

of the accident. Some time later two skiers came up, and an improvised toboggan was made of skis. McAllister was transported down to the Sno-Cat (elev. 9,500 ft.) which was then used to transport McAllister down to Timberline Lodge (elev. 6,000 ft.), where a splint was applied by members of the Mt. Hood Ski Patrol.

*Source:* D. G. Hitchcock after telephone conversation with Harry McAllister (injured climber), Amos Smelser (member of the assisting Party), Dr. George Austin (member of the third party), and Howard Veazey (member of the Mt. Hood Ski Patrol).

*Analysis:* Although there may be some question of the advisability of using crampons in the "chute" that particular day, McAllister feels that there was enough hard snow or ice under the soft layer of surface snow to require their use. This accident, although not serious, should again serve as a reminder to all climbers that even under good conditions and on an easy slope such as the "chute," extreme care is required to prevent a "slip" such as caused this accident.

*Oregon, Mt. Jefferson*—Robert A. Trahon (18) with his companion David L. Neitting attempted to climb the Jefferson Park Glacier route on Sunday, July 13. The weather was warm and clear. They reached the lower bergschrund with no difficulty. Here they got across the schrund and ascended a snow slab that extended down the buttress which lies to the west of the main pinnacle. Once off the snow they continued on the rock to the upper schrund. From here they were unable to get across and decided to traverse further to the west and find a way up the rock ridge. While descending, a very large rock hit the lower man and when the rope pulled tight, it somehow pinned the upper man, Neitting, in such a way that he couldn't move. Figuring that his partner was dead, he cut the rope; the body dropped down to the lip of the lower schrund. Neitting managed to get down and report the accident at the Brightenbush Guard Station. Mountain Rescue was alerted in both Portland and Salem at shortly before 6:00 p.m. The call to Salem was through the Sheriff's office and the call to Portland was through the Mt. Hood National Forest. Parties of 14 men left from Portland and six men from Salem and it was known that a party of approximately eight Mazama's was camped at Jefferson Park. The base headquarters was set up at Brightenbush Lake. The main party left Brightenbush at 4:00 a.m., reached the body at 11:00 a.m. Twelve men actually worked on the mountain. The recovery of the body was somewhat hazardous because of having to work under the rock buttress and bergschrund. The weather was cold and the sun had not hit that area. Warmer conditions may have made the operation too hazardous to justify the removal of the body. Radio communication failed, but base coordinator, using good judgement, made arrangements for both horses and helicopters to carry the body out from Jefferson Park. A relief party waited at the bottom of the snow to carry the body over the rocks and into Jefferson Park.

*Source:* Keith Petri, Rescue Chairman.

*Analysis:* The route chosen was extremely difficult and hazardous and probably would not have been even attempted by experienced climbers. The

climbers had some experience but not enough to attempt this route. A further error was that there were only two in the party, so it is very fortunate that both men were not killed. This party did not register for the climb. It is interesting to note that a party of quite experienced climbers were attempting the route the same day and they turned back because of adverse conditions. There was a failure in coordinating the activities of the Portland and Salem groups. In spite of the failure of radio communication, the over-all organization kept the operation running smoothly.

This case brings up the question of whether the removal of a body is justifiable under certain unusually hazardous conditions.

*Oregon, Mt. Thielson (North Face), Cascade Range*—On September 7, Charles Carpenter (20) and Gerry Honey (27) were attempting to climb the unclimbed north face of Mt. Thielson. At about 1:30 p.m., while still several hundred feet below the summit, the climbers decided the route would not go and started their descent. At a point about 300 feet above the base of the face, Honey descended a steep couloir and traversed about 20 feet to the left, taking up a belay stance under the protection of an overhanging rock, and using a piton for safety. Carpenter then descended the couloir, pulling the four pitons as he came. Upon reaching the bottom, Carpenter discovered that he had left his pack on the ledge above. He then reclimbed the couloir, using no pitons, picked up his pack, and started to descend. About 40 feet from the bottom of the couloir, a large boulder which Carpenter was using for a hold dislodged, causing Carpenter to fall. Carpenter tumbled and rolled out of the couloir, taking the boulder with him and rendering himself unconscious. Honey, executing a dynamic belay, stopped the fall with only 10 feet of rope remaining. The climbing rope was not through a piton, (although Honey was anchored to a piton) so the arresting force was taken by Honey's body. Honey received third degree burns on his hands in stopping the fall. Then, using the remaining rope, Honey lowered Carpenter to a ledge a few feet below. Rappelling to this ledge, Honey administered first aid. The accident occurred about 5:30 p.m. Carpenter regained consciousness and rappelled the remaining 100 feet to the scree with an upper belay. Carpenter was placed in a sleeping bag and Honey went for assistance. The following day Carpenter was carried down the scree and by trail out to the road by U. S. Forest Service personnel. It was determined that Carpenter had suffered a deep cut above the left eye, requiring stitches, a sprained right ankle, a sprain of both knees, several bruised ribs, and many minor cuts and abrasions, requiring several days in the hospital.

*Source:* Dave Hitchcock.

*Analysis:* This accident shows the great danger of climbing on unstable rock. Even though Carpenter had climbed this couloir and descended once before, certainly pitons for safety were called for. Had the original pitons been left in place, there would have been two pitons between the belayer and the climber, and the fall would have been less serious. Carpenter was most fortunate in having so skilled a climbing partner. At the time of