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
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EDITORIAL

DEALING WITH DIVERSE CHALLENGES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT: COVID-19 AND BEYOND

Thean Potgieter

These are challenging times across the world – as we are reeling from the impact of COVID-19, we also have to manage the diverse challenges that are so akin to the dilemmas of our time. In such times, as throughout history, stories and fiction do not only captivate as sources of entertainment but also provide gems to encourage us to adapt and persevere. One such example is a quote from the well-known work by Tolkien, *The Fellowship of the Ring.* When Frodo remarks that "I wish it need not have happened in my time", Gandalf replies, "So do I … and so do all who live to see such times. But that is not for them to decide. All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us" (Tolkien 1981:82).

We now know that it "happened in [our] time". Although it is nearly two years since COVID-19 first occurred as a predominant global emergency, we still need to manage old challenges as well as the constantly emerging (and often shocking) crises global news so constantly report on. But going forward we must "decide" how to deal with the multiple challenges we face at this junction in world history and "what to do with the time that is given us".

Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic is not yet condemned to the dustbin of history but we have certainly progressed much in our fight against it since the end of 2019. When

THE USE OF SYSTEMS THINKING FOR HOUSING DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Thomas Ramovha[1]

INTRODUCTION

In terms of Section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (South Africa 1996), the state is enjoined to ensure that everyone has access to adequate housing. The Constitution obligates the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures to achieve the progressive realisation of this right to housing. The government of South Africa has thus far delivered about five million subsidised houses and serviced sites to the poor and low- to medium-income households through its housing delivery model introduced since the dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994. However, despite this significant achievement, the housing deficit has risen from about 1.2 million in 1994 to about 2.5 million households in 2020. The number of informal settlements across the country has gone up from 300 in 1994 to more than 2 700 in 2019. Disturbingly, the increasing housing deficit comes at the backdrop of a declining rate of housing delivery, from a delivery rate of about 235 000 housing opportunities in 1998 to a delivery rate of about 125 000 in 2018 (Department of Human Settlements 2020) Housing opportunities include houses as well as serviced sites allocated to beneficiaries for them to construct their own houses. See the depiction in Figure 1 below.

This high demand for housing is exacerbated by the current housing delivery model entrenched after 1994 which has since produced a dependent and inactive citizenry who

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BALANCING SOCIO-ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA: TOWARDS GOOD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE FOR INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT

Firimooni Rweere Banugire[1]

INTRODUCTION

The notion that socio-economic drivers of development in Uganda should be balanced to ensure inclusive development is central to this discussion. As it is a wide and comprehensive topic, it can be approached from a variety of perspectives, including placing emphasis on budget expenditure priorities, harmonisation of development goals, sector-wide development strategies and good governance, among others. Of pertinent relevance is to link growth opportunities in the key growth sectors to the human development goals as was initially embodied in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and now the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations. During the first 15 years of this millennium the lessons learned from developing and implementing the MDGs resulted in broad global consensus and the creation of the SDG framework guiding socio-economic development (UN 2015). It is a bold and ambitious collective initiative to address sustainable development within various interrelated contexts ranging from socio-economic challenges and quality education and responsive governments to addressing comprehensive ecological and climatological issues (Potgieter 2019:5; Tandoh-Offin 2019:49). The state's role, good governance and cooperation

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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ELECTIONS AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC, 1992-2020

Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari[1]

INTRODUCTION

The so-called "Third Wave" of democratisation that swept through the world during the 1990s re-introduced political competition in Africa as well as in various other developing economies (Huntington 1991). With more open multi-party democratic systems and political contestation, scholars began to explore the question of voters' behaviour and the economics of elections in the new democracies. While many of the earlier studies emphasised African democratic experiments, others focused on salience of ethnicity and clientelism (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Ayee 1998; Nugent 1999; Ayee 2001; Gyimah-Boadi 2001; Nugent 2001a). Later studies on elections in Africa and democracy on the continent considered a greater variety of explanatory factors like ideological positions, retrospective voting, prospective or rational voting (Lindberg and Morrison 2005; Lindberg and Morrison 2008). However, beyond the macro-level and party system-based dynamics, politics and economics of election (defined as *political economy of electioneering* for the purposes of this article) also play an important role in a majoritarian electoral system in new democracies like Ghana.

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ANALYSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION POLICY OF 2008: A CASE STUDY OF THE ONHIMBU INFORMAL SETTLEMENT, OUTAPI, NAMIBIA

Gabriella Loteni Nguluwe[1] and Charles Keyter [2]

INTRODUCTION

The Namibian Constitution of 1990 advocates for equity as a fundamental principle to ensure equitable access to services by all Namibians. The provision of safe water supply and sanitation services to the general public in Namibia has been one of the key factors that helps in the improvement of quality of life of the citizens. It is against this background that the government of the Republic of Namibia has adopted the Water Supply and Sanitation Policy (WSASP) of 2008. The policy strives to contribute to public health, reduce the water collection burden and ensure a hygienic environment. Moreover, it aims to ensure that water supply and sanitation services become available to "all Namibians and should be acceptable and accessible at a cost which is affordable to the country as a whole" (Republic of Namibia 2008:3). The objectives of the WSASP of 2008 are to improve the provision of water supply and sanitation services. The WSASP of 2008 further states that local authorities and regional councils are responsible for the implementation of water supply and sanitation services in the urbanised areas and rural

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INCLUSÃO DA PESSOA COM DEFICIÊNCIA NAS POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS DE EMPREGO EM MOÇAMBIQUE

Domingos Carlos Batone[1]

INTRODUÇÃO

O desenvolvimento de políticas públicas vem buscando abrir espaço, dar direitos e visibilidade para as Pessoas com Deficiências (PcDs) (Souza et al 2017). No entanto, a continuidade de comportamentos negativos na comunidade, limitações no acesso ao transporte e diversos serviços públicos ou privados têm dificultado ainda mais a exploração de oportunidades que o mercado cria para este grupo vulnerável. Assim sendo, todos os actores sociais relevantes são convidados a envidar esforços humanos, inovativos e financeiros para que se alcance uma solução sustentável.

A Organização Mundial de Saúde (2011) refere que todos os períodos históricos enfrentaram a questão moral e política de como melhor incluir e apoiar as Pessoas com Deficiência. Essa questão estará mais visível em função das mudanças demográficas das sociedades, pois cada vez mais pessoas alcançam a faixa etária de idoso.

No âmbito das políticas de emprego, quatro tendências globais recentes aumentaram a importância dos empregos como uma preocupação política e renovaram o interesse na eficácia das políticas activas. A primeira foi a crise financeira global de 2007-2008, que aumentou o desemprego em muitos países do mundo. Em segundo lugar, as crescentes pressões demográficas em algumas partes do mundo em desenvolvimento levaram às

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FACILITATING PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AND COLLABORATIVE ACTION LEARNING: A REFLECTION ON THE EMERGING MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME OF THE NATIONAL SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Milly Paile, Johnny M. Pietersen and Juanita Fennell[1]

INTRODUCTION

As social conditions bring forth increasingly complex and ubiquitous challenges for governments or scientific communities to resolve on their own, appropriate solutions have to be devised in various forms of networks and partnerships. Undeniably, the involvement of role players with different values and interests can present its own set of difficulties that could hamper the envisaged collaborative task. However, the cooperative access to and use of complementary expertise and resources often outweigh setbacks that might arise along the way – whether the collaboration entails extensive governance networks, regional programmes or localised projects (Klijn, Steijn, Edelenbos and Vermeeren 2011; Oluikpe 2014; Pakarinen and Virtanen 2017). In sketching a picture of South Africa as a "capable and developmental state", the National Development Plan (NDP) places emphasis on collaboration among all sections of society and partnerships among sectors

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WHEN REFORM TRIGGERS REFORM: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED (PUBLIC) UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN THE RWENDEIRE VISITATION COMMITTEE REPORT

Lazarus Nabaho[1]

INTRODUCTION

Since 2000, higher education has been acknowledged as a driver of Africa's social and economic development, an enabler of the region's transition into a knowledge economy and an imperative for global competitiveness (Bloom *et al*. 2014; AUC 2015, 2016, 2018; Teferra 2016; World Bank 2000). The post-2000 ideological shift from viewing higher education as a public good rather than a luxury – after over two consecutive decades of neglect – has metamorphosed university governance from a marginal into a topical issue in the African higher education discourse. Consequently, governance of the education system, including the higher education sub-sector, is integral to the drive to revitalise higher education in Africa. It has, in some circles, been advanced as "a determinant factor in how [higher education] institutions contribute to the solution of social contradictions and development problems – or to their aggravation" (Oanda and Sall 2016: 63). It is also a driver of education quality as well as the financial sustainability of higher education institutions (World Bank 2000). The proliferation of empirical studies that attest to a strong nexus between university governance and academic excellence as well as the

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POLICING IN NIGERIA:

A SOCIOECONOMIC, ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NIGERIAN POLICE FORCE

Tope Shola Akinyetun[1]

INTRODUCTION

The level of development of any society is partly a function of the relative peace enjoyed in such a society. Seeing peace as a *sine qua non* for development is therefore an aphorism. The task of maintaining peace and order in Nigeria is the responsibility of the police; in this case, the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). The police are saddled with the responsibility of maintaining public order, controlling and preventing crime, and ensuring internal security (Ikuteyijo and Rotimi 2012; Chinwokwu 2016). A police service plays a crucial role in society and its existence determines that of other institutions such as the courts and prisons (Chinwokwu 2016). Police are an agency of the government that must be close to the people and ensure that government rules and regulations are enforced. But the view is often expressed that the NPF is inefficient and ineffective in maintaining law and order (Ebeniro 2011). Others add that the NPF has consistently failed in maintaining social control (Otu 2012) or stress that NPF is excessively militarised as is clearly evidenced in its interaction with the Nigerian populace (Aborisade 2021).

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NOTES ON SELECTED NEW BOOKS FOR READERS AND STUDENTS ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Thean Potgieter

Africa is a vital and fascinating region of the world. The relevance of studying African issues is apparent, as some of the fastest growing economies in the world are located on the African continent. Africa has a long and varied history, is rich in diversity with thousands of languages and cultures, and has a vibrant and innovative population of more than 1.3 billion. Africa is also richly endowed with mineral reserves and has truly diverse ecosystems.

Studying African history, its interaction with the world, politics, governments, current affairs, economics, culture and ecology, amongst others, gives us a deeper understanding of world history in our quest to become better-informed global citizens. The number of publications on Africa, African affairs and comparative studies, including cases from Africa, has steadily grown over a number of years. Although these publications vary in content and quality, the fact that they are published and contribute to the international understanding of and debate on Africa is significant and could be seen as indicative of both greater global recognition and growing interest in Africa.

Only a few of the large variety of books published globally recently are briefly introduced below. The sources listed are by no means representative, comprehensive or exhaustive. It is merely a selection of African themes that are not too common in the world of international publications. It includes interesting new history texts, a biography of one of the great continental leaders, an autobiography and a comparative study. In addition, the selected sources address governance, democratic processes, ethnicity and development

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES IN THIS EDITION

RESUMES DES ARTICLES DE CETTE EDITION

SUMÁRIO DOS ARTIGOS NESTA EDIÇÃO

THE USE OF SYSTEMS THINKING FOR HOUSING DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Thomas Ramovha

One of the challenges plaguing the government of South Africa is the dire shortage of adequate housing for poor and low- to medium-income earners. To ensure the realisation of the right to adequate housing for its people as enshrined in its Constitution, the government introduced a housing subsidy programme that delivered housing to about five million poor and low- to medium-income households since 1994. Despite this initiative, the housing deficit increased exponentially, and new housing demand exceeds the rate of delivery. To compound an already dire situation, there is concern within government regarding the glaring unsustainability of the current housing delivery programme in terms of its affordability to the fiscus. The current housing delivery model is riddled with unintended consequences and has since become complex due to the huge number of stakeholders with diverse and sometimes conflicting views. This article explores the applicability of Systems Thinking to housing to ensure sustainable delivery of housing in South Africa. Systems Thinking is the ability to have a holistic view of the world where parts of a system are viewed in relation to the whole of which they form part, enabling one to better understand the behaviour of the whole system in order to improve its

performance. The article demonstrates that Systems Thinking, as a tool for tackling issues that are embedded in complexity, may be applied to housing in South Africa to ensure sustainable delivery. It is proposed that the Systems Thinking capability be developed in the public service, particularly in the execution of the housing delivery mandate.

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L'UTILISATION DE L'APPROCHE SYSTÉMIQUE DANS LA GESTION DE LA CRISE DU LOGEMENT EN AFRIQUE DU SUD

Thomas Ramovha

L'un des défis auxquels le gouvernement sud-africain doit faire face est le manque criard de logements décents pour les pauvres et les personnes à faibles et moyens revenus. Dans l'objectif de respecter le droit à un logement décent pour sa population tel que stipulé par sa constitution, le gouvernement a mis en place un programme de subventions pour le logement qui a permis de fournir des habitations depuis 1994 à environ cinq millions de ménages pauvres et à revenus moyens et faibles. Malgré cette initiative, le déficit en logements a augmenté de façon exponentielle, et la demande de nouveaux logements dépasse le taux de production. Et pour ne rien arranger, le gouvernement s'inquiète de la non-pérennité évidente du programme actuel de livraison de logements en termes de coûts. Le modèle actuel de fourniture de logements comporte des effets indésirables et s'est complexifié en raison d'un grand nombre de parties prenantes aux opinions diverses et parfois contradictoires. Cet article explore dans quelle mesure l'application d'une approche systémique au domaine du logement peut garantir une fourniture durable de logements en Afrique du Sud. L'approche systémique (de l'anglais Systems Thinking) est la capacité à avoir une vision globale du monde et à considérer les parties d'un système par rapport à l'ensemble du système, ce qui permet de mieux comprendre son fonctionnement et d'en d'améliorer les performances. L'article démontre que l'approche systémique, en tant qu'outil de résolution de problèmes extrêmement complexes, peut s'appliquer au logement en Afrique du Sud pour assurer un service durable. L'une des

propositions est de développer la compétence d'approche systémique au sein de la fonction publique, notamment dans le cadre des prestations de logements.

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A UTILIZAÇÃO DO RACIOCÍNIO SISTÉMICO PARA O FORNECIMENTO DE HABITAÇÃO NA ÁFRICA DO SUL

Thomas Ramovha

Um dos desafios que aflige o governo da África do Sul é a escassez extrema de habitações adequadas para os pobres e para os que auferem rendimentos baixos a médios. Para assegurar a realização do direito à habitação adequada para o seu povo, tal como consagrado na sua Constituição, o governo introduziu um programa de subsídios à habitação que, desde 1994, tem fornecido habitação a cerca de cinco milhões de famílias carenciadas e de baixos a médios rendimentos. Apesar desta iniciativa, o défice em habitação aumentou exponencialmente, e a nova procura da habitação excede a taxa de entrega. Para agravar uma situação já de si terrível, existe uma preocupação no seio do governo relativamente à insustentabilidade gritante do actual programa de fornecimento de habitação quanto à sua acessibilidade ao fisco. Para agravar uma situação já terrível, existe uma preocupação dentro do governo relativamente à insustentabilidade gritante do actual programa de fornecimento de habitação em termos da sua acessibilidade ao fisco. Este artigo explora a aplicabilidade do Raciocínio Sistémico à habitação para garantir um fornecimento sustentável de habitações na África do Sul. O Raciocínio Sistémico é a capacidade de ter uma perspectiva holística do mundo, em que as partes de um sistema são vistas em relação ao todo do qual fazem parte, permitindo que se compreenda melhor o comportamento do sistema no seu todo e assim melhorar o seu desempenho. O artigo demonstra que o Raciocínio Sistémico, como ferramenta para abordar questões que estão imbuídas de complexidade, pode ser aplicado à habitação na África do Sul para assegurar um fornecimento sustentável. O que propomos é que a capacidade do Raciocínio Sistémico seja desenvolvido no serviço público, em particular na execução do mandato de fornecimento da habitação.

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BALANCING SOCIO-ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA TOWARDS GOOD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE FOR INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT

Firimooni Rweere Banugire

Based on current concerns about the decline in the quality of service delivery systems and how the economy is managed, this paper argues for good economic governance as a means of ensuring inclusive and sustainable development. The research followed a deductive approach and a comparative analysis, based on lessons learnt from global success stories and past performance. The author firstly urges for a special focus that combines structural transformation policy and good governance reforms. He then discusses the decline of good economic governance in Uganda since the 1960s. Thirdly, he identifies several key principles for good economic governance that should be operationalised through the application of good economic governance mechanisms to drive inclusive development. He concludes with policy suggestions on how to get budget priorities right for implementing policies for inclusive development.

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INTÉGRER LES MOTEURS SOCIO-ÉCONOMIQUES DU DÉVELOPPEMENT EN OUGANDA DANS UNE BONNE GOUVERNANCE ÉCONOMIQUE POUR UN DÉVELOPPEMENT INCLUSIF

Firimooni Rweere Banugire

Face aux préoccupations actuelles concernant la baisse de la qualité des prestations de services et de la gestion de l'économie en Ouganda, le document soutient fermement qu'une bonne gouvernance économique constitue la condition préalable à un développement inclusif et durable. L'étude suit une méthodologie déductive et une analyse comparative, et s'appuie sur les leçons tirées des réussites mondiales et des performances passées. L'auteur préconise fortement l'action combinée d'une politique de transformation structurelle et des réformes de bonne gouvernance. Il aborde ensuite le sujet du déclin de la bonne gouvernance économique en Ouganda depuis les années 1960. Il identifie également plusieurs principes clés de bonne gouvernance économique qui devraient être mis en œuvre par l'application de mécanismes de bonne gouvernance économique pour favoriser un développement inclusif. Il conclut par des suggestions politiques sur la manière de bien définir les priorités budgétaires pour mettre en œuvre des politiques de développement inclusif.

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EQUILIBRAR OS MOTORES SOCIOECONÓMICOS DO DESENVOLVIMENTO NO UGANDA RUMO A UMA BOA GOVERNAÇÃO ECONÓMICA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO INCLUSIVO

Firimooni Rweere Banugire

Com base nas actuais preocupações sobre o declínio na qualidade dos sistemas de prestação de serviços e a forma como a economia é gerida, este documento defende a boa governação económica como meio de assegurar um desenvolvimento inclusivo e sustentável. A investigação seguiu uma abordagem dedutiva e uma análise comparativa, baseada em lições aprendidas de histórias de sucesso globais e desempenhos passados. O autor começa por apelar a um enfoque especial que combine a política de transformação estrutural e as reformas da boa governação. Debate seguidamente o declínio da boa governação económica no Uganda desde os anos 60. Em terceiro lugar, identifica os principais princípios para uma boa governação económica que deve ser operada mediante a aplicação de mecanismos de boa governação económica que orientem o desenvolvimento inclusivo. Conclui o Prof. Firimooni Rweere Banugire com sugestões políticas de como obter prioridades orçamentais directamente das políticas de implementação para o desenvolvimento inclusivo.

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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ELECTIONS AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC, 1992-2020

Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari

The paper deals with the analysis of the political economy of elections and voting in Ghana during the Fourth Republican period from 1992 to 2020 based on economic policy effects on electoral outcomes. The paper adopts a macro-level analysis approach, utilising various governmental economic policies and electoral data covering the period 1992 to 2020. The results of the analysis indicate that worsening economic conditions have a significant influence on voters' decisions and vote choice in each of the eight elections conducted under the Fourth Republic of Ghana. Also, the increase in governmental economic policy failures has been clearly established. Further, based on the economic policies and electoral politics of the Fourth Republic of Ghana, the analysis shows that several challenges of democratic transition have been overcome and the country's democracy continues to grow. The growth of the economy and the improvement in the provision of social services have also been modest over the period under review, but with widening income inequality in the country. Ghana's democratic development is driven by patronage electoral politics, and this is done by connecting the interests of ordinary people with those in society who possess greater access to power and resources. The conclusion is that average Ghanaian voters consider their vote within the framework of cost benefits and only lend support to candidates whose party policies approximate their own aspirations. This has been explained by the outcome of general elections conducted under the Fourth Republican era 1992 to 2020, though the outcome of the 2020 general elections is contentious.

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ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE DES ÉLECTIONS ET COMPORTEMENTS ÉLECTORAUX DURANT LA QUATRIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE DU GHANA, DE 1992 À 2020

Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari

Le document traite de l'analyse de l'économie politique des élections et du vote au Ghana au cours de la quatrième période républicaine de 1992 à 2020 sur la base des effets de la politique économique sur les résultats électoraux. Le document adopte une approche macro en examinant différentes politiques économiques gouvernementales et données électorales au cours de la période 1992-2020. Cette analyse révèle que la détérioration des conditions économiques a grandement influencé les décisions et le choix de vote des électeurs lors des huit élections menées sous la Quatrième République du Ghana. De plus, les échecs des politiques économiques gouvernementales se sont multipliés. L'analyse indique cependant que grâce aux politiques économiques et électorales de la Quatrième République du Ghana, plusieurs défis de la transition démocratique ont été surmontés et les processus démocratiques continuent de s'améliorer dans le pays. Durant la période analysée, il y a eu une croissance faible de l'économie et peu d''amélioration des prestations des services sociaux, mais les écarts de revenus se sont accrus. Le développement démocratique du Ghana est également soutenu par la politique de parrainage électoral qui consiste à faire défendre les intérêts des populations par des membres de la société qui disposent d'un meilleur accès au pouvoir et aux ressources. La conclusion est que l'électeur ghanéen en général fait son choix de vote et apporte son soutien en fonction des avantages financiers et des politiques qui se rapprochent de ses propres aspirations. Cela est démontré par les résultats des élections générales organisées sous la quatrième ère républicaine, de 1992 à 2020, bien que l'issue des élections de 2020 soit controversée.

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ECONOMIA POLÍTICA DE ELEIÇÕES E COMPORTAMENTO DE VOTO NA QUARTA REPÚBLICA DO GANA, 1992-2020

Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari

O artigo trata da análise da economia política das eleições e da votação no Gana durante o Quarto Período Republicano de 1992 a 2020, com base nos efeitos da política económica sobre os resultados eleitorais. O artigo adopta uma abordagem de análise a nível macro, utilizando várias políticas económicas governamentais e dados eleitorais que cobrem o período entre 1992 e 2020. Os resultados da análise indicam que o agravamento das condições económicas tem uma influência significativa nas decisões dos eleitores e nas escolha dos votos em cada uma das oito eleições realizadas no âmbito da Quarta República do Gana. Por outro lado, foi claramente estabelecido o aumento de falhas na política económica governamental. Mais ainda, com base nas políticas económicas e nas políticas eleitorais da Quarta República do Gana, a análise mostra que foram ultrapassados vários desafios da transição democrática e que a democracia do país continua a crescer. O crescimento da economia e uma melhor prestação dos serviços sociais foram igualmente modestos no período em análise, mas com o alargamento da desigualdade de rendimentos no país. O desenvolvimento democrático do Gana é impulsionado por políticas eleitorais clientelistas e isso é feito ligando o interesse das pessoas às pessoas da sociedade que possuem maior acesso ao poder e aos recursos. A conclusão é que os eleitores ganeses médios consideram o seu voto no quadro dos benefícios de custo e só dão apoio aos candidatos cujas políticas partidárias se aproximam das suas próprias aspirações. Tal foi explicado pelo resultado das eleições gerais realizadas durante a Quarta República entre 1992 e 2020, embora o resultado das eleições gerais de 2020 seja controverso.

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ANALYSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION POLICY OF 2008: A CASE STUDY OF THE ONHIMBU INFORMAL SETTLEMENT, OUTAPI, NAMIBIA

Gabriella Loteni Nguluwe and Charles Keyter

Since Namibia gained independence in 1990, there has been an increase in urbanisation which has led to most of the local authorities failing to provide enough houses, resulting in the emergence of squatter camps and informal settlements. Residents in the informal settlements lack access to clean water and receive poor sanitation services. One such informal settlement is the Onhimbu informal settlement, with a population of 1 521 in the town of Outapi. Outapi is a town situated in the northern part of Namibia in the Omusati region. As reported in the 2011 Namibian census the residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement did not have proper access to clean water and sanitation services. Research was conducted in 2017 to determine whether the Water Supply and Sanitation Policy of 2008 had been implemented was successfully to provide quality services. A mixed method approach was used to obtain the information from all stakeholders involved. In this regard, questionnaires and interviews were administered among officials from the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development, the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry, officials from the Outapi Town Council as well as residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement. Respondents revealed that the Water Supply and Sanitation Policy of 2008 had not been implemented fully due to various challenges ranging from lack of funds to lack of capacity. Data also revealed that the lack of human and financial resources had affected the implementation of the policy by the Outapi Town Council.

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ANALYSE DE LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA POLITIQUE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT EN EAU ET D'ASSAINISSEMENT DE 2008 : ETUDE DE CAS DU QUARTIER INFORMEL ONHIMBU À OUTAPI EN NAMIBIE

Gabriella Loteni Nguluwe et Charles Keyter

Depuis l'indépendance de la Namibie en 1990, le processus d'urbanisation s'est accéléré. Les autorités locales n'ont cependant pas été en mesure de fournir suffisamment de logements et plusieurs abris précaires et quartiers informels ont émergé. Les habitants des quartiers informels n'ont pas accès à l'eau potable et bénéficient de services sanitaires médiocres. L'un de ces quartiers informels est le quartier d'Onhimbu, qui compte 1 521 habitants dans la ville d'Outapi. Outapi est située dans la partie nord de la Namibie, dans la région d'Omusati. Comme indiqué dans le recensement de 2011 en Namibie, les habitants du quartier informel d'Onhimbu n'avaient pas un véritable accès à l'eau potable et aux services d'assainissement. Des recherches ont été menées en 2017 pour déterminer si la politique d'approvisionnement en eau et d'assainissement de 2008 avait bien été mise en œuvre et fournissait des services de qualité. Une méthodologie mixte a été utilisée pour obtenir les informations de toutes les parties prenantes concernées. En effet, des questionnaires et des entretiens ont été menés auprès de fonctionnaires du ministère de l'habitat et du développement urbain, du ministère de l'agriculture, des eaux et des forêts, de fonctionnaires du conseil municipal d'Outapi ainsi que de résidents du quartier informel d'Onhimbu. Les personnes interrogées ont révélé que la politique d'approvisionnement en eau et d'assainissement de 2008 n'avait pas été pleinement mise en œuvre en raison de divers problèmes allant du manque de fonds au manque de capacités. L'enquête a également révélé que le manque de ressources humaines et financières avait affecté la mise en œuvre de la politique par le conseil municipal d'Outapi.

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ANÁLISE DA POLÍTICA DE IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DO FORNECIMENTO DE ÁGUA E SANEAMENTO DE 2008: UM ESTUDO DE CASO DO ASSENTAMENTO INFORMAL DE ONHIMBU, OUTAPI, NAMÍBIA

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Desde que a Namíbia ganhou a independência em 1990, tem-se verificado um aumento da urbanização, que levou a que a maioria das autoridades locais não fornecessem casas suficientes, resultando no surgimento de bairros de lata e assentamentos selvagens. Aos residentes nos assentamentos selvagens falta o acesso a água potável e sofrem com serviços sanitários deficientes ou inexistentes. Um desses assentamentos selvagens é Onhimbu, com uma população de 1 521 habitantes na cidade de Outapi. Outapi é uma cidade situada na parte setentrional da Namíbia na região de Omusati. Como noticiado no recenseamento namibiano de 2011, os residentes do assentamento selvagem de Onhimbu não tiverem acesso adequado aos serviços de água potável e saneamento. A investigação foi realizada em 2017 para determinar se a Política de Abastecimento de Água e Saneamento de 2008 tinha sido implementada com sucesso para fornecer serviços de qualidade. Utilizou-se um método misto para obter informação de todos os intervenientes envolvidos. Neste particular, realizaram-se questionários e entrevistas entre funcionários do Ministério do Desenvolvimento Urbano e Rural, do Ministério da Agricultura, Água e Florestas, funcionários públicos da municipalidade de Outapi assim como de residentes do assentamento selvagem de Onhimbu. Os respondentes revelaram que a Política de Fornecimento de Água e Saneamento de 2008 não fora totalmente implementada devido a vários problemas, entre eles a falta de fundos e a falta de capacidade. Os dados revelaram ainda que a falta de recursos humanos e financeiros afectaram a implementação da política por parte da municipalidade de Outapi.

Palavras-chave: Fornecimento de água, serviços sanitários, assentamento selvagem, política de água e saneamento, urbanização

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INCLUSÃO DA PESSOA COM DEFICIÊNCIA NAS POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS DE EMPREGO EM MOÇAMBIQUE

Domingos Carlos Batone

O artigo discute a inclusão das Pessoas com Deficiência no mercado de trabalho moçambicano através de duas dimensões das políticas públicas de emprego, nomeadamente, as passivas, que fornecem suporte de renda para pessoas desempregadas por meio do seguro-desemprego e outros subsídios sociais, bem como as activas, destinadas a ajudar os deficientes desempregados a voltar ao trabalho com novas competências, por meio dos programas de formação e criação directa de emprego no sector público e privado. Embora ambas as abordagens tenham as suas valências, serão aplicadas na prática para verificar o nível de inclusão das PcD nas políticas públicas de emprego, identificar as alternativas e desafios para a sua implementação. Recorrendo a uma metodologia mista, serão operacionalizadas a consulta bibliográfica, utilizadas as estatísticas do Quarto Censo Geral de 2017 e aplicadas entrevistas aos portadores de deficiência que são assistidos pela organização TV Surdo, vocacionada na defesa dos direitos das PcD. No entanto, a continuidade das práticas de discriminação e estigmatização limitam cada vez mais o seu acesso ao mercado de trabalho, demandando assim por medidas que promovam acções afirmativas para este grupo prioritário. O estudo chegou à conclusão de que as políticas públicas de emprego em Moçambique são predominantemente passivas e excludentes; no entanto, dos subsídios alocados desde 2018 até 2021 não sofreram nenhum incremento, apesar do comportamento da inflação demonstrar o aumento do alto custo de vida.

Palavras-chave: Inclusão, Pessoas com Deficiência e Políticas de Emprego.

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INCLUSION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN PUBLIC LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN MOZAMBIQUE

Domingos Carlos Batone

The paper discusses the inclusion of people with disabilities in the Mozambican labor market through two aspects of public employment policies, specifically, the passive ones which provide income support for unemployed people through unemployment insurance and other social subsidies, as well as active ones, which aim to help unemployed disabled people to return to work with new skills, through training programs and direct job creation in the public and private sectors. Although both approaches have their strengths, they will be applied in practice to verify the level of inclusion of people with disabilities in public employment policies, and identify alternatives and challenges for their implementation. Using mixed methodology, bibliographic consultation will be carried out, using statistics from the fourth general census in 2017, and interviews with the disabled who are part of the TV Surdo organization, dedicated to defending the rights of people with disabilities. However, the continuation of practices of discrimination and stigmatization are increasingly limiting their access to the labor market, thus requiring measures which promote affirmative action for this priority group. The study came to the conclusion that public employment policies in Mozambique are predominantly passive and exclusionary, and subsidies allocated from 2018 to 2021 have not increased, despite the behaviour of inflation showing the increase in the high cost of living.

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INCLUSION DES PERSONNES HANDICAPÉES DANS LES POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES DU MARCHÉ DU TRAVAIL AU MOZAMBIQUE

Domingos Carlos Batone

Le document traite de l'inclusion des personnes handicapées sur le marché du travail mozambicain à travers deux types de politiques publiques pour l'emploi, les politiques passives qui assurent un soutien aux revenus des chômeurs par le biais de l'assurance chômage et d'autres subventions sociales, et les politiques actives qui aident les chômeurs handicapés à retourner sur le marché du travail avec de nouvelles compétences, grâce à des programmes de formation et de création directe d'emplois dans les secteurs public et privé. Bien que les deux approches présentent des points forts, elles doivent être concrètement appliquées pour vérifier le niveau d'inclusion des personnes handicapées dans les politiques publiques pour l'emploi et identifier les alternatives et les difficultés de leur mise en œuvre. À l'aide d'une méthodologie mixte, une consultation bibliographique a été menée sur la base de statistiques du quatrième recensement général de 2017 et d'entretiens avec des personnes handicapées faisant partie de l'organisation TV Surdo spécialisée dans la défense des droits des personnes handicapées. Cependant, les pratiques de discrimination et de stigmatisation persistantes limitent de plus en plus l'accès au marché du travail de ce groupe prioritaire. Des mesures d'action positive doivent donc être prises. L'étude est arrivée à la conclusion que les politiques publiques pour l'emploi au Mozambique sont principalement passives et exclusives, et que les subventions n'ont pas augmenté entre 2018 et 2021 malgré l'inflation et l'augmentation du coût de la vie.

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FACILITATING PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AND COLLABORATIVE ACTION LEARNING: A REFLECTION ON THE EMERGING MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME OF THE NATIONAL SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Milly Paile, Johnny M. Pietersen and Juanita Fennell

This paper is written from the perspective of education, training and development practitioners in the South African public service. We take a reflective look at the provision of the Emerging Management Development Programme through a partnership arrangement for a cohort of participants from the South African National Parks. The project has offered a structured way of enriching a traditional block release programme with action learning aimed at enhancing participants' problem-solving skills while supporting the improvement of organisational systems and practices. We reflect on the context from which institutional collaboration for capacity development arises, and consider the intention and manifestation of opportunities for personal and organisational learning. We draw upon observations of the training sessions, interactions with programme participants and facilitators as well as views of the senior managers involved. Our findings highlight a blend of personal development and collaborative action learning as essential features of programme design and implementation to stimulate cycles of organisational learning and sector-wide development. These findings support calls to reinvigorate teaching and learning approaches for stronger applicability and adaptability of current curricula, especially in light of unpredictable disruptions locally and globally.

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ENCOURAGER LE DÉVELOPPEMENT PERSONNEL ET L'APPRENTISSAGE COLLABORATIF PAR L'ACTION : UNE RÉFLEXION SUR LE PROGRAMME DE LA NATIONAL SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT DE DÉVELOPPEMENT D'UNE NOUVELLE GESTION

Milly Paile, Johnny M. Pietersen and Juanita Fennell

Le document reflète la vision des professionnels du service public sud-africain de l'éducation, de la formation et du développement. La réflexion est portée sur la mise en œuvre du programme de développement d'une nouvelle gestion par le biais d'un partenariat entre participants des parcs nationaux d'Afrique du Sud. Le projet propose d'enrichir le programme de façon structurée par l'apprentissage par l'action, le but étant d'améliorer les compétences des participants en matière de résolution de problèmes ainsi que les pratiques et les systèmes organisationnels. Nous examinons le contexte d'émergence d'une collaboration institutionnelle pour le développement des compétences et examinons l'intention et la manifestation des opportunités d'apprentissage personnel et organisationnel. Nous nous appuyons sur les observations des sessions de formation, les interactions avec les participants au programme et les animateurs, ainsi que sur les points de vue des cadres supérieurs impliqués. L'étude révèle que combiner le développement personnel et l'apprentissage collaboratif par l'action sont des caractéristiques essentielles de la conception et de la mise en œuvre du programme pour stimuler les cycles d'apprentissage organisationnel et le développement du secteur. Ces résultats appellent à adopter des approches d'enseignement et d'apprentissage visant à renforcer les aspects pratiques et adaptables des programmes d'études actuels, en particulier dans le contexte local et mondial des perturbations imprévisibles.

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FACILITAR O DESENVOLVIMENTO PESSOAL E A APRENDIZAGEM DE ACÇÕES DE COLABORAÇÃO: UMA REFLEXÃO SOBRE O PROGRAMA EMERGENTE DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA GESTÃO DA ESCOLA NACIONAL DE GOVERNO

Milly Paile, Johnny M. Pietersen e Juanita Fennell

Este artigo foi escrito sob a perspectiva da educação, formação e desenvolvimento dos profissionais da função pública sul africana. Assumimos uma opinião reflexiva sobre o lançamento do Programa de Desenvolvimento de Gestão Emergente através de um acordo de parceria para os participantes dos Parques Nacionais Sul Africanos. O projecto ofereceu uma forma estruturada de enriquecer o programa com aprendizagem de acção destinada a melhorar as capacidades de resolução de problemas dos participantes, ao mesmo tempo que apoia a melhoria dos sistemas e práticas organizacionais. Reflectimos sobre o contexto a partir do qual surge a colaboração institucional para o desenvolvimento de capacidades, e temos em linha de conta a intenção e a manifestação de oportunidades de aprendizagem pessoal e organizacional. Baseamo-nos nas observações das sessões de formação, nas interacções com os participantes e formadores do programa, assim como nas opiniões dos gestores de topo envolvidos. As nossas conclusões destacam um misto de desenvolvimento pessoal e aprendizagem de acção colaborativa como características essenciais da concepção e implementação de programas para estimular ciclos de aprendizagem organizacional e desenvolvimento de todo o sector. Estes resultados apoiam os apelos para revigorar as abordagens de ensino e aprendizagem para uma aplicabilidade e adaptabilidade mais fortes dos currículos actuais, concretamente à luz de perturbações imprevisíveis a nível local e global.

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WHEN REFORM TRIGGERS REFORM: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED (PUBLIC) UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN THE RWENDEIRE VISITATION COMMITTEE REPORT

Lazarus Nabaho

The extant literature on university governance in Africa focuses on how universities are governed rather than how they should be governed. Based on the Rwendeire Report (2016) – a Visitation Committee Report on Makerere University in Uganda – this interpretive article examines how the report envisages the governance of public universities in Uganda. The corporate-level governance reform proposals include, *inter alia*, adoption of a lean and lay-dominated university council; disfranchisement of vice chancellors; the introduction of competence-based councils, mandating the Minister responsible for higher education to appoint members of university councils, and the institutionalisation of a maximum membership term limit. Conversely, discarding the current practice of electing the vice chancellorship in favour of appointment, professionalising the post of vice chancellor and strengthening the executive authority of the post are part of the reform menu at executive leadership level. At senate level, the reform proposals constellate around a shift from statutory to institution-specific functions of the university senate and introducing the competence-based membership criterion. The reform proposals, which have been shaped by policy borrowing and new public management ideals, are attempts to remodel university councils as corporate boards and to further subordinate the senates of public universities to university councils. The proposals suggest that higher education systems be cautious regarding the adoption of a pure corporatist model of university governance that advocates for lay university councils under which chief executive officers are members of the oversight bodies but without voting rights.

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QUANDO REFORMAS DESENCADEIAM REFORMAS: UMA ANÁLISE DA PROPOSTA DE REFORMAS (PÚBLICAS) DE GOVERNAÇÃO UNIVERSITÁRIA NO RELATÓRIO DA COMISSÃO DE VISITAS AO RWENDEIRE

Lazarus Nabaho

A literatura existente acerca de governação universitária em África centra-se na forma como as universidades são governadas e não como devem ser governadas. Baseado no Relatório de Rwendeire (2016) – "A Visitation Committee Report on Makerere University in Uganda" – este artigo interpretativo analisa a forma como o relatório prevê a governação das universidades públicas no Uganda. As propostas de reforma de governação ao nível corporativo incluem *inter alia*, a adopção de um conselho universitário 'lean' e dominado por leigos; o afastamento dos vice-chanceleres; a introdução de conselhos baseados na competência, mandatando o Ministro responsável pelo ensino superior para nomear membros dos conselhos universitários, e a institucionalização de um limite máximo de duração dos membros. No sentido inverso, o abandono da actual prática de eleição do cargo de vice-chanceler em favor da nomeação, a profissionalização do cargo de vice-chanceler e o reforço da autoridade executiva do cargo, fazem todos eles parte do menu da reforma ao nível da liderança executiva. Ao nível do senado, as propostas de reforma andam em torno de uma mudança das funções estatutárias para funções específicas da instituição do senado universitário e introduzem o critério de filiação baseada em competências. As propostas de reforma, que foram moldadas com base em políticas e novos ideais de gestão pública, são tentativas de remodelação dos conselhos universitários como entidades corporativas e subordinarem ainda mais os senados das universidades públicas aos conselhos universitários. As propostas sugerem que os sistemas do ensino superior deveriam ser cautelosos na adopção de um modelo corporativista puro de governação universitária que defenda conselhos universitários leigos sob os quais os directores executivos são membros dos órgãos de supervisão, mas sem direito de voto.

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QUAND LA REFORME DECLENCHE LA REFORME : EXAMEN DES REFORMES PROPOSEES DE LA GOUVERNANCE DES UNIVERSITES (PUBLIQUES) DANS LE RAPPORT DU COMITE DE VISITE DE RWENDEIRE

Lazare Nabaho

Les publications existantes sur la gouvernance universitaire en Afrique traitent davantage de la façon dont les universités sont gouvernées que de la façon dont elles devraient l'être. Cet article interprétatif examine comment le Rapport Rwendeire (2016), un rapport du comité de visite sur l'Université Makerere en Ouganda, envisage la gouvernance des universités publiques en Ouganda. Les propositions de réforme de la gouvernance au niveau de l'organisation comprennent *entres autres* l'adoption d'un conseil universitaire à la gérance autonome, la privation du droit de vote des recteurs, le choix des membres du conseil sur la base des compétences, le mandat du ministre responsable de l'enseignement supérieur pour nommer les membres des conseils universitaires, et l'institutionnalisation d'une limite maximale du mandat des membres. À l'inverse, l'abandon de la pratique actuelle de l'élection du rectorat au profit de la nomination, la professionnalisation du poste de vice-chancelier et le renforcement de l'autorité exécutive de ce poste font partie du menu des réformes au niveau de la direction exécutive. Pour ce qui est du sénat des universités, les propositions de réforme recommandent de passer des fonctions statutaires à des fonctions spécifiques et d'introduire le critère compétence comme condition d'adhésion. Les propositions de réforme, influencées par la politique et les idéaux de gestion publique, sont des tentatives visant à remodeler les conseils universitaires en conseils d'administration et à subordonner davantage les sénats des universités publiques aux conseils universitaires. Les systèmes d'enseignement supérieur sont encouragés à être prudents quant à l'adoption d'un modèle purement corporatiste de gouvernance universitaire qui préconise des conseils universitaires non professionnels dans lesquels les directeurs généraux sont membres des organes de contrôle mais sans droit de vote.

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POLICING IN NIGERIA: A SOCIOECONOMIC, ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NIGERIAN POLICE FORCE

Akinyetun Tope Shola

Like other police institutions of the world, the primary duty of the Nigerian police is to maintain public order and safety, secure life and property and enforce the law. Recent events such as the calls for the disbandment of an arm of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), show that the NPF has fallen short of expectations. This paper is of the view that the NPF is enmeshed in corruption and protects the interests of the state through violence. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to assess how coercion, corruption and brutality have affected the performance of the NPF. As such, this paper has adopted a qualitative approach that relies on secondary data and documentary sources such as textbooks, refereed journal articles, newspapers, government reports as well as local and international agencies reports. The findings indicate a simple theme: the NPF is challenged by socio-economic, ecological and sociocultural factors – the effects of which are lack of effective policing and a disparity between the police and the policed. This disparity has led to the nationwide reprisal of violence by the Nigerian youth against police brutality. This paper, therefore, recommends that the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) adopt a public-private partnership administration, such that political interference in policing activities be reduced. More so, the federal government, in conjunction with the private sector, should carry out a systemic and institutional reform of the NPF to address the socio-economic, ecological and sociocultural challenges plaguing the force.

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LA POLICE AU NIGERIA : UNE ANALYSE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE, ECOLOGIQUE ET SOCIOCULTURELLE DE LA PERFORMANCE DE LA POLICE NIGERIANE

Akinyetun Tope Shola

À l'instar des autres institutions policières du monde, la mission première de la police nigériane est de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité publics, de protéger les vies et les biens et de faire respecter la loi. Récemment, des appels à la dissolution d'une branche de la police nigériane (NPF) appelée la SARS (Special Anti-Robbery Squad) montrent que la NPF n'a pas répondu aux attentes. L'article affirme que le NPF est empêtré dans des affaires de corruption et protège les intérêts de l'Etat par la violence. L'objectif de ce document est donc d'évaluer dans quelle mesure la coercition, la corruption et la brutalité ont affecté les performances de la NPF. Le document adopte une approche qualitative qui s'appuie sur des données secondaires et des sources documentaires telles que des manuels, des articles de revues à comité de lecture, des journaux, des rapports gouvernementaux ainsi que des rapports d'agences locales et internationales. Les résultats révèlent une réalité simple : la PFN est confrontée à des facteurs socio-économiques, écologiques et socioculturels dont les effets sont l'absence d'un maintien de l'ordre efficace et une disparité entre le rôle de la police et les actions policières. En raison de cette disparité, la jeunesse nigériane a réagi avec violence aux brutalités policières. L'article recommande par conséquent que les forces de police nigérianes (NPF) adoptent une administration de partenariat public-privé, afin de limiter l'ingérence politique dans les activités de la police. En outre, le gouvernement fédéral, en collaboration avec le secteur privé, devrait procéder à une réforme systémique et institutionnelle de la NPF afin de relever les défis socio-économiques, écologiques et socioculturels auxquels la police est confrontée.

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O POLICIAMENTO NA NIGÉRIA: UMA ANÁLISE SOCIOECONÓMICA, ECOLÓGICA E SOCIOCULTURAL DO DESEMPENHO DA FORÇA POLICIAL NIGERIANA

Akinyetun Tope Shola

À semelhança de outras instituições policiais do mundo, o dever principal da polícia nigeriana é manter a ordem pública e a segurança, proteger a vida e a propriedade e implementar a lei. Eventos recentes, como os apelos à dissolução de um braço da Força Policial Nigeriana (NPF, Nigerian Police Force), o Esquadrão Especial Anti-roubo (SARS, Special Anti-Robbery Squad), mostram que a NPF ficou aquém das expectativas. Este artigo transmite a opinião de que a NPF está envolta em corrupção e protege os interesses do estado através da violência. O objectivo deste artigo é, pois, avaliar como a coerção, a corrupção e a brutalidade têm afectado o desempenho da NPF. Como tal, este artigo adoptou uma abordagem qualitativa que confia em dados secundários e em fontes documentais, como livros de texto, artigos em revistas técnicas de nomeada, jornais, relatórios governamentais, assim como em relatórios de agências locais e internacionais. As conclusões apontam um único tema: a NPF é desafiada por factores socioeconómicos, ecológicos e socioculturais – cujos efeitos são o policiamento ineficaz e a disparidade entre a polícia e os policiados. Esta disparidade levou à represália nacional da violência por parte da juventude nigeriana contra a brutalidade policial. Este artigo recomenda, portanto, que a Força Policial Nigeriana (NPF) adopte uma administração de parcerias público-privadas, de forma a reduzir qualquer tipo de interferência política em actividades de policiamento. Mais ainda, o governo federal, juntamente com o sector privado, deve realizar uma reforma sistemática e institucional da NPF para enfrentar os desafios socioeconómicos, ecológicos e socioculturais que atormentam a força.

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and political identity. The list also includes books with a specific focus on countries and regions.

Why is it important that we do research, publish and also study sources on Africa? It is possible through such publications to disseminate research results as well as new scholarly contributions to specific fields. It is also a way to make researchers and practitioners in other parts of the world aware of African realities, practices and experiences. It enhances knowledge and understanding of Africa and contributes to breaking down stereotyping. It provides us with opportunities to diagnose, analyse and remedy challenges. The publication of books and scholarly articles are therefore an asset to African researchers and scholars, as it provides them with opportunities to be acknowledged as experts in specific fields at national, regional and international level. Through publications, specific individuals, academic departments, universities and institutions receive recognition. We need to read published sources on Africa, as they develop the mind and contribute to creating insight, new ideas, theories and a new understanding of our continent.

The brief notes on the selected publications below were mainly compiled from the descriptions of these books by their authors and publishers.

Development as rebellion: A biography of Julius Nyerere

This three-volume work is the most comprehensive biography on the life and politics of Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922-1999). Not only was Nyerere Tanzania's first and longest serving president but he also became an influential African statesman, expressing his strong commitment to and vision for the development of his country and Africa as a whole. Spanning more than 1 000 pages, the three authors, namely Saida Yahya-Othman, Ng'wanza Kamata and Issa G. Shivji, each acted as the lead author for a volume focusing on different aspects of Nyerere's life and politics. Although much information is available on the span of Nyerere's life, the three parts are thematically divided and not a chronological biography of the life of Nyerere.

Saida Yahya-Othman is the lead author of the first volume, *The Making of a Philosopher Ruler*. Its focus is on the young Nyerere, his education and private life. The second volume, *Becoming Nationalist,* with Ng'wanza Kamata as lead author, is concerned with Tanzania's independence struggle and Nyerere's efforts to build a nation. Issa G. Shivji

is the lead author of the final volume, *Rebellion Without Rebels*, concentrating on Nyerere's version of socialism. The authors consulted a large variety of both primary and secondary sources. They consulted primary sources in public archives and personal collections, and also conducted interviews with contemporaries of Nyerere. The three volumes are all enriched by a collection of unique and interesting photographs.

Reference: Shivji, I.G., Yahya-Othman, S., and Kamata, N. (2020). *Development as Rebellion: A Biography of Julius Nyerere.* Three volumes. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers.

Understanding modern Nigeria: Ethnicity, democracy and development

As the title reflects, this book by Toyin Falola, the renowned specialist on African and Nigerian affairs, makes an important contribution to understanding contemporary Nigeria. After Nigeria had received independence from Britain in 1960, it emerged as Africa's second largest economy and one of the biggest producers of oil in the world. Despite its economic success, the country has 250 ethnic groups, often with deep divides among them. The central themes discussed in the book are ethnicity, democracy and governance in post-colonial Nigeria. The content provides a good narrative on the history of Nigeria, the competition for resources and power that accompanied colonialism along with the gaps between the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups forced together under British rule. Falola also discusses the Nigerian federal political system, religious and political pluralism and many of the challenges associated with the recent history of Nigeria.

Reference: Falola, T. (2021). *Understanding Modern Nigeria: Ethnicity, Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Democratic struggle, institutional reform, and state resilience in the African Sahel

This edited volume addresses a theme that is not a common focus area in international scholarly publications and academic research, namely the experiences of countries of the West African Sahel. Since the 1990s these countries have experienced political struggles and conflict-related democratic and institutional developments, while they are currently central to the global debate on security, terrorism, migration and conflict. The book asks

an important and little-studied question: How have the politics of democratisation across the Francophone Sahel shaped the processes of state-building, and what effects have politics had on the resilience of state institutions? The content focuses on six Sahel states (Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) and shows that the politics of institutional reform, often referred to as the democratisation debate, have different effects on the creation of resilient states. The contributors to the volume are six distinguished scholars from across the region, many of whom played important roles in the struggles they discuss.

