَّه مدرك معلوم (6) وحسَّ النائم وإن كان بالقوَّة فقد يخرج إلى الفعل غير أنَّ منه ما يخرج خروجاً بيّناً واضحاً ومنه ما هو عسر غير بيّن (7) فأما أتقنهما وأشرفهما فإنَّ الروحانيَّ أشرف من الجسمانيِّ وليس الروحانيُّ أشرف من الجسمانيِّ عند الجسمانيِّ ولا الجسمانيُّ أشرف من الروحانيِّ عند الروحانيِّ بل الروحانيُّ أشرف من الجسمانيِّ عند الروحانيِّ والجسمانيُّ أشرف من الروحانيِّ عند الجسمانيِّ إلاَّ أنه غير ممكن أن يكون الروحانيُّ أشرف عند الجسمانيِّ البتَّة بل قد يمكن أن يكون الروحانيُّ الذي ذكرنا أنه بالقوَّة أشرف عند المرء من الجسمانيِّ الذي ذكرنا أنه بالفعل (8) والدليل على أنَّ الروحانيَّ أشرف من الجسمانيِّ أنَّ الروحانيَّ دالٌّ على ما هو كائن في الزمان الآتي والجسمانيُّ إمَّا هو دالٌّ على ما كان في زمان الآن موجوداً فقط (9) فإذا أحد المرء قواه بألطف الأشياء وصيَّرها متَّحدة فإنَّه يرى ذلك الشيء الذي يراه بالقوَّة كالذي يرى الشيء بالفعل وإمَّا يُمنع المرء من أن يرى الأشياء بالقوَّة مثل ما يراها بالفعل لأنَّ قواه مفترقة [...].

(1) **This can be proven and recognised by [considering] the waking and the sleeping person.** For a sleeper will perceive many things without doubting that those things that he is perceiving in his sleep are there while he is being awake. (2) The difference between the perception of the waking and that of the sleeping person lies in that the sleeper **perceives internally** only, – and that [kind of] perception of his [takes place] without any **movement** on his part – whereas **the waking person perceives externally**, that [kind of] perception [taking place] through **movement**. (3) Let us therefore say: the difference between sense-perception of the sleeping and that of the waking person has become clear, [i.e.] which one of the two [types of] sense-perception is more apt and more correct; this ought to be recognised and known. (4) The sense-perception of the sleeper, we shall then say, is sense-perception **potentially**, whereas the sense-perception of the waking person is sense-perception **actually**. (5) Whatever is potential is hard to perceive, whereas what is actual is perceptible and knowable. (6) However, the sense-perception of the sleeper, even though potential, may emerge into actuality; although some of it will emerge in a clear and plain manner, while some of it will be difficult [to perceive] and unclear. (7) As for [the question which one is] the most perfect and the noblest of the two: the spiritual is nobler than the corporeal. However, the spiritual is not [considered] nobler than the corporeal by the corporeal, nor is the corporeal [considered] nobler than the spiritual by the spiritual; rather, the spiritual is [considered] nobler than the corporeal by the spiritual, whereas the corporeal is [considered] nobler than the spiritual by the corporeal; only that it is not at all possible that the spiritual should be [considered] nobler by the corporeal, whereas it may indeed be possible that the spiritual, which we have said to be potential, is [considered] nobler by man than the corporeal, which we have said to be actual. (8) Evidence for the spiritual being nobler than the corporeal is that the spiritual indicates what will come to be in the future, whereas the corporeal indicates what has come to exist at the present time only. (9) When a person unites his faculties through the most subtle of things and makes them a unified one, he will see the things that he sees potentially just as someone does who is seeing them actually. It is just because his faculties are separated that a man is prevented from seeing things in potentiality in the same way as the things which he sees in actuality [...].

Arist., *De Somno*, 453 b 31- 454 a 4, 454 a 7-11 (ed. Ross).

- (1) ἐτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον ὅτι γὰρ τὸν ἐγρηγορότα γνωρίζομεν, τοῦτω καὶ τὸν καθυπνοῦντα.
 (2) τὸν δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἐγρηγορένα νομίζομεν, καὶ τὸν ἐγρηγορότα πάντα ἢ τῶν ἕξωθέν τινος

αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κινήσεων. [...] ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τοῦ σώματος (4) (οὐ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις, τούτου καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἡ δὲ λεγομένη αἰσθησις ὡς ἐνέργεια κινήσις τις διὰ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ), φανερόν ὡς οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ἴδιον, οὔτ' ἄψυχον σῶμα δυνατὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι.

(1) Again, the point is clear from the following. We recognize a person as sleeping by the same mark as that by which we recognize someone as waking. (2) It is the person who is perceiving that we consider to be awake; and we take every waking person to be perceiving either something external or some movement within himself. [...] But given that perceiving belongs neither to the soul nor to the body solely (4) (for what owns any capacity also owns its exercise; and what is called perception, in the sense of exercise, is a certain movement of the soul by means of the body), it is plain that the affection is not peculiar to the soul, nor is a soul-less body capable of perceiving (trans. D. Gallop, *Aristotle. On Sleep and Dreams*, Aris & Phillips, Peterborough 1990 / Warminster 1996, pp. 61ff.).

With text (6) we move one step further. It is taken from the beginning of *Bāb al-Nawm*. Up to where the example starts, *Bāb al-Nawm* has more or less faithfully represented the beginning of *De Somno*; this is the point now where added material first starts to creep in, until it will finally dominate the text further down the line. As the bold type indicates, correspondences remain, but they are increasingly few and far between; the correspondence deteriorates.

What does Aristotle say here? Waking is linked to perception, and as perception affects body and soul sleep and waking must also affect both soul and body.

What does the Arabic text say? The context (established in what precedes the quoted passage) affirms that the absence of sleep is waking. Thus the text speaks of the contrast between sleep and waking. As in the Greek, perception is a central theme – however, not in so far as it identifies the waking state. *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* speaks of two types of perception, one linked to sleep, and one to waking. In Aristotle, perception is described as either of external objects or internal events; in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs* this turns into the distinction between external perception, assigned to waking, and internal perception, assigned to sleep. The keyword ‘movement’ is also taken up: external perception occurs through movement, internal perception without. The same treatment is applied to the pair *dynamis / energeia*: external perception is proclaimed to be actual, internal perception potential. The potential is then identified as the spiritual, the actual as the corporeal (see end of clause 7). It is then asserted at length that the spiritual is nobler than the corporeal – and not least because spiritual perception means perceiving the future, whereas corporeal perception means perceiving the present only.

The adaptor's dichotomy:

sleep	waking
rest	motion
potentiality	actuality
spirituality	corporeality
internal perception	external perception
perception of future	perception of present
union of faculties	separation of faculties

By now it is clear where the adaptor is steering the text: right at the beginning of his chapter on sleep and waking he is already paving the way for his doctrine of divinatory dreams, including his idea

of a dichotomy between the spiritual and the corporeal. Apart from the 'spiritual' and 'corporeal', all the elements for his scheme are sourced from the Aristotelian text. This is likewise true for the notion of the 'union of faculties' vs. the 'separation of faculties', which is also derived from an Aristotelian passage, as will emerge from text (7).

7)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, f. 27 v 20 f. (*Bāb al-Nawm*)

فإذا كان هذا هكذا فلا محالة أن اليقظة هو انحلال رباط القوى والنوم رباط القوى فقد بان وضح
أن اليقظة ضد النوم.

If this is so, then **waking will inevitably [equal] the loosening of the bond** of the faculties, whereas **sleep will [equal] the [fastened] bond** of the faculties. – Thus it has been established clearly and soundly that waking is the opposite of sleep.

Arist., *De Somno*, 454 b 25-27 (ed. Ross)

τῆς δ' αἰσθησεως τρόπον τινὰ τὴν μὲν ἀκίνησιαν καὶ οἷον δεσμὸν τὸν ὕπνον εἶναι φαμεν, τὴν δὲ λύσειν καὶ τὴν ἀνεσιν ἐγγρήγορσιν.

And we maintain that sleep is, in a certain way, an immobilization or 'fettering' of perception; whereas its liberation or release is waking (trans. Gallop, *Aristotle. On Sleep and Dreams*, p. 67).

In the interpretation of *Kitāb al-Hiss wa-l-mahsūs*, Aristotle's 'fettering of perception', i.e. the halt and lack of perception during sleep becomes a positive 'bond', a union of the faculties that in fact enables them to perceive on an even higher level.

Whatever the Aristotelian text was like that he was working from, texts (6) and (7) show that the adaptor makes very good use of it in terms of his own theory, displaying great creativity and inventiveness, together with a strong inclination towards systematisation. It seems as if he can make anything fit his theory – and it even makes some sort of sense, that is the beauty of it!

A similar case is text (8), which informs the reader about the anatomical location of the three mental faculties.

8)

Ms Rampur, Raza Library, Arab 1752, ff. 34 r 18 – 34 v 10 (*Bāb al-Nawm*)

(1) والدليل على <ذلك> أن الحواس إنما تذكر كينونتها من العضو الذي منه بدء حركة [...] لأن الحركة لا تكون إلا من العصب وبدء العصب من الرأس والحركة من الرأس لا محالة فقد بان وضح أن الحس إنما يكون من العضو الذي منه يكون بدء الحركة وهو من الرأس (2) وفي الرأس ثلاث جوبات في وسط الرأس جوبة وفي أعلاه جوبة وفي أسفله جوبة والجوبة التي في وسط الرأس هي جوبة الفكر والجوبة السفلى موضع المصور لأنه قريب من الحس المشترك لأن الحس المشترك هو الذي ينال صور المحسوسات وأشكالها وأقدارها من الأجرام بالآلات الجرمية فإذا قبل الحاس تلك الصور وتلك الأشكال والأقدار قبلها قبولاً بين الروحانية والجسمانية ثم يقبلها منه المصور فيصورها عنده بنوع من الأنواع الروحانية فيها أكثر من الجسمانية والجوبة العالية موضع الذكر (...)

(1) Evidence for <that> is that the senses are said to come into being in that part of the body in which the movement of [...] originates; for all movement must come from the nerves, but the origin of the nerves is in the head, and [therefore] movement inevitably must originate in the head. Thus it has been established clearly and soundly **that sense-perception originates in that part of the body where the**

origin of movement lies, which is the head. (2) There are **three** ventricles in the **head**; one ventricle is [situated] in the **middle** of the **head**, one ventricle in its highest part, and one ventricle in its lowest part. The ventricle in the middle of the head is the ventricle of [the faculty of] thought, whereas the lowest ventricle is the seat of the formative [faculty], because it is close to the common sense; for the common sense is the one which obtains the forms of the perceptibles, their shapes and their measures from the bodies by means of bodily organs; hence when the sensing [faculty] receives such a form and such shapes and measures, it will receive them between spirituality and corporeality; after that, the formative [faculty] will receive them from it and will form them within it in one way or other such that spirituality will exceed corporeality within them. The uppermost ventricle is the seat of [the faculty of] memory (...).

De Somno, 455 b 31 - 456 a 3 (ed. Ross)

(1) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀρχὴ γίγνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέρους τοῖς ζώοις ἀφ' οὐπερ καὶ ἡ τῆς κινήσεως, διώριστα πρότερον ἐν ἑτέροις. (2) αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶ τριῶν διωρισμένων τόπων ὁ μέσος κεφαλῆς καὶ τῆς κάτω κοιλίας.

(1) Now it has already been determined in other works that perception in animals originates from the same part as does movement. (2) Of three areas that have been determined, this is the one that lies midway between the head and the lower abdomen (trans. Gallop, *Aristotle. On Sleep and Dreams*, p. 73).

Aristotle speaks of three areas in the body, and specifically of the one that lies ‘midway between the head and the abdomen’.

In the Arabic, this turns into the three ventricles in the head: highest, middle, lowest. What is interesting about this – apart from the fact that once again, the adaptor adjusts Aristotle’s text to his purposes – are two details. First, the ancient medical texts specify the ventricles as front, middle and rear. The adaptor, on the other hand, speaks of highest, middle, and lowest (which is quite absurd if you try to picture it). While this may have originated somehow in the Aristotelian text (where head, middle, and lower abdomen are mentioned), one also has to keep in mind that the adaptor thinks in terms of a top-down hierarchy when it comes to the faculties. Second, the text speaks of *three* ventricles – and as we have just seen, this will have been triggered by the Aristotelian text. However, it is interesting to know that most medical texts actually speak of four ventricles – two in the front, one in the middle, one at the rear. There are, though, some earlier sources that also speak of three ventricles, so it may not have been an original idea of the adaptor’s to reduce the number to three.⁸

I hope that I have been able to show how skilled and creative our adaptor was in using Aristotle’s text to support his own preferred theory, without really committing himself to Aristotle’s ideas. Those of you who know about later developments in Arabic philosophy can probably fathom how important his inventiveness should prove, for example with regard to Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the internal senses. But even apart from the impact his text was to have, to see how the adaptor was working is intriguing in its own right.

We can see in detail what he was doing, and in specific instances we can also have a good guess at his motivation: obviously he was interested in a theory of divinatory dreams that Aristotle was not exactly forthcoming with; hence the adaptor did his best to supply the text with such a theory himself. But

⁸ Cf. e.g. G. Strohmaier, “Avicennas Lehre von den ‘Inneren Sinnen’ und ihre Voraussetzungen bei Galen”, in Id., *Von Demokrit bis Dante: die Bewahrung antiken Erbes in der arabischen Kultur*, Olms, Hildesheim - New York 1996, pp. 330-41 (pp. 337-8).

there is a further interesting, if rather speculative question: What did the adaptor himself think he was doing? Are we looking at a ‘master plan’ to wilfully distort and ‘falsify’ an Aristotelian text, and promote a certain theory under the name of Aristotle’s? Or, at the other extreme, was the adaptor dealing with a very fragmentary and flawed translation, and was simply – and perhaps naively – trying to produce a text that made sense to him, in the honest assumption that the theory he was putting forward was what Aristotle himself would have agreed with, too? Presumably the truth will lie somewhere in the middle.

The adaptor shows a rather bold hand, lots of creativity and strong determination when it comes to promoting his favourite theory. However, before we level the charge of ‘wilful distortion’ against him, we should remember that we do not know the actual state of the Graeco-Arabic translation that he worked with. There are some indications that the translator was somewhat out of his depth with regard to this text. And a garbled translation will invite an adaptor to try to make sense of it as best as he can – and likely enough he will understand it according to his own convictions. Much of what we see as distortion may have appeared, to the adaptor, as ‘making sense’ of a problematic and perhaps fragmentary text.

One should further consider that we do not know exactly what sort of text the adaptor intended to produce, whether he actually wanted it to circulate under Aristotle’s name, and whether the text we have today is a properly finished work in the first place. The textual transmission does not allow us to pass judgment on any of these matters.

Nevertheless, all these deliberations cannot ‘absolve’ the adaptor entirely, exactly because we have seen evidence of how he set to work in re-shaping the text. At least in part this was done very consciously; he must have felt entitled to ‘play around’ with his source text at least to certain extent. In a certain sense the subsequent success of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-mahsūs* (and its theory of divinatory dreams) has vindicated him.

All the same it would be interesting indeed to have more primary source material at hand that would help us to get closer to what really happened. For the moment, we are left with the text of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-mahsūs* as it is preserved in the Rampur manuscript, and all we can do is trying to analyse it as it is.

Recepción de la Ética Nicomaquea en el mundo árabe: la teoría de la virtud en la filosofía islámica

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Abstract

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1. La reflexión ética en el Islam

El Corán, libro que contiene los principios doctrinales de la religión islámica, se propone también como una guía de la conducta de los creyentes que abarca todos los aspectos de la vida humana. Aunque su contenido dogmático es muy limitado, ha funcionado como un código normativo ético que trata de establecer cómo vivir en virtud de un Dios único:

¡Adorad a Dios y no le asociéis nada! ¡Portaos bien con los dos padres, con los parientes, los huérfanos, los pobres; con el cliente por parentesco; con el cliente por vecindad, el compañero circunstancial; con el viajero y con los esclavos que posean vuestras diestras! Dios no ama a quien es soberbio, vanidoso; a quienes son avaros y recomiendan a los hombres la avaricia y ocultan el favor que Dios les ha concedido.¹

Contiene numerosos pasajes que formulan una regulación de la vida moral del creyente, pero propiamente no es un libro de ética con teorías morales.²

Pero la Ley expresada en este Libro se desarrolló como un sistema de obligaciones morales, en el que se establecía cómo deben ser las relaciones del hombre con Dios, con los demás hombres y consigo mismo.³

* Las recientes publicaciones de Manfred Ullmann, *Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung* (Teil I. Wortschatz. Teil 2. Überlieferung, Textkritik, Grammatik), Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2011-2012 y de Ernst A. Schmidt - Manfred Ullmann, *Aristoteles in Fes. Zum Wert der arabischen Überlieferung der Nikomachischen Ethik für die Kritik der griechischen Textes*, Universitätsverlag Winter, Heidelberg 2012 (Philosophisch- historische Klasse der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 49) han añadido elementos importantes para el conocimiento de la transmisión de la *Ética Nicomaquea* al mundo árabe. M. Ullmann ha demostrado, con argumentos convincentes, que Ḥunayn solamente tradujo los libros I-IV de la *Ética Nicomaquea*, mientras que los libros V-X fueron vertidos por Uṣṭāṭ, el traductor de la *Metafísica* para al-Kindī. Cfr. más adelante las notas 17 y 18.

¹ Corán 4, 40.36-41.37, versión de J. Vernet, *El Corán*, Ed. Planeta, Barcelona 1973³ (Clásicos Planeta, 5).

² Cf. T. Isutzu, *The Structure of the Ethical Terms in the Koran. A Study in Semantics*, Keio Institute of Philological Studies, Tokyo 1959 (Studies in the Humanities and Social Relations, 2).

³ Sobre las implicaciones entre ley y ética en el Islam, cf. F. Rahman, “Law and Ethics in Islam”, in R.G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Ethics in Islam: Ninth Giorgio Levi della Vida Biennial Conference (May 6-8, 1983)*, Undena, Malibu 1985, pp. 3-15.

El texto coránico prescribe que Dios manda y el hombre obedece, por lo que éste tiene que “someterse”⁴ a Él:

Quienes no juzguen según lo que Dios ha revelado, éstos son los infieles.⁵

La moralidad quedaba expresada así en términos de dictados y acciones divinas. La razón se debía atener al mandato divino y al reconocimiento de lo que Dios ha calificado desde toda la eternidad, por lo que la moral no se podía basar en una razón autónoma sino en los imperativos de la Ley.⁶ Por ello, el sentimiento moral se exteriorizó en una amplia gama de expresiones que no se redujeron exclusivamente al ámbito de la ética filosófica, sino que abarcó otros campos, como el de la educación y la literatura (*adab*), que reflejó una moral profana, y el religioso, y se manifestó en obras literarias, en textos de carácter gnómico y en escritos de tipo místico y religioso.

A las primeras reflexiones éticas de juristas y teólogos y a las expresadas en estos diversos ámbitos, se añadieron otras tradiciones distintas a la islámica. Por un lado, la literatura de origen persa en la que se formulaban principios ético-religiosos, plasmados en fábulas, aforismos, poesías, antologías y otros escritos. Por otro lado, la procedente del mundo griego que aportó una ética de tipo popular, entendida como medicina del alma, y una ética filosófica que propició el nacimiento de un pensamiento moral más centrado en el hombre que en Dios o en la propia Ley, en el que se valoró en su justa medida la razón humana.

Se desarrollaron así cuatro tipos de pensamiento ético según G. Hourani: la ética normativa religiosa, a partir de las fuentes primarias del Islam; la ética normativa secular, representada por los “Espejos de Príncipes” de la tradición persa; el análisis de los principios éticos en la tradición religiosa, iniciado en las discusiones de los juristas sobre las fuentes de la ley divina; y, finalmente, las teorías éticas elaboradas a partir de la tradición filosófica griega recibida en el Islam.⁷

2. La recepción de la Ética Nicomaquea en el mundo árabe

Estas teorías reflejan el pensamiento platónico y aristotélico, mezclado con elementos estoicos,⁸ si bien la influencia de estos filósofos fue confusa, identificados a veces con otros autores: en las fuentes se habla de las “gentes del Pórtico”, pero se desconocía quiénes eran.⁹ Con pocas excepciones, estas teorías presentan una vinculación entre ética y política, al considerar que son dos aspectos de una misma realidad, la que atañe al hombre en sus dimensiones individual y social. Ambas son inseparables en una sociedad, la islámica, que tuvo su inicio en la natural conexión entre religión y comunidad, pues Muḥammad fue el encargado por Dios de instituir “la mejor comunidad que se ha hecho surgir para los hombres”.¹⁰ Esta unión de ética y política fue vista por Averroes de la siguiente manera:

⁴ Es lo que significa la raíz árabe a la que pertenece el mismo término de Islām, “sometimiento”.

⁵ Corán 5, 44.

⁶ Cf. M. Arkoun, *Pour une critique de la raison islamique*, Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris 1984 (Islam d’hier et d’aujourd’hui, 24), p. 35.

⁷ Cf. G. F. Hourani, “Ethics in Medieval Islam: A Conspectus”, in G.F. Hourani (ed.), *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science*, State University of New York Press, Albany 1975 (Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science), pp. 128-35.

⁸ Cf. F. Jadaane, *L’influence du stoïcisme sur la pensée musulmane*, Dār el-Machreq, Beirut 1968, pp. 177-237. Cf. M. Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam*, Brill, Leiden 1991 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 8), 1994², pp. 61-6.

⁹ Cf. Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam*, p. 5.

¹⁰ Corán 3,110.

Este saber ético ha sido dividido en dos partes; en la primera, las costumbres y hábitos son tratados de un modo general, estableciéndose así la mutua correlación de las conductas. En la segunda parte, se conoce el modo como se organizan las costumbres en los grupos sociales de tal manera que unas conductas se interrelacionan con otras.¹¹

Por otra parte, las reflexiones éticas en la filosofía islámica responden a las dos tradiciones distintas antes indicadas, una más popular, que entiende la ética como medicina o terapia del alma, como preparación necesaria para iniciarse en el estudio de la filosofía,¹² a la que pertenecen obras de al-Kindī o de al-Rāzī; y otra más científica, basada en el conocimiento de los textos filosóficos griegos, que llega a considerar la ética como un saber demostrativo.¹³

Se conocieron diálogos de Platón y se supo pronto que Sócrates había sido el iniciador de la corriente ético-política de la filosofía griega, como reflejan varios biógrafos:

Los primeros filósofos griegos se aplicaron al estudio de la filosofía natural, la que profesaban Pitágoras, Tales de Mileto y todos los sabeos griegos y egipcios. A continuación, sus sucesores, Sócrates, Platón, Aristóteles y sus discípulos prefirieron la filosofía moral. Aristóteles lo señala en su *Historia de los Animales*, cuando dice: “Desde hace un siglo, es decir, desde la época de Sócrates, se ha desdeñado la filosofía natural por la filosofía moral”.¹⁴

Aunque parece que tuvieron conocimiento de las diversas obras éticas de Aristóteles,¹⁵ sin embargo fue la *Ética Nicomaquea* la que modeló definitivamente el pensamiento ético en la filosofía islámica, especialmente el de al-Fārābī, Avempace¹⁶ y Averroes, por citar los nombres más conocidos. En ella se les ofrecía un modelo de vida ideal, diferente al presentado en el Corán, así como indicaciones apropiadas para alcanzar esa vida en la sociedad humana. La historia de la obra aristotélica en el mundo árabe presenta muchas dificultades acerca de su traducción y transmisión en las noticias bibliográficas e historiográficas.¹⁷ Una información bastante completa sobre el conocimiento de la

¹¹ *Averroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic*, ed. with an introduction, translation and notes by E.I.J. Rosenthal, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 1956 (Oriental Publications), p. 21; R. Lerner, *Averroes. On Plato's Republic*, translated, with an introduction and notes, Cornell U. P., Ithaca 1974 (Agora Paperback Editions), p. 4; M. Cruz Hernández, *Averroes. Exposición de la República de Platón*, traducción y estudio preliminar, Ed. Tecnos, Madrid 1986 (Clásicos del pensamiento, 14), p. 4. De esta obra de Averroes sólo se conservan una versión hebrea y dos latinas.

¹² Cf. D. Gutas, “The Starting Point of Philosophical Studies in Alexandrian and Arabic Aristotelianism”, en W.W. Fortenbaugh - P.M. Huby - A.A. Long (eds), *Theophrastus of Eresus: on his Life and Work*, Rutgers U. P., New Brunswick - Oxford 1985 (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 2), pp. 115-23.

¹³ Cf. Th.-A. Druart, “La philosophie morale arabe et l'antiquité tardive”, *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* 48 (1996), pp. 183-7.

¹⁴ Šā'id al-Andalusī, *Kitāb ṭabaqāt al-umam*, ed. H. Nasīb al-Īd Bū-'Alwān, Dār al-Ṭalī'a, Beirut 1985, pp. 94-5; Šā'id al-Andalusī, *Libro de las categorías de las naciones*, trad. F. Maíllo, Ed. Akal, Madrid 1999 (Akal Universitaria, Serie Historia medieval), p. 76.

¹⁵ Es lo que parece deducirse de la información proporcionada por varios biobibliógrafos y algunos filósofos, quienes además de citar la *Ética Nicomaquea* hablan de otros libros de ética, como la *Ética a Eudemo*, los dos *Libros Grandes de Ética* y la *Pequeña Nicomaquea*. Cf. edición árabe: Aristotelis *Ethica Nicomachea* (*Kitāb al-ablāq*), ed. 'A.Badawī, Wakālat al-Maṭbū'āt, Kuwait 1979; introducción, pp. 12-17.

¹⁶ Cf. J. Lomba Fuentes, “Lectura de la ética griega por el pensamiento de Ibn Bāḡḡa”, *Al-Qanṭara* 14 (1993), pp. 3-46.

¹⁷ Cf. A.J. Arberry, “The Nicomachean Ethics in Arabic”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 17 (1955), pp. 1-9; D.M. Dunlop, “The Nicomachean Ethics in Arabic. Books I-VI”, *Oriens* 15 (1962), pp. 18-34; F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus. The Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*, Leiden, Brill 1968 (Monographs on Mediterranean Antiquity), pp. 52-3; E. A. Schmidt - M. Ullmann, *Aristoteles in Fes. Zum Wert der arabischen*

ética de Aristóteles en el mundo árabe se halla en la amplia Introducción que Douglas M. Dunlop dejó escrita para su edición de la *Ética Nicomaquea* que no pudo publicar y que ha sido editada hace poco, y en el definitivo estudio por Manfred Ullmann.¹⁸

Los biobibliógrafos que informan sobre la vida y las obras de Aristóteles en el mundo árabe hablan de manera confusa sobre este texto. En el *Fibrist (Catálogo)* del librero Ibn al-Nadīm, compuesto durante la segunda mitad del siglo X, se puede leer lo siguiente:

Entre los libros de Aristóteles, copiados del puño y letra de Yahyā b. ‘Adī en el catálogo de sus libros, está el *Libro de la Ética*; lo comentó Porfirio; doce libros; lo tradujo Ishāq b. Ḥunayn; Abū Zakariyyā tuvo, del puño y letra de Ishāq, un cierto número de libros con el comentario de Temistio; ha aparecido en siríaco.¹⁹

La noticia es reproducida luego por Ibn al-Qiftī, pero modificando el nombre del traductor al decir: “lo tradujo Ḥunayn b. Ishāq”.²⁰ No están claras en esta noticia muchos datos sobre la obra, sobre el comentario de Temistio, sobre el traductor, sobre la propia traducción del texto o del comentario, sobre lo que existió en siríaco, etc. La ambigüedad de la noticia, como se percibe en el texto transcrito, es muy grande.

La existencia actual del texto árabe de la *Ética Nicomaquea* fue puesta de manifiesto por vez primera por Arthur John Arberry,²¹ quien había encontrado en la mezquita Qarawiyyīn de Fez un manuscrito conteniendo el texto de los libros VII-X. Posteriormente, Dunlop halló los libros I-VI en otro manuscrito y lo dio a conocer en un artículo,²² al que poco después siguió otro trabajo²³ en el que señalaba la existencia de un libro añadido entre el VI y el VII, dando en conjunto los once libros de que consta hoy la versión árabe editada por ‘A. Badawī. Además, el manuscrito de Fez contiene un pequeño tratado de ética que Malcolm C. Lyons²⁴ atribuye a Nicolás de Laodicea; mezclado con él se encuentra una especie de paráfrasis o resumen de la propia *Ética Nicomaquea*.

Überlieferung der Nikomachischen Ethik für die Kritik der griechischen Textes, Universitätsverlag Winter, Heidelberg 2012 (Philosophisch-historische Klasse der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 49).

¹⁸ *The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. by A. Akasoy - A. Fidora with an introduction and annotated translation by D.M. Dunlop, Leiden, Brill 2005 (Aristoteles Semitico-latinus, 17); M. Ullmann, *Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung (Teil I. Wortschatz. Teil 2. Überlieferung, Textkritik, Grammatik)*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2011-2012.

¹⁹ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fibrist*, ed. G. Flügel, Vogel, Leipzig 1872, p. 252.1-4; trad. inglesa por B. Dodge, *The Fihrist of al-Nadīm. A Tenth-century Survey of Muslim Culture*, Columbia U. P., New York 1970 (Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, 83), vol. II, p. 606.

²⁰ Ibn al-Qiftī, *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā*, ed. A. Müller - J. Lippert, Dieterich, Leipzig, 1903, p. 42.8-10. Aquí, antes de “doce libros”, añade la expresión *wa-huwa*, que matiza el texto de Ibn al-Nadīm: “y son doce libros”. Arberry, sostiene que el *wa-huwa* se refiere al comentario de Porfirio, que estaría compuesto así de doce libros. Cf. también R. Walzer, “Some aspects of Miskawayh’s *Tadhīb al-Akhlāq*”, en Id., *Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy*, B. Cassirer, Oxford 1962, p. 225. Otros autores, sin embargo, sostienen que los doce libros podría referirse a una división árabe de la *Ética Nicomaquea*. De hecho, la traducción que se ha conservado consta de once libros. Cf. Ullmann, *Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung. Teil 2*, pp. 15-56.

²¹ A.J. Arberry, “An Arabic Treatise on Politics”, *Islamic Quarterly* 2 (1955), pp. 18-19.

²² Dunlop, “The *Nicomachean Ethics* in Arabic. Books I-VI”.

²³ D.M. Dunlop, “Observations on the Medieval Arabic Version of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*”, en *Oriente e Occidente nel Medioevo. Filosofia e Scienze*, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 1971 (Fondazione Alessandro Volta. Atti dei convegni, 13), pp. 229-50.

²⁴ M.C. Lyons, “A Greek Ethical Treatise”, *Oriens* 13-14 (1961), pp. 35-57.

Badawī aduce en la introducción de su edición testimonios sobre la traducción, que atribuye a Ishāq b. Ḥunayn. Pero como parece que existió otra versión, realizada por Abū l-Ḥayr al-Ḥasan b. Suwār b. al-Ḥammār (942-1017), hecha del siríaco al árabe,²⁵ entonces ¿cuál de las dos versiones es la editada por Badawī?

Sahbān Ḥalifāt, en la introducción a su edición del *Kitāb al-tanbīh ‘alā sabīl al-sā‘āda* de al-Fārābī,²⁶ indica que el texto de la *Ética* que edita Badawī debe ser posterior a la traducción de Ishāq y funda su afirmación en un pasaje de la introducción del propio Badawī, en el que éste da cuenta²⁷ de que el filósofo Abū l-Ḥasan al-‘Āmirī (m. en 992)²⁸ hace amplio uso de la obra aristotélica en su *Kitāb al-sā‘āda wa-l-is‘ād fi l-sīra al-insāniyya* (*Sobre la felicidad y el hacer feliz en la vida humana*).²⁹ Badawī señala que el texto de *Ética Nicomaquea* IV 3, 1123 b 1, es distinto en la traducción copiada por al-‘Āmirī y en la que él edita y se pregunta si es que éste reprodujo libremente el texto aristotélico. Ḥalifāt observa que la traducción reproducida por al-‘Āmirī se ajusta más a la literalidad del texto griego que en la supuesta versión de Ishāq. El texto copiado por al-‘Āmirī dice así:

Afirma Aristóteles en *Nicomachea*, en el capítulo sobre la magnanimidad, que no hay diferencia alguna entre que alguien examine la disposición y que examine a quien tiene la disposición.³⁰

En cambio, en la versión editada por Badawī se puede leer lo siguiente:

No hay diferencia entre que nosotros consideremos la grandeza del alma o que el alma es grande.³¹

Independientemente de quién sea el autor de la traducción árabe hoy conocida, interesa destacar la amplia difusión e influencia que la obra aristotélica tuvo en el mundo árabe. Al-Fārābī la comentó. Fue ampliamente utilizada por al-‘Āmirī, quien también se sirvió de los comentarios de Porfirio y de Temistio,³² lo que confirma la veracidad de la narración de Ibn al-Nadīm. El cristiano discípulo de al-Fārābī y conocido bibliófilo, Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī (m. 974), compuso un *Kitāb tabdīb al-ahlāq* (*Libro de la reforma de las costumbres*)³³ en el que hay una clara influencia de la obra de Aristóteles. El autor persa Miskawayh (m. 1030), contemporáneo de Avicena, se inspiró en el texto del filósofo griego

²⁵ Ibn al-Qifī, *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā*, p. 164 Müller - Lippert. Sobre este traductor cf. J.L. Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam. The Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age*, Brill, Leiden 1986 (Studies in Islamic Culture and History, 7), pp. 123-30.

²⁶ Al-Fārābī, *Risālat al-tanbīh ‘alā sabīl al-sā‘āda*, ed. S. Ḥalifāt, al-Ġāmi‘a al-Urdunniyya, Amman 1987, pp. 77-80 de la introducción árabe.

²⁷ Arist., *Kitāb al-ahlāq*, introducción, p. 26 Badawī.

²⁸ Sobre este autor, cf. Kraemer, *Humanism*, pp. 233-41. E.K. Rowson, *A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and its Fate: al-‘Āmirī’s Kitāb al-Amad ‘alā l-abad*, American Oriental Society, New Haven 1988 (American Oriental Series, 70).

²⁹ Abū-l-Ḥasan Muḥammad ibn-Yūsuf al-‘Āmirī, *As-sā‘āda wa-l-is‘ād* (*On Seeking and Causing Happiness*), ed. facsimil del texto por M. Mīnūwī, Steiner, Wiesbaden 1957-1958. Cf. Ullmann, *Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung. Teil 2*, pp. 57-63.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 200.18-201.3; cf. Ullmann, *Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung. Teil 2*, p. 59.

