

89th Congress }
2d Session }

JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT

HOLD FOR RELEASE

SUN JUL 31 AM

NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
SOVIET ECONOMY

STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
OF THE
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

Part IV
THE WORLD OUTSIDE
and
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
RECENT SOVIET MONOGRAPHS
and
APPENDIXES



Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1966

68-591 O

J0410

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Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price 55 cents

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POSTWAR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN EASTERN EUROPE
(A Comparison With Western Europe)

BY
MAURICE ERNST

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POSTWAR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN EASTERN EUROPE

A Comparison With Western Europe

This paper uses comparisons with Western Europe to evaluate post-war economic growth in Eastern Europe. Three main aspects of comparative economic growth are examined: the growth of production; the increase in personal consumption; and the efficiency in the use of inputs. In addition, the relative influence of external factors on economic growth in the two areas is considered. The method of analysis is statistical—a comparison of various measures of economic growth and of the measurable factors which may have influenced this growth. Its purpose, however, is to provide evidence on a very intangible question—the relative performance of the market-type economic system of Western Europe and of the Soviet-type “command economy” of Eastern Europe.

An evaluation of economic performance founded on international comparisons can be highly artificial since governments or populations may set for themselves standards for growth or efficiency that differ greatly from those of other countries. In the case of Eastern and Western Europe, however, both history and geography give inter-country comparisons considerable importance for national governments and stimulate people to look across the border for standards of consumption. Moreover, even in the absence of direct comparisons and influence, technological and sociological trends on both sides of the border tend to be similar enough to make international comparisons meaningful.

The comparison in this study is limited to six Eastern European countries—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania—and nine Western European countries—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway. The selection was based partly on the availability of appropriate statistics—which excluded such countries as Albania and Spain. A second criterion was a reasonable degree of similarity in economic system among the two groups, which excluded Yugoslavia because its system is a blend of state planning, decentralized state administration, and the market mechanism. A third criterion was to include only countries which met either defeat or occupation during World War II and thus suffered some economic retardation. For many reasons—some evident, some subtle, and some that are not yet clear—victors, such as the United Kingdom, and neutrals, such as Sweden, have had a very different pattern of growth than the defeated or occupied countries. They emerged from the war with increased production and have since tended to grow more slowly.

The main statistical findings of this study are the following:

(1) Over the postwar period as a whole, the growth of production has been rapid in Eastern Europe, but no more so than in Western

Europe. In recent years it has been slower in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.

(2) The improvement in per capita consumption and probably also in general consumer welfare has been much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.

(3) By the main statistical indications, economic growth has been less efficient in Eastern than in Western Europe—it has taken larger investment expenditures to obtain similar rates of growth. Lower efficiency, indeed is a major cause of the relatively slow rise in consumption in Eastern Europe.

The causes of these differences in economic performance are complex and include a great many factors unique to individual countries of Eastern and Western Europe. But the advantage of the Western over the Eastern countries in the measures of economic performance appears large and general enough to suggest important common causes, notably the effects of the separate institutional development of these two areas—Western Europe under capitalist institutions with broad access to the world market; Eastern Europe under Soviet-type institutions with close ties with the U.S.S.R.

Soviet exploitation of Eastern Europe, in contrast to large U.S. aid to Western Europe probably was largely responsible for the slower recovery of the Eastern European economies after World War II, but neither this factor, nor the trends in the volume and terms of trade appear to explain the recent economic slowdown in Eastern Europe or that area's postwar disadvantage in economic efficiency. This is not to say that membership in the Soviet bloc did not have far-reaching effects for economic growth and efficiency, but rather that the external influences on each country's economy of applying Soviet-type policies and institutions are inseparable from the internal effects. These policies and institutions embrace among other things the method and principles of detailed state planning, the method of economic administration through a vast state bureaucracy, the relegation of the market mechanism to a minor role, and the collectivization of agriculture. In the author's opinion, such institutions and the associated policies were mainly responsible for the relatively poor performance of Eastern Europe.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES

Excluding East Germany and the Bohemia-Moravia section of Czechoslovakia, which historically has been part of Central Europe, Eastern Europe has always been a relatively undeveloped region. Before World War II agriculture was the predominant economic activity, although there were islands of urban and industrial development. Peasants, by and large, were poor, eating mainly self-produced crops and buying little besides the most essential items. The industrial workers were much better off than the peasants, but there were few industrial jobs. In Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, more people were employed in handicraft shops than in factories. Outside East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the main industries were textiles, leather and food processing (throughout the area), coal mining (Poland), oil extraction (mainly in Rumania), and nuclei of the metallurgical,

metalworking and chemical industries. East Germany and Czechoslovakia were highly industrialized, but lacked a strong heavy industrial base, having concentrated on the manufacture of finished products.

Although postwar industrialization has raised considerably per capita GNP's in Eastern Europe, these remain considerably lower than those in most of Western Europe. In 1963, per capita GNP in Czechoslovakia and East Germany was less than three-quarters of that in West Germany and about halfway between the West German and Italian levels. Hungary and Poland were in an intermediate position, with per capita GNP's less than half of the West German level and falling between Italy and Greece. Bulgaria and Rumania were in the rear, at about the level of Greece. The combined GNP of these six Eastern European countries was about 10 percent smaller than that of West Germany and came to roughly one-third of the combined GNP's of the EEC countries or the U.S.S.R. The six countries range in size from Poland—the largest—whose GNP is about half that of Italy, to Bulgaria—the smallest—whose GNP is about four-fifths of Norway's.

Two alternative sets of figures for GNP and per capita GNP in Eastern and Western European countries are shown in table 1, and

TABLE 1.—Comparisons of GNP and GNP per capita in selected European countries in 1964¹

(1963 U.S. dollars)

	Using official exchange rates for Western countries		Using calculated exchange rates for Western countries	
	Total GNP, billion dollars	Per capita GNP, dollars ²	Total GNP, billion dollars	Per capita GNP, dollars ²
Eastern Europe:				
Bulgaria.....	4.9	600	5.6	690
Czechoslovakia.....	18.0	1,290	20.7	1,470
East Germany.....	21.0	1,220	24.1	1,400
Hungary.....	9.0	880	10.3	1,020
Poland.....	24.1	770	27.7	890
Rumania.....	11.2	590	12.9	680
Total above.....	88.1	880	101.3	1,020
Western Europe:				
Austria.....	8.1	1,120	9.3	1,290
Belgium.....	14.6	1,660	17.7	1,890
Denmark.....	8.6	1,820	10.1	2,180
France.....	88.6	1,780	97.0	2,010
West Germany.....	100.2	1,720	115.2	1,980
Greece.....	4.7	550	5.9	690
Italy.....	46.3	910	57.9	1,140
Netherlands.....	15.6	1,290	20.7	1,710
Norway.....	6.0	1,610	6.9	1,870
Total above.....	287.7	1,420	340.7	1,660

¹ See app. A for methodology.

² Rounded figures.

the methods of calculation are described in appendix A. The GNP's of the Eastern European countries were estimated through direct comparisons with West Germany by means of calculated exchange rates and quantity indexes. The relatives so obtained were applied to two estimates of the dollar value of GNP in West Germany—one

with the official exchange rate, the other with a calculated exchange rate obtained from a study for the OEEC.

The ranking of the Eastern European countries as to industrial production per capita is similar to that for GNP per capita, although, as might be expected, the differences among countries are greater. Estimates of the relative levels of industrial production, total and per capita, are shown in table 2. My estimates, which are described in appendix A, apparently are nearly identical to those made by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

TABLE 2.—Comparisons of industrial production, 1961

(Total Eastern Europe equals 100)

	My estimate ¹		CMEA estimate, ² total
	Total	Per capita	
East Germany.....	28	165	28
Poland.....	26	90	27
Czechoslovakia.....	23	165	23
Rumania.....	11	80	12
Hungary.....	8	60	7
Bulgaria.....	4	50	3
Total Eastern Europe.....	100	100	100
West Germany.....	123	220
U.S.S.R.....	262

¹ See app. A.

² See "Planowane Hospodarstwo" No. 4, Apr. 1, 1964.

The differences among Eastern European countries and between them and Western Europe are more pronounced for per capita GNP and industrial production than for the sectoral distribution of GNP at factor cost, which is shown in table 3. The contribution of agricul-

TABLE 3.—Percentage distribution of GNP at factor cost, 1960

	Percent of GNP originating in—		
	Industry and construction	Agriculture and forestry	Other sectors (services)
Bulgaria.....	39	29	32
Czechoslovakia.....	32	15	33
East Germany.....	54	9	37
Hungary.....	40	24	36
Poland.....	41	31	28
Austria.....	55	18	27
Belgium.....	45	8	47
Denmark.....	42	15	40
France.....	49	10	41
West Germany.....	55	7	38
Greece.....	28	28	44
Italy.....	45	19	36
Netherlands.....	44	12	44
Norway.....	39	11	50

NOTE.—For sources and methods, see app. B.

ture to GNP is considerably larger in most of the Eastern European countries than in nearly all the Western European countries—which was to be expected—and the contribution of services (all sectors other than industry and construction and agriculture and forestry) is smaller. The contribution of industry to GNP on the average is only

slightly smaller in Eastern Europe than in most of Western Europe, in spite of the fact that the relative volume of industrial output is much smaller. This may be due to high relative costs of industrial production in Eastern Europe, particularly in such countries as Bulgaria and Poland, although differences in the method of calculating factor costs may also have strong effects on the sector shares.

II. STATISTICS AND METHODS

Comparisons of economic growth and performance require comparable statistics and until recently, such statistics did not exist for Eastern Europe. In recent years, however, a great deal of work has been done to recalculate economic aggregates and indexes for Eastern Europe using Western-type methods. Much of this work has been a product or an outgrowth of the "Project on National Income in East-Central Europe" at Columbia University, under the direction of Thad Alton, who has published three monographs and a number of occasional papers (see appendixes). The statistical analysis of this paper for Eastern Europe is based predominantly on these recalculated series.

The official series (on national income, industrial production, and so forth) differ considerably in concept and method from the recalculated series and tend to show considerably higher rates of economic growth. Although very sound analysis of trends in the individual countries can be based on judicious use of official statistics (as for example in the ECE's Economic Survey of Europe and Economic Bulletin for Europe), the same is not true of international comparisons. Moreover, the differences in methodology between Eastern and Western countries are such that rule-of-thumb adjustments (for example, to achieve greater comparability of coverage) rarely suffice—complete recalculations are usually necessary. The differences in methodology can indeed be crucial to an evaluation of comparative economic performance. For example, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in an otherwise very thorough and competent study¹ drew what I believe are wholly incorrect conclusions as to the relative productivity of investment in Eastern and Western Europe by relying on official series, with adjustments, for both sets of countries. According to the ECE, returns to investment during the 1950's were probably not greater in market economies than in planned economies. The use of recalculated series for the Eastern countries makes it clear that returns to investment were in fact considerably greater in market than in planned economies.

Official Eastern European measures of the growth of national income are not comparable to Western-type measures for three main reasons. First, the Marxist concept of national income excludes so-called non-productive services (that is, direct governmental and private services and often also passenger transportation). In postwar Europe the output of direct services generally has grown more slowly than the output of goods so that their exclusion has tended to raise the rate of growth of national income. Second, market prices—the basis of valuation for national income in Eastern Europe—differ drastically from factor costs in these countries. This is because of the absence of explicit

¹ UN/ECE, "Economic Survey of Europe in 1961," pt. II, "Some Factors in Economic Growth in Europe During the 1950's" (especially ch. II, p. 30).

charges for the use of capital and land and the collection of the resulting savings in accounting costs by the Government in the form of the turnover tax. The turnover tax is levied mainly on industry, whose weight in national income is thereby increased, at the expense mainly of that of agriculture. Since industry usually is the most dynamic sector the rate of growth of national income is raised. Third, the method of calculating the growth of individual sectors of the national income differs from that used in the West. Although some of the Eastern European indexes of income originating in industry and other sectors give reasonable results, others do not, and little is known about them.

Official indexes of gross industrial production in Eastern Europe in my opinion overstate considerably the rate of growth. The main reason is that industrial production indexes in Communist countries are not just measures of the results of industrial activity, but also are devices for the direction of industry and the establishment of producers' incentives. Industrial managers, whose success often depended on fulfilling a plan for gross industrial production, had every incentive to produce an assortment of goods and to negotiate prices that would show the best results for the smallest effort. Although there were a multiplicity of controls designed to specify assortment and fix prices, these controls rarely prevented an inflation of the gross production index.²

III. GROWTH OF PRODUCTION

A. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

Postwar economic growth has been rapid in both Eastern and Western Europe³ (see table 4). In Western Europe total GNP in 1964 was

TABLE 4.—Growth of GNP, prewar to 1964

	Indexes, 1965=100					Annual percentage increases ¹			
	Prewar	1950	1955	1960	1964	1951-55	1956-60	1961-64	1961-64
Bulgaria.....	66	75	100	142	198	5.9	7.3	4.3	5.9
Czechoslovakia.....	79	84	100	137	145	3.6	6.6	1.3	4.0
East Germany.....	84	71	100	127	141	7.2	4.9	2.7	5.1
Hungary.....	80	76	100	128	147	5.5	4.2	4.6	4.8
Poland.....	72	79	100	127	155	4.8	5.0	5.0	4.9
Rumania.....	66	66	100	119	144	3.6	3.5	4.9	5.7
Total Eastern Europe.....	76	76	100	128	148	5.7	5.2	3.6	4.9
Unweighted average.....	4.9	5.2	3.6	5.1
Austria.....	62	74	100	129	151	6.1	5.2	4.2	5.2
Belgium.....	67	84	100	112	133	3.6	2.3	4.3	3.3
Denmark.....	68	91	100	127	167	2.0	4.9	5.5	4.0
France.....	66	80	100	126	155	4.4	4.8	5.3	4.8
West Germany ²	51	65	100	135	163	6.1	6.2	4.8	6.8
Greece.....	98	71	100	151	153	7.0	5.6	5.7	7.0
Italy.....	71	75	100	133	156	6.0	5.9	5.5	5.8
Netherlands.....	68	76	100	122	146	5.6	4.1	4.5	4.7
Norway.....	62	84	100	117	143	3.6	3.2	5.1	2.9
Total Western Europe.....	62	75	100	129	157	5.9	5.2	5.1	5.4
Unweighted average.....	5.3	4.7	5.2	5.0

¹ Calculated from unrounded data.

² Excluding the Saar.

NOTE.—For sources and methods, see app. B.

³ These points are developed further in Maurice Ernst, "Overstatement of Industrial Growth in Poland," Quarterly Journal Of Economics, November 1965.

⁴ That is, the six Eastern European countries and the nine Western European countries listed earlier.

about double the 1950 level and two and a half times the prewar level; in Eastern Europe, total GNP in 1964 was double both the 1950 and the prewar level. Economic recovery from the effects of World War II was more rapid in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. By 1950, the western economies were well beyond prewar levels, except in the case of Greece, where the effects of the civil war were felt for years. By contrast, GNP fell short of prewar levels in East Germany by 15 percent and in Hungary by 5 percent, just reached this level in Rumania, and showed a significant rise in Poland only because the change in boundaries greatly increased that country's economic potential—in postwar boundaries Polish GNP in 1950 was at least 10 to 15 percent lower than in 1937.

After 1950, the Western European economies combined grew somewhat faster than the Eastern European economies combined, mainly because of the large weight and usually rapid growth of West Germany. If we compare average growth rates with each country having equal weight, the rates in the east are about the same as those in the west.

The growth rates in Eastern Europe vary inversely with per capita GNP, East Germany being an exception because of its delayed recovery—after 1955, East German growth is the slowest in the area. In Western Europe, growth rates range widely, from around 7 percent (Greece and West Germany) to 3.8 percent (Belgium), with no clear pattern.

There have been marked changes in growth rates over the years. On the average, growth in both Eastern and Western Europe was only a little slower in the second half than in the first half of the 1950's. An acceleration of growth in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria was more than offset by a deceleration in East Germany, where postwar recovery finally had ended, in Hungary, as a result of the 1956 revolt, and in Rumania, mainly because of poor results in agriculture. Since 1960, however, growth in Eastern Europe has slowed considerably, while there has been little change in the Western rates. The sharp slowdown in Eastern Europe is due almost entirely to the severe economic recession in Czechoslovakia and a cut of nearly one-half in the East German growth rate in comparison with 1956-60. Czechoslovakia sustained one of the highest growth rates in Europe during the late 1950's and in 1960. Growth slowed a little in 1961 and considerably in 1962. Then GNP fell nearly 3 percent in 1963 and did not rise in 1964; no other industrial country has had a more severe economic recession since World War II. The East German slowdown came at least a year earlier, under the strain of the Berlin crises and the sudden collectivization of agriculture, but it was not as severe as that in Czechoslovakia, annual growth having been fairly steady since 1962. Among the other eastern countries, the sharp decline in Bulgarian growth reflects mainly the economic consolidation following an extremely rapid expansion during the "great leap" of 1959-60 and the increased rate of growth in Rumania is influenced by the fact that 1960 was a bad agricultural year. Growth accelerated slightly in Hungary and decelerated slightly in Poland. Polish growth has been remarkably stable since 1950. In Western Europe growth rates increased during 1961-64 in six countries out of nine and decreased substantially only in

West Germany, which fell from first to sixth place among the nine countries.

Some of the ranking of growth rates, although not the broad relationships between the Eastern and Western countries, are changed if we compare the growth of per capita GNP's (table 5). The largest differ-

TABLE 5.—Growth of GNP and GNP per capita

	Percentage increases					
	Prewar to 1964			1950 to 1964		
	GNP	Popula- tion	GNP per capita	GNP	Popula- tion	GNP per capita
Bulgaria.....	148	21	105	123	12	99
Czechoslovakia.....	84	-3	90	73	13	53
East Germany.....	69	6	59	100	-6	113
Hungary.....	83	10	65	93	8	78
Poland.....	116	-10	140	96	25	56
Rumania.....	117	21	79	117	16	87
Total above.....	94	3	88	94	13	72
Austria.....	146	6	132	103	4	95
Belgium.....	97	12	76	58	9	45
Denmark.....	129	24	84	73	10	57
France.....	136	15	105	93	16	66
West Germany.....	219	39	129	151	17	114
Greece.....	97	20	64	157	12	129
Italy.....	132	17	98	121	9	103
Netherlands.....	150	39	80	92	20	60
Norway.....	128	27	80	70	13	50
Total above.....	155	23	107	110	15	83

Sources for population: "U.S. Bureau of Census" and OECD statistics.

ence is for Poland, where boundary changes, war losses and migration after the war caused a large decline in population. By 1950, Polish GNP per capita was about 50 percent above prewar levels (in the old boundaries) although total GNP had risen only 10 percent. In Czechoslovakia also, where the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans reduced the population, per capita GNP had increased almost one-third from 1937 to 1950 with a 7 percent growth in total GNP. During the early postwar years East Germany gained some population, although much less than West Germany, as a result of the expulsion of Germans from the areas acquired by Poland. Between 1950 and 1962, however, the East German population declined steadily because of its unfavorable age structure and the flight to West Germany, while the West German population grew rapidly. In consequence, the growth of East German GNP per capita is about the same as that of West Germany for the postwar period (it is much smaller in comparison with prewar) in spite of a lag of one-third in the growth of total GNP. On a per capita basis, Hungarian growth is about average among European countries while Polish growth is one of the lowest.

B. PATTERN OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Industrialization has been the dominant form of economic growth in Eastern Europe. As shown in table 6, industry and construction account for about 70 percent of the postwar increase in GNP in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and for nearly 60 percent even in so

TABLE 6.—Composition of the growth of GNP at factor cost, 1951-64

(Percent of increment in GNP)

	Industry, including construction	Agriculture, including forestry	Services
Bulgaria ¹	69	9	32
Czechoslovakia.....	68	-2	34
East Germany ²	72	0	28
Hungary.....	69	9	32
Poland.....	66	11	23
Austria.....	62	7	31
Belgium ³	63	3	44
Denmark.....	48	8	44
France.....	55	5	40
West Germany.....	63	3	34
Greece ¹	30	22	48
Italy.....	65	11	24
Netherlands.....	61	3	46
Norway.....	40	-1	61

¹ 1951-63.² 1951-62.³ 1955-64.

undveloped a country as Bulgaria (twice as high a share as in Greece). The role of agriculture in total growth ranged from small (10 percent or so) to negative and the role of services ranged from a quarter to a third. The contribution of industry and construction to total economic growth was smaller in six out of nine of the listed Western European countries than in any of the eastern countries in spite of a generally higher initial level of industrial development, while the contribution of services was generally much larger.

1. Industrial production⁴

Industrial production has increased more rapidly in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe over the entire postwar period, and at about the same rate as in Western Europe since 1960, as shown in table 7.

TABLE 7.—Growth of industrial production,¹ prewar to 1964

	Indexes, 1955=100					Annual percentage increases			
	Prewar	1950	1955	1960	1964	1951-55	1955-60	1961-64	1961-64
Bulgaria.....	40	67	100	183	230	8.4	12.7	8.2	9.9
Czechoslovakia.....	60	80	100	155	167	4.6	9.1	1.9	5.4
East Germany.....	80	59	100	141	166	11.2	7.2	4.1	7.7
Hungary.....	67	65	100	131	179	9.0	5.5	8.2	7.5
Poland.....	63	63	100	148	194	9.6	8.1	7.3	8.4
Rumania.....	49	69	100	167	244	7.6	9.4	11.7	9.4
Total above.....	64	67	100	148	185	8.5	8.1	5.8	7.6
Unweighted average.....						8.4	8.6	6.9	8.0
Austria.....	47	69	100	134	169	7.8	6.0	4.3	6.2
Belgium.....	63	80	100	110	139	4.5	1.8	6.1	4.0
Denmark.....	69	90	100	130	168	2.0	5.5	6.5	4.5
France.....	65	79	100	131	166	4.9	5.0	6.1	5.5
West Germany.....	61	66	100	138	170	12.1	6.6	6.6	8.2
Greece.....	60	67	100	160	200	5.2	8.5	7.4	8.1
Italy.....	48	60	100	160	199	10.6	8.4	7.3	8.9
Netherlands.....	62	75	100	130	168	5.9	5.5	4.9	5.5
Norway.....	60	82	100	114	141	4.1	2.7	5.5	4.0
Total above.....	65	67	100	135	170	8.3	6.2	5.9	6.8
Unweighted average.....						6.7	5.6	5.8	6.1

¹ Includes construction for post war years, except Rumania and East Germany. Excludes construction for prewar years.

NOTE.—For sources and methods, see app. B.

⁴ Industrial production is here defined to include construction and all handicraft production.

All of the Eastern countries, except East Germany, had easily surpassed prewar levels by 1950 and since then annual rates of growth have averaged around 8 percent in Eastern Europe compared with 6 or 7 percent in Western Europe. As in the case of GNP, however, industrial growth in the Eastern countries has slowed down since 1960, largely because of the recession in Czechoslovakia, where industrial production in 1964 was below the 1962 level, and a fall of nearly one-half in the rate of growth in East Germany.

Rates of industrial growth in both Eastern and Western Europe have been inversely related to the level of economic development and there is little difference in rates of growth among countries at similar levels of economic development. For example, the three least developed countries, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece have been at or near the top in industrial growth rates, with Greece lagging somewhat behind the other two because of its more balanced economic development; in the next group, Poland and Hungary have lagged slightly behind Italy; and in the more advanced group, growth in Czechoslovakia has been about the same as that in France and the Netherlands. Eastern and Western Germany have been exceptions, both being industrialized countries with high growth rates until recent years, and West Germany has had the edge.

2. *Agricultural production*⁵

In contrast to industrial production, which grew quickly in all the Eastern European countries, agricultural production in the area has barely surpassed the prewar level, while it is more than 50 percent above this level in Western Europe. A substantial lag in Eastern European agriculture in comparison with Western Europe developed in the early postwar years and the lag increased during the postwar period. Only in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria did production in the early 1960's exceed the average for 1934-38, and most of the Polish gain is due to boundary changes. The more developed countries did much worse. Production in East Germany was 20 percent, and in Czechoslovakia nearly 10 percent, below the prewar level, and in neither of these countries has there been an upward trend since the early 1950's (see table 8).

TABLE 8.—*Trends in agricultural production*

[Indexes: 1950-53 average equals 100]

	Pre-war	1960-63 average		Pre-war	1960-63 average
Bulgaria.....	96	107	Belgium.....	75	131
Czechoslovakia.....	114	105	Denmark.....	77	117
East Germany.....	122	98	France.....	89	134
Hungary.....	120	118	West Germany.....	88	119
Poland.....	95	126	Italy.....	85	125
Rumania.....	112	144	Netherlands.....	77	123
Austria.....	106	120	Norway.....	85	96

NOTES.—Western Europe:

1950-53 to 1960-63.—GNP originating in agriculture and forestry in constant prices.

Prewar to 1950-53.—Agricultural output, excluding forestry (total agricultural production less the use of self-produced materials).

For sources and methods, see app. B.

⁵ Agricultural production refers to the contribution of agriculture, forestry, and fishing to the GNP in constant prices.

3. Services

This residual category of GNP is a composite of transportation, trade, and direct services, such as housing, personal services, and government services. Rates of growth vary a great deal among these components and, for individual components, among countries. By and large, the output of transportation, communications, and trade, approximately kept up with the total output of goods during the post-war period. In the case of direct services, government services increased much faster than direct private services and housing in the Eastern European countries—indeed, the output of many personal services declined. In the Western countries the differences are in the same direction but less marked. These differences in both areas are offsetting, and production of services rose at about the same rate as GNP in almost all of the countries covered (see table 9).

TABLE 9.—Trends in the output of services¹ 1951-64

	Annual percentage increases	Ratio of rate of growth of services to rate of growth of GNP (in percent)
Bulgaria.....	5.9	98
Czechoslovakia.....	4.2	105
East Germany.....	3.8	69
Hungary.....	4.4	92
Poland.....	3.9	80
Unweighted average.....	4.4	—
Austria.....	4.8	92
Belgium.....	3.0	100
Denmark.....	4.4	110
France.....	4.7	98
West Germany.....	5.9	87
Greece.....	5.5	81
Italy.....	4.6	79
Netherlands.....	4.4	98
Norway.....	5.0	135
Unweighted average.....	4.7	—

¹ All sectors of GNP except industry, construction, agriculture, and forestry.

² 1951-63.

³ 1951-62.

⁴ 1953-63.

IV. TRENDS IN CONSUMPTION AND CONSUMER WELFARE

The Eastern European consumer has not benefited in proportion to the growth of production. In the Western European countries, the growth of personal consumption since World War II and since prewar years has almost kept up with the growth of GNP. In the Eastern European countries for which reliable consumption statistics are available (they are not for Bulgaria and Rumania), the growth in personal consumption was much slower than that of GNP (table 10). The most extreme difference is in Czechoslovakia, where personal consumption grew about half as fast as GNP, the discrepancy being most marked during the early postwar years. In East Germany on the other hand, consumption grew much faster than GNP in the early 1950's and almost as fast as GNP in the late 1950's. The reason was the open border with West Germany, which forced the East German regime to keep living conditions as close to those in West Germany as possible. The closing of the border in 1961 made this competition

TABLE 10.—*Growth of personal consumption in relation to that of GNP*

	Ratios of growth rates (in percent)				
	1951-55	1956-60	1961-64	1951-64	Prewar to 1964
Czechoslovakia.....	31	55	136	55	43
East Germany.....	160	90	22	114	79
Hungary.....	36	100	89	71	52
Poland.....	85	84	78	84	78
Austria.....	100	100	112	104	94
Denmark.....	75	76	102	85	81
France.....	111	83	114	102	78
West Germany.....	88	105	106	97	100
Italy.....	75	76	133	91	100
Netherlands.....	62	98	142	94	-----
Norway.....	67	94	80	79	-----

NOTE.—For sources and methods, see app. B.

unnecessary at a time when the slowdown in overall economic growth made it more impractical. Consequently, there was almost no increase in East German consumption between 1961 and 1964. The postwar pattern of growth of consumption in Hungary clearly shows some causes and effects of the 1956 revolt. During the early 1950's the growth of consumption was less than 40 percent of that of GNP; since 1955 consumption and GNP have grown at about the same rates. In Poland, the stability of the ratios in table 10 hides some considerable fluctuations in consumption policy within the periods shown—consumption was sacrificed during 1951-53; favored during the "new course" of 1954, the disorders of 1956 and the period of consolidation of Gomulka's power in 1957; and again given a low priority after 1957.

The effects of Communist policies and priorities on comparative changes in per capita consumption are shown in table 11. The increases in per capita consumption are much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe whether we consider the period since prewar years, since the early postwar years, or since 1960. Unusual circumstances explain the two exceptions—the changes in boundaries and the decline in population explain the large improvement in Poland since prewar days; and the late recovery and open border until 1961 explain the rapid postwar increase in East Germany. The only sub-

TABLE 11.—*Growth of personal consumption per capita*

	Percentage increases		
	Prewar to 1964	1950 to 1964	1960 to 1964
Czechoslovakia.....	35	20	5
East Germany.....	43	134	3
Hungary.....	24	47	16
Poland.....	97	39	10
Austria.....	119	100	17
Denmark.....	58	43	19
France.....	76	67	18
West Germany.....	127	110	16
Italy.....	100	88	29
Netherlands.....	-----	62	20
Norway.....	-----	36	14

stantial increase in recent years among the Eastern countries, although a moderate one by Western standards, was in Hungary, a fact that has been noted by many travelers.

Lags of this sort in the growth of consumption inevitably had dramatic effects on relative consumption levels. Table 12 compares per capita consumption levels in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland with those in West Germany and Austria—of all the countries considered, those which have the closest historical, social, and cultural ties, and so for which comparisons are most relevant to the governments and populations involved. Before World War II, East Germany was roughly at parity with West Germany, with Czechoslovakia not far behind.⁶ Since the war, personal consumption in East Germany and Czechoslovakia have fallen to around 60 percent of the West German level. These two countries also lost a clear lead over Austria, which they now trail by a wide margin; and Hungary, which before the war probably was at about the Austrian level was some 40 percent below the Austrian level in 1964 and not much above that of Poland. These contrasts have been evident to travelers for some time but until recently the necessary statistics were not available.

TABLE 12.—Comparative levels of personal consumption per capita

	Prewar ¹	1950	1955	1960	1964
West Germany.....	100	100	100	100	100
Austria.....	81	82	79	78	79
Czechoslovakia.....	95	100	71	63	57
East Germany.....	95	54	68	68	60
Hungary.....	87	60	52	49	48
Poland.....	45	60	48	42	40

¹ 1936 for West Germany and East Germany; 1937 for Poland and Czechoslovakia; 1938 for the other countries.

Methods: App. A. For Austria linked with West Germany in 1955 using official exchange rate.

The contrast between the Eastern and the Western European countries in the growth of personal consumption is certainly large enough to warrant some definite judgments on relative changes in consumer welfare in spite of probable inaccuracies in the calculations and the fact that many other things besides the average volume of personal consumption affect welfare. Among the influences on consumer welfare that the personal consumption statistics do not reflect, some probably favor Western Europe, others Eastern Europe. For example, the range of choice among products and models has been considerably narrower in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Recurring shortages of many products and the consequent need to queue up for hours, possibly to go home emptyhanded, also has been a negative feature of the Eastern European scene. On the positive side has been the large increase in the supply of free, or nearly free, social services, such as educational and health services and recreation, which, in contrast to personal consumption, probably was at least as rapid

⁶ If prewar consumption were known for the same year—for example, 1938—in all the countries, consumption in both parts of Germany would be higher than in table 12 relative to that in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

in Eastern as in Western Europe (although to make certain of this would take additional research).

Most difficult of all to evaluate are the changes in the distribution of income among various socioeconomic groups. This is still largely an unexplored subject on which available information is very scarce. My general impressions on Eastern Europe, based mainly on Polish data, are the following. Among the various socioeconomic groups the peasants since prewar days have had the largest increase in per capita consumption. The main reason has been a shortage of agricultural products, caused originally by the disruptions of World War II, and later sustained by the inadequate growth of agricultural production. The Communist governments tried at various times to depress the farmers' terms of trade, with some success, particularly where they had strengthened their control over agriculture as a result of collectivization. But success was only temporary; farm incomes had to be raised to stimulate food production. Semiskilled and unskilled blue-collar workers also saw a considerable improvement in their standard of living, particularly those who formerly had been peasants.

These groups of workers gained from what appears to have been a general reduction in wage differentials due both to egalitarian Socialist ideology and the easy overfulfillment of work norms. They also were the main beneficiaries of the low prices of necessities, such as bread, and the rationing of housing at nominal rent levels. On the other hand, the skilled blue-collar workers often suffered from these changes and the white-collar workers lost the favored economic and social status that they had had before the war. The prewar middle class, of course, fared worst of all, and the relative and absolute position of managerial and professional people generally declined, although with some exceptions. According to a Polish estimate,⁷ which places the overall increase in per capita consumption from 1937 (old boundaries) to 1960 at 100–115 percent, the increase in per capita consumption of farm families was more than double that of nonfarm families—125–150 percent compared with 60 percent (the increase resulting from the shift of population from farm to city also is substantial). The increase in nonfarm consumption was due only in part to a rise in real monthly wages (30 percent). Other factors were the near elimination of unemployment, an increase in the number of breadwinners per family and a large increase in moonlighting. Considering that the workweek lengthened and that the above Polish estimates probably have some upward bias (the Polish figure for the percentage increase in total consumption is 25–40 percent above the estimate used in the present study) it is quite likely that the choice of weights largely determines whether average real wages increased or declined. In any case, real wages, and probably also per capita consumption, of some social groups certainly are still lower than before World War II, and in 1956—the time of the Poznan riot and the near revolution in Warsaw—most groups of older workers had ample reason to believe that they were worse off than before the war.

Although the other Eastern European countries probably experienced less dramatic changes in income distribution than Poland, they

⁷ Leszek Zienkowski, "Dochod Narodowy Polski 1937–60" (Warsaw, 1963, pp. 199–201).

also had much smaller increases in average per capita consumption. The net effect on the real incomes of the less privileged groups, in comparison with prewar years, consequently, was probably similar to that in Poland.

V. THE COST OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

A low productivity of investment has been the major cause of the lag in the growth of consumption in Eastern Europe. Eastern European countries used a considerably larger proportion of their GNP for investment than Western European countries to achieve similar rates of growth in output. The productivity of investment was lower in Eastern Europe in spite of several favorable factors, including a more rapid increase in industrial employment, a distribution of investments that favored industry at the expense of the more capital-intensive service sectors, and relatively smaller needs for the replacement of fixed assets. A strong case can be made, therefore, for attributing the low productivity of investments in the Eastern countries to the economic policies and institutions that have characterized communism of the Soviet type.

A. VOLUME AND DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT

In both Eastern and Western Europe the key factor in postwar economic growth has been the large and rapidly rising level of investments. The share of gross fixed investment in GNP at factor cost increased steadily in nearly all Eastern and Western European countries during the entire postwar period,⁸ as shown in table 13. Typically the Western European shares rose from 20 percent or less in the early 1950's to near 25 percent in the early 1960's, while those in Eastern Europe (excluding East Germany) went from the low 20's to near 30 percent. In East Germany the high priority given to raising consumption during the 1950's and the heavy reparations payments to the U.S.S.R. until about 1957 (see sec. VI below), greatly limited investment, which was low even by Western European standards. Since the ending of reparations, and especially since the raising of the Berlin wall, investments have increased rapidly, becoming a respectable share of GNP.

Much more striking are the differences in the distribution of investment. Investment in industry (including construction) and agriculture (including forestry) took a much larger share of total investment in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe; investment in services, a correspondingly much lower share. The Eastern European countries put a remarkably uniform 45 percent of investments into industry and construction, while few of the Western shares, even in the most industrialized countries, approached 40 percent and one (Greece) was as low as 20 percent, less than half that of Bulgaria. The share of agriculture in total investment is much greater in Eastern than in Western Europe not only in absolute terms but also in comparing countries where the relative importance of agriculture in the economy is similar (for example, Bulgaria and Greece; East and West Germany; Czecho-

⁸ The method of derivation is described in app. B.

TABLE 13.—Size and distribution of gross fixed investment

	Years	As a percent of GNP ¹				As a percent of total investment ²		
		Total investment	Investment in industry ³	Investment in agriculture ⁴	Investment in services	Investment in industry	Investment in agriculture	Investment in services
EASTERN EUROPE								
Bulgaria.....	1950-54	23.7	10.6	4.1	9.0	45	17	38
	1955-59	27.7	12.1	7.6	8.0	44	27	29
	1960-63	41.5	19.3	11.2	11.0	47	27	26
Czechoslovakia.....	1950-54	23.5	10.6	2.3	10.6	45	10	45
	1955-59	27.3	11.4	4.3	11.6	42	16	42
	1960-63	27.7	12.9	4.4	10.4	46	16	38
East Germany.....	1950-54	14.5	5.8	1.8	6.9	40	12	48
	1955-59	19.4	8.3	2.2	8.9	43	11	46
	1960-63	23.6	11.4	2.9	9.3	48	13	39
Hungary.....	1950-54	25.9	12.2	3.6	10.1	47	14	39
	1955-59	24.2	11.0	3.9	9.3	46	16	38
	1960-63	27.2	12.0	5.3	9.9	44	10	47
Poland.....	1950-54	21.1	9.9	2.0	9.2	47	19	33
	1955-59	25.1	11.0	3.2	10.9	44	13	43
	1960-63	28.1	12.5	3.4	12.2	45	12	43
WESTERN EUROPE								
Austria.....	1950-54	20.1	7.2	2.5	10.4	36	12	52
	1955-59	23.1	7.8	3.2	12.1	34	14	52
	1960-63	24.1						
Belgium.....	1950-54	17.1	5.5	.8	10.8	32	5	63
	1955-59	19.1	6.7	.6	11.8	35	3	62
	1960-63	17.2	3.1	2.6	11.5	18	15	67
Denmark.....	1950-54	18.6	3.2	1.9	13.5	17	10	73
	1955-59	22.5	4.6	2.2	15.7	21	10	69
	1960-63	18.1						
France.....	1950-54	20.3	7.4	1.6	11.3	36	8	56
	1955-59	21.7	8.5	1.3	11.9	39	6	55
	1960-63	21.1	7.9	1.3	11.9	38	6	56
West Germany.....	1950-54	24.3	9.2	.9	14.2	38	4	58
	1955-59	26.4	10.3	1.5	14.6	39	6	55
	1960-63	15.9	4.3	1.6	10.0	27	10	63
Greece.....	1950-54	19.2	3.5	2.0	13.7	19	10	71
	1955-59	22.9						
	1960-63	19.7	6.8	2.6	10.3	35	13	52
Italy.....	1950-54	22.4	6.7	2.7	13.0	30	12	58
	1955-59	25.6	8.5	2.6	14.5	33	10	57
	1960-63	21.5	6.9	1.2	13.4	32	5	63
Netherlands.....	1950-54	24.4	7.5	1.0	15.9	31	4	65
	1955-59	24.7	7.9	1.0	15.8	32	4	64
	1960-63							

¹ Percent at estimated factor cost in constant prices. See app. B.

² Distribution at constant market prices.

³ Includes construction.

⁴ Includes forestry.

⁵ Excludes construction and handicrafts.

⁶ Calculated from the distribution in current prices.

⁷ 1956-59.

slovakia and France). Moreover, in the East the share of agriculture in investment has been rising while the contribution of agriculture to GNP has been falling. In one Eastern European country, Poland, agricultural investments have not been high by Western standards considering the large size of the agricultural sector; but as will be seen later, the exception proves the rule—Poland is the only Eastern country which has not collectivized agriculture.

As a result of the higher share both of total investment in GNP and of industry and agriculture in total investment, investment in these sectors took a much larger share of GNP in the East than in the West, as shown also in table 13.

The counterpart of the high investment in industry and agriculture in Eastern countries is the low investment in services—transportation,

trade, housing, and so forth. Typically, the share of services in total investment has been around 40 percent in the East, compared with 60 percent in the West, although with wide variation among individual Western countries. An adequate breakdown of investment in services is lacking, but it appears that the East invested relatively less than the West both in "tertiary" sectors like transportation and trade and in social overhead like housing.

B. PRODUCTIVITY OF INVESTMENT

The estimates of the growth of output and of gross fixed investment provide measures of the productivity of investment. In accordance with usual practice, the reciprocal of the productivity of investment—the ratio of gross fixed investment to the increment in output—was used.⁹

We will call this ratio the investment cost ratio (or just investment costs) instead of the more usual, but cumbersome term, incremental capital-output ratio.

The investment cost calculations, the results of which are summarized in table 14, reveal some important differences between the Eastern and Western European countries. Investment costs in Eastern Europe were higher than in Western Europe—on the average by some 25 percent for the total economy, by 40 percent for industry, and by a great deal in agriculture. Only for services were the ratios similar in the two areas. Very few Western investment ratios exceed those in any of the Eastern countries and the differences between the most comparable countries of the two groups are very large. For example, the Bulgarian ratios exceed those in Greece by 75 percent for the total economy and by more than 100 percent for industry; Czechoslovak investment costs are two-thirds more than those of France for the total economy and more than double the French in industry; Hungarian and Polish overall ratios respectively are only 25 percent above those of Austria and Italy, but in industry the difference is 100 percent and two-thirds. Investment costs in agriculture were astronomical in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany (in the latter country, net agricultural output declined), and were higher in Hungary than in any of the listed countries of Western Europe. However, Poland with its predominantly private agriculture, had a low ratio, even by Western European standards.

Investment costs have tended to be higher in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe during the entire postwar period, but the difference has been growing in recent years, as shown in table 15. The astronomical cost ratios for Czechoslovakia during 1961-64 reflect the near stagnation of output in the face of a high level of investment, and the ratio in East Germany has become the second highest among the listed European countries, after having been the lowest during the

⁹ For the economy as a whole, these were obtained as the ratios of the percentages of gross fixed investment in GNP at factor cost to the average annual percentage increase in GNP. For the three main sectors of GNP (industry and construction, agriculture and forestry, and services), the ratios are the average shares in GNP of the sector's investment to the rate of growth in the sector's output, the latter being weighted by the average share of the sector's contribution to GNP. For all periods, the increase in output is lagged 1 year behind gross fixed investment—for example, average annual investment in 1950-54 is related to the average rate of growth in output during 1951-55.

TABLE 14.—Comparative investment costs, 1951-64

	Gross fixed investment per unit of increase in output ¹			
	GNP	Industry	Agriculture	Services
Bulgaria.....	5.1	3.8	33.6	4.7
Czechoslovakia.....	6.7	4.4	40.0	7.8
East Germany ²	6.1	3.5	(³)	7.2
Hungary.....	5.3	4.0	9.6	6.1
Poland.....	5.0	3.4	3.6	9.5
Unweighted average.....	5.6	3.8	7.1
Austria.....	4.3	2.1	7.6	7.1
Belgium ³	5.9	4.7	3.6	7.7
Denmark.....	4.9	1.9	5.5	8.0
France.....	4.1	2.8	4.5	5.7
West Germany ³	4.6	2.9	8.3	8.6
Greece.....	3.0	1.8	n.a.	5.5
Italy.....	3.9	2.0	5.3	7.8
Netherlands.....	5.0	3.2	4.4	6.5
Unweighted average.....	4.5	2.7	5.6	7.1

¹ Increase in output lagged 1 year behind gross fixed investment.

² 1956-64.

³ Decline in output.

NOTE.—Norway is excluded because its investment statistics have a broader coverage than those of other countries (they include all kinds of repair expenditures).

early 1950's when a considerable amount of unused productive capacity still remained because of the delayed recovery from the effects of the war.

TABLE 15.—Changes in investment costs

	Gross fixed investment per unit of increase in output ¹					
	Total economy			Industry		
	1951-55	1956-60	1961-64	1951-55	1956-60	1961-64
Bulgaria.....	4.0	3.8	7.7	4.3	2.6	5.5
Czechoslovakia.....	6.5	4.1	25.2	5.1	2.6	12.2
East Germany.....	2.0	4.0	5.7	1.1	2.3	5.0
Hungary.....	4.7	5.5	6.0	3.8	5.2	3.6
Poland.....	4.4	5.0	5.8	3.2	3.6	3.4
Austria.....	3.3	4.4	5.7	1.5	2.4
Belgium.....	7.4	4.4	6.7	2.8
Denmark.....	2.6	3.8	4.4	3.8	1.4	1.7
France.....	4.1	4.2	4.2	2.7	2.8
West Germany.....	2.3	3.9	5.5	1.3	2.5	3.4
Greece.....	2.3	3.4	3.8	2.2	1.5
Italy.....	3.3	3.5	4.6	1.7	1.8	2.4
Netherlands.....	3.8	5.9	5.7	2.8	3.2	3.6

¹ Increase in output lagged 1 year behind gross fixed investment.

C. FACTORS IN INVESTMENT COSTS

The wide differences in investment costs are the key to a comparative analysis of the determinants of economic growth in Eastern and Western Europe. The remainder of this section will deal with some of the factors that may have caused these differences in investment costs—the growth and distribution of labor inputs; the sectoral and branch distribution of investment; the options and policies regarding replacement of fixed assets; and a number of pertinent institutional factors and policies in industry and agriculture.

1. Labor inputs

The overall rate and pattern of growth of employment was similar in the two parts of Europe, as shown in table 16.¹⁰ In both Eastern and Western Europe, the growth of the total labor force was less than one quarter as fast as the growth of output per person, and it is possible that there was no increase at all in the total number of hours worked in several countries. In industry both employment and output per worker increased faster in the Eastern than in the Western countries, but on the average the difference was greater for employment (two-thirds) than for output per worker (one-third). Agricultural employment declined in all the countries of both areas but on the average the decline was more rapid in the West, and consequently the advantage of the West was greater for output per worker in agriculture than for agricultural output. These averages disguise some wide differences among countries—particularly the contrast between East German growth, which resulted entirely from increased labor productivity, and West German growth, which was supported by the fastest increase in employment among the countries listed. Nevertheless it appears that somewhat less substituting of capital for labor was necessary in most of the Eastern countries than in the Western countries to achieve a given rate of growth in output. A definite judgment on the relative role of labor inputs in Eastern and Western Europe must await a much more thorough study of the use of labor and also of education, training, and other influences on the quality of the labor force. But it is probable that the effect of labor inputs on relative investment costs was at worst neutral, and most probably tended to keep costs in the East lower than those in the West.