Reference: Villalón, L.A. and Idrissa, R. (Eds). (2020). *Democratic Struggle, Institutional Reform, and State Resilience in the African Sahel.* Lanham: Lexington Books.

Neither settler nor native: The making and unmaking of permanent minorities

This book by Mahmood Mamdani could be described as a "genealogy of political modernity". The author maintained that the nation state and the colonial state created each other. The "construction" of the colonial state and the nation state were mutual through politicisation of religious or ethnic majorities at the expense of a minority. He referred to various cases, including the New World, South Africa, Israel, Germany and Sudan. In North America, genocide and internment on reservations created both a permanent native underclass and the physical and ideological spaces for developing an identity as a settler nation. Europe saw the terrible Nazi policies and associated actions toward the Jewish population. Israel was created as a Jewish state with the "minoritization of Palestinian Arabs" and the resultant violence. In Mamdani's opinion, there must be political solutions to political violence. It is necessary to rethink the political community for all survivors, including the victims, perpetrators, bystanders and beneficiaries. This community must be based on the common residence and commitment to build a common future; it must also be without the permanent political identities of "settler and native".

Reference: Mamdani, M. (2020). *Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, Harvard University.

Colonialism, ethnicity and war in Angola

Vasco Martins contributes a fresh appreciation to our understanding of the history of Angola through an analysis of how social, political and economic changes have impacted on the largest ethnic group of the country, the Ovimbundu. Instead of focusing on colonial enterprise, international politics and ideology, the emphasis is on African experiences and responses. The book has resulted from extensive research in Angola which includes using archival sources, collecting oral evidence and life stories and making personal observations. Focus is placed on the transformative effect of Christianity and colonialisation on the politicised modern notions of ethnic identity as it has manifested during the anti-colonial struggle. Such ethno-political notions assisted UNITA in mobilising from the Ovimbundu during the civil war, supporting the axiom of an Ovimbundu UNITA. The author explores how ethnicity, politics and war have impacted on post-war citizenship in Angola, specifically in terms of national integration and marginalisation.

Reference: Martins, V. (2021). *Colonialism, Ethnicity and War in Angola*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Party proliferation and political contestation in Africa: Senegal in comparative perspective

Catherine Lena Kelly examines various elements of democratisation and party competition in West Africa with a specific focus on Senegal. As Senegal has one of the longest histories of multiparty elections, it is of relevance to scrutinise how proliferation of political parties has occurred, its consequences and to what extent this trend also occurs in other African countries. Through an analysis of data sources, the author highlights the economic and political functioning of parties, provides information on how parties have come into being, party loyalty in both the ruling and opposition parties, and changes in incumbent presidents. As the discussion is placed within the local and regional contexts, the study is of note to scholars, policy makers and students of African affairs.

Reference: Kelly, C.L. (2020). *Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa: Senegal in Comparative Perspective*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Know the beginning well: an inside journey through five decades of African development

This book by K.Y. Amoako intertwines a personal journey with the history of African development. The author reminds us of the often-stated idea that if we wish to plan for the future, we need to understand our past. This is specifically relevant to this book: it is not simply another discussion on Africa's development journey during the previous five decades but an inside look and told from the personal experiences of somebody who has made the trip. The author served as Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, amongst others, and is the founding President of the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET). He narrates a thought-provoking journey through the politics, policies and institutions that have shaped Africa's postcolonial history. As this history has created an important base, it will continue to shape the future of the continent.

Reference: Amoako, K.Y. (2020). *Know the Beginning Well: An Inside Journey Through Five Decades of African Development*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

NOTES SUR LES NOUVEAUX LIVRES À L'INTENTION DES LECTEURS ET DES ÉTUDIANTS SUR LES QUESTIONS AFRICAINES

Thean Potgieter

L'Afrique est une importante région du monde qui n'arrête pas de fasciner. Certains pays africains font partie des économies à la croissance l'une des plus rapides au monde. Il paraît donc évident de s'intéresser à ce continent. Dotée d'un passé historique riche et varié, l'Afrique compte des milliers de langues et de cultures ainsi qu'une population dynamique et innovatrice de plus de 1,3 milliard d'habitants. L'Afrique possède également de nombreuses réserves en minerais et des écosystèmes très diversifiés.

S'intéresser à l'histoire, la politique, la gouvernance, l'actualité, l'économie, la culture et l'écologie de l'Afrique ainsi qu'à son interaction avec le monde et à bien d'autres aspects améliore notre compréhension de l'histoire du monde et nous aide par là-même à devenir des citoyens mieux informés. Le nombre de publications, d'analyses, d'études comparatives et d'études de cas en rapport avec l'Afrique n'a cessé d'augmenter ces dernières années. Même si ces documents varient par leur contenu et leur qualité, leur publication contribue grandement à la compréhension et aux débats internationaux sur l'Afrique, et atteste d'une certaine reconnaissance mondiale et d'un intérêt croissant pour l'Afrique.

Seuls quelques-uns des nombreux livres récemment publiés dans le monde sont présentés ci-dessous. Les sources citées ne sont en aucun cas représentatives, complètes ou exhaustives. Il s'agit simplement d'une sélection de thèmes concernant l'Afrique et qui sont rarement abordés dans les publications internationales. Cette sélection comprend entre autres de récents livres d'histoire, la biographie d'un grand leader africain, une autobiographie et une étude comparative. Les thèmes abordés portent sur la gouvernance,

les processus démocratiques, l'identité politique, l'origine ethnique et le développement. La sélection contient également des livres qui portent un intérêt particulier à certains pays et régions.

Pourquoi est-il important de faire des recherches et de publier des études sur l'Afrique ? De telles publications permettent une large diffusion des résultats de recherche de spécialistes et de chercheurs dans des domaines précis. Il s'agit également d'un moyen de sensibiliser les chercheurs et les professionnels d'ailleurs aux réalités, aux pratiques et aux expériences africaines. Par ailleurs, la grande connaissance et la meilleure compréhension de l'Afrique qui en résulte contribuent à briser les stéréotypes. Cela permet de faire des diagnostics et des analyses ainsi que de relever les défis. La publication de livres et d'articles est un réel avantage pour les chercheurs et les universitaires africains dans la mesure où cela leur permet d'être reconnus aux niveaux national, régional et international en tant qu'experts dans des domaines spécifiques. À travers ces publications, des individus, des départements universitaires, des universités et des institutions se font connaître. Lire des articles sur l'Afrique permet d'ouvrir l'esprit et favorise la prolifération des idées, la créativité, l'élaboration de théories et de nouvelles compréhensions de notre continent.

Les brèves notes figurant sur les publications sélectionnées correspondent généralement à des descriptions de ces livres par des auteurs et des éditeurs.

Development as rebellion: A biography of Julius Nyerere

Cet ouvrage en trois volumes est une biographie qui retrace en détail la vie et le parcours politique de Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922-1999). Il a non seulement été le premier président de Tanzanie et celui à avoir occupé ce poste le plus longtemps, mais il a également été un politicien influent, qui n'hésitait pas à exprimer son engagement fort et sa vision pour le développement de son pays et de l'Afrique en général. Les auteurs des trois volumes sont respectivement Saida Yahya-Othman, Ng'wanza Kamata et Issa G. Shivji. Ils retracent en plus de 1 000 pages différents aspects de la vie et du parcours politique de Julius Nyerere. Bien que des dates et des événements de sa vie soient mentionnés, les trois volumes sont organisés de façon thématique et non chronologique.

Saida Yahya-Othman est l'auteur principal du premier volume, *The Making of a Philosopher Ruler*. Il s'intéresse surtout au jeune Nyerere, à son éducation et à sa vie

privée. Le deuxième volume, *Becoming Nationalist,* a pour auteur principal Ng'wanza Kamata et présente la lutte pour l'indépendance de la Tanzanie et les efforts de Julius Nyerere pour construire une nation. Issa G. Shivji est l'auteur principal du dernier volume, *Rebellion Without Rebels*, qui se focalise sur sa vision socialiste. Les auteurs ont consulté une grande variété de sources primaires et secondaires. Les sources primaires provenaient d'archives publiques et de collections personnelles. Les auteurs ont également mené des entretiens avec des contemporains de Julius Nyerere. Les trois volumes contiennent une riche collection de photographies intéressantes et uniques.

Référence : Shivji, I.G., Yahya-Othman, S., et Kamata, N. (2020). *Development as Rebellion: A Biography of Julius Nyerere.* Trois volumes. Dar es Salam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers.

Understanding modern Nigeria: Ethnicity, democracy and development

Comme son titre l'indique, ce livre de Toyin Falola, spécialiste renommé des questions africaines et nigérianes, aide grandement à mieux comprendre le Nigéria actuel. Après avoir obtenu son indépendance de la Grande-Bretagne en 1960, le Nigéria est devenu la deuxième plus grande économie d'Afrique et l'un des plus importants producteurs de pétrole au monde. Le succès économique n'a cependant pas départi le pays des profondes divisions qui existent entre les 250 groupes ethniques qui le composent. Les principaux thèmes abordés dans l'ouvrage sont l'appartenance ethnique, la démocratie et la gouvernance dans le Nigéria postcolonial. L'ouvrage relate l'histoire du Nigéria, la lutte pour les ressources et le pouvoir tout au long de la période coloniale et les écarts qui existent entre les groupes ethniques Haoussa-Peuls, Yoruba et Igbo forcés de s'unir sous la domination britannique. Falola se penche également sur le système politique fédéral nigérian, le pluralisme religieux et politique et de nombreux défis en rapport avec l'histoire récente du Nigéria.

Référence : Falola, T. (2021). *Understanding Modern Nigeria: Ethnicity, Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Democratic struggle, institutional reform, and state resilience in the African Sahel

Ce volume traite des expériences des pays sahéliens de l'Afrique de l'ouest, un thème qui a rarement fait l'objet de publications internationales et de recherches universitaires. Depuis les années 1990, ces pays ont connu des luttes politiques et des développements démocratiques et institutionnels liés aux conflits. Aujourd'hui, ils sont actuellement au cœur du débat mondial sur la sécurité, le terrorisme, la migration et les conflits. Le livre interroge sur une question importante et peu étudiée : De quelles manières les politiques de démocratisation au Sahel francophone ont-elles façonné les processus de construction de l'État, et quels effets la politique a-t-elle eu sur la résilience des institutions gouvernementales ? L'étude concerne six États du Sahel (Sénégal, Mauritanie, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger et Tchad) et montre que la politique de réforme institutionnelle, souvent appelée débat sur la démocratisation, produit des effets différents sur la création d'États résilients. Les auteurs de ce volume sont six éminents chercheurs de la région, dont beaucoup ont joué un rôle important dans les luttes dont ils parlent.

Référence : Villalón, L.A. et Idrissa, R. (Eds). (2020). *Democratic Struggle, Institutional Reform, and State Resilience in the African Sahel.* Lanham: Lexington Books.

Neither settler nor native: The making and unmaking of permanent minorities

Ce livre de Mahmood Mamdani pourrait être qualifié de « généalogie de la modernité politique ». L'auteur soutient que l'État-nation et l'État colonial se sont créés l'un l'autre. La « construction » de l'État colonial et de l'État-nation serait mutuelle en raison de la politisation des majorités religieuses ou ethniques aux dépens d'une minorité. Il cite le Nouveau Monde, l'Afrique du Sud, Israël, l'Allemagne et le Soudan en exemples. En Amérique du Nord, le génocide et le confinement dans les réserves ont institué une classe marginalisée autochtone et des espaces physiques et idéologiques pour développer une identité de nation colonisatrice. L'Europe a été témoin des terribles politiques nazies et des horreurs perpétrées envers la population juive. L'État juif d'Israël a été créé grâce à la « minorisation des Arabes palestiniens » et aux violences qui en ont résulté. Selon Mamdani, des alternatives politiques à la violence existent. Il est nécessaire de repenser la communauté politique tant pour les survivants que pour les victimes, les auteurs, les spectateurs et les bénéficiaires. Cette communauté doit être fondée sur la résidence

commune et l'engagement à construire un avenir commun. Elle doit aussi se débarrasser des identités politiques permanentes de « colon et autochtone ».

Référence : Mamdani, M. (2020). *Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, Harvard University.

Colonialism, ethnicity and war in Angola

Vasco Martins éclaire notre compréhension de l'histoire de l'Angola à travers une analyse de l'impact des changements sociaux, politiques et économiques sur les Ovimbundu, le plus grand groupement ethnique du pays. Plutôt que de s'intéresser à l'entreprise coloniale ou aux politiques et idéologies internationales, il met l'accent sur les expériences et les réponses africaines. Ce livre est le fruit d'une recherche approfondie en Angola qui s'est basée entre autres sur des archives, des témoignages verbaux et des récits de vie ainsi que des observations personnelles. Il décrit l'effet transformateur du christianisme et de la colonisation sur les notions modernes politisées d'identité ethnique qui ont émergé au cours de la lutte anticoloniale. Ces notions ethno-politiques ont aidé l'UNITA à mobiliser les Ovimbundu pendant la guerre civile, soutenant le concept d'une UNITA Ovimbundu. L'auteur explique l'impact de l'origine ethnique, de la politique et de la guerre sur la citoyenneté d'après-guerre en Angola, en particulier en termes d'intégration nationale et de marginalisation.

Référence : Martins, V. (2021). *Colonialism, Ethnicity and War in Angola*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Party proliferation and political contestation in Africa: Senegal in comparative perspective

Catherine Lena Kelly examine divers aspects de la démocratisation et de la concurrence entre partis en Afrique de l'Ouest et en particulier au Sénégal. Le Sénégal étant l'un des pionniers en Afrique en termes d'élections multipartites, il paraît utile d'examiner comment la prolifération des partis politiques s'est produite dans ce pays, quelles conséquences cela a entraîné et dans quelle mesure cette tendance s'étend à d'autres pays africains. À travers une analyse des sources, l'auteur met en évidence le fonctionnement économique et politique des partis, fournit des informations sur la façon dont les partis

ont vu le jour, la loyauté envers les partis, tant au pouvoir que dans l'opposition, et les changements des Présidents en exercice. L'étude est d'autant plus intéressante pour les universitaires, les décideurs politiques et les étudiants des affaires africaines qu'elle est réalisée dans le contexte local et régional.

Référence : Kelly, C.L. (2020). *Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa: Senegal in Comparative Perspective*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Know the beginning well: an inside journey through five decades of African development

Ce livre de K.Y. Amoako entremêle un voyage personnel avec l'histoire du développement africain. L'auteur rappelle l'idée courante selon laquelle comprendre le passé permet de planifier le futur. Et cela est particulièrement vrai dans le cas de ce livre, qui loin d'être un n-ième récit relatant le parcours de développement de l'Afrique au cours des cinq dernières décennies, apporte plutôt un regard de l'intérieur d'expériences personnellement vécues. L'auteur a entre autres occupé les postes de Secrétaire général adjoint des Nations Unies, de Secrétaire exécutif de la Commission économique des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique et de Président fondateur du Centre africain pour la transformation économique (ACET). Il raconte un voyage qui force la réflexion à travers la politique, les politiques et les institutions qui ont façonné l'histoire postcoloniale de l'Afrique. Cette histoire constitue un socle solide et continuera de façonner l'avenir du continent.

Référence : Amoako, K.Y. (2020). *Know the Beginning Well: An Inside Journey Through Five Decades of African Development*. Trenton, NJ Africa World Press.

NOTAS SOBRE NOVOS LIVROS SELECCIONADOS PARA LEITORES E ESTUDANTES ACERCA DE ASSUNTOS AFRICANOS

Thean Potgieter

África é uma região do mundo vital e fascinante. A importância de estudar temas africanos é aparente, dado que algumas das economias em crescimento mais rápido no mundo estão situadas no continente africano. África possui uma história longa e diversas, é rica em diversidade com milhares de idiomas e culturas, e tem uma população vibrante e inovadora de mais de 1,3 mil milhões de pessoas. África é também ricamente dotada de reservas minerais e tem ecossistemas realmente diferentes.

Estudar a história de África, a sua interacção com o mundo, a política, os governos, os assuntos correntes, a economia, a cultura e a ecologia, entre outros, dá-nos um entendimento mais profundo da história do mundo no nosso desejo de sermos cidadãos globais bem informados. O número de publicações sobre África, assuntos africanos e estudos comparativos, incluindo casos de África, tem vindo sistematicamente a crescer desde há alguns anos. Embora essas publicações variem no seu conteúdo e qualidade, o facto é que são publicadas e contribuem para a compreensão internacional e o debate sobre África é significativo e pode ser considerado como indicador tanto de maior reconhecimento global, como de um interesse crescente por África.

Apenas alguns da grande variedade de livros públicos global e recentemente são brevemente apresentados abaixo. As fontes referidas não são de modo nenhum representativas, abrangentes nem exaustivas. É meramente uma selecção de temas africanos que não são comuns no mundo das publicações internacionais. Inclui textos históricos novos e interessantes, uma biografia de um dos principais líderes continentais, uma autobiografia e um estudo comparativo. Além disso, as fontes seleccionadas relatam

governação, processos democráticos, etnia e desenvolvimento e identidade política. A lista inclui ainda livros com um enfoque específico sobre países e regiões.

Porque razão é importante que investiguemos, publiquemos e estudemos fontes sobre África? Através dessas publicações é possível divulgar os resultados de investigação, bem como novas contribuições académicas para campos específicos. É igualmente uma forma de sensibilizar outros investigadores e interessados de outras partes do mundo para as realidades, as práticas e as experiências africanas. Contribuem para o conhecimento e o entendimento de África e para romper com estereótipos. Dão-nos a oportunidade de diagnosticar, analisar e solucionar desafios. A publicação de livros e de artigos escolares são,por conseguinte, trunfos para os investigadores e os académicos africanos, visto que lhes proporcionam oportunidades de serem reconhecidos como especialistas num campo específico a nível nacional, regional e internacional. Através das publicações pessoas, departamentos académicos, universidades e instituições recebem reconhecimento. Precisamos de ler fontes publicadas em África porque nos desenvolvem a mente e contribuem para formar opiniões, novas ideias, teorias e uma nova compreensão do nosso continente.

As breves notas acerca das publicações seleccionadas abaixo foram compiladas principalmente a partir de descrições destes livros por autores e editores.

"Development as rebellion: A biography of Julius Nyerere"

Esta obra de três volumes é a maior biografia sobre a vida e política de Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922-1999). Nyerere não só foi o primeiro e mais longo presidente ao serviço da Tanzânia, como também se tornou um influente estadista africano, expressando o seu forte empenho e visão para o desenvolvimento do seu país e da África como um todo. Ao longo de mais de 1 000 páginas, os três autores, nomeadamente Saida Yahya-Othman, Ng'wanza Kamata e Issa G. Shivji, actuaram cada um como autor principal de um volume centrado em diferentes aspectos da vida e política de Nyerere. Embora haja muita informação disponível ao longo da vida de Nyerere, as três partes estão divididas tematicamente e não se trata de uma biografia cronológica da vida de Nyerere.

Saida Yahya-Othman é a autora principal do primeiro volume, *"The Making of a Philosopher Ruler"*. Aborda o jovem Nyerere, a sua educação e a vida privada. O segundo volume, *"Becoming Nationalist",* tendo Ng'wanza Kamata como autor principal, dedica-

se à luta pela independência da Tanzânia e aos esforços de Nyerere para construir uma nação. Issa G. Shivji é o autor principal do último volume, *"Rebellion Without Rebels"*, que se concentra na versão de socialismo de Nyerere. Os autores consultaram uma enorme variedade de fontes primárias e secundárias. Consultaram fontes primárias em arquivos públicos e em colecções particulares, além de terem realizado entrevistas com contemporâneos de Nyerere. Os três volumes são enriquecidos por uma colecção de fotografias únicas e interessantes.

Referência: Shivji, I.G., Yahya-Othman, S., e Kamata, N. (2020). *"Development as Rebellion: A Biography of Julius Nyerere".* Três volumes. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers.

"Understanding modern Nigeria: Ethnicity, democracy and development"

Como o título reflecte, este livro de Toyin Falola, o especialista de renome sobre assuntos africanos e nigerianos, faz uma importante contribuição para o entendimento da Nigéria contemporânea. Depois de a Nigéria ter recebido a independência da Grã Bretanha em 1960, surgiu como segunda maior economia de África e um dos maiores produtores de petróleo do mundo. Apesar do seu sucesso económico, o país tem 250 grupos étnicos, por vezes com divisões profundas entre eles. Os temas centrais debatidos nesta obra são etnia, democracia e governação na Nigéria pós-colonial. O conteúdo é uma excelente narrativa da história da Nigéria, a competição por recursos e poder que acompanhou o colonialismo a par das lacunas entre os grupos étnicos de Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba e Igbo forçados à convivência sob o domínio britânico. Falola refere ainda o sistema político federal nigeriano, o pluralismo religioso e político e muitos dos problemas associados à história recente da Nigéria.

Referência: Falola, T. (2021). *"Understanding Modern Nigeria: Ethnicity, Democracy and Development".* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Democratic struggle, institutional reform, and state resilience in the African Sahel"

Este volume editado aborda um tema que não é uma área de foco comum nas publicações académicas internacionais e na investigação académica, nomeadamente as experiências dos países do Sahel da África Ocidental. Desde a década de Noventa que estes países têm

vivido lutas políticas e desenvolvimentos democráticos e institucionais relacionados com o conflito, ao mesmo tempo que são actualmente centrais no debate global sobre segurança, terrorismo, migração e conflito. O livro questiona uma questão importante e pouco estudada: Como é que a política de democratização em todo o Sahel francófono moldou os processos de construção do Estado, e que efeitos teve a política na resiliência das instituições estatais? O conteúdo centra-se em seis estados do Sahel (Senegal, Mauritânia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Níger e Chade) e mostra que a política de reforma institucional, frequentemente referida como o debate sobre a democratização, tem efeitos diferentes sobre a criação de Estados resistentes. Contribuíram para o volume seis académicos de nomeada de toda a região, muitos dos quais tiveram um papel relevante nas lutas que referem.

Referência: Villalón, L.A. e Idrissa, R. (Eds). (2020). *"Democratic Struggle, Institutional Reform, and State Resilience in the African Sahel"*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

"Neither settler nor native: The making and unmaking of permanent minorities"

Este livro de Mahmood Mamdani poderia ser descrito como uma "genealogia da modernidade política". O autor manteve que o estado da nação e o estado colonial se criaram mutuamente. A "construção" do estado colonial e o estado da nação foi mútua através da politização de maiorias religiosas e étnicas às custas de uma minoria. Referiu vários casos, entre eles o do Novo Mundo, a África do Sul, Israel, Alemanha e Sudão. Na América do Norte, o genocídio e o internamento em reservas criou tanto uma subclasse nativa permanente como os espaços físicos e ideológicos para desenvolver uma identidade como nação colonizadora. A Europa assistiu às terríveis políticas nazis e acções associadas em relação aos judeus. Israel foi criado como um estado judeu com a "minorização dos árabes palestinianos" e a consequente violência. Na opinião de Mamdani, devem existir soluções políticas para a violência política. É imperativo repensar a comunidade política para todos os sobreviventes, incluindo vítimas, perpetradores, espectadores e beneficiários. Esta comunidade deve ter por base uma residência comum e o compromisso de construir um futuro comum; deve ser também sem identidades políticas permanentes de "colonizador e nativo".

Referência: Mamdani, M. (2020). *"Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities"*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, Harvard University.

"Colonialism, ethnicity and war in Angola"

Vasco Martins contribui com uma nova apreciação para a nossa compreensão da história de Angola através de uma análise de como as mudanças sociais, políticas e económicas tiveram impacto no maior grupo étnico do país, os Ovimbundos. Em vez de se focar no empreendimento colonial, na política e na ideologia internacionais, a ênfase assenta nas experiências e respostas africanas. O livro foi o resultado de uma extensa investigação em Angola, que inclui o recurso a fontes de arquivo, a recolha de provas orais e histórias de vida e de observações pessoais. O foco é colocado no efeito transformador do cristianismo e da colonização nas noções modernas politizadas de identidade étnica, tal como se manifestou durante a luta anti-colonial. Essas noções etno-políticas ajudaram a UNITA a mobilizar-se a partir dos Ovimbundos durante a guerra civil, apoiando o axioma de uma UNITA Ovimbunda. O autor explora como a etnia, a política e a guerra influenciaram a cidadania do pós-guerra em Angola, especificamente em termos de integração nacional e marginalização.

Referência: Martins, V. (2021)**.** *"Colonialism, Ethnicity and War in Angola"*. New York, NY: Routledge.

"Party proliferation and political contestation in Africa: Senegal in comparative perspective"

Catherine Lena Kelly analisa vários elementos da democratização e competição partidária na África Ocidental com especial ênfase no Senegal. Como o Senegal tem uma das mais longas histórias de eleições multipartidárias, é relevante analisar como ocorreu a proliferação de partidos políticos, as suas consequências e até que ponto esta tendência também ocorre noutros países africanos. Através de uma análise das fontes de dados, o autor destaca o funcionamento económico e político dos partidos, fornece informações sobre a forma como os partidos surgiram, a lealdade partidária tanto nos partidos no poder como nos da oposição, e as mudanças nos presidentes em exercício. Uma vez que a discussão é colocada no contexto local e regional, o estudo é de importante para académicos, decisores políticos e estudantes de assuntos africanos.

Referência: Kelly, C.L. (2020). *"Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa: Senegal in Comparative Perspective"*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

"*Know the beginning well*: *an inside journey through five decades of African development*"

Esta obra de K. Y. Amoako entrelaça uma viagem pessoal e a história do desenvolvimento africano. O autor recorda-nos da ideia por vezes pré-concebida de que se desejamos planear o futuro, temos de compreender o nosso passado. Isto é especificamente relevante para este livro: não é simplesmente mais uma discussão sobre a viagem do desenvolvimento de África durante as cinco décadas anteriores, mas um olhar interior e contado a partir das experiências pessoais de alguém que fez a viagem. O autor foi Sub-Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas, Secretário Executivo da Comissão Económica das Nações Unidas para África, entre outros, e é o Presidente fundador do Centro Africano para a Transformação Económica (ACET, African Center for Economic Transformation). Narra uma viagem estimulante de pensamento através da política, políticas e instituições que moldaram a história pós-colonial de África. Como esta história criou uma base importante, continuará a moldar o futuro do continente.

Referência: Amoako, K.Y. (2020). *"Know the Beginning Well: An Inside Journey Through Five Decades of African Development"*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

In 2019, Nigeria ranked 157 (36.68 score aggregate) out of 167 countries in safety and security on the Legatum Prosperity Index (Legatum 2019). This contrasts with previous years where Nigeria ranked 161 (33.01), 161 (29.40), 161 (30.70) and 155 (38.25) in 2018, 2017, 2016 and 2015 respectively. With regard to what could be termed politically related terror and violence (political terror, extrajudicial killings, use of torture, disappearances and political imprisonment) Nigeria ranks 138 (34.8) among 167 countries in the 10-year (2009-2019) trend analysis. However, political terror, use of torture and intentional homicides have been on an increase between 2009 and 2019 (Legatum 2019). This is an indication of the poor security system in the country and to some observers the NPF lags in maintaining order and security and combating the rising crime wave in the country (Ebohon and Ifeadi 2012).

The history of the NPF spans three distinct epochs, namely the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. However, it is a history that is characterized by violence, extortion, embezzlement, corruption, brutality and human rights violations (Arisukwu 2012; Human Rights Watch 2010). In more than a decade after the Human Rights Watch (2010) news release that documents the illegal activities of the NPF, which include corruption, arbitrary arrests, torture, sexual assault, raiding and prolonged unlawful detention, among others, the NPF remains plagued by widespread corruption and poor performance. The force has been accused of oppression, brutality, conflict, violence, coercion, human rights violations, sexual abuses, harassment, intimidation and professional misconduct (Agbiboa 2013; Ajayi and Longe 2015; Aborisade and Obileye 2018; Akinlabi 2019; Madubuike-Ekwe and Obayemi 2019; Aborisade 2021). It seems that the police in Nigeria, as in other parts of Africa, is deeply resented due to widespread corruption and protracted brutality which has affected its performance with far-reaching implications for police-community relations (Campbell 2020).

In a survey carried out by Wambua (2015) for Afrobarometer in 34 African countries, it was reported that the majority of Africans did not report a crime to the police because of their poor performance, negligence and the possibility of soliciting a bribe. The report revealed that Nigeria ranked above average in crime victims not reporting a crime to the police due to their mistrust of the police. This finding was supported by Akinlabi (2019), as he reported that the excessive use of force by the police and its penchant for abuse had impacted negatively on the trust reposed in it by the people.

Several studies have been carried out on the challenges facing the NPF (Human Rights Watch 2010; Ebohon and Ifeadi 2012; Ikuteyijo and Rotimi 2012; Otu 2012; Akinyetun

2016; Madubuike-Ekwe and Obayemi 2019;). Ebohon and Ifeadi (2012) have indicated that the centralisation of the NPF and its involvement in anti-state activities such as election violence are responsible for coercion and corruption, engendering the security dilemma faced in the country. The centralisation of the NPF is actually seen as inimical to positive development (Otu 2012). The Human Rights Watch (2010) report indicated that the NPF had over time been used as an instrument of coercion by the government to oppress citizens, particularly the youth. This is supported by Ikuteyijo and Rotimi (2012), arguing that the colonial history of the police, which favoured coercion and brutality, was carried over to the post-colonial epoch and influenced contemporary policing.

Besides the historical factors and the origin of the police to which the challenges of the NPF are attributed, structural, institutional and personality framework factors are also high on the list (Madubuike-Ekwe and Obayemi 2019). These factors include the frustration with work conditions, the politicization of the force, and its perception of itself and it also increases the chances of law and order in society breaking down. The security lacuna in the country was seen as a stimulus for rising public disorder (Ebohon and Ifeadi 2012), a perception that remains relevant in light of the recent developments. The police responded hard-handedly to the protests against police brutality by Nigerian youths in October 2020 during the Coronavirus pandemic lockdown. In fact, during the lockdown complaints against the Nigerian police included an avalanche of violations, the use of unwarranted force and abuse (Aborisade 2021).

The relevance of this paper could be ascribed to its focus on an area to which few studies pay attention, specifically the link between police authority, coercion, brutality and corruptive practices. It examines recent reprisal violence by the Nigerian youths against an arm of the NPF; the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), for its alleged violation of human rights. The activities of the SARS caused the so-called "#EndSARS" protests which culminated in violence that threatened the security of the country. The paper also provides notes relevant to further research as the Conflict Theory is applied, the role of the elite in using the police to serve their interest is discussed and how administrative negligence gives impetus to poor performance is highlighted. Finally, the paper does not only deal with the challenges of the NPF but also suggests policy solutions to policing in Nigeria. It is therefore a review of socioeconomic and cultural factors affecting the NPF's performance.

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Conflict theory

One of the most prominent proponents of social conflict is Karl Marx who argued that the capital-industrial society is characterised by a class struggle between the working class and the owners of the means of production, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Marx's views hold value and have contemporary significance, as they explain the power struggle between the classes of society. One of the elements of class conflict as Karl Marx's understood it was that "political organization and power is an instrumentality of class struggle, and reigning ideas are its reflection" (Obah-Akpowoghaha 2013:73). Herein lies the utilisation of political power in the struggle for recognition. Consequently, the superimposition of class interests contributes to the intensity of struggles and conflict.

Conflict could result from interaction between opposing parties in a competitive environment (Oberschall 1978). Usually, it is overt rather than covert, and it could be behaviour exhibited and not probable action or violence. Social conflict is conflict ensuing from the sum of interaction between individuals, groups, communities, crowds and organisations. Social conflict could commonly be defined as "interaction in which the means chosen by the parties in pursuit of their goals are likely to inflict damage, harm or injury, but not necessarily in every case" (Oberschall 1978:291). By implication, social conflict involves the struggle for power and scarce resources amongst conflicting groups which results in injury or outright elimination of a supposed rival.

Although the theory has been used differently to examine societal and class differences with particular reference to social, economic and political status, this paper aims to apply conflict theory to policing in Nigeria. Since conflict theory contends that the dominant and powerful strata of society perceive the disadvantaged as a threat, this powerful group influences public policy to reflect their disdain for their perceived threat which invariably affects the behaviour of security apparatuses (Chamlin 1989). Furthermore, the growth in size of the deprived and poor increases the fear of the political elites:

> … and thereby yield increased policing resources and police use of deadly force against civilians, it is likely that they might also increase the level of civilian use of deadly force against police officers. This outcome may be especially likely for those citizens who are the probable targets of police aggressiveness and who already hold negative opinions about the legal system (Chamlin 1989:363).

Regarding the Nigerian society, this view finds expression in the fear exhibited by the political elite towards the teeming population who may revolt against their control as a result of bad governance, corruption, poor service delivery and systemic failure that permeates the Nigerian political system. As a result, the elite use the security apparatus (police) to oppress and suppress their perceived threat from revolting. This explains the use of deadly force and torture on Nigerians, particularly the youth, by the NPF (Akinyetun 2021).

On this basis, this theory is relevant as a lens into the recurring brutality of the Nigerian police, who in a bid to exert influence and control, inflicts damage and injury on defenceless citizens. For Ibeanu and Momoh (2008:51), the police "have a statist and orthodox definition of what constitutes a crime and crime policing. The police force remains a major perpetrator of the crime, and as such is implicated in the discourse of crime." As an elitist and presidential organ, the police are often treated as an outpost of the political elite. Ojo (2010) avers that the Nigerian police can be described as authoritarian and lacking in integrity. The perception is that the police in Nigeria and the security apparatus is elite-centric (serving the interest of the elite) and not people-oriented (serving the people). The result is that they find it difficult to succeed in their responsibility to protect (Ebohon and Ifeadi 2012).

More so, social theorists argue that conflict is often used to protect the interest of the state. This was aptly reflected in the assertions by Lersch (1998) that the state functioned and served the interest of the dominant class in the society, whereas government institutions such as the police are political instruments that further serve the interest of the privileged in society. That is, the police maintain the order of societal inequality by assisting the powerful of society to exploit the powerless. Lersch (1998:82) submits that complaints of police brutality and general misconduct are common among the economically and politically marginalised groups in society because "citizens with less power and fewer resources … or those from a lower socioeconomic class, would be more likely to experience police misconduct." This explains why Nigerian youth are seen as the major targets of police brutality in Nigeria. The youth, due to their powerlessness, have been unjustly subjected to police brutality, oppression, abuse and extrajudicial killings. When analysed within the Nigerian context, social conflict theory exposes the power dynamics of class divisions between the powerful and powerless as well as between the agents of government and the people, specifically the youth.

It is argued that the lack of appropriate administrative actions to control police behaviours and check misconduct further leads to widening the powerlessness of the politically excluded (Lersch 1998). Put differently, the NPF continues in its act of misconduct and brutality due to lack of oversight. The accusations of police brutality and extrajudicial killings in Nigeria have gone unanswered, indicating that the police lack proper administrative control (Akinyetun 2021). Rather than abate, the oppression of the powerless has continually pervaded society. This view that conflict theory captures the upsurge in police coercion as evidenced in the coercive efforts to subject the underprivileged, minority and powerless to their control is also held by other observers (Sun, Payne and Wu 2008). This form of coercion, as captured by the theory, festers amidst political and economic inequality, and is expressed through unlawful arrests, harassment, brutality and abuse, amongst others. Furthermore, the opinion is that "support for conflict theory emerges in considering the findings that minorities and poor citizens were more likely to be subjected to coercive activities than were others" (Sun *et al.* 2008:29).

As indicated above, conflict theory could provide valuable perspectives for analysing police performance in Nigeria. However, despite its richness, social conflict theory suffers from imperfection. For instance, the theory assumes that police misconduct is due to the influence of the state and the elite class. Although this sounds plausible, yet, limiting one's understanding of this notion is to assume that the state is complicit in the oppression of its citizens. Besides, it would be illogical to assume that the Nigeria Police Force acts in "uniformity" to control the powerless, since it theorises that the police exist to protect the elite's interests. As Kwon (2012) indicates police brutality has always been a product of individual interaction wherein police officers select their victims and perpetuate their various forms of police misconduct. But police brutality is not necessarily due to state influence or elite control; it rather results from individual police interaction with their victims. This shortcoming regardless, conflict theory strongly pigeonholes police performance in Nigeria, whereby societal differential is used as a basis to promote brutality.

THE POLICE IN NIGERIA: THE POPULAR NARRATIVE

To present a coherent discussion, this paper adopted a meta-synthesis approach which involved the systematic review of existing qualitative studies to offer an integrated meaning. The steps were relevant to meta-synthesis: define the research question, driving the selection of the studies, quality assessment, extracting and presenting formal data,

data analysis and expressing the synthesis. The following questions guided this research: "What are the factors affecting the NPF?" and "Why did youths call for the disbanding of SARS?" A simple search revealed several keywords such as *brutality*, *corruption* and *coercion*. The factors were used to search for the literature which was reviewed and re-sorted according to the title. The author then assessed the quality of the literature available by title and selected peer-reviewed journal articles, government reports and local and international agencies' reports. From a careful analysis of the literature on the focus area of this study, a number of sources were selected as the standard references for the compilation of the content of this paper. These issues are discussed and analysed in order to come to specific conclusions and propose a few recommendations.

The police should be seen as the "state officials charged with responsibility for law enforcement and order maintenance in society" (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000:10). In addition, the police are also a visible agent of social control and is saddled with the responsibility of upholding justice and correcting wrong behaviour (Afon and Badiora 2016). As the Human Rights Watch (2010:1) report adds, "good policing is the bedrock for the rule of law and public safety."

The points made above on the responsibilities of the police are certainly taken cognisance of in Nigerian legislation such as the Police Act which clearly states the following:

> The police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged and shall perform such military duties within, or outside Nigeria as may be required of them by, or under the authority of this or any other Act (Police Act 2004:4).

Like in other societies of the world, the police in Nigeria strive to maintain law and order. Generally, the police help to prevent crime, provide security to the citizens and sustain public peace. More so, the police have been seen upholding orderliness by managing traffic and maintaining control at accident scenes (Afon and Badiora 2016). However, beyond these good works, the Nigerian police have also been marred by poor performance and a plethora of other challenges (Akinyetun 2016). Notable among these problems are the abuse of human rights (Afeno 2014) traceable to the colonial era (Alao 2000; Ibeanu and Momoh 2008) and an ingrained culture of corruption (Adebayo and Ojo 2009; Abdelmottlep 2016). These factors, in addition to a lack of an effective police

accountability system, are the cause of the impunity displayed by the police (particularly SARS) in human rights abuse and its poor performance (Amnesty International 2020a).

Concerning the performance of the police in Nigeria in the opinion of the United States of America, the force's response to crime is abysmally poor (OSAC 2020). Asides from not having a reliable crime reporting or emergency number and crime laboratory, the NPF is also torn between safeguarding the people, escorting businessmen and expatriates on travel, acting as hired private security to VIPs and supplementing a private guard force. This makes crime-solving difficult for the police, shifts their allegiance from the people to their private employers and exposes it to corruptive practices. In fact, with a score of 0.255, the NPF ranks low on the World Internal Security and Police Index (WISPI scale), followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya and Uganda (Abdelmottlep 2016). This could be ascribed to the fact that

> … the police had an average-sized police force, and a relatively small military and private security sector. There are 219 police officers for every 100,000 Nigerians … an additional 71 private security workers per 100,000 people … a prison occupancy rate of about 100 per cent … and a police and judicial ineffective system … and a homicide rate of 20 per 100,000 people (Abdelmottlep 2016:25).

Observers indicate that, due to the failures of the NPF in ensuring peace, safety and security, Nigerians are disenchanted with it (Akinyetun 2016). A study on Nigerian perceptions of the NPF have indicated that people have a poor opinion of the police, that this opinion is continuously declining and consequently, it is impacting negatively on the maintenance of law and order in society (Afon and Badiora 2016). Respondents also indicated that the police lacked respect for human rights and engaged in systematic extrajudicial killings, arbitrary executions and crimes escalation. The public have negative perceptions about the police, and they are distrusted which weakens their effectiveness in solving crimes. As a result, many citizens do not report crimes to the police for fear of victimization (Human Rights Watch 2010).

The NPF has also been accused of poorly managing internal security and when they are called to intervene in a violent incident, it often ends up escalating the situation (Afeno 2014). As the record indicates, between June 2006 and May 2014, the security forces in Nigeria escalated the fatalities of the incidents where they intervened by 59 percent, while more people were killed as their intervention increased. As the research by Afeno (2014) revealed, even though the Nigerian Army could be more fatal, police interventions killed more people, especially in the southern part of the country:

… the security forces cause most fatalities in Lagos State. Between June 2006 and May 2014, incidents involving the security forces caused 1,195 fatalities in the state. As the commercial hub and one of the most populous states in the country, Lagos is a haven for social miscreants, including armed robbers whose engagement with the security forces often results in violent deaths. Clashes between smugglers and customs officers, as well as violent confrontations among personnel of the various security agencies, often result in high fatality figures … Although most security forces killings in the state are related to criminals, there are instances where innocent people have been killed either intentionally or accidentally. Many fatalities have resulted from stray bullets fired by security personnel, mostly during encounters with criminal gangs in the state (Afeno 2014:27).

The police have also been accused of elite servitude and characterised of a pro-elite orientation. This aspect has made the elite ignore reforming the Police Force due to its usefulness in holding to power, while the elite is "preoccupied with a narrow competition for power" (Alao 2000:31). Because the people are excluded from the government, the government relies on the security forces, especially the police, to discourage protests.

The problems plaguing the police in Nigeria can be placed within the context of three major focus areas: socioeconomic, ecological and sociocultural (Akinyetun 2016). *Socioeconomic* implies the challenges such as corruption and inadequate funding as the bane of poor policing in Nigeria, while the ecological constraints could be understood as a lack of adequate training and political interference. The sociocultural factors include their bad image, their lack of up-to-date equipment, inadequate personnel and lack of a standardised intelligence-gathering unit. In support of these areas, it should be highlighted that police officers are generally considered to lack quality education, moral uprightness, social relation skills and leadership skills, while they do not always follow departmental rules and internal control mechanisms. One can add that the crisis of police inefficiency is exacerbated by a lack of good training institutions providing quality training (specifically intelligence and tactical training is insufficient), poor facilities and equipment (communication tools and durable vehicles, amongst others), insufficient discipline, poor remuneration and reward systems as well as poor accountability (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000). Taken together, these aspects make them susceptible to corruption (Obah-Akpowoghaha 2013). This is supported by an American analysis highlighting that the NPF is marred by poor performance, bribe soliciting and lack of resources (OSAC 2020). Unfortunately, government has not addressed these problems through tough action.

Shoddy recruitment processes pose an important challenge (Alao 2000). The majority of the people in the police force either entered as a result of unemployment or were people with a criminal past; hence, their disposition to abuse. The creation of a Joint Security Task Force (JSTF), which drew membership from all the security forces in the country (Nigerian Army, Air force, Navy, Police, Department of State Security, State Security Services, Customs and Immigration) to combat militancy, organised crime and insurgency, also complicated the role of the police in maintaining law and order (Afeno 2014). This was because the JSTF used force to arrest criminals and in some other instances killed their suspects with the belief that they were fighting insurgency and hard crimes. The police joined the army in mounting roadblocks on highways to extort commuters which resulted in the killings (sometimes accidental) of unyielding victims. In fact, "police violence in the form of summary executions occurs frequently among Special Task Forces assigned to the patrol of highways and cities to curb armed robbery" (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000:21). With this reorientation, the police began responding to protests with force, resulting in fatalities.

THE COLONIAL ANGLE

The history of the Nigerian police dates back to the colonial era (Ibeanu and Momoh 2008). The Southern and Northern police forces (established in 1861 and 1900 respectively) were merged in 1930 and thirty years later, a Police Council was created to oversee the force while the Police Service Commission was also formed and saddled with the responsibility of appointment and discipline of the force members (Ibeanu and Momoh 2008). The local police were mainly established to serve colonial interest by violently oppressing communities that resisted colonial influence. As they were known for high-handedness, abuse and for "numerous acts of lawlessness and pillage" they were referred to as the "forty thieves" by the community (Akinyetun 2016). Local police were also used to attack the political rivals of the government (Ibeanu and Momoh 2008:756) and for punitive missions to enforce and sustain exploitative and repressive activities. It was common for them to carry "batons, rifles and revolvers" (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000:18) to harm or kill those who opposed colonial policies. For instance, as a result of police high-handedness, 21 miners were killed, and 50 others wounded during the Enugu colliery strike in 1949. As a creation of the colonial authority, the history of policing in Nigeria is often seen as one of excessive force, abuse, repression, violence and extrajudicial killings in dealing with the civilian population (Alemika 1993).

Various views support the notion that the police force inherited at the independence of the country had colonial perspectives, it saw itself as the government's tool of war against the citizens and was therefore used to quash opposition. The police remained allegiant to the Crown until the Republican Constitution of 1963 placed it under the control of the President of Nigeria. Yet, the police are not free from "direct political pressure and officers had to implement and act on politically motivated laws and orders, including those that could endanger the peace" (Alao 2000:30).

As Campbell (2020) therefore observes, the NPF emanates from a colonial creation used primarily to subjugate the people for imperialistic interests and that it is simply continuing with this colonial orientation. For Perouse de Montclos (2014), the killings by the police cannot be dismissed as unfortunate mistakes but an exhibition of the ingrained culture of violence and impunity. The draconian mentality of maintaining internal security has continued unabated even after colonial rule. In effect, the military rule that greeted the post-colonial epoch in Nigeria heightened the despotic nature of the security forces due to the militarisation of internal security (Alao 2000).

Since the return of civil rule in 1999 successive civilian administrations have failed to reform the security forces and wean it off its brutal approach. In 1999, government did inherit security forces and an administration capacity that was inherited was weak and demoralised and lacked respect for preserving the rights of civilians due to its history of involvement in politics. Furthermore, "the most important element that has been misused is the security apparatus" which was consistently "exploited by successive governments to consolidate their grip on power" (Alao 2000:9). After two decades of uninterrupted civilian rule this perception remains. The police are regularly used by the state and political parties to foment violence during elections as the example of the 2007 general elections indicates when an incumbent government used the police to cause violence at the polls (Onapajo 2014). People seem to have lost confidence in the security forces in Nigeria due to its ensnarement by ethnicity and corruption (Ibeanu and Momoh 2008; Ojo 2010).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The objective of this paper is to examine the socioeconomic, ecological and sociocultural factors that affect the performance of the Nigerian Police Force. Given the meta-synthesis

approach adopted for this paper, the dominant factors identified are corruption, brutality and violence or coercion. This paper now turns to consider these factors in detail.

Culture of corruption

That corruption in Nigeria is widespread requires little emphasis. Nigeria scored 26 out of 100 and ranks 146 out of 180 on the Transparency International corruption perceptions index (Transparency International 2020). Corruption in Nigeria exists in almost all sectors of the economy. Human Rights Watch (2020) reports that public sector corruption in Nigeria is entrenched, even among the security forces. The police are not immune to the contagion effect of corruption that ravages the country, as they are enmeshed in corruption in the full glare of the public (Adebayo and Ojo 2009). In fact, corruption is high among police officers as demonstrated by the Control of Corruption indicator as 81 percent of Nigerian respondents to the Global Corruption Barometer admitted that they paid a bribe to a police officer and only 0.06 percent of thefts were reported to the police (Abdelmottlep 2016:25). Unsurprisingly, the Rule of Law index found that military and police officials are likely to use their public positions for private gain.

For Alemika (1999), police corruption is a distinct concept that captures the various corrupt practices of the police. The police run afoul of its moral code. Among the manifestations of police corruption is stealing from suspects and/or accident victims, extortion from motorists on highways, supply of police arms and uniforms to criminals in exchange for money, escorting vehicles loaded with contraband goods and stolen items, receiving a bribe to help offenders out of police custody, closure of case files and stealing from crime scenes.

Human Rights Watch (2020) understands corruption in the NPF as acts of extortion and bribery at roadblocks, markets and workplaces, kickbacks or returns paid to senior officers as daily or weekly targets, paying for lucrative postings, embezzlement and mismanagement of public monies meant for police operations, payment before an investigation and lack of internal control. Widespread corruption in the NPF is profound, since it fuels "abuses against ordinary citizens and severely undermining the rule of law in Nigeria" (Human Rights Watch 2010:1) and has seen the institutionalisation of extortion, bribery and extensive embezzlement. Although it will be unfair to state blandly that the whole police force is enmeshed in corruption, it is endemic among police officers. Indeed, corruption by one police officer is cancerous and like a communicable disease

that affects others. However, it must also be stated – although it is not an excuse – that corruption among police officers in Nigeria is stimulated by poor remuneration, high standard of living, social status, family pressure and greed (Akpunonu-Ogu 2014).

Prevalent brutality

In accordance with the results of the World Justice Project Report (2020) focusing on 128 countries, Nigeria ranks as follows: 127th in order and security, 109th in absence of corruption and 99th in fundamental rights. Due to high levels of political terror, Nigeria scored a 4 on the Political Terror Scale since 1993 and the country's overall rule of law index is 0.43. The overall governance score given to Nigeria by the Ibrahim Index is 45.5, ranking it 34 out of 54 countries. Further analysis shows a score of 44.3 and ranks 34 in security and rule of law; 29.5 and 38 in anti-corruption, and 47.0 and 25 in rule of law and justice (Mo Ibrahim 2020).

Police brutality is usually associated with countries with racial or sexual discrimination, impunity, conflict or defective and insufficient laws (Amnesty International 2020). Governments that encroach upon the human rights of citizens often rely on the police to forcefully dispel protests and demonstrations. This usually leads to cyclical violence and entrenched impunity where people who pose no threat are killed. This supports the view that "a society with authoritarian political structures and an economic system characterized by widespread exploitation and inequalities will generate social conflicts. Police violence [brutality] is often a response by a dictatorial government to repress such conflicts" (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000:10). Police brutality in Nigeria takes several forms, including violation of human rights during interrogations or union gatherings, arrest and detention by proxy summary execution, extrajudicial killings, police participation in criminal activities, interfering in civil matters and police reprisal attacks (Abegunde 2015).

It is contended that police brutality in Nigeria has become recurring and threatens peace. The use of violence by the NPF against citizens is widespread and not adequately frowned upon by the government (Afon and Badiora 2016). It could include human rights abuses and sexual violations, while the NPF have persistently beaten, injured and killed innocent citizens (Aborisade and Obileye 2018). Reports on the killing of both suspected and innocent Nigerians by the police have become regular and occur almost daily (Perouse de Montclos 2014). After accidents, Boko Haram insurgency and crime, political violence

by security forces is yet another prevalent cause of violent deaths in Nigeria. Security forces are responsible for more politically related killings than criminal organisations.