³¹ Arist., *Kitāb al-ahlāq*, p. 153.12-13 Badawī.

³² Cf. A.A. Ghorab, “The Greek Commentators on Aristotle quoted in al-‘Āmirī’s *As-sā‘āda wa-l-is‘ād*”, en S.M. Stern - A. Hourani - V. Brown (ed.), *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays presented by his Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on his Seventieth Birthday*, Cassirer, Oxford 1972 (Oriental Studies, 5), pp. 77-88.

³³ M.-Th. Urvoy, *Traité d’éthique d’Abū Zakariyyā Yahyā ibn ‘Adī*, introd., texte et trad., Cariscript, Paris 1991.

para componer su *Tabdīb al-ablāq* (*La reforma de las costumbres*),³⁴ donde propone un concepto filosófico de vida feliz para el hombre. También hay presencia de ella en Avempace, tanto en el *Tadbīr al-mutawahhid* (*El régimen del solitario*),³⁵ como en la *Risālat al-wadā'* (*Carta de la despedida*).³⁶ En fin, Averroes terminó de componer el día 27 de mayo del año 1177 un *talhīs*, esto es, una exposición o paráfrasis, de la que se conservan las versiones latina, realizada por Hermann el Alemán en 1240, y la hebrea, debida a Samuel de Marsella, hecha en 1322, mientras que el texto árabe sólo es conocido por unos escasos fragmentos.³⁷

La obra aristotélica, pues, fue leída y comentada en el mundo islámico. Como ejemplo de ello, me voy a centrar en su recepción por al-Fārābī.

3. *Al-Fārābī y la Ética Nicomaquea*

Autor de comentarios a textos aristotélicos, escribió notables e influyentes obras originales, la mayoría de ellas consagradas al estudio de las condiciones sociales e individuales en que el hombre puede alcanzar la felicidad.³⁸ Compuso un comentario a la *Ética Nicomaquea*, hoy perdido, del que se tiene noticia por referencias de Avempace, Ibn Ṭufayl, Averroes, Maimónides y Tomás de Aquino, y por ser mencionado en las listas de sus obras.³⁹

Avempace afirma en su tratado *Fī l-sā'āda al-madaniyya wa-l-sā'āda al-uhrawiyya aw difā'an an Abū Naṣr* (*Sobre la felicidad política y la felicidad de la otra vida, o defensa de Abū Naṣr*) lo siguiente:

Respecto de las palabras que se suponen de Abū Naṣr (al-Fārābī) en su comentario al libro de la *Ética* de que no hay pervivencia después de la muerte o separación (del alma), de que no hay más felicidad que la felicidad política ni más existencia que la existencia sensible, y que lo que se dice sobre que hay otra existencia distinta de la sensible son cuentos de viejas, todo esto es infundado y acerca de lo cual Abū Naṣr ha sido acusado falsamente.⁴⁰

³⁴ Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Miskawayh, *Traité d'éthique (Tabdīb al-ablāq wa-tadbīr al-ā'rāq)*, trad. française avec introd. et notes par M. Arkoun, Institut Français de Damas, Damas 1969, nueva ed., Vrin, Paris 2010 (Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques).

³⁵ *El régimen del solitario por Avempace*, ed. y trad. de M. Asín Palacios, CSIC - Escuelas de Estudios Árabes, Madrid-Granada 1946; nueva trad. por J. Lomba Fuentes, Ed. Trotta, Madrid 1997.

³⁶ M. Asín Palacios, "La Carta de adiós de Avempace", *Al-Andalus* 8 (1943), pp. 1-87; nueva trad. Avempace, *Carta del adiós [Risālat al-wadā'] y otros tratados filosóficos*, trad. de J. Lomba Fuentes, Ed. Trotta, Madrid 2006.

³⁷ Cf. L.V. Berman, "Excerpts from the lost Arabic original of Ibn Rushd's *Middle Commentary* on the *Nicomachean Ethics*", *Oriens* 20 (1967), pp. 31-59, Id., "Ibn Rushd's *Middle Commentary* on the *Nicomachean Ethics* in Medieval Hebrew Literature", en J. Jolivet (ed.), *Multiple Averroës*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1978, pp. 287-321.

³⁸ Sobre su vida cf. R. Ramón Guerrero, *Filosofías árabe y judía*, Ed. Síntesis, Madrid 2001 (Síntesis filosofía. Thémata, 16), pp. 108-11; M. Mahdi, *La cité vertueuse d'Alfarabi. La fondation de la philosophie politique en Islam*, A. Michel, Paris 2000, pp. 9-10; trad. esp. por R. Ramón Guerrero, *Alfarabi y la fundación de la filosofía política islámica*, Herder, Barcelona 2003.

³⁹ Cf. Ibn al-Qiftī, *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā'*, p. 279 Müller - Lippert. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā' fī tabaqāt al-aṭibbā', ed. N. Riḍā, Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayā, Beirut 1965, p. 608.

⁴⁰ Texto editado en Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Bāgġa, *Rasā'il falsafiyya: nuṣūs falsafiyya ġayr mansūra*, ed. Ğ.D. al-'Alawī, Dār al-Taqāfa - Dār al-naṣr al-maġribiyya, Beirut - Casablanca 1983, p. 197. Sobre el sentido de este pasaje atribuido a al-Fārābī, cf. Lomba en su traducción anotada de este tratado: J. Lomba Fuentes, "Sobre la felicidad política y la felicidad de la otra vida o defensa de Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī] de Avempace", *Revista del Instituto Egipcio* 27 (1995), pp. 23-39; nueva ed. en Avempace, *Carta del adiós y otros tratados filosóficos*, pp. 117-30 Lomba Fuentes.

Ibn Ṭufayl se hace eco de esta acusación en su *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaqzān*, donde se lee:

Finalmente, en su comentario al *Kitāb al-ablāq* describe algo de lo que se refiere a la felicidad humana y allí dice que sólo se la halla en esta vida y en este mundo; a continuación añade una frase cuyo sentido es: “Y todo lo que se diga, fuera de esto, son chocheos y cuentos de viejas”.⁴¹

Averroes cita varias veces el comentario, especialmente en su *Tafsīr (Gran comentario)* al *De Anima*, afirmando que al-Fārābī había sostenido allí que la única felicidad posible es la perfección especulativa,⁴² frente al texto de Avempace, en donde se decía que es la felicidad política. Esta aparente contradicción entre las lecturas de Avempace y de Averroes no debe sorprender en un autor como al-Fārābī, quien sostiene en una misma obra, el *Tahṣīl al-sāʿāda (La obtención de la felicidad)* la superioridad de la felicidad intelectual individual y la importancia de la filosofía política.

Maimónides menciona en su *Guía de perplejos* el comentario alfarabiano, cuando, al debatir la providencia divina, dice:

También los filósofos han tratado este asunto; así, Abū Naṣr, en la introducción a su comentario sobre la *Ética Nicomaquea* de Aristóteles, se expresa en estos términos: “Aquellos que poseen la facultad de encumbrar su alma de virtud en virtud son, al decir de Platón, los que la divina Providencia protege más”.⁴³

Tomás de Aquino también cita el libro de la *Ética* de al-Fārābī por negar que el intelecto humano pueda llegar a las sustancias separadas, en un pasaje de su *Comentario al Libro de las Sentencias*, inspirado seguramente no por el conocimiento del texto farabiano sino por su lectura del texto antes citado de Averroes:

Ciertos filósofos establecieron que nuestro intelecto posible nunca puede llegar a las sustancias separadas, como dice Alfarabi al final de su *Ética*, aunque haya dicho lo contrario en su libro *De Intellectu*, como refiere Averroes en el tercer libro de su *Comentario al De Anima* de Aristóteles.⁴⁴

Dado por perdido,⁴⁵ parece que la introducción de este comentario se ha conservado en versión hebrea en el mismo manuscrito que contiene la revisión más completa del *Talḥīs* a la *Ética*

⁴¹ Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, ed. A. Nādir, Dār el-Machreq, Beirut 1968, p. 21; trad. esp. por A. González Palencia, Ibn Ṭufayl, *El filósofo autodidacto*, edición de E. Torner, Ed. Trotta, Madrid 1995, p. 38.

⁴² Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros*, ed. F.S. Crawford, The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge Mass. 1953 (Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem versionum Latinarum / Averroes Cordubensis, 6,1), p. 433.155-159: “In libro enim de Nicomachia <Alfarabius> videtur negare continuationem esse cum intelligentiis abstractis, et dicit hoc esse opinionem Alexandri, et quod non est opinandum quod finis humanus sit aliud quam perfectio speculativa”.

⁴³ *Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn*, ed. H. Atay, Maṭbaʿat Ğāmiʿat Anqarah, Ankara 1974 (Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi yayınlarından, 93), p. 534; trad. esp. por D. Gonzalo Maeso, Maimónides, *Guía de perplejos*, III, 18, Ed. Trotta, Madrid 1983 (Al-Andalus. Trotta, 3), p. 429.

⁴⁴ *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1: “Quidam enim philosophi posuerunt quod intellectus noster possibilis nunquam potest ad hoc pervenire ut intelligat substantias separatas, sicut Alfarabius in fine suae Ethicae: quamvis contrarium dixerit in libro De intellectu, ut Commentator refert in tertio De anima”.

⁴⁵ En la introducción a la edición del *Tanbīh* ya citada, S. Ḥalifāt, señala la existencia de dos manuscritos de este comentario, que no han podido ser estudiados hasta ahora, el n° 45 (217) 35 de la Biblioteca del Ministerio de Publicaciones e Instrucción de Kabul, en Afganistán, y el que figura en la colección n° 176 de la Biblioteca al-Āṣafīyya de Haydarabad, en la India.

Nicomachea de Averroes, según ha establecido Lawrence V. Berman⁴⁶ al compararla con unos fragmentos conservados en latín.⁴⁷ En esa introducción, al-Fārābī habla del título de la obra, de su autor, del arte al que se refiere el libro, de su intención, de su lugar entre otros libros, del método de estudio que se aplica en él y de su utilidad; después, describe brevemente el contenido de cada uno de los diez libros de que consta la obra aristotélica, lo que permite suponer que la conoció completa, aunque sólo comentase los primeros libros.⁴⁸

Además de este comentario, al-Fārābī hace mención de la obra en otros textos suyos. En la *Epístola sobre los diversos sentidos del término “intelecto”*, traducida al latín durante el siglo XII, habla de los diversos sentidos que tiene aquel término, siendo uno de ellos el mencionado por Aristóteles en la *Ética Nicomachea*:

En cuanto al intelecto que menciona en el libro sexto de la *Ética*, quiere aludir con él a la parte del alma que adquiere, por perseverar en el hábito de alguna de las cosas que están en algún género y por la larga experiencia en algunas cosas que están en algún género y durante un largo tiempo, la certeza en los juicios y en las premisas referentes a las cosas propias de la voluntad, cuya condición es ser elegidas o ser evitadas. En el libro sexto de la *Ética*, [Aristóteles] llama intelecto a esta parte del alma.⁴⁹

Se muestra familiarizado con la doctrina aristotélica de que la ética no puede ser una ciencia demostrativa, precisamente porque los primeros principios de la conducta práctica del hombre se alcanzan con la experiencia, creciendo el intelecto práctico con la edad y alcanzando diferentes grados de desarrollo en las gentes. Las premisas éticas son opiniones generalmente admitidas, pero no principios universales, verdaderos y necesarios. Al-Fārābī no hace más que exponer la concepción de Aristóteles, no la suya propia, porque en otras obras sí admite la ética como ciencia demostrativa basada en principios prácticos universales dados por el intelecto agente.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Cf. L.V. Berman, “Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* in Medieval Hebrew Literature”, en Jolivet (ed.), *Multiple Averroës*, pp. 287-321; sobre la introducción de al-Fārābī, cf. pp. 298-99, editada y traducida al inglés en las pp. 303-11.

⁴⁷ Cf. D. Salman, “The Medieval Latin Translations of Alfarabi’s Works”, *The New Scholasticism* 13 (1939), pp. 246-51.

⁴⁸ No está claro si al-Fārābī comentó los diez libros del texto aristotélico o sólo una parte: Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 263.11 Flügel lo cita así: “Comentario a una parte (*qiṭ’a*) del *Libro de la Ética* de Aristóteles”. Ibn Abī Uṣaybī’a, *Uyūn al-anbā fi ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā*, p. 608.16-17 Riḍa lo hace así: “Comentario al inicio (*ṣadr*) del *Libro de la Ética* de Aristóteles”. Sobre esta cuestión, cf. Badawī, introducción a su edición del *Kitāb al-ablāq* de Aristóteles, pp. 22-3. Cf. también al-Fārābī, *Risālat al-tanbīh*, pp. 70-3 (introducción de S. Ḥalifāt).

⁴⁹ Al-Fārābī, *Risāla fi l’-aql*, ed. M. Bouyges, Imprimerie Catholique, Beirut 1938 (Bibliotheca arabica scholasticorum. Série arabe), p. 9. *Editio princeps*, F. Dieterici: *Al-Fārābī’s philosophische Abhandlungen aus Londoner, Leidener und Berliner Handschriften*, Brill, Leiden 1890 (repr. Osnabrück 1982), pp. 39-48; trad. alem. de F. Dieterici, *Al-Fārābī’s philosophische Abhandlungen aus dem arabischen übersetzt*, Brill, Leiden 1892 (repr. Osnabrück 1982), pp. 61-81; trad. it. de F. Lucchetta, *Farabi. Epistola sull’intelletto*, Antenore, Padua 1974; trad. es. de R. Ramón Guerrero, “Al-Fārābī: *Epístola sobre los sentidos del término intelecto*. Traducción”, *Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval* 9 (2002), pp. 215-23. Sobre la traducción latina, cf. M. Steinschneider, *Al-Fārābī. Des arabischen Philosophen Leben und Schriften...*, Commissionnaires de l’Académie impériale des Sciences, St.-Petersburg 1869, p. 91. Edición del texto latino: *Alpharabii vetustissimi Aristotelis interpretis opera omnia quae latina lingua conscripta reperiri potuerunt, studio et opera Guilelmi Camerariis*, Apud Dionysium Moreau, Paris 1638; E. Gilson: “Les sources gréco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant”, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 4 (1929), pp. 5-149, texto latino en pp. 124-41.

⁵⁰ Cf. A.-Th. Druart, “Al-Fārābī, Ethics, and First Intelligibles”, *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 8 (1997), pp. 403-23, p. 405. Cf. R. Ramón Guerrero, “Razón práctica e intelecto agente en Alfarabi”, *Tópicos* 18 (2000), pp. 73-95.

En su *Kitāb al-ġam' bayna ra'yay al-ḥakīmayn Aflātūn al-ilābī wa-Aristūṭālīs* (*Armonía entre los sabios Platón el divino y Aristóteles*) dice:

Respecto del asunto de las costumbres morales (*ablāq*) del alma, hay quienes creen que la opinión de Aristóteles es diferente de la opinión de Platón, porque Aristóteles dice en su Libro *Nicomaquea* (*Niqūmahīyyā*) que todas las costumbres morales son hábitos que cambian, que ninguna de ellas se da por naturaleza y que el hombre puede pasar de una a otra por habituación y por práctica.⁵¹

Más adelante vuelve a citar la obra aristotélica y hace mención de su propio comentario:

Aristóteles, en su libro conocido por *Nicomaquea*, habla de las leyes políticas (*al-qawānīn al-madaniyya*), como hemos expuesto en varios pasajes de nuestro comentario a ese libro; por el contrario, si, como dijeron Porfirio y muchos otros comentaristas posteriores, su asunto fuera que Aristóteles habla de las costumbres morales, entonces su discurso versaría sobre las leyes éticas.⁵²

Se trata de una referencia muy importante, porque, como apunta Dunlop,⁵³ confirma la existencia del comentario de Porfirio y de otros, quizá el de Temistio, y porque afirma que su propio comentario difería del de éstos al entender que la *Ética Nicomaquea* es un tratado político y no sólo ético, lo que está en consonancia con su visión de la ética como parte de la política. Entendería la ética no sólo de manera individual, sino como una ética social, como una filosofía de la convivencia humana, según la doctrina que expone Aristóteles en varios pasajes de su obra y también en sus *Magna Moralia*.⁵⁴

Un problema que se plantea es la alusión que hace en la *Armonía* a una *Pequeña Nicomaquea*:

No ignora Aristóteles que algunos hombres pueden pasar de una costumbre moral a otra con más facilidad y otros con más dificultad, según lo que expone en su libro conocido por *Pequeña Nicomaquea*, donde enumera las causas de la dificultad de pasar de una costumbre moral a otra y las causas de su facilidad.⁵⁵

Cuál sea este libro, es tarea difícil de precisar. Se ha sugerido que podría ser el resumen de la *Ética* conocido con el título *Summa Alexandrinorum*, pero hay serias razones en contra de esta identificación.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Cf. *Al-Fārābī's philosophischen Abhandlungen*, p. 16 Dieterici; trad. es. de M. Alonso, "Al-Fārābī. *Concordia entre el divino Platón y el sabio Aristóteles*", *Pensamiento* 25 (1969), pp. 43-4; trad. franc. de D. Mallet, Al-Fārābī, *Deux traités philosophiques*. L'harmonie entre les opinions des deux sages, le divin Platon et Aristote. *De la religion*, Institut français de Damas, Damas 1989, p. 77; trad. it. de C. Martini Bonadeo, *L'armonia delle opinioni dei due sapienti, il divino Platone e Aristotele*, PLUS, Pisa 2008 (Greco, arabo, latino. Le vie del sapere, 3), p. 56.1-4. El pasaje citado podría corresponder a Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, I, 1, 1103 a 18-22.

⁵² *Al-Fārābī's philosophischen Abhandlungen*, p. 17.8-11 Dieterici; trad. Alonso, p. 44; trad. Mallet, p. 78; ed. y trad. Martini Bonadeo, p. 56.11-14.

⁵³ Dunlop, "Observations", p. 236.

⁵⁴ Aristoteles, *Magna Moralia*, ed. F. Dirlmeier, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1958 (Werke in deutscher Übersetzung / Aristoteles, Band 8, 5). Cf. I. Düring, *Aristoteles. Exposición e interpretación de su pensamiento*, trad. de B. Navarro, Universidad Nacional Autónoma, México 1990, pp. 672 y 678.

⁵⁵ *Al-Fārābī's philosophischen Abhandlungen*, p. 18.3-6 Dieterici; trad. Alonso, p. 45; trad. Mallet, p. 79; ed. y trad. Martini Bonadeo, p. 57.12-15.

⁵⁶ Cf. D.M. Dunlop, "The manuscript Taimur Pasha 290 Akhlaq and the *Summa Alexandrinorum*", *Arabica* 21 (1974), pp. 252-63. La crítica a esta interpretación la hace Badawī en la introducción a su edición del *Kitāb al-ablāq* de Aristóteles, pp. 24-5. Tras un estudio de las diversas variantes que se hallan en los biógrafos al hacer referencia a las obras éticas de Aristóteles, Ḥalifāt, en su introducción citada, Al-Fārābī, *Risālat al-tanbih*, pp. 72-6, propone que la *Ética* fue

Por ahora, en virtud de los escasos conocimientos sobre este asunto, parece un problema difícil de solucionar.

Sorprende, sin embargo, que en el libro en el que repasa los escritos de Aristóteles no mencione las obras de *Ética*. Se trata de *Falsafat Aristūtālīs* (*La filosofía de Aristóteles*),⁵⁷ escrito que parece estar inconcluso, como ya reconoció en el siglo XI el cadí Šā'id al-Andalusī (m. 1070):

[Al-Fārābī] tiene un *Libro sobre los objetivos de la filosofía de Platón y de Aristóteles*, que da testimonio en su autor de la excelencia en el arte de la filosofía y de su acreditación en las distintas clases de la sabiduría. Es de gran ayuda para aprender el camino de la teoría y para conocer los métodos de la investigación. En él examina los secretos de las ciencias y sus frutos, ciencia por ciencia, y muestra cómo progresar de una ciencia a otra gradualmente. Comienza por la filosofía de Platón;⁵⁸ da a conocer su objetivo en ella y menciona sus libros sobre ella. Luego sigue con la filosofía de Aristóteles;⁵⁹ comienza con una notable introducción en la que da a conocer la manera de progresar en su filosofía y, a continuación, describe sus objetivos en sus libros lógicos y físicos, libro por libro, hasta que el discurso llega, en el ejemplar que se nos ha conservado, hasta el comienzo de la metafísica y las conclusiones que ésta extrae de la física.⁶⁰

Hasta este mismo pasaje llega el texto editado por Muhsin Mahdi, lo que permite deducir o que el manuscrito truncado es el mismo o es copia del que usó Šā'id, o que al-Fārābī dejó inconclusa la obra, ocupándose sólo, como dice el Andalusī, de describir el objetivo de los libros lógicos y físicos, en contra de lo que anuncia el título completo: "La filosofía de Aristóteles; las partes de su filosofía y los grados de sus partes", que permitiría suponer que la obra versaría sobre todas las partes de la filosofía de Aristóteles, incluyendo la ética y la política.

4. La teoría de la virtud en la filosofía islámica

La huella dejada por la *Ética Nicomaquea* de Aristóteles en el mundo filosófico escrito en árabe ha quedado reflejada en una enseñanza que recorre las principales obras de ética filosófica árabe. Se trata de la doctrina de la virtud (*faḍīla*), que, a diferencia de otras doctrinas que fueron tomadas de los neoplatónicos, sigue fundamentalmente la exposición aristotélica y no la tabla de virtudes señalada por algunos neoplatónicos.⁶¹

dividida a lo largo de su historia en varias partes para facilitar su lectura o para multiplicar las obras de Aristóteles con vistas a mejorar el mercado de ellas, llegando a los árabes esas partes como libros éticos independientes. La *Ética Nicomaquea* estaría compuesta sólo por los cuatro primeros libros, que serían los comentados por al-Fārābī, y la *Pequeña Nicomaquea* sería una de estas partes, la constituida por los libros VI y unos fragmentos del VII. Sobre la cuestión del añadido libro VII o *Summa Alexandrinorum* cf. Ullmann, *Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung. Teil 2*, pp. 67-81.

⁵⁷ Al-Fārābī, *Falsafat Aristūtālīs wa-āğzā falsafatihī wa-marātib āğzā'uhā wa-al-mawḍī alladī minhu ibtada' wa-ilayhī intahā*, ed. M. Mahdi, Dār Mağallat Šī'r, Beirut 1961; trad. ingl. de M. Mahdi, *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, Glencoe, New York 1962 (repr. Ithaca 1969).

⁵⁸ Es el libro que se conoce por el título *Falsafat Aflātūn*, edición *Alfarabius. De Platonis Philosophia*, ed. F. Rosenthal - R. Walzer, Warburg Institute, London 1943 (Plato arabus, 2; Corpus Platonicum medii aevi), reimp. Nendeln-Liechtenstein 1973; nueva ed. por 'A. Badawī, *Aflātūn fi l-Islām*, Mu'assasa-i Muḥāla'āt-i Islāmī, Tehran 1974, pp. 5-27; trad. ingl. por M. Mahdi, *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*.

⁵⁹ Al-Fārābī, *Falsafat Aristūtālīs*.

⁶⁰ Šā'id al-Andalusī, *Kitāb ṭabaqāt al-umam*, pp. 138.11-139.5 Bū-'Alwān; trad. esp. de Maíllo, p. 107. El subrayado es mío.

⁶¹ Cf. A. Papamanolakis, "L'échelle néoplatonicienne des vertus chez Psellus et chez Eustrate de Nicée", en C. D'Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network "Late*

La idea general que preside la ética aristotélica es la de la felicidad (*eudaimonía*), fin último al que tiende todo hombre para perfeccionar su naturaleza y que sólo puede conseguir por medio de la virtud. Es una ética que busca no el conocimiento de la virtud, sino el obrar virtuosamente, el ser virtuoso. ¿En qué consiste la virtud? A dilucidarlo dedica Aristóteles el libro segundo de la *Ética Nicomaquea*. La virtud (*areté*) es lo que completa la buena disposición de una cosa, lo que la perfecciona, su bien propio. Virtud es la excelencia o perfección que hay en toda clase de ser: “La virtud perfecciona la buena disposición de la que procede y con arreglo a la cual produce su propia obra”.⁶² Por ser propia de todo tipo de ser, pone Aristóteles como ejemplo la eficacia de los ojos por los que vemos bien o la agilidad del caballo que lo hace apto para correr, para sostener al jinete y para resistir al guerrero.⁶³ En relación con el hombre, la virtud es el carácter específico del ser humano, el poder propiamente humano que viene expresado, dice Aristóteles, por el justo medio y concierne a todas las actividades humanas y no sólo a las morales: “La virtud es, por consiguiente, un hábito peculiar que consiste en un término medio relativo a nosotros”.⁶⁴

Al comienzo de este libro segundo Aristóteles ha distinguido dos clases de virtudes: las *dianoéticas* o intelectuales, las que perfeccionan el entendimiento en la consideración de la verdad, que se obtienen por la instrucción o adiestramiento y requieren experiencia y tiempo, y las virtudes *éticas*, las que se generan en las costumbres, porque no proceden de la naturaleza sino de la práctica que genera un hábito.⁶⁵

a) *Al-Fārābī*

Esta doctrina es recogida en el mundo islámico por al-Fārābī, quien en sus obras políticas⁶⁶ se ocupa del mejor régimen político capaz de garantizar a los ciudadanos la excelencia o virtud humana y donde presenta la filosofía como una reflexión sobre la felicidad y el modo en que puede ser alcanzada en una comunidad humana. Así, la felicidad se halla íntimamente unida a la política y puede definirse por el ejercicio de las virtudes en la sociedad. Por ello, su idea de virtud se enmarca dentro del contexto de su concepción política.

Para al-Fārābī, la felicidad sólo puede obtenerse en una sociedad, como indica en su obra *Kitāb āraʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila* (*Libro de las opiniones de los habitantes de la ciudad excelente*):

Por su propia naturaleza, cada hombre necesita, para subsistir y alcanzar su más alta perfección, muchas cosas que no puede conseguir por sí mismo y aisladamente todas ellas [...] Por tanto, el hombre no puede alcanzar la perfección, por razón de la cual al hombre se le han dado dotes naturales, si no es por la asociación de muchos que colaboran mutuamente aportando cada uno de ellos lo que necesitan otros.⁶⁷

Antiquity and Arabic Thought. Patterns in the Constitution of European Culture” (Strasbourg, March 12-14, 2004), Brill, Leiden 2007 (Philosophia Antiqua, 107), pp. 231-42.

⁶² Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 6, 1106 a 15-16. Las traducciones de Aristóteles son de Salvador Rus Rufino y Joaquín E. Meabe, *Aristóteles, Ética a Nicómaco*, Ed. Tecnos, Madrid 2009, 2011².

⁶³ Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 6, 1106 a 16-21.

⁶⁴ Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 6, 1106 b - 1107 a.

⁶⁵ Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 6, 1103 a 14-16.

⁶⁶ Cf. al-Fārābī, *Obras filosóficas y políticas*, ed. y trad. R. Ramón Guerrero, Ed. Trotta - Liberty Fund, Madrid 2008.

⁶⁷ Al-Fārābī, *On the Perfect State. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's Mabādi āraʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila*, ed. R. Walzer, Oxford U. P., Oxford 1985, p. 228; trad. esp., Al-Fārābī, *La Ciudad Ideal*, presentación M. Cruz Hernández, trad. M. Alonso, Tecnos, Madrid 1985 (Colección Clásicos del Pensamiento, 2), p. 82.

La ética es inseparable de la vida en común, consistiendo en una justa apreciación de la razón, como se deduce de los últimos capítulos de esta obra. Y en otro texto, *Kitāb al-tanbīh 'alā sabīl al-sā'āda* (*Información acerca del camino de la felicidad*) reitera la idea de que la ética forma parte de la política:

La filosofía política se divide en dos clases: la primera es aquella por la que se adquiere el conocimiento de las acciones bellas, los hábitos morales de los que proceden las acciones bellas y la capacidad de adquirirlos, por lo que las acciones bellas se convierten en adquisición para nosotros. Ésta se llama ética. La segunda comprende el conocimiento de aquellas cosas por las que los habitantes de las ciudades alcanzan las cosas bellas y la capacidad de adquirirlas y conservarlas para ellos. Ésta se llama filosofía política⁶⁸ y ciencia política.⁶⁹

La felicidad, dice al comienzo de este libro, es el fin que todo hombre desea, aquel que es buscado por sí mismo y no por razón de otra cosa:

En cuanto a que la felicidad es un fin que todo hombre desea y que todo aquel que aspira a ella con su esfuerzo tiende a ella en tanto que es una cierta perfección, es algo que no necesita de discurso alguno para ser explicado, puesto que es sumamente conocido. Toda perfección y todo fin que el hombre desea, los desea solamente en tanto que son un cierto bien. Todo bien es indudablemente algo elegible. Puesto que son muchos los fines que se desean, en tanto que son bienes elegibles, la felicidad es uno de los bienes elegibles. Está claro que entre los bienes la felicidad es el más grande bien y entre las cosas elegibles es la más elegible y el más perfecto de todos los fines a los que el hombre aspira, por el hecho de que entre los bienes que son elegibles unos se eligen para alcanzar otro fin por medio de ellos, como el ejercicio [físico] y el tomar medicamentos, y otros se eligen por razón de sí mismos solamente. Está claro que los que se eligen por sí mismos son preferibles y más perfectos que los que se eligen por razón de otra cosa distinta.⁷⁰

Este texto muestra la clara dependencia que tiene al-Fārābī respecto de la *Ética Nicomaquea*, especialmente del libro I, capítulos 1 y 7. Incluso utiliza términos que se encuentran en la versión árabe de la obra aristotélica.⁷¹ La felicidad es el fin último, el bien más grande, la perfección más elevada, el bien de manera absoluta, buscado por sí mismo y no por otra cosa. Es, en definitiva, la perfección final, como se lee en otro de sus libros, *Fuṣūl muntazā'a* (*Artículos seleccionados [de la ciencia política]*):

La perfección última es la felicidad suprema y el bien absoluto, lo preferible y apetecible por sí mismo, no por ninguna otra cosa.⁷²

⁶⁸ En árabe *al-falsafa al-siyāsa*, literalmente “filosofía del gobierno político” o “del régimen político”. Véanse los títulos de dos obras de al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-siyāsa* y *Fuṣūl muntazā'a*, también conocida por *Fuṣūl al-madānī*.

⁶⁹ Al-Fārābī, *Risālat al-tanbīh*, ed. de S. Ḥalifāt ya citada; *editio princeps*: Haydarabad 1927, nueva ed. Ğ. Āl-Yāsīn, Dār al-Manāhil, Beirut 1985, repetida luego en al-Fārābī, *al-'amal al-falsafiyya*, Dār al-Manāhil, Beirut 1992; trad. franc. de D. Mallet, “Le rappel de la voie à suivre pour parvenir au bonheur”, *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* 39-40 (1987-88), pp. 113-40; trad. esp. de R. Ramón Guerrero, *Al-Fārābī, El camino de la felicidad (Kitāb al-tanbīh 'alā sabīl al-sā'āda)*, Ed. Trotta, Madrid 2002, p. 68.

⁷⁰ Al-Fārābī, *Risālat al-tanbīh*, pp. 177-8 Ḥalifāt; trad. esp. Ramón Guerrero, pp. 43-4.

⁷¹ Arist., *Kitāb al-ahlāq*, pp. 53-4 Badawī y 65-6.

⁷² Al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl muntazā'ah (Selected Aphorisms)*, ed. F.M. Nağğar, Dar el-Mashreq, Beirut 1971, § 28, p. 46; trad. esp. de Ramón Guerrero en Al-Fārābī, *Obras filosóficas y políticas*, p. 181.

Para alcanzarla hay que seguir un camino, que al-Fārābī formula al inicio del *Tahṣīl al-sá'āda* (*La adquisición de la felicidad*):

Las cosas humanas por medio de las cuales, cuando se dan en acto en las naciones y en los ciudadanos, ellos consiguen la felicidad terrena en esta vida y la felicidad última en la otra vida son de cuatro clases: las virtudes teóricas, las virtudes deliberativas, las virtudes morales y las artes prácticas.⁷³

Son cuatro las virtudes, que, en otro texto de los *Fusūl*, reduce a las dos señaladas por Aristóteles en la *Ética Nicomaquea*: las intelectuales y las éticas o morales.⁷⁴ Las artes prácticas son aquellas que permiten la adquisición de una ciencia o de una virtud y su aplicación o ejercicio, como parece deducirse de un texto de *Fusūl muntazá'a*, de clara inspiración en la *Ética Nicomaquea*,⁷⁵ donde al-Fārābī habla de la facultad racional práctica, que se divide en técnica (*mihniyya*) y reflexiva (*fiqriyya*). Ésta es la que permite el conocimiento de lo que puede ser hecho o no, mientras que aquella faculta al hombre para realizarlo:

[La facultad racional] puede ser práctica o teórica. La práctica, a su vez, es técnica o reflexiva. [...] La teórica es aquella por la que el hombre conoce los existentes cuya naturaleza es tal que no los podemos hacer ni cambiarlos de un estado a otro, como, por ejemplo, que el tres es número impar y el cuatro número par. No podemos cambiar el tres para convertirlo en par, mientras permanezca como tres; ni podemos cambiar el cuatro para convertirlo en impar, mientras permanezca como cuatro, como sí podemos cambiar un tablón de madera, haciendo redondo al que era cuadrado: en ambos casos será un tablón de madera a la vez. La práctica es aquella por la que se disciplinan las cosas cuya naturaleza es tal que las podemos hacer y cambiarlas de un estado a otro. La técnica y propia del arte es aquella por la que se adquieren las diversas técnicas, como, por ejemplo, la carpintería, la agricultura, la medicina y la náutica. La reflexiva es aquella por la que reflexionamos sobre aquello que queremos hacer cuando queremos hacerlo, si es posible hacerlo o no, y, si es posible, cómo se debe hacer esa acción.⁷⁶

¿Qué es entonces la virtud para al-Fārābī? En varias de sus obras políticas hallamos definiciones de qué es la virtud.⁷⁷ Así, se pueden citar algunos ejemplos de estas definiciones:

Las disposiciones propias del alma por las que el hombre puede realizar actos buenos y acciones hermosas son las virtudes.⁷⁸

Dígase lo mismo de las virtudes, que son disposiciones del alma y hábitos intermedios entre dos disposiciones que son vicios las dos, una por exceso y otra por defecto.⁷⁹

⁷³ Al-Fārābī, *Tahṣīl al-sá'āda* (*The Attainment of Happiness*), ed. Ğ. Āl-Yāsīn, Dār al-Andalus, Beirut 1981; al-Fārābī, *al-'Amāl al-falsafīyya*, p. 119, trad. ing. Mahdi, *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, p. 13.