TABLE 16.—Growth of employment and output per employee, 1951-62¹ (annual percentage increases)

	Employment ²			Output per employee ³		
	Total labor force ⁴	Industry	Agriculture	Total	Industry	Agriculture
Bulgaria.....	0.5	5.2	-1.3	5.6	4.7	2.0
Czechoslovakia.....	1.0	3.1	-3.2	4.2	3.2	3.7
East Germany.....	0	-1	-3.0	5.5	5.4	2.8
Hungary.....	1.2	4.6	-2.1	3.4	2.8	3.8
Poland.....	1.1	3.5	-8	3.6	5.1	3.1
Rumania.....	1.0	3.6	-2	4.7	5.2	3.9
Unweighted average.....	1.0	3.3	-1.8	4.5	4.9	3.2
Belgium.....	.3	.4	-3.5	2.8	3.1	6.2
Denmark.....	1.3	2.0	-1.6	2.5	2.1	3.2
France ⁵2	1.1	-3.5	4.8	4.6	6.5
West Germany.....	1.5	3.1	-3.0	5.6	5.0	4.8
Italy ⁶7	4.5	-3.0	4.8	4.1	5.3
Netherlands.....	1.1	1.3	-1.8	3.4	4.1	3.9
Unweighted average.....	.	2.1	-2.7	4.0	3.8	5.0

¹ Industry includes construction (except in East Germany and Rumania); agriculture includes forestry.

² 1951-62 unless otherwise specified.

³ For Total and for Industry, 1951-62 unless otherwise specified; for agriculture, calculated from increases in output from the 1950-53 average to the 1960-63 average.

⁴ Includes the unemployed and the military.

⁵ 1950-62.

Sources: Eastern Europe, U.S. Bureau of Census; except for employment in construction. Employment in construction from various statistical yearbooks of individual countries. Western Europe: OECD Manpower Statistics, 1950-1962.

¹⁰ Comparable employment statistics are more scarce than comparable production statistics. Those shown in table 16 cover the 1951-62 period for most countries, but shorter periods for a few countries.

2. Sectoral and branch distribution of investment

The relatively high investment costs in Eastern Europe clearly are not due to the sectoral distribution of investments. Indeed, the opposite is true—the sectoral distribution of investment in the East was intended to keep, and should have kept, overall investment costs lower than in the West. The reason is evident from table 14—investment costs are higher in services, into which the Eastern countries put a relatively small share of investments, than in the economy as a whole, and much higher than in industry (almost double in the Eastern countries and two and a half times in the Western countries).

The Eastern countries followed the strategy of maximizing expenditures in the construction of new factories (or major expansion of old factories) by minimizing expenditures on the modernization of railroads, the construction of a modern road network, the expansion of warehouse space, and the satisfaction of consumer demand for housing. This strategy could be sustained for some years because to a point the use of capacity in these services is quite elastic. It was hoped that the extra boost given to industrial production by concentrating investments in industry would be sufficient to allow the backlog of investment demands in services to be made up eventually without strain on the economy. These hopes were disappointed, however. We have seen that agriculture took a large part of investment with little yield (for reasons to be described later), and the expected advantage in industrial production did not materialize because of the relatively low yield of industrial investments. Moreover, the possibilities for squeezing more output from existing capacity in services have been running out and in recent years industrial growth has been hindered with increasing frequency by a lack of freight cars (notably in Czechoslovakia), while great waste of agricultural products has resulted from the lack of storage facilities and adequate farm-to-market roads. In the future, the need to make up for the deficiencies caused by the shortsighted policies of the past probably will raise overall investment costs and hence limit the possible rate of economic growth.

It is unlikely that these conclusions on the effect of the distribution of investment on investment costs would be greatly changed if more detailed comparative data on investment allocations were available. Within industry, the Eastern countries probably put a greater emphasis than the Western countries on some capital-intensive branches, like steel and cement, and less emphasis on some labor-intensive branches, like textiles. On the other hand, chemicals and petroleum refining, which are both highly capital-intensive, probably were developed more intensively in the West.

3. Replacement and maintenance of fixed assets

Eastern Europe had another advantage over Western Europe that should have tended to hold down its investment costs—the fact that replacement needs took a smaller part of its gross investment. There are no comparable data on capital stock for Eastern and Western European countries, but it is probable that Eastern countries, being in general less developed, had lower average capital-output ratios than the Western countries both before World War II and in the early postwar years. It is also likely that the average age of capital was

somewhat less in the East than in the West because the industrial revolution had started later. For both these reasons a smaller share of GNP is likely to have been needed in the East than in the West to cover replacement needs for capital. Moreover, since investment was a higher share of GNP in the East than in the West, the share of replacement needs in investment would have been smaller even if their share in GNP was the same. Thus it is probably safe to assume that net investment correctly measured—that is, gross investment, less the expenditures required to maintain the productive capacity and efficiency of the existing capital stock—was a considerably larger share of gross investment in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. This means, of course, that investment costs in the East were relatively even higher measured with net investments than with gross investments.

In practice, the Eastern European countries appear to have tried to maximize the increase in productive capacity by minimizing retirements, relying on repairs to maintain the productivity of existing assets. Again the intention was to hold down investment costs. The few available data on actual retirements of fixed assets indicate that retirement rates in Eastern countries were extremely low. For example, they were less than 1 percent of productive fixed assets per year in Czechoslovakia during most of the 1950's.¹¹ Actually, this policy probably had the opposite effect from that which was intended—in the end, it probably increased investment costs. Expenditures on repairs, both capital repairs, which are included in the present investment statistics, and current repairs, which are not included, were high but insufficient, leading to frequent breakdowns of equipment (the tractor standing idle for lack of spare parts is as common a scene in Eastern Europe as in the U.S.S.R.), which in turn created unused capacity and caused a loss in efficiency. Moreover, the strong bias against retiring existing assets, long after they had become obsolete, caused some of the most productive investment opportunities to be unused.

4. Other factors affecting investment costs

We have seen that the growth of employment, the broad sectoral distribution of investment, and the maintenance and replacement needs for fixed assets all should have helped the Eastern European countries to keep investment costs below those in Western countries. The influence of external factors is discussed in the next section. Here we will consider from an internal point of view the effect of such factors as the introduction and use of new technology, and the planning and management of production.

In general, the relative backwardness of the Eastern European countries should have given them opportunities for a more rapid technological transformation than in Western Europe (such an advantage has often been attributed to the U.S.S.R. relative to the United States). In addition, the relatively larger gross investments and probably much larger net investments in Eastern Europe provided relatively greater means to take advantage of these opportunities. Among Western countries, high shares of investment in GNP usually have been ac-

¹¹ K. Novotny, *Vyvoj základnich fondů v letech 1948-1957*, "Statistický Obzor, No. 1, 1959, p. 16.

companied not only by a rapid growth of GNP but also by low investment costs.¹² Large investment not only can mean a large injection of new technology, but also opportunities for introducing economies of scale in new and old plants. However, the relatively small size of the Eastern European economies tends to limit the possible economies of scale. There could be offsetting opportunities in foreign trade, but these opportunities probably were less favorable in Eastern than in Western Europe.

There is no way of measuring the actual development of technology in Eastern and Western Europe. One gains the impression that new technology in Eastern Europe was inferior to that in Western Europe, partly for lack of effort, partly because of bad planning and management, and partly because of lack of access to the best Western and Soviet technology (technology in the Communist bloc was generally inferior to that in the West). Any technological disadvantage for Eastern Europe was bound to have the most serious effects on the industrialized countries, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. But technological lags are by no means the only explanation for the high investment costs in Eastern countries. Bad planning and management were also important, and indeed, contributed to the technological lags.

An important source of inefficiency was the insistence on investing at rates which strained the capacity of the construction and machinery industries. The result was unduly high costs and long periods of construction for new plants¹³ and an accumulation of unfinished projects well beyond what is probably usual in the West. The value of unfinished investments in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary has amounted to about 1 year's gross fixed investment.¹⁴

In industry, the bulk of investments went for new plants, often in previously undeveloped sites, leaving insufficient investments for an efficient modernization of existing plants. (We have already discussed a similar bias in regard to replacement.) The main recipients of investments in new plants were of course the least developed industrial branches and those where there was the least flexibility in the utilization of existing capacity. Most basic industrial branches—at first, metallurgy, and later electric power, fuels, chemicals, and construction materials—had a great deal of new plant construction because they were initially relatively less developed than the branches producing finished goods and there was continuously an incipient shortage of industrial materials. Many new branches of the machinery industry also were built. Existing machinery plants and nearly all of light industry, however, received very little investment; their management was always under strong pressure to squeeze more output from existing equipment and what improvements there were entailed the installation of a few new machines, leaving production processes unchanged.

Moreover, new plants in the East often were run at well below full capacity and produced at high unit cost for a long time after they

¹² See, for example, Angus Maddison, "Economic Growth in the West" (New York, 20th-Century Fund, 1964), p. 77 and United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, "Economic Survey of Europe in 1961, pt. 2, "Some Factors in Economic Growth in Europe During the 1950's" ch. II, p. 20.

¹³ See, for example, Andrzej Karpinski "Zagadnienia socjalistycznej industrializacji Polski" (Warsaw, 1958), pp. 89-92.

¹⁴ United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, "Economic Survey of Europe," 1962, pt. 1, pp. 1, 20-23.

had been commissioned.¹⁵ This was probably due partly to inexperience, at least in the less industrialized Eastern countries, but the principal cause was certainly poor planning of the plants and poor coordination of the construction of complementary facilities and of supplies and components.

There are also plenty of indications that bad management led both to unused capacity—for example, the well-known “storing” of foundry capacity by machinery plants to protect themselves against possible shortages of parts—and to unnecessarily high costs of production, which in turn held down the possibilities for increasing output. The institutional roots of such problems are well known; they will be taken up briefly in the concluding section.

The principal cause of the extremely high investment costs in agriculture already has been mentioned. The collectivization of agriculture, and before that the threat of collectivization and the discrimination against private farmers increased the demand for investment while they held down the growth of agricultural output. Collectivization increased the demand for investment in several ways: by creating a need for common livestock shelters and other “overhead” expenditures which do not necessarily raise production; by hastening the flight of labor from agriculture and hence the need for machinery to replace the labor; by tending to reduce the effective input of the remaining farmworkers, at least those who work on collective land and livestock, and so again increasing the need for mechanization. At the same time collectivization tended to depress output because of reduced incentives for farmers to work hard, carefully, and skillfully. Complaints are often heard from Eastern Europe that mechanization and other farm investments were inadequate. This inadequacy, however, is largely a reflection of the inefficiency of agricultural institutions in using available capital.

Inefficiency in the system of economic planning and management in Eastern Europe has been prevalent during the entire postwar period and was probably worse during the early 1950's than today. Recently, however, it has been more apparent because it has become more of an obstacle to economic growth. Until around 1960, although plans for the cost of investment projects, the growth of labor productivity, and the reduction of unit costs of production were rarely fulfilled, production goals nevertheless were often achieved by mobilizing so-called hidden reserves.

There were many such reserves; mobilizing labor from the farm and the kitchen for use in industry; keeping obsolete equipment in production; making increased use of existing productive capacity in railroads, warehouses, and plants in low priority industries; and taking advantage of easy opportunities for the rationalization of production after industry had been nationalized. The Government's ability to pass on the burden of inefficiency to the consumer, was another kind of “hidden reserve,” for investment could be raised rapidly enough to generate high rates of growth in output in spite of high investment costs. Among the burdens passed to the consumer were the poor

¹⁵ According to Karpinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–210, in 1955 nearly all the major industrial plants built during 1949–55 in Poland produced for some time at higher unit costs than the old plants, in spite of considerably greater capitalization and an advantage in technology.

quality, assortment, and design of consumer goods. When increased consumer resistance and increased strain in the supply of raw materials were manifested during the mid-1950's, most of the Governments had to temporarily lower or stabilize the share of investment in GNP, raise consumption and concentrate on straightening out the "disproportions" which had developed in the economy. New intensive investment drives were launched during the late 1950's, however, causing "reserves" once again to be used up at a rapid rate, and these drives were to continue during the early 1960's. Collectivization of agriculture, which accelerated between 1958 and 1961, made matters worse. By about 1960 the reserves had nearly run out in the more industrialized countries, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Agriculture had run short of labor, most housewives were already working, the strain on the railroad system had become excessive, and in many branches of the machinery and light industries equipment and processes were too obsolete to produce in accordance with modern technical specifications. At the same time, both domestic and foreign customers were becoming increasingly discriminating and large inventories of unsalable goods accumulated. With the lack of production reserves and the greatly reduced possibilities for dumping low-quality products on domestic or foreign consumers, the inefficiency of the system of planning and management was bound to force a sharp slowdown in economic growth.

VI. EXTERNAL FACTORS

The foregoing analysis indicates that economic performance in Eastern Europe was decidedly inferior to that in Western Europe. Production grew no more rapidly in the East than in the West; consumption increased much more slowly; and by all indications, economic growth was achieved less efficiently. It remains to be seen to what extent the East's inferiority in performance can be attributed to external disadvantages, for example, to Soviet impositions in contrast to U.S. aid, less favorable price terms, or more limited access to foreign goods and technology. We will deal first with quantifiable aspects of external economic relations—comparative trends in the volume of imports; foreign aid and impositions; and the terms of trade—and then evaluate the effects of these factors on economic performance and consider also nonquantifiable factors, such as the broad foreign economic environment.

A. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

1. Trends in the volume of imports

Except in East Germany, trends in the volume of imports were at least as favorable to economic growth in Eastern Europe as in Western Europe. Imports grew very rapidly in both areas, as shown in table 17. Until the early 1960's annual rates of growth in the volume of imports (that is, the value of imports in constant prices) were in excess of 10 percent in nearly all the Eastern European countries, and for the most part were below 10 percent in Western Europe. During the early 1960's, the growth of imports has slowed in Eastern Europe

and accelerated in Western Europe. The post-1950 expansion began from levels which were already above those of the late 1930's in all the countries covered, except East and West Germany. The exception for the two Germanys is due to the inclusion of estimates of interzonal trade in the prewar statistics. Interzonal trade had been far more important to East Germany than to West Germany, a factor which largely explains why the volume of imports in 1950 was only about 10 percent of that of 1936 in East Germany, while it was 60 percent in West Germany.

TABLE 17.—Growth of imports in constant prices

	Indexes: 1955=100				
	Prowar ¹	1950	1955	1960	1964
Bulgaria.....	68	78	100	262	447
Czechoslovakia.....	68	64	100	189	258
East Germany.....	371	37	100	194	233
Hungary.....	47	58	100	187	291
Poland.....	38	72	100	164	233
Rumania.....	48	54	100	148	272
Total above (Excluding East Germany).....	137	59	100	185	262
Austria.....	60	61	100	167	233
Belgium ²	66	75	100	141	207
Denmark.....	(4)	80	100	155	222
France.....	73	73	100	145	229
West Germany.....	78	47	100	146	214
Italy.....	46	64	100	109	207
Netherlands.....	59	72	100	146	211
Norway.....	65	71	100	143	194
Total above.....	(4)	64	100	152	224

¹ East Germany and West Germany, 1936; Poland and Czechoslovakia, 1937; Bulgaria, 1939; all other countries, 1938.

² Includes interregional trade between East Germany and West Germany.

³ Includes Luxembourg.

⁴ Not available.

Sources: See app. C. All prowar data in prowar boundaries.

In nearly all of Europe imports grew much more rapidly than GNP, as shown in table 18. Traditionally, dependence on imports had been greater in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe, largely because most of the Western countries were more industrialized. The prowar ratios of imports in GNP had been surpassed by 1950 in all of Eastern Europe, except East Germany, but had not been in Western Europe, except in Italy and West Germany. Since 1950 the ratio of imports to GNP has risen steadily in every country and the difference between Western Europe and Eastern Europe has narrowed further. By 1964 the smaller Eastern European countries (Bulgaria and Hungary) had achieved higher import ratios than the larger Western European countries and much higher ratios than before World War II. The Bulgarian experience is especially noteworthy, the import ratio having increased from 9 to 24 percent in less than a decade. The Polish and Rumanian ratios, however, continue to be much lower than those in Western Europe—a reflection of the relatively rich resources of these countries in relation to their degree of industrialization. The contrast between East and West Germany remains striking—the ratio of imports to GNP is only one-quarter of the prowar ratio in East Germany while it has almost recovered to the prowar level in West Germany.

TABLE 18.—*Relation of imports to production*

	Imports as a percent of GNP (from values in constant 1963 dollars)					Import index as a percent of industrial production index—1955=100			
	Prewar	1950	1955	1960	1964	Prewar	1950	1960	1964
Bulgaria	8	9	9	17	24	146	109	143	178
Czechoslovakia	6	6	8	12	15	84	80	122	155
East Germany	137	4	8	13	14	1464	63	137	141
Hungary	5	6	8	13	17	82	90	143	163
Poland	3	6	6	8	10	72	114	111	119
Rumania	4	5	6	8	12	98	78	96	112
Austria	15	12	15	20	23	127	89	125	147
Belgium ¹	25	23	25	32	40	106	94	120	149
Denmark	(²)	19	21	26	30	(²)	88	119	132
France	9	7	8	9	12	113	93	109	138
West Germany	118	8	12	12	15	1183	83	106	125
Italy	5	7	8	12	15	96	105	133	149
Netherlands	31	26	30	36	44	115	97	112	133
Norway	25	20	24	29	33	130	87	125	137

¹ Includes interregional trade between East and West Germany.

² Includes Luxembourg in imports.

³ Not available.

NOTE.—Prewar imports are in prewar boundaries while prewar GNP and industrial production are in postwar boundaries for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. In comparable boundaries the prewar ratios of imports to GNP and industrial production should be somewhat higher than in the table in Bulgaria, slightly lower in Czechoslovakia, and considerably lower in Rumania.

Imports grew not only in relation to GNP, but also in relation to industrial production in all the listed countries, except the two Germanies, as also shown in table 18. Industrial production recovered from the war faster than did imports in most countries of both areas, but then lagged behind imports during the post-1950 expansion. Surprisingly, imports in the Eastern countries, except Poland, rose faster than industrial production even between 1950 and 1955, a period when all of the countries were trying to become more self-sufficient. Apparently, rapid and broad industrialization created a derived demand for imports so large that it swamped the effects of import substitution.

2. Foreign aid and impositions

Unquestionably the postwar balance on economic aid and impositions has been highly unfavorable to Eastern Europe and highly favorable to Western Europe. The Eastern European countries had to make large net payments to the U.S.S.R. for reparations and other reasons and these net payments were concentrated in the early postwar years, when they were most burdensome. By contrast Western Europe was a large net recipient of U.S. aid and most of this aid was obtained early, when it was most needed. The following discussion of foreign aid and impositions and of international capital movements will treat these complex subjects only in very general terms, for a detailed treatment would require a number of specialized studies.

No reliable estimate exists of Soviet takings from Eastern Europe, but an order of magnitude of \$15 to \$20 billion in postwar prices probably is reasonable to cover dismantlings, reparations, and occupation costs. The bulk of this amount (probably some \$10 to \$15 billion) was taken from East Germany between World War II and the mid-1950's (10 to 15 percent of East German GNP). Another half billion dollars at least is accounted for by deliveries of coal by Poland to the U.S.S.R.

at nominal prices. Soviet removals of fixed assets and current production on reparations account from Hungary and Rumania also were substantial, although much smaller than those from East Germany. There were also Soviet takings from the jointly owned but Soviet-controlled companies in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The great bulk of all these Soviet impositions came between World War II and 1953, and the burden on the Eastern European economies probably declined steadily over this period. In comparison with Soviet impositions, Soviet economic aid to Eastern Europe (which was entirely in the form of credits, although repayment obligations for some of these were waived), was small—in the order of \$4 billion, not much over 1 billion of which was extended before 1956. For its part, Eastern Europe extended some \$2 billion in credit to non-Communist developing countries, all after 1955, and about \$1 billion to other Communist countries.

The large unrequited Eastern European exports to the U.S.S.R. make a striking contrast with the even larger net receipt of U.S. aid by Western Europe. Total U.S. economic aid to the nine Western European countries treated in this paper came to nearly \$19 billion for 1946-64 (excluding UNRRA aid), \$16 billion of which had been disbursed by the end of 1962. (The United States also extended a half a billion dollars of aid to Eastern Europe, consisting mainly of Public Law 480 credits to Poland after 1956.) For the 1946-52 period, U.S. economic aid on the average amounted to some 2 percent annually of the combined GNP's of the nine Western European countries (about the average proportion for France, West Germany, and Italy; a considerably larger proportion for Greece and Austria; and smaller proportions for the other countries). These figures exclude some \$13 billion of U.S. military aid, which was disbursed mainly after 1952. They also exclude private long-term U.S. investments in Western Europe, which have exceeded the flow of official and private aid from the Western European countries to the developing countries. Both U.S. private investments in Western Europe and Western European aid to developing countries have become important only since the mid-1950's.

To conclude, the balance of aid, impositions and credits was highly unfavorable to Eastern Europe for the postwar period as a whole, but the disadvantage for Eastern Europe (and the advantage for Western Europe) was concentrated in the early postwar years. Since the mid-1950's, both Eastern and Western Europe appear to have been net importers of long-term capital.

3. The net terms of trade

Rough estimates of trends in the "net terms of trade" (the ratio of the export price index to the import price index) are shown in table 19 for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, these three countries combined, and, by way of comparison, the EEC countries. The movement of the "net terms of trade" is nearly the same for the two groups of countries, except that the changes were more favorable to the Eastern group between 1950 and 1955 and more favorable to the Western group between 1955 and 1960. But there were wide differences in trends among Eastern countries. Czechoslovakia suffered a marked worsening in its net terms of trade in the early 1950's, which it has not yet made up, while Poland's terms of trade improved substantially from prewar years to 1950 and again from 1950 to 1955. These opposite

trends between 1950 and 1955 may have been due to the stabilization of prices in intrabloc trade at levels which favored primary producers, like Poland, but hurt importers of foods and industrial materials, like Czechoslovakia. In addition, there was a strong European market for coal, Poland's principal export of the early 1950's. The drastic fluctuations of Bulgaria's terms of trade appear to be due mainly to price fluctuations for tobacco, until recently Bulgaria's predominant export. There is no information on the terms of trade of the other Eastern European countries—the combined price indexes for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland were used to calculate price and quantum indexes in Hungary and Rumania. But although the information is very spotty, it appears to indicate that trends in the terms of trade in the East were not greatly different from those in the West.

TABLE 10.—*Net terms of trade*¹

	Indexes: 1964 equals 100				
	Prowar	1950	1955	1960	1964
Bulgaria.....	168	-----	111	99	100
Czechoslovakia.....	102	109	95	98	100
Poland.....	70	78	97	95	100
Above countries together.....	95	87	98	97	100
EEC Countries.....	96	87	89	96	100

¹ Ratio of export price index to import price index. See app. C.

These findings on trends in the net terms of trade appear to be consistent with evidence on the pricing of Eastern European trade with the U.S.S.R. and the West, which can be summarized as follows:

(1) Soviet foreign trade statistics show that the U.S.S.R. charges Eastern Europe higher prices and pays Eastern Europe lower prices than it charges and pays for the same commodities in its trade with Western Europe.¹⁶ The evidence is convincing for Soviet exports, which consist mainly of materials and foods with fairly definite prices, but much less so for Soviet imports because most of these consist of manufactures, for which meaningful price data are lacking.

(2) Eastern European trade statistics show that the Eastern European countries obtain higher prices from the U.S.S.R. (and each other) than from the West for their exports of the same commodities. Comparisons of import prices are inconclusive. Corroborating evidence comes from Western trade statistics, which seems to indicate that Western countries pay the Eastern European countries less for the same goods than in their trade with other Western countries.¹⁷ It would appear, then, that (1) the U.S.S.R. has better terms of trade with Eastern Europe than with the West; and (2) that Eastern European countries also have better terms of trade with the U.S.S.R. (and each other) than with the West. In other words, Eastern Europe appears to be discriminated against, on the one hand by the U.S.S.R. and

¹⁶ Horst Mendershausen, "Terms of Trade Between the Soviet Union and Smaller Communist Countries, 1955-57," "The Review of Economics and Statistics," No. 2, May 1959. "The Terms of Soviet-Satellite Trade: A Broadened Analysis," *ibid.*, May 1960.

¹⁷ Franklyn Holzman, "Soviet Foreign Trade Pricing and the Question of Discrimination," "Review of Economics and Statistics," May 1962. "More on Soviet Bloc Trade Discrimination," "Soviet Studies," July 1965. Frederic Pryor, "The Communist Foreign Trade System" (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), ch. V.

on the other by Western Europe. There is nothing inherently inconsistent about this. A plausible explanation is that pricing in intrabloc trade actually was based, as Soviet and Eastern European sources often state, on world market prices—that is the actual prices used in world commodity markets or in contracts between large Western firms. The prices obtained in the West by the Eastern European countries were usually much less favorable to these countries than the “world market prices.” This is especially true of Eastern European manufactured goods, which suffer in world markets from tariff barriers, lack of publicity, reliable trade contacts and adequate servicing facilities, and from inflexibility in the planning and management of foreign trade. Exports of raw materials and foods fare better, but even these tend to receive lower prices than average because they are often sold in small lots and at the wrong time. The basing of prices in intrabloc trade on actual world market prices (with many modifications, including a tendency to stabilize the prices of raw materials for a number of years) would tend to create similar trends in the terms of trade as in Western Europe. This, as we have seen, is what the statistics appear to show.

B. EVALUATION

What conclusions can be drawn from the statistical analysis as to the relative influence of external factors on the economic development of Eastern and Western Europe? It seems certain that Soviet impositions in the early postwar years and the unwillingness or inability of the Soviet Union to make up for the loss of interzonal trade had a great deal to do with the severe lag of the East German economy behind that of West Germany. The enormous structural adjustments forced upon an economy whose imports in 1950 were only about 10 percent of the prewar level can be imagined. East Germany had to develop a substantial steel industry, production of nearly all types of heavy machinery and transportation equipment, and many other industrial branches. Some of this forced structural change was bound to involve a loss of efficiency in the allocation of resources—certainly initially, and probably also in the long run. In addition the lack of imported materials for many years held down the utilization of existing plant capacity and the growth of labor productivity. This massive readjustment had to take place simultaneously with an outflow of uncompensated exports to the U.S.S.R. that cut deeply into investment possibilities. Economic recovery from the effects of the war had hardly begun in 1950 and during the early 1950's, with the U.S.S.R. taking 10 to 15 percent of GNP and with heavy pressure to improve living conditions rapidly, East Germany could not undertake a large investment program. As was shown earlier, investments reached a respectable share of GNP in East Germany only in the late 1950's, after reparations had ceased. By contrast, West Germany adjusted very easily to its separation from East Germany because interzonal trade had been a much smaller part of West German than of East German trade, the West German economy was much larger and more balanced, and there were broader trade opportunities abroad and large receipts of U.S. aid.

The evidence that measurable external factors were seriously disadvantageous is far less clear for the other Eastern European countries than for East Germany. The quantitative growth of imports was certainly more than adequate to sustain a rapid growth of output. Changes in the net terms of trade appear to have been generally similar in Eastern and Western Europe. In the early postwar years Hungary and Rumania paid substantial reparations, and the other Eastern European countries, unlike the Western European countries, were not net recipients of aid, but since 1955 the Eastern European disadvantage in this regard probably has been small.

To conclude, the measurable factors probably account fully for the severe lag in East German growth until the mid-1950's. It is reasonable to suppose that they were largely responsible also for the lags of most other Eastern European countries behind Western Europe during the early postwar years of economic recovery and growth. Hungary and Rumania, the two countries which, after East Germany, were probably most affected by Soviet impositions, were the latest to regain prewar levels. After Poland and both parts of Germany these countries also suffered the most war damage. Except in East Germany, where Soviet impositions affected mainly investment, the main impact of these impositions (or the lack of aid) probably was on consumption. But these external factors do not explain the decline in rates of growth in recent years nor the high investment costs in all the Eastern European countries during the postwar period.

The preceding analysis, since it deals only with measurable external factors, leaves out a highly important difference between Eastern and Western Europe—the general foreign economic environment. This difference, however, is both external and internal, and it is most appropriately treated as an aspect of the broad institutional and policy framework of the two areas. Membership in the Soviet bloc entailed among other things the adoption of Soviet-type economic policies and institutions and it is pointless to speculate about the extent to which Soviet pressure or the willing emulation of things Soviet by local Communist parties were responsible.

The application of Soviet-type policies and institutions in Eastern Europe had interrelated effects on the domestic use of resources and on foreign trade opportunities. Trade opportunities were to some extent limited by Western controls, but Soviet and Eastern European policies were much more important limitations.

For the individual Eastern European country, materials, foods, and machinery were almost always in short supply—they could rarely be imported in the desired quantities and qualities. Consequently it was necessary to develop high-cost mineral resources, raise expenditures in agriculture to the point of small return, and overdiversify manufacturing production. Shortages of industrial materials were especially severe in the early and mid-1950's. In recent years availability of foodstuffs and technology have been increasing problems. Inability to import the most advanced or appropriate technology kept labor costs and often also investment costs higher than they might have been. This disadvantage was especially burdensome for the more developed countries, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which depended on advanced technology to maintain their lead in productivity.

Moreover, the cost of doing without first-rate technology has increased in recent years as East Germany and Czechoslovakia have exhausted the opportunities for tapping "reserves" of unused productive capacity and labor and as all of the Eastern European countries have faced more exacting customers abroad.

Some of the overdiversification and development of high-cost production during the early 1950's can be traced to a form of Soviet exploitation—the levying of requirements on Eastern Europe for a wide variety of machines and other goods, without regard for prior experience, factor endowments, or economies of scale. East Germany and Czechoslovakia suffered most from such Soviet policies. Since the mid-1950's, however, the U.S.S.R. has greatly increased its support for Eastern European economic development. The Soviet share of Eastern Europe's total imports has remained at about 40 percent since 1950, but since 1955 the U.S.S.R. has supplied a growing share of Eastern European imports of industrial materials, some of which it produced at high marginal cost, and has provided considerable amounts of grain in spite of domestic shortages. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. has tried, although with little success, to bring about a more rational allocation of resources in Eastern Europe through intrabloc coordination of economic plans and specialization in production, thereby reversing previous policies.

At least since the mid-1950's, the external difficulties of the Eastern European countries appear to be largely symptoms of ailments which have affected all Communist countries. Shortages of materials were caused by excessively rapid increases in production of finished goods, by lack of coordination of national investment programs, and by inefficiency in the use of materials. Shortages of foods were due mainly to collectivization and to other policies depressing farmers' incentives. Lagging technology was the result of a system of economic incentives which rewarded increased production at any cost and penalized innovation and careful consideration of customers' interests. Uncertainty in deliveries of imported goods and components and the lack of flexibility in adapting import schedules to changing domestic needs reflected the general rigidity of management in foreign trade as well as the domestic economy.

VII. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES AND REFORMS

One after the other, the Eastern European regimes have become aware of the poor performance of their economies, and have been groping for more effective economic policies and more efficient forms of planning and management. The revolution in Hungary and the near revolt in Poland in 1956 brought home the necessity for change to the regimes of these countries earlier than to those of the other Eastern European countries. Although the consumer-oriented priorities adopted at the time in both countries and the partial decentralization of management in Poland were short lived, economic policies have been much more moderate and flexible since 1956 than before, and this early adjustment to realities is one of the reasons why the rate of growth of the Polish and Hungarian economies has not declined. The Czechoslovak and East German regimes, however, in spite of

rapidly declining economic "reserves," tried to maintain or accelerate economic growth, relying heavily on Communist Party activists to create the necessary stimulus, and in 1959-60 the Bulgarian regime went so far as to try a "great leap" somewhat on the Chinese model. It was the sharp slowdown of economic growth in East Germany in 1961, in Czechoslovakia in 1962, and in Bulgaria in the aftermath of the "great leap" of 1959-60, that brought home the need for economic reform in these countries and this example has created new pressure for reform in Poland and Hungary. Only Rumania, which has achieved increased rates of industrial growth since 1958, has been generally satisfied with the old system of economic planning and management.

Improvements in economic performance have been sought both through internal economic reform and through external assistance and international economic cooperation. The remainder of this paper will deal with the main outlines of these internal and external measures.

A. ECONOMIC REFORM

Little by little, Eastern European economists and government officials have come to recognize two basic deficiencies in what we have been calling the "Soviet-type economic system." Planning was not based sufficiently on rational economic considerations; management was not flexible enough to adapt to changing needs. Lack of rationality in economic plans was due sometimes to inexperience, but mainly to the primacy and overdiversification of political objectives. The province of economic analysis was limited not only by politically inspired institutional changes, such as the collectivization of agriculture, but also by the requirements imposed by politically determined growth objectives. Until the past few years, moreover, economic analysis had to be performed with a very limited set of tools (such as the "material balances"), the use of more efficient and appropriate tools, such as linear programming, having been barred for ideological reasons.

The basic form of ownership and management aside, the most restrictive feature of the system for economic planners was the politically determined rate of industrial growth. If, as was usually the case, this rate was set beyond the economy's capabilities, extreme tautness in economic plans was inevitable and this entailed a forced "balancing" of the plans by such means as unrealistic adjustments of coefficients for the use of materials, unrealistic estimates of investment costs, and the taking of resources from low-priority sectors such as housing. Moreover, the severe constraints caused by taut planning were felt by all levels of management which were forced to raise production by any means and could ill afford to risk cost reductions, product changes, or technological improvements that might reduce, even temporarily, the rate of growth of output. The same taut conditions created a sellers' market for almost all goods and gave all but the highest priority customers little chance to be heard; instead, unsuitable goods were accepted, processed, and passed on, until they finally were bought by private consumers, who had few alternatives, or used at high cost in investment projects, or exported to relatively undemanding foreign countries, or simply left in inventories. Taut, overopti-

mistic planning for the overall rate of industrial growth also had serious implications for the structure of investment and the pattern of economic development. Unable to obtain enough raw materials from the other Communist countries, which also had taut plans, each country had to invest heavily in slow-maturing projects in basic industries. If we add to this the politically determined priorities among economic branches, lack of access to first rate technology, and plain incompetence on the part of planners, a good bit of inefficiency can be easily explained.

The system of economic management was inflexible because it was operated as a huge bureaucracy, where each echelon made economic decisions on the basis of directives from above but with insufficient knowledge of the situation below. Constrained by what were often unrealistic and mutually inconsistent directives, the ministries, and their subordinate units had to work out all the details of a production and distribution program leaving the enterprises little choice on how to put this program into effect. What choice there was consisted mainly in ignoring lower priority goals in favor of higher priority goals, and managers' efforts tended to be directed to pleasing the government (or party) boss rather than the customer. Moreover, a system of premia and other incentives which rewarded mainly fulfillment of gross production goals and an artificial price system which reflected neither marginal social costs nor consumer preferences created a poor basis for guiding unplanned decisions in line with national interests.

The reforms introduced in Eastern Europe during the past 2 or 3 years are aimed at these deficiencies. Neither Eastern Europeans, nor indeed Westerners, can be certain how deeply the reforms will have to cut into the Soviet-type "command economy" to bring a marked improvement in economic performance.

The best publicized, and possibly the most thorough reforms are being introduced in Czechoslovakia. There the number of obligatory production and input goals for enterprises is being greatly reduced. Various measures of profits are to be a basis for bonuses and premiums. Part of investment decisions and most contracts with customers are to be undertaken by the enterprises themselves. Producer prices are to contain charges for the use of fixed capital and are to be influenced by market conditions at home and abroad. Similar changes are being introduced in East Germany and Bulgaria, and some at least are likely to be introduced in Poland and Hungary. In all the Eastern European countries there is great emphasis on "scientific planning," which involves not just balancing of needs and requirements but "optimization" of programs, based on centrally or locally determined criteria, with the help of electronic computers. The desire to develop the branches of production for which the economy will be best suited in the long term, to use modern technology, and to compete on world markets has at least partly replaced the early drive to increase the quantity of production at all cost. While trying to make plans more rational and management more flexible, however, the regimes have tried to avoid any real loss of control over the economy. The meeting place of the new system of planning and management with the power structure of the state and party appears to be at the newly formed intermediate administrative units, called associations or trusts, which

control either an entire industrial branch (for example, machine tools), or a vertically integrated set of enterprises. In East Germany and Czechoslovakia at least the directors of these associations on paper have very wide powers, similar in some respects to those of Western corporation managers. They could in theory run their subordinate enterprises largely according to market criteria, or they could intervene directly in most enterprise activities. How much pressure will be put on these managers by the political authorities and how the managers will react to pressure remains to be seen.

B. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

1. *Intrabloc economic cooperation*

The search for increased efficiency through internal economic reform had a counterpart in the effort to promote economic cooperation among the Eastern European countries, but nationalism and the nature of the Soviet-type economic system have greatly hindered progress. The drive for increased cooperation, which began in earnest during the late 1950's, was intended to invigorate a largely inactive organization, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, usually called CEMA or COMECON. It was hoped to achieve a more rational distribution of capacity in basic industries and savings in investments and materials through coordination of investment plans; greater economies and scale and better concentration of technological effort through specialization in the production of manufactures; and a more effective use of scarce hard currency through cooperation in trade with non-Communist countries. In spite of high-level political pressure and innumerable meetings and proposals, however, there was very little progress in intrabloc economic cooperation. Intrabloc trade continued to increase rapidly, but largely in the framework of bilateral agreements and as a consequence of independently established national plans. Specialization agreements have been limited to a tiny percentage of industrial output, and apart from the construction of the "friendship" oil pipeline, and the linking of electric power grids, cooperation in investments has been minimal. The reasons for this failure are rooted in the very nature of the "command economy."¹⁸ Lacking any sort of automatic regulator and arbiter for economic decisions and conflicts, such an economy needs an ultimate authority to make or enforce any decision. But there has been no such authority internationally, and so no way to force agreement on specialization, prices, investments, and so forth, or to apply sanctions in cases where agreements are not fulfilled. Khrushchev's proposal in 1962 for the creation of a CEMA planning staff with some supranational authority no doubt was intended as at least a first step toward a blocwide "command economy," but the proposal failed to be adopted because of nationalistic opposition, notably from Rumania.

Failing a supranational authority, all of the internal weaknesses of the Soviet-type system of planning and management are magnified internationally, and its principal virtue, the ability to mobilize resources quickly for high-priority purposes, is inoperative.

¹⁸ See, for example, Michael Kaser, "Comecon—Integration Problems of the Planned Economies" (Oxford University Press, 1965).

2. Soviet-East European economic relations

The most obvious source of assistance for the Eastern European countries to improve their economic performance has been the U.S.S.R., the more so because of the lack of significant progress in intra-East European economic cooperation. As we have seen, the U.S.S.R. has tried to help—by providing some credits (since 1960, only to East Germany and Bulgaria), foods, and rapidly increasing amounts of industrial materials. In 1963, the U.S.S.R. covered nearly 100 percent of the area's net imports of materials and fuels, compared with two-thirds in 1960 and only 40 percent in 1955, thereby enabling the Eastern European countries to use a large share of their scarce earnings of Western currencies to buy specialized machinery. It is unlikely, however, that the U.S.S.R. will be willing to continue increasing its support of Eastern European economic growth to this extent. Although the U.S.S.R. gains some price advantage in its trade with Eastern Europe (as was indicated earlier), it is questionable whether this compensates for the disadvantages in the composition of trade. Soviet exports consist mainly of industrial materials and foods. Some of these, coal, for example, are produced at high average cost, and many, including coal, iron ore, and grain, are produced at rapidly rising marginal cost. The exchange of such goods for machinery and equipment, the largest part of Soviet imports, is certainly profitable when the machinery and equipment embodies advanced technology that the U.S.S.R. can produce only with difficulty if at all. Such is the case for Soviet trade with the West. But this exchange may not be profitable when the imports consist of ordinary machinery and equipment, which embody the same general level of technology as is available from Soviet production.

Most Soviet machinery imports from Eastern Europe probably are of this type. Estimates of ruble/dollar price relations and data on Soviet costs suggest that both the average and marginal costs of most machinery and equipment production in the U.S.S.R. are considerably below those for raw materials and foods, and the gap is probably increasing. Probably the main advantage to the U.S.S.R. in importing machinery from Eastern Europe rather than producing it at home is as a source of flexibility. The Soviets have been able to import machines on special order or in small batches, so that they could better concentrate on series production. In recent years, the Soviets have added their influence to other pressures for raising the quality and technological level of Eastern European manufactures, and have increased rapidly their imports of consumer manufactures from that area. To the extent that quality and technology are improved, however, opportunities for Eastern European trade with the West are increased as well.

3. Economic relations with the West

Growing economic difficulties and the inability to solve these difficulties within the Soviet bloc have increased the demand in Eastern Europe for Western goods, capital, technology, and knowhow, and increased the receptiveness to Western ideas. The binds of Marxist economic dogma have been loosening since at least 1955. The thaw went quite far in Poland as early as 1956, but only recently has "mar-

ket socialism" become ideologically respectable in Eastern Europe. This intellectual revolution obviously has had a great impact on the economic reforms that are being undertaken. The trend has been less clear, however, in the more tangible aspects of economic relations. Western goods and technology have long been in high demand, but, except in Rumania, there was until recently little inclination to treat trade with the West as more than a supplementary source of goods and technology.

The basic obstacle to increased trade with the West has been the inability of the Eastern European countries to market their exports of manufactured goods in the West, and their unwillingness to make the adjustments required for an expansion of such exports in the long run. The temporary increase in the share of the West in Poland's foreign trade from 36 percent in 1955 to 42 percent in 1958 was due to U.S. credits under Public Law 480 and a temporary shift in Polish exports of coal from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. With the ending of U.S. credits and the weakening of the Western European coal market, the share of the West in Poland's trade has returned to about what it was before Gomulka's accession to power. Difficulties in exporting to the West have caused the share of the West in total trade to decline also in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary since the late 1950's. In the early 1960's the West's share in these countries and in Bulgaria has been between 25 and 30 percent. Rumanian trade followed the opposite pattern—the share of the West increased from 20 percent in 1958 to 32 percent in 1961-64. This shift was undertaken as an aspect of Rumania's policy of enhancing national independence and accelerating industrial development. What made it possible was that Rumania's three major types of exports, corn, petroleum products, and wood were readily salable in the West and that in addition Western firms were willing to extend large export credits to Rumania.

In the past 2 or 3 years there have been signs that the more industrialized Eastern European countries were beginning to lay a sounder basis for the expansion of their trade with the West. In 1964, for the first time since the mid 1950's, there was a fairly general rise in the share of Eastern European trade taking place with the West. Although it is much too early to see a trend from these statistics, there are other favorable signs. One is the increased flexibility in production which should result from the internal economic reforms. Because production, and hence the use of productive capacity, will no longer be planned in so much detail, it will be easier for producers to adapt output mix to changing foreign demand. Although this increased flexibility will facilitate all foreign trade, it is especially important in the case of trade with the West. A second favorable development is the increased willingness of the Eastern European regimes to undertake production of manufacturing lines specifically for the Western market. East Germany is making a real effort to develop clothing production for sale in Western Europe. Joint production and marketing arrangements between Eastern and Western European firms (for example, the arrangements between Poland and the German firms Krupp & Grundig for the joint manufacture and sale of tape recorders) have been multiplying in the past 2 years, and may in time considerably enhance the ability of the Eastern European countries to sell man-

ufactures in Western Europe. These arrangements, like many Eastern European purchases of Western European equipment, sometimes include credit terms and technical help.

But the original features of some of them are to provide Western technical and quality control over Eastern European production and in addition the name and connections of the Western firm to sell in Western countries. This knowhow and "goodwill" may be as important as the basic production technology and their possession may save the Eastern European countries a great deal of time and effort. At the same time, the Eastern European countries have been seeking better terms for their exports to the West by negotiating with GATT, looking for most-favored nation treatment in the United States, trying to make better arrangements with the EEC and its member countries, and so forth. Lower tariffs and higher quotas in the West would help Eastern Europe's exports. In the long-term, however, the prospects for trade with the West depend mainly on the Eastern European countries themselves—on the way they allocate their resources, and especially on how much they are willing to change the economic system to which so many of their economic problems can be attributed.

APPENDIX A. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ECONOMIC LEVELS

In all cases estimates of comparative economic levels (for GNP, industrial production, personal consumption) were made for a single postwar year. Comparative levels for other years were obtained by moving the base year comparisons by means of indexes for the individual countries.

WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

GNP in the Western European countries was obtained in terms of a common denominator (U.S. dollars in 1963 prices) in two alternative ways: (1) by applying official exchange rates to the values of GNP in domestic currencies in 1963; and (2) by using the geometric means of the two sets of dollar values in purchasing power equivalents for 1955 as estimated for the OEEC (Milton Gilbert and Associates, *Comparative National Products and Price Levels*, Paris, OEEC, 1958), and converting these to 1963 prices by means of the U.S. official GNP deflator. For Austria and Greece, the only countries discussed for which Gilbert did not estimate purchasing power rates, it was assumed that the dollar value of GNP at purchasing power rates exceeded that at the official rate in 1963 by the same percentage as in West Germany and Italy respectively.

The relative magnitudes of industrial production in Western Europe were obtained from the weights used by the OECD to calculate the combined industrial index for the member countries.

EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The dollar value of GNP and personal consumption in Eastern Europe and the comparison of industrial production in these countries with Western Europe were obtained via direct comparisons between Eastern European countries and West Germany. The estimates for the Eastern European countries relative to West Germany were then linked into the comparisons between West Germany and other western countries. Consequently, two alternative sets of dollar figures for GNP were obtained for Eastern Europe, corresponding to the two alternative dollar estimates for West Germany. The year for the comparison with West Germany is 1955. West German data for that year exclude the Saar.

In the comparison with West Germany, two sets of estimates were made which, in some cases, complement each other, and, in other cases, serve as checks against each other.

(1) GNP at current domestic prices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (from sources listed later) was converted to Deutschmarks by means of estimated

purchasing power ratios for individual components of GNP. This calculation yielded estimates for the major end uses of GNP, as well as for total GNP. The calculations for personal consumption are more reliable than those for the other end uses. The Deutschmark values so obtained were then related to the actual values for West Germany in 1955.

(2) Quantity indexes were calculated relating personal consumption, net industrial production, and net agricultural production in each Eastern European country to those in West Germany. The indexes were calculated from commodity samples in physical units, weighted by West German prices (except for the metal-working component of industrial production which was obtained by converting domestic values of production into Deutschmarks at calculated exchange rates). Group indexes for industry and consumption were aggregated by means of West German value weights (value of purchases for personal consumption; value added for industrial production). For agricultural production, estimates of purchased inputs were deducted from estimates of agricultural output (net of own production used for feed or seed, or wasted). This set of calculations yielded values of personal consumption, industrial production, and agricultural production as relatives of West Germany.

The two sets of calculations are methodologically consistent, the first involving conversion by means of price indexes *with Eastern European quantity weights*, and the second involving quantity indexes *with West German price weights*. Both sets of calculations give results for Eastern Europe in West German Marks. Because of the tendency for relative quantities to be inversely correlated with relative prices, conversion of West German magnitudes into Eastern European currencies (the reverse of the above) probably would give less favorable results for Eastern Europe. Consequently, the original estimates for Eastern Europe were lowered by various percentages by analogy with estimates for other countries and on the basis of other information.