According to the Human Rights Council (2007), the level of torture, ill-treatment, disappearance and extrajudicial killing exhibited by the Nigerian police is disturbing. The Council emphasises

> … the inability of the current system to effectively investigate allegations, protect victims of serious human rights violations, and bring law enforcement officials in Nigeria to account. The conditions of detention in police cells visited were appalling … the vast majority of detainees are held in detention awaiting trial or held without charge for lengthy periods, as long as 10 years (Human Rights Council 2007:2).

Amnesty International (2020a) observes that despite being a party to various international treaties such as the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), Nigeria has failed to address the brutality of the police by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). SARS is an investigating unit of the NPF formed in 1992 to combat the rise in armed robbery and kidnapping in Lagos state. Since its creation, the unit has become known for human rights abuses, disappearances, brutality, unlawful detention, extrajudicial killings, sexual abuse, torture and summary execution, among others (Amnesty International 2019; Amnesty International 2020a; Human Rights Watch 2020). SARS has been accused of torture and inhumane and other cruel treatments (Akinyetun 2021). It favours torture, abuse, violations and brutality as means of extracting the truth due to the inadequate equipment for investigation.

Although police brutality is prevalent in Nigeria and involves many victims, it is quite difficult to get a reliable and accurate figure of the total number of fatalities and killings because governments do not collect such data (Ojo 2010; Amnesty International 2020b). As Afeno (2014) articulates, even though the security forces in Nigeria are known for their repressive actions, the figures of fatalities reported by the media and the victims are often discrepant. There are cases where the media and victims account for more fatalities than reported by the security forces, while in some other cases, the reverse is the case – this is dependent on the prevailing circumstances. Most often, the security forces report lesser figures to douse tension and create a positive impression before the international community. Perouse de Montclos (2014:6) substantiates this view, stating that the security forces in Nigeria are trigger-happy and unable to maintain law and order

professionally and peacefully. On the contrary, the more they intervene, the bloodier the fighting. In a majority of violent cases in which they were involved, they were responsible for causing death. The police, for instance, killed 5 851 in 1 561 of 2 707 lethal incidents where it intervened in 2006-2014. Meanwhile, policemen have also been victims of crime, and indications are that as of 2013, a total of 1 585 police officers have been killed during active service (Afeno 2014).

Reprisal violence

The Nigerian police have lost public support and cooperation due to the prevalence of abuse, brutality and extrajudicial killings. This has resulted in citizens sometimes defending themselves against police victimisation and hard-handedness which could result in public reprisal attacks on police officers, vehicles and stations (Akinyetun 2021:5). This fuels police violence which could either be from the police to the citizens or vice versa (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000). Public violence against the police could take the following forms:

- Violence associated with police encounters with criminals – as in cases of armed robbery and drug law enforcement activities.
- Violence associated with an encounter between police and groups opposed to the government or with industrial conflicts. This may engender displaced aggression against police by such groups and unions.
- Violence associated with police intervention in inter-group (ethnic, religious, etc.) conflicts. Police may be accused of partiality, ironically by both parties, and made a target of a violent attack.
- Violence associated with reprisal against police for their actions in line with the points above.

Of significance in this analysis is the fourth category which highlights reprisal violence against the police. Following the prolonged operation of the SARS unit of the NPF and its involvement in human rights violations, Nigerian human rights activists launched a campaign tagged #EndSARS in 2017 (Amnesty International 2020a). In an unprecedented move, Nigerian youths marched across major suburbs in the country, including Lekki, Alausa and Berger in Lagos state and other parts of the country, reliving the #EndSARS chants and calling on the government to disband SARS and to prosecute SARS officers guilty of youth brutality.

The government, through the Inspector General of Police, announced the dissolution of SARS and its replacement by another police unit, the Special Weapon Tactical Team (SWAT). The protesters rejected this move for its hurried implementation and their distrust for the government's commitment to reform the police grew. Hence, the protests continued and gained more momentum across the country. However, what began as a peaceful protest soon degenerated into chaos, particularly in the southern parts of the country where protesters (referred to as hoodlums) freed inmates in Benin City, Edo state, set police stations ablaze, robbed malls, vandalised government and private-owned properties, and fomented violence which led to the death of no fewer than 15 people (Munshi 2020). This was why the Minister of Information and Culture, Lai Mohammed, warned that "we are no longer dealing with #EndSARS but a volatile situation that can lead to anarchy if the government does not take some very firm steps to protect the lives and livelihood of innocent Nigerians," (Quinn 2020:1).

This fear of anarchy led to the government's use of force on October 20, 2020, now infamously referred to as 'Black Tuesday', when the Nigerian Army allegedly acting on the orders of the federal government, cracked down on the protesters at the ground-zero of the protests, the Lekki tollgate, Lagos state – after the governor had declared a 24-hour curfew. This led to the death of some protesters and the injury of many more. Surprisingly, the military denied involvement in the shootings, while the governor claimed only one fatality was recorded and thirty others were injured. Nonetheless, this contradicted the pictures and videos circulated on social media from the scene of the incident (Quinn 2020). Apparently "angry youths launched reprisal attacks all over the state" hours after the shooting. They burned and damaged many state-owned establishments, "media houses believed to be influenced by the government" and even the house of the governor's mother was "razed to the ground" (Obiezu 2020:2). The right of freedom of expression is under threat in Nigeria, as is evident by the youth protests against police brutality. The security forces in Nigeria seem to increasingly gag freedom of expression, media and association (Human Rights Watch 2020).

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Based on the history of the NPF, its current track record, the way in which it is accepted and viewed by the people of Nigeria as well as its international reputation based on renowned research and the views of many observers, it is evident that changes are overdue and necessary. The findings and discussion of this paper postulate the idea that the following policy changes should be proposed:

Comprehensive reforms

Observably, the NPF is plagued by socioeconomic, ecological, and sociocultural challenges such as corruption, lack of discipline, lack of infrastructure, poor police-community relations, lack of motivation, lack of respect for human rights and lack of professionalism – among others. This paper therefore proposes a comprehensive reform of the police to emphasise professionalism among the police. The reform will pay particular attention to the recruitment process and training of the police. Significance must also be given to the incorporation of social skills in the training process of the police. Meanwhile, the issue of funding must be given prominence in the reform process. The reform must also take into consideration the adoption of a public-private partnership framework and the decentralisation of the police.

Public-private partnership framework

This paper proposes a public-private partnership in the management of the NPF to help improve its performance. This partnership will involve a continuous collaboration between the two sectors in such a way that one sector does not overshadow or usurp the operations of the other (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: NPF public-private partnership framework

(Source: Author)

This reorganisation will reduce interference, shoddy recruitment and ethnocentrism as well as increase transparency accountability and improve the performance of the NPF.

Decentralisation

This paper also proposes that the NPF be decentralised to reflect the federal structure of the country (see Figure 2). This will ensure that the NPF cater to the increasing policing demands of a heterogeneous nation like Nigeria. The proposed framework emphasises the creation of state and district police. The state police will reduce the concentration of power to control the police from the centre and distribute the same among state governors. However, to reduce governors' influence and forestall abuse of power, the framework advances the creation of district police to reduce the influence of state governors by placing the units under the control of district officers who are answerable to yet independent of the governors. More so, governors will become enabled to respond swiftly to emerging insecurities in their respective states. Meanwhile, it will also be easy to track the NPF's performance under each state and provide a basis for comparison and healthy rivalry which will invariably become a precursor to development.

Figure 2: NPF decentralisation framework

(Source: Author)

CONCLUSION

This paper provides evidence that the Nigerian police have a dismal performance and suffer from a lack of citizen trust. For one, this is a result of police involvement in corruption, coercion, brutality and such other maladies which make its policing efforts ineffective and inefficient. Consequently, the police have over the years attracted public distrust. The implication of this is that citizens will not cooperate with the police to solve crimes for fear of being victimised.

The history of the NPF, varied international perceptions and studies as well as the arguments mane in this paper reflect the legacy of police brutality in Nigeria. Although it is traceable to colonial rule, it has unfortunately been sustained after the end of colonialism and supported by a culture of corruption, coercion and brutality. Now it is considered as being of such a serious nature that one can surmise it threatens the peace of the nation. Action must be taken out of necessity.

The conclusions and recommendations contained in this paper are therefore an attempt to once again highlight the situation to important stakeholders such as readers, police commanders and officers, policymakers and the federal government. The results and discussions contained in this paper place emphasis on the need to make decisions now with regard to policy changes as proposed. It is also hoped that the paper will encourage researchers, observers and stakeholders to evaluate these proposals, and that further research on this important topic will continue unabated.

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research and financial performances of universities has further sustained higher education stakeholders' interest in the governance of the academe besides reaffirming the conviction to improve governance at both systemic and institutional levels (Aghion *et al*. 2010; Núñez and Leiva 2018).

Since 2000, university governance models in African countries have undergone profound changes. The major reforms – which have been influenced by the New Public Management (NPM) ideals and isomorphic forces – include a shift from the state control model to the state supervision model of university governance (Sall and Oanda 2014; Bisaso 2017; Nabaho 2019; Nabaho *et al*. 2020). Reforms also include the establishment of buffer quasi-governmental agencies to supervise universities to assure quality of provision and to reinforce the state supervision model. In varying degrees reforms have enhanced the autonomy of universities in human resource management, the management of fiscal resources and internal organisation besides increasing accountability of universities to the state (Saint 2010; Sall and Oanda 2014; Melu 2016; Varghese 2016). The reform efforts were geared towards, among others, enhancing the flexibility and responsiveness of universities to the changes in the external environment and societal demands. Despite these transformations, new reform pressure continues to be exerted on higher education systems and institutions in Africa to adapt their governance systems to the current realities. Similarly, there are competing voices and discourses about how universities in the African higher education landscape and in the national higher education spaces should be steered.

There has been a rapid surge in scholarship on university governance in Africa with studies shedding light on the post-2000 university governance reform endeavours in the various political jurisdictions in Africa (Saint 2010; Sall and Oanda 2014; Kasozi 2016; Melu 2016; Oanda and Sall 2016; Varghese 2016; Bisaso 2017). Nonetheless, the majority of these extant studies are retrospective in orientation. Put differently, the studies hinge on the university governance reforms that have been implemented based on the legal frameworks of the countries – or how the universities are governed in the post-2000 era – rather than on how universities should be steered internally. In Uganda's higher education sub-sector, the literature on university governance reform proposals is mostly found in the voluminous reports of the Inspectorate of Government, University Visitation Committees and Taskforces, but rarely in the form of scholarly research which utilises the reports as source documents. Therefore, there is a dearth of empirical studies on university governance reform proposals in Uganda. Arguably, proposals on university governance reforms are important for three reasons: they symbolise the challenges of the earlier reform attempts, they give direction to the new reforms and they point to the

competing voices about how universities should be governed in a particular higher education space.

In view of the above, this article focuses on the Visitation Committee Report on Makerere University of 2016, referred to as the Rwendeire Report for the purposes of this discussion (Government of Uganda 2016). As a point of departure, emphasis is placed on and the discussion centres around the following question: "How does the Rwendeire Report envisage the governance of public universities in Uganda following the introduction of certain governance reforms since 2000?" The article comprises five sections. The brief introduction is followed by a literature review and reference to methods. Various insights on how public universities in Uganda should be governed and the basis for the reform proposals are introduced. A number of findings are highlighted and brief conclusions drawn.

UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE: VIEWS FROM THE LITERATURE

Governance in higher education provides the means to formally organise and manage institutions such as universities. Although higher education and its governance are very diverse globally, the various approaches still share commonalities and common goals. Consequently, much could be gained from a review of the vast body of literature on university governance. In this discussion specific focus will fall on defining university governance, followed by important aspects on 21st century university governance reforms in Africa highlighted in the literature.

The meaning of university governance

Governance of higher education can be defined based on either the higher education system, the higher education institution, or both, as frames of reference. University governance, which hinges on the higher education institution as a unit of analysis, elicits a plethora of definitions and there is no consensus on what it means. There are as many definitions of university governance as those who have attempted to unravel the ostensibly slippery concept. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines university governance as "the structures, relationships and processes … through which university level policies are developed, implemented and reviewed" (OECD 2008:68). This definition resonates with that of Neave (2006:28) who unravels it as "a conceptual shorthand for the way higher education … institutions are

organized and managed." The Council on Higher Education (CHE), a South African regulatory agency for higher education, delineates the scope of governance at institutional level as encompassing the "formal structures and informal interactions" (CHE 2016:108) through which the various role-players in the university participate in making high-level decisions and provide oversight. In line with CHE's conceptualisation of university governance, according to Toma (2007:57), university governance has to do with "responding to the question: who makes what decisions?"

A central thread in the definitions above is that university governance entails the organisational set-up or structures and organs with different levels of authority through which decisions are made, reviewed and implemented as well as the formal and informal interactions among the university structures. The principal structures at institutional level are the University Council, the Senate (and other structures at the academic heartland), the administration (or the management board) and the student body (AUC, 2018).

University governance reforms in Africa

Since 2000, university governance in Africa has experienced a series of reforms. The notable ones in most countries include a retreat from direct state control to state supervision of universities (Sall and Oanda 2014; Oanda and Sall 2016; Varghese 2016; Bisaso 2017; Nabaho 2019). The state supervision model is underpinned by "the State's responsibility to protect and promote the public's interests with an individual institution's need for academic freedom and autonomy" (World Bank 2000:53). In keeping with the state supervision model of university governance, especially in Anglophone Africa, new quasi-governmental bodies have been created to serve as buffer organs between the state and universities, and to provide oversight and quality assurance on behalf of government (Saint 2010; Sall and Oanda 2014). Therefore, the role of the state has changed from direct steering of universities to ensuring that the higher education system functions well through providing a framework for higher education institutions to operate and insist on "accountability measures to ensure that the operations in the sector help achieve national objectives" (Varghese 2016:32), serve the interests of the public and are equitable as well as responsive to societal needs. The African Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ASG-QA), a document which provides a common language in the African higher education space, points to the imperative of African countries, and higher education institutions by implication, to adopt the state supervision model.

At the institutional level, university councils were created as the supreme governance organs to provide oversight of universities (Sall and Oanda 2014) and to shield universities from undue political control (Oanda and Sall 2016). These institutional-level oversight organs have province over "formulating the institution's strategic direction, approving internal statutes, accepting budgets, accounting for use of funds, managing the institution's assets, and safeguarding institutional interests" (Saint 2010:18). The modes of populating the university councils in the various political jurisdictions are diverse: appointment by the Head of State, appointment by the Minister responsible for education and election by specific stakeholder groups (Saint 2010; Varghese 2016).

In a number of African countries, the post-2000 higher education legal frameworks stipulated the election of deans and heads of departments (Varghese 2016). However, the African Quality Assurance Mechanism (AQRM), a tool for assessing the quality of higher education institutions, attest to other modes through which deans and heads of departments ascend to office. These include appointment by the government or proprietor, appointment by the chief executive officer of the university and ascension via an open competitive process following advertisement. Finally, the academic governance function is exercised by the Senate (or Academic Board) which is responsible to the University Council. The Senate, which is chaired by the Vice Chancellor, is the principal academic body. Senates are responsible "for institutional policies concerning curriculum, educational quality, admissions, examinations, award of degrees, and research" as well as advising the University Council on "academic employment, promotions, and the establishment of new academic units" (Saint 2010:19).

As already observed, the existing literature on university governance reforms leans towards the current governance arrangements and not the reforms that have been proposed in relation to the extant governance arrangements.

METHODOLOGY

The question that this article endeavours to answer is: "How does the Rwendeire Report envisage the governance of (public) universities in Uganda following the introduction of certain governance reforms since 2000?" The *Report of the Visitation Committee on Makerere University* or the Rwendeire Report (Government of Uganda 2016) was reviewed to answer the research question. The Visitation Committee on Makerere University, the oldest and largest public university in Uganda (Nabaho, Aguti and Oonyu

2016), was constituted in November 2016 by the Ugandan Head of State in his capacity as the Visitor of the University. Among the terms of reference of the Committee was to "visit, study and make a situation analysis of Makerere University and [the] causes of endemic strikes including but not limited to academic affairs, financial affairs, governance affairs, and student affairs, and make recommendations" (Government of Uganda 2016:xiv). Part of the report is dedicated to governance and management within the university (Government of Uganda 2016:59-72). The Rwendeire Report is important because it has ramifications for the entire higher education sub-sector and it is anticipated to inform a government White Paper that will set the stage for the amendment of the Universities and Other Tertiary Institutions Act (UOTIA), Uganda's principal higher education legislation (Government of Uganda 2001).

The Rwendeire Visitation Committee was preceded by the Taskforce on Job Evaluation, Re-organisation of the Staff Structure and Financing of Makerere University which was led by the chairperson of the Makerere University Council (the so-called Omaswa Taskforce Report). It was constituted at the request of the central government in November 2011 against the backdrop of a staff strike over salary issues and unpaid allowances. The taskforce comprised ten members and consulted academia in various countries (Independent 2016; Lule 2016). The report, submitted as report in February 2014, made salient proposals regarding the governance of public universities in Uganda. The Omaswa Report was preceded by the McGregor Visitation Committee Report of August 2007 (McGregor Report 2007). This committee was constituted by the Head of State in March 2006 and entrusted with the task of conducting a situational analysis of public universities in Uganda. Unlike the Rwendeire Visitation Committee, which focused on Makerere University, the McGregor Visitation Committee examined all four public universities at the time: Makerere University, Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Kyambogo University and Gulu University. The Committee submitted a report to the appointing authority in August 2007 which culminated in the development of a government White Paper in November 2008. It ought to be noted that the recommendations in both reports were not implemented. Little wonder that one of the terms of reference of the Rwendeire Committee was "[t]o study the three earlier Reports: the McGregor Visitation Committee, Omaswa and Kabaasa Reports, and make actionable recommendations" (McGregor Report 2007:xv; Government of Uganda 2016).

Therefore, the document review of the Rwendeire Report was a main thrust for collecting data. This method could be described as "the careful examination of documents and their content in order to draw conclusions about the social circumstances in which the documents are produced and read" (Chiome 2012:110). Content analysis was used to

analyse the data that was obtained from the report. Through qualitative content analysis an examination occurred of the language in the text and the information was classified into categories that represented similar meaning (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Open coding techniques were employed through an in-depth analysis of the content of this 370-page report. This resulted in organising the information extracted from the report into various categories (governance structure, composition structures and functions of structures) and themes (corporate governance, academic governance and administration).

UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE: INSIGHTS FROM THE RWENDEIRE REPORT

The proposed governance reforms at corporate governance and executive leadership levels as well as at the academic heartland are discussed in this section. The corporate governance level reforms hinge on the supreme oversight organ (the University Council). Conversely, the executive leadership level reforms in essence concern the steering core of the academy. Finally, reform proposals at the academic heartland pertain to affairs around the University Senate and academic units of universities.

Reform proposals regarding corporate governance

The Rwendeire Report proposes altering the corporate governance architecture of public universities in Uganda. The striking proposals in the report include, *inter alia*, adoption of a lean and lay-dominated University Council as opposed to the 30-member University Council comprising 50% internal university members, disfranchisement of the Vice Chancellor, the introduction of competence-based councils, mandating the Minister responsible for (higher education) to appoint members of the University Council and the institutionalisation of a maximum membership term limit (Government of Uganda 2016).

Lean and lay-dominated university councils

The size of the current councils of public universities have been criticised for, among others, being unnecessarily big and almost balancing the number of internal and external stakeholders, thus undermining public confidence in the institutions. This has contributed to some governance dilemmas at institutional level. The voice for rethinking the size, and by implication, the composition of the oversight body is unequivocal in the report. Therefore, the report recommends a council of 15 members comprising:

Nine (9) independent members (from outside the University with knowledge, competencies and experience in key areas of higher education governance), a representative of the Makerere University Convocation, the Vice Chancellor as an *ex-officio* [member], one representative of academic staff as an *ex-officio* [member], one representative of non-teaching staff as an *ex-officio* [member], one representative of graduate students as an *ex-officio*, and one representative of undergraduate students as an *ex-officio* [member] (Government of Uganda 2016:62).

The proposed reform in the outlook of the University Council entails a reduction of the entire membership by half and of the internal stakeholders by two-thirds. Therefore, the proportion of external and independent members is 60%. This reform proposal, if adopted by the state, will occasion total winners, partial winners and outright losers as far as membership of the University Council is concerned. The winners, or those likely to retain their seats in the University Council, are the University Convocation as a stakeholder group and the Vice Chancellor. On the other hand, the partial winners are academic staff who will retain membership, though the number of slots would drop from two to one. The outright losers are the University Senate, which is currently represented in the University Council by two members, staff at the steering core of universities except the Vice Chancellor and all the external stakeholders, save the University Convocation. The University Senate could have been excluded from the University Council owing to the imperative to create a division of labour between the supreme governance body and the principal academic body. Generally, the report favours participation of the internal stakeholders in corporate governance through representation and the exclusion of external stakeholders from corporate governance. This reform proposal has the potential to change the university from being a stakeholder organisation to a partial stakeholder organisation, with the University Convocation featuring as the only external stakeholder group with a statutory right to participate in corporate governance. The exclusion of internal stakeholders may make universities appear as unrepresentative of a full range of external stakeholders and as undemocratic.

The proposed reforms under this theme are not an end in themselves. First, a lay-dominated corporate governance organ is anticipated to alter the current balance of membership – and ostensibly of power – between the internal members and the lay members in favour of the latter. Secondly, it is envisaged to promote some level of objectivity in arriving at decisions. Under the current arrangement, where 50% of the members are non-independent members (staff and students), breeds conflict of interest, thus "clouding objectivity in making decisions affecting the University" (Government of Uganda 2016:39). Thirdly, it aims at lessening "stakeholderisation" of the University

Council. Stakeholderisation of Council arises when Council members exclusively pursue the vested interests of the constituencies that elected or nominated them at the expense of the interests of the institution. Arguably, "stakeholderisation" of Council is responsible for the endemic crisis of governance at the institutions. Finally, it is anticipated to pave way for constructive debate that has been found to be lacking in large councils.

Disfranchisement of vice chancellors

The Chief Executive Officer, in line with good practice in corporate governance, stands to lose voting rights and, therefore, decision-making powers in the University Council. Disfranchisement of the Chief Executive Officer is explicit in the report. Under the proposed reform, the Vice Chancellor will have leeway to influence decision-making through persuasion and lobbying rather than through casting the ballot. This reform proposal reflects an attempt to mirror governance practices in the corporate world and to remodel the University Council as a corporate board. The proposed denial of voting rights to the Chief Executive Officer could be intended to facilitate smooth implementation of the resolutions of the oversight organ without being constrained by the side his/her ballot took.

Competence-based university councils

The current size of the University Council is rationalised by the imperative to ensure representation of constituencies in university governance. The Rwendeire Report proposes a shift from the current constituency-based mode of representation in a university council to a competence-based approach. According to this Report, "[t]he constituency representation model of University governance … should be replaced with competence-based membership" (Government of Uganda 2016:62). This is in line with the Omaswa Report calling for the University Council members to be experienced and highly competent, and to operate effectively in a business-like manner (Lule 2016). This recommendation in the Rwendeire Report has been, therefore, informed by the realisation that university councils, owing to the election or nomination of the members on the basis of their popularity or other subjective grounds, are inexpert and lack a balance of skills and experiences to steer universities in the current marketised environment. Therefore, the current practice of constituting the councils of public universities breeds straw people who depend on the strategic guidance of the Vice Chancellor and also serve as his/her rubber stamp. However, the report is non-committal on the specific competencies or the criteria for eligibility. It holds the view that the requisite competencies should be informed by both the changing corporate governance context and the changing higher education landscape.

Nevertheless, incongruity between the Visitation Committee Report recommendation that the constituency-based model of representation should come to an end and the actual composition of the University Council is apparent. Whereas the Visitation Committee Report recommends an end to the constituency-based membership model, it dilutes the well-packaged and justified proposal by providing for the representation of the principal constituencies – the University Convocation, academic staff, non-teaching staff, graduate students and undergraduate students – in the University Council. Therefore, it can be inferred that the representation of the internal stakeholder group or constituencies is integral to the recommended corporate governance architecture of public universities. However, the only reform proposal in this respect revolves around mainstreaming the ability dimension into the selection practices of the representatives of the internal stakeholders and the University Convocation. Another area to contemplate is whether undergraduate students – the majority of whom are high school leavers – would qualify for membership in view of the membership standard of being "… highly accomplished men and women with a wide range of experience to handle complex higher education issues" (Government of Uganda 2016:62) or whether exceptions can be made for some stakeholder groups in the interests of nurturing democracy.

Appointment, discipline and removal of members by the line Minister

The report recommends appointment of the members of the University Council by the Minister responsible for education. However, it is not clear whether this appointment should extend from the independent to the *ex-officio* members. Finally, the report is silent on the procedures to be followed prior to appointment. It also entrusts the Minister with the powers to exercise disciplinary control over and to remove members of the University Council from office.

Term-based membership

The report has identified what may be referred to as "careerism" – the tendency to serve Council for many years – by some University Council members. These individuals exploit the weaknesses associated with the statutory requirement to serve a particular constituency for a maximum of eight years to switch constituencies and represent them. Specifically, the report highlights that "[t]he Committee noted the existence of near lifetime members of Council metamorphosing from representation of one constituency to another for Council membership longevity" (Government of Uganda 2016:46). This manoeuvring by individuals was criticised for promoting "negative group culture whereby long-serving members dominate Council business with old methods of doing

things at the expense of innovative ideas and advice emanating from new members" (Government of Uganda 2016:46); hence, affecting the effectiveness of the University Council. The report, therefore, recommends institutionalisation of a maximum term limit of eight years. The term limits will pave way for councils to bring on board new members with new competencies and perspectives to steer universities in the constantly changing higher education terrain. To retain valuable skills, preserve institutional memory and introduce new expertise, the report recommends a staggered rotational approach as follows: "[F]or preservation of institutional knowledge, all Council members should not be replaced at once. There should be a plan to replace 5-10 members every cycle, retaining five to provide institution memory" (Government of Uganda 2016:67).

The idea of replacing the members can work best with the independent members other than the representatives of particular stakeholder groups. Therefore, the practice of replacing 4-5 of the independent members is tenable. This may necessitate that either four or five of the independent members are retired after their first term in the University Council.

Reform proposals at the executive leadership level

Three reforms are suggested as far as the issues at the steering core of a public university is concerned. The themes pertain to the appointment of university executives, professionalisation of the Vice Chancellor's job and strengthening the executive authority of the Vice Chancellor.

Appointment of university executives

Under the current higher education legal regime, the Vice Chancellor of a public university is appointed by the Chancellor – the titular head of the university – on the recommendation of the University Council from among three candidates recommended by the University Senate. Operationally, a search committee comprising two members of the University Council and three members of the University Senate identifies suitable candidates for the post and forwards their names to the Senate to nominate three candidates for recommendation to the University Council which, in turn, submits the names to the Chancellor for appointment.

The current selection practice for the Vice Chancellor – which also applies to the Deputy Vice Chancellors – was blamed by the Rwendeire Report, *inter alia*, for its failure to deliver the minimum required leadership, polarising the university and promoting inbreeding, since it locked out candidates outside the university (Nabaho 2019). Therefore, the report recommends a change from election to appointment of the executive leaders of universities as follows: "The Vice Chancellors of public universities should be appointed by the Minister responsible [for education] upon recommendation of the respective University Councils" (Government of Uganda 2016:xix) following an open competitive exercise that is free from politicking. For the Deputy Vice Chancellors, the same process is recommended but the University Council should remain the appointing authority. The proposed arrangement for appointing and disciplining the Vice Chancellor by the Minister could have been aimed at guaranteeing the security of tenure of the Vice Chancellor.

Professionalisation of the Vice Chancellor's job

In Uganda, there is no profile for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a public university. Cognisant of the above, the report recommends that "[t]he profile and person specifications of the Vice Chancellor should be provided in the Gazetted Governance Charter of the University" (Government of Uganda 2016). This suggests that the Visitation Committee has opted for particularisation rather than standardisation of the person specifications of the Vice Chancellor. The proposal, if adopted by the government, implies that there is a likelihood of different public universities having different profiles for the Vice Chancellor.

Strengthening the post of Vice Chancellor

Section 31 of the UOTIA creates the post of a University Secretary and entrusts the role-holder with two statutory functions: secretary to the University Council and accounting officer of the university (Government of Uganda 2001). However, there is a perceived conflict in the law because the UOTIA assigns the Vice Chancellor province over the financial affairs. As part of strengthening the post of Vice Chancellor, the report recommends that "[t]he Vice Chancellor should be the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of a Public University" and that the role of the University Secretary should be redefined to "Director Legal and Secretary to University Council (Corporation Secretary)" (Government of Uganda 2016:68). This realignment of the roles is designed to create a strong executive authority. This stems from the fact that the Vice Chancellor should have control over the university finances if the role-holder is to be held accountable for executive implementation.

Reform proposals relating to academic governance

The proposed reforms regarding academic governance hinge on two questions, namely who should be a member of the principal academic governance organ (the University Senate) as well as what the responsibilities and powers of the University Senate should be within an institution of higher learning.

Composition of Senate

In public universities in Uganda, membership of the University Senate is defined in the legal framework for higher education. Membership of the Senate is by virtue of the position held in the university, through representation of particular constituencies within the university and by ministerial appointment. The Minister responsible for education is required to appoint from the public "three persons who are capable of contributing to the academic and social development of the University" (Government of Uganda 2001; Makerere University no date).

The Visitation Committee Report recommends an overhaul of the current Senate membership criterion – from predominantly representing particular constituencies to a demonstrated ability to execute the academic governance roles. The report further suggests that the requisite competences for members of the Senate should be contained in the Senate Charters to "enable the University to respond to the dynamics imposed to (sic) it by adopting strategies for competitiveness from time to time but not in the Principal Act" (Government of Uganda 2016:62). The Committee Report further recommends that "the composition and membership of Senate should be the remit of the University Council" (Government of Uganda 2016:68) as opposed to the current overly restrictive prescription of the membership in the Act which limits "the relevance of Senate's mandate in the dynamic pursuit of excellence with specific reference to the Strategic Plan of a particular University" (Government of Uganda 2016:48).

The powers the report grants to the University Council in respect of shaping the outlook of the University Senate points to two insights. First, the University Senate should be in a subordinate position to the University Council. Finally, universities, as corporate entitles, have latitude to determine whether to embrace a unicameral or a bicameral model of university governance. Bicameralism would necessitate that the University Council assign financial and oversight powers to itself while the University Senate would have a

remit over all academic affairs. Unicameralism, when adopted, would entail either the University Council delegating its academic governance functions to the University Senate or the University Senate operating as a sub-committee of the University Council. The latter academic governance arrangement dictates that the University Senate loses decision-making powers and that its decisions constitute recommendations to the University Council for approval. However, the recommendation can occasion a situation where the University Senate can be granted both decision-making and advisory roles, thus blurring the dividing line between bicameralism and unicameralism as models of university governance.

Functions of the Senate

The UOTIA stipulates the functions of the University Senate. However, the Rwendeire Report is opposed to the practice of prescribing the functions in the Act by asserting:

> The Principal Act (UOTIA) should not prescribe the functions … This should be done by the University Council through a Senate Charter or Handbook, in tune with the University's Strategic Plan from which the relevant internal governance and management structures are derived and given effect (Government of Uganda 2016:68).

CONTEMPLATIONS AND THOUGHTS ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

The Rwendeire Report suggests a plethora of university governance reforms for Uganda's higher education space. The governance reform proposals stem from the perceived deficits in the current governance framework for public universities and bear the hallmarks of the university governance practices in both developing and advanced economies. Mimetic isomorphism – or policy borrowing from other higher education spaces and universities in other national jurisdictions – is unavoidable since the Visitation Committee employed the benchmarking methodology and makes constant reference to the "best practice" in other countries and universities to reinforce some of the recommendations.

The corporate governance reform proposals relate to reducing the size of the University Council and changing the membership criterion of the University Council from the current constituency-based model to a competence-based model. The desirability of

having a smaller university council has been highlighted by OECD pertaining to European and other institutions. The recommendations contained in the Rwendeire Report on the size of the University Council (Government of Uganda 2016) is in line with OECD recommendations that a university council should ideally consist of between 12 to 25 members (OECD 2003). The need for a competence-based oversight body was equally raised by the Omaswa Report of 2014 and also features in the public discourse on university governance. Arguably, the reform proposal aims at addressing the skill deficits in the governance organ, making universities more entrepreneurial and competitive, and strengthening the oversight bodies to steer the universities in the highly competitive and rapidly changing higher education landscape in which the stakeholders' expectations of universities as development actors have escalated. Whereas the Omaswa Report is silent on the competencies, in a report by the South African Department of Higher Education and Training, these competencies are identified as higher education, business/finance, information technology, human resources, law, facilities, communication and marketing (DHET 2016).

However, it should be noted that competence-based university councils can skew the universities away from the needs of society or community at a time when there is greater recognition that universities should be sensitive to the needs of society as well as contribute to their achievement. This calls for blending expertise with a deep understanding of the political, social and economic challenges that Ugandan society anticipates leapfrogging through higher education. The above notwithstanding, it is pertinent to delve into the likelihood of the government adopting the recommendation and eventually implementing it. The starting point is to interrogate why the government of Uganda could not have implemented a similar recommendation in the Omaswa Report (Lule 2016) which was accompanied by another recommendation to the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) to "fast track the necessary amendments to UOTIA Section 38 to enable implementation" (Government of Uganda 2016:46) of the recommendation.

The government seems not to have "fast tracked" – or ignored – the seemingly urgent proposal in the Omaswa Report because non-constituency-based oversight is incongruent with Uganda's post-2000 practice of constituting corporate governance organs of public sector organisations, the uniqueness of universities notwithstanding. The current practice entails representation of the key stakeholders under which, except for the *ex-officio* members, the rest of the members of the oversight organs derive their mandate from the stakeholder groups in a particular sector that are assumed to have an interest in the effective performance of the respective public entities. This model is entrenched in all the

public institutions under the oversight of the MoES and in the public agencies that have been established either by Acts of Parliament or by subsidiary legislation.

The constituency-based model seems to appeal to the state for four reasons. First, ministerial appointees, regardless of the robustness of the criteria followed, lack legitimacy outside government circles. Second, the appointment of all the members of the governance organs may be (mis)construed as a scheme by the government to resurrect state control through political appointees which can, inadvertently, lead to politicisation of universities. Third, the constituency-based model, which includes the line ministries and other critical ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), provides the state with an opportunity to exercise on-site oversight of the semi-autonomous public institutions. Therefore, despite the steering-at-a-distance model, the representatives of government ministries also act as *de facto* government eyes and ears in the semi-autonomous public institutions. Similarly, the representatives of government ministries provide expertise in some areas, including, but not limited to, financial management, human resource management and governance which may be lacking among the representatives of the various stakeholders. Finally, the merit-based model would make the universities lose the texture of stakeholder organisations and also weaken the relationship between public universities and the public or society as well as accountability to the community. Arguably, the constituency-based model promotes stakeholder involvement (ensuring that governance decisions take into account the view of appropriate stakeholders), something that cannot be effectively achieved through consultation and participation in committees. Therefore, reform decisions by governments are not solely informed by efficiency and effectiveness concerns. In view of the above, the chances of shifting to a merit-based University Council appear to be slim.

The government's adoption of the recommendation pertaining to competence-based university councils has not been ruled out. However, if this proposal is to be embraced, the members should be identified through an independent professional process as opposed to the current practice under which universities present the names to the Minister for appointment.

The report agitates for a shift from the election to the appointment of staff at the steering core (the Vice Chancellor and his/her deputies) and academic leaders. The recommendation is premised on the notion that elections do not deliver the minimum required leadership to steer the institutions and politicises an academic exercise. This

school of thought is in sync with the World Bank's (2000) view that appointed leaders are "prejudiced in favour of the status quo", are "less likely to allow their programmes to be stalled by lack of consensus" (World Bank 2000:65) and have the potential to take unpopular decisions. It is also in line with the OECD perspective that newly appointed staff members normally experience few hurdles to implement major changes that cut across vested interests (OECD 2003). Ideally, such appointments would be based on leadership and managerial qualities and the traditional academic skills. Nevertheless, the McGregor Visitation Committee Report (2007) was in favour of maintaining the status quo or subjecting some sections of staff to the ballot. As Kasozi indicated, the McGregor Committee felt that "even though the election method by [the] peers was difficult, the development of a democratic behaviour in societies might require passing through such painful processes" (Kasozi 2016:95). As Sall and Oanda (2014) emphasised, in some countries the shift occurred from electing to appointing executive and academic leaders.

The reform menu at the corporate level also pertains to scaling up external involvement in university governance through having more external members. This trend has been witnessed in some countries in continental Europe as the example of the University of Copenhagen in Denmark indicates (Gornitzka, Maassen and De Boer 2017). However, the situation at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands and at the University of Zurich in Switzerland is rather different. At these universities, as a result of national legal frameworks for higher education, the oversight body comprises lay members only who are appointed by the state (Donina and Hasanefendic 2019). On the other hand, at the University of Vienna in Austria the oversight body comprises four external members appointed by the state, four internal members appointed by the University Senate and one member appointed by the eight other appointed members (Gornitzka *et al*. 2017). In these cases, students are not participants in the corporate governance processes. However, the Norwegian experience is rather an outlier: the oversight body at the University of Oslo comprises ten members of which four are internal staff, four are external and two are students' representatives (Gornitzka *et al*. 2017). It can, therefore, be inferred that there is no one-size-fits-all corporate governance architecture in continental Europe.

It is also worth noting that the African Union, in the African Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ASG-QA), maintains strategic silence on the size, composition, appointment and functions of the University Council. It is plausible to argue that the supranational body could have viewed these as matters being within the realm of national higher education systems and higher education institutions, and it being risky to homogenise. However, the AUC is emphatic on the participation, which may not be necessarily through representation, of students in decision making in the governance

organs. This is consistent with the Omaswa Report which has recommended participation of students in both corporate and academic governance through providing them with the opportunity to present their views in the committees of the University Council and the University Senate (Nabaho 2019).

Regarding the academic governance function, the report suggests that the membership of the University Senate be competence-based and not prescribed in higher education legislation. The idea of a competence-based Senate resonates with the extant literature. Baird and Woodhouse (2007:10) recommend that academic Senates "made up of acknowledged experts and leaders that could better discharge quality assurance functions and assist in holding others accountable for the achievement of the institution's strategies." Arguably, the quality of the members of the Senate has a bearing on its effectiveness in discharging the academic governance roles (Nabaho 2019). The drive towards a competence-based Senate is buttressed by the notion that the Senate is "…the heartland of the university, which is responsible for its reputation and its key performance indicators" (Shattock 2017:ix) because Senate deals with the reason for the existence of a university – teaching and learning and research (Rowlands 2017).

Finally, the Visitation Committee Report recommends that the functions of the University Senate not be embedded in the principal higher education legislation but prescribed in the gazetted Senate Charter so that the functions can be reviewed whenever the need to do so arises in line with the corporate strategy. In other words, the report favours contextualisation of the functions of the Senate at institutional level rather than standardisation of the same. This seems to suggest that the university (or the corporate) strategy should shape the functions of the University Senate as well as its membership.

However, the view articulated here is that the functions of the University Senate cannot be shaped by the corporate strategy. Differently put, the corporate strategy, especially the academic aspects of it, should be responsive to the functions of the University Senate that have evolved with the development of higher education and that seem to be agreed upon by the stakeholders in the higher education sub-sector based on the nature of universities. In keeping with the above, the extant studies consider the functions of the Senate as rotating around "assuring academic quality including academic freedom, academic integrity, assessment, admissions, and research conduct" (Dooley 2007:25) as well as dealing with matters of teaching, research and programmes. Therefore, it can be inferred that the University Senate has an overarching responsibility of monitoring academic policy and standards as well as protecting academic freedom. The variant in the national

higher education spaces regarding university senates may relate to whether in the exercise of these functions, the University Senate plays an advisory role to the University Council (the unicameral model) or has decision-making powers over academic questions (the bicameral model) and matters relating to academic standards.

What academic governance therefore entails – as well as the functions of the Senate – is too important a matter to be relegated to universities. Doing so would run counter to Uganda's legislative practice which prescribes the functions of the principal organs in the relevant legislation. The retention of the functions of the Senate in the principal higher education legislation provides a similar frame of reference for higher education institutions, standardises the functions across Uganda's higher education space and defines the nature of the Senate. However, this does not negate the fact that the University Council can delegate some of its functions to the Senate or assign new roles, in addition to the statutory ones, to the University Senate.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Two relevant points of conclusion emanate from the discourse above. Firstly, the university governance reform proposals can be analysed from three angles: as an attempt to fix the holes in the current university governance arrangements, as a mimicking of the university governance practices of other universities which may be considered model universities and as an attempt to import the business models which are advocated by NPM into university governance. However, whereas there is a homogenisation of the form of university governance structures, though with variations in nomenclature, internationalisation or convergence of the substance of the shared governance organs (Council, Senate and Management Board) of the academy. Arguably, the reform efforts at national level, therefore, only shape the substance as opposed to the form of the principal governance organs.

A second concluding aspect is that the collegial tradition of universities ought to be respected, and staff and students are eligible players in the governance bodies. It is the collegial tradition as well as the missions of universities that make universities different from other organisations. It is under this premise that the Rwendeire Report, unlike the Omaswa Report, recommends a total "corporatisation" of university councils or remodelling as corporate boards with lay councils with chief executive officers serving as *ex-officio* members, and provides for the representation of the internal stakeholders and

the University Convocation in the University Council. However, the internal stakeholders, according to the report, ought not to perceive themselves as fulfilling a representative role but as critical players in the university's strategy. The basis for their representation in corporate governance ought to be built on consensus and pave the way for effective policy implementation.

It is hoped that this article will contribute to the knowledge of university governance through its examination of the proposed governance reforms for public universities as highlighted in this critique of the Rwendeire Report. A well-governed higher education sector (specifically public universities in this case) is important for capacity building, knowledge creation and dissemination as well as the sustainable social and economic development of the African continent. It is therefore important to constantly study and analyse the way in which universities are governed and through complementing the existing literature we trust that a contribution could be made to reforms and improved governance in several African jurisdictions.

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(NPC 2011:55, 420). By collaborating, it is possible to recognise resources that can be harnessed, while also creating the necessary capacity to respond to persistent problems.

Over the two decades of its existence as a fully-fledged government department, the National School of Government (NSG) has adopted collaboration as one of its strategic goals and operational principles (SAMDI 2007; NSG 2020). The NSG participates in collaborative networks with local and international institutions as well as practitioners for capacity development purposes, and contributes to the advancement of the study and practice of public administration. Similar government institutions in other countries include the Administrative Staff College of India, Canada School of Public Service, Kenya School of Government, Latvia School of Public Administration and Malaysia National Institute of Public Administration.

In this paper, we consider circumstances and experiences in the augmented provision of a management development programme of the NSG for a cohort of emerging managers working in the same sector. We revisit the institutional collaboration arrangements involved, assumptions and anticipated benefits of action learning, and the actual implementation of the programme and its learner support strategies. In the process our conceptual understandings are outlined, the methodology applied is explained, followed by findings. As part of the conclusions, we highlight the possibility of, and need to, adaptively embed continuing personal and organisational learning for meaningful development.

NOTES ON MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

While acknowledging that the discourse as well as the nuances associated with the considerable body of research on management, leadership, capacity building and development are almost endless, for the purposes of this paper it is of relevance to provide a brief overview of our understanding.

Capacity development

Capacity is an integral aspect of social service strategies, programmes and projects. It relates to sufficiency of resources, skills, abilities and factors essential to achieve a goal. Capacity necessitates constant adaptation, flexibility and expansion in stakeholder involvement and partnering processes. Collaborative relationships can, and do, change over time, and a new configuration of partners may be preferred depending on the situation and desired outcome (Draai 2010; Matsiliza 2016; Venter 2019).

The *development* aspect linked to capacity places value on the potential and already-in-place proficiency that can be elicited and enhanced. In education, training and development (ETD) terms, the simplest form of capacity development is mobilised through formal learning programmes that can be consistently replicated. More nuanced interventions are sensitive to "what might work in the particular circumstances", while giving attention "to both individual and organisational issues and to the enabling environment for capacity development" (OECD 2006:8). Thus, a broad view of capacity development is concerned with resources, relationships and outcomes at individual, organisational and societal levels. The hyper-connectedness (Pedersen 2016) of social, environmental, political and economic issues reinforces the need for cross-sector and cross-disciplinary collaborations to optimise capacity.

Traversing disciplines and sectors

The discipline of Public Administration has been shaped by other disciplines, especially in the Humanities and Social Sciences. It derives many of its theories from disciplines such as Political Science, Philosophy and Sociology (Zürn, Wälti and Enderlein 2010; Frederickson, Smith, Larimer and Licari 2016). Hence, all disciplines are relatively pertinent in the public sector as evidenced by public services that range from the arts to zoo keeping. It is in the context of this inter- and multi-disciplinarity that the practice of public administration welcomes a variety of ETD offerings and approaches to address the needs of the equally diverse public institutions. Importantly, the choices and purposes of collaborative ETD endeavours demand reflexivity in attitude and in methodological approach (Zienkowski 2017) in order to facilitate transformative learning in the long run.

The collaborative ETD initiative under discussion entails a management development programme for the South African National Parks (SANParks) which is one of the public

entities and statutory bodies in the South African environmental sector. The legislative mandate of SANParks "is the conservation of South Africa's biodiversity, landscapes and associated heritage assets through a system of national parks" (SANParks 2019:25). Therefore, major functions of this entity include promoting sustainable conservation and nature-based tourism, managing natural and heritage assets as well as building strategic partnerships in aid of cultural, educational and socio-economic objectives.

Management and leadership development

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) articulates democratic values and principles that should exemplify public service and administration. These include human dignity and the achievement of equality, a high standard of professional ethics, responsiveness, transparency, fairness and accountability, inclusivity and representativity as well as efficient, economic and effective use of resources and good human resource management and career development practices. Simply put, public officials must be fully equipped to serve in a development- and people-oriented government. Largely though, the available capacity development interventions portray a dominance of competency-based management development programmes, together with managerial leadership support interventions (Qwabe 2013; Naidoo 2015; Daweti and Evans 2017). At the NSG, the policy environment and historical makings of the institution are evident in the nature and variety of programmes on offer.

The Integrated Management Development Model of the NSG is intended to provide "a comprehensive and coherent career development framework for all public service managers and leaders" (NSG 2013:4). The model is premised on the managerial career progression from entry level administration and supervision to junior and middle management and finally, the senior management echelon. The original model of the IMDP entailed three layers: attendance of face-to-face training sessions of the selected programme, post training support interventions which may involve seminars, workshops or other just-in-time interventions and back-home interventions such as coaching, mentoring, job rotation or job enrichment (NSG 2013:4-5). In practice though, only the first attendance layer has really been consistently implemented, accompanied by a course in mentoring on request. The programme design and delivery approach largely focus on developing the individual learner who receives a certificate of competence upon fulfilling the programme attendance and assessment requirements. Nevertheless, interactive facilitation strategies are considered mandatory to enhance programme relevance and enable application. For example, foregrounding the sector or departmental context and

current issues in the various modules is a facilitation requirement, as is the use of modified formative group activities. The collection of individuals in the enrolled departmental groups is presumed prepared to transfer the new capabilities and insights gained into their work environments.

SANParks chose the Emerging Management Development Programme (EMDP) for a cohort of 130 employees who were divided into five groups and hosted at four regional sites. The programme is designed for junior managers and comprises three blocks of face-to-face training sessions, each being five days in duration. The University of Pretoria (UP) was the delivery partner in line with the NSG collaboration strategy. The circumstances around the provision of the EMDP for this SANParks cohort are investigated by means of two research questions:

- What characterised the implementation of the SANParks capacity development initiative?

- To what extent did the initiative engender the intended forms of learning?

METHODS

The paper is written from the perspective of practitioners employed at the NSG. Our roles include co-design of curricula and learning programmes, management of programme delivery partnerships and facilitation support. We bring experiences from the local sphere of government, the legislative sector, higher education and open and distance learning. As practitioners, we strive to nurture deeper knowledge and understanding of theoretical perspectives, while also fulfilling the obligation to reflect in and on practice (Schön 1983; Knassmüller and Meyer 2013). We embrace reflexivity "as a research practice" and a beneficial "characteristic of interpretive social science research" (Zienkowski 2017:6-9).

This reflection on the SANParks capacity development initiative is prompted by the realisation that each cohort and its organisational context shape the learning and development experiences in a particular way. It is possible to glean insights about the extent to which learning can be embedded past the formal programme delivery phase. Also, we are curious about the role that learning experiences might play in fostering the attainment of broad public sector and national aspirations. To address the research questions of this qualitative study, we relied on a combination of data collection methods and sources:

- *Document analysis of key project records and notes*: These included terms of reference, facilitators' reports and our reflection notes from the training sessions we attended, the learner support sessions we facilitated and the award ceremony.

- *Observations of EMDP training sessions and learner support sessions*: Besides our observations at selected sessions, we read observation reports compiled by monitoring and evaluation (M&E) colleagues, each focusing on a particular regional site for almost all contact sessions.

- *Informal interviews with participants and managers*: The interviews were largely arranged as conversations with groups of participants – as learners – during training sessions. The groups included those loosely occurring before or after formal session times and the syndicates formed for the action learning project (ALP). Occasions for individual interviews with park managers and learners were similarly used.

RESULTS OBTAINED

Our reading of the data encompassed assumptions and expectations about the EMDP and the ALP component, the rationale for the selection of participant groups, trends across the regional sites and overall impressions about the success of this capacity development initiative. The results are presented from this line of analysis.

Clarity of purpose and project parameters

As expressed in the project terms of reference, SANParks identified the EMDP as one of the "tools for the pursuit of learning and development of employees in a manner that supports the realization of service excellence and employment equity" (SANParks 2018b). Specifically, the EMDP was considered appropriate "for developing current and future managers on the C5 – D2 Paterson Band category", and to create "a good pool of emerging mangers" to support SANParks succession planning efforts. In addition to the broad purpose, important topics and objectives of the contextualised EMDP were articulated 111(SANParks 2018b):

> *[Include content in] financial management, human capital development, quality assurance, problem solving, client orientation and customer focus, team work, and programme and project management.*

> *[A]ssist the emerging managers to develop an understanding of how their work fits into the organisational agenda and to adopt improved ways of managing self and others.*

On delivery requirements and methodology, the following delimitations were requested (SANParks 2018b):

> *The organisation would like to explore a blended learning approach in the delivery of this programme. e-Learning is not an option for the delivery of learning but could be used minimally.*
>
> *Some of the modules offered should allow for credit articulation into other programmes.*
>
> *Action learning project by groups of five.*

Noting that senior managers had recently participated in a learning programme that included action learning, a similar blend for emerging managers was desirable. Thus, as expressed in the terms of reference, the design assumption behind this ETD opportunity was that it would "enable the participants to strengthen their capability to use their formal learning in the programme for the benefit of organisational learning and vice versa" (SANParks 2018b). Through action learning, participants would "develop solutions to a problem wherein improved, more cost-effective methods are presented". An operational assumption was that the EMDP and ALP would be undertaken concurrently over a period of six months, "with a combination of on-site and off-site learning" (SANParks 2018b). Thereafter, three months would allow for the completion of EMPD portfolios of evidence, assessment, and finalisation of results; leading to the hosting of ALP presentations and the award ceremony.