⁷⁴ Al-Fārābī, *Fusūl muntazá'ab*, § 8, p. 30 Nağğar; trad. Ramón Guerrero, p. 169. Cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, I 13, 1103 a 4-5.

⁷⁵ Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, VI 1, 1139 a 5-16, 26-29.

⁷⁶ Al-Fārābī, *Fusūl muntazá'ab*, § 7, pp. 29-30 Nağğar; trad. Ramón Guerrero, pp. 168-9.

⁷⁷ Cf. I. Alon, *Al-Fārābī's Philosophical Lexicon* (Qāmūs al-Fārābī al-falsafī), The Gibb Memorial Trust, Cambridge 2002, vol. I, *Arabic Text*, pp. 319-22; vol. II, *English Translation*, pp. 754-6.

⁷⁸ Al-Fārābī, *Fusūl muntazá'ab*, § 2, p. 24 Nağğar; trad. Ramón Guerrero, p. 164.

⁷⁹ Al-Fārābī, *Fusūl muntazá'ab*, § 18, p. 36 Nağğar; trad. Ramón Guerrero, p. 174. Cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 6, 1106 a 28-30 y 1106 b 15-27.

Como en Aristóteles, al-Fārābī entiende la virtud como la disposición o capacidad por medio de la cual se perfecciona el ser y, en el caso del hombre, su virtud es un hábito por el que él mismo y su acción propia se hacen buenos. La virtud, entonces, no es algo innato que el hombre tenga por naturaleza, sino que se adquiere por la costumbre y el hábito. El pensamiento aristotélico está presente en esta concepción de al-Fārābī:

Desde el principio y por naturaleza el hombre no puede tener innata ninguna virtud ni vicio,⁸⁰ de la misma manera que tampoco por naturaleza puede ser tejedor ni escribiente. Sí puede, en cambio, por naturaleza estar predispuesto hacia los actos de la virtud o del vicio, por serle estos actos más fáciles que los actos de otras cosas distintas, de la misma manera que puede por naturaleza estar predispuesto hacia los actos de la escritura o de cualquier otro arte, porque tales actos le sean más fáciles que los de otra cosa distinta. Desde el principio el hombre se siente movido a hacer lo que por naturaleza le es más fácil, siempre que un agente no le instigue desde afuera a hacer lo contrario. A esta predisposición natural no se la puede llamar virtud, como tampoco a la predisposición natural hacia los actos del arte se le puede llamar arte. Sin embargo, cuando hay predisposición natural hacia los actos de la virtud, estos actos se repiten y uno se acostumbra a ellos, afianzándose por la costumbre una cierta disposición en el alma, de la que procedan esos actos mismos, entonces la disposición afianzada por la costumbre es la que se llama virtud. La disposición natural no se llama virtud ni vicio, aunque de ella procedan acciones esporádicas. La natural no tiene nombre; si alguien la llama virtud o vicio, solamente la llama así por la homonimia, no porque el significado de ésta sea el mismo que el de aquélla. Por la que es adquirida por la costumbre podrá el hombre ser alabado o vituperado; pero, por la otra, el hombre no podrá ser ni alabado ni vituperado.⁸¹

Las virtudes teóricas y las virtudes deliberativas que ha distinguido en el texto del *Tahṣīl* no son sino las virtudes intelectuales de Aristóteles. A ellas dedica al-Fārābī la tercera parte de *Tanbīh*, donde las identifica con la filosofía:

Las artes (*ṣanāʿī*) son de dos clases: una cuyo propósito es alcanzar lo bello y otra cuyo propósito es alcanzar lo útil. El arte que pretende alcanzar lo bello solamente es aquel arte que se llama filosofía y que se llama también sabiduría humana en sentido absoluto. Ninguna de las artes por las que se tiende a lo útil se llama sabiduría en sentido absoluto, aunque a veces alguna de ellas recibe este nombre por semejanza con la filosofía. Puesto que lo bello es de dos clases, una que es ciencia solamente y otra que es ciencia y acción, el arte de la filosofía será de dos clases: una aquella por la que se adquiere el conocimiento de los seres que no pertenecen a la acción del hombre, y ésta se llama filosofía teórica; otra es aquella por la que se adquiere el conocimiento de las cosas cuya naturaleza consiste en ser hechas, entre ellas la capacidad de hacer lo bello, y ésta se llama filosofía práctica y filosofía política (*al-falsafa al-madaniyya*) [...] Éstas son todas las partes de la filosofía. Puesto que solamente obtenemos la felicidad cuando tenemos las cosas bellas en posesión y puesto que las cosas bellas sólo llegan a ser posesión nuestra por medio del arte de la filosofía, se sigue necesariamente entonces que la filosofía es aquella por la que alcanzamos la felicidad.⁸²

⁸⁰ Cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 1, 1103 a 20-21: “Ninguna de las virtudes éticas se produce en nosotros por naturaleza”.

⁸¹ Al-Fārābī, *Fusūl muntazaʿab*, § 10, pp. 31-2 Nağğar; trad. Ramón Guerrero, pp. 170-1. Cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 5, 1105 a 1-5.

⁸² Al-Fārābī, *Risālat al-tanbīh*, pp. 223-6 Ḥalīfāt; trad. Ramón Guerrero, pp. 67-8.

Las virtudes intelectuales tienen que ver con la parte racional del alma; en cambio las virtudes morales están referidas a la parte apetitiva del alma; se originan y se afianzan en ella por medio del hábito o costumbre,⁸³ esto es, por la repetición de actos, siendo, por tanto, algo adquirido y no innato. Como en Aristóteles,⁸⁴ el concepto de “término medio” es asimilado por al-Fārābī para establecer el perfecto equilibrio de las acciones humanas, determinando qué es la virtud por relación a lo que conviene, y qué es el vicio, por exceso o por defecto, como se ha visto en la segunda de las definiciones antes dada. Pone algunos ejemplos, que tienen su fuente clara en el texto aristotélico. Así dice al-Fārābī:

Debemos mencionar ahora, a manera de ejemplo, algunas de los hábitos morales que son conocidos como bellos. Mencionaremos las acciones medias que proceden de ellos y por las que ellos son adquiridos, para que la mente llegue a tener en cuenta lo que aquí se resume respecto de las clases de hábitos morales y de acciones que proceden de ellos. Decimos que el valor es un hábito moral bello y se obtiene por ser medio entre arriesgarse a hacer las cosas temibles y arredrarse ante ellas; el exceso en arriesgarse en hacerlas lleva a la temeridad y el defecto en arriesgarse en hacerlas lleva a la cobardía, que es un hábito feo; cuando se adquieren estos hábitos morales, de ellos proceden estas acciones mismas. La liberalidad sucede por ser medio entre conservar las riquezas y malgastarlas; conservarlas en exceso y malgastarlas con defecto lleva a la tacañería, que es un hábito moral feo; malgastarlas con exceso y conservarlas con defecto lleva a la prodigalidad, que es [también un hábito moral] feo; cuando se adquieren estos hábitos morales, de ellos proceden estas acciones mismas.⁸⁵

La *Ética Nicomaquea*, pues, está presente en casi todo el pensamiento de al-Fārābī. Aristóteles le sirve para establecer una doctrina ética muy simple, porque esta ética ha de integrarse en una teoría política. Al final de su exposición de las virtudes morales lo dice con claridad:

Por esta vía el hombre puede facilitar, para sí mismo y para los demás, la acción⁸⁶ del bien y el abandono del mal. Cuanto se ha dicho aquí acerca de esto es suficiente; indagar a fondo la doctrina sobre esto pertenece a quien se ocupa en estudiar la ciencia política; esto ya se ha indagado a fondo.⁸⁷

Las enseñanzas éticas establecidas por al-Fārābī tienden a mostrar el camino que lleva a la felicidad y que sólo se obtiene cultivando la virtud. Los hombres nacen con igual inclinación hacia las disposiciones buenas o malas del alma, pero es el hombre el que adquiere los hábitos que inclinarán definitivamente hacia unas u otras disposiciones. El hombre tiene capacidad de autodeterminación, lo que lleva a una negación de la predestinación,⁸⁸ y es libre para crear su camino hacia su perfección última a través de la filosofía.

⁸³ Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 1, 1103 a 18-20; *The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 85 Akasoy - Fidora; cf. Ullmann, *Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung. Teil 2*, p. 134.

⁸⁴ Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 6, 1106 b 25 - 1107 a 5; *The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics*, pp. 96-7 Akasoy-Fidora.

⁸⁵ Al-Fārābī, *Risālat al-tanbīh*, pp. 199-200 Ḥalifāt; trad. Ramón Guerrero, pp. 55-6. El texto sigue poniendo los mismos ejemplos que Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, II 7.

⁸⁶ La edición de Yāsīn y la traducción de Mallet leen “camino” en lugar de “acción”.

⁸⁷ Al-Fārābī, *Risālat al-tanbīh*, p. 219 Ḥalifāt; trad. Ramón Guerrero, p. 64. Alfarabi venía hablando del placer y del dolor, por lo que recoge aquí las palabras de Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, VII 11, 1152 b 1, donde afirma que “el estudio del placer y del dolor pertenece al filósofo político”, precisamente porque éste ha de ocuparse de la felicidad.

⁸⁸ Cf. Druart, “Al-Fārābī, Ethics, and First Intelligibles”, p. 414.

b) *Otros autores*

La concepción aristotélica de la virtud continuó estando presente en otros autores y en textos anónimos. Por ejemplo, en el tratado atribuido a Aristóteles titulado *Sirr al-asrār*, conocido en el mundo latino como *Secretum secretorum*, los tres primeros discursos deben de alguna manera mucho de la doctrina allí expuesta a la *Ética Nicomaquea*, especialmente en la concepción de la virtud como justo medio entre dos extremos,⁸⁹ mostrada al ocuparse de las diferentes virtudes que han de adornar las distintas clases de reyes que se señalan en la obra.⁹⁰

Entre los autores conocidos hay que citar en primer lugar a Abū Zakariyyā' Yaḥyā b. 'Adī, nacido en el año 279-280/893 en Takrīt, importante centro intelectual donde se mantenían notables discusiones teológicas y filosóficas entre cristianos y entre cristianos y musulmanes.⁹¹ De origen cristiano monofisita (jacobita), se formó en Bagdad en medicina, teología, ciencia y filosofía, donde "estudió con Abū Bišr Mattā b. Yūnus, con Abū Našr al-Fārābī".⁹² Fue recopilador de manuscritos de textos griegos, así como un excelente copista de manuscritos, como lo testimonian muchos autores que refieren haber visto textos escritos del puño y letra de Yaḥyā b. 'Adī. Tuvo como discípulos a los más ilustres hombres, cristianos y musulmanes, de la Bagdad de su época, muchos de los cuales son reconocidos hoy por sus obras. Murió el jueves 21 de Dū l-qa'da del año 363, o sea, el 13 de agosto del año 974. En su *Libro de la reforma de las costumbres*, que se ha citado antes, hace uso del tratado aristotélico así como de la concepción de la virtud.⁹³

Hay que citar también al mencionado anteriormente Abū l-Ḥasan Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-'Āmirī,⁹⁴ que vivió en la segunda mitad del siglo IV/X, natural de Nišāpūr, donde estudió filosofía con un discípulo de al-Balḥī (Abū Zayd Aḥmad ibn Sahl), discípulo a su vez de al-Kindī. En su *Kitāb al-sā'āda wa-l-i'sād* anteriormente aludido,⁹⁵ colección de materiales diversos más que obra filosófica propiamente dicha, con citas de diversos autores, entre ellos y principalmente de Platón y de Aristóteles, nombra la *Ética Nicomaquea* una vez:

Aristóteles dijo en *Ética Nicomaquea* en el capítulo sobre el hombre magnánimo que no hay distinción en absoluto entre un investigador que investiga el estado del carácter y quien investiga el hombre que lo tiene.⁹⁶

Sin embargo, la utilización que hace de la obra aristotélica es amplia, aunque no está claro si se sirvió de la obra original o de algún resumen o compendio de ella, así como del *Comentario* que Porfirio escribió al texto de Aristóteles.⁹⁷

⁸⁹ Cf. M. Manzalaoui, "The *Secretum Secretorum*. The Medieval European Version of *Kitāb Sirr al-asrār*", *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts (Alexandria)* 15 (1961), pp. 83-107, esp. p. 89.

⁹⁰ *Kitāb Sirr al-asrār*, ed. 'A. Badawī en *al-Uṣūl al-Yunāniyya li-l-naẓariyyāt al-siyāsiyya fi al-Islām (Fontes Graecae doctrinarum politicarum islamicarum)*, Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, Cairo 1954, pp. 65-171.

⁹¹ Cf. Kraemer, *Humanism*, pp. 104-16. Sobre Yaḥyā b. 'Adī, cf. Brockelmann, *GAL*, I, p. 288; *GALS*, I, p. 370. Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 369 Flügel. Ibn al-Qifṭī, *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā'*, pp. 361-4 Müller - Lippert. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *'Uyūn al-anbā' fi ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*, pp. 317-8 Riḍa. Una obra ya clásica sobre este autor es la de A. Pérrier, *Yaḥyā ben Adī: un philosophe arabe chrétien du X^e siècle*, Gabalda, Paris 1920.

⁹² Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *'Uyūn al-anbā' fi ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*, p. 318 Riḍa.

⁹³ Ed. y trad. de M.-Th. Urvoy, *Traité d'éthique*; sobre el uso de la *Ética Nicomaquea*, cf. introducción, pp. 21-3.

⁹⁴ Ghorab, "The Greek Commentators on Aristotle".

⁹⁵ Cf. Arberry, "An Arabic Treatise on Politics. Al-'Āmirī, *As-sā'āda wa-l-i'sād*", ed. facsimil del texto por Minūwī antes citada.

⁹⁶ al-'Āmirī, *Al-sā'āda wa-l-i'sād*, pp. 200-1 Minūwī.

⁹⁷ Cf. *The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics*, Introduction, pp. 19-25 Akasoy - Fidora; Ullmann, *Die*

La amplia Sección segunda del Libro Primero está consagrada al estudio de la virtud.⁹⁸ Plantea en primer lugar qué es la virtud (*Fī l-faḍīla mā hiya*) y comienza citando una definición de Aristóteles: “la virtud es una propiedad de las cosas que está entre lo que es un defecto y lo que es un exceso y su nombre es excelencia (*al-ḡūda*)”.⁹⁹ A esta definición al-‘Āmirī añade como ejemplo el hombre, que es un animal, pero que es más virtuoso (excelente) que los demás animales. Continúa con la división de las virtudes en éticas y teóricas (*ḡulqiyya wa-naẓariyya*) y explica qué son las virtudes éticas.¹⁰⁰ Seguir todo el discurso de al-‘Āmirī es, como dice Arkoun,¹⁰¹ algo ineficaz, porque se trata de una vasta compilación de citas acompañadas por paráfrasis a veces muy simplistas y corroboradas por citas de otros autores de distintas épocas y confesiones sin indicación de la fuente de la que proceden. Muchos pasajes que toma de Aristóteles se encuentran en obras de autores contemporáneos suyos.

Tal es el caso del también citado anteriormente Abū ‘Alī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ya‘qūb b. Miskawayh (325/936-421/1030), autor de obras como *Taḡārib al-umam* (*Las experiencias de las naciones*), de claro propósito didáctico político, en donde considera la historia desde un punto de vista ético.

Su obra más importante, también vinculada a la ética, es su tratado de ética aludido previamente, *Reforma de las costumbres*, en el que al parecer tuvo delante un texto de la *Ética Nicomaquea*, puesto que sigue en su obra el orden lógico de ésta.¹⁰² Se ocupa en ella de la felicidad suprema, que sólo se alcanza tras una actividad virtuosa, que comienza con la liberación de las pasiones sensibles del alma hasta alcanzar la perfección de la ciencia y del entendimiento, porque tal felicidad está reservada al sabio perfecto, cuyos actos son divinos.¹⁰³ Por ello, la obra comienza estudiando el alma y sus virtudes, que describe en términos platónicos y aristotélicos, señalando la existencia de las virtudes cardinales como propias del alma racional y estableciendo una tabla de virtudes subordinadas a las cuatro virtudes cardinales. Entiende, con Aristóteles, que la virtud es un término medio entre dos extremos que son dos vicios: se es virtuoso cuando se permanece entre el más y el menos, en la debida proporción o en la prudente moderación:

La virtud del alma reside en el deseo que la lleva hacia sus actos propios, es decir, las ciencias y los conocimientos, mientras que se aleja de los actos propios del cuerpo. Cuanto más busque un hombre esta virtud y la desee, tanto más valor tiene. Esta virtud se acrecienta ocupándose de su alma y esforzándose en ser capaz de abastecerse para defenderse de lo que le impide alcanzar esta realidad espiritual (*al-ma‘nā*, idea, noción). A partir de lo que antecede se ve con claridad cuáles son los obstáculos que nos mantienen lejos de las virtudes: me refiero a las cosas corpóreas, los sentidos y todo lo que se relaciona con ellos. Por lo que se refiere a las virtudes, solamente las adquirimos después de que nuestras almas se hayan purificado de los vicios que son sus contrarios, es decir, de los viles apetitos corpóreos y de los bajos impulsos bestiales. Cuando el hombre sabe que tales cosas no constituyen virtudes sino vicios, las evita y le repugna recibir la calificación de ellos. Pero si los toma por virtudes, se une a ellos de tal manera que se convierten en hábito para él. Entonces

Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung. Teil 2, pp. 63-66. Cf. Arkoun, “La conquête du bonheur selon Abū l-Ḥasan al-‘Āmirī”, pp. 149-84.

⁹⁸ al-‘Āmirī, *Al-sā‘āda wa-l-iṣ‘ād*, pp. 68-173 Mīnūwī.

⁹⁹ al-‘Āmirī, *Al-sā‘āda wa-l-iṣ‘ād*, p. 69.2-3 Mīnūwī.

¹⁰⁰ al-‘Āmirī, *Al-sā‘āda wa-l-iṣ‘ād*, p. 70 Mīnūwī.

¹⁰¹ Arkoun, “La conquête du bonheur selon Abū l-Ḥasan al-‘Āmirī”, pp. 163-5.

¹⁰² Cf. *The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics*, introd. de Dunlop, pp. 22-3.

¹⁰³ Cf. M. Arkoun, *Contribution à l'étude de l'humanisme arabe au IV^e/X^e siècle: Miskawayh philosophe et historien*, Vrin, Paris 1970 (Études musulmanes, 12), p. 288.

será tanto menos receptivo a las virtudes cuanto más esté penetrado y mancillado por estos vicios. El hombre puede constatar que estas cosas que el cuerpo desea – me refiero a las comidas, bebidas y placeres sexuales – son vicios y no son virtudes. Puede darse cuenta de ello si las observa en los animales, puesto que éstos tienen una capacidad más grande para usar de ellos abundantemente y los codician más ávidamente.¹⁰⁴

Al enumerar completamente las virtudes cardinales y sus subdivisiones y al citar sus especies y sus partes, hemos por ello mismo definido los vicios que son los contrarios de las virtudes. Porque, a partir de cada una de todas estas virtudes, se comprende su contrario, siendo una la ciencia de los contrarios. Estas virtudes son justos medios entre los extremos que son vicios, por lo que a partir de ellas se comprenderán necesariamente estos últimos. Si tuviésemos tiempo, citaríamos unas y otros, pero ahora es imposible encontrar sus listas. Cuando decimos que cada virtud es un justo medio entre vicios, hay que comprender lo que voy a explicar a continuación [...] Así es como hay que comprender la noción de justo medio al hablar de la virtud, puesto que ésta se sitúa entre los vicios a una distancia máxima. Por ello, la virtud se acerca a un vicio o a otro si ella se desplaza aunque sea un poco de su posición propia. Entonces, ella no escapa a la alteración (*al-ʿayb*), en la medida de su proximidad al vicio hacia el que tiende. Así, es muy difícil encontrar este justo medio y, una vez encontrado, es más difícil aún mantenerlo. Esto hay que decir a los filósofos: tocar el punto preciso del fin al que se tiende es más difícil que tocar su lado y que dedicarse a apuntar al sitio justo de manera que no se fracase en el fin es más difícil aún y mucho más arduo. Los extremos llamados vicios, sean actos, estados, tiempos o cualesquiera otras dimensiones, son muy numerosos. Por ello, las causas determinantes del mal son mucho más numerosas que las causas determinantes del bien; cada hombre debe tender hacia los centros de estos extremos.¹⁰⁵

Miskawayh señala después estos vicios y los pone en relación con las virtudes, cuyo ejercicio está dominado por la idea de justicia, en clara dependencia con Platón todavía.¹⁰⁶

En Avicena (ca. 980-1037) sorprendentemente es poco lo que se halla de la *Ética Nicomaquea* aristotélica. En su *Risāla fī aqṣām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya* (*Epístola sobre la división de las ciencias intelectuales*)¹⁰⁷ expone una clasificación de la filosofía en la que la divide en teórica y práctica, de la que forma parte la ética, aquella que da a conocer cómo deben ser las costumbres y acciones del hombre para que su vida en este mundo y en el otro sea feliz. Es la ciencia, dice, contenida en el libro de la *Ética* de Aristóteles (*Kitāb Aristūṭālis fī l-ahlāq*).¹⁰⁸ Lo curioso, sin embargo, es que sólo explica, y de manera muy breve, la moral y la política al final de su *Metafísica*, en el libro décimo, donde hace una concisa exposición de la virtud moral, que no son sino la templanza, la fortaleza y la sabiduría, a la que se añade la justicia, especie de balanza que se adquiere por los hábitos morales y rasgos de carácter, por medio de la cual se rompe el dominio de las pasiones del alma.

En la misma *Epístola sobre la división de las ciencias intelectuales* señala que la *Metafísica* tiene cinco partes principales y dos ramas o secciones secundarias. Las cinco principales versan sobre el

¹⁰⁴ Miskawayh, *Traité d'éthique*, pp. 14-15 Arkoun (nueva ed. Vrin, Paris 2010).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 35-36 Arkoun.

¹⁰⁶ Así lo indica Arkoun, *Contribution à l'étude de l'humanisme arabe*, p. 294.

¹⁰⁷ Ibn Sīnā, *Tis' rasā'il*, ed. Ḥ. al-'Ibādī, Ma ba' a al-Ġawā'ib, Constantinople 1880, pp. 71-80; nueva ed. Cairo 1908, pp. 104-18; trad. franc. por G. Anawati, "Les divisions des sciences intellectuelles d'Avicenne", *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales* 13 (1977), pp. 323-35 et R. Mimoune, "Épître sur les parties des sciences intellectuelles d'Abū 'Alī Ibn Sīnā", en J. Jolivet - R. Rashed (ed.), *Études sur Avicenne*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1984 (Sciences et philosophie arabes), pp. 143-51.

¹⁰⁸ Ibn Sīnā, *Tis' rasā'il*, p. 83.13-16 al-'Ibādī.

conocimiento de las cosas comunes a todos los existentes, los fundamentos y principios de las ciencias, la existencia y naturaleza de Dios, la existencia de las sustancias espirituales y, finalmente, de las sustancias corporales y la vinculación de las cosas terrestres y las celestes. Las partes secundarias son las que dan a conocer la profecía, su naturaleza y condiciones, por una parte, y las características especiales del retorno, por otra.¹⁰⁹ Se trata, entonces, de una filosofía práctica que es la perfecta conclusión de una filosofía teórica, porque para Avicena la felicidad última no sólo se consigue por la virtud teórica, sino también, y muy especialmente, por la virtud práctica. Precisamente, aquel en quien se unen de manera perfecta ambos tipos de virtud es el profeta, el verdadero gobernante que está, incluso, por encima de aquel hombre que sea verdaderamente feliz.¹¹⁰

Queda por decir una palabra sobre Averroes (1126-1198), autor de una *Paráfrasis* o *Comentario Medio a Ética Nicomaquea*, de cuyo original árabe sólo subsisten algunos fragmentos, pero que se conserva en versión latina,¹¹¹ hecha por Hermann el Alemán en 1240, y en versión hebrea, realizada en 1322 por Samuel de Marsella.¹¹² En este comentario hay una extensa discusión de las virtudes morales, siguiendo muy de cerca el texto de Aristóteles y concede especial atención a la virtud de la magnanimidad.¹¹³

También se ocupa de la virtud, aunque no de manera detallada, en su *Paráfrasis* o *Comentario medio a la República de Platón*,¹¹⁴ obra que se inspira en muchos pasajes en el texto aristotélico de la *Ética Nicomaquea* y en donde comienza indicando que la perfección humana procede de cuatro géneros de virtud, que subraya a lo largo de la obra: virtudes teoréticas, dianoéticas, éticas y artes prácticas:

Decimos, pues, que como ya era evidente en la primera parte de esta ciencia o ética, la perfección humana en su totalidad procede de cuatro géneros: virtudes teoréticas, virtudes dianoéticas, virtudes éticas y pericia en las artes prácticas. Todas estas perfecciones consideradas en sí mismas sólo tienen una finalidad teorética, mas por ello mismo sirven de base para el establecimiento de los principios que se utilizan para determinar la razón de su fin.¹¹⁵

Se aprecia claramente que este texto está tomado del *Tahṣīl* de al-Fārābī, como muchos otros pasajes de la obra. El desarrollo de la virtud que hace aquí está siempre vinculado a la consecución

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 76-9 al-'Ibādī.

¹¹⁰ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Šifā. Ilāhiyyāt (La Métaphysique)*, éd. M.Y. Mūsā - S. Dunyā - S. Zāyid, revue et précédée d'une introduction par I. Madkour, Organisation Générale des Imprimeries Gouvernementales, Cairo 1960, pp. 452-5. Trad. lat. en Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina*, ed. S. Van Riet - G. Verbeke, 3 vols., Peeters - Brill, Louvain-Leiden 1977-1983 (Avicenna Latinus, 3-5), vol. II, pp. 548-53; trad. it. de A. Bertolacci, Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). *Libro della guarigione. Le cose divine*, UTET, Torino 2008 (Classici della filosofia), pp. 818-25.

¹¹¹ *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, Tertium Volumen: *In Moralia Nicomachia Expositione*, Venetiis apud Junctas 1562-1564 (Minerva, Frankfurt a.M. 1962).

¹¹² Cf. Berman, "Ibn Rushd's *Middle Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics* in Medieval Hebrew Literature", pp. 287-321; Id., "The Broken Mirror: Ibn Rushd and Ibn Rushd's Aristotle on *Ethics*", en Ch. Wenin (ed.), *L'Homme et son univers au Moyen Âge. Actes du VII Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale*, Éd. Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Louvain-la-Neuve 1986, vol. II, pp. 763-8.

¹¹³ Cf. J.B. Korolec, "Le Commentaire d'Averroès sur l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*", *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 27 (1985), pp. 104-7.

¹¹⁴ Edición y traducciones citadas anteriormente cf. *supra* n. 11.

¹¹⁵ Trad. Cruz Hernández, *Averroes. Exposición de la República de Platón*, p. 5.

de la felicidad del hombre, que consiste fundamentalmente para él en el conocimiento teórico.¹¹⁶ Lo que sorprende es que no inicie su comentario con las virtudes cardinales platónicas, sino con las de al-Fārābī, lo que quizá signifique que realiza este comentario a la luz de la doctrina aristotélica de la virtud, entendiendo esas virtudes como medios necesarios para el establecimiento de la comunidad ideal.

En conclusión, creo que se puede afirmar que en la filosofía árabe la teoría de la virtud, inspirada por la lectura, directa o indirecta, de la *Ética Nicomaquea*, propone un ideal ético como programa para todos los hombres, en su búsqueda de la felicidad o perfección individual, pero cuya realización práctica queda reservada a una minoría, la de los sabios, únicos capaces de alcanzar la perfección contemplativa aunada con la vida virtuosa práctica.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Ch.E. Butterworth, "Ethics in Medieval Islamic Philosophy", *Journal of Religious Ethics* 11 (1983), pp. 224-39.

Book Announcements & Reviews

Siglas

AU – Angela Ulacco

CDA – Cristina D’Ancona

CMB – Cecilia Martini Bonadeo

Book Announcements

R. Chiaradonna - G. Galluzzo (eds), *Universals in Ancient Philosophy*, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa 2013 (Seminari e convegni, 33), 545 pp.

It is a sad task to account for the contents of a volume which, as Riccardo Chiaradonna and Gabriele Galluzzo say in their Introduction, “is part of a large scholarly and editorial project on the problem of universals in the history of philosophy conceived and coordinated by Francesco Del Punta” (p. 21). The void left by the untimely death in December 2013 of Francesco Del Punta, one of the most distinguished scholars in the field of Medieval philosophy, will be measured also by the survey of the contents of this volume, which reflects only a small part of the scientific enterprises he gave birth to.

This collection of thirteen essays revolves around the problem of universals from the Presocratics to Neoplatonism. In doing so, the editors part company with those scholars who maintain that “there is not such a thing as the problem of universals: what we are used to calling ‘the problem of universals’ is actually a bundle of different and yet related issues, which are rather differently articulated and analysed in different historical contexts” (*Introduction*, p. 1). On the contrary, the editors are convinced not only that “universals” represent a relatively unitary problem throughout the history of philosophy, but also that such a problem is primarily an ontological and metaphysical one, instead of falling primarily within the province of epistemology: “Even though the multifaceted character of the problem of the universals should not be underestimated, there is something to be said in favour of the view that it is first of all an ontological and metaphysical issue, which has important consequences for our semantics and epistemology as well” (*Introduction*, p. 4). Hence the decision to gather papers dealing with this problem from its roots in pre-Platonic thought down to Neoplatonism, with the aim of reconstructing “the specific conceptual and historical context in which the debate over the nature of universals unfolded in Antiquity” (*ibid.*).

Most essays deal with ancient philosophy, both of the classical age and of Hellenistic times: M. Bonazzi, “Universals before Universals: Some Remarks on Plato in His Context” (pp. 23-40), F. Ademollo, “Plato’s Conception of the Forms: Some Remarks” (pp. 41-85), M. Rashed, “Plato’s Five Worlds Hypothesis (*Ti.* 55cd), Mathematics and Universals” (pp. 87-112), D. Sedley, “Plato and the One-over-Many Principle” (pp. 113-37), L.M. Castelli, “Universals, Particulars and Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Forms” (pp. 139-84); M. Mariani, “Universals in Aristotle’s Logical Works” (pp. 185-208), G. Galluzzo, “Universals in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*” (pp. 209-53); A. Bronowski, “Epicureans and Stoics on Universals” (pp. 255-97). It is well known that in the early Imperial age a renewal of interest in Plato and Aristotle gave rise to a scholastic activity of writing companions on them, monographs on specific issues, and commentaries upon their works; the issue of universals accommodates with this new scenario. R. Chiaradonna, “Alexander, Boethus and the Other Peripatetics: The Theory of Universals in the Aristotelian Commentators” (pp. 299-328) deals with it, and two papers are devoted to Neoplatonism: P. Adamson, “One of a Kind: Plotinus and Porphyry on Unique Instantiation” (pp. 329-51), and M. Griffin, “Universals, Education, and Philosophical Methodology in Later Neoplatonism” (pp. 353-80). Another paper by R. Chiaradonna deals with Galen’s account of individuals and the medical science: “Universals in Ancient Medicine” (pp. 381-23). An essay by J. Zachhuber on “Universals in the Greek Church

Fathers” (pp. 425-70) concludes this very useful collection of studies, which is enriched by a substantial bibliography.

CDA

Christoph Helmig, *Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition*, De Gruyter, Berlin - Boston 2012 (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina, Quellen und Studien, 5), 395 pp.

Christoph Helmig’s book is a comprehensive study of Proclus’ epistemology and concept attainment in the Platonic tradition. The volume is innovative, in that it offers the first systematic account of Proclus’ theory of concepts attainment and an original approach to the object studied. As the author suggests, the book “can be read as an attempt to accurately describe Proclus’ (and his teacher’s Syrianus) views on Plato and Aristotle and to unearth possible sources for Proclus’ theory of knowledge in the long period between the Stoics and Plotinus” (p. 9). The main thesis of the book consists in the rejection of the widespread opinion (see for instance L.P. Gerson, *Aristotle and Other Platonists*, Cornell U. P., Ithaca 2005) that Neoplatonists substantially harmonize Plato’s with Aristotle’s theory of the acquisition of knowledge, by subordinating Aristotelian induction to Platonic recollection. Helmig aims to show that in Proclus’ epistemology induction and abstraction play no role as far as the attainment of concepts is concerned. In fact, recollection is at play already in the acquisition of basic forms of knowledge, which do not derive from sense perception. To the question formulated at the outset, ‘how comes the mind to be furnished?’ (p. 1, quoting John Locke), the author gives the answer that according to Plato and later Platonists, unlike Aristotle, the Stoics and Alexander of Aphrodisias, the mind does not need to be furnished: ‘it already contains innate universal knowledge which has to be recollected’ (p. 335). How is it, then, that Proclus in his own philosophy has use for universals ‘of later origin’? In order to understand Proclus’ epistemological theory and to answer this question, according to Helmig it is necessary to address two issues, not adequately raised in previous studies: 1) the relation between Proclus and Aristotle and 2) the status and the role of concepts in Proclus’ philosophy. In order to do so, it is necessary to rethink how Plato, Aristotle and post-Aristotelian philosophers settled the questions on knowledge attainment. This is what the author does in the first part of the book. Chapters II-IV provide an extensive introduction to the second and main part of the monograph (chapters V-VIII), centred on Proclus’ and his teacher Syrianus’ answer to the problems raised before and on the innovative aspects of their theory.

In the *Introduction* (pp. 1-12), Helmig argues that the processes of knowledge attainment in ancient philosophy can best be described by appealing to the language of concepts. Although the ancients did not have a single word for our ‘concept’, this notion makes it possible to give a more adequate explanation of the various moments implied in the process of knowledge attainment. What is a concept, then? Chapter 1 (“Concepts- (ancient) problems and solutions”, pp. 13-37) provides a set of criteria by which we can “mark off and characterize concepts” (p. 10) in ancient epistemology. The term ‘concept’ refers to an “inner-mental or inner-psyche entity that is, to a certain extent, stable, permanent, objective, shareable and universal” (p. 15). This implies that there are different kinds of concepts. Concepts can be classified according to their origin (empirically or innate) or according to their content and function (concepts that allow us to recognize objects from concepts that provide knowledge of the essence of things). Moreover, concepts are different from Platonic Forms, in so far as the latter are not mere mental entities. Chapter 2 (“Plato on learning as recollection”, pp. 39-86) is devoted to Plato’s theory of concept formation. Helmig reconstructs the

Platonic theory of recollection, arguing that there is no contradiction between the earlier (like the *Meno*) and the later dialogues (like the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus*). The chapter chiefly deals with the question whether or not recollection of innate concepts is involved in lower forms of acquiring knowledge. Helmig opposes Scott's understanding of Platonic recollection as a process operating only in 'higher learning' (D. Scott, *Recollection and Experience. Plato's Theory of learning and its successors*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge - New York 1995). Several passages from the dialogues rather suggest, according to Helmig, that recollection is operating also in everyday conceptual thought and non-expert knowledge.

