

STUDIES IN
EVIDENTIALITY

Edited by

ALEXANDRA V. AIKHENVALD
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Studies in Evidentiality

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Volume 54

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Research Centre for Linguistic Typology, La Trobe University

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Table of contents

Contributors	VII
Preface	IX
Abbreviations	XI
CHAPTER 1	
Evidentiality in typological perspective <i>Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald</i>	1
CHAPTER 2	
Evidentiality in Shipibo-Konibo, with a comparative overview of the category in Panoan <i>Pilar M. Valenzuela</i>	33
CHAPTER 3	
Evidentiality in Qiang <i>Randy J. LaPolla</i>	63
CHAPTER 4	
Evidentiality in Western Apache (Athabaskan) <i>Willem J. de Reuse</i>	79
CHAPTER 5	
Evidentials in Eastern Pomo with a comparative survey of the category in other Pomoan languages <i>Sally McLendon</i>	101
CHAPTER 6	
Evidentiality in Tariana <i>Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald</i>	131

CHAPTER 7	
Evidentiality in Jarawara	165
<i>R. M. W. Dixon</i>	
CHAPTER 8	
Evidentiality in the Balkans with special attention to Macedonian and Albanian	189
<i>Victor A. Friedman</i>	
CHAPTER 9	
Evidentiality in Yukaghir	219
<i>Elena Maslova</i>	
CHAPTER 10	
Evidentiality in M̄yky	237
<i>Ruth Monserrat and R. M. W. Dixon</i>	
CHAPTER 11	
Evidential category and evidential strategy in Abkhaz	243
<i>Viacheslav Chirikba</i>	
CHAPTER 12	
Evidentiality in Turkic	273
<i>Lars Johanson</i>	
CHAPTER 13	
Evidentiality in West Greenlandic: A case of scattered coding	291
<i>Michael Fortescue</i>	
CHAPTER 14	
Evidentials. Summation, questions, prospects	307
<i>Brian D. Joseph</i>	
Index of authors	329
Index of languages and language families	333
Index of subjects	341

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Preface

This volume includes revised versions of presentations at the International Workshop on ‘Evidentiality’ organised by the Research Centre for Linguistic Typology at La Trobe University, 6–11 August 2001. The discussion was organised around the issues raised in Aikhenvald’s position paper (a revision of this is Chapter 1 below) but in fact ranged well beyond it. Contributors had a list of relevant issues and questions to address.

The week of the Workshop was an intellectually stimulating and exciting time, full of exchange and cross-fertilisation of ideas. All of the authors have experience in intensive investigation of languages, as well as in dealing with linguistic typology, historical comparative issues and problems of areal diffusion.

We thank all of the authors included here for taking part in the Workshop, for getting their papers in on time, and for revising them according to recommendations of the editors.

We owe a large debt of gratitude to Siew Peng Condon and Abby Chin, Executive Officers of the Research Centre for Linguistic Typology who organised the workshop with care and good humour. Thanks go to our Publication Assistants Anya Woods and Tania Strahan, for carefully proof-reading the contributions.

This Workshop would not have been possible without the constant support and encouragement of Professor Michael Osborne, Vice-Chancellor and President of La Trobe University.

Abbreviations

=	clitic boundary	AUX	auxiliary
1	first person	BEN	benefactive
2	second person	C.INT	content interrogative mood
3	third person	CAUS	causative
4	fourth person	CL	classifier
3sp	'space' impersonal third person subject	CMPL	completive aspect
A	transitive subject function	CO.REF	co-reference
ABL	ablative	COM	comitative
ABS	absolutive	COMP	comparative
ABSTR	abstract	COMPL.CL	complement clause marking
ACC	accusative	COND	conditional
ADM	admirative	CONF	confirmation
ADV	adverb	CONJ	conjunction
ADVM	– adverbial marker	CONV	converb
AFF	affirmative	COP	copula
AGT	agentive	CSM	change of state marker
ALL	allative	CUST	customary
ANIM	animate	DAT	dative
ANT	anterior	DEB	debitive
AO	synthetic aorist	DECL	declarative
AOR	aorist	DEF	definite
APPLIC	applicative	DEM	demonstrative
APPR	apprehensive	DEP	dependent clause marking
ART	article	DES	desiderative
ASP	aspect	DETR	detrimental
ASSOC	associative	DIM	diminutive
ASSP	asserted past particle	DIR.EV	direct evidential
ATTR	attributive	DIR	directive
AUG	augmentative		

DIST	distal	IMPER	imperative
DIST.IMPV	distal imperative	IMPERF	imperfect
DISTR	distributive	IMPF.ASP	imperfective aspect
DN	deverbal noun		inflection
DP	discourse particle	IMPV.SEC	secondhand imperative
DPAST	direct past	IN	intransitive marker
DS	different subject	INAN	inanimate
DSTR	distributive	INC	incomplete aspect
DTRNZ	detransitivizer	INCH	inchoative
du	dual	INCL	inclusive
DUR	durative	INDEF	indefinite
DYN	dynamic	INDIC	indicative
e	eyewitness evidentiality	INF	infinitive
EMPH	emphasis	INF.NON.MIR	non-mirative
ERG	ergative		inferential particle
EV	evidential	INFR	inference
EXC	excessive	INST	instrumental
EXCL	exclusive	INTER	interrogative
EXIST	existential	INTERJ	interjection
EXT	extension	INTRA	intraterminal aspect
f, FEM	feminine	INTRST	complement of interest
F	future tense inflection	IP	immediate past
FIN	finite	IPAST	indirective past
FOC	focus	IRR	irrealis
FP	far past	IV	imperative
FR	frustrative	L	l-past (aorist and imperfect)
FUT	future		ligature
FUT.PART	future tense particle	LIG	linker
FUT.NOM	nominal future	LNK	locative
GEN	genitive	LOC	masculine
GEN.INFR	inferred generic	M, MASC	mirative/inferential
HAB	habitual	MIR	particle
HS	hearsay		modal particle
HUM	human	MOD	non-eyewitness
I	intransitive	N	evidentiality
IC	indirective copula		noun class
IM	synthetic imperfect	NCL	
IMP	imperative		

NCM	non-compact matter classificatory verb stem	PDR	past deferred realization particle
NEC	necessitative	PDS	previous event,
NEG	negative		different subject
NF	nonfeminine	Pe	Eastern Pomo
NFIN	non-finite	PERF	perfect
NOM	nominative	PFV	perfective
NMLZ	nominalizer	PINDEF	past indefinite
NOM.PAST	nominal past	PINF	physical inferential particle
NON.IMM	non-immediate		
NONVIS	nonvisual	Pk	Kashaya Pomo
NPOSS	nonpossessed	pl, PL	plural
NSG	non-singular	PLUPERF	pluperfect
NUM.CL	numeral classifier	Pn	Northern Pomo
NVEXP	non-visual experiential particle	POSS	possessive
		POST	postterminal aspect
NVOL	nonvolitional	POT	potential
O	transitive object function	PP1	incompletive participle
		PP2	completive participle
OBJ	object	PPAST	postterminal past
OC	marker of O-construction type	PRES	present
		PREVEN	preventive
OG	object focus	PREV	preverb
ONOM	onomatopoeia	PRIV	privative
OPT	optative	PROG	progressive
P	perfective aspect inflection	PROP	proprietary
		PROSP	prospective
P.INT	polar interrogative mood	PROX	proximate
		PROX.IMPV	proximate imperative
PA	past	PRS	prospective aspect
PABS	past absolutive	Pse	Southeastern Pomo
PART	participle	PSSI	previous event, same subject, intransitive
PASS	passive		matrix clause
PAST.REL	past relative		
PB	probabilitive	PSST	previous event, same subject, transitive
PC	Central Pomo		matrix clause
PC	particle of concord		
		PST1	earlier today past

PST2	yesterday past	SSSI	simultaneous event, same subject,
PT	participle		intransitive matrix clause
PURP	purposive	SSST	simultaneous event, same subject, transitive matrix clause
Q	interrogative particle		
QUOT	quotative	STAT	stative
REC	reciprocal	SU	subjunctive marker
REC.P	recent past	SUB	subordinating
REF	referent	SUBJ	subjunctive
REFL	reflexive	SUPP	suppositive, presumptive
REL	relative	SWITCH.REF	switch reference
REM.P	remote past	T	temporal
REP	reported	TR	transitive
RNR	result nominalizer	TAG	tag question particle
S	intransitive subject function	TOP	topic enclitic
SDS	simultaneous event, different subject	TOP.NON.A/S	topical non-subject case
SF	subject-Focus	TR	transitive
SG, SG	singular	VA	verbal adjective
SMU	submorphemic unit	VERT	vertical
SPEC	specific nominalizer and relativizer enclitic	VIS	visual
SPEC	specifier	VN	verbal noun
SPEC.INFR	specific inferred	VOC	vocative
SPECL	speculative	YNQ	yes-no question particle
SS	same subject marker		

CHAPTER 1

Evidentiality in typological perspective

Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald

1. Evidentiality: general remarks¹

In a number of languages, the nature of the evidence on which a statement is based must be specified for every statement – whether the speaker saw it, or heard it, or inferred it from indirect evidence, or learnt it from someone else. This grammatical category, referring to an information source, is called ‘evidentiality’. As Boas (1938:133) put it, ‘while for us definiteness, number, and time are obligatory aspects, we find in another language location near the speaker or somewhere else, source of information – whether seen, heard, or inferred – as obligatory aspects’. Not all languages have ‘evidentiality’ as a grammatical category, and those that do vary in how many types of evidence they mark. Some have a marker just for information reported by someone else. The term ‘verificational’ is sometimes used in place of ‘evidential’. There is an excellent summary of work on recognizing this category, and naming it, in Jacobsen (1986).

The following terminological consensus has been adopted for the present volume: EVIDENTIALITY proper is understood as stating the existence of a source of evidence for some information; this includes stating that there is some evidence, and also specifying what type of evidence there is.²

Evidentiality systems differ in how complex they are – some distinguish just two terms (eyewitness and noneyewitness, or reported and everything else), while others have six (or even more) terms. Evidentiality is a category in its own right, and not a subcategory of epistemic or some other modality, or of tense-aspect.

Every language has some way of making reference to the source of information; but not every language has grammatical evidentiality. Having lexical means for optional specification of the source of knowledge is probably universal – cf. English *I guess, they say, I hear that* etc. as well as lexical verbs such as *al-*

lege (e.g. *the alleged killer of X*). These lexical means can be of different status – adverbial expressions such as *reportedly* in English (also see Aoki 1986: 234–235 for a discussion of adverbial phrases dealing with speaker’s attitude in Japanese), or introductory clauses with complementation markers, such as *it seems to me that*, or particles, such as Russian *jakoby, mol, deskatj* ‘hearsay’ (Rakhilina 1996). Modal verbs are often used to express meanings connected with information source (cf. discussion of French *devoir* in Kronning, forthcoming). These expressions are not obligatory and do not constitute a grammatical category; consequently, they are tangential to the present discussion. They may, however, provide historical sources for evidential systems.

A number of grammatical categories, such as conditional mood or perfective aspect, can each acquire a secondary evidential-like meaning without directly relating to source of information. Such extensions of grammatical categories to evidential-like meanings will be referred to as ‘evidentiality strategies’.

In order to establish cross-linguistically valid parameters for any category, one needs in-depth studies of individual languages. For evidentials, this was first done in the seminal collection of papers edited by Chafe and Nichols (1986); another attempt – albeit from a different theoretical stance – can be found in Guentchéva (1996). Johanson and Utas (2000) present a definitive study of two-term evidentiality systems.

The aim of this volume is to elaborate definitive cross-linguistic parameters of variation and a unified typological framework for evidentiality. It covers evidential systems of varied structure, from different parts of the world. In this introductory chapter, I outline the typological parameters for evidentiality, in terms of which the papers in this volume are cast. Most of my examples are drawn from languages discussed in the volume. In fact, the typology outlined here is based on an examination of grammars of over 500 languages; a fuller discussion and exemplification is in Aikhenvald (in press).

Evidential markers may gain additional meanings and extensions such as the probability of an event or the reliability of information (often called ‘epistemic’ meanings), or unusual and ‘surprising’ information (called ‘mirative’ in the recent literature, following DeLancey’s 1997 seminal paper).

Evidentiality may be independent of clause type, modality or tense-aspect choice. Alternately, evidentiality may be fused with a tense-aspect marker; or a choice made in the evidentiality system may depend on tense, aspect, or clause type. Evidentials may acquire specific uses in discourse as a means of backgrounding or foregrounding information; the ways in which evidentials are employed may correlate with narrative genres. These, and other, issues are discussed here. The last section contains an overview of the volume.

2. An overview of evidentiality systems

Evidentiality systems are divided into two broad types: (I) those which state the existence of a source for the evidence without specifying it; and (II) those which specify the kind of evidence – be it visually obtained, based on inference, or reported information. In languages with a type (I) system, a statement marked for ‘evidentiality’ is characterized ‘by reference to its reception by a conscious subject’ (Johanson, this volume, Chapter 12). In other words, the existence of an unspecified source of information presupposes that this information was acquired ‘indirectly’, through a mediator. This kind of evidentiality is called ‘indirectivity’ by Johanson (2000, and Chapter 12); and is a characteristic feature of Turkic and a number of Iranian and Finno-Ugric languages. Languages with a type (II) system fall into a number of subtypes, depending on the number and kinds of sources specified.

The simplest evidentiality systems consist of just two distinctions; more complicated ones involve up to six (or possibly more). The semantic content of each distinction depends on the type of system (hence, labels may sometimes be misleading). For instance, in a two-term system ‘eyewitness’ may imply visually acquired information; it may also refer to visual and auditory information simultaneously (and may also cover information obtained through other senses). This is the case in Jarawara (Chapter 7). Or it may cover a combination of visual information and something personally witnessed, but may never refer to strictly auditory data (as is the case in Kalasha and Khowar, Dardic languages: Bashir 1988: 48–54). In Yukaghir (Chapter 9), the eyewitness term can refer to any sense appropriate to the context; this is also the case in Shipibo-Konibo (Chapter 2). The noneyewitness term in a two-term system may imply that the speaker heard about the action from some secondary source, or made inferences about it, or participated in it directly but was not in control (some of this was analyzed in Guentchéva 1996, under the label ‘mediativity’). But a noneyewitness term is unlikely to refer to secondhand information if there is a special evidential used for reported information – such is the case in Mŷky (Chapter 10). The semantic complexity of individual terms, and their extensions, are further discussed in §5 below.

Two-term systems of type II cover:

A1. EYEWITNESS AND NONEYEWITNESS. Such a distinction often – but not always – applies just in the past tense, as in Jarawara (Chapter 7), Yukaghir (Chapter 9), and Mŷky (Chapter 10). Other examples include the North-east Caucasian language Godoberi (Dobrushina & Tatevosov 1996: 94–97),

Dardic languages Kalasha and Khowar (Bashir 1988:48–54), and also Yanam (Yanomami family: Gomez 1990:97).

A2. NONFIRSTHAND AND EVERYTHING ELSE. The nonfirsthand term typically covers inference based on visible traces and reported information, as in Abkhaz (Hewitt 1979; Chapter 11), a number of Northeast Caucasian languages (e.g. Hunzib: van den Berg 1995), Ugric languages Mansi (Rombandeewa 1973:137–138; 141–142) and Khanty (Nikolaeva 1999), and the Samoyede languages Nenets (Décsy 1966:48), Enets (Künnap 1999), and Selkup (Kuznetsova et al. 1980:241).

A3. REPORTED (OR ‘HEARSAY’) AND EVERYTHING ELSE. Cross-linguistically, this is by far the most widespread kind of system. The reported term is marked, and the non-reported (‘everything else’) term is not marked; there are no systems of the opposite sort. In Enga (Engan family, Papuan), quoted utterances are marked with the suffix *-na* added to the last syllable of the predicate (Lang 1973:xli). Another example of a similar system is Tauya (Madang-Adelbert Range Subphylum, Papuan: MacDonald 1990:301). Lezgian (Lezxic, Northeast Caucasian) has a recently grammaticized hearsay marker *-lda* (resulting from the contraction and suffixation of *luhuda* ‘one says’: Haspelmath 1993:148). A3 systems are found in Tibeto-Burman languages, e.g. Kham (Watters 1998), and in numerous South American languages (Aikhenvald & Dixon 1998b). Estonian and Livonian (Balto-Finnic) have a set of ‘reported’ forms which go back to participles (see Stolz 1991:45–50; Perrot 1996).

Three-term systems involve at least one sensory specification.

B1. VISUAL (OR DIRECT), INFERRED, REPORTED. Systems of this kind are found in Jaqi languages such as Aymara (Hardman 1986) which have three evidentiality specifications – personal knowledge (acquired visually), hearsay (knowledge acquired through someone else), and nonpersonal knowledge (inferred). Quechua languages have three evidentiality specifications: direct evidence (*-mi*), conjectural (*-chi*, *chr(a)*) and reported (*-shi*) (Floyd 1997). Similar systems are also found in Shasta (Shastan family: Silver & Miller 1997:38), Maidu (Shipley 1964:45), and in Northern Embera languages from Colombia (Mortensen 1999:87–88). The system described for Qiang by LaPolla (Chapter 3) is also a subtype of B1.

B2. VISUAL, NONVISUAL SENSORY, INFERRED. An example is Washo (Jacobsen 1986:8), which has visual, auditory and a marker of ‘ex post de facto inference with some connotation of surprise’.

B3. NONVISUAL SENSORY, INFERRED, REPORTED. In Retuarã (Central Tucanoan: Strom 1992:90–91), the three suffixes that give evidential information refer to: (1) strictly auditory information, (2) assumed information, and (3) secondhand information. A similar system is found in Northern Pomo (Sally McLendon, p.c.).

Four term systems involve at least one sensory specification. If there is just one sensory evidential, additional complexity may arise within evidentials based on inference (C2, C3), or on reported information (C4). Visually obtained data (or data based on direct knowledge) can be contrasted with data obtained through hearing or smelling (as in C1), or through inference (which may be of different kinds, as in C2–3); many of these systems have a marker for reported information.

C1. VISUAL (OR DIRECT), NONVISUAL SENSORY, INFERRED, REPORTED. Such a system is found in traditional Tariana (Chapter 6), in a number of East Tucanoan languages spoken in the same area, and also in Xamatauteri (Yanomami family) (see Aikhenvald & Dixon 1998b); and in Eastern Pomo (McLendon, this volume).

C2. VISUAL, INFERRED (1), INFERRED (2), REPORTED. In Tsafiki (Dickinson 2000:407–409) the visual (used for ‘directly witnessed events’) term is formally unmarked; there is one suffix marking information inferred from direct physical evidence, another for inference from general knowledge, and an additional one for reported, or hearsay. A similar system is found in Pawnee (Caddoan: Parks 1972).

C3. NONVISUAL SENSORY, INFERRED (1), INFERRED (2), REPORTED. Wintu (Wintun family: Schlichter 1986) has four evidentials: *-nt^hEr*, for ‘nonvisual sensory evidence’; *-ke* ‘hearsay’; *-re* ‘inferential’; and *-[?]el* ‘assumed’ whereby the ‘speaker believes his proposition to be true because of his experience with similar situations’ (occurs with conditional, never followed by other suffixes). It is not clear how visual information is marked.

C4. VISUAL, INFERRED, REPORTED (1), REPORTED (2). Southeastern Tepehuan (Uto-Aztecan: Willett 1991:161–166) is said to distinguish eyewitness (‘perceived by the speaker’), inferred, and two kinds of reported – ‘previously known to the hearer’ and ‘previously unknown to the hearer’.

We have few clearly described examples of evidentiality systems with five or more terms. A system comprising VISUAL, NONVISUAL SENSORY, INFERRED, ASSUMED, REPORTED is found in Tuyuca (Central Tucanoan), and in a few other Tucanoan languages. Evidentials are realized as verb suffixes combining the following information: person, number and gender of the subject; tense; and evidence. The visual implies that the speaker saw the event or state; nonvisual sensory means that the speaker heard, tasted, smelt, or felt the event or state; inferred (based on results) is employed when the speaker saw the results of the event or state; and assumed is used if the speaker assumes that the event or state occurred or if no information at all is available (Barnes 1984:257). Reported is chosen if the speaker heard about the event from someone else. Similar systems are found in Tucano (East Tucanoan) and the innovative Tariana (Chapter 6).

Further examples of complex multi-term systems include the Nambiquara languages, from southern Amazonia (Lowe 1999:275–276). There is obligatory marking on the verb depending on whether a statement is (i) eyewitnessed (implying that the speaker has seen the action they are reporting); (ii) inferred; (iii) assumed (‘the speaker’s claim... based either on seeing an associated simultaneous action and making an interpretation therefrom, or on seeing a set of circumstances which must have resulted from a previous action and making an inference; different suffixes mark these two options’); (iv) reported (‘the speaker is simply passing on information they have heard from another speaker’); and (v) ‘internal support’ (‘the speaker reports their “gut feeling” that that which they assert must be so’). Fasu, a Papuan language from the New Guinea highlands, has (i) visual (‘seen’); (ii) nonvisual sensory (‘heard’); (iii) reported; (iv) heard from a known source, such as the original speaker; (v) statement about something in which the speaker participated directly; and also a number of specifications which are reminiscent of ‘inferred’: ‘statement about a thought’, ‘deduced from evidence’ as well as ‘obvious to the speaker’ (May & Loeweke 1980).

Systems which contain five or more terms may or may not involve two sensory evidentials – e.g. Tuyuca has visual, nonvisual, reported, inferred, and assumed. Western Apache (Chapter 4) has a five-term system, with just one – noneyewitness – sensory evidential, three inferentials and a reportative. Most large systems have several subtypes of inferentials (the distinction is often that between reasoning and physical evidence; see §5).

3. Markedness in evidentiality systems

Evidentiality systems vary as to the relative markedness of terms. There is a fundamental distinction between two kinds of markedness – formal and functional. A formally unmarked term will be the only one in its system to have zero realisation (or a zero allomorph). Functional markedness relates to the context of use – the marked term(s) may be used each in a restricted, specifiable context, with the unmarked term being used in all other circumstances. Formal and functional markedness do not necessarily coincide – a term from a system that is functionally unmarked need not be formally unmarked, and vice versa (see Aikhenvald & Dixon 1998a).

The only clear example of a functionally (but not formally) unmarked term in an evidentiality system so far comes from Jarawara: here, the immediate past noneyewitness is the only term that functions – in certain contexts – as neutralisation of the three past tenses and two evidentiality values.

In most types of evidentiality systems, the visual (or direct, or eyewitness) evidential may acquire a zero-realization, i.e. be formally unmarked, as in Yukaghir (Chapter 9), and in Pawnee (Caddoan: Parks 1972). In Tariana, the visual evidential is the least formally marked (Chapter 6, especially §8). In many systems, a zero-marked verb is understood as referring to visually acquired or directly witnessed information – this is the case in Qiang (Chapter 3), in Western Apache (Chapter 4) and in Koreguaje (Gralow 1993). In Hixkaryana (Derbyshire 1985:255), absence of any ‘verificational particle’ – which expresses some evidentiality-related meanings – specifically marks ‘eyewitness’ when contrasted with ‘hearsay’. This suggests visual perception and/or direct (firsthand) witness as ‘default’ in many cases – though this is far from universal.

An analytic problem that arises in these cases is whether the zero marked form should be considered a term in an obligatory system, or whether the system (including no zero term) should be said to apply optionally. An informed decision between these alternatives can only be made on language-internal grounds. If zero-marking has a specific semantic connotation, then it should be looked upon as part of the system. This is the case in Yukaghir (§3.1 of Chapter 9) where zero-marked forms are always interpreted as witnessed with an appropriate sense by the speaker, as opposed to inferential for which the source of information lies elsewhere.

In Tsafiki (Barbacoan: Dickinson 2000:407), a morphologically unmarked verb is used to code directly witnessed events, and is in paradigmatic opposition to the two types of inferred and to the reported evidential.

The situation in Qiang is different – while an unmarked clause is ‘assumed to represent knowledge that the speaker is sure of, most probably (but not necessarily) from having seen the situation or event first-hand’, the ‘firsthand’ interpretation of a formally unmarked verb is just a tendency. Similarly, the absence of an evidential marker in Western Apache (§2.5 of Chapter 4) only tends ‘to imply that the speaker was an eyewitness of the event’, and the absence of an evidential particle remains semantically ambiguous. In these cases, zero-marking may not be considered as a term in the evidential system.

If zero-marking has no positive value but simply covers ‘everything else’, then one might prefer not to include it in the system, as is the case in M̄yky (Chapter 10).

4. Different evidentiality subsystems in one language, and scattered coding of evidentiality

The contributors to this volume concur with a working definition of an evidential system as ‘taken to be a paradigmatic set of [...] forms’ (Johanson, this volume). But is evidentiality – a grammaticalized source of information – always one paradigmatic set of forms, and always one grammatical category? Here I address this question.

4.1 Different evidentiality subsystems in one language, and double marking of information source

Languages can have more than one evidentiality system, or more than one paradigmatic set of forms with evidentiality meaning. Firstly, different evidentials can be in complementary distribution, depending on clause types. Tariana (Chapter 6) distinguishes four evidentials – visual, nonvisual, inferred, and reported (C1) – in affirmative clauses, only three in interrogatives and in apprehensives (B2: the reported is not used there), and just reported in commands (A3). There is also a visual-nonvisual distinction (A1 type) in the purposives. Similarly, Northern Embera languages have visual, inferred and reported (B1) in affirmative clauses, but just reported (A3) in commands. It appears that Tariana has the highest number of subtypes of evidentiality systems depending on clause types. In each case, the largest systems are attested in affirmative clauses. The kinds of coexisting systems are a matter for further investigation.