There was firm coordination of activities and communication to ensure consistency in project implementation by the regionally dispersed management teams and participants. For further clarification and support, the NSG and UP developed a participant briefing note and ALP guide. Once these were consolidated with SANParks input, they were issued to line managers and to the confirmed programme participants (NSG, UP, and SANParks 2018; UP 2018). Prior to attendance, learners would take time to read essential documents in order to gain a better grasp of the challenges and opportunities of their work environment. They would also ponder on what SANParks and their specific regions were doing well, what could be done to improve the organisation and how the learners

themselves could contribute to the improvement. The participant briefing notes also assisted learners to make connections from pre-attendance reflections to the EMDP assignment as a portfolio of evidence and the ALP report they would produce.

Learning needs identification and participant profiles

The pre-attendance letter to line managers requested that they nominate candidates according to the stated minimum requirements for the programme and also comment on knowledge gaps in relation to topics of the EMDP modules. Twenty responses were received from managers. These responses from managers are documented in SANParks 2018a. As illustrated below most of these responses incorporated candidates' strengths as well as organisational learning needs:

> *She is very capable but needs to be able to identify how the nursery fits into the bigger picture at SANParks and nationally* (Manager 12).
>
> *He is working in a very diverse situation dealing with different departments & also with different age groups & people with different backgrounds. His team tends to dwell in conflicts [that] get escalated to my attention* (Manager 4).
>
> *Emerging managers are leaders of the future so the sessions must also focus more on strategic planning and implementation. This must be aligned with budget especially in the current economic situations* (Manager 1).
>
> *Their current role requires them to be ethical within the finance division. The buyers deal with clients and they need to be assertive all the time* (Manager 9).
>
> *We are living in the ever-changing world... Should understand the fact that there are strikes and civil unrest sometimes and should have emergency plan around it* (Manager 8).

By job grading, participants straddled the categories of skilled workers, supervisory staff and middle management. Their specific job titles reflected the various business units of SANParks such as trails ranger, conservation officer, civil technician, curator, hospitality service manager, supply chain management officer, business analyst and web content editor. In the five groups combined, the youngest participant was 24 years old and the oldest was 58. Although some said that they were "nominated by my manager" to participate in the EMDP, many indicated that they looked forward to the programme in order to learn and grow as managers (NSG 2019b).

Regional trends and features

The discipline and commitment of participants were consistently noted across the four regions. As one observation report stated (NSG 2018):

> *The participants are extremely focused and disciplined. They participated actively in all the group activities and groups became quite competitive…*

One regional group was described as being close-knit and mature in age and work ethic. They "had a sense of comradery" and "their dominant language of communication was Afrikaans, which sometimes caused a level of discomfort amongst those using English" (NSG 2019a). At another region, the facilitator pointed out that it was "mainly the males who took the opportunity" (NSG 2018) to submit their draft EMDP portfolios for developmental comment. Relatedly, in one conversation, participants stated that the dual use of the park as a workplace and residence made it difficult to separate work, study and family life. Female participants added that domestic responsibilities tended to diminish time for study.

Although some participants wished that the content could be more clearly tailored for their business-oriented environment, they generally expressed satisfaction with facilitators' capabilities and the relevance of most topics. During the first two block sessions, participants already mentioned that the EMDP gave them "exposure", was "enlightening" and "speaks exactly to the daily challenges or uncertainties I face on a daily basis". As the EMDP tasks had to be completed alongside the development of the ALP, strain set in, leading participants to describe the learning experience as "tiring" and "hectic" (NSG 2019c). The peak tourist season and hot weather in some regions, as well as year-end work demands added to the challenges. For example, two groups at one region were unhappy with accommodation facilities and other logistics. One of the groups submitted a collective petition in which they demanded "protection from the mosquitos", amongst other issues (NSG 2018). Once their concerns were addressed and the regional official explained the factors that contributed to shortages of suitable facilities, the group was appeased. In another region, participants shared the ordeal of raging fires that destroyed plant and animal life and caused distress to some tourists and staff members.

Even so, no one missed the next block. Only three participants out of the 130 could not attend the last block session due to mandatory or pre-scheduled commitments. Their appreciation of the learning opportunity is denoted in this feedback:

> *Although she was extremely sick with the flu, she did not want to drop out as she was scared that she might not get this opportunity again* (NSG 2018).

Action learning projects

The importance of the ALP for bridging participation in the EMDP and improving workplace practices was highlighted at the outset. The learning opportunity was intended to equip learners to become effective problem solvers while also contributing to the overall success of SANParks activities (NSG, UP and SANParks 2018). The ALP would be an aspect of development that increased learners' ability to plan and organise resources, improved their confidence as communicators who employed appropriate strategies and technologies, enabled them to reflect on and express their knowledge and learning experiences and let them present a report that made practical proposals for action in a specific area of work. The participant briefing note further elucidated:

> *Your manager and other SANParks senior managers will play a role in guiding the project topics…, which will address a real issue in the Environmental Affairs and SANParks setting. … As the intention behind the action learning project is to prompt action, the critical recommendations made by the best presentations will be adopted for implementation* (NSG, UP and SANParks 2018).

The creation of the ALP supplemented the standard delivery of the EMDP in several ways. The contact session for each block commenced at midday on a Sunday in order to concentrate on ALP requirements. The guidance and support by facilitators included topic and problem statement clarification, team member strengths and roles, resources required and available to address the problem and to support proposed solutions, and the report writing and proposal presentation protocols. While facilitators needed to ensure that ALP groups worked as project and peer learning teams, they understood that the facilitators' input had to be of a nature that promoted project ownership and resourcefulness by teams themselves. As the project topics first emanated from senior managers in the organisation, some ALP teams struggled to fine-tune or replace their topics for final adoption. Some felt that they could contribute better in another group whose topic seemed more relevant

to their area of work, but had to accept the eventuality of the semi-autonomous allocation. Others reported that, although they had established WhatsApp work groups, communication with one another was a challenge owing to initial group dynamics. Predictably, some project teams would arrive unprepared at the start of the session (NSG 2019a, 2019b):

> *We had a challenge with the topic identification, as every member had a suggestion, but at the end of the day we agreed on our chosen topic.*
>
> *Assignments were good but the resources were limited because three [of us] out of the five did not have laptops and also did not have internet connection.*
>
> *The action learning report also had some challenges, especially with regard to academic writing. The facilitator assisted ... to ensure that the two documents were synchronised.*

This guidance was extended to some afternoons and evenings during the same sessions where preparations for the EMDP cumulative assessment tasks were also conducted. Between blocks, facilitators could reach project team members by means of the cell phone. This tool became an indispensable resource for facilitator-learner and learner-learner communication and support.

In keeping with the dedication of learners throughout the training session, creativity and zeal soon became the overriding character of ALP teams. ALP group names largely expressed the identity that members assumed for themselves, the creative usage of concepts to convey the meaning given to a chosen project and the diverse languages of the regions. Examples of names included *360+* (signifying the distance between north and south borders of the Kruger National Park), *Ha Ringana* ('we are all equal' in XiTsonga), *Pikkewyne* ('penguins' in Afrikaans) and *Pro-cure-mend* (an abbreviated play on the phrase 'proactively mending procurement processes').

The revision of received topics and identification of issues of organisational concern led to the construction of some overlapping, some similar, and some unique ALP topics. The themes of organisational communication, employee morale, customer service, use of technologies and revenue generation arose from more than one region. Among these were nuances around assertiveness, absenteeism, professional identity and the connection between SANParks and surrounding communities. Distinctive topics included a focus on

the stock records system, waste management and benefit-sharing of traditional medicinal plants.

In the course of the Block 3 training session, it became more evident that learners needed dedicated time and support to do justice to the ALP. Our facilitation at that stage aimed to provide encouragement, reinforce the ALP guiding principles, clear up some misunderstandings that were still unresolved about the expected report and presentation. Project teams had to ensure that their drafts demonstrated scientific procedure, sound argument and convincing proposals with practical recommendations for organisational improvement. With the exception of one regional group where only the NSG representative was present, the presentation dry runs were jointly observed by the NSG and SANParks management teams. ALP teams received formative feedback that incorporated contextual and practical aspects such as the following (NSG 2019a):

> *Most groups demonstrated adequate understanding of the issues for which they propose interventions, and the ability to organise and present important insights. There was good use of pictures, videos, statistics, models and relevant legislations. Improve presentation skills such as voice projection, eye contact, and time management.*

> *Be certain about issues that are presented as facts. For example, one group incorrectly claimed that SANParks does not use a device that scans cars at entry points at [a certain park].*

> *There are worrying gaps in some project details, like a project plan and the cost-benefit analysis. All presentations have to provide a convincing justification of the recommended interventions. Ask yourself the questions: 'so what?' and 'why should SANParks EXCO pay attention to this proposal?*

Participants' comments about their experience of the support session confirmed that they understood how they would address identified shortcomings as they finalised the reports and presentations. The responses also highlighted that the ALP activities enabled participants to communicate effectively, do problem solving, negotiate with team members and management, carry out tasks and take responsibility as part of teamwork, undertake research in the areas where they had insufficient information and present a product of which they were proud. Regarding personal and workplace benefits arising from their participation in the EMDP and carrying out the ALP, participants were

cautiously to highly confident about the improvements that could be set in motion (NSG 2018, 2019b):

> *I don't think there was a specific positive spin-off in the workplace emanating from the ALP, but it gives a guideline for future project identification if we have to start a project.*

> *One cannot really separate the EMDP training and the Action Learning Project. I applied what I learned during the training to completing the sections that I was responsible for in our ALP.*

> *The ALP ensured that we have come a full circle. It pulled all the loose strings together and showed us what could be done with the knowledge that we gained.*

> *This [programme] is really beneficial because I have acquired more knowledge related to management and life in general, and this will assist when approaching any situation whether work related or person.*

> *I was already applying situational leadership in my workplace ... but now, I am able to apply it better and correctly and it's already showing effects.*

> *I can now communicate better with my staff. I started to delegate some of my workload.*

The planned finale

> It was a day filled with jubilation, triumph and excitement as the SANParks employees received their certificates of their successful completion of the Emerging Management Development Programme (EMDP) on the 28th of May ... This marked the end of their 9-month journey when the 130 participants from four regions of SANParks across the country converged to attend the EMDP in an effort to improve their managerial skills (NSG 2019c).

This is how the NSG newsletter captured the spirit of the day that marked the planned culmination of the EDP certificate and ALP award ceremony. The day was preceded by buoyant and methodical presentations of 25 groups, all of which were notable strides further than the last drafts we saw. The criterion-based evaluations were carried out by a panel of NSG, SANParks and University of Pretoria representatives. Subtly, the facilitators' attachment to "their" regions could be felt as they enthusiastically rooted for project teams with whom they had come a long way as it were. Having identified

seven best performing groups, the quizzing by the SANParks executive team provided the final sifting of project proposals that offered novelty and real import to SANParks (NSG, UP and SANParks 2019a, 2019b). The presence of the Chief Executive Officer made a mark on the emerging managers. They were assured that the demonstrable solutions and recommendations presented by various groups would certainly be considered to address organisational challenges and lift SANParks to world class stature.

By this stage, inter-group competitiveness had made way for regional pride and overall rejoicing with each deserving winner. The top three ALP groups received gold, silver and bronze awards respectively, and two individual learners were recognised as the EMDP top achievers. Hinting at the connection between personal development and organisational learning, the top achievers remarked (NSG 2019c):

> *Through this [programme] I was able to understand other functions of the organisation. I had no idea what inventory management was at the beginning, and now I fully understand it.*
>
> *I feel confident now that I will be able to perform my duties as a supervisor. I now understand my organisation better and how it operates, the work we did in groups was very real and practical. ...I now value my position in the organisation even more.*

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In times of increasing unpredictability, the intensive learning opportunity provided for the SANParks emerging managers is possibly one of the best illustrations of *seizing the day* or *making hay while the sun shines*. The discomfort of a common influenza and the torment of mosquitoes (ostensibly non-malaria carrying) pale into insignificance compared to the life-threatening pandemic that would break out less than a year later. No-one imagined that the predominant mode of face-to-face training sessions or venue-based group work would be so abruptly interrupted.

The nine months of concentrated on-site and off-site learning in block-release format was near optimal for learners for whom e-Learning was "not an option" at that point. The simplicity and consistency offered by the modular learning material, experienced

facilitators and integrated logistical arrangements were reminders of the basics that had kept education, training and development (ETD) systems tenacious. In a modest way, the notion of blended learning was decoupled from online learning and technology-enhanced elements. Even the reliance on cell phones for group communication and support did not constitute a form of mobile learning. Instead, it was the combination of methods and learning formats used that delivered pedagogical richness to stimulate individual, group and organisational capacity development (Makoe 2012; Wong, Hamzah, Goh and Yeop 2016; Udugama and Perera 2019).

The range of views about what action learning meant or how it should be planned and facilitated did not stall its adoption. The ALP guide that was prepared for participants stated: "Indeed, there are many ways to implement Action Learning, in whole or in part". Prominence was placed on a real organisational challenge as the content, participants working with others in teams, and time for reflection and discussion by individuals and teams. These requirements are consistent with several contributions on the subject which emphasise personal and organisational learning through inquiry, reflection and action. Focus on real world / work problems, the agency of the learning set or project team and sponsorship by the organisation are highly valued (Revans 1982; Marsick and O'Neil 1999; Pedler, Burgoyne and Brook 2005; Heneberry and Turner 2016). Besides promoting collaborative learning and team accomplishment as confirmed by the EMDP participants, Raelin (2006:156) adds that action learning inspires collaborative leadership which is concurrent, collective and mutual. This prospect endorses the development of emerging managers also as emerging leaders who may influence the direction and actions of the organisation without being at the top.

The action learning project undoubtedly mediated the traditional, uniform, place and time bound learning on the one hand, and the opening up of innovative and team-led responses to organisational challenges on the other. In both provisions, personal experiences of the received curriculum (EMDP content) and the co-created curriculum (ALP activities and proposals produced) can never be predetermined. Still, it is noteworthy that all self-reported gains of participating in the EMDP and its ALP component have revealed immediate and future application of various learning points and practices. Insofar as the executive leadership of the organisation is committed to drawing from the know-how and ideas coming from staff members, the importance of a conducive environment is aptly acknowledged. No longer should programmes and learners be invalidly burdened with the responsibility of creating change in the absence of enabling strategies, processes, systems, incentives, language and culture (Tyler 2004:160; Paile 2019:475). Equally, the

inclusion of reflection and action imperatives in capacity development programmes should no longer be the exception or an afterthought of design.

The connection between the delivery of the EMDP and building a capable public service is by no means trivial. The SANParks intervention can be said to have provided a context-based rejoinder to the plea by Subban and Vyas-Doorgapersad (2014:507) "to facilitate the integration of knowledge (information, concepts, theories, and methodologies) together with skills and values, into the learners' practice in a participatory and reflective manner". For this kind of facilitation to be sustained, the quality of institutional collaborations has to be purposefully oriented toward curriculum richness, relevance and adaptability. The complementarity of institutional capabilities for capacity development has to be explicit about management development approaches that galvanise an inclusive co-construction of ways of knowing, being, doing and relating. As Pedersen (2016:6) indicates, the collaborations ought to avail "new tools and platforms that reflexively stimulate the curiosity, creativity and problem-solving capacity of all". Thus, collaboration between institutions and sectors can contribute to closing "the technical and managerial skills shortages" (NPC 2011:55) in the public sector.

Because learning is not a once-off event, it is of interest to follow up the initial programme with pertinent personal and team support interventions, along with embedding the desired organisational ethos. This support includes equipping line managers with the necessary strategies to draw out the participants' competences and to create a conducive environment for collaborative action learning to be a practice in the workplace. Moreover, as we come to grips with new and recurrent disruptions to learning and working environments, more proactive action is required in capacity development choices. How well organisations and ETD providers espouse relevant technologies and mainstream flexibility will determine the extent to which we transcend unexpected alterations in work and learning systems. Other context dependent factors will play a role in how far we stretch our foresight and resilience for the benefit of next cohorts, project teams, regions and sectors. Are we considering the pronunciations of erstwhile leaders going forward: *never let a good crisis go to waste*?

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manchetes de uma "bomba-relógio de empregos", com afirmações como "a necessidade de dez a doze milhões de jovens entrando no mercado de trabalho anualmente na África e na região do Oriente Médio" e "Norte da África, que precisa criar 100 milhões de novos empregos até 2020". Terceiro, as altas taxas de desemprego juvenil, particularmente na região do Oriente Médio e Norte da África, aumentaram os temores de agitação social e grandes fluxos de emigração (Banco Mundial 2004; Mohammed 2015; Kelly 2016; McKenzie 2018). Em Moçambique, a questão da deficiência é muito sensível tanto para as PcD, como para a sociedade, por ainda não estar preparada para lidar com esta situação (Trindade 2020). Nesse sentido, é levantada a seguinte questão orientadora: *Quão inclusivas são as políticas de emprego para as Pessoas com Deficiência em Moçambique*?

Este artigo tem como objectivo geral analisar o nível de inclusão das Pessoas com Deficiência nas políticas de emprego moçambicanas. Em relação aos objectivos específicos, pretende-se: (i) Descrever o quadro legal e institucional sobre a Inclusão das Pessoas com Deficiência; (ii) Verificar o nível de inclusão das Pessoas com Deficiência nas políticas públicas de emprego; e (iii) Identificar as alternativas e desafios na Implementação das políticas activas de emprego para as Pessoas com Deficiência. Dessa forma, a estrutura desde escrito obedece à seguinte ordem: a introdução, metodologia, revisão da literatura, resultados, conclusão e referências bibliográficas.

METODOLOGIA

Esta pesquisa sustentou-se numa metodologia mista, pois recorreu aos dados quantitativos produzidos pelo Quarto Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação de 2017 para apurar os números das Pessoas com Deficiência em função dos tipos de deficiência; no entanto, foi usada também a informação qualitativa produzida por meio das entrevistas efectuadas aos deficientes que são assistidos pela organização TV Surdo, vocacionada na defesa dos direitos das PcD, bem como a consulta bibliográfica que suportou a revisão da literatura, cujos temas abordados estavam associados às políticas públicas, política de emprego e à Pessoa com Deficiência.

REVISÃO DA LITERATURA

Políticas Públicas

Um dos grandes pesquisadores sobre políticas públicas (*policy ou public policy*) é Thomas Dye (2012), que as vê como sendo tudo aquilo que o governo decide ou não fazer.

Assim sendo, as políticas públicas reconciliam interesses divergentes em relação à gestão de recursos escassos; estabelecem os incentivos para a cooperação e acção colectiva que seria irracional sem a influência do Governo; proíbem comportamentos moralmente sancionados; protegem as actividades de indivíduos e grupos e promovem actividades que são importantes para o Governo; e, finalmente, mas não menos importantes, as políticas públicas providenciam benefícios directos para os cidadãos (Theodoulou e Cahn 2012).

Numa dimensão mais pragmática, as políticas públicas podem ser definidas como tentativas de regular situações que representam um problema público, em uma comunidade ou entre comunidades. Portanto, um problema é público quando afecta de alguma forma a distribuição de recursos entre os actores sociais. No caso da noção de comunidade, ela deve ser entendida num sentido amplo, podendo ser uma colectividade política formada como um estado soberano, ou uma sub-colectividade política dentro dessa colectividade maior (uma província, um município), ou mesmo uma grande organização (por exemplo, um hospital, uma universidade, etc.) (Lemieux 2003). Na percepção de Sitoe e Lumbela (2013), as Políticas Públicas envolvem as decisões que são tomadas pelo Governo ou Sector Público, num sentido mais geral, que de forma intencional e significativa afectam uma actividade ou sector da sociedade.

Nessa perspectiva, nada impede que algumas políticas públicas nasçam do poder legislativo ou judicial, mas, o agente primário na elaboração destes instrumentos é o executivo (governo). Deste modo, as políticas públicas podem tomar a forma de lei, regulamentos, posturas, decretos e não é imperioso que sempre sejam chamadas de "Política X…". As políticas públicas podem ser estratificadas em função da sua hierarquia, podendo ser de abrangência mundial (exemplo, Objectivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável-Agenda 2030), regionais, nacionais, transversais, sectoriais, provinciais, municipais e distritais. Conforme a tipologia de Theodor Lowi (1964), as *políticas distributivas* envolvem as decisões tomadas pelo governo que

desconsideram a questão dos recursos limitados, gerando impactos mais individuais do que universais, ao privilegiar certos grupos sociais ou regiões em detrimento do todo. As *políticas regulatórias*, que são mais visíveis ao público, envolvendo burocracia, políticos e grupos de interesse, que regulam o comportamento da sociedade. As *políticas redistributivas*, são aquelas que atingem maior número de pessoas e impõem perdas concretas e no curto prazo para certos grupos sociais e ganhos incertos e futuro para outros; são, em geral, as políticas sociais universais, por exemplo, o sistema tributário e o sistema previdenciário. Finalmente, as políticas *constitutivas*, que lidam com procedimentos.

Há necessidade de destacar que essa tipologia nos leva ao argumento apresentado por Lemieux (2001), segundo o qual, à primeira vista, algumas políticas públicas parecem focar-se mais na quantidade de recursos do que na sua distribuição.

Políticas Públicas de Emprego

Actualmente existe uma diversidade de políticas públicas voltadas para a redução do desemprego e para a elevação da produtividade (Barros e Carvalho 2002). As políticas passivas fornecem suporte de renda para pessoas desempregadas, por exemplo, seguro-desemprego e o Subsídio para Candidato a Emprego; no entanto, as políticas activas, tais como a assistência e serviços de emprego, programas de formação e provisão de emprego directo, destinam-se a ajudar os desempregados a voltar ao trabalho com novas competências (Kelly et al 2011). No entanto, na prática, os governos há muito que se engajam numa variedade de políticas activas que intervêm directamente no mercado de trabalho com o objectivo de gerar mais e melhores oportunidades de emprego para os trabalhadores (Mackenzie 2017).

O principal objectivo das políticas activas de emprego é aumentar as oportunidades de emprego para aqueles que o procuram, como também, melhorar a adequação entre os postos de trabalho (vagas) e os trabalhadores (ou seja, os desempregados). Desta forma, as políticas activas podem contribuir para o crescimento do emprego e do Produto Interno Bruto e reduzir o desemprego e a dependência de subsídios. As políticas activas variam desde ofertas de formação institucionais e no local de trabalho acerca dos incentivos indirectos ao emprego (preservação do posto de trabalho, partilha do posto de trabalho e incentivos ao recrutamento) até à criação de emprego protegido e apoiado ou à oferta de incentivos para a criação directa de emprego (programas de interesse público) ou para o

arranque de uma actividade (Comissão Europeia 2017). Isso significa que as políticas activas contribuem para assegurar que os desempregados regressam o mais rapidamente possível a uma situação de emprego e que esse emprego é o mais adequado possível.

No que concerne as políticas passivas, elas envolvem os gastos com seguro-desemprego, auxílio-desemprego e programas de aposentadoria/reforma antecipada. Porém, essa diferenciação bem definida nem sempre se aplica a economias emergentes e em desenvolvimento onde os programas de apoio à renda tendem a privilegiar os grupos mais vulneráveis da população, sem uma condicionalidade estrita do mercado de trabalho (Pignatti e Belle 2018). Moçambique encontra-se nessa situação, pois a lista dos grupos vulneráveis é grande, desde as Pessoas com Deficiência, idosos, vítimas de desastres naturais, vítimas da violência baseada no género, deslocados de ataques armados, as crianças órfãs, até mesmo as famílias afectadas directamente pela COVID-19.

De acordo com Kelly et al (2011), as principais estratégias para a implementação de políticas activas de emprego são:

1. *Auxílio na procura de emprego, monitorização e sanções*

Incluem uma variedade de medidas que visam aumentar a eficácia da procura de emprego. Exemplos de tais medidas incluem: aconselhamento, monitorização, cursos de procura de emprego, orientação profissional, estabelecimento de planos de acção individuais, encaminhamento directo para empregos vagos e a imposição de sanções quando os candidatos a emprego não cumprem as actividades de procura de emprego exigidas para o recebimento dos benefícios dos subsídios de desemprego.

2. *Programas de treinamento*

O principal objectivo dos programas de formação é aumentar o capital humano dos candidatos a emprego e, portanto, as suas perspectivas de emprego. Os programas de formação variam de acordo com o tipo de candidato a emprego. Por exemplo, alguns candidatos a emprego exigem formação básica de busca de emprego ou outras habilidades gerais (por exemplo, habilidades básicas de informática), enquanto outros realizam formação mais intensivo e específico para melhorar a sua empregabilidade ou para garantir empregos de melhor qualidade. A formação tende a representar a maior parte dos gastos com medidas activas de emprego; especificamente, esses programas precisam ser direccionados aos participantes, em escala relativamente pequena, e estabelecer vínculos

fortes com os empregadores locais por meio da inclusão de um componente prático no programa de formação.

3. *Programas de criação de empregos no sector público*

A criação directa de empregos no sector público e os incentivos à criação de empregos no sector privado procuram influenciar o lado da demanda. No sector público os programas de criação de empregos se concentram na criação de oportunidades públicas que produzem bens e serviços públicos. O principal objectivo deste tipo de programas é manter o desempregado à procura de emprego enquanto mantém o contacto com o mercado de trabalho e, assim, evitar a erosão do seu capital humano durante o período de desemprego. No entanto, esses empregos muitas vezes não estão próximos do mercado de trabalho regular, visto que tendem a ser temporários.

4. *Programas de incentivos do sector privado*

O objectivo destes programas é criar incentivos que alterem o comportamento do empregador e/ou do trabalhador em relação ao emprego no sector privado. Por exemplo, os subsídios salariais no sector privado têm como objectivo encorajar os empregadores a criar novos empregos ou a manter os cargos existentes. Esses subsídios, que podem ser dados directamente ao empregador ou empregado, tendem a ser por um período fixo de tempo e muitas vezes são direccionados a indivíduos mais desfavorecidos. Os incentivos ao início de actividades, que são fornecidos a indivíduos desempregados que desejam estabelecer o seu próprio negócio, são outro tipo de programa de incentivo do sector privado.

Segundo Barros e Carvalho (2002), as principais políticas activas de emprego e renda podem ser agrupadas em três tipos. A primeira é o *Microcrédito,* uma política activa que visa reduzir o desemprego e elevar a produtividade do trabalho. Em termos do desemprego, ele é uma arma contra o seu componente estrutural, na medida em que leva à expansão da produção e, consequentemente, a um aumento na demanda por trabalho. Este tipo não tem qualquer impacto sobre a qualificação dos trabalhadores e sobre a informação disponível. Em termos da busca por aumentos da produtividade, o microcrédito é um instrumento útil para a melhoria na qualidade dos postos de trabalho, pois, pode aumentar o investimento em capital físico e induzir à incorporação de novas tecnologias. A segunda é o a *formação profissional,* uma política activa que visa combater tanto o desemprego, como a baixa produtividade da força de trabalho. Ela é vital para a redução do desemprego, na medida em que, ao expandir a qualificação de alguns trabalhadores, lhes dá acesso a uma série de postos de trabalho, aos quais não teriam

acesso sem formação adicional. Finalmente, a terceira é a *intermediação de mão-de-obra.* Esta política visa combater as imperfeições de informação no mercado de trabalho, na medida em que a intermediação aumenta a informação disponível a trabalhadores e firmas, reduz o período de desemprego, não tem impacto directo sobre a qualificação dos trabalhadores, nem sobre a quantidade e a qualidade dos postos de trabalho disponíveis.

Para efeitos dessa pesquisa, entendemos as políticas activas de emprego como sendo aquelas que visam facilitar a entrada ou regresso dos jovens e adultos ao mercado de trabalho, envolvendo a formação profissional, iniciativas de emprego promovidas pelos governos locais, estágios profissionais, empreendedorismo, a intermediação laboral e projectos de inserção dos jovens no mercado. E, no caso das políticas passivas, focam-se na atribuição de um subsídio de desemprego ou outro para minimizar os impactos negativos do desempregado no período em que se encontra fora do mercado de trabalho.

Pessoa com Deficiência

A deficiência faz parte da condição humana. Quase todas as pessoas terão uma deficiência temporária ou permanente em algum momento das suas vidas, e aqueles que sobreviverem ao envelhecimento enfrentarão dificuldades cada vez maiores com a funcionalidade dos seus corpos. A maioria das grandes famílias possui um familiar deficiente, e muitas pessoas não deficientes assumem a responsabilidade de prover suporte e cuidar de parentes e amigos com deficiências (Organização Mundial da Saúde 2011). De acordo com Resolução nº 20/99, de 23 de Junho, que aprovou a Política para a Pessoa Portadora de Deficiência, qualquer redução ou perda de capacidade normal para um ser humano resultante de um impedimento, significa deficiência.

A Pessoa com Deficiência é aquela que possui alteração parcial ou completa de um ou mais segmentos do seu corpo, acarretando comprometimento da função física, auditiva, visual ou intelectual e que, em função de contingências histórias, sociais e espaciais, essa alteração poderá resultar em perda da autonomia para a pessoa, trazer problemas de discriminação social e dificultar a inserção social das pessoas com deficiência (Carvalho-Freitas 2009). Portanto, a falta de conhecimento por parte dos administradores das organizações, da capacidade de trabalho da pessoa com deficiência dificulta a inclusão dos indivíduos com deficiência no mercado de trabalho (Carreira 2013). Os estudos sobre a inclusão das pessoas com deficiência (PcD) vêm, nos últimos anos, sendo consolidados com o foco direccionado à inclusão no mercado de trabalho, uma vez que esse tema se

tem configurado como uma questão actual, polémica, e de grande importância para as organizações, por se referir a um grupo relevante socialmente (Silva e Helal 2017).

RESULTADOS

Quadro Legal e Institucional sobre Protecção Social e Inclusão da Pessoa com Deficiência em Moçambique

Iniciativas nacionais e internacionais tais como as Regras Padrões sobre Equiparação de Oportunidades para a Pessoa com Deficiência, das Nações Unidas, têm incorporado os direitos humanos das pessoas com deficiência, culminando em 2006 com a adopção da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre os Direitos da Pessoa com Deficiência (CDPD) (Organização Mundial de Saúde 2011). A Agenda 2030, que aprova os Objectivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS), estabelece no objectivo número dez a necessidade de "reduzir a desigualdade dentro e entre os países", onde na meta dez ponto dois prevê "até 2030, empoderar e promover a inclusão social, económica e política de todos, independentemente da idade, género, deficiência, raça, etnia, origem, religião, condição económica ou outra".

Em Moçambique, tem um quadro legal e institucional que preserva os direitos das PcD. A Lei Fundamental do Estado moçambicano, a Constituição da República de Moçambique (2004 e 2018), no artigo 37 define os deveres e direitos das PcD, nos seguintes termos: "Os cidadãos portadores de deficiência gozam plenamente dos direitos consignados na Constituição e estão sujeitos aos mesmos deveres com ressalva do exercício ou cumprimento daqueles para os quais, em razão da deficiência, se encontrem incapacitados."

O texto constitucional, actualiza de forma protectora a necessidade de tratamento não diferenciado da PcD previsto pela Resolução nº 20/99 de 23 de Junho que aprovou a primeira Política para a Pessoa Portadora de Deficiência defendia que "por força do texto constitucional, o cidadão portador de deficiência, como regra geral, tem as mesmas obrigações, deveres e direitos dos demais compatriotas." Esta política pública já incorpora elementos que promovem a equidade e cidadania, dois valores fundamentais dum Estado de Direito e Democrático.

Portanto, o governo moçambicano observando a necessidade de acelerar a intervenção para a resolução dos problemas das PcD, operacionalizou no intervalo entre 2009 a 2013, uma política pública para garantir o cumprimento dos direitos e respeito pelos deveres dos deficientes no aparelho do Estado, que se designou de Estratégia da Pessoa Portadora de Deficiência na Função Pública. Porém, em 2016 foi aprovada a Política de Emprego pelo Ministério do Trabalho e Segurança Social, que foi a melhor tentativa política para promover uma medida activa de emprego, visto que, no pilar das PcD, pretendia promover medidas com vista a facilitar o acesso das pessoas com deficiência física à educação, à formação profissional e ao emprego.

Para reforçar a protecção social da Pessoa com Deficiência, o Estado moçambicano apostou no Plano Nacional para a Área da Deficiência – PNAD II (2012 - 2019). Na percepção de Meneses (2014), para promoção de uma plena participação, igualdade e empoderamento das pessoas portadoras de deficiência; bem como assegurar a igualdade de direitos e oportunidades destas pessoas, este instrumento de governação foi elaborado.

O governo de Moçambique aprovou também uma política pública para o segundo mandato do Presidente Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, nomeadamente, a Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica (ENSSB II) 2016-2024, que visa materializar o Programa Quinquenal do Governo, através da implementação de acções que concorrem para a redução da pobreza e da vulnerabilidade, assegurando que os resultados do crescimento da economia moçambicana beneficiem a todos os cidadãos, sobretudo os que vivem em situação de pobreza e de vulnerabilidade.

Para efeitos de harmonização das políticas públicas de apoio as PcD e protecção social dos grupos mais carenciados, através do Decreto 47/2018 de 6 de Agosto, do Conselho de Ministros, foram revistos e actualizados todos os Programas de Assistência Social de forma incremental, desde a designação e os seus objectivos, passando a ser:

1. **Programa Subsídio Social Básico (PSSB):** consiste na realização de transferências monetárias regulares mensais por tempo indeterminado, para reforçar o nível de consumo, autonomia e resiliência dos Agregados Familiares (AFs) que vivem em situação de pobreza e vulnerabilidade, bem como a melhoria da nutrição das crianças;
2. **Programa Apoio Social Directo (PASD):** consiste em transferências sociais pontuais ou prolongadas por tempo determinado, em forma de apoio multiforme para

fazer face a choques e situações diversificadas de emergência que afectam indivíduos ou AFs em situação de pobreza e vulnerabilidade;

3. **Programa de Atendimento em Unidades Sociais (PAUS):** consiste num conjunto de intervenções orientadas para o acolhimento permanente ou temporária a pessoas desamparadas, ou em risco no ambiente familiar ou comunitário;

4. **Programa Acção Social Produtiva (PASP):** consiste em transferências monetárias mediante a realização de actividades produtivas para (AFs) expostos a insegurança alimentar crónica, agravada pelos choques e riscos estruturais e impactos das mudanças ambientais e/ou choques económicos; e

5. **Programa Acção Social Produtiva (PASP):** consiste em transferências monetárias mediante a realização de actividades produtivas para AFs expostos a insegurança alimentar crónica, agravada pelos choques e riscos estruturais e impactos das mudanças ambientais e/ou choques económicos.

Observando as finalidades e os problemas que essas políticas públicas pretendem resolver, elas incorporam subsídios directos a pessoas vulneráveis e não o reforço de capacidades para a reinserção dos grupos vulneráveis no mercado de emprego para a sua autossuficiência. Ou melhor, o governo moçambicano investe mais em políticas públicas passivas para suprir a lacuna da exclusão das PcD e de outros grupos vulneráveis no mercado, através de subvenções financeiras revestidas em forma de subsídio.

Inclusão da Pessoa com Deficiência nas Políticas de Emprego: Desafios e Alternativas para Moçambique

Os dados do IV Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação de 2017, evidenciou que existiam em Moçambique cerca de 736 038 Pessoas com Deficiência, num universo de 26 899 105 de habitantes, representando uma percentagem de 2,7, um número que justifica a implementação de políticas públicas que promovam acções afirmativas e a empregabilidade deste grupo específico. Há necessidade de evidenciar que as estatísticas oficiais distribuem também a quantidade das PcD no país em função do tipo de deficiência, como demonstrado no quadro 1.

Quadro 1: Distribuição das PcD pelo tipo de deficiência

Tipo de Deficiência	Frequência	Percentagem (%)
Cego	*58 021*	*7,9*
Surdo/Mudo	*68 326*	*9,3*
Braço (s)/amputado (s)/ atrofiado (s)	*55 670*	*7,6*
Perna (s)/amputada (s)/atrofiada (s)	115 918	15,7
Paralisia	44 875	6,1
Mental	49 565	6,7
Dificuldade para ver mesmo usando óculos	81 072	11
Dificuldade para ouvir mesmo usando aparelho auditivo	35 803	4,9
Dificuldade de memória ou de concentração	30 173	4,1
Dificuldade de locomoção (andar)	105 529	14,3
Outra	91 086	12,4
Total	**736 038**	**100**

Fonte: Elaborado pelo autor através dos dados do IV Censo Geral (INE 2017).

Se observarmos para o sexo das PcD, 372 061 correspondente a 51 por cento eram Homens e 355 559 equivalente a 49 por cento eram Mulheres (Conferir o Gráfico 1).

Gráfico 1: Percentagem das Pessoas com Deficiência em função do sexo

49%   51%

■ HOMENS   ■ MULHERES

Fonte: Elaborado pelo autor através dos dados do IV Censo Geral (INE 2017).

Em relação às deficiências adquiridas por meio de acidentes de trabalho o quadro 2 demonstra que as deficiências mais frequentes são: perna (s) amputada (s) ou atrofiada (s) (25,6 por cento), braço (s) amputado (s) ou atrofiado (s) (23,8 por cento) e Dificuldade de locomoção (andar) (17,7 por cento). (Conferir o quadro 2).

Quadro 2: Pessoas com Deficiência causada por Acidentes de Trabalho

Tipo de Deficiência	Número de PcD Causadas por Acidentes de Trabalho	Percentagem (%)
Cego	1 561	4,9
Surdo/Mudo	457	1,4
Braço (s)/amputado (s)/ atrofiado (s)	7 521	23,8
Perna (s)/amputada (s)/atrofiada (s)	8 073	25,6
Paralisia	1 001	3,2
Mental	312	1,0
Dificuldade para ver mesmo usando óculos	3 045	10

Dificuldade para ouvir mesmo usando aparelho auditivo	338	1,1
Dificuldade de memória ou de concentração	278	0,9
Dificuldade de locomoção (andar)	5 583	17,7
Outra	3 373	10,7
Total	31 542	100

Fonte: Elaborado pelo autor através dos dados do IV Censo Geral (INE 2017).

Constata-se que muitas dessas deficiências acabam por limitar o acesso da PcD ao mercado de emprego e agudizar comportamentos de descriminação e descrença nas capacidades actuais, depois de sofrer um acidente, demandando a protecção do Estado e da sociedade. Essa nossa tese é consubstanciada pela pesquisa desenvolvida por Alexandre (2013), ao demonstrar que em Moçambique, as Pessoas com Deficiência ainda são vítimas de discriminação, marginalização e isolamento, atitudes visíveis nas ruas das grandes cidades do país. São várias as PcD que passam todos os dias a pedir esmola como fonte de sobrevivência, algo que revela que se encontram em condições deploráveis, apesar de a Constituição da República reconhecer, à luz do número um do artigo 125, que é da responsabilidade da família, da sociedade e do Estado, a sua especial protecção. Por outro lado, o Estado assume quando na alínea b) do número quatro do mesmo artigo evidencia a obrigação de criação de condições que possam impedir o isolamento e a marginalização das PcD.

No âmbito das políticas passivas de emprego, o Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP 2020), demonstrou num dos seus estudos que uma das preocupações está associada ao facto de alguns responsáveis pela inscrição de beneficiários destas políticas públicas (geralmente os chefes de quarteirão) se inscrevem a si próprios e aos seus familiares ou conhecidos, os quais geralmente não fazem parte do grupo dos mais vulneráveis, deixando assim de lado as pessoas que efectivamente deveriam fazer parte destas listas, num contexto em que existem pessoas que preenchem os requisitos necessários para receber os subsídios mas ficam em listas de espera por muitos anos. Portanto, um dos entrevistados do CIP (2020), portador de deficiência e residente em Matutuine, testemunhou o alto nível de exclusão das PcD nas políticas passivas, dado que se encontra em lista de espera há cerca de três anos e nunca foi chamado.

Com base nas nossas entrevistas efectuadas a cerca de seis pessoas portadoras de alguma deficiência, foi possível verificar que há predominância de políticas de emprego passivas relativamente a activas, pois as entidades governamentais, como é o caso do Instituto Nacional de Acção Social, acabam por atribuir um subsídio ínfimo para custear o seu autossustento, apesar das PcD em alguns casos demonstrarem vontade de desempenharem actividades remuneratórias que qualquer membro da sociedade pode exercer. Portanto, esta exclusão das PcD por alegada invalidez no mercado de trabalho moçambicano denota a existência de práticas discriminatórias nas organizações moçambicanas, tanto as governamentais do nível central e local, como as empresas privadas, apesar das PcD demostrarem na prática que têm competências (Conhecimentos, Habilidades e Atitudes) que os demais. Pois vejamos, a Entrevistada (E_1) respondeu o seguinte:

> Eu nasci muda e a primeira dificuldade que enfrentei foi a exclusão no sistema de educação, porque as nossas escolas primárias, secundárias e até universidades não estão preparadas para o ensino de Pessoas com Necessidades Especiais. E acabamos sendo excluídos pela sociedade, porque as empresas e as pessoas reparam em nós como inválidos e ninguém quer aprender a linguagem gestual que usamos. Actualmente, trabalho no associativismo e numa organização que defende os interesses das PcD, pelo facto das empresas privadas e organizações públicas não estarem preparadas para nos receberem. Somos excluídos de muitas oportunidades de emprego.

O E_2 respondeu o seguinte, na entrevista cedida:

> Sou deficiente há muito tempo, sou surdo-mudo, mas tenho muitos amigos e conhecidos que têm habilidades de cozinha e outras que poderiam trabalhar em restaurantes, mas, porque foram rejeitados, continuam nas ruas a pedir esmola para sobreviver, visto que alguns não recebem o subsídio do INAS e os que recebem não chega para nada.

Conforme refere a Organização Mundial de Saúde (2011), a maioria das grandes famílias possui um familiar deficiente, e muitas pessoas não deficientes assumem a responsabilidade de prover suporte e cuidar de parentes e amigos com deficiências. Logo, as políticas públicas de protecção social do Estado moçambicano são desafiados a aumentar a sua abrangência e efectividade.

Podemos entender que as PcD têm vontade de contribuir activamente no desenvolvimento da sociedade. Por conseguinte, a acção de atribuir um subsídio de assistência social a este grupo de cidadãos, uma política de emprego passiva, constitui uma fonte que reduz o engajamento e fortalecimento destes. No entanto, a subvenção financeira atribuída a cada deficiente não é suficiente para minimizar a situação de vulnerabilidade social à qual estão sujeitas, pois o custo de vida tende a aumentar e o salário mínimo, que é a base de cálculo desses subsídios, não tem aumentado na proporção do crescimento da inflação (índice do preço do consumidor). (verificar o quadro 3).

Quadro 3. Evolução do Subsídio do INAS para as PcD versus Inflação e Salário Mínimo

ITEM	ANOS			
	2018	2019	2020	2021
Subsídio do INAS para PcD[1] (Em meticais)	540 Meticais-para agregados familiares constituídos por uma pessoa; 640 Meticais-para os agregados de duas pessoas; 740 Meticais-para os agregados de três pessoas; 840 Meticais-para os agregados de quatro pessoas; 1.000 Meticais-para os agregados de cinco pessoas.			
Inflação Acumulada (%)	3,52	3,50	3,52	3,07
Salário Mínimo (Em meticais, Administração Pública)	4 255,00	4 467,75	4 467,75	4 467,75

Fonte: Decreto nº 47/2018 de 6 de Agosto, INE (2018), INE (2019), INE (2020), INE (2021), UNICEF (2018) e ABCC (2019).[2]

Um dado relevante que merece realce é que as PcD que são assistidas nas políticas públicas sob implementação do Instituto Nacional de Acção Social (INAS) são aquelas que obedecem aos critérios de elegibilidade deste órgão, através dos instrumentos

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[1]Os subsidios desde a actualização de 2018 até a realização desta pesquisa (2021) não haviam beneficiado qualquer incremento.
[2]Disponível em: https://www.abcc.co.mz/.

definidos no artigo 24 do Decreto 47/2018 de 6 de Agosto, do Conselho de Ministros, a destacar:

- Ter um Cartão de assistência social para o acesso aos subsídios;
- Ter a Caderneta de Assistência Social, na qual se regista o tipo de apoio concedido aos beneficiários dos diferentes programas.

Nestes moldes, fica evidente que o primeiro desafio é aceder aos programas que atribuem estes subsídios, mas também inverter a abordagem governamental de investir em políticas passivas em todos os seus programas de protecção social às PcD para as activas. Conforme refere Mackenzie (2017) e a Comissão Europeia (2017), as políticas activas podem gerar mais e melhores oportunidades de emprego para aqueles que procuram melhorar a adequação entre os postos de trabalho (vagas) e os trabalhadores (ou seja, os desempregados), e dessa forma contribuir para o crescimento do emprego, do Produto Interno Bruto, reduzir o desemprego e a dependência de subsídios.

Se compararmos o total das PcD (736 038) apresentados pelo IV Censo de 2017 e os beneficiários assistidos em 2018 segundo o Plano Economico Social-PES e UNICEF, cerca de 567 290, é possível constatar que muitos deficientes não são cobertos pelas políticas públicas de assistência social. Porém, o número de beneficiários deficientes reduz ainda mais se levarmos em consideração que dos 567 290 assistidos pelo INAS, não incluem apenas as PcD, mas igualmente, crianças, idosos e outros grupos vulneráveis sem capacidade de renda e subsistência.

O segundo desafio está na monitorização, fiscalização e inspecção que o ministério que tutela a área de emprego e trabalho deve fazer regularmente aos empregadores, para evitar a exclusão de PcD no acesso ao mercado, pelo facto de terem alguma deficiência. Assim sendo, é aceitável que haja um investimento considerável nas políticas activas, para efeito de preparar esse grupo específico com ferramentas e competências relevantes para competirem em pé de igualdade com outros candidatos em busca das melhores oportunidades de emprego ou auto-emprego.

A monitorização e fiscalização tem amparo legal na Lei do Trabalho moçambicana, Lei nº 23/2007 de 1 de Agosto, no artigo 28, onde protege o trabalhador deficiente nos seguintes termos:

1. O empregador deve promover a adopção de medidas adequadas para que o trabalhador portador de deficiência ou portador de doença crónica goze dos mesmos direitos e obedeça aos mesmos deveres dos demais trabalhadores no que respeita ao acesso ao emprego, formação e promoção profissionais, bem como às condições de trabalho adequadas ao exercício de actividade socialmente útil, tendo em conta as especificidades inerentes a sua capacidade de trabalho reduzida;

2. O Estado, em coordenação com as associações sindicais e de empregadores, bem como com as organizações representativas de pessoas portadoras de deficiência, estimula e apoia, no quadro da promoção do emprego, tendo em conta os meios e recursos disponíveis, as acções tendentes a proporcionar a reconversão profissional e a integração em postos de trabalho adequados à capacidade residual de trabalhadores com deficiência.

Mesmo que a Lei do Trabalho proteja os portadores de deficiência, há necessidade de investir em acções concretas para viabilizar este instrumento, pois, se recordarmos as observações de Simonelli e Camarotto (2011), a maior barreira apresentada para a inclusão das pessoas com deficiência é a falta de conhecimento por parte das pessoas envolvidas na colocação destas no trabalho, sobre as actividades de trabalho, seus conteúdos e processos, além da falta de acessibilidade do ambiente físico das empresas e do estigma presente na sociedade quanto às capacidades funcionais e habilidades das pessoas com deficiência.

O relatório da Organização Mundial de Saúde (2011) é claro quanto aos desafios globais para a inclusão das PcD, como passamos a destacar: (i) *Políticas e padrões inadequados* (a elaboração de políticas nem sempre leva em consideração as necessidades das pessoas com deficiência, ou então as políticas e padrões existentes não são cumpridos); (ii) *Atitudes negativas* (crenças e preconceitos constituem-se como barreiras à educação, ao emprego, aos serviços de saúde e à participação social); (iii) *Falhas na oferta de serviços* (Pessoas com deficiência são particularmente vulneráveis a falhas em serviços tais como saúde, reabilitação, e apoio e assistência); (iv) *Problemas na prestação de serviços* (uma pobre coordenação dos serviços, funcionários mal preparados e inadequados afetam a qualidade, acessibilidade, e adequação dos serviços às pessoas com deficiência); (v) *Financiamento inadequado* (recursos alocados na implementação de políticas e planos são frequentemente inadequados. A falta de financiamento efectivo é um grande obstáculo aos serviços sustentáveis ao longo de todos os níveis de renda); (vi) *Falta de consultas e envolvimento* (muitas pessoas com deficiência estão excluídas do processo de

tomada de decisões em assuntos directamente relacionados às suas vidas como, por exemplo, quando pessoas com deficiência não têm direito à escolha e controlo sobre como o apoio lhes é oferecido em suas casas; (vii) *Falta de acessibilidade* (muitos ambientes construídos, incluindo instalações públicas, sistemas de transporte e comunicação não são nada acessíveis. A falta de acesso ao transporte é uma razão frequente pela qual as pessoas com deficiência são desencorajadas a procurar trabalho ou são impedidas de acessar os serviços de saúde; (viii) *Falta de dados e evidências* (uma falta de dados rigorosos e comparáveis sobre a deficiência e evidências sobre programas que funcionam pode prejudicar o entendimento e a acção. Conhecer os números das pessoas com deficiência e suas circunstâncias pode melhorar os esforços para a remoção das barreiras incapacitantes e oferecer serviços que permitam que as pessoas com deficiência participem).