Chapter 3 ("Aristotle's reaction to Plato", pp. 87-140) aims at analyzing Aristotle's theory of formation of knowledge as a "conscious reaction to Plato's theory of innate knowledge" (p. 87). The chapter falls into three sections: Aristotle's doctrine of abstraction (*aphairesis*); the origin and nature of mathematical concepts, and the theory of universal concepts as deriving from a process of induction (*epagōgē*). Helmig suggests that neither abstraction nor induction imply a form of innate knowledge. He then addresses the problematic issues of abstraction and induction with an eye to Neoplatonic criticism of both methods. He concludes with a reconsideration of the well-known passage of *Posterior Analytics* II 19, which he interprets as a text on the attainment of universal concepts (pp. 128-40).

The most original contribution of Chapter four ("Three case studies: Alcinous, Alexander & Porphyry, and Plotinus", pp. 141-204) is probably one of Helmig's theses that is bound to generate much discussion in the scholarship. Helmig argues against the influential reading of Alcinous as a paradigmatic case of a Platonist who combines Plato's with Aristotle's theory of concept formation (p. 141). According to this view, the first step of Alcinous' theory of knowledge attainment is Aristotelian and consists in the empirical attainment of immanent forms by means of induction, whereas the second stage is Platonic and amounts to the recollection of innate Forms (see for instance D. Sedley, "Alcinous epistemology", in K.A. Algra - P.W. van der Horst - D.T. Runia (eds), *Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy*, Brill, Leiden - New York 1996, pp. 300-12, and G. Boys-Stones, "Alcinous, Didaskalikos 4: In Defence of Dogmatism", in M. Bonazzi - V. Celluprica (eds), *L'eredità platonica: studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2005, pp. 201-34). According to Helmig, who bases his interpretation on Baltes' reading of Alcinous' theory of soul (H. Dorrie† - M. Baltes, *Der Platonismus in der Antike* VI 2, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt 2002, pp. 125-6), a form of unconscious recollection is already at work in the first step of the acquisition of knowledge and in the formation of doxastic reasoning.

Chapters V-VII offer a deep and detailed discussion on Proclus' and Syrianus' theory of concept formation. In chapter V ("Syrianus' and Proclus' attitude towards Aristotle", pp. 205-21) the Neoplatonic criticism of Aristotle's theories of induction and abstraction is discussed. Helmig distinguishes between abstracted universals, on the one hand, and recollected universals of later origin, on the other (*husterogenēs*). Helmig tracks down several kinds of concepts in Proclus, which correspond to different stages of recollection. The first one is represented by the *logoi* in the soul, which indeed constitute a form of innate knowledge. A second kind of recollected concepts is constituted by universals of later origin: they are images of the *logoi* in the soul and objects of *doxa*. Helmig emphasizes the role of the doxastic concepts, superior to abstracted concepts: thanks to doxastic concepts, opinion can recognize sensible objects and also judge sense perception in virtue of its access to innate knowledge (the *logoi* in the soul). Chapter VI ("The crucial role of the doxastic concepts in Proclus' epistemology", pp. 223-61) is devoted to a detailed discussion on the nature and the status of doxastic concepts. Chapter VII ("Proclus' Platonic theory of concept attainment", pp. 263-333) systematically describes Proclus' theory of recollection in its different stages. Starting from a description of the relation between soul and innate knowledge, Helmig distinguishes three elements, which he calls the "triad of recollection". They

consist in forgetting, articulation of preconceptions, and “putting forth” (*probolē*) innate knowledge. According to Helmig, the *probolē*, which he refuses to translate with ‘projection’, is an innovation of Neoplatonic philosophers. The chapter continues with a discussion of the difficult passage of Proclus’ *Commentary on the Parmenides* (*In Parm.* IV 895.24 - 896.5), which contains an exegesis of Plato’s *Parmenides* 132 B-C and should prove the crucial role of the concepts of later origin in the process of concept learning. Also according to Plato’s *Phaedrus* 249 B-C, “the formation of the *husterogenes*-concepts necessarily precedes the putting forth of the innate *logoi* of the soul” (p. 316). Finally, the chapter discusses the nature of error and the status of problematic concepts.

Chapter VIII (“Plato and Aristotle in harmony? – Some conclusions”, pp. 335-41) concludes this fascinating and very well documented book by summarising the results of Helmig’s inquiry. The author suggests a new hermeneutical approach to the much-discussed problem of the harmony (*sumphōnia*) between Plato and Aristotle in the Platonic tradition. There is no doubt that it will lead to animated debates on the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato and Aristotle.

AU

R. Hansberger - M. Afifi al-Akiti - Ch. Burnett (eds), *Medieval Arabic Thought. Essays in Honour of Fritz Zimmermann*, The Warburg Institute - Nino Aragno Editore, London - Turin 2012, (Warburg Institute Studies and Texts, 4), 247 pp.

After the preface presented by Ch. Burnett to Fritz W. Zimmermann on the occasion of his seventieth birthday and of his election for a second time to a Senior Research Fellowship at the Warburg Institute, the volume opens with an article by P. Adamson on the relation between Galen’s and al-Rāzī’s treatments of time (pp. 1-14). In 1955 S. Pines pointed out a resemblance between al-Rāzī’s theory of ‘absolute time’ as one of his ‘five eternal’ and a definition of time ascribed to Galen in the Arabic tradition as a substance which subsists in and by itself, independently of the body, and which is measured by motion, and not vice-versa, as it is in the *Timaeus*. Galen presents his views on time in his *On Demonstration* in the context of a criticism of Aristotle’s theory of time as the number of motion. Unfortunately, Galen’s work is lost and survives only fragmentarily in Greek and Arabic. Adamson analyzes a set of Greek and Arabic documents which are sources for Galen’s doctrine of time, in order to verify Pines’ hypothesis; he presents the accounts by Themistius in his paraphrase of the *Physics*, by Simplicius in his own commentary on the *Physics*, by al-Rāzī in the *Doubts about Galen*, by the Jewish philosopher Abī Sa’īd al-Mawṣilī in a letter to Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, by Ibn Bāḡḡa in his commentary on the *Physics*, and by Averroes in his *Long Commentary on the Physics*. Also the Arabic versions of two works lost in Greek are discussed: Galen’s paraphrase of the *Timaeus*, and Alexander’s *On Time*. According to Adamson, while the Greek indirect tradition on this topic focuses on Galen’s epistemic point in criticizing Aristotle (time cannot be defined in terms of anything else), in the Arabic tradition the epistemic primitiveness of time (i.e. the idea that time is ‘self-indicating’) is misunderstood as a metaphysical primitiveness, giving rise to the idea that time possesses ‘self-subsistence’. He concludes that *On Demonstration* plays a significant role in the development of al-Rāzī’s theory of the ‘five eternal’.

In the second essay (pp. 15-18) M. Afifi al-Akiti collects seven examples of al-Ġazālī’s *ḥikam* or aphorisms. An article by S. Brock follows, entitled “Some Syriac Pseudo-Platonic Curiosities” (pp. 19-26). Two short pieces are masterfully edited, which come from an intriguing monastic anthology, housed in St. Catherine of Mount Sinai (MS Sinai Syr. 14 of the ‘Old Collection’, fols 128r - 128v

and fols 131v - 132r). The first text is in the form of a series of sayings. The first two are attributed to Plato, and do not resemble anything of the various sayings attributed to Plato in Greek or elsewhere in Syriac. The second text is in the form of a narrative and has no Greek counterpart either. Finally in an appendix, Brock translates into English the Syriac pseudo-Platonic *The Instruction of Plato to his disciple*, edited by E. Sachau (1870), from the MSS London, British Library, *Add.* 14658, 14614, and 14618.

The focus of the essay by P. Crone is a passage of the *Book on Animals* where al-Ġāḥiẓ depicts al-Nazzām as arguing against the opponents of his doctrine of *kumūn* ('latency' of the properties in the infinitely divisible matter), and as defining these opponents as those who "agree with the *Ġabmīyya*, gone to *al-ġabālāt*, and professed denial of the *ṭabā'i*' and the *ḥaqā'iq*" (p. 27). Crone analyzes the figure of the Transoxanian *mawlā* Ġahm ibn Ṣafwān (d. 746) and his Muslim reformulation of the Mahāyāna Buddhism (pp. 27-39).

In "Jawhar and Dhāt in Some Medieval Arabic Philosophers" (pp. 41-52) J. Faultless tries to show through a very selective survey of the history of the two crucial technical terms *ġawhar* and *dāt* that "the Arabic philosophers working in Greek-based *falsafa* (...) had an active engagement with the Greek tradition, using semantic distinctions which do not mirror Greek terms (or Syriac ones, for that matter)" (p. 41). He refers particularly to the use of these terms in the Arabic translators, in al-Fārābī, Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, and Ibn Sīnā.

Ch. Genequand devotes his article to the refutation of Scepticism in the *Kitāb al-Mu'tamad fi Uṣūl al-Dīn* of the mu'tazilite al-Malāḥimī al-Ḥuwārizmī, who died in 1141 (pp. 53-60). Genequand judges al-Malāḥimī's refutation a dialectic one, based on the attempt to raise the charge of self-contradiction against all the sects of Sceptics which al-Malāḥimī recognizes. According to Genequand, the arguments used show that not only the Islamic mu'tazilite rationalism is taken into account, but also the Greek debate within the Academy between the 2nd century B.C. and the 2nd century AD.

In "Mediating the Medium: The Arabic Plotinus on Vision" (pp. 61-76) R. Hansberger presents the test-case of Plotinus's discussion of the role of the transparent medium in vision to prove Zimmermann's suggestion that the Arabic adaptation of Plotinus's *Enneads* IV-VI to some extent 'aristotelianizes' Plotinus' thought. Aristotle's transparent medium (τὸ διαφανές) was rejected by Plotinus, who devoted to the theory of vision the first four chapters of *Enn.* IV.5 entitled *On Difficulties about the Soul, or On Sight*. Parts of these materials (*Enn.* IV.5.1, 1-17; 2, 33-61; 3, 1-10 and 4, 2-4) are reflected in the Arabic Plotinus in the fifth group of the fragments of the so-called "Greek Ṣayḥ" preserved in the MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Marsh* 539. R. Hansberger analyzes these passages in their Greek and Arabic tradition and demonstrates that the Greek Plotinus is adapted by Ibn Nā'ima al-Ḥimṣī to Aristotle's theory of vision. In doing so, Ibn Nā'ima al-Ḥimṣī took inspiration either from the paraphrase of Aristotle's *De Anima* translated within the "circle of al-Kindī", or from its underlying source, and according to a precise strategy: the Aristotelian notion of the medium is only superficially retained, whereas in essence the text remains closer to Plotinus's view.

E. Kohlberg devotes his contribution to the "Shī'i Views of the Death of the Prophet Muḥammad" (pp. 77-86). The Shī'i sources preserve two different accounts on the death of the Prophet Muḥammad from poison. According to the first, which is attested also in Sunnī sources, the Prophet dies of poisoned mutton given to him by a Jewish woman after the conquest of the Ḥaybar oasis in the year 628. His death from poison elevates him to the rank of martyr. In the second account, which is fiercely anti-Sunnī, the Prophet dies as a result of poison administered to him by two of his wives, 'Ā'isha and Ḥafṣa, the daughters of Abū Bakr and 'Umar, who are cast as "the most evil of God's creatures". Kohlberg discusses the origins and significance of these accounts.

In the subsequent article (pp. 87-97) Y. Tzvi Langermann presents an English translation of an exposition of the concept of *mayl* by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) in his commentary to Avicenna's *al-Isārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt*, edited by S. Dunya. Langermann makes a few corrections to Dunya's edition on the basis of MS Teheran, Maḡlis 11409.

In the essay "Īsā ibn 'Umayr's Ibādī Theology and Donatist Christian Thought" (pp. 99-103) W. Madelung describes the rapid spread of Ibādī sectarianism in the Maghrib under the early caliphate as related to the prevalence of Donatists among the Berber population since the 4th century AD. After the Muslim conquest, the Berbers adhered to movements of opposition to the Sunnī imperial government: some Berber tribes adhered to the Mu'tazila, known in the Maghrib as Wāšiliyya, others to the Ibādīyya, the most successful until the present, according to the teaching of Abū 'Umar 'Īsā ibn 'Umayr al-Hamdānī. 'Īsā ibn 'Umayr's theological views, which are presented by Madelung, are known through his rival Kūfan Ibādī theologian 'Abd Allāh ibn Yazīd al-Fazārī (8th century).

T. Mayer devotes a detailed article (pp. 105-34) to Muḡammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm al-Šahraṣṭānī's refutation of Avicenna's doctrine about the eternity of the world. Al-Šahraṣṭānī (d. 1153) develops his refutation in his work *The Wrestling with the Philosophers* (*Muṣāra'at al-Falāsifa*) by focusing the absurdities involved by the notion of an infinite time. Mayer analyzes also the counter-refutation of al-Šahraṣṭānī by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in his *Wrestlings Down of the Wrestler* (*Maṣāri' al-Muṣāri'*).

In "The Islamic Literature on Encounters between Muslim Renunciants and Christian Monks" (pp. 135-142), C. Melchert presents the development of Islamic piety in the first three centuries of Islam. In particular, thanks to an analysis of the literature on encounters between the Muslim renunciants (*zubbād*, sing. *zābid*) and the Christian monks (*ruhbān*, sing. *rāhib*), he focuses on the shift of the prevailing attitude towards Christians with respect to hostility starting from the time of the Second Civil War and especially the caliphate of 'Abd al-Malik (r. 685-705).

P.P. Pormann analyzes in his article (pp. 143-62) the translation techniques from Greek into Syriac and Arabic concerning the sixth book of Galen's *On the Faculties and Powers of Simple Drugs*, in order to show how medical Arabic evolved against the backdrop of Graeco-Arabic translation activity. We are lucky enough to have three different versions of this text: the Syriac version by Sergius of Rēsh'aynē preserved in MS London, British Library, Add. 14661; an Arabic translation produced towards the end of the 8th century by al-Biṭrīq, the father of Yuḡannā al-Biṭrīq, which is extant in MS Istanbul, Sülemaniye Kütüphanesi, Saray Ahmet III 2083; and a more recent Arabic translation which belongs to Ḥunayn's school, which is extant in a number of manuscripts. Pormann gives a detailed comparison of these three translations and adds at the end of his article a very useful synoptic table (pp. 158-62).

In "The Working Files of Rhazes: Are the *Jāmi'* and the *Hāwī* Identical?" (pp. 163-80) E. Savage-Smith analyzes the nature of Abū Bakr Muḡammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī's "working files". To these 'files' belong the extracts from earlier authors regarding diseases and therapy, together with his own clinical observations. These materials were available after his death, but in a not fully organized form. The "working files", so far identified, cover twenty-five volumes in modern printing and are entitled *al-Kitāb al-ḡāwī* (*The Comprehensive Book*). Savage-Smith wonders whether the title of this amorphous work should be *Kitāb al-Hāwī*, or rather *Ġāmi'* (*The Compilation*) or again *al-Ġāmi' al-kabīr* (*The Large Compilation*). These titles may also represent different works. Through a careful exam of the testimonies of the four scholars who had first-hand knowledge of the compilation (al-Maḡūsī, d. 994, al-Birūnī, d. after 1050, Ibn Ġumay', d. 1198, Ibn al-Bayṭār, d. 1248), from the bibliographical literature, from al-Rāzī himself, she suggests that the term *al-Hāwī*, which al-Rāzī never used, was the term used by others to refer to what al-Rāzī himself called his *Ġāmi'*, as in *The Comprehensive Book*, or *al-Ġāmi' al-kabīr*, as in his later monographs.

In “Waiting for Philoponus” (pp. 181-96) R. Sorabji claims that the Christian Philoponus, with his *Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World*, was the first to be successful in his refutation of Proclus’s eighteen arguments for the eternity of the cosmos. Proclus died in 485, while Philoponus wrote his reply in 529. In the between period of almost fifty years, three Christians from Gaza, i.e. Aeneas of Gaza, Zacharias, and Procopius, tried to combat the pagan philosophy of Platonism, but only Philoponus was able to argue against the Neoplatonists on their own terms, quoting Christian Scripture only as an addition to the argument, and not as its focus: “it was only Philoponus who had the ability to carry the attack home into the pagan camp” (p. 181).

One of Zimmermann’s first teachers of Arabic, M. Ulmann, devotes his article, entitled *Ἀλλὰ τὴν μάχαιραν* (pp. 197-208) to collecting thirty-one Arabic sayings and proverbs which can be traced back to a Greek origin, and which allude in various ways to the silly goat uncovering herself the knife which will be used to kill her. The Greek *corpus paroemiographicum* was known in the Arabic-speaking world, and thus several situations alien from the usual topics of pre-Islamic poetry became known. The study offers a detailed analysis of each of the 31 entries related to this topic.

G.J. Van Gelder (pp. 209-20) presents an annotated translation of the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth nights of al-Tawhīdī’s *al-Imtā’ wa-l-mu’ānasa* (*Enjoyment and Geniality*) which deal with the topic of ‘coincidence’ (*ittifāq*).

In the last article of the volume (pp. 221-38) E. Wakelnig sheds light on five fragments of the hitherto lost Arabic translation of Galen’s last work *On My Own Opinions*, where Galen presented his philosophical legacy, “dealing with topics such as the createdness of the world, the essence of God and the soul, the natural heat of bodies, fevers and temperaments, the motions of brain, heart and liver and what power forms the embryo in the womb” (p. 221). These fragments survive in the so-called *Philosophy Reader* recently edited by the same author (see in this volume the review by G. Chemi, pp. 377-80), i.e., the MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Marsh* 539 mentioned above. E. Wakelnig presents a detailed comparison of the Arabic fragments with the Greek original and the Latin version of Galen’s *On My Own Opinions*. An Appendix contains the passages from Galen’s *De Usu partium* present in the *Philosophy Reader*.

This interesting and rich volume ends with the list of publications by F. Zimmermann and an index of proper names.

CMB

Reviews

L.P. Gerson, *From Plato to Platonism*, Cornell U. P., Ithaca - London 2013, 345 pp.

Secondo Gerson, il termine “platonismo” non indica soltanto l’insieme della produzione letteraria di Platone, ma una dottrina filosofica compiutamente strutturata. La domanda a prima vista capziosa “Platone era un platonico?” serve a far emergere questo aspetto sistematico e completo: “do we possess evidence that supports the view that Plato’s own philosophy was in substantial agreement with that of one or another soi-disant Platonists?” (p. 3). Il volume vuole dimostrare che una risposta positiva a questa domanda è possibile: si può provare che i platonici condivisero una visione organica presente nei dialoghi.

From Plato to Platonism è suddiviso in tre parti principali: “Plato and his readers” (pp. 1-130); “The continuing creation of Platonism” (pp. 131-224); “Plotinus: Exegete of the Platonic Revelation” (p. 225-304). Nel primo capitolo (pp. 3-33) Gerson è impegnato a determinare la natura della filosofia di Platone e il collegamento tra questa e il platonismo successivo. Il pensiero di Platone viene così definito “Ur-Platonism (UP)” (p. 9), una posizione filosofica generale che emerge per contrasto dall’insieme delle posizioni filosofiche esplicitamente rigettate nei dialoghi platonici. Gli elementi dell’UP, dunque, saranno l’antimaterialismo, l’antimeccanicismo, l’antinominalismo, l’antirelativismo e l’anticetticismo. Platone sarebbe stato impegnato a costruire un sistema filosofico alternativo a queste concezioni: l’UP si configura come “a *via negativa* to Plato’s philosophy” (p. 9).¹ l’adesione ad esso, cioè l’impegno a costruire una dottrina a partire da ciò, si configura come ciò che i platonici hanno condiviso. Di conseguenza, i disaccordi tra platonici possono essere spiegati dal fatto che l’adesione all’UP e l’elaborazione a partire da esso non determina in maniera univoca la risposta agli specifici problemi filosofici. L’UP, dunque, è secondo Gerson, una sorta di cornice teorica elaborata da Platone, la matrice dalla quale deriva il suo stesso platonismo e quello dei suoi successori.

Nel secondo (pp. 34-72) e nel terzo capitolo (pp. 73-96) Gerson, opponendosi a quanti hanno sostenuto la distinzione tra una filosofia socratica e una filosofia platonica, sostiene che tutte le dottrine attribuite a Socrate nei dialoghi sono dottrine di Platone: tutti i dialoghi sarebbero scritti occasionali, frutto delle discussioni interne all’Accademia, dietro i quali si cela una posizione filosofica generale legata all’UP. Il quarto capitolo (pp. 97-129) è dedicato ad Aristotele, considerato come la fonte migliore per la conoscenza del platonismo di Platone. Inoltre, l’intera impresa filosofica di Aristotele stesso è interpretata come un tentativo di identificare e risolvere i problemi della costruzione dell’UP.

Con il quinto capitolo (pp. 133-62) inizia la seconda parte dello studio, in cui il platonismo antico ed il medioplatonismo sono esaminati per dimostrare che gli accademici dopo Platone sono impegnati nella costruzione di una filosofia positiva a partire dagli elementi dell’UP. Nel quinto capitolo la sostituzione, da parte di Speusippo, delle forme intelligibili con gli enti matematici viene interpretata come una componente dell’UP. Nel sesto capitolo (pp. 163-78) Gerson analizza il modo in cui lo scetticismo di Arcesilao e Carneade può essere d’aiuto per comprendere il platonismo.

¹ Questa visione è già stata presentata in L. P. Gerson, *Aristotle and Other Platonists*, Cornell U. P., Ithaca 2005, pp. 37-42.

Nel settimo capitolo (pp. 179-207) vengono presentate le dottrine dei medioplatonici Antioco di Ascalona, Plutarco di Cheronea e Alcino. L'ottavo capitolo (pp. 208-23) è dedicato a Numenio di Apamea.

I capitoli nono (pp. 227-54), decimo (pp. 255-82) e undicesimo (pp. 283-304) costituiscono la terza parte del libro e sono dedicati a Plotino. A un'esposizione generale del sistema filosofico plotiniano segue la discussione della relazione con il pensiero di Platone: Gerson pensa che sia da condividere l'opinione di Proclo secondo il quale Plotino sarebbe stato il più grande esegeta della rivelazione platonica.² Nella presentazione di Gerson, Plotino è fedele ai principi della filosofia di Platone intesa come un sistema organico di dottrine positive nate a partire dall'UP.

Chi abbia studiato uno o più aspetti della plurisecolare tradizione platonica si riconoscerà nell'idea che la filosofia platonica fosse considerata dai pensatori che si definivano platonici come un insieme organico e coerente; molti platonici, anche se non tutti, ritennero che l'adesione al platonismo comportasse la costruzione di un sistema metafisico, epistemologico ed etico che aveva il suo punto di partenza nelle dottrine elaborate da Platone stesso e, nello stesso tempo, l'adesione ad una condotta di vita. In un precedente volume, Gerson aveva già incluso anche Aristotele tra i filosofi che condivisero le assunzioni di base dell'UP.³ Il fatto di condividere una base comune non impedisce ai diversi platonici di essere in disaccordo su alcune questioni specifiche, pur rimanendo tutti seguaci della dottrina di Platone.

Una tesi storiografica così generale è piuttosto difficile da verificare; mi limiterò perciò a un'osservazione di dettaglio, che mi sembra suggerire cautela. La nota 87 relativa alla p. 158 commenta un passo del quinto capitolo nel quale Gerson sostiene che i platonici trovarono difficile spiegare in che modo sia possibile per un'anima esercitare l'intellezione e contemporaneamente altri modi di conoscenza inferiori. Poiché questa difficoltà sarebbe stata espressa più chiaramente da Aristotele che da Platone, i platonici tardi avrebbero adottato la teoria aristotelica dell'intelletto separato per risolvere la difficoltà insita nella posizione platonica. La nota che sorregge questa argomentazione è la seguente: "[...] It should be noted that the obscurity of the relation of intellect to soul is evident in the various positions regarding the immortality of the soul: Is it the entire soul that is immortal or only the rational part? Both Xenocrates and Speusippus seem to have maintained that the entire soul is in some sense immortal. See Damascius, *In Phd.* 1177, p. 124.13ff Norvin (= fr. 211 IP). This commentary is transmitted under the name of Olympiodorus". La nota 57 relativa alla p. 219 correda la discussione, nell'ottavo capitolo, dell'idea per cui gli argomenti in favore dell'immortalità dell'anima contenuti nel *Fedone* mostrerebbero che l'essere umano incarnato conoscerebbe le Forme tanto quanto l'anima disincarnata, prima di entrare in un corpo. L'ambiguità di questo ragionamento sarebbe stata la fonte di molti problemi interpretativi per i platonici: come è possibile che il soggetto di stati psichici diversi dall'intellezione, nonché di affezioni corporee (come le passioni) sia identico al puro intelletto? La nota che documenta questa difficoltà di alcuni platonici è la seguente: "See fr. 46 des Places, where Olympiodorus reports the very different views among Platonists, including Numenius, on whether the whole soul in all parts is immortal or whether less than all of the parts are immortal. [...]". Il lettore è quindi indotto a credere che nella nota 87 relativa alla p. 158 Gerson si stia riferendo ad un commento di Damascio sul *Fedone* trasmesso sotto il nome di Olimpiodoro, e che nella nota 57 relativa alla p. 219 si riferisca ad un passo tratto da un'opera di Olimpiodoro dalla

² Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, texte établi et traduit par H.D. Saffrey - L.G. Westerink, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1968-1997 (CUF), I 1, p. 6.16.

³ Gerson, *Aristotle and Other Platonists*.

quale des Places⁴ estrasse il frammento di Numenio. Ma il passo al quale fa riferimento la seconda nota è il medesimo passo al quale fa riferimento la prima. Esso viene dal commento di Damascio al *Fedone*;⁵ il commento⁶ è stato edito da Westerink sotto il nome di Damascio,⁷ dopo che W. Norvin, nella sua edizione Teubner del 1913, lo aveva erroneamente attribuito ad Olimpiodoro.⁸ L'edizione Westerink contiene sia il commento di Damascio al *Fedone* che quello realmente composto da Olimpiodoro.

Il passo al quale Gerson fa un vago riferimento in queste note è tratto dal commento di Damascio (I § 177 Westerink): ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ἕξεως ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος [...] οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος.

Sembra quasi che l'autore non conosca direttamente i commenti al *Fedone* dal quale è tratto il passo al quale si riferisce: si ha l'impressione che il passo sia stato trovato o nelle edizioni dei frammenti di Speusippo e Senocrate curate da M. Isnardi Parente⁹ o nell'edizione dei frammenti di Numenio curata da É. des Places nel 1973.¹⁰ Des Places poteva basarsi solo sull'edizione Norvin, perché l'edizione Westerink non era ancora stata pubblicata; M. Isnardi Parente attribuiva il passo allo "ps. Olympiodorus", pur precisando che il testo "è un *excerptum* delle letture di Damascio dal *Fedone*" e che "Westerink pone il II volume sotto il nome di Damascio".¹¹ La confusione nella quale incorre Gerson è confermata dalla bibliografia, in cui sotto il nome di Damascio si legge: "1977. *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's 'Phaedo'*. Vol. 2, *Damascius*. Edited by L. Westerink. Amsterdam" e sotto il nome di Olimpiodoro: "1968. *Olympiodori Philosophi in Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria*. Edited by W. Norvin. Hildesheim". Non ha alcun senso nel 2013 citare il commento di Olimpiodoro nell'edizione Norvin del 1913 (ristampata nel 1968). Chi ha accesso ai commenti di Damascio nell'edizione Westerink ha accesso, nello stesso tempo, al commento di Olimpiodoro, poiché essi sono stati editi insieme.

Germana Chemi

⁴ Numénus, *Fragments*, texte établi et traduit par É. des Places, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1973 (CUF).

⁵ L.G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, I Olympiodorus, II Damascius*, Verhand. d. Kon. Ned. Ak. v. Wetenschappen, Afd. Lett. N.R. 92 & 93. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam - Oxford - New York, 1976, 1977.

⁶ Più precisamente si tratta di due raccolte di note di lezioni fatte in tempi diversi.

⁷ L.G. Westerink, *Damascius. Lectures on the Philebus Wrongly Attributed to Olympiodorus*, Hakkert, Amsterdam 1982, pp. xv-xx. Un riassunto dei motivi che hanno portato a quest'attribuzione è contenuto in Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, pp. 15-17.

⁸ *Olympiodori philosophi In Platonis Phaedonem commentaria* ed. W. Norvin, Lipsiae 1913 (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), rist. Hildesheim 1968.

⁹ Speusippo, *Frammenti*, a cura di M. Isnardi Parente, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1980 (La scuola di Platone, 1); Senocrate-Ermodoro, *Frammenti*, a cura di M. Isnardi Parente, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1982 (La scuola di Platone, 3), riveduta analiticamente e aggiornata a cura di T. Dorandi, Edizioni della Scuola Normale, Pisa 2012.

¹⁰ Cf. n. 4.

¹¹ Cf. il frammento 99 in Isnardi Parente, Speusippo, *Frammenti*, pp. 105-6.

R. Arnzen, *Platonische Ideen in der arabischen Philosophie. Texte und Materialien zur Begriffsgeschichte von "Šuwar Aflātūniyya" und "Muthul Aflātūniyya"*, De Gruyter, Berlin - Boston 2011 (Scientia Graeco-Arabica, 6), VI + 463 pp.

In this book Rüdiger Arnzen addresses the question of the influence of the Platonic theory of Forms on Eastern Arabic-Islamic philosophy.¹ He narrows his focus on the labels *Šuwar Aflātūniyya* and *Muthul Aflātūniyya*, whose first occurrence in Arabic philosophy belongs to the mid-tenth century.² Arnzen aptly begins with a survey of the Greek texts out of which the Arab readers extracted their ideas about the "Platonic Forms".³ This process of assimilation, which began almost a century before the appearance of these labels, is especially relevant for Arnzen's enquiry, and this on two counts. First and foremost, the texts translated create in a sense the problem with which he is dealing, namely the fact that the theory of Forms was not known directly, from Plato himself and within the context of the dialogues. As Arnzen has it, "Die wenigen-erhaltenen Fragmente arabischer Platon-Übersetzungen oder Platon-Paraphrasen enthalten kaum Textstellen, in welchen Platon von *Ideen* spricht oder das Wort ἰδέα benutzt" (p. 5).⁴ Scholars have advanced various reasons why only a few of Plato's dialogues were translated,⁵ but for the present purpose suffice it to say that none of

¹ Both of the classical and post-classical periods: the span of time covered in this enquiry goes from the Graeco-Arabic translations which set the tone for Arabic-Islamic philosophy to Mullā Šadrā (d. 1640).

² "Bereits in der ersten Hälfte des 10. Jahrhunderts sind sowohl Formulierungen der Art 'die Formen, die (oder: deren Postulierung) Platon zugeschrieben werden (wird)' (*al-šuwaru llatī tunsabu ilā Aflātūn*) als auch der Terminus 'Platonische Formen/Ideen' (*šuwar aflātūniyya*) anzutreffen" (p. 8). This happens in al-Fārābī's *Book on the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages*, whose Farabian authorship is not accepted by some scholars: as for Arnzen's opinion on this, see below, p. 354-5.

³ The wording is in itself noteworthy: "Schon die formale Konstitution dieser Begriffe stellt ein Unikum in der arabischen Philosophie dar. Vergleichbare arabische Begriffsbildungen zentraler philosophischer Konzepte in Verbindung mit einer adjektivischen Ableitung ihre (vermeintlichen oder realen) antiken griechischen Urheber sind meines Wissens nicht bekannt" (pp. 2-3).

⁴ With the notable exception of the first item quoted by Arnzen (p. 6), namely the two passages from Plato's *Republic* discussed below.

⁵ Translations of the *Timaeus*, *Republic*, *Laws*, *Sophist*, and the *Letters* are mentioned in the Arab bibliographies from Ibn al-Nadīm onwards. Traces of the translation of (parts of) these writings have been found; in addition, there are traces of the Arabic versions of some dialogues whose translation has left no record in the bibliographies, namely the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Symposium*. Recent surveys on the Arabic Plato include: R. Arnzen, "Arabisches Mittelalter", in C. Horn - J. Müller - J. Söder (eds), *Platon-Handbuch. Leben - Werk - Wirkung*, J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart 2009, pp. 439-46; Id., *Plato's Timaeus in the Arabic Tradition. Legend - Testimonies - Fragments*, in F. Celia - A. Ulacco (eds), *Il Timeo. Egesesi greche, arabe, latine*, PLUS, Pisa 2012 (Greco, arabo, latino. Le vie del sapere, Studi, 2), pp. 181-267; D. Gutas, "Platon. Tradition arabe", in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 2012, Va, pp. 845-63. Previous scholarship raised the problem of the paucity of the translations, especially if compared with the abundance of the sayings attributed to Plato and the doxographical records on him. According to F. Rosenthal, "On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy in the Islamic World", *Islamic Culture* 14 (1940), pp. 387-422 (also in *Greek Philosophy in the Arab World. A Collection of Essays*, Greath Yarmouth 1990), the main reason for this was the fact that the Arab readers were much more interested in Plato's doctrines than in the literary form of his writings. F.E. Peters, "The Origins of Islamic Platonism: The School Tradition", in P. Morewedge (ed.), *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, SUNY Press, Albany 1979 (Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science), pp. 14-45, points to the tradition of learning inherited by the Arab scholars. After having mentioned Stephen of Alexandria, the last professor in the Neoplatonic school who left the city in 616 to join the court in Constantinople, Peters presents a synthetic account which is worth reading in full: "This is the end of the *falsafah* tradition of late antiquity. Stephen, who served Heraclius, touches the chronological limits of Islam. The Arabs who followed pieced together their knowledge of that tradition from the philosophical texts available to them and from a far less easily identified set of historical perspectives. Both, however, betray their origins in a clear way: clustered around the works of Aristotle are the names of the great commentators from the Platonic school tradi-

these develops the theory of Forms and its problems, at least for the parts whose Arabic translation is known. This tallies with the fact that when dealing with this topic the *falāsifa* do not refer to Plato's dialogues: "Es spricht (...) für sich, dass die gesamte Tradition arabischer und persischer Erörterungen und Theorien Platonischer Formen und Platonischer Urbilder *keinen einzigen* Verweis auf diese Schriften oder irgendeinen anderen platonischen Dialog enthält" (p. 4). The second reason why the translations of the basic Greek texts must be taken into account is the fact that at times they entail shifts of meaning, that can account for the ways in which the theory of Forms was understood by the *falāsifa*. For this reason, a fine-grained analysis is devoted by Arnzen to the Arabic rendering of the Greek sources which refer to this topic.