The choice of an evidentiality subsystem may depend on a choice made in the tense system or in the mood system (cf. Aikhenvald & Dixon 1998a).

Jarawara has an eyewitness–noneyewitness distinction (A1) restricted to the three past tenses; reported (A3), and inferred (A2) are marked independently of tense distinctions, and of each other. Similarly, M̄yky (Chapter 10: Table 3) distinguishes visual versus nonvisual (A1 system) as an obligatory specification in the past tense of the declarative mood; reported and inferred occur in a different slot in the verb structure, independently of tense (and no evidentials are distinguished in commands or questions). Abkhaz (Chapter 11), and Archi (Northeast Caucasian: Kibrik 1977:231–232) have a reported evidential, independent of an A2 system. Archi has an A2 system in past tenses, while in Abkhaz the inferential markers appear in the same slot as mood.

Secondly, several subsystems of evidentials can be postulated if evidentials can combine with each other, creating double marking of source. In Qiang, the visual evidential can occur together with inferential – as in the situation described in example (18a) in Chapter 3: the speaker first guessed someone was playing drums next door (the inferential is used for this), and then went there and indeed saw a person holding a drum or drumsticks: this actual seeing justifies the use of visual. Similarly, in Shipibo-Konibo, the direct evidential can combine with an inferred evidential, to indicate that ‘the reasoning or speculation is based upon evidence derived from the speaker’ (§2 of Chapter 2). Here, sources of evidence are different, but the evidence was acquired by the same person – the speaker who uses the inferential evidential to interpret the evidence acquired visually.

A combination of a noneyewitness with a reported evidential specifies the source of reported information in Tsafiki (Dickinson 2000:408), a language with a four-term evidential system of a C2 type (see above, §2). The reported evidential can combine with any of the other three, indicating ‘the type of information the original informant had for the assertion’, as in (1):

- (1) *Manuel ano fi-nu-ti-e*
 Manuel food eat-INFR.PHYSICAL.EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-DECL
 ‘He said/they say Manuel has eaten’ (they didn’t see him, but they have direct physical evidence)

The evidence marked in one clause may come from different sources. The reported evidential – in which the narrative is cast – refers to the way the narrator acquired the information. And this reported evidential may combine with an evidential referring to the way the information was obtained by the main character. Numerous examples of this are discussed by McLendon in §5.2, of Chapter 5. Example (58) (Chapter 5) (repeated below as (2)) illustrates such marking of two different sources of evidence on one verb: here, the nonvisual

sensory *-(i)nk'e* refers to the fact that the blind old villain could hear the hero walk out; and the hearsay suffix *-le* is the evidential typically used in traditional narratives:

- (2) *bá=xa=k^{hi}* *xów-aqa-nk'e-le*
 then=they.say=3person.agent outwards.move-NONVIS.SENSORY-HEARSAY
 'Then he started to walk out, it is said' (the old man villain, who is blind,
 heard the hero start to walk out)

Similar cases are found in other languages – Shipibo-Konibo (§§4 and 5 of Chapter 2), possibly Western Apache (Chapter 4; example (13), and discussion there), and Bora (Thiesen 1996:97).

In all these cases, it is the reported, or the inferred, specification that forms a system distinct from others, since a reported or an inferred specification can cooccur with another one. If a language has two sensory evidentials, one would not expect them to belong to different subsystems.

4.2 Scattered coding of evidentiality

In many languages with several evidential distinctions, evidentials may occur in different slots of the verbal word, and have different restrictions on cooccurrence with other categories. The evidentiality marking itself may be obligatory – but different evidentiality specifications are 'scattered' throughout the verbal system, and by no means make up a unitary category.

Jacobsen (1986) demonstrated that, although Makah (Wakashan) does have obligatory evidentiality marking, this is 'scattered' among suffixes of different orders; they enter into different paradigmatic oppositions with other (not necessarily evidential) affixes and thus cannot be considered a morphologically unitary category.

Along similar lines, in West Greenlandic (Chapter 13) evidential meanings are expressed with several kinds of verbal derivational suffixes, a quotative enclitic and an adverbial particle. These affixes do not form a category of evidentiality – they are in opposition to other derivational suffixes, most of which have nothing to do with information source.

Japanese is another example of a language with different ways of marking source of information, but without evidentiality as a unitary grammatical category (Aoki 1986). The so-called evidentials in Japanese include one reported form (marked with a nominalizer *soo* followed by a copula *da*), and three 'inferential' forms: *yoo da* is used when the speaker has some 'visible, tangible, or audible evidence collected through his own senses to make an inference'

(Aoki 1986: 231), *rasi* -*i* is used ‘when the evidence is circumstantial or gathered through sources other than one’s own senses’, and *soo da* (which differs in pitch from the hearsay marker) is used to talk about events which are imminent and when ‘the speaker believes in what he is making an inference about’ (p. 232). The morphemes *soo* and *yoo* are nouns, while *rasi* is an adjective; the evidential specification does not appear to be obligatory. There are a few other ways to refer to the ways information has been obtained. For instance, a ‘marker of fact’, *no* or *n*, is ‘used to state that the speaker is convinced that for some reason what is ordinarily directly unknowable is nevertheless true’; however, this morpheme can be interpreted as referring to validation of information rather than the way it was obtained. Since ‘hearsay’ in Japanese can cooccur with other so-called evidentials, it could be considered a separate system on its own; in this case we could just say that Japanese has an A3 system. A similar claim can be made for West Greenlandic. Systems of such kinds are only marginally relevant to the study of evidentiality.

The status of evidentiality as a category is complicated by additional factors. Evidentiality specifications may enter into paradigmatic relations with morphemes of different sorts. In M̄yky, the reported and the inferred evidentiality markers occur in the same slot as negation. In Ladakhi (Bhat 1999: 86–87), Yukaghir, Abkhaz, Eastern Pomo and most Samoyede languages, evidentiality markers occupy the mood and modality slot in a verbal word, and are thus mutually exclusive with conditional, imperative, interrogative markers and so on. However, as shown in Chapters 9 and 11, this does not mean that evidentiality is a kind of mood or modality – see §6.

Polysynthetic languages with rich verbal morphology – such as Eskimo languages, other North American languages, such as Wakashan, or South American languages, such as Jarawara – present another problem: most verbal affixes are optional, and the traditional distinction between obligatory inflection and optional derivation may not be useful for such a category as evidentiality (see §9 of Chapter 13, also Dixon 2002, and Chapter 7 here). An informed decision concerning the categorial status of evidentiality and what exactly constitutes a grammatical category in these cases can only be made on the basis of language-internal criteria.

5. Semantic complexity of evidentials, their extensions and functions

The semantic ‘core’ of evidentials is source of information. Individual terms in different systems tend to acquire various semantic extensions, e.g. ‘epis-

temic' meanings,³ expressing a speaker's (relative) certainty in the veracity of their statement. However, these extensions are by no means universal (pace Willett 1988).

In small systems of A1 type (eyewitness/direct versus noneyewitness), both terms tend to be semantically complex. In Jarawara, eyewitness usually implies visually acquired information; but can be extended to hearing and even smelling. In Yukaghir eyewitness covers any sense appropriate to the context. The noneyewitness term covers inference and hearsay in Northern Khanty (Nikolaeva 1999) and in Yukaghir (where there is no special reported evidential), but just unseen events and inference in Jarawara (which does have a distinct reported). In A2 systems, the nonfirsthand term covers a broad range of nonwitnessed situations, be they unseen or reported or inferred. This is similar to the semantic extensions of indirectives in Turkic languages (Chapter 12): here, 'specification of the source of information [...] is not criterial' (Johanson, this volume); an unspecified indirect source may imply hearsay, inference or simply the fact that the situation was perceived by any means (see examples under §11.1 in Chapter 12). However, some Turkic languages tend to make an additional distinction between reported and nonreported sources of information, thus drifting towards an A3 type system.

Semantically broad evidential categories tend to develop additional overtones. These involve creating a conceptual distance (§11.3–5 of Chapter 12) which results in the overtones of 'unprepared mind' involving unexpected, new (and surprising) information, and also 'noncommitment' of the speaker to the truth of the utterance (as in Kalasha and Khowar: Bashir 1988), and caution and modesty. Mirative extensions have been noticed for most systems – we find examples in Jarawara, Yukaghir, Abkhaz as well as in Turkic. The inferential forms may be employed to focus the listener's attention on crucial points in a narrative, as in Abkhaz (§3.3.2 of Chapter 11); this is comparable to the adversative ('but') and argumentative values of evidentials in Western Armenian as illustrated by Donabédian 2000).

One of the meanings of the inferential in systems of all kinds is deferred evidence: that is, inference made on the basis of the seen result: this is the case in Yukaghir (§3.2 of Chapter 9). Western Apache has a separate morpheme, *lék'eh*, whose primary meaning is 'past deferred realization': that is, it refers to a post factum inference made on the basis of something that the speaker had previously witnessed but could only have made all the right inferences about later. The specific inferential in Tariana (§2 of Chapter 6) has similar semantics. The wealth of possibilities of various inference types accounts for the fact that

a fair number of large evidential systems distinguish several inferentials – as do Shipibo-Konibo, Tariana and Tucano, besides Western Apache.

Evidential markers may indicate a speaker's attitude towards the validity of certain information but do not have to. This is why evidentiality should not be considered as part of the 'linguistic coding of epistemology'. The meanings and extensions of individual terms depend on the system. The simpler the system, the more semantic complexity of terms we expect. There is here similarity to vowel systems. In a small system, with just three or four members, each vowel is likely to cover a considerable phonetic space, while in a large system each vowel is likely to have a restricted realization.

Two-term systems usually have no epistemic extensions (see Chapter 9 for Yukaghir, Chapter 11 for Abkhaz and Chapter 7 for Jarawara). These languages have other means (typically, other moods) to express probability and other epistemics. The Indirective term in Turkic, on the contrary, is typically extended to mean uncertainty and probability (Chapter 12).

In systems of three terms or more, the visual evidential indicates events perceived through seeing and may be extended to cover direct observation, participation, control, generally known and observable facts, and also certainty. However, certainty is by no means the core meaning. The 'lexical reinforcement' of evidentiality (see examples (8) and (64) in Chapter 6, for Tariana) provides justification for associating evidentiality markers with particular sources of evidence. In Tariana, 'visual source' can be strengthened by a comment 'I saw it'; and a nonvisual source by 'I heard it', and so on. This poses an additional question concerning the organization of the lexicon in languages with grammatical evidentiality. Some languages, such as Tariana, have lexical items roughly matching evidentiality distinction; others appear not to. This is a matter for separate study.

In addition to visually acquired information, visual evidentials in systems with more than two terms may cover general statements about well-known and observable facts (such as 'Summer follows spring'), and events for which the speaker takes full responsibility, as in Tariana (Chapter 6). Qiang is more complex: the unmarked forms which may acquire a visual reading are employed for generally known facts (§3 of Chapter 3). The formally marked visual indicates that the speaker saw the event happen. But with first person this visual can acquire the meaning of a non-intentional action.

In a large evidential system, a sensory nonvisual term does not necessarily have a counterpart which refers to visually acquired information. The marker of direct evidence in Eastern Pomo simply indicates that the speaker has direct knowledge of the event (generally, since they performed it, or experienced it).

A noneyewitness term in a two-way system, or an inferred term in a three-term system, tends to subsume all sorts of information acquired indirectly – that is, through inference (based on direct evidence, or general knowledge, or no information), and also indirect participation, and often new knowledge. This is why a noneyewitness evidentiality specification in a two-term system and an inferential evidential in a three-term system may acquire a mirative extension. In Quechua (Floyd 1997) the reported evidential can be used in a mirative sense. Mirative extensions have not been attested in systems of evidentials which have a special ‘admirative’ mood, as is the case in Tariana (Chapter 6), and Albanian (Chapter 8).

Evidentials can be used in varied ways to describe cognitive states and feelings. In the three-term system in Quechua, visual (or direct) is used to talk about one’s own feelings; however, Tariana and the Tucano languages with four term systems use nonvisual for this. In Tuyuca (Malone 1988: 131), nonvisual evidentials are preferred when speakers refer to their own cognitive states (e.g. knowing or understanding). Assumed evidentials are preferred when speaking about a third person – there is no way of *perceiving* that such a state exists inside another person, one can really only assume it. In Eastern Pomo, one cannot make claims about other people’s sensory perception; thus, either a direct or an inferential evidential has to be used when talking about a third person’s feelings (examples (13–15) in Chapter 5). These usages pose yet another question, concerning correlations between semantic types of verbs, for instance, verbs of wanting, cognition and perception (including, possibly, their transitivity classes: cf. Dickinson 2000) and preferences in the choices made in evidentiality systems. These may correlate with cultural stereotypes (as yet uninvestigated).

In multi-term systems nonvisual always covers evidence which was heard and sometimes also information obtained through senses other than hearing – such as taste and smell. In Eastern Pomo (§1 of Chapter 5), the semantic scope of the nonvisual sensory evidential is quite broad – it covers hearing, smell, taste, feelings and cognitive processes. But in no language of the world is taste or smell the primary meaning of a nonvisual term. Nonvisual can be extended to refer to one’s own or other peoples’ states or feelings – as in Tariana and Tuyuca, where these states are regarded as being perceived by senses other than ‘seeing’.

The inferred in a three-term system may acquire epistemic extensions of uncertainty and probability – as in Qiang and in Tsafiki. In Shipibo-Konibo (Chapter 2), both inferred evidentials (*-bira* and *-mein*) have overtones of uncertainty and doubt. In some four-term systems, only nonvisual acquires epis-

temic extensions, since it may imply that the speaker is not in control. But this is by no means universal. Many multi-term systems require subtle precision in indicating how the information was obtained, which leaves little leeway for uncertainty. Thus, epistemic meanings are not expressed through evidentials. Moreover, languages with multi-term evidentials generally tend to have a multiplicity of other verbal categories, especially ones that relate to modalities – examples include Tsafiki, and Tariana (Chapter 6). Inferred evidentials in systems with more than two terms may even acquire mirative connotations – as is the case in Qiang (Chapter 3) and Shipibo-Konibo (Chapter 2).

In the large evidential system of Western Apache, most evidentials – with the notable exception of reported – have epistemic extensions. This does not appear to be the case in Eastern Pomo.

Reported – which may subsume secondhand and thirdhand unless there is a special term for thirdhand – often acquires an overtone of information the speaker does not vouch for, both in small systems and in large ones. In Estonian, reported may be used for ‘shifting’ responsibility for the information and relating facts the speaker does not vouch for, as in (3) (Ilse Lehiste, p.c.):

- (3) *Ta olevat aus mees*
 he be:REPORTED honest man
 ‘He is said to be an honest man (but I take no responsibility for the truthfulness of this claim)’

A similar extension is found in Tariana – example (18) in Chapter 6. But this does not have to be the case, as can be seen for Qiang, Jarawara, M̄yky and Shipibo-Konibo. In Western Apache, the use of the quotative evidential implies an obligation to quote the information accurately; it thus precludes any possibility of epistemic extension. This may imply a possible differentiation between reported, or hearsay (which may be accurate or not, and may be prone to epistemic extensions) and quotative (which does not allow any further interpretations).

6. Evidentials and their correlations with other categories

Evidentiality specifications are sometimes made independently of clause type, modality or tense-aspect choice. However, choice of evidential may depend on the choice within a tense-aspect system. Most frequently, evidentiality distinctions are found in past tenses: of the languages discussed in this volume, this applies to Jarawara and M̄yky. An etymological connection between per-

fects ('postterminal aspects') and indirectives in Turkic languages is discussed in Chapter 12. A valid explanation for the connection between perfective or past and evidentiality has been suggested by Comrie (1976: 108): 'the semantic similarity (not, of course, identity) between perfect and inferential lies in the fact that both categories present an event not in itself, but via its results'. This link, however, is not universal. In Qiang the inferential sense of the suffix *-k* is primary only for perfective actions. If an action is imperfective the primary meaning of this suffix is mirative, and not inferential.

Evidentiality is often not distinguished in future, as is the case in Shipibo-Konibo, Tariana and Qiang. And in Yukaghir, the combination of inferential with a future marker has the epistemic meaning of 'probably'.

In a number of languages, evidentiality marking is mutually exclusive with mood and modality, as is the case in Abkhaz and in many Samoyede languages. However, in Western Apache (§4.4 of Chapter 4), Jarawara and Tariana, mood and modality markers can occur together with evidentials.

There can be restrictions or preferences for the cooccurrence of evidentials with negation. In M̄yky, negation is mutually exclusive with reported and with inferred. The majority of languages discussed in this volume show no such restrictions.

Evidentiality systems often interact with the grammatical person of the subject or experiencer. Cross-linguistically, there is a tendency to develop restrictions as to the use of first person with noneyewitness specifications in two-term systems (both A1 and A2) and specifications other than visual in larger systems. There may also be a preference for eyewitness in A1 and A2, and visual in other systems to be used with first person. In Eastern Pomo, the 'direct' evidential is more frequently used with first person than with third person (Sally McLendon, p.c.). Evidentiality specifications other than eyewitness (or visual/direct) tend to develop overtones of lack of control or non-intentionality, when used with first person. M̄yky is quite remarkable in that only the visual/nonvisual evidentials are never distinguished for first person, in other words, the opposition between visually and nonvisually acquired information is neutralized for first person (but not for second or third person; see Table 3 of Chapter 10).

Evidentials can have a special effect. In Eastern Pomo, no overt marker of experiencer is permitted in clauses which include the nonvisual sensory suffix (the experiencer of the action or state described is always the speaker) (Chapter 5, §1).

Evidentials are hardly ever within the scope of negation (the only possible example is that of Akha; see Egerod 1985). Neither can an evidential be ques-

tioned (as pointed out by LaPolla, §5 of Chapter 3). But evidentials can have a time reference of their own, independent of that of the action or state of the clause. This is illustrated with (26) and (28), from Western Apache (Chapter 4); and (32–36) under §5.1 from Tariana (Chapter 6). The idea of ‘deferred realization’, as illustrated for Yukaghir (§3 of Chapter 9), has to do with relative time of inference with respect to the event: inference is always post factum. Examples of how to tell a lie in Tariana show how one can distinguish the truth value of an evidential and of the actual event: example (13) in Chapter 6 shows deliberate use of a wrong evidential, with the correct information; and (23) illustrates false information accompanied by correct evidential. This demonstrates the relative independence of evidentials – which behave, in a way, as predications in their own right.

The choice of evidential marker used in evidential systems often depends on clause type. A fair number of languages do not have any evidentials in subordinate clauses; these include Abkhaz, Qiang, Eastern Pomo, Tariana and Jarawara. This restriction is not universal – for instance, it does not apply in Shipibo-Konibo. Many languages have no evidentials in commands – examples include Qiang, Eastern Pomo, Jarawara, Turkic languages and Yukaghir. Other languages – like Shipibo-Konibo, Tariana and Northern Embera – have a reduced set of evidentials in commands: typically, just reported (A3 system).

In quite a few languages evidentials are not used in questions – as is the case in Western Apache and Abkhaz. In those languages where evidentials do occur in questions, their use may have to do with the source of information the speaker has. This is the case in Yukaghir (Chapter 9, §4.3), and Eastern Pomo – for instance, one uses the nonvisual sensory evidential to ask about something that was perceived with senses other than sight (as in examples (36) and (37)). Indirective in Turkic languages can be used in questions asked on behalf of someone else – similar to the use of reported evidentials in questions in Kham (Watters 1998). Alternatively, evidentials in interrogative clauses may involve assumptions about the source of knowledge of the hearer – this is the case in Qiang, Jarawara and Tariana. Such assumptions may be considered daring, and culturally inappropriate; this is why one avoids asking too many questions in Tariana. Interestingly, the inferential *-mein* in content questions for Shipibo-Konibo combines reference to the source of the knowledge of the speaker, and of the addressee – see example (21) in Chapter 2. Evidentials in yes-no questions may have an additional overtone of politeness (see examples under (32), Chapter 2). Evidentiality is the only grammatical category that allows one to question, in an interrogative, the assumption of the speaker, of the addressee, or of both.

Evidentials play an important role in discourse. They are often manipulated – typically for highlighting important aspects of a narrative. In Yukaghir, a speaker may switch to the direct form (rather than inferential), to make the story sound more vivid (example (29), Chapter 9). Friedman (§6 of Chapter 8) provides numerous examples of how evidentials are deployed in political discourse in the Balkans. Similarly, evidentials in Turkic, and in Abkhaz, can be used to animate the discourse; or as means of ‘distancing’ oneself from what is being narrated. In Eastern Pomo, the direct evidential can be used at particular dramatic moments in narratives, ‘heightening’ a climactic event in a story (§4 of Chapter 5). And the inferential evidential can be employed even if the speaker had seen the event, as a way of distancing themselves from something unconventional and bizarre.

Evidentials often correlate with narrative genres. In Tariana and in Shipibo-Konibo, reported evidentials are used to describe traditional knowledge. However, in Tariana and in Tucano inferred is used in stories which relate important mythological events known to have left tangible traces in the surrounding landscape (§7 of Chapter 6). The importance of evidentials is corroborated by additional facts: Friedman (§9 of Chapter 8) reports that English – with no grammatical evidentiality – is perceived as a ‘deficient’ language in this respect by speakers of Turkic and of Balkan Slavic languages.

7. Evidentiality strategies

Various grammatical categories can acquire an additional evidential-like meaning as a ‘side effect’ without having ‘source of information’ as their primary meaning (see discussion in Lazard 1999; Dendale 1993, and Kronning forthcoming). Conditionals and other non-declarative moods often acquire overtones of uncertain information and of information taken from some other source, for which the speaker takes no responsibility. This is the way various authors characterized French ‘conditionnel d’information incertaine’. Similar usage of conditionals in Romance languages has been described by Squartini (2001). In Mangarayi (Australian: Merlan 1981:182), past irrealis forms are used to convey information which the speaker cannot vouch for.

Past tense and perfective aspect in Turkic and in some Iranian and Turkic languages can acquire additional meanings of ‘indirect experience’ (see discussion in Chapter 11, of how ‘postterminal’ aspects are used in this way in Turkic). Perfective and resultative participles may be extended to convey

reported information in a number of Estonian dialects and in Livonian (see Fernandez-Vest 1996; Laanest 1975: 155).

Different complementizers (Noonan 1985) can express meanings related to information source as well as the speaker's degree of belief in – or degree of commitment to – the proposition expressed in the sentential complements of cognition verbs, as in Kinyarwanda (Givón & Kimenyi 1974). In English, different complement clauses serve to distinguish an auditory and a hearsay meaning of the verb *hear*. For example, *I heard France beating Brazil* implies actual hearing while *I heard that France beat Brazil* implies hearsay (see Dixon 1991: 218; and a discussion of similar examples by Noël 2001). A similar strategy is found in Boumaa Fijian: here, the difference between clausal NP and *ni* complement corresponds to the distinction between a firsthand and a hearsay source of information (Dixon 1988: 38).⁴

The term 'evidentiality', in the strict grammatical sense adopted here, is not appropriate for these systems. One of the current misconceptions concerning evidentiality is to do with a gratuitous extension of this term to cover every way of expressing uncertainty, probability and one's attitude to the information, no matter whether it is expressed with grammatical or with lexical means; or whether it is the primary meaning of a category or not, or talking of evidentiality in a 'broad sense' – by Chafe's (1986: 271) definition: as marking speaker's *attitude* towards his/her knowledge of reality as opposed to its 'narrow sense': marking the *source* of such knowledge. This is unhelpful and quite uninformative. What is more, this approach obscures the status of evidentiality in languages which do have it as a grammatical category quite distinct from modality, mood or tense; a selection of such languages is discussed in Chapters 2–11 of this volume. Following this path, one can find evidentiality in English, and just about every other language (cf. Fox 2001, and many others). This is similar to how, a few years back, when ergativity was in 'vogue', languages which have ambitransitive verbs of type S=O (e.g. English *I broke the glass* and *The glass broke*) were analyzed as 'ergative' (see Dixon 1994: 18–20).

Here is another analogy. Many languages of the world have genders (often feminine and masculine, or animate and inanimate) realized by agreement, e.g. French, Portuguese, and Iroquoian languages. Other languages do not – but just about every language has some way of distinguishing males and females, be it by pitch, or choice of words, or speech style (see Appendix 1 of Aikhenvald 2000), as happens in Turkish or Finnish. Saying that English, on the one hand, and Qiang (or Shipibo-Konibo, or Tariana), on the other, have 'evidentiality', is similar to saying that both Portuguese and Turkish have grammatical gender.

What is and what is not an evidentiality strategy, is another matter. Maslova, in §7 of Chapter 9, demonstrates that the resultative nominal in Yuk-aghir shows only superficial similarity to an inferential and in fact does not have to do with information source at all. Along similar lines, epistemic modalities in Tariana, with meanings of ‘possibly, whatever’ and so on, do not indicate the source of information, and hence are not evidentiality strategies.

Evidentiality systems with several evidentiality distinctions – such as Western Apache, Jarawara or Tariana – have hardly any evidentiality strategies, or just a few. (See note 6 of Chapter 2, on a possible evidentiality strategy in Shipibo-Konibo.) Epistemics in Qiang show some semantic overlap with the inferential marker and hence could be considered an evidential strategy – see the discussion in §4 of Chapter 3.