There were discrepancies for other reasons, also, between results of the comparison by means of price indexes and those of the comparison by means of quantum indexes. In the case of personal consumption, the price indexes were obtained using commodity samples which, although often rather small, at least could be defined quite specifically in regard to type and quality of product. The quantity comparisons, however, necessarily used broad, undifferentiated series, such as cotton fabrics in meters or tons, to represent a very wide variety of products. The final estimates of personal consumption were based mainly on the price conversion for Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The final estimate for GNP was a compromise between the results of the price conversions and those of a weighted average of the quantum comparisons for industrial production and agricultural production.

APPENDIX B. MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

All of the postwar calculations of the growth of GNP and its components by origin and use are taken from OECD statistics. Series in constant 1954 prices were used for 1950-60. These series were linked in the year 1960 with the new series in constant 1958 prices. The linking was done independently for GNP, for industrial production (including construction) and agricultural production (including forestry). The growth of services in constant prices was calculated as a residual—a method which may give different results for the years after 1960 than the direct calculation of trends in services because the change from 1954 to 1958 weights had some effect on the measurement of growth of GNP. The alternative, which would have been to recalculate the growth of GNP in 1954 prices after 1960, was rejected. A similar method was used to calculate the distribution of and trends in gross fixed investment.

The prewar estimates for Western European countries are mainly from OECD and FAO sources. Indexes of industrial production excluding construction were used to link prewar years with the postwar series of GNP originating in industry and construction, beginning in 1950. The agricultural indexes for prewar years are for agricultural output (net of feed, seed and waste from own production but not of inputs from outside agriculture) and exclude forestry. They were linked in 1950-53 (average) with postwar series for GNP originating in agriculture and forestry.

The share of gross fixed investment in GNP at factor cost in the Western European countries was estimated by means of a rough rule of thumb. It was assumed that the correct relation would fall between two sets of estimates: (1) the ratios of gross fixed investment at market prices to GNP at market prices (which implies a burden of indirect taxes—net of subsidies—proportionately as large on investment as on the GNP as a whole); (2) the ratios of gross fixed investment at market prices to GNP at factor cost (which implies that there is no burden of indirect taxes on investment). The rule of thumb used in this estimate was to take the midpoint of the range of ratios obtained with methods (1) and (2). For some countries this method may give rise to significant errors, but in general it seems reasonable to assume that the midpoint of the range is closer to the true figure than either of the extremes. It was assumed in addition, that the sectoral distribution of gross fixed investment at market prices could be used to represent the distribution at factor cost.

EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

For Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, the estimates of economic growth are mainly from the work of the *Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe* at Columbia University under the direction of Thad Alton. This project has published monographs on the structure of the Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian economies and a large number of *Occasional Papers* of the project have either been published or are awaiting reproduction. Mr. Alton has been kind enough to make these papers available to me. The principal publications of the project, as well as some of the main supplementary sources used in this paper are listed at the end.

For East Germany, extensive use was made of the work of Wolfgang Stolper (*The Structure of the East German Economy*, Cambridge, 1960) and of estimates by Edwin Snell.

For Rumania, use was made mainly of official Rumanian series and of an index of industrial production calculated by the Alton project.

1. Sectoral weights and share of investment in GNP

The percentage distribution of GNP at factor cost provided the weights for the principal sectors of origin with which sectoral indexes could be combined to calculate indexes for total GNP. For Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria in 1956 and for Hungary in 1955, the distribution of GNP at factor cost was obtained from the Alton studies with one adjustment. To estimate the contribution of each sector to the GNP at factor cost, the Alton studies first determine the labor cost attributable to each sector. They then impute the cost of non-labor factors by redistributing to each sector the part of total GNP in established prices which is not accounted for by labor costs in proportion to the sectoral distribution of fixed and working capital. This procedure implies a constant rate of return to all types of capital. Although this assumption has some theoretical merit, rates of return actually vary considerably in market economies among the sectors, the return usually being much lower on housing than on other assets. For this reason, and to avoid making housing services an unreasonably large share of GNP, the Alton estimates were adjusted to give housing a rate of return one-half as high as that of the economy as a whole. In the absence of any detailed national accounts on Rumania, it was assumed that the sectoral distribution of Rumanian GNP at factor cost in 1956 was the same as that of Bulgaria. This analogy was suggested by the roughly comparable level of industrialization of these countries in 1956 (as reflected in similar per capita GNP's).

For East Germany, estimates by Snell of the distribution of GNP in 1936 German Marks were used. Stolper's work shows that it makes little difference in the sectoral distribution whether 1936 Reichsmarks or 1950 Deutschmarks are used. Unfortunately, detailed postwar estimates in East German marks are not available, but what information does exist on the East German national accounts and price structure appears to indicate that prewar German prices do not greatly distort the picture.

The estimates of gross fixed investment as a share of GNP at factor cost in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria are from Alton, except for an adjustment for housing corresponding to that on the sector of origin side of the accounts. For East Germany they are from Snell. As for Western Europe, it was assumed that the sectoral distribution of gross fixed investment at market prices could be used to represent the distribution at factor cost.

2. Sectoral and end use indexes

The sectoral indexes and those for personal consumption and gross fixed investment cover the postwar years from 1950 through 1964 and a prewar year (1939 for Bulgaria, 1937 for Czechoslovakia and Poland, 1936 for East Germany, and 1938 for Rumania). Prewar estimates are intended to represent production in the postwar territory, except in Poland, where they represent the prewar territory.

All indexes for Czechoslovakia and Poland (through 1962), and for Hungary (through 1960), the sectoral indexes for Bulgaria (through 1960), and the industrial production index for Rumania (through 1964), are from Alton. The methods of calculating these indexes are approximations of those used in Western countries. Industrial production indexes were obtained mainly by aggregating commodity series in physical units by means of weights made up of wage bills or other substitutes for value added, supplemented by prices. Construction indexes were obtained from data on inputs of materials into construction. Agricultural indexes were calculated from estimates of agricultural output (final product) of all major agricultural commodities, from which estimates of industrial inputs were deducted. Indexes for services are a composite of such indicators as ton-kilometers carried in various modes of transport, retail trade turnover in constant prices, the growth of the housing stock, and employment in various types of private and government services. Personal consumption indexes reflect the weighting of series on consumption of goods and services, mainly in terms of physical units, by retail prices and values of purchases. The indexes for fixed investment combine estimates of construction expenditures (usually the same as those for GNP originating in construction) with estimates of apparent consumption of machinery and equipment. The Alton estimates were extended for the years after 1962 mainly by adjusting official Eastern European series. Official series for national income originating in industry, construction, agriculture, and other "productive" sectors were used for Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. Comparisons show that the differences between most of these official series and the calculated series have tended to decline over the years and in some cases (for example, industrial production in Poland) that the differences had disappeared. Consequently, the use of these official series probably does not give bad results, especially for only a few years. Two adjustments had to be made, however. First, some (rather arbitrary) allowance was made for the growth on "non-productive" services, which are not included in official Eastern European national income statistics. Second, the sectors were reweighted in line with the estimates for earlier years. For both of these reasons, the calculated growth of GNP in these years differs considerably from the official growth of national income. For Rumania in the entire period, official indexes were used for value added in agriculture. For Bulgaria, official series for gross fixed investment, including investment by collective farms, were used.

The indexes for industrial production and agricultural production, in East Germany are from Stolper through 1957, and are simplified updatings of Stolper's series for later years. For personal consumption, Snell provided estimates through 1955 and a new quantity index, obtained mainly by weighting East German series on the consumption of individual commodities with West German retail price weights was used after 1955. The series on gross fixed investment were obtained from official East German data on investment in machinery and in construction and on investment in industry and agriculture in current prices, and from various estimates of price changes for machinery and construction.

APPENDIX C. FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS

The foreign trade analysis required mutually consistent series on: (1) the value of imports and exports in current dollars; (2) the value of imports and exports in constant (1963) dollars; (3) the average unit value of imports and exports in relation to the 1963 price level.

For Western European countries these series are available from the United Nation's *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, except the most recent years, which were covered by OECD statistics. For Eastern European countries, the series in current prices are from the UN source mentioned above and the statistical yearbooks of the various countries. Poland and Czechoslovakia for the postwar years and Bulgaria for both postwar years and 1939 also provide quantum indexes of imports and exports in their statistical yearbooks. A

quantum index for Czechoslovakia, relating 1937 to 1948, was obtained from *Statistický Zpravodaj* No. 7-8, 1949, p. 251. This index was linked to the postwar index, which begins in 1948. For Poland quantum indexes relating prewar to 1950 were taken from Josef Kryniccki, *Problemy handlu zagranicznego polski* (Warsaw, 1958). This index was linked to the official postwar quantum index in 1950. Unit value indexes for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland were derived from the series in current dollars and the quantum series. It was assumed that average unit values for imports and exports in Rumania and Hungary changed in the same way as the weighted average for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

For East Germany, the postwar export series beginning in 1957 and the import series for the entire postwar period are from official East German statistical yearbooks. Official East German export data exclude reparations. Reparations were added by means of estimates by Snell which are based mainly on the publications of the West German Social Democratic Party (in particular, SPD Information Service, *Die reparationen in der Sowjetzone von 1945-1952*, Denkschriften no. 51). Estimates of East and West German trade, including inter-regional trade, in 1936 are from UN/ECE, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, 1949, no. 3, p. 26. This source gives a breakdown of trade in the Soviet zone of occupation, West Germany and Berlin in 1936, with each other and with the outside world. To obtain a correspondence with the postwar division of Germany, the trade of Berlin was further subdivided between East and West Berlin. The estimates of prewar East and West German trade in 1936 prices were linked to estimates of postwar trade in the same prices.

Western European trade statistics are given f.o.b. for exports, c.i.f. for imports. Eastern European trade statistics were given this same way before World War II, but since 1950 imports have been given f.o.b., except in Hungary. To achieve greater comparability with Western statistics and prewar Eastern statistics, the postwar import series for the Eastern European countries, except Hungary, were increased by 11.1 percent (on the assumption that the f.o.b. value of imports was 90 percent of the c.i.f. value). Other possible causes of differences—for example, in the treatment of re-exports and the method of recording trade (by country of origin or destination or by country of payment)—were not adjusted for.

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF STATISTICAL DATA

I. Publications of the "Research Project on National Income in East-Central Europe" at Columbia University (Alton Project).

MONOGRAPHS

"Czechoslovak National Income and Product in 1947-48 and 1955-56" (Columbia University Press, 1962).

"Hungarian National Income and Product in 1955" (Columbia University Press, 1963).

"Polish National Income and Product in 1954, 1955, and 1956" (Columbia University Press, 1965).

OCCASIONAL PAPERS (MULTILITHED)

Published to date—

1. Growth of Czechoslovak Trade, Banking, and Insurance, 1937-1962.
2. Trends in Czechoslovak Housing, Government, and Other Services, 1936-1963).
3. Czechoslovak Index of Investment, 1937-1962: Machinery and Equipment.
4. Czechoslovak Index of Construction, 1937-1962.
5. Indexes of Polish Industrial Production, 1937-1960.
6. Output of Czechoslovak Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting, Trapping and Game at Constant 1948 Prices, 1936 and 1946-1962.
7. Czechoslovak Agricultural Output, Expenses, Gross and Net Product and Productivity, 1934-1938 and 1946-1962.
8. Hungary, Index of Transportation and Communication Services, 1938-1962.
9. Output and Value Added in Czechoslovak Transportation and Communications, 1937 and 1946-1962.

Awaiting reproduction—

Personal Consumption in Poland, 1938 and 1946-1962.

Czechoslovak Industrial Production Index, 1937-1962.

Personal Consumption in Hungary, 1938 and 1947-1962.

Czechoslovak Gross National Product by Sectors of Origin and by End Uses, 1937 and 1948-1962.

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THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD MARKET

BY

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THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD MARKET

I. INTRODUCTION

During the past decade the Soviet Union has displayed a growing awareness of the potential of foreign trade as an instrument of foreign policy and an increasing skill in using it for international political objectives. Nonetheless, foreign trade remains a small part of overall Soviet economic activity and its basic economic function in the Soviet scheme of things has remained essentially unchanged. That is, the procurement from abroad of goods needed for plan fulfillment, when they are not available domestically, with exports thus primarily serving the purpose of financing necessary imports.

The Soviet state monopoly over foreign trade has insured complete government control, with specialized state-trading enterprises conducting all external economic transactions on the basis of a foreign trade plan geared to the requirements of the overall economic plan. This compulsory intermediary role plus the fact that prices for exported and imported goods bear no relation to domestic prices has served as a barrier which effectively insulates the Soviet economy from repercussions of economic developments in the rest of the world. While this isolation has been considered necessary to assure undisturbed implementation of economic plans, it has recently come to be recognized by top-level Soviet leadership as an impediment to a more rapid and soundly based expansion of Soviet foreign trade.

The directives of the recent 23d Party Congress on foreign economic relations reflect to some extent this increased concern with the economic effectiveness of foreign trade, and Premier Kosygin, in his major address to the Congress, specifically called for "a reappraisal of the role of foreign trade." Describing the improvement of Soviet domestic efficiency as the basic objective of foreign trade, Kosygin emphasized the need for closer liaison between Soviet industry and foreign trade enterprises. No real change is likely to come about, however, until the Soviet Union embarks on a program of specific measures providing Soviet managers with a real incentive to produce for the international market—as most East European countries have done.

Relations with other Communist countries, and with the members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), in particular, continued to receive priority in Soviet foreign trade policy. They assumed especial importance when prospects for CEMA-wide economic integration faded following the defeat in 1963 of Soviet proposals for a supranational approach to economic planning, leaving trade as the principal channel for preserving and strengthening bloc economic cohesion. While East European reliance on the Soviet Union as a source of raw materials and as an outlet for manufactures has re-

mained strong, this has not deterred East Europeans from expanding trade relations with the industrial west and with the less developed countries. This was in part a consequence of internal economic difficulties in individual East European countries in the early sixties, disappointment with the meager results of CEMA-sponsored intrabloc specialization, as well as Soviet inability to meet requirements for modern equipment and technology.

Increasing East European purchases of such items in the free world have been encouraged by West European credits and recent moves to liberalize imports from the bloc. The trend may pick up further momentum as measures designed to make foreign trade economically more effective are implemented in most East European countries. This poses a dilemma for the U.S.S.R. On the one hand, it can hardly object in principle to its CEMA partners following its example in obtaining in the West equipment which is not available from other Communist countries and which may contribute significantly to individual members' economic viability. At the same time, the necessity for increasing exports to the West—given the hard currency shortage in most of Eastern Europe—may well set in motion a process of production reorientation in individual countries, and contribute to a further loosening of bloc economic bonds.

In policy pronouncements on trade relations with the free world, the Soviets have stressed the intensification of commercial ties with the less developed countries, where political considerations have been paramount. U.S.S.R. efforts to expand trade turnover have been more successful with respect to exports, to the extent that the latter have been greatly stimulated by financing under economic assistance programs.

Despite the relatively low priority publicly accorded to economic relations with the industrial West they have assumed increasing importance in recent years, accounting for one-fifth of Soviet foreign trade in 1964. Here the U.S.S.R.'s principal objective has been to secure equipment embodying sophisticated technology to help modernize and expand Soviet industry. This task has been complicated by Soviet inability to date to develop Western markets for its products on a scale commensurate with its import requirements, which were swelled by a recurrent need for grain purchases. In order to avoid excessive depletion of its declining gold reserve, the Soviet Union sought to obtain credits for capital goods imports from Western Europe. In this it succeeded at the beginning of this decade and, having established a faultless credit reputation, embarked on a concerted drive to break down existing Western unity on the issue of limiting credits for bloc countries to a maximum of 5 years. As competition for large-scale bloc orders grew increasingly keen, West European governments gave way to business pressures and extended guarantees for longer term credits for the first time in 1964. After an initial show of interest, however, the Soviet Union has become quite selective in utilizing long-term financing possibilities, especially since Khrushchev's removal, reflecting a basic financial conservatism and greater cost consciousness on the part of the new leadership in its foreign economic relations.

II. CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

A. VOLUME

Soviet trade turnover in 1964, according to official statistics¹ amounted to \$15.4 billion at current prices, and to a little over \$16 billion in 1965. Table 1 shows that Soviet trade turnover has continued to expand without interruption, but that annual growth since 1963 has tapered off to a slower pace.

TABLE 1.—*Soviet foreign trade turnover, 1961-65*

[Dollars in millions at current prices]

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Turnover.....	\$11,831	\$13,485	\$14,331	\$15,416	\$16,200
Percent increase over preceding year.....	5.7	14.0	6.3	7.6	5.2

The decline might have been even more pronounced, had it not been for the rapid increase of imports, which outstripped Soviet export expansion in 1963 and 1964 (see table 2).

TABLE 2.—*Annual growth rates of Soviet exports and imports, 1961-65*

[In percent]

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Exports.....	7.9	17.2	3.4	5.6	6.3
Imports.....	3.5	10.8	9.3	9.6	4.1

These overall trends reflected primarily a deceleration in the growth of trade with Communist countries which as a group account for 70 percent of Soviet foreign commerce; and relative stagnation in trade from developing areas. Trade with the industrial West increased considerably, but mainly on the import side, with Soviet grain purchases necessitated by the poor 1963 harvest the single most important element.

B. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE

1. *Trade with Communist countries*

In 1964 the U.S.S.R.'s turnover with all Communist countries amounted to \$10.75 billion compared to \$7.8 billion in 1961. This represented over two-thirds of the Soviet Union's foreign trade. The Communist countries' share, however, has decreased from 73.2 percent in 1960 to 69.7 percent in 1964, a decline is attributable entirely to the uninterrupted shrinking of Sino-Soviet trade—especially Soviet exports—which began in 1960.

Soviet trade with Eastern Europe.—The Soviet Union conducts almost 60 percent of its foreign trade with Eastern Europe, which in 1964 reached a level of almost \$9 billion. While turnover has continually expanded in the sixties, the rate of growth has shown a down-

¹ "Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 1964 god," Moscow, Vneshtorgizdat, 1965.

TABLE 3.—*Distribution of Soviet foreign trade by country grouping 1961-64*

(In percent)

	1961	1962	1963	1964
Total.....	100	100	100	100
Communist countries.....	71.6	70.2	70.4	69.7
CEMA members.....	56.1	57.4	59.2	59.3
Bulgaria.....	5.8	6.2	6.6	7.1
Hungary.....	5.8	5.9	6.0	6.3
East Germany.....	17.6	18.1	18.3	17.6
Mongolia.....	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.3
Poland.....	8.5	8.6	8.9	9.0
Romania.....	5.3	5.4	5.6	5.9
Czechoslovakia.....	11.4	11.8	12.6	12.1
Other.....	15.5	12.8	11.2	10.4
China.....	7.8	5.5	4.2	2.9
North Vietnam.....	.5	.6	.6	.5
North Korea.....	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1
Cuba.....	5.1	4.5	3.9	4.3
Yugoslavia.....	.8	.9	1.3	1.6
Free world.....	28.4	29.8	29.6	30.3
Industrial West.....	18.7	18.1	18.7	20.0
LDC's.....	9.7	11.7	10.9	10.3

ward trend since 1963, when it dropped to 10 percent (1962-17 percent), followed by a further decline to 8 percent in 1964 and probably to less than 4 percent in 1965. This deceleration has affected primarily its most important bloc partners, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which together account for half of Soviet commerce with Eastern Europe, and Rumania.. It appears unlikely that the growth of trade will markedly accelerate during the next 5 years. Bilateral agreements for 1966-70 which were concluded during the latter part of 1965 between the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries, provide for an overall increase of about 35 percent over the estimated actual level during the preceding 5-year period—somewhat more than half the rate realized in 1961-65.

Among the factors contributing to the slowdown in Soviet trade expansion with Eastern Europe have been Soviet inability to meet their requirements for modern equipment and advanced technology. To fill this gap bloc countries have increasingly turned to the West. Another was the cutback following its poor harvest in 1963 in Soviet grain exports, which are unlikely to be restored to the high level of the late fifties and early sixties. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is not known to have extended any large credits to East Europeans, other than Bulgaria, since 1961 while substantial repayments on earlier loans have been falling due from several of the others.

Apart from these concrete factors, affecting the growth of trade in essentials, it should be noted that in the bloc economic systems insufficient stimulus exists for the expansion in trade of items other than those needed for plan fulfillment. The desire for the greatest possible self-sufficiency admittedly still persists in individual countries where ideological emphasis on heavy industry and national pride have become inextricably intermingled. Because of this underlying attitude, coupled with continued rigid bilateral balancing of imports and ex-

ports, largely predetermined commodity mixes, and the insulation of production enterprises from international trade, many opportunities for trade expansion remain unexplored. This situation may gradually improve, since most East European countries are modifying their foreign trade procedures so as to provide direct incentives for enterprises to produce for export. However, the impact of such measures on Soviet and East European trade is bound to remain limited as long as there is no real progress toward true multilateralization of intrabloc settlements.

The commodity structure of Soviet East European trade has not changed greatly over the past few years, except for rather wide fluctuations in the food component. Machinery and equipment predominated among Soviet imports (45 percent) from Eastern Europe, which have represented three quarters of total Soviet imports in this category. Manufactured consumer goods were next in importance (19 percent). Fuels and industrial raw materials have been the U.S.S.R.'s major exports (50 percent), followed by machinery (17 percent) and foodstuffs (7 to 14 percent). No major shifts in this distribution appear likely in the near future, although the Soviet Union is evidently concerned about its export composition. While the share of machinery exports has been rising gradually, raw materials are bound to remain the hard core of Soviet exports to resource-poor Eastern Europe.

Trade with Cuba.—In 1964 Cuba became the U.S.S.R.'s largest trading partner outside the CEMA group. Soviet trade with Cuba which had more than tripled in 1961 has fluctuated around a level of \$580 million since then, apparently resuming an upward trend in 1964 when it reached \$657 million. If increases stipulated in subsequent annual trade agreements are realized, a level of over \$900 million may be attained in 1966. Steadily expanding Soviet exports cover a wide range of commodities, among which machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, crude oil, and petroleum products make up about two-thirds. On the other hand, sugar has been the factor determining the level of Soviet imports and this has given rise to wide variations from year to year in overall Soviet purchases from Cuba. Under the terms of an agreement signed early in 1964 Cuban sugar exports to the U.S.S.R. are slated to rise from 1.6 million tons in 1964 to 5 million tons annually in 1968-70, at a stable price of 6 cents per pound. If implemented, this should contribute to a more consistent uptrend in Soviet imports from Cuba. At the same time, Cuban exports of metallic ores and concentrates—presumably largely nickel—and leaf tobacco have been rising (10 percent of imports in 1964) but are hardly likely to assume a major role. Since 1962 the Soviet Union has run a large trade surplus with Cuba, which it has underwritten through balance-of-payments credits.

Sino-Soviet trade.—Trade between the Soviet Union and Communist China has shown no signs of recovery from the precipitous decline which began in 1960. By 1964 it had shrunk to \$450 million compared to a peak of over \$2 billion in 1959. Soviet exports plummeted to only 14 percent of the 1959 level while imports decreased to 29 percent. A substantial export surplus with the U.S.S.R. since 1961 enabled Communist China to accelerate repayment of its debt which was completed during 1965. As a result, it may be expected that Sino-Soviet

trade may be more nearly balanced from now on. Soviet imports have consisted largely of consumer goods (75 percent), while the composition of exports has varied considerably. The share of machinery and equipment in exports, after dropping sharply in 1961-62, recovered to 43 percent in 1964; crude oil and petroleum products, after accounting for about one-third, plunged to 16 percent; while ferrous metals steadily increased in importance.

2. *Trade with the industrial West*

Soviet trade with the industrial West reached a level of \$3 billion in 1964. As imports increased much more rapidly (1961-64—60 percent) than exports (20 percent), the U.S.S.R. has faced a widening hard currency gap, which it covered primarily through gold sales and to a lesser extent also through use of Western credit facilities. Largely as a result of wheat purchases in the West, following the poor harvest in 1963, the U.S.S.R.'s convertible currency deficit in 1963-64 was about \$1 billion. Unable to expand its exports to the industrial West in pace with its import requirements, the Soviet authorities curtailed purchases of capital equipment for hard currency in order to minimize the drain on gold reserves. The shift became most noticeable following Khrushchev's removal, and its effect should be reflected in 1965 and 1966 trade figures. The poor harvest of 1965 has again necessitated substantial Soviet wheat imports involving hard currency outlays though not of the same magnitude as in 1963-64.

Soviet exports to the industrial West continue to be dominated by raw materials, with petroleum and petroleum products the most important single category, followed by the traditional wood and wood products, metals and ores. Food exports, in 1961 15 percent of Soviet sales to the West, dwindled to 5.5 percent mainly on account of shrinking grain exports. Machinery exports remained insignificant.

At the recent 23d Soviet Party Congress, Soviet Premier Kosygin indicated that Western trade partners would have to "take into account the changes in the Soviet economy," presumably presaging a drive to sell machinery and other Soviet manufacturers for hard currency. Asserting that Soviet machinery is of high quality and advanced design, Kosygin called for better finishing, technical documentation, and servicing facilities in order to enhance its salability in the West.

Fluctuations in the makeup of Soviet imports reflected mainly the impact of grain purchases (1961, 3 percent against 1964, 28 percent), as machinery, the most important category, declined from 47 to 36 percent of the total. Another development was a steady drop in importance of ferrous metals, from almost one-fifth of total imports in 1962 to less than 4 percent in 1964.

Apart from Finland, the U.S.S.R.'s main trading partners in 1964 were Japan, the United Kingdom, the German Federal Republic, (each accounting for a fraction over 2 percent). In 1964 Japan became the U.S.S.R.'s most important trade partner in the industrial West replacing the United Kingdom. The volume of Soviet-Japanese trade has risen steadily, with Soviet imports almost tripling between 1961 and 1964, while exports increased by 45 percent. Ships made up almost one third of Soviet imports, while Japan bought primarily fuels. U.S.S.R.-United Kingdom trade stagnated, mainly because of a decline in Soviet machinery purchases, and has been

characterized throughout by a large British deficit, which persisted in 1965, despite an upswing in both exports and imports. In the case of West Germany, a close second to the United Kingdom, both exports and imports have tapered off, but the Soviet trade deficit has remained. Although hitherto less important, Soviet trade with Italy and France appears likely to assume greater proportions, since the U.S.S.R. has embarked on a drive to expand economic relations with these countries. In particular, the recent agreement with Fiat for the construction of an automobile plant with a capacity of 600,000 passenger cars per year in the U.S.S.R. should give a big boost to Soviet trade with Italy. United States-Soviet trade, although remaining at a low level, has registered a substantial growth—\$87 million in 1965 as against 66 million in 1961. In 1964 Soviet grain purchases temporarily boosted U.S. exports to \$146 million. U.S.S.R. sales to the United States which had stagnated around \$20 million for the past 5 years, in 1965 more than doubled mainly as a result of U.S. platinum metals imports.

TABLE 4.—Foreign trade between the U.S.S.R. and selected free world countries, 1961-64¹

(Million U.S. dollars)

	1961	1962	1963	1964
Free world, total.....	3,358.0	4,015.2	4,245.3	4,664.8
Industrial West.....	2,147.5	2,377.6	2,597.0	2,997.6
Of which—				
Finland.....	278.9	395.4	427.2	389.4
United Kingdom.....	355.0	330.4	344.9	341.8
West Germany.....	298.1	344.1	284.2	328.9
France.....	199.9	239.9	174.4	176.1
Italy.....	226.2	229.9	272.8	232.8
Sweden.....	103.2	129.6	133.8	143.1
Belgium.....	67.6	79.2	77.8	75.9
Netherlands.....	75.8	90.0	79.4	78.1
United States.....	75.0	44.4	52.7	183.2
Less developed countries.....	1,091.5	1,183.7	1,436.9	1,440.5
Of which—				
United Arab Republic (Egypt).....	204.9	176.8	258.8	279.2
India.....	162.3	196.4	316.7	387.7
Malaysia.....	171.5	163.2	138.1	74.2
Afghanistan.....	59.2	64.7	64.5	70.9
Argentina.....	30.4	17.8	19.3	24.4
Iran.....	36.5	32.6	41.6	42.8
Indonesia.....	65.2	97.2	79.7	72.4
Other countries.....	119.0	453.9	211.3	226.7

¹ Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

3. Trade with LDC's

Soviet trade with the developing countries has continued to expand and since 1961 has risen by one-third, thus approximately keeping pace with the overall increase in Soviet foreign trade. Soviet exports have been responsible for most of the expansion—at \$778 million in 1964 they were 53 percent above the 1961 level, to which deliveries financed by Soviet aid disbursements contributed significantly. By comparison imports rose by a modest 13 percent during the same period and amounted to \$663 million in 1964. In fact, a small decline occurred in Soviet imports from less developed areas in 1964. The LDC's share in Soviet foreign trade has fluctuated around 10 percent since 1961,

whereas the U.S.S.R. has accounted for less than 2 percent of the LDC commerce.

The countries of Asia and the Middle East accounted for the largest share of Soviet trade with the less developed world. Here the stimulus to exports provided by the Soviet economic assistance program is particularly evident. Although the U.S.S.R. maintains trading relationships with more than 40 developing countries, roughly two-thirds of its total exports have been directed to a relatively small group of countries in the area; namely, India, the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, which also have been the largest recipients of Soviet aid.

India has been the U.S.S.R.'s foremost LDC trade partner since overtaking the United Arab Republic in 1962. Its share in Soviet trade continued to rise in the next 2 years, reaching 2.5 percent in 1964, when India received goods valued at \$232 million (machinery and equipment made up over three-fourths, with complete plants alone valued at \$130 million) and sold \$156 million worth consisting primarily of tropical products, including jute and jute products (25 percent), tea (20 percent), and nuts (15 percent). The United Arab Republic in 1964 imported \$156 million from the U.S.S.R., of which two-thirds represented machinery and equipment including 62 million worth of complete plants, and crude oil, wood and paper products and metals together made up a large part of the remainder. In contrast to the steady growth of Soviet exports to the United Arab Republic, the level of Soviet imports has varied (1964—\$124 million) mainly because of differences in the volume of cotton purchases which have declined from 90 percent to less than 60 percent of Soviet imports while cotton yarn and rice have assumed considerable importance. Trade with Malaysia, which used to be the U.S.S.R.'s third ranking LDC trading partner, has steadily diminished since its 1961 peak as a result of a drastic cutback in Soviet rubber imports, which have traditionally accounted for over 90 percent of total turnover between the two countries. Soviet trade with Afghanistan has slowly but steadily expanded, while the turnover with Indonesia has declined since 1962.

In Africa, which accounted for only about 10 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s LDC trade, Ghana remained the U.S.S.R.'s foremost partner. Since 1962 Ghana has enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with the U.S.S.R., exclusively on account of its cocoa bean sales. In 1964 Mali moved into second place, replacing Guinea whose trade with the Soviet Union has been on the downgrade since 1962 as well as the Sudan and Morocco, who had registered substantial but short-lived spurts in their commerce with the U.S.S.R. in 1963.

The volume of Soviet trade with Latin America (not including Cuba) has been quite small and varied rather erratically. It showed a 13 percent increase between 1961 and 1964 when it amounted to \$91 million. Brazil remained the only Latin American country to sustain a significant turnover with the U.S.S.R. Its favorable trade balance has been attributable to substantial though widely fluctuating Soviet purchases of coffee, cotton, and cocoa. Among imports from the U.S.S.R., crude oil and oil products have figured importantly. Soviet trade with Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay has been characterized by sporadic purchases of wheat, wool, tobacco, and leather, while exports remained insignificant.

The overall commodity composition of U.S.S.R. trade with developing countries has not essentially changed in the past 3 years. The main Soviet export item was machinery and equipment (except in Latin America), which accounted for 47 to 60 percent, followed by petroleum and petroleum products (11 to 12 percent), and food products (6 to 13 percent) which declined substantially in 1964.

Among Soviet imports raw materials predominated, despite Soviet propaganda claims that it can offer a market for LDC manufactures. The share of food has shown a steady increase since 1961 and reached 34 percent in 1964. A shift of purchases of rice from China to Burma and the United Arab Republic was a major factor, and increased purchases of tea (India) and cocoa (Ghana, Brazil) also contributed substantially to this development. The share of rubber declined in each year from a level of 38 percent in 1961 to 14 percent in 1964. The other major item, cotton, fluctuated between 18 and 25 percent.

C. COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF SOVIET TRADE

The basic commodity makeup of Soviet foreign trade has remained much the same as it was at the beginning of the sixties. Machinery and equipment, food, ores, and metals continued to figure significantly on both sides of the ledger, while additionally fuels and lubricants and wood are important on the export side, and textiles and clothing on the import side. However, there have been some noteworthy changes in the relative importance of these categories, and within them.

TABLE 5.—Commodity composition of Soviet foreign trade 1961-64

[In percent of total]

	1961		1962		1963		1964	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Machinery and equipment...	29.8	16.1	34.8	16.6	34.9	19.7	34.4	21.0
Complete plants.....	(1)	5.9	(1)	5.9	(1)	7.6	(1)	7.8
Transportation equipment...	9.2	3.2	11.6	3.5	12.0	4.6	12.9	5.5
Fuels, lubricants, and re-								
lated materials.....	3.7	17.4	3.1	16.4	2.9	17.7	2.4	17.8
Coal and coke.....	1.6	4.7	1.5	4.9	1.4	5.2	1.3	5.4
Petroleum and petroleum								
products.....	2.1	12.6	1.6	11.4	1.5	12.5	1.1	12.3
Ores and concentrates.....	5.0	4.2	4.6	3.9	4.1	4.0	3.9	4.1
Iron ore.....	(1)	3.1	(1)	3.1	(1)	3.2	(1)	3.3
Base metals and manufac-								
tures.....	8.5	15.4	8.7	14.4	6.6	13.9	4.6	16.3
Ferrous metals.....	6.0	11.9	6.6	11.3	4.8	10.9	3.6	12.5
Rolled ferrous metals.....	7.8	8.0	3.0	7.7	2.4	7.6	1.8	8.5
Nonferrous metals.....	2.5	3.5	2.1	3.1	1.8	3.0	1.0	3.8
Aluminum.....	(1)	1.0	(1)	1.1	(1)	1.1	(1)	1.5
Tin.....	.4	.2	.3	(2)	.2	(2)	.2	(2)
Copper.....	.9	.6	1.1	.6	.9	.6	.2	.7
Chemicals.....	2.6	2.9	3.3	2.5	4.0	2.6	4.5	2.5
Rubber and rubber products.	4.7	1.0	3.9	.7	3.0	.8	1.9	.7
Wood and wood products.....	2.1	6.0	1.8	6.0	1.7	5.7	1.7	6.6
Lumber.....		3.4		3.1		3.2		3.7
Textile raw materials and								
semimanufactures.....	5.2	6.1	4.4	4.9	4.8	4.6	3.8	5.0
Cotton fiber.....	2.2	4.7	1.8	3.7	2.4	3.3	1.5	3.9
Consumer goods.....	30.5	16.8	23.3	16.1	29.9	15.9	34.1	10.5
Food.....	13.4	13.3	11.0	13.0	12.4	12.5	19.2	7.4
Grain.....	.8	7.9	.1	7.5	3.1	5.8	6.4	3.1
Other consumer goods.....	17.1	3.6	17.3	3.1	17.6	3.4	14.9	3.1
Other merchandise.....	5.8	3.8	5.5	3.3	5.8	3.1	6.0	2.9
Unspecified.....	2.0	11.2	1.6	16.0	2.2	12.6	2.7	13.4

¹ Not available.

² Negligible.

Foods.—The most striking development in the composition of Soviet foreign trade since 1961 was the shift of the U.S.S.R. from a large exporter to a major buyer of grain. This was the consequence of the 1963 crop failure, which had its strongest impact on trade in 1964.

TABLE 6.—*Soviet grain trade balance*

	1961	1962	1963	1964
Exports.....	7,480.9	7,814.3	6,269.9	3,513.5
Imports.....	678.7	46.2	3,102.9	7,286.5
Balance.....	+6,702.2	+7,768.1	+3,157.0	-3,773.0

Net exports shrank from 6.7 and 7.8 million tons of grain in 1961 and 1962, respectively, to 3.2 million in 1963 and turned into net imports of 3.8 million tons in 1964, even though exports in that year were cut by 2.7 million tons. In addition, net flour exports of 230,000 tons in 1961 turned to net imports of 650,000 tons in 1964. The poor 1965 harvest undoubtedly will again have a similar though less drastic adverse effect on the Soviet grain trade balance in 1965 and 1966. On the export side, this impact was reflected in a declining share of food in Soviet exports—from over 13 percent in 1961 to some 7 percent in 1964, as the Soviet Union reduced shipments to Eastern Europe and virtually discontinued deliveries to most other destinations, except Cuba and Finland. On the import side, agricultural problems accounted largely for the upsurge in the food category from 13.4 percent in 1961 to 19.2 percent in 1964. The Soviet Union purchased the bulk of its 10.3 million tons wheat imports (90 percent of its total bread grain imports) in 1963 and 1964 from hard currency countries. Canada was the main supplier (6.2 million tons), with the United States next (1.8 million tons) followed by Australia (1.7 million tons). As long as the 50-50 shipping clause continues to apply to U.S. wheat sales to Communist countries, the U.S.S.R. will doubtless avoid purchasing U.S. grain, except as a last resort. As of the present, Canada and France are likely to be in the forefront of wheat suppliers to the European Communist countries for some time to come.

As a result of the intensification of economic ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union became rather heavily engaged in the sugar trade. While imports of raw sugar declined from the peak 1961 level of 3.3 million tons, they remained large, fluctuating between just under 1 million tons and 2.3 million. At the same time exports of refined sugar doubled between 1961 and 1963 when they reached over 800,000 tons but dropped back to 348,000 tons in 1964, mainly because a poor domestic sugarbeet crop in 1963 coincided with the lowest level of raw sugar procurement from Cuba in 5 years. The main recipients of refined sugar, as far as can be gaged from the incomplete breakdown available, appear to have been LDC's particularly in the Middle East and Africa.

Machinery and equipment.—Machinery and equipment has again become the U.S.S.R.'s largest export category (1964—\$1.6 billion or 21 percent of exports) as stepped up deliveries to Eastern Europe, Cuba, and the LDC's gradually filled the gap left by the sudden drop in shipments to Communist China at the beginning of the decade. In

TABLE 7.—Soviet grain trade

(In 1,000 metric tons)

	1961	1962	1963	1964
Imports, total.....	678.7	46.2	3,102.9	7,286.5
Wheat.....	655.9	45.1	3,052.5	7,281.4
Canada.....	485.6	2,323.4	3,885.4
United States.....	1,784.5
Australia.....	273.0	1,402.0
Rumania.....	162.0	5.0	395.2	4.8
Mongolia.....	5.2	40.1	54.7	98.9
Argentina.....	6.2	105.8
Exports, total.....	7,480.9	7,814.3	6,259.9	3,513.5
Wheat.....	4,800.6	4,765.2	4,105.6	2,030.5
Czechoslovakia.....	768.3	902.7	1,157.0	458.4
East Germany.....	1,227.0	1,251.2	1,069.4	684.1
Poland.....	302.7	505.2	163.4	49.8
Bulgaria.....	4.7	93.7	149.9	98.1
Hungary.....	386.2	40.1	62.9
Cuba.....	191.9	269.3	264.3	265.5
China.....	100.8	104.1
North Korea.....	240.0	50.0	50.1
Finland.....	105.7	219.4	165.5	70.1
England.....	338.2	344.9	276.3
Norway.....	79.6	79.3	41.0
Netherlands.....	199.1	95.5	118.3
West Germany.....	112.9	70.4	86.0
Brazil.....	202.3	412.8	241.8
Rye.....	1,088.0	1,300.3	815.0	150.3
East Germany.....	252.1	451.7	254.3	101.1
Poland.....	271.9	221.6	401.0
Czechoslovakia.....	181.9	174.3	15.7
Finland.....	32.0	59.0	47.8	49.2
Corn.....	405.6	1,256.7	723.1	638.6
East Germany.....	82.5	344.7	169.7	215.4
Czechoslovakia.....	115.2	231.8	197.8	198.6
Cuba.....	31.9	107.7	94.9	178.8
Italy.....	12.8	62.0	78.7	27.6

1964, as in 1961, 37 percent of Soviet machinery exports consisted of complete industrial installations. Transport, agricultural and road-building machinery made up another 33 percent, instruments remained an important subgroup (1964—\$66 million), while airplanes and helicopter sales almost tripled reaching \$114 million in 1964.

Imports of machinery grew at about the same pace as overall imports, and from 1962-64 exceeded machinery exports by a little over \$1 billion. Of the total machinery imports of \$2.7 billion for 1964, transportation equipment (of which more than half were ships) accounted for almost \$1 billion. Other major components were machinery for the chemical industry, mining, and the food industry. Bloc countries supplied three-quarters of Soviet machinery imports lead by East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Almost the entire remainder came from the industrial West, with West Germany and Japan the foremost suppliers. After a 3-year decline beginning 1961, West German machinery sales to the U.S.S.R. in 1964 came close to doubling and amounted to \$135 million, of which equipment for the chemical industry and ships made up over 70 percent. Machinery imports from Japan registered a spectacular (almost five times since 1961) and uninterrupted increase to \$133 million, with ships accounting for more

than half of the total. Sweden, Italy, and France have assumed an increasingly important role in Soviet machinery imports, outdistancing Great Britain.

Petroleum and petroleum products.—An important category (12 percent) in the overall Soviet export picture, crude oil and petroleum products have loomed particularly large in the U.S.S.R.'s trade with the industrial West. In 1964 they accounted for 22.4 percent of Soviet hard currency sales. Crude oil exports to the industrial West rose to 15.9 million metric tons from 11.2 million in 1961, and accounted for 43 percent of total Soviet crude sales abroad. Italy has remained the U.S.S.R.'s most important free world customer with over 7 million tons in 1964, followed by West Germany, Japan, and Finland. Italian purchases have greatly exceeded the amounts agreed up for the 3-year period 1962-65 and are slated to rise further. The Communist countries' share in Soviet crude export which in 1961 had been somewhat smaller than that of the industrial West, now again exceeds the latter. Of 17.4 million metric tons exported to these countries in 1964, 4.8 million went to Czechoslovakia, 3.9 million to East Germany. Cuban purchases 1961-64 have averaged around 3.5 million tons. In addition, Communist countries receive the bulk of Soviet gasoline exports, but less than a third of diesel fuel and less than one-fifth of lubricants. Their overall imports of Soviet petroleum products have fallen off each year from the 1961 level, with their share in the total declining from 45 percent to 34 percent in 1964. The main reason was the steady drop in Communist Chinese purchases which were only in part offset by higher Bulgarian, Polish, and Cuban imports. In 1964, Sweden and Finland were the U.S.S.R.'s foremost customers for oil products, followed by Poland, Bulgaria, and Cuba.

TABLE 8.—Soviet crude oil exports

(1,000 metric tons)

	1962	1963	1964
Total.....	26,279.4	30,242.9	36,660.7
Communist countries.....	12,376.9	14,462.7	17,421.4
Czechoslovakia.....	3,673.0	4,222.3	4,759.7
East Germany.....	2,437.2	3,060.4	3,936.4
Cuba.....	3,629.3	3,765.6	3,426.6
Developed West.....	12,110.3	13,663.5	15,875.0
Italy.....	6,083.4	6,727.1	7,017.3
West Germany.....	1,914.5	2,214.6	2,958.7
Finland.....	1,121.0	1,652.3	1,872.5
Japan.....	2,136.3	2,026.3	2,482.6
Less developed countries.....	1,793.2	2,116.7	3,394.3
United Arab Republic.....	1,182.3	926.8	705.7
Morocco.....	157.8	284.8	300.7
Brazil.....	154.8	666.1	1,876.7

Other commodities.—Other commodities significant in Soviet foreign trade are shown in table 9. Exports of rolled steel reached 4.2 million in 1964, with more than three-quarters going to Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany. At the same time considerable amounts were imported (though they have declined from the 1962 peak level of over 1 million tons), with Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Aus-

tria, and Japan the major suppliers. Steel pipe also remains an important trade item on both sides of the ledger, with imports coming primarily from Rumania and Czechoslovakia, as well as Sweden, and the bulk of exports going to other Communist countries. As regards coal, imports (almost exclusively from Poland) have leveled off around 5 million metric tons, while exports have continue to expand reaching almost 24 million tons in 1964, with well over half going to Eastern Europe. France, Italy, and Japan have emerged as the U.S.S.R.'s major free world customers. Soviet net exports of cotton remain at around a quarter million tons, as exports, largely to Eastern Europe, seem to have stabilized at below 400,000 tons. Overall cotton purchases fluctuated considerably from year to year. The United Arab Republic remained the U.S.S.R.'s major source, while Communist China faded out of the picture. The traditional Soviet lumber and timber exports increased further, with the free world claiming the major portion. Clothing continues to be of importance on the import side (6 percent in 1964)—Communist China is still the largest supplier followed by East Germany.

TABLE D.—Soviet trade in selected commodities

	1963		1964	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Metalliferous ores and concentrates (million dollars).....	\$292.1	\$291.4	\$302.0	\$313.7
Rolled steel (thousand metric tons).....	926.0	3,536.3	732.0	4,181.1
East Germany.....		1,356.8		1,632.7
Romania.....	108.3	679.4	161.8	805.2
Czechoslovakia.....	140.5	283.3	192.5	293.2
Bulgaria.....		263.9		317.5
Japan.....	283.4		71.2	
Austria.....	108.6		107.2	
North Korea.....	64.9	4.8	66.9	4.5
Steel pipe (thousand metric tons).....	656.6	221.1	514.1	238.7
East Germany.....		87.7		100.5
Bulgaria.....		24.1		35.2
Romania.....	204.4	28.8	215.0	32.2
Communist China.....		24.5		12.8
Czechoslovakia.....	132.6	0.9	130.5	1.2
Sweden.....	60.9		63.3	
Coal, bituminous (thousand metric tons).....	5,100	21,362	5,100	23,628
Poland.....	4,820	1,228	4,805	1,223
East Germany.....		5,838		6,194
Czechoslovakia.....		3,058		3,342
Bulgaria.....		1,283		1,994
Yugoslavia.....		1,057		1,092
France.....		1,908		1,723
Italy.....		1,194		1,213
Japan.....		956		1,068
Natural rubber (thousand metric tons).....	298.4	88.5	186.1	60.2
Malaysia.....	240.6		124.8	
Indonesia.....	43.4		38.7	
Cotton (thousand metric tons).....	225.6	321.5	144.9	393.6
United Arab Republic.....	99.5		75.3	
Syria.....	18.5		19.3	
Sudan.....	19.0		4.0	
Afghanistan.....	11.9		15.4	
Brazil.....	40.1		9.1	
Communist countries.....		273.8		340.8
Wool (thousand metric tons).....	42.4	27.6	46.3	24.8
Australia.....	18.0		14.3	
Mongolia.....	8.0		10.6	
East Germany.....		16.5		14.8
Czechoslovakia.....		6.4		6.0
Lumber (million cubic meters).....		8.0		9.4
Japan.....		1.8		2.5
Hungary.....		1.1		1.3
Finland.....		1.3		1.3
Sawn timber (million cubic meters).....	0.4	6.5	0.3	7.7
United Kingdom.....		2.1		2.4
East Germany.....		1.1		1.2

D. BALANCE OF TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

The Soviet Union's overall balance of trade has deteriorated since 1962, going from an export surplus of over half a billion dollars in that year to deficit of \$55 million in 1964. The most important factor in this development was the widening trade gap with the industrial West—largely on account of Soviet grain purchases—while at the same time the customary surplus with the East European Communist countries shrank. Their effect could not be fully offset by a substantial surplus with other Communist countries (mainly Cuba, plus Yugoslavia and Outer Mongolia), a decline in the deficit with Communist China as the latter approached completion of its debt repayments to the U.S.S.R., and a growing surplus with less-developed areas.