First comes a couple of passages from Plato's *Republic*⁶ discovered by the late lamented David Reisman⁷ in the *Book of the Metaphysical Questions* (*K. fi Masā'il al-umūr al-ilāhiyya*) by the little known Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfīzārī (Xth century). Two passages of great philosophic importance are quoted in an almost literal translation: the first, *Resp.*, VI, 507 B 9-10, sets sense-perception against intellection, pointing to the Forms as to the objects of intellection; the second, *ibid.*, 508 E 1-3, is the well-known passage where the Idea of Good is said to be at one and the same time the cause of truth for the knowable things, and the cause of the capability the knower has to know them.⁸ Since it is impossible to determine the exact source of this quotation,⁹ one cannot say when the Arab readership became acquainted with these two crucial Platonic tenets. At any rate, one can safely say that the source of al-Isfīzārī's quotation was available by the time of al-Fārābī, who was more or less his contemporary and had himself some acquaintance with the *Republic*.¹⁰ But it is worthwhile to pause and note that both doctrines were already known and clearly referred to Plato by the time of al-Kindī, one century before al-Fārābī and al-Isfīzārī.

In a wide excursus placed at the end of the first chapter of the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, i.e. a treatise issued from the "circle of al-Kindī"¹¹ in which a selection from Plotinus' *Enneads* IV-VI is attributed to Aristotle, the latter praises Plato for having taught both doctrines:

tion at Alexandria, from Ammonius in the fifth century to Stephen in the seventh. (...) Considerable nuances can be added on this on the basis of the texts that have actually been preserved. There are, of course, Aristotle and Plato, the former in integral Arabic versions and the latter in resumé, a situation which once again points to Alexandria, where from Ammonius onward the publishing emphasis was on the Aristotelian lectures" (p. 25).

⁶ See above n. 4.

⁷ D.C. Reisman, "Plato's *Republic* in Arabic: a newly discovered passage", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 14 (2004), pp. 263-300.

⁸ Plat., *Resp.*, VI, 507 B 9-10: καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὁραῖσθαι φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δ' οὐ, τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὁραῖσθαι δ' οὐ, "And we say that the many beautiful things and the rest are visible but not intelligible, while the forms are intelligible but not visible"; 508 E 1-3: τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γινωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γινώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι, "So that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of good" (trans. Grube-Reeve, in *Plato. Complete Works* edited by J.M. Cooper, Associate Editor D.S. Hutchinson, Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis-Cambridge 1997, pp. 1128-9).

⁹ The quotations by al-Isfīzārī provide a *terminus ante quem*: see the useful survey of the traces left by the translation of Plato's *Republic* by Reisman, "Plato's *Republic* in Arabic", p. 264-71.

¹⁰ See Reisman, "Plato's *Republic* in Arabic", pp. 266-7 and C. Martini Bonadeo, *Al-Fārābī. L'armonia delle opinioni dei due sapienti, il divino Platone e Aristotele*, PLUS, Pisa 2018 (Greco, arabo, latino. Le vie del sapere, 3), pp. 99, 117-8, 202-3, 210-11.

¹¹ G. Endress, "The Circle of al-Kindī. Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy", in G. Endress - R. Kruk (eds), *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences dedicated to H.J. Drossaert Lulofs on his ninetieth birthday*, CNWS Research, Leiden 1997, pp. 43-76.

فريد أن نبدأ نخبر عن رأي هذا المرء الفاضل الشريف في هذه الأشياء التي ذكرناها. فيقول إن أفلاطون الشريف لما رأى جُلّ الفلاسفة قد أخطؤوا في وصفهم الأنبيات، وذلك أنهم لما أرادوا معرفة الأنبيات الحقيّة طلبوها في هذا العالم الحسي، وذلك أنهم رفضوا الأشياء العقلية وأقبلوا على الحسي وحده فأرادوا أن ينالوا بالحسي جميع الأشياء الدائرة والدائمة الباقية، فلما رأهم قد ضلوا عن الطريق الذي يؤدّيهم إلى الحق والرشد واستولى عليهم الحس رثى لهم من ذلك وتفضل عليهم وأرشدهم إلى الطريق الذي يؤدّيهم إلى حقائق الأشياء ففرّق بين الحس والعقل، وبين طبيعة الأنبيات وبين الأشياء المحسوسة، وصير الأنبيات الحقيّة دائمة لا تزول عن حالها، وصير الأشياء الحسيّة دائمة واقعة تحت الكون والفساد. فلما فرغ من هذا التمييز بدأ فقال إن علة الأنبيات الحقيّة التي لا أجرام لها، والأشياء الحسيّة ذوات الأجرام واحدة وهي الأنبيّة الأولى الحق، ويعني بذلك البارّي الخالق – عزّ اسمه. ثم قال إن البارّي الأول الذي هو علة الأنبيات العقلية الدائمة والأنبيات الحسيّة الدائرة، وهو الخير المحض (...).

We intend to begin by giving the view of this surpassing and sublime man on these things we have mentioned. We say that when the sublime Plato saw that the mass of the philosophers were at fault in their description of the essences, for when they wished to know about the true essences they sought them in this sensible world, because they rejected intelligible things and turned to the sensible world alone, wishing to attain by sense-perception all things, both the transitory and the eternally abiding, when he saw that they had strayed from the road that would bring them to the truth and right, and that sense-perception had won the mastery over them, he pitied them for this and was generous towards them and guided them to the road that would bring them to the truths of things. He distinguished between mind and sense-perception and between the nature of the essences and the sensible things. He established that the true essences were everlasting, not changing their state, and that the sensible things were transitory, falling under genesis and corruption. When he had completed this distinction he began by saying “The cause of the true essences, which are bodiless, and of the sensible things, which have bodies, is one and the same, and that is the first true essence”, meaning by that, the Creator, the Maker. Then he said “The first Creator, who is the cause of the everlasting intelligible essences and of the transitory sensible essences, is absolute good” (trans. Lewis).¹²

True, the Platonic Forms do not feature as such in this passage; but the two topics of the *Republic* mentioned above, namely (i) the contrast between the objects of sense-perception and those of intellectual knowledge, and (ii) the universal causality of the Good, are emphatically presented as the backbone of Plato’s position. This text reaches back to the first half of the IXth century, and everything in it suggests that the milieu in which it was composed was well acquainted with Plato’s main metaphysical tenets:¹³ otherwise such an account would have been impossible.

¹² ‘A. Badawī (ed.), *Aflūṭīn ‘inda L’-arab. Plotinus apud Arabes. Theologia Aristotelis et fragmenta quae supersunt*, Maktabat al-naḥḍa al-miṣriyya, Cairo 1955 (Dirasāt Islāmiyya, 20), pp. 25.15-26.10; English trans. in *Plotini Opera II, Enneades IV-V* ediderunt P. Henry et H.-R. Schwyzler, *Plotiniana Arabica ad codicum fidem anglice vertit G. Lewis*, Desclée de Brouwer - L’Édition Universelle, Paris-Louvain 1959 (Museum Lessianum. Series philosophica, 34), p. 231.

¹³ Cf. G. Endress, “Building the Library of Arabic Philosophy. Platonism and Aristotelianism in the Sources of al-Kindī”, in C. D’Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network “Late Antiquity and Arabic Thought. Patterns in the Constitution of European Culture”*, Strasbourg, March 12-14, 2004, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2007 (Philosophia Antiqua, 107), pp. 319-50, in part. p. 328: “It is true that more of Plato’s authentic works were available in Kindī’s generation than were preserved beyond the next century (mainly through the philosophical tradition of medical authors – the tradition of Galen the Platonist)”.

Plato's doctrine is framed here against the backdrop of an overarching concern by the speaker, "Aristotle", with the issue of the harmony between his own ideas and Plato's, something that seemingly flies in the face of the awareness that the Arab readers had of Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Forms already at an early stage of the Graeco-Arabic transmission. This criticism is documented by Arnzen (pp. 12-29). The *Metaphysics* was translated for the first time by a certain Uṣṭāṭ¹⁴ in the same milieu where "Aristotle's" fictitious exaltation of Plato was concocted,¹⁵ namely the "circle of al-Kindī". Thus, one may wonder whether or not al-Kindī and his fellow philosophers were percipient of the anti-Platonic import of Aristotle's utterances. Book *Alpha Meizon*, where Aristotle openly criticises the Platonic Forms, does not feature in the translation of the *Metaphysics* by Uṣṭāṭ, and it has been contended that this book was not available to al-Kindī and his circle.¹⁶ But even in this case¹⁷ there are other books of the *Metaphysics* in Uṣṭāṭ's translation which contain unambiguous statements against the existence of the separate Forms, and Arnzen's analysis elucidates some interesting details in the treatment of such passages.

Uṣṭāṭ's version of B 2, 997 a 34 - b 5 is a case in point. Aristotle raises the question whether or not there are other substances beyond the sensible ones, and criticises the opinion of those who posit the Forms and the intermediate realities.¹⁸ The Arabic rendering, instead, creates a tripartite set of Forms: the sensible forms, the intermediate forms, and those which differ from both. Arnzen lays emphasis on the implications of this shift: "Während Aristoteles' Kritik also zwischen drei (postulierten) Seinsbereichen unterscheidet, Ideen, τὰ μετὰ ζῦ, und sinnlichen Gegenständen, denen nicht notwendigein gemeinsames Charakteristikum 'Form' zukommt (...), scheint die arabische Übersetzung von drei Arten von Form zu handeln, 'sinnlichen Formen' (*ṣuwar mahṣūsa*), 'mittleren Formen' (*ṣuwar mutawassiṭa*), und Formen,

¹⁴ Ibn al-Nadīm, *K. al-Fihrist*, p. 251.27-28 Flügel = p. 312.14 Taḡaddud.

¹⁵ The Arabic version of the *Metaphysics* famously begins with *alpha elatton*, not with *Alpha Meizon*; in addition, the latter is extant in Arabic only in part (chapters 1-4 and part of chapter 5 are missing); in the unique manuscript of the Arabic *Metaphysics* known to date, this translation is attributed to Nazīf ibn Ayman (Xth century). Two main explanations have been advanced for this: either the Greek manuscript out of which the translation had been made was incomplete, or the Arab readers, baffled by the double beginning of the *Metaphysics* (and possibly misled by a scholion which seems to attribute this book to Theophrastus) decided not to translate it. For a survey of the scholarship, see C. Martini, "La tradizione araba della *Metafisica* di Aristotele. Libri α-A", in C. D'Ancona - G. Serra (eds), *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2002 (Subsidia mediaevalia patavina, 3), pp. 75-112, in part. pp. 80-4.

¹⁶ According to A. Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Sifā'*. *A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2006 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 63), pp. 10-11, Book *Alpha Meizon* was missing in Uṣṭāṭ's translation of the *Metaphysics*; Arnzen (p. 13) sides with him.

¹⁷ According to A. Neuwirth, "Neue Materialien zur arabischen Tradition der beiden ersten *Metaphysik*-Bücher", *Die Welt der Islam* 18 (1977-78), pp. 84-100, al-Kindī was acquainted with at least two passages of Book *Alpha Meizon*, which are reflected in his treatise *Fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*: 982 a 21 - b 10 and 983 a 24-31. Martini, "La tradizione araba della *Metafisica* di Aristotele", pp. 91-92, suggests that *Alpha Meizon*, although known to al-Kindī, was not included in the translation of the *Metaphysics* issued from his circle, precisely because of its outright criticism of Plato (the assumption here is obviously that the contents of *Alpha Meizon* were known, at least to some extent). According to Martini, the inclusion of *Alpha Meizon* might have hampered the Kindian project to promote a concordist view of Greek philosophy pivoting on the harmony between Plato and Aristotle, which has long been recognized as the hallmark of the Kindian project.

¹⁸ *Metaph.*, B 2, 997 a 34 - b 5: ἔτι δὲ πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας μόνας εἶναι φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταῦτας ἄλλας, καὶ πότερον μοναχῶς ἢ πλείω γένη τετύχηκεν ὄντα τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ λέγοντες τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τὰ μετὰ ζῦ, περὶ ἃ τὰς μαθηματικὰς εἶναι φασι ἐπιστήμας; ὡς μὲν οὖν λέγομεν τὰ εἶδη αἰτιά τε καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις περὶ αὐτῶν: "Further, must we say that sensible substances alone exist, or that there are others besides these? And are substances of one kind or are there in fact several kinds of substances, as those say who assert the existence both of the Forms and of the intermediates, with which they say the mathematical sciences deal? The sense in which we say the Forms are both causes and self-dependent substances has been explained in our first remarks about them" (trans. Ross).

die von gewissen Philosophen als von diesen beiden verschieden gesetzt werden, die auf einer Skala von Immanenz und Transzendenz voneinander zu unterscheiden sind” (p. 21).

Such a smoothing of Aristotle’s anti-Platonism, or total misunderstanding if you want, features also in passages where Aristotle openly criticises Plato. This is the case with book *Alpha Meizon*, attested (partially) in two versions which are both different from each other, and from the Greek original: one is quoted by Averroes in his Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, and was the work of a certain Nazīf ibn Ayman;¹⁹ the other is quoted by al-Šahrastānī (d. 1153) in his *Book of Religions and philosophical sects*, and its origin is unknown (p. 14). Book *Alpha Meizon* contains an exposition of Plato’s theory of Forms in a highly critical vein, but here too its Arabic rendering presents some shifts in meaning and wording, so that Aristotle’s objections are watered down into a sort of complementary account, which may coexist with Plato’s own position. In the issue at hand, Aristotle is saying that Plato – who mostly follows the lead of Pythagoras while parting company with him on some points – is convinced that there is no science of the sensible things, because of their restless change (A 6, 987 a 29 - b 1); then, Aristotle says that Socrates was the first to enquire about definitions (987 b 1-4) and that for Plato the search for definitions is possible only in the field of realities that must differ from the sensible ones, since the latter are changeable (987 b 4-7). Hence, Plato called “Ideas” those realities which the sensible things are named after. The two Arabic versions of this passage, although differently from one another, are not completely faithful to the Greek original. In Nazīf’s translation quoted by Averroes, Aristotle says that Plato called “Ideas” those things which are “one” in and by themselves, a sentence which may or may not entail a real shift in meaning, but in any case is not literal.²⁰ As for the account recorded by al-Šahrastānī, it is heavily interpretative: Aristotle says that Plato named “Ideas” the universals (*al-ašyā al-kulliyya*) and established between the sensible things and such “universals” a relationship of “participation”, a statement that cannot but water down the objections levelled against the theory of Forms. All in all, Arnzen’s conclusion is that “die arabische Überlieferung der aristotelischen Ideenkritik ein heterogenes, oft widersprüchliches Bild der platonischen Ideenlehre entfaltet” (p. 28).

On the contrary, the Arab translator of Plotinus dealt in a more satisfactory way with the theory of Forms interspersed in the *Enneads* with the properly Plotinian tenets. Even though the

¹⁹ See above n. 15.

²⁰ Aristotle says: οὗτος οὖν τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε (987 b 6-7) and the Arabic rendering in Nazīf’s version is: “[Plato] called Forms those things which for the existents are ‘one’ in themselves (*wa-sammā llātī biya li-l-mawǧūdātī wāhidatun bi-‘aynihā šuwaran*)”. Arnzen, p. 15 n. 26, relies on A. Bertolacci, “On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), pp. 241-75, in part. p. 265, n. 73, for the idea that the Arabic rendering just quoted is better explained if we suppose in the Greek model τὰ αὐτά, instead of τοιαῦτα. The Greek antecedent hypothesized by Arnzen is *τὰ μέντοι αὐτά. Attractive as this explanation may be, the existence of the variant reading *τὰ μέντοι αὐτά in the Greek manuscript on which Nazīf’s translation is based remains speculative, especially because there is no adversative particle in the Arabic sentence, which would reflect *μέντοι. It is true that *τὰ μέντοι αὐτά looks like a typical mistake of transliteration from uncials into minuscule (TA MEN TOIAYTA vs TA MENTOI AYTA) – obviously not in the Greek manuscript which served as the basis for the translation, but in its model. Still, only one thing is sure: the Arabic *wāhidatun* presupposes that *έν has been read in the Greek sentence (something that goes against *μέντοι). be this as it may, the exact form of the Greek sentence underlying the Arabic cannot be reconstructed; it might also be the case that it was the same as that quoted above (i.e. the text of both Jaeger’s and Ross’ editions; the variant readings are of no help for understanding Nazīf’s translation). As a matter of fact, this sentence is by no means a simple one: despite appearances, τοιαῦτα does not look back to the last items mentioned, i.e. the sensible things, but to ἐτέρων of 987 b 5, i.e. the realities which are different from the sensible things. My guess is that the translator might have been bewildered, and that he relied on *έν in order to obtain a meaningful sentence. The Arabic is in any case a free rendering of the contrast established by Plato, in Aristotle’s report, between sensible things and Forms.

Neoplatonic texts have been heavily adapted and much more substantially reworked if compared with Aristotle's,²¹ and even if here too the theory of Forms undergoes various changes, the outcome is more consistent than in the case of the *Metaphysics*: "Im Gegensatz zur arabischen Überlieferung der aristotelischen Ideenkritik boten die arabischen *Plotiniana* eine mehr oder weniger kohärente Doktrin hierarchisch geordneter, transzendenter und immanenter Formen" (p. 41). To disentangle the Platonic theory of Forms from Plotinus' own doctrines is not an easy task, given that the latter presents himself as an exegete of Plato (V 8[31], 4.54-55) and endorses the Platonic Forms as the unsurpassed account of the true causes of reality – whether or not modifying Plato's genuine tenets, is a question that cannot be addressed here. It is well known that Plotinus goes as far as to claim that his doctrine of the One is nothing if not Plato's own position, that he limited himself to expound (V 1[10], 8.10-14). This helps to explain why the theory of Forms omnipresent in the Arabic Plotinus is not recognised by its readers as idiosyncratic of Plato, while counting as one of the main sources for its knowledge. As Arnzen points out, here too they are labelled *suwar* (p. 32). Also, the Platonic Forms as embedded in Plotinus' philosophy undergo several adaptations. First and foremost, they are presented as principles derived from the Good by way of creation, as implied in the passage quoted above (p. 349 and n. 12), and as noted by Arnzen: "Erste Ursache dieser Hervorbringung [i.e. of the Forms], die, sofern von ewigen Formen die Rede ist, außer oder vor der Zeit und in nichtdiskursiver Form erfolgen muss, ist der Schöpfer (*al-bārī*)" (p. 33). A second difference is the arrangement of the Forms into a hierarchy of degrees. Arnzen (p. 32) points to the passage of ps.-*Theol. Arist.*, p. 58.2-7 Badawī, where the intelligible Forms (*suwar 'aqliyya*), the natural forms (*suwar tabī'iyya*) and the forms of artifacts (*suwar šinā'iyya*) are arranged into a tripartite hierarchy. It is rewarding to pause and comment upon Plotinus' sentence and its Arabic rendering.

The tripartite hierarchy singled out by Arnzen elaborates upon Plotinus' statement of the ontological superiority of the cause: καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ποιῶν πᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ κρεῖττον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ ποιουμένου (V 8[31], 1.30-31, see below for Armstrong's translation), a sentence intended to assess not the transcendence of the first principle, but the rule – intrinsic in the Platonic theory of Forms and accepted with qualifications also by Aristotle – of the so-called "causality of the maximum".²² Plotinus is speaking of *every* primary principle, τὸ πρῶτον ποιῶν πᾶν, and proceeds to apply the rule to one specific case, that of beauty. As a matter of fact, he is engaged here in a move which may alert us against his proclaimed unqualified adherence to Plato: the overturning of Plato's well-known blame of figurative art in Book X of the *Republic*. Plotinus is indeed creating a tripartite hierarchy: the Forms in themselves, their imitation by natural things, and the imitation of the latter by craftsmen. However, such a hierarchy remains implicit in his passage. Its focus lies elsewhere: Plotinus' main point is in fact to counter the Gnostic refusal to admit the mimetic relationship between the sensible world and its intelligible model, and the issue at hand, i.e. beauty and the arts, paves the way to deal with the physical world as with an immense oeuvre which, like Phidias' statue of Zeus, is directly

²¹ In a nutshell, Plotinus' and Proclus' works in the Arabic versions are rearranged as for their structure, and substantially adapted as for their contents: the Neoplatonic One turns out to be not only God the Almighty, the Creator, but also the First Agent of the Aristotelian universe, and the Pure Being of the pseudo-Dionysian theology. Despite the shifts in meaning exemplified above, none of Aristotle's statements has undergone manipulations of this kind, although some adaptations have been made, as the substitution of *rūḥānī* for θεῶν in the Arabic rendering of Aristotle's *De Caelo*, as shown by G. Endress, "Platonizing Aristotle: The Concepts of 'Spiritual' (*rūḥānī*) as a Keyword of the Neoplatonic Strand in Early Arabic Aristotelianism", *Studia graeco-arabica* 2 (2012), pp. 265-79.

²² See A.C. Lloyd, "Primum in genere: the Philosophical Background", *Diotima* 4 (1976), pp. 32-36; Id., "The Principle that the Cause is Greater than its Effect", *Phronesis* 21 (1976), pp. 146-56.

issued from the contemplation of its intelligible model by the Demiurge. Be this as it may, the Arabic version expands Plotinus' implicit hierarchy into an explicit one. Plotinus limited himself to saying:

Every original maker must be in itself stronger than that which it makes; it is not lack of music which makes a man musical, but music, and music in the world of sense is made by the music prior to this world (V 8[31], 1.30-32, trans. Armstrong).

Instead, the Arabic version says:

We say, briefly and concisely, that every doer is superior to the things done and every pattern superior to the reproduction derived from it. For the musician is from music and every beautiful form is from another form prior to it and higher than it, for if it is an artistic form it is from the form in the mind and knowledge of the artist, and if it is a natural form it is from an intellectual form prior to it and worthier than it. The first, the intellectual form, is superior to the natural form, and the natural form is superior to the form in the knowledge of the artist, and the known form in the knowledge of the artist is superior to and more beautiful than the form executed: *art imitates nature* and nature imitates mind (ps.-*Theol. Arist.*, pp. 57.19-58.7 Badawī, trans. Lewis p. 277; my emphasis).

This hierarchy of three degrees of Forms – transcendent, instantiated in natural things, and artificial – goes hand in hand with another tripartition, in itself different but exhibiting the same concern with a hierarchy of levels: that which has been superposed on *Metaphysics*, B 2, 997 a 34 - b 5, as we have seen before under Arnzen's guidance.²³ It is also worth noting the presence of the saying "art imitates nature", a well-known Aristotelian tenet²⁴ which does not feature in Plotinus' passage. It may or may not come directly from Aristotle,²⁵ but the main point is that in the Kindian "metaphysics file", to borrow from Zimmermann's felicitous label,²⁶ Aristotle's wording in Book *Beta* gives a Platonic ring, and Plotinus' sentence ends with a famous Aristotelian saying. Far from being an extrinsic claim, the "harmony between Plato and Aristotle" emerges from the texts themselves as a consequence of their adaptations.

As shown by Arnzen (see above), Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic theory of Forms was quite obscured in the Arabic translations of the *Metaphysics*. However, in ways which remain for the most

²³ See above, pp. 350-1.

²⁴ Arist., *Phys.* II 2, 194 a 21-22: ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν. *Ibid.*, II 8, 199 a 15-17: ὅλως δὲ ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι. τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται.

²⁵ The Arabic version of Aristotle's *Physics* is later than that of Plotinus' *Enneads*, but in al-Kindī's times the commentary by Philoponus was translated, partly by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, and partly by Ibn Nā'ima al-Ḥimṣī, the translator of Plotinus (*K. al-Fibrīst*, p. 251.18-20 Flügel = p. 311.1-3 Tağaddud). This may have been a conduit for acquaintance with Aristotle's *ars imitatur naturam*, but this saying is so widespread that it may have been known also in many other ways.

²⁶ The creation of the "Skala von Immanenz und Transzendenz" of Forms described by Arnzen in the Arabic version of *Metaphysics Beta* (see above, p. 351) is in all likelihood due to the translator, Uṣṭāṭ, who worked for al-Kindī; as for the amplification of Plotinus' sentence discussed above, it is not easy to decide if it were the work of the translator or of al-Kindī himself, who is said to have "corrected" Ibn Nā'ima's translation (p. 3.7-9 Badawī). The latter is my favourite explanation, but discussing this issue would exceed the limits of this review. The label "Kindī's metaphysics file" has been created by F.W. Zimmermann, "The Origins of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*", in J. Krayer - W.F. Ryan - C.-B. Schmitt (eds), *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages: the Theology and Other Texts*, The Warburg Institute, London 1986, pp. 110-240, in order to indicate "a compilation of Greek metaphysics, most probably sponsored by al-Kindī, which (...) united Uṣṭāṭh's version of the *Metaphysics* with contributions from post-Aristotelian theology by other translators and adaptors" (p. 131).

part unknown to us, these criticisms circulated in the Arabic-speaking world by the time of al-Fārābī. The latter proves to be well acquainted with them, both in his indisputably genuine works like the *Epistle on the Goals of Aristotle's Metaphysics* and in the *Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle*, whose Farabian authorship has been challenged. Arnzen's analysis highlights a twofold attitude in al-Fārābī towards the theory of Forms: on the one hand, he follows Aristotle's lead in denying the existence of Forms as the separate causes of visible things; on the other, he shares in the Platonic principle that sense-perception does not meet the criteria to produce science. In his Platonizing epistemology, al-Fārābī goes as far as to claim that sensible objects are only images of true objects of science (p. 54 and n. 184, with al-Fārābī's passages), which by the same token rise to the status of intelligible *realities*. An in-depth analysis of the Farabian understanding of the theory of Forms leads to the conclusion that Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements are intermingled in it. Al-Fārābī proves to be acquainted with Aristotle's criticisms; however, he also endorses the Neoplatonic identification of the separate Intellect with the totality of intelligible Forms. After having described (pp. 58-9) the Farabian hierarchy of Forms expounded in the *K. al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya*, which culminates in the highest degree named *ṣūrat al-ṣuwar* (the Form of Forms), Arnzen compares the latter with the Agent Intellect of the *Epistle on the Intellect*: "Al-Fārābī's Abhandlung über den Intellekt legt die Vermutung nahe, dass es sich bei der Form der Formen um den Aktiven Intellekt (*al-'aql al-fā'āl*) handelt. Anders als in den bisher betrachteten Werken zieht al-Fārābī dort die Möglichkeit in Erwägung, dass es transzendente Formen gibt, denen freilich eine separate Existenz nicht *qua* durch-sich-subsistierende Substanz, sondern nur *qua* *Intelligibilia* des Erworbenen Intellekts (*al-'aql al-mustafād, intellectus acquisitus*) eignet" (p. 60). This raises a problem of consistency. While in the *Epistle on the Goals of Aristotle's Metaphysics* al-Fārābī states that Aristotle in this work demonstrated the inanity of the Platonic separate Forms (*al-ṣuwar al-aflātūniyya*), in the *K. al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya* he posits the hierarchy of Forms mentioned above, whose pinnacle is the somehow obscure "Form of Forms"; finally, in the *Epistle on the Intellect* the "Form of Forms" coincides, in purely Neoplatonic vein, with the separate Intellect: "Die höchste Stufe der Formen wird nun, in der *Risāla Fī l-'aql*, mit dem Aktiven Intellekt identifiziert und explizit als transzendente Form beschrieben" (p. 61).

It is noteworthy, in itself and for the subsequent developments of Arabic-Islamic philosophy, that in the Farabian *Epistle on the Intellect* the Agent Intellect of the Peripatetic tradition bears also the hallmarks of the Plotinian divine νοῦς.²⁷ More germane to my argument here is to follow Arnzen's treatment of what prima facie seems to be an item of blatant inconsistency in al-Fārābī's thought. Arnzen is right, in my opinion, when he says that the presence of as different accounts as that of the inanity of the Platonic Forms on the one hand, and that of the hierarchy of Forms culminating in the Intellect, on the other, can be traced back to the systematic layout of a philosophical science which, as a whole, should be brought to harmony with the Muslim system of learning. As Arnzen has it, "Andererseits deutet alles darauf hin, dass mit der Form der Formen im *K. al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya* nach plotinischem Vorbild nichts anderes als der Aktive Intellekt der *Risāla Fī l-'aql* gemeint ist. Diese Inkonsistenz ist selbstverständlich al-Fārābī's Bemühen geschuldet, sowohl das aristotelische als auch das neuplatonische Erbe in eine systematische islamische Philosophie zu integrieren"

²⁷ The most important Neoplatonic feature that distinguishes the Farabian Agent Intellect from that of the Peripatetic tradition cannot be discussed here, having little to do with the issue of Platonic Forms. Suffice it to say that in Alexander of Aphrodisias' treatise *On the Intellect*, which is the main source of al-Fārābī, the Agent Intellect coincides with the First Principle itself; on the contrary, al-Fārābī keeps it as a subordinate separate substance, as it is in the Arabic Plotinus.

(p. 62). It is against this background that one should replace the extremely influential Farabian *Epistle on the Intellect*, and this Arnzen does neatly: “Darüber hinaus wird deutlich, dass al-Fārābī in der *Risāla Fi l-ʿaql* durchaus nicht nur eine Kategorie transzendenter Formen annimmt, die insgesamt und ausschließlich Formen im Aktiven Intellekt sind, sondern eine Vielzahl hierarchisch geordneter transzendenter Formen, die in dem Bereich zwischen dem Aktiven Intellekt und der niedrigsten transzendenten Form, dem Erworfenen Intellekt, lokalisiert werden” (p. 63). Arnzen’s idea that all this can be explained with the assumption of the unity of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic legacy is surely true, although the basic inconsistency among the diverse accounts in al-Fārābī’s writings remains. In my opinion, the only way to dispose satisfactorily of the charge of inconsistency is to deepen the analysis in the direction indicated by Arnzen,²⁸ and raise the question to what extent the *Epistle on the Goals of Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”* contains al-Fārābī’s own thought, and to what extent it represents his account of the points made by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, to be eventually integrated with other views held elsewhere, either by ‘Aristotle’ himself (like in the *Theology*) or by his followers (like Alexander in his own writing *On Intellect*).²⁹

This leads me to a point in Arnzen’s treatment of al-Fārābī which is not entirely convincing. It is well known that the main reason why the Farabian authorship of the *Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle* has been challenged in scholarship is the fact that the Neoplatonic *Theology of Aristotle* is accepted here as a genuine work by the First Teacher, while it does not feature as Aristotle’s work, let alone as his last word in metaphysics, in other writings by al-Fārābī. To this inconsistency an entire set of others has been added, in order to demonstrate that the *Harmonization* could hardly have been written by al-Fārābī, who either puts things differently in other works by him, or uses a different language, or even endorses different doctrines. It would lie beyond the scope of this review even to list the pros and cons, while it is appropriate to discuss the way in which Arnzen deals with the issue of consistency versus inconsistency. As for the authorship of the *Harmonization*, Arnzen seems to steer a middle course between those who include it in al-Fārābī’s early writings and those who take it as a forgery (p. 67); but it is striking that one additional reason in favour of pseudepigraphy he presents (p. 67, n. 216) is precisely that of the inconsistency between the views held in the *Harmonization* and in the Farabian works, this time on the issue of anamnesis. While it is perfectly legitimate to list this item among others for those scholars who believe that al-Fārābī is an entirely consistent author, it seems to me that the fact that anamnesis is dealt with differently in the *Harmonization* with respect to other writings should not prevent Arnzen, who has so satisfactorily dealt with the much more strident contrast about Forms, from including it among the works whose inner consistency he looks for, despite the contradictory statements held in them. At any rate, it is in the *Harmonization* that occurs for the first time the expression *al-ṣuwar wa-l-muṭul (aflātūniyya)*, and this, coupled with the influence of this writing on the early Avicennian understanding of

²⁸ Arnzen draws attention to the fact that in his logical works al-Fārābī completely discards the issue of Forms: “In al-Fārābī’s logischen und sprachphilosophischen Werken spielen diese transzendenten Formen keine Rolle” (p. 64), an attitude which is clearly inspired by Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. In a similar vein, in the *K. al-ḥuruf* the Platonic forms do not feature at all.

²⁹ This move might eventually lead to critically reconsider what seems to be the assumption with which part of the Farabian scholarship operates, namely that al-Fārābī is true to Aristotle as the latter is understood by us, after a multiseular effort to get near his thought *iuxta propria principia* (so to say), instead than to the late antique Aristotle, who incorporated a number of elements of other philosophical schools.

separate Forms,³⁰ raises this text to a major source for Arabic-Islamic thought in subsequent ages, no matter who the author was.

Predictably, the real turning point in Arnzen's narrative of the history of Platonic Forms in Islamic thought is Avicenna. An accurate description of the distinction between Forms and universals in Avicenna's thought, and an insightful survey of the changes in his various works, allows Arnzen to conclude that "Im Rahmen der Entwicklung dieser Lehre hat Ibn Sīnā die durch die arabischen *Neoplatonica* inspirierte und in einer frühen Schaffensperiode in Betracht gezogene Identifikation himmlischer Intellekte *qua* selbst-denkende Formen mit Platonischen Formen wieder verworfen. Nach der engültigen Etablierung seines philosophisches Systems stellte die platonische Ideenlehre für ihn keine ernsthafte philosophische Option mehr dar, sondern galt ihm lediglich noch als interessantes historisches Phänomen, das seinem Wesen nach ein dialektisches und sophistisches Problem darstellt" (p. 99).

Thus, the Platonic Forms fade out from the actual philosophical options, into a remote background where Aristotle disposed of them; they are superseded by and included within the Plotinian intelligible realm endorsed by the Neoplatonized Aristotle of the pseudo-*Theology*. In the early Avicennian writings like the *K. al-mabda' wa-l-ma'ād* the intelligible realm is the place where our soul comes from and strives to return to, but even in later writings, where the doctrines of the *Provenance and Destination* are no longer held, the Neoplatonic implications of the cosmic hierarchy beginning with the First Intellect and ending with the *dator formarum* are evident.