8. Grammaticalization of evidentiality strategies, and origins of evidentials

Grammaticalization of evidentiality strategies often results in the creation of evidentiality systems. In his seminal contribution (Chapter 8), Friedman shows how the languages of the Balkans – in particular, Macedonian and Albanian – tend to grammaticalize erstwhile evidentiality strategies into obligatory categories – that is, ‘a meaning which is encoded into certain paradigms cannot be avoided when those forms are used.’⁵ In both Macedonian and Albanian, evidentials developed from past tense forms. In Macedonian, evidential meaning subsequently extended to new paradigms, while Albanian has a separate set of paradigms with an evidential meaning. Any grammaticalization process is best viewed as a continuum: evidential forms in the Balkans occupy an intermediate place on this continuum, as opposed to systems discussed in Chapter 3–7, 9–12 where evidentials are grammatical categories in their own right.

Almost any evidentiality strategy may develop into an obligatory evidentiality system. Typically a perfective or perfect-like tense carries an inferential or noneyewitness specification. This path has been described for a number of Caucasian and Finno-Ugric languages. Serebrjannikov (1960: 59, 66) traces the ‘unobvious’ past back to plain perfect in both Komi and Mari. In Tadjik (Lazard 1996: 29) a series of forms with noneyewitness meanings has developed out of a perfect. We have no clear examples of such an origin for terms within complex systems except for a possible scenario for Tuyuca which involves the development of a nonvisual present marker from an older perfect aspect construction (Malone 1988: 132). The inferential marker in Abkhaz goes back to

reanalyzed future markers (see §3 of Chapter 11). This development – quite unusual cross-linguistically – may have to do with grammaticalization of an erstwhile modal category employed as an evidential strategy. This is similar to the development of the Daco-Romanian presumptive mood, and the probabilistic mood in the Novo Selo dialect (northwestern Bulgaria), from evidentiality strategies to bona fide evidentials – according to Friedman (Chapter 8), they now have source of evidence as their primary meaning.

Evidentials may develop out of participles or other nominalizations. In Nenets (Décsy 1966:48; Perrot 1996), the noneyewitness ('auditive') forms probably come from nominalizations. Lithuanian has two strategies used for conveying evidential meanings. Active participles are used for 'reported' action, and neuter passive participles for the 'inferential' construction (see Grone-meyer 1997:97–100, 102–106). An evidentiality system can develop as the result of reanalysis of a complementation strategy, that is, by a process of reanalysis of a complement clause into a main clause. This grammaticalization path for the reported in Estonian was suggested by Campbell (1991:285–290). In complement clauses with speech act and mental state verbs containing a main verb, *et* (complementizer), and VERB-ACTIVE PARTICIPLE, the VERB-ACTIVE PARTICIPLE was reinterpreted as a finite verb form – traditionally called Modus Obliquus – associated with 'reported speech'; then the reinterpreted VERB-ACTIVE PARTICIPLE came to be also employed in main clauses (see further exemplification in Campbell 1991:286).⁶

Evidential markers often – but not always (pace Willett 1988) – go back to grammaticalized verbs. The reported term often involves grammaticalization of a verb of speech. In Qiang (Chapter 3), the hearsay marker is derived from the verb 'say'. In Lezgian (Haspelmath 1993), and in Tauya (MacDonald 1990) the hearsay evidential comes from a depleted verb of speech. In Maricopa (Yuman: Gordon 1986) the eyewitness evidentiality suffix is homonymous with the lexical verb 'see', and has undoubtedly developed from it. Nonvisual marker *-mha* in Tariana could go back to the verb *-hima* 'hear, feel'. And four of the six evidentials in Western Apache come from verbs: the nonvisual experiential comes from a passive verb 'it is heard', the non-mirative inferential is from 'it is sensed'. The physical inferential goes back to 'look like, resemble', while the quotative comes from 'say'.

Evidentiality is extremely prone to diffusion (what Johanson calls 'code-copying'); the emergence and loss of evidentiality systems is often due to intensive language contact (see Aikhenvald & Dixon 1998b, for evidentiality and its diffusion in Amazonia). Evidentials are a distinct areal feature of Caucasian languages (see §5.4 of Chapter 11), as well as of the Balkans (Chapter 8). Ev-

idententials spread from Turkic into numerous non-Turkic languages of Southwestern and Central Asia, Southeastern and Northeastern Europe, etc. (Chapter 12:§17). Evidentials are considered an areal feature for a number of areas in North America (see Jacobsen 1986; Sherzer 1976). A clear-cut example of calquing a whole system of obligatory evidentiality specification under the impact of areal diffusion is found in Tariana, spoken in the multilingual Vaupés area (Chapter 6; also Aikhenvald 2002). Emergent marking of evidentiality is found in the contact language of the Vaupés, Brazilian Portuguese (§9 of Chapter 6).

Evidentials can also be lost as a result of language contact. As Johanson points out in §17 of Chapter 12, a few Turkic languages only have evidentiality strategies, rather than bona fide evidentiality, under the influence of Indo-European languages: examples are Azerbaijani (influenced by Persian) and Karaim (influenced by Lithuanian and Ukrainian). Tucanoan languages spoken outside the Vaupés area have a reduced system of evidentials. Retuarã, from the Central Tucanoan subgroup, is spoken in Colombia, next to Yucuna, a language from the North Arawak subgroup that lacks evidentials. Yucuna is the dominant language in this region, with speakers of Retuarã also being bilingual in it. As a result of Yucuna influence, Retuarã has drastically reduced its system of evidentials (Aikhenvald 2002).

This extreme diffusability of evidentiality may have to do with its importance for human cognition, and possibly also with diffusability of cultural attitudes and stereotypes associated with evidentiality – see next section.

9. Evidentiality and cultural attitudes

The choice of evidentials may correlate with cultural stereotypes and with attitudes to knowledge. In Tariana and in Shipibo-Konibo, shamans use visual evidentials to relate their knowledge and supernatural experiences: these are viewed as real. The perception of dreams in different cultures goes together with different evidentials. In Jarawara (Chapter 7) descriptions of dreams are cast in visual evidential since they are supposed to be ‘seen’. In Turkic languages indirectives are not used in describing dreams; neither are any evidentials in Qiang. In contrast, in Yukaghir dreams are cast in noneyewitness (see Jochelson 1905:400). In Tariana, dreams are normally cast in nonvisual since they are not supposed to belong to the ‘real world’; and Shipibo-Konibo speakers employ the reportative *-ronki* when describing their own dreams. But prophetic dreams of Shipibo-Konibo shamans are cast in visual (since shamans are omni-

scient); a similar usage of evidentials is found in other languages of the Vaupés linguistic area (e.g. Gomez-Imbert 1986).

New insights into evidentials could be obtained from examining the ways in which evidentials are used to describe emerging cultural practices. In Qiang, reported is used for relating something seen on television (Randy LaPolla, p.c.), while the Tariana use the visual evidential. Another newly introduced practice is reading. In Shipibo-Konibo, the reported *-ronki* is used for information read in a newspaper (similar usage in Quechua was reported by Floyd 1997: 104). Literate Tariana speakers tend to use *inferred* when retelling stories they have just read, or when translating. We can offer a tentative explanation for this difference. In Shipibo-Konibo and in Quechua reported does not have overtones of ‘unreliable’ information, which it does in Tariana. *Inferred* in Tariana does not have any epistemic connotation and can therefore be safely used for information transmission.

In languages with grammatical evidentiality it is not appropriate to be vague about one’s source of information (see Chapter 6, and also §8 of Chapter 13). This attitude to information may correlate with the fact that in Amazonian society it is held that there is an explicit cause – most often, sorcery – for everything that happens. So as not to be blamed for something that in fact they were not responsible for, a speaker is careful always to be as explicit as possible about what they have done. This relates to the desirability of stating the source of the evidence for everything that is said, visually obtained information being the most valuable. We need detailed cross-cultural studies of societies which speak languages with evidentiality systems before any cross-linguistically valid conclusions can be formulated.

10. Misconceptions

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in ‘evidentiality’⁷ resulting in a large number of publications and definitions. Quite a few of these are misleading. Anderson (1986: 274–275) lists the following properties which he considers as ‘definitional’ for evidentials:

- (a) evidentials show the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making that claim, whether direct evidence plus observation (no inference needed), evidence plus inference, inference (evidence unspecified), reasoned expectation from logic and other facts; (b) evidentials are not themselves the main predication of the clause, but are rather a specification added to a factual claim about something else; (c) evidentials have the indica-

tion of evidence as in (a) as their primary meaning, not only as a pragmatic inference; (d) morphologically, evidentials are inflections, clitics or other free syntactic elements (not compounds or derivational forms).

While points (a)–(c) are basically sound, point (d) – which concerns the surface realization of the category – should not be among its definitional properties: for one thing, this criterion would not work for systems in which the distinction between inflectional and derivational categories is not clear-cut. Further criteria include (p. 277):

(i) evidentials are normally used in assertions (realis clauses), not in irrealis clauses, nor in presuppositions; (ii) when the claimed fact is directly observable by both speaker and hearer, evidentials are rarely used (or have a special emphatic or surprisal sense); and (iii) when the speaker (first person) was a knowing participant in some event (voluntary agent; conscious experiencer), the knowledge of that event is normally direct and evidentials are then often omitted.

All these points are highly arguable – evidentials in some systems may be used in ‘irrealis’ clauses depending on how the interactions between mood and modality, and evidentials, work in a particular language. Chapter 6 and §3.7.1 of Chapter 11 provide ample illustration of evidentials with nondeclarative moods in Tariana, and in Abkhaz. And in Tucano, evidentials occur with the conditional mood (Aikhenvald, Chapter 5 of 2002).

The obligatoriness of evidentials depends on the particular system rather than on randomly chosen parameters such as (ii) and (iii). In Tuyuca (Barnes 1984) evidentials are never omitted, whether the speaker is the ‘knowing participant’ or not. Finally, Anderson’s additional criterion, that ‘second person in questions is treated as first person in statements’ (that is, a locutor versus nonlocutor distinction in person marking), is not at all necessarily linked to evidentiality (see footnote 4).

Evidentiality systems differ in how complex they are – some distinguish just two terms, eyewitness and noneyewitness, or reported and everything else, and some distinguish up to seven (Central Pomo), or eight terms (Kashaya Pomo). In this, and many other cases discussed in this volume, evidentiality is a grammatical category in its own right. It is not usefully treated as a subcategory of tense-aspect (Willett 1988), or as a subtype of epistemic or some other modality (Bybee 1985; Chung & Timberlake 1985; Palmer 1986; and van der Auwera & Plungian 1998). The fact that evidentials are typically (albeit inaccurately) translated into English and other familiar European languages as epistemics ‘apparently’ or ‘obviously’ could have contributed to these treatments

(also see the arguments in de Haan 1999).⁸ In this volume we present ample evidence in favour of evidentiality as a cross-linguistically valid grammatical category whose meaning is source of information and not just ‘linguistic coding of epistemology’.

11. The structure of this book, and prospects for future study

A brief note on the organization of the volume is in order. Chapters 2–13 are each concerned with an in-depth study of an evidentiality system of a distinct type. Each considers the following issues:

- organisation of systems, semantics of individual terms and their extensions;
- correlations between evidentiality and other grammatical categories;
- the role evidentiality plays in discourse, the existence and the status of evidentiality strategies;
- the origins of evidentials, and the correlations between these and the kinds of extensions evidentials acquire; and
- evidentials and cultural attitudes.

The volume opens with a discussion of largish systems, in Chapter 2 on Shipibo-Konibo (Pano), by Pilar Valenzuela; Chapter 3 on Qiang (Tibeto-Burman), by Randy LaPolla; Chapter 4 on Western Apache (Athabaskan), by Willem De Reuse; Chapter 5 on Eastern Pomo (Pomoan), by Sally McLendon; and Chapter 6 on Tariana (Arawak), by Alexandra Aikhenvald.

This is followed by discussion of smaller evidentiality systems: Chapter 7 on Jarawara (Arawá), by R.M.W. Dixon; Chapter 8, by Victor Friedman, on how an evidentiality strategy has been grammaticalized to become an evidentiality category in the Balkans; Chapter 9 on Yukaghir (isolate), by Elena Maslova; Chapter 10 on M̄yky (isolate), by Ruth Monserrat and R.M.W. Dixon; and Chapter 11 on Abkhaz (West Caucasian), by Viacheslav Chirikba.

In Chapter 12, Lars Johanson discusses evidential systems of indirective type in Turkic languages – unlike any other evidentiality systems, these involve just an indication of existence for an information source, without specifying it. In Chapter 13, Michael Fortescue discusses scattered coding of evidentiality in West Greenlandic (Eskimo-Aleut) where evidential meanings do not constitute one grammatical category.

Chapter 14, by Brian Joseph, summarizes the results of the preceding chapters, and provides further prospects, questions and challenges.

The volume lays foundations for further typological cross-linguistic work on evidentiality. Importantly, all the authors have firsthand knowledge of languages with evidentiality, based on original fieldwork. The papers follow a unified typological approach. All this contributes to the reliability and comparability of the inductive generalizations attempted here.

In order to know more about evidentiality systems and their status, we suggest the following fruitful lines for future inquiry:

- investigating dependencies between evidentials and narrative genres;
- analyzing evidentials and how their usage correlates with different semantic groups of predicates;
- exploring correlations between evidentials and other grammatical categories, especially in large systems;
- investigating possible further distinctions such as quotative and reportative;
- analyzing the various origins and grammaticalization paths for evidential systems;
- investigating how the ways in which evidentials are employed may relate to cultural stereotypes and newly emerging cultural practices; in other words, how cultural changes may affect changes in evidentiality systems.

These are just a few of the possible directions for future investigations in contact-induced change. To elaborate on these, and other issues (which have not been mentioned here), we need further theoretically informed studies of evidentials from across the world. This volume is but a start.

Notes

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2. That is, evidentiality covers ‘type of evidence’ (e.g. Willett 1988) and ‘the existence of source’ (Frawley 1992: 413). We see no point in contrasting these two approaches as diametrically opposed, *pace* Squartini (2001).
3. That is, following Matthews’ (1997) definition, ‘indicating factual necessity, probability, possibility, etc.’
4. The opposition between locutor and nonlocutor, also known as conjunct and disjunct participant marking, can acquire additional meanings related to the source of information

and speaker's participation in the action, and can thus be considered evidentiality strategies (as in Tsafiki: Dickinson 2000: 382–385; and numerous Tibeto-Burman languages).

5. A useful summary of how evidential strategies grammaticalize in other neighbouring languages is in Lazard (2000).
6. The grammaticalization of 'reported' in Standard Estonian was speeded up by deliberate language planning starting in 1922, especially by Johannes Aavik, the leading figure of the Estonian language planning movement (Perrot 1996: 159).
7. The term 'evidential' itself appears to have first been introduced by Jakobson (1957/1995); he described it as a verbal category 'which takes into account three events – a narrated event, a speech, and a narrated speech event'. In actual fact evidential systems can differ in complexity, covering more than just these three parameters.
8. Wierzbicka's (1996: 427–458) treatment of evidentiality (based on a reinterpretation of the English translations of the limited data published in Chafe and Nichols 1986) is both misguided and simplistic. She defines evidentials through semantic primitives such as 'know', which are arguable as to their universality; thus, she is defining a grammatical category through lexical means. Like many others, she does not make a distinction between evidentiality as a grammatical system and as a lexical means of expressing meanings somehow related to 'source of knowledge'.

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CHAPTER 2

Evidentiality in Shipibo-Konibo, with a comparative overview of the category in Panoan

Pilar M. Valenzuela

1. Introduction

Shipibo-Konibo (henceforth, SK) is the language of the Shipibo, a Panoan people composed of circa 30,000 individuals settled along the meandering Ucayali River and its main tributaries in the Peruvian Amazon. Among the major features of SK grammar are: dominantly agglutinative morphology; use of suffixes (except for a closed set of mostly bodypart prefixes), enclitics, and postpositions; AOV/SV basic constituent order; absence of cross-referential pronominal marking on the verb or auxiliary; consistent ergative-absolutive alignment manifested through case-markers at the phrasal level; fairly complex switch-reference system; unusual types of transitivity agreement; and a hitherto undescribed evidential system.

The coding of evidentiality in SK takes place at two different levels. First, a major distinction between first-hand information and second-hand information is established; secondly, a further specification may occur to indicate either inference or speculation. As commonly found in languages with a grammaticalized evidentiality category, SK evidentials may also encode epistemic modality and mirativity.

When eliciting isolated sentences from a Shipibo speaker, it becomes evident that any declarative sentence requires the presence of either *-ra* or *-ronki* to be considered fully acceptable; their omission would simply yield “incomplete” utterances. Consider the following examples:¹

- (1) a. ^{??}*Jawen jema ani iki.*
POSS3 village:ABS large COP
‘Her village is large.’

- b. *Jawen jema-ra ani iki.*
 POSS3 village:ABS-DIR.EV large COP
 ‘Her village is large. (I have been there.)’
- c. *Jawen jema-ronki ani iki.*
 POSS3 village:ABS-REP large COP
 ‘Her village is large. (I have not been there, I have been told that it is large.)’

As indicated in parentheses, there is a clear evidential distinction between (1b) and (1c). Two other possibilities involve the morphemes *-bira* and *-mein*; while *-bira* generally co-occurs with *-ra*, combinations of *-mein* and *-ra* are less common:

- d. *Ani-ra i-bira-[a]i jawen jema.*
 large-DIR.EV be-INF-INC POSS3 village:ABS
 ‘Her village must be large (e.g. because it has a secondary school.)’
- e. *Ani-mein(-ra) iki jawen jema.*
 large-SPECL-DIR.EV COP POSS3 village:ABS
 ‘Perhaps her village is large. (I am just guessing, I ask myself.)’

Additionally, *-bira* and *-mein* may combine with *-ronki*:²

- f. *Ani-ronki i-bira-[a]i jawen jema.*
 large-REP be-INF-INC POSS3 village:ABS
 ‘Her village must be large (from what I heard).’
- g. *Ani-mein(-ronki) iki jawen jema.*
 large-SPECL-REP COP POSS3 village:ABS
 ‘Perhaps her village is large (from what I heard).’

Crosslinguistically, interesting interactions and combinatorial constraints can be attested between evidentials and other grammatical categories such as tense-aspect, mode, person, and verb class. In many languages, evidentiality is encoded as part of the finite verb inflection. Dependent clauses, being typically less finite, exhibit a reduced verbal morphology that commonly excludes evidentials. Similarly, evidentiality specifications tend to be reduced or absent in interrogative expressions, and are mostly absent in imperatives (Aikhenvald, Chapter 1, this volume).

SK evidentials are clitics that do not take part in the obligatory verb morphology. They may attach to non-finite clauses and, depending on semantico-pragmatic feasibility, occur with all tense-aspects, persons, and verb classes. There are two major constraints: (a) while all evidentials are found in the declarative, only *-mein* may combine with interrogative-marked expressions,

Table 1. Distribution of Evidentials across Clause Types

CLAUSE TYPE	<i>-ra</i> DIR.EV	<i>-ronki</i> REP	<i>-bira</i> INFR	<i>-mein</i> SPECL	<i>-ki</i> REP2
main declarative	+	+	+	+	+
dependent	+	+	+	+	+
(<i>-ki</i> -marked) interrogative	–	–	–	+	?
imperative	–	–	–	–	+

and (b) only the second reportative *-ki* (to be treated in 3.2) is attested with imperatives. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of evidential morphemes in SK.

2. The direct evidential *-ra*

The selection of the direct evidential *-ra* indicates that the speaker is a performer in the situation described, is an observer, has first-hand sensory knowledge (through vision, hearing, smell, taste, or touch) or, when combined with *-bira* and *-mein*, that the reasoning or speculation is based upon evidence derived from the speaker herself. In situations such as threats, warnings, generally known facts, and habitual and future events, *-ra* indicates certainty. Despite this additional meaning, I argue that *-ra* cannot be analyzed as a basic epistemic marker (see also §§4, 5, and 10).

-Ra is realized as *r-* when preceding the copula *iki*, thus resulting in *r-iki*. Otherwise, *-ra* is phonologically attached to the right of the first major sentence constituent, other positions yielding ungrammatical utterances. *-Ra* is ubiquitous in texts dealing with personal experiences:

- (2) a. *Nokon jane r-iki Inkan Soi.*
 POSS1 name:ABS DIR.EV-COP Inkan Soi
 ‘My name is Inkan Soi.’
- b. *E-a r-iki Bawanixo-nko-ni-a.*
 1-ABS DIR.EV-COP BAWANIXO-LOC-LIG-ABL
 ‘I am from Bawanixo.’
- c. *E-n-ra mato yoi-ai westíora nokon yosi-shoko betan*
 1-ERG-DIR.EV 2PL:ABS say-INC one POSS1 elder-dim CONJ
e-a winó-ni jawéki yomera-i ka-[a]x.
 1-ABS pass:DTRNZ-REM.P:NMLZ thing:ABS get.prey-SSSI go-PSSI
 ‘I will tell you something that happened to me and my grandfather
 once when we went fishing.’

- d. *Westíora nete-n-ra ka-a iki nokon yosi betan e-a,*
 one day-temp-DIR.EV go-PP2 AUX POSS1 elder CONJ 1-ABS
piti bena-i...
 fish:ABS search-SSSI
 ‘One day my grandfather and I went to look for fish...’

The second position clitic behavior of *-ra* is corroborated by the following examples starting with a coordinated subject NP, a relative clause construction, and a biclausal adverbial (in (5) /-ra/ is realized as [-a] after a sibilant):

- (3) [*Papa betan tita*]-*ra wai-nko ka-békon-ai.*
 father CONJ mother:ABS-DIR.EV garden-ALL go-DUAL-INC
 ‘Father and mother are going to the garden.’
- (4) [[*E-n atsa meni-ibat-a joni*]-*ra moa*
 1-ERG manioc:ABS give-PST2-PP2 person:ABS-DIR.EV already
ka-ke.
 go-CMPL
 ‘The person to whom I gave manioc yesterday already left.’
- (5) [[*No-n papa nokó-ketian*] *oin-ax*]-*a no-a*
 1PL-GEN father:ABS meet:DTRNZ-PDS see-PSSI-DIR.EV 1PL-ABS
raro-ke.
 become.happy-CMPL
 ‘When we saw that our father arrived, we became happy.’

If the utterance starts with a vocative, *-ra* skips the vocative and occurs, again, after the first major sentence constituent (see direct quote in example (21)). However, when the first or only constituent is a finite verb, *-ra* precedes the plural *-kan* (if present) and the aspect markers, thus occurring word-internally (see also example 8):

- (6) *toxbá-paké-yama-ra-kan-ai*
 float-going.down-NEG-DIR.EV-PL-INC
 ‘(they) are not floating down the river’
- (7) *bi-bain-yama-ra-kan-ke*
 get-going.TR-NEG-DIR.EV-PL-CMPL
 ‘they did not take it while going’/‘they did not take it and left’

While *-ra* shows a low degree of selection with respect to its hosts, the plural *-kan* and the aspect markers occur only with verbs. Additionally, *-ra* attaches to elements already containing indisputable enclitics (such as case- and switch-

reference markers), while *-kan* and the aspect morphemes do not. Hence, the clitic *-ra* precedes morphemes that are best analyzed as verbal suffixes.³

The next expression shows that *-ra* is not restricted to visual evidence. The transitive verb ‘fry’ is composed of an onomatopoeic root which combines with the transitive auxiliary; the SK sentence is active:

- (8) *Shee a-rá-kan-ai yapa.*
 ONOM:frying do.TR-DIR.EV-PL-INC fish:ABS
 ‘Fish is being fried. (I smell it and hear it, but cannot see it.)’

Sentences (9) and (10) illustrate, respectively, the use of *-ra* in a warning expression and in a future situation involving a non-first person:

- (9) *Mi-a-ra rono-n natex-na-ke.*
 2-ABS-DIR.EV snake-ERG bite-PREVEN-CMPL
 ‘Be careful, the snake could bite you.’
- (10) *Jatibi-tian-ra i-nox iki chiní bake-bo ja-ská*
 all-TEMP-DIR.EV do.I-FUT (FUT) last child-PL:ABS that-COMP
ja-skát-i
 that-COMP-I
 ‘From now on, your children will live just like that.’

-Ra also functions as a “default” evidential when describing events the speaker might have witnessed. For example, if asked to translate the sentence “The dog caught a paca”, a Shipibo speaker will most probably employ *-ra* without further inquiring about the source of the information. The relatively broad semantic area covered by *-ra* is comparable to that of the inferential in Yukaghir (Maslova, this volume); see also §3.3 for possible etymology and diachronic development.

3. The coding of reported information

3.1 The reportative *-ronki*

The reportative *-ronki* indicates that the speaker did not perform or directly experience the situation described, but obtained the information from an identified or an anonymous source. The use of *-ronki* does not entail disbelief or a lower degree of reliability with regard to the information.