While it is clear from the recurrent Soviet gold sales that the U.S.S.R. has a chronic deficit with hard currency areas, data are lacking on the nontrade components of the Soviet balance of payments. Apart from commodity trade the most important element in the Soviet payments picture vis-a-vis the free world is a substantial deficit on capital account. It consists primarily of disbursements under loans and credits extended to less-developed countries (believed to have averaged at between \$350 to \$400 million in recent years) and Soviet repayments of Western credits. Together these far exceeded new Soviet drawings on such credits and LDC repayments of Soviet loans (the latter amounting to \$135 million in 1964). As regards invisible transactions with the free world, there may be a small outflow since net transportation expenditures are presumably offset only in part by net receipts from tourism. A moderate deficit may be assumed in the category of transfer payments, mainly on account of Soviet military and economic grants and contributions to the U.N. The resulting overall deficit with the free world, and particularly the part representing convertible currencies has constituted a severe drain on Soviet gold reserves. Following a 5-year period when Soviet gold exports had ranged from \$210 to \$265 million per annum, the volume of such sales more than doubled in 1963 an estimated \$560 million followed by another large outflow of around half a billion dollars' worth in 1964.

In view of this situation, Soviet interest in long-term credits from the West is clear. It also explains the more conservative Soviet approach to use of short and medium term credits and to purchases from the West in general which has been especially evident since Khrushchev's ouster.

TABLE 10.—Soviet balance of trade

(In millions of dollars)

	1962			1963			1964		
	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance
Total.....	7,030.6	6,455.4	+575.1	7,272.4	7,058.7	+213.7	7,681.3	7,736.6	-55.3
Communist countries.....	4,905.2	4,565.6	+339.7	5,099.4	4,966.4	+113.0	5,406.3	5,346.8	+59.5
East Europe.....	3,971.1	3,590.3	+380.8	4,163.3	4,146.9	+16.4	4,496.1	4,450.4	+45.7
Far East.....	368.7	634.7	-266.0	326.0	536.4	-210.4	265.3	429.6	-164.3
Other ¹	565.3	340.4	+224.9	610.1	303.1	+307.0	642.9	466.7	+176.2
Free world.....	2,125.3	1,889.9	+235.4	2,173.0	2,072.3	+100.7	2,275.0	2,389.8	-114.8
Industrial West.....	1,106.6	1,271.0	-164.4	1,208.3	1,388.7	-180.4	1,273.0	1,724.6	-451.6
Less developed.....	668.5	615.2	+46.7	761.6	675.4	+86.2	777.7	662.8	+114.9
Unspecified ²	450.3	3.6	+446.7	203.2	8.2	+195.0	224.4	2.4	+222.0

¹ Cuba, Outer Mongolia, Yugoslavia, Albania.² Probably unlisted trade with LDC's.

**SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE AND THE
UNITED STATES MARKET**

**BY
LEON M. HERMAN**

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SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE AND THE U.S. MARKET

INTRODUCTION

The uses and benefits of international trade at present loom larger than ever in the official thinking of the political authorities of the U.S.S.R. Commercial operations across the national frontier are proceeding on a more ambitious scale, in terms of volume as well as geography, than any time during the 50 years of the existence of the Soviet State. Although as a matter of established tradition, foreign trade continues to absorb only a small proportion of the country's national product, the percentage in question has been growing steadily in recent years. Specifically, the value of all goods exported abroad in 1965 by the Soviet Union represented 3.8 percent of national income, as compared with 2.7 percent in 1958.

What is more significant in terms of the direction of current trends is the fact that the political authorities of the U.S.S.R. are consciously reorienting their economic planning toward a more active involvement of their domestic production system in the international division of labor. Gradually, the official pronouncements of the leadership have begun to reflect their acceptance of a larger role for foreign trade in the economic development of the U.S.S.R. On the occasion of the recent unveiling of the latest 5-year plan for the national economy (1966-70), the Soviet Government expressed a particularly firm determination to pursue a policy of active expansion of the exchange of goods through the mechanism of the world market.

The language of this statement places the Soviet leadership squarely on the side of the economic principle of comparative advantage long honored by the trading nations of the world. In this document, published on February 20, 1966, the leaders of the U.S.S.R. conveyed the clear implication that their approach to world commerce has been unduly apprehensive in the past; moreover, that they had tended in the past to adhere rather mechanically to a traditional export structure, based on raw materials and farm products, which reflected the agrarian past of their economy rather than its industrial present. The statement recalls the all-too-familiar fact that under the approach to economic development followed during the past decades, the planning authorities of the Soviet Union were under instruction to strive for self-sufficiency both in industrial and agricultural production, regardless of the involved cost.

On this score, it is quite clear, the Soviet leadership is now disposed to undertake a systematic effort to achieve a substantial modification of the domestic production pattern in a way designed to take fuller advantage of the opportunities for exchange offered by the world market. The present stated objective is to work in the direction away from maximum self-sufficiency toward a more optimal use of domestic resources. The language used in the new draft 5-year plan to express

the new official thinking in this sphere deserves to be reproduced at some length:

In order to use more fully the advantages of the international division of labor, of the rise in the economic effectiveness of external trade, and to better satisfy the Soviet people's demands in trade, provision is to be made for: improvement of the structure of Soviet exports by means of increasing exports of machinery, equipment, instruments, means of transport and communications, and other readymade articles of the processing industry;

Improvement of the structure of imports by importing primarily those types of raw materials, materials, and articles whose production inside the country entails greater costs and capital investment, and by increasing the purchase of technically advanced equipment which contributes to acceleration of the development of the progressive branches of the national economy;

On the basis of a profound study of foreign markets, creation of new, specialized production and development of existing production, for increased output of export products corresponding to the demands of the world market—particularly machine-building production; * * *.¹

It is a matter of some interest, too, that the above description of the new approach in foreign trade appears in the document in the context of a discussion of future Soviet commercial policy toward "the industrially developed capitalist countries." As the Soviet leaders know, these are the countries that account for some 70 percent of total world trade. Yet, to date, they account for only 20 percent of the foreign trade of the U.S.S.R. Under the circumstances, therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that the Soviet Union has committed itself to a new departure in trade policy. At the very least, the above declaration must be read as a recognition of the considerable potential value which the markets of the industrial West can contribute to the future development of the Soviet economy.

I. THE ECONOMIC PULL OF THE WEST

As a matter of simple practical opportunity, Soviet trading authorities, in the recent past, have been gradually expanding their exchange of goods with the more developed countries of the West, especially since the end of the Stalin period. Past official expectations to the contrary, the Soviet Union's own steady development of domestic industrial production has not diminished the need for expanded economic exchanges with the markets of the West. In fact, the more economic development the Soviet Union has achieved over the years, the more extensive and continuous has become its commodity exchange with the industrial community of the world, mainly with Western Europe and Japan. In this respect, of course, Russia has not been unique; she has merely repeated, in her own fashion, the experience of most of the other countries that have preceded her in their advent into the age of industrialization. In the modern era, the historical record has shown, the principal movement of commodity trade has taken place among the more developed, the more cost-conscious, nations of the world.

It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the most rapidly growing component of Soviet foreign trade in recent years has been that portion of trade which it conducts with the nations of the industrial West. To take the most recent figures available, Soviet trade with

¹ Pravda, Feb. 20, 1966.

the West increased by 126 percent between 1958 and 1964, a period during which the entire volume of the country's international trade expanded by 78 percent. In aggregate ruble figures, the recent course of Soviet foreign trade, by major political subdivisions of the entire trade operation, may be summed up as follows:

TABLE I.—Recent course of Soviet foreign trade

[In thousands of rubles ¹]

	1958	1964	Index 1964/ 1958
Trade turnover, total.....	7,782	13,876	178
With Communist countries.....	5,764	9,678	151
With industrially developed countries.....	1,223	2,768	226
With newly developing countries.....	805	1,430	178

¹ One ruble officially valued at \$1.11.

What makes this aspect of the recent record of Soviet foreign trade especially interesting is the fact that the expansion of trade with the industrial nations does not seem to have been a matter of high priority with the political authorities of the U.S.S.R. If anything, this has been precisely the component of Soviet world commerce with the least political motivation behind it. To be sure, nothing that affects the sensitive sphere of foreign trade can be regarded as taking place in a political vacuum in the U.S.S.R. The kind of important issues that spill over into foreign economic policy are not likely to escape the discipline of political direction from the center, whether at the strategic or the tactical level of operation. However, as far as the general orientation of national policy is concerned, Soviet authorities working in the field of trade have been all along under instruction to exert their principal effort towards maximizing their commodity exchanges, first of all, with their Communist trade partners and, beyond that, with the nations of the newly developing regions of the globe.

TABLE II.—Soviet trade with the less developed countries

[In million U.S. dollars]

	1955	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Exports.....	112.4	340.8	507.4	568.5	700.4	962.1
Imports.....	210.4	574.9	584.1	615.2	674.8	628.2
Total turnover.....	322.8	920.7	1,091.7	1,182.7	1,435.2	1,597.8

Source: Published Soviet trade data converted at the official rate of 1 ruble equals 1.11 dollars.

In terms of this general direction of trade policy, therefore, it is fair to assert that, by contrast, the trade of the U.S.S.R. with the countries of the industrial West has been marked by a motivation that has been more economic than political. There is ample evidence to support such a distinction. To begin with, the Soviet Union continues to be impelled by sheer economic necessity to turn to the markets of the West to help meet its requirements for a wide variety of new, research-intensive categories of manufactured goods, especially their requirements for advanced types of machinery. There is, all too

plainly, no comparable reservoir of industrial productivity, or technical innovation, available either within the Communist world or in the markets of the newly developing nations. This is precisely the kind of indispensable reservoir from which the present production-minded group of Soviet leaders will not again choose to cut themselves off, as did Stalin during the last years of his regime.

As far as its exports are concerned, the Soviet Union also finds it necessary to continue to concentrate on marketing raw materials and farm products as its principal source of foreign exchange earnings required to carry out its import program. It requires no special technical knowledge of the intricacies of the world market mechanism to discover that, as a region, Western Europe contains the largest concentration of processing industries based on largely imported raw materials. This, in fact, is a familiar and basic economic condition which, at one time, brought the merchants of Tsarist Russia into the markets of Western Europe, more than a hundred years ago, in search of a ready outlet for the products of their domestic farms, forests, and mines. At a later period, in the early 1920's, the fledgling Soviet regime was also very quick to discover the phenomenon of Russian economic complementarity with the more developed societies of Western Europe and the implications it has for mutually profitable trade.

Except for the abnormal years of World War II and the grim 8 years that followed, there has, therefore, been a certain degree of continuity in the pattern of commodity exchanges between the economies of the Soviet Union and the West. Today, too, the traditional range of Soviet export commodities continues to reach the markets of the industrial Western nations, including Japan, in rather substantial quantities. As a result, we are faced by the fact that although the Soviet Union allocates to the industrial West only 17 percent of its global exports, there are a number of individual commodities for which it is substantially dependent upon Western markets for their systematic profitable disposal.

Thus, for example, when we examine the 1964 trade returns, we find that the Soviet Union marketed 55 percent of its exported forest products, and 54 percent of its refined petroleum, in the countries of the West. In the case of crude oil, the proportion was 43 percent. Similarly, some 40 percent of all exported manganese, iron ore, and fish products, found their outlet in Western markets. In addition, sizable proportions of total sales fell to the share of the markets of the West in the case of such representative Soviet export commodities as coal (32 percent), aluminum (33 percent), potash (62 percent), chrome ore (86 percent), and fur skins (96 percent).

On the import side, Soviet foreign trade with the West discloses a record that is quite similar. When the need arose recently, for example, to accelerate the development of some of the more modern branches of industrial production and transport in the U.S.S.R., the critical ingredients required for assembling the necessary productive capacity had to be imported from the West. Soviet foreign trade sources show, more specifically, that 53 percent of all chemical equipment imported in 1964 (73 percent in 1960) was procured in the markets of the industrially developed countries. The case was approximately the same in regard to merchant ships. Of the total dollar

value of ships imported by Russia in 1964 (\$537 million), 45 percent came from Western shipyards. Large proportions of total imports were also supplied by Western sources in the case of a number of other essential commodities, such as copper (50 percent), cattle hides (69 percent), staple fiber (96 percent), synthetic rubber (53 percent), chemical products (46 percent), and wheat (97 percent).

II. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES MARKET

One unique feature of the recent pattern of Soviet trade with the industrial nations of the West has been the rather unspectacular role played by the United States in this exchange. The United States is, of course, a major world trader, currently accounting for over 20 percent of all merchandise exported by the economically developed nations as a group. Yet, as far as the U.S.S.R is concerned, this fact has not been reflected in its recent intake of industrial products from the West. What the United States now contributes, in fact, amounts to only some 2 percent of the total value of goods currently being imported by the Soviet Union from all the developed industrial nations. The year 1964 was an exception in this respect. It was a year that was heavily influenced by a single nonrecurrent sale of wheat, valued at \$110 million; as a result, the share of the United States in total Soviet imports rose to 9 percent of all commodities supplied by the Western group of nations in that year.

There is, of course, no particular mystery as to the nature of the political strains that brought about the present low level of participation of the United States in the foreign trade of the Soviet Union. This part of the record, namely, the impact of the political cold war on our bilateral economic relations, has been discussed at length in a number of recent general surveys of this subject.² In the present discussion, however, an attempt will be made to abstract from the specific political factors that inhibit the flow of trade between the two countries. The intent here will be to focus, as far as that is possible, on the economic potentialities of this trade under more favorable political conditions. We shall proceed on the assumption that the United States would, sometime within the foreseeable future, proceed to align the administrative regulations governing its trade with Eastern Europe in general and the Soviet Union in particular with those enforced by most countries making up the present O.E.C.D.³ structure.

III. A BRIEF GLANCE BACKWARD

For the purpose of such a discussion we need to turn our attention, if only briefly, to the record of our commercial exchanges with the U.S.S.R. during the late 1930's. This, according to the record, was a period in our bilateral relations that was largely free of political complications. By taking such a retrospective view we will find that during the period 1937-40, the United States, rather than any country in Western Europe, was the leading source of imports into the Soviet

² See "A Background Study on East-West Trade," Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 1965; also, "Law and Contemporary Problems," Duke University, autumn 1964.

³ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Union. Goods imported from this country accounted for 28 percent of all imports into Russia in 1938 and for 31 percent in 1940. As far as machinery imports are concerned, the U.S. role was, relatively, still larger, since we supplied as much as 55 percent of the total in 1938 and 41 percent in 1940.

TABLE III.—*Soviet trade with the United States, 1937-40*

[In millions of rubles of the 1950-50 rate of exchange¹]

	1937	1938	1939	1940
Imports from the United States (rubles).....	186	308	229	338
Percent of total imports.....	18	28	31	31
Exports to the United States (rubles).....	101	67	65	86
Percent of total exports.....	8	7	14	8
Imports of machinery from the United States (rubles).....	86	206	133	146
Percent of total machinery imports.....	31	55	46	41

¹ 1 ruble officially valued by the U.S.S.R. at \$0.25.

Source: "Vneshniala torgovlia SSSR za 1938-40 gg.," Moscow, 1950.

Despite the great distance in time involved, the record of United State-Soviet trade during the late thirties may be said, with good reason, to have some valid implications for the situation today. For one thing, this record does imply, for example, that the Soviet Union is able, when necessary, to sustain for a number of years a bilateral exchange of goods in which the balance falls heavily on the import side of the trade. For another, the prewar record of our bilateral trade relations is also suggestive in still another sense, namely in the sense that it helps to bring to light a strong Soviet interest in U.S.-made equipment and production ideas in general. The economic reasons underlying this interest, it may be fairly argued, are as operative today as they were three decades ago, as will be shown in some detail at a later point. Suffice it to say at this juncture that the very active involvement of U.S. companies in production licensing arrangements with industrial firms throughout the West is manifestly an important fact of international economic life today. It is also relevant to recall that the trading agencies of the Soviet Union are exceedingly well informed on this subject.

IV. POSTWAR DECLINE OF U.S.-U.S.S.R. TRADE

By comparison, the 1940's were a most abnormal period, heavily influenced by political factors, both favorable and unfavorable. The lend-lease program of the war years, which involved massive shipments of U.S. goods to the Soviet Union (\$3.5 billion in 1944), came to an end during the second half of 1945. By the end of 1947, all previous "special" categories of export, namely goods provided, either free or on credit, under the Lend-Lease and U.N.R.R.A. programs, disappeared from our shipments to the Soviet Union. At the same point in time, moreover, the mild temperature of political relations in effect between the United States and Russia during the war-time period began to turn quite cold. The U.S. Government found it necessary to react vigorously against the growing manifestation of Soviet expan-

sionism along the entire perimeter of its newly won frontiers—in the Balkans, Iran, Berlin, and Eastern Europe. Inevitably, too, the rising political tension between the United States and the U.S.S.R. soon spilled over into the sphere of international trade. U.S. trade regulations were tightened severely in March 1948 in an attempt to keep essential commodities, especially products likely to be used in war production, from reaching the Soviet Union and its allies. As a consequence, the dollar value of our exports to Russia declined from \$149 million in 1947 to \$28 million in 1948, and to \$6.6 million in 1949. During the subsequent 6 years, U.S. exports to the Soviet Union hovered at a level below \$1 million per annum. Those were the bleak years of maximum cold war tension generated by the war in Korea and similar military probings by Stalin of the defenses and the collective will of the Western powers.

TABLE IV.—United States-Soviet trade, 1947-65

(In thousands of dollars)

Year	U.S. exports (including reexports)	U.S. imports (general)
1947.....	149,069	77,102
1948.....	27,879	86,825
1949.....	6,617	89,140
1950.....	752	88,296
1951.....	55	27,396
1952.....	20	16,818
1953.....	19	10,791
1954.....	219	11,809
1955.....	252	16,875
1956.....	3,823	24,561
1957.....	4,483	16,784
1958.....	3,422	17,504
1959.....	7,398	28,624
1960.....	36,264	22,644
1961.....	45,873	23,230
1962.....	20,155	16,157
1963.....	22,928	21,161
1964.....	146,360	20,666
1965.....	44,368	42,670

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, "United States Trade with Eastern Europe," BIS Washington, D.C.; U.S. Department of Commerce, "Trade of the United States with the Soviet Bloc," WTIS-O-B-R reports, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Department of Commerce, "Export Control," Quarterly report, Washington, D.C.

V. THE PRESENT SITUATION

In the course of the past 10-year period since 1956, our trade with the Soviet Union has witnessed an upward trend; but while the rise has been steady it has not been steep. Today, the United States is still one of the lesser trade partners of the Soviet Union. It ranks among the minor trading nations of the OECD group, somewhere in the same class with Denmark and Greece, accounting for about 0.5 per cent of total Soviet trade turnover.

The year 1965, the latest on record, was a fairly balanced year in our bilateral exchange of goods. The value of U.S. merchandise exported to the Soviet Union amounted to \$44.4 million according to our statistics. Soviet goods sold in this market in the same year came to a total value of \$42.7 million. However, in the formerly important category of "machinery and equipment," Soviet returns show the following

modest volume of annual imports from the United States (in thousands of dollars) :

1958.....	\$1, 123
1959.....	6, 555
1960.....	27, 698
1961.....	15, 733
1962.....	1, 808
1963.....	856
1964.....	2, 910

If we bear in mind the fact that the Soviet Union imported \$620 million worth of machinery from the Western countries in 1964 (\$2,669 million from all sources), the role of the United States as a supplier in this category of commodities looks insignificant indeed.

VI. POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

As the situation stands today, five industrial nations dominate the trade of the Soviet Union with the West; namely, the German Federal Republic, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. Together, according to their own trade returns, they exported \$728 million worth of merchandise to the U.S.S.R. and imported \$1,007 million worth in 1964. Taking the same five countries over the past 5 years, on the average, each of these major Western trade partners of the Soviet Union exported \$133 million and imported \$164 million.

These average figures are useful in the present context of our discussion in the sense that they may be taken as representing something like the order of magnitude of the amount of trade which the Soviet Union could generate with the United States, if conditions for an optimum exchange of goods were favorable. Present conditions are, of course, not favorable. It is quite plain that, by comparison with the other countries of the West, our trade with the U.S.S.R. at present operates under three handicaps, namely: (1) Our more restrictive export control policy; (2) our denial of "most favored nation" treatment to imported Soviet products; and (3) the lack of a sizable demand in this market for the type of commodities the U.S.S.R. generally exports to the West. As far as the first two obstacles are concerned, it is conceivable that a change in the tariff treatment and in the administrative regulations governing exports to the U.S.S.R., say along the lines of the Miller report,⁴ would help to align our trade policy, in a general way, with that of the rest of the West, thereby clearing these particular hurdles out of the way. The third handicap, however, lies beyond the reach of legislative or administrative policy. Here we are confronted by an economic condition that is basic to the present structure of Soviet exports. Such a condition can be altered only over the long term, and only by means of a gradual diversification in the commodity composition of the export trade of the U.S.S.R.

Let us take one example. While it is possible to envision, somewhere in the near term, a level of U.S. exports to the Soviet Union equal to that of the United Kingdom in 1964; namely, \$128 million (1 percent of total United Kingdom exports), it would be quite unrealistic to forecast for the United States, anytime in the foreseeable

⁴ "Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European countries and the Soviet Union." The White House, Apr. 29, 1965.

future, a figure anywhere near the dollar value of United Kingdom imports from the U.S.S.R.; namely, \$333 million (2 percent of total United Kingdom imports).

At the present juncture, it is fairly common practice to assume a change in the regulation of U.S. trade with the Soviet Union along the following lines:⁵

1. Maintain our controls over nonstrategic trade and technology at a level now maintained by Western Europe.

2. Accord most-favored-nation tariff treatment to goods imported from the U.S.S.R.

3. Allow government-guaranteed commercial credit at a level considered to be normal to the trade or beneficial to the national interest.

Should a change along the above lines ensue, it would be eminently reasonable to expect, within the next few years, a modest rise in the level of U.S. trade with the U.S.S.R. both on the export and the import side of the exchange. There is every good reason to believe, at the same time, that the export side of this trade is likely to rise relatively higher as a direct result of a relaxation of administrative procedures. Hence, it would seem realistic to anticipate a level of annual exports somewhere around \$100 million, or a level roughly on par with that of our exports to, say, Austria or Finland.

In regard to imports, the known hard facts on the demand side of this commercial equation would suggest an estimate of a somewhat lower order of magnitude; roughly \$75 million per annum.

On the evidence at hand, therefore, the outlook is distinctly more favorable on the export side of the trade. Clearly, the reason simply is that on this side of the exchange of goods with the Soviet Union we possess some tangible elements of strength. For one thing, U.S. industry is known to invest more resources, in absolute as well as relative terms, in industrial research, development, and experimentation. A recent OECD study⁶ brought to light the fact that the United States spends as much as 3.5 percent of its GNP on research and development, the highest proportion by a considerable margin of any country in the West. For another, U.S. economic operations in manufacturing, mining, power generation, transport, and farming are generally organized on a relatively larger scale. What this means in practice is that our domestic productive equipment tends to be designed to larger dimensions and greater capacity of output. This practical condition has long been a matter of material interest to the trading organizations of the Soviet Union.

To this may be added the fact that the higher labor productivity in effect in the U.S. economy has long served as a factor in attracting the interest of Soviet economic executives in our productive processes and equipment. There is also still another potential favorable element in regard to our situation; namely, the large number of competing firms within the U.S. market, which by their very existence provide a wide choice of alternative suppliers of goods as well as technical data and production licenses. The United States, in short, may be said to operate the largest industrial department store on the main street of the world market.

⁵ See: "The Battle Act Report, 1965." U.S. Department of State, Dec. 30, 1965, p. 17.

⁶ The Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America, and the Soviet Union. Paris, 1965, p. 71.

The last, but not least, factor in the outlook for a possible increase in exports to the Soviet Union is our continuing strong surplus position in a wide range of agricultural commodities.

In sum, if commercial considerations were to be allowed once more to govern the flow of trade, in a setting of undisturbed political relations, the United States could be expected before very long to become a major factor in Soviet commerce with the West. There are, as outlined above, a number of active economic forces at work in the direction of drawing the two national economies toward the resumption of their former cooperation in the sphere of commerce. Given the continued limited receptivity of the Soviet Union to trade with non-Communist partners, the scale of this bilateral trade would, to be sure, remain relatively small. The absolute dollar value of this exchange can, however, be expanded several times above its present level.

APPENDIX TABLE

Selected Soviet contracts for Western machinery and equipment 1958-May 1966

Year	Type of plant(s)	Supplying country	Estimated price (million U.S. dollars)
1958	Polyethylene (2)	West Germany	30
1959	Tires	United Kingdom	43
1959	Acetylene, ethylene, titanium dioxide, maleic anhydride	Italy	25
1960	Cellulose	France	25
1960	Textiles	United States	25
1961	Pulp mill equipment	Japan	31
1961	Meat packing	Sweden	30
1961	Ammonia and methanol (2)	Italy	24
1962	Cargo ships and tankers	Japan	96
1962	Pulp and paper	do	32
1962	Phosphoric acid	West Germany	25
1963	Fish factory and refrigerator ships	Japan	135
1963	Fish factory ships	West Germany	64
1963	Ethylene and polyethylene (6)	United Kingdom	63
1963	Phosphoric acid	Belgium	22
1964	Terylene (dacron)	United Kingdom	87
1964	Caprolactam (2)	Netherlands	30
1965	Polyvinyl chloride	France	22
1965	Textile spinning	Italy	20
1965	Cardboard (11)	France	12
1966	Motor vehicles manufacturing plant and related facilities	Italy	320

**SOVIET FOREIGN AID TO THE LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES**

**BY
LEO TANSKY**

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SOVIET FOREIGN AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

I. INTRODUCTION

The emergence of a large number of new nations in the postwar world brought with it a "revolution of rising expectations," the ramifications of which are playing an ever increasing role in East-West conflict. While the key element of this "revolution" is economic in nature, political instability, nurtured by factional struggles for power, frustrations over the lack of economic progress, and external political pressures, has become a prevailing feature in almost every area in which these countries are located. Real and imaginary grievances are vented against former colonial powers and complete severance of all, especially economic, ties often is advocated by radical nationalist elements as the only means for achieving true independence from "neo-colonialism." Traditional tribal conflicts, once localized in their impact, are converted into border disputes between newly independent neighbors. Perhaps most disruptive of all factors is the drive of various leaders who have seized the leadership of regional political movements and who employ extremist tactics in their efforts to achieve the objectives of these movements.

In many countries the demand for rapid achievement of the fruits of economic development as a corollary of the struggle for independence has often resulted in overambitious and poorly designed economic development plans which frequently place the greatest emphasis on industrialization and infrastructural development. Such programs, however, require substantial amounts of capital and technical know-how, resources largely absent in these countries. The consequence usually is a willingness to accept economic assistance from any foreign source to support the program. Such aid also is sought to ease the economic pressures which result from the infusion of large-scale economic activity into an institutional structure not capable of absorbing such activity.

After years of denouncing Western foreign aid as an ill-disguised instrument of imperialism the U.S.S.R., in the mid-1950's, injected itself into this milieu of economic and political instability with an aid program of its own. During the past dozen years economic and military aid to the less developed countries of the non-Communist world has become a key instrument in Soviet efforts to project its presence into all areas of the developing world. From a small beginning in mid-1954 the program has grown dramatically, has widened in scope and content, and has attained a relatively high degree of sophistication. In 1954 about \$6 million in foreign aid was extended by the Soviet Union. By the end of 1965 the cumulative total of Soviet economic assistance had grown to about \$5 billion and its military aid

program to about \$4 billion.¹ During these years about 13,500 academic students and nearly 25,000 military and technical trainees have trained in the U.S.S.R. In addition, an estimated 65,000 Soviet economic and military technicians have been employed in aid activities in recipient countries.

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC AID

The "national liberation" of colonial peoples and their ultimate amalgamation with world communism have always been accorded high priority in Communist strategic thinking.² Current Soviet policy gives tactical priority to gaining entry to these countries, to establishing a position which could be used to influence their policies, and to reduce or eliminate Western influence. The nationalist governments of these countries have been accepted and acknowledged and the Communist countries have established diplomatic and economic relations with most of them. Simultaneously, local Communist parties subservient to Moscow's directives have been restrained from overt revolutionary activity that would offend nationalist governments. This course has been pursued to such an extent that in many countries the interests of indigenous Communist groups have been largely ignored. India and the United Arab Republic, countries in which Communist parties have either been banned or sharply attacked by the ruling political party, have received more economic assistance than any other beneficiary of Soviet aid.

The Soviet Union, however, remains willing to overlook such attacks in the hope that "revolutionaries" like Nasser or the deposed Ben Bella, with Soviet assistance, will do more damage to Western influence in the Near East and Africa in the name of anticolonialism and Arab nationalism than the U.S.S.R. could ever hope to achieve alone. Similarly, Indian leaders will continue to be the beneficiaries of Soviet largesse because of India's influence among the Afro-Asian nations and its strategic position in Asia. Moreover, the leaders of the Soviet Union apparently believe that well-conceived and effectively implemented Soviet aid programs will serve to bolster economically the newly achieved political independence of new states. Such aid also is expected to sever or disrupt the economic ties of less developed countries with the West and to encourage existing socialist predispositions toward more Soviet-oriented forms of economic and social organization.

Soviet willingness to establish official relations with the developing countries, however, could not of itself have proven successful unless such overtures were reciprocated. The leaders of many of the less developed countries, pushed by political aspirations or desires for rapid economic development, were receptive to the post-Stalin changes in Soviet policy and generally were prepared to accept assistance from any quarter. In addition to the general demand for developmental capital, receptivity to Soviet blandishments was enhanced by the unwillingness of many less developed countries to associate their new found independence with the foreign policy objectives of the West. The availability of Soviet aid enabled these countries to follow what

¹ All data in this study excludes Cuba, which is discussed in ch. III.

² For background discussion on this subject see, for example, Milton Kovner, "Soviet Aid Strategy in Developing Countries," ORBIS, fall 1964.

they considered to be neutralist policies in pursuit of their own objectives. Thus the political character of Soviet aid proved to be a "two headed" phenomenon with political considerations also playing an important—sometimes primary—role in the decisions of many countries to accept Soviet aid. The U.S.S.R. needed only to present itself as an additional source of political and economic support to find a number of willing recipients. Afghanistan, Egypt, India, and Indonesia, either seeking support for their economic development programs or for particular political goals, readily accepted Soviet assistance.

II. THE ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM

A. MAGNITUDE AND DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AID

Since 1954 the Soviet Union has extended more than \$5 billion in economic credits and grants to non-Communist less developed countries. Approximately 42 percent of the total of such economic assistance has been extended to countries in Asia and about 41 percent to Middle Eastern countries (see table 1). Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Republic received nearly two-thirds of total Soviet extensions; India and the United Arab Republic alone accounted for 40 percent.

TABLE 1.—Soviet economic aid extended to less developed countries, by area 1955-65

[In million U.S. dollars]

	Total	Africa	Asia	Latin America	Middle East
Total.....	5,030	729	2,125	115	2,061
1955.....	126	0	126	0	0
1956.....	243	0	223	0	20
1957.....	310	0	147	0	163
1958.....	415	0	37	100	278
1959.....	855	187	577	0	141
1960.....	594	69	255	0	270
1961.....	547	193	354	0	0
1962.....	53	24	27	0	2
1963.....	226	100	53	0	83
1964.....	998	208	262	0	530
1965.....	653	0	64	15	574

¹ Includes \$6 million in 1954.

While the Soviet economic aid program has grown to sizable magnitude over the years, this growth has not been constant and the annual level of new commitments has experienced periodic fluctuations. The program itself can be divided roughly into four important phases. The first period, 1955-57, was largely one of initial penetration, during which time the Soviet leadership probed for opportunities, traveled to much of Asia, and appeared to offer aid indiscriminately. It was a period in which the U.S.S.R. sought to manipulate the "neutralist spirit" which had emerged from the Bandung Conference of 1955. Both economic and military aid were used as a means of entree into Asia and the Middle East. Aggregate annual economic aid extensions were not very large, with Asia accounting for nearly three-fourths of total Soviet extensions.

During the years of the second stage, 1958-61, the magnitude and distribution of the Soviet aid program underwent its most rapid expansion. Nearly half of the total aid extended by the U.S.S.R. occurred during this period. Soviet extensions in 1959 totaling \$855 million represented a peak year in new Soviet aid commitments, a level not surpassed until 1964. About half of total extensions during these years were to Asian countries and nearly 30 percent to countries in the Middle East. Although the U.S.S.R. still continued to probe for opportunities to establish its presence in newly emergent countries, the character of the program changed.

The Soviet Union became willing to commit resources for the development programs of aid recipients and allocated more than \$1.8 billion for the development plans of Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iraq, and the United Arab Republic. India alone received pledges of nearly \$550 million for its third plan (1961-66). Soviet credits totaling \$500 million were provided for the United Arab Republic's first 5-year plan (1960-65)³ and the construction of the Aswan High Dam.

These years also witnessed the rapid development of Africa's contact with the Communist countries. About 55 percent of all Soviet aid to African countries was extended during this period, more than one-quarter in 1961 alone. The initial Soviet aid agreements with Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, the Somali Republic, and Tunisia were signed in these years.

The third stage began in mid-1961 with the Soviet aid program experiencing a sharp decline which was not arrested until late in 1963. New aid commitments declined sharply in 1962 and 1963. Soviet credit extensions dropped precipitously from \$547 million in 1961 to \$53 million in 1962, the lowest level since 1954. For the most part, the decline during these 2 years reflected the high level of earlier aid commitments. The three major recipients—Afghanistan, India, and the United Arab Republic—had only recently received sizable aid credits and were in the early stages of their respective 5-year plans. In addition, a spate of agreements with almost all receptive African countries had been concluded in 1961. In view of these new aid commitments, it is not surprising that the aggregate level of new extensions declined sharply.

The fourth phase emerged late in 1963 when Soviet economic aid extensions began to rise sharply again, reaching their highest annual total of nearly \$1 billion in 1964. This resurgence in new extensions was largely a result of the Soviet response to opportunities for further participation in the development programs of India and the United Arab Republic and to the increasing Chinese Communist challenge to Soviet influence among the Afro-Asian countries. About one-fifth of total Soviet credits in 1964 was extended to six African countries. Approximately two-thirds of new Soviet economic aid committed in 1964 was to the United Arab Republic and India for use during their next 5-year plans to begin in 1965 and 1966, respectively. The magni-

³ The U.S.S.R. extended a \$175 million industrial credit to Egypt in January 1960 for use in a 5-year industrialization program. This plan was subsequently incorporated into the United Arab Republic's first 5-year plan which began in July 1960. Little of the Soviet credit was utilized prior to that time.

tude of new aid extensions to these countries indicates the important role they continue to play in Soviet foreign policy.

Although new Soviet aid commitments in 1965 continued at a relatively high level, a post-Khrushchevian approach to aid may have emerged. It had been Khrushchev's style to extend large lines of credit while deriving as much propaganda benefit as possible from the extension. The new regime has taken a more cautious approach and appears unwilling to announce specific credits until cost surveys are completed. The aid finally committed appears to be project oriented in contrast to the umbrella-type lines of credit frequently extended in the past. India, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey are examples of countries in which Soviet technicians have undertaken extensive surveys during much of 1965. Prospective aid to these countries also reflects Soviet preference for such commitments to countries where the governments are relatively stable and offer prospects for absorbing Soviet aid at a satisfactory rate. During 1965 the U.S.S.R. did not extend a single credit to an African country. Nearly 85 percent of Soviet aid extensions in 1965 went to Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, all members of the Central Treaty Organization.

B. DRAWINGS ON SOVIET CREDITS AND GRANTS

While the annual level of Soviet extensions has reflected some sharp fluctuations, drawings on these credits have risen almost consistently, reaching an estimated total of approximately \$2 billion by the end of 1965.⁴ About 45 percent of all Soviet credits extended prior to 1965 have been drawn.⁵ Three countries—Afghanistan, India, and the United Arab Republic—account for three-fourths of expenditures under Soviet assistance. The fact that outlays for all other recipients account for only 25 percent of total drawings (although these countries account for 45 percent of total Soviet extensions prior to 1965) indicates the relatively poor progress of the Soviet aid program in these countries. A major cause for this lag in drawings lies in the relatively primitive and chaotic political and economic conditions existent in most of these countries. Many recipients have not even been able to devise any workable development program. Nearly all of these countries lack sufficient numbers of professional, managerial, and technical personnel required to carry out aid projects. Most countries are unable to provide adequate amounts of local currency to finance their shares of Soviet-aided projects. Since credits from the Soviet Union have covered only the goods and services not available locally, the rate of drawdowns on these credits is largely determined by the ability of recipient countries to meet the companion domestic costs. The Soviet Union generally has not shown any willingness to undertake any sizable commodity aid program to overcome this difficulty. Only about 5 percent of total Soviet aid has been for this purpose.

⁴ Drawings on Soviet economic aid are based largely on trade data presented in the Soviet Foreign Trade Handbook. Figures presented under category 16 (complete plants and installations), are a minimum estimate since it is believed that practically all such deliveries move under economic aid. A substantial amount of aid moves under other categories but it is not possible to precisely identify these exports.

⁵ Soviet extensions during 1965 are not included in the discussion on drawings as no large outlays on project-type undertakings could be expected in so short a period of time.

The relative success achieved by the Soviet Union in pushing forward its aid programs in India and the United Arab Republic, on the other hand, reflects the greater absorptive capacity of these two countries. They have been able to supply much of the technical skills required to implement aid projects. In Afghanistan, the relatively rapid rate of project construction can only be explained by a Soviet willingness to send in large numbers of professional, administrative, and technical personnel in conjunction with a commodity aid program to raise local currency for Soviet projects.

The acceleration of Soviet aid deliveries in recent years has influenced both the aggregate level of Soviet exports to the less developed countries and the commodity pattern of those exports. As the rate of aid expenditures has increased, the level of Soviet exports has grown (see table 2). Between 1955 and the end of 1964 Soviet deliveries of machinery and equipment (the category in which all of the aid goods are included) rose from 16 percent of total exports to the less developed countries in 1956 to a peak of 59 percent in 1964. Exports of complete plants and installations (almost all aid goods) rose from 4 to 38 percent during the same period.

TABLE 2.—Soviet exports to the less developed countries, 1956-64

[In million U.S. dollars]

	Total exports	Of which: Machinery and equipment		Percent of total exports	
		Total	Of which: Category 16	Machinery and equipment	Category 16
1956.....	180	24	8	16	4
1957.....	283	87	47	31	17
1958.....	389	160	112	41	29
1959.....	343	113	69	33	20
1960.....	346	126	69	36	20
1961.....	507	236	139	46	27
1962.....	598	265	163	50	32
1963.....	782	360	221	47	29
1964.....	778	460	296	59	38
Total, 1956-64.....	4,186	1,861	1,144	44	28

Source: Annual issues of "Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR (U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade)," published by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Moscow.

C. SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION

Soviet economic assistance is being provided for a variety of purposes and for important sectors of the economies of different less developed countries. The bulk of this aid has been channeled into the construction of basic industrial facilities and overhead investments. By the end of 1965, about 55 percent of total Soviet extensions had been allocated for industrial development, 20 percent for agricultural and major multipurpose projects, and nearly 15 percent for transportation and communications facilities. This pattern of Soviet obligations does not appear to have varied much over time. Between 1959 and 1964 the industrial sector, for example, accounted for 50-55 percent of total Soviet aid commitments. Those projects considered to have little economic priority, that is, a sports stadium

in Indonesia or a hotel in Guinea, account for only a small share of Soviet aid obligations. India is perhaps the only country where it can be said that Soviet aid truly concentrates on industrial development. India alone accounts for about 40 percent of Soviet commitments for industrial development and 45 percent of the total allocated to heavy industry.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the development of industry is an important aspect of its aid program. Through this device it seeks to preempt or replace private capital in industry by performing the same function. Communist doctrine holds that a less developed country is not truly independent unless it develops and owns its industrial sector. But while emphasizing the development of industry, Soviet spokesmen have been careful to consider the resources of aid recipients and their particular stages of development. Speaking before the delegates to the Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo in December 1957, the chief Soviet delegate stated " * * * the development of various branches of the manufacturing industry cannot be effected otherwise than by expanding agriculture and the extracting industry * * * it should be noted that agriculture and the extracting industry may become the basis for developing many other branches of the economy * * * "s

The criteria employed by the Soviet Union for selecting the sectors for concentration in any particular country are not easily determined. Generally, the country seeking aid will come forward with a list of projects included in its development plan, from which the Soviet Union will select the projects for which it will provide assistance. This pattern of selection has not changed over time. The U.S.S.R. apparently does not recommend the projects to be included in the country's development program. In a few instances, however, Soviet advisers assisted in the drawing up of development plans and may have influenced the selection of projects included.

There does appear to be a rough correspondence between the stage of development of a country receiving aid from the U.S.S.R. and the nature of that assistance. The Soviet Union does not ordinarily agree to undertake projects which it believes to be much beyond the technical competence of a less developed country. In India, where the human and physical substructure is sufficiently advanced to begin widening the industrial base, Soviet aid is concentrated on the expansion of heavy industrial and electric power capacity.

Afghanistan, at the opposite end of the development scale from India, is receiving aid of a different nature, with the greatest emphasis on infrastructural development. About half of Soviet aid to Afghanistan has been allocated for the construction of transportation facilities, much of it in areas which have been inaccessible to modern vehicles. Nearly 20 percent of total Soviet aid to Afghanistan has been obligated for the development of mineral resources and about 15 percent for the construction of multipurpose projects. Manufacturing units being aided by the Soviet Union are small and require simple skills for their operation. Approximately \$15 million have been allocated for constructing and equipping centers for

* Quoted in "Current Digest of the Soviet Press," Feb. 3, 1958.

training skilled and semi-skilled technicians. Soviet aid to African countries also is characterized by a great number and variety of small-scale projects. Such aid generally is in accord with the requirements of the recipient and is concentrated in multipurpose, transportation, agricultural, mineral, and light industrial projects.

D. ASSISTANCE FOR THE STATE SECTOR

Practically all Soviet economic assistance to the less developed countries is being channeled into the public sectors of these countries. Such aid has been made available for investment in undertakings in which the private sector traditionally had the dominant role. In countries where the larger share of investment in economic development is accounted for by the public sector, Soviet assistance, by virtue of its concentration in this sector, exerts a strong influence on the character and direction of economic development, particularly in the development of industry.

Perhaps more important, the Communists view such aid as enabling these countries to achieve economic independence from Western capitalism, maintaining that "Soviet credits above all promote the development of the state sector of the national economy which represents the strongest basis for the genuine independence of less developed countries."⁷ Furthermore, by supporting the development of the state sector—as well as encouraging the nationalization of foreign and domestic private investment—the Communists seek to destroy the economic ties these countries have with the industrial West and hasten the "inevitable crisis of capitalism" as markets and sources of raw materials are cut off. The Soviet Union has stressed that Communist economic relations with the less developed countries "noticeably constricts the sphere of the world capitalist market * * * and expands the sphere of activities of the world socialist market."⁸

The U.S.S.R. does not seek specifically to assist the less developed countries in achieving a high rate of economic growth. Soviet leaders in fact do not believe that these countries can attain a satisfactory rate of growth without adopting the Communist road to development. But while waiting for the "inevitable" failures the U.S.S.R. is encouraging the development of institutional forms which can readily assist in the "transition to socialism." Industrialization and expansion of the state sector are viewed as a step toward the gradual adoption of the Communist model. Moreover, emphasis on industrialization appeals strongly to the newly emerging elite and thus provides an opportunity for propagandizing the Soviet economic model. Industrialization also is expected to transform the institutional structure of these countries and destroy the traditional pattern of their economic ties with the industrial West.

In the United Arab Republic and India, Soviet aid has enabled the public sectors, especially in industry, to expand to an extent unlikely in the absence of Communist assistance. Soviet economic aid to the United Arab Republic not only has contributed substantially to the

⁷ V. Rymlov, "Soviet Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 9, 1960.

⁸ G. Kim, "The Coexistence of Two Systems and Economically Underdeveloped Countries of the East," *Contemporary East* (Moscow), No. 11, 1960.

public sector's expansion but also has made it easier for Nasser to pursue specific domestic policies designed to eliminate Western influence. Nationalization of foreign and domestic private investments in Egypt and agrarian reform did much to sever the close ties between foreign capital and the small groups of wealthy landowners, industrialists, and financiers who controlled the Egyptian economy. In these moves the U.S.S.R. cooperated willingly. Soviet capital, for example, was substituted for Western private investment, further severing the ties of domestic business elements with Western firms.

Communist expenditures during India's second 5-year plan (1956-61) accounted for about 20 percent of public investment in the industrial sector and represents almost one-fourth of total public investment in industry planned for the third plan. A sizable part of Communist aid to India has been allocated for such traditional preserves of private investment as petroleum and pharmaceuticals. The U.S.S.R., with Rumanian participation, has dominated petroleum development in the public sector and has constructed the only state-owned petroleum refineries in India. Soviet assistance is being employed to establish a pharmaceutical industry in India, one which will be competitive with private, particularly foreign-owned, interests.

E. REPAYMENT OF SOVIET CREDITS

By the end of 1965 an estimated \$400 million in principal and interest was scheduled to have been repaid on the \$2 billion in obligations incurred by the less developed countries under Soviet economic assistance programs. Most of these repayments have taken place during the past four years and are expected to become larger during the next few years. Such payments to the U.S.S.R. rose from an estimated \$30 million in 1961 to \$125 million in 1964 and are expected to continue rising for the rest of the decade.

The magnitude of these prospective repayments indicates that even if Soviet economic assistance to less development countries rises in the next few years, the burden on the U.S.S.R. of such outlays will be partially offset by this growing level of repayments. In recent years the ratio of annual repayments to annual drawdowns on Soviet credits has shown an upward trend, rising from 15 percent in 1960 to 40 percent in 1965. This trend is likely to continue during the next few years as debt servicing payments accelerate at a faster rate than Soviet economic aid expenditures.