Another important point made by Arnzen is that of the influence of the unmistakable Neoplatonism of the *Harmonization* on post-Avicennian thought. It is from this writing that Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī draws his account of the "world of the Intellect" (*'ālam al-'aql*); he says also that Plato expounds the doctrine of the "world of the Divinity" (*'ālam al-rubūbiyya*) and the hierarchically arranged worlds of Intellect and Soul: while it is certain that this ultimately derives from the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*,³¹ the intermediate source is in all likelihood the *Harmonization*. The section where Arnzen describes the attitude of the post-Avicennian authors towards the Platonic Forms (pp. 106-18) paves the way to the subsequent chapters, on Suhrawardī (pp. 119-50) and on the Eastern thinkers of the 13th and 14th centuries: Ibn Kammūna, Šams al-Dīn al-Šahrazūrī, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Širāzī (pp. 151-74). Then the anonymous treatise *On the Intelligible Platonic Forms, Risāla fī l-Muṭal al-'aqliyya al-aflātūniyya*, is analyzed (pp. 175-84) and translated (pp. 219-354). A major contribution in the field, this translation allows the reader to get acquainted with a unique piece of information. "Die anonyme *Abhandlung über die Platonischen noetischen Urbilder* is in vielerlei Hinsicht ein einzigartiges Dokument der spätmittelalterlichen post-suhrawardischen Auseinandersetzung mit den arabischen Konzepten von Platonischen Formen und Urbildern. Soweit wir wissen, handelt es sich bei ihr um die einzige umfassende monographische Erörterung dieser Konzepte aus dieser Epoche" (p. 213). One can only hope that the Author will continue his enquiry on the same subject taking into account the philosophical thought of the Muslim West.

Cristina D'Ancona

³⁰ Discussed by Arnzen at p. 93.

³¹ The pseudo-*Theology* bears as its subtitle "discourse on the Divinity (*qawl 'alā al-rubūbiyya*, p. 3.7 Badawī)"; the passage quoted above, p. 349 and n. 12, lies in the background of Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī's attribution to Plato of the doctrine of the "world of Divinity".

D. Janos, *Method, Structure, and Development in al-Fārābī's Cosmology*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2012 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 85), vii-433 pp.

This beautiful and rich book is the revised version of D. Janos' Ph.D. dissertation submitted to McGill University in February 2009. One of its merits is to synthesise the recent scholarship on al-Fārābī's metaphysics and cosmology, and its main point is to provide a new interpretation of his theories on the structure and essence of the heavenly world, in order to solve some problems of al-Fārābī's cosmological thinking. To this end, Janos analyses in depth a cluster of key cosmological and metaphysical concepts such as celestial substance, causation, intellection, and motion, paying attention to al-Fārābī's terminology and lexicon. He contextualises these concepts in the light of Ancient and late Antique Greek sources, combined with the Arabic sources examined against the background of the early Islamic intellectual milieu in which al-Fārābī flourished. Janos pays attention also to the role of the Ptolemaic astronomical theories in the Farabian philosophical system. "Al-Fārābī's exegetical approach was neither static nor monolithic, and it underwent various shifts in direction and perspective due to his dynamic understanding of the Greek works and factors emanating from his social and cultural environment" (p. 3). Following this textual and contextual approach, the thesis of this book is that al-Fārābī's cosmology underwent a clear evolution which falls into two main periods, characterised by his shifting from a creationist position to an eternalist one. I will discuss this assumption later.

After a concise introduction (pp. 1-9), the opening chapter, *Cosmology, the Sciences, and the Scientific Method* (pp. 11-113), places al-Fārābī in context and makes the networks of different scientific and philosophical traditions alive with respect to which he formulated his own cosmology (pp. 11-43). According to Janos, al-Fārābī inherited a dual cosmological tradition – one from the Ptolemaic astronomical treatises and one from the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian philosophical writings – which is testified first of all by his commentatorial and writing activities. Concerning the cosmological tradition inherited from the Ptolemaic astronomical treatises, Janos analyses the attribution to al-Fārābī of a commentary on the *Almagest*. He calls attention to the elements which al-Fārābī derives directly from the Ptolemaic texts or through the intermediary of Arabic authors and which feature in his own works, like the arrangement and order of the planets, the description of the various motions of the orbs, and the endorsement of the epicycles and eccentrics.

Concerning the philosophical tradition, it is well known that al-Fārābī's commentaries on the Aristotelian physical treatises are unfortunately lost; for this reason, even if the ancient sources make it plausible that al-Fārābī read several late Antique commentaries on Aristotle, we cannot judge with certainty the degree of his reliance on these works. In addition, many of his works in the field of physics and cosmology are lost too, except for parts of *On Changing Beings* (*Fī l-Maw ḡūdāt al-mutaḡayyira*) and the treatise *Against Philoponus* (*al-Radd' alā Yahyā al-Nahwī*), a treatise too long underestimated which has been recently considered as a key text for the understanding of al-Fārābī's argumentative strategies.

Notwithstanding this, Janos proceeds to reconstruct al-Fārābī's cosmology, starting from his emanationist treatises – the *Perfect State* (*Mabādī' arā' ahl al-madīna al-fāḡila*) and the *Principles of Beings* (*Al-siyāsa al-madaniyya* or *Mabādī' al-maw ḡūdāt*) –, but taking into account also several other works, as for example the *Book of Music* (*Kitāb al-Mūsīqā al-kabīr*) and the *Demonstration* (*Kitāb al-Burhān*) which, although not devoted to cosmological issues, contain interesting material. Janos takes into account also two astrological treatises which shed light on al-Fārābī's refutation of some aspects of astrology, thus helping to redefine the borders between astronomy and astrology: *On the Utility of the Sciences and the Crafts* (*Risāla fī Faḡilat al-'ulūm wa-l-ṣinā'āt* or *Maḡāla fī Mā yaṣiḡḡū wa-lā yaṣiḡḡū min aḡkām al-nu ḡūm*) and *On the Aspects in which Belief in Astrology is Valid* (*Maḡāla fī ḡihati allatī yaṣiḡḡū 'alayhā l-qawl fī aḡkām al-nu ḡūm*). Finally, Janos presents three other topics which are

important in al-Fārābī's cosmology: his reaction to the traditional Islamic cosmology, his attitude towards the previous Arabic philosophical tradition represented by al-Kindī and Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and his knowledge of the Arabic astronomical tradition with its new emphasis on observation.¹

In the second part of Chapter 1 (pp. 43-84) Janos presents a careful survey of al-Fārābī's sources. More precisely, he deals with "al-Fārābī's conception of the method and epistemic foundations of astronomy, on how it may benefit the philosophical enterprise, and on how it relates to the other philosophical sciences, particularly physics and metaphysics" (pp. 43-4). According to al-Fārābī, physics studies the realm of corporeal beings, not only sublunary hylomorphic beings, but also "the heavenly bodies, that is, the orbs, stars, and planets" (p. 66). Hence, physics studies different aspect of the same subject matter of astronomy and it is from physics that astronomy derives some of its principles.² But it is metaphysics which provides the knowledge of the ultimate causes of celestial bodies, as well as the definition of their true substance: in other words, metaphysics has the primacy in the cosmological inquiry. Nevertheless, "al-Fārābī regards the relation among astronomy, physics, and metaphysics as reciprocal, rather than unilateral (...). Astronomy depends on metaphysics and physics for some of its principles, but it can in return contribute to these sciences by providing them with knowledge of certain existents with which physics and metaphysics also deal. These existents chiefly consist of the planets and orbs, and an example might be the discovery of new stars through astronomical observation, as well as the calculation of their distances, sizes, etc. In this manner, astronomy can contribute to one's knowledge of the existents subsumed under a certain genus, which may be of value to metaphysics as well. On the other hand, astronomy will not be able to explain why this particular star exists, a question which requires an aetiological account that transcends the astronomical discipline. But more significantly, astronomy may also shed light on metaphysical beings such as the separate intellects, and particularly on the question of their number. This statement might appear most surprising at first glance, given that immaterial existents do not fall within the subject matter of astronomy. Yet according to al-Fārābī and later Ibn Sīnā, who follow Aristotle directly on this point,³ the question of the number of the separate intellects or unmoved movers hinges to some extent on the number of orbs identified by the astronomical discipline" (pp. 78-9).

Finally, the last part of Chapter 1 (pp. 84-113) deals with the problem of the human capacity to know superlunary phenomena. Al-Fārābī states that human beings are predisposed to get knowledge of the heavens and that "the 'first intelligibles' that lead to such knowledge are commonly shared by all humans" (p. 91). Al-Fārābī writes, "these things can be known in two ways: either by being impressed on their souls as they really are or by being impressed on them through affinity and symbolic representation. (...) The philosophers in the city are those who know these things through demonstrations and their own insight".⁴ Hence, demonstration is the proper method of cosmological inquiry. But if demonstration is

¹ Al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Mūsīqā l-kabīr*, ed. 'A.Ḥ. Ḡaṭṭās, Dār al-Katib al-'Arabī li-l-Ṭibā'a wa-l-Naṣr, al-Qāhira 1960, p. 101, English translation by Janos, p. 58: "many of the principles of astronomy are acquired through observations by means of instruments".

² Janos (pp. 70-1) observes a striking parallel between al-Fārābī's conception of the importance of natural philosophy in astronomy and the *Introduction to the Phainomena and Concise Exposition of the Meteorology of Poseidonios* by the Stoic philosopher Geminus. Janos refers to R. Todd, "Geminus", in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, CNRS-Éd., III, Paris 2000, pp. 472-7. According to Todd (p. 473), both the Hebrew and the Latin translations of Geminus' *Introduction to the Phainomena* have been made from Arabic; hence, some of Geminus' works were available in Arabic at least in part.

³ Arist., *Metaph.* XII 8, 1073 b 1-1074 a 17.

⁴ R. Walzer, Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Mabādi' āra' abl al-madīna al-fāḍila*, A Revised Text with Introduction, Translation and Commentary, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1985, pp. 277-9 and 146-7; English translation revised by Janos, p. 91.

the proper method for cosmology, why does the *Perfect State and the Principles of Beings* lack extensive demonstrative proofs? According to Janos, in al-Fārābī the belief in demonstration in the study of celestial bodies (as expressed in the passage above) coexists with the idea that the human inquiry into metaphysical knowledge is limited, and especially that into God, because of divine transcendence. To overcome the limits of our metaphysical knowledge, al-Fārābī proposes the use of comparison, analogy, and ‘transference’ (*naqla*) to which Janos devotes the last pages of Chapter 1.

In Chapter 2, *The Architecture of the Heavens: Intellects, Souls, and Orbs* (pp. 115-202), Janos reconstructs the basic structure of al-Fārābī’s hierarchical model of the cosmos as expounded in the “emanationist” treatises (the *Perfect State* and the *Principles of Beings*), discussing also the various physical and immaterial entities that constitute it. Janos’ analysis begins with the celestial bodies of the visible heavens – orbs, planets and stars – which al-Fārābī distinguishes conceptually, even though he does not stick to a consistent terminology. According to al-Fārābī, who follows in Aristotle’s footsteps, the celestial bodies are a sort of bodies in which each one is a unique individual in its species. Every celestial body is characterized by spherical shape, luminosity and continuous circular motion around the earth. Orbs, planets and stars consist of two principles: soul, acting like the form in the sublunary bodies, and substrate, acting like the matter. In the “emanationist” treatises, al-Fārābī omits any reference to a simple celestial matter. Concerning the spatial arrangement of the celestial bodies, Janos has the following account: “According to al-Fārābī, the heavens are divided into what he calls “groups” (sing. *jumla*, plur. *jumal*) (...). Al-Fārābī establishes a hierarchy among the various cosmic groups, and the orbs are organized in ranks (*marātib*) in a descending order of excellence. There are in total nine *jumal*, which correspond to the nine main celestial orbs inherited from Ptolemaic astronomy. The farthest, outermost orb, also called ‘the first heaven’ (*al-samā’ l-ūlā*) and ‘the first body’ (*al-jism al-awwal*), is a starless and planetless orb, which is nobler in rank than the other orbs, due to its essential proximity to the first separate intellect. This first orb surrounds all the other orbs and causes the daily rotation of the heavens from east to west. Below it is ‘the orb of the fixed stars’ (*kurat al-kawākib al-thābitah*), which is characterized by its dual motion – one being the motion of the outermost orb, the other a retrograde motion from west to east called precession – and by the fact that the stars are ‘fixed’ in their orb and hence do not change position *vis-à-vis* one another. Next are the orbs of the seven planets, whose descending order according to al-Fārābī is as follows: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the sun, Venus, Mercury, and the moon. The orb of the moon is thus the last orb, which is closest to the earth, and whose concave surface marks the separation between the sublunary world and the heavens proper” (pp. 120-1). Then, Janos raises the question whether the nine celestial groups mentioned by al-Fārābī consist of one orb (as frequently alleged in the secondary literature) or several orbs: in other words, he wonders whether al-Fārābī’s planetary model presents an Aristotelian system of homocentric orbs, or echoes the Ptolemaic planetary devices of the eccentrics and epicycles, interpreted by al-Fārābī as corporeal entities. Janos points out that in the *Perfect State* al-Fārābī gives a simplified cosmological model, but that in the Farabian corpus many hints suggest a more complex theory: his knowledge of Ptolemy’s *Almagest* on which he is credited with a commentary and some textual references on eccentrics and epicycles, more or less obscure, which are listed and commented upon (pp. 123-5).

Celestial souls constitute part of the substance of celestial bodies; they do not exist separately from the orbs, but they are part of them and are compared to forms.⁵ Despite the fact that the souls are

⁵ Janos, pp. 177-80, discusses the problem of the separability of the form according to al-Fārābī. On the Neoplatonic background see C. D’Ancona, “Separation and the Forms. A Plotinian Approach”, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 71 (1997), pp. 367-403.

something existing in a substrate, they contemplate the higher principles and this activity makes them actual intellects. Unlike al-Kindī, al-Fārābī limits the activity of the celestial souls to a continuous, simultaneous and non-discursive intellection, without granting them sensation and imagination. The celestial souls have for him three simultaneous objects of thought: God, their proximate efficient and final cause – i.e. each different separate intellect which causes the existence of each celestial soul –, and their own essence. Janos insists on this threefold intellection of the celestial souls and suggests that the source of inspiration to al-Fārābī was proposition 3 of the *K. al-Mahḍ al-ḥayr*, an interesting suggestion on which one regrets that he does not elaborate, and which remains not entirely clear (pp. 138-42).

Above the celestial souls there are the separate intellects, ten in number, hierarchically ordered from the First according to their essential priority and posteriority. Janos specifies that these ten intellects are in turn divided into two categories with different characteristics and different functions: the first nine separate intellects (*al-tawānī*) and the Agent Intellect (*al-'aql al-fā'āl*). The first nine intellects are called “second” with respect to the First Cause, God, and they are secondary causes of the existence of the celestial bodies: their twofold intellection, i.e. the intellection of the First and that of their own essence, produces another intellect and an orb together with its soul, i.e. a ‘planetary system’. Hence, there are nine intellects which correspond to the nine celestial orbs, and one Agent Intellect which governs the sublunary world. Janos provides a fairly accurate description of the nine separate intellects, pointing to the hints that al-Fārābī may have found in *Metaphysics Lambda* and in its Greek commentators, especially Alexander and Simplicius,⁶ so that he came to formulate “the simplified cosmological structure of nine main orbs, the doctrine of the ensoulment of the heavens, the existence of a plurality of separate intellects responsible for causing their motion, and the attempt to reconcile Ptolemaic kinematic theories with physical and metaphysical ideas” (p. 167). Concerning the Agent Intellect, Janos emphasises its difference with respect to the nine separate intellects, a difference which arises from its being less simple if compared with them. It has, in fact, a threefold intellection: the First, all the nine separate intellects (*al-tawānī*) in one sweep, and its own essence.

Above the separate intellects there is the highest metaphysical entity, God. It is the First, because of its essential priority in existence. The First is one: a simple eternal substance which is constantly engaged in the act of contemplating its own essence. It is the First Cause, because of its causing the lower effects. Its mode of production of the universe is an issue at stake in contemporary scholarship on al-Fārābī: does God create the whole world *ex nihilo* all at once, or He is the cause only of one single effect, the first separate intellect?⁷ Before approaching this crucial question, Janos ends this chapter with an interesting analysis of the ontological hierarchical continuum of al-Fārābī’s cosmology from the First to the sublunary world in terms of unity and multiplicity, intellection and causality. On the one hand, intellection is the act that necessary leads to the production of similar, albeit inferior, effect; on the

⁶ Janos is aware (p. 157 and note 136 at p. 158) of the fact that Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s *De Caelo* was, as far as we know, not translated into Arabic; however, he considers it to be “a promising source for understanding the philosophical roots of al-Fārābī’s cosmology”, pointing to the elements in Simplicius’ cosmology which anticipate al-Fārābī’s thought: the attempt to reconcile some aspects of the Ptolemaic astronomy with Aristotle’s cosmology, a system of eight, with some hint for a ninth starless orb beyond that of the fixed stars, the hypothetical assumption in Simplicius of a separate mover to each main orb. It seems to me that, given the absence of any direct source, such parallels are by much general; the conclusion (p. 160) that “The astronomical and metaphysical parallels outlined above strongly suggest the possibility that al-Fārābī was acquainted with the works of thinkers from Ammonian school, especially with Simplicius, who was one of its outstanding members” remains speculative.

⁷ On the Neoplatonic background of this theory with a special focus on Avicenna, one can see C. D’Ancona, “*Ex uno non fit nisi unum*. Storia e preistoria della dottrina avicenniana della Prima Intelligenza”, in E. Canone (ed.), *Per una storia del concetto di mente*, II, Olschki, Firenze 2007 (Lessico intellettuale europeo, 103), pp. 29-55.

other, it is also what enables the cosmic existents to actualize their essence and to seek the attainment of their perfection by reverting toward the prior principles. Hence, this causality is characterized by a dual orientation: a downward one (efficient causality), and an upward one (final causality), which is used to explain both the existence of the celestial entities and the perfectibility of their existence.⁸

Chapter 3, “Matter and Creation: A Shift in Paradigms?” (p. 203-32) surveys the scattered evidence on celestial matter within the debate about the creation of the world that can be found in al-Fārābī’s *corpus* and in the indirect tradition of al-Fārābī’s works, with the aim of reconstructing his views on this important cosmological question. Janos mentions the captivating hypothesis of an evolution in al-Fārābī’s thought suggested by G. Endress⁹ and uses it to explain al-Fārābī’s evolution from an Aristotelian account of the celestial substance as it appears in the *Enumeration of the Sciences* (*Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*) – where al-Fārābī refers unambiguously to the heavens as being material – to the *Perfect State*, where he denies matter to the heavens. In this work the heavens are described as a compound of form (*ṣūra*) and substrate (*mawḍūʿ*) of a special kind: the substrate resembles matter, and each celestial body can receive only a unique form: its soul. Janos states that “al-Fārābī was positively influenced by the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, which provided him with next exegetical possibilities on the question of celestial matter”¹⁰ (p. 222), and by Philoponus’s criticism to Aristotle’s theory of aether; second, Aristotle’s aether was difficult to reconcile with the Ptolemaic theories of celestial motion; all this suggests that al-Fārābī developed to a progressive depreciation of matter.

In the second part of this chapter Janos tries to extend the developmentalist hypothesis of al-Fārābī’s thought to the question of creation versus eternal causation. “As it stands today, the Fārābīan corpus adopts two ‘paradigmatic’ interpretations concerning the origin of the material world. The first is based on the concepts of absolute creation out of nothing and on the world’s temporal finitude; the second, on the concepts of atemporal causation and the eternity of the physical universe. I use the word ‘paradigm’ in order to stress the pre-existent conceptual framework these interpretations imply, as well as to emphasize the fact that they are mutually irreconcilable and rely on fundamentally different premises” (p. 235). Some scholars¹¹ have explained this apparent contradiction by questioning al-Fārābī’s authorship of the *Harmony of Plato and Aristotle* (*Kitāb al-Ġamʿ bayna raʾyay al-ḥakīmayn Aflāṭūn al-ilāhī wa Aristūṭālīs*) and of *Answers to questions* (*Ġawābāt li-masāʾil suʾilāʾ anḥā*), where al-Fārābī refers to a creationist position. This is premature, having regard to “the cumulative evidence supporting their authenticity” (p. 239). However, Janos rejects the method that he calls ‘comparative’,¹² according to which the authenticity of

⁸ On the relation between the notion of assimilation to the First Principle and that of final causality see C. Martini Bonadeo, “ΩΣ ΕΡΩΜΕΝΟΝ: alcune interpretazioni di *Metaph. A 7*”, in V. Celluprica - C. D’Ancona (eds), *Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici. Logica ed ontologia nelle interpretazioni greche e arabe. Atti del convegno internazionale, Roma, 19-20 ottobre 2001*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2004 (Elenchos. Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico, 40), pp. 209-43.

⁹ C. Martini-Bonadeo, *Al-Fārābī, L’armonia delle opinioni dei due saggi, il divino Platone e Aristotele*, Introduzione, testo arabo, traduzione e commento, prefazione di G. Endress, PLUS, Pisa 2008 (Greco, arabo, latino. Le vie del sapere, 3), pp. x-xi.

¹⁰ Obviously, Alexander’s commentary is lost, as it also the paraphrase by Themistius which is extant only in Hebrew and Latin. Cf. in this volume E. Coda, “Reconstructing the Text of Themistius’ Paraphrase of the *De Caelo*”, in part. pp. 4-5.

¹¹ J. Lameer, *Alfarabi and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice*, Brill, Leiden 1994 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 20); M. Rashed, “Al-Fārābī’s Lost Treatise On Changing Beings and the Possibility of a Demonstration of the Eternity of the World”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 18 (2008), pp. 19-58; Id., “On the Authorship of the Treatise *On the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages* Attributed to al-Fārābī”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 19 (2009), pp. 43-82.

¹² Followed by D. Mallet in Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *L’harmonie entre les opinions de Platon et d’Aristote. Texte arabe et Traduction*, éd. F.M. Nağğar - D.xMallet, Institut Français de Damas, Damas 1999; by G. Endress and myself in

the *Harmony of Plato and Aristotle* can be decided solely on the basis of how the particular doctrines of the *Harmony* compare to those of other Farabian works. In sum, he maintains that the explanatory potential of the developmentalist hypothesis extended to al-Fārābī's theory on creation/eternal causation is superior, given that it takes into account other important factors: chronology, intention, context.

According to this developmentalist hypothesis, during the "early Baghdad phase" (p. 261) to which belong the *Harmony of Plato and Aristotle*, the *Answers to questions*, and the treatise *Against Philoponus*¹³ al-Fārābī holds a creationist view of the universe and time out of nothing, and follows al-Kindī's harmonizing project; he has access to al-Kindī's 'metaphysics file',¹⁴ where the book *Lambda* is combined with the *Theology of Aristotle*. The *Enumeration of the Sciences* is modelled closely on the *Harmony* in phrasing, content and outlook; in it, as in the *The Aims of the Metaphysics* (*Fī aḡrād mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*), al-Fārābī describes God as the only efficient cause of the universe, even though he posits a multiplicity of immaterial beings between God and the world. Hence these two works would represent a "later stage of al-Fārābī's creationist" (p. 265).¹⁵ Finally, during al-Fārābī's "late Baghdad and wandering phase" (p. 326) to Syria and Egypt, he reaches his final position, eternalism – in particular in the *Perfect State* and the *Principles of Beings*. In his mature works the First is the eternal cause of an atemporal – beyond eternity? – act of emanation of one single immaterial being, the first Intellect. In turn, all the nine separate intellects (*al-ṭawānī*) are the efficient causes of celestial bodies; the latter are the causes of the continuous existence of prime matter due to which all the generations and corruptions occur in the sublunary world. In presenting the nature and role of the nine separate intellects al-Fārābī is, according to Janos, deeply indebted to Proclus and even to Syrianus.¹⁶ To these separate substances a

Al-Fārābī, *L'armonia delle opinioni dei due saggi Platone il divino e Aristotele*; by C. D'Ancona, "The Origins of Islamic Philosophy", in L.P. Gerson (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2010, II, pp. 869-94.

¹³ Janos follows a non-eternalist interpretation of this important writing; in the same vein, see my *Al-Fārābī, L'armonia delle opinioni dei due saggi Platone il divino e Aristotele*, pp. 190-3.

¹⁴ On the fortune of al-Kindī's 'metaphysics file' in the Muslim East after Avicenna, through the mediation of al-Fārābī, see C. Martini Bonadeo, 'Abd al-Latīf al-Baḡdādī's Philosophical Journey. From Aristotle's Metaphysics to the 'Metaphysical Science', Brill, Leiden - Boston 2013 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Textes and Studies, 88).

¹⁵ In Janos's view, the absence/presence of several immaterial beings after the First is one of the most important doctrinal elements for demonstrating al-Fārābī's progressive removal from his creationist stage to his most mature eternalist thought. For this reason he maintains that the *Enumeration of the Sciences*, where this multiplicity is introduced, comes after the *Harmony* with its scattered references to the "corporeal and spiritual parts of the world" (p. 246; cf. Martini Bonadeo, p. 65). I am not sure that the relative chronology of these two writings can be easily established. First, the reference of the *Harmony* comes after the following passage: "He then explains that the true one is what provides oneness to all the rest of the existing things. Then he explains that the multiple is by all means after the one and that the one precedes the multiple. He then explains that every multiplicity that approaches the true one is less multiple than what is at distance from it and *vice versa*" (Alfarabi, *The Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle*, in Alfarabi, *The Political Writings. Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts*, translated and annotated by Ch. Butterworth, Cornell U. P., Ithaca - London 2001, p. 156). In this passage al-Fārābī links the degree of multiplicity to the degree of approximation to the True One, in precisely the same way as, in the *Enumeration of the Sciences*, he links the degree of multiplicity to the degree of approximation to the perfection of the First. Second, in the *Harmony* al-Fārābī's intention is less to advance his own opinion than to present Aristotle's doctrine, and to ensure its harmony with that of Plato. Therefore, in the *Harmony* al-Fārābī would never have spoken clearly of the intermediate causes between God and the cosmos, as he does in the *Enumeration of the Sciences* (cf. Janos, pp. 246-7).

¹⁶ Janos suggests that Syrianus's commentary on *Metaphysics* may have contributed to shaping al-Fārābī's theory of the separate intellects and gives some examples from Syrianus's passages about books M and N. This deserves a note of caution, in my opinion: in the *Fihrist* only Book B of Syrianus' commentary is mentioned: Ibn al-Nadīm refers that he saw it in Yahyā ibn 'Adī's list of writings. I think that once again, as for Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *On Heavens*, this does not license the conclusion that "it is hardly surprising to find a continuous line of thought on this subject from him (i.e. Syrianus) to his disciple Proclus, through the Arabic translators and adaptors, to al-Fārābī himself" (p. 300).

complete demiurgic autonomy is granted: they are the efficient causes of existence no less than the First, even if they tend in a reversion movement to the First as to their own final cause. Janos adds a note of caution about the separate intellects' demiurgic autonomy, when he states: "the existence of each one of them is dependent on a higher cause" (p. 303) or again: "It is their sustained contemplation of the First, which is their main object of intellection, which enables them to exist and subsist actually qua intellectual beings, and in that sense their subsistence directly depends on It" (p. 297, n. 232).

Janos locates the *Epistle on the Intellect* (*Risāla fī 'aql*) in the third, eternalist phase of al-Fārābī's thought and underlines a passage in which we are told that every celestial body is moved by a mover (*muḥarrik*) which is neither a body nor in a body, and which is the cause of the existence of the celestial body (*fā-innahū huwa sabab fī wuḡūdiḥī*) inasmuch as it is that by virtue of which the celestial body is a substance.¹⁷ According to Janos, "this proves that this treatise goes beyond the Aristotelian cosmology exposed in Book *Lambda* in attributing efficient causality to each unmoved mover" (p. 288). Even if I agree that the *Epistle on the Intellect* goes beyond the Aristotelian cosmology, I would like to observe that a few lines later we find a statement which is clearly different from the emanationist theories held in the treatises where al-Fārābī ascribes matter to the heavens: "However, the mover of the first heaven is a principle by virtue of which two distinct things exist. One is what constitutes the substance of the first heaven, namely a corporeal substance (*ḡawhar ḡusmānī*) or something corporeal (*mutaḡassim*). The other is the mover of the sphere of fixed stars, namely, that which itself is neither a body nor in a body. [Now, since the mover of the first heaven is a principle of two distinct things], it cannot produce both things in a single way and by a single thing in itself by virtue of which it is a substance. On the contrary, it [must produce them] by two natures, one of which is more perfect than the other, since the nature by which it produces the more perfect thing – that is, the one that is not a body nor in a body – is more perfect than the nature by which it produces a corporeal thing (*mā huwa ḡusmānī*), that is, the one that is less perfect".¹⁸ In this passage the materiality of the heavens is not a matter of analogical language.

Janos himself has a caveat on this and underlines that "al-Fārābī's account of causality with respect to the First is undermined by ambiguity" (p. 292; cf. also p. 180): on the one hand, in the *Perfect State* al-Fārābī states that "the First is that from which existence is brought about (*'anhu wuḡīda*)",¹⁹ that "the substance of the First is a substance from which every existent emanates (*yafīdu 'anhu*)",²⁰ and that "the substance of the First is also such that when the existents are derived, they are necessarily united and connected with one another".²¹ There are many other passages where the First is described as the first cause of the existence of all things. On the other hand, al-Fārābī elsewhere seems to limit the First to cause only one effect, the first separate Intellect.²²

Although the developmentalist hypothesis is fascinating, it should not be taken to extremes. There is still room for a more nuanced hypothesis: a progressive evolution of thought – according to the most standard intellectual biography of any other ancient or modern philosopher active for many decades – by an author who nevertheless remains not completely systematic, as evidenced by his statements in the *Perfect City*, probably because of the amount of exegetical material of the Greek tradition in Arabic translation which he gradually came to know and tried to systematize,

¹⁷ Al-Fārābī, *Risāla fī l-'aql*, ed. M. Bouyges, Imprimerie Catholique, Beyrouth 1938, p. 34.4-5.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 34.8-35.3; English trans. in J. McGinnis - D. C. Reisman, *Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources*, Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis IN 2007, p. 77.

¹⁹ Al-Fārābī, *Mabādī arā' abl al-madīna al-fāḍila*, p. 88.11 Walzer.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 94.7 Walzer.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.9 Walzer.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 100.11 Walzer.

and because of the gradual maturing of his independent thinking into its definitive form. Al-Fārābī's unsystematic aspects and the theory of his evolution are obviously not in conflict with each other.

Chapter 4, *The Aporia of the Celestial Motion*, attempts to reconstruct al-Fārābī's theory of celestial motion and describes how the Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Ptolemaic theories interact in his theory, on the basis of the rare passages dealing with this question in his surviving works. Unfortunately, works such as the commentaries on *The Heavens*, on *Almagest*, his *Book of Stars* (*Kitāb al-nuġūm*) and *Book on the Eternal Movement of the Sphere* (*Kitāb fī anna ḥarakat al-falak sarmadiyya*) are lost. Janos has recourse also to the testimonies about al-Fārābī's cosmological doctrines that can be extracted from Ibn Sinā's treatises. It is evident that al-Fārābī's account is indebted to Ptolemy: "According to al-Fārābī, all the heavenly bodies are characterized by circular motion, the most perfect type of motion. To begin with, the ninth, outermost orb, also called the first heaven (*al-samā l-ūlā*) and the first body (*al-ġism al-awwal*), possesses a single and regular westward motion that elapses in a day and a night and that marks a complete revolution of the heaven on itself. The 'first' motion is imparted by the ninth orb to all the other orbs that are contained in it, with the result that the heaven as a whole has a common circular movement from east and west. However, these orbs and spheres also have their own particular motions. The orb of the fixed stars shares the motion of the outermost orb and also possesses a second, eastward motion proper to it, the precession. As for the other seven main planetary orbs below the orb of the fixed stars, they also participate in the general westward motion of the ninth orb, but in addition possess other particular easterly motions that distinguish them. It is these particular motions that explain the unique trajectories of the wandering planets in the firmament, namely, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury, in addition to the sun and moon" (pp. 336-7). However, the fact that each celestial body has a multiplicity of movements and a velocity specific to it depends upon the soul, intellect, inclination, matter or whatever? Janos advances a hypothetical reconstruction of al-Fārābī's view on this problem. On the basis of the emanationist treatises each celestial body, i.e. each planetary system, has a rational soul, which probably ensouled the planet of that system. In the case of the outermost orb and of the orb of the fixed stars, which are planetless, the orbs themselves are ensouled. Each rational soul allows the celestial body to contemplate its separate intellect and, since the separate intellects are described in the *Epistle on the Intellect* as movers, one may conclude that the ten separate intellects act as final causes of motion for the orbs by being each an eternal object of thought. The First too is an object of thought for the celestial souls and, on the model of the First Unmoved Mover of Aristotle's *Metaphysics Lambda*, it imparts motion as an object of love, namely as a final cause. On the other hand, from the attempt to imitate the perfection of its principles, each rational soul emanates powers (*quwan*), as in Ptolemy's *Planetary Hypotheses*, to the various corporal devices of a planetary system and in this way causes the particular motions of each planetary system. In spite of its conjectural nature, this reconstruction deserves to be taken into account for further studies. Janos' study ends with a comprehensive bibliography, an index of ancient names and terms, and two appendices. One is devoted to cosmology and the disputed question of the authorship of the three treatises *Book of Remarks* (*Kitāb al-tā liqāt*), *Fontes Quaestionum* (*'Uyūn al-masā'il*), *The Claim of the Heart* (*Al-dā āwā l-qalbiyyah*), which Janos judges spurious on the basis of their cosmological accounts. The second appendix deals with the ubiquitous concept of 'substantialisation' (*taḡawhur*), which al-Fārābī uses both about the superlunary and the sublunary worlds and which he refers to the human soul, the celestial bodies, the separate intellects, and the First Principle itself.

Janos' book fills a gap in the scholarship and opens new perspectives for further studies. It shows that al-Fārābī has important things to say, and that he is a figure with whom we should engage intellectually in the present.

Cecilia Martini Bonadeo

A Philosophy Reader from the Circle of Miskawayh edited and translated by E. Wakelnig, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2014, 524 pp.

Elvira Wakelnig offre in questo bel volume l'edizione integrale del manoscritto Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Marsh* 539, unico testimone sinora conosciuto di una fonte molto importante per la storia della filosofia araba, ma anonima e mutila dell'inizio. Si tratta di una raccolta dossografica, di grande rilievo per conoscere i testi che hanno orientato l'attività filosofica nel mondo islamico orientale a partire dal XI s.