-Ronki is found in traditional stories that commonly start with *Moatian-ronki*.. “It is said that a long time ago...” or *Nete benatianronki* “It is said

that when the world was new...”. Once the reported nature of the utterance has been established, *-ronki* is not attested in all clauses, sentences, or conversational turns; instead, *-ronki* seems to mark certain discourse units. Consider the following excerpt from a myth of origin. In (11a) the narrator employs *-ronki* to open the text, where the general living conditions of the Shipibo in remote times are described; several clauses unmarked for evidentiality follow:

- (11) a. *Nete bena-tian-ronki, no-n reken-bo onitsapi-bires*
 world new-TEMP-REP 1PL-GEN first-PL:ABS suffer:SSSI-purely
ja-pao-ni-ke; wetsa-nko-bires raka-t-ax
 live-HAB-REM.P-CMPL other-LOC-purely lying-DTRNZ-PSSI
oxa-ai-bo, chopa sawe-ti
 sleep-PP1-PL:ABS clothes put.ON-INF:ABS
onan-ma-bo, piti oa jawékiati-bo
 knowledgeable-NEG-PL:ABS fish DIST crops-PL:ABS
onan-ma-bo, bimi-bicho
 knowledgeable-NEG-PL:ABS fruit:ABS-only
koko-ai-bo, boan-boan-res-i
 eat.sweet.fruit-PP1-PL:ABS pass.many-pass.many-just-SSSI
ja-kan-a-bo.
 live-PL-PP2-PL:ABS
 ‘When the world was new (*-RONKI*), our ancestors lived just suffering;
 they lay and slept anywhere, they didn’t wear any clothes, they did
 not know (how to obtain) fish or crops, they ate just fruit, they lived
 walking and walking.’

A second instance of *-ronki* occurs on the adverbial clause initiating (11b), then the God Sun is introduced and the main story-line begins:

- b. *Jaskara onitsapi-bires i-t-ai oin-xon-ronki no-n*
 that.way suffer:SSSI-purely do.I-PROG-PP1 see-PSST-REP 1PL-GEN
Bari Rios-en jawen rabé bake no-a
 Sun God-ERG POSS3 two child:ABS 1PL-ABS
raan-xon-ni-ke: Papa Inka Rios betan Xane Inka Rios.
 send-BEN-REM.P-CMPL Papa Inka God CONJ Xane Inka God
 ‘Seeing that they were suffering (*-RONKI*), our God Sun sent us his two
 sons: Papa Inka God and Xane Inka God.’

The next instances of *-ronki* coincide with a discontinuity in the story-line, when the two Inkas sent by the Sun are characterized in a contrastive fashion; *-ronki* occurs after the mention of each one of them:

- c. *Ja Papa Bari Inka Rios-ronki i-ni-ke jakon*
 that Papa Sun Inka God:ABS-REP be-REM.P-CMPL good
shinan-ya, ikaxbi ja Xane Inka Rios-ronki i-ni-ke
 mind-PROP but that Xane Inka God:ABS-REP be-REM.P-CMPL
jakon-ma shinan-ya...
 good-NEG mind-PROP
 ‘Papa Inka Bari God (-RONKI) was generous, but Xane Inka God
 (-RONKI) was stingy...’ (Fucshico 1998: 11, my analysis)

Although *-ronki* and *-ra* are not overtly marked in every clause, sentence, or conversational turn, I argue that evidentiality is “obligatory” in the sense that the evidential value of the information has always been grammatically marked in the forgoing discourse and is clear to native speakers. Once this has been established in the text, *-ra* and *-ronki* can be left out in certain clauses that can be said to be under the “scope” of a previous overt evidential. This analysis is compatible with the fact that either *-ra* or *-ronki* is required in declarative expressions produced in isolation (§1), since in these instances there is no context from where their evidential value could be derived. When there is a switch in evidential value, however, this has to be indicated overtly.⁴

Crucially, *-ronki* is a clitic and occupies the same position as *-ra* in the sentence; i.e. it occurs to the right of the first major constituent. Furthermore, *-ronki* precedes the plural and aspect markers if the first or single constituent is a finite verb:

- (12) a. *A-ronki-ai.*
 do.TR-REP-INC
 ‘It is said that s/he will do (it).’/‘S/he says that s/he will do it.’
 b. *A-ronki-a iki*
 do.TR-REP-PP2 AUX
 ‘It is said that s/he did (it).’/‘S/he says that s/he did (it).’

However, *-ronki* cannot be followed by the completive aspect marker *-ke* or the plural *-kan* unless an auxiliary verb is placed inbetween:

- c. **A-ronki-ke.*
 do.TR-REP-CMPL
 It is said that s/he did (it)./S/he says that s/he did (it).
 d. *A-ronki-a-ke.*
 do.TR-REP-do.TR-CMPL
 ‘It is said that s/he did (it).’/‘S/he says that s/he did (it).’

- e. **A-ronki-kan-a iki.*
 do.TR-REP-PL-PP2 AUX
 It is said that they did (it).
- f. *A-ronki-a-kan-a iki.*
 do.TR-REP-DO.TR-PL-PP2 AUX
 ‘It is said that they did (it).’

By contrast, *-ra* may combine with the plural and the completive *-ke* directly (examples (6)–(8)).

As shown in (13), the general interrogative *-ki* exhibits the same distribution as *-ra* and *-ronki* (a different position of *-ki* would yield ungrammatical utterances):

- (13) a. *Mi-a-ki xawi wai-nko ka-[a]i?*
 2-ABS-INTER sugar.cane garden-ALL go-PP1
- b. *Xawi wai-nko-ki mi-a ka-[a]i?*
 sugar.cane garden-ALL-INTER 2-ABS go-PP1
- c. *Ka-ki-ai mi-a xawi wai-nko?*
 go-INTER-PP1 2-ABS sugar.cane garden-ALL
 ‘Are you going to the sugar cane garden?’

Hence *-ra*, *-ronki* and the interrogative *-ki*, occupy the same position in the sentence (with the minor reservations in (12c–f)). In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this suggests that the three clitics form a single paradigm (cf. Jaqaru, an Aymara language from Peru where markers for questions, first-hand information, and reported information are part of the same paradigm; Hardman 1986: 129). I will return to this point in Sections 3.3 and 10.

An interesting use of the reportative in SK is to mark indirect speech, when describing someone else’s utterances or thoughts. In 14(a) *-ra* marks the first clause corresponding to an event in which the speaker participated herself, while *-ronki* occurs in the complement clause where the speaker reports what Beso told her:

- (14) a. *Beso-n-ra e-a yoi-ke [Kontámanain-ronki oi*
 BESO-ERG-DIR.EV 1-ABS say-CMPL [Contamana:LOC-REP rain:ABS
be-ai].
 come-PP1]
 ‘Beso told me that it is raining in Contamana.’

By contrast, *-ronki* is not acceptable in (14b), where the speaker reports something she has previously said herself:

- b. **E-n-ra* *yoi-ke* [*Kontámanain-ronki oi be-ai*].
 1-ERG-DIR.EV say-CMPL Contamana:LOC-REP rain:ABS come-PP1
 ‘I said that it was raining in Contamana.’

In (15) the speaker, assuming that s/he has indeed witnessed the theft, cannot use the reportative *-ronki* to avoid responsibility for the information, but would be considered to have lied:

- (15) *Ja-ronki yometso-iba-ke*.
 3:ABS-REP become.thief-PST2-CMPL
 ‘(I heard that) he stole it (but actually I saw him).’

Either *-ra* or *-ronki* may be employed when the speaker refers to an event that took place while being drunk, the selection depending on whether s/he has a recollection of the events or was just told about them:

- (16) *E-a-ronki/-ra tima-nan-iba-ke*.
 1-ABS-REP/-DIR.EV hit.with.fist-REC-PST2-CMPL
 ‘I had a fight.’ (I was told, I don’t recall it./I recall it, although I was drunk.)

Although the use of *-ronki* by itself has no negative implication as to the reliability of the information, it may be used sarcastically in combination with other means (such as a marked intonation, a gesture, and/or a smile):

- (17) *Nato ox-e-ronki mi-a sueldo nee-n-xon-ai apo-n,*
 this moon-REP 2-ABS salary:ABS go.up-TRNZ-BEN-INC chief-ERG
oin-tan-we!
 see-go.do-IMP
 ‘(It is said that) this month the president will raise your salary. Go see it!’
 (I am sure this is not true.)

3.2 The reportative *-ki*

There is a second reportative, *-ki* (possibly a short form of *-ronki*), which is identical in form to the general interrogative (example 13). Although the two reportatives are semantically interchangeable, *-ki* tends to occur more often than *-ronki* in text and may even mark different constituents in the same sentence:

- (18) a. *Ja-ská-ketian-ki choro-pake-ni-ke,*
 that-COMP-PDS-REP2 disentangle-DISTR-REM.P-CMPL
 ‘In that way (the sloth woman) disentangled (the thread),’

- b. *ja tita-shoko-n-ki a-ni-ke ja*
 that mother-DIM-ERG-REP2 do.TR-REM.P-CMPL that
yoman-ki choro-ma-xon-ki,
 thread:ABS-REP2 disentangle-CAUS-PSST-REP2
 ‘the elderly woman made (her) disentangle (the thread)’
- c. *jakiribi-ki tonko a-ma-a iki ja ponsen*
 again-REP2 ball:ABS do.TR-CAUS-PP2 AUX that sloth
ainbo.
 woman:ABS
 ‘(she) made the sloth woman form a ball (of thread) again.’
 (Canayo 1993: 191, revised by Sanken Bari, my analysis)

The relatively freer distribution of the reportative *-ki*, together with the meaning difference, distinguishes it from the interrogative bearing the same form.

A second difference between the two reportatives is that *-ki* but not *-ronki* may be used with imperative expressions (cf. reported imperatives in Tariana and some Tucanoan languages, Aikhenvald, Chapters 1 and 6, this volume):

- (19) *Onpax-ki be-wé! *-ronki*
 contained.water:ABS-REP2 bring-IMP
 ‘(S/he says that you must) bring water!’

In addition, the two reportatives may be found in the same discourse chain. Moreover, it is possible to attest the sequence *-ronki-ki* as in (20) (the reverse order *-ki-ronki* is ungrammatical). Note that the presence of two contiguous reportatives does not encode second degree hearsay:⁵

- (20) *Ne-ke-a nete keská-ribi-ronki-ki jene meran.*
 PROX-LOC-ABL world COMP-also-REP-REP2 flowing.water inside
 ‘(It is said that) inside the water it is just like on this world.’

The next example illustrates the coding of second degree hearsay. It has been extracted from a text where the Shipibo plan to deceive the Sun in order to obtain the white-lipped peccaries he keeps in the sky. The protagonist is the shaman Ashi, who is supposed to visit the Sun and have him come down to the earth; in the meanwhile Ashi will set the peccaries free. The transitive auxiliary *a(k)-*, translated here as ‘tell’, closes a direct quote which in turn contains a reportative expression introduced by verbs of saying and marked by *-ronki*:

- (21) “*Ja noko-xon-ra e-n yo-i ka-[a]i ne-ská-a-kin:*
 that find-PSST-DIR.EV 1-ERG say-SSSI go-INC PROX-COMP-DO.TR-SSST
 “*Papá, mi-a-ra bake wetsa-baon kena-ma-ke,*
 father:VOC 2-ABS-DIR.EV child other-PL:ERG call-CAUS-CMPL
mi-n-ronki xea-i ka-ti iki”, *a-kin ak-á.*
 2-ERG-REP drink-SSSI go-INF AUX do.TR-SSST do.TR-PP2
 ‘(Ashi) told (the people): “Once I find him I will tell him the follow-
 ing: “Father, my brothers have sent (me) to call you, they say that you
 have to come (down to the earth) to have a drink”’. (Soi Rawa 1995:27,
 my analysis)

3.3 Possible sources of the reportatives

The form *-ki* may be related to the semantically generic intransitive auxiliary *ik-*, which translates as ‘say’ when introducing or closing a direct quote (analogous to the transitive *ak-* in (21)). In the related language Kashibo-Kakataibo, the intransitive auxiliary is *ki-* instead of *ik-*; apparently, its meaning and functions coincide with those in SK (Wistrand 1969:157). *Ki-* ‘say’ may be the source of both the shorter reportative and the general interrogative; in both instances *-ki* would indicate absence of first-hand knowledge on the part of the speaker (see also §10).

Interestingly, a third Panoan language, Matses, has two intransitive verbs of saying: *onke-* ‘speak’ and *ke-* ‘say’ (Kneeland 1979). It is tempting to relate these verbs to the SK reportatives *-ronki* and *-ki*, respectively. In support of this hypothesis is the fact that Proto-Panoan⁶ */i/ has the reflex /i/ in SK but the reflexes /i/ ~ /e/ in Matses (e.g. **pi-* ‘eat’, SK *pi-*, Matses *pe*; **βi-* ‘get’, SK *bi-*, Matses *bed*; **bawi*[*n/mV*] kind of fish, SK *bawin*, Matses *bawen*; Shell 1975; Kneeland 1979). The reportative *-ronki* may have resulted from the combination of *-ra* + *onke-/onki-*, in which case *-ra* may have been a declarative marker at a previous stage of the language (Faust 1973 as well as Lorient, Lauriault, & Day 1993 analyze *-ra* as a declarative/indicative marker). In turn, the grammaticalization of *-ronki* as reportative may have pressured an evidential reinterpretation of *-ra*. Note that a declarative origin of *-ra* would account for its current wide distribution which includes future situations, a context where evidentiality marking is not expected. One must be cautious with the hypothesis outlined here, however, since the roots *ki-* and *onki-* are not attested in SK.

4. The inferential *-bira*

-Bira encodes inference based on reasoning or observable evidence. It indicates that the speaker has a fairly well-sustained hypothesis for the proposition expressed. However, a consultant explained, *-bira* entails some degree of uncertainty since the speaker has not directly observed what is being described.⁷

-Bira does not generally occur by itself but combines with either *-ra* or the reportatives. Hence *-bira* can be analyzed as an addition or specification on clauses already marked by *-ra*, *-ronki*, or the reportative *-ki*. The inferential *-bira* is commonly found in the verb but may also occur on a focused non-verbal element.

Suppose two women are commenting on Beka's recent move to Charax Manan, a village where there is scarcity of fish, the main ingredient of Shipibo diet; then, one of the women could say *Beka-ra pi-kas-i-bira i-t-ai* [Beka:ABS-DIR.EV eat-DES-SSSI-INFR be-PROG-INC] 'Beka must be hungry'. Or someone hears Beka's baby crying and tells her *Mi-n bake pi-kas-bira-[a]i, oin-we!* [2-GEN child:ABS eat-DES-INFR-INC see-IMP] 'Probably your child is hungry, go see her!'

Now let's turn to text examples. The next sentence belongs to a narrative where a family goes to fish with *barbasco* (kind of plant used to poison fish).⁸ Given that a reasonable time has passed after the *barbasco* was spread on the water, it is expected that the fish are already getting poisoned and floating, and hence it is time to go catch them. In this context the mother says:

- (22) ...*moa-ra i-bira-[a]i yapa paen-i, oin-non*
 already-DIR.EV do.I-INFR-INC fish:ABS become.dizzy-SSSI see-PROSP
bo-kan-we!
 go.PL-PL-IMP
 '... the fish must be getting poisoned already, let's go see (them)!'
 (Inuma 1993: 16, my analysis)

When the family members are already close to the river, they hear a child crying (and possibly see a heap on the sand too); then, the mother tells her son:

- (23) *Ka-men-tan-we koka-baon-ra jawe-bira*
 go-quickly-go.do-IMP maternal.uncle-PL:ERG-DIR.EV what:ABS-INFR
miin-ke, bake-ra sion i-t-ai.
 bury-CMPL child:ABS-DIR.EV ONOM:crying do.I-PROG-INC
 'Go quickly and see! What could your uncles have buried, a child is crying.'
 (Inuma 1993: 16, my analysis)

In (23) it is obvious that the woman, hearing the child crying, suspects it is him/her mean relatives have buried. This is exactly what had happened according to the story, they had buried the Inka's son.

In the example below, the narrator is telling a group of people about the domesticated animals living on the Salt Mountain up the Pishki River. He claims that cows and chickens can be heard and seen in this place, despite the fact that no inhabitant or owner of the animals is to be found. Then the speaker adds:

- (24) a. *Nato jawéki-bo-ra e-n onan-yama-ke*
 this animal-PL:ABS-DIR.EV 1-ERG know-NEG-CMPL
tso-n-a-ra i-bira-[a]i, ikaxbi ja Tashi
 who-GEN-NMLZ-DIR.EV be-INFR-INC but that Salt
Manamamea iki.
 Mountain:LOC:ABL COP
 'I don't know whose animals these could be, but they are from the Salt Mountain.'

Although from the narrative itself it seems the narrator has no clue as to who the owner of the animals is, this is not really the case. One can learn in that village about the Inka (mythical hero) who used to live among the Shipibo in the old times. One day the Shipibo disobeyed the Inka, so the Inka abandoned them and went to live to the Salt Mountain. Therefore, the owner of the domesticated animals must be the Inka. (If the narrator had really had no idea with regard to the identity of the domesticated animals' owner, I believe he might have used *-mein* instead of *-bira*; see §5.)

The following examples are taken from a narrative about the Inka's daughter who was sent by her father to marry the last Shipibo man left on earth after the deluge and procreate with him. But instead of taking the Inka woman, the man takes her female servant and refuses to let her go. Seeing this situation, the Inka's daughter tells her servant the following (note that *-bira* occurs on the contrastive focal element, while *-ra* follows the first major constituent):

- (25) *Mi-on-bira keen-kin-ra mi-a a-ke, mi-a benta-n*
 2-INTRST-INFR want-SSST-DIR.EV 2-ABS do.TR-CMPL 2-ABS benta-ERG
yatan-ke.
 hold-CMPL
 'Probably it is because he wants YOU that he took you, that the *benta* took you.' (Inuma 1993:35, revised by Sanken Bari, my analysis).

Interrupting the story-line the narrator comments on the meaning of the word “*benta*” which is unknown to him (an archaism?). In this example *-bira* combines with the reportative *-ronki*:

- (26) *Jawe joi-ronki i-bira-[a]i “benta” ja-boan ak-á*
 what word:ABS-REP do.I-INFR-INC *benta* 3-PL:ERG do.TR-PP2
joi-bi-ribi.
 language-EMPH-also
 ‘What could “*benta*” have meant in their language (from what I heard).’
 (Inuma 1993:35, my analysis)

The use of *-bira* in (26) indicates that the speaker has a reasonably good hypothesis regarding the meaning of “*benta*”. In fact, from the narrative context it is obvious that “*benta*” refers to a partner in a love-sexual relationship.⁹

-Bira is also found in expressions presenting two alternatives (27), or it can be used to mean ‘approximately’ (28). The structure *V-ti iki* employed in (27) commonly signals obligation:

- (27) *E-n-ra kopi-bira-ti iki, e-n-ra a-yama-bira-ti*
 1-ERG-DIR.EV return-*bira*-INF AUX 1-ERG-DIR.EV do.TR-NEG-*bira*-INF
iki.
 AUX
 ‘Should I take revenge against him or not?’
- (28) *Jaino-a-x kimisha oxe-bira ik-á iki.*
 there:LOC-ABL-I three moon:ABS-*bira* do.I-PP2 AUX
 ‘Then, about three months passed.’

In addition, *-bira* is used when a speaker hesitates trying to recall information that does not come to her mind immediately but that is probably accessible to her. For example, trying to recall how a song starts, a speaker uttered *Ja-bira... jaa-bira...* and then started singing. Finally, *-bira* may be used to soften a request that would otherwise sound too direct.

In sum, *-bira* indicates the existence of fairly good evidence based on reasoning or observable facts; at the same time, *-bira* allows for some degree of uncertainty. *-Bira* is additionally used when presenting two alternatives, to express approximation, to soften a request, and in hesitations.

5. The speculative *-mein* ~ *-main*

Although often attested by itself, *-mein* ~ *-main* (in free distribution) may combine with *-ra*, the reportatives, or even the interrogative *-ki*. In structural terms, sentences containing *-mein* look like declarative expressions since they may carry the completive aspect marker *-ke* (*-ke* is necessarily replaced by *-a* in questions and other types of nominalized clauses). However, *-mein* is interpreted by native speakers as something that “one asks oneself”. A consultant translated *-mein* as ‘I am (just) guessing’. *-Mein* is used when the evidence for the proposition is rather poor or maybe even non-existent. For example, if someone knocks at one’s door and one is not expecting anybody, one could use *-mein* to express *Tso-a-mein i-ti iki?* [who-ABS-SPECL be-INF AUX] ‘Who could it be?’ However, if one is expecting Beka, one would probably use the inferential *-bira* to say *Beka-ra i-bira-ai* [Beka:ABS-DIR.EV be-INFR-INC] ‘It must be Beka’. Or, if one is watching a soccer match on TV and sees that a player suddenly falls to the ground and others come in his help, one could say *Oa-ra taské-bira-ke* [DIST:ABS-DIR.EV sprain-INFR-CMPL] ‘He must have sprained or twisted his ankle’. In this context, the use of *-mein* would be dispreferred given that the evidence to arrive at that conclusion seems fairly good. However, *-mein* would be preferred if one simply sees an unknown person on the street walking with difficulty (Yoi Sani, p.c. 2000; Sanken Bari, p.c. 2002). *-Mein* also expresses doubt.

In the text example below, a man observes that fruit fall down from a tree into the water. A group of pilchards swim towards the fruit. Some minutes afterwards the pilchards fly. Then, the man “asks himself”:

- (29) *Nato jiwí bimi pi-ax-mein(-ra) sipan noya-ke.*
 this tree fruit:ABS eat-PSSI-SPECL(-DIR.EV) pilchard:ABS fly-CMPL
 ‘Having eaten the fruit from this tree perhaps the pilchards flew.’

In a different story, a woman goes to clear the garden every day without taking a machete with her. Her husband wonders:

- (30) a. *Jawe keská-xon-main ak-ai nokon awinin wai*
 what COMP-TR-SPECL do.TR-INC POSS1 wife:ERG garden:ABS
oro-kin, machíto-oma i-xon-bi?
 clear-SSST machete-PRIV be-PSST-EMPH
 ‘How can my wife clear the garden in spite of not having a machete with her?’ (Ministerio de Educación and ILV 1979:23, my analysis)

The husband decides to spy on his wife and hides close to the garden. Then, he sees a turtle clearing the garden with its shell and thinks:

- b. *Nokon awin ik-ax-bi-main iki?*
 POSS1 wife:ABS be-PSSI-EMPH-SPECL COP
 ‘Is this perhaps my wife?’ (Ministerio de Educación and ILV 1979:23,
 revised by Sanken Bari, my analysis)

It was in fact his wife, the man had married a turtle woman.

As probably noted already, *-mein* may be used in situations when the speaker is confused or surprised because what he experiences is totally unexpected or contradicts his knowledge of the world. In these cases *-mein* plays a mirative function;¹⁰ however, this is not necessarily the case, as shown below:

- (31) *Nato joxo koriki miin-kan-ni bi-ax-main, no-a*
 this white money:ABS bury-PL-REM.P:NMLZ get-PSSI-SPECL 1PL-ABS
yometso i-ti iki.
 become.thief do.I-1NF AUX
 ‘If we take these coins that were buried long ago, we would perhaps be taken as thieves.’ (Loriot, Lauriault, & Day 1993:241, my analysis)

In the following example, *-mein* combines with the interrogative *-ki*:

- (32) *Mi-n-mein-ki a-ti iki?*
 2-ERG-SPECL-INT do.TR-1NF COP
 ‘Would you perhaps do it?’

In addition, *-mein* may indicate courtesy or politeness:

- (33) *Mi-n-mein e-a nokon wai oro-xon-ai?*
 2-ERG-SPECL 1-ABS POSS1 garden:ABS clear-BEN-INC
 ‘Would you please/perhaps clear my garden for me?’

-Mein is also attested in content questions. After having his students read a short story about a man who killed forty red monkeys that had eaten up his bananas, a teacher asked the children the following question:

- (34) *Jaweti joshin shino-mein joni-n rete-a iki?*
 how.many red monkey:ABS-SPECL man-ERG kill-PP2 AUX
 ‘How many red monkeys did the man kill?’

Unlike *-bira*, *-mein* cannot be used as an approximative marker; besides, the exact number of monkeys the man killed is clear from the text. According to the teacher, if he had employed just the interrogative *-ki* in (34) the question would

have been addressed to the children exclusively. However, through the use of *-mein* he as a teacher showed involvement in the task and presented himself as a participant (Ronon Meni, p.c. 2000). This explanation is compatible with the interpretation of constructions containing *-mein* as “something one asks oneself”, and of those involving the interrogative *-ki* as related to second-hand information.

Yet another function of *-mein* is to mark a type of rhetorical question presupposing a negative answer. The following example belongs to a woman’s description of the Shipibo social rule according to which those holding the relationship of *rayos* (a man’s parent-in-law, a man’s or woman’s son-in-law) cannot communicate directly but must do it through their daughter or wife:

- (35) *No-n bene i-ke-mein*
 1PL-GEN husband:ABS be-PDS-SPECL
rayos no-n yoká-ti iki?
 son.in.law/man’s.parent.in.law:ABS 1PL-ERG ask-INF AUX
 ‘What, is our son-in-law perhaps our husband to ask him questions directly?’

From the examples above it can be seen that *-mein* occurs after the first major constituent of the sentence similarly to the direct evidential *-ra*, the reportative *-ronki*, and the interrogative *-ki*. The next sentence shows that also *-mein* precedes aspectual morphology when the first constituent is a finite verb:

- (36) *Ka-mein-ke Charo Mashi-nko?*
 go-SPECL-CMPL Charo Mashi-ALL
 ‘S/he may have gone to Charo Mashi.’¹¹

Summarizing, *-mein* is used when the evidence for the proposition is rather poor or possibly even non-existent; also, it expresses doubt and may have a mirative extension. In questions or requests, *-mein* can indicate courtesy or involvement on the part of the speaker, or may mark a type of rhetorical question presupposing a negative answer. It could be said that *-mein* forms a paradigm with *-ra*, *-ronki*, and the interrogative *-ki* except for the fact that *-mein* may be followed by these markers. Sentences containing *-mein* carry finite verb inflection and hence resemble declarative expressions. But even when in combination with *-ra* which is restricted to the declarative, expressions marked by *-mein* are interpreted by native speakers as something “one asks oneself”, as a speculation or guessing.