As repayments of Soviet economic aid credits have fallen due, some aid recipients have been hard put to meet their obligations. For some developing countries, sizable repayments in the form of commodities often preempt a large share of their chief sources of foreign exchange. Such diversions of primary commodity exports—as well as payments required in foreign exchange—are particularly burdensome where recipient countries must simultaneously make payments for military debt obligations and for economic assistance from other donors.

In the long run the problem of repayment is likely to be compounded by two factors tending to retard the rapid development of export capabilities of aid recipients. The willingness of the Soviet Union to accept traditional commodities as payment for its aid itself inhibits

the expansion of new export capabilities. Many of the goods which will be produced by newly established industries are not likely to find outlets in Western markets. If the U.S.S.R. does not accept such goods in payment, default on debts owed to them will become widespread since the production of traditional commodities is not likely to expand rapidly enough to keep pace with the growth in debt servicing requirements.

More important, perhaps, is the fact that the development plans of most less developed countries undertaking industrialization programs emphasize import substitution rather than export expansion. As such facilities are expanded, imports are expected to decline while exports continue to rise. During the planning for its first 5-year plan, for example, the United Arab Republic expected its exports to rise from about \$480 to \$655 million in 1965 while imports were expected to decline from \$690 to \$615 million over the same period. In 1964 United Arab Republic exports totaled about \$540 million while imports rocketed to \$955 million.

What generally is overlooked is that the development of import substitution facilities in itself tends to cause a rise in import requirements relative to export capabilities and subsequently to a chronic balance-of-payments problem. Not only does the establishment of new industries require investment with a high import content, but any industrial activity, particularly in less developed countries, requires the use of nonindigenous materials; e.g., fuel, replacement parts, etc. Moreover, the new activity also generates an increase in incomes, a portion of which is spent on imported goods and services. These pressures have become particularly serious in such countries as India and the United Arab Republic. As the Soviet Union becomes more involved in the development programs of many recipient countries and assumes the role of a major creditor, the question of what form repayment shall take will become increasingly serious. One common solution will have to be the stretching out of repayment over much longer periods than the current 12 years.

F. CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The impact of Soviet economic assistance on the economic development of recipient countries still is difficult to assess because the implementation of the program did not really gain momentum until a few years ago. In most recipient countries, Soviet expenditures have not been particularly large, even where developmental credits have been available for as long as 10 years. In many of these countries (ranging from Guinea to Ceylon to Indonesia) no foreign donors have been successful in generating forces sufficient to initiate the growth process.

In only three countries—Afghanistan, India, and the United Arab Republic—do Soviet aid expenditures appear to have contributed to a sizable increase in productive capacity. The extent of this contribution, however, is difficult to determine, primarily because of the lack of reliable investment and production statistics. Soviet investment through its aid program is most significant in the case of Afghanistan. During the latter's first 5-year plan (1956-61), about one-third of total gross investment in Afghanistan was represented by Soviet expenditures. Such capital outlays are expected to cover half of total

Afghan investment during the second plan (1962-67). Soviet outlays represented more than 40 percent of a total of \$490 million invested in Afghanistan during the period 1956-63.

The amount of Soviet aid actually disbursed in the United Arab Republic by the end of 1965 is estimated to have been more than \$300 million. During the United Arab Republic's first 5 year plan (1960-65) drawings on Soviet economic credits were equal to about 10 percent of gross investment and accounted for about one-fourth of aggregate United Arab Republic investment in industry, electric power, and the Aswan High Dam. United Arab Republic officials claim that during this period, national income generated by the industrial sector increased about 45 percent and the sector's share of national income rose from 20 to 22 percent.

Although Soviet aid represented only about 10 percent of the foreign aid allocated for industrial development during India's second 5-year plan, it accounted for nearly 40 percent of the assistance provided to the public sector. Soviet expenditures during the second plan totaled about \$160 million, almost entirely for the construction of the Bhilai steel mill. These outlays represented about 15 percent of total aid expenditures in the industrial sector and 5 percent of total industrial investment during the plan.

Soviet participation in India's industrialization program during the third plan is extensive. Such assistance is particularly important for the construction of facilities to produce heavy electrical and machine building equipment, development of the petroleum industry, and expansion of steel and coal production and thermal electric power capacity. The machine building plant the Soviet Union is constructing at Ranchi with an annual capacity of 80,000 tons is expected to provide the bulk of the equipment required for the expansion of India's steel industry. By March 1966 the Soviet contribution to the total increase in the capacity created during Indian's three plans was expected to be about 25 percent in the steel industry; machine tools, 20 percent; petroleum refining, 20 percent;* electric power, 15 percent; and heavy machine building and coal mining machinery, 100 percent.

G. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND ACADEMIC TRAINING

The desire of the less developed countries for rapid economic development has resulted in programs that require substantial infusions of professional and technical skills. The range of skills required for such undertakings include not only skilled workers to operate industrial machinery and equipment but also individuals who possess the ability to determine the activities that shall be pursued, the techniques to be employed, and the most efficient use of available resources. In view of the paucity of these skills in less developed countries, an important part of all external economic assistance is a parallel program of technical assistance to provide a minimum amount of these requisite skills. Some technical skills can be acquired quickly through short-range training programs. Others require many years of training and experience and must be imported until professional and technical

* The contribution will jump to about 65 percent by the end of 1966.

personnel in the aid-receiving country can be trained abroad or at home to satisfy this need.

The people who guide the Soviet foreign aid programs fully realize that technical assistance and academic training must be important components of their aid activities in less developed countries. Between 1955 and the end of 1965, at least 50,000 Soviet economic technicians have been employed in less developed countries. During the same period more than 20,000 students and technical trainees have undertaken training at facilities in the Soviet Union.

1. Soviet technicians abroad

As the pace of the Soviet economic aid program has quickened, the numbers of technicians sent to the less developed countries have grown rapidly. In 1956 there were about 800 Soviet technicians engaged in economic aid programs; in 1960, there were nearly 4,000; and during 1965, about 9,500. Nearly 80 percent of the total number of Soviet technicians who have been employed in recipient countries have been sent since 1960.

Approximately 45 percent of all Soviet economic technicians have been employed in Asian countries; and more than one-third in the Middle East. In recent years, the number of Soviet technical personnel engaged in economic aid activities in Africa has risen sharply, reflecting the general increase in Soviet aid activities in that continent.

For the most part, the services of Soviet technicians are dispensed within the framework of the major lines of credit extended for economic development projects and, consequently, resemble the technical services made available by Western private enterprise. Initial project surveys and studies, supervision of construction projects, on-the-job training and, in some cases, management of the completed installation generally comprise the assistance provided by Soviet technical personnel. The total foreign exchange outlays for the services of these technicians between 1956 and the end of 1965 is estimated at about \$300 million, about 15 percent of total drawings on Soviet economic aid credits.

The foreign exchange costs of the services of Soviet technicians usually include their salaries; round trip plane fare, often first class, between the U.S.S.R. and the host country; leave accumulated at a rate of about three days per month; round trip fare of the technician to spend his leave in the U.S.S.R.; and life insurance premiums. If the period of employment is more than a year, the technician may be accompanied by his family. In that event, the recipient country must pay their round trip fares and a family transfer allowance. In addition to the foreign exchange costs, the host country also is responsible for much of the maintenance costs of the technician. These local currency costs include free medical care and hospitalization, office and laboratory accommodations, transportation for official business in the host country, and furnished quarters for the technician and his family.¹⁰

Technical services costs are relatively large during the initial survey stages but decline as the projects move into the construction phases.

¹⁰ For sample agreements with such details see, for example, Klaus Billerbeck, "Soviet Bloc Foreign Aid to the Underdeveloped Countries." (Hamburg: Hamburg Archives of World Economy, 1960).

This generally has been the pattern with expenditures on Soviet projects. With the acceleration of drawings after 1960, total aid outlays per technician are estimated to have risen from about \$25,000 to \$45,000 in 1965, indicating a more rapid rise in expenditures on capital goods relative to technical services.

Although in the aggregate the ratio of technical services costs to capital goods outlays has followed the anticipated downward trend, for some countries the level of such expenditures has continued at a high level. This is particularly true of those countries in which the number of indigenous personnel with the requisite professional and technical skills is the smallest. In many countries outlays for technical assistance have accounted for 25 to 30 percent of total drawings on Soviet credits to these countries. The inability of such aid recipients to provide sufficient managerial and technical personnel for Soviet aid projects has necessitated employing large numbers of costly Communist technicians. This problem is exacerbated by the narrowness of specialization of Soviet technicians (an outgrowth of the highly specialized Communist educational system) which necessitates the employment of larger numbers of technicians for each project than would be required on projects constructed by Western firms.

The administrative inexperience of officials in recipient countries has posed additional obstacles to the rapid construction of projects and has tended to increase the employment period of Soviet technicians. The reluctance of the Soviet Union to assume complete administrative responsibility for an aid project has resulted in frequent—and costly—work stoppages and delays. Soviet aid organizations are, as a rule, responsible only for coordinating the work of all technicians employed on a project, directing basic construction activities, supervising the installation of machinery and equipment, and putting this equipment into operation according to established schedules. The authorities of the recipient countries and their agencies, on the other hand, are responsible for all work involving the use of domestic goods and services. They are responsible for the presentation of basic data for the preparation of a given project, for site preparation, the hiring of labor, the purchase of local materials, and the direct organization of construction work.

In recent years there has been an increase in the number of Soviet technical personnel not connected with specific economic aid projects. These technicians are engaged in managerial, educational, medical, economic planning, agricultural, and other activities. Although Soviet personnel have undertaken such nonproject activities in recipient countries since 1955, their numbers were quite small until 1961. In recent years, however, Soviet technicians engaged in nonproject activities have grown rapidly. Assistance of this type apparently is not provided on credit but is handled as a current account transaction.

Most nonproject technicians have been sent to those countries with the greatest need for technical personnel, particularly in Africa. To a large extent, this trend reflects the Soviet concern over the large backlog of undrawn credits in these countries and the recognition that a greater general training effort is required merely to provide sufficient skilled workers to participate in Soviet aid projects. This form of assistance also enables the Soviet Union to rapidly expand its presence

in these countries, particularly in areas of a country in which there are no Soviet construction projects.

2. *Technical training*

(a) *In the U.S.S.R.*—A major objective of Soviet technical assistance programs is to transmit to the local population those technical skills needed to insure that its aid projects are successfully completed. One important form of assistance consists of technical training programs in the U.S.S.R. for persons who will be employed as supervisors, managers, foremen, and skilled technicians on Soviet-aided projects being constructed in the recipient country. This type of training generally consists of 6 to 12 month programs, except for highly specialized training which may run for as much as 3 years.

The number of technical trainees sent to the U.S.S.R. has risen with the expansion of the Soviet aid program. Beginning with approximately 125 trainees from India and the United Arab Republic in 1956, the U.S.S.R. by the end of 1965 had provided some technical training for about 7,000 trainees from less developed countries; about 75 percent of the total have received their training since 1960. Most of these trainees were trained for employment on Soviet industrial projects. About 85 percent of all trainees have been from countries in Asia and the Middle East.

(b) *In Less Developed Countries.*—Among other technical training techniques employed by the Soviet Union is the construction of technical institutes and vocational training centers in the less developed countries. These institutes and centers are staffed largely with Soviet instructors and use Soviet training equipment. The curriculum of the institutes generally includes courses in engineering, agriculture, mining, and industrial production and is designed to produce highly skilled professional and technical personnel. The capacity of these institutes ranges from 250 in Cambodia to 1,100 in Burma.

The establishment of vocational training centers is part of most of the major aid programs undertaken by the Soviet Union. These centers offer training in most industrial and agricultural skills required below the supervisory levels. For example, four centers under construction in Ghana will accommodate 5,000 to 6,000 trainees annually and will include training in the the repair of agricultural machinery and mining equipment. In the United Arab Republic 20 training centers which can train about 4,000 workers during one training session have been constructed under the \$175 million credit extended by the U.S.S.R. in 1958.

The most important way of transferring simple technical skills to large numbers of workers is through on-the-job training programs. In addition to group training, the usual practice is to have a worker assigned to each Soviet technician employed on a construction project. By the time the project is completed the trainee presumably is able to perform the same function satisfactorily. The U.S.S.R., for example, provided such training to about 5,000 Indian engineers, technicians, and skilled workers during the construction of the Bhilai steel mill. Indian officials claim that as a result of this type of training Indian technical personnel subsequently were able to participate in all stages of construction of the second blast furnace and to take over completely the work on the third blast furnace.

Where such on-the-job training techniques are feasible the impact tends to be favorable for the U.S.S.R. Indian officials, for example, have stated that this aid technique has the advantage of leaving the Indians with the feeling of having participated in the construction of a project. One official claims that, in contrast to the steel plants built by Western firms, at the Soviet-built Bhilai steel mill " * * * the morale of the Indian participants was extraordinarily high. They were enormously proud of the relatively good record that the work at Bhilai had made * * * they had gained so much inservice training and experience during the project's planning and construction phases that they were thoroughly confident of their ability to move to an entirely Indian operation of the plant in a very short order."¹¹ Furthermore, "Aid given for specific industrial or other projects should, as far as possible, not take the 'turnkey' form as this * * * deprives the recipient country of the experience acquired in actual construction and initial operation * * *."¹² Such situations, however, are not universal and are more likely to occur in such countries as India and the United Arab Republic, where the labor force already has a sizable component of skilled technicians. In most countries receiving Soviet aid the participant approach is apt to founder on the low level of technical competence of the domestic labor force.

3. *Academic training*

An important program for establishing and maintaining contact with the emerging elite in many less-developed countries is the provision of scholarships for academic study in the Soviet Union. Since 1955 an estimated 13,500 students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America have undertaken such programs in Soviet academic institutions. About half of all students have come from African countries, largely since 1961. At least one special university—the Peoples' Friendship University (Patrice Lumumba) in Moscow has been established as an academic center solely for foreign students.

The costs of this training generally are borne by the U.S.S.R. in the form of scholarship aid. Among the costs generally covered by these scholarships are transportation to and from the student's homeland, tuition, medical care, clothing, and housing. In addition, each student is provided with a personal allowance, which at Peoples' Friendship University is about 90 rubles or \$100 monthly.

Since the peak year of 1962, when more than 3,400 students initiated academic programs, the number of new enrollees has declined each year with an estimated 1,300 students entering the Soviet Union in 1965. To some extent this decline may be attributed to a more stringent selection process, not only as a means of raising the academic standards of the program but also to counter the growing volume of reported dissatisfaction by Soviet nationals with the presence of these students. Another factor may be the increasing student dissatisfaction with the conditions under which academic programs must be pursued; for example, inadequate facilities and financial assistance, racial discrimination, and political indoctrination. The Soviet Union also may have

¹¹ John P. Lewis, "Quiet Crisis in India. Economic Development and American Policy," (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1962), p. 297.

¹² V.K.R.V. Ras and Dharm Narain, "Foreign Aid and India's Economic Development" (Bombay: Institute of Economic Growth, 1963), p. 95.

reached the point where continued large increments can no longer be accommodated with existing school and housing facilities.

III. SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO CUBA

Cuba is the only less developed country to have "joined" the socialist camp since the inception of the Soviet aid program. But the Cuban decision did not represent a Soviet policy success; Cuba fell into the Soviet Union's lap. Soviet aid, however, has prevented Cuba from sliding into an economic collapse.

Since early 1960 the Soviet Union has extended nearly \$1.1 billion in economic aid to Cuba. About 70 percent of Soviet aid has consisted of balance-of-payments assistance to cover the annual deficits in the bilateral clearing account of the two countries (see table 3). Since 1960 such credits have totaled an estimated \$735 million.¹³ Cuba's economic aid debt to the U.S.S.R., exclusive of any military aid obligations, now totals about \$900 million.

TABLE 3.—Cuban trade with the U.S.S.R., 1961-65

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Cuban exports.....	300	220	165	275	310
Cuban imports.....	290	410	460	410	440
Trade balance.....	+10	-190	-295	-135	-130
Clearing balance ¹	-10	-210	-315	-155	-150

¹ Trade balance plus hard currency payments for sugar totaling about \$20 million annually.

Source: Periodic Issues of "Commerce Exterior (Foreign Commerce)," Havana.

In addition to balance-of-payments assistance, the Soviet Union also has extended about \$345 million in economic development credits to Cuba. Approximately \$150 million has been drawn on these credits, largely for industrial development. A minimum of 15,000 Soviet technicians are estimated to have been employed in Cuba on economic aid activities. About 2,500 such technical personnel were present at the end of 1965, largely engaged in agricultural, industrial, and geological exploration activities. In addition, approximately 4,500 Cuban students currently are enrolled in Soviet academic institutions.

IV. THE MILITARY AID PROGRAM

Perhaps the most dynamic aspect of the Soviet aid effort in the less developed countries has been its military assistance program. The U.S.S.R., apparently reluctant to be openly identified with these arms agreements, initially employed other East European countries as intermediaries. Thus Czechoslovakia concluded the first arms agreement with Egypt in 1955 and with Syria and Yemen in 1956, and Czechoslovakia and Poland signed the early agreements with Indonesia in 1958.

¹³ The total deficit amounted to about \$840 million. Cuban exports, however, included about \$45 million to cover payments for the services of Soviet technicians. Cuban imports also included about \$150 million in goods under long-term Soviet economic development credits. After allowing for these adjustments, the net imbalance totaled \$735 million.

Since the inception of the military aid program in 1955, the U.S.S.R. has provided about \$4 billion worth of military assistance to 16 less developed countries. The major recipients have been Indonesia and the United Arab Republic, each having obtained more than \$1 billion worth of military equipment. Other important recipients have been India, Iraq, and Syria. Within the framework of military assistance agreements the recipient countries have purchased a wide range of land armaments and air force and naval equipment. Included in these inventories are such weapons systems as MIG jet fighters, jet light and medium bombers, a light cruiser, submarines, destroyers, surface-to-surface antitank missiles, and surface-to-air missiles.

A. POLITICAL IMPACT

Soviet military assistance to the less developed countries has been the primary vehicle for achieving a position of influence in some regions vital to Western interests and has had an immediate impact on regional balances of power. In the guise of an advocate of national aspirations, generally anti-Western in character, the U.S.S.R. has exploited regional or local conflicts for the broad political objective of diminishing Western influence in strategic free world areas. Arab-Israeli tensions, Yemen's conflict with the United Kingdom over Aden, Afghanistan's border dispute with Pakistan, and Indonesia's territorial conflict with the Netherlands and, more recently Malaysia, are all examples of prime opportunities exploited by the Soviet Union.

Assistance of this kind, coming as it does during periods in which the recipient is caught up in political turmoil, establishes a donor-donee rapport which provides a basis for expanding other political and economic ties with Communist countries. Thus, in some cases, Soviet credits for economic development have followed soon after the signing of arms agreements. As the recipient becomes further entangled in the web of Soviet accommodation and as its inventory of Soviet arms increases, a large degree of dependence on the U.S.S.R. is created for spare parts, ammunition, and the like. A recipient government's political survival may well depend upon Soviet willingness to continue its program.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the immediate political impact of large-scale arms purchases from the U.S.S.R. is represented by the Middle East. Such agreements provided the primary entree for the U.S.S.R. into that area and preceded economic aid agreements with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The first arms agreement signed with a less developed country was concluded between Czechoslovakia and Egypt in September 1955. This agreement, totaling \$250 million, opened the door to other Soviet activities in the area, decreased the strategic value of the newly created Baghdad Pact, and set off a chain of events which included Western refusal to construct the Aswan high dam and Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal. Egyptian willingness to conclude such an agreement stemmed largely from Egypt's obvious weakness vis-a-vis Israel and Iraq—a recent adherent to the Baghdad Pact—which brought into question the loyalty of the Egyptian officer corps and threatened the survival of the Nasser regime.

Because the Soviet military aid program is motivated primarily by political considerations and responds to available opportunities, it is difficult to determine any significant trends in the flow of such assistance. During the years of 1955 to 1958 military aid commitments were sizable because of the initial major agreements with Middle Eastern countries and Indonesia. New large-scale agreements presumably were concluded in 1960 and 1961 as Indonesia's dispute with the Netherlands over West Irian intensified. A high level of new Soviet commitments also occurred during the 2 years covering mid-1962 to mid-1964, influenced largely by Sino-Indian tensions, civil war in Yemen and the United Arab Republic's commitment to the republican government in that country, and the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia.

One other factor influences the level of new military aid extensions in certain years—replacement of obsolete and depreciated equipment. The most obvious examples are the periodic replacement of the various generations of fighter aircraft (Mig-15's and 17's with 19's and 21's), greater emphasis on procurement of the Tu-16 medium jet bomber after initial purchases of the Il-28 light jet bomber, and more widespread use of the T-54 tanks as compared with less advanced and lighter T-34 tanks. Such cycles will continue as an important feature in the Soviet program, not only because recipient countries continually clamor for more advanced arms but as each generation of weapons become obsolete for Soviet requirements the U.S.S.R. discontinues its manufacture. In time, replacement parts become scarce and a country that has received a large and varied inventory of Soviet arms must accept the more advanced equipment coming off Soviet production lines.

B. ECONOMIC IMPACT

The desire of many less developed countries to develop modern military establishments has diverted a large share of scarce resources from their economic development programs and frequently has caused internal economic dislocation and financial distress. These problems are particularly severe in those countries receiving Soviet arms since these purchases must be paid for through commodity shipments and hard currency payments.

An immediate result of a large arms purchase agreement that permits repayment in commodities is a major shift of the recipient's trade toward the Communist countries. This was particularly true, for example, of the initial Czech and Soviet agreements with Egypt during 1955-57. Owing to the immediate repayments required, Egypt's exports to the Soviet bloc rose from about 10 percent of its total exports in 1954 to nearly 30 percent in 1956 and 40 percent in 1958. Exports of cotton to Czechoslovakia alone jumped from 247,000 cantars¹⁴ during the 1954-55 cotton marketing year (September-August) to 1.2 million cantars in the 1955-56 marketing year. Shipments to the U.S.S.R. rose from 265,000 cantars in 1955-56 to 1.1 million cantars in 1956-57. By 1957 more than half of Egyptian cotton exports were being shipped to the Soviet bloc and by 1959 these countries purchased more than 60 percent of Egyptian exports of cotton.

¹⁴ 1 cantar equals 99.05 pounds.

Some reorientation in the pattern of Egyptian cotton exports probably would have occurred even if Soviet arms were not purchased. A sharp decline in Western purchases of Egyptian cotton during the 1954-55 season, the general worldwide increase in cotton production, and frequent fluctuations in cotton prices had already convinced the Egyptians that additional markets would have to be developed in order to stabilize cotton export earnings. As early as March 1955 President Nasser already had indicated that sales in Soviet bloc markets offered the best prospects for such stabilization.¹⁵ Although increased Czech and Soviet purchases in 1955 and 1956 reflected the implementation of this decision, the severity and rapidity of the geographic shift of Egyptian cotton exports can only be accounted for by the payments for Soviet arms. At no time since the 1955-56 season have cotton exports to this market dropped below 50 percent of the total and it appears that the United Arab Republic has accepted this share as the minimum to be exported to the Communist countries.

The decline in exports to the West and repayments of Soviet military credits in foreign exchange have made it much harder for recipient countries to carry out economic development programs. Foreign exchange earnings that could have been used to import machinery and equipment have been dissipated in long-term repayment obligations for military hardware. United Arab Republic payments currently run at least \$20 million annually.¹⁶ Moreover, arms debt repayments have become a financial burden which some recipients find difficult to carry. In Syria, for example, large outlays for defense expenditures in 1957 resulted in a financial crisis which necessitated curtailment of many development projects and caused Syria to default on its first payment to Czechoslovakia. The latter finally agreed to ease the period of repayment. In 1964 Indonesia requested a moratorium on payments due to the U.S.S.R.

C. MILITARY-TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The rapid influx into the less developed countries of large quantities of modern complex military equipment has demanded military skills that either are in short supply or nonexistent in these countries. This lack of skilled military manpower has posed more serious problems than a similar human resources gap in the economic sector because of the rapid rate at which military equipment has been delivered. The manpower base in these countries has been unable to supply in a short period of time enough men capable of being trained to command, operate, and maintain the modernized military establishments. The acceptance of military personnel for training at Soviet military installations and the dispatch of large numbers of Soviet military technicians to less developed countries subsequently have proved to be important elements of the Soviet military assistance program.

The largest part of the Soviet military technical assistance program consists of training military personnel from less developed countries at military installations in the U.S.S.R. By the end of 1965, as many as 18,000 trainees may have received such training. In addition to

¹⁵ Charles D. Cremeans, "The Arabs and the World" (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 144-45.

¹⁶ "Egyptian Mail" (Cairo), Jan. 1, 1966.

training provided on specific weapons systems, many trainees enroll at such Soviet higher military schools as the Frunze Military Academy of the General Staff. Indonesia and the United Arab Republic undoubtedly have accounted for the bulk of all military trainees sent to the U.S.S.R.

Soviet military technicians in the less developed countries generally are engaged in delivering, assembling, and maintaining military equipment; training military personnel in tactics and in the operation and maintenance of equipment; and serving as advisers to staff and line military officers. It is estimated that a minimum of 15,000 military technicians may have been employed in the countries receiving Soviet arms, largely in Indonesia and the United Arab Republic. During the period of initial arms deliveries to recipient countries the immediate need is for technicians to assemble the equipment received and to train local personnel in its use and maintenance. Although most of these technicians do not remain longer than is necessary to fulfill their initial functions, some are required to remain for extended periods to service the more intricate equipment.

The major functions of the military technicians, however, have been to train local personnel and to serve as military advisers. For the larger aid recipients, courses generally are established in the use of the entire range of armaments, from rifles to aircraft to naval craft. Soviet officers also serve as instructors in the major military academies of these countries. In their advisory capacities, Soviet military officers have played key roles in modernizing and reorganizing the military establishments of the countries receiving sizable amounts of Soviet assistance. Often they are assigned to line units to assist in planning and conducting training exercises in the tactical use of the new military equipment.

V. THE BALANCE SHEET—SUCCESSSES AND FAILURES

The continuing high level of economic aid extensions suggests that the results of the Soviet politico-economic offensive are satisfactory to the Soviet leadership which succeeded Khrushchev, particularly when viewed against the relatively small amount of resources involved. With its economic and military assistance the U.S.S.R. has established a strong presence across the belt of less developed countries ranging from Cuba to Indonesia, changing the previously prevailing Soviet image from a menacing scowl to an almost benevolent smile. It also has broadened what used to be an exceedingly narrow base of communications between the U.S.S.R. and the developing countries whose emergence is now regarded by the Soviet Union as being of decisive significance to the future course of world history.

Through the aid mechanism, the U.S.S.R. has insinuated men, materials, and ideas into less developed countries and impinged on the hitherto almost exclusive Western political and economic predominance in these areas. By its willingness to undertake such major projects as the Aswan High Dam in the United Arab Republic and the Bhilai steel mill in India, the U.S.S.R. has done much to enhance its prestige. It has sought, and not without some success, to convince the new states that it would be safe and advantageous for them to invest their economic future with the U.S.S.R., both as a source of

industrial equipment and as a "model" for economic development. Furthermore, it has created the basis for lasting rapport and contact which, the Soviet Union hopes, will open a wide spectrum of opportunities: opportunities to participate in the economic life of an aid recipient; opportunities to influence the direction of economic development; opportunities to influence a recipient's foreign policy.

Soviet support of nationalist movements in many less developed countries has been an important factor in weakening, or eliminating, Western political and economic influence in such diverse areas as Indonesia, the Middle East, and Cuba. In pursuing this objective, the U.S.S.R. has capitalized on the already strong anti-Western proclivities of many of the new governments and has encouraged many nationalist leaders to adopt measures hostile to Western economic interests in their countries. Without the alternative source of political, military, and economic support which the Communists represent, the new leaders would have been reluctant to initiate actions which could provoke Western retaliation or lead to a loss of Western assistance. Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal and Sukarno's belligerent and adamant policy toward Dutch New Guinea, for example, were almost certainly encouraged by knowledge of Soviet support, both actual and potential.

In other areas, Soviet political backing, and to a lesser extent real and promised economic support to the state sector, have encouraged the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises. The Soviet regime has found in many of the emerging countries a leadership already sympathetic to the idea that rapid economic development can occur only through a high degree of governmental participation and control and has attempted to channel this predilection for centralized economic control into specific Communist institutional forms. Under advice from Soviet technicians a number of countries have established Soviet-type state farms, planning commissions, foreign trade monopolies, and industrial organizations.

But along with the obvious short run successes of the offensive, there have been some notable failures. From the practical standpoint of carrying out economic aid programs the Communists have encountered frequent difficulties that have done little to enhance their objectives. For many aid recipients the phase of actual project implementation has proved much less glamorous than the initial announcements of large-scale lines of credit. Many officials in less developed countries have chafed because the rapid conclusion of an aid agreement is not followed by rapid implementation of that agreement, primarily because time-consuming surveys and feasibility studies must be undertaken before construction work can begin. Nor have the Communists come up with a magic formula for overcoming the institutional, human, and economic obstacles in these countries that hamper any aid donor.

The Soviet Union has compounded its difficulties in finishing projects by refusing to assume complete responsibility for the projects, insisting that they furnish only the materials, equipment, and technical guidance. Because of this unwillingness to assume administrative responsibilities, the Soviet Union exercises inadequate control over projects with which they are identified. The resultant inefficient imple-

mentation and subsequent delays tend to discredit Soviet performance. In Guinea, for example, the general inability of Guinean officials to maintain a steady flow of local labor and materials to jobsites caused numerous delays and extended periods of inactivity, for which the Soviet Union was blamed. In order to overcome this difficulty, the U.S.S.R. agreed in June 1963 to assume this responsibility and set up a special organization in Guinea to handle these functions.

As for long-range objectives, the decline in Western influence in the emerging nations has not necessarily led to a corresponding rise in Soviet influence. The new governments generally have converted their anticolonialist energies into strongly assertive nationalist policies rather than one distinctly pro-Soviet. The surge of nationalism has also led to various regional movements, such as pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism, which the Soviet Union has viewed as incompatible with its long-range interests in the area. During his visit to the United Arab Republic in May 1964, an irritated Nikita Khrushchev criticized Arab nationalism and stated that "It would be wrong to set the unity of all the revolutionary forces of the world against any grouping of forces by color of skin or religious conviction * * *. The Arab worker, Arab peasants, and Arab intellectuals should unite against exploitation. You will find a place in this union for the Russians, a place, too, for other people, not for the sake of nationalism."¹⁷

Particularly distressing to the Soviet leadership has been the inability of regimes which they have viewed with favor to remain in power, in spite of relatively sizable amounts of Soviet assistance. Not only have such leaders with pro-Soviet tendencies as Kassem, Ben Bella, and Nkrumah fallen, but the Soviet Union has had to bear the onus of its close association with them as well as to accept the reverse swing of the foreign policy pendulum initiated by the elements which engineered the coups. Perhaps even more galling to the Soviet leadership has been the inability to prevent some of the largest beneficiaries of its economic and military assistance from periodically attacking the Soviet Union (Nasser) or pursuing a foreign policy course favorable to Communist China (Sukarno).

The offensive also has failed to gain any appreciable number of adherents to Communist ideology, either among the new national leadership or among the masses. Most of the present leaders in the Afro-Asian States are committed to carrying out a "Socialist" political and economic transformation of their countries, but each declares his own intention to develop a national brand of socialism, and each states his determination not to merge his nation's identity in the larger cause of communism. Khrushchev voiced Soviet disappointment over this trend in his bitter remarks about those national leaders who "call themselves Socialists," but who have no understanding of what "scientific" socialism really means.¹⁸ The negligible Communist ideological impact on the masses of the less developed world is due in part to the strongly traditionalist character of the less developed societies and in part to the necessary restrictions on the range of Communist activities.

¹⁷ Khrushchev's speech at Aswan on May 17, 1964; quoted in "The Current Digest of the Soviet Press," June 10, 1964.

¹⁸ Khrushchev's speech in Sofia on May 19, 1962; quoted in "The Current Digest of the Soviet Press," June 13, 1962.

It is in this context that the programs of technical and academic assistance assume a key role in Soviet long-range strategy. The political elite in the developing nations are searching for their own ideology and institutions and the Communists seek to influence this development. In this connection, the Communists believe that the growth of a state-controlled sector in some of the young countries, assisted by the absence of a strong bourgeoisie, the disillusionment with capitalist efforts to promote economic development, and the assumed advantages of Socialist methods for carrying out development programs at a rapid pace, could encourage a gradual transition to a "non-capitalistic" form of development. As a result of their propaganda, the Communist countries have scored an important semantic victory in getting many people in developing areas to associate "colonialism" and "capitalism" with only their bad features or their failures.

Important returns unquestionably have accrued to the Soviet Union from its technical and academic assistance programs. The Western monopoly in these fields has been broken and many individuals in the less developed countries exposed to ideas, techniques, and material formerly known only to a few. Through military, technical, and academic training programs and the use of its technical personnel, the Soviet Union has established important relationships with individuals who in the future may hold key positions in their countries. Despite the larger number of students from less developed countries studying in the West, the new elite in many countries is becoming increasingly Soviet trained with little or no contact with Western society.

There are, of course, short-run practical considerations inherent in the dispensation of Soviet technical assistance. The Soviet Union has the desire to see its aid program implemented as expeditiously as possible. Difficulties, delays, and inefficient use of equipment in the field, regardless of fault, often tarnish the image and prestige of the aid donor. The U.S.S.R. has sought to avoid these situations by providing the bulk of professional and technical skills required for their own developmental projects and military training programs and by teaching similar skills to local personnel.

The Soviet technical assistance program, however, has not been without its difficulties. The contact of aid recipients with Soviet technicians and Soviet society has generated mixed feelings toward Communist institutions and techniques. Although Soviet technicians frequently have been praised for accepting difficult working conditions, performing creditably, and steering clear of proselytizing activities, an increasing number of countries are concerned over the financial burden represented by these technical personnel. Where indigenous personnel have had contact with Western methods and technicians, the Soviet performance often is deprecated for the large numbers of Soviet technicians required to undertake a project. And even though large numbers of people have been trained at high cost, the lack of skilled personnel continues to be a major problem.

The number of students who have succumbed to Communist indoctrination efforts cannot be ascertained but the growth of an ever increasing pool of Communist assets ready to assume official positions at opportune moments cannot be doubted. Even though blatant indoctrination courses have been discontinued after official protests, mere

exposure to the Communist environment for extended periods often leads to a subtle form of indoctrination. During their long stay in the U.S.S.R. many students undoubtedly become adherents of Marxism-Leninism and many establish lasting professional and personal ties with Soviet students and officials, often expressing gratitude for being trained for career opportunities that probably would not be possible without Soviet assistance.

But there are also those individuals who have become disillusioned as a result of their contacts with Soviet society or with the educational programs offered at Soviet academic institutions. Individuals who have had training in the Soviet Union have registered numerous complaints about language difficulties, poor living conditions, severe security restrictions, indoctrination efforts, lack of contact with the populace, and racial problems. When voiced in their own countries, such criticism tends to affect adversely the image of Communist society which the Soviet Union seeks to create.

VI. OUTLOOK FOR THE SOVIET AID PROGRAM

The aid program undoubtedly will remain a major element in Soviet policy toward the less developed countries and can be expected to follow its present pattern for some time. New extensions of economic aid will rise or fall in response to changing Soviet estimates of its own short-run economic capabilities, on the capacity of prospective recipients to absorb additional Soviet aid, and on the Soviet assessment of the likely impact of such aid. The U.S.S.R. will take care to preserve political prestige and advantages already won and is unlikely to curtail significantly a program which has proven to be one of Moscow's most effective weapons in its struggle for influence in Asia and Africa, both in competition with the West and with Communist China.

From the point of view of Soviet aid recipients, such assistance has served many of their political and economic objectives. For some countries, economic assistance from the Soviet Union has become an important source of investment for their long-term development plans; and they have not been slow to appreciate the bargaining leverage that the existence of another aid donor has given them in playing off one source of funds against another. Also, the Soviet Union is prepared to make long-term aid commitments and to deal "painlessly" with the transfer problem, i.e., to accept repayment in the form of the commodities of the recipient countries and, on occasion, to relieve them of burdensome surpluses. Even countries closely allied with the West, e.g., Iran and Turkey, have begun to look to the U.S.S.R. for capital and to purchase that part of their crops which cannot be sold in the West.

The U.S.S.R. will continue to place heavy emphasis on military assistance because of the immediate political effects of such aid and the greater degree of dependence it generates. Military assistance, in particular, has at various times since 1955 encouraged some recipients, e.g., Afghanistan, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen, to assume more aggressive postures toward neighboring countries. The leaders of such countries have been more willing to pursue policies hostile to the West, knowing that any resulting sanctions can be at least partially offset by aid from the Soviet Union.

The demands from the less developed countries for military aid from all external sources is likely to increase and the U.S.S.R. will continue to be willing to assist. Although some countries have received Soviet military assistance for 10 years, they remain plagued by a chronic need for skilled personnel. The problem will be compounded as increasingly complex military equipment is supplied by the U.S.S.R. and as new recipients come into the picture.

Over the next few years, the Soviet Union probably will continue to pursue its current recruitment of large numbers of academic students. For their part, the less developed countries apparently intend to continue sending large numbers of students to the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries. The willingness of the Soviet Union to extend academic training on a scholarship basis is a benefit that these countries cannot afford to turn down. For the individual, the offer of an "all expenses paid" education may represent his only chance for an advanced education.

Economic malaise, political instability, and the rising radical influences in many less developed countries should widen the opportunities for the Soviet aid program. In many countries the Western-oriented political elite has been compelled by newly emergent political forces to permit the Communist countries to play a role in the development process or in building national security forces. These leaders will come under even greater pressure as a host of worrisome problems persist and expectations of social and economic progress dwindle. Even though political and social conditions may make it difficult for the Communists to make ideological headway, the inevitably slow pace of evolutionary change will enable the Communists to associate themselves with pressures for radical change. And more and more of these radical forces are setting the tone of their countries' foreign policies. Attacks on foreign and domestic private investment and continuing balance-of-payments difficulties will tend to limit sources of assistance for economic development programs and increase the attractiveness of Soviet economic aid.

But the ability of the Soviet Union to seize these opportunities to expand its influence through an economic aid program will be circumscribed by the total demand on the U.S.S.R.'s limited economic resources. The Soviet Union cannot launch a major effort in an area such as Latin America without sharply curtailing aid activities elsewhere. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. will continue to be highly selective in deciding which countries will receive sizable amounts of its economic assistance. Moreover, the efforts of the Soviet Union to project itself as a model for economic growth will be impeded by its own internal economic problems, particularly the inability to solve its domestic agricultural problems.

TABLE 4.—Soviet economic aid extended to less-developed countries, 1954-65

	Millions of U.S. dollars		Millions of U.S. dollars
Total.....	5,080	Ghana.....	89
India.....	1,022	Greece.....	84
United Arab Republic.....	1,011	Guinea.....	70
Afghanistan.....	552	Somali Republic.....	57
Indonesia.....	372	Mali.....	55
Iran.....	330	Kenya.....	44
Algeria.....	230	Ceylon.....	30
Turkey.....	210	Tunisia.....	28
Iraq.....	184	Sudan.....	22
Syria.....	150	Cambodia.....	21
Argentina.....	115	Nepal.....	20
Ethiopia.....	102	Uganda.....	16
Pakistan.....	94	Burma.....	14
Yemen.....	92	Congo (Brazzaville).....	9
		Senegal.....	7

NOTE ON SOURCES


Much of the detail contained in this study is drawn from numerous official and nonofficial publications available to the public. A primary source of information concerning aid extensions, drawings on credits, technical assistance, and military aid is the annual reviews of the Communist aid programs published by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the U.S. Department of State. The last of the series, "The Communist Economic Offensive Through 1964," was published in June 1965. The current issue was in draft when this study was written and was not available for public dissemination.

Official publications of many less developed countries also have been invaluable sources. Particularly important publications used for discussions pertaining to specific countries were the periodic reports of the Afghanistan Ministry of Planning, "Survey of Progress"; the quarterly Economic Bulletin of the National Bank of Egypt; and the Indian Ministry of Finance annual publications, "External Assistance" and "Economic Survey."

**A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT
SOVIET MONOGRAPHS**

BY

MURRAY FESHBACH



SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT SOVIET MONOGRAPHS

This bibliography is limited primarily to monographs which have been received by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, in the fields of Soviet economics, labor force, and population. With several exceptions, the selection is restricted to those monographs which have appeared since 1959. Entries marked with an asterisk (*) have been added to the original bibliography appearing in Joint Economic Committee, *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, 1962, pages 671-688 and the subsequent committee reports, *Annual Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R.*, 1964, pages 145-171, and *Current Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R.*, 1965, pp. 181-217. Relatively few purely technical books are included, and statistical handbooks are omitted entirely.

The bibliography is arranged according to subject and branch of the national economy. The subject listing is in alphabetical order, whereas the branch listing approximates the sequence used in Soviet statistical handbooks. Each entry appears only once in either the subject or the branch classification. A list of cross-references has been added at the end of each classification group. The arrangement within the subject listing and the branch listing is as follows:

SUBJECT LISTING

Background
Capital Investment
Communist Party
Cooperatives
Cost of Production
Economy—General
Geography, Urbanization, Location of Industry
Input-Output, Linear Programming, Mathematical Methods
International Comparisons
Labor
Law
Level of Living, Consumption
National Income, State Budget, Taxes
Planning
Population and Vital Statistics
Prices
Regional Economy
Social Insurance, Social Security
Sociology
Statistics, Accounting, Mechanized Data Processing
Trade Unions
Wages

BRANCH LISTING

Industry—General
 Electric Power
 Fuels
 Metallurgy
 Machine-Building and Metalworking
 Chemical
 Construction Materials
 Logging, Woodworking, and Paper
 Light
 Food

Construction
 Agriculture
 Forestry
 Transportation—General
 Railroad
 Automotive
 Sea
 River
 Air

Communications
 Trade and Material-Technical Supply
 Housing-Communal Economy
 Public Health
 Education
 Science and Scientific Services
 Banking
 Government
 Armed Forces
 Other

SUBJECT LISTING

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APPENDIXES



**APPENDIX I. PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE
ECONOMY OF THE U.S.S.R. IN 1965**

NOTE.—Detailed official statistical data on the national economy for each given year are usually published in the U.S.S.R. during the late months of the following year in the annual volume titled "Narodnoe khoziaistvo S.S.S.R. v * * * godu." Prior to that date, however, the Soviet Government regularly publishes in the central press a brief official communication containing selected economic data and production figures designed to provide a preliminary report on the state of the national economy during the preceding year.

The following four tables are based on the latest official communication in this series which appeared in the Pravda for February 3, 1966, under the heading: "On the Results of the Fulfillment of the State Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1965."

INDUSTRY

Commodity	Unit	1965	Percent of 1964
Electric power.....	Billion kilowatt-hours.....	507.0	110.0
Steel.....	Million metric tons.....	91.0	107.0
Iron ore.....	do.....	153.0	111.0
Petroleum, crude.....	do.....	243.0	109.0
Coal.....	do.....	578.0	104.0
Cement.....	do.....	72.4	111.0
Timber, hauled.....	Million cubic meters.....	258.0	99.0
Paper.....	Million metric tons.....	3.4	112.0
Turbines.....	Million kilowatts.....	14.6	110.0
Machine tools, metal cutting.....	Thousand units.....	185.0	100.4
Machine tools, metal forming.....	do.....	34.4	100.0
Metallurgical equipment.....	Thousand metric tons.....	243.0	100.8
Petroleum equipment.....	do.....	140.0	100.0
Chemical equipment.....	Million rubles.....	384.0	112.0
Weaving looms.....	Thousand units.....	24.8	98.0
Autos and trucks.....	do.....	616.0	102.0
Tractors.....	do.....	355.0	108.0
Farm machinery.....	Million rubles.....	1,431.0	103.0
Excavators.....	Thousand units.....	21.6	107.0
Fertilizers, mineral.....	Million metric tons.....	31.3	122.0
Manmade fibers.....	Thousand metric tons.....	407.0	113.0
Soda, caustic.....	do.....	1,303.0	113.0
Soda ash.....	Thousand metric tons.....	2,900.0	105.0
Sulfuric acid.....	do.....	8,518.0	111.0
Automobile tires.....	Million units.....	28.4	109.0
Fabrics:			
Cotton.....	Million square meters.....	5,504.0	102.0
Wool.....	do.....	466.0	99.0
Linen.....	do.....	547.0	100.7
Silk.....	do.....	796.0	96.0
Shoes, leather.....	Million pairs.....	484.0	102.0
Watches and clocks.....	Million units.....	30.6	107.0
Radio sets.....	do.....	6.2	108.0
Television sets.....	do.....	3.7	125.0
Refrigerators.....	Thousand units.....	1,675.0	148.0
Washing machines.....	do.....	3,400.0	120.0
Meat, factory produced only.....	Million metric tons.....	5.2	125.0
Fish catch.....	do.....	8.7	112.0
Butter.....	Thousand metric tons.....	1,184.0	124.0
Cheese.....	do.....	283.0	113.0
Whole milk products.....	Million metric tons.....	11.7	112.0
Granulated sugar, beet.....	do.....	8.9	127.0
Vegetable oils.....	do.....	2.7	124.0
Soap.....	do.....	1.9	103.0
Canned goods.....	Billion standard cans.....	7.0	94.0

AGRICULTURE

	Unit	1965	Percent of 1964
PRODUCTION			
Grain.....	Million metric tons.....	120.5	79
Meat, slaughtered weight.....	do.....	9.6	116
Milk.....	do.....	72.4	114
Eggs.....	Billion.....	29.0	109
Wool.....	Thousand metric tons.....	356.0	104
LIVESTOCK NUMBERS (END OF YEAR)			
Large-horned cattle.....	Million heads.....	93.4	107
Cows.....	do.....	40.1	104
Hogs.....	do.....	59.5	113
Sheep and goats.....	do.....	135.3	104
Sheep.....	do.....	129.8	104

TRANSPORT

	Unit	1965	Percent of 1964
FREIGHT CARRIED			
Railroad.....	Billion ton-kilometers.....	1,948.0	106
River (common carrier).....	do.....	134.0	108
Sea.....	do.....	387.0	130
Truck (common carrier).....	do.....	42.0	109
Oil pipeline.....	do.....	147.0	131
FREIGHT ORIGINATED			
Railroad.....	Million metric tons.....	2,401.0	106
River (common carrier).....	do.....	269.0	107
Sea.....	do.....	119.0	108
Truck.....	do.....	2,353.0	106
Oil pipelines.....	do.....	226.0	106

OTHER ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Population (end of year).....	Million.....	232.0	101
Workers and employees.....	do.....	76.9	105
Labor productivity:			
In industry.....	Percent.....		105
In construction.....	do.....		106
Retail trade.....	Billion rubles.....	104.6	109
Foreign trade turnover.....	do.....	14.6	104
Capital investment (State).....	do.....	37.2	107
New housing.....	Million square meters.....	77.9	104
Do.....	Number of apartments (thousands).....	2,197.0	101
Number of enrolled students:			
Elementary (8 years).....	Thousand.....	40,006.0	101
Secondary (9-11 years) general.....	do.....	7,976.0	116
Secondary, specialized.....	do.....	3,669.0	110
Higher education.....	do.....	3,859.0	107

APPENDIX II.—PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES IN THE U.S.S.R.
AND UNITED STATES—1965

	Unit	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R. as percent of United States
Electric power.....	Billion kilowatt-hours.....			
Total output.....	do.....	507	1,220	41.6
Total transmitted.....	do.....	472	1,157	40.8
Total used in industry.....	do.....	351	560	62.7
Petroleum, crude.....	Million metric tons.....	243	385	63.1
Gas.....	Billion cubic meters.....	129	450	28.7
Coal.....	Million metric tons.....			
Gross tonnage.....	do.....	578	475	121.7
Hard coal tonnage.....	do.....	505	474	106.5
Steel.....	do.....	91.0	121	75.2
Fertilizers.....	do.....			
In terms of nutrient.....	do.....	7.4	11	67.3
In terms of conventional units.....	do.....	31.3	50	62.6
Sulfuric acid (in monohydrate).....	do.....	8.5	22	38.6
Chemical fibers.....	Thousand metric tons.....	407	1,500	27.1
Lumber, including rail ties.....	Million cubic meters.....	115	83.5	137.7
Cement.....	Million metric tons.....	72.4	65.4	110.7
Autos and trucks.....	Thousands.....	616	11,113	5.6
Trucks, including buses.....	do.....	415	1,777	23.4
Passenger automobiles.....	do.....	201	9,336	2.2

Source: SSSR v tsifrakh v 1965 godu. p. 38-40, 59.