Il primo studioso a portare l'attenzione su questo manoscritto è stato Franz Rosenthal in un celebre studio del 1940 sulla conoscenza di Platone nel mondo arabo: Rosenthal se ne è occupato diffusamente perché il manoscritto contiene alcune citazioni tratte dalle *Leggi* e le prove platoniche dell'immortalità dell'anima.¹ In uno studio successivo, Rosenthal ha individuato numerosi estratti dal "Plotino arabo" attribuiti a un "Sapiente Greco" e ha dimostrato che essi appartengono allo stesso *corpus* dal quale è stata tratta la pseudo-*Teologia di Aristotele*.²

Il volume di E. Wakelnig contiene uno studio approfondito dell'intero manoscritto. Una visione d'insieme era stata fornita anche da E. Cottrell, che aveva posto la questione della natura dell'opera da esso trasmessa e ne aveva fornito una descrizione generale e una tavola dei contenuti.³ Ad una lunga introduzione (pp. 1-62), nella quale E. Wakelnig descrive il manoscritto, delinea il contesto nel quale è stata prodotta questa antologia di testi filosofici e fornisce una dettagliata tavola dei contenuti, segue l'edizione del testo arabo e la traduzione inglese a fronte (pp. 63-339). Al commento analitico dell'opera sono dedicate le pp. 341-479. Segue un'appendice (pp. 481-7) che contiene alcuni estratti del *Kitāb fī Manāfi al-á-dā*, traduzione araba del *De Usu partium* di Galeno.⁴ Quest'opera è una delle fonti utilizzate dall'anonimo autore della compilazione; ma poiché, eccetto che per il XVI libro,⁵ la traduzione araba del *De Usu partium* è ancora inedita, E. Wakelnig presenta il testo arabo e la traduzione inglese dei passi dello scritto di Galeno che il compilatore ha utilizzato per la sua antologia. Infine, il volume presenta una ricca e aggiornata bibliografia (pp. 489-510).

Nel commento al testo E. Wakelnig individua ventidue fonti certe, che elenca e sulle quali fornisce informazioni anche nell'introduzione (pp. 17-41). Per ognuna viene indicata l'edizione del testo

¹ F. Rosenthal, "On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy in the Islamic World", *Islamic Culture* 14 (1940), pp. 387-422, rist. in *Greek Philosophy in the Arab World. A Collection of Essays*, Variorum, Aldershot-Brookfield 1990.

² F. Rosenthal, "Aš-Šayḥ al-Yūnānī and the Arabic Plotinus Source", *Orientalia* 21 (1952), pp. 461-92; 22 (1953), pp. 370-400; 24 (1955), pp. 42-66; rist. in *Greek Philosophy in the Arab World*.

³ E. Cottrell, "L'Anonyme d'Oxford (Bodleian Or. *Marsh* 539): bibliothèque ou commentaire?", in C. D'Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists*, Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network "Late Antiquity and Arabic Thought", Brill, Leiden 2007 (*Philosophia Antiqua*, 107), pp. 415-41.

⁴ *De Usu partium libri XVII* ad codicum fidem recensuit G. Helmreich, Teubner, Lipsiae 1907-1909. In quest'opera, Galeno cerca di dimostrare l'adeguatezza della struttura corporea dell'uomo alla sua natura di animale razionale. I primi due libri contengono una descrizione minuziosa della mano; il terzo, del piede e della gamba; il quarto e il quinto sono dedicati agli organi della nutrizione; il sesto e il settimo a quelli della respirazione; l'ottavo e il nono si occupano del cranio e degli organi di senso; il decimo, della vista; l'undicesimo, della faccia; il dodicesimo, delle parti comuni a faccia e collo; il tredicesimo, della colonna vertebrale; il quattordicesimo e il quindicesimo analizzano gli organi genitali; il sedicesimo è dedicato a vene, arterie e nervi; il diciassettesimo, infine, espone i principi generali della fisiologia e della filosofia galenica. Della traduzione araba di questo trattato parla Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq (m. 911) nella *Lettera* sulle traduzioni delle opere di Galeno: G. Bergsträsser, "Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen", *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 17, Bd. 2 (1925); testo arabo pp. 27.13-28.15, trad. tedesca pp. 22-3.

⁵ E. Savage-Smith, *Galen on Nerves, Veins, and Arteries: A Critical Edition and Translation from the Arabic*, with notes, glossary, and an introductory essay, PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison 1969, Ann Arbor Univ. Microfilms, 1975.

greco (se si tratta di una traduzione araba di un testo greco), l'edizione del testo arabo, se esistente, e la lista dei manoscritti delle opere ancora inedite. Le indicazioni fornite sono estremamente puntuali, così come il commento al testo.

Secondo E. Wakelnig, è molto probabile che il compilatore facesse parte del circolo di Miskawayh⁶ (p. 7). Diversi elementi vanno in questa direzione: innanzitutto, Miskawayh è l'unico autore ad essere citato per nome più di una volta e tutti gli altri autori arabi che vengono citati sono o suoi predecessori, o suoi contemporanei; inoltre, un quinto del materiale presente nel manoscritto proviene da opere di Miskawayh; infine, molti dei materiali in esso contenuti sono direttamente collegati alle discussioni filosofiche che Miskawayh svolge nelle proprie opere. Tutti i passi attribuiti esplicitamente a Miskawayh derivano dal *Kitāb al-Fawz al-ašgar*.⁷ La versione alla quale il compilatore ha attinto non è però quella nella quale il *Fawz* è giunto sino a noi (p. 31). E. Wakelnig aveva già affrontato la questione in un articolo preparatorio,⁸ nel quale, mettendo a confronto il materiale tratto dal *Fawz* contenuto nel manoscritto di Oxford con il medesimo materiale contenuto in un anonimo *Kitāb al-ḥikma* conservato nel manoscritto Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, *Esad Efendi* 1933, ff. 56v1-78v15, l'autrice ha ipotizzato che esistesse una versione differente del *Fawz*, dalla quale avrebbero attinto sia l'autore della compilazione conservata nel manoscritto di Oxford che quello del *Kitāb al-ḥikma*. Le citazioni tratte dal *Fawz*, infatti, corrispondono letteralmente nelle due opere, ma sono diverse dal *Fawz* edito.⁹

Dal *Fawz* deriva anche la discussione delle prove platoniche dell'immortalità dell'anima contenuta nei ff. 52v7 - 54r5 del manoscritto di Oxford (pp. 166-71). Nel commento su questa sezione dell'opera, E. Wakelnig spiega che "the proofs for the immortality of the soul are taken from Miskawayh who, in turn, rephrases some Arabic version of Proclus' monograph on Plato's three proofs for the immortality of the soul" (p. 400). La monografia alla quale fa riferimento l'autrice è uno scritto di Proclo perduto in greco, il cui titolo è menzionato nel *K. al-Fihrist*.¹⁰ Benché lo scritto non sia stato ritrovato nemmeno in arabo, la sua utilizzazione da parte di Miskawayh suggerisce che esso sia stato tradotto.¹¹ La svolta nella storia di questo testo è rappresentata da un breve studio di L.G. Westerink,¹² il quale ha dimostrato che il perduto scritto di Proclo può essere ricostruito a partire dai capitoli 6 e 7 del *Fawz* di Miskawayh e da un passo delle *Solutiones ad Chosroem* di Prisciano Lido.¹³

⁶ Su Miskawayh (935 ca.-1030), erudito e filosofo di origine persiana, cf. M. Arkoun, *L'humanisme arabe au IV^e-X^e siècle. Miskawayh philosophe et historien*, Seconde édition revue, Vrin, Paris 1982 (Études musulmanes, 12).

⁷ *Al-Fawz al-ašgar li-Miskawayh*, ed. A. Š. Uđayma – *Le Petit Livre du Salut*, trad. française et notes par R. Arnaldez, Maison Arabe du Livre, Tunis 1987.

⁸ E. Walkenig, "A New Version of Miskawayh's *Book of Triumph*: an alternative recension of *Al-Fawz al-ašgar* or the lost *Fawz al-akbar*?", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 19 (2009), pp. 83-119.

⁹ Cf. n. 7.

¹⁰ Nel *Kitāb al-Fihrist* di Ibn al-Nadīm compare nella voce su Proclo uno scritto intitolato *Kitāb šarḥ qawl Falātūn anna al-nafs ġayr mā'ita, talāt maqālāt* (*Libro dell'esposizione della dottrina di Platone circa il fatto che l'anima è immortale, tre capitoli*): cf. *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, a cura di G. Flügel - J. Roediger - A. Müller, Vogel, Leipzig 1871-1872, p. 252.15-16.

¹¹ È anche possibile ipotizzare che Miskawayh, che era di origine persiana, abbia trovato le prove di Proclo in una versione in medio-persiano delle *Solutiones* di Prisciano Lido, di cui è ragionevole immaginare l'esistenza (anche se non ne è rimasta alcuna traccia): esse erano state scritte sicuramente in greco da Prisciano, ma forse furono tradotte in medio-persiano per Cosroe. La possibilità teorica non va esclusa, ma nel mio articolo pubblicato in questo stesso volume, pp. 125-43, espongo alcune ragioni per cui mi pare molto più probabile che sia Prisciano che Miskawayh abbiano utilizzato direttamente il perduto scritto di Proclo.

¹² L.G. Westerink, "Proclus on Plato's Three Proofs of Immortality", in *Zetesis. Album Amicorum door vrienden en collega's aangeboden aan Prof. Dr. E. de Strycker*, Nederlandsche Boekhandel, Antwerpen - Utrecht 1973, pp. 296-306.

¹³ Prisciani Lydi *Solutiones eorum de quibus dubitavit Chosroes Persarum rex* ed. I. Bywater, Reimer, Berlin 1886 (Suppl. Arist. I.2), pp. 39-104, in part. pp. 47-9.

Poco prima della parte in cui nel manoscritto di Oxford sono riportate le prove dell'immortalità dell'anima tratte da Proclo (ff. 51v7-52r6 = p. 164-5 Wakelnig), si trova una discussione della natura auto-movente dell'anima. Anche questa è tratta dal *Fawz*.¹⁴ Wakelnig commenta: "This Platonic proof for the soul being self-moving is also taken from Miskawayh, who, in the standard version of the *Fawz*, explicitly refers his readers to Plato's *Leges*". Una nota esamina i dettagli della questione: "Sweetman¹⁵ (*Fawz*, p. 135, n. 2) suggests more convincingly that this reference must be to 895 C - 896 C, whereas Arnaldez¹⁶ (*Salut*, p. 110, n. 43) assumes it is to 966 E. If the reference is only to Plato as in the *PR* [Marsh] and not explicitly to the *Leges* one may also think of *Phaedrus* 245 C-D, which is also taken up by Plotinus in *Enn.* IV 7, 9. However, this Plotinian section is not rendered in the extant Arabic *Plotiniana*". Nella versione edita del *Fawz*, per spiegare come l'anima muove se stessa si esamina il modo in cui possono essere applicati all'anima i tipi di movimento distinti nelle *Leggi*. Poiché l'essenza dell'anima è quella di essere auto-movente, essa non compie i movimenti tipici del corpo, ma si muove con il pensiero ed il ragionamento. Miskawayh cita esplicitamente le *Leggi*, riferendosi con ogni probabilità a 895 C - 896 C, come suggerisce Sweetman. Nella citazione di questo passo, come essa compare nel manoscritto di Oxford, manca la menzione esplicita delle *Leggi* e il riferimento è genericamente a Platone. Per questa ragione Wakelnig ritiene che se non avessimo il passo parallelo contenuto nel *Fawz*, si potrebbe pensare che il riferimento è non alle *Leggi*, bensì al *Fedro*. Nel *Fawz* il passo nel quale Miskawayh si riferisce esplicitamente alle *Leggi* è incluso nella terza prova platonica dell'immortalità dell'anima, tratta dal *Fedro*, 245 C - 246 A, e fondata sulla natura auto-movente dell'anima. È proprio questa sezione, benché disposta in maniera lievemente diversa quella ripresa nel manoscritto di Oxford. Che questa discussione del tipo di movimento proprio dell'anima facesse parte della monografia di Proclo è mostrato dal confronto con le *Solutiones ad Chosroem*,¹⁷ in cui compare la stessa combinazione della prova tratta dal *Fedro* con la classificazione dei tipi di movimento tratta dalle *Leggi*. A differenza di Miskawayh, Prisciano non cita espressamente le *Leggi*, ma la combinazione dei due testi platonici sulla natura auto-movente dell'anima è un tratto tipico dell'esegesi neoplatonica,¹⁸ presente nel commento al *Fedro* di Ermia¹⁹ e quindi con ogni probabilità anche nella perduta monografia di Proclo.²⁰ Dunque è necessario collegare all'ultima prova dell'immortalità dell'anima il passo che nel manoscritto di Oxford invece precede tutte le tre prove: non si sa perché l'autore della compilazione abbia suddiviso il testo in modo diverso da come esso compare nel *Fawz*, ma a mio parere è qui, nel *Fawz*, che egli ha trovato la classificazione dei tipi di movimento tratta dalle *Leggi*, già unita alla prova del *Fedro*.

Il volume di Elvira Wakelnig rende un grande servizio agli studiosi del pensiero arabo. L'attribuzione del compendio all'*entourage* di Miskawayh è senza dubbio convincente e ben motivata; l'edizione e la traduzione del manoscritto di Oxford rendono disponibile agli storici della filosofia un testo di straordinaria importanza; l'analisi, l'individuazione e l'indicazione delle fonti, infine, sono puntuali e ricche.

Germana Chemi

¹⁴ *Al-Fawz al-ašgar li-Miskawayh*, pp. 84.10-86.4 'Uḍayma.

¹⁵ J.W. Sweetman, *Islam and Christian Theology. A Study of the Interpretation of Theological Ideas in the Two Religions*, Part. I, Vol. I, Lutterworth Press, London 1945; rist. James Clarke & Co., Cambridge 2002, pp. 93-185.

¹⁶ Cf. sopra, n. 7.

¹⁷ Prisc. Lyd., *Solutiones eorum de quibus dubitavit Chosroes Persarum rex*, pp. 48.10-49.36 Bywater.

¹⁸ *Hermiae Alexandrini In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, ed. C.M. Lucarini - C. Moreschini, De Gruyter, Berlin 2012 (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), pp. 107.26-125.23.

¹⁹ Il commento di Ermia al *Fedro* è costituito da una serie di appunti presi dall'autore durante un corso di Siriano al quale aveva partecipato anche Proclo: cf. Herm. Alex., *In Plat. Phaedr. Scholia*, p. 92.6-7 Couvreur (= 96.24-26 Lucarini-Moreschini).

²⁰ Westerink, "Proclus on Plato's Three Proofs of Immortality" (cit. alla n. 12), p. 302.

J. Thiele, *Kausalität in der mu'tazilitischen Kosmologie. Das Kitāb al-Mu'atṭirāt wa-miftāḥ al-muškilāt des Zayditen al-Ḥasan ar-Raṣṣāṣ (st. 584/1188)*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2011 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 84), xi + 155 pp., 1 - 0 v pp. Arabic Text.

Causality is famously one of the main issues between philosophy and *Kalām*.¹ Some distinctive theories of Islamic theology concerning God's causality have long been traced back to the influence of Greek philosophy: pioneer scholarship in the Graeco-Arabic field highlighted the (indirect) influence of atomism on early *Kalām*,² observing that the assumption of a universe composed of bits of reality lies in the background of the idea that the very existence of each of them continuously depends upon God's will.³ Furthermore, incorporation of some basic Aristotelian doctrines and technical terms was detected in the theological systems of the various schools of *Kalām* in its flourishing age: they feature in Mu'tazilism and are embedded even in the thought of the outspoken enemy of *falsafa* Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī.⁴ Thus, the study by J. Thiele is very welcome of a treatise on this crucial topic of both Islamic theology and Graeco-Arabic philosophy by al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ, a theologian of Zaydite allegiance⁵ who was active in Yemen in roughly the

¹ That the relationship between *Kalām* and philosophy was that of views of the world competing with one another is clearly stated by R.M. Frank, "Kalām and Philosophy, A Perspective from One Problem", in P. Morewedge (ed.), *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, SUNY Press, Albany 1979 (Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science), pp. 71-95. Frank observes that "Under any circumstances 'the science of the fundamental elements of the professed religion' of Islam contains, as in the nature of things it must, a large number of constructions and theses that have to do with philosophical problems – that explicitly or implicitly take up and elaborate positions on major philosophical questions. (...) The conflict of the *kalām* and *falsafa* arises early. We read that Abū l-Hudayl studied the works of the philosophers and that an-Nazzām, when Ja'far b. Yahyā l-Barmakī told him that he did not even know how to read Aristotle properly, began to go through the work point by point. Ibn al-Qiftī reports, in an oft cited passage, that, when invited by the wezir to carry on a discussion with a number of theologians (*ahl al-kalām*), Yahyā b. 'Adī declined saying 'they do not understand the underlying principles of what I say and I, for my part, do not understand their terminology. I fear lest I find myself in the position of [Abū Hāsim] al-Ġubbā'ī in his *Kitāb at-Taṣaffuḥ*: the work is a criticism of the teaching of [the *De Caelo* of] Aristotle and a refutation of it according to what he fancied he understood of it, but in fact he did not understand its logical foundations and consequently the refutation has no validity'. (...) The fact is that the *falsafa* and the *kalām* share a number of basic concepts inherited from common, ancient sources, and that the *kalām* rejected *falsafa* precisely because it understood quite clearly the ultimate and basic structure and meaning of Greek philosophy as represented in the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic schools, which were those that had survived" (pp. 72-4).

² S. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, Hein, Berlin 1936 (English version with the title *Studies in Islamic Atomism*, The Magnes Press, Jerusalem 1987); see now A. Dhanani, *The Physical Theory of Kalām. Atoms, Space, and Void in Baṣrian Mu'tazilī Cosmology*, Brill, Leiden - New York 1994 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 14).

³ On the atomistic views held by the early mu'tazilite thinker Ḍirār ibn 'Amr (d. 816 ca.), see J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam*, I-VI, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1991-1997, III (1992), pp. 37-44; on the developments of this theory in Abū l-Hudayl (d. 841 ca.), see *ibid.*, pp. 67-70 and 224.

⁴ The influence on the *Kalām* of John Philoponus' arguments, based both on Aristotle and Neoplatonism, has been highlighted by H.A. Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy*, Oxford U. P., New York - Oxford 1987, esp. pp. 117-53; contemporary scholarship often conceives of the presence of elements derived from the Graeco-Arabic translations and from *falsafa* as a naturalization of philosophy in Muslim theology: a fully-fledged example of this scholarship is the book by F. Griffel, *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, Oxford U. P., New York 2009. Also the *Book of the Affecting Factors* by al-Raṣṣāṣ operates with the concepts of Greek philosophy transmitted by and reworked in *falsafa*: see for instance the two main categories of the "affecting factors", i.e. substances (*ḡawābir*) and accidents (*a'rād*), described by Thiele at pp. 75-6.

⁵ The Zaydite school is a branch of the Šī'a, based in Yemen, which is named after its founder Zayd ibn 'Alī (d. 740). From its beginning as a legal doctrine vindicating the rights of the *ahl al-bayt* (i.e. the supporters of 'Alī), the school moved

same years when in the Muslim West Averroes was coming to grips with Aš'arite theology, al-Ġazālī, and *Kalām* in general.

Chapter 1 sets the scene for the little known *Book of the Affecting Factors and Key of the Unsolved Questions*, a working title which I propose for the sake of clarity, but deserves discussion as to the exact meaning of the term *mu'attir* (see below). The biography of al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ is extracted from the tiny documentation available (pp. 4-5); comparatively much more is known about his literary output, which allows Thiele to sum up his work as follows: "Raṣṣāṣ hat ein umfangreiches Werk hinterlassen, das sich auffällig intensiv mit den Detailfragen der Theologie (*daqā'iq al-kalām*) im Bereich der Naturphilosophie befasst" (p. 5). Hence the interest in the topic of causality, with which the *Book of the Affecting Factors* deals.

Chapter 2 (pp. 8-61) counts as the philological introduction and includes the description of the manuscripts as well as the principles of the edition. Although this is not clearly stated, Thiele seems to side with those scholars who part company with the rules of philology as established by Lachmann and Maas;⁶ hence the lack of a *stemma codicum* in his edition. The manuscripts are grouped according to the variant readings: "Anhand der Textvarianten ist es möglich, mehrere Handschriftengruppen zu bilden" (p. 18). However, no list of these variant readings is given, nor are they treated as *errores coniunctivi*. So, the way in which Thiele comes to the conclusion that the text is attested in three versions (*Fassungen*), named A, B, and C (pp. 24-51), plus several "Kontaminierte Fassungen" (pp. 51-52) remains somewhat obscure. No explanation is provided of the criteria for the identification of the three *Fassungen*. Are they families of manuscripts, or different redactions?

Two manuscripts, housed in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana of Milan and attesting version A, are of the highest value for Thiele. One of them, MS Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, ar. F 177, is the most ancient dated manuscript of this work; the other, MS Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, ar. E 460, has been copied in all likelihood during the lifetime of al-Raṣṣāṣ himself (p. 58). According to Thiele, "Der gemeinsame Hyperarchetyp beider Handschriften ist daher das älteste nachweisbare Textstadium, dessen Rekonstruktion in der Edition erstellt werden soll" (*ibid.*). I must confess that it is not entirely clear to me what "Hyperarchetyp" means: this term seems to be modelled on "hyparchetype", but most I can say it does not belong to philological terminology. At any rate, in order to posit a common source of the two manuscripts of the Ambrosiana, the relationship between them should have been analysed. This analysis is lacking in Thiele's edition. If the two manuscripts share in at least one conjunctive error, this means that they depend upon a common source which cannot be identical with the original (i.e. the text as written or dictated by al-Raṣṣāṣ). If this common source counts as the starting point of the entire manuscript tradition, it is the archetype (*simpliciter*; no need to create a new label "Hyperarchetyp"). If, on the other hand, it proves to be impossible to ascertain the dependence of these two manuscripts upon a common source already marred with error(s), then the archetype most probably coincides with the original. In our case, the dating of the two manuscripts of the Ambrosiana, and in particular of MS ar. E 460, leans towards identifying the archetype with the original. Obviously, only the retrieval of the structure of the manuscript tradition

closer to the Mu'tazilite creed with the teaching of al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm al-Raṣṣī (d. 860), especially as to the topics of God's transcendence and man's free will. See W. Madelung, "Die Šī'a. Die Zaydiyya", in H. Gätje (ed.), *Grundriß der arabischen Philologie. Band II: Literaturwissenschaft*, Reichert, Wiesbaden 1987, pp. 358-63.

⁶ Reference is given to K. Stachmann, "Neue Philologie?", in J. Heinzele (ed.), *Modernes Mittelalter. Neue Bilder einer populären Epoche*, Insel, Frankfurt - Leipzig 1994, pp. 398-427 (see p. 17, n. 24), and to J.J. Witkam, "Establishing the stemma: fact or fiction?", *Manuscripts of the Middle East* 3 (1988), pp. 88-101 (see *ibid.*, n. 25).

would permit assessing the value of the manuscripts, and by the same token would make it possible to establish the basis of the edition. And it is precisely because such a retrieval is lacking, except for a first grouping of the manuscripts, that Thiele takes as the basis of his edition the MS Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, ar. E 460, not because of its stemmatic position, but “als Leithandschrift (...) da es sich um eine Abschrift von sehr guter Qualität handelt” (p. 58). On the whole, this edition seems to be inspired by the criterion of the *codex optimus*, without any argument intrinsic to the textual tradition.

In Chapter 1, Thiele had already mentioned the contrast between the Muṭarrifiyya⁷ and the Bahšamiyya, namely the most widespread version of what one may call the scholasticism of the Mu‘tazila; in Chapter 3 (pp. 62-73), he frames his analysis of al-Raṣṣās’ position against this backdrop. While the Muṭarrifiyya depicts the laws of nature as transmitting divine causality itself, to the effect of having God’s power which produces the accidents and changes of created things, for the Bahšamiyya the “affecting factor” (*al-mu‘attir*) counts as a real cause (“entitative Ursache”, p. 65). Such causes can be classified according to various categories. This is apparent already in the treatise *On Affection and the Affecting Factor* (*K. al-Taṭīr wa-l-mu‘attir*) by al-Ḥākim al-Ġuṣamī (d. 1101),⁸ which Thiele (p. 67) indicates as a source of al-Raṣṣās, and comes to the fore in the latter’s *Kitāb al-Mu‘attirāt*. This treatise classifies the various senses in which something can be an affecting factor: “cause” (*‘illa*, or *sabab*)⁹ and “agent” (*fā’il*) are instances of *mu‘attirāt*, but also “motivation” (*dā’i*) is one. The classification of the kinds of the affecting factors and the interplay of the modalities of “necessary” and “contingent” as they apply to each of them occupies Chapter 4 (pp. 74-134).

As I have said before, “affecting factor” is a working translation of *al-mu‘attir*, which Thiele prefers to keep as a technical term, because he is persuaded that “das Bewirkende”, i.e. the literal translation of the active participle of the verb *attara* (“Bewirken”), does not grasp the meaning of the term as it is used by al-Raṣṣās. In fact, as we have just seen, the latter lists among the *mu‘attirāt* also factors that do not imply any efficient causality (e.g. “motivation”). According to Thiele, “Die Problematik der Übersetzung ‘Wirkursachen’ für die in diesem Text behandelten *mu‘attirāt* besteht darin, dass das so evozierte aristotelische Modell Kausalbeziehungen in ganz anderen Kategorien beschreibt. ‘Wirkursachen’ im aristotelischen Sinne geben den Impuls, der den Anstoß für eine Bewegung gibt. Der Sammelbegriff *mu‘attirāt* ist hingegen viel weiter definiert und umfasst auch solche Ursachen, welche die Form des Seienden bestimmen, also in der aristotelischen Kausalität Formursachen sind. Deshalb wird hier die Übernahme des Begriffs *mu‘attir* als *terminus technicus* bevorzugt” (p. 75). This decision may be the right one, and I do not want to question it; but I would like to point out that both the notion and term are by no means unprecedented in the philosophical literature of that age. The notion of a kind of causality which has nothing to do with the production of events and does not

⁷ The Muṭarrifiyya is a sect within the Zaydite school, which refers to the Zaydite legal and theological doctrines as settled by al-Ḥādī (d. 911): see Madelung, “Die Šī‘a”, p. 362.

⁸ The spelling of the name of this author is different as given by Thiele and by W. Madelung, “Der Kalām. Die spätere Mu‘tazila”, in Gätje (ed.), *Grundriß der arabischen Philologie*, p. 329 (“Abū Sa‘d al-Baihaqī, bekannt als al-Ḥākim al-Ġuṣamī”), but I think this is the author Thiele points to; therefore, I have given above the date of death indicated by Madelung for al-Ḥākim al-Ġuṣamī.

⁹ The distinction between *‘illa* and *sabab* consists in that *‘illa* necessarily implies its effect while *sabab* does not; the true agent is only the second one: “Vor diesem Hintergrund ist die bahšamitische Position zu verstehen, dass Handlungen nicht durch eine *‘illa* bewirkt werden. (...) Der *sabab* kann im Gegensatz zur *‘illa* ohne das durch ihn Verursachte existieren, nämlich dann, wenn ein Hindernis vorliegt, das das Eintreten der Wirkung verhindert. Darüber hinaus unterscheiden sich beide dadurch, dass die *‘illa* ein Attribut notwendig macht, während der *sabab* eine Essenz notwendig macht” (p. 93). On this terminological issue see also p. 77, n. 9, where the idea that *‘illa* translates as “cause” is challenged.

impart movement belongs to the tradition of *falsafa* since its beginning: the Neoplatonic causality of those principles that do not operate along the lines of efficiency (e.g. Intellect with respect to our soul, or soul with respect to matter) has been rendered from the outset through the verb *aṭṭara* and its cognate forms in the texts derived from Plotinus and Proclus, and attributed to Aristotle in the formative period of *falsafa*.¹⁰ Once again, the influence of the philosophical literature seems to be even more pervasive than its recipients were ready to acknowledge, or simply were aware of.

Thiele observes that the *Book of the Affecting Factors and Key of the Unsolved Questions* counts as an attempt to build up a comprehensive theory of causality to be set against that of the *falāsifa*. In al-Raṣṣās' eyes, the philosophical account of God's action is superseded by his classification of all the modes in which something can be produced or modified – a classification which is theologically driven. “Schließlich untermauert die Kausalitätslehre ein – mit gewissen Einschränkungen – occasionalistisches Gottesbild. Gott ist demnach die Ursache einer kontingenten und nicht notwendig existierenden Welt und kann jederzeit und seinem Willen entsprechend in die Schöpfung eingreifen. Konzeptualisiert wird sie durch die Kategorie des Handelnden (*al-fā'il*) der als einziger *mu'aṭṭir* sowohl die Möglichkeit zu wirken, als auch das Bewirkte selbst verursachen kann. Dieses Gottesbild versteht sich als Gegenmodell zum philosophischen Verständnis des Göttlichen als eine notwendig und von Ewigkeit her wirkende Ursache” (p. 138). And indeed, the overall picture that emerges from this treatise is that of an effort to classify all the meanings of “active principle” within the main frame of the *Kalām*, independently of any specific allegiance to this or that school. As Thiele aptly remarks, the *Mu'tazila* (voiced here by the Bahšamiyya) shares with Aš'arite theology the idea that God's action is dictated only by free will, a theory which is set against that of the *falāsifa*: “Die hier formulierte Konzeption Gottes als Handelnder versteht sich im Kontext der zeitgenössischen Diskussion als Gegenposition zur Annahme der aristotelischen bzw. avicennischen Philosophie. Dort ist das Göttliche die ewige, notwendig wirkende und erste Ursache (*'illa* bzw. *'illat al-'ilal*) der Welt. In Übereinstimmung mit anderen theologischen Schulen betrachtete die Bahšamiyya hingegen Gott als willentlich handelnd und nicht notwendigerweise wirkend” (p. 84). However, one may observe that to define (in typically *mu'tazilite* terms) the *mu'aṭṭir* of God's action as that “attribute of the essence” of “being active” that arises directly from God's nature (*muqtaḍāt an šifatihī al-dātiyya*) equals to apply to the Koranic God the philosophical – and for that matter Neoplatonic – notion of the causality *ἀντὶ τῶ ἐῖναι* (*bi-anniyatihī faqat*), which had been elaborated by the *falāsifa* and then handed down to Avicenna, against whom al-Raṣṣās and his school were reacting.

Cristina D'Ancona

¹⁰ See for instance pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, pp. 11.3; 18.16; 43.18; 52.16, 18; 66.1 Badawī, corresponding to *πάσχειν, πάθος, πάθημα* in Plotinus (the instances of *aṭṭara, aṭṭār, mu'aṭṭir* with no counterpart in Greek are much more numerous than this); see also *Liber de Causis* (i.e. the Arabic reworking of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*), p. 63.2 Bardenhewer, corresponding to Proclus' *μετέχειν*, and p. 85.5 Bardenhewer, corresponding to Proclus' *παράγειν* (here too the instances of *aṭṭara* and its derivatives with no counterpart in Greek are numerous); see also G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Übersetzung*, Imprimerie Catholique, Wiesbaden-Beirut 1973, pp. 76, 157, 255 and 284.

C. Martini Bonadeo, *‘Abd al-Laṭīf al Baġdādī’s Philosophical Journey. From Aristotle’s Metaphysics to the “metaphysical science”*, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2013 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 88), XII + 378 pp.

Già dalle prime pagine di questa monografia, composte da una breve prefazione di Gerhard Endress e dall’*Introduzione*, si comprende subito che ‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (1162-1231) è stato uno studioso complesso, che ha rivolto il suo interesse verso vari campi, dalle scienze coraniche alla medicina, dalla filosofia all’alchimia e alla geografia; ciò rappresenta una sostanziale rettifica dell’opinione di Dimitri Gutas secondo cui ‘Abd al-Laṭīf è stato uno studioso pedante, “il cui approccio alla scienza e alla filosofia era scolastico e legalistico piuttosto che sperimentale e creativo”.¹

Il volume, diviso in tre capitoli, vuole inquadrare il filosofo nel suo contesto storico e mostrare come la filosofia greca e gli inizi della *falsafa* giochino ancora un ruolo molto importante nella dottrina metafisica dell’Islam, a cavallo fra il XII e il XIII secolo.

Il primo capitolo è interamente dedicato alla tradizione della *Metafisica* di Aristotele, sia nel mondo greco che in quello arabo. Non possiamo prescindere dalla conoscenza precisa del percorso storico che il testo greco ha avuto per poter successivamente capire il contesto in cui ‘Abd al-Laṭīf elabora il *Libro sulla scienza della Metafisica* (*Kitāb fī ilm mā ba’d al-tabī’a*): questo è il motivo per cui C. Martini Bonadeo inizia la sua opera guardando alla ricezione delle tesi aristoteliche da parte dei filosofi di età imperiale e tardo-antica, tesi che poi, così modificate, sono state tradotte in arabo.

L’esegesi della *Metafisica* durante l’età imperiale e l’età tardo-antica prende due indirizzi differenti:² da un lato troviamo Alessandro di Afrodisia – il maggior esegeta aristotelico, che si impegna a difendere l’aristotelismo dalle critiche dei platonici e degli stoici dandone un’immagine unitaria e priva di incoerenze –, di cui ad oggi possediamo il commento ai primi cinque libri della *Metafisica*. Dall’altro lato troviamo invece i neoplatonici, primo fra tutti Porfirio – la cui lettura unitaria della filosofia greca si rivelerà fondamentale per lo nascita della *falsafa* – seguito da Giamblico, Temistio, Plutarco di Atene, Siriano, Proclo, Ammonio, Damascio, Filopono, Simplicio, Olimpodoro, Elia e Davide (pp. 24-5). Di questo secondo gruppo i testi che riguardano direttamente la *Metafisica*, a noi pervenuti, sono: il commento di Siriano ai libri B, Γ, M e N; il commento ai primi sette libri (A-Z) di Ammonio (edito dal suo allievo Asclepio); un commento ai libri E e N risalente al XII secolo dello pseudo-Alessandro; l’epitome siriana e la traduzione araba del Περὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας (perduto in greco); due frammenti di Porfirio del commento al libro Λ contenuti nel commento di Simplicio al *De Caelo*; la parafrasi del libro Λ di Temistio, anch’essa perduta in greco, ma conservata parzialmente in traduzione araba; infine la duplice allusione dello pseudo-Simplicio, nel commento al *De Anima*, a un suo commento alla *Metafisica*.

Nella seconda parte del capitolo (pp. 33-45) l’autrice affronta la prima ricezione della filosofia greca nel mondo arabo, sempre concentrandosi sul testo aristotelico. L’incontro vero e proprio fra la cultura araba e la cultura greca si verifica nel 642, anno in cui gli arabi si impadroniscono di Alessandria d’Egitto, il principale centro della cultura classica. È grazie all’incontro con la scuola alessandrina se l’Islam si apre a un sapere extra-coranico ed è soprattutto durante il califfato degli ‘Abbāsidi che l’attività di traduzione prende piede principalmente a Bagdad. Le maggiori traduzioni vengono effettuate all’interno del circolo di al-Kindī, spesso da intellettuali cristiani bilingui che traducono in arabo sia dal greco che dal

¹ D. Gutas, *Pensiero greco e cultura araba*, trad. it. a c. di C. Martini, Einaudi, Torino 2002, p. 181.