6. Common and traditional knowledge

Evidentials are found in dealing with common and traditional knowledge in accordance with the patterns described above.¹² In folkloric texts, for example, the reportatives are employed except for the instances of direct quotation which generally trigger a switch to the direct evidential *-ra*.

Piripiri is a generic category referring to a wide variety of herbs (mostly *Ciperacea*) with special powers that are beneficial for those using them. Describing the properties of the ‘love *piripiri*’, a male consultant said:

- (37) *Noi waste r-iki ainbo bi-ti.*
 love *piripiri*:ABS DIR.EV-COP woman:ABS get-INF
 ‘The love *piripiri* is used to conquer a woman.’

Answering subsequent questions, the consultant explained that he had tried the love *piripiri* himself (and it worked). Next, referring to the ‘*piripiri* to give birth with ease’ the same male speaker stated:

- (38) *Jakon baken-ti waste r-iki kikin ikon.*
 good give.birth-INF *piripiri*:ABS DIR.EV-COP completely true
 ‘The *piripiri* to give birth with ease is really effective.’

In this case the consultant explained that he had seen his wife use *jakon baken-ti waste* and she delivered their baby at home without major difficulties. By contrast, *-ronki* was selected when describing the similar properties of the ray fat, with which the consultant had not had personal experience (although he didn’t seem to question its effectiveness):

- (39) *Iwi xeni-ribi-ronki jakon baken-ti iki.*
 ray fat:ABS-also-REP good give.birth-INF COP
 ‘(It is said that) also the ray fat is good to give birth with ease.’

7. Evidentials and cultural attitudes

The reportative *-ronki* is used when describing one’s own dreams. This function of *-ronki* does not seem in accordance with its basic meaning; i.e. to mark information heard from somebody else:

- (40) *E-a-ronki i-wan-ke ani aros wai napo chankat-a.*
 I-ABS-REP do.I-PSTI-CMPL large rice garden center stand-PP2
 ‘(It is said that) I was standing in the center of a large rice garden.’¹³

I hypothesize that the non-use of the “highest” evidential *-ra* in this situation may be a way to signal that what one has experienced is not part of reality.

According to Shipibo worldview, the great shaman under the influence of the hallucinogen *ayahuasca* (*Banisteriopsis species*, *Malpighiaceae*) travels to another layer of reality and relates with beings that cannot be seen by the non-specialist, among them the “hidden” people called *Chaikoni*. These experiences are viewed as real. For example, a great shaman can establish a kinship relationship with a *Chaikoni*. Hence, a Shipibo may claim to have *Chaikoni* siblings given that his father, a great shaman, married a *Chaikoni* woman and had children with her (Kanan Jisma, p.c. 1991; Ranin Ama, p.c. 1998).

Through the use of *ayahuasca*, the shaman sees designs or knots on a patient’s face and body, and consults with his allied spirits to arrive at a diagnostic and determine the appropriate treatment (see Tournon 1991 and references therein). The following example is an excerpt from a chant sung by a shaman during an *ayahuasca* healing session (from Tournon 1991: 196, my analysis):

- (41) ...*e-n-ronki jakon ak-ai...*
 1-ERG-REP good do.TR-INC
 ‘... they (my allied spirits) say that I do it well...’
 ...*joni yora senen-ma,*
 man body:ABS edge-NEG
 ‘... the man’s body is not fully healed,’
yora senen-mamea e-n-ra keyo-bo-ai
 body edge-NEG:LOC:ABL 1-ERG-DIR.EV finish-go.TR-INC
 ‘I will complete the healing of the body’
jakon koshi bewakan...
 good strong song:INST
 ‘with my good and powerful song...’

Sentence (42) would carry *-ra* if pronounced by a shaman giving a diagnostic to a patient; the reportative *-ronki* would be used by a third participant telling the patient the diagnostic heard from the shaman:

- (42) *Mi-a-ra/-ronki koshoshka-nin yoto-a iki.*
 2-ABS-DIR.EV/REP river.dolphin-ERG hit.with.blowpipe.dart-PP2 AUX
 ‘The river dolphin hit you with a (imaginary) blowpipe-dart.’

The shaman may use the reportative when communicating to his patient information he has obtained from the spirits:

- (43) *Mi-a-ronki benxoa-ti jakon iki.*
 2-ABS-REP heal-INF good COP
 ‘(The spirits told me that) I can heal you.’

8. Evidentials and European innovations

Watching an image on television is considered as experiencing the event oneself, since one actually “sees” what is happening. Therefore, when watching a soccer match the ongoing events as well as the results will be described using *-ra*. On the other hand, if the match is heard on the radio, the hearsay *-ronki* must be employed since the speaker is being told about the events by the reporter:

- (44) a. *Penal r-iki.*
 penalty:ABS DIR.EV-COP
 ‘It is a penalty.’ (I am watching it on television)
 b. *Penal-ronki iki.*
 penalty:ABS-REP COP
 ‘It is a penalty.’ (I am hearing it on the radio)

However, explained a consultant, if one hears the news on television without watching images on what is being reported *-ronki* rather than *-ra* would be appropriate (Yoi Sani, p.c. 2000). In addition, *-ronki* is used to talk about something one has been told over the telephone.

-Ronki is also employed for information one reads in the newspaper because “the newspaper says it”, on the internet (without watching images), or in a book. *-Ronki* is ubiquitous when dealing with Peruvian history in the bilingual elementary schools:

- (45) *No-n reken Inka-ronki ik-á iki Manco Capac.*
 1PL-GEN first Inka:ABS-REP be-PP2 AUX Manco Capac
 ‘(It is said that) our first Inka was Manco Capac.’

Commenting about geography classes, a teacher explained that if one reads in a book about the location of a given place, *-ronki* would be used; however, if one obtains the same information from a map, *-ra* would be appropriate instead:

- (46) a. *Alemania-ronki Holanda patax iki.*
 Germany:ABS-REP the.Netherlands next.to COP
 ‘Germany is next to the Netherlands (I read it in a book).’

- b. *Alemania-ra* *Holanda* *patax iki*.
 Germany:ABS-DIR.EV the.Netherlands next.to COP
 ‘Germany is next to the Netherlands (I saw it on a map).’

9. A comparative overview of evidentiality in Panoan

Based on the available literature, in this section I briefly examine comparative data regarding the grammatical coding of evidentiality in Panoan and put forward a few observations. Given the fact that Panoan languages are underdescribed (if not simply undescribed) and the lack of studies focusing on evidentiality in the individual languages, this overview cannot be exhaustive and my conclusions are necessarily provisional.

For the purposes of the present comparison, I divide Panoan languages in two groups: the Ucayali group to which SK, Kapanawa, and Wariapano belong; and the non-Ucayali group which includes Kashibo-Kakataibo, Matses, Kashinawa, and Chakobo. The four non-Ucayali languages can be seen as representing distinct branches of Panoan (Shell 1975; Loos 1999).

9.1 The non-Ucayali languages

9.1.1 *Kashibo-Kakataibo*

So far, only one evidential has been described for Kashibo-Kakataibo, the second position reportative clitic *-isa* (Shell 1978). Note that Kashibo-Kakataibo *-isa* does not resemble the SK reportatives; i.e. *-ronki* and *-ki*.

9.1.2 *Matses*

From Kneeland’s (1979) description of Matses, I conclude that this language exhibits a set of evidential suffixes that take part in the verb morphology and may precede tense-aspect and person inflection. Apparently, evidentials are restricted to the past. The morpheme $-\emptyset$ indicates that the speaker has directly witnessed the event described (but cf. Kneeland 1979:42, fn. 1, where $-c^{14}$ is listed instead). This marker may be used, for instance, when the speaker states that a place is far away, and s/he has actually been to that place; or that a certain object is in a basket, and s/he has in fact seen it inside the basket.

A second verbal marker, *-ac*, is described as indicating knowledge inferred from observable facts (Kneeland 1979:50, 131–132). For example, *-ac* could be used in the expression ‘He has killed a peccary’ when the speaker has not

directly witnessed the event but sees the hunter carrying the dead peccary; or to say that a jaguar passed by a certain place after having found the traces left by it. By contrast, *-ash* encodes assumed information, lack of circumstantial evidence (Kneeland 1979: 149).

Further investigation might reveal the existence of other evidentials in Matses. What I would like to highlight here is that the Matses suffixes above differ from Kashibo-Kakataibo *-isa* and the Kashinawa markers to be introduced below.

9.1.3 *Kashinawa*

Camargo (1996a and 1996b) provides an analysis of “modal markers” in Kashinawa. Some of these morphemes may be interpreted as evidentials. Camargo (1996a) describes a set of modals that follow the predicate and form a single paradigm.¹⁵ An important point illustrated by Camargo is that these markers remain optional in Kashinawa. All her examples are in the declarative.

-Ki means that the speaker presents herself as the source of information, has directly experienced the situation described, is certain, assumes responsibility for the information, and presents the statement as something that cannot be contested. In comparison to *-ki*, *-bin* indicates a stronger statement or engagement on the part of the speaker; however, *-bin* may also indicate surprise and inference. Camargo translates *-bin* as ‘vraiment’.

-Kin is described as a “subjective” marker, expressing personal experience or knowledge exclusive to the speaker. It is translated by Camargo into French as ‘*selon moi*’ ‘according to me’. In contrast, *-kin* indicates collective or public knowledge already integrated by the Kashinawa community, even if it is recent. Historical narratives, myths, costumes are narrated using *-kin*.

The “constatative” *-ka* may be translated as ‘as you say’, ‘*effectivement*’ ‘effectively’. It means that the speaker picks up somebody else’s utterance; *-ka* may also indicate concession, surprise, astonishment, amazement, compliment, or approval.

-Iki is called a “*médiatif*” ‘mediative’ and is translated by Camargo into French as ‘*on dit que*’ ‘they say’, ‘*il paraît que*’ ‘it appears that’. Apparently, *-iki* indicates lack of personal commitment on the part of the speaker. *-Iki* may co-occur with *-ka* and unexpectedly with *-ki*.

9.1.4 *Chakobo*

Following Prost (1965), Chakobo has a reportative particle of the form *kiʔa*; this marker may be related to the SK reportative *-ki*. Other morphemes listed by Prost that may have evidential(-like) functions are: *-kara*, provisionally

Table 2. Waripano Person-Marked Evidentials

Person	Direct	Reportative
1	-ra	?
2	-ra-ma	-ronki-mi
3	-ra	?
1pl	-ra-na	?
2pl	-ra-ma	?
3pl	-ra	-ronki

described as indicating ‘that which seems to be true for the speaker’ (Prost 1965:87, my translation), *pʰiʰi* ‘certainly/surely’, *mitsa* ‘may be/could be’, *-tiari* ‘probably’, and *ʔo* expectation.

9.2 The Ucayali languages

9.2.1 *Kapanawa*

Loos and Loos (1998:24) refer to a set of evidential particles in Kapanawa that occur after the first major constituent of a declarative sentence. These particles are: *ra* ‘perhaps’, *ki* reportative (like in SK, *ki* may occur more than once in a complex sentence, Loos & Loos 1998:27), *ronki* reportative, *kaʔen* ‘of course, as you may know’ (p. 122), and *s* visible evidence.

Additionally, Loos and Loos include a set of sentence-final particles; some of which may be evidentials: *kan* ‘of course’ (also translated into Spanish as ‘*pues*’), *raʔka* ‘probably’, and *ki* ‘certainty’ (labeled ‘fact’ in Loos 1999:246); cf. Kashinawa *-ki*. *Ki* occurs also in questions (Loos & Loos 1998:25).

9.2.2 *Wariapano*

Valenzuela (2000) analyzes the scarce data on Wariapano (Navarro 1903; Parker, Sinuiri, & Ramírez 1992) and concludes that in this language *-ra* and *-ronki* function roughly like in SK. A distinctive feature of Wariapano, however, is that it has developed person/number inflection on evidentials (also a vowel harmony process seems to be at work). Unfortunately, there is not enough data to provide complete paradigms. Consider the data in Table 2 (from Valenzuela 2000, based on the examination of the data in Parker, Sinuiri, & Ramírez 1992).

Certain Panoan languages exhibit constructions containing a pronominal form which is coreferential with a previous full nominal or free pronoun in the same clause. These anaphoric pronouns tend to follow the first major sentence constituent and operate on a non-ergative basis. Valenzuela claims that person-marked evidentials in Wariapano might have originated from the en-

cliticization of these coreferential pronouns on the evidential markers (2000 and references therein).

9.3 Evidentiality as an innovative feature

The four non-Ucayali languages exhibit very different evidential(-like) markers. While Kashibo-Kakataibo and Chakobo have specific morphemes to encode second-hand information, neither Matses nor Kashinawa have a dedicated reportative. Kashibo-Kakataibo *-isa* does not resemble the reportative in any other sister language, but Chakobo *kiʔa* contains the sequence /ki/ also found in the Ucayali reportatives and the Kashinawa ‘*médiatif*’.

The markers described for Matses may correspond to direct, inferential, and supposed evidentials; Kashinawa appears to mark direct knowledge, knowledge exclusive to the speaker, collective knowledge, and other functions not easily identifiable with a single evidential meaning. However, the morphemes that seem to encode direct evidentiality in Matses and Kashinawa differ greatly in form.¹⁶ Kashinawa shares with Kapanawa the morpheme *ki* indicating certainty/fact. Finally, only Matses evidential(-like) markers take part in the verb morphology and may be restricted to the past.

Turning to the Ucayali languages, Kapanawa shares with SK the reportatives *ronki* and *ki* but employs *ra* as a dubitative rather than as a direct evidential, and has a visible evidence marker *s* absent in SK. As for Wariapano, this language shares the reportative *-ronki* with Kapanawa and SK, and the direct evidential *-ra* with SK, but differs from all other languages in that certain evidentials carry overt person/number inflection.

As mentioned above, both Kapanawa and Kashinawa have the certainty/fact marker *ki*; the sequence /ki/ is also present in the Kashinawa “*médiatif*”, as well as in the Chakobo and Ucayali reportatives.

In sum, evidentials in languages belonging to different branches of Panoan differ greatly not only in form but also in the semantico-pragmatic categories they encode.¹⁷ Although evidential(-like) morphemes involving the sequence /ki/ are found in Kashinawa, Chakobo, and the Ucayali languages, these morphemes do not always encode the same meaning, and it may be the case that /ki/ rather corresponds to a common verb of saying (cf. §3.3). Hence, preliminary evidence suggests that not one evidential could be reconstructed for Proto-Panoan. This conclusion is compatible with Aikhenvald and Dixon’s (1998:245–246) hypothesis that evidentiality systems in some languages of Southern Amazonia, including Panoan, may have a relatively recent origin. Aikhenvald and Dixon point out that in these languages evidentiality is ex-

pressed through particles or clitics, evidentials do not interact with tense-aspect distinctions in the way they do in Tucanoan and other languages, and non-cognate markers are found even in languages pertaining to the same family. An interesting counterexample to these generalizations within Panoan is found in the northernmost language Matses, where evidentials take part in the verb inflection and seem to be restricted to the past.

Although future research might show that some of the interpretations in this section need revision and/or that other evidentials must be added to the languages represented in this survey, I expect that the general conclusions will hold.

10. Final remarks

I have shown that SK marks evidentiality on two different layers. The first layer consists of a direct versus reportative distinction. *-Ra*, *-ronki*, and the interrogative *-ki* form a single paradigm and are mutually exclusive. These three morphemes may be given an evidential interpretation: respectively, first-hand information, second-hand information, and request for second-hand information (i.e. for information that will count as second-hand for the one posing the question). On a second layer, two additional evidential values can be encoded as a specification upon the basic distinction: inference (*-bira*) and speculation or guessing (*-mein*).

Besides their evidential functions, *-ra* extends to certainty, *-bira* to probability, and *-mein* to doubt and mirativity. Crucially, *-ra* combines with *-bira* and *-mein*, where no certainty regarding the information can be claimed. If *-ra*, *-bira*, and *-mein* were epistemic markers solely, certain combinations in the data would render contradictory meanings such as: ‘I am sure that I doubt’. While certainty can be derived from direct sensory experience, the reverse situation seems less plausible. Additionally, the selection of *-ronki* over *-ra* does not indicate uncertainty or a lesser degree of reliability but simply reported information. Also, the use of *-ra* in the context of European innovations reinforces its analysis as a first-hand evidential, while *-ronki* has been extended from coding information one has heard to information one has read.

Evidentials in SK are clitics that do not take part in the obligatory verb inflection. While inference and speculation are marked overtly, direct and reported information need only be coded in the first of a string of clauses, with zero-marking an option in subsequent clauses. Nevertheless, I argue that evidentiality is “obligatory” in the sense that the evidential value of the infor-

mation has always been grammatically marked in the forgoing discourse and is clear to native speakers. Further research is needed to offer an exhaustive, more refined account of the SK system, including rules for the overt marking and omission of *-ra* and *-ronki*, and the clause elements that host the inferential *-bira*.

As for evidentials and cultural attitudes, I believe the use of the direct evidential when describing events experienced under the influence of *ayahuasca*, as opposed to the reportative when narrating one's own dreams, is very revealing of Shipibo worldview. While *ayahuasca* visions are part of reality, dreams are not, and this distinction is encoded in the system.

The grammatical coding of evidentiality is an innovative feature in Panoan, and the languages seem to be developing/have developed an evidential system more or less independently from each other. Comparing evidential systems might prove useful in the subclassification of the family. Furthermore, Panoan languages provide an ideal situation to study how evidentiality may emerge. Another important question awaiting investigation has to do with the motivations for the development of evidentiality in Panoan.

Notes

1. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the following Shipibo collaborators for their significant help and valuable insights; for each person, the Shipibo name is given followed by the Spanish name within parentheses: Ronon Meni (Evaristo López Magín), Yoi Sani (Luis Márquez Pinedo), Ranin Ama (Agustina Valera Rojas), Kesin Beso (Oseas Barabán Sánchez), Ranin Nita (Hagner Valera Rodríguez), and Sanken Bari (Rafael Urquía Odicio). *Ichabires iráke!* Special thanks are also due to Bernard Comrie and the scholars participating in the International Workshop on Evidentiality, in particular Sasha Aikhenvald, for their useful comments on a previous version of this article. Remaining infelicities are my sole responsibility. In this work, the symbols of the official SK alphabet are used, except for the following modifications: x represents the voiceless retroflex sibilant /ɣ/ and ' stands for the voiceless glottal stop. As in the official alphabet, j represents the voiceless glottal fricative /h/, e stands for the high central vowel /i/, and Vn for nasalized vowels. Generally, SK words bear primary stress on the first syllable unless the second syllable is closed, in which case the latter is stressed. In words deviating from this rule, primary stress is indicated with an acute accent. The sources of the illustrative sentences contained in this chapter are indicated unless they come from my own fieldnotes; the analysis of all the examples is my responsibility.
2. Combinations of *-bira* and *-mein* with the reportative *-ronki* are potentially ambiguous. First, the speaker may be reporting someone else's inferences or speculations; secondly, the speaker may be expressing her own inferences or speculations, drawn from what she has

heard. While both possibilities were accepted in elicitation, only the latter has been attested in text (e.g. example (26)). This interesting point requires further research.

3. In this respect, *-ra* is comparable to the “endoclititic” in Udi (Harris 2000) and, as pointed out to me by Martin Haspelmath, to the “mesoclititic” in European Portuguese.

4. The distribution of *-ronki* and *-ra* may be comparable to that of tense and evidential marking in the Algonquian language Ojibwe (Rhodes, p.c. 2001). I would like to thank Rich Rhodes for sharing his Ojibwe data and valuable insights with respect to this point.

5. At present I cannot provide any explanation for the presence of two reportatives in this context.

6. Shell (1975) employs the term Reconstructed-Panoan instead of Proto-Panoan given that her comparative reconstruction is mainly based on the languages spoken in Peru. However, Reconstructed-Panoan and Proto-Panoan are not expected to differ in any significant way.

7. *-Bira* is also found in indefinite constructions:

Tso-a-ra *sai* *i-bira-i*.
 who-ABS-DIR.EV cry.out.for.help doi-bira-INC
 ‘Somebody is crying out for help.’

Kesiman-ra *e-a* *bo-ma-iba-ke* *westiora* *jawe-bira-ribi...*
 Kesin:ERG-DIR.EV 1-ABS carry-CAUS-PST2-CMPL one what:ABS-bira-also
 ‘Kessin sent me something...’

-Bira might have arisen from the combination of the emphatic *-bi* plus *-ra*. There is also the sequence *-bi-ra* commonly found on concessive clauses. This is analyzable into *-bi*, emphatic yielding a concessive meaning when appended to an adverbial clause, plus *-ra* indicating direct evidentiality.

On non-verbal elements, *-bira* can often be replaced by the comparative *keská* which in this context can be translated as ‘it seems that, I think that’. Although *keská* can play an evidential function, its basic meaning is that of a comparative or similitive like in examples (20) and (30a); therefore, *keská* is best analyzed as an “evidential strategy” in the sense of Aikhenvald, Chapter 1 of this volume.

8. Identified as *Lonchocarpus* sp., *Tephrosia* sp., *Leguminosae*; Jacques Tournon, p.c.

9. According to Sanken Bari, the term *benta* was used by the Inkas to refer to the Shipibo.

10. In addition to *-mein*, the emphatic *-bi*, the contrastive *-kaya*, or a periphrastic verb form involving a doubled auxiliary may be used to encode mirativity.

11. According to Loriot, Lauriault & Day (1993:241), the use of *-mein* in this context indicates expectancy that the answer will be positive. This alleged function of *-mein* (in contradiction with its role in example (35)) was disconfirmed by the Shipibo speakers with whom I consulted.

12. One exception is procedural speech (i.e. the description of a process such as how to prepare manioc beer) where a speaker may use the reportative even when she has previously carried out the activity at hand herself. This point requires further research.

13. This function of *-ronki* is similar to the Spanish *dizque* or *dice que* ‘third-person says that’ employed when opening a description of one’s own dream. Hence, the example at hand could be translated as “*Dice que yo estaba parada en medio de un arrozal...*”
14. Kneeland employs <c> to represent [ʔ] and [k].
15. But cf. Camargo (1996b:3) where *-ki* is said to occur at the end of the utterance, with the possibility of moving to other positions in order to mark emphasized elements.
16. Based on my analysis of the data, I am assuming that the direct evidential marker in Matses is not *-c*, despite Kneeland’s (1979) claim cited above.
17. This situation differs from the one described by Tournadre (1996:198) for some Tibetan dialects in which the verbal auxiliaries marking evidentiality exhibit different forms but encode the same basic evidential distinctions.

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CHAPTER 3

Evidentiality in Qiang*

Randy J. LaPolla

1. Introduction

The Qiang language is spoken by about 70,000 (out of 200,000) Qiang people, plus 50,000 people classified as Tibetan by the Chinese government. Most Qiang speakers live in Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture on the eastern edge of the Tibetan plateau in the mountainous northwest part of Sichuan Province, China.² The Qiang language is a member of the Qiangic branch of the Tibeto-Burman family of the Sino-Tibetan stock. Within Tibeto-Burman, a number of languages show evidence of evidential systems,³ but these systems cannot be reconstructed to any great time depth. The data used in this chapter is from Ronghong Village, Chibusu District, Mao County in Aba Prefecture.

Qiang is a verb-final language, with complex agglutinative morphology on the verb, including direction marking prefixes, negation marking prefixes, aspect marking prefixes and suffixes, person marking suffixes, and evidential marking suffixes. There is no tense marking, only perfective, experiential ('already'), continuative ('yet, still'), change of state, and prospective aspect marking. The full set of prefix and suffix types and their positions is given in Diagram 1 (not all of these affixes can occur together), and a few examples are given in (1)–(4) (see LaPolla in press, LaPolla to appear, for other aspects of Qiang grammar).

- (1) *qa tsə tu-χsu-z-ja.* (*<ji-a*)⁴
1SG water OR-boil-CAUS-CSM+1SG
'I brought the water to a boil.'
- (2) *tə-wa-jə-ji-ji jə.*
OR-big-RA-CSM-2PL say
'He said you(pl) have gotten big again.'

- (3) *panə-le ha-χə-k-ən.*
 thing-DEF OR-broken-INFR-2SG
 ‘It seems you broke the thing.’ (inference from seeing the broken pieces in the person’s hands)
- (4) *xsə meʹzə-lə-m i-pə-l-jə-k-ui.*⁵
 again look.for-come-NMLZ OR-arrive-come-RA-INFR-HS
 ‘Again someone came looking (for him).’ (lit. ‘One who was looking for him came again, it is said.’) (from a traditional story)

Diagram 1. The structure of the Qiang verb complex

prefixes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. intensifying adverb 2. direction/orientation prefix or 3rd person indirect directive marking prefix (or the two combined as one syllable) 3. simple negation /mə-/ or prohibitive /təə-/ prefix 4. continuative aspect marking prefix /tci-/
VERB ROOT	
suffixes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. causative marking suffix /-z/ 6. prospective aspect marking suffix /-a:/ 7. auxiliary directional verb /kə/ ‘go’ or /lə/ ‘come’ 8. repetition marking suffix /-jə/ 9. change of state /-ji/ aspect marking suffix 10. 1st or 2nd person indirect directive marking suffix 11. inferential evidential and mirative marking suffix /-k/ 12. visual evidential marking suffix /-u/ 13. non-actor person marking 14. actor person marking (1sg /-a/, 2sg /-n/, 1pl /-əʹ/, 2pl /-i/, 3pl /-tci/) 15. hearsay evidential marking /-i/

2. Organization of the system

The evidential system in Qiang basically has three terms, visual, inferred/mirative, and reported marking (the B1 type discussed in Chapter 1), but it does not necessarily involve marking of the evidential category on all clauses, and there are complications related to verb types and combinations of forms. The inferential can appear together with the hearsay or visual marker, therefore it may be seen as two systems rather than three paradigmatically related items in one system. The actor person marking, when used without the inferential/mirative marker, also is involved in expressing an evidential meaning, in that it implies direct observation, and cannot be used with the hearsay marker.