A maior parte desses desafios foram apontados pelos nossos entrevistados, como passamos a ilustrar:

> "Temos dificuldades em aceder ao transporte e dificilmente temos participação na definição dos subsídios de apoio, só podemos aceitar mesmo, a nossa condição é negligenciada na sociedade. O governo através do INAS deve preparar os seus técnicos para saberem avaliar devidamente as condições existentes nas nossas famílias e os subsídios de apoio não chegam para muita coisa. Eu pessoalmente conheço muitas pessoas com alguma deficiência com potencial para trabalhar e a melhor forma de ajudar seria dar esse oportunidade para concorrer em pé de igualdade com as pessoas consideradas normais". (E$_4$)

> "Para mim, que tenho problemas de visão, as estradas da Cidade de Maputo são um autêntico risco para a minha vida. E se não estivesse a trabalhar para uma Organização Não-Governamental estaria a pedir esmola como as outras pessoas com deficiência, apesar de saber ler e escrever e ter habilidades. E os empregos todos exigem atestados médicos que nos acabam porexcluir das oportunidades e até existem algumas pessoas que alegam que as empresas operam em edifícios que não estão preparados para nós e não têm rampas, como justificação para nos deixar de fora." (E$_5$)

Para Silva e Helal (2017), acredita-se, assim, que modificações nas práticas de gestão de pessoas, com vista a garantir a efectiva inclusão das PcD, bem como acções de

sensibilização e adaptações das condições de trabalho podem modificar a percepção do desempenho das pessoas com deficiência no cotidiano de trabalho. Outro importante desafio é desmistificar o estigma de que a PcD não possui competência para disputar o mercado competitivo. Por fim, é esperado o estabelecimento de acções estruturadas e planeadas por parte das empresas, sociedade e o governo, a fim de que os factores que dificultam a inclusão no mercado de trabalho das pessoas com deficiência sejam minimizados, daí a relevância da combinação de políticas públicas de emprego activas e passivas, onde as primeiras devem sempre sobressair para que tenhamos maior produtividade e desenvolvimento da sociedade.

Nestes moldes, algumas alternativas para a inclusão das PcD só podem prosperar com uma reforma institucional ou legal, nas regras de candidatura para ingresso no aparelho do Estado e no sector privado, ou melhor, o Estatuto Geral dos Funcionários e Agentes do Estado e a Lei do Trabalho devem incluir cotas para admissão de PcD, por exemplo, estabelecer que para todos concursos no processo de recrutamento de mão-de-obra dez a quinze por cento devem ser ocupadas por PcD, onde nos anúncios de candidatura deve estar inclusa uma nota que diga: incentivamos a candidatura de PcD com o perfil da vaga; não só mas também, há necessidade de retirar do texto legal qualquer excerto que pode autorizar o empregador implicitamente a excluir o candidato por razão de ter alguma deficiência. O terceiro desafio está associado à educação especial para a sociedade moçambicana entender o básico da linguagem gestual, o que facilitará a inclusão das PcD em todos sectores da sociedade moçambicana. Em termos de alternativas, a inclusão nos curricula do alfabeto da linguagem gestual na disciplina de português a partir da quinta classe e a promoção de campanhas de divulgação das regras de leitura e escrita.

Essas medidas estariam alinhadas com a meta dez ponto três dos Objectivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS, Agenda 2030), que obriga os Estados membros das Nações Unidas, onde Moçambique faz parte, a "garantir a igualdade de oportunidades e reduzir as desigualdades de resultados, inclusive por meio da eliminação de leis, políticas e práticas discriminatórias e da promoção de legislação, políticas e acções adequadas a este respeito". Por conseguinte, o derradeiro desafio para o país é a implementação adequada de todas as políticas de emprego na sua plenitude, independentemente de serem passivas ou negativas, cujas razões foram afloradas e o Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP 2020), também reforçou no seu relatório.

CONCLUSÃO

A inclusão da Pessoa com Deficiência nas políticas de emprego em Moçambique acontece por meio de medidas passivas de atribuição de subsídios de apoio através de uma subvenção financeira mensal que varia entre os 540 a 1 000 meticais, dependendo do tamanho do agregado familiar. Esses valores são muito insignificantes para agregados familiares maiores, pois, devido às taxas altas de inflação, aos salários mínimos que estão há dois anos sem incremento e pelo facto de os valores ainda não reflectirem o custo de vida alto no país, alguns deficientes ainda continuam a depender de esmolas e da boa vontade dos vizinhos.

E as políticas públicas de emprego que assistem as PcD em Moçambique, encontram amparo legal na Constituição da República do país, no Programa Subsídio Social Básico (PSSB), Programa Apoio Social Directo (PASD), Programa de Atendimento em Unidades Sociais (PAUS), Programa Acção Social Produtiva (PASP), Programa Acção Social Produtiva (PASP), implementadas pelo Instituto Nacional de Acção Social (INAS). Porém, para além das lacunas existentes na gestão dos subsídios, os critérios de selecção por dependerem da boa vontade do chefe do quarteirão e do técnico do INAS, mostram ser cada vez mais excludentes para as PcD, visto que, parte considerável dos deficientes ainda não beneficiam do mesmo. Nestes moldes, os cursos de formação profissional e programas de formação direcionados para as PcD em Moçambique para áreas como informática, restauração, contabilidade, *procurement*, gestão de contratos, gestão de pequenos negócios, secretariado e gestão de recursos humanos, seriam boas alternativas para os preparar a enfrentar o mercado de trabalho.

Concluindo, as políticas públicas de emprego destinadas às PcD em Moçambique são predominantemente passivas; no entanto, os subsídios alocados desde 2018 até 2021 não sofreram nenhum incremento, apesar do comportamento da inflação demonstrar o aumento do alto custo de vida. Face a esta situação recomenda-se que elas devem continuar, desde que sejam mais inclusivas, ao mesmo tempo em que os empregadores estejam a ser socializados a participar nos programas que revitalizem as políticas activas para este grupo vulnerável.

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settlements (proclaimed and unproclaimed) where the demand is continually increasing, and a growing backlog exists.

In addition to the WSASP the National Development Plan 4 (NDP 4) clearly indicates that the provision of clean water and proper sanitation facilities such as flushing toilets are very important to the citizens. They not only provide a conducive and better living environment but also help citizens live a healthy life (Office of the President 2012). In addition, NDP 4 targets to increase water provision for the rural population to 100% by 2030 (Office of the President 2012). The problem of the lack of water and sanitation services is mostly experienced in the informal settlements where there are no adequate sanitation facilities due to high population growth and urbanisation. Providing adequate water and sanitation facilities in the informal settlements, including Outapi, has been a major challenge to the Namibian government. Regardless of the existence of the WSASP of 2008, Outapi was reported as one of the towns facing challenges with water scarcity and limited sanitation facilities in the Onhimbu informal settlement (Mather 2015).

Moreover, according to the national census of 2011 (Namibia Statistics Agency 2011), Outapi has failed in terms of provision of proper sanitation and clean water to its residents, especially those in the informal settlements. However, despite all the aforementioned policy interventions, the residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement complained about poor service delivery regarding the water and sanitation services (Mather 2015). Therefore, the purpose of this study was to:

- Establish the extent of the implementation and effectiveness of the WSASP of 2008 in addressing the supply of water and sanitation services at the Onhimbu informal settlement in the town of Outapi.
- Investigate the inhibiting factors that affect the ability of the Outapi Town Council to provide the Onhimbu residents with water and sanitation services.
- Determine the perceptions of the residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement regarding the way forward to address the lack of supply of water and sanitation services.
- Make recommendations to improve the supply of water and sanitation services to the Onhimbu informal settlement in Outapi and Namibia in general.

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Pressman and Wildavsky (2007), the founding fathers of public policy formulation, policy implementation means to carry out, accomplish, fulfil, produce and complete. They claim that policy implementation is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired result. They further postulate that policy implementation is the process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them (Pressman and Wildavsky 2007). A more specific definition is provided by Van Meter and Van Horn (2007:447) when they argue that "policy implementation encompasses those actions by public or private individuals or groups that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions." On the other hand, Sabatier (2005:21) defines policy implementation as the "carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute, but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions." O'Toole (2003:266) defines policy implementation as what "develops between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do something or stop doing something and the ultimate impact of world of actions." Theodoulou and Kofinis (2004) are of the view that policy implementation can be considered as the stage where government executes an adopted policy as specified by the legislation or policy action, meaning various government agencies and departments responsible for the respective area of policy are formally made responsible for implementation. Policy implementation could then be defined as "the conversion of mainly physical and financial resources into concrete service delivery output in the form of facilities and services" (Cloete, De Coning, Wissink and Rabie 2018:197).

It is apparent from the said definitions that policy implementation is a process of moving an idea from concept to reality. In other words, the carrying out, accomplishing, fulfilling, producing or completion of a given task for the betterment of society. Policy implementation is a process that involves all the activities designed to carry out the policies enacted by the legislative branch, and encompasses those actions by public or private individuals or group that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in the policy decision (Cloete, De Coning, Wissink and Rabie 2018:195).

It is critical for ensuring successful implementation of policy that the policy implementation processes are structured properly (Sabatier 2005). The first part of structuring implementation begins with clearly defining the problem and then stating clear, explicit, precise, measurable and realisable objectives that are ranked in importance.

The structuring of policy must follow a means-end theory in which the final results are genetically related to the original policy idea (Sabatier 2005). In other words, the policy must clearly state not only how to complete the objectives, but also how the objectives will solve the problem.

Resources are the next important feature to consider when structuring implementation because without resources, implementation of public policies is merely impossible. Sabatier (2005) emphasises that adequate financial resources should be available during the implementation process. In order to properly structure implementation, a policy must also contain incentives for compliance, sanctions for non-compliance or a combination of both. The final pieces of structured implementation are the number of veto or clearance points involved in enforcement actions, the assignment of implementation to sympathetic agencies and officials, inter-agency relationships and hierarchy, the number of people and agencies involved, and the new policy's relationship to previous and existing policies (Sabatier 2005).

Policy implementation is a complex political process which is affected by variables and referred to as 7-C Protocols which travel through the complex, dynamic maze of implementation (Brynard 2005; Cloete, De Coning, Wissink and Rabie 2018:225). The first C Protocol is the content of the policy itself. In terms of the content protocol, the policy should set out what it intends to address or do, how directly it relates to the issue and how it aims to solve the perceived problem. The second C Protocol should be the context under which the policy is implemented. This is critical, as the context determines the corridor through which the policy must travel and by whose boundaries it is limited in the process of implementation. The third C Protocol is commitment which, on the part of those entrusted to implement the policy at various levels and methods of policy implementation, is vital for the success of policy implementation (Cloete, De Coning, Wissink and Rabie 2018:207-208). Governments may have the most logical policy imaginable which may pass cost/benefit analyses with honours, and it may have a bureaucratic structure that would do honour but if those responsible for carrying it out are unwilling or unable to do so, little will happen.

Capacity, which is the fourth C Protocol of the implementers, is paramount to the success of the policy implementation (Cloete, De Coning, Wissink and Rabie 2018:207-208). In addition, local capacity will matter for the success of policies as adequate resources, while clear goals are important factors for successful policy implementation (Weaver 2009). Another C Protocol, as Cloete and others argue, is "support of the clients or coalitions

whose interests are enhanced or threatened by the policy, and the strategies they employed in strengthening or deflecting its implementation, contributes to the success or failure of policy implementation" (Cloete, De Coning, Wissink and Rabie 2018:211). They point out that it is important for a government to join coalitions of interest groups, opinion leaders and other outside actors who actively support a particular implementation process. The sixth C Protocol refer to communication, as "better public policy communication contributes to transparency and good governance in terms of stakeholder engagement, which could directly enhance organisational legitimacy". The final C Protocol refers to coordination, since "this variable relates to assessing inter- and intra-organisational coordination and cooperation in policy implementation" (Cloete, De Coning, Wissink and Rabie 2018:212).

A widely used concept in the policy implementation literature distinguishes between top-down and bottom-up approaches. The two approaches vary in a number of areas such as the role of actors and their relationships and the type of policies to which they may be applied. A rational management perspective dominates the top-down model where implementation is viewed as a product of strong bureaucratic management involving control, coercion and compliance to ensure fidelity with the policy objectives (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 2009). In contrast, the bottom-up model suggests that successful implementation occurs only when those affected are involved earlier in the policy process; that is, in stages such as issue, definition and policy formulation as well as during the implementation stage (Berman 2003). Top-down theorists see policy designers as the central actors and concentrate their attention on factors that may be manipulated at central level (Matland 2005).

The most detailed top-down approach was presented by Mazmanian and Sabatier (2000) who identified a number of legal and political variables and then synthesised them into six conditions needed for effective implementation, ranging from clear objectives, causal theory, legal structure of the implementation process, committed officials, supportive interests' groups who will not undermine the implementation effort and to the changing socioeconomics. Matland (2005:155) is of the view that, in terms of policy areas, "top-downers usually prioritise clear policies." The top-down policy implementation approach seeks to execute the wishes of the policy makers and has remained the more dominant genre, while the bottom-up approach is largely a reaction to the top-down approach based on identifying weaknesses in it and suggesting alternatives to address those weaknesses (Cloete, De Coning, Wissink and Rabie 2018:201). According to Hill and Hupe (2009), the top-down policy implementation presupposes the existence of an earlier stage in which general decisions and objectives have been created and then actuated precisely

through the implementation process. It would therefore be useful to evaluate the possible gap that exists between initial objectives and eventual results achieved. This would elucidate some of the challenges faced by policy makers in implementing policy.

The strength of the top-down approach is that it seeks to develop generalisable policy advice and to come up with consistent recognisable patterns in behaviour across different policy areas (Matland 2005). However, the top-down approach is criticised for only taking statutory language as a starting point and hence does not consider the significance of previous actions. Hjern and Hull (2004) criticise the top-down theorists for only taking into consideration the central decision-makers and neglecting other actors.

The bottom-up approach, developed by Porter (2003), identifies networks of actors who are involved in service delivery in one or more local areas. The approach uses the contacts in order to develop a networking technique to identify the local, regional and national actors required for the planning, financing and execution of relevant governmental and non-governmental programmes. Sabatier (2005:23) propounds that the bottom-up approach "provides a mechanism for moving from local actors up to the top policy makers." The main benefit of the bottom-up approach is its focus on centrally located actors who devise and implement government programmes. Contextual factors within the implementing environment are thus important. Actors and their goals, strategies and activities need to be understood in order to successfully implement a policy. According to Matland (2005), the bottom-up approach does not present prescriptive advice but rather describes what factors have caused difficulty in reaching stated goals. It is significant that strategies be flexible so that they may adapt to local difficulties and contextual factors. Nonetheless, the bottom-up approach has been criticised on two counts. First, policy control is not exercised by actors who have been elected by the voters as their elected representatives (Matland 2005). Second, this approach tends to overemphasise the level of local autonomy (Matland 2005).

Policy implementation has long been recognised as a distinct stage in the policy process, unique for representing the transformation of a policy idea or expectation to action aimed at solving social problems; therefore, it was essential for this study to discuss the factors that could lead to the success of policy implementation. Effective implementation implies that implementing agencies comply with the directives of the statutes. Agencies are held accountable for reaching specific indicators of success, goals of the statute are achieved, local goals are achieved or there is an improvement in the political climate around the programme (Ingram and Schneider 2000). Birkland (2001) describes policy learning as a

characteristic that impacts implementation and as one of the factors essential for effective policy implementation. Birkland (2001) explains that this type of learning is when policy creators learn how to both better structure policies and how to better advocate for policies. Policy learning also includes when political institutions (including governmental agencies) learn how to either better implement or better avoid implementation.

According to Birkland (2001), the second factor that deserves special attention is the impact that time and changes in social, economic, political and technological conditions have in the attainability of objectives. Time and its relationship with change are significant to implementation. Birkland (2001) argues that the concept of change makes defining successful implementation and predicting implementation success difficult, as policy and subsequently its implementation, is constantly evolving for its own benefit. Therefore, change over time is a vital part of the implementation process and one that implementers need to better evaluate (Birkland 2001).

On the other hand, Elmore (2009:195) has identified four main factors for effective implementation which are:

- "Clearly specified tasks and objectives that accurately reflect the intent of the policy.
- A management plan that allocates task and performance standards to subunits.
- An objective means of measuring subunit performance.
- A system of management controls and social sanctions sufficient to hold subordinates accountable for their performance."

In addition, Gornitzka and Stensaker (2005) considered the following as critical variables for effective policy implementation:

- The nature of policy to be carried out and the specific factors contributing to the realisation or non-realisation of policy objectives vary across policy types.
- Funds are needed for implementation but the ones available are usually not adequate which makes reaching policy objectives difficult.
- Technical advice and assistance should be provided, and superiors should rely on positive and negative sanctions.
- Both formal structural features of organisations and informal attributes of their personnel are important. These include, for example, the competence and size of an agency's staff and the degree of hierarchical control of processes within implementing agencies.

- General economic, social and political conditions are important for the relationship between objectives and results.
- Implementers should be motivated and exhibit positive attitudes for the implementation to be successful.

Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) add that the role of civil servants and administrative and non-governmental actors are critical for policy success, as they argue that policy implementation relies on civil servants, administrative officials and non-governmental actors to establish and manage the necessary actions. This supposition is in line with Dye (2001) when he argues that bureaucrats are the most significant actors in policy implementation.

It is clear from the aforementioned authors' viewpoints that there is only unanimity on four variables critical to effective policy implementation. These are clear policy directives and objectives, the competence of the implementers, the availability of funds as well as favourable political and economic conditions and commitments on the part of the implementers, i.e., a positive attitude and a willingness to implement the policy. It should be noted that it is difficult to say with certainty which factors or conditions facilitate successful implementation, since so much depends on the political, economic and social contexts. For instance, local factors such as size and the institutional complexity matter for policy responses (McLaughlin 2008).

For a policy to be implemented effectively, funding must be allocated, personnel assigned and rules or procedures developed. Moreover, implementing agents/participants should have a shared understanding of the values and assumptions of a programme (Werner 1980). But many "implementing agents are novices", missing deeper relationships or tend to "be biased towards interpretations that are consistent with prior beliefs and values" (Cerna 2013:21). Generally, effective policy implementation requires effective organisation. This entails that policies are to be implemented by the appropriate government agencies or that agencies are created to implement the policy. Moreover, the policy content must be clear. The bureaucrats who are the primary implementers must have a clear interpretation of the policy they are to implement. In other words, legislative intent must be translated into operating rules and guidelines. Too much ambiguity may lead to failure of policy implementation. The bureaucrats who are entrusted with the implementation of the policy must understand the policy to enable them to effectively implement it.

The challenges of policy implementation differ according to the level of social change, ranging from incremental change, change requiring growth on the part of those undertaking change to change that represents loss for the implementing agent (Marris 2005). It is not surprising that the more fundamental changes are sought, the more existing frameworks need to be restructured (Spillane, Reiser and Reimer 2002). As Majone and Wildavsky (2000) have argued, implementation is evolution. One explanation for this evolution is the process of human sense-making (Spillane *et al.* 2002). Therefore, the challenge is on the political office bearers who should take a leading role in executing the mandate vested in them by the people. Pressman and Wildavsky (2007) argue that implementation of policies sometimes fails because policy objectives are at times too ambiguous, offering street-level bureaucrats room for adaptation of objectives to suit their clients or their own preferences. Furthermore, they claim that other actors who may be involved in the implementation stage such as citizens, private businesses or interest groups each with their own needs and interests, may influence the policy implementation and its outcomes.

Hill and Hupe (2009) argue that, at times, the content of policies is rather symbolic and therefore difficulties arise in the "real-world" implementation process. Policies often contain a multitude of goals which may even be in partial conflict with one another, reflecting the conflicts that exist between the different actors involved in the formulation of policies. Another challenge postulated by Hill and Hupe (2009) is that policy makers may temporarily accept compromise for the sake of reaching an agreement, but many times hostilities resume during the phase of policy implementation. Implementers of policy must solve problems that decision makers have left unresolved in the formulation of policy. Furthermore, Hill and Hupe (2009) claim that there are situations where implementation occurs even in the absence of actual policies (policies are then approved, making legal the implementation already carried out) or where there are multiple policies competing. They argue that the top-down approach has the risk of underestimating the ability of decision makers to influence objectives, preferences and strategies. Moreover, the evaluation of policy outcome will invariably be highly subjective, since previously stated objectives of the policy are no longer the starting points.

Khosa (2003) notes that some of the challenges faced in the implementation of policies are that the discrepancies between policy and implementation are largely caused by unrealistic policies and a lack of managerial expertise. In addition, Khosa (2003) argues that policy implementation has suffered from the absence of a people-driven process. Furthermore Khosa (2003) argues that insufficient coordination of policy implementation is cited in virtually all sectors and has significantly hampered the implementation of

policies. Furthermore, insufficient staffing and capacity of all tiers of government as well as the linkages between them have largely worked against the successful implementation of policies. In addition to the aforementioned challenges, policy implementation may further be complicated when policies are passed down to agencies without a great deal of direction. Moreover, bureaucratic incompetence and ineptitude may complicate the policy implementation process.

According to Khosa (2003), cross-sectorial issues such as water, with conflicting priorities in the different sectors, pose challenges for effective implementation owing to the government agencies with different interests. Khosa (2003) argues that government agencies may often unknowingly work in direct opposition to one another due to a lack of high-level coordination and agreement on shared priorities. Moreover, the concerned agencies may feel that they are acting according to their official mandates, but they are in direct opposition to one another on the specific issue (Khosa 2003). Such conflicts may arise through misinterpretation or misunderstanding of policy and legislation as much as from the actual intent of policy and legislation.

However, the clear separation of line functions between different government departments makes it difficult to attain proper levels of alignment and coherence between different functions, as each department operates independently within its area of mandate. In addition, agents tend to be biased towards interpretations that are consistent with prior beliefs and values. Khosa (2003) further claims that at local government level where the key functions of service delivery are devolved to the lowest feasible or practicable level, there is even greater difficulty in ensuring proper alignment and coherence between national and local levels as well as between different sectors. At local level, the situation is particularly complicated by the need for some measure of additional geographical alignment or integration between local authorities.

The policy implementation lens invites evaluators to consider a multi-faceted set of challenges, especially when evaluating macro-level change processes. Some of these include contending with multiple institutional actors with variable degrees of power and influence, contemporary health and social problems that are inherently complex and a political environment emphasising accountability and programme outcomes. As Wanna, Butcher and Freyen (2010) argue, it is not possible to come up with any single or simple model for meeting the challenges of implementation. In similar vein, Suggett (2011) proposes that complexity may lead to nuanced implementation strategies. The complexity of public policy and political sub-systems poses serious challenges to the study of policy

implementation. Therefore, the variety of policy implementation frameworks should be taken advantage of and combined according to the needs and policy areas.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

A mixed method research design approach was used for this study. In this regard, the qualitative research design approach was used to get perceptions from those respondents entrusted with the implementation of the WSASP of 2008. This implied in-depth interviews with officials from the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development, Water and Forestry, councillors from the Omusati Regional Council, officials from the Outapi Town Council (Directorate of the Water Supply and Sanitation Services) and members from the Outapi Town management. A quantitative research approach was used to provide statistical analysis as to what the number of people thought about the provision of water and sanitation services at the Onhimbu informal settlement. According to Creswell (2014), a quantitative design approach emphasises objectivity by using numbers, statistics, structure and control. In this regard, a structured questionnaire was used with mostly closed-ended questions. The questionnaire was completed by the selected residents in the Onhimbu informal settlement of Outapi.

Fifty members from the Onhimbu informal settlement were selected. Random sampling was used to give an equal chance to any Onhimbu resident to be selected. In addition, judgmental or purposive sampling was used to select three officials from the Ministry of Rural and Urban Development, Water and Forestry, two councillors from the Omusati Regional Council, three officials from the Outapi Regional Council (Directorate of the Water Supply and Sanitation Services) and two members from the Outapi Town Council. The total sample of the study was 60.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the findings and discusses the data obtained during the study. It presents the real-life experiences and challenges public officials and residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement face with respect to water supply and sanitation services. Every attempt has been made to ensure that key officials and residents who were knowledgeable about the water and sanitation services at the informal settlement respond to the interview and questionnaire respectively. The aim has been to gain a detailed understanding of the extent to which the implementation of Namibia's water supply and

sanitation policy has improved the provision of water and sanitation services at the informal settlement. An interpretative process, which involved an analysis of the information leading to findings, was conducted. The data obtained during the field research and findings are presented below.

Accessibility to clean water

The purpose of this question was to establish the number of households that had access to clean water. This was an open-ended question that allowed respondents who did not have access to clean water to explain how they survived without water. On the question as to whether the respondents had access to clean water, the respondents' responses are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Access to clean water

The finding in Figure 1 shows that 45% of the respondents had access to clean water, while 55% did not have access to clean water. The respondents (55%) who reported that they did not have access to clean water explained that they bought water from those who had taps in their houses. The respondents further claimed that it was not easy because if they did not have money, they would not have access to water. It was very costly to buy water every day, as most of them were unemployed; hence, they could not afford to buy water. In addition, residents indicated that one liter of water cost between N$2 and N$5 dollars.

Availability of toilets in Onhimbu informal settlement

The objective of the question was to establish the extent to which toilets were available to households. The responses of the respondents to the question are reflected in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Availability of toilets to households**

The responses reflected in Figure 2 above revealed that the majority (78%) of the residents did not have access to flushing toilets. Of note was that only 22% of the residents indicated that they had access to flushing toilets in their homes. Those who did not have access to flushing toilets had been asked what they used as a form of toilet to relieve themselves. They indicated that they sometimes went to the bush to relieve themselves, while others indicated that they used a communal pit latrine. They further pointed out that one pit latrine was shared by 30 residents and when the latrines filled up, they could no longer use them until the Outapi Town Council came to empty them. Furthermore, they complained that the Outapi Town Council took up to three weeks to remove the waste.

Most important basic services lacking in the Onhimbu informal settlement

The focus of this question was to establish the most important service lacking in the informal settlement. As water and sanitation are crucial, not surprisingly, the respondents

replied they regarded the most important basic services lacking in their informal settlement to be access to water, toilets or both (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Basic services lacking

As indicated in Figure 3, the majority of the respondents (70%) indicated that both clean water and proper sanitation services were lacking in their area. Seventeen percent (17%) indicated the lack of proper sanitation services in their area, whereas 13% indicated lack of access to clean water in their respective area. An overwhelming 70% of respondents considered water and sanitation as basic needs which were inseparable.

Rating of service delivery by the Outapi Town Council in terms of the provision of clean water and proper sanitation

Respondents were asked to rate the service delivery of the Outapi Town Council in terms of the provision of clean water and proper sanitation services. Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of participants' responses in this regard.

Figure 4: Rating of provision of water and sanitation

The majority of the respondents (43%) indicated that the service delivery provided by the Outapi Town Council was average. Half (50%) of the respondents indicated that the service provided by the Outapi Town Council was either poor (28%) or very poor (22%). Only 7% of the respondents reported that the service was good.

The findings are a clear indication that most of the residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement were not happy with the service delivery provided by the Outapi Town Council as shown by the findings in Figure 4 above. This negative rating suggested that the majority of Onhimbu informal settlement residents were not satisfied with the service delivery of the Outapi Town Council.

Solutions to address the lack of provision of clean water and sanitation services

The residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement were asked to provide possible solutions to the challenges of providing clean drinkable water and sanitation services to them. Based on the feedback received, possible solutions came to the fore to improve the delivery of clean water and sanitation services to the informal settlement (see the solutions highlighted in Table 1 below).

Table 1: Solutions to improve the delivery of clean water and sanitation services

Solution proposed	Number	Percentage %
Increased Town Council service fee for middle- and high-income earners	12	24
Allocation of funds from central government	14	28
Through public-private partnership arrangement	16	32
Seek for donors	8	16
Total	**50**	**100**

When the participants were asked to propose solutions to address the lack of the provision of water and sanitation, 24% proposed an increase in the service fee of the middle- and high-income earners, 28% proposed allocation of funds from the central government, 32% suggested that the Town Council enter into public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements, whereas 16% suggested donors' support.

In terms of obtaining qualitative data from the ten interviewees, they provided information related to the capacity and impediments hindering the implementation of the WSASP of 2008 as discussed below.

Capacity of the Outapi Town Council in implementing the WSASP of 2008

During the interviews with the selected respondents among the Outapi Town Council officials as indicated, they were asked to explain their views regarding their Council's capacity to implement the WSASP of 2008. They responded as follows:

The biggest challenge with the implementation of the policy is the availability of funds which the Outapi Town Council does not have at the moment. The town is still small and developing and the cost to provide water and sanitation services is too high.

When informal settlements were established, no proper planning was done. This created a big problem today, as capacity might be there but implementation and

the modality on how it should be done becomes a problem. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the Town Council does not have the capacity to implement. If it had the capacity, everyone in the Onhimbu informal settlement could have been provided with clean water and sanitation

The Outapi Town Council does not have the capacity to implement the WSASP because as far as I am concerned, not everyone who works in the Department of Water and Sanitation is aware of the policy and without awareness by the employees who were supposed to implement the policy? It is difficult to implement it if some of the employees of the Town Council are not conversant with it. The biggest problem with our employees is ignorance because most of the employees do not want to work according to what the policy states.

From the above statements made by respondents the following conclusions can be made: firstly, the availability of financial resources is crucial in the implementation of the WSASP to benefit the community. Generating income is a challenge and sources of local income should be investigated. Secondly, the planning and implementing the WSASP is a serious concern because of a lack of capacity and know-how. Although members of the Outapi Town Council might be knowledgeable on the WSASP, the community has not been informed about the policy and how it will be implemented. The lack of proper communication is a serious concern in the implementation of WSASP.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions that may be drawn from the findings are that the overwhelming majority of Onhimbu residents do not have access to clean water and sanitation services. The absence of the said essential basic services suggests that the Outapi Town Council is not doing well in providing sanitation services to the residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement. It appears that an overwhelming majority of the residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement are not satisfied with the service delivery by the Outapi Town Council. Evidence also seems to suggest that the Outapi Town Council lack funds to finance the provision of water and sanitation to all residents in the Onhimbu informal settlement. The central government should allocate increased financial resources to the Outapi Town Council to enable the Council to provide water and sanitation services to all residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement in order to achieve the objectives of the WSASP of 2008.

The study revealed that the majority of respondents interviewed identified the lack of capacity on the part of the officials of the Outapi Town Council as the main challenge that hindered the implementation of the WSASP of 2008. During the research, respondents pointed out that most of the employees in the Department of Water and Sanitation at the Outapi Town Council were not familiar with the contents of the WSASP of 2008. The Outapi Town Council and central government should provide workshops to all employees in the Department of Water and Sanitation at the Outapi Town Council at all levels, educating them on the contents and objectives of the WSASP of 2008. Moreover, the Outapi Town Council should involve all relevant stakeholders and increase PPP arrangements in order to get funds because PPP arrangements will have a better chance for success if supported financially by donors.

The study furthermore revealed that there was a lack of community participation in the implementation of the WSAP of 2008. Therefore, the study concluded that without the full participation of community members and awareness among those who needed to implement the policy, it would be very difficult for the policy to be implemented successfully. The involvement of the community and relevant stakeholders should begin in the planning phase up to the implementation stage. The Outapi Town Council should more vigorously consult the residents of Onhimbu informal settlement in the implementation of the WSASP of 2008.

In conclusion then: the purpose of the study was to determine how the residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement within the Outapi Town Council perceived the implementation of the WSASP of 2008 to enhance service delivery. From the study results it was clear that the implementation of the WSASP by the Outapi Town Council was inefficient and ineffective, resulting in poor service delivery. Therefore, to enhance the implementation of the WSASP policy within this specific community, recommendations, as listed above, were proposed to enhance the general welfare of the residents of the Onhimbu informal settlement. Only the future will tell whether these proposed interventions may lead to better service delivery.

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Ghana returned to constitutional rule for the fourth time on 7 January 1993, after the 1992 Republican Constitution was fully promulgated. Thus, after many years of political instability, 27 years with various military interventions in politics (from February 1966 to January 1993), the country became largely politically stable and did not again experience a military coup-de-tat (from 1993 to 2021). However, the period was still characterised by intermittent and localised conflicts around the country which often centred on local development, land matters and issues concerning chieftaincies. At national level the political system became a duopoly (characterised by a two-party zero-sum game) since 7 January 1993, with permanent political economy of electioneering campaigns and an intense struggle for political power. Currently, the two main parties are the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC).

The theory of the political economy of elections, according to the literature, indicates that an incumbent political party seeking re-election would generally spend excessively during national election years with the aim of retaining political power (Nordhaus 1975; Hibbs 1977; Tufte 1978; Anaman 2016; Bukari 2017; Anaman and Bukari 2019). In Ghana, incumbent governments displayed an excessive desire to maintain power since 1992. This could largely be ascribed to the rewards and spoils of electoral victory and to the extensive political patronage system that it is associated with an incumbent executive president of the Fourth Republic of Ghana. Thus, the fierce nature and never-ending national electioneering campaign in the country often dominated by the NPP and NDC reflects the intense countervailing competitive struggle amongst the political elite for power due to the winner-takes-all and the loser-goes-home-with-nothing political system (Economist 2015; Anaman 2016; Bukari 2017; Anaman and Bukari 2019). In Ghanaian electoral politics, the political elite of the two main parties are largely dominated by people from about seven to eight relatively big and powerful social/ethnic groups out of the 100 or more social/ethnic groups in the country as identified by Ghana Statistical Service (GSS 2013) and others (Anaman 2016; Bukari 2017; Anaman and Bukari 2019).

Also, under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana, the President of the Republic has considerable political and constitutional powers (Ghana 1992). These include the appointment of ministers and deputy ministers of the 16 administrative regions of the country, all chief executives and mayors of the 260 government's administrative districts, over 5 000 direct state appointments and the administration of the Government of Ghana budget of about 40 billion US dollars (US$) each year (Anaman and Bukari 2019). Furthermore, numerous other appointments, characterised by exclusionary perks and privileges, need to be approved by the President of the Republic. These include major international appointments like ambassadors, High Commissioners

etc., members of boards of numerous state-owned corporations and enterprises and quasi-government agencies, access to foreign scholarships, and management of hundreds of billions of state-owned investments, foreign exchange reserves as well as natural and environmental assets and resources together with many state-sponsored contracts and civil works linked to the annual Government of Ghana budget (Anaman and Agyei-Sasu 2012; Anaman and Bukari 2019).

Conversely, studies showed that general economic conditions had an impact on elections in Ghana since 1992 (Bukari 2017; Anaman and Bukari 2019). For instance, Anaman and Bukari (2019) argued that the more recent macro-economic problems of the country were partly linked to the management of the economy which had electoral effects. This meant that provision of more information from a political economy of electioneering and voting perspective was useful to confirm or reject this evidence as a means of improving economic policy and the electoral politics debate in the country under the Fourth Republic. The purpose of the paper was, therefore, twofold: first, to analyse political economy of electioneering and electoral cycles in Ghana and secondly, to examine the economics, politics and elections of the Fourth Republic. Hence, it sought to elucidate electoral politics and how economic policies and the performance of various governments under the Fourth Republic of Ghana from 1992 to 2020 had influenced electoral outcomes and affected the change of governments. To this end, the paper provides answers to the question: *What is the link between economic performance and policies of the governments, and how do voters attribute responsibility and hold them electorally accountable?*

The rest of this paper is organised as follows: the next section is the methodology and data sources of the paper. This is followed by the political economy of electioneering, including theories and empirical works; democratic development and electoral cycles in Ghana; politics, economics and elections (1992-2020); implications for electoral democracy, and finally, the conclusion and references.

METHOD AND DATA SOURCES

Methodologically, the paper adopts political economy analysis at the macro-level based on aggregate information on Ghana's economy and national elections. It employs a macro-level analytical approach to explain the politics, economics and elections in Ghana. In the context of the Fourth Republican era, eight (8) national elections have been

conducted; two national censuses had also been undertaken during 2000 and 2010 which have provided detailed aggregate socio-economic characteristics for each district in Ghana. Also, three national living standard surveys have been undertaken in 2005/2006, 2012/2013 and 2016/2017, and are considered to be of similar standard. These surveys provide information on the income and expenditure of selected districts combined with election and economic information to explain the politics, economics and national election outcomes of the Fourth Republic of Ghana, 1992-2020.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ELECTIONEERING

Theoretically, political economy explores the interaction of markets and government, both domestically and internationally. It explains how international economic integration constrains domestic policy making and how voters often respond to economic shocks that originate abroad. The economic policies. And how voters respond to economic conditions fall within the broad research field of political economy, as political economy is essentially concerned with the relationship between politics and economics. Political economy of electioneering therefore examines the determinants and consequences of voting, with a pertinent emphasis on the relationship between economy and elections (kayser 2014). For the purpose of this paper, political economy of electioneering is conceptualised within the framework of an "economically rational" voter, though political economy offers various analytical lenses to analyse and understand national elections and their impacts in society.

Downs (1957) is credited for establishing the foundations for the modern political economy theory of elections based on the economically rational voter theory. Downs assumes that individuals, as voters, rationally pursue their self-interest and that they are concerned with policies that an elected government will implement in terms of benefits to them. Policies may be represented by single dimensions such as increased government spending on education or increased money supply. The rational voter has preferences characterised by a policy that he/she most prefers; however, deviations from this policy lead to less satisfaction for that voter. For their part, politicians seek to win office based on rational self-interest. Political parties are considered teams of politicians who work together to win power and control the government. Electoral politics deal with policy promises that candidates and parties offer to implement if elected. Voters choose the candidate closest to their ideal set of policies. A common prediction from Downs's model is that electoral competition for office leads to candidates and parties who represent the public policies that most strongly appeal to the median voter.

Empirically, socio-economic condition is a key variable and the most important issue in an election. As such, the economic vote is the strongest evidence that the governed actually hold those who govern them accountable in contemporary democracies. Functioning democracies hold regular national elections that allow citizens to choose their leaders to run the affairs of the government and related state institutions for particular periods of time. In literature, three principal claims play a prominent role in the literature concerned with voting behaviour in Ghana. The first one is *ethnicity matters* and this explains that two out of many ethnic groups in Ghana show a robust leaning towards a certain political direction. The second claim regards the existence of a *rural-urban divide*. A number of studies have found rural and urban dwellers having particular party preferences. The third finding can be described as *economic matters.* Various scholars stress the impact of the macro-economic situation on election outcomes in Ghana. Below the three claims are outlined and discussed seriatim and end up with a conclusion.

The first two findings state more structural relationships among comparatively stable social characteristics, and party and electoral preferences in Ghana. They specifically explain the behaviour of core voters. That is, voters who consistently vote for the same party. However, indices of electoral volatility report high values for Ghana (Feree 2010). Consequently, there must be a considerable number of swing voters in the country. Concrete numbers vary between roughly 20 percent (Lindberg and Morrison 2005) and 35 percent (Ephson 2009). But it seems evident that a crucial part of Ghana's electorate is not constrained by long-term social structures. It suggests more issue-related motives for vote casting; especially economic consideration seems to influence the electorate in Ghana.

Scholars have provided evidence of economic voting in Ghana from 1992 onwards. For instance, Bawumia (1998) provides an economic explanation for the strong urban-rural discrepancy in the election of 1992. He argued that Ghana's structural adjustment programme, controlled and implemented by the NDC administration before 1992, was especially economically favourable to rural households. He inferred that the high support for the NDC in rural areas was a case of retrospective economic voting (Bawumia 1998). There was also a strong correlation between the popularity of a government and the perceived state of the economy based on Afrobarometer data and controls for several other potential influences; therefore, the robust results regarding government popularity

might be interpreted as "a strong suggestion of economic voting in Ghana" (Youde 2005: 13).

Further, the economy is seen as an essential factor in qualitative explanations for the electoral turnovers in Ghana. Nugent (2009: 412) attributes the fall of the NDC in 2000 largely to an economic crisis rooted in a decrease in the price of Ghana's primary export commodities and a high international oil price. Likewise, Whitfield (2009) explains the turnover in 2008 almost exclusively as based on economic factors. In a paragraph called "Why the NPP lost and the NDC won", she gives a detailed account of specific macro-economic problems and unfulfilled economic promises made by the NPP administration and concludes that these factors have been decisive in the change in office 2008. Gyimah-Boadi (2001) also points to issues like rising fuel prices and the cost of living deeming them "significant liabilities" for the incumbent NPP in the 2008 election. However, issues motivating swing voters are on the contrary quite a rare focus area. Research has indicated that presidential debates play a "negligible role in positively affecting the electoral fortunes of political parties" (Van Gyampo 2009: 445). This could certainly be interpreted as an indication that the campaign issues as well as capacities of candidates, which are usually on the fore during presidential debates, do not influence the voting behaviour of Ghanaians.

Further, excessive government spending and related abuse of incumbency, including the use of state institutions for partisan political campaigning, are the norm in election years in Ghana. This is evidenced by the excessive spending observed for all incumbent governments in elections during the Fourth Republican era in Ghana, except in 2004, which was the year the government was under a strict supervision regime by Western development partners as part of the steps for the country to directly benefit from the cancellation of two-thirds of its total foreign debt. Despite the large-scale foreign debt cancellation in December 2006, the infusion of about US$8 billion worth of grants and gifts from overseas development partners over the 2001 to 2012 period (Anaman 2016), the start of modest commercial export of crude oil starting in mid-December 2010 and the continuous positive economic growth rates of the country from 1984 to the present date, Ghana has continued to suffer adverse macro-economic instability and severe socio-economic problems. This macro-economic instability includes the relatively large depreciation of the country's currency, the Ghana cedi (GHS), a continuously weak balance of trade and balance of payments positions along with the rapid accumulation of domestic and foreign debt since 2006, reached about 69.8% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of December 2017 (Government of Ghana 2018: 14).

Furthermore, since 2013, the three rigid expenditures of the Government of Ghana related to wages and salaries firstly, then to debt service expenditure and thirdly to statutory payments have exceeded its total revenue and grants (Government of Ghana 2018: 23). As noted by Boakye (2018), in 2017 alone, the three rigid expenditures amounted to 46.35 billion Ghana cedis (GHS), and they exceeded the total revenue and grants of GHS41.50 billion by GHS4.85 billion, equivalent to almost one billion US dollars. Given the reduced level of grants, much of the new government borrowing since 2013 has been used mainly for government consumption. For example, in 2017, the total capital expenditure of government as a proportion of GDP was only 3.1 percent, the lowest in 25 years with only about one-sixth (0.5%) of the total capital expenditure financed through domestic sources (Boakye 2018).

The weak macro-economic position of the country caused partly by the end of the decade-long international commodity price boom that occurred during the first decade of the 21st century, and the sharply reduced levels of grants and gifts from Ghana's development partners since 2013, led Ghana to enter into an emergency short-term programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2015. The excessive spending by the government in 2008 and 2012, both presidential election years, led to the refusal of Western development partners to support the Ghanaian government with relatively large amounts of grants and other forms of external assistance in 2013 and 2014, as they had done generously over the 2001 to 2012 period totalling US$8 billion. This lack of development assistance in the form of grants and gifts triggered a balance of payments crisis in 2015, characterised by sharp falls in the value of the local currency, the Ghana cedi, forcing the government to enter into the IMF bailout programme in 2015 for which the government of Ghana has continued to exist till 2019. Strangely, the government has entered into another economic and financial agreement with the IMF and World Bank in March 2020 to mitigate the effect of COVID-19 on Ghana's economy (World Bank 2000).

However, while the country is sometimes hailed internationally for its three peaceful transitions of power in the Fourth Republican era in 2001, 2009 and 2017, a major socio-economic problem that has persisted from the politically unstable period (1966 to 1992), is the large-scale abandonment of a new government of many state-initiated projects and civil works started by the previous government, including almost completed facilities and amenities such as public school buildings, clinics, hospitals, market centres and public housing facilities. Similar to the era of military governments, the abandonment of projects

started by the previous government has been recurring as the new government starts its own projects, often discrediting the policies and projects of the previous government, leading to the reduced ability of the state to generate revenues to pay for the loans incurred for such abandoned projects. Therefore, based on evidence of macro-economic impacts of elections in Ghana (Bukari 2017; Anaman and Bukari 2019), the paper elucidates political process, and how the economic policies and performance of the various governments under the Fourth Republic of Ghana, 1992 to 2020, influenced voters' participation and choices in the elections and affected the change of governments.

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND ELECTORAL CYCLES

Ghana formally became independent from the United Kingdom on 6 March 1957 and also became a member of the Commonwealth of Nations with Dr Kwame Nkrumah of the Convention People's Party as prime minister. At a referendum in April 1960 on the issue of Ghana becoming a republic, 1 008 740 people (88 percent) voted in favour of the new Constitution and 131 425 voted against it. The 1960 Constitution of the First Republic provided for a presidential system of government and vested all executive powers in the president. Nkrumah was elected president after receiving 1 016 076 of the valid votes (89 percent) compared to Dr Danquah who received 124 623 valid votes (Frempong 2015). The First Republic of Ghana came into being with the inauguration of Nkrumah as president on 1 July 1960.

Since 1957 Ghana has had four republics, with three following the military interventions of 1966 to 1969, 1972 to 1979 and 1981 to 1992. The First Republic was suspended on 24 February 1966 after the Convention People's Party (CPP) government, led by Dr Kwame Nkrumah, was overthrown in a military coup-de-tat. Thus, between February 1966 and September 1969 Ghana was ruled by National Liberation Council (NLC) headed by Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah and later by Lieutenant General Afrifa. In 1969, the Second Republican Constitution was inaugurated following the general elections. The Progress Party (PP) won that election with 105 of the 140 seats in parliament. The party's leader, Dr Kofi Busia, became the prime minister of the Second Republic of Ghana, with General Afrifa as ceremonial president. In 1971, Edward Akuffo-Addo became the ceremonial president of the Second Republic of Ghana.

Unlike the First Republic, the Second Republican Constitution established a parliamentary executive with a president as the head of state and a prime minister as the

head of government. However, the Constitution of the Second Republic was suspended after a coup-de-tat by Lieutenant Colonel I.K. Acheampong on 13 January 1972. He ruled the country until 1979. Following the general elections in 1979, the Constitution of the Third Republican was promulgated and inaugurated on 24 September 1979. In the election, the People's National Party (PNP) led by Dr Hilla Limann won both presidential and parliamentary elections, and Limann became president of the Third Republic of Ghana. Unlike the Constitution of the Second Republic, the Constitution of 1979 maintained the features of the First Republican Constitution and thus re-established the presidential system of government. The Third Republic was suspended on 31 December 1981, following the revolution led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. A Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was established to steer the affairs of the state which occurred up to 1992.

The country's Fourth Republic was promulgated with a new Constitution after the referendum of April 1992. Presidential as well as parliamentary elections occurred in November and December 1992, and the constitutional democracy of the country's Fourth Republic was established on 7 January 1993. Between 1992 and 2016, the country conducted seven successive competitive democratic elections every four years. The democratic elections held between 1992 and 2016 included the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992 as well as four-yearly general elections in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016.

Ghana had a 104-seat National Assembly or parliament at independence which was increased to 140 seats during the Third Republic in 1979 and to 200 seats in the Fourth Republic in 1992. By 2016, the country had 275 constituencies with 216 metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies or district councils. Ghana's political system under the Fourth Republic is a hybrid system, comprising the features of both presidential and parliamentary systems of government under the Constitution of 1992 (Ghana 1992). The president is directly elected by popular vote for a four-year of two-term cycle. The members of the unicameral parliament with 275 seats are also directly elected for a four-year term by single-member constituencies using the first-past-the-post system. Ghana's four-yearly electoral cycle separates national (presidential and parliamentary) elections and local-level (for district assemblies) elections with a two-year overlap between them.

For the purpose of this paper, a four-year electoral period in Ghana commences in the year in which presidential and parliamentary elections are held, irrespective of which month during the year. Every four years on 7 December seven general elections occur

under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana (see Article 112(4) in Ghana 1992). The pre-electoral period is seen as the year before the election, while the post-electoral period is the two years following the election.

Arguably, although a multiparty democracy had been adopted in 1992, upon the promulgation of the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution, it was clear that the multiparty elections in the country had largely developed into being a two-party zero-sum game. Since 1992, two political parties, namely NDC and the NPP, won the elections and formed their own governments. Although the NDC and NPP are considered as political left and political right parties respectively, they are essentially centre-right political parties. They support a mixed political economy approach based on sustaining publicly owned state enterprises and government subvention programmes such as the Universal Health System and the National Health Insurance Policy for Ghana, and public education. They support related social interventions to ensure social justice and equal opportunities for all Ghanaians as required in Chapter 6 of the 1992 Constitution by the Directive Principles of State Policy (see Articles 34 and 35 in Ghana 1992). This means that there is little or no difference in the policies of the two main parties that have formed governments in the Fourth Republic (Anaman and Agyei-Sasu 2012; Bukari 2017; Anaman and Bukari 2019).

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS (1992-2020)

The electoral behaviour of voters is an important criterion for democratic consolidation. Elections are a rather short-term tradition in Ghana but for the last 25 years under the Fourth Republic electoral competition has led to the deep transformations in Ghanaian society, its political system and valuable political and social orientations of citizens.

The first elections under the new Constitution were held in 1992. In an apparent reaction to the presidential elections, won overwhelmingly by Rawlings of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP) boycotted the parliamentary elections and so, the NDC won 189 seats of the 200 seats, while the other 11 seats went to other parties and independent candidates. Though shifted to constitutional rule, the slower pace of economic growth and development was a challenge. The development partners and donors contended that the economic policy in the country had shifted from the technocrats to the paradigm of political control and voter sensitive policies. The

macro-economic imbalances re-emerged. It was fuelled in part by election risks resulting in government overspending and accelerated privatisation.

In 1994, the government started a long development policy framework for the country termed 'Ghana - Vision 2020' to achieve an average GDP growth rate of 8 percent and macro-economic stability to ensure human, agricultural and business development as well as reduce poverty among Ghanaians by 2020.

In 1996, the second elections under the Fourth Republic were held. Thus, the 1996 general elections, unlike the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections, were held concurrently. The elections were fought on the basis of economic development in the country. The period saw the emergence of a multiparty democracy and significant outlines of economic policies of the contesting parties in those elections, given a certain economic policy direction. The then incumbent government fought the 1996 elections on the basis of its economic record from 1983-1992 and 1993-1996. In April 1983, the PNDC regime openly accepted the neo-liberal economic programme although it was heavily criticised. In those elections, the main opposition party promised to continue with the Vision 2020 policy formulated by the Rawlings government if elected into power in 1996.

The opposition party promised a business-friendly environment and social intervention policies such as the introduction of health insurance in the country. The NPP also criticised the Rawlings government of bad economic policies like its cost-recovery and cost-sharing reform policies, the cash-and-carry healthcare system and the poor educational system. They promised to provide good economic and social policies to ameliorate the suffering of Ghanaians if they won the 1996 elections. Also significant in the 1996 elections was the fact that court ordered the state-owned media to grant equal opportunities to all contesting parties. In the 1996 general elections, voter participation recorded 78 percent of turnout; this was remarkably giving a clear indication of acceptance of democratic ideals by Ghanaians. In that election, the incumbent governing party, the NDC, was retained with Rawlings who was the then siting president as its candidate. He was re-elected with a victory margin of 57.4 percent.