APPENDIX III.—RECENT DATA ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET RETAIL
TRADE

TABLE 1.—The development of Soviet retail trade

[Billions of current rubles]

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Total volume of retail trade (state and cooperative stores) including public dining.....	67.7	71.9	78.6	81.1	87.3	91.7	96.4	104.6
Volume of public dining.....	6.4	6.4	7.0	7.4	8.0	8.8	9.6	(¹)
Total volume of CFM sales.....	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.8	4.0	3.7
Inventories in retail trade (end of year).....	14.8	17.4	18.2	20.2	21.5	23.4	25.7	(¹)
Number of retail stores (thousands).....	519.3	542.7	587.3	587.5	603.4	616.1	632.4	(¹)
Number of public dining establishments (thousands).....	130.9	137.7	147.2	155.4	163.1	169.9	180.6	(¹)
Indexes of physical volume (1958=100):								
Retail trade.....	100	108	119	123	131	137	145	159
Public dining.....	100		111			130	142	150
Share of the market (current prices):								
State stores.....	65.2	65.7	66.7	66.9	67.3	67.8	68.0	(¹)
Cooperatives.....	29.2	29.2	28.8	28.5	28.4	28.4	28.1	(¹)
Collective farm market.....	5.6	5.1	4.5	4.6	4.3	3.8	3.9	(¹)

¹ Not available.Data are based on information from the following publications of the TsSU USSR: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 godu*, pp. 629, 636, and 708, *Nkh. 1960*, pp. 511, 516, 516 and 540, *Nkh. 1961*, pp. 621-625, and *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1965 godu*, pp. 144 and 146.

TABLE 2.—U.S.S.R.'s structure of retail trade

(Millions of 1958 rubles)

	1958 ¹	1960	1962	1963	1964	1965
All goods.....	67,720	79,165	88,713	93,115	97,855	107,743
Foods.....	36,958	43,426	48,341	51,593	54,550	59,133
Meat products.....	3,604	4,862	4,959	5,406	5,435	6,138
Fish products.....	1,207	1,317	1,456	1,580	1,837	1,911
Butter.....	1,469	1,639	1,692	1,645	1,810	1,898
Vegetable oils.....	595	659	738	777	913	913
Milk and milk products (including cheese).....	1,687	2,207	2,428	2,539	2,830	3,192
Eggs.....	290	355	501	510	550	753
Sugar.....	3,069	3,594	4,275	4,723	4,613	4,843
Flour and bread.....	7,063	7,536	8,172	8,094	8,067	8,172
Confectionery.....	2,626	2,973	3,369	3,716	4,136	4,136
Nonfood goods.....	30,762	37,222	40,329	41,406	43,282	48,673
Cotton cloth.....	2,215	2,388	2,042	1,956	1,907	1,894
Woolen cloth.....	1,366	1,627	1,382	1,257	1,244	1,429
Silk.....	1,808	1,784	1,821	1,804	1,723	2,005
Linen.....	230	253	215	208	210	256
Clothing and underwear.....	5,582	7,084	8,178	8,194	8,373	9,434
Knitwear.....	1,497	1,874	2,163	2,332	2,566	3,001
Leather shoes.....	2,309	2,732	3,200	3,283	3,483	3,810
Furniture.....	1,075	1,636	2,182	2,500	2,598	2,806
Radios.....	494	608	568	618	651	696
Watches.....	481	545	549	481	467	518
Sewing machines.....	212	255	208	184	(²)	(²)

¹ Nkh. 64 p. 629-30 moved forward by indexes of volume of sales for each good from *Sovetskaya torgovlya*, Moscow, 1964, p. 29 and *SSR v. tsifrah 1965*, pp. 147-48.

² Not available.

TABLE 3.—United States and U.S.S.R.: Per capita consumption by major components, 1955-64

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Food products:										
U.S. (1955=100).....	100	102	102	99	100	100	99	101	101	103
U.S.S.R. (1955=100).....	100	104	108	110	112	113	115	119	118	119
U.S.S.R. as a percent of United States.....	46	47	49	51	52	52	53	54	54	53
Nonfood products:										
U.S. (1955=100).....	100	98	99	95	102	103	102	108	111	117
U.S.S.R. (1955=100).....	100	107	110	118	125	132	136	140	141	143
U.S.S.R. as a percent of United States.....	11	12	12	14	14	14	15	14	14	13
Services (excluding health and education):										
U.S. (1955=100).....	100	107	105	107	109	115	114	117	120	123
U.S.S.R. (1955=100).....	100	105	111	118	125	133	139	148	155	163
U.S.S.R. as a percent of United States.....	13	13	14	14	15	15	16	16	17	17
Health and education:										
U.S. (1955=100).....	100	105	108	114	119	123	125	129	133	138
U.S.S.R. (1955=100).....	100	104	109	111	115	121	127	130	137	143
U.S.S.R. as a percent of United States.....	52	51	53	50	50	51	53	53	54	54

Sources: U.S. indexes—based on data from the Department of Commerce (ER 66-6 p. 44); U.S.S.R. indexes—those used in "Recent Trends in Consumption and Personal Income in the U.S.S.R.," U.S.S.R. as a percent of the United States—1955 from CIA "A Comparison of Consumption in the U.S.S.R. and the United States"; January 1964, p. 15. The remaining years are derived by moving the 1955 ratio with the per capita indexes presented here

$$\frac{\text{U.S.S.R. 1956}}{\text{U.S. 1956}} \times R_{1955} = R_{1956}$$

APPENDIX IV. ON IMPROVING MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY, PERFECTING PLANNING AND ECONOMIC STIMULATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

[Speech* by A. N. Kosygin, Member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.]

Comrades, the Presidium of the Central Committee is submitting for discussion at this plenary meeting proposals for improving the planned guidance of industry and organization of industrial management. This is a most important problem the solution of which is imperatively demanded by the practice of Communist construction in our country.

The October (1964) plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee has initiated a new approach to the essential problems of national economy based on a profound analysis and all-around consideration of the objective laws of economic development. The party, drawing on the historic experience of socialist construction in our country and the experience gained by the entire world Socialist community, is gaining an ever deeper knowledge of the essence of economic relations in our society, in order properly to utilize the economic laws and tremendous creative potentialities.

The Soviet Union is on the threshold of a new 5-year plan. We have to make a big stride forward along the road of economic development and considerably to raise living standards. The Presidium of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers hold that a series of measures have to be taken to improve planning and industrial management and economic stimulation of production, in order to cope with the new tasks in developing industry—the basis of the entire national economy—and to create conditions making for higher rates of technical and economic progress.

Correct solution of these problems is of tremendous political and practical significance. It will be no exaggeration to say that the successful completion of the program of building the material and technical basis of communism, further improvement of the people's well-being and the strengthening of the defense capacity of our country will largely depend on how effectively they will be solved.

The issues involved in improving planned guidance of industry have been extensively and lively discussed for a number of years by party workers and economists, scientists and our press. Many useful proposals have been made.

The basic measures which are being submitted for consideration by this plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, have been comprehensively discussed by managements, party workers, economists and other workers of many industrial enterprises in Moscow, Leningrad, Volgograd, Minsk and other cities, by scientists and experts from planning and economic organizations. They were also considered by the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics, the state planning committee of the U.S.S.R., the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, Ministries, state committees and departments. The fundamental propositions of the draft have met with universal approval.

*Pravda, Sept. 28, 1965.

1. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND NEW DEMANDS DEVOLVING ON MANAGEMENT

Comrades, our industry is developing on the sound and firm foundation of socialist production relations. A considerable increase in industrial output has been achieved in the course of the 7-year plan; the structure of production has improved; the most progressive branches are advancing at a faster rate. Ever new areas, and especially areas in the east of the country, are being drawn into industrial development.

In the course of the 7-year plan, which will be completed this year, the overall volume of industrial production will grow by 84 percent instead of the 80 percent envisaged by the plan. Generation of electric power has more than doubled, from 235,000 million kilowatt-hours in 1958 to 509,000 million kilowatt-hours in 1965.

Steel output is to increase from 55 million to 91 million tons, which is much more than the aggregate steel output in Britain, France, and the FRG put together. Oil production will rise this year to 242 million tons compared with 113 million tons in 1958, and natural gas output will total some 130,000 million cubic meters as against 30,000 million cubic meters in 1958. The 2.4-fold increase in the output of engineering and metalworking industries and the nearly 2.5-fold increase in the output of the chemical industry are an important result of the 7-year plan. Output in light and food industries increased 50 percent.

More than 5,500 major industrial enterprises have been built and put into operation in the course of the 7 years. Fixed assets in the national economy have increased by 90 percent, and in industry by 100 percent. This means that in the course of the 7-year plan we shall have put into operation the amount of fixed assets in industry equal in value to that of the assets it disposed of in 1958 as a result of all previous development.

The technical standard of Soviet industry is rising. This is expressed in a constant growth and renewal of fixed assets, an increased amount of power per worker, launching of new branches of production, development and introduction of the most modern highly productive equipment, mechanization and the automation of production processes. Thus the amount of power per worker in industry has increased over 50 percent in the past 7 years.

The share of electric power engineering, metalworking and chemical industries; i.e., the industries which underlie technical progress in the entire national economy, is steadily growing in the total production volume. In the course of the 7 years this share has increased from 27 to 35 percent.

Our science and technology have outstanding achievements to their credit which have earned them worldwide recognition, and are in the lead in a number of important areas of world scientific and technological progress. The splendid achievements of our country in space exploration are well known. Broad opportunities are opening up for using sputniks and rockets to improve communications, weather forecasting and navigation. The Soviet Union is in the forefront of world progress in nuclear physics and nucleonics.

Major successes have been achieved in the sphere of electrification, in the design of the world's biggest hydroturbogenerators, thermal turbines, and in transmitting electricity over long distances.

Soviet science has made a major contribution to the development of quantum generators. Achievements in physics and chemistry have provided broad opportunities for evolving new effective methods of processing materials. Tangible progress has been made in increasing the hardness and durability of many structural materials. Industrial production has been organized of artificial diamond crystals, used as abrasive materials. Important achievements have also been registered in other branches of science and technology.

Under the influence of technological progress new branches of production are constantly being launched and developed; they are springing forth from the old branches of industry, and specialization is steadily growing. A step forward has been made in creating a number of specialized branches, such as the manufacture of spare parts, castings, forgings and other items of general use in industry.

In the course of the 7-year plan, a number of major measures has been implemented to improve the well-being of the people. Working hours have been cut, average wages have grown, wage taxes have either been abolished or reduced for a substantial section of factory and office workers and pensions have been introduced for collective farmers. The assortment of goods available on the home market has substantially expanded, and the supply of consumer goods to the population has improved. Housing construction is conducted on a large scale.

All that is the result of the creative effort of our glorious working class, engineers, technicians, and scientists, the result of the extensive organizational and political work carried out among the masses by the party, Government, trade union, and Komsomol organization.

But to be able to visualize more clearly the tasks of securing a further advance of socialist industry, we have to take into account a number of factors characterizing the present stage of development of social production.

The scale of production, the volume of capital investments, and the value of the fixed assets have grown immensely. Economic ties have expanded considerably and become more complex.

The pace of scientific and technological progress has quickened, and prompt industrial application of the latest results of science and technology has become a must.

The present-day scientific and technical revolution advances to the fore such problems as technical standards, quality, reliability, and effective use of goods. It is precisely these factors that are today in the focus of the peaceful economic competition between the socialist and capitalist countries.

We must make tremendous accumulations for capital investment and at the same time secure a considerable improvement in the material well-being of the people. This poses the very important problem of expanding the sources of economic growth.

Thus raising the efficiency of social production to the utmost, saving live and materialized labor, and considerably and steadily increasing returns from capital investments and fixed assets becomes a prime and central task.

Of great importance, in this connection, is intensification of the struggle against all manner of mismanagement, wastefulness, and unproductive spending. We still have considerable overstaffing and

unnecessary overheads in our managerial apparatus. We must instill strict order and rigid economy in this field.

It is not at all a matter of indifference to society by what effort and at what price results are obtained, what the efficiency is, not only at each enterprise but also of each individual worker.

Rational and economical management in all branches of the national economy without exception, and first of all in industry, is acquiring decisive importance at the present stage of development of the Soviet economy, science, technology, and culture.

And how do matters stand with raising efficiency of production and productivity of social labor?

In order correctly to assess the state of industrial production, it is necessary clearly to see not only the successes achieved but also the shortcomings and difficulties we have, as well as the still unresolved problems facing industry.

It should be said that in recent years the national income and industrial output calculated per ruble of the fixed assets' worth has somewhat declined. The rate of growth of labor productivity in industry, which is also an important index of the efficiency of social production, has slowed down somewhat in recent years. We can and must remedy this state of affairs in the near future.

It must be said that our learned economists are doing very little in the way of analyzing the effectiveness of social production and of working out ways of increasing it.

The tremendous socioeconomic advantage of our country must be utilized so as to secure the necessary rate of growth of the national income, an increase in output per ruble of fixed assets and a steady rise in labor productivity.

The higher the national income, the more means can be allocated for the development of production and for raising the well-being of the people. We must, therefore, strive to achieve steadily growing returns from each ruble invested in the fixed assets.

Because the fixed assets are not yet adequately utilized we have to invest heavily with a view to creating new production facilities. This cannot but affect the distribution of the national income and the size of the share allocated for popular consumption.

One of the most important problems is to increase in the next few years the share of the national income spent on consumption. The absolute volume of capital investments, however, must also grow steadily. We have the opportunities to do this. All we need is to use them rationally. This calls for constantly improving the use of the tremendous and ever-growing production capacities created by the labor of the people, and increasing the productivity of social labor.

We must admit that the advantages and potentialities offered by the socialist system of economy are still far from being utilized in full. Although our industry is developing successfully and on the whole is overfulfilling the targets of the 7-year plan, we are not satisfied with the results achieved, especially in such branches as the light, food, chemical, timber, and paper industries and in the building materials industry.

We are aware, comrades, that in the not-too-distant past quite a few errors were committed in planning, and a thoughtless, voluntaristic

approach prevailed in solving important economic problems. This led to the upsetting of the necessary proportions between the different branches of economy. For a long time we have not had the necessary correlation between the development of agriculture and the development of industry. The lag in agriculture has resulted in a slowing down of the rates of development in industry, and especially in the branches producing consumer goods.

The March plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee considered in detail the reasons for the lag, and evolved concrete measures to step up the development of all the branches of agricultural production. We must say outright that it was only the March plenary meeting which mapped out effective measures to do away with that imbalance. Consistent implementation of the measures adopted has already yielded practical results.

An incorrect proportion has developed between industry of group "A" and group "B". For a number of years now the "B" group has lagged behind in its development. This lag has been due not only to the fact that the plans themselves envisaged inadequate rates of growth for the group "B" branches but also to the fact that even those plan targets have been systematically underfulfilled.

The lag in agriculture and group "B" industries has created a certain discrepancy between the production of consumer goods and the production of the means of production. This could not fail to influence the rate of growth of the real incomes of the population and the level of material incentives. Elimination of this lag by raising the efficiency of the whole of social production is the principal task today.

Some negative phenomena in the national economy have arisen also as a result of underfulfillment of plans in certain branches of heavy industry, mainly in putting new capacities into operation. This has caused difficulties in the supply of raw materials and semifinished goods, as has happened, for example, in the chemical industry.

There are serious shortcomings in capital construction: often the time limits set for putting new capacities into operation are not observed, the cost of the enterprises put into operation exceeds the planned cost, and considerable state funds do not bring in the expected returns for a long time.

In present-day conditions, with technology developing at a fast rate, slowness in building enterprises means that the equipment installed becomes technically obsolete even before the plant becomes operational.

To a great extent the major drawbacks in capital construction are due to the unsatisfactory standard of planning. Inflated plans for capital construction result in funds being scattered over many projects, creating financial and material difficulties, and causing damage to the national economy.

The U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee must play the main role in introducing order into the system of capital construction planning. The Planning Committee must, in drafting plans, adhere strictly to the correct correlation between financial and material resources and the volume of capital construction, no matter what pressure is brought to bear on it by Government departments and local organizations. We must firmly and consistently follow this principle in our plan for 1966, which will greatly accelerate the development of our economy and cut down on the amount of incomplete capital-construction work.

It is necessary to reconsider the very system of planning capital construction. The performance of construction organizations must be gaged not on the basis of how much money they have spent but by their output, i.e., by the enterprises and housing actually made available.

A radical improvement in capital construction calls for the implementation of many measures in the sphere of financing, for the improvement of mutual cost-accounting relations between the contracting organizations and their clients, for better designing and quantity-surveying of the projects and better construction work as such. We must begin evolving such measures now so that later we will be able to consider all the problems of organization and planning of capital construction thoroughly and comprehensively.

Lower output per rouble of fixed assets is largely due to the fact that bringing the new project to full-capacity operation takes too long a time. The planned output indexes for new enterprises are in a number of cases reached over 4 years or even longer. New production capacities are being realized particularly unsatisfactorily in the chemical, iron and steel, building materials, and pulp and paper industries. More often than not this is the result of putting incomplete sets of plans into operation at new enterprises, and of errors and mistakes in design and the technological processes. Poor organization of the supply of raw materials to new plants and inadequate training the personnel for their exploitation also tell here.

The Kuibyshev, Volzhski and Efremov synthetic rubber plants, for example, where capacities for producing new types of synthetic rubber have been created, lag seriously in utilizing these new capacities. Our national economy, therefore, is not getting all the synthetic rubber it needs—and our needs for this commodity are very great. The capacities which have been made available for the manufacture of double superphosphates are also being put to poor use. Thus, of the production capacity commissioned in 1963 at the Voskresensk chemical plant only 17 percent is being used, and of the capacities put into operation in 1964 at the Volkhov aluminum plant, 32 percent.

Faster mastery of new capacities is a fundamental issue of scientific and engineering progress.

At present, industry has entered upon a stage of development where rates of growth are increasingly determined by technological progress and the speed with which scientific achievements are introduced into the production process. But we have serious shortcomings in this sphere would tend to affect adversely the rates of growth of industrial production and the technical retooling of many enterprises.

The reasons for the slow introduction of scientific achievements derive, on the one hand, from the inadequacy for practical purposes of a number of scientific projects, and, on the other hand from the slowness with which industry masters the highly effective technological processes, machinery and materials which have been evolved by science. Permit me to cite a number of examples.

Several years ago, and for the first time in the world, our scientists developed a highly effective method of working metals with liquids under great pressure. The method makes it possible to work metals—even those which it is hard to reshape—with great precision, improve their properties, decrease production premises, simplify the techno-

logical equipment and work metals at high speeds. Production of high-pressure equipment had to be organized in order to secure widespread introduction of the new method. This however, has not been done to this day.

Several years ago our scientists evolved fundamentally new and highly efficient transistorized electric current converters. These converters, as compared with the old mechanical or mercury rectifiers, are of higher efficiency and smaller in size. Despite all their advantages our industry is lagging inexcusably in developing their production on a broad scale.

Over 5 years ago, Soviet scientists evolved a method of producing polypropylene, a highly effective structural material. Polypropylene can be used to manufacture pipes, fixtures, and parts of machines resistant to chemically aggressive media, parts for radio- and power-engineering industries, film products for industrial, agricultural, and domestic purpose, and very durable fibers. The first plant in our country for producing polypropylene was to have been put into operation in December 1964. However, the Moscow City Economic Council and the State Committee for the Chemical Industry failed to put it into operation by the specific date.

The plans for research work and the introduction of achievements of science and engineering into production processes are regularly underfulfilled. The situation is especially unsatisfactory in designing and launching mass production of new plant. Complex mechanization and automation of production is introduced too slowly, and efficacy of a number of automation measures is very low. New technologies are not finding proper place in production.

The pattern of output of machinery and equipment by many branches does not conform to modern standards. Up to now, for example, precision casting machines and forging and pressing equipment account for a very insignificant share of the total output of metalworking equipment.

We should considerably expand the output of modern types of machinery and equipment. Above all we must increase the output of forging and pressing equipment, machines for precision casting, machine tools and plant for working metals with the help of electro-physical, electrochemical, and other highly productive methods.

In vigorously developing our engineering industry we must make wider use of the achievements of engineering abroad.

The quality of our goods must compare favorably with the best international standards. To this end we must strengthen technological and production discipline in all enterprises and raise overall production efficiency, so that we are able genuinely to satisfy our own needs and the needs of our export trade.

Rational use of manpower resources is of great importance in attaining higher rates of development of production and in improving the well-being of the people. At present 85 percent of our total able-bodied population, including 75 percent of the women, are either employed in social production or are studying, while the rest of the population either work on the individually owned plots of land or keep house. These figures show that there are opportunities for drawing additional manpower into social production and the service industry.

There are considerable reserves of manpower in small towns, especially in the western areas of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, in some localities in Transcaucasia and in the central areas of the Russian Federation. It must be stressed that one of the reasons for this state of affairs is the tendency of the economic organizations, committees and ministries to develop production and build new enterprises primarily in large cities. This practice cannot be considered correct.

The State Planning Committee must study the availability of manpower by the country's regions and envisage, in the national-economic plans, such a distribution of production and construction work as will secure the fullest possible utilization of manpower resources in the national economy.

The presidium of the central committee of the party and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. have thoroughly analyzed the shortcomings in the national economy and have laid bare the reasons for slower rates of economic growth. This analysis has shown that certain difficulties in the development of our economy are temporary difficulties that must be overcome very quickly.

The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. are of the opinion that in tackling the problems of the further development of industry and the raising of the people's living standards, the greatest attention should be focussed on improving the methods and forms of industrial management. The forms of management, planning and stimulation now in use in industry no longer conform to modern technico-economical conditions and the level of development of productive forces.

The framework within which the enterprises can display economic initiative and exercise their rights is too narrow, while their responsibilities are inadequate. The cost-accounting system, or khozraschet, is in many ways a formality. The existing system of material benefits to industrial workers for high production results is a poor incentive for interesting them in improving the overall results of the work of their enterprises and, more often than not, runs counter to the interests of the national economy as a whole.

Greater flexibility and efficiency are needed in industrial management and planning under present conditions. It is highly important to take the changed economic situation into account at the proper time, to be able to maneuver with resources, adequately to correlate production—not only from the top, but also from below—with the increased needs and demands of the population, to introduce swiftly scientific and engineering achievements into production, and to find the best solutions to economic problems facing each particular enterprise.

All this can only be achieved when the centralized planned management is combined with the economic initiative of enterprises and collectives, with the increased application of economic incentives and material stimuli in developing production, and with using sound business principles. Only then will the system of economic management become sufficiently suited to tackling the tasks of raising production efficiency.

The proposals put forward for consideration by this plenary meeting have as their point of departure the thesis on the leading role of centralized planned management in developing our economy.

Improvement in planning methods and greater economic stimulation of industrial production will yield the necessary effect only in combination with such organizational forms of management as would correspond to the level of the productive forces achieved and the tasks posed at the present stage of the creation of the material and technical basis of communism.

In the conditions of today, when production and technical problems are becoming extremely complex, industry can only be managed effectively if full account is taken of the specific features and functions of every industrial branch. Specialization of production is an important aspect of technological progress and the development and improvement of production. For this reason the principle of management according to industrial branch should underlie all economic management.

As we know, the principle of management according to industrial branch has been violated in recent years, which has somewhat hampered the development of production and technology. The proposed measures will permit us to remedy this situation.

The management-by-branch principle must be combined, however, with the territorial principle, with interbranch activities required by the comprehensive development of the national economy as a whole and the individual economies of the republics and territories of our country, and with wider economic rights of the republics.

Proposals on the following are entered for consideration by this meeting: first the improvement of planning, provision of greater scope for the economic initiative of enterprises and more economic stimuli in production and, secondly, better organization of industrial management. The first set of questions is closely connected with the new and recently endorsed Statute of the Socialist Enterprises, and the second—with the resolution on granting wider economic rights to the Union Republics. All these questions together comprise an integral whole.

The main aim of the submitted proposals is to bring the planning system and methods of economic management into line with the tasks of Communist construction, to develop further the most important aspects and advantages of the Socialist mode of production, and thus to secure a more rapid advancement of our economy along the road to communism.

Allow me to proceed to an exposition of the problems connected with the improvement of planning and increasing economic stimulation of industrial production.

II. IMPROVEMENT OF PLANNING AND GREATER ECONOMIC STIMULATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

What are the main trends of the proposed program to improve the forms of the planned guidance of industry and the methods of economic management at each and every enterprise?

First, a number of measures are envisaged to raise the scientific standards of State planning of the economy.

The rates of growth of production and of the national income, and the basic proportions envisaged in the national economic plans must be optimum; i.e., they must guarantee the best and most effective utili-

zation of all available potentialities in conformity with the objective economic laws of socialism. In conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, the task of the planning bodies is to stipulate a rapid industrial application of the latest achievements of science and engineering. Plans should be compiled on the basis of the outlook for scientific and technological progress. It is necessary to attach more importance to long-term planning, and to work out a system of scientifically grounded planning norms.

Thus we shall be able to avoid voluntarism in planning and create conditions for raising the effectiveness of social production.

Second, a series of measures are proposed to expand the economic independence and initiative of enterprises and amalgamations, and to raise the importance of the enterprise as the main economic unit in our economy. In conditions of the growing concentration of production and multiplication of ties between enterprises, the existing framework of economic independence has become too narrow for modern Socialist enterprises and tends to restrict their capability to raise labor productivity and production efficiency. Greater economic independence of enterprises and the growth of the political consciousness and activity of the working class, open up before the factory collectives the possibility to participate on a broader scale—under the leadership of party organizations—in the management of production.

To this end it is necessary to abolish the improperly excessive regulation of the economic activities of enterprises, to provide them with the necessary means for developing production and to establish firm legal guarantees for the greater powers of the enterprises.

Third, it is proposed to strengthen and develop the system of *khozraschet*, or cost accounting, to intensify the economic stimulation of production with the help of such indexes as price, profit, bonuses, and credit. Each enterprise should be made more interested in the growth of its production, in increasing its incomes and in the optimum utilization of its tremendous wealth—the fixed assets assigned to the enterprise.

It is planned greatly to enhance the interest of factory and office workers in improving the overall performance of their enterprise and thus to strengthen the economic foundation for expanding the masses' independent activity and initiative in economic construction, and insure them a greater say in the organization of production.

The proposed measures are aimed at the consistent application of the Leninist principle of providing material incentives for the working people, at finding new reserves at the enterprises themselves and creating new sources for raising the wages of factory and office workers.

Improving industrial planning and increasing the economic independence of enterprises

In order to increase the economic independence of enterprises it is proposed to reduce the number of indexes assigned from above. At the same time the indexes retained in the plan should be aimed at raising production efficiency.

Experience shows that the index of overall volume of output does not stimulate the enterprises to produce goods really needed by the

national economy and the population, and in many cases holds up the improvement of assortment and quality. Not infrequently our enterprises produce low-quality goods which the consumer does not want and which therefore do not sell.

Instead of an overall volume of production index, it is proposed that the plans of enterprises should incorporate assignments for the volume of goods actually sold. This will make enterprises pay greater attention to quality in order to be able to fulfill their assignments for marketed products. An enterprise that produces low-quality goods will experience difficulties in selling them and, consequently, will be unable to fulfill its plan. Under the existing system of evaluating the activities of an enterprise on the basis of overall volume of output, such an enterprise would have been considered as having fulfilled its plan.

However, it would not be sufficient to appraise the work done by an enterprise only on the basis of the volume of goods sold. The national economy requires definite products to satisfy the needs of society.

For this reason assignments for the more important items must be retained as plan indexes.

When economic ties between enterprises have been well organized and the contract system well developed, it will be possible steadily to reduce the assortment of goods produced according to the state plan, and to substitute for it a classified, or enlarged, list of commodities.

If the assignment for goods sold is aimed at establishing closer ties between production and consumption, to orientate the enterprise toward raising efficiency, it would appear better to use the profit index, the index of profitability. The size of obtained profits characterizes, to a considerable extent, the contribution made by an enterprise to the net national income which is used to expand production and raise the people's standard of living.

It goes without saying that profit assignments do not make the need to lower production costs less important but, on the contrary, increases its importance. One of the most important tasks of economic managers is to lower production costs. The production cost index should command special attention in the technical, production and financial plan of the enterprise.

The state is interested in constantly increasing accumulations not only by lowering the cost of production of each item, but also by producing more, and by expanding and modernizing the range of manufactured goods and raising their quality. Profit reflects all these aspects of the production activities of an enterprise in a much more complete way than the production cost index. What is important in this case is to take into account not only the amount and increment of profit obtained, but also the level of profitability; i.e., the amount of profit per ruble of fixed assets.

Substantial changes are also envisaged in the planning of labor at enterprises.

At present the enterprises receive four labor indexes from above—productivity of labor, number of workers, average wages, and wage fund. From now on it is proposed to hand down only one of these indexes—the wage fund. This, of course, does not mean that the other indexes have lost their significance. The indexes of labor produc-

tivity, number of employees, and average wages will remain important elements of the national economic plan and the production plan of the enterprise. But is it really necessary to hand down all these assignments to the enterprise from above? Experience has shown that such planning fetters the initiative of the enterprise in the search for means and ways of increasing labor productivity.

There have been proposals that the wage fund of the enterprise be not assigned from above, either. But to discard the planning of the wage fund would be premature. There must be a proper balance between the quantity of consumer goods manufactured and the population's purchasing power. And the purchasing power is determined in large measure by the wage fund.

In the future, when we have succeeded in considerably expanding the production of consumer goods and accumulating adequate stocks of these goods, we will be able to discontinue assigning the wage fund of the enterprise from above. We plan to do this, first of all, in the industries producing consumer goods.

Thus the enterprise will have the following indexes passed down from above:

- The volume of goods to be sold;
- The main assortment of goods;
- The wage fund;
- The amount of profit and level of profitability; and
- Contributions to the budget and allocations from the budget.

Besides, they will be assigned:

- The volume of centralized investment and the putting into operation of production capacities and fixed assets;
- The main assignments for introducing new techniques; and
- The indexes of material and technical supply.

All other indexes of economic activity will be planned by the enterprises themselves, without endorsement from above. This will relieve the enterprise of uncalled-for tutelage, and will enable it to adopt the most economical decisions according to the actual conditions of production.

While extending the economic independence of the enterprises, the state will continue to conduct a unified policy in the sphere of technical progress, investment, labor remuneration, prices and financing, and will insure the compilation of accounts and statistical returns according to a unified system.

Improving the quality of goods in conformity with the demands of consumers and modern technical standards is one of the main tasks facing the planning and economic organizations.

The plans must incorporate the most important indexes relating to technical standards and the quality of goods, and all the financial, manpower, and material resources necessary to achieve them.

It is necessary to raise the role of state standards as an effective means of raising the quality of output. State standards should be steadily improved in the light of the latest achievements of science and technology. A system of state certification of the quality of goods should be introduced.

The normal economic activity of an enterprise is frequently upset by the fact that the plans assigned them from above are not

supported with the necessary technical and economic calculations and that the different sections of the plans are not correlated. Little attention has been given so far to the working out of the technical and economic management. Plans are frequently changed, which upsets the work of the enterprise and lowers production efficiency. One of the main tasks in improving planning is to work out stable plans for enterprises on the basis of scientifically sound standards and technical and economic calculations taking into account the peculiarities of the industries and groups of enterprises concerned.

The need to raise the scientific standards of planning confronts our professional economists with the task of analyzing modern processes of the technical and economic development of the country, and of ascertaining the trends and prospects that are emerging. A special effort should be made to increase the economic effectiveness of new machinery and equipment, readjust the patterns of both production and consumption, and study economic ties, the comprehensive development of regional economies and the territorial division of labor throughout the country.

Now that raising the technical standards of production and its efficiency has become a most important task, planned management of the economic activity of enterprises cannot be restricted to annual plans. As to long-term plans, their importance has been underrated. Many enterprises did not take the trouble to compile them at all, and those that did usually failed to correlate them with plans for the development of the national economy. Another major drawback of the existing system of long-term planning was that the assignments included in long-term plans and, in particular, the target figures of the 7-year plan, were not broken down into annual figures.

As a result, enterprises do not know their production prospects and so cannot make preparations in time nor establish links with suppliers and consumers on a permanent basis.

It is proposed to make the 5-year plan the basic form of planning, distributing the more important assignments by years, so that the enterprises may carry on their production and economic activities on the basis of this plan.

Lately national economic plans have envisaged few measures aimed at increasing production efficiency by industries, which is due to violation of the branch principle of management. In industrial management and in national economic plans, the task is to increase the significance of each branch of industrial production and to guarantee a correct combination of planning by branches and planning at republic and economic-area level.

In this connection we must mention the tasks facing the state planning committee of the U.S.S.R. The committee must concentrate on guaranteeing proper balances and relationships within the national economy, raising the efficiency of social production, and searching for means of hastening the growth of the national income and the improvement of the people's standard of living. Of special importance in this respect will be a more profound and thorough elaboration of national income and its utilization, of the manpower supply and its utilization both in the country as a whole and in individual

areas, the balance of money incomes and expenditures of the population, the balance of financial resources, and the more important material balances.

Increasing economic stimuli for enterprises and promoting cost accounting

Improvement of the forms and methods of planning will make it possible to tackle the problem of strengthening and developing cost accounting in a new way. Lenin stressed that each enterprise must work at a profit, i.e., completely cover its expenditures from its incomes and make a profit.

The enterprises operating on a cost-accounting basis, and their managers must bear full responsibility for the economic results of the work they do. Lenin's ideas of cost accounting should underline our economic activities. We see their consistent implementation and further development as the way to solve urgent problems of Communist construction at the present stage.

What must we do to strengthen and develop cost accounting in the new conditions?

First, we must create conditions in which the enterprises will be able to solve problems of improving production independently, and will be interested in making better use of the fixed assets assigned to them to increase output and profit. It is therefore necessary to leave to the enterprises more of the profit they derive, so that they can develop production, improve techniques, materially encourage the staff and improve its working and living conditions. The proportion of funds to be left to the enterprise should be made directly conditional on how effectively it uses its fixed assets, increases the volume of goods sold, improves the quality of its goods and increases profitability. At the same time the state should restrict the gratuitous financing of investment and extend the use of credits.

Secondly, it is necessary to strengthen the principle of cost accounting in the relations between enterprises, guarantee strict fulfillment of delivery commitments and increase material responsibility for their fulfillment.

Thirdly, on the basis of cost accounting, it is necessary to provide material incentives for the entire personnel and every shop and section of the enterprise personnel and every shop and section of the enterprise, so that they will not only fulfill their own assignments but also improve the overall results of the enterprise. The system of incentives should be so devised that the enterprise will be interested in working out and fulfilling higher plan assignments and in making better use of its internal resources.

In short, it is necessary to direct the entire activity of the enterprise toward finding ways of improving the economics of production, increasing the incomes of the enterprise and thereby increasing the overall national income.

Under the existing system, investments are almost exclusively allocated according to the central plan, and a considerable proportion of them is spent on new construction. Many of the operating enterprises lack adequate means and so cannot replace obsolete plant in time. This holds up the growth of labor productivity, improvement of the quality of goods produced and the growth of the profitability.

It is proposed that every enterprise establish a production development fund which would include deductions from its profit. Part of the depreciation money intended for the complete restoration of fixed assets would also be contributed to the fund. At present this part of the depreciation money is allocated on a centralized basis for financing capital construction, and the enterprises cannot use it as they see fit.

When these measures have been implemented, the production development fund—which the enterprises will be free to use for technical improvements in production—will constitute a much larger sum than is the case now. This can be seen from the following data.

In 1964 expenditures from enterprises' funds for the introduction of new techniques and development of production in industry totaled 120 m. rubles, and 600 m. rubles in bank credits was spent for the same purposes; the total figure was therefore 720 m. rubles. Under the new conditions, the development funds will approximate to 4,000 m. rubles in 1967, including 2,700 rubles from the depreciation fund.

The promotion of cost accounting and the economic stimulation of production depend on the basis on which the state grants means to the enterprise, and on the way in which the enterprise transfers part of its income to the budget.

Investment at present is financed gratis from the budget. Enterprise managers show little concern as to the cost of the reconstruction of the enterprise or the effect that additional investment will produce, because their enterprises are not obliged to refund the sums granted them. Hence we need a system that will induce our economic managers to strive for the most judicious use of investment funds, so that new shops and units can be built with a minimum of investment and put into operation in time and that their rated capacities are put to use as early as possible.

One way of solving this problem is to switch from the free allocation of means for capital construction to long-term credits. The idea is that credits will be introduced, first of all, for investment in operating enterprises. As for new construction, it would apparently be expedient to introduce long-term credit for projects with a comparatively short period of recoupment.

Of great importance in making production more efficient is correct and economical use of the working capital allocated to the enterprise. At present, any shortage in the working capital of the enterprise is made up for from the budget. We cannot, therefore, speak of genuine cost accounting if the enterprise does not, in effect, bear any economic responsibility for the utilization of the working capital allocated to it. It is proposed to abolish the practice of providing free supplements to the working capital of enterprises from the budget and to grant them credits if necessary. Such a system will induce enterprises to use the working capital allocated to them more thriftily.

A change in the system by which enterprises make payments to the state budget from their incomes is also envisaged. At present the amount of the deductions made from profits of enterprises in favor of the budget does not depend on the value of the fixed assets assigned to them. That is one of the reasons why enterprises attempt to obtain more money from the state for investment and for supplementing

their working capital, without taking the necessary measures for their rational use. Sometimes an enterprise purchases equipment it does not need just to spend the funds allocated to it.

As has been said, the effectiveness of fixed assets has recently declined in a number of industries. It is most important, therefore, to interest enterprises in increasing their output and raising not only the sum total of their profits but also the amount of profit made per ruble of fixed assets assigned to them. To this end it is necessary to introduce deductions in favor of the budget from the profits of enterprises in proportion to the value of fixed assets and working capital allocated to them, as payment for the fixed assets.

Rates of payment for fixed assets and working capital will be established for a long period—over several years—so that after each payment a normally functioning enterprise will have profits left for setting up incentive funds and for covering its planned expenses. Those enterprises which make better use of their fixed assets and working capital will retain more profit for setting up incentive funds, which will provide adequate material encouragement for better use of the public funds allocated to the enterprises.

New machines, newly installed equipment, and shops and enterprises just put into operation cannot in every case produce their full economic effect immediately, and enterprises may therefore experience temporary financial difficulties. Therefore it is proposed that deductions for fixed assets and working capital be made only when the planned time limit for mastering new capacities has passed.

It must be stressed that these payments are not proposed as additional contributions to the budget over and above payments which enterprises make now; the idea is to divert a considerable proportion of the payments to the budget through a new channel. Eventually payments for fixed assets and working capital will become a most important part of the budget income, and the importance of other payments, including the turnover tax, will decrease accordingly.

It is also planned to use cost accounting more freely between enterprises. At present the mutual economic responsibility of enterprises is most inadequate. Contracting has not as yet acquired the importance it deserves in relations between enterprises.

It is proposed to increase the material responsibility of enterprises and organizations in cases of nonfulfilment of contract obligations for deliveries of goods so that, as a rule, losses will be made good by the faulty enterprise. The responsibility of rail, water, road and other transport organizations for delays in moving goods from enterprises and retarding their delivery to the customer will also be increased. It is necessary that design organizations should also be responsible for errors made in projects, technical drawings and designs, if these errors lead to material losses and additional expenditures during the building of a project or while production at new-built plants is being organized.

The introduction of the sales index makes the position of the producing enterprises and the size of their funds dependent on payments by customers. It goes without saying that every enterprise must itself bear full responsibility for making payments and for clearing accounts with suppliers in time. A cost-accounting relationship between enterprises demands that payment discipline be tightened. Simultaneously

the role of State credit in economic turnover must be intensified with the aim of guaranteeing unhindered clearance of accounts between suppliers and their clients.

Increasing material incentives for workers to improve the work of enterprises

At present the material incentives provided for production collectives and for individual workers to improve the overall results of the work of their enterprises are quite inadequate. Enterprises have very limited opportunities of raising the pay of their staffs out of sources of income created by the enterprises themselves.

About 50 percent of the industrial enterprises have no funds created from their own profits, and where these funds do exist they are very small and the sums paid out of them by way of encouragement are insignificant. Nearly every kind of bonus and other stimuli are paid, not out of profits, but out of the wage fund. The achievements of the enterprise in increasing profits and raising profitability have no direct effect on the wages and salaries of the staff.

We must change this practice in order to provide staffs with greater material incentives. We must establish a system under which the enterprise's opportunities for increasing the remuneration of its staff would be determined, above all, by the growth of production, improved quality, increased profits and greater profitability. Basic wages and salaries will be raised on a centralized basis as before. At the same time enterprises should have—in addition to the wage fund—a special fund to stimulate their employees for individual achievements and for a good performance of the enterprise as a whole.

This fund should consist of a part of the profit obtained by the enterprise, which would use it not only to pay the staff bonuses for high efficiency in the course of the year, but also an extraordinary allowance at the end of the year. In doing this, account will be taken of the length of uninterrupted service at the enterprise, which will help to check the outflow of skilled manpower.

Under the existing system of material incentives, enterprises are not interested in providing in their plans for the fullest utilization of their internal resources, because the performance of the enterprise is appraised and its staff offered inducements according primarily to the extent that plan targets are exceeded. This system encourages enterprises to strive for lower plan assignments in terms of volume of output, growth of labor productivity, and lower costs, and for larger wage funds, staffs, investments and material funds, so that it will be easier for them to exceed plans. This makes it difficult to draft realistic plans. How is this system to be changed?

A fund for the material stimulation of the staff will be set up at each enterprise. It will be derived from the profits obtained by the enterprise. Allocations for the material stimulation fund should be made according to stable quotas established for a number of years and in such a manner as to insure that the amount of the material incentive fund is determined by increases in the sale of products or in profit and by the level of profitability envisaged by the plan. Those who exceed the plan will be paid relatively less by way of incentive than those who achieve plan indices. This will induce enterprises to find reserves in time and to accept larger plan assignments.

The material stimulation fund will also increase depending on the proportion of new products and on additional returns derived by the enterprise from higher prices for goods of high quality. Enterprises will be interested in mastering the production of new items and in improving their quality as soon as possible.

Since the pattern and cost of production and the ratio between profit and wages vary from industry to industry, we propose to differentiate the rates of allocation for the stimulation fund according to groups of enterprises, taking the amount of the wage fund into account.

A fund for financing social and cultural development and housing construction must also be set up at enterprises. Allocations from this fund will be spent for housing construction (over and above the sums allocated for this purpose on a centralized basis), the construction and upkeep of children's institutions, Young Pioneer camps, holiday and health homes, and other social and cultural purposes.

Consequently, the better an enterprise functions, the more opportunities it will have, not only to raise wages and salaries, but also to improve the living conditions of its staff and carry out cultural and health protection measures.

The proposed changes in the methods of planning and economic stimulation are not based on theoretical conclusions alone but also on experience.

In 1964 and 1965, new methods of planning and economic stimulation were introduced at a number of enterprises of the sewing, footwear, and textile industries. The performance of these enterprises is evaluated according to output and profit under the plan.

Recently a new bonus system for managers, engineers, technicians, and office workers has been introduced at enterprises in a number of industries to afford the personnel greater incentives to increase output and improve quality. The first results show that we are on the right track. I would like to dwell in some detail on a practical experiment involving the use of the new system. It has to do with motor transport.

These are some major shortcomings in motor transport. About half of the runs are empty ones. Of course, plans every year envisage a reduction of empty runs, a lowering of maintenance costs, an increase in loads, etc. But they yield scant results. Motor transport organizations put forward any number of arguments to prove that the plan quotas assigned to them are unrealistic.

Five months ago the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. instructed the Labor and Wages Committee and the Moscow and Leningrad City Soviets to introduce the new system of planning and economic stimulation in some motor transport organizations. The system was introduced in three Moscow and two Leningrad organizations. They are large organizations servicing construction, the trading network, industry, and interurban transport.

The economic independence of these organizations was extended: they had fewer plan indexes assigned from above and were allowed greater freedom in using above plan profit and savings on the wage fund to encourage their personnel in material terms, improve social and cultural conditions and expand production facilities.

The Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. recently examined the first results of their work and heard the reports of

the directors of two of the Moscow motor transport organizations. The very first results showed that the introduction of the new system of planning and economic stimulation produces a considerable effect. Having received ample powers and opportunities, the collectives found ways and means to improve their work and to transport more, above all by reducing empty runs. They extended the range of enterprises and organizations using their services, considerably improved the quality of service, encouraged their clients to shorten loading and unloading time, improved the organization of repairs and maintenance, sold the lorries and equipment they did not need, and reduced their staffs.

The new system of planning and economic stimulation increased the employees' interest in the results of their work. In 4 months of work under the new conditions (May–August 1965) empty runs were reduced by 15 percent, with the result that haulage increased by 34 percent. Labor productivity went up by 31 percent and profits more than doubled, making it possible to raise wages. Above-plan profit in the five organizations totaled 969,000 rubles in 4 months. As before 40 percent of the profit was transferred to the budget, and the balance—over 550,000 rubles—was used for improving facilities, accumulating reserves, meeting social and cultural requirements and stimulating the staffs materially.

Of course, one can hardly expect that the work of all the motor transport organizations would improve in the same way. Nevertheless, the results of the experiment speak for themselves. We see in them something new that will also yield important results in other branches of the national economy.