In general, an unmarked clause is assumed to represent knowledge that the speaker is sure of, most probably, but not necessarily, from having seen the situation or event first-hand, and so, for witnessed events, the evidential marking is not obligatory, as in (1) and (2). If the overt visual marker, [-u ~ -wu] is used (see (5a) below), then the source is definitely visual. This marker is actually rarely used, and is difficult to elicit from linguistically naive speakers. It is used only when the actor of the clause is animate, and usually only when it is necessary to emphasize that the speaker actually saw the other person(s) carry out the action. This form is used together with the actor person marking suffixes, but use of the person marking suffixes alone can also imply visual observation, as in (5b).

- (5) a. *the: zdzyta: ha-qə-(w)u.*
 3SG Chengdu+LOC OR-go-VIS
 ‘He went to Chengdu.’ (used in a situation where the speaker saw the person leave and that person has not yet returned)
- b. *ʔi̯ tɕɛχun tu-pu-ji-n.*
 2SG marry OR-do-CSM-2SG
 ‘You got married.’ (I saw you get married)

If the speaker is not completely sure of the information being presented in the utterance, which generally means s/he did not witness it, then one of the non-visual markers is obligatory. In reporting second-hand or third-hand knowledge of some situation or event the speaker is unsure of, the hearsay marking suffix /-i/ is used after the verb. Only one token of the hearsay marker is used in a clause; it cannot be repeated to show the number of sources between the speaker and the event, as in Tsafiki (Dickinson 2000).

Statements that represent ‘just discovered’ information (mirative) or information based on inference derived from some physical or other non-visual evidence take the suffix /-k/ after the change of state marker, if there is one, but before the prospective aspect and person marking (if there is any – 3sg animate and all inanimates are unmarked), a different position in the verb complex from the narrative evidential marking. In some contexts, this marker, particularly in combination with the hearsay marker, can be used to mark simple uncertainty (not necessarily inference).

3. The semantics of the system

The unmarked verb form can be used for visual evidence, and for generally known facts and for observations that lead to a strong conclusion, such as if you say ‘He is a strong man’ when you see him do something that makes that obvious. In this latter case, use of the inferential marker would be optional, and would imply less certainty.

The visual and inferential evidential markers can be used for past events (as in examples (5a–b)) or ongoing events, but not future events. The visual marker [-u ~ -wu] is only used for visual sensory information, not other types of sensory information. If you hear some noise, such as the sound of drums in the next room, and you want to say ‘Someone is playing drums next door’, you would use the inferential marker, as in (6). Even if you feel something in your hand but can not see it, the inferential marker, not the visual marker, would be used.

- (6) *mi ʒbə ʒete-k!*
 person drum beat-INFR
 ‘Someone is playing drums (it seems to me from hearing a noise that sounds like drums).’

The visual marker is used together with the actor person marking. In most cases the person marking reflects the person and number of the actor of the clause, the usual situation with the person marking, as in (7a), but in the case of a 3sg actor, which would normally have zero person marking, it is possible to add 1sg person marking in order to particularly emphasize that the speaker saw the person do the action, as in (7b) (the resulting form, [wa], is to be distinguished from the clause-final emphatic particle /wa/, which appears in (7a)).

- (7) a. *themle jimi de-se-ji-wu-tçi-wa.*
 3PL fertilizer OR-spread-CSM-VIS-3PL-EMPH
 ‘They spread the fertilizer.’ (I saw them do it)
 b. *the: jimi de-se-ji-w-a.*
 3SG fertilizer OR-spread-CSM-VIS-1SG
 ‘She spread the fertilizer.’ (I saw her spread it)

This same form is also used when the actor is 1sg, but then the meaning is one of unintentional action, as in (8).

- (8) *qa the: ta de-we-z-u-a.*
 1SG 3SG LOC OR-have/exist-CAUS-VIS-1SG
 ‘I hit him (accidentally).’ (The context for this was the speaker having hit the person while leaning back and stretching his arms back without looking behind him.)

The suffix /-k/ has both an inferential sense and a mirative sense. The inferential sense is primary when the action involved is an activity, as in (6) and (9a). The inference may be based on evidence obtained visually or by some other sense. If what is reported is a state or the resulting state of some action, as in (9b–c), then the meaning is mirativity (‘just discovered’).⁶

- (9) a. *the: zdzyta: ha-qə-k.*
 3SG Chengdu+LOC OR-go-INFR
 ‘He went to Chengdu.’ (Used in a situation where the speaker knew the person was supposed to go to Chengdu, but wasn’t sure when, and then saw the person’s luggage gone, so assumed he had left for Chengdu. /-k/ could not be used if the speaker saw the person leave.)
- b. *the: ɕtɕimi zdzi-k!*
 3SG heart sick-INFR
 ‘He’s unhappy!’ (just discovered; relatively sure, not a guess)
- c. *dzy de-zge-ji-k!*
 door OR-open-CSM-INFR
 ‘The door is open!’ (just discovered; see that the door is open, but don’t know who opened it)

If the speaker needs to express an inferential sense in talking about a state or perfective situation, then the speaker would use the adverbial phrase /χsu-ni/ ‘seems’ or the construction with [-tan] or [-lahan] for marking possibility (both discussed below), not the inferential marker. For example, if the speaker feels wind on her back and makes the assumption that the door is open, she could say (10).

- (10) *dzy zge-m-tan ŋua.*
 door open-NMLZ-appearance COP
 ‘It appears the door is open.’ / ‘Apparently the door is open.’

Generally the inference marker is used for single instances of an event, such as if someone was supposed to quit smoking, but then the speaker sees cigarette butts in an ashtray, the speaker could use the inference marker to comment that (it seems) the person had smoked. If it was discussed as a habitual action, then again generally the construction with [tan] or [lahan] would be used.

- (11) *the: jan tʃhe-m-tan ŋuə.*
 3SG cigarettes smoke-NMLZ-appearance COP
 ‘S/he might smoke (seems s/he smokes / s/he has the appearance of some-
 one who smokes).’
- (12) *the: jan tʃhe-m-la-han ŋuə.*
 3SG cigarettes smoke-NMLZ-DEF-kind COP
 ‘S/he might smoke (might be a smoker / is a smoking kind of person).’

The inferential/mirative marker is also used together with the person marking, with the person marking always reflecting the person and number of the actor, as in (3) and (13), but with first person actors the interpretation is not only that the action was just discovered, but also that it was unintentional or originally unknown, as in (14a–b).

- (13) *themle stuaha sə-tʃhə-ji-k-tʃi.*
 3PL food/rice OR-eat-CSM-INFR-3PL
 ‘They have already eaten.’ (inference from seeing used dishes)
- (14) a. *qa dzigũ tʃy-k-a-ŋi!*
 1SG money bring-INFR-1SG-ADVM
 ‘I have money!’ (Used when the speaker originally thought he didn’t
 have money, but then opened his wallet and found he did have
 money.)
- b. *(qa) dzy ha-mə-sua-k-a!*
 1SG door OR-NEG-lock-INFR-1SG
 ‘I didn’t lock the door!’ (Used in a situation where the speaker had
 thought he had locked the door.)

The suffix /-k/ can appear alone with a mirative sense (e.g. (9b–c)), but often in these cases the particle [-ŋi] or [-wa] is added after the inferential marker. The particle [-ŋi] is an adverbial marker used also to mark surprise and/or disbelief; [-wa] is an emphatic marker. Its use with /-k/ gives the construction a stronger mirative sense. Examples (15a–b) show the use of the suffix /-k/ together with [-wa] and [-ŋi] respectively.

- (15) a. *me:^t de-çi-k-wa!*
 rain OR-release-INFR-EMPH
 ‘It’s raining!’ (just discovered; this clause could also mean ‘it has
 rained’, with the statement based on inference from having seen the
 ground wet)

- b. *the: zdzyta: ha-qə-k-ni!*
 3SG Chengdu+LOC OR-go-INFR-ADVM
 ‘He went to Chengdu!’ (just discovered)

The suffix /-k/ is used with 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person actors, though with first and second person actors, /-wa/ is not used to emphasize the sense of ‘just discovered’; instead /-ni/, /-ʂə/ or /-niəu/ is used for first person actors (of these three, the latter is stronger) and /-ni/ is used for second person actors (/ -ni/ can be used for other persons, but if the clause has a second person actor, then /-ni/ must be used). The combination [-k-wa] is stronger (more certain) than [-k] alone, but weaker than [-k-ni], which can have the sense that you can’t believe your own inference, that it is totally unexpected. The auxiliary verb /ɣu/ ‘willing, allow’ can also be added after [-k] to weaken (make less certain) the force of the statement. Following are examples of first and second person actors ((16) and (17) respectively).

- (16) *qa da-mə-k-a-ʂə!* (if plural, then /k-əʔ-ʂə/)
 1SG OR-forget-INFR-1SG-EMPH
 ‘I (just realized I) forgot!’
- (17) *ʔu sə i-tɕhi-k-ən-ni!* (if plural, then /k-əi-ni/)
 2SG WOOD OR-bring.in-INFR-2SG-ADVM
 ‘(I saw) you brought the wood in!’ (just discovered)

The inferential marker, the visual marker, and the person marking can all be used together for ongoing or past events. This would be possible given a situation such as having guessed someone was playing drums next door the speaker went next door and saw the person standing there holding a drum or drumsticks. When commenting that ‘He WAS playing drums’, adding (/ -k/ + /-u/ > [ku]) after the verb (see example (18a)) adds the sense of ‘as I had guessed and now pretty-well confirm’. This interpretation also holds when the clause has a 2nd person actor ([k-u-ən] 2sg, as in (18b), [k-u-i] 2pl) or 3rd person plural actor ([k-u-ətɕi]).

If upon opening the door in that situation the person was still playing drums, the speaker could say (18c). Adding the 1sg person marking where the actor is 3sg marks the clause very explicitly as representing information obtained by direct visual observation. The forms with [-k-] and the visual and person marking contrast with forms without [-k-] in that with the latter do not imply a previous supposition.

- (18) a. *oh, the: z̥bə z̥ete-k-u!*
 oh 3SG drum beat-INFR-VIS
 ‘Oh, He WAS playing a drum!’
- b. *ʔū zdzyta: ha-qə-k-u-ən.*
 2SG Chengdu OR-go-INFR-VIS-2SG
 ‘You went to Chengdu’ (as I had assumed, I heard or guessed from some evidence).
- c. *oh, the: z̥bə z̥ete-k-u-a!*
 oh 3SG drum beat-INFR-VIS-1SG
 ‘Oh, he IS playing a drum!’

If the actor is 1st person, use of the inferential, visual and person marking together involves an implication not only that the action was done unintentionally and just discovered, as with use of the inferential and person marking alone, but also that the action was a mistake of some kind, as in (19) (if the actor was 1pl, then the suffixes would be [k-u-əʔ]).

- (19) *qa apə-tɕə-iantu-le: tsa tɕy-k-u-a.*
 1SG grandfather-GEN-pipe-DEF+CL here bring-INFR-VIS-1SG
 ‘I mistakenly brought grandfather’s pipe here.’

Usually no marking of evidentials is necessary in retelling dreams, as long as the speaker remembers the dream clearly, but if not, then the speaker would use the adverbial phrase /χsu-ɲi/ ‘seems’ or the construction with [-tan] or [-lahan] for marking possibility (both discussed below), not the inferential or hearsay markers. When retelling some event witnessed on TV the unmarked form can also be used, but often the hearsay marker would be used (the visual marker cannot be used), as when retelling something heard on the radio. There is no special marking for information that is not to be taken literally, such as metaphors or sarcasm.

The hearsay marking suffix /-i/, derived from the verb [jə ~ ji] ‘to say’, is used to mark hearsay of future or presently ongoing events (e.g. ‘I heard he’s leaving’) or relatively recent past events, as in (20) (could be up to 40–50 years, but generally not ancient history, though there are exceptions).

- (20) *the: zdzyta: ha-qə-i.*
 3SG Chengdu+LOC OR-go-HS
 ‘He went to Chengdu (I heard).’

The hearsay marker is used only for hearsay, and not for simple uncertainty, when it is used alone. It can also appear in narratives recounting distant past events (e.g. example (21), the first line in the traditional creation story), but

generally in distant past narratives (story-telling) it is used together with the inferential marker, to show a greater degree of uncertainty, as in example (22), the first line of another traditional story.⁷ The hearsay marking is not used together with 2nd person marking (e.g. (23)). Unlike in Jarawara (Chapter 7), the hearsay particle is not used in clauses with a 2nd person actor to remind the person of what they said.

- (21) *qe^llotʃu-ba, mutu-la mujuqũ zguə-zi we-i.*
 before-LOC heaven-LOC sun nine-CL have/exist-HS
 ‘(It is said) in the past there were nine suns in the sky.’
- (22) *qe^l:-qe^l:-tu hala kapətʃ kou ŋuə-k-əi-tçu.*
 before-before-LNK INT orphan INDEF+one+CL COP-INFR-HS-SFP
 ‘(It is said) in the past there was an orphan.’
- (23) *?ũ tçeχun tu-pu-ji-i-ji!*
 2SG marry OR-do-ASP-HS-ADVM
 ‘(I heard) you got married!’

Generally there is no difference between second-hand and third-hand reported information, but if the hearsay marker is used in a clause with 1sg marking on the verb, as in (24), the utterance must be interpreted as similar to a direct quote (even though the actor is 3rd person), with the assumption being that, for example in (24), that the referent mentioned in (24) himself told the speaker of (24) that he (the referent mentioned in (24)) is unhappy.⁸ If instead the verb root is the third person form plus the hearsay marker (i.e. would be [zdzi-i] in (24)), then the implication is that someone else told the speaker the other person was unhappy.

- (24) *the: ctçimi zdza-i* (*< zdzi-a-i*)
 3SG heart sick+1SG-HS
 ‘He’s unhappy (he told me).’

4. Evidential strategies

Two other types of marking might be considered evidential strategies rather than evidential marking. The adverbial particle /χsu-ŋi/ can be added to the end of the clause, after the verb complex (and so does not take person marking), to show uncertainty about some information. This adverbial functions something like English ‘seem’, taking the whole clause in its scope. The (se-

mantically) main clause may or may not take the hearsay evidential marker /-i/ (compare (25) and (26)).

- (25) *the: zɔzyta: ha-qə-i χsu-ni.*
 3SG Chengdu+LOC OR-go-HS seem-ADV
 ‘S/he went to Chengdu.’ (guessing, unsure if true)
- (26) *zɔzyta: le χsu-ni.*
 Chengdu+LOC exist seem-ADV
 ‘It seems (he) lives in Chengdu.’

For expressing contingent (‘it is possible that’, ‘perhaps’) situations, often a construction involving a clause nominalized by /-m/, plus [la-han ~ la-hən] (definite marker + ‘kind’), [ka-han ~ ka-hən] (indefinite marker + ‘kind’), or /tan/ (‘appearance’), and the copula is used. This is structurally similar to the Japanese *yoo-da* and *soo-da* constructions (see Aoki 1986). Following are examples of a direct evidential (27a) and a construction using the nominalizer /-m/ plus /tan/ (27b). The question particle [lʉxʉa] can be added to the end of a [tan/lahan] clause to make the statement even more of an uncertainty (as in (47d) below).⁹

- (27) a. *the: tha zi.*
 3SG there exist
 ‘S/he is there.’
- b. *the: tha-zi-m-tan ηuə.*
 3SG there-exist-NMLZ-appearance COP
 ‘S/he might be there.’

An expression with [-m-tan] is more of a certainty than one with [χsu-(ni)] ‘seems’. The former can also be used for non-past events.

To make a strong statement of certainty, or of information that was not recently discovered, but known for some time, then a clause nominalized by /-s/ is used without /tan/ or /la-hən/. This is an evidential strategy with epistemic extensions. This form can’t be used for past/perfective actions.

- (28) *pəs zmu tsu-s ηuə.*
 today meeting hold-NMLZ COP
 ‘There is a meeting today.’ (set and known about beforehand)
- (29) *the: tha-zi-s ηuə.*
 3SG there-exist-NMLZ COP
 ‘S/he is definitely there.’

5. Correlations with other grammatical categories

Use of evidential marking in a question is not obligatory, as long as no assumptions about the source of the addressee's information are made, but if it is used, in the case of the visual or hearsay marking it would imply the assumption that the hearer saw (visual, as in (30)), or heard about (hearsay, as in (31)), the action being questioned. It is the action that is questioned, not the source of the information.

(30) *the: ha-qə-u ηua?*
 3SG OR-go-VIS Q
 'Did he go?'

(31) *the: ha-qə-i ηua?*
 3SG OR-go-HS Q
 'Did he go?'

If the speaker of a question assumes the addressee of the question also does not have visual evidence of information about the situation being asked about (though knows more about the situation than the speaker), the inferential particle can be used in the question, as in (32):

(32) *the: ha-qə-k ηua?*
 3SG OR-go-INFR Q
 'Did he go?'

The form used by the one responding to the question would then depend on the source of that person's information, visual, inference or hearsay.

If the speaker is asking the addressee about his or her own actions, then the inferential marker can still be used, but in this case would not represent a presupposition that the addressee is also not clear about the situation. Instead it would represent a guess about some aspect of the question, for example in (33), the guess that Chengdu is the place that the person went to. (The question marker used in this example also differs from the usual second person question marker /-a/, in that it implies more of a guess about the situation.)

(33) *ʔū zdzyta: ha-qə-k-ən dza?*
 2SG Chengdu+LOC OR-go-INFR-2SG Q
 'Did you go down to Chengdu?'

Other examples of the use of the inferential marker in questions are given in (34)–(35). (Example (35) is actually a rhetorical question, from a traditional story.)

- (34) *the: zdzyta: ha-qə-k ja?*
 3SG Chengdu+LOC OR-go-INFR Q
 ‘Did he go down to Chengdu?’
- (35) *?ū ja qa a-qəs we-k-a:ʰ tci?*
 2SG COM 1SG one-form have/exist-INFR-PROSP+1PL Q
 ‘(Could it be) yours and mine are the same?’

The evidential markers can be used with causatives, just as with simplex clauses (see (8) and (36)).

- (36) *the: ha-qə-z-i*
 3SG OR-go-CAUS-HS
 ‘He was made to go (I heard).’

It is possible to use the evidential markers in some embedded clauses, with the acceptability of the marker depending somewhat on the matrix verb (contrast (37) and (38)).

- (37) *the: pieye tu-pu-ji-(u) qa dzukū la.* (< le + a)
 3SG graduate OR-do-CSM-VIS 1SG knowledge have/exist+1SG
 ‘I know he graduated.’
- (38) *the: pieye tu-pu-ji-i qa ə-ma.* (< mə + a)
 3SG graduate OR-do-CSM-HS 1SG OR-hear+1SG
 ‘I heard he graduated.’

With direct quotes, as in (39), different evidential marking can appear on the matrix and quoted clauses, e.g. in (39) the inferential marker appears in the quote, and the narrative marker appears on the verb of saying (from a traditional narrative).

- (39) *“ta, qa ?ile ep ŋuə-k-a,” ikə jə-k-ui.*
 INT 1SG 2PL father COP-INFR-1SG thus say-INFR-HS
 ‘(It is said) he said (based on inference from what the two boys had just said), “Then, I am your father.”’

In other types of complex sentences, evidential marking can appear either on only the final clause, when the initial clause has a hypotactic relation to the second clause, or on both clauses:

- (40) *the: zdzyta: ha-qa me-tchi, peitcin-la da-tɕə-qa-k-əi.*
 3SG Chengdu+LOC OR-go NEG-want Beijing-LOC OR-yet-go-INFR-HS
 ‘It seems he not only went to Chengdu, he also went to Beijing.’ (I heard, not too sure)

- (41) *the: bu-q-ta ha-qə-k-əi tu, tci ke:*
 3SG mountain-top-LOC OR-go-INFR-HS LNK bear INDEF+CL
tu-tsu-k-əi.
 OR-meet-INFR-HS
 ‘When he went up on the mountain, he ran into a bear.’ (I heard but I’m not too sure)
- (42) *the: dzoqu-le: dagə-k-(əi), pitç sei ma-lə-jy-k-(əi).*
 3SG leg-DEF+CL break-INFR-HS now walk NEG-able-ASP-INFR-HS
 ‘It seems he broke his leg and now can’t walk.’ (I heard but I’m not too sure)

There is no marking of evidentials in relative clauses (43), conditional clauses (44), or imperatives (45a), though the verb of saying can be added to an imperative to show that someone told the speaker to order the person to do something, as in a direct quote (45b).

- (43) *qa-wu-panə-dele-m mi*
 1SG-AGT-thing-give-NMLZ person
 ‘the person to whom I gave something’
- (44) *the: mo-lu tu, qa-qəi ka:* ($< kə + a: + a$)
 3SG NEG-come LNK 1SG-self go+PROSP+1SG
 ‘If s/he doesn’t come, I’m going to go myself.’
- (45) a. *ʔū ə-zuə-n!* b. *ʔū ə-zuə-n ji!*
 2SG OR-sit-2SG 2SG OR-sit-2SG say
 ‘You sit!’ ‘You sit!’ (someone else told me to say that)

6. Negation, modality, person, and aspect

If the visual evidential marker is used in the negative, such as to say ‘He didn’t come’, or ‘It didn’t rain’, there is a presupposition that the speaker has visual evidence of the person not coming, that is, the speaker was in the place all day, and so would have seen the person if he had come, or the speaker was outside all day, and so would have seen it had it rained. When the inferential or hearsay markers are used with a negative clause (e.g. [ma-tci-kə-k] [NEG-yet-go-INFR] ‘(He) hasn’t gone yet’ (inferred from seeing his baggage still in the hallway)), the implication is that the negative proposition is an inference or hearsay, the same as with positive propositions. Unlike in Akha (Egerod 1985; Hansson, in

press), the evidential particles cannot be negated to express the idea that the speaker doesn't know what is happening.

Generally actions performed by oneself do not need to be overtly marked with evidentials, but the visual evidential can be used with inadvertent actions, as mentioned above. In the case of one's mental or physical states, if one is not sure about some particular state, for example, whether one has caught a cold or not, usually the construction with [-tan] or [lahan] 'seems' would be used, e.g. 'It seems like I caught a cold', as in (46).

- (46) *qa tə-lian-tha-m-la-han* *ŋua*.
 1SG OR-catch.cold-AUX-NMLZ-DEF-kind COP
 'I might have caught a cold.' (cf. English 'It's kind of like I caught a cold.')

7. Conclusion

We have seen that Qiang basically has three evidential terms, but the interpretation of these forms relies on the type of activity or situation involved, the person of the actor, and the combination of markers used. Following is a set of examples showing the same basic clause with some of the main evidential possibilities:

- (47) a. *the: tshinpi wa-(u)*. (certain)¹⁰
 3SG intelligent very-VIS
 'She is intelligent.'
- b. *the: tshinpi wa-k*. (just discovered)
 3SG intelligent very-INFR
 'She is intelligent.'
- c. *the: tshinpi wa-i*. (hearsay)
 3SG intelligent very-HS
 'She is intelligent.'
- d. *the: tshinpi wa-k luəua*. (guess)
 3SG intelligent very-INFR Q
 'She is intelligent.'
- e. *the: tshinpi wa-m-tan* *ŋua*. (possibly)
 3SG intelligent very-NMLZ-appearance COP
 'She possibly is intelligent.'
- f. *the: tshinpi wa-m-la-han* *ŋua*. (possibly)
 3SG intelligent very-NMLZ-DEF-kind COP
 'It seems she is intelligent.'

Notes

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1. The term ‘Qiang’ is an exonym given by the Chinese. Roughly 50,000 of the Qiang speakers are classified as Tibetans by the Mainland authorities, though both groups use the same name for themselves (/zme/ or a dialect variant of this word) when speaking the Qiang language, which is called /zmez/ in that language.

2. E.g. Rawang, which has a distinction between hearsay and non-hearsay, the former marked by the particle *wā* (derived from the verb ‘say’; LaPolla & Poa 2001), Tibetan (DeLancey 1986; Woodbury 1986; Sun 1993; Hongladarom 1993; Haller 2000; Huber 2000), Newar (Hargreaves 1983), Meithei (Chelliah 1997), and Akha (Egerod 1985; Thurgood 1986; Hansson, in press).

3. A form given in parentheses to the right of an example is the uncombined form.

4. Where an epenthetic vowel is required when a suffix is added, it is represented as part of the suffix. In this case the [u] in [ui] is epenthetic (a variant of [ə], the usual epenthetic vowel).

5. This is reminiscent of the systems in Hare and Sunwari discussed by DeLancey (1997), where perfective contexts yield an evidential interpretation, and imperfective contexts yield a mirative interpretation. See also Zeisler (2000) for discussion on the relationship between tense/aspect and interpretation as mirative or not.

6. The combination of inferential and hearsay marking is sometimes pronounced [kui] in stories, as in (4), but there is no difference in meaning between [kəi] and [kui] in that context.