² Per questa distinzione cf. P. Moraux, *D’Aristotele à Bessarion. Trois exposés sur l’histoire et la transmission de l’aristotelisme grec*, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, Québec 1970, pp. 13-40.

siriaco,³ ed è proprio all'interno di questo circolo di traduttori che si ha la piú antica traduzione della *Metafisica* in lingua araba, a opera di Uṣṭāṭ.⁴ Il testo aristotelico riscuote grande successo e viene quindi commentato all'interno del *Bayt al-ḥikma* dal matematico e astronomo di Ḥarrān Ṭābit ibn Qurra (m. 901) e tradotto dal siriano da Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn (m. 910-911). Abū Bišr Mattā ibn Yūnus (m. 940) traduce il libro *Lambda* con il commento di Alessandro – perduto in greco – e forse la parafrasi di Temistio. Martini Bonadeo ricorda che esiste un'altra traduzione araba della *Metafisica* attribuita a Naẓīf, traduttore del secolo X attivo a Bagdad. Per quanto riguarda solo il libro *Lambda* Averroè riporta altre due traduzioni: quella di Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (893-974) e quella di Šamlī (IX s.).

A questo punto del volume l'autrice propone un'attenta panoramica sulla ricezione della *Metafisica* da parte dei maggiori filosofi che hanno preceduto 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, a partire dall'inizio della *falsafa*, indicando sempre quali testi greci sono presenti nelle biblioteche di ogni filosofo (pp. 45-105).

L'autrice ci guida così attraverso quel lungo processo di armonizzazione fra fonti neoplatoniche e aristoteliche che ha permesso ad al-Kindī di dimostrare nella *Filosofia prima* (*Kitāb al-Kindī ilā al-Mu'tašim bi-llāh fī al-falsafa al-ūlā*) l'assoluta unicità della causa prima, difendendo il credo dell'Islam monoteista (*tawḥīd*): l'eredità aristotelica della causalità del Primo Principio (libro *Lambda*), accompagnata dagli argomenti a favore della creazione di Filopono (*De Aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*), trova il naturale completamento nelle *Enneadi* di Plotino – la cui parafrasi nel mondo arabo è conosciuta come *pseudo-Teologia di Aristotele* – e negli *Elementi di Teologia* di Proclo (*Liber de Causis* nel mondo latino). Inoltre anche le tesi di Alessandro di Afrodisia (*Quaestio* II.19), rielaborate nel mondo arabo giocano un ruolo importante nella teologia kindiana, consentendogli di elaborare una teoria della causalità del Primo Principio che non comporta né mutamento, né azione nel senso della causalità efficiente.

Al progetto metafisico di al-Kindī reagiscono pochi decenni dopo prima Ṭābit ibn Qurra e poi al-Fārābī.

Già Ṭābit ibn Qurra, attivo nel circolo di traduttori della Bagdad del IX secolo raccolti intorno a Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq e al figlio Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn, nell'*Esposizione concisa della Metafisica di Aristotele*⁵ cerca di rimanere piú fedele al testo aristotelico, depurandolo dall'onnipresente neoplatonismo kindiano, pur mantenendone però alcuni capisaldi, come per esempio l'impredicabilità della natura del Primo Principio. È però nel circolo peripatetico di Bagdad del X secolo che si inizia a delineare un Aristotele effettivamente eternalista. L'Aristotele di al-Fārābī diventa il maestro della logica e delle dimostrazioni scientifiche; la metafisica, nel *Catalogo delle scienze* (*Iḥṣā' al-'ulūm*), non è piú concepita solo come teologia, ma viene inserita nel sistema delle scienze come scienza universale, filosofia prima, ontologia e teologia. L'assimilazione della *Metafisica* e di tutto il corpus aristotelico, ormai interamente conosciuto nel mondo arabo, porta al-Fārābī a dire che Aristotele ha sostenuto l'eternità del mondo, che è prodotta eternamente da un'emanazione creativa (cosmologia neoplatonica), staccandosi dalla visione tradizionale di una creazione decisa da Dio in un momento preciso.

³ Cf. G. Endress, "The Circle of al-Kindī. Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy", in G. Endress - R. Kruk (eds), *The Ancient Tradition of Christian and Islamic Hellenism. Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences dedicated to H. J. Drossaart Lulofs on his Ninetieth Birthday*, Research School CNWS, Leiden 1997, pp. 43-76.

⁴ Possiamo leggere questa traduzione grazie ad Averroè che ne fa uso nel *Commento Grande alla Metafisica* per commentare i libri B-A. Alle pagine 38 e 39 del libro di Martini Bonadeo troviamo un'utile tavola che schematizza le differenti traduzioni utilizzate da Averroè, indicando per ogni libro gli autori delle traduzioni dei lemmi, dei passaggi citati nel commento e delle traduzioni copiate a margine del ms Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, or. 2074 (*cod. arab.* 1692).

⁵ Per questo testo cf. D.C. Reisman - A. Bertolacci, *Ṭābit ibn Qurra's Concise Exposition of Aristotle's Metaphysics: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, in *Ṭābit ibn Qurra. Science and Philosophy in 9th century Baghdad. Ṭābit ibn Qurra (826-901)*, eds. R. Rashed - M. Rashed, De Gruyter, Berlin 2009, pp. 715-76.

Avicenna, grazie agli strumenti acquisiti studiando i testi di al-Fārābī, capisce che la *Metafisica* aristotelica contiene i principi dello studio dell'essere in quanto tale; egli tuttavia dipende dalle fonti neoplatoniche per quanto riguarda la concezione della conoscenza e della causalità proprie del Primo Principio (pseudo-*Teologia di Aristotele* e *Liber de Causis*, scritti che Avicenna ritiene aristotelici). Nella sezione della *Scienza delle cose divine* (*Ilāhiyyāt*) del *Libro della guarigione* (*Kitāb al-Šifā*) in cui Avicenna individua i tre campi di indagine della *Metafisica* – proprietà dell'esistente, cause dell'esistente, Dio – basandosi sulla organizzazione della *Metafisica* fornita da Aristotele in Γ 1-2 e in E 1, ancora una volta tradizione aristotelica e tradizione platonica vengono fuse. Le fonti a cui Avicenna attinge per descrivere il Primo Motore come la potenza che muove senza muoversi in quanto oggetto d'amore ($\acute{\omega}\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\rho\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$) sono gli scritti cosmologici di Alessandro e la traduzione araba del commento a *Lambda* di Temistio. Dal Temistio arabo Avicenna dipende anche per la prerogativa del Primo Motore di essere condizione necessaria di intelligibilità dell'universo: è l'intelletto che conosce tutto il creato non a partire dalla conoscenza delle creature, ma partendo da se stesso in quanto in lui sono presenti tutte le Idee.

Il lettore deve avere una buona padronanza delle tematiche, ampiamente trattate dall'autrice, di cui si parla nel primo capitolo perché queste sono la base indispensabile per poter comprendere il pensiero di 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, che verrà spiegato nei due capitoli successivi.

Nel secondo capitolo infatti C. Martini Bonadeo affronta con molta attenzione la formazione culturale di 'Abd al-Laṭīf attraverso lunghi estratti delle due biografie ancora esistenti del filosofo. La prima è contenuta nell'opera di Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *Fonti di informazioni sulle classi dei medici* (*'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*)⁶ e riporta anche la più antica lista delle opere di 'Abd al-Laṭīf, mentre la seconda è un'autobiografia, il *Libro dei due consigli* (*Kitāb al-Naṣīḥatayn*).⁷ Grazie a questi documenti l'autrice ricostruisce il percorso formativo del filosofo, risalendo ai diversi centri culturali in cui egli ha studiato (Bagdad, Mossul, Aleppo, Damasco, Gerusalemme, Il Cairo...) e ai maestri che ha incontrato durante la sua formazione, fra cui al-Ġazālī e Maimonide.

Fra i tanti viaggi di 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, il soggiorno al Cairo è certamente uno dei periodi più proficui: qui infatti egli studia le opere di Aristotele, dei suoi commentatori Alessandro e Temistio, e gli scritti di al-Fārābī. Grazie a quest'ultimo 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī conosce l'etica e la politica della *Repubblica* e delle *Leggi*, conosce la classificazione delle scienze dei *Topici* e della *Metafisica*, la logica aristotelica, ma soprattutto apprende il giusto metodo di indagine, la dimostrazione inconfutabile, che darà il primato alla filosofia degli antichi. L'autrice fa notare che spesso 'Abd al-Laṭīf parafrasa gli scritti di al-Fārābī e ne fa proprie alcune tesi, come per esempio l'unità della filosofia greca: entrambi i filosofi sono persuasi dell'armonia fra Platone, Aristotele e il Corano. Partendo dal presupposto che il pensiero degli antichi è più chiaro e più completo rispetto a quello dei contemporanei, 'Abd al-Laṭīf si allontana dal pensiero avicenniano – unica filosofia considerata possibile durante gli anni della formazione –, arrivando a sostenere che questo pensiero è ricco di omissioni ed errori, che poi si sono trasmessi nella cultura filosofica successiva.

Il sistema filosofico avicenniano non è esaustivo e diversi ambiti della filosofia non ricevono un'adeguata trattazione: Avicenna per esempio, secondo 'Abd al-Laṭīf, trascura il criterio

⁶ Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *Fonti di informazioni sulle classi dei medici* (*'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*), a cura A. Müller, al-Maṭba'a al-Wahbiyya, Il Cairo 1882, vol. 2, pp. 201-13.

⁷ Questa autobiografia è edita nella tesi di laurea di Enes Tas, *Abdüllatif el-Baġdādî'nin Kitabü'n-Nasihateyn adli eser: tabkikli neşir ve muhteva analizi*, Uludağ Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Anabilim Dalı, İslam Felsefesi Bilim Dalı, Bursa 2011. Un altro testo importante per collocare l'autore nel suo contesto storico è il *Libro della relazione e del resoconto delle cose di cui sono stato testimone e gli eventi visti in terra d'Egitto* (*Kitāb al-Ifāda wa-l-ītibār fī-l-umūr al-mušābada wa-l-ḥawādīṭ al-mu'āyana bi-arḍ Miṣr*).

epistemologico aristotelico per cui bisogna partire da ciò che si conosce più facilmente e per questo motivo sbaglia, antepoendo i discorsi sull'anima alla zoologia. Inoltre Avicenna non tiene di conto dei precetti morali della filosofia pratica e non conduce la vita virtuosa dettata dalla legge etica che ogni filosofo dovrebbe seguire. Al-Bağdādī prende le distanze anche dalla dottrina metafisica avicenniana: ciò è chiaramente detto dal *faylasūf* nell'introduzione al *Libro sulla scienza della Metafisica*, quando afferma che la ragione per cui ha scritto questo trattato è proprio quella di mettere in guardia gli studenti dal perseverare negli errori contenuti nel *Libro della guarigione*.⁸

È nel terzo e ultimo capitolo, il cuore di tutto il volume, che Martini Bonadeo affronta l'analisi della principale opera di al-Bağdādī, il *Libro sulla scienza della metafisica*,⁹ che nei primi sedici capitoli presenta e discute gli argomenti della *Metafisica* aristotelica. La prima parte del capitolo (pp. 217-68) è incentrata sulla forte influenza che i testi della fase formativa della *falsafa* hanno avuto sullo sviluppo dell'opera. Ancora una volta viene utilizzata la parafrasi di *Lambda* di Temistio – conosciuta da 'Abd al-Laṭīf grazie all'*Esposizione di Lambda* di Ṭābit ibn Qurra – per risolvere il problema della conoscenza dei particolari da parte del Primo Principio e il suo rapporto con il mondo (capitolo XIII del *K. fī 'ilm*); anche 'Abd al-Laṭīf, come i suoi predecessori, arriva alla conclusione secondo cui al Primo Principio aristotelico, che nella parafrasi di Temistio è legge e ordine del mondo, appartengono i due attributi divini che si trovano nel Corano: la provvidenza e la giustizia. Ma non solo: il Primo Motore anche per al-Bağdādī è “not only the mover of things, but it is also their perfection and their final cause. And it is in its essence both principle and perfection” (p. 231). È dunque principio di movimento e perfezione a cui ogni cosa tende, è quindi causa di stabilità che conserva tutto nell'esistenza, poiché è provvidente. La divina provvidenza per 'Abd al-Laṭīf, dipendendo dall'Alessandro arabo del *De Providentia*, si esercita direttamente sui cieli e indirettamente, attraverso la mediazione dei cieli, sul mondo sublunare (capitoli XVI-XIX).

L'analisi dell'opera di 'Abd al-Laṭīf si concentra a questo punto sul compendio che l'autore fa del *Liber de Causis* e della proposizione 54 degli *Elementi di Teologia*, a proposito della differenza fra eternità e tempo (capitoli XX-XXI). Del Proclo arabo nel *Libro sulla scienza della metafisica* ritroviamo la descrizione della Causa Prima intesa come l'Uno neoplatonico, per natura semplice, inconoscibile e atemporale, e la descrizione del rapporto fra l'Uno e il molteplice. La Causa Prima, dando unità al molteplice, è causa dell'esistenza di ogni cosa, con l'unica differenza – rispetto al *Liber de Causis* – che al Primo Principio viene attribuito da 'Abd al-Laṭīf il pensiero: esso quindi è identificato con l'Intelletto Primo, ma questo non comporta alcuna duplicità perché nell'Uno è presente una perfetta coincidenza fra il soggetto pensante, l'atto del pensiero e l'oggetto pensato. Sempre nel XI capitolo il filosofo si avvale anche di parti del *De Aeternitate mundi contra Proclum* di Filopono.

⁸ Alle fine del secondo capitolo (pp. 197-208), prima che inizi quello dedicato al *Libro sulla scienza della metafisica*, troviamo una sezione dedicata all'opera enciclopedica di 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Bağdādī. C. Martini Bonadeo, comparando l'antica lista delle opere del filosofo che si trova in Ibn Abī Uṣaybī'a con il ms. Bursa, Hüseyin Çelebi, 823, che contiene molti trattati di 'Abd al-Laṭīf, descrive la vastissima produzione, non solo filosofica, ma rivolta a discipline come la lessicografia, la grammatica, gli *ḥadīṭ*, il *fiqh*, la medicina, la storia, la matematica e la zoologia.

⁹ L'autrice cita da due manoscritti: Il Cairo, Dār al-kutub, *Aḥmad Ṭaymūr Pāšā Ḥikma* 117, pubblicato per la prima volta in P. Kraus, “Plotin chez les Arabes. Remarques sur un nouveau fragment de la paraphrase arabe des *Ennéades*”, *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte* 23 (1940-41), pp. 263-95, e ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, *Carullah* 1279, pubblicato in F. Rosenthal, “Aṣ-Ṣaykh al-Yūnānī and the Arabic Plotinus Source”, *Orientalia* 21 (1952), pp. 461-92 e ristampato in Id., *Greek Philosophy in Arab World. A Collection of Essays*, Greath Yarmouth, 1990. Di questo trattato fino a oggi sono state edite solo le parti riguardanti i primi due libri della *Metafisica* (cap. 1), il compendio di *Lambda* (cap. 13-16), il riassunto del *Liber de Causis* (cap. 20) e la parte relativa alla pseudo-*Teologia di Aristotele* (cap. 21-24).

Che un'altra fonte del *Libro sulla scienza della metafisica* sia la pseudo-*Teologia di Aristotele* è ben visibile nei capitoli XXII, XXIII e XXIV. Come ci fa notare l'autrice, basandosi su uno studio di P. Fenton,¹⁰ il testo conosciuto da 'Abd al-Laṭīf non è quello risalente alle origini al "circolo di al-Kindī", ma è una versione piú tarda e piú lunga, composta nell'Egitto fatimide (969-1171) e rielaborata all'interno di un gruppo di intellettuali ebrei neoplatonici. È quindi molto probabile che 'Abd al-Laṭīf abbia conosciuto la versione lunga della pseudo-*Teologia* durante il suo viaggio al Cairo e su questa si sia basato per identificare la *Metafisica* come scienza della sovranità divina (*'ilm al-rubūbiyya*) che indaga la causalità propria del Primo Principio: "in it the One is presented as the First Cause and Pure Being, above eternity and time, source of unity in multiple things, superordinate to all the sensible and intelligible realities" (p. 261). Per meglio spiegare la causalità divina, 'Abd al-Laṭīf fa piú volte riferimento anche a passi del *Timeo* (cap. XXIII-XXIV).¹¹

La seconda parte del capitolo (pp. 268-93) è dedicata invece alla dipendenza di 'Abd al-Laṭīf da due opere farabiane, piú precisamente il *Catalogo delle scienze* (*Iḥṣā' al-'ulūm*) e *Sugli intenti della "Metafisica" di Aristotele* (*Fī aḡrād mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*). Questi due testi sono le fonti a cui 'Abd al-Laṭīf attinge per comprendere come deve essere condotta un'esposizione sistematica e completa della scienza della *Metafisica*: infatti, seguendo le indicazioni epistemologiche date da al-Farābī, il piano editoriale del *Libro sulla scienza della metafisica* segue una precisa tripartizione. La prima parte (capitoli I-IV) è dedicata allo studio degli enti e dei loro accidenti: questi capitoli includono la parafrasi dei libri A, α, B e Δ della *Metafisica*. Nella seconda parte (capitoli V-XII) si trova lo studio dei principi della definizione e della dimostrazione: qui 'Abd al-Laṭīf parafrasa i libri centrali della *Metafisica*, in particolare i libri Γ e Z. La terza parte (capitoli XIII-XXIV), come abbiamo visto sopra, si occupa di descrivere la gerarchia degli enti immateriali e intellegibili fino a che, risalendo in questa gerarchia, si raggiunge il Primo principio, il Dio unico e provvidente del Corano (p. 275). Dunque per 'Abd al-Laṭīf la *Metafisica* è al tempo stesso una scienza universale e divina, ontologia e teologia.

Le ultime pagine del volume sono dedicate a una lunga tabella che mostra dettagliatamente le fonti e la struttura di ogni capitolo del testo di 'Abd al-Laṭīf (pp. 293-304).

Il *Libro sulla scienza della metafisica* si rivela, in conclusione, fondamentale per ricostruire la tradizione araba della *Metafisica*, dal momento che l'aristotelismo di 'Abd al-Laṭīf al Baḡdādī è intriso di tutta la produzione della *falsafa*, primi fra tutti al-Kindī e al-Farābī. Credendo di ricercare l'autentico pensiero dell'Aristotele greco,¹² l'autore del *Libro sulla scienza della metafisica* fonde il primo principio della tradizione aristotelica con l'Uno neoplatonico di Plotino e di Proclo, con la Causa Prima dei commenti di Alessandro e di Temistio e, ovviamente, con il Dio creatore della teologia islamica.

¹⁰ CfP. Fenton, "The Arabic and Hebrew version of *Theology of Aristotle*", in J. Kraye - W.F. Ryan - C.B. Schmitt (eds), *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The Theology and Other Textes*, The Warburg Institute, London 1986, pp. 241-64.

¹¹ A questo proposito Martini Bonadeo ricorda che non esiste nel mondo arabo una traduzione del *Timeo*, ma esistono l'epitome del *Timeo* di Galeno, tradotto da Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq, e alcuni passaggi della *Teoria medica nel Timeo di Galeno*, tradotti sempre da Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq e dal figlio, Ishāq. Sappiamo inoltre dal *Fibrist* che il *Timeo* era stato tradotto anche da Ibn al-Bīṭrīq. L'autrice, avvalendosi di uno studio di R. Arnzen, sostiene che i passi citati nel *Libro sulla scienza della Metafisica* non derivino da una traduzione integrale del dialogo, ma da varie fonti arabe che si occupano del *Timeo* sotto vari aspetti. Cf. R. Arnzen, "Plato's *Timaeus* in the Arabic Tradition. Legends - Testimonies - Fragments", in F. Celia - A. Ulacco (eds), *Il Timeo. Eseggesi greche, arabe, latine*, PLUS, Pisa 2011, pp. 181-267.

¹² Il testo riportato alle pp. 210-11 è esemplificativo per comprendere l'"Aristotele virtuale" che si è creato durante i secoli in cui la *falsafa* si è sviluppata. 'Abd al-Laṭīf, vedendo alcuni resti di colonne granitiche che emergono dal mare davanti ad Alessandria, crede di individuare il Peripato di Aristotele. Aristotele, non piú identificabile con il vero Aristotele storico, rappresenta ormai la figura piú autorevole e la personificazione di tutta la filosofia greca, in quanto si tratta di colui che ha fondato il paradigma del discorso razionale e un sistema coerente del mondo.

Il volume di Martini Bonadeo è un interessante strumento da utilizzare per studiare la produzione filosofica nel mondo arabo posteriore ad Avicenna e per scoprire che la trasmissione indiretta della *Metafisica* aristotelica non continua solamente in al-Andalus, per opera di Averroè, ma trova anche nell'Oriente musulmano, con 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, "a defender or true Aristotelianism and a fierce critic of Avicenna" (p. XI). Mi sembra che il merito principale di questo testo sia quello di fare luce sulla figura ancora poco conosciuta di 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, mostrandone la complessità del lavoro e al tempo stesso l'originalità delle teorie, che fanno della filosofia greca la base per spiegare il monoteismo islamico.

Gloria Giacomelli

H. Pasqua (ed.), *Nicolas de Cues et l'Islam*, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie - Peeters, Louvain-la-Neuve - Leuven - Paris - Walpole (MA) 2013 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 59), pp. 202.

The proceedings of the conference held at the University of Rennes in April 2011 on the attitude of Nicholas of Cusa towards Islam are published in this volume. The papers cover the whole extent of Nicholas of Cusa's production on the problem of the relationship between Christendom and Islam, from his interest in the religion of Muḥammad to his works dealing with the Islamic question dramatically raised by the fall of Costantinople in May 1453, with an overall concern for inter-faith dialogue.

The main frame is given in the useful presentation by H. Pasqua, "Nicolas de Cues et l'Islam" (pp. 1-7). Then, an overview of Cusanus' correspondence with Juan de Segovia (1393?-1458) is offered by W.A. Euler, "L'image de l'Islam à la fin du Moyen Âge. La Correspondance entre Jean de Ségovie et Nicolas de Cues" (pp. 9-20). John of Segovia launched the idea of what we would call today an international conference, where the representatives of the various religions would have been offered the possibility to discuss about the truth of their belief: thus, Euler's article provides the reader with the main historical framework of the papers gathered in the volume. The idea of a meeting of the spokesmen of the various religions from allover the world features also in Cusanus' dialogue *De Pace fidei*, written in Summer 1453, i.e. immediately after the fall of Costantinople. Here, the conference is convened by God himself in the heavens, and the focus is on the theological ground for belief in the various religions. The viewpoint of Islam is represented by three people, an Arab, a Persian, and a Turkish; interestingly – as it has been pointed out by U. Rudolph – the German spokesman suggests that, should one want to understand properly Islam, one should turn to Avicenna's works.¹ Thus, the question of the inner meaning of the various faiths is primary for Cusanus, and that of the differences in their claims comes second: an attitude which paves the way to the well known plea for harmony expressed by the saying *una religio in rituum varietate*.²

¹ U. Rudolph, "Kann Philosophie zum Dialog der Religionen beitragen? Anmerkungen zur Koranexegese des Nikolaus von Kues", in A. Speer - L. Wegener (eds), *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter*, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 2006 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 33), pp. 179-93, in part. p. 181.

² Nicholas of Cusa, *De Pace fidei*, in R. Klibansky - H. Bascour (eds), *Nicolai de Cusa Opera omnia (...) ad codicum fidem edita, VII. De Pace fidei cum epistula ad Ioannem de Segobia*, Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Meiner, Hamburg 1959, 1970², p. 7.10-11.

Predictably, the focus of the volume is Cusanus' interpretation of the Qur'ān, which counts for him as the core of the problem. As he says in the Prologue of the *Cribratio Alkorani*, written in 1460-61, his interest in the Muslim faith dates back to his diplomatic mission to Constantinople in 1437. Cusanus was convinced from the outset that the only way to put an end to the Muslim conquest and to the consequent destruction of the Christendom was the conversion of the Muslim *élite*, and that this might have been done only on the basis of an in-depth analysis of the Sacred Book of Islam. The Qur'ān had already been translated into Latin in the 12th century,³ but, as pointed out by Euler (p. 11), this translation was poor on several counts: the great enterprise of the trilingual Qur'ān carried out by John of Segovia with the help of the head of the Muslim community of this city was intended to provide a reliable text, ready for examination: "C'est ainsi que Jean créa sa célèbre édition trilingue du Coran. À gauche, il y avait deux colonnes avec le texte arabe entièrement vocalisé qu'Yça [i.e., the head of the Muslims of Segovia just mentioned] avait écrit en personne; à droite, on trouvait la traduction castillane, également mise par écrit de manière calligraphique et complétée par la traduction latine interlinéaire imprimée en lettres rouges. Le manuscrit ne fut malheureusement pas conservé: seule la préface est parvenue jusqu'à nous, parce que Jean l'avait envoyée séparément et accompagnée d'autres textes sur l'Islam à Enea Silvio Piccolomini" (p. 12).⁴ An in-depth knowledge of the Qur'ān is needed, in Cusanus' eyes, if the aim is that of addressing Muslims *per viam pacis et doctrinae*: Euler concludes his paper by quoting the *De Pace fidei*: "Dans ce contexte, le Cusain présente le cœur de son herméneutique du Coran: 'D'où il semble qu'il faut toujours s'efforcer de faire en sorte que ce livre, qui pour eux fait autorité, soit reconnu en notre faveur. Car nous trouvons en lui des choses qui nous sont utiles, par lesquels nous interpréterons celles qui nous sont contraires'" (p. 20). This study of the Qur'ān, openly destined to an apologetic use, forms the basis of the method of the *pia interpretatio* analysed by T. Kerger, "La *Cribratio Alkorani*: un projet de dialogue avec l'Islam" (pp. 21-34). One should be wary of approaching this 15th century debate with the assumptions of the contemporary inter-faith dialogue: the scope is to analyse the text of the Qur'ān in the light of what in it allows the reader to acknowledge the truth of the Gospel, as Cusanus himself says in the Prologue of the *Cribratio*: its scope is the *manuductio ad veritatem christianam*. After having listed and analysed the four passages of the *Cribratio* in which occurs the expression *pia interpretatio*, Kerger discusses the various translations that have been offered of it and concludes that the attempts to avoid the confessional implications of the adjective *pia* (e.g. by rendering it as "accurate" or "charitable") should not be retained: "C'est pourquoi je plaide pour rester, également en allemand, à une traduction littérale de 'pieuse interprétation' (*fromme Interpretation*), dans le sens de 'interprétation selon la Vérité (et la foi) chrétiennes', c'est-à-dire tout simplement une interprétation du texte coranique dans le sens chrétien, ou comme chrétien. Si, aujourd'hui, cette méthode de la 'pieuse interprétation' telle que l'applique Nicolas de Cues, peut nous sembler assez étrange ou inappropriée à certains endroits, pour le Cusain même, elle est en quelque sorte tout à fait normale, et, surtout, tout à fait légitime" (p. 27). The analysis of Cusanus' approach to the Qur'ān is carried out also in two papers by G. Gobillot, "La singulière clairvoyance de Nicolas de Cues à l'égard du Coran" (pp. 35-86), and Ead., "De l'Armoire Arsenal (traductions de Pierre le Vénérable - 1092-1122) à la *Cribratio Alkorani*: au sujet de quelques notions fondamentales de la théologie coranique" (pp. 105-46), where various

³ Cf. M.-Th. d'Alverny, "Deux traductions latines du Coran au Moyen Âge", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 16 (1948), pp. 69-131.

⁴ Interestingly, Cusanus quotes the Qur'ān mostly in the Medieval translation by Robert of Ketton: Gobillot, "De l'Armoire Arsenal", p. 126 and p. 135; Federici Vescovini, "Le problème de l'attitude appropriée", pp. 149-50.

passages of the *Cribratio* are compared with some *sūras* (in part. Q 7:2-4). It is Gobillot's conviction that Cusanus' *pia interpretatio* is best approached against the background of the modern "lecture intertextuelle" of the Qur'ān (pp. 36-41): "Or il se trouve que, ce faisant, il [that is, Cusanus] met en application sans en avoir conscience, un concept spécifique du Coran lui-même qui est de ne garder des textes antérieurs que ce qui a, selon lui, valeur positive, refusant de prendre en compte leurs aspect incongrus. En conséquence, il met en pratique, à propos du Coran la méthode coranique elle-même de l'abrogation des textes antérieurs qui ne consiste nullement à les rejeter en bloc, mais à les lire selon une vision qui permet de rectifier ce qui doit l'être et de laisser totalement de côté ce qui n'a pas lieu d'être. (...) On peut avancer (...) que la pieuse interprétation de Nicolas de Cues coïncide presque complètement avec les grandes lignes de la théologie coranique dans la mesure où le Coran lui-même manifeste sa propre *pia interpretatio* à l'égard de la Bible et de nombreux textes parabibliques d'une manière qui met souvent en œuvre des méthodes et des formulations connues de la théologie chrétienne de son époque" (pp. 45-7).

The place the *Cribratio Alkorani* in the whole of Cusanus' theological production is studied by S. Gottlöber, "*Cribratio Alkorani* – Impetus for Discourse? A Case of Study" (pp. 87-104). The author argues that the *Cribratio* is "more than just another apologetic writing" (p. 91). The ideas expressed by Nicholas in his letters to John of Segovia "show explicitly what the *Cribratio* is not: First and foremost, it is not a comparative study of religion using objective criteria" (*ibid.*). This paves the ground for S. Gottlöber's claim that "the value of the work (beyond the historical) lies not so much in the specific contents but rather in the method employed" (p. 95), namely that which, on a metaphysical level, guides Nicholas towards a topic which proves crucial for him, that of the (Neoplatonic) negative theology: we do not really know what the First Cause is, and in this ignorance lies a more profound truth than in asserting that it is such or such: "We recognize in these notions without too much difficulty the fundamental thought of the *docta ignorantia*: the Good, the One, the source of all that is, is at the same time origin and *telos* without being comprehended by the *ratio*. Quite striking is the way Cusa continues: *Sed cum multae possint viae esse, quae bonae videantur, manet hesitatio, quae sit illa via vera et perfecta, quae certitudinaliter nos ducit ad cognitionem boni*. What is amazing is that Cusa includes not only Jesus and Moses but also Mohammed among those who indicate ways that lead to the one Good which is called God in all three religions" (p. 97).

G. Federici Vescovini, "Le problème de l'attitude appropriée à l'Islam de la *Paix de la foi* (1453) au *Coran tamisé* (1461) de Nicolas de Cues" (pp. 147-57) deals with the differences between the two works taking into account their different backgrounds: "(...) ce sont surtout deux circonstances externes qui ont fortement conditionné la rédaction du *Coran tamisé*: 1) la situation historique très grave pour la Chrétienté et la dure réaction de Pie II; 2) la qualité philologiquement douteuse du texte du Coran et des documents dont il se servait pour le passer au crible. (...) À cette époque, Jean de Ségovie poursuivait lui aussi le but de démontrer que le Coran n'était pas un texte révélé par Dieu, mais par la méthode philologique, en prenant l'initiative de faire une nouvelle traduction confiée à des personnes expérimentées, à savoir des vaillants traducteurs de l'arabe et d'authentiques connaisseurs de la loi coranique. Aussi, à ce qu'il paraît, c'est justement aussi à cause des erreurs contenues dans l'ouvrage que, historiquement, le but poursuivi par le *Coran tamisé* du Cusain n'a pas été atteint" (pp. 149-50).

H. Pasqua, "Le Coran et le Verbe de Dieu dans la *Cribratio Alkorani*" (pp. 159-74), focuses on Cusans' interpretation of the figure of Jesus in the Gospel and in the Qur'ān, analyzing two crucial passages of the *Cribratio Alkorani* in which Nicholas accounts for the Islamic refusal of the divinity of Christ on the grounds of the Nestorian doctrine, which was the version of the Christian doctrine known to Muḥammad. It is particularly interesting to see that in this Cusanus follows the lead of

the *Apology* attributed to the (probably fictitious) ‘Abd al-Masīh ibn Ishāq al-Kindī,⁵ which was known to him in the Medieval Latin version.⁶ “Nicolas de Cues a établi dans son premier Prologue⁷ que l’Islam se fonde sur le nestorianisme. Il s’ensuit qu’en exposant sa christologie à Mahomet II et aux musulmans, il pense s’adresser à des chrétiens victimes de l’hérésie. Rappelons que si le Cusain dans sa *Cribratio Alkorani* tient un discours défensif, il ne vise pas à réfuter le Coran mais à enseigner le christianisme authentique avec la conviction que, si les musulmans le connaissaient, non seulement ils l’accepteraient, mais ils le reconnaîtraient dans le Coran qui l’implique” (p. 171).

J.-M. Counet, “Quelques conjectures sur les rapports entre christianisme et islam à partir de la pensée de Nicolas de Cues” (pp. 175-90) deals with the philosophical background of the doctrines set forth by Nicolas of Cusa in the *Cribratio Alkorani*, taking into account Nicholas’ *De Filiatione Dei*, *De Coniecturis*, and *De Docta ignorantia*. A comparison with Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of abstraction and intellection allows Counet to conclude that this is the background of Cusanus’ firm belief that the Qur’ān itself should suggest to Muslims to proceed towards the Gospel: “De plus, quand le Cusain déclare que le musulman et tout homme doté de raison peuvent et doivent s’élever jusqu’à la Trinité, il base sa démonstration sur l’activité intellectuelle de l’homme. (...) En considérant sa propre activité intellectuelle, et la structure ontologique qu’elle implique, l’homme peut parvenir à pressentir le mystère trinitaire et la vérité intrinsèque du christianisme” (p. 188).

This interesting volume contains also a bibliography, where one may however remark the absence of the study by Ulrich Rudolph quoted above, n. 1.

Elisa Coda

⁵ A useful dossier on this work is provided in the Introduction to the Italian translation of the *Apology*: Al-Kindī, *Apologia del Cristianesimo*. Traduzione dall’arabo, introduzione e cura di L. Bottini, Jaca Book, Milano 1998 (Biblioteca del Vicino Oriente. Patrimonio culturale arabo-cristiano, 4), pp. 11-15.

⁶ As the author remarks (p. 159 n. 1) the *Apology* had been translated into Latin for Peter of Cluny.

⁷ At p. 159, this historical *excursus* based on the *Apology* of the pseudo al-Kindī is referred to as located in the Second Prologue.

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