The transition to new forms and methods of economic stimulation of industrial production demands improvements in the pricing system. Prices should increasingly reflect the expenditures of socially necessary labor, cover production and circulation outlays and insure that each normally functioning enterprise makes profit.

The existing underestimation of economic methods in planning and managing the national economy, and neglect of cost accounting, are connected to a considerable extent with the serious shortcomings in price formation. If prices are not well-grounded, economic calculations become less reliable, which, in turn, leads to the adoption of subjectivist decisions.

From now on, in fixing wholesale prices for industrial goods, it will be necessary to calculate the level of profitability of the various industries on the strength of scientific evidence. Normally functioning enterprises should make profit from the sale of their products at wholesale prices and so be able to form a corresponding stimulation fund, and also have the necessary means for expanding their activities, paying for their fixed assets and making other contributions to the budget.

Prices must also play a major role in solving problems of quality and in extending the reasonable length of service and dependability of products. This is why, in pricing new, improved articles, the additional expenditures made by the manufacturers and the economic effect which customers will derive from improved products should be taken into consideration. This will encourage manufacturers to improve their products, and will make it economically more advantageous for customers to use these products.

In preparing for this plenary meeting, the Presidium of the CC, CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. decided to set up a State Committee for Prices under the State Planning Committee of the U.S.S.R. This committee is entrusted with working out and presenting by January 1, 1966, guidelines for fixing wholesale prices for industrial goods with a view to bringing prices as near as possible to the value of socially necessary labor expended. These prices must guarantee the implementation of the contemplated measures for the improvement of planning and economic stimulation of enterprises.

A better pricing system and the fixing of wholesale prices will help in improving the economic indexes of the work of industry, in finding additional reserves and in insuring steady reduction of production costs. Needless to say retail prices may be revised only with the aim of reducing them.

Experience shows that establishing wholesale price levels for every product, and preparing new price lists for every industry will take considerable time. It will probably be possible to introduce new prices in 1967 or 1968.

However, the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Finance, and the Committee for Prices will have to introduce the necessary amendments into current prices in all those industries where the new forms of economic stimulation will be adopted at an earlier date, in order to eliminate unjustified differences in profitability.

Such are roughly the main proposals for improving planning and stimulation in industry. The proposed system of planning and stimulation is also applicable, in its main features, to the building industry, railway transport and certain other branches of the national economy. But it must not be extended to these branches mechanically, without taking into account their special economic features and the tasks facing them. Work in this direction will be gradually carried on.

III. IMPROVING THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT

Improving the organizational forms of economic management on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism and through the timely elimination of outdated forms of management is objectively necessitated by the development of the productive forces and of socialist-relations of production.

It goes without saying that genuine improvement of economic management has nothing in common with rash, ill-advised changes divorced from economic reality and running counter to objective economic laws.

Recent years have seen a large-scale reorganization of economic management in our country. Ever since 1957 industry has been managed through economic councils. Industrial ministries were abolished, and the enterprises operating under them were subordinated to economic councils.

The organization of industrial management through economic councils had a number of positive aspects. In some cases it resulted in the useful amalgamation of kindred enterprises, in the setting up of plants for equipment repairs and for the production of semi-manufactured parts and tools for a wide range of industries.

But in time major shortcomings began to make themselves felt. Division of managerial functions in industries constituting a single production and technical entity among numerous economic regions disrupted management. The various industries were dissolved, so to speak, in the economy of the economic regions. Heterogeneous industries are often managed by economic councils not through specialized, but through multisector boards. The councils lack competent personnel for some of the industrial branches.

This state of affairs prompted us to look for remedies. In 1960 republic economic councils were set up in the Russian Federation, Ukrainian SSR and Kazakh SSR, and in 1962 some economic councils were amalgamated. The national economic councils and Supreme Economic Council of the U.S.S.R., and state committees for branches of industry were established. However, these additional measures could not eliminate basic defects.

The branch committees had no decisive effect on the technical standards of industrial production. Lacking adequate rights as they did, they became in fact, consultative bodies dissociated from the enterprises concerned and the entire range of production problems.

As matters stand today, plans for new plants are examined and decided upon by one agency, plans for production and capital construction by another, and supply problems by a third. There is virtually no single agency that could examine and decide upon every aspect of the development of an industry.

All this has produced an adverse effect on technical progress, growth of output, specialization, and the production ties between enterprises located in different economic regions.

Departures from the industrial branch principle have told on management. They have led to infringements of the uniform technical policy and to the dispersion of competent personnel and given rise to a multistage system of management. Numerous agencies bearing no direct responsibility for the development of the particular branch have appeared. The overall result is irresponsibility, endless coordination of decisions, and managerial inefficiency.

Thus the problem of seriously improving industrial management has become urgent. To develop industry successfully, it is essential to integrate the management of production, technology, economics and research in every particular industry. Under the socialist system the managerial forces of industry can be properly concentrated and centralized only by following the branch principle of management.

Characteristically, industrial progress has necessitated a new form of organization—branch amalgamations operating on the cost-accounting principle. The rise of branch amalgamations based on cost accounting within the framework of economic councils proves that the branch form of management is gaining ground because it is more effective. This form promotes the specialization, coordination and concentration of production, makes for a more judicious use of competent personnel, and creates favorable conditions for improving technical and economic management.

To improve management, we must set up managerial bodies on the branch principle, that is, industrial ministries fully empowered to manage production branches and fully responsible for the development of these branches.

The ministries are to plan and control production and handle technical policy, supplies, financing, labor, and wages. They will run branch research institutions. This will facilitate production and economic activity of the enterprises, since all the important problems of this activity will be settled by a single body, the ministry.

The ministries will be responsible for satisfying the demands of the national economy and the population. They will have to take the initiative in manufacturing new, more up-to-date items and see to it that the output of these items keeps pace with demand.

It is clear that centralized planned management of the economy should be combined with measures to encourage the initiative of the union republics, of local bodies and enterprises.

We propose to establish all-union, union-republic and republic industrial ministries, with due regard to the production and technical peculiarities of each industry.

We plan to set up all-union ministries by branches of the engineering industry, which is particularly in need of integrated technical management on a countrywide scale, such as would enable it to carry out standardization and unification of articles, units, and parts and to guarantee that they are up to the present high standard of world science and technology. These problems can be dealt with provided the engineering industry is managed on a countrywide scale.

We propose to establish the following all-union ministries for the management of branches of engineering:

- Ministry of Heavy, Power, and Transport Machine Building,
- Ministry of the Building, Road Building, and Municipal Machinery Industry,
- Ministry of the Tractor and Farm Machinery Industry,
- Ministry of the Automobile Industry,
- Ministry of Power Engineering,
- Ministry of the Instrument Making, Automation Facilities, and Control Systems Industry,
- Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine Building,
- Ministry of the Machine-Tool and Tool Industry,
- Ministry for the Manufacture of Machinery for the Light and Food Industries and of Household Machines.

Other industries are to be put under union-republic jurisdiction. This will enable the union republics to take part in the management of these industries. Both union-republic ministries of the U.S.S.R. and ministries of the same name in the union republics will be set up and the republics themselves will decide, by agreement with the corresponding ministry of the U.S.S.R., whether to set up a ministry or a board (economic association) for the industry concerned in the republic.

We propose to set up the following union-republic ministries of the U.S.S.R.:

- Ministry of the Iron and Steel Industry,
- Ministry of the Nonferrous Metals Industry,
- Ministry of the Coal Industry,
- Ministry of the Chemical Industry,
- Ministry of the Oil-Extracting Industry,
- Ministry of the Oil-Refining and Petrochemical Industry,

Ministry of the Timber, Cellulose and Paper, and Woodworking Industry,

Ministry of the Building Materials Industry,

Ministry of Light Industry,

Ministry of the Food Industry,

Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry.

The union-republic industrial ministries or boards (associations) in the union republics will be subordinated to the councils of ministries of the union republics and the corresponding union-republic ministry of the U.S.S.R., and in their management of enterprises will follow the guidelines elaborated by the union-republic ministries of the U.S.S.R.

As regards industry under republic jurisdiction, the republics will decide themselves whether to set up this or that ministry or economic association. A vital function of the republic bodies will be to develop local industry, which is very important for the population.

The central committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. have upon discussion decided to grant new powers to the union republics in the field of planning, capital construction, financing, labor and wages. In the future as well, we will have to promote the initiative of the union republics in the sphere of economic and cultural development.

The setting up of ministries should by no means lead to increases in managerial staffs. On the contrary, they must be reduced. We must devise a simple pattern for the ministries and assign them small staffs since the enterprises and economic associations are to be granted extensive rights and hence there is no need for a machinery exercising petty tutelage over enterprises.

The setting up of branch ministries will call for enhancing the role of the State Planning Committee. The existence of centralized branch management bodies will increase the importance of coordinated development of the various branches of the economy and economic areas of the country.

The State Planning Committee of the U.S.S.R. is at present subordinated to the Supreme Economic Council. But as Lenin stressed, the task of the State Planning Committee is to plan the entire national economy along scientific lines. We therefore propose to subordinate the State Planning Committee, a union-republic agency, directly to the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

To insure proper territorial planning and comprehensive exploitation of the natural, labor, power and other resources of the economic areas, the state planning committees of the republics will draft economic development plans of the republics, including industries under union-republic and republic jurisdiction. The state planning committees of the republics will also have to draw up proposals for the draft plans of the enterprises under union jurisdiction, situated on the territory of the republics in question.

Thus, the state planning committees of the union republics will become agencies dealing with problems of the industrial development of the republics as a whole, bearing in mind the interests of the entire national economy. This will enable the union republics to rule out parochialism.

The State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research of the U.S.S.R. is to be reorganized into an all-union State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for Science and Technology. It is expedient to reorganize the State Committee for Construction of the U.S.S.R., now under the Supreme Economic Council, into the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for Construction, preserving it as a union-republic agency.

We plan to abolish the Supreme Economic Council and the Economic Council of the U.S.S.R. as well as economic councils of the republics and economic areas.

The organization of material and technical supply is an important field of economic management. On it depend in large measure the proper utilization of material resources, labor productivity, profitability and quality. Material and technical supply must be planned and managed as a single whole if it is to meet the needs of the national economy.

A departmental system of material and technical supply, with numerous overlapping small offices, depots and warehouses, existed till 1957. It was a costly system under which economic resources could not be handled flexibly.

The measures taken in recent years to organize supply and sales along territorial lines have resulted in improving this system somewhat. The vast number of small supply-and-sale organizations has been cut. Larger and better equipped specialized depots, general (interbranch) offices and warehouses have been set up. Fuller use is being made of local resources.

In the future the State Planning Committee of the U.S.S.R. will place material and technical resources at the disposal of the Union ministries, which will control these resources and distribute them among the consumers subordinated to them.

The resources will be used by the central supply-and-sales boards and territorial material and technical supply bodies operating at the present time.

It is intended to retain the existing territorial material and technical supply bodies with their network of offices and specialized and general depots and warehouses for the utilization of raw and other materials and equipment according to plan. They will be responsible for the utilization of material resources supplied by the enterprises situated in the areas concerned and for control over delivery of the products of these enterprises to consumers in other areas.

We should encourage more extensive direct contacts between manufacturing and consuming enterprises in the sphere of material and technical supply. We should gradually go over to wholesale trade in certain materials and items of equipment through territorial supply-and-sales centers in the areas of consumption.

We plan to entrust the guidance of material and technical supply in the country to a Union-republic State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for Material and Technical Supply. It will be responsible for the realization of supply plans, coordinated inter-branch deliveries, and control over the timely fulfillment of delivery plans. It is intended to subordinate to this committee the central boards of inter-republican deliveries now under the Economic Council of the U.S.S.R.

However, no supply system will meet the interests of the national economy unless enterprises and organizations are really made responsible for the fulfillment of economic contracts and unless they are afforded adequate material incentives.

This, in the main, is how the economic management of industry is to be reorganized.

It may seem at first glance that what is suggested is a mere return to the ministries of the past. To think so, however, would mean disregarding a number of new factors and making a mistake. The new ministries will work in entirely different conditions. The administrative management of industry will be combined with a considerably greater application of cost-accounting methods and economic incentives. The economic powers of enterprises will be substantially extended and their initiative stimulated.

A network of cost-accounting organizations is to be set up in the various industries to exercise direct management of their respective enterprises. Management will be increasingly built on the principle of cost accounting, with strict adherence to state planning discipline. The ministries will enlist the assistance of cost-accounting organizations by handing over many of their own routine functions to them. Moreover, within the ministries themselves, particularly those of the light and food industries, many departments will operate on the principle of cost accounting. The ministries will concentrate on the main progressive trends of development of the industries they manage. Emphasis will be laid on economic levers, on rendering enterprises practical assistance to improve their operation and steadily to introduce complete self-sufficiency.

The development of economic methods of industrial management changes the very character of relations between enterprises and higher bodies. The old notion that the leading economic bodies have only rights and the enterprises only duties must be given up. The development of economic methods of management, the extensive introduction of cost accounting in industry, calls for the establishment of mutual rights and duties between enterprises and industrial management bodies, and for greater responsibility on the part of both.

The draft statute of the Socialist state-owned industrial enterprise was discussed for a long time with broad participation of factory workers. It was studied by the presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and will be introduced after this plenary meeting. The statute settles pressing questions of the economic activity of enterprises not only in industry, but also in construction, agriculture, transport, and communications.

The enterprise will enjoy wider powers in the use of its working capital, depreciation funds, and also the receipts from the sale of surplus equipment and other material values. The housing built by it will be distributed only among its workers. The enterprise will enjoy wider powers in the use of the money saved on the wage fund during the year. It will decide independently, without registering in financial bodies, on its structure and staff and on administrative expenses. It will be allowed greater economic initiative and independence in solving other production problems. The statute will no doubt promote cost accounting.

The proposed measures for improving the organization and the economic methods of industrial management combine centralized planning by the state with complete self-sufficiency of the enterprise, centralized management of industry with far-reaching local economic initiative, the principle of one-man management with greater say for the personnel. This system will meet present-day requirements and will help to use the advantages of the socialist system more effectively.

The rapid growth of our socialist economy will continue to call for improvements in economic management. This is why we must overcome the lag in research in this field and carefully elaborate the scientific principles of managing social production.

IV. IMPLEMENTING THE NEW PLANNED INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN ORGANIZED FASHION

Comrades, the decisions of this plenary meeting will bring big changes into the planned management of industry. It is, in fact, an important economic reform covering the production activities of the millions of factory and office workers, engineers, technicians, economists, and industrial executives.

The adoption of new economic and organizational methods in industry will no doubt benefit the entire national economy. It will enable us to raise the entire economic system to a qualitatively new stage, to draw on additional sources in increasing the wealth of our country and improving the people's living standard.

But success will not come of itself. To use the opportunities being provided, we must make careful organizational preparations for the transition of the economic management of industry to new working conditions, raise the standard of the economic activity of industrial personnel in keeping with new tasks and requirements, and allow proper scope for the creative activity of the workers, individually and collectively.

The measures planned to improve industrial management must be implemented in an organized manner, by stages and in strict accordance with the plan. The organization of ministries will take time. The transition to the new managerial system must be so effected as to insure that state plans are fulfilled and that industry operates normally.

Until every production unit has been placed under the control of the relevant ministry, the economic councils must continue to work and bear full responsibility for the uninterrupted operation of the production units under their jurisdiction. This applies also to the state production committee and their duties.

The drawing up of the economic development plan and the state budget for 1968 is nearing completion. The plan and the budget have been suited to the present structure of industrial management.

The Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics, the economic councils and the appropriate state committees must therefore hand the plans down to production units in time.

In view of the establishment of new ministries, the list of production units to be assigned to each ministry should be specified as early as possible and, accordingly, the economic plan and budget targets determined for every industry, in line with the new managerial structure.

The State Planning Committee should carefully organize and supervise this work. The Finance Ministry should carry out appropriate work to draw up the state budget for 1966 with due regard to the new structure of industrial management.

On the basis of decisions to be adopted, the State Planning Committee, Finance Ministry, State Labor and Wages Committee, State Prices Committee, State Bank and the industrial ministries must carry out this year, and especially in 1966 and 1967, a great deal of work to prepare regulations, methodological instructions and directives taking into account the specific features of each industry and each group of production units. This work must be conducted with the participation of industrial executives, leading specialists and research workers.

The transition to the new industrial management system will necessitate a redistribution of executive personnel. This important problem should receive serious attention from the central committees of the Communist parties of the Union Republics, the councils of ministers of the Union Republics, ministries and local party, government and economic organizations.

We must do our utmost to provide production units with highly qualified personnel. After all, it is on them that success hinges. We must also carefully select competent people for the new ministries, for the efficiency of industrial management will largely depend on this. We must give maximum attention to executive personnel and use every worker properly.

Many thousands of able and competent organizers of socialist production have been trained in our country in Soviet years. At the present time more than 2 million experts with a higher or secondary education are employed in industrial establishments. There are more than 4 million Communists working in industry. This is a large force with which we can accomplish very complicated tasks. The party and the people value the country's experts and executives whom they fully trust and support in their difficult work for the good of society.

The demands on our industrial and managerial personnel are growing due to changing conditions. Managers are expected to display initiative based on competence, an ability to make prompt decisions, a business-like approach to problems, a sense of the new, an ability to make the maximum use of production resources in the given situation.

As their powers are extended, economic executives must show an increasing sense of responsibility to the party and the state. They will have to solve, together with their staffs, problems which formerly were solved for them higher up.

The training of specialists for industry in the new conditions will be much more important. There are serious shortcomings in this sphere for many of which the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education and the State Planning Committee are to blame. Major imbalances have been allowed to develop in the training of technicians and engineers, with the result that we have a shortage of specialists in some industries and a surplus in others.

The economic training of engineers and technicians is poorly organized. It is impermissible for an engineer or designer to have a superficial understanding of production economics today.

The training of economists will be of paramount importance. We must give greater attention to this matter since there is a serious shortage of trained economists. At the beginning of 1965 specialists with a higher economic education constituted only 6 percent of the total number of specialists in the U.S.S.R., somewhat less even than the figure at the end of 1940.

The earlier system of raising the qualifications of key executives, which proved its worth, should be restored. It was a big mistake to abolish it.

Many establishments use engineers and technicians wrongly. Heads of factories and building projects, engineers and technicians are often obliged to participate in useless conferences instead of attending to their direct functions. Some of the specialists are compelled to draw up all kinds of performance and statistical reports, which are not really their duty.

These shortcomings in the training and utilization of personnel must be eliminated.

The industrial manager is personally responsible for the job assigned him by the state. This responsibility, and one-man leadership in industry, is of especial importance now. But one-man management should go hand in hand with the broadest participation of the staffs in discussing every important economic problem of the enterprise and its management. The success of a manager's work depends on the support he receives from his staff and on the authority he wins by his competence and integrity.

Better management is impossible without carrying forward its democratic principles and considerably extending the participation of the masses in it. The role of the workers and their organizations in the solution of planning problems, the mustering of internal production reserves, the assessment of the results of work, and the provision of incentives must be substantially enhanced. As the funds of the enterprises are to be increased, factory organizations will have to play a much greater role in the use of these funds. Every worker should be made to feel that he is one of the owners of the factory. No factory can operate efficiently without strict labor and production discipline, and unless every executive, engineer, office employee, or worker is properly fulfilling his duties and tasks.

The collective agreement is an important means of enlisting the participation of the personnel in the effort for more efficient operation of the factories. Its role will be greatly enhanced. Collective agreements should be extensively and carefully discussed by the workers, for they are going to have a much greater stake in improving overall results. Every employee should know of the specific measures that will be taken to operate the factory better and more profitably, of how improved operation of the factory will effect his working and living conditions and pay, and of the responsibility the collective agreement places on every employee. Managers and trade union organizations must improve the negotiation of collective agreements and see to it that the commitments contained in the agreements are fulfilled.

To improve management, the party and trade union organizations and heads of enterprises must radically improve the organization of the Socialist emulation movement. The new methods of economic

management provide a solid economic foundation for this movement, organizing labor on scientific lines, achieving greater profitability, improving the quality of output, and raising labor productivity. Every new departure at an enterprise should be popularized through the Socialist emulation movement. This is an important condition for raising the standard of Socialist management at every enterprise.

The party, the trade unions, the Government and economic agencies must organize the extensive popularization of the measures to improve planning and management, and to provide greater economic stimuli for industrial production, with a view to rallying the efforts of all the working people and insuring that every enterprise, and industry as a whole, works efficiently.

Comrades, our Leninist Communist Party is the leading and guiding force in the advance of the Socialist economy to communism. It always strives to find the most effective ways and means of solving our country's major economic problems. This meeting of the central committee of our party will discuss and adopt decisions of fundamental importance. Their implementation and, consequently, the progress of our economy will depend in decisive measure on the political and organizing work of our party, of its organizations and members.

The very nature of the proposed measures points to the growing role of party guidance of the economy. The responsibility of the central committees of the Communist parties of the union, republics and the territorial and regional party committees for insuring truly scientific management of industry, management free from any influence of parochialism and departmentalism, for the full use, in the interests of Communist construction, of the opportunities which will be afforded by the new methods of management, will increase steadily. The responsibility of the territorial and regional party committees for the management of industry will now be greater than ever before.

Without doing the job of the economic management agencies, and without exercising petty patronage over them, party committees at all levels should work, in their own specific way, first of all, among the people, among the workers and specialists. The important thing is to encourage their initiative and activity, to pool their experience and creative energy.

The increased rights and independence of the enterprise will be accompanied by the growth of the role of its party organization. One of the important tasks of the latter will be to find reserves for increasing output, improving quality, and making proper use of economic stimuli. It is the party organizations that must provide moral stimuli for work, and promote the Communist consciousness of the working people.

There can be no doubt that, given a steady effort by all our party organizations, the measures proposed for improving production management will yield favorable results and their success will contribute to the construction of Communist society in our country.

Comrades, the work of this plenary meeting is bound to evoke widespread comment abroad. We are sure that our friends in the Socialist countries, who are following Soviet life and economic progress with keen interest, will be gratified by the decisions of this meeting. But our enemies will certainly try to misrepresent these decisions. Bourgeois ideologists, who have heard about the economic reform being

prepared in the U.S.S.R. are already trying to present it as evidence of the weakness of Socialist economic planning. The bourgeois press, emphasizing some real but mostly imaginary shortcomings of our economic development, talks of "chaos" and "crisis" in the Soviet economy. Apparently that is the distorted way in which the discussions we had on improving economic planning and management were reflected in the minds of some bourgeois "Sovietologists." While we think of how to make our work still more effective and how to use the opportunities of socialism to still greater advantage, they keep talking, as in times past, about the "failure" of our system of social production, about the Soviet Union "reverting" to capitalist economic management and replacing the principles of planning by the chaotic machinery of market regulation.

Vain hope. The character of an economic system depends on who wields state power and owns the means and instruments of production, in whose class interests production is developed and profit distributed. This is a fundamental issue, and in this issue we have always adhered, and will continue to adhere, to an unshakable Marxist-Leninist position. The Soviet Union stands firm as a country of victorious socialism, a country confidently building the material and technical base for communism. Socialist property in the U.S.S.R. is developing into Communist property. And the bourgeois economists' talk about the gradual "return" of the Soviet economy to the capitalist track is merely wishful thinking.

We realize that the propaganda fuss about "difficulties" in the Soviet economy and about its "bourgeois transformation" has yet another air. Our enemies are alarmed because many independent Afro-Asian countries choose the Socialist road of development, study the experience of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, and develop economic and political relations with them.

Their tale about "crisis" in the Soviet economy is designed to discredit socialism, its economic methods, its economic efficiency, and so to defame our country's economic policy. It will not help them. Decisions which this plenary meeting will make open opportunities of making still better use of the advantages of the Socialist economic system.

An important international feature of the proposed economic reform is that it will strengthen socialism in the economic competition between the two different social systems.

Economic management is being improved in almost every European Socialist country. The distinctions in the approach to the solution of specific problems reflect peculiarities of the national economies concerned. The changes that are taking place are aimed at raising the scientific standard of planning, providing stronger economic stimuli for production, promoting cost accounting, and increasing the independence of enterprises.

It is typical of all the European Socialist countries that they are developing the branch principle of management, with branch amalgamations working on the cost-accounting basis and playing a growing role.

The adoption of new methods of Socialist economic management in our country and in other Socialist countries of Europe will con-

tribute to the development of the international Socialist division of labor and to the close and mutually profitable coordination of economic development plans. This also shows the great international significance of the decisions to be taken by this meeting.

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. consider that the adoption of the new methods and forms of planning and management of industry will strengthen the economic foundations of the Soviet policy of cooperation between countries. The proposed reform meets the basic interests of the Soviet people, who want to see their country prosper. Its implementation will help improve the life of the Soviet people, increase the might and defense capacity of our country, and hasten our advance to communism.

Allow me to express confidence that the measures worked out by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for improvements in industrial management will be fully supported by the members of the central committee and receive the unanimous approval of the party and the people.

APPENDIX V. MEASURES TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING AND TO INCREASE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN INDUSTRY¹

DECISION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CC, CPSU, SEPTEMBER 29, 1965

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is firmly and consistently carrying on the policy of building Communist society in the U.S.S.R., has since the October (1964) plenum of its CC been making an earnest effort to improve the methods of guidance of political, social, and economic life in the country. It has reestablished the Leninist principles of organization of party bodies. In guiding the national economy, it has been going deeper and deeper into the character of economic relations in our society in order to make proper use of the economic laws of society and its immense creative potentialities for the good of the people. A program of measures to increase agricultural production drawn up by the March plenum of the CC is being put into practice.

A major task today is to improve the operation of industry. A well-organized and highly developed industry forms the basis of an up-to-date Socialist economy, of the might of the country. The growth of our economy, the improvement of our people's standard of living, and the strengthening of the defenses of our country depend on the level and extent of industrial progress, on the results achieved by industry.

Industry is growing and improving steadily. Since the 7-year plan was launched gross industrial output has increased by roughly 84 percent as against the 80 percent planned; power generation and output of oil, gas, coal, iron, and steel show a steep uptrend.

Output of chemical products, machinery, equipment, instruments, and consumer goods has been growing noticeably. Over 5,500 large industrial plants have been built and put into operation in 7 years. The fixed assets of industry have almost doubled.

¹ Pravda, Oct. 1, 1965.

In line with modern requirements, the pattern of industrial production has been undergoing important changes. The share of the power, engineering, and chemical industries; that is, of the industries guaranteeing the technological progress of the entire economy, has gone up from 27 to 35 percent since the beginning of the 7-year period.

The wages and salaries of certain categories have been raised, collective farmers have been granted pensions, the supply of consumer goods has been improved and housing construction expanded.

These achievements are due to the tremendous effort of workers, engineers, technicians and scientists, to the vast amount of organizing and educational work done by party, government, trade union, and Komsomol organizations.

The important tasks facing the Soviet economy—raising the level and rate of industrial development, hastening technological progress in every branch of the economy, and improving the standard of living—call for using all the untapped resources of industry and for increasing the national income. This means, first and foremost, increasing production efficiency, raising labor productivity, achieving greater returns from investments and fixed assets, exercising the most rigid economy, eliminating excesses and wasteful spending, and encouraging the working people's initiative to accomplish these tasks.

It is very important to improve planned guidance of the economy and raise the scientific standard of state planning. Economic plans should take into account the prospects of scientific and technological progress and provide for the speedy introduction and use of the latest achievements of science and technology. They should be based on realistic or objective calculations. In drawing up plans, the principal effort should be made to take the economic laws of socialism into careful consideration, guarantee the balanced development of the economy, and obtain maximum output with minimum outlay.

This plenum of the CC, CPSU notes that the present organization of industrial management, methods of planning, and economic stimuli no longer meet requirements and fall short of the level attained by the productive forces.

The prevalence of administrative to the detriment of economic methods is a serious drawback of industrial management. At the enterprises, cost accounting is largely nominal. The economic powers of the enterprises are restricted.

The operation of enterprises is controlled through numerous plan indices, which limits the autonomy and initiative of their staffs and discourages them from improving the organization of production. The material incentives employed in industry do not properly encourage people to improve the overall performance of the enterprises concerned, to make production more profitable and to improve the quality of output.

Industrial management on the regional principle slightly extended opportunities for interindustry specialization and coordination within economic regions. On the other hand, it held up branch specialization and hampered appropriate links between enterprises situated in different economic regions. It moved research and production farther apart, led to fragmentation and to multistage control of industries, and lowered efficiency.

With a view to advancing industry, making social production more effective, hastening technological progress, increasing the rate of growth of the national income and achieving on this basis a further rise in the people's standard of living, we must improve planning methods, afford greater economic stimuli for industrial production and provide staffs with greater material inducements to improve the performance of the enterprises concerned.

The plenum of the CC considers it necessary to organize industrial management on the branch principle and to establish union-republic and union ministries by industries.

It recognizes the advisability of ending excessive control of the enterprises, reducing the number of the plan indices the enterprises are assigned from above, providing them with adequate means for the expansion and improvement of production, and making better use of such important economic stimuli as profit, prices, bonuses, and credits.

Economic and planning agencies must show great flexibility and efficiency in planning and guiding production, promptly take into account changes in the economic situation, use resources flexibly, coordinate production with the growing requirements of the population, promote cost accounting, promptly introduce the latest achievements of science and technology, and find at each particular enterprise optimum ways of fulfilling assignments.

The whole system of planning, guidance of production and material incentives should be directed toward insuring the rapid growth of social production and making it more effective. To attain these objectives, it is very important to afford the personnel of enterprises inducements to make greater commitments under plan, improve the use of production assets, of manpower and material resources and funds, improve production techniques and the organization of labor, and make production more profitable.

While extending the economic autonomy of the enterprise, the party and the government will continue to follow a uniform policy as regards planning the main lines of development of production, technological progress, investment, prices, remuneration, and financing.

The proposed measures to improve management and promote economic methods of guiding industry are important in that they combine integrated state planning with full self-sufficiency of the enterprises, centralized branch management with free economic initiative at the level of the republic or the enterprise, and the principle of one-man management with the increased role of the staffs. Furthermore, they will make for the extension of the democratic principles of management and create economic conditions for greater participation of the rank and file in production management, enabling them to influence the economic performance of the enterprises. This system of economic management is more in keeping with modern requirements and will enable us to make better use of the advantages of the Socialist system.

The plenum approves the measures to improve industrial management and planning and increase economic incentives in industrial production, drafted by the Presidium of the CC, CPSU and reported by Comrade A. N. Kosygin, member of the Presidium of the CC, CPSU, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. It instructs the Presidium of the CC, CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the

U.S.S.R. to adopt relevant decisions and to submit to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. proposals concerning industrial management bodies.

The plenum instructs the Presidium of the CC, CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., the central committees of the Communist parties of the Union republics and the territorial and regional committees of the party to settle without delay all the organizational questions arising from the establishment of Union-republic and Union ministries, as well as of local economic management bodies, in order to guarantee the normal operation of industry, solve properly the problems of placing and using the personnel of the economic agencies to be abolished, and assign highly competent executives to enterprises. The new ministries and departments should be staffed with highly competent experts and able organizers who can organize production in statesmanlike fashion.

The chief task of the ministries, the staffs of industrial enterprises and the research, designing, and planning offices is to insure the rapid growth and greater efficiency of industrial production, the highest possible productivity of labor, and the most effective use of available production assets. With this aim in view, it is imperative to put the latest achievements of Soviet and foreign science and technology to use in the national economy, organize labor on scientific lines, improve the quality of output, tighten state and production discipline, and heighten everyone's responsibility for his job.

The plenum of the CC stresses that the ministries are responsible to the party, state, and people for the development of industry. They must see to it that the technological standards of industry are high, that every branch of the economy is provided with technically perfect and highly efficient machinery, equipment, and instruments, with high-grade raw and other materials, and that the population's demand for high-quality goods is met more fully.

With the adoption of the branch principle of industrial management, and greater economic stimulation of production the role of the party organizations of the republics, territories, regions, towns, districts, enterprises, ministries, and departments in accelerating economic progress will grow, and will impose added responsibility on them for the operation of enterprises and the functioning of economic agencies as they fulfill economic plans and government assignments. Without assuming the functions of economic executives, party committees must concentrate on organizing work, on the selection, placing, and education of personnel, on control over the execution of party and government directives, on more active Communist education of the people.

Party organizations are dutybound steadfastly to study the work of enterprises, help economic executives in revealing and removing shortcomings, direct the efforts of staffs toward utilizing every production reserve, and combat departmental and parochial abuses.

Party committees must have a thorough knowledge of the economic aspects of production, organize the working people's effort for thrifty management, for economy in the use of funds, materials, and manpower, make thriftiness a cause for the whole people, disseminate economic knowledge among executives, and teach them to use economic stimuli for improving industrial production.

Party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations must intensify their effort to heighten the Communist alertness of the people, foster their creative activity, strive for higher productivity of labor, for proper labor and production discipline, and pay greater attention to the task of improving the working and living conditions of staffs. It is essential to organize the working people's socialist emulation movement more effectively so as to insure that every progressive method developed at an enterprise is put to widespread use. The new system of management should be used to the utmost to promote production and afford material inducements to efficient industrial enterprises and personnel.

The economic stimulation of labor productivity is a powerful means of promoting the advance of the socialist economy to communism. On the other hand, the party will continue its effort to heighten the Communist consciousness of the people and inculcate in them a Communist attitude to labor. Communist construction will progress only if every working man or woman does his or her job consciously, exercising initiative and approaching the task in hand in a creative spirit, and if everyone treats public property as thriftily and carefully as his own. It is the duty of party organizations to promote moral stimuli for labor and provide every condition for the genuinely Communist creative effort of the people.

The plenum considers it the duty of party organizations to explain the purpose of the decisions of this plenum to industrial personnel and to working people generally, and to concentrate the efforts of party, Government and economic executives on the realization of the measures proposed by the party and the Government. In drafting these measures, our party was prompted by the fundamental interests of the working class and other working people of our country, and took into full account the proposals and suggestions made by workers, engineers, technicians, and scientists, by party, government, trade union, and Komsomol organizations.

The plenum of the CC, CPSU feels confident that the party and all the working people of our country will welcome the measures to improve industrial management and planning and increase economic incentives in industrial production. Realization of these measures will increase the economic power of the Soviet state, improve the living standards, strengthen the alliance of the workers and peasants, and make for increasing success in Communist construction.

APPENDIX VI. THOUGHTS AFTER THE PLENUM

[By Prof. A. Birman, in *Novyi mir*, December 1965]

If we do not count the revolutionary transformations as a result of which the means of production were socialized, the economic reform promulgated by the September (1965) plenum of the central committee of the party and the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R., in my view, may be considered the third in significance in the entire 48 years of the existence of the Soviet state. The first reform was the transition to the new economic policy in 1921. The second was the change in conditions of economic activity as a result of a number of important governmental acts in 1929-32: The enterprise (and not the

trust, as it was before this time) became the basic economic link; commercial credit with the use of promissory notes was replaced by direct bank financing; the 86 types of payments made by enterprises (to the state) were reduced basically to the turnover tax and deductions from profits; nonreturnable financing of capital investments became predominant; and so forth.

Is it proper to place these three reforms in one rank?

Each of them formulated and determined conditions of the economic activity of the enterprises and the contents of the economic policy of the Soviet state for a long period of time. Each was a complex reform, including more than purely economic problems, but an entire totality of production relationships and, moreover, social relationships. At the present time the foundation has again been laid for economic development over a prolonged period—at least until the end of the current 20-year period, until the construction of the material and technical base of communism in the U.S.S.R.

The multitude of economic and political acts composing the reform in its totality requires a certain amount of time for their development and practical introduction. The new economic policy took approximately 2 years to be introduced after its promulgation at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party. The second reform—and this is apparent from the dates by which it characterized—also took more than 2 years, filled with complex processes in the economic and political life of the country. It is proper and natural that approximately a period of 2 years is also established for the present reform.

The most basic thing, in my view, that characterizes the decisions of the September plenum of the central committee of the party, is the fact that the modern understanding of the essence and quantitative relationships of the Socialist production has been transformed into a system of economic management and administration. As a result of a prolonged and intense discussion, in which many economic workers and scientific workers of the most different branches of knowledge participated—from engineers and agronomists to economists and philosophers—the features of the first phase of the Communist method of production became much more understandable to us, and especially those of the Socialist phase. The creative atmosphere that developed in the country after the criticism of the personality cult made it possible in a comparatively short time to study an enormous quantity of problems and arrive at conclusions in many of them which may be considered generally accepted or in any case approved by a wide circle of economic and party workers and scientists. The fact that the economic discussion and the national economic transformations corresponding to it occurred not only in our country, but also in other Socialist countries, on the one hand confirmed the common nature and homogeneity of the social relationships in all the countries of socialism in the presence of certain peculiarities and differences in each of these countries; on the other hand, this made it possible to exchange experience in economic experiments. All this, taken together, expedited making the necessary practical decisions.

Therefore, it seems to me, an analysis of the decisions of the plenum should begin precisely with the characteristics of our understanding of the essence and quantitative relationships (laws) of socialism and we should discover how they were formed.

In the works of Marx and Engels the characteristics of the features of production under socialism, naturally, were very general, although they contained all the necessary elements for a scientific understanding of the first phase of communism. In them it was mentioned that the means of production will be socialized, that the economy will be planned, that mutual relationships between people will be relationships of comradely cooperation of the workers and a labor competition. Nothing more could be expected from the founders of Marxism. As real scientists, they could construct their scientific conclusions only by generalizing material from practice. But, however, there was no practice in Socialist economic management then and therefore the theory of this phase of the development of mankind could not be developed in details.

If we attentively study the pre-October revolution works of Lenin and the works written by him up to the middle of 1918, it becomes apparent that V. I. Lenin assumed a certain sequence and a gradual nature of the transition from capitalist to Socialist methods of production. The first measures proposed were nationalization of the banks, transfer of the land to the peasants, and the establishment of workers' control of the enterprises. He had in mind the widespread use of the monopoly of foreign trade, financial and credit policy, and a number of other economic levers as the commanding heights of the proletarian state. In this case, however, in a definite form and within definite limits, so to say, not only was the possibility of using domestic capitalist elements not excluded, but it was even considered possible to bring in foreign concessionaires.

The desperate resistance of the landowners and capitalists, and their transition to a civil war against the young Soviet states, and the military intervention, forced the party and the Government to make a sharp turn in the direction of their economic policy. As is well known, in the period of militant communism, trade and monetary relationships were sharply reduced, and the natural distribution of that relatively small quantity of material values which could be mobilized and distributed was widely propagated. And right then appeared the temptation to make a transition immediately to direct exchange of products between various branches of the national economy, primarily between industry and agriculture. Simultaneously, the mandatory general cooperation of the population was promulgated, in order to shift to the distribution of consumers' goods among the workers. As V. I. Lenin indicated later on, this was an attempt to make the transition from the multiple-ownership nature of the economy to socialism by a "Red Guard" attack on capital.

However, this attempt was not crowned with success.

Actually, relationships involving the exchange of money for goods continued to exist in the country, both legally and semilegally, trade under the counter went on, and unbridled speculation in the greatest varieties of goods and products flourished. Besides this, the administrative prohibition of goods exchange led to the fact that a certain part of the middle peasantry began to oppose the economic policy of the Soviet state. The party opportunely and deeply analyzed the real economic relationships and made the only correct conclusion, showing its scientific penetration, that it was necessary to make an open transition to monetary-goods relationships upon condition of the concentra-

tion of the commanding heights of the economy in the hands of the state and a persistent and purposefully directed development of it toward socialism.

The detailed development of Lenin's legacy of the last years of his life and activities is of enormous interest and great urgency. While in the first years of the Soviet regime the problem of monetary and goods relationships was still not entirely clear and Lenin was pondering about whether or not the products of the state enterprises in the U.S.S.R. were goods, to what degree they were goods, and to what degree they already could not be considered as goods, in the works of 1921-23 the attention of which was concentrated on other things. In a most thorough manner he analyzes every detail, every side and feature of economic mutual relationships and finds in them the necessity of using the goods exchange, money, credit, finances, prices, and other economic levers, which occupy, in his opinion, a decisive place in the mechanism of the transition to the Socialist method of production.

In the first section of the regulation concerning trusts it is said that a trust is a state enterprise, based on commercial principles, for the purpose of making a profit. It is entirely possible to assume that for such a type of definition, a student, until quite recently, would have gotten a bad mark or two in an examination of political economy. * * *

However, such a definition is absolutely correct, and the 44 years that have passed since that time shows that there is no necessity of correcting even a single word in it. As a matter of fact, the enterprise is a "state" enterprise; in conditions of the Soviet regime this means an enterprise belonging to the people, working in the interests of the people, making products of good quality, which cannot engage in inflating prices or other speculative machinations. "Founded on commercial principles" means working expeditiously, without stagnation, or bureaucratism, applied for the needs of the people, and striving to satisfy these needs completely and rapidly. "For the purpose of making a profit" means that it operates efficiently, not only covering production expenses, but also creating accumulations, which (as was already mentioned in the resolutions of the 12th party congress) determined the fate of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country.

In essence, the necessity of achieving maximum savings with a minimum of expenditures, as formulated in the party program, accepted by the 22d party congress as a most important law of economic management, is the repetition of Lenin's "regulation concerning trusts," but, of course, applies to the entire national economy, on the scale and in the conditions of the middle 1960's.

We must remember that Lenin's ideas of autonomous financing in the management and organization of the national economy as a whole were not entirely accomplished in practice. Since the beginning of the 1930's, as economic principles of management were pushed further and further into the background, to an ever greater degree, methods of organizational effect on the rates and proportions of expanded production became ever more widely distributed.

Incidentally, the entire situation scarcely facilitated the development of the political economy of socialism as a science. The combination of these two circumstances also led to the fact that until recent

times we had a very poor conception of the essence and the laws of the Socialist society in which we live. Incidentally, there is nothing surprising in this. Several decades is a negligibly short historical period. And it is also not surprising that we, contemporary people and participants in rapid and continuous historical events, were in no position to gain a thorough and objective understanding of the social relationships whose creators we are, while at the same time we are products of them.

In the first year or two after the great October revolution, all sorts of series of relative degrees of dispensing with money and replacing it with all sorts of certificates or vouchers expressed in labor units, power units, or other types of units were in circulation. However, these views became obsolete quite rapidly. In practice, the necessity of a firm and stable Soviet currency, a balanced budget, and a well-developed credit system was generally recognized. It is true that by the end of the first 5-year plan "dizziness due to success" caused a relapse to the leftwing standpoint of the possibility of abolishing money and trade. However, these points of view evaporated quite rapidly. Thus, no disagreement, in practice, existed as to whether or not it was necessary to strengthen the financial and credit system and improve trade. Things were much more complex in theory. Until 1940 it was considered generally accepted that the law of value is not in effect under socialism. It was impossible, under such conditions, to explain what prices, money, credit, or finances could be. If the law of value is not in effect, if value as an economic category is lacking, then, of course, the forms of value also cannot be explained, that is, primarily money and prices. The theoretical "gap" was filled by applied dissertations that the economic categories just listed were survivals which had been handed down to the Socialist society from capitalism, some sort of appendage of little use and a dangerous source of possible inflammation. It is true that almost no one agreed to the necessity of its surgical excision. It was assumed that forms of value would gradually die away by themselves as the intensification of Socialist principles in the national economy increased, with the total liquidation of the private capital sector, as we approached Communist conditions of production and distribution.

In 1940 it was formulated that under socialism the law of value is in effect, but "in a converted form." Nothing was said in detail about the nature of this "conversion." But one could assume that they were speaking as if the law of value, perceived as before as a survival from the past, was subordinate to the effect of such relationships forming the Socialist method of production as common ownership of the means of production and planned development.

Discussion about the draft of a political economy textbook at the beginning of the 1950's, although it gave us quite a lot for an analysis of the essence of the Socialist method of production and its laws, at the same time served as a source of a number of improper conclusions. In Stalin's work "Ekonomicheskiye problemy sotsializma v SSSR" (Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.) it was indicated that the basic cause of the operation of the law of value and the use of forms of value lies in the presence of two forms of Socialist ownership. It was established that only the products of cooperative enter-

prises and consumers' goods, fabricated at state enterprises, can be real goods, since they make a transition into use in the spheres of cooperative and personal ownership. The overwhelming part of the national economy, all enterprises based on the state form of Socialist ownership, were considered to be outside goods production, and were not considered to be goods producers. The necessity of money and of the entire "money economy" was explained by the fact that it is necessary to calculate, to keep accounts, and to know how the work of the enterprise is going. With such an understanding of the essence of the matter, it was not difficult to see the prospect of future development in the curtailment of money and goods relationship, rather than in their development. It is not surprising that in a number of speeches at the 19th Party Congress mention was made of the necessity of expediting in every way natural exchange between industry and agriculture. Natural relationships between state enterprises and kolkhozes were also widely distributed. Suffice it to say that the overwhelming part of payment for work performed by MTS [machine-tractor stations], as is well known, were made in kind. And in the kolkhozes also, accounting of the work and distribution of products was of a natural nature [that is, kolkhoz members were paid in kind and their labor was reckoned by the farm produce they were responsible for growing]. Very few monetary payments were made by workdays.

However, all practice in the development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. protested against such an understanding of economic relationships. Everyday experience had convinced each objective researcher, each practical worker, that the application of material incentives (and in a monetary form), economically justified prices, a differentiated regime of crediting and financing, not only had not held back the development of the economy, but, on the contrary, had facilitated it in every way. And this referred not only to cooperative enterprises, but primarily and especially to state enterprises. And, on the contrary, each reduction of the sphere of monetary and goods relationships, any relaxation of economic levers and their replacement by administrative levers, had hampered the growth of the national economy. No sooner had planning organizations been converted from an autonomous to a budget regime of financing in 1950 than their work immediately deteriorated, and numerous frictions arose between them and their clients.

The urgent necessity of accelerating the rates of development of the Socialist economy required that real autonomous financing be introduced, first in the sovkhozes and then in the kolkhozes also. Thus, in agriculture—in this branch where natural relationships and administrative methods of management had dominated longest and most of all—it turned out to be necessary primarily to introduce a widespread system of economic methods of management. This forced many economists and practical workers to give the matter more thought, to analyze again and again what the socialist method of production is, what must economic relationships between workers and enterprises be, between enterprises within a branch of industry, between branches of production, between state and cooperative sectors? And the end of the 1950's was marked by the beginning of an active and fruitful economic discussion, which, sometimes dying down a bit, but never broken off,

extended until this year, when, by the resolutions of the September Plenum, a considerable part of the problems in question were solved. And solved in a new way: that is, on the basis of the modern understanding of the essence of the Socialist method of production.

What is this understanding?

The overwhelming majority of Soviet economists, and also the economists of other Socialist countries, stand on the principle that monetary and goods relationships are organically proper to the Socialist method of production, as they are a form of connection between various spheres of the division of labor. It has turned out that monetary and goods relationships are nothing more common than simply the condition of the existence of simple goods production, or the capitalist method of production. Apparently, monetary and goods relationships can exist in other formations of human society than these. But the specific content of these relationships, entirely naturally, changes; under capitalism they are not the same as in a simple goods economy, and under socialism they are far from the same as they are in the capitalist method of production.