The candidate of the NPP, John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor, garnered nearly 36.6 percent of the vote in the election, with 66 seats out of the 200 seats being contested in the elections. The 1996 elections confirmed the regional and ethnic vote pattern like the previous 1992 elections, and this had become a feature of Ghana's multiparty politics since 1992. In the

1992 presidential elections, for instance, Mr Rawlings (Ewe man) won the Volta region with 93.2 percent (Ghana Election Watch 2020), while the NPP's candidate, Adu Boahen (an Asante), won 60.5 percent of the vote in the Ashanti region. Thus, this general pattern repeated itself in the 1996 presidential elections, with 94.5 percent of the Volta region voting for Rawlings, while 65.8 percent voted for the NPP candidate Kufuor (also an Asante) in his home region of Ashanti.

The run-up to the 1996 elections demonstrated that, in a competitive democratic election, the incumbent government sacrificed prudence fiscal and efficient economic policies for electoral purposes. For instance, the government launched projects not budgeted for electoral purposes. The suspension of the petroleum tax as a result the government's fiscal situation worsened. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme was also suspended. All the suspended reforms were implemented. Including the introduction of VAT in 1998, the electricity tariffs were increased by 280 percent. Many other reforms were carried out such as the creation of independent regulatory agencies for telecommunications, electricity and water utilities in order to ensure private sector participation.

Between 1992 and 2000, several policies and economic reforms were carried out. These included a uniform salary and grading system in 1998 and a 20-percent salary increase, a cocoa development plan in 1999, a 15-percent increase in the cocoa price in 1999, the cocoa producer price was increased from 60 percent of the export price to 70 percent in 2000 and the privatisation of 230 out of about 300 state enterprises by 2001. However, the poverty levels were still high: about 51 percent of Ghanaians were poor in 1992 which slightly decreased to 43 percent in 1999 (GSS 2014). As school enrolment improved, the gender gap declined in the country. In addition, the life expectancy rate increased, the maternal mortality rate fell by two-thirds of a percent and the infant mortality rate decreased by 25 percent. Finally, access to safe water, sanitation and electricity improved and by 1998, all the district capitals were connected to the national grid, up from the 45 percent in 1990 (GSS 2013).

However, by the beginning of the new millennium the country faced considerable economic challenges such as low productivity rates, high population growth, little investment in human capital, inadequate private savings and investment rates, poor educational performance, poor agricultural development, environmental problems and aid dependency. Also prior to the 2000 elections, the money supply increased by 40 percent, coupled with low prices for gold and cocoa and high oil prices which affected the foreign

reserve position of the country. The inflation rate hit a high of 40 percent, the cedi depreciated to about 70 percent against the dollar and the GDP growth declined in 1999 (World Bank 2000). All these economic problems, coupled with high poverty and high prices of goods on the market, angered the people to vote for change of government in the 2000 general elections.

The third general elections under the Fourth Republic occurred on 7 December 2000. The economic conditions were poor with high inflation, price and unemployment rates. The 2000 elections were therefore fought at a time of poor economic conditions in the country. But interesting in the 2000 elections was the fact that incumbent President Rawlings, who had then served his constitutional mandated term, supported his vice president. In the elections, the NDC lost both the presidential and parliamentary elections to the NPP. The NPP won 100 of the 200 seats. The NDC lost its majority, from 133 to 92 seats, with eight seats going to independent candidates and other parties.

In the first round of the 2000 presidential elections, NPP candidate Kufuor won 48.4 percent of the vote, while the NDC candidate, Professor Atta Mills, garnered 44.5 percent of the vote. In the second round, Kufuor won the elections with 56.9 percent of the total valid votes cast to defeat NDC candidate Mills on 28 December 2000. In the 2000 elections, unlike the 1992 and 1996 elections, the ruling NDC party could not benefit from the incumbency advantage, as Ghanaians needed change. The economic indicators in the country in 1999 and 2000 were very poo. These included the rise in oil prices, declines in the price of gold and cocoa, a cedi depreciated about 70 percent between January and December 2000, the interest and inflation rates were over 40 percent, joblessness, inequality and corruption. There were also allegations against government appointees. The positive change slogan of the main opposition NPP, therefore, resonated well with Ghanaian voters in the 2000 elections, contributing to the loss of the NDC to the NPP in the elections.

Also significant of the 2000 general elections were the vibrant mass media for freedom of expression of people's opinions in the country. All contested parties in the 2000 general elections were allocated equal airtime and print space on national television and radio and in national daily papers. By 2000, the private radio stations rose to 30 in total, and they provided alternative and balanced coverage, largely reporting on opposition parties and their campaign messages. The use of criminal code by the government to prosecute certain influential journalists and publishers in the country worsened the relationship between the NDC government and the media at that. The main opposition NPP took

advantage of the bad relationship between government and the media and promised to repeal the criminal libel law if voted into power in the elections.

Again, during the 2000 general elections, unlike those of 1992 and 1996, the ethnicity and regional vote patterns were evident. In the parliamentary elections, the NPP won the majority of the seats in the five Akan-dominant regions plus the Greater Accra region, which is cosmopolitan, but suffered defeats in the three northern regions and the Volta region where the NDC was very strong. In the second round of the presidential elections, the NDC regained some of the constituencies it had lost to the NPP in the first round through vote mobilisation drives among voters, particularly in the swing constituencies of the western, central, Brong-Ahafo and Greater Accra regions. What weakened the NDC was that all the other opposition parties joined hands with the NPP to unseat the NDC in the second round of the presidential elections.

The 2004 general elections were the fourth to be organised under the Fourth Republic. In the 2004 general elections, therefore, the opposition NPP, who had won the 2000 elections, was again retained with the incumbent president Kufuor as the candidate being re-elected with a victory margin of 52 percent of the votes in the first round in that election. In parliamentary elections the NPP won 128 seats, an increase of 26 percent in the 230-member parliament which was increased from 200 seats in the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections, while the then main opposition party, the NDC, won 94 seats and the remaining eight seats went to the CPP, PNC and independent candidates. Towards the 2004 elections, the then incumbent government party campaign was based on their 2000 election manifesto entitled 'Positive Change Chapter One' as the party claimed that the first four years of NPP administration was indeed the first chapter of *positive change* which laid a solid base for economic stability, market-based economic growth, development and the broad quality of life improvements of Ghanaians. The NPP went into the 2004 elections with the promise of 'Positive Change Chapter Two' as its manifesto. The party therefore promised that if they are voted back into office for a second term, they will do much better than during the first chapter and continue to implement their economic policies.

As noted earlier, external factors contributed significantly to the economic downturn of Ghana by 2000. The new government led by John Kufuor in 2001, therefore, faced poor economic indicators such as low growth rates, currency depreciation, poor prices for Ghana's the two main export commodities of gold and cocoa, high inflation and interest rates, high youth unemployment and many other problems facing the country.

Consequently, the government applied for the IMF-World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 2001. Although heavily criticised, the government went ahead with the initiative. The country's $1.5 billion debt was then cancelled and received $3.5 billion debt relief from its creditors (Anaman 2016). This policy initiative saw a significant improvement in the Ghanaian economy. For instance, the GDP growth rate was brought from 3.7 percent in 2000 to 6.3 percent in 2007.

Between 2000 and 2007, the Ghanaian GDP growth rate was 5.2 percent compared with that of sub-Saharan Africa which was 4.8 percent. Inflation was also reduced from 40.5 percent in 2000 to 10 percent in 2007 but rose to 16 percent in the 2008 due to election-year spending. The country's external debt was reduced from $6.3 billion in 2000 to $2.6 billion in 2007. Ghana also signed a Millennium Challenge Account Compact with the U.S.A. government worth $547 million in 2007. The country received a $750 million Eurobond and it was sold in September 2007. The country's sovereign credit rating was B+ at that time (ISSER 2015). The NPP government, starting in 2001, declared a Golden Age of Business and created the Ministry of Private Sector Development (MPSD) with its mandate to develop the private sector in the country. The MPSD was later called the Presidential Special Initiatives (PSIs). The Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC), the Venture Capital Fund and the Business Assistance Fund were all establishment with the sole aim of aiding and providing small loans and credit facilities to individuals and small businesses in Ghana. Consequently, the total government expenditure and the wage bill increased from 20 percent in 2001 to 30 percent by 2006. Also, the total fiscal deficit shot up from 9.2 percent of GDP in 2007 to 14.9 percent of GDP in 2008 which was an election year. The huge fiscal deficit in 2008 was due to a high government wage bill of 11.5 percent of the country's GDP – over 40 percent high in 2007 (ISSER 2015).

Privatisation of state enterprises was also slower under the NPP administration than in the second term of the NDC from 1996 to 2000. This meant that the NPP government planned to privatise the state-owned Ghana Commercial Bank, but it was stopped due to objections and protests from the labour unions as well as opposition and civil society groups. In the case of Ghana Airways, despite the expressions of international organisations and airlines to manage it, the state air carrier was allowed to collapse, while Ghana Telecom was sold to Vodafone UK in 2007. Furthermore, in 2003, the framework for the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I (2003-2005) was developed to eradicate poverty, and it was followed by Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy II (2006-2009) in 2006, also known as GPRS II.

Several social interventions were launched by the NPP government between 2001 and 2008. There was the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) which covered about 54 percent of the population (or 12.5 million people) by 2008. In May 2008, all children under 18 years of age as well as all pregnant women in the country were to be registered free of charge into the scheme. The education capitation grant was introduced in 2005, while a school feeding programme had already been introduced in 2004. The Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty Programme (LEAP) was initiated in March 2008 to provide cash relief to the poor and vulnerable individuals such as orphans and children. The LEAP initiative was piloted in 54 districts nationwide and this resulted in the coverage of the vulnerable groups under the NHIS which grew by 22 percent in 2008 (Anaman 2016; Anaman and Bukari 2019a).

The fifth round of elections under the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution were the 2008 General elections. The 2008 elections, unlike those of 2000, meant the incumbent president had served the constitutional requirement of eight years of two terms of four years each in office (2001-2008). In the elections, the then ruling party candidate, Akufo-Addo of the NPP, narrowly lost the first-round election with 49.1 percent, while the main opposition candidate, Mills, garnered 47.9 percent. But in the second round of those elections, Professor Atta Mills of the NDC won with 50.2 percent, defeating Akufo-Addo of the NPP who obtained 49.8 percent. The 2008 elections once again brought change of government through the ballot under the Fourth Republic. In parliamentary elections, the NDC won 114 of the 230 seats to the NPP's 107 members of parliament. In fact, the 2008 general, or fourth elections, tested Ghana. It was a test of acceptability and consolidation of the country's democratic experiment which started in 1992. The NDC was again giving opportunity to rule Ghana after losing elections to the NPP in the 2000 general elections. President Mills took over from Kufuor on 7 January 2009 with Vice President Alhaji Aliu Mahama.

Under the watch of president Mills and VP Mahama, the economy again saw a significant improvement since 2010 even though the mainstay of the Ghanaian economy continued to decline. Between 2009 and 2014 the economy continued to be resilient but with a slow pace in growth. For instance, Ghana achieved a record high growth of 14.0 percent in 2011 (IMF 2014) largely due to oil exported from newly discovered fields. The growth could not be sustained in the subsequent years. However, the country's growth was consistently above the average (median) for the sub-Saharan Africa region. Ghana's growth rate was 5.4 percent in 2013 compared against the target of 8.8 percent (GSS

2014; IMF 2014) and much lower than the rate in 2011, or even the 7.9-percent rate in 2012. Since it might be argued that the phenomenal growth achievement in 2011 was primarily the result of the oncoming petroleum exploitation, the more appropriate comparison over time was the non-oil real GDP growth rate which also fell from 9.4 percent in 2011 to 7.8 percent in 2012 and to 3.9 percent in 2013 (IMF 2014).

In 2012, the sixth general elections under the Fourth Republic of Ghana were held (again on 7 December). During this election the then Vice President Mahama who took over after the demise of his former boss President Mills, had entered the 2012 elections with the main opposition leader Nana Akufo-Addo along with minor parties and independent candidates. In all, seven presidential candidates contested the 2012 elections, namely seven political parties and one independent candidate. There were two major electoral reforms ahead of the elections in 2012. The first was the biometric registration of eligible voters in March 2012. The second was the re-demarcation of constituencies: The Fourth Republic had 200 parliamentary seats, which after demarcation increased to 230 in 2004. In 2012 the number of constituencies was raised from 230 to 275 (Bukari, 2017; Anaman and Bukari 2019).

The ruling party was retained in 2012 with the incumbent president as its presidential candidate and with a victory margin of 50.7 percent. The main opposition leader Akufo-Addo garnered 47.7 percent of valid votes cast. The remaining 2.1 percent went to the minority parties and the independent candidate. The final verdict was announced by the Supreme Court on 29 August 2013, but the opposition party led by Akufo-Addo challenged the validity of the Electoral Commission's declaration of the winner of the 2012 presidential election.

The inauguration of President John Dramani Mahama as the Fourth President of the Fourth Republic of Ghana further consolidated the gains the country had made as the beacon of elections and democracy in Africa. Winning the 2012 general elections let the ruling NDC consolidate its development achievement. The party campaigned on the "Better Ghana Agenda" slogan in 2008. The Mahama-led administration was building on their achievements since the party was re-elected in the 2012 elections.

While the then main opposition NPP campaigned on 'Free Education' the incumbent NDC party led by their candidate Mahama (also the incumbent president) fought the elections on an infrastructure development record. However, under the watch of Mahama the

economy of Ghana remained in the news as macro-economic indicators continued to decline amidst erratic power supply known in the local parlance as *Dumsor-Dumsor* (meaning off and on). The weak macro-economic situation partly resulted from the end of the decade-long international commodity price boom and excessive spending by the government in 2008 and 2012 (both presidential election years), which caused a sharp reduction in grants and gifts from some Western development partners. It triggered a balance of payments crisis in 2015 and a sharp fall in the value of the local currency, the Ghana cedi, which made Ghana enter into emergency short-term International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout programme in 2015 (Anaman, 2016). The economic conditions in Ghana affected the fortunes of the incumbent NDC during the 2016 elections.

In 2016, the country's seventh general elections under the Fourth Republic of Ghana were held. In the 2016 general election, there were still 275 seats in a single-chamber house of parliament. Though characterised by rancour and acrimonies in the run-up to the elections, they were fought mainly on the economy. In the election itself, the incumbent governing party led by the incumbent president garnered 4 771 188 votes, representing 44.53% of the population. The main opposition party won the elections with a total of 5 755 758 votes, representing 53.72% of the valid votes cast, while the other parties, including the independent candidate, managed 186 788 votes, representing 1.7% of the population. The margin of President Akufo-Addo over ex-president John Dramani Mahama of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) was 984 570 votes, representing a 9.19% difference. In the parliamentary elections, the incumbent governing party, the NDC, lost its majority and managed to win only 106 seats, while the main opposition party won 169 seats. The 2016 general elections, like the previous elections, was fought on bread-and-butter issues in the contemporary politics of the Fourth Republic of Ghana.

Ghana held her eighth general election under the Fourth Republic on 7 December 2020. Unlike the previous seven general elections this one could be described as "chaotic". This was because the events leading up to the 2020 general elections could be described as an agenda that was politically motivated for the re-election of Nana Addo as president. Upon assuming political office on 7 January 2017, the NPP formed a government led by Nana Addo Danquah Akufo-Addo as President of the Republic sacked all the electoral commissioners and appointed some for his "re-election agenda", as described by his political opponents. The NPP leadership, in opposition, promised to sack the then Commissioner appointed by President Mahama in 2015, describing "her" as incompetent, should the party win 2016. This was actually done after winning the 2016 general elections. The appointed Electoral Commissioner by Nana Addo immediately announced the change of voter registration. This statement from the Electoral Commission was

corroborated and supported by statements from leading members of the ruling NPP. For instance, the majority leader and Minister for Parliamentary Affairs said, that by the time they finished compiling the new voter register, the NDC "cannot ever win any election" in Ghana again (Lartey 2019). This statement, coupled with other statements from the ruling class, could be understood as indicative of the view that only a segment of the population in Ghana has the right to rule. So, all efforts were made to disenfranchise voters in order to minimise the chances of the opposition NDC from winning the 2020 elections through the new voter registration system.

The 2020 general election, like the previous elections, was fought on bread-and-butter issues. It was one that cannot be described as credible, considering the pre-election, during election and post-election events. This was because the Electoral Commissioner claimed that the incumbent president who had won the presidential election, had since changed the presidential election results six times. The opposition disputed the declaration by the Electoral Commissioner, insisting that their candidate, John Dramani on the ticket of the NDC, won the election. The opposition claim was vindicated by the conduct and behaviour of the Electoral Commissioner for changing the presidential results six times since 9 December 2020. Parliamentary elections results are also in contention though both the NDC and the NPP won 137 seats each out of 275 seats, with one seat won by an independent candidate. Generally, the outcome of the 2020 general elections in Ghana is best described as contentious, an election which failed the Fourth Republic of Ghana's democratic credibility test.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

In this paper, perspectives on the political economy of electioneering were examined. The analysis led to formulating certain implications for the electoral democracy in Ghana. In the first place, the analysis showed that voters' attributed responsibility and held political parties electorally accountable in Ghana. This meant that regularities in voting behaviour of the citizens often influenced policy making, redistribution and specific policy making of the government in power. This is good for Ghana's democracy and socio-economic development.

As a second point, it should be highlighted that the economic vote was the strongest evidence that the governed actually held those who governed them electorally accountable in a democratic society. This meant the empirical regularities in the key

relationship that determined who won and who lost the elections of Ghana's Fourth Republic depended on the prevailing socio-economic conditions. Thirdly, the analysis indicated that a narrow view of electoral democracy as just ballots and elections still prevailed in Ghana today rather than focusing on the broader sense of what the concept of democracy implies. It is expected that in a democracy fundamental liberty are certain and must be enshrined in national constitutions, while democratic systems must formulate and implement public policies. The shortcoming of the narrow view of democracy as "just winning an election" kills the spirit and principles of democracy, as the effectiveness of ballots themselves depends on what accompanies balloting such as free speech, access to information and freedom of dissent.

Finally, the excessive government spending and related abuse of incumbency, including the use of state institutions for partisan political campaigning, are the norms in election years in Ghana. This is evident in the excessive spending observed for all incumbent governments during election years during the Fourth Republican era in Ghana. This has had negative implications on the sustainability of an electoral democracy, a situation where only the highest political bidder wins the election in the country.

CONCLUSION

This examination of the political economy of electioneering and voting behaviour, with an emphasis on the economy, is an effort to understand how the economy has influenced politics and elections in Ghana. Overall, Ghana has overcome several challenges inherent to democratic transition with the result that democracy in Ghana has continued to grow. A strong press is established in the country, it has a vibrant and growing civil society and the electioneering processes through the history of the Fourth Republic have largely been fair.

Furthermore, the period under review saw economic growth and modest improvements in providing social services. Despite economic growth, Ghana faces the challenge of widening income inequality, while electoral politics are essentially patronage-driven and hinged on major ethnic groups. Also, the interests of people or voter sentiments are often connected with those in society who possess greater access to power and resources.

Electoral behaviour in Ghana could in summary be understood as closely connected to three major aspects, namely ethnicity, rural-urban dichotomy and the economy.

Consequently, socio-economic conditions are the key determinants of electoral outcomes in the country. In fact, reliable empirical observations indicate that they could be seen as the most crucial determinants in explaining the fact that a high number of voters constantly "swing" in their electoral support to specific political parties.

The findings of various studies placed much emphasis on economic factors when explaining the causes for the government turnovers that occurred in the 2000, 2008 and 2016 elections respectively (Nugent 2001b; Gyimah-Boadi 2009; Whitfield 2009; Bukari 2017; Anaman and Bukari 2019). The key conclusions drawn from available results indicate that to individuals, government popularity hinges on the perceived macro-economic situation which is a strong pointer to voting behaviour associated with the economy in Ghana. Even though the outcome of the 2020 general elections is contentious, the above explanation assists in understanding the outcomes of the eight general elections during the Fourth Republic of Ghana from 1992 to 2020.

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between the public and private sectors remain central to creating effective and comprehensive socio-economic development in a country.

Within this context the main focus of this paper is to articulate the principles and mechanisms of good economic governance as tools to guide public investment priorities within the social framework of a private sector-driven economy and in the context of capitalist globalisation. The concept of good economic governance (GEG) should be seen as a critical foundation for both economic and social policy management (Banugire and Namanya 2018).

Problem statement

The assumptions in a recent paper make it evident that there is "need for institutionalized good economic governance mechanisms for collective self-reliance at African union level; for structural transformation for endogenous development at national levels: and for decentralized economic governance at local and community levels" (Banugire and Namanya 2018:4). This was based on the inherent understanding that the concepts of economic governance and good economic governance will expand the economic policy space in the interests of prosperity for all citizens of Africans, not just the elites and their collaborators in the global jungle of capitalist globalisation.

Uganda has experienced increasing inequality, poverty and more vulnerability to poverty and hunger. As government has implemented policies towards eradicating poverty and despite some success in reducing poverty, more needs to be done (MFPED 2005). Hence, the critical importance of good economic governance at both the national and local levels to drive structural transformation towards middle-income status and sustainable, inclusive green growth and development.

Study approach and structure

The study is analytically deductive, based on comparative lessons learnt from Uganda's past experience and lessons from success stories worldwide. It is essentially a structural-institutionalist analysis of development management practices, searching for what can work best in Uganda's historical and agrarian economy context. First, it elaborates on the link between structural transformation strategies and good economic governance systems

as the basis and means for promoting inclusive development. The conceptual framework highlights the importance of getting budget priorities right to ensure adequate resources for transformation strategies and good economic governance. It links the concepts of structural transformation, good economic governance and inclusive development as basis for highlighting the critical importance of good governance institutions, mechanisms and practices. The discussion then traces and explains the evolution of good economic governance (GEG) from the colonial period to show decline in GEG practices. The principles of GEG mechanisms and strategies for inclusive and green development, as required to address the critical challenges of the 21st century and achieve the sustainable development goals, are then discussed. The crucial importance of getting budget priorities right is highlighted in the concluding remarks.

STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, GOOD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT

A good starting point is to first point out a number of ideas that underlie the way economists think and act with respect to development management in general and economic policy management, in particular, structural transformation and good governance for industrial development. First is the idea of a balanced versus an unbalanced growth strategy which was popular in the 1960s and 1970s. There are two dimensions to this approach: the first is whether Uganda should first develop economic and social infrastructure which do not generate growth-promoting marketable surpluses or agriculture and manufacturing which do so. The second concern is the sequencing of public investment priorities to agriculture and manufacturing by tackling each in different phases so that each one creates markets for the other.

Transforming economies for sustainable and inclusive development

There are long-term structural and social transformation issues which embrace opportunities for economic and social development (Banugire and Nuwagaba 2019). Lessons from success stories world-wide show that social development facilities (education, health, etc.) are critical to long-term sustainable and inclusive growth; hence, the importance of public investment packages that combine both directly productive investment and the physical as well as the social infrastructures to support them. This requires a high level of inter-sectoral coordination that can only be achieved through effective strategic planning or through a central planning body, namely the National

Planning Authority (NPA) in the case of Uganda. However, according to various policy / programme evaluation reports, Uganda lacks an effective mechanism for long-term planning; the mandates and institutional capacities of the NPA are still limited by both resources as well as conceptual approaches / methods and political governance practices (Banugire and Namanya 2018). Hence, the failure to achieve inclusive growth with sustainable human development.

Second is the idea of balancing the four goals of development: economic growth, poverty reduction (human development), environmental protection and good governance. These may be reduced to two fundamental goals, namely sustainable and green economic growth, and sustainable human development in a green economy. This means harmonising public investment programmes for growth and those for human development, thereby including all social groups without marginalising any. One way to do this is to focus on the budget items that are pro-poor and pro-human development in each of the growth sectors and each of the social development sectors. One may have high budget allocation to agriculture, while most items have a pro-poor content and vice versa. One may have high allocations to agriculture, while marginalising the peasant household producers, thereby missing human development as sustainable poverty reduction (MFPED 2005). This is happening in many African countries because of prioritising market liberalisation at the expense of harmonising social development with green growth. The best results can only be achieved with careful and harmonised economic and social planning that mainstream economic, social and cultural rights systematically (Balakrishnan *et al*. 2011). However, this calls for systems with good economic governance strategies driven by clearly articulated principles and mechanisms of good governance.

Third is the idea of balancing agency roles. Development initiatives may be generated and managed by the state (public sector) or the market actors (private, business enterprises) or by cooperatives and civil society organisations (collective community actions of the community sector). Good economic policy management requires a balancing of the agency roles of these institutional sectors irrespective of whether one is prioritising private sector-driven development (PSDD) or public policy-driven development (PPDD). Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) pushed Uganda to over-use PSDD at the expense of sound economic policies for sustainable, inclusive and green growth. They also provided "perverse incentives" for destruction of the environment and erosion of collective action organisations, especially cooperatives that are crucial to commercialisation of peasant production, food security and community-based human development activities. SAPs were, therefore, major drivers of bad economic governance

and rent-seeking by public officials. What Uganda has today is a *profit-driven* and *power-driven* economic governance system in which "getting budget priorities right" is extremely problematic, to say the least (Kasente *et al.* 2002; Banugire 2017a).

Fourth, and related to the above, is the issue of a "resource/oil curse" which has plagued most, if not all, resources rich countries in Africa and beyond. The oil curse may be understood and analysed from a market transaction (or cash flow) perspective or the agency perspective. For example, some see it as a distortion of national expenditure priorities, favouring consumption at the expense of productive investment and imports instead of local production, including food. However, the oil curse must also be understood as essentially a *governance curse* rooted in changes in motivations and behaviours of decision makers towards rent seeking and power-driven policymaking as practised in Uganda. It is bad governance that "makes the oil boom a peoples' doom", environmentally, politically and growth-wise. This doom is also routed in capitalist globalisation as a predatory force for exploitation of the less developed countries by the most developed countries through multinational corporations (Banugire and Nuwagaba 2019).

Good economic governance

The ideas highlighted here, amongst others, demonstrate the fact that balancing the economic drivers of social development is a question of good economic governance (GEG). As concept and practice, GEG should be understood as distinct from the idea of good political governance of the economy (i.e., good governance). It emphasises the fact that economic actors / managers control resource allocation in society, and should be regulated to ensure they do it right for optimising economic performance and ensuring that it has a positive impact on society. To get our budget priorities right, it is imperative to focus on building appropriate mechanisms for good economic governance that will use correct and progressive principles that mainstream economic, social and cultural rights (Balakrishnan *et al*. 2011). This approach is still inadequate in Uganda's budgets (ISER 2017). As economic governance in Uganda has worsened since the late 1990s, the issues below remain central to the discussion.

- As GEG in Uganda declined during the 1990s and resulted in bad economic governance (BEG) that distorted budget priorities, it is important to understand why and how this trend could be reversed.

- Explaining the key roles of GEG in development management is another issue to be addressed.

- Identifying the main principles of GEG that can restore it and help Uganda to get budget priorities right for inclusive and sustainable development can support the country in its efforts to achieve the SDGs.

- Whereas Uganda has great opportunities for inclusive growth and rapid social development, the BEG curse is the main constraint to the realisation of the potential for sustainable inclusive development.

Economic governance means the rules, regulations and procedures designed or possessing the capacity to govern the initiation, organisation and management of economic activities concerned with creating sustainable livelihoods and wealth. Therefore, good economic governance may be defined as the process of deliberately governing parts of it with the aim of growing the economy efficiently in an inclusive people-centred and environmentally friendly manner or more generally, as governing the economy for sustainable human development and economic prosperity for all.

Governing economies for transformation and inclusive development

Uganda is still a low-income country with a per capita income of less than $1 100 per year, and is still classified among the least developed economies (less than $750) by 2017. To achieve sustainable and inclusive growth and development, Uganda has to structurally transform the economy in several directions. Firstly, by commercialising the predominantly peasant economy; secondly, by promoting agricultural-led industrialisation through value addition and finally by promoting rapid poverty reduction to grow the middle class that is the main market for industrial products in order to sustain industrial growth. All the above cannot be achieved through macro-economic policy reforms alone, but also largely through comprehensive structural transformation strategies and policy instruments (Banugire 2017a; Banugire and Namanya 2018; Banugire and Nuwagaba 2019). However, these cannot be adequately designed and effectively implemented without a well-institutionalised system of GEG. Hence, the critical importance of harmonising strategies for transformation with those for GEG. In Uganda, the former is embodied in the five-year National Development Plan (NDP), while the latter is practically missing.

A conceptual framework for understanding and integrating the roles of the two types of strategies to achieve inclusive and green development in the shortest time possible is provided in Figure 1 (see below). It emphasises the importance of building appropriate mechanisms for value chain governance, including environmental governance to mitigate climate change, livelihood governance, participatory economic policy management and local economic development programmes at grass root level in rural and urban areas. Bad economic governance leads to failure to achieve correct and inclusive resource allocation in annual budgets and development plans. Budget priorities are the moderating variable that enhances the role of structural transformation strategies or policies and good economic governance approaches.

Figure 1: Key drivers of inclusive development

(Source: Author)

FROM THE GOOD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF THE 1960s TO CURRENT BAD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Uganda inherited a system of GEG at independence which eroded over time due to the poor political governance of successive regimes. The system was an obstacle to structural transformation of the economy and to balanced budget priorities for inclusive social and economic development. A brief outline of economic governance trends is presented below as well as the major driving forces for this continuing decline.

The GEG of the 1960s was characterised by three models, namely one for agricultural growth, the second for industrialisation and the third for overall coordination of economic development efforts by the state. This strategic framework was put in place after the Second World War by the progressive governor, Andrew Cohen, who also promoted the first hydro-electric power station in East Africa at Jinja.

The three models are:

- The cooperatives model for commercialisation of peasant agriculture up to value addition and export growth.

- The Uganda Development Corporation (UDC) model for sustainable industrialisation through local and foreign investments with UDC acting as private-public partnership for research and development services as well as venture capital for both state-owned and private business enterprises.

- The strategic planning model (SPM) for overall coordination of resource mobilisation and resource allocation for accelerated and inclusive economic growth and development.

The cooperative model (first model) was designed to fit the needs and inspirations of smallholder farmers in the process of transiting from subsistence farming to commercial farming through self-help initiatives. It had various pillars for integrating the peasants into the market economy in an inclusive manner. First, the primary societies that were organised through self-help initiatives with strong and effective support from the Department of Cooperatives. Then, the regional and commodity-based cooperative unions representing the primary societies for each cash crop (coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco and vegetables) were spread all over the country in every district. Thirdly it had a new

network of the support services cooperative unions for financial services (the Cooperatives Bank), for transport (the Uganda Cooperative Transport Union, UCTU) and for information, education and communications the Uganda Coop. Alliance (UCA) was connected at national level and participated in national planning processes. In addition, marketing boards were set up for each major cash crop and acted as parastatal agencies value chain for external marketing and higher stages of value additions for export promotion and competitiveness through coordinated value chain management.

This "cooperativisation model" provided a strong foundation for rapid and inclusive commercialisation and growth of the agricultural sector. This holistic approach demanded and deserved high levels of budgetary allocation, properly targeted to the critical sources and drivers of economic growth and transformation which included research and development expenditure, feasibility studies and technical training. A similar approach is called for if government has to recognise the need to increase the share of agriculture from a dismal 4% to at least 10% for maximum transformation and sustainable, inclusive and green growth.

The UDC model (second model) was essentially a research and development model for development corporations. UDC was designed to play an entrepreneurship role on behalf of government by identifying strategic but viable projects for industrialisation and agribusiness development as well as to mobilise private investors to implement them in partnerships with government as financial investors. As a holding company it was empowered with technical capacity for project management and related policy advice; it was a mechanism of GEG for sustainable growth. In the second five-year plan from 1966 to 1971, the UDC and relevant ministries assembled at least four agribusiness projects in all regions of Uganda for horticulture and ranching, together with several manufacturing projects for meat processing, textiles, fertilizers, iron and steel (Uganda Ministry of Planning and Economic Development 1967; Uganda NPA 2020). Most of these projects had not taken off by 2015 due to lack of GEG. Hence, the recent revival of the UDC as an investment arm of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. This UDC was equivalent to the development boards or cooperatives that had been established as part of the success story in Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.

The Strategic Planning Model (third model) was in the form of a separate Ministry of Planning and Economic Development responsible for coordinating development projects for growth (e.g., UDC projects) and for social development (e.g., 22 hospitals). Effective

development coordination was enshrined in the Ministry Planning Units (MPUs) in every major ministry. Political coordination was carried out through the Planning Commission as the cabinet sub-committee for developmental governance of all long-term strategies and policies for economic and social development. Currently, this role is played by the NPA under the oversight roles of Cabinet and Parliament. However, as in many African countries, the concept of good developmental governance has not been recognised and operationalised in good practices as done in Taiwan (Lauridsen 2014).

The three models of the past had the capacity to transform Uganda's economy into a self-sustaining economy within three decades. The evidence that it was a robust system of economic governance was the fact that the success stories of East Asia used similar, if not the same, mechanisms. For example, Singapore and Malaysia used economic development boards (UDC model) which Rwanda had adopted ahead of Uganda. Most of them mobilised peasants into cooperatives or village associations/movements, often accompanied with nationwide agrarian reforms. All of them had strategic planning mechanisms in both the government machinery and autonomous agencies such as the Korean Development Institute (South Korea).

The decline in GEG was propelled by both internal and external forces. The former was mainly in the form of political instability of the 1960s up to the 1980s but also lack of vision and political choice for power-driven governance at the expense of development-driven governance since 1986. The external forces were mainly in the form of SAPs which were based on the ideology and principles of capitalist globalisation in the services of multi-national corporations (MNCs). The logic and practices of SAPs were against the cooperativisation model in favour of MNCs and foreign investors capturing the marketplace up to village level. The powerbrokers of SAPs had up to recently opposed an active industrialisation policy (UDC model) and effective cooperative movements which they regard as barriers to the expansion of MNCs in least developed countries (LDCs). Furthermore, foreign investors, especially MNC and foreign aid, opened up opportunities for rent-seeking by politicians, technocrats and their agents, leading to corruption which combines with pro-power governance to evolve a culture of *governance by corruption.*

In brief, the bad economic governance currently experienced is partly externally driven but largely self-inflicted domestic political choices. In Uganda, the national resistance movement regime has militarised governance in economic policy management, thereby consolidating a system of government by corruption with high levels of tolerance for

corruption. While bad economic governance persists, it is unrealistic to expect governments to get their priorities right. But what are the basic principles that should guide correct budget priorities for both inclusive green economic growth and sustainable social development? These are discussed in the *Key Principles* section below.

Trends in economic governance systems

The decline in national economic governance systems, which requires urgent reversal in order to promote economic and social transformation towards middle income status, is outlined in Table 1 below. Whereas Ugandans have expected reversal of the decline of the 1970s and the 1980s, it has not yet happened. To many, reversal can only be carried out by a new developmental political regime and not the NRM party that thrives on corruption and impunity.

Table 1: Decline in economic governance systems

Period/ Context	Type of economic governance	Quality implications
1. Colonial heritage, 1950/1960s	Good developmental governance (GDG), state-driven transformation	• Rapid commercialisation of agriculture • Rapid industrialisation and community development
2. Political instability, 1970-1986	• Chaotic governance • Dispossession of Asian community • Decline of cooperatives • Market failures • Poor administration of economy	• Uganda refugees abroad • Institutional failures and decline • Economic crisis, decline over 30% of GDP
3. SAP, recovery, 1987-2005	• Liberal economic governance • Market liberalisation strategy • Creates incentives to corruption	• Privatisation drives rent-seeking • Privatisation of state enterprises

		• Growth without transformation • Dominance of foreign investors
4. Multiparty politics with authoritarian state, 2006-2015	• Governance by corruption • Monetised politics • State incentivised corruption	• Rampant land grabbing • High demand for new districts • Militarised economic policy management • Policy failures, politics-driven
5. Militated politics / administration militarized, 2016-2026	Governance by impunity (GBI) of economic management emerges / consolidates	• State-driven conflicts / violence • Rise of mafia gangs • Deepening of militarisation of economy

(Source: Author)

The table above emanates from direct observations the author made in different periods and roles, commencing with work as an economist in the Uganda Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MPED) and the Uganda Export Promotion Council. This was followed by consultancy support to public sector management, macro-economic policy management and subsector policy development as well as an appointment as Director General for taxation and industrial promotion in the Uganda Ministry of Finance. It is also supported by research and analysis on GEG and cross-cutting economic policy frameworks.

KEY PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE GOOD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Having recognised the crucial roles of GEG as the principal driver of rapid, sustainable and inclusive growth and social development, it is imperative to generate consensus among practitioners and policy makers on principles that must guide its practice at national and local levels. This section, therefore, elaborates on a few principles which

have been recognised by both policy makers and private and civil sector practitioners as crucial to getting right public sector priorities in policy and budget frameworks as well as in institutional reforms for better economic performance and its social impacts. Governments must govern economies in partnership with private business associations and collective action organisations to maximise inclusive development and other national goals.

Key principles

First is the need to balance the respective roles of the state (public sector), the markets (private sector) and communities (civil societies) in promoting growth and social development. The higher the role of the state, the higher the budget allocation. For example, whereas the oil and gas sector falls in a very low category, agriculture and social services are in the higher category of top priorities because their development promotes both inclusive growth and sustainable human development. Moreover, effective participation in decision-making and collective learning for development management are key to good policy management (Johnson and Wilson 2009; Banugire 2017b).

Second is the recognition that social development is primarily policy-driven, while growth is largely private sector-driven, implying higher allocation for sectors that drive food security (agriculture), cultural transformation and knowledge acquisition (education and learning) along with the health status of the population (health, water and sanitation). This is indeed a major aspect of harmonising economic and social goals of development in order to maximise social inclusiveness in development and to achieve climate change mitigation and adaptation objectives.

Third is the recognition and imperative that business enterprises, as social organisations for wealth creation, be managed as "servants of society not as masters of society" (Drucker 1977:256-258; Stiglitz 2010). It has been observed that the recent and current financial crises are driven by unregulated markets which are driven by the greed and social values of capitalist enterprises and their managers, leading to both market failures and policy failures for the benefit of the drivers of bad governance in both most developed countries (MDCs) and LDCs at the expense of the wider society (Stiglitz 2010). This calls for effective regulatory frameworks funded by the government budgets. This principle is crucial for the oil and gas sector in the sense that the key budget issue is that of fair sharing of the oil revenues among the key stakeholders, namely the citizens as the ultimate owners

of the resources, the government as the steward and resource manager, and oil companies as the producers. The citizen's ownership rights are the main link to social development. Oil production provides the opportunity to enhance inclusive development but the principal driver of the realisation of this opportunity are the economic governance mechanisms. This is one of the reasons why the model of autonomous development funds (ADF) was developed and recognised by the OAU (Hyden 1995).

Fourth, is the principle of subsidiarity which says that decisions should, as far as possible, be made at the level of the direct beneficiaries of the policies or programmes of the actors. The ADF model aims to create NGOs with adequate institutional capacity and autonomy from government interference necessary to create a global partnership for directing foreign aid funds directly to grass roots initiatives for economic and social empowerment of the beneficiaries. This calls for decentralised economic governance embracing decentralised decision making for collective action institutions as means of leveraging resources and interventions for the benefits of citizens (Kasente *et al*. 2002; Banugire and Namanya 2018). This principle has been eroded by the market liberalisation strategies of the IMF and World Bank, leading to the neglect and collapse of the cooperative sector in the 1990s which have not yet been adequately addressed due to the hangovers of SAPs. These SAPs also provided the incentives to the public officials to privatise public assets, and even worse, the role of the state to themselves; hence, rampant corruption systems that have gradually encroached on the space for good economic governance. If unchecked, they have the potential to take over the national system of economic governance, leading to poor budget allocation priorities and eventually policy implementation failures which are already happening (Lyons 2011).

Fifth is the principle of public-private-community partnerships (PPCPs or CPPPs) which is a mechanism of minimising public expenditure and maximising its social productivity or cost-effectiveness. The present practice of partnership building often excludes or generally under-rates the roles of collective community action, thereby missing the opportunities of promoting inclusive social and economic development. This is one reason widespread value chain management and effective participatory economic policy management have not taken root in Uganda and Africa (Kasente *et al.* 2002; Nuwamanya and Banugire 2018).

The sixth principle is that of recognising the role of knowledge management as a crucial element in the long-term performance of the economy (Banugire 2017b). UNCTAD (2006) has advocated for recognising the existence of multiple knowledge systems right

from the high-tech models to low-tech models and grass roots models. This calls for knowledge management as adequately operationalised in Asian success stories through research and development agencies and in the various coordination mechanisms in the central planning agencies as well as public-private partnerships for export promotion and rural transformation (World Bank 2008; CLGF 2014; Lauridsen 2014). As Uganda still lack appropriate strategic planning mechanisms, right from community level to rural economy level to critical growth sectors, and above all, to national level (Banugire and Nuwamanya 2018). In brief, the fundamentals of GEG are critically lacking; hence, the distorted budget priorities. Let us not forget that getting priorities right is a continuous learning process and not a matter of simple mathematical calculation. This is why a recent study has recommended the establishment of a decentralisation economic governance system for a bottom-up approach to development management and governance, properly coordinated at national level (Banugire and Nuwamanya 2018). This calls for building GEG systems at both macro and local levels to ensure inclusiveness and performance management.

The seventh principle is that of participatory economic policy management which is currently operationalised in the budgetary process. The Medium-Term Budget Framework is an important innovation whose opportunities for GEG have not been widely recognised and exploited. The main weaknesses are that social budget parameters (priorities) are not adequately based on long-term strategic structural transformation policy frameworks. Also, bargaining for annual budget allocations is not carried out on the basis of institutional capacity for good developmental governance but they are power-driven rather than performance-based (Banugire and Nuwamanya 2018:10-14).

Towards a good economic governance strategy: Getting budget priorities right

The above principles must be operationalised in the form of an appropriate strategic framework for GEG to ensure that they guide policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. First, Uganda must adopt the principle of good developmental management for long-term economic transformation that embraces GEG. Where Uganda's economy was in 2012 demanded a very high share for agriculture and social services, especially health, and although the situation has not changed much today, their shares are still very low in the third NDP at 3-4% for agriculture and less than 15% for all social services, while defence has received about 25-30% by 2018. The oil revenue windfalls must, therefore, be used for this purpose after balancing the claims of the various stakeholders. The main focus of short-term budgets for human development

sectors should include first and foremost the operationalisation of appropriate models of GEG as the direct driver of inclusive growth and sustainable human development.

Secondly, the vision of prosperity for all must be embraced by the key stakeholders in the public, private and civil society sectors, and operationalised. This must be based on the long-term priorities for economic and social transformation towards people-centred economies that address critical challenges of the day, especially climate change and other potential disasters such as pandemics. It must be recognised that achieving prosperity for all is not simply a question of high per capita incomes and high technology status but also of building appropriate mechanisms for social capital (good economic governance, cooperatives, rural financial services) and for social protection of the vulnerable groups. These measures are the ones that ensure rapidly expanding domestic markets for sustainable growth as well as benefits of "learning for development" as the fruits of knowledge-driven economy. Prosperity for all is driven by both the right knowledge for development and good economic governance, both of which are missing or inadequate in Uganda today. It is time we begin to think long term, focusing on human security and a shared future for the common good of all citizens and humanity.

Third, the UDC model of the 1960s must be restored as a matter of urgency as a central pillar of the industrialisation strategy and the process of building a knowledge economy. The management of the oil sector must borrow a leaf from success stories elsewhere such as Norway where a strong partnership between the private and public sector is based on the principles of GEG and best practices by the state and the oil companies. The state-owned oil company should follow the resource mobilisation, entrepreneurship, research and development principles similar to those of the UDC model. The Uganda Industrial Research Institute (UIRI) is a more recent component of the UDC model that did not exist in the 1960s and which needs strengthening and scaling up. The UIRI has been established by an Act of parliament in 2002 as a government parastatal under the auspices of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MoSTI). It must undertake applied research, champion innovation and translate it into practice to support the development of a competitive development sector in Uganda (UIRI 2021).

Fourth, the Autonomous Development Funds (ADF) model recommended by the Economic Commission for Africa in the 1990s (Hyden 1995) should be considered as a social technological innovation for channelling foreign aid and domestic revenue surplus into community-based initiatives for empowering rural communities and vulnerable groups such as women organisations for self-help initiatives. These development NGOs

have been widely used in Latin America and Asia, with significant social impacts while minimising the incidence and scale of corruption. It is a mechanism for improving both aid-effectiveness and social accountability of government agencies (ISER 2017).

Fifth, there is a need to focus on the share of administration costs of development policies and programmes in both development and recurrent budgets. This parameter is very important to monitoring the cost-effectiveness of economic governance mechanisms as well as general administration. Budget reforms must embrace both the budget-making process and the budget frameworks as well as the review of limits to various cost centres, especially administrative costs of service delivery. This is one reason why independent service delivery monitoring systems are needed to guide evidence-based development management and provide checks and balances on government spending priorities to ensure best practices for fiscal policy management (Lyons 2011; Banugire 2017b). This is particularly crucial, given the continuing power-driven creation of new districts as well as presidential manifesto-driven programmes (e.g., SACCOs, youth employment loans, trade-based loans) and duplication of line ministries tasks in the office of the president. Presidential manifesto-driven policies are motivated by regime survival, and benefit bureaucrats and politicians most. This bias is recognised by policy beneficiaries and has therefore motivated them to default. Indeed, as a member of parliament (Lyons 2011) indicated some of the youth thought that the money had to facilitate them during elections, and had no plan to pay back the loans they received before presidential elections.

Lastly, there is a need to mainstream the economic, social and cultural rights of citizens to enhance the effectiveness and inclusiveness of both economic and social policies. Special focus should be on universal access to social protection and social services as well as transforming rural economies for sustainable development. This calls for a shift from the SAPs approach of the Washington Consensus model of macro-economic policy to a home grown one to which the author refers as the Addis Ababa Consensus model (Banugire 2017a).

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR BUDGET PRIORITIES

This review of problems and principles for GEG indicates that there are two types of economic drivers of inclusive social and economic development. First, resource allocation to economic growth sectors which contribute resources for financing development programmes. These include the vulnerable/marginalised population in

income-generating activities of the prime minister (OPM) and the president. These are indirect drivers because they merely provide the opportunities for development. Special policies/programmes such as social protection and economic empowerment are needed to ensure poverty reduction and growth inclusiveness. Secondly, mechanisms of economic governance are directly involved in resource mobilisation, allocation and utilisation for accelerated sustainable development. They are the direct drivers and key to inclusiveness of quality and pro-poor growth to getting budget priorities right.

This position assumes that there are non-economic drivers such as political governance and cultural factors. It is, therefore, important to link the economic drivers to the non-economic drivers in the most effective and appropriate manner. The GEG mechanisms provide the links, since they are politically designed and politically implemented, based on prevailing social values or ethical standards and because they include collective action institutions such as cooperatives and informal social security systems (Kasente *et al.* 2002). However, good political governance as a pre-condition for GEG, requires the checks and balances enshrined in the separation of roles/power among the Executive, Parliament and the Judiciary. Unfortunately, these have been eliminated or eroded to allow institutionalised rent setting by public officials with a high degree of tolerance (or impunity) to corruption.

Therefore, the lack of adequate resource allocation to poverty reduction sectors in Uganda is largely explained by the lack of GEG mechanisms. Lack of adequate resource allocation is the manifestation of poor and ineffective economic policy management that is largely driven by politics rather than appropriate and inclusive economic governance organisations. The poverty of policies is not due to the poverty of appropriate knowledge for development, but failure to get right the politics and administration of policy management agencies. This is essentially a structural failure of political processes in Uganda. As one motivational speaker put it: "Uganda is gifted by nature and destroyed by politics" (Kibuka 2011). Therefore, Uganda cannot get its budget priorities for social development right. To formulate budget priorities that rhyme with the national objectives of inclusive growth and sustainable human development and protection of the environment, the right set of rules and principles, not only for sound fiscal management but also for GEG must be adopted.

In conclusion, a number of aspects of pertinent relevance require highlighting. Based on current challenges and the current context, clear definitions must be agreed upon for (a) the roles and responsibilities for service delivery and development management for

public, private and civil sectors, for each production sector and agency as well as (b) the principles and mechanisms of good economic governance for driving agricultural transformation, industrialisation and universal access to social services. It is necessary to specify the limits to costs of administration vis-a-vis service delivery or programme management as shares in total allocations as well as rigorous and participatory procedures for generating medium-term budget shares for sectors that drive inclusive development and address priority needs of vulnerable groups. These rules must be reviewed periodically in order to prioritise budget allocations as mechanisms for sustaining good governance practices. What is, therefore, necessary is to build the capacities for GEG mechanisms and mainstreaming economic social and cultural rights for maximum inclusiveness.

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believe they are entitled to free housing from the state. On a large scale, households and communities have become passive recipients of government housing delivery (South Africa 2012). Is the government of South Africa, through its current housing subsidy programme, perchance unwittingly contributing to the housing problem?

Figure 1: Decrease in housing delivery from 1994-2019

(Source: Department of Human Settlements 2020)

There are concerns regarding the effectiveness and sustainability of the current housing programme in terms of its affordability to the fiscus considering the exponential increase in the demand for housing (DHS 2011; DHS 2012). From a review on the comprehensive literature focusing on systems thinking it is possible to explore the applicability of systems thinking to housing delivery in South Africa. This article focuses on the definitions of the concepts of systems and systems thinking, the differences between the conventional reductionist thinking approach versus systems thinking and the characteristics of organisational settings which could benefit from the use of systems thinking. These characteristics are juxtaposed with South Africa's housing delivery environment to determine the applicability of systems thinking. A Systems thinking approach may be one of the keys to unlocking the door of cause-and-effect relationships in public service delivery arenas such as housing, health and education (Rhodes 2006:8). According to Chapman (2004:51), systems thinking is a useful tool for tackling issues that are embedded in complexity, particularly where human activity is involved.

EXAMINING SYSTEMS THINKING AS CONCEPT AND APPROACH

A comprehensive body of published literature exists on systems thinking, specifically in journal articles and books. As all the literature is not necessarily relevant to the focus of this article, an effort was made to organise and build an understanding of the content of the literature around the following themes: definitions of a system and systems thinking, the reductionist thinking approach versus systems thinking and the preference of systems thinking over the use of the conventional reductionist approach to problem solving.

Definition of a system and systems thinking

There are many different definitions of the concepts of systems and systems thinking found in the literature, such that it is impossible to establish completely universal definitions of these two concepts. Notwithstanding the absence of universal definitions, the following definitions suffice to introduce the concepts. A *system* is, according to Jackson (2003:3), a complex whole comprised of a number of parts that interact with one another, and the functioning of the whole system is depended on the interaction of the components of the system. According to Senge (1994:68), a system is a perceived whole that is comprised of elements that continually interact with one another to achieve a common goal and in the process affect one another. Similarly, Meadows (2008:11) defines a system as an interconnected set of elements that is coherently organised in a

way that achieves something, a purpose. He suggests that the world is made of hierarchies of systems nested within systems, wholes nested within wholes. Every system is a whole and is also a part of another larger system; that larger system is, in turn, a part of an even larger system. Similarly, Midgley (2000:10) suggests that the world can be described as a hierarchy of systems, each of which contains and is contained by other systems where larger systems are just as dependent on the existence and healthy functioning of the smaller ones (their components) as the smaller ones are on the larger ones of which they are part of (their environment).