7. This form contrasts with a direct quote, which would involve a 1st person pronoun and a full verb of speaking (i), and an indirect quote, which would involve third person forms (ii):

- | | | | |
|-----|---|------|--|
| (i) | “ <i>qa</i> <i>çtçimi</i> <i>zdza</i> ” <i>jə</i> . | (ii) | <i>the: çtçimi</i> <i>zdzi</i> <i>jə</i> . |
| | 1sg heart sick+1sg say | | 3sg heart sick say |
| | ‘He said “I’m unhappy.”’ | | ‘He said he’s unhappy.’ |

8. [luɕua], when used alone, marks a type of tag question, but when used with /-k/ or the construction in (27b), it simply marks the clause as less certain.

9. In this case, the visual marker is marking certainty based on observing the person do intelligent things, but would actually generally not be used. I had difficulty eliciting the visual evidential with this verb in other dialects, as generally an unmarked form would be used, hence the parentheses around the visual marker.

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CHAPTER 4

Evidentiality in Western Apache (Athabaskan)

Willem J. de Reuse

1. Introduction

Western Apache (henceforth WA) is a Southern Athabaskan or Apachean language spoken by approximately 13,000 people on and near five reservations in central and east central Arizona, U.S.A.¹

In WA, evidentiality is marked by particles only. As seen in the example sentences in Section 2, the position of the evidential particles is after the main verb of the clause. WA is basically an SOV language, but this does not mean that post-verbal particles are invariably clause-final, since adverbs and noun phrases often follow the verb plus particle complex. Example (9) contains adverbs and a noun phrase following the verb plus particle complex. As seen in (8), the evidential particle follows the negative enclitic.

These particles, understandably, never have the degree of obligatoriness that an inflectional system, such as the one described for Tariana by Aikhenvald (this volume) has. However, there are discourse genres in WA where the marking of evidentiality is obligatory (see Section 3.3). Evidentiality is more a strategy than a category in WA. These characteristics of Athabaskan evidentiality are the reason why it has only recently attracted the attention of scholars, such as Rice (1986) and DeLancey (1990, 2001) on Slave, Liebe-Harkort (1983) and Potter (1995) on Western Apache, Willie (1996) on Navajo, Webster (1999) on Chiricahua Apache, and de Haan (1999) on Athabaskan in general. However, as pointed out by DeLancey (1990:152–153), the early Athabaskanist Pliny Earle Goddard mentioned elements indicating the source of information in the Pacific Coast Athabaskan languages Hupa (1905:322–326), Kato (1912:80–81), and in the Northern Athabaskan lan-

guage Chipewyan (1912a: 162–163). Goddard (1917: 511–512) also noted them in Beaver, another Northern Athabaskan language.

I will tentatively postulate an evidential system with the following terms: Experiential (non-eyewitness only); Inferential (three particles: mirative/inferential, non-mirative inferential, and physical inferential); and Quotative (two particles, the second of which also having functions that are not quotative). So, in the typology of Chapter 1 (this volume), we would have a six-term system, with one (nonvisual) sensory evidential, three inferentials, and two reportatives.

2. Semantics of the system

2.1 The non-eyewitness experiential

The non-eyewitness experiential particle *hiłts'ad* covers something heard (not quoted), exemplified in (1) and (26) below; felt physiologically (2) or psychologically (3); sensed inside one's body (4); and smelled (5). The difference between heard information and quoted information is that heard information is either a noise, or speech not directed to or intended for the speaker. That speech is something that the speaker overheard, and s/he is not under any obligation to quote it accurately. Quoted information is directed to the speaker, who is expected to repeat it as exactly as possible.

- (1) *Train hilwoł hiłts'ad.*²
 train 3SG.PROG.RUN NVEXP
 'I hear the train (running).' (noise heard)
- (2) *Gozdod hiłts'ad.*
 3SP.P.be.hot NVEXP
 'It's hot.' or: 'I sense it's hot.' (felt physiologically)
- (3) *Ch'a'oshíntsoo hiłts'ad.*
 2SG+1SG.P.lose.NCM NVEXP
 'You got me lost like a fluffy ball.' (felt psychologically)
- (4) *Dinshñiih hiłts'ad.*
 1SG.IMPERF.ASP.hurt NVEXP
 'I am not feeling well.' (sensed inside one's body)
- (5) *Likq̄h gonłchj̄h hiłts'ad.*
 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.be.sweet 3SP+2SG.IMPERF.ASP.smell NVEXP
 'You smell good.' (smelled)

2.2 The inferentials

2.2.1 *The mirative/inferential*

In (6), the speaker had heard on the radio that a bear had attacked a woman. From the description of her wounds on the radio, he infers, using the mirative/inferential particle *lāq̄*, that she was dragged by the bear.

- (6) *Shash isdzán oyintshōōd lāq̄.*
 bear woman 3SG+3SG.P.drag MIR
 ‘A bear dragged a woman.’

This particle also implies that the speaker was surprised at the event. Bear attacks are uncommon in Arizona, and the woman was someone the speaker was acquainted with. In fact, *lāq̄* is more fundamentally a mirative than an inferential, and functions exactly like the Hare particle *lq̄* (with which it is cognate),³ described by DeLancey (1990: 153–158; 2001: 375–377). DeLancey argues, with evidence from Hare, Tibetan and Turkish, that the inferential sense can be derived from the more basic ‘new knowledge’ or mirative sense. The derivation can be explained in terms of the interaction between mirativity and tense or aspect, since an event in the past will typically be new information to the speaker only if the speaker’s knowledge of that event is gained by inference rather than by direct perception (2001: 369, 379). In WA as well, the mirative sense of *lāq̄* is primary. In (7), the speaker states, to her surprise, that my Apache was better than that of another white person. This speaker could not have inferred this, because in fact my Apache is not as good as that other person’s is. The use of the mirative in compliments is widespread (DeLancey 2001: 376–377).

- (7) *Kī Nnēē itisgo nht’ēēgo*
 he Apache more 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.be.good=SUB
ch’idits’ad lāq̄!
 4SG.IMPERF.ASP.understand MIR
 ‘He understands Apache better!’

There is another example of mirative *lāq̄* in (13).

2.2.2 *The non-mirative inferential*

The non-mirative inferential particle *golnī* occurs in (8), a statement by a father inferring about his children’s wishes. This particle is often translated as ‘I think’, ‘it seems like’, or ‘apparently’.

- (8) *Chagháshé doo ákū nádabini’ da golnī.*
 Children NEG there 3PL.want.to.go.back NEG INF.NON.MIR

‘I don’t think the children want to go back there.’ or:
 ‘I think the children do not want to go back there.’

2.2.3 *The physical inferential*

The physical inferential particle *nolj̄h* in (9) is semantically quite close to *gol̄n̄ī̄*, but it is different in that it focuses on inferences on the basis of physical appearances. It is often translated as ‘it appears so’, or ‘it looks like it’. In (9) the inference was on the basis of the speaker’s seeing the daughter’s car driving around.

- (9) *Mízhaazhé míl̄ na’it̄bq̄as nolj̄h dak’eh aldó’ áí.*
 her.little.one with.it 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.drive PINF at.times also that
 ‘Her daughter seems to drive her at times also.’

2.3 The quotatives

The quotative particle *ch’in̄ī̄* occurs in (10), the first sentence of a traditional story, of the Coyote story genre.

- (10) *Ma’ hanaazh̄i’ sit̄ī̄ ch’in̄ī̄.*
 Coyote on.the.other.side 3SG.P.lie QUOT
 ‘Coyote was lying on the other side (of the fire), it is said.’

The particle *l̄ék’eh*, typically also translatable as a quotative, occurs in (11), the first sentence of a story translated from English, *The Tale of Peter Rabbit*, by Beatrix Potter.

- (11) *Łah j̄ī̄, gah d̄ī̄’i dagól̄ī̄ l̄ék’eh.*
 some day rabbit four 3PL.IMPERF.ASP.live PDR⁴
 ‘Once upon a time there were four rabbits, it is said.’

In stories such as the ones containing (10) and (11), the particles *ch’in̄ī̄* and *l̄ék’eh* are fully interchangeable.

WA has no distinctions between secondhand and thirdhand quotatives. WA does have spectacular strategies for embedding direct speech into direct speech, and so on, but these are not part of the evidential system.

2.4 Epistemic extensions of the evidentials

Most evidentials have epistemic extensions. The non-eyewitness experiential *hilt̄s’ad* is used to emphasize that the speaker personally hears, feels, senses,

or smells something, and that the interlocutor is not expected to share this sensation.

The mirative/inferential *lāq̄* is sometimes used in tentative statements and questions, but does not have strong epistemic extensions, probably because it is primarily a mirative. The other inferentials *golnī̄* and *nolj̄h* generally add some measure of doubt, and are sometimes translated as ‘it seems’ or ‘maybe’.

The quotative *ch’inī̄* does not have epistemic extensions. The possible epistemic extensions of *lĕk’eh* will be treated under Section 3.3.

2.5 The absence of an evidential particle

A clause with no evidential particle tends to be interpreted as a statement that the speaker is quite certain of, and such statements tend to imply that the speaker was an eyewitness of the event. Thus, (12) would typically be uttered by someone who is looking at the road, or just looked at it.

- (12) *Intinhi sáí.*
 road=TOP sand
 ‘The road is sandy.’

It would be incorrect, however, to conclude from this that the absence of particle marks an eyewitness evidential. The absence of a particle is ambiguous, since evidentials are not obligatory, except in certain well-defined types of discourse.

2.6 Conclusions

The evidential particle system described above is somewhat problematic in that several particles do not form a neat syntactic paradigm. Particles in the set *lāq̄*, *chinī̄*, and *lĕk’eh* can occur in sequences of two. The particles *hilt̄s’ad*, *golnī̄*, and *nolj̄h* do not occur followed or preceded by other evidential particles.

Since *lāq̄* is primarily a mirative, it is not surprising that it can cooccur with other evidentials. (13), from a traditional story, contains the sequence *lāq̄ ch’inī̄*.

- (13) *Ishikín nakih n’i dála’á dayits’isxī̄ lāq̄ ch’inī̄.*
 boys two the.former one 3PL+3SG.P.kill MIR QUOT
 ‘They killed one of those two boys!, it is said.’

In (13), *lāq̄* is clearly mirative, expressing the protagonist’s surprise over this killing.

The particle *lɛk'eh* turns out to be the most intriguing element in the system and will be reconsidered in Section 3, together with the sequences of evidentials it occurs in.

3. The past deferred realization evidential

3.1 Introduction

Speakers of WA usually comment that *lɛk'eh* has to do with something that happened in the past, or that the speaker was not an eyewitness to what happened, opinions which are congruent with the quotative function assumed in Section 2.3.

However, there is much more to the function of *lɛk'eh* than that of a plain quotative. In Section 3.2, I discuss the meaning of *lɛk'eh* in nonnarrative genres, and in Section 3.3, I return to *lɛk'eh* in narrative genres and to the difference between the quotative *lɛk'eh* and the quotative *chin̄n̄i*. I conclude that the overall function of *lɛk'eh* is that of a past deferred realization marker.

3.2 The particle *lɛk'eh* in nonnarrative genres

The particle is pervasive in narrative genres, but also occurs, albeit sporadically, in other genres such as autobiography or conversation. My sense is that the occurrences of *lɛk'eh* in these less typical environments are more revealing about its precise meaning than the almost automatic occurrence of the particle in storytelling.

I now illustrate *lɛk'eh* with examples from such atypical contexts. The extract under (14) is from an autobiographical account of a family returning from a dance. On their way, they became very tired and spent the night on a spot in the dark, not knowing where they were sleeping. As they were sleeping, they were constantly disturbed in their sleep by something touching them until finally they became too frightened and decided to leave. In (14), *lɛk'eh* is underlined. It is useful to contrast *lɛk'eh* with the epistemic and tense particle *ni'* 'asserted past tense'⁵ (discussed in Section 4.4), which is not an evidential, but does have visual evidential connotations. The particle *ni'* is double underlined.

- (14) [1] *T'ah t'ɛ'dá' danásikai ni' áídí.* We left from there while it was
still dark.
- [2] *Hikahgo nohwee goz't'ij d.* It got daylight while we were
walking.

to the speaker experiencing fear at the time, and *ni'* in sentence [5] refers to the speaker's driving past the accident location. The speaker was certain of these three events or states at the time that they occurred, and there is no reason to assume that he became aware of them at a later time.

I will define *lɛk'eh* as a past deferred realization (PDR) particle, because it marks the fact that the speaker had no awareness of the event or state at the time that it occurred, but realized what had occurred at a later time in the past.

The particle *lɛk'eh* is also inferential since we usually infer on the basis of some earlier event or state. It can also be mirative since if one becomes aware of something at a later time, one is usually surprised about it. The potential mirative function is particularly clear in sentence [4] of (14). It is therefore important to contrast *lɛk'eh* with the mirative/inferential *lāā*. The two might actually be etymologically related, as discussed in Section 6. With *lɛk'eh* the emphasis is not on the fact that there is an inference or new information, but rather on the fact that there is a significant time lag between the occurrence and the realization. While *lɛk'eh* can have a mirative function, it is possible to emphasize mirativity by adding the mirative/inferential *lāā* to it, as in sentence [4] of (15). This is evidence that *lɛk'eh* by itself is not primarily a mirative, and cannot be substituted by *lāā*.

Furthermore, *lɛk'eh* neutralizes the distinction between inferred evidence and reported evidence, as shown in the elicited sentence under (16).

- (16) *Yáhwqhyú nashāā* *lɛk'eh*.
 store=at 1SG.IMPERF.ASP.be.around PDR
 'I was at the store.'

At first glance, we expect (16) to be infelicitous, since it would appear impossible for a speaker to have been at the store without being aware of it. The interpretation of (16) is that the speaker has no personal recollection of the fact that s/he was at the store, maybe because s/he has lost his/her memory, or was unconscious at the time. The person realized it later, either because s/he was told or inferred that s/he had been at the store.

Since *lɛk'eh* marks non-firsthand or indirect evidence and has a mirative function, it is comparable to the Turkic indirectives (Johanson, this volume), the commentative in Abkhaz (Chirikba, this volume), and the noncongruent in Tsafiki (Dickinson 2000, p.c.).

3.3 The particle *lĕk'eh* as a quotative in narrative genres

In modern WA, the repetition of *lĕk'eh* at the end of every single sentence is the proper way of telling a story. It occurs with this distribution in traditional stories, myths, or tales, or in anything that is not considered historical or autobiographical. It also occurs in this way in tales translated from English, including such things as *The Little Red Hen*, *Gingerbread Man*, and even nursery rhymes such as *Jack and Jill*. If one reads a story without the sentence-final *lĕk'eh*, my consultants react that it is no longer recognizable as a story: '*lĕk'eh* brings you back to the fact that this is a story'. If one was unaware of the cases discussed in Section 3.2, *lĕk'eh* would certainly be considered a typical storytelling particle, which one finds in so many other Native American languages.⁶

Since I analysed *lĕk'eh* as a deferred realization marker, its conventional usage as a quotative in narrative is now problematic. Indeed, what does storytelling have to do with deferred realization? I suggest that *lĕk'eh* performs two functions in storytelling. First, it allows the narrator to emphasize that the evidence is not firsthand, and that s/he cannot be held responsible for it. Second, and more interestingly, it establishes that the storyteller is aware of his or her authority as a storyteller. This awareness can be viewed as the deferred realization, since it becomes apparent only through the telling itself.

There is some historical evidence for this admittedly tentative assumption that *lĕk'eh* helps establish the authority of the storyteller. The traditional tales and myths in early 20th century texts compiled by Goddard (1919) and Hoi-ger (n.d.) did not use *lĕk'eh*, but had the bona fide quotative *ch'inī* at the end of every sentence instead. I speculate that this difference is not an example of language change, but rather the result of the breakdown in the oral tradition of storytelling. *ch'inī* is typically used when oral information is passed down from a specific person, even though that person is not named. In my modern consultants' words: '*ch'inī* means "that's what s/he said, and you know who said it, but you don't want to say who said it." In early 20th century texts, the storyteller knew exactly which person had passed the information on to him or her, and indicated this fact by the use of *ch'inī*. Nowadays, the knowledge of traditional storytelling is much more diffuse; modern speakers get their stories from a variety of sources, including pieces of oral tradition from several speakers, schools, and even written materials. Furthermore, composition classes at schools and universities have been encouraging speakers to make up their own stories, and in such cases there is obviously no oral tradition, and only *lĕk'eh* is appropriate. I assume that modern speakers no longer use *ch'inī* because they are unable to trace the story to a specific storyteller whom they learned it from,

and establish their authority by using *l̥k'eh* instead. *ch'in̄ī* itself still exists as a quotative particle but has acquired the connotation of gossip, and indeed, speakers tend to know which specific person gossip comes from. An example of quotative *ch'in̄ī* in gossip is (28).

Some modern speakers can still use *ch'in̄ī* in storytelling, especially in the sequences *l̥k'eh ch'in̄ī*, and *ch'in̄ī l̥k'eh*, which are considered identical in meaning, and equivalent to the single quotative *l̥k'eh*.

To conclude this discussion of *l̥k'eh*, it is worthwhile examining its potential epistemic extensions. Since it can be an inferential, one would expect there to be such extensions. In a text such as (15), the alternation between the asserted past *ni'* and *l̥k'eh* could be seen as representing various degrees of certainty. However, in Bible translations, carried out by devout Christians who would avoid elements that would cast doubt on the divinely inspired character of the text, *l̥k'eh* also occurs. It occurs sporadically in the New Testament (Edgerton & Hill 1988), a distribution which is stylistically inappropriate, and deserves a detailed study. In the earlier and very rigorous translation of the beginning of Genesis by Uplegger (n.d.: 68–79), *l̥k'eh* occurs at the end of every sentence, in a pattern identical to that of traditional myths. This is evidence that at least Uplegger, and his native assistants, did not consider *l̥k'eh* to have any dubitative connotations.

4. The interaction of evidentiality with other grammatical categories

4.1 Imperative and interrogative clauses

The evidentials are not normally used in imperative or interrogative clauses. However, *l̥q̄* and *l̥k'eh* do occur in interrogative clauses. Examples with *l̥q̄* are (17) and (18):

(17) *Ch'a'ónyāā l̥q̄?*
2SG.P.be.lost MIR
'You're lost?'

(18) *Nañlwod l̥q̄ ya'?*
2SG.IMPERF.ASP.be.strong MIR TAG
'You are strong, aren't you?'

However, such sentences are not prototypical interrogatives. (17) is unusual in that it does not contain a yes-no question particle, and could just as well be translated as 'It appears you are lost', or 'To my surprise, you are lost', with

an interrogative intonation to make it more polite. Note that the speaker's own gloss was 'you are lost?', and not 'are you lost?'. Similarly, (18) is actually a statement, expressing some surprise, with the tag question particle emphasizing it for rhetorical purposes. The sequence *lāq̄ ya'* is quite common in conversation.

It is also to be noted that the use of *lāq̄* in questions (17–18) presupposes the questioner's assumption that the answerer would, in the possible answers (19–20), use *lāq̄* to express surprise:

(19) *Ch'a'óyāā lāq̄!*
1SG.P.be.lost MIR
'I am lost!'

(20) *Nanshwod lāq̄!*
1SG.IMPERF.ASP.be.strong MIR
'I am strong!'

(21) is a question with *lék'eh*. The speaker is discussing someone's heart condition, and is trying to find out when the condition was first discovered. It is unlikely that *lék'eh* is an evidential in this sentence, but the deferred realization sense of the particle is quite appropriate.

(21) *Yá' lahn ákū naghāā lék'eh né?*
YNQ at.one.time there 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.be.around PDR YNQ
'Had it been there before?'

4.2 Subordinate clauses

Muysken (1995: 381–382) pointed out that evidentials are used in main clauses only, and that their occurrence should not be expected in subordinate clauses. As far as WA is concerned, *lāq̄* and *lék'eh* are again unusual in that they do occur in subordinate clauses. (22) is an example of *lāq̄* in a subordinate clause, which is marked by the subordinating enclitic =*go*. In such clauses, *lāq̄* has a mirative function only. *lāq̄* is also common in clauses which look like complements of 'to think'. Such clauses appear to be subordinated, but are actually direct quotations. The verb 'to think' thus functions like a verb of saying. For example, sentence [2] of (15) contains *náyinił'ḡ lāq̄ nsj̄h ni'* 'I had thought that they would check', where *náyinił'ḡ lāq̄* 'they would check' appears to be subordinated to *nsj̄h ni'* 'I had thought'.

- (22) *Nnēēk'ehgo* *yánti'* *lāq̄go* *shít*
 Apache=in.the.manner 2SG.IMPERF.ASP.speak MIR=SUB to.me
ígózh.
 3SP.IMPERF.ASP.be.known
 'I see that you speak Apache.'

Lék'eh is common in certain types of subordinate clauses, to be treated in Section 4.3.

4.3 Irrealis clauses

Anderson (1986:277–278) pointed out that evidentials are not used in irrealis clauses. For WA, Anderson's claim does hold up, except for *lék'eh*, which is quite common in the protasis of a conditional sentence (the *if* clause), which is both irrealis as well as subordinate. (23) is an extract of a conversation in which a man discusses the hotel room he is staying in. The underlined part is the protasis, which ends in *lék'eh*, followed by the conditional subordinator =*yúgo(hí)* 'if'. The conditional clause is counterfactual.

- (23) *Dáhayú nt'é ánaíl'j̄hi goz'q̄* If there were a place that had a
lék'ehyúgohí tsíst'w̄ ik'án ła' nasínii kitchen, I would have bought some
doleet ní' nláh, tsíst'w̄ hidq̄āhí bighq̄, tortilla flour, because we would
itsj' bíł, doleet ní'. have eaten tortillas, with meat.

In (24), an extract of a funerary speech, the conditional clause is factual.

- (24) *Ínashood ch'ilj̄ lék'ehyúgohí, kíł* If you are a Christian, you have to
goch'oba'hí da'ítséh si'q̄ā shj̄h gó'w̄. be kind, first of all, you see.

The common occurrence of *lék'eh* at the end of protases is worthy of more research. A description of *lék'eh*: 'as it is to be seen in mind though belonging to the past or to circumstances not actually present' given by Uplegger (1945:13), might be relevant here, since it is reminiscent of the past-as-unreal hypothesis (Dahl 1997:97), which proposes that in many languages both past and irrealis can be subsumed under a general meaning 'remote' or 'distant'. Dahl (1997) concludes that this hypothesis must be rejected as inadequate but does note that there is a relationship between past tense and counterfactuality crosslinguistically. Since *lék'eh* has a past tense reference, one would then expect it to occur with counterfactual protases only. But that is not the case: *lék'eh* occurs with counterfactuals such as (23) as well as with factials such as (24). Dahl (1997:108–111) proposes that instances of noncounterfactual hypotheticals have arisen through grammaticalization of the counterfactuals, and I

assume he would attribute the usage of *lék'eh* in factuals to a similar process of grammaticalization.

Furthermore, it is not impossible that in the Apache world view, the past is actually conceived as belonging to the realm of hypothetical situations. The particle *lék'eh* would then refer to both past (mythical, historical, as well as immediate) and hypothetical situations, as in (23) and (24), and reflect this world view.

4.4 Tense and epistemic modality

The important tense and epistemic particle *ni'* interacts in interesting ways with the evidential system. *Ni'* is best defined as an asserted past tense.⁷ When using *ni'*, the speaker emphasizes that something happened in the past, and that s/he is quite certain that it happened. *Ni'* has visual evidential connotations, however, since most WA speakers will only be very sure of a past event if they actually saw it happen. In (25), the speaker was implying that he saw a man and his girlfriends dancing (several months before the utterance). Notwithstanding the asserted past particle, this statement was actually untrue, and intended as teasing the man.

- (25) *Bisáné* *yil* *nda'izhish* *ni'*
 his.old.ladies with.them 3PL.IMPERF.ASP.dance ASSP
 'He and his girlfriends were dancing around.'

Because of these visual evidential connotations, *ni'* is very common in autobiographical narratives or first person narratives of past events, but it is not obligatory.

Ni' commonly follows evidential particles. Examples are (26–29).

- (26) *Áígee* 'ha'ish'aah' *nī* *hilt's'ad ni', la'*
 there 1SG.IMPERF.ASP.buy 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.say NVEXP ASSP some
 'Someone was wanting to buy some there.'

In (26), the speaker is certain that he overheard someone say 'I am going to buy some (beer)'; *ni'* marks the evidential *hilt's'ad* as past tense. The evidential is thus within the scope of past tense.

- (27) *Dakū baa* *ch'inkai* *lāq̄ ni'*
 they to.him 4PL.P.COME MIR ASSP
 'It appears that they came to visit him.'

In (27), the past tense marking is on the verb ‘come to visit’, and therefore *lāq̄* is not within the scope of the past tense.

- (28) *Izee baa gowaḥyú óyāā ch’inī ni’.*
 medicine about.it home=to 3SG.P.go.off QUOT ASSP
 ‘I heard she went to the hospital.’

(28) is like (26) and unlike (27) in that the evidential is within the scope of the tense.

- (29) *Adāq̄dā’ magashi náyis’ah lək’eh ni’.*
 yesterday cow 3SG+3SG.P.butcher PDR ASSP
 ‘It is clear that he butchered the cow yesterday.’