It has turned out that the law of value may operate precisely thus in different social formations and that it in general has never had and in no way must mandatorily have a spontaneous nature. Experience in the development of the Soviet economy, and also the economies of other Socialist countries, shows that the law of value not only does not contradict other economic laws, such as, for example, the basic economic law and the law of planned development, but, on the contrary, its use is a very important lever for intensification of the effect of other economic laws, exactly in the same way as the correct use of the law of planned development intensifies the effect of the law of value on Socialist production.

It has turned out that state Socialist enterprises (and cooperative enterprises even more so) are in no way simple fillers of the orders of the state. They are not merely the bricks in the building or the bolts in a machine. An enterprise in the system of the national economy under socialism, is a living cell of a living organism. This is a whole world, with its own peculiarities, interests, and laws. The most convincing proofs exist that underestimation of these peculiarities, interests, and laws inflict harm not only upon the cell itself, but also upon the entire organism as a whole. In other words, state Socialist enterprises (and cooperative enterprises to an even greater degree) at the stage of socialism stand out as goods producers. Of course, they are not like the Cimmerian shoemakers carrying their goods to the fair. These are goods producers operating in conditions of social ownership of the means of production, in conditions of a planned development of the economy, when the purpose of economic management is the maximum possible satisfaction of the needs of the people by means of a continuous development of the forces of production and of production relationships.

But, nevertheless, these are goods producers. This means that the relationships between them—between two state enterprises—are relationships of goods exchange, where the requirements of equivalency in relationships dominate with an irresistible inflexibility. Unfortunately, there are too many examples and proofs of the fact that any

violation of equivalency in exchange, in particular as a result of the effect of prices that are not economically justified, inflicts direct harm upon the development of production. The presence of subsidies, of enterprises that operate at a planned or actual loss, and many other generally known facts prove how vitally necessary the observation of the requirements of equivalency is in relationships between enterprises.

What is the cause of the fact that in a period of socialism state enterprises stand out as goods producers? Why is it that, with every decade of the development of the Socialist method of production, monetary and goods relationships in our country not only are not relaxing, but are intensifying, and the sphere of their use is not only not contracting, but is continuously expanding? Does not this signify delays in the development of Socialist production relationships, retarding the transition, the flowering of socialism into communism? A positive answer to the last question is natural, if monetary and goods relationships are considered as they were before, in the form of a survival that had been handed down to us from capitalism, in the form of foreign bodies not proper to our social structure. But an entirely different answer is obtained in a case when we consider them as organically proper to the Socialist method of production.

One of the principal distinctions of the first phase of communism—the Socialist phase—from its second phase consists precisely of the fact, in our opinion, that the Socialist economy is an economy developing in conditions of monetary and goods relationships, in distinction from the Communist phase, when such relationships will not exist. As a matter of fact, many other production conditions—common ownership of the means of production, and planned development—remain the same for both phases, which, of course, does not exclude an incommensurably higher development of these relationships and concepts in conditions of communism.

Thus, how do we explain the fact that state Socialist enterprises almost half a century after the establishment of the Soviet regime stand out as goods producers? Apparently by the peculiarities of the nature of labor in the period of socialism.

Socialization of the means of production and the management of the national economy on a planned basis has changed the content of labor in a basic manner, and has given it a social nature. While in pre-Socialist formations only on the market, after sales, was it established whether or not a product is needed by society, in our country the suppliers and consumers are indicated a long time before the beginning of production. However, when speaking of the social nature of labor, Soviet economists usually add that it is still not completely social. Completely social labor will exist only under communism.

But what does saying that it is not final mean? What economic sense is included in these words, and what practical conclusions are derived from them?

It is apparent that the fact is labor has a social nature primarily from the standpoint of its organization. Actually, the enterprises work according to a plan, thus the labor of each worker is provided for and purposefully directed in advance. Nevertheless, numerous facts are known when the products made—both means of production and

consumers' goods—do not find a purchaser. The goods are not of the right fashion, not made at the right time, not the right quality, the consumer no longer needs them—such are only a few of the reasons engendering difficulties in the sales of definite types of products, although they were also produced according to plan. Consequently, at the stage of socialism society still does not have the opportunity to determine its needs absolutely accurately and faultlessly or to organize the ideal satisfaction of these needs. Of course, in the general goods traffic the fraction of products that do not find a market is negligible. But the fact that it rises every year is alarming. As scarcities disappear, difficulties in the sale of individual types of goods increase. And these difficulties do not have an absolute nature, but, so to speak, a relative nature. When we are speaking about each specific type of goods, they are caused by some sort of difficulties or others, in most cases organizational difficulties. However, the presence of these troubles themselves can scarcely be considered accidental. It is rather that they are objectively proper to the given level of planning and organization of the management of production. Consequently, the incompleteness of the social nature of labor (in which all economists are in agreement) consists, apparently, in the first place of the fact that some part of the products do not correspond to the real needs of society, although they were produced in precise correspondence with the plan.

But this is not the main thing.

The main thing lies in the fact that the producer himself still does not consider his labor as an organic need. Labor has still not ceased to be a forced necessity for everyone. In order for labor to become an organic need, it must be interesting, pleasant, and give complete moral and material satisfaction. The development of the forces of production and production relationship under socialism is proceeding in this direction, but we are still far from complete achievement of our purpose.

As long as labor remains a forced necessity for many persons, methods of providing for work discipline and a continuous rise in its productivity must be found. And we are speaking not only about the efficiency of human labor, that is, the direct work of each individual person, but also the efficiency of the use of social labor, that is, the labor that is fixed and personified in buildings, equipment, materials, fuel, tools, and so forth. The higher the degree of technical equipment of production, the greater the importance of the efficiency of the use of social labor itself. Suffice it to say that in production expenses in industry wages, on the average, do not make up more than 20 percent, while the means of production occupy more than 80 percent. But how can we rally the efficiency of the use of human and social labor? How can we measure the degree of success with which machinist Comrade Ivanov expends his working time, uses his turning lathe, cutting tools, metal, and other elements of production? This is possible only by the reduction of all specific expenditures to a general abstract form. Cost, finding its external expression in a monetary measurement, has become such an abstract form historically. Having said that the enterprise is within its rights to expend, let us say, not more than 4 rubles on production of one chair, we thus have programed the necessary degree of the efficiency of use of human labor, tools, and the ob-

jects of labor. But people do not work individually, they work in collectives, forming Socialist enterprises. Consequently, the task becomes more complicated. It is necessary to determine the efficiency of the work of each of hundreds or thousands of workers and employees of each of these enterprises, and their managers. This is again possible only by reducing all forms of expenditures to those socially necessary and expressing them in a monetary form.

Consequently, the general conclusion at which we arrive on the basis of an analysis of decades of practice in Socialist economic management in the U.S.S.R. may be formulated thus: at the given level of the socialization of labor and the possible degree of its social nature in the period of socialism, a value measurement of the expenditures of human and social labor is necessary, and a check of the real needs for each product by means of its sales is needed; that is, the transformation of the goods into money.

It is precisely by these circumstances that the necessity of monetary and goods relationships at the first stage of a Communist society is also determined. The presence of two forms of Socialist ownership, and also individual peasants and handicraftsmen that are not in co-operatives, introduces only certain additional complicating circumstances, but are not the basic cause of the necessity of the existence of monetary and trade relationships and the operation of the law of cost.

With such an understanding of the essence of production relationships under socialism, we arrive at the conclusion that the basic thing in the organization of management is the creation of optimum conditions for the work of the enterprise, because it is precisely this that is the cell of the Socialist economic organism. The essence of the decisions of the September plenum of the central committee of the party and the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R., as it seems to us, lies in the fact that the enterprise is placed at the center of planning and management. All other organs, all forms and methods of planning and management, are constructed in such a manner as to give the enterprise the opportunity to manage its affairs in the optimum manner. It is precisely these problems that were at the center of 3 years of economic discussion that have occurred in our country. And the decisions of the plenum, as was mentioned in the report of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers U.S.S.R., A. N. Kosygin, summarized this discussion, having transformed into legislative principles all those possible solutions of the problems confronting us, with relationship to which the overwhelming majority of the economic workers and scientists had arrived to a common conviction. Thus, the present reform differs in principle from a number of the organizational measures which during the past decade have been promulgated without preliminary study and scientific justification.

What caused this economic discussion? Why did it flare up precisely now? What explains its urgency?

We also find the answer to these questions in the materials of the last plenum of the central committee of the party and the last session of the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. The successful fulfillment of the 7-year plan showed how exceptionally great the production capacities created in our country are and how much their wise and effective use

may give. As a matter of fact only a highly developed and flourishing country is in a position to provide simultaneously such a high rate of production, to achieve such outstanding successes in the field of science and engineering, to accomplish a gigantic program of housing construction, and to raise the standard of living of the people.

The fulfillment of the 7-year plan convincingly opened the eyes of managers and economists to the gigantic opportunities enclosed in the Socialist economy. In this case, the transition from the branch to the territorial principle of the management of industry had no small significance. Although this transition did not justify itself as a whole, nevertheless we cannot deny the fact that it caused a considerable rise in economic activity in many industrial centers and economic regions of the country. Production capacities and economic connections, which for decades had been developed in the territory of the entire country, but were so constricted within the framework of the ministries and departments, immediately were transformed into diverse totalities, showing how great and significant were the production centers located in the most different parts of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, during the fulfillment of the 7-year plan, phenomena were also observed which could not help but alarm us. This was also discussed in detail at the plenum. The rate of growth of the social product and of industrial production slowed down somewhat. Of course, this rate is considerably higher than, let us say, it is in the United States of America, but it did show a certain tendency toward slowing down. There is no necessity for us to comfort ourselves by the fact that, let us say, 1 percent of growth in 1965 is considerably more than 2 percent in 1957. We do not need consolations, but an analysis of the tendencies, and, which is even more important, measures to overcome them. In order to catch up with and over-take the leading capitalist countries with respect to level of production per head of population, we must increase production, not only absolutely, but also relatively; that is, in percentages, in rates.

What is called the return in the language of economists has also decreased somewhat. In other words, we have begun to obtain less production annually for each thousand rubles of fixed assets (buildings, structures, machines, mechanisms) than we did 3 to 5 years ago. And there are explanations for this. To some measure, the reduction in the return is caused by the change in the structure of industrial production, the development of more inaccessible regions, and the decrease of prices for the products made. And, again, it is more important not to make a collection of these soothing explanations, but to concentrate our attention on this tendency in order to overcome it.

In a number of branches of industry, productivity of labor is growing slowly, sometimes even falling behind the growth of the wage fund. However, productivity of labor, and its growth, have always been and always will be the basic factor guaranteeing the victory of socialism over capitalism in their peaceful economic competition.

Not everything is well in the quality of products. Those high requirements upon quality of the product, which are caused by the modern technology of production and the increased demands of the people, are far from always satisfied by our industry.

The problem of material and technical supply and wholesale trade has also become more complicated. On the one hand, an unsatisfied

demand still exists for certain means of production and consumers' goods. On the other hand, stockpiles of both means of production and consumers' goods are continuously growing. The saddest thing of all is that these products lying in the warehouse are fabricated from the same material and made by the same people who could have been making products for which the demand has not been satisfied. Here is one of many examples. They are continuing to produce cotton staple fiber, which has gone out of style, and are not making cotton knitwear, for which there is a great demand.

What has caused these phenomena and tendencies that alarm us? Are these not symptoms that are organically proper to the Socialist method of production?

By no means! All Soviet economists and practical economic workers are unanimous in this. However, opinions diverge in a decisive manner in the explanation of the cause.

Some participants in the discussion have assumed that the cause of these undesirable phenomena that we mentioned above lies in the fact that planning and management have fallen quantitatively behind the scale of the economy. The national economy has grown to such limits that it cannot be planned by means of adding machines and key-punch calculating machines. Another type of organizational technique is needed. In the opinion of these economists, the planning organs should be equipped with an adequate quantity of electronic computers, and the necessary mathematical algorithms must be developed, then everything will be all right. A detailed address plan could be compiled for any quantity of products—even for each hook individually—which would indicate who, to whom, when, and how much of these products must be delivered, and the entire problem would be solved.

In the opinion of other economists and management workers, things are quite different, and the causes of these phenomena are not the same. In their opinion, the conception of administrative regulation of their establishment contradicts the economic nature of the Socialist method of production; namely, the necessity for creating the material and technical base of communism in conditions of the effect of monetary and goods relationships. With such an approach to the matter centralized planning must be concerned only with the most general trends and indices—and, at the same time, the most decisive, determining, vitally important ones: the structure of social production, proportions between individual branches, rates of growth, basic trends in the distribution of the forces of production, the relationships between the first and second subdivisions of social production, relationships between consumption and accumulation. As for the mechanism of the economic relationships in the accomplishment of the plan, they must be accomplished on the basis of economic agreements and direct mutual economic connections between producers and consumers, sub-contractors and contractors, the clientele and transport, trade and the population.

Recently we read in the newspapers this type of communication: some construction project is going slowly, because some main administrations or the Sovnarkhoz RSFSR, for example, have forgotten to provide it with some sort of machines or instruments. But can we, in general, assign to the central planning and management organs

the task of providing each construction project with thousands and thousands of types of tools, equipment, and instruments, if we consider that in our country not less than 100,000 construction projects are functioning simultaneously? In the opinion of the second group of economists, the very statement of the problem, the very attempt to accomplish production and the distribution of the social products by administrative methods, are unrealistic and impossible. And the more diversified the economy becomes, the greater the number of miscalculations and shortcomings in planning will occur, these economists assume, if it remains the same as it was until recent times, and no electronic computers or mathematical algorithms will be able to help this.

The plenum of the central committee of the party and the session of the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. agreed with this position, having acknowledged that the system of planning and management of the national economy that existed until recent times did not correspond to the increased scales of the national economy. Thus, the solution of the problem was transferred from the organizational, technical, and administrative sphere to the economic and social sphere. The enormous principal and historic significance of the present economic reform lies in this.

In what was the basic flaw of the system of planning, management, and incentive that was in existence until recent times? In the fact that attempts to approve all detailed conditions of the activity of each enterprise from the center was unavoidable, and objectively led to a mechanical, equalizing approach. Since it is impossible to know the situation at each enterprise precisely, they worked from some average conditions, which actually did not exist at each given enterprise, and added to them approximately the same rate of growth—easy for some and not within the capabilities of others. This forced the enterprises to hide the internal reserves they had, in order to avoid “treading on their own heels,” and excessive plan assignments that were not within their capabilities.

V. I. Lenin devoted enormous attention to the problem of the stimulus of a continuous growth in Socialist production. Answering those who predicted the unavoidability of the failure of the Soviet regime on the basis of the fact that under it private enterprise incentive for a continuous expansion of production was lacking, Lenin indicated that as a replacement for this private enterprise incentive a new, incommensurably more powerful and effective incentive would come—the aspiration of millions of people to make as much as they could, as rapidly and as well as they could. As a matter of fact, the Socialist method of production is incompatible with private enterprise incentive, which—this must in no way be denied—serves as a very effective springboard for the economic development of capitalist states. However, we need not fear this loss. Actually, the socialization of the means of production, and the transformation of the workers into the owners of the factories, plants, the land, transport, and other means of production, causes such a tide of creative initiative in them, and creates such opportunities for its practical accomplishment, in comparison to which the efficiency of private enterprise incentive is negligible. The troubles of the past decades, however, lay in the fact

that the system of planning, incentive, and management forced the enterprises to hide their reserves, to hold back initiative, in order to have the capability of fulfilling the plan and obtaining the appropriate material reward.

As a matter of fact, it is really well known that the plan for each subsequent year really contained an approximately equal addition for the enterprises, let us say, of 6-8 percent or more to the "base," that is, to the level of the past year. In such a situation the enterprise, which in the past year had entirely mobilized all its reserves, would be in an impossibly difficult situation in the forthcoming year, while a collective which had been able to work at less than full capacity in the past year would obtain a correspondingly smaller assignment and would be among the winners.

The losses which the national economy suffered from the necessity of the enterprises to oppose their interests to the interests of society as a whole to some degree literally do not yield to calculations. And this is generally recognized.

Recently a book was published by the famous aircraft designer, Oleg Konstantinovich Antonov, entitled "Dlya vsekh i dlya sebya" (For Everyone and for Yourself). In it the author appears as an economist rather than a designer of aircraft. His book is interesting from many standpoints and deserves special attention. In this article we want only to say that in it dozens of the most diverse examples and facts are given, showing the devices to which the collectives of enterprises had to turn in order to eliminate or at least reduce losses, which were bad for society, that originated as a result of improper planning, forms of incentive, and accounting of the work of the enterprises that were not well conceived. But it is entirely apparent that methods of planning and management which inflict harm upon the basic and decisive advantage of socialism over capitalism—the possibility of an unlimited manifestation of the economic initiative by millions of workers—cannot be tolerated any longer. They must be replaced. And they have actually been replaced by the resolutions of the September plenum of the central committee and the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.

What is the main essence of these decisions?

Bringing economic methods of management to the foreground. This does not mean at all that the state is dispensing with the use of administrative forms of coercion. It is well known that some people are capable for a prolonged time of listening and acting differently; that is, to recognize in words the necessity of change, but to continue the previous, customary, ossified "line." The state has applied and in the future will still apply severe administrative methods of coercion upon such a type of people. Administrative methods of management are also necessary in dozens of other cases. However, economic methods of planning, management, and incentive are now being brought to the foreground.

What does this signify in practice? Why, the fact that the state will influence the collectives of the enterprises and each individual worker by means of influencing their interests.

V. I. Lenin indicated that classes and individual people, in their actions, guide themselves primarily by their own interests. This is

also applicable to a Socialist society, with only the advantage that under socialism, since the means of production have been socialized and there are no hostile classes, the interests of each individual worker, with the correct organization of economic management, coincide fully with the interests of the enterprise, and the interests of the enterprise with the needs of society as a whole.

Does each individual worker have some special interests? Of course he does. They lie in the fact that he wants to have the opportunity to work according to his capabilities; that is, to do that work for which each worker actually has the necessary experience and knowledge; to have the opportunity to work productively during the entire working day; to obtain for his work effective material incentives; to participate actively in the management of production, to be not only one who does the work, but also a participant in the compilation of plans and measures for their fulfillment, in other words, to have the work give him continuous and high moral satisfaction, which is an organic element of the process of labor in a Socialist society.

Does an enterprise, as a collective of the workers, have its own special interests?

Perhaps it does. They consist of fulfilling the plan, and, if possible, overfulfilling it, and feeling oneself by rights to be an active participant in Communist labor; to have the brand of the enterprise enjoy deserved fame; to have the products of the enterprise sought (i.e., by buyers); to have the technical level of production continuously improve, to have the equipment and production areas satisfy today's requirements; to have successes in work rewarded effectively by material incentive.

It is quite apparent that the interests of the enterprises and the workers under socialism not only do not contradict, even in the smallest degree, the needs of society, but, to the contrary, serve as an incentive force and a source of high rates of development of Socialist production. Here, as it were, is a closed circle: the interests of each worker, each enterprise, are satisfied, the greater material values society will obtain, and the greater its capabilities will be for additional satisfaction of the needs of each worker, each enterprise. To the contrary, with shortcomings in planning, incentive, or management, the "busier" an enterprise is, the more energetically it finds out its internal reserves, the lower the quality of production, the more difficult it is to introduce technical innovations there, the lower the return obtained by society as a whole.

Are there no contradictions between the aspiration to have an influence by means of the interests of the enterprises and workers and the centralized system of planned management?

If we understand the word "plan" as Lenin did—as a program of the struggle of the people for the building of communism—there are no contradictions. Because, with such an understanding of the word "plan," it embodies in itself the creative initiative of the people, but, in this case, it is given the necessary purposefulness and consistency.

The accomplishment of the economic reforms, undoubtedly, will bring forth great and good fruits for Socialist industry and all the other branches of the national economy. We are now simply in no position to imagine their real scale, precisely because the present eco-

conomic regime (perhaps for the first time in all the years of the existence of the Soviet state) will give us the opportunity to place in correspondence and join the interests of tens of millions of workers and hundreds of thousands of enterprises with the needs of society as a whole, completely, on a deep scientific basis, and this society, strictly speaking, also consists of these tens of millions of workers, working for themselves, for their families, for the people as a whole.

There is no necessity to expound the decisions of the plenum of the central committee of the party and the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.—everybody is reading and studying them. We should only call attention to certain main trends, as it seems to us, in economic policy as proposed in them.

We have already said that the enterprise will become the center of the entire system of planning, management, and incentive. In order to expand our capabilities of maneuvering it, the quantity of indexes approved for the enterprise "from above" has been reduced. Now altogether only five of them have been established: sales of products, assortment of basic products, wage fund, profit and profitability, and mutual relationships with the state budget. The matter, however, does not lie merely in the fact that the number of indexes has become fewer. The main thing lies in another thing, in the nature of the indexes left.

The basic index is sales of the product. But what is sales? This is not packing, not shipping, and not transportation of the product. Sales is an economic process, and, precisely, the transformation of goods into money. Only after the consumer has paid for the products delivered to him is a sale completed. This does not mean that the process of production will retreat to the background. Production always has been and always will be the basic form of economic activities. It is precisely in the process of production that material values, the social product, and the national income are created. However, production does not exist merely for production, but for consumption. The sales index of the products testifies to the fact that, passing through a multibranch system of economic relationships, the product is accepted by those for whom it was intended; that is, its necessity and the advisability of expending labor on its fabrication is confirmed at the most final and decisive stage. At the same time, having obtained money from the purchaser, the supplier is in a position to begin a new production cycle. Until the goods have been turned into money, there are no funds for a new economic cycle. Of course, there is practically no need to stop production after the shipment of each individual lot of the product. We do not have such a primitive understanding of the connection of sales with production in mind. We are speaking about the fact that if the product is not paid for, after some short interval of time, production ceases.

The introduction of sales as a basic index gives enormous importance to the struggle for improving the quality of the product. Now it becomes clear to everyone that it is necessary to fabricate that which will be accepted and paid for. From the sphere of conviction and agitation, quality of the product has made a transition into the sphere of practical functions: a product that is not accepted is not listed in the fulfillment of the plan, with all the consequences derived therefrom

for each worker of the enterprise supplying it. But the matter does not lie merely in this. It has happened that a production that is of good quality in itself does not find any market, either because it is simply not needed, or because those persons who require it do not have funds to acquire it. Finally, in the sphere of trade, good products are encountered which have gone out of style. Advancement of the sales index of the product to the foreground raises the commercial side of economic activity, which has been buried during the previous decade, to the proper level. In the absolutely overwhelming majority of our enterprises there are also no independent and capable financial services; that is, those organs, those particles of the economic mechanism, whose direct service duty is servicing the circulation of money. That which is called financial work at the overwhelming majority of the enterprises is, as a matter of fact, elementary financial recordkeeping—the compilation of documents for delivery to the bank, and receiving and distributing money. Now, when the well-being of each enterprise depends upon its customers, the establishment of commercial and financial work acquires vitally important significance for the enterprise. One customer who refuses to pay, delaying sales of 10 suppliers, thus transforms them into factories and plants that have not fulfilled the plan, with all the consequences derived therefrom.

In his report Comrade A. N. Kosygin has indicated that, perhaps, the mechanism of credit will be used in order to come to the aid of those "who are guilty through no fault of their own." However, such aid, and this is clear to everyone, cannot be continuous or unlimited. Each autonomously financed enterprise must take concern itself that payment discipline is strictly observed. And this is not so simple, if we bear in mind that every year in our country trillions of payment documents are compiled and carried out, and some economic operation is hidden behind each of them. At an average machine-building plant every day 300 or 400 bills are paid to suppliers, and 150 to 200 payments from customers arrive * * *.

The necessity of leaving the basic assortment of products among the indexes does not require any special explanations. The requirement of the observation of proportions in the development of the national economy obligates the planning organ to know how many such products are fabricated, and also where and when they are fabricated, and each of these products occupies a special place in the development of the national economy. Nevertheless it is apparent that as planning is improved, and artificially created disproportions are eliminated, the circle of such directly planned products will be energetically reduced. And today already millions of types of means of production exist, the number of which is entirely adequate in our country; with respect to them we may make the transition to ordinary wholesale trade without any risk, and dispense with funds and allotments. Every month, and every year, this circle will widen more and more, but some quantity of products, of course, always will be indicated in the plan by name. Wholesale bases never will trade in blooming mills, turbines, generators, and icebreakers * * *.

The advancement of the profit and profitability index to the foreground has especially important significance.

How long prejudices last. Ask any five people, and three of them, without a doubt, will say to you that profits are a concept foreign to

socialism, taken by us "on hire" for the time being. However, neither the classic writers of Marxism-Leninism, nor half a century of practice in Socialist economic management, have never advanced any doubts of the usefulness of profit and its complete correspondence to Socialist principles of economic management. However, the prejudices of which we are speaking are not merely propagated among non-specialists (which would be only half the trouble). In any political economy textbook we may encounter the phrase that the purpose of production under socialism is not to obtain profits, but to satisfy the needs of the people. This means that profits are somehow in opposition to the interests of the people. However, one needs to think only a little in order to become convinced of the total senselessness of this phrase.

As a matter of fact, what are profits? Let us take two textile mills. Let us assume that they are entirely the same in every way, and differ only in the fact that the first ended the year of 1964 with a profit, and the second with a loss. In what was this difference expressed? In the fact—and only in the fact—that the first factory produced more cloth or (which is the same thing) expended less cotton, fuel, wages, and other expenses to make an equal quantity of cloth. From the cotton and other expenses saved, additional fabric was produced, either at this factory or at another. It is precisely thus that the profits of the machine builders are expressed in machine tools, the profits of a confectionery in confections, etc. It could not be otherwise. Actually profit—and this no one denies—is a monetary expression of the value of the additional product created by additional labor; that is, by labor given for the good of society. At first this additional product, like any other part of the social product, is produced in the natural form and only later, after sale, does it settle in the form of an additional sum of money in the accounts of the producer. But actually, it is not only additional products, but all the products, that are transformed into money. Consequently the phrase: "The purpose of production is not profit" may signify only one thing: we do not need more good products, but fewer * * *.

From whence was this sacramental phrase taken? Apparently it originated in quite a simple manner. The classic writers of Marxism-Leninism repeatedly and justly said that the purpose of production under capitalism is not to satisfy the needs of the people, but to obtain profits. This is really true. It is a matter of indifference to a capitalist what he produces, and since the fabrication of atomic bombs is more profitable than the printing of textbooks or the construction of dwelling houses, capital floods from peaceful to warlike branches of industry to that measure that is possible. There are no crimes, swindles, or falsifications to which a capitalist monopoly will not resort if this will bring in additional profits.

So that here, from this correct Marxist position, according to the simple principle of "among us everything is the contrary," apparently the opposition of profits to other parts of the social product was born. But actually are profits in the U.S.S.R. the result of exploitation, inhuman intensification of production, falsification of production, or speculative machinations with prices? No, no, and again no. Only the surface concept of the essence of the Socialist method of production

could engender, and actually did engender, the prejudice of the non-correspondence of profits to the Socialist method of production. However, it is not difficult to understand that actually our society needs profits to a much greater degree and in much larger dimensions than does capitalism. There we are speaking about satisfying the needs of the dominating class and the circles serving it, which, in the final analysis, would scarcely compose more than 10 or 15 percent of the entire population. We, however, set ourselves the task of complete satisfaction of the needs of all the people, and we are solving it. This means that we need much more profit. This was also said in the party program, where, as a basic law of economic management, the requirement was advanced of obtaining the maximum savings with the minimum of expenditures. And this also means to work as profitably as possible.

The advancement of profit as one of the most important indexes of the work of an enterprise is important for at least two reasons.

In the first place, in the profit index it is not only the production activity that is reflected, but all sides of economic management: the commercial side, auxiliary enterprises, the use of the housing fund, and so forth. Any achievement increases, any blunder reduces them.

In the second place, profit is not only an index, at the same time it is a source of the material incentive of the enterprise as a whole, and of each worker in particular. Here we have in mind not only bonuses, but also the creation of the possibility of expanding the enterprise.

As is well known, the decisions of the plenum provided for the formation of a fund at each enterprise for its technical development and improvement, and the basic part of this fund is formed by deductions from profits. It is precisely thus that deductions from profits become the basic source of the material incentive fund, and the fund for social and cultural measures, also being created at the enterprises. When the basic indexes were gross production or the fulfillment of assignments with respect to cost, no pluses or minuses for the enterprise were derived directly from them. It was necessary to attach the wage fund, the bonuses, and other levers for influencing production to these indexes by administrative methods. Profits are another thing. They contain in themselves the index and also the means, thus they have organically embodied into one whole the work program of the enterprise and sources of incentive for fulfillment and overfulfillment of this program.

This does not signify that the profit index cannot be used to harm the interests of society. Perhaps, for example, in the race for profits only costly products are produced, and distortions of the assortment and plan indexes are made. But the possibility of a negative use of an index can scarcely be considered its shortcoming. It is necessary only to provide the proper control and social influence on production. Incidentally, an enterprise that excessively violates its assortment, undoubtedly, will collide with difficulties in selling the product, and thus the law of goods circulation will force it to work as the real needs of society require.

The wage fund, established as one of the indexes for the enterprises, determines those limits within which the enterprise is within its rights to use its own resources for payment for labor. There have been many

arguments relative to whether or not it is necessary to approve the wage fund from above for the enterprises. There are arguments both for and against this. The plenum decided temporarily, until the necessary reserves of consumers' goods have been created, to establish the wage fund for the enterprises from above. We cannot doubt that the successful translation of the economic reform into reality within a short time will also make it unnecessary to approve this index, just as assignments for the numerical strength of the workers and growth of productivity of labor are no longer needed. Actually, it would never come into anyone's head to consider that the indexes of numerical strength and productivity of labor have become less important because they are no longer approved from above. Street-traffic rules are necessary, not because militiamen, that is, policemen, exist, but because without them it would be impossible to live in a city * * *.

Finally, mutual relationships of the enterprise with the state budget are subject to mandatory approval. Here we have in mind the establishment of long-term standards for the payments made by the enterprises into the budget. It would be no exaggeration to say that the introduction of such standards is equal in force to the replacement of the surplus-appropriations system by the foodstuff tax; that is, tax paid in kind, in the field of finances. Then the enterprises will know for 5 years ahead of time how much they must contribute to the state budget; this will have enormous significance for the stabilization of all economic relationships at the enterprises. Simultaneously, the decision was made to narrow essentially the sphere of nonreturnable financing from the budget, especially at existing enterprises. Such enterprises, if their own profits and amortization deductions do not suffice, will apply to the State Bank or the Stroybank—State Construction Bank—for long-term loans, will pay interest for them, and liquidate them from the profits obtained. "Gifts" of money will come to an end. It is necessary to pay for everything. This also means the rooting out of formal autonomous financing and its replacement by real honest-to-goodness Leninist autonomous financing.

We should note that long-term standards are approved for other things than mutual relationships with the budget. It is intended to increase the role of future plans decisively, which will become basic; within their limits annual plans will be developed and approved.

In order to intensify economic incentive of the enterprises, besides creating the funds of which we have already spoken and expanding the sphere of credit, payment for assets granted to the enterprises has also been established. These assets do not fall from the sky. They are the product of the people's labor, and, as we have already said, it is necessary to pay for them. Payment for these assets will be a decisive incentive to release machines and materials not needed by the enterprises, to save capital investments to the limit, to use existing buildings, structures, equipment, and other material values more efficiently. Compensation of the entire sum of the loss suffered by a consumer due to the fault of the supplier has been provided, which will transform an economic agreement into a document of primary significance.

The problem of intensifying the material interests of the workers of the enterprises and the enterprises as a whole in a continuous improvement of the economic activities was one of the central problems

at the plenum and at the session of the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. It was indicated there that material incentive is quite inadequately used, that the opportunities of the enterprises in this field are very limited. As a matter of fact, in the past few years, the fraction of bonuses obtained by engineers, technicians, and workers has been continuously and considerably reduced. Half of the industrial enterprises are systematically failing to form enterprise funds, for some reasons or other.

What is the matter here?

Apparently in a quite incorrect understanding of the essence of material incentive under socialism. The Ministry of Finances, U.S.S.R. and the Committee on Labor and Wages of the Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R. are still continuing to consider bonuses as an expense, and at each necessity of balancing the budget, they turn to bonuses for the purpose of reducing them. However, from the entire essence of the economic relationships of the Socialist methods of production, it follows inevitably that bonuses are not an expense at all, but, to the contrary, a self-forming source for increasing the income of society, and thus, increasing the state budget. Bonuses, with respect to their role, can be properly compared to seeds in land cultivation or fodder in animal husbandry. Of course, seeds also may be considered an expense, but only a very unwise farmer would reduce the norm of seed planted per measure of land area and expect abundant harvests after this. All our practice in economic management convincingly testifies that each ruble used for material incentive is returned to the national economy fivefold, or even tenfold, if, of course, simultaneously with this we provide the necessary conditions for the normal activity of the enterprise.

In the field of management, the economic reform is expressed in the fact that branch ministries will replace the sovnarkhozes of the economic regions, republics, and the U.S.S.R. At the plenum and the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet, U.S.S.R., the necessity of introducing the branch principle of management in industry was quite adequately and convincingly motivated. Therefore, we shall not dwell in detail here on this entirely clear problem. However, we should call attention to the fact that in such a gigantic country as ours we cannot limit ourselves to the application of the branch principle of management alone, just as only the territorial principle alone could not be used. A deeply thought-out and careful combination and enmeshing of the branch and territorial principles is needed, with the leading role assigned to the branch principle, when we are speaking of industry, since in this branch of economic activities, where technical progress is very rapid, new types of production are continuously budding off, and an exceptionally deep, specialized and well-qualified technical and economic management is required.

A great shortcoming of the former ministries lay in the fact that they had fenced the country into narrow, departmental "corridors." Each of the enterprises tried to have its own repair and tool shop, motor-transport bases, construction organizations and quarries, schools for the training of personnel, clubs and polyclinics, housing fund and stadiums, et cetera, et cetera. Thus, the industrial centers were artificially partitioned off. Not infrequently cases existed when one and

the same material was transported by water from Moscow to Gor'kiy by one ministry, and another ministry sent the same stuff from Gor'kiy to Moscow by steamship.

In the years of the existence of the sovnarkhozes in this field quite a lot of useful work was done—many small enterprises were liquidated and interbranch repair, tool, packing, transport, construction, and other enterprises were created. Enterprises were created supplying all the consumers with castings, forgings, hardware, and so forth, within the limits of the given city or oblast. It would be a fatal mistake to destroy all these connections, to liquidate these interbranch rear echelons, and return again to the branch fragmentation of former years. In speeches at the plenum of the central committee of the party, and at the session of the Supreme Soviet, U.S.S.R., and at meetings of active party members of various cities, much was said about how these interbranch rear echelons should be retained, and also developed and strengthened. This is a task of great importance, and its solution requires constant attention on the part of Gosplan—State Planning Committee, Council of Ministers—U.S.S.R., and other economic management organizations.

The question arises in many people's minds as follows: Is not the role of the centralized state plan weakening, because of the intensification of the independence of the enterprises, and the advancement of economic methods of management and incentive to the foreground?

With full conviction we may answer that this not only will not lead to a weakening of the planned principle, but, to the contrary, will raise centralized planning management to a higher level, corresponding to the present scale of economic management and modern qualifications of personnel. As for the level of centralized planned management, existing until recent times, it corresponded basically to the scales of the economy of the beginning of the 1930's when this level actually was developed. There can be no question that the Soviet Union, entering the second 50 years of its existence, intends, to any degree whatsoever, to narrow the sphere or reduce the efficiency of centralized state planned management of the economy. We are speaking about quite another matter: How can we understand the very process of further improvement and deepening of the planned principle?

Until recent times, Gosplan, U.S.S.R., distributed 18,000 types of means of production in a centralized manner. Besides this, tens of thousands of other various types of materials, tools, instruments, and so forth, were also distributed, in a centralized manner, by main administrations of supplies and sales and other organs. From the center, from top to bottom, approved indexes of the numerical strength of the workers of enterprises "descended" and, in a number of cases, also the size of the average wage, all the assortment of the product in its entirety, by elements of the standards of fixed assets, and dozens of other indexes. But was this really economically justified scientific planning? Or, was this merely joint attempts, laid down during several decades, to observe the work of each enterprise and regulate its activities by means of small-scale administrative levers? Now we must give an answer to this question. We are all agreed that it is necessary to intensify centralized planning, but how shall we under-

stand, how shall we conceive the results of this process? Does this signify a process of continuous improvement in planning, so that, let us say, in 2000 it will be not 1,800 designations of means of production but, let us say, 40,000 or 400,000 that will be distributed in a centralized manner? Or, perhaps, to the contrary, the success of scientific centralized planning will consist of the fact that, let us say, in 2000 not one type of means of production will be directly distributed by the central planning organization? This is the matter in which the essence of the problem lies. We repeat, everyone agrees that we are proceeding to intensification of centralized planning, but many have a different conception of the contents and results of this process.

Decades of the predomination of administrative methods of management, with agreement upon the coordination of any step of the enterprise, in dozens of instances, convinced many planners that it is precisely in this specific management that the essence of centralized planning lies. However, the conviction of these comrades, no matter how deeply sincere it may be, has nothing in common with objective reality. Similar to the way that a rocket in space cannot be controlled from the ground by means of levers, but it is necessary to use automatically operating remote-control systems, similar to this, it is simply impossible to control the national economy of the U.S.S.R., on its present scale and at its present rates of development, from the center and plan it by hundreds or thousands of small and minor administrative and organizational instructions and assignments. But, exactly in the way that a rocket flying in space is no less controllable than a motorboat or a truck, precisely thus the national economy, guided and directed by economic methods of planning and management, will develop purposefully and efficiently to an incommensurably greater degree than it did under the domination of administrative methods of management.

In the report of A. N. Kosygin at the plenum of the central committee of the party it was said that "our economic scientists are too little concerned with the analysis of the efficiency of social production and the development of proposals to improve it."

We must recognize the validity and justification of this reproach.

However, it is of interest to delve into certain causes of the backwardness of economic science, all the more so in that the reproach addressed to it is not being made for the first time, that the validity of these reproaches has been repeatedly acknowledged, while the situation of affairs is not changing for the better as rapidly as we would like. What is the matter here? Is it possible that economic sciences have gathered around themselves only such dullards and loafers who dream only about how to obtain a little more money, drink cognac, and play cards? Perhaps some reasons exist which are delaying the development of economic science and do not permit it to give our national economy everything of which it is capable—actually, when in our times it has at its disposal highly qualified cadres of scientific and practical economic workers, and it has accumulated a gigantic amount of experience in socialist economic management? Undoubtedly. And there are quite a few of these reasons. Here are some of them.

We should note, in the first place, the lack of statistical data. Of course, in recent years the output of statistical handbooks and the

publication of materials have increased. However, these handbooks are suitable for a general acquaintance, for studies in higher educational institutions, but are entirely inadequate and unsuitable for economists to work with them. And actually, statistics for economic science is the same thing as tools and instruments for other branches of knowledge. And, we may say quite definitely, that until such time as economic scientists have at their disposal a few dozen general and specialized statistical handbooks, containing the necessary absolute and relative data, until that time economic science will give to practical workers only a fraction of that knowledge of which it is potentially capable. In recent decades, the statistical service of our country has lost its taste for publications. It is possible that they do not have the necessary personnel, paper, or lack other conditions. Such conditions must be created, as otherwise we will not close the gap in economic science that has become so aggravated.

The shortage of economic personnel, about which so much has been said, and so sharply, in recent times, also has led and is leading to a weak participation of economic science in the practice of Socialist economic management. What generalization of practice may we expect if, on the average, there is only one economist with a higher education for every six or seven industrial enterprises? If in Moscow there are not 10 chiefs of the financial departments of the enterprises with a higher special education? In the past 10 years the network of economic higher educational institutions and faculties has been reduced, while the contingents of students accepted for the day sessions and for graduate school have been reduced. And one more thing. Because of the energetic and fruitful penetration of mathematics into economics, students in recent years have been receiving, in addition to the previous educational plans, hundreds of hours of mathematics and the technique of electronic computer work. This is an additional enormous load on their former curriculum. Has the Ministry of Higher Education reacted to this change in the volume of the study load for students of economic higher educational institutions? Yes, it has reacted, and in a quite senseless manner: the duration of studies in economic higher educational institutions was reduced from 5 years to 4.

It is not so simple for economic scientists to discuss the problems agitating them. Because of the very nature of economic science, it requires widespread discussions of various opinions, and projects, since here laboratory research is impossible, and the experiments applied again, because of the peculiarities of economic science, with all their significance, cannot play that same part as they do in technical sciences. However, the overwhelming majority of the economic journals are organs of the corresponding departments, and on their pages it is not simple to come out with a criticism of the activities of these departments. Go over the sets of the journals *Finansy SSSR* (Finances of the U.S.S.R.), or *Den'gi i kredit* (Money and Credit), or *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Planned Economy), *Vestnik statistiki* (Herald of Statistics), or *Sotsialisticheskiy trud* (Socialist Labor) over the past 10 years and try to find there even one paragraph containing criticism addressed to the corresponding departments.

And, nevertheless, in spite of this backwardness, economic science has developed dozens of valuable proposals, the majority of which are

not being applied in practice, or are being introduced with an intolerable slowness. Let me give only one fact. Since 1949 a large group of scientific workers have been studying the problem of improving the organization of working capital in the U.S.S.R. With a correct organization of it, working capital would serve as a very effective economic lever for improving material and technical supply, sales, and production.

As a result of prolonged investigations and practical planning, a methodology of standardizing working capital was developed, and was approved in 1958 at a conference in Leningrad. The conference appealed to Gosplan U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Finances U.S.S.R. to consider its recommendations and arrive at a scientifically validated standardization of working capital. The answer was an icy silence from Gosplan U.S.S.R. and a flood of criticism (most frequently unjustified) and sneers on the part of the Ministry of Finances U.S.S.R. Nevertheless on January 30, 1962, the Council of Ministers U.S.S.R., by decree No. 85, approved the "Basic Principles of the Standardization of Working Capital" and the "Type Instructions for Standardization of Working Capital in Industry." Gosplan U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Finances U.S.S.R., the Gosbank and Gosstroy (State Committee for Construction Affairs), by this decree, were obligated, in a short period of time, to develop branch instructions and introduce them in order to shift to a scientific method of determining needs for working capital in the national economy of the U.S.S.R. starting in 1962. Since that time, about 4 years have passed, but the decision has not been carried out, although all the necessary conditions for its fulfillment were present. The reason? The stubborn unwillingness of the Ministry of Finances U.S.S.R. to put an end to "willful" methods of financial planning and management and replace them by objective, scientifically validated methods, in at least one part of the finances of the enterprises, their working capital. What could economic scientists do in such conditions? Make signals? The possibility is not excluded that these signals would arrive at the Ministry of Finances U.S.S.R., where they would read them and laugh about the naivete of the professors.

We must note with grief that until very recent times economic science had no "master," as did physics, geology, medicine, and many other branches of knowledge. And it is Gosplan U.S.S.R. primarily that should be such a master. The sharp criticism to which the work of Gosplan U.S.S.R. has been subjected for many years is explained to no small degree by the fact that this important organ has lost contact with economic science and does not use its assistance. We are full of confidence that the present reorganization of Gosplan U.S.S.R. primarily and most of all will consist precisely of a deep penetration of economic science into the content, forms, and methods of the work of this important governmental organ.

Over the next few years, we must develop and introduce an economically valid system of prices, bonuses, planning indexes, and dozens of other standards, regulations, and economic documents. It is necessary that these documents and standards be created in close contact of the workers of the economic organs, practical economic administrators and economic scientists, so that this work will pass under deep and con-

tinuous party control. Only upon this condition is a full and qualified solution of a great number of purely practical tasks possible, which also compose the content of the present economic reform. At meetings we frequently have heard that, unfortunately, it has occurred not infrequently that instructions issued by the Ministry of Finances U.S.S.R., the Committee for Labor and Wages, Gosplan and the Gosbank, and also certain other organs, for purposes of developing some decrees or other issued by the party and the Government, have narrowed these decrees, and sometimes even distorted them. Thus, for example, in the well-known instruction for incentive for a decrease in production costs, the matter was formulated in such a manner that a bonus was issued only if a saving was achieved in the wage fund. However, in some branches of group B, the fraction of the wage in production expenses does not exceed 10 percent. It was only necessary to find that there were no wage savings to have the workers of the enterprises deprived of their bonus, even though they had saved hundreds of tons of cotton or other material values. Thus, the instruction was distorted and an important decree concerning the struggle for a decrease in production costs was emasculated.

The validity of the demand of practical workers that they be brought in to the development of instructions and other standard documents is apparent also because during the economic discussion that preceded the plenum it fell out that many workers of planning, financial, and other economic organs spoke against the introduction of making funds payable, expanding the sphere of credit financing, and narrowing nonreturnable budget financing, limiting the circle of indexes approved in a centralized manner, and a number of other most important bases of the economic reform. We do not want to rebuke these comrades: a discussion is merely a discussion, in order that everyone could freely express their opinions and different points of view could be heard. But now the party and the Government have accepted a definite content and direction for the program of economic development. The development of the standard documents derived from it is being transmitted to the hands of workers of various state organs, and the matter is now to insure that each of these workers is able to overcome completely any points of view deviating from the reform now being carried out, and is able to facilitate its most rapid and complete translation into reality. What has been said in no way signifies a lack of trust in some workers or other of these economic organs. We are speaking merely of the correct combination of different categories of workers in the preparation of most important economic documents, corresponding to the spirit of socialist democracy.

We will scarcely find such an enterprise or institution, and not only in the sphere of economy, where in the most detailed manner, with such great interest, has not been discussed the materials of the plenum and the session of the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. From the press it is well known that the plenum and session also caused widespread comments beyond the borders of our country. There is no need to dwell on the fantasies of our enemies, who wish to see a "manifestation of crisis," signs of "distintegration," and other horrors in each stage of the development of the Socialist economy. We may only be surprised that there is still such a market for such goods in foreign

markets. For us, another thing is important. The reform being carried out signifies that many effective levers of influencing production activity, based on a deep penetration into the very essence of the production relationships of socialism, will now be at the service of the needs of the national economy. All experience in the development of our state convinces us that every time when measures have been taken not corresponding to the nature of social relationships in our country, such measures have been rejected by life, and we have been obliged to abandon them. And, to the contrary, each decision, each reform, derived from the very essence of the Socialist method of production has given an enormous new stimulus for the development of the forces of production and production relationships of our society. The present economic reform will give wide scope to the effect of the economic laws of socialism by means of a correctly selected and clearly formulated mechanism of economic management. It is precisely in this source that our deep confidence lies that the national economy of the U.S.S.R. is standing on the threshold of a great boom, of new and even greater successes in the creation of the material and technical base of communism.