According to Lucas (2004:4), the level of agent interactions in a system is threefold:

- Intra-system or intra-level interaction: these are interactions of agents within the system.
- Inter-system interaction: this is where agents interact with each other across the boundaries of the system.
- Hierarchical or inter-level interaction: agents interact within a vertical hierarchy.

Another way of understanding organisational systems is through the Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory. CAS models represent a genuinely new way of simplifying complex systems (Anderson 1999:216). In reviewing a number of different perspectives on complex systems, Anderson suggests that complex systems are characterised by many differentiated components interacting with one another and with their environment, exhibiting adaptive capabilities and responding to feedback (Anderson 1999:220). Each of these elements may contribute to surprising nonlinear behaviour.

The main features of a complex adaptive system are, according to Rhodes (2006:8), agents that may act independently but that are dependent, to varying degrees, on other agents in the system, the environment in which the agents operate, the objectives that agents are pursuing and their perceptions of how best to pursue these objectives, the nature of the connections between agents, the initial conditions that were present at the start of the system and the outcomes of the system that create feedback that influences agents' subsequent actions.

A principal feature of a complex adaptive system is its ability to adapt to survive significant changes in its environment through changes in behaviour and internal processes (Chapman 2004:52). This adaptation is therefore the process that enables this system to maintain its integrity. Similarly, Boisot and Child (1999:239) posit that systems

have to fit with the complexity of their environment, either to achieve an appropriate alignment with the environment, or to free themselves from any potential adverse impact or constraints the environment might impose.

From the definitions above, a system can loosely be defined as a whole that comprises parts or elements that are connected together to achieve a purpose. A system must be composed of elements, interconnections and a function or purpose. So, what can we then state is systems thinking? According to Churchman, one of the initial and foremost theorists of systems thinking, such an approach begins when one sees the world through the eyes of another and a process of sweeping in as many factors as possible to a system of concern while looking at things from different viewpoints or worldviews (Churchman 1968:231).

Systems thinking is, according to Senge (1994:68), a discipline for seeing wholes and a framework for seeing interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static snapshots. According to Richmond (1994:6), systems thinking is the art and science of making reliable inferences about behaviour by developing an increasingly deep understanding of underlying structure. Raymond emphasises that people embracing systems thinking position themselves such that they can see both the forest and the trees, one eye on each.

Systems thinking is the art of simplifying complexity. It is about seeing through chaos, managing interdependency and understanding choice. The world is increasingly more complex and chaotic because people use inadequate concepts to explain it. When people understand something, they no longer see it as chaotic or complex (Gharajedaghi 1999:283). Similarly, systems thinking can be thought of as a language and a specific way of viewing the world and can serve as a useful framework to communicate complex issues (Kim 2000:5). Systems thinking is a scientific discipline concerned with organisation and relationship and seeing the overall pattern. Whatever is observed from a systems thinking point of view is looked at as it relates to the whole (Checkland 2000:2). Systems thinking can be described as a way of thinking that permits consideration of both the entire system and its parts at the same time (Salazar *et al.* 2009:4).

According to Kordova, Frank and Miller (2018:1), systems thinking enables the understanding of the entire system beyond its components and clarifies the importance of the isolated components as parts of the system as a whole. Squires *et al.* (2011:5) define

systems thinking as the ability to think abstractly in order to incorporate multiple perspectives, work within a space where the boundary or scope of problem or system may be fuzzy, understand diverse operational contexts of the system, identify inter- and intra-relationships and dependencies, understand complex systems behaviour and reliably predict the impact of change to the system. Hence, system thinking is, according to Capra and Luisi (2014:65), thinking in terms of connectedness, relationships, patterns and context. Stroh (2015:16) defines systems thinking as the ability to understand this connectedness in such a way as to achieve a desired purpose. According to Checkland (2012:3), systems thinking is thinking in a holistic way, requiring that, what the thinker perceives to be the whole, might in fact be seen as a part of an even larger whole.

After their review of a number of definitions of systems thinking, Arnold and Wade (2015:675) conclude that systems thinking is a set of synergistic analytic skills used to improve the capability of identifying and understanding systems, predicting their behaviours and devising modifications to them in order to produce desired effects and that these skills work together as a system. One of the fathers of General Systems Theory (GST), Bertalanffy (1968:9), has defined systems thinking as an approach that advocates viewing the issue at hand as a whole, emphasising the interrelationships among its components rather than the components themselves contrary to the traditional approach that understood a subject by analysing its individual parts.

Without attempting to redefine the concept, the reviewed literature reveals that systems thinking is the ability to have a holistic view of the world where parts or elements of a system are viewed in relation to the whole of which they form part; thus, enabling one to better understand the behaviour of the whole system emerging from the interactions of the interconnected parts with the purpose of improving the performance of a system. Understanding how sub-systems connect to one whole system, their interactions and interrelationships are therefore the primary focus of the systems thinking approach.

Reductionist thinking approach versus systems thinking

As Chapman (2004:35) has indicated, one way of understanding systems thinking is to contrast it with the reductionist approach to tackling complexity. The essential aspect of the reductionist approach is that complexity is simplified by dividing a problem into sub-problems or lesser components. The process of sub-division is continued until the resulting bits are simple enough to be analysed and understood. The operation of the

original complex entity is then reconstructed from the operation of the component. Similarly, Jackson (2003:4) has declared that reductionism sees the parts as paramount and seeks to identify the parts, understand the parts and work up from an understanding of the parts to an understanding of the whole. The problem with this is that the whole often seems to take on a form that is not recognisable from the parts. The whole emerges from the interactions between the parts which affect one another through complex networks of relationships. Once it has emerged, it is the whole that seems to give meaning to the parts and their interactions.

Unlike the reductionist thinking, systems thinking provides the possibility of switching viewpoints, from a "30 000 foot" view to a "weeds" viewpoint.

> Seeing from the "30,000 foot" view is to see the big picture, to see how it all works together. Seeing from a "weeds" view is to see the connections and elements that are local to the viewer. Seeing from multiple views gives rise to an emergent property termed depth perception, which exists in neither place but only emerges when you put the two views together (Evitts *et al.* 2010:24).

Similarly, Richmond (2000:17) has postulated that "forest thinking" involves a "view from 10,000m rather than focusing on local trees" and "considering how the system influences systems on the other side of the line and how these latter systems influence the former system". Bertalanffy (1968:36) has posited that, while in the past, science has tried to explain observable phenomena by reducing them to an interplay of elementary units investigable independently of each other, today's systems problems are not understandable by investigation of their respective parts in isolation. Capra (1996:3) suggests that the more we study the major problems of our time, the more we come to realise that they cannot be understood in isolation because they are systemic problems, as they are interconnected and interdependent.

Criticising the reductionist approach to problem solving, Jackson (2003:3) posits that too often today's managers are sold simple solutions to complex problems. These solutions focus on parts of the organisation rather than the whole and take little account of the interaction of the parts. Consequently, they are rarely effective in the face of complexity, change and diversity. Commenting on the reductionist approach, Kordova *et al.* (2018:3) posit that the traditional linear thinking approaches work against an understanding of how the different parts of an organisation or business work together and underplay or ignore the multifaceted nature of complex problems.

Clearly, unlike the reductionist approach that seeks to dissect a system into parts in order to understand it, systems thinking focuses on the whole system and its parts to understand the dynamic behaviour of the system. While the reductionist approach has gone a long way in attempting to solve organisational and societal problems, focusing on individual parts of a system can misrepresent the facts, misdiagnose the problem and result in inappropriate solutions.

Systems thinking preferred over the conventional reductionist approach

According to Stroh (2015:15), systems thinking is most suitable where the problem is chronic and has defied people's best intentions to solve it. It is also suitable in situations where diverse stakeholders find it difficult to align their efforts despite shared intentions or where stakeholders try to optimise their part of the system without understanding their impact on the whole and where stakeholders' short-term efforts might actually undermine their intentions to solve the problem. Other situations where, according to Stroh (2015:15), systems thinking is equally suitable are where people are working on a large number of disparate initiatives at the same time, where promoting particular solutions comes at the expense of engaging in continuous learning and where there is unintentional conflict or opposition among stakeholders.

Systems thinking helps to deal with "wicked" problems. The term *wicked problems* was introduced by two urban planners, Rittel and Webber (1973:160), to refer to complex policy problems and to describe an issue that is highly resistant to resolution. The problems on which scientists and engineers have usually focused were mostly "tame" or "benign" ones (Rittel and Webber 1973:160). The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social policy is bound to fail because of their very nature of being wicked problems, whereas science has developed to deal with tame problems. Wicked problems are problems with no definitive formulation, no stopping rule and no right or wrong solutions but may be viewed as good or bad. Wicked problems may further have no immediate or ultimate test of a solution, problems with "one-shot" solutions and no opportunity for trial-and-error (experiments) as every intervention counts significantly. These problems may have no enumerable, exhaustively describable set of solutions, are unique, may be considered as symptoms of other problems and whose explanation can be contested where people choose those explanations that are most plausible to them (Rittel and Webber 1973:161-166).

Wicked policy problems could be seen as difficult to tackle effectively using the techniques traditionally used by the public sector (Commonwealth of Australia 2007:3). Traditional policy thinking suggests that the best way to work through a policy problem is to follow an orderly and linear process, working from problem to solution. The process would usually start by understanding and defining the problem. This involves gathering and analysing data and other evidence, and consulting with stakeholders. Once the problem is specified, and the evidence and stakeholder views are analysed, options and a preferred option can be determined. Outcomes and output are identified, implementation plans are designed, and performance targets specified. It is often thought that the more complex the problem is, the more important it is to follow this orderly flow. The consensus in the literature, however, is that such a linear, traditional approach to policy formulation is an inadequate way to work with wicked policy problems. This is because part of the wickedness of an issue lies in the interactions between causal factors, conflicting policy objectives and disagreement over the appropriate solution. Linear thinking is inadequate to encompass such interactivity and uncertainty (Chapman 2003; Cabrera and Cabrera 2015; Midgley 2015).

Midgley (2015:3) defined a wicked problem as a problem that involved many interlinked issues, cutting across the usual silos (e.g., economy, health and environment) and making for a high degree of complexity. The problem might have multiple agencies (across the public, private and voluntary sectors) in trying to account for multiple scales (local, regional, national and global). There might be many different views on the problem and potential solutions; even conflict over the desired outcomes or the means to achieve them while power relations were making change difficult along with uncertainty about the possible effects of action.

Averring on the root cause of failure to tackle wicked problems, Cabrera and Cabrera (2015:12) claim that wicked problems tend to result from a contradiction between the ways that systems work in the real world and the way people think systems work. They posit that, generally, people's thinking tends to focus on parts that obscure the whole, or alternatively, focus on the whole without recognising the parts. People may see hierarchy as opposed to more complex, distributed networks or rely on static categories as opposed to taking perspectives on part-whole groupings. Moreover, people may see linear causality rather than nonlinear causal processes; seeing structural parts but overlooking the dynamic relationships that are also part of the whole (e.g., mystical forms of emergence); and favouring bivalent over multivalent logic.

As Chapman (2003:18) suggests, these complex problems, sometimes referred to as a "mess", "wicked problem" or "adaptive problem", require a completely different approach to deal with them. Their characteristics are a lack of agreement on what the problem is and what goals to pursue. They entail several different perspectives on events and issues; however, they are unbounded in terms of what it would take to resolve the issue. Additionally, they have a significant ambiguity and uncertainty about what is actually occurring, with suspected interactions between efforts to engage with this issue and actions likely to be taken on other messy issues. Likewise, Mingers and Rosenhead (2011:1) characterise wicked problems as problem situations involving many interested parties with different perspectives (worldviews). The problem situations are not well-defined and there might be issues where there is difficulty in agreeing on objectives. Situation success may require creating agreement amongst the parties involved or where there are many uncertainties and lack of reliable data. Situations may also be working across the boundary between human activity systems and engineering artefacts.

According to Reynolds and Holwell (2010:6), reductionist thinking can be counterproductive in resolving complex issues by ignoring interconnections rather than looking at the bigger picture or by assuming a single cause of a problem rather than there being multiple interrelated causation. Reductionist thinking may also blame an individual rather than attempt to understand the ways in which a situation has arisen that has led to a problematic outcome and by focusing on outcomes rather than the processes by which beneficial change might best occur. Similarly, Evitts *et al.* (2010:5) suggest that, although the reductionist approach has brought a certain kind of success to society, operating in a complex system with an inadequate worldview leads to repercussions and unintended consequences. It is therefore not surprising that "we're in a mess" (Evitts *et al.* 2010:5). To illustrate the need to approach and understand any human activity system in terms that are quite different from the normal linear, mechanical and reductionist framework, Chapman (2004:51) has compared throwing a stone with throwing a live bird as follows:

> The trajectory of a stone can be calculated quite precisely using the laws of mechanics, and it is possible to ensure that the stone reaches a specified destination. However, it is not possible to predict the outcome of throwing the live bird in the same way, even though the same laws of physics ultimately govern the bird's motion through the air. One approach is to tie the bird's wings, weight it with a rock and then throw it. This will make its trajectory (nearly) as predictable as that of the stone, but in the process the capability of the bird is completely destroyed.

This is more or less what policy-makers try to do when using a scientific management approach, based on a mechanical model, to try to control the behaviour of a complex system for which they are devising policy. A more successful strategy for getting the bird to a specified endpoint might be to place a bird feeder or other source of food at the destination (Chapman 2004:51).

Expounding on the relevancy of this, Arnold and Wade (2015:678) posit that, with the exponential growth of systems in our world, comes a growing need for systems thinkers to tackle these complex problems. From the literature above, it is evident that systems or organisational settings that have the characteristics listed below (see Table 1) can benefit more from the application of systems thinking than from the use of the conventional reductionist perspective. In this article, these characteristics are used to test the applicability of systems thinking to housing delivery in South Africa, particularly to the poor and low- to medium-income earners.

Table 1: Characteristics of systems or organisational settings

A system, organisation or a service with:

1. Chronic problems that have defied people's intention to solve them
2. Diverse stakeholders who find it difficult to align their efforts
3. Unintentional conflict or opposition amongst stakeholders
4. Issues that are embedded in complexity
5. The need to engage citizens and stakeholders
6. Many interlinked issues cutting through the usual silos
7. Multiple agencies across the public, private, voluntary sectors
8. Many different views on the problem and potential solutions
9. Unintentional consequences
10. Uncertainty about the possible effect of action

THE APPLICABILITY OF SYSTEMS THINKING TO THE DELIVERY OF HOUSING

The elements identified by Arnold and Wade ((2015:678), which characterise conditions that are a fertile ground for the application of systems thinking in organisations, are used

to test the applicability of systems thinking to the delivery of housing in South Africa. The results are discussed hereunder.

Housing delivery as wicked problem

South Africa has, through its current housing delivery model, delivered about five million subsidised houses to the poor and low- to medium-income households. Despite this achievement, the housing demand is rising exponentially at a rate that exceeds the delivery rate. The rate of housing delivery declined from a delivery rate of about 235 000 housing opportunities (including houses and serviced sites allocated to beneficiaries for them to construct their own houses) in 1998 to a delivery rate of about 125 000 in 2018. At this housing delivery rate, it would take the country at least 15 years to deal with the current housing deficit of two million housing opportunities alone without dealing with the new demand. This is also against the backdrop of a decline in the state budget for housing. The government will not be able to deal with the housing challenge without involving all relevant stakeholders and leveraging on resources at their disposal.

Diverse stakeholders who find it difficult to align their efforts

Housing delivery is not a discrete entity and thus can never be isolated from the larger system. Housing is part of other systems. Housing production is a part of the construction sector, while housing investment is part of overall capital formation. Residential property is a part of the real estate sector, with housing finance being part of the financial sector. Housing subsidies are part of social welfare expenditures and residential development is a part of urban development (UN-Habitat 2011:8). The housing department cannot, therefore, hope to develop an autonomous housing policy without recognising the impact of other systems. The development of the housing policy must matter to dwellers, builders, lenders, government agencies and other stakeholders concerned with housing. Key stakeholders who are supposed to participate in the delivery of housing in South Africa include, amongst others, the three spheres of government, the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), communities and individuals. However, most of these stakeholders do not participate meaningfully due to poor coordination of stakeholder involvement by government (Ramovha 2018:408).

Unintentional conflict or opposition amongst stakeholders

From about the second decade of South Africa's post-apartheid constitutional democracy growing concern has been expressed about the government's ability to deliver public services, including housing, to which its people feel they are entitled. Since 2004, inadequate delivery of public services, including housing, has elicited protests all over the country. Over the years, the majority of these protests have been marked by exceptionally high levels of violence and vandalism as people vent their frustration and anger (Managa 2012:1). One of the top-ten barriers to the delivery of housing in South Africa is the conflicts between provincial departments and municipalities (Ramovha 2017:337). Conflicts relate to where houses should be built, which beneficiaries to be prioritised, which contractors to employ and generally, the allocation of subsidies. These conflicts often delay the start and completion of housing projects, and often lead to under-expenditure of housing budgets.

Housing and system complexity

The housing delivery system has become complex over time, involving all three spheres of government. Within the three spheres of government, housing delivery involves other government departments besides the national Department of Housing and the nine provincial Departments of Housing. Adequate housing is more than a roof over one's head for a settlement to be sustainable. Ensuring that a settlement has roads, electricity, water and sanitation and other social amenities requires the participation of many government departments and municipalities. Coordination within government remains a serious challenge. Different departments still work at cross purposes. Basic collaboration amongst government departments and agencies seems like a far-fetched dream (South Africa 2012:12). This contributes to the complexity of housing delivery in South Africa, as this requires collaboration amongst government departments to achieve.

Stakeholder engagement in the delivery of housing

A recent study on the barriers to the delivery of state-subsidised housing in South Africa revealed that half of the top-ten barriers are related to poor housing stakeholder engagement or lack thereof, including communities (Ramovha 2017:337). Engaging citizens would help reduce violent protests and the vandalising of property during times when people are unhappy with the pace of housing delivery. This would also encourage

active citizenry and thus reduce the dependency on the state for the delivery of housing. Engaging stakeholders would enhance both their participation and the resources available for housing delivery instead of entirely depending on the dwindling state resources. Big construction companies in South Africa exited the subsidised housing market and were replaced by emerging contractors. Because of inadequate construction capacity of emerging contractors, the quality of some of the houses constructed is inadequate. This has also affected the delivery rate that has since become slower. Engaging these key stakeholders would help enhance the pace and quality of houses constructed for the poor and low-income earners.

Many interlinked issues cutting through the usual silos

Adequate housing means more than four walls and a roof over one's head. It must meet minimum conditions, namely security of tenure, availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location and cultural adequacy (UN-Habitat 2009:3-4). It is clear that the provision of adequate housing requires the availability of land, water, sanitation, roads, transport, energy, sports and recreation facilities, health facilities, schools, worship centres, etc. The delivery of adequate housing thus requires the involvement of various municipal departments, various national and provincial departments, communities, non-governmental organisations, state-owned entities and the private sector to deliver.

Does housing involve many different views on the problem and potential solutions?

As indicated above, housing is not a discrete entity and as such never isolated. Generally, in housing development, important perspectives are those of housing consumers, housing producers, housing finance institutions, politicians and all spheres of government, amongst others. Each of these perspectives focus on different qualitative norms that represent desired outcomes of each of the key actors.

According to Lux (2003:1), housing is not a simple product that can be viewed from a single perspective. On the one hand, housing is one of the basic human needs, and the right to adequate housing has been classified as a basic social human right in most developed and developing countries around the world. On the other hand, housing constitutes a special type of private property that is traded on the market. Although trade-offs between the social and economic aspects of housing may have to be made, the

purpose of housing policies lies in searching for a consensus that assures both the effective functioning of the housing market and the financial affordability of housing for all social groups within a society.

However, the reality is that, in selecting housing delivery models, rational politicians are more often than not persuaded by their selfish ambitions of maximising the number of potential voters for themselves in the next election by supporting housing models that will result in the distribution of income from the few wealthy people to the majority of poor people regardless of the sustainability, effectiveness and consequences of such models (Lux 2003:14). Accordingly, Schwartz and Clements (1999:125) suggest that the reason behind using subsidies as a policy tool may be political, that is, having to do with logrolling or vote trading or for economic reasons. This could be the reason why the current ruling party in South Africa does not address the perceived unsustainability of the current housing delivery model, but rather insist on continuing with the implementation of the housing subsidy that is obviously unsustainable.

Are there unintentional consequences in the delivery of housing?

Since the introduction of South Africa's housing subsidy programme, which mainly provides free housing to the poor and low-income households, South Africa has unwittingly created a dependent and inactive citizenry. Households and communities have become passive recipients of government delivery as they passively wait for government to provide housing for them without attempting to realise their housing needs by themselves. This is one of the unintended consequences of the provision of free housing by government (South Africa 2012).

Another unintended consequence of the current housing subsidy programme is the distortion of the housing market. The quality of free houses provided to the poor and low-income earning households through the current housing subsidy programme has improved tremendously and is the same in quality as the affordable housing market mortgaged houses. Affordable housing is earmarked for those who earn above the qualification criteria for a free house. This discourages this group of people who must pay a mortgage for a house that is equal to a free house in quality. The demand in the affordable housing market has declined, as those who do not qualify for free housing often access free houses through corrupt manners.

Is there uncertainty about the possible effect of action?

There are concerns within the government of South Africa regarding the effectiveness of the current housing delivery trajectory and its national housing programme. These concerns are shared within the civil society and the private sector, and relate to what is referred to as the "un-sustainability" of the current housing programme; not only in terms of its affordability to the fiscus, but also in terms of the nature of socio-economic benefits and leverages which are being achieved. Malpezzi (2014:11) has cautioned that housing subsidies must be consistent with the fiscus to avoid the need to withdraw them at a later stage, given that, once introduced, subsidies are difficult to withdraw. And, accordingly, the government of South Africa has threatened to withdraw the subsidy since 2011, but to date, no action has been taken.

SUMMATION OF THE FINDINGS

Housing delivery has all the attributes for the application of systems thinking. It meets all the conditions that are a fertile ground for the application of systems thinking in organisations. The findings related to the applicability of systems thinking to housing, as discussed above, could be summarised as follows:

Table 2: Applicability of systems thinking to housing delivery

Applicability to Housing Delivery	Yes	No
• Is housing a chronic problem that has defied people's intention to solve?	Yes	-
• Do diverse stakeholders find it difficult to align their efforts in housing?	Yes	-
• Are there unintentional conflict or opposition amongst stakeholders?	Yes	-
• Is housing an issue that is embedded in complexity?	Yes	-
• Is there a need to engage citizens and stakeholders in housing?	Yes	-
• Does housing involve many interlinked issues cutting through the usual silos?	Yes	-

• Does housing involve multiple agencies across the public, private and voluntary sectors?	Yes	-
• Does housing involve many different views on the problem and potential solutions?	Yes	-
• Are there unintentional consequences in housing delivery?	Yes	-
• Is there uncertainty about the possible effect of action in housing?	Yes	-

(Source: Author)

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As indicated above, the housing delivery system is comprised of a huge number of diverse stakeholders, to be understood as parts or sub-systems, that should interact with one another to deal with the housing problem. Key to these stakeholders is the state, namely the national department, provincial departments, municipalities and their public entities as well as politicians, the private sector such as the financial institutions, construction material suppliers, construction firms, estate agents, built environment professionals and others, together with NGOs, CBOs, communities and individuals. These stakeholders all have diverse views and interests that must be taken into cognisance when dealing with the housing challenge.

Clearly, government cannot achieve a sustainable realisation of the right to adequate housing for its people without their involvement and the involvement of stakeholders mentioned above. Similarly, even within government, the three distinct spheres of government should work together during housing policy development, housing programme development, housing-delivery planning, implementation and the monitoring and evaluation stages of housing delivery. It is, however, concerning that half of the top-ten barriers to the delivery of housing in South Africa have to do with both poor housing stakeholder engagement or a lack thereof and conflicts among stakeholders.

Recent history, as well as the discussion above, reiterate that housing delivery is a complex and wicked problem that could be better dealt with through the adoption of the systems thinking approach. Housing delivery would benefit from the application of systems thinking. Clearly, government, through its current housing delivery model, is

unwittingly contributing to the unsustainable delivery of housing. Systems thinking would help government officials and stakeholders recognise interconnections and relationships among systems components, and understand the dynamic nature and behaviour of systems. This way of thinking would allow officials to consider both the entire housing delivery system and its parts, and appreciate the system's multiple and diverse perspectives. Officials would thus appreciate the participation of all stakeholders. At a practical level, government would benefit from resources available from stakeholders who would now be viewed as part of the housing delivery systems. This would enhance the sustainability of the housing delivery system.

Based on the foregoing, the author recommends the following regarding the building of systems thinking capability in the human settlements sector. Government officials (i.e., public servants) responsible for the delivery of housing across all spheres of government should be introduced to the concept of systems thinking and make this one of the compulsory competencies. The systems thinking skills set would equip them with the insight and ability to facilitate and coordinate meaningful participation of all stakeholders in the housing delivery value chain, including beneficiaries, for collective impact and sustainable housing delivery.

To enhance the participation of all stakeholders in the delivery of sustainable human settlements, the author recommends that government and the Ministry of Housing (Human Settlements) establish, at national level, a National Housing Committee that would oversee the development of the housing policy and programmes. The committee would also monitor the implementation of programmes and the allocation of housing. This committee would be constituted of members from the state (i.e., three spheres of government), the private sector (e.g., material suppliers, housing finance institutions, developers), labour unions, NGOs, CBOs, professionals in the built environment and political parties represented in the national assembly (i.e., parliament), among others. This could be replicated in each provincial government.

Lastly, the article recommends that government, through the Department for Public Service and Administration (DPSA), consider building systems thinking capabilities into the public service, including at local government level. The use of systems thinking in housing has the potential of addressing the complexity attached to the delivery of housing in South Africa. This complexity is threatening the effectiveness and sustainability of the nation's housing delivery programme that has seen an unprecedented delivery of more than five million housing opportunities in just two and a half decades. The nation would

benefit from the participation of all stakeholders in ensuring access to adequate housing for all. Lastly, the use of systems thinking would ensure meaningful participation of communities and individuals in the realisation of their right to adequate housing.

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the rate of new COVID-19 infections dramatically increased early in 2020, its spread surprised the international community as well as countries that considered themselves geographically distant, or mistakenly trusted in their own capacity to deal quickly with such a contingency. Although the term "pandemic" is not easily used when referring to health matters, the World Health Organization (WHO) characterised COVID-19 as a global pandemic on 11 March 2020. Various international conventions and protocols for managing COVID-19 followed, while states had to make tough decisions on national lockdowns and managing their societies to limit the spread of the disease.

With the dawn of 2021, COVID-19 was still unfolding as an international pandemic with no conclusive idea of its timelines, the extent of global vaccine drives and their effectiveness, the prospects for new variants of the virus and the possibility of further deadly waves of infection. Yet, despite these uncertainties, what was clearly evident was that COVID-19 would have an enduring effect on global health, economies and societies together with politics and government activities, amongst others. In our efforts to make sense of COVID-19, it is therefore important to continue studying its origins, evolution and impact on a national, regional and international scale, and to gain knowledge and understanding from it for managing future health emergencies.

By the middle of 2021, COVID-19 infections and deaths, fuelled by different variants of the coronavirus, rose sharply across the African continent. The highly transmissible Delta variant of the virus was detected in 26 African countries, the Alpha variant in 38 countries and the Beta variant in 35 countries. However, COVID-19 statistics in Africa are largely driven by South Africa (with about 37% of all reported cases) and Tunisia (accounting for about 8%) by the end of July 2021 (WHO 2021a). Although reported cases declined during the second half of the year, the pandemic remained a deadly and destructive reality. By early September 2021, the cumulative reported COVID-19 cases in 47 African countries amounted to 5 748 519 and the confirmed COVID-19 fatalities were 139 718 (WHO 2021b). The fact that the COVID-19 disease pattern in Africa is lower than on other continents could likely be ascribed to socio-ecological factors such as low population density, a younger demographic, and hot and humid weather. However, the WHO Africa office has warned against complacency and that relaxing vigilance could ramp up infections again (WHO 2020).

A positive development during the latter part of 2021 was that, after a worrying lull in shipping vaccines to Africa in the first half of the year, the vaccine drive on the continent and the delivery of vaccines from multiple sources is now rapidly increasing. Close to

four million doses of vaccine from the COVAX facility arrived in Africa during the last week of July in comparison with only 245 000 doses during the whole of June. At the end of July about 79 million vaccine doses arrived in Africa and 21 million people were fully vaccinated, amounting to roughly 1.6% of Africa's population. If everybody were to receive the two-dose vaccine, about 820 million doses would be required to fully vaccinate 30% of Africa's population by the end of 2021. As the COVAX target for 2021 was to deliver 520 million vaccine doses to Africa, it was quickly evident that much had to be done to substantially increase the vaccination rate on the continent (WHO 2021a).

By 23 December 2021, the total vaccine doses administered globally stood at a total of 8 802 278 315. Africa's likelihood of completely overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic is minimal unless 70% of its population is vaccinated by the end of 2022 but only five of 54 countries in Africa are on track to have 40% of their populations fully vaccinate by the end of 2022. Africa received too few vaccines from the global supply: approximately 540 million of more than nine billion doses produced. Of these, 309 million doses were administered by early January 2022 and less than ten percent of Africans were fully vaccinated (Sidibé 2022). Due to lower vaccination levels in Africa and new, fast-spreading variants such as Omicron emerging, the potential for higher infection and death rates from COVID-19 increased. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed Africa's vulnerabilities in access to vaccines as well as medical technology and specifically vaccine manufacturing, as less than a percent of the vaccines used in Africa had been produced on the continent (Geddes 2022).

Although we might wish to "forget" the COVID-19 experience as soon as possible and move on, it has certainly set the stage for years to come and we need to take cognisance of its lessons. One of the most pertinent lessons learned is that, although it was required to place a concerted effort on fighting COVID-19 and its impact, it did not imply that we could forget about the many other global, regional and national challenges that pre-dated the pandemic. They did not mysteriously disappear but were either latent, did not receive sufficient attention due to the overwhelming focus on COVID-19 or were exacerbated by the impact of COVID-19. Consequently, it is evident that one crisis does not dissolve another and that despite a globally destructive event such as COVID-19 we still constantly need to understand, adapt and address multiple challenges, consider the suitability of our systems and governance processes, and allocate appropriate resources.

Initially COVID-19 might have been perceived as essentially a health crisis but the reality has proven to be dramatically different. It resulted in a global economic crisis but with an

unequal, extensive and disproportionate economic impact on Africa. The economic crisis was, amongst others, fuelled by contracted external demand, reduced local demand and less economic activity due to lockdown measures, shrinking tax revenues and increasing spending on health and social protection (Adam 2020). Although Africa is still reeling, the prospects for economic recovery are strengthened by actions to contain the pandemic and speed up vaccine rollouts, a slower spread of the virus and lower mortality rates on the continent, agricultural growth and a commodity price recovery that has occurred faster than expected. However, African countries need to continue with reforms to create jobs, encourage investment and enhance competitiveness (World Bank 2021).

The pandemic resulted in one of the most severe disruptions of education in history which could be seen as a greater threat to most children than the virus itself. As UNESCO indicated, the worldwide closing of schools in an effort to stop the spread of the virus worsened global inequalities and access to education as well as higher drop-out rates – even more so for girls, as they might face more pressure to substitute education for domestic chores, could be forced into marriage earlier or become pregnant or be victims of sexual violence and abuse (UNESCO 2021; Solberg 2020). In addition to the few aspects highlighted above a much wider, and in some cases, deeper impact of the pandemic on society endured as food insecurity increased, inequalities and polarisation between countries and people became worse, disproportionate distress to women, girls and marginalised communities became apparent, while a worldwide mistrust of public institutions and leaders surged (Mirchandani 2020). Such mistrust is, amongst others, evident in the anti-vaccine positions of groups and individuals across the globe along with conspiracy theories and fake news. Social media have become valuable instruments for fuelling these matters and entrenching divisions.

Nevertheless, all was not negative. It was encouraging to see that often generosity and humanity were able to triumph in this time of crisis. We constantly saw reports of unbelievable solidarity between individuals and communities as well as across countries. It showed that different people and the wider world could work together to address shared challenges – an experience that we hope will outlast the pandemic as many other global challenges loom ahead.

The looming humanitarian crises related and unrelated to COVID-19 remain matters of much concern. Many countries on the African continent must deal with diverse and large vulnerable groups (as the article by Domingos Batone indicates in this volume) which include people with disabilities, the elderly, victims of natural disasters, victims of

gender-based violence, displaced persons, refugees fleeing conflict, orphaned children and now even families directly affected by COVID-19. As COVID-19 disproportionately impacts on the most vulnerable and marginalised communities and individuals in society, equity and inclusivity must remain at the centre of what we do going forward and how we govern our societies.

In March 2020, the Secretary-General of the United Nations made an urgent appeal for a global ceasefire as we had to focus on defeating COVID-19 together. Silencing the guns would also create opportunities for life-saving aid and diplomacy and bringing hope to people in conflict zones who were particularly vulnerable because of the pandemic (UN 2020). Yet, despite this call, violence, conflict and unrest surged across the globe and in a number of instances also in Africa. This certainly impeded on earlier gains in growth and development, while also setting the strides many African countries had made towards consolidating democracy backwards for some time to come. Complex challenges such as conflict, hunger and climate change are closely linked and should be tackled by governments, all levels of society and through states working together. The level of peace and stability as well as the prospects for economic development is shaped by the quality and characteristics of governance, as it contributes to the legitimacy of those exercising authority. Although the UN commemorated its 75th anniversary in 2020, global cooperation is not where it should be and multilateralism should be reimagined, specifically as recent events have shown how urgent it is for countries to collaborate internationally in their efforts to address challenges ranging from health care to inequality, sustainable economic development and international peace and security (Mirchandani 2020). This is specifically relevant to Africa and its place in the emerging world, as the 54 African states constitute 25 percent of the membership of the UN.

We need to appreciate that our environment is facing an "ecological pandemic". As biodiversity is disappearing, many ecosystems have already collapsed and oceans are acidifying as a result of generations of unchecked human activity, emission trajectories and the unscrupulous plundering of nature. As we are experiencing some of the warmest years on record, unchecked wildfires, power typhoons, floods and droughts around the world, it is a decisive time to address the health of our planet.

To address many of the challenges referred to above, the implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) remains pertinent. We need to reiterate the universal call to action for global partnerships in enhancing peace and prosperity for all people living on our planet. Holistic and balanced approaches to ensure sustainable

development in all spheres are necessary, as actions in a specific goal area will also affect other areas. The collective resolve in Africa to tackle integrated developmental challenges and address the focus areas inherent to the SDGs must be enhanced. What is necessary, amongst others, for the implementation of the SDGs is ensuring that suitable plans are in place, together with good governance, engagements among and with countries aimed at allocating effective resources, responsive public services with the capacity to implement plans and leverage resources, cooperation with stakeholders in all sectors on the most appropriate approaches and continuing with efforts to secure the sustainable funding required (Tandoh-Offin 2019: 49-50). Achieving the ambitious outcomes inherent to the SDGs and creating a better planet for future generations therefore call for effective partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil society.

As we are hopefully taking important steps on our journey to move beyond COVID-19, it is crucial to again place much focus on dealing with the complex challenges of our continent, good governance, sustainable socio-economic development and enhancing human security in the widest terms. Since dealing with complex challenges depend on good institutions, African countries must continue to fortify their often-weak institutions (Fosu 2018). To stimulate growth and create jobs are of utmost importance. Amongst others, this is to be supported by infrastructure developments, industrialisation processes, strategic localisation of production, expansion of exports, improved energy security and development of the digital economy on the continent. Free trade among African economies under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement will provide important future opportunities for economic growth and development, and businesses can form part of this effort by pursuing diverse opportunities.

However, taking action should not only be seen as the responsibility of governments, the private sector and NGOs but also of all citizens collectively. So, what can citizens do in dealing with the complex challenges and adapting to "our time"? They need to support the many international, regional and national initiatives aimed at normalising society, economies and politics, while also cooperating with these collective efforts to achieve success. Although it might appear to be a cliché, being law abiding citizens is crucial. All citizens must contribute within their spheres to stabilise societies, exterminate corruption, make sure that the rule of law applies, contribute towards preserving the planet for human habitation and support civil society efforts to create better governments. We must support business and small business development by stimulating demand through buying goods produced locally and on the African continent. The business aptitudes of particularly young people and women must be stimulated to encourage them to seize opportunities and start their own small businesses. Entrepreneurs are the lifeblood of any economy, as

they can create a cycle of economic activity and a ripple effect within communities and across the economy. Small businesses are one of the best ways to drive growth, in particular inclusive growth, while small business development may contribute to navigating the economic fallout caused by the pandemic.

The contributions published in this edition of the *Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance* (AJPSDG) highlight some of the diverse issues with which African governments must deal. These include theoretical approaches to service delivery, governing institutions of higher learning, democracy and sustainable development, service delivery and policing.

The relevance of theoretical approaches and their contribution to addressing the complex challenges remain issues of debate and interpretation. The article by Thomas Ramovha questions if Systems Thinking could be applied to addressing the challenges the South African government is facing in the sphere of housing delivery. There is a dire housing shortage for poor and low- to medium-income earners in South Africa, and government needs to deliver on the constitutional imperative relating to the right to adequate housing. Although the housing subsidy programme introduced after 1994 has delivered about five million housing opportunities to the poor and low- to medium-income households, the housing deficit has increased exponentially with demand exceeding delivery. The problem is compounded by the fact that government's current housing delivery programme is unsustainable in terms of affordability, is riddled with unintended consequences and complicated by many stakeholders with diverse views. As Ramovha indicates, Systems Thinking is a tool for tackling complex issues because it provides a more holistic perspective with parts of a system viewed in relation to the whole, and performance may be improved through understanding the whole system. The view is that Systems Thinking may contribute to successful housing delivery.

As the African Union Commission has often reiterated, quality higher learning, the creation of a knowledge economy and well-governed institutions are crucial in supporting capacity building and are drivers of socio-economic development of the continent (African Union Commission 2018). Lazarus Nabaho examines proposed university governance reforms emanating from the Rwendeire Report on the Makerere University in Uganda. He highlights that corporate-level governance reform proposals include adopting a lean and lay-dominated university council, the disfranchisement of vice chancellors and the introduction of competence-based councils. The minister responsible for higher education should be mandated to appoint university councils and limit terms.

In addition, vice chancellors should be appointed and not elected, and their position should be professionalised to strengthen their executive authority. Senates should move from focusing on statutory to institution-specific functions, and membership should be competence-based. These proposals attempt to remodel university councils as corporate boards and to further subordinate senates of public universities to councils. Higher education, however, should be cautious of adopting a pure corporatist model for university governance that advocates for lay university councils under which chief executive officers are members of the oversight bodies but without voting rights.

The article by Milly Paile, Johnny M. Pietersen and Juanita Fennell is a reflection on action learning as part of a management development programme of the South African National School of Government. It is written from the perspective of education, training and development practitioners in the South African public service. The authors reflect on the rollout of the Emerging Management Development Programme through a partnership arrangement for participants from the South African National Parks. The project offers a structured way of enriching the programme with action learning aimed at enhancing participants' problem-solving skills while supporting the improvement of organisational systems and practices. The authors reflect on the context of institutional collaboration and the opportunities for personal and organisational learning, drawing on observations during training as well as views from managers, participants and facilitators. They found that blending personal development with collaborative action learning could stimulate cycles of organisational learning and sector-wide development. Consequently, and specifically due to unpredictable local and global disruptions, it is of much relevance to adapt curricula and apply such teaching and learning approaches.

The article by Firimooni Rweere Banugire focuses on balancing socio-economic drivers of development in Uganda. Because of the current concerns about a decline in the quality of service delivery systems and the management of the economy in Uganda, the paper argues strongly for good economic governance as a prerequisite in the quest for ensuring inclusive and sustainable development. The author takes a deductive and comparative approach while also taking cognisance of global success stories and lessons from past experience. He highlights three important aspects he urges decision makers and policy developers in Uganda to take note of: first, a special focus on combining structural transformation policy with good governance reforms; secondly, the decline of good economic governance in Uganda since the 1960s, and finally, the operationalisation of the key principles of good economic governance through proper mechanisms to drive inclusive development in Uganda. He concludes that the implications of policies, getting

budget priorities right and implementing the correct policies are of crucial importance for inclusive development.

As the debate about the prospects of democracy at a global level is ongoing, the same applies to democratisation as well as the crucial link between democracy and development in Africa. Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari contributes with an article on the political economy of elections and voting in Ghana during the Fourth Republican period from 1992 to 2020. Government's economic policies and electoral data are used to analyse the effects of economic policy on electoral outcomes at macro level. It indicates that worsening economic conditions and economic policy failures have influenced voting behaviour in each of the eight elections of the period. Several challenges in Ghana were overcome as the democratic transition continued together with economic growth and better social services delivery but income inequality widened. Ghana's democratic development is also driven by patronage electoral politics and this is done by connecting the interest of people with those in society who possess greater access to power and resources. In conclusion, the general elections outcome between 1992 and 2020 indicated that the average Ghanaian voter considered how to vote due to cost benefits associated with candidates whose party policies approximated his or her aspirations.

The article by Gabriella Loteni Nguluwe and Charles Keyter focused on the implementation of Namibia's 2008 water and sanitation policy with reference to the Onhimbu informal settlement close to Outapi. After Namibia had gained independence in 1990, urbanisation increased. As local authorities often failed to provide sufficient housing, squatter camps and informal settlements emerged, with residents lacking access to water and sanitation services. With a population of 1 521 in the town of Outapi, the Onhimbu informal settlement is a case in point. Outapi is located in the northern part of Namibia in the Omusati region. As the Onhimbu residents faced challenges with water and sanitation services, a research project conducted in 2017 aimed to determine if the Water Supply and Sanitation Policy of 2008 had been implemented successfully. Through a mixed method approach relying primarily on questionnaires and interviews, perceptions of all stakeholders ranging from officials in different spheres of government to the residents of Onhimbu were obtained and analysed. It revealed that the 2008 policy had not been fully implemented due to a lack of human and financial resources.

Police services across the world must ensure public order and safety, secure life and property and enforce the law. Tope Shola Akinyetun indicates that this is also the primary duty of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) but they have fallen short of expectations. The

author argues that the NPF is enmeshed in corruption and protects the interest of the state through violence. The paper aims to assess how coercion, corruption and brutality have affected the performance of the NPF. In a qualitative approach based on wide-ranging sources the author highlights that NPF performance is influenced by socio-economic, ecological and sociocultural factors that have resulted in a lack of effective policing and differences between the police and the policed. This has caused violent reaction from Nigerian youths against police brutality and resulted in calls to disband an arm of the NPF (the Special Anti-Robbery Squad or SARS). The author recommends that the NPF improve public-private partnerships in its administration and limit political interference in policing. The federal government, in conjunction with the private sector, should institutionally reform the NPF to address the many challenges plaguing the force.

Domingos Carlos Batone discusses the inclusion of people with disabilities in the Mozambican labour market. The focus is on two dimensions of public employment policies: the "passive" contributions providing income support for unemployed people through unemployment insurance and other social subsidies, and the "active" contributions aimed at helping unemployed disabled people to return to work with new skills through training programmes and direct job creation in both the public and private sectors. Although both approaches have strengths, in practice, implementation and access of people with disabilities to public employment and other alternatives are challenging. The findings of this study emanate from a literature study, statistics of the 2017 general census, interviews and assistance from the TV Surdo organisation dedicated to defending the rights of people with disabilities. Because discrimination and stigmatisation increasingly limit access to the labour market, more action is necessary to promote the rights of this group. Furthermore, public employment policies in Mozambique are predominantly passive, and between 2018 and 2021 subsidies have not increased despite inflation and an increase in the cost of living.

The final contribution is a brief overview of selected newly published books on Africa by publishers worldwide. Books selected highlight African history, include a biography and an autobiography, focus on governance and democratic processes, and represent different regions. It is important that we research, publish and study sources on Africa. Such publications disseminate research and scholarly contributions in different fields and provide opportunities to diagnose, analyse and remedy challenges. It is also a way to make researchers and practitioners in other parts of the world aware of African realities, practices and experiences, and to enhance knowledge and understanding on Africa. In addition, the publication of books and peer-reviewed articles are assets to African researchers and scholars, as they provide them with opportunities to be acknowledged as

experts in a specific field at national, regional and international level. Through publications individuals, academic departments, universities and institutions receive recognition. We need to read published sources on Africa, as they stimulate scholarly pursuits and new ideas, while also contributing to better insight into and understanding of our continent.

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ÉDITORIALE

FAIRE FACE A DIFFERENTS DEFIS SUR LE CONTINENT AFRICAIN : PENDANT ET APRES LA COVID-19.

Thean Potgieter

Le monde entier traverse une période difficile. En plus des conséquences de la COVID-19, nous devons gérer différents défis inhérents aux dilemmes de notre époque. Dans pareils moments, comme tout au long de l'histoire, les récits et la fiction n'ont pas uniquement joué un rôle divertissant, mais ils ont également produit des joyaux qui nous encourageaient à nous adapter et à persévérer. L'un de ces joyaux est une citation du célèbre ouvrage de Tolkien, *La Communauté de l'anneau,* où Frodon déclare : « J'aurais bien voulu que cela n'eût pas à se passer de mon temps ». Et Gandalf lui répond : « Moi aussi (...) comme tous ceux qui vivent pour voir de tels temps. Mais la décision ne leur appartient pas. Tout ce que nous avons à décider, c'est ce que nous devons faire du temps qui nous est donné. » (Tolkien 1981/82).

Nous savons maintenant que cela « s'est passé de [notre] temps ». Bien que près de deux années se soient écoulées depuis que la COVID-19 est devenue une situation d'urgence mondiale majeure, de nouvelles crises (souvent choquantes) et d'anciens défis rapportés par les médias internationaux restent à gérer. Dans l'avenir, il nous faudra « décider » comment faire face aux multiples défis auxquels nous sommes confrontés à ce carrefour de l'histoire du monde et « que faire du temps qui nous est donné ».

Malheureusement, la page de la pandémie de COVID-19 n'est pas encore tournée même si nous avons beaucoup progressé dans notre lutte depuis la fin de 2019. Lorsque les cas d'infections ont explosé en début 2020, la propagation de la COVID-19 a surpris la communauté internationale ainsi que les pays qui se considéraient géographiquement éloignés ou qui pensaient à tort être capables de réagir rapidement à une telle éventualité. Le terme « pandémie » ne s'emploie pas à la légère dans le domaine sanitaire. Pourtant, c'est bien le terme que l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) a utilisé le 11 mars 2020 en qualifiant la COVID-19 de pandémie mondiale. Plusieurs conventions et protocoles internationaux de gestion de la COVID-19 ont ensuite été adoptés et les États ont dû faire des choix difficiles tels que le confinement à l'échelle nationale et la gestion des populations afin de limiter la propagation de la maladie.

À l'aube de l'année 2021, la pandémie mondiale de COVID-19 faisait toujours rage et ne laissait rien présager avec certitude, que ce soit son évolution, l'ampleur des campagnes mondiales de vaccination et leur efficacité, les perspectives de nouveaux variants du virus et la possibilité de nouvelles vagues mortelles d'infection. Pourtant, malgré ces incertitudes, il était évident que la COVID-19 aurait un effet durable sur la santé mondiale, les économies et les sociétés, ainsi que la politique, les activités gouvernementales et dans bien d'autres domaines. Dans nos efforts de donner un sens à la COVID-19, il est important de continuer à étudier ses origines, son évolution et son impact à l'échelle nationale, régionale et internationale, et d'en tirer des enseignements et une compréhension pour gérer les futures urgences sanitaires.

En milieu d'année 2021, les infections et les décès dus à la COVID-19 et à ses différents variants ont fortement augmenté sur l'ensemble du continent africain. Le variant Delta, extrêmement transmissible, a été détecté dans 26 pays africains, le variant Alpha dans 38 pays et le variant Bêta dans 35 pays. Cependant, les statistiques relatives à la COVID-19 en Afrique sont principalement tirées par l'Afrique du Sud (avec environ 37 % de tous les cas signalés) et la Tunisie (environ 8 %) en fin de juillet 2021 (OMS 2021a). Bien que les cas signalés aient diminué durant la deuxième moitié de l'année, la pandémie est restée une réalité mortelle et destructrice. En début septembre 2021, les cas cumulés de COVID-19 signalés dans 47 pays africains s'élevaient à 5 748 519 et les décès confirmés dus à la COVID-19 étaient 139 718 (OMS 2021b). Le caractère moins meurtrier de la COVID-19 en Afrique par rapport aux autres continents pourrait être imputable à des facteurs socio-écologiques tels qu'une densité de population faible, une population plus jeune et un climat chaud et humide. Toutefois, le Bureau régional de l'OMS pour l'Afrique a mis en garde contre la complaisance et le relâchement de la vigilance qui pourraient causer une remontée du taux d'infection (OMS 2020).

La fin d'année 2021 a connu une évolution positive car après une période inquiétante de cessation d'expédition de vaccins vers l'Afrique durant le premier semestre de l'année, la campagne de vaccination sur le continent et la livraison de vaccins à partir de différents endroits ont bien repris et s'accélèrent. Près de quatre millions de doses de vaccin en provenance des bureaux COVAX sont arrivées en Afrique au cours de la dernière semaine de juillet, contre seulement 245 000 doses durant tout le mois de juin. Fin juillet, environ 79 millions de doses de vaccin sont arrivées en Afrique et 21 millions de personnes ont été entièrement vaccinées, soit environ 1,6 % de la population africaine. Si tout le monde recevait le vaccin à deux doses, il faudrait environ 820 millions de doses pour vacciner complètement 30 % de la population africaine d'ici la fin de 2021. L'objectif du COVAX étant d'administrer 520 millions de doses de vaccin en l'Afrique en 2021, il est vite devenu évident qu'il restait beaucoup à faire pour augmenter de façon significative le taux de vaccination sur le continent (OMS 2021a).

Au 23 décembre 2021, le nombre de doses de vaccin administrées dans le monde s'élevait à 8 802 278 315. À moins que 70 % de sa population se fasse vacciner d'ici fin 2022, l'Afrique a peu de chances de venir complètement à bout de la pandémie de la COVID-19. Jusqu'ici, seuls cinq des 54 pays d'Afrique sont en bonne voie pour que 40 % de leur population soit entièrement vaccinée d'ici fin 2022. L'Afrique a reçu très peu de vaccins du stock mondial : environ 540 millions de doses sur plus de neuf milliards produites. Sur la quantité reçue, seules 309 millions de doses ont été administrées début janvier 2022 et moins de dix pour cent des Africains ont été entièrement vaccinés (Sidibé 2022). En raison du faible taux de vaccination en Afrique et des nouveaux variants à diffusion rapide tels qu'Omicron, les risques d'infection et d'augmentation de la mortalité dus à la COVID-19 se sont accrus. En outre, la pandémie de COVID-19 a exposé les vulnérabilités de l'Afrique en matière d'accès aux vaccins et à la technologie médicale, en particulier dans le domaine de la fabrication de vaccins. En effet, moins d'un pour cent des vaccins utilisés en Afrique ont été produits sur le continent (Geddes 2022).

Bien que nous avons hâte « d'oublier » l'épisode COVID-19 dès que possible et de passer à autre chose, cette expérience nous a préparé aux années à venir et il est important d'en tirer des leçons. L'une des plus importantes leçons apprises est que, bien que la COVID-19 et la gestion de ses effets ont mobilisé des efforts conjoints, il ne faut pas pour autant négliger les nombreux autres défis mondiaux, régionaux et nationaux antérieurs à la pandémie. Ces défis n'ont pas mystérieusement disparu. Certains étaient latents, d'autres ont été négligés en raison de toute l'attention focalisée sur la COVID-19, et d'autres encore

se sont aggravés en raison de la pandémie. Il est évident qu'une crise n'en dissout pas une autre et qu'en dépit d'un événement destructeur mondial tel que la COVID-19, nous devons continuer de comprendre, de nous adapter et de relever les multiples défis qui se présentent. Nous devons également examiner dans quelle mesure nos systèmes et processus de gouvernance sont adaptés aux besoins, puis affecter les ressources en conséquence.

Au départ, on aurait pu penser que la COVID-19 n'était qu'une crise sanitaire, mais la réalité s'est révélée toute autre. Elle a entraîné une crise économique mondiale aux conséquences économiques inégales, graves et démesurées en Afrique. La crise économique a entre autres été alimentée par la contraction de la demande extérieure, la réduction de la demande locale, la baisse de l'activité économique en raison des mesures de confinement, la diminution des recettes fiscales et l'augmentation des dépenses de santé et de protection sociale (Adam 2020). L'Afrique se remet à grand peine, mais les mesures visant à endiguer la pandémie et à accélérer le déploiement des vaccins laissent présager une reprise économique. Cet espoir est renforcé par une propagation plus lente du virus, des taux de mortalité plus faibles sur le continent, une croissance agricole et une remontée plus rapide que prévu des prix des produits de base. Les pays africains doivent cependant poursuivre les réformes pour créer des emplois, encourager l'investissement et renforcer la compétitivité (Banque mondiale 2021).

La pandémie a perturbé le système d'éducation comme jamais auparavant, ce qui a constitué pour la plupart des enfants une menace plus grande encore que le virus même. Comme l'expliquait l'UNESCO, la fermeture des écoles dans le monde entier dans le but de freiner la propagation du virus a aggravé les inégalités dans le monde et réduit l'accès à l'éducation. L'abandon scolaire a augmenté, en particulier chez les filles car elles subissaient davantage de pressions pour remplacer l'école par les tâches domestiques, certaines tombaient enceintes tandis que d'autres étaient forcées de se marier plus tôt ou étaient victimes de violence et d'abus sexuels (UNESCO 2021 ; Solberg 2020). En plus des éléments précédents, la pandémie a eu un impact plus large et parfois plus profond sur la société avec notamment l'augmentation de l'insécurité alimentaire, des inégalités et de la polarisation entre les pays et les personnes. De plus, le sentiment d'intense détresse chez les femmes, les filles et les communautés marginalisées est devenu évident, ainsi qu'une méfiance générale envers les institutions publiques et les dirigeants (Mirchandani 2020). Cette méfiance transparaît clairement dans les positions antivaccins de groupes et d'individus à travers le monde, ainsi que dans les théories du complot et les fausses nouvelles. Les médias sociaux ont été les instruments clés pour alimenter ces suspicions et consolider les divisions.

Cependant, tout n'a pas été négatif. Il était encourageant de voir la générosité et l'humanité bien souvent triompher durant cette période de crise. De nombreux rapports faisaient état d'élans de solidarité incroyables entre les individus, les communautés et les pays. Cela a démontré que des personnes différentes et le monde entier pouvaient collaborer à relever ensemble des défis communs, une collaboration qui on l'espère survivra à la pandémie dans la perspective de défis mondiaux futurs.

Les crises humanitaires imminentes liées ou non à la COVID-19 restent très préoccupantes. De nombreux pays du continent africain doivent gérer d'importants groupes de personnes vulnérables (comme l'indique l'article de Domingos Batone dans ce volume). Il s'agit entre autres de personnes handicapées, de personnes âgées, de victimes de catastrophes naturelles, de victimes de violence sexiste, de personnes déplacées, de réfugiés fuyant les conflits, d'orphelins et même de familles directement touchés par la COVID-19. Puisque la COVID-19 a un impact encore plus grand sur les communautés et les individus vulnérables et marginalisés de la société, l'équité et l'inclusivité doivent rester une priorité dans l'exercice de nos activités et la gouvernance de nos sociétés.

En mars 2020, le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies a lancé un appel urgent en faveur d'un cessez-le-feu mondial afin de mobiliser tous les efforts dans la lutte contre la COVID-19. Un cessez-le-feu permet de créer des opportunités d'aide et des solutions diplomatiques de secours, et apporte de l'espoir aux personnes dans les zones de conflit particulièrement rendues vulnérables par la pandémie (ONU 2020). Pourtant, malgré cet appel, des troubles et des conflits violents ont éclaté dans le monde, dont certains en Afrique. Cela a entravé les acquis antérieurs en matière de croissance et de développement et rallongé durablement le processus de démocratisation de nombreux pays africains. Les conflits, la faim et le changement climatique sont des problématiques complexes et étroitement liées qui doivent être abordées par toutes les couches de la société, les gouvernements et les États travaillant ensemble. Le niveau de paix et de stabilité ainsi que les perspectives de développement économique sont déterminés par la qualité et les caractéristiques de la gouvernance, qui contribue à la légitimité des dirigeants. Bien que l'ONU ait célébré son 75e anniversaire en 2020, la coopération mondiale n'est pas à son meilleur niveau et le multilatéralisme devrait être repensé. En effet, les événements récents ont révélé à quel point la collaboration internationale et les efforts communs des pays sont essentiels pour relever les défis relatifs à la santé, aux inégalités, au développement durable et à la paix et la sécurité internationales (Mirchandani 2020). Cela est particulièrement pertinent pour l'Afrique et sa place dans le

monde émergent, car les 54 États africains représentent 25 pour cent des membres de l'ONU.

Il faut comprendre que notre environnement vit actuellement une « pandémie écologique ». La biodiversité disparaît peu à peu, de nombreux écosystèmes se sont déjà effondrés et les océans s'acidifient du fait d'activités humaines non contrôlées depuis des décennies, de courbes d'émission ascendantes et du pillage sans scrupules des ressources naturelles. Dans le contexte actuel de records de chaleurs, d'incendies de forêts non maîtrisés, de typhons destructeurs, d'inondations et de sécheresses dans le monde entier, c'est plus que jamais le moment de s'occuper de la santé de notre planète.

Afin de relever les nombreux défis précédemment mentionnés, il est important de mettre en œuvre les objectifs de développement durable (ODD) des Nations Unies. Nous devons réitérer l'appel à l'action de tous grâce à des partenariats mondiaux visant à assurer la paix et la prospérité de tous les peuples vivant sur la planète. Des approches complètes et intégrées sont nécessaires pour assurer un développement durable global, car des actions ciblant un domaine en affecteront d'autres. La détermination collective en Afrique de relever les défis du développement intégré et de s'attaquer aux domaines prioritaires inhérents aux ODD doit être renforcée. La mise en œuvre des ODD nécessite plusieurs mesures. Il est important de mettre en place des programmes adaptés, une bonne gouvernance, des engagements entre pays concernant la répartition des ressources efficaces et des services publics réactifs ayant la capacité de mettre en œuvre des plans et de mobiliser des ressources. Les parties prenantes de tous les secteurs doivent également définir ensemble les approches les plus appropriées et poursuivre leur efforts pour garantir un financement durable (Tandoh-Offin 2019 : 49-50). Pour produire les effets ambitieux des ODD et créer une meilleure planète pour les générations futures, il est donc nécessaire d'établir des partenariats efficaces entre les gouvernements, le secteur privé et la société civile.

Nous espérons prendre des mesures importantes qui nous permettront de continuer à avancer même après la fin de la pandémie de COVID-19. C'est pourquoi il faut nous attaquer de nouveau aux problématiques complexes de notre continent grâce à la bonne gouvernance, le développement socio-économique durable et la promotion de la sécurité humaine au sens large du terme. Les pays africains doivent continuer de renforcer leurs institutions souvent faibles car relever des défis complexes passe par des institutions solides (Fosu 2018). Par ailleurs, il est absolument primordial de stimuler la croissance et de créer des emplois. Cela suppose notamment le développement des infrastructures, les

processus d'industrialisation, la localisation stratégique de la production, l'augmentation des exportations, l'amélioration de la sécurité énergétique et le développement de l'économie numérique sur le continent. Le libre-échange entre les économies africaines dans le cadre de l'Accord sur la zone de libre-échange continentale africaine offrira d'importantes possibilités de croissance et de développement économiques, et les entreprises peuvent participer à cet effort en recherchant des opportunités.

Cependant, agir n'est pas uniquement de la responsabilité des gouvernements, du secteur privé et des ONG, mais également de tous les citoyens. Comment les citoyens peuvent-ils réagir face aux défis complexes et s'adapter à « notre temps » ? Ils doivent soutenir les nombreuses initiatives internationales, régionales et nationales visant à réguler la société, les économies et la politique et coopérer à ces efforts collectifs pour en garantir le succès. Au risque de faire cliché, il est important que les citoyens respectent les lois. Chaque citoyen peut contribuer à son niveau à stabiliser la société, à lutter contre la corruption, à veiller au respect des lois, à préserver le cadre d'habitat de la planète et à soutenir les efforts de la société civile pour créer de meilleurs gouvernements. Nous devons soutenir le développement des activités et des petites entreprises en stimulant la demande par l'achat de biens produits sur le continent africain. Il est important d'encourager tout particulièrement les jeunes et les femmes ayant des aptitudes commerciales à saisir les opportunités et à démarrer leurs petites activités. Les entrepreneurs sont le poumon de toute économie, car ils créent un cycle d'activité économique et un effet d'entraînement au sein des collectivités et dans l'ensemble de l'économie. Les petites entreprises constituent l'un des meilleurs moyens de stimuler la croissance, en particulier la croissance inclusive. Les développer peut contribuer à faire face aux retombées économiques causées par la pandémie.

Les articles publiés dans cette édition du *Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance* (AJPSDG) mettent en évidence quelques difficultés auxquelles les gouvernements africains doivent faire face. Ces articles comprennent des approches théoriques de la prestation de services, des institutions régissant l'enseignement supérieur, de la démocratie et du développement durable, de la prestation de services et des services de police.

La pertinence des approches théoriques et leur rôle dans la lutte pour relever des défis complexes reste un sujet à polémique. L'article de Thomas Ramovha interroge dans quelle mesure une approche systémique (de l'anglais Systems Thinking) peut être appliquée pour relever les défis en matière de logement auxquels le gouvernement sud-africain est

confronté. L'Afrique du Sud connaît une grave pénurie de logements pour les personnes pauvres et à revenus faibles ou moyens. Pourtant, le gouvernement a l'obligation d'après la constitution de respecter le droit à un logement convenable. Bien que le programme de subventions au logement mis en place après 1994 ait permis de fournir environ cinq millions de logements aux ménages pauvres et à revenus faibles ou moyens, le déficit en logements a augmenté de façon exponentielle, la demande dépassant le nombre de logements fournis. Le problème est aggravé par le fait que le programme gouvernemental actuel de fourniture de logements n'est pas viable en termes d'accessibilité économique. De plus, il produit des conséquences indésirables et est rendu complexe par de nombreuses parties prenantes dont les avis divergent. Comme l'auteur Ramovha l'indique, l'approche systémique est un outil pour aborder des questions complexes car elle offre une perspective plus holistique. Les parties d'un système sont considérées par rapport à l'ensemble, et la performance peut être améliorée en ayant une compréhension du système tout entier. L'idée est qu'une approche systémique peut aider à gérer efficacement la crise du logement.

Comme souvent défendu par la Commission de l'Union africaine, un enseignement supérieur de qualité, la création d'une économie de la connaissance ainsi que des institutions bien gérées constituent les moteurs du développement socio-économique du continent et sont indispensables pour soutenir le développement des compétences (Commission de l'Union africaine 2018). Lazarus Nabaho examine les propositions de réforme de la gouvernance universitaire contenues dans le rapport Rwendeire sur l'Université de Makerere en Ouganda. Parmi ces propositions de réforme de la gouvernance au niveau de l'organisation, on peut citer l'adoption d'un conseil universitaire à la gérance autonome, la privation du droit de vote des recteurs et l'introduction du critère compétences pour les conseils. Le ministre responsable de l'enseignement supérieur devrait nommer les conseils des universités et limiter la durée des mandats. Les recteurs d'universités devraient être nommés et non élus, et leur poste devrait être professionnalisé afin de renforcer leur pouvoir exécutif. Les sénats devraient passer des fonctions statutaires à des fonctions institutionnelles spécifiques, et le choix des membres devrait être basé sur les compétences. Ces propositions visent à transformer les conseils universitaires en conseils d'administration et à soumettre davantage les sénats des universités publiques aux conseils. L'enseignement supérieur doit toutefois se garder d'adopter un modèle purement corporatiste de gouvernance universitaire qui préconise des conseils universitaires non professionnels dans lesquels les directeurs généraux sont membres des organes de contrôle, mais sans droit de vote.

L'article de Milly Paile, de Johnny M. Pietersen et de Juanita Fennell est une réflexion sur l'apprentissage par l'action dans le cadre d'un programme de développement de la gestion de la South African National School of Government. Les choses sont présentées sous l'angle des professionnels de la fonction publique sud-africaine exerçant dans les domaines de l'éducation, de la formation et du développement. Les auteurs s'intéressent au lancement du programme Emerging Management Development Programme réalisé grâce à un accord de partenariat des parcs nationaux sud-africains. Le projet propose d'enrichir le programme de façon structurée par l'apprentissage par l'action, le but étant d'améliorer les compétences des participants en matière de résolution de problèmes ainsi que les pratiques et les systèmes organisationnels. Les auteurs se penchent sur le contexte de la collaboration institutionnelle et des opportunités d'apprentissage personnel et organisationnel en examinant les observations faites lors des formations et les points de vue des responsables, des participants et des animateurs. D'après leurs conclusions, la combinaison du développement personnel et de l'apprentissage par l'action et de manière collaborative peut stimuler les cycles d'apprentissage organisationnel et le développement sectoriel. Par conséquent, et surtout en raison des perturbations locales et mondiales imprévisibles, il est important d'adapter les programmes et de mettre en œuvre de telles approches d'enseignement et d'apprentissage.

L'article de Firimooni Rweere Banugire porte sur l'équilibre des moteurs socio-économiques du développement en Ouganda. Face aux préoccupations actuelles concernant la baisse de la qualité des prestations de services et de la gestion de l'économie en Ouganda, le document soutient fermement qu'une bonne gouvernance économique constitue la condition préalable à un développement inclusif et durable. L'auteur adopte une approche déductive et comparative tout en examinant des cas de réussite mondiaux et des leçons tirées d'expériences passées. Il invite instamment les décideurs et les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques en Ouganda à considérer trois aspects. Le premier est l'importance d'allier une politique de transformation structurelle à des réformes pour une bonne gouvernance, le deuxième est le déclin que la gouvernance économique en Ouganda a connu depuis les années 1960 et le troisième est la mise en œuvre des principes clés de bonne gouvernance économique par le biais de mécanismes destinés à stimuler le développement inclusif en Ouganda. Il soutient enfin qu'un développement inclusif passe par la mise en place de politiques adaptées et de bonnes priorités budgétaires.

Le débat sur les perspectives de la démocratie au niveau mondial se poursuit. Il en est de même pour le processus de démocratisation en Afrique et le lien fondamental entre démocratie et développement. Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari apporte sa contribution au débat

grâce à un article sur l'économie politique des élections et du vote au Ghana au cours de la quatrième période républicaine de 1992 à 2020. Les politiques économiques et les données électorales du gouvernement sont exploitées dans l'analyse des effets de la politique économique sur les résultats électoraux au niveau macroéconomique. Il en ressort que la détérioration de la situation économique et les échecs des politiques économiques ont influencé le comportement électoral au cours des huit élections de cette période. Le Ghana a su relever plusieurs défis tandis que la transition démocratique accompagnait la croissance économique et l'amélioration de la prestation des services sociaux. Cependant, les écarts de revenus se sont creusés. Le développement démocratique du Ghana est également soutenu par la politique de parrainage électoral qui consiste à faire défendre les intérêts des populations par des membres de la société qui disposent d'un meilleur accès au pouvoir et aux ressources. En conclusion, le résultat des élections générales entre 1992 et 2020 a révélé que l'électeur ghanéen basait son choix de vote sur les avantages financiers des programmes politiques défendus par les candidats qui partageaient le plus ses aspirations.

L'article de Gabriella Loteni Nguluwe et de Charles Keyter présente la mise en œuvre de la politique namibienne de 2008 en matière d'eau et d'assainissement dans les quartiers informels d'Onhimbu près d'Outapi. Après l'indépendance de la Namibie en 1990, le processus d'urbanisation s'est intensifié. Etant donné que les autorités locales ne fournissaient pas suffisamment de logements, des camps de squatters et des habitations précaires ont vu le jour. Les habitants n'avaient accès ni à l'eau ni aux services d'assainissement. Dans la ville d'Outapi, le quartier informel d'Onhimbu qui compte 1 521 habitation est un exemple concret de ce type de camp. Outapi est située dans la partie nord de la Namibie, dans la région d'Omusati. Face aux difficultés des résidents d'Onhimbu à accéder aux services d'eau et d'assainissement, un projet de recherche a été mené en 2017 dans le but de déterminer si la politique d'approvisionnement en eau et d'assainissement de 2008 avait été mise en œuvre avec succès. Grâce à une approche mixte reposant principalement sur des questionnaires et des entretiens, il a été possible de récolter et d'analyser les points de vue de toutes les parties prenantes, que ce soit les fonctionnaires dans les différentes branches du gouvernement ou les résidents d'Onhimbu. L'étude a révélé que la politique de 2008 n'avait pas été pleinement mise en œuvre en raison d'un manque de ressources humaines et financières.

Les services de police du monde entier doivent assurer l'ordre et la sécurité, protéger la vie et les biens des citoyens et faire respecter la loi. Tope Shola Akinyetun affirme que la police nigériane (FPN) a également ce devoir, mais qu'elle n'a pas répondu aux attentes. L'auteur soutient que la FPN est corrompue et protège les intérêts de l'État par la violence.

L'article évalue dans quelle mesure la coercition, la corruption et la brutalité ont affecté la performance de la FPN. Dans une approche qualitative basée sur différentes sources, l'auteur souligne que le rendement de la FPN est influencé par des facteurs socio-économiques, écologiques et socioculturels qui ont entraîné un manque de services de police efficaces et des différences entre la police et les policiers. Ces brutalités policières ont provoqué de violentes réactions de la part des jeunes Nigérians et conduit à des appels à dissoudre un corps de la FPN appelé SARS (Special Anti-Robbery Squad). L'auteur recommande que la FPN améliore les partenariats public-privé dans son administration et limite l'ingérence politique dans les services de police. Le gouvernement fédéral, de concert avec le secteur privé, devrait réformer la FPN afin de relever les nombreux défis auxquels elle fait face.

Domingos Carlos Batone traite de l'inclusion des personnes handicapées sur le marché du travail au Mozambique. Il met l'accent sur deux dimensions des politiques publiques pour l'emploi : les supports « passifs » qui soutiennent le revenu des chômeurs par le biais de l'assurance chômage et d'autres subventions sociales, et les supports « actifs » qui visent à aider les chômeurs handicapés à retrouver un emploi qualifié grâce à des programmes de formation et à la création directe d'emplois dans les secteurs public et privé. Bien que chacune des approches présente des points forts, il reste difficile dans la pratique de les mettre en œuvre et de faire accéder les personnes handicapées à l'emploi et à d'autres alternatives. Les conclusions de cette étude sont tirées d'une étude documentaire, des statistiques du recensement général de 2017, des entretiens et de l'aide apportée par l'organisation TV Surdo spécialisée dans la défense des droits des personnes handicapées. À cause de la discrimination et de la stigmatisation qui limitent de plus en plus l'accès au marché du travail de ces personnes, des mesures supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour défendre leurs droits. En outre, les politiques publiques pour l'emploi au Mozambique sont essentiellement passives, et entre 2018 et 2021, les subventions n'ont pas augmenté en dépit de l'inflation et de l'augmentation du coût de la vie.

Le dernier article présente brièvement quelques livres récemment publiés sur l'Afrique par des éditeurs du monde entier. Les livres sélectionnés mettent l'accent sur l'histoire de l'Afrique, comprennent une biographie et une autobiographie, traitent de la gouvernance et des processus démocratiques de plusieurs régions. Il est important de faire des recherches et de publier des études sur l'Afrique. Ces publications diffusent des travaux universitaires et de recherche dans différents domaines, ce qui offre des opportunités de diagnostics, d'analyse et de résolution des problèmes. Il s'agit également d'un moyen de sensibiliser les chercheurs et les professionnels d'ailleurs aux réalités, aux pratiques et aux expériences africaines, et de promouvoir une meilleure connaissance et

compréhension de l'Afrique. La publication de livres et d'articles est un réel avantage pour les chercheurs et les universitaires africains dans la mesure où cela leur permet d'être reconnus aux niveaux national, régional et international en tant qu'experts dans des domaines bien précis. Ainsi, des individus, des départements universitaires, des universités et des institutions se font connaître. La lecture de publications sur l'Afrique stimule non seulement les recherches et l'émergence d'idées nouvelles, mais contribue également à nous faire mieux connaître et comprendre notre continent.

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EDITORIAL

LIDAR COM DIVERSOS DESAFIOS NO CONTINENTE AFRICANO: COVID-19 E NÃO SÓ

Thean Potgieter

Estes são tempos difíceis em todo o mundo – agora que estamos a recuperar do impacto da COVID-19, temos também de gerir os diversos desafios que são tão semelhantes aos dilemas do nosso tempo. Em tempos assim, tal como ao longo da história, histórias de ficção não só chamam à atenção porque são fontes de entretenimento, como também são verdadeiras joias que nos incentivam a adaptarmo-nos e a perseverar. Um desses exemplos é uma citação do famoso trabalho de Tolkien, *A Irmandade do Anel.* Quando Frodo observa que "Quem me dera que não tivesse acontecido no meu tempo", Gandalf responde: "Também eu... e todos os que vivemos nestes tempos presentes. Mas isso não lhes cabe a eles decidir. A única coisa que temos de decidir é o que fazer com o tempo que nos é concedido" (Tolkien 1981:82).

Sabemos agora que "aconteceu no [nosso] tempo". Apesar de a COVID-19 ter surgido pela primeira vez há quase dois anos como uma emergência global predominante, continuamos a ter de gerir velhos problemas, assim como a crise global constantemente emergente (e quantas vezes chocante) que as notícias de todo o mundo nos comunicam diariamente. Mas temos de continuar o nosso caminho e "decidir" como lidar com os inúmeros problemas que enfrentamos neste cruzamento na história mundial e "o que fazer com o tempo que nos é concedido".

Infelizmente, a pandemia da COVID-19 ainda não está condenada ao caixote do lixo da história, embora tenhamos feito inúmeros progressos na nossa luta contra ela desde os finais de 2019. Quando a taxa das novas infecções de COVID-19 aumentou assustadoramente no início de 2020, a sua propagação surpreendeu a comunidade internacional, bem como os países que se consideravam geograficamente distantes, ou que erradamente confiavam na sua própria capacidade para lidar rapidamente com esta contingência. Apesar de o termo "pandemia" não ser facilmente usado quando nos referimos a problemas de saúde, a Organização Mundial de Saúde (OMS) caracterizou a COVID-19 como pandemia global no dia 11 de Março de 2020. Seguiram-se várias convenções e protocolos internacionais para gerir a COVID-19, ao mesmo tempo que os estados eram obrigados a tomar decisões difíceis sobre os bloqueios nacionais e a gerir as suas sociedades de forma a limitar a propagação da doença.

Nos inícios de 2021, a COVID-19 continuava a revelar-se como uma pandemia internacional sem quaisquer ideias conclusivas acerca da sua linha cronológica, da extensão das vacinas em todo o mundo nem da sua eficácia, das perspectivas de novas variantes do vírus e da possibilidade de novas ondas mortíferas da infeção. E, apesar destas incertezas, o que era claramente evidente era que a COVID-19 teria um efeito duradouro não só na saúde global, como nas economias e nas sociedades, a par das actividades políticas e governamentais, entre outras. Nos nossos esforços para entendermos a COVID-19, é importante continuarmos a estudar as suas origens, a sua evolução e o impacto numa escala nacional, regional e internacional, e adquirirmos conhecimentos e entendermos a sua lição para sabermos como enfrentar emergências sanitárias no futuro.

Em meados de 2021, as infecções e as mortes provocadas por COVID-19, alimentadas por diferentes variantes do coronavírus, aumentaram exponencialmente em todo o continente africano. A altamente transmissível variante do vírus Delta foi detetadas em 26 países africanos, a variante Alfa em 38 países e a variante Beta em 35 países. No entanto, as estatísticas da COVID-19 em África são, em grande medida, lideradas pela África do Sul (com cerca de 37% de todos os casos reportados) e a Tunísia (com cerca de 8%) no final de Julho de 2021 (OMS 2021a). Embora os casos reportados tenham diminuído no segundo semestre desse ano, a pandemia continuou a ser uma realidade pandémica mortífera e destruidora. No início de 2021, os casos acumulados de COVID-19 reportados em 47 estados africanos ascendiam a 5 748 519 e as mortes confirmadas por COVID-19 eram 139 718(OMS 2021b). O facto de o padrão da doença COVID-19 em África ser inferior ao dos outros continentes pode provavelmente ficar a dever-se a factores socioecológicos, como a baixa densidade populacionais, uma demografia mais

recentes e um clima quente e húmido. No entanto, o gabinete da OMS em África advertiu contra a complacência e que uma vigilância relaxante poderia aumentar de novo as infecções (OMS 2020).

Já no final de 2021 deu-se um desenvolvimento positivo e que foi que, após uma pausa preocupante no envio de vacinas para África na primeira metade do ano, a movimentação de vacinas no continente e a entrega de vacinas vindas de múltiplas fontes estava agora a aumentar rapidamente. Perto de quatro milhões de doses da vacina COVAX chegaram a África ao longo da última semana de Julho, em comparação com apenas 245 000 doses durante todo o mês de Junho. No final de Julho, aproximadamente 79 milhões de doses de vacina chegaram a África e 21 milhões de pessoas foram completamente vacinadas, representando cerca de 1,6% da população do continente africano. Se todas as pessoas recebessem duas doses da vacina, seriam necessárias cerca de 820 milhões de doses para vacinar 30% da população do continente africano até ao final de 2021. Como a meta da COVAX para 2021 era entregar 520 milhões de doses da vacina para África, rapidamente se concluiu que muito havia a fazer para aumentar substancialmente a taxa de vacinação no continente (OMS 2021a).

A 23 de Dezembro de 2021, o total de doses de vacinas administradas globalmente atingia um total de 8 802 278 315. A probabilidade de África ultrapassar completamente a pandemia da COVID-19 é mínima, exceto se 70% da sua população seja vacinada até ao final de 2022, mas apenas cinco dos 54 países no continente africano irão possuir 40% das suas populações totalmente vacinadas até ao final de 2022. África recebeu muito poucas vacinas do fornecimento mundial: aproximadamente 540 milhões mais de nove mil milhões doses produzidas. Destes, 309 milhões de doses foram administradas em Janeiro de 2022 e menos de dez por cento dos africanos estavam completamente vacinados (Sibidé 2022). Devido aos níveis de vacinação inferiores em África e às variantes novas e de rápida propagação, como é o caso da emergente Omicron, o potencial para maiores taxas de infecção e mortalidade da COVID-19 aumentaram. Mais ainda, a pandemia da COVID-19 expôs as vulnerabilidades de África no acesso a vacinas, assim como as tecnologias médicas e fabrico específico de vacinas, sendo menos de dez por cento das vacinas usadas em África produzidas no continente (Geddes 2022).

Embora desejássemos "esquecer" a experiência da COVID-19 tão depressa quanto possível e seguirmos com as nossas vidas, o facto é que nos marcou para os anos vindouros e devemos aprender as lições que nos deixou. Uma das lições mais pertinentes é que, embora tenha sido necessário o empenho de um esforço concertado no combate

contra a COVID-19 e o seu impacto, não significou que pudéssemos ter esquecido muitos outros problemas globais, regionais e nacionais antes de pandemia. Esses problemas de que falamos não desapareceram como que por artes de magia, ficaram, sim, latentes, sem a atenção que mereciam por causa da extraordinária ênfase dada à COVID-19 ou então foram exacerbados pelo impacto da COVID-19. Consequentemente, é óbvio que uma crise não encobre outra e que, apesar de um evento globalmente destruidor como a COVID-19, continuamos a precisar de compreender, de nos adaptarmos e de enfrentar inúmeros outros problemas, considerar a adequabilidade dos nossos sistemas e processos de governação, e alocar os recursos apropriados.

Inicialmente, a COVID-19 pode ter sido encarda como essencialmente uma crise sanitária, mas a realidade provou ser drasticamente diferente. Resultou numa crise económica mundial, porém com um impacto desigual, extenso e desproporcionado em África. A crise económica foi, entre outras coisas, alimentada pela procura externa contraída, uma procura local reduzida e uma menor atividade económica devido a medidas de bloqueio, à diminuição das receitas fiscais e ao aumento das despesas com a saúde e a protecção social (Adam 2020). Embora África esteja ainda a recuperar, as perspectivas de recuperação económica são reforçadas por acções para conter a pandemia e acelerar o lançamento de vacinas, uma propagação mais lenta do vírus e taxas de mortalidade mais baixas no continente, o crescimento agrícola e uma recuperação dos preços das mercadorias que ocorreu mais rapidamente do que o esperado. Mas os países africanos têm de continuar com reformas para criação de empregos, incentivo ao investimento e aumento da competitividade (Banco Mundial 2021).

A pandemia transformou-se numa das perturbações mais graves da educação na história, que poderia ser vista como uma autêntica ameaça para a maioria das crianças mais do que o próprio vírus. Como indicou a UNESCO, o encerramento das escolas em todo o mundo, num esforço de parar a propagação do vírus, piorou as desigualdades e o acesso à educação, assim como aumentou ainda mais as taxas do abandono escolar – sobretudo para as raparigas, visto que poderiam enfrentar maior pressão para substituir a educação por tarefas domésticas, poderiam ser forçadas a casar mais cedo ou engravidarem ou ainda serem vítimas de violência sexual e abuso (UNESCO 2021; Solberg 2020). Além dos aspectos salientados acima, houve um impacto muito maior e, em certos casos mais profundo, da pandemia na sociedade à medida que a insegurança alimentar aumentou, as desigualdades e a polarização entre países e pessoas se agravaram, a angústia desproporcionada para as mulheres, raparigas e comunidades marginalizadas se tornou aparente, ao mesmo tempo que acresceu uma desconfiança mundial em relação às instituições públicas e aos líderes (Mirchandani 2020). Essa desconfiança é, entre outras,

evidente nas posições anti-vacinação de grupos e indivíduos em todo o globo, aliada a teorias de conspiração e notícias falsas. Os meios de comunicação social transformaram-se em instrumentos valiosos para alimentar tais assuntos e para entrincheirar divisões.

Mas nem tudo foi negativo. Foi um incentivo verificar que neste tempo de crise muitas vezes a generosidade e a humanidade conseguiram triunfar. Vimos constantemente comunicações de incrível solidariedade entre pessoas e comunidades assim como entre países. Mostrou-se que pessoas diferentes e todo o mundo trabalharam em uníssono para enfrentar problemas partilhados – uma experiência que esperamos perdure para lá da pandemia já que muitos outros problemas globais nos assombram.

As crises humanitárias iminentes relacionadas e não relacionadas com a COVID-19 continuam a ser assuntos de grande preocupação. Muitos países do continente africano têm forçosamente de lidar com grupos não só diversos como grandes (como indica o artigo de Domingos Batone neste volume), que incluem pessoas com deficiências, os idosos, as vítimas de desastres naturais, vítimas de violência baseada no género, pessoas deslocadas, refugiados que fogem de zonas de conflito, crianças órfãs e agora até famílias diretamente afetadas pela COVID-19. Como a COVID-19 tem um impacto desproporcionado nas comunidades e indivíduos mais vulneráveis e marginalizados da sociedade, a equidade e a inclusão devem permanecer no centro do que fizermos no futuro e da forma como governamos as nossas sociedades.

Em Março de 2020, o Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas fez um apelo urgente a um cessar fogo global porque nos deveríamos focar em combater juntos a COVID-19. Silenciar as armas também criaria oportunidades de ajuda e diplomacia para salvar vidas e trazer esperança às pessoas em zonas de conflito que eram particularmente vulneráveis devido à pandemia (ONU 2020). No entanto, e apesar deste apelo, a violência, o conflito e a agitação surgiram em todo o mundo e, em vários casos, também em África. O que certamente impediu os ganhos anteriores em crescimento e desenvolvimento, ao mesmo tempo que também deu os passos que muitos países africanos tinham dado no sentido de consolidar a democracia de trás para a frente durante algum tempo. Problemas complexos, como conflito, fome e alterações climáticas estão intimamente ligados e devem ser enfrentados pelos governos, todos os níveis da sociedade e através do trabalho conjunto dos Estados. O nível de paz e estabilidade, bem como as perspectivas de desenvolvimento económico, são moldados pela qualidade e características da governação, visto que contribuem para a legitimidade dos que exercem a autoridade. Apesar de a ONU ter comemorado o seu 75º aniversário em 2020, a cooperação não é aquela que deveria ser e

o multilateralismo deveria ser reimaginado, concretamente porque eventos recentes mostraram como é urgente que os países colaborem internacionalmente nos seus esforços para enfrentar desafios, que vão desde cuidados de saúde até à desigualdade, desenvolvimento económico sustentável e paz e segurança internacionais (Mirchandani 2020). Isso é particularmente relevante no que respeita a África e o seu lugar no mundo emergente, uma vez que os 54 estados africanos constituem 25 por cento da participação da ONU.

Temos de reconhecer que o nosso ambiente está a enfrentar uma "pandemia ecológica". Com a biodiversidade a desaparecer, muitos ecossistemas já colapsaram e os oceanos estão a acidificar como resultado de gerações de atividade humano não controlada, de trajetórias de emissões e da pilhagem sem escrúpulos da natureza. Como estamos a viver alguns dos anos mais quentes de que há registo, incêndios florestais descontrolados, tufões devastadores, inundações e secas em todo o mundo, é um momento decisivo para abordar a saúde do nosso planeta.

Para enfrentar muitos dos desafios acima referidos, a implementação dos Objectivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS) das Nações Unidas continua a ser pertinente. Temos de reiterar o apelo universal à acção de parcerias globais no reforço da paz e prosperidade para todas as pessoas que vivem no nosso planeta. Impõem-se abordagens holísticas e equilibradas para assegurar o desenvolvimento sustentável em todas as esferas, uma vez que as acções numa área específica do objectivo também afectarão outras áreas. A determinação colectiva em África para enfrentar os desafios do desenvolvimento integrado e abordar as áreas de enfoque inerentes aos ODS deve ser reforçada. O que é necessário, entre outras coisas, para a implementação dos ODS é assegurar que os planos adequados são implementados, juntamente com uma boa governação, compromissos entre e com os países com vista à atribuição de recursos eficazes, serviços públicos reactivos com capacidade para implementar planos e alavancar recursos, cooperação com as partes interessadas em todos os sectores sobre as abordagens mais adequadas e continuação dos esforços para assegurar o financiamento sustentável necessário (Tandoh-Offin 2019: 49-50). Alcançar os resultados ambiciosos inerentes aos ODS e criar um planeta melhor para as futuras gerações exige parcerias eficazes entre governos, o sector privado e a sociedade civil.

Uma vez que esperamos estar a dar passos importantes na nossa jornada para ir além da COVID-19, é fundamental voltar a colocar bastante ênfase na abordagem dos desafios complexos do nosso continente, na boa governação, no desenvolvimento socioeconómico

sustentável e no reforço da segurança humana em termos mais amplos. Atendendo a que lidar com desafios complexos depende de boas instituições, os países africanos devem continuar a fortalecer as suas instituições frequentemente enfraquecidas (Fosu 2018). Estimular o crescimento e criar emprego são factores de extrema importância. Entre outros, esse facto deve ser apoiado por desenvolvimentos ao nível das infraestruturas, processos de industrialização, localização estratégica da produção, expansão das exportações, maior segurança energética e desenvolvimento da economia digital no continente. O comércio livre entre economias africanas ao abrigo do Acordo de Comércio Livre Continental Africano proporcionará importantes oportunidades futuras para o crescimento económico e o desenvolvimento, e as empresas podem fazer parte deste esforço ao procurarem oportunidades diferentes.

Contudo, tomar medidas não deveria ser visto apenas como responsabilidade dos governos, do sector privado e das ONG, mas sim de todos os cidadãos colectivamente. Por isso, o que podem fazer os cidadãos para lidar com os desafios complexos e adaptá-los ao "nosso tempo"? Devem apoiar as inúmeras iniciativas internacionais, regionais e nacionais destinadas a normalizar a sociedade, as economias e a política, ao mesmo tempo que cooperam com estes esforços colectivos para alcançar o sucesso. Embora isso possa parecer um cliché, sermos cidadãos cumpridores da lei é crucial. Todos os cidadãos devem contribuir nas suas respectivas esferas de acção para estabilizar sociedades, exterminar a corrupção, certificar-se de que o Direito se aplica, contribuir para a preservação do planeta para habitação humana e apoiar os esforços da sociedade civil no sentido de criar melhores governos. Devemos apoiar o desenvolvimento de empresas e pequenas empresas, estimulando a procura através da aquisição de bens localmente e no continente africano. As aptidões comerciais sobretudo dos jovens e das mulheres devem ser estimuladas, com vista a incentivá-los a agarrar as oportunidades e começarem as suas próprias pequenas empresas. Os empresários são a seiva de qualquer economia porque são eles que criam um ciclo de atividade económica e um efeito em cascata nas suas comunidades e em toda a economia. As pequenas empresas são uma das melhores maneiras de impulsionar o crescimento, sobretudo crescimento inclusivo, enquanto que o desenvolvimento das pequenas empresas pode contribuir para a navegação nas consequências económicas causadas pela pandemia.

As contribuições publicadas nesta edição do *Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance* (AJPSDG) assinalam alguns dos diferentes problemas que os governos africanos enfrentam. Entre eles, as abordagens teóricas à prestação de serviços, governando instituições de ensino superior, democracia e desenvolvimento sustentável, prestação de serviços e policiamento.

A relevância das abordagens teóricas e da sua contribuição para lidar com problemas complexos continuam a ser temas de debate e interpretação. O artigo de Thomas Ramovha questiona se o Raciocínio Sistémico poderia ser aplicado para enfrentar os desafios com que o governo sul africano se depara no âmbito da entrega de habitações. Existe uma terrível falta de habitação para os pobres e os que auferem rendimentos baixos a médios na África do Sul, e o governo precisa de cumprir o imperativo constitucional relacionado com o direito a uma habitação condigna. Embora o programa de subsídios à habitação tenha introduzido após 1994 cerca de cinco milhões de oportunidades de habitação às famílias pobres e de baixo a médio rendimento, o défice habitacional aumentou exponencialmente com a procura a exceder a entrega. O problema é agravado pelo facto de o actual programa governamental de fornecimento de habitação ser insustentável em termos de acessibilidade económica, está repleto de consequências não intencionais e é complicado por muitos dos interessados com opiniões diversas. Como indica Ramovha, o Raciocínio Sistémico é uma ferramenta para lidar com questões complexas porque dá uma perspectiva mais holística com partes de um sistema vistas em relação ao todo, e o desempenho pode ser melhorado compreendendo todo o sistema. A opinião é que o Raciocínio Sistémico pode contribuir para um fornecimento de habitação bem sucedido.

Como a Comissão da União Africana reiterou por diversas vezes, a qualidade do ensino superior, a criação de uma economia do conhecimento e instituições bem governadas são cruciais no apoio ao reforço das capacidades e são motores do desenvolvimento socioeconómico do continente (Comissão da União Africana 2018). Lazarus Nabaho analisa as reformas propostas de governação universitária emanadas do Relatório Rwendeire sobre a Universidade de Makerere no Uganda. Realça Nabaho que as propostas de reforma da governação a nível corporativo incluem a adopção de um conselho universitário 'lean' e dominado por leigos, o afastamento dos vice-reitores e a introdução de conselhos baseados na competência. O ministro responsável pelo ensino superior deveria ser mandatado para nomear os conselhos universitários e delimitar os seus termos. Além disso, os vice-chanceleres deveriam ser nomeados e não eleitos, e os seus cargos deveriam ser profissionalizados para reforçar a sua autoridade executiva. Os senados deveriam passar do enfoque nas funções estatutárias para funções específicas da instituição, enquanto que a filiação deveria ser com base na competência. Estas propostas procuram remodelar os conselhos universitários como conselhos corporativos e subordinar ainda mais os senados das universidades públicos aos conselhos. O ensino superior, contudo, deveria ser cauteloso na adopção de um modelo corporativista puro de

governação universitária que defenda conselhos universitários leigos sob os quais os directores executivos são membros dos órgãos de supervisão, mas sem direito de voto.

O artigo de Milly Paile, Johnny M. Pietersen e Juanita Fennell é uma reflexão sobre a acção da aprendizagem como parte de um programa de gestão do desenvolvimento da South African National School of Government. Está escrito na perspectiva da educação, formação e desenvolvimento dos profissionais da função pública sul africana. Os autores reflectem sobre o lançamento do Programa de Desenvolvimento de Gestão Emergente através de um acordo de parceria para os participantes dos Parques Nacionais Sul Africanos. O projecto oferece uma forma estruturada de enriquecer o programa com aprendizagem de acção destinada a melhorar as capacidades de resolução de problemas dos participantes, ao mesmo tempo que apoia a melhoria dos sistemas e práticas organizacionais. Os autores reflectem sobre o contexto de colaboração institucional e as oportunidades de aprendizagem pessoal e organizacional, recorrendo a observações durante a formação, assim como a pontos de vista de gestores, participantes e facilitadores. Os autores reflectem sobre o contexto de colaboração institucional e as oportunidades de aprendizagem pessoal e organizacional, recorrendo a observações durante a formação, bem como a pontos de vista de gestores, participantes e formadores. Consequentemente, e especificamente devido a perturbações locais e globais imprevisíveis, é da maior relevância adaptar os currículos e aplicar essas abordagens de ensino e aprendizagem.

O artigo de Firimooni Rweere Banugire centra-se no equilíbrio dos motores socioeconómicos do desenvolvimento no Uganda. Atendendo às actuais preocupações acerca de um declínio na qualidade dos sistemas de prestação de serviços e na gestão da economia no Uganda, o documento defende fortemente a boa governação económica como pré-requisito na procura de assegurar um desenvolvimento inclusivo e sustentável. O autor assume uma abordagem dedutiva e comparativa, tomando conhecimento embora de histórias de sucesso global e de lições de experiências passadas. Salienta três aspectos importantes para os quais chama a atenção urgente dos decisores e dos responsáveis pela elaboração de políticas no Uganda: em primeiro lugar, uma atenção especial na combinação da política de transformação estrutural com reformas de boa governação; em segundo lugar, o declínio da boa governação económica no Uganda desde os anos 60 e, por fim, a operacionalização dos princípios-chave da boa governação económica através de mecanismos adequados para impulsionar o desenvolvimento inclusivo no Uganda. Conclui o Prof. Firimooni Rweere Banugire que as implicações das políticas, a definição das prioridades orçamentais e a implementação das políticas correctas são de vital importância para o desenvolvimento inclusivo.

Como está em curso o debate sobre as perspectivas da democracia a nível global, o mesmo se aplica à democratização, bem como à ligação fundamental entre democracia e desenvolvimento em África. Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari contribui com um artigo sobre a economia política das eleições e do voto no Gana durante o quarto Período Republicano, entre 1992 e 2020. As políticas económicas governamentais e os dados eleitorais servem para analisar os efeitos da política económica acerca dos resultados eleitorais a nível macro. Indica que o agravamento das condições económicas e as falhas da política económica influenciaram o comportamento de voto em cada uma das oito eleições do período. Foram ultrapassados vários desafios no Gana à medida que a transição democrática continuava juntamente com o crescimento económico e a prestação de melhores serviços sociais, mas a desigualdade de rendimentos aumentava. O desenvolvimento democrático do Gana é também impulsionado por políticas eleitorais clientelistas e isso é feito ligando o interesse das pessoas às pessoas da sociedade que possuem maior acesso ao poder e aos recursos. Concluindo, o resultado das eleições gerais entre 1992 e 2020 indicaram que o eleitor médio ganês tinha pensado em como votar devido aos benefícios de custos associados aos candidatos, cujas políticas partidárias se aproximavam das suas aspirações.

O artigo de Gabriella Loteni Nguluwe e Charles Keyter centrava-se na implementação da política da água e saneamento da Namíbia de 2008 com referência ao assentamento informal de Onhimbu, perto de Paragem. Após a independência da Namíbia em 1990, a urbanização multiplicou-se. Uma vez que as autoridades locais não providenciavam habitações em número suficiente, começaram a surgir campos ilegais e bairros de lata, tendo os habitantes falta de acesso a água potável e a saneamento. Com uma população de 1 521 habitantes na cidade de Outapi, o assentamento selvagem de Onhimbu é, sem dúvida, um caso marcante. Outapi está situado na parte setentrional da Namíbia na região de Omusati. Os residentes de Onhimbu sofriam dificuldades com os serviços de água e saneamento e, por essa razão, realizou-se um projecto de investigação em 2017 para averiguar se a Política de Fornecimento de Água e Saneamento de 2008 fora implementada com êxito. Através de um método misto de questionários fiáveis recolhidos inicialmente e entrevistas realizadas, obtiveram-se e analisaram-se as percepções de todos os intervenientes, desde funcionários públicos em diferentes esferas do governo até aos próprios residentes. Revelou esse estudo que a política de 2008 não tinha sido totalmente implementada por falta de recursos humanos e financeiros.

Os serviços da polícia de todo o mundo devem assegurar a ordem pública e a segurança, proteger a vida e a propriedade e implementar a lei. Tope Shola Akinyetun indica que esse deve ser igualmente o dever primordial da Força Policial da Nigéria (NPF, Nigerian Police Force), mas ficaram-se somente pelas expectativas. Argumenta o autor que a NPF está envolvida numa teia de corrupção e que protege os interesses do estado através da violência. O artigo pretende avaliar como a coerção, a corrupção e a brutalidade têm afectado o desempenho da NPF. Sob um ponto de vista qualitativo com base em fontes abrangentes, salienta o autor que o desempenho da NPF é influenciado por factores socioeconómicos, ecológicos e socioculturais que originaram uma falta de policiamento eficaz e em diferenças entre a polícia e os policiados. O facto causou uma reacção violenta por parte dos jovens nigerianos contra a brutalidade policial e resultou em apelos à dissolução de um braço da NPF (a Brigada Especial Anti-Roubo ou SARS, Special Anti-Robbery Squad). O autor recomenda que a NPF melhore as parcerias público-privadas na sua administração e limite a interferência política no policiamento. O governo federal, juntamente com o sector privado, deveria reforma institucionalmente a NPF a fim de lidar com os inúmeros desafios que medram no seu seio.

Domingos Carlos Batone discute a inclusão de pessoas com incapacidades no mercado do trabalho moçambicano. O enfoque está em duas dimensões das políticas públicas de emprego: as contribuições "passivas" trazendo apoio ao rendimento para os desempregados mediante o subsídio de desemprego e outros subsídios sociais, e as contribuições "ativas"destinadas a ajudar pessoas com incapacidade que estão desempregadas e dirigir a criação de empregos tanto nos sectores públicos como no pessoal. Apesar de ambas as abordagens terem pontos fortes, na prática, a implementação e o acesso de pessoas com incapacidades ao emprego e à função Pública e outras alternativas permanecem um problema. As conclusões deste estudo emanam de um estudo literário, de dados estatísticos do recenseamento geral de 2017, de entrevistas e do auxílio da organização de TV Surdo dedicada à defesa dos direitos das pessoas com incapacidades. Dado que a discriminação e estigmatização limitam cada vez mais o acesso ao mercado do trabalho, impõem-se mais medidas que promovam os direitos deste grupo. Além disso, as políticas públicas de emprego em Moçambique são predominantemente passivas, e entre 2018 e 2021, os subsídios não aumentaram, apesar da inflação e de um aumento do custo de vida.

A contribuição final é uma breve síntese de alguns livros seleccionados recentemente publicados em África por editoras de todo o mundo. Os livros escolhidos chamam à atenção para a história africana, incluem uma biografia e uma autobiografia, focam-se nos processos de governação e democráticos, e representam diferentes regiões. É

importante que investiguemos, publiquemos e estudemos fontes em África. Tais publicações divulgam a investigação e as contribuições académicas em diferentes campos e oferecem oportunidades para diagnosticar, analisar e remediar os desafios. É igualmente uma forma de sensibilizar outros investidores e interessados de outras partes do mundo para as realidades, as práticas e as experiências africanas, e de aumentar o conhecimento e o entendimento do que é África. Por outro lado,a publicação de livros e de artigos revistos pelos pares são trunfos para os investigadores e os académicos africanos, visto que lhes proporcionam oportunidades de serem reconhecidos como especialistas num campo específico a nível nacional, regional e internacional. Através das publicações pessoas, departamentos académicos, universidades e instituições recebem reconhecimento. Precisamos de ler fontes publicadas sobre África porque estimulam as buscas académicas e as novas ideias, ao mesmo tempo que contribuem para um melhor conhecimento e compreensão do nosso continente.

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