(Potter & Dawson 1996:29)

In the elicited sentence (29), *lək’eh* is translated as ‘it is clear’. Past tense *ni’* has scope over the verb ‘to butcher’ only, and not over *lək’eh*, a situation similar to that of (27). My own consultants confirm that the sequence *lək’eh ni’* means: ‘it happened in the past, and I know about it, but I did not see it’.

Ni’ can also occur preceding evidentials. An example is (30), the beginning of a traditional tale:

- (30) *Álk’idá’ nnēē gólīī ni’ chinī.*
 long.ago people 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.live ASSP QUOT
 ‘Long ago, people were living, it is said.’

The sequence **ni’ lək’eh*, however, is ungrammatical, presumably because *lək’eh* would have scope over *ni’*. Clearly, it is impossible to realize later something that one was certain of in the past.

To conclude, *ni’* can occur before or after evidentials, but when it occurs after the evidential, *ni’* does not necessarily have scope over this evidential. With the particles *hīts’ad* (26) and *ch’inī* (28), it does, but with the particles *lāq̄* (27) and *lək’eh* (29) it does not. As already seen in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, the particles *lāq̄* and *lək’eh* again function in similar ways, setting them apart from the other evidentials.

As a result, the evidentials *hīts’ad* (26) and *ch’inī* (28) can have their own time reference. Evidentials with their own time reference are an unusual typological feature of the WA system. Only past tense marking *ni’* can provide evidentials with their own time reference. Future tense particles cannot follow evidentials, and therefore evidentials cannot have a future time reference.

4.5 Person

There are constraints on the use of particles with 2nd person subjects, having to do with cultural etiquette. One cannot comfortably say: ‘You are cold’ with no particle (31a), or with asserted past *ni’* (31b), because that would presume that the speaker has the power to tell how another person really feels inside, and that is culturally inappropriate (see Section 7). Speakers prefer to use the mirative/inferential (31c). A past deferred evidential is also possible (31d). There are no restrictions on the use of evidentials, or lack thereof, with first and third person subjects.

- (31) a. **?Nił gozk’az.* ‘You are cold.’
 with.you 3SP.P.be.cold
 b. **?Nił gozk’az ni’.* ‘You were cold.’
 c. *Nił gozk’az lāqā.* ‘You are cold, it appears.’
 d. *Nił gozk’az lēk’eh.* ‘You were cold (I realized later).’

5. Further evidentiality strategies

In addition to the system outlined in Section 1 through Section 3, there are various lexical elements which can refer to source of information, but are not clause-final particles. There is a postpositional stem *-nāāł* which is often translated as ‘in one’s presence’ but literally means ‘with one’s eyes’, which can be a very concrete visual evidential. Examples are (32) and (33):

- (32) *Nihzhá shīnāāł onánzi’ doleel.*
 you=only in.my.presence 2SG.IMPERF.ASP.dive.in FUT.PART
 ‘Only you will dive in (as I watch).’

(32) is from a conversation in which a wife tells a husband that she will not be able to go swimming with him, but she will be there to watch him.

- (33) *Ái dála’á nago’ lēk’eh bināāł, hadín shīh*
 that one 3SG.P.fall PDR in.his.presence someone
 biskahgo.
 3SG+3SG.P.shoot
 ‘He saw one (a duck) that had fallen, shot by someone.’

In (33), *lēk’eh* preceding *bināāł* implies that the subject did not see the duck fall, but watched it on the ground. Note that if the order *lēk’eh -nāāł* is possible, the

order **nāāł lək'eh* is ungrammatical (34b), since one cannot see something now and realize it later. *Ni'* is possible, as shown in (34a).

- (34) a. *Willem shināāł k'é'itichū (ni')*.
 (name) in.my.presence 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.write (ASSP)
 'Willem is writing/wrote in front of me.'
 b. **Willem shināāł k'é'itichū lək'eh*.

The verb *nsjh* 'I think', often used in combination with other particles, implies inference from reasoning. (35) is an example with a negative clause. (36–37) are examples of the very common sequence *shjh nsjh*, including the epistemic *shjh* 'maybe'. (37) contains a negative clause also, and shows that the subject of the preceding clause can be different from that of *nsjh*.

- (35) *Doo disháh da nsjh*.
 NEG 1SG.IMPERF.ASP.start.to.go NEG 1SG.IMPERF.ASP.think
 'I don't think I'll go.' or: 'I think I will not go.'
 (36) *Ánáshdle' shjh nsjh*.
 1SG.IMPERF.ASP.make.again maybe 1SG.IMPERF.ASP.think
 'I think that I can fix it.'
 (37) *Bíhí doo na'iziid da shjh*
 she=TOP NEG 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.work NEG maybe
nsjh, A.
 1SG.IMPERF.ASP.think (name)
 'I don't think that she works, that A.' or:
 'I think that she doesn't work, that A.'

The second or third persons of the verb 'to think' are very rarely used in this way, because is culturally inappropriate to presume to know the thoughts of others (see Section 7).

6. Origins of evidentials

The mirative/inferential *lāq̄* and the asserted past tense *ni'* are unanalyzable particles. Both have cognates in the other Apachean languages, e.g. Navajo (Young and Morgan 2000:305, 311), and are probably reconstructible for Proto-Athabaskan. However, these particles are not primarily evidentials, since *lāq̄* is primarily mirative, and *ni'* is primarily tense and epistemic. This does not bode well for the reconstruction of a Proto-Athabaskan evidentiality system.

Four evidentials are recent-looking grammaticalizations of complement-taking verbs of sensation and of a complement-taking verb of saying. Two are passives. The nonvisual experiential *hīts'ad* is from a passive verb 'it is heard'. The non-mirative inferential *golnī* is from a passive verb 'it (spatial subject) is sensed'. The following two are not passives. The physical inferential *nołih* is derived from a third person subject form of 'to look like, to resemble'. The quotative *ch'inī* is the fourth person⁸ subject form of 'to say'.

One should note that if the verbs above have undergone some of the semantic bleaching that one expects from grammaticalized elements, they are still clearly recognizable as verbs, and can still be inflected like verbs. For example, I recorded a perfective aspect form of imperfective aspect *hīts'ad*. Actually, all four forms can function as full verbs.

(38) and (39) exemplify the contrast between the quotative particle *ch'inī*, and the homonymous verb of saying *ch'inī*, and shows that the contrast is semantic rather than formal. (38) is a line from a traditional story, so the particle is quotative. In (39), my consultant had in mind a particular person quoted, referred to with the fourth person.

- (38) *Dénzhónéhi* *ánīyú*
 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.be.beautiful=SPEC 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.sound=to
dit'āāzh' *nī* *ch'inī* *ní*.
 1DL.P.start.to.go 3SG.IMPERF.ASP.say QUOT ASSP
 "“We are going towards the beautiful sound”, she said, it was said."
- (39) *'Nich'?* *nanáhishnīp'* *chinī* *ní*.
 to.you 1SG.F.pay.back 4SG.IMPERF.ASP.say ASSP
 "“I will pay you back”, he had said."

The sixth evidential particle *lėk'eh* appears to be an analyzable particle rather than a verb. There is even some etymological justification for glossing it as 'past deferred realization'. Its older variant is *lánk'eh*, still occurring as a variant in the San Carlos, Cibecue, and Tonto dialects of WA. This form can be analyzed as the particle *lán*, a hypothetical/irrealis found in interrogative past and hypothetical sentences, possibly related to *lāq̄*, followed by an adverbial element *-k'eh* 'the next', occurring in *hik'eh* 'and then' and *iskāq̄nik'eh* 'the next day'.

7. Evidentials, responsibility, and thought in Western Apache culture

Even though evidentiality is by no means an obligatory category in WA, WA speakers mark source of information more often and more precisely than Eu-

ropean language speakers do. This might be due to Athabaskan attitudes about the autonomy of the person (Basso 1979, 1990; Greenfeld 1996; Perry 1991; Rushforth & Chisholm 1991), resulting in a reluctance to speak for another person, or to impute feelings to another person ((31) is an example).

It must also be significant that putting words in another person's mouth for humorous purposes is done a lot more in WA culture than in Euro-American culture, and is considered a rather funny sort of teasing. This must be because such a thing is considered particularly incongruous or preposterous. (40) and (41) are from conversations between friends:

- (40) *'The Westyú⁹ doo ánií idishzhíizh da ní*
 (placename)=at NEG recently 1SG.IMPERF.ASP.dance NEG ASSP
íníí
 2SG.IMPERF.ASP.say
 'Say: "I have been dancing at the West for a long time"'

In (40), the speaker jokingly commands the interlocutor to say this sentence, knowing that The West is a place where he goes dancing often.

- (41) *'Shits'á' ndlāq' tah¹⁰ íníí.*
 from.me 2SG.IMPERF.ASP.drink ? 2SG.IMPERF.ASP.say
 'Say: "Drink it from me"'

In (41), the speaker is thirsty and jokingly commands his wife to tell him that he can drink from her own cup.

Finally, as seen in (35–37), a possible evidential strategy is the verb form 'I think'. This is also culturally significant, since in speeches Apaches say 'when I think about it', and such expressions much more often than Euro-Americans do. Thinking and its powers (magical and otherwise) are very important in Athabaskan culture, as discussed in Werner, Austin-Garrison & Begishe (1996) on 'thought' regarding Navajo.

8. Conclusions

The most interesting typological characteristic of the WA evidential system is the existence of the past deferred realization evidential *lék'eh*, which has not been attested in any other evidential system. This particle displays an intriguing constellation of overlapping past tense, irrealis, inferential, mirative, and quotative functions, and at the same time it is separate syntagmatically from the other distinctively past tense, inferential, mirative, or quotative elements.

Another typological characteristic of the WA system is the absence of a visual evidential, as in Eastern Pomo (McLendon, this volume) or Eskimo (Fortescue, this volume), and actually in most other chapters in this volume. This suggests that the visual evidential is often a default, and that systems with an explicitly coded eyewitness evidential such as the ones occurring in Amazonia (Aikhenvald, this volume, Dixon, this volume) are very marked.

More general conclusions on the WA system viewed synchronically and diachronically are the following.

Viewed synchronically, evidentiality in WA is coded in a scattered way, and is not a neat system, as shown by its lack of paradigmaticity and obligatoriness. The presence of several inferentials with non-evidential extensions, and various lexical strategies is fairly typical of scattered coding situations, such as the Greenlandic one (Fortescue, this volume). At best, the WA evidential system is a fuzzy, or non-prototypical system, in the sense of Rosch (1975). When one looks beyond the WA evidential system, it appears that the evidential particles fit into a broader system of WA clause-final particles. This complex system, a description of which is beyond the scope of this chapter, marks, in addition to evidentiality, epistemic, and deontic modal distinctions, presentationals like French *voici, voilà* and tense. Sequences of three, four, and even five clause-final particles are not uncommon in conversational speech, as can be seen in (15).

From a diachronic point of view, the modern WA evidential system appears to be the result of an intersection of various elements, none of which are clearly evidential in origin: complement-taking verbs of sensation or saying (see Section 6), a mirative (with inferential extensions), and a past deferred realization particle (with quotative extensions).

Notes

1. The other Apachean languages are Navajo, Chiricahua, Mescalero, Jicarilla, Lipan, and Plains Apache. These languages form a chain, with some mutual intelligibility between geographically contiguous languages, such as between WA and Navajo, and between WA and Chiricahua. There are four major dialects or variants of WA: San Carlos, Cibecue, White Mountain, and Tonto. The WA forms in this chapter are from my own fieldwork (1992-present). Unless otherwise specified, the WA forms in this chapter are in the San Carlos dialect, and from naturally occurring speech. The research leading to this chapter was funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the University of Arizona (Nr. SBR-9408543), and to the University of North Texas (Nr. SBR-9896227). This support is hereby gratefully acknowledged. I also thank Shobhana Chelliah, Keren Rice, David Samuels, Siri Tuttle, and the participants at the SSILA Winter 2000 meeting, the Third High Desert

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2. The spelling of WA is the standard system used and described in White Mountain Apache Culture Center (1972:vii–xii, 107–110) and in Bray (1998:xii–xviii). This standard system only distinguishes high tone (acute accent) and low tone (no accent); the mid tone is usually marked as a low tone, but occasionally it is marked as high tone (acute accent), particularly on a short *i* or a long *i i*, or on a long *oo* (often written *ū*). Because of the unsatisfactory marking of the mid tone in the standard system, the following addition to the system is used in this chapter: Low tones are unmarked *v*, *vv*, mid tones are marked *Ṽ*, *ṼṼ*, and high tones are marked *Ṽ*, *ṼṼ*. Underlined *ṽ* stands for a sound varying between [n] (Tonto and most San Carlos subdialects) and prenasalized voiced [ṽ] (some San Carlos subdialects). Underlined *ḍ* stands for a sound varying between voiceless [t̚] and voiced [ḍ] (the latter with or without slight prenasalization) (Cibecue and White Mountain). See de Reuse et al. (2001) for a grammar consistently using these additional conventions.

3. Hare is a dialect of Slave, an Athabaskan language of northern Canada. The Slave cognate of WA *lq̄ā* would indeed be a low toned particle. However, Rice's grammar of Slave distinguishes between *lq̄*, *lq*, *nq̄* 'evidential, dubitative' (1989:401–410), and *lq̄q̄*, *lq̄*, *nq̄* 'apparently, reported, uncertainty' (1989:410–412). She points out that these two particles are identical and have the shape *lq̄q̄* in the Slavey dialect of Slave, but that they differ in tone, in the other dialects of Slave, including Hare. It is difficult to distinguish between the two semantically, and to decide which of the two particles DeLancey (1990) is considering. From Rice's discussion and examples, it appears that both particles are inferential and mirative, and have epistemic (dubitative) extensions. Rice (p.c.) comments that she has few Hare data about these particles, but suggests that in Hare there is indeed a phonological distinction between a high toned and a low toned particle. The matter needs further research.

4. The label PDR 'past deferred realization particle' used for this second quotative particle will be justified in Section 3.2.

5. In de Reuse's (2000:18) preliminary account of *lĕk'eh*, *ni'* was considered to be a genuine evidential meaning 'experienced past'. I believe that this view was erroneous.

6. In narrative, *lĕk'eh* functions exactly like the Navajo storytelling particle *jini* (Haile 1984), but of course it is WA *ch'iṽṽ* which is cognate with Navajo *jini*.

7. I owe this term to Potter and Dawson (1996:19).

8. The Athabaskan fourth person is a type of third person with a variety of specialized uses. It is used to talk politely about persons present, or to talk to others without having to address them with the more direct second person.

9. The West is short for 'Wild Wild West', the name of a country western night-club in Tucson, Arizona.

10. The absurdity of the command ‘(you) say:’ is often softened by the particle *tah*, difficult to translate, preceding it. Samuels (1998) first noted the *tah ʔnī* construction, and discusses its meaning and pragmatics in his Chapter 2.

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Evidentials in Eastern Pomo with a comparative survey of the category in other Pomoan languages

Sally McLendon

Eastern Pomo is one of seven distinct but related Pomoan languages spoken in northern California in the coastal range of mountains between the Pacific Ocean and the Sacramento Valley.¹ All formally differentiate the sorts of evidence on which an assertion is based, but they differ among themselves in both the forms used and the number of categories distinguished. All are agglutinative, verb-final languages with rich phonological, morphological, and semantic systems.

In Eastern Pomo, four independent verb forming suffixes distinguish claims based on direct sensory evidence, someone else's reporting, inferences from circumstantial evidence, or direct knowledge. They are:

- ink'e* the non-visual sensory evidential
- ine* the logical inferential evidential
- le* the hearsay or reportative evidential
- ya* the direct knowledge evidential

They are contrasted below with the stem *p^ha·bék^h* 'burn'.

- (1) *bi·Yá p^ha·bé-k^h-ink'e*
hand burn-PUNCTUAL-SENSORY.EV
'I burned my hand' (I feel the sensation of burning in my hand)
- (2) *bé-k-al p^ha·bé-k-ine*
3PL-PATIENT burn-PUNCTUAL-INFR
'They must have gotten burned' (I see circumstantial evidence – signs of a fire, bandages, burn cream)

- (3) *bé·k-al* *p^ha·bé·k^h·-le*
 3PL-PATIENT burn-PUNCTUAL-HS
 ‘They got burned, they say’ (I am reporting what I was told)
- (4) *mí·-p-al* *p^ha·bé·k-a*
 3SG-MASC-PATIENT burn-PUNCTUAL-DIR.EV
 ‘He got burned’ (I have direct evidence)

Evidentials cannot be consistently elicited in Eastern Pomo from English prompts, as speakers routinely translate literally the various periphrastic devices used in English to suggest evidential meanings. For example, once when attempting to elicit examples of the inferential evidential, *-ine*, I asked Leonard Bateman, a particularly insightful speaker, how to say ‘He must have stolen it/I think he stole it’. He provided sentence (5) with an explicit verb ‘think’ as the main verb of the Eastern Pomo matrix clause, but no logical inferential suffix. The verb ‘think’ is suffixed with the direct evidential, presumably because when one thinks one has direct knowledge of one’s thoughts:

- (5) *bé·k^h* *p^hu·dí·yaki-* *ha·’*
 3PL.AGENT steal-PL.AGENT-STAT 1SG.AGENT
ma·šóy·k-kil-a
think-PUNCTUAL-HAB-DIR.EV
 ‘They stole it, I think/I think they stole it’

Evidentials appear spontaneously from time to time in elicited sentences, since speakers usually imagine a communicative context within which the Eastern Pomo utterance they provide might be appropriate. Fortunately, speakers usually describe this communicative context when they provide the form. Several of these volunteered contexts are provided in examples below, set off by quotation marks within parentheses.

A thorough understanding of the evidential suffixes, thus, requires an examination of their occurrence in naturally occurring discourse. This analysis is based on such evidence.

1. The non-visual sensory evidential

The non-visual sensory evidential, *-ink’e* (*-nk’e* after vowels, *-ank’e* after /q/) indicates that the speaker is experiencing, or has just experienced, through any sense except sight, the action or state expressed by the verb suffixed. Thus:

- (6) SMELL: *kó·piʔ mi·šé-nk'e*
 coffee smell-SENSORY.EV
 'I smell coffee'
- (7) HEARING: *ku·Má má·l-ink'e*
 enemy go.around-SENSORY.EV
 'I hear a night prowler going around/A night prowler is going around'
- (8) TASTE: *q'o·díy di·kí·t^h-ki-nk'e*
 good continuous.flow-SEMELFACTIVE-SENSORY.EV
 'It's going down good, tastes good (what I'm drinking)'
- (9) INTERNAL FEELINGS: *šów di·Láq'ma-nk'e*
 now think-SENSORY.EV
 'I just now thought of it'
- (10) INTERNAL FEELINGS: *mí ma·rá--nk'e*
 2SG.PATIENT like/want-SENSORY.EV
 'I like you'

As these examples show, when the main verb is suffixed with *-(i)nk'e*, there is no overt marker of experiencer if the experiencer of the action or state described is identical with the speaker. Nevertheless, such sentences are regularly translated into English with a first person subject as in (6), (7), (9), (10). When there is an explicit non-first person agent or patient in the clause *-(i)nk'e* continues to indicate that the basis for the assertion is the speaker's senses other than sight.² Thus

- (11) *ba· háyu-heʔmì·p' k^hé.š ka·Nú·l-ink'e du·wé*
 that dog-3SG-MASC.AGENT lots talk/bark-SENSORY.EV last.night
 'The dog was barking last night' (I heard it)
- (12) *du·láʔdu·lâw-u·là qa·néqa·nèm-ink'e*
 mosquito-AGENT bite.repeatedly-SENSORY.EV
 'Mosquito's biting [me] repeatedly' (I feel it)
- (13) *kó·piʔ-heʔè hóyyaʔ mi·šé-nk'e*
 coffee-SPEC good smell-SENSORY.EV
 'The coffee smells good' (I smell it)

One cannot form predications with *-(i)nk'e* which make claims about other people's sensory perception. Thus one says

- (14) *k^hé.š k^hú·lma-nk'e*
 lots afraid-SENSORY.EV
 'I'm afraid (of the dark)'

but:

- (15) *mí·-p'* *k^hú·lma-k'i-yà--l-a*
 3SG-MASC.AGENT afraid-CONTROL-DIR.EV
 'He's afraid (of the dark)'

or:

- (16) *mí·-p'* *k^hú·lma-k'i-yà--l-ine*
 3SG-MASC.AGENT afraid-CONTROL-INFR
 'He's afraid (of the dark)/He must be afraid (of the dark)' (I infer from his
 behaviour or other evidence)

2. The logical inferential evidential

The logical inferential evidential, *-ine* (*-ne* after vowels) indicates that the speaker's assertion is based on a logical inference as to the action or process that led to the evidence or resultant state observed. As Frances Dennison once explained to me, "if you come home and find a vase broken and only your ten year old son was home during the afternoon, you could say 'my son broke the vase' with this suffix attached to the verb 'break.'" Other examples are:

- (17) *wáx* *sánti.ya?* *ba·*
 1SG.POSS watermelon that
mu·sísib-ine [*<mu--sí-p^h>*]³
 [from.internal.energy-split.open-sudden.pressure]+ROOT.REDUP-INFR
 'My watermelon split open' (Said when found watermelon split open on
 vine from overripeness)
- (18) *bá.=k^hi* *p^hu·di-yaki-ne-he*
 SPEC.ANAPHORIC=3AGENT steal-PL.AGENT-INFR-ANT
 'They must have stolen it' ("You know it's taken because you left it there,
 and now it's disappeared")

The logical inferential suffix occasionally occurs with a rare, poorly understood clitic =*qa*:

- (19) *mí·-p'=qa* *ʔi·-ne* *c^há-wuhù*
 3-SG.MASC.AGENT=? do-INFR away-travel
 'He must have gone away'

Circumstantial evidence can include evidence provided by the senses. The inferential suffix is used when one infers a condition from a sense perception. The sensory evidential is used when one asserts one's sense perceptions. Thus one says:

- (20) *šá-he?* *mo-wós-k-ine*
 fish-SPEC ripe-PUNCTUAL-INFR
 'Fish must be ripe' (Said when one smells that fermentation has reached the desired point)

but:

- (21) *šá-he?* *mi-šé-nk'e*
 fish-SPEC smell-PUNCTUAL-SENSORY.EV
 'I smell the fish' (Said of one's perception, not inferring the state of the fish)

Since the inferential suffix presupposes lack of firsthand experience on the part of the speaker, it can only be used in predications with explicit first person agents and patients in the unusual situation in which the speaker has to infer what happened to him or her from circumstantial evidence. For example:

- (22) *xó-č^h-inay há·* *kó-q-ane*
 two-times 1SG.AGENT shoot-INFR
 'I (must have) hit the deer twice' ("I didn't see the arrow or bullet hit, but the deer has two cuts on its body, and I shot at him, so I must have hit him")

See also example (54).

3. The hearsay evidential

The hearsay evidential suffix, *-le*, indicates that the speaker knows about the events being recounted through someone else's telling. A clitic =*xa* normally follows the first constituent in the matrix clause when the main verb is suffixed with the hearsay evidential *-le*, as in:

- (23) *bá-y=xa* *xáy* *k^híl-ayax-le*
 there-LOC=HS stick hang.vertically-FUT-HS
 'They're going to have a dance, they say' (lit. the (invitation) stick will be hung up there)

The hearsay clitic is described in more detail in Section 8.1.

The hearsay evidential is commonly used in recounting *ma·rú·* ‘traditional myths’. Ralph Holder, a knowledgeable and gifted speaker, began his telling of the *ma·rú·* ‘Old Man Coyote and Flint-Young Man’:

- (24) *yu=xa ku·nú·la·bú·c'ike ká--le, yó·qa·qó·y,*
 already=HS Coyote-Old.Man live.SG-HS south-valley-LOC
nó·na·p^hó·ti·yay
 ash-village-ancient-LOC
 ‘Coyote Old Man was staying at home in Big Valley, at Nonapoti’

and continued using the hearsay evidential suffix *--le* on the main verbs of all subsequent independent clauses.

However, Joe Augustine, another gifted speaker, and an initiate in the secret society of Ash Ghosts, recounted many unique versions of myths to Abraham Halpern in 1939 with almost no use of the hearsay evidential suffix *--le*. Perhaps this was a special way of speaking used by members of the secret society.

4. The direct knowledge suffix

The direct knowledge suffix *-ya* (*-a* after vowels) indicates that the event referred to by the verb is actually happening or has just happened and that the speaker has direct knowledge of it, primarily because the speaker performed or experienced the action, process, or state.⁴ Thus

- (25) *wí q'a·lálma·ya*
 1SG.PATIENT sick.become-DIR.EV
 ‘I got sick’ (I experienced it)
- (26) *mí·-p-al há· ?óki déwer?-a*
 3-SG.MASC-PATIENT 1SG.AGENT still owe-DIR.EV
 ‘I still owe him’ (I know it)
- (27) *t'á=mà šó·-k-a*
 INTER=2SG.AGENT hear-PUNCTUAL-DIR.EV
 ‘Did you hear [that]?’ (I know there was a sound)
- (28) *méya-lal mí·-p' wá·-l-a*
 here-towards 3-SG.MASC.AGENT go-CONTINUATIVE-DIR.EV
 ‘He’s coming here’ (I know he’s coming)

When I created the form in (29) below, and asked Leonard Bateman what it would mean if it was acceptable, he explained that ‘if [one was] on a journey

already and should meet someone and they asked you where you're going, you could say:

- (29) *há·* *šó-hu-ya*
 1SG.AGENT east-travel-DIR.EV
 'I'm going east' (I know which way I intend to go)

Mr. Bateman also explained that if something had disappeared and "one knows for sure who took it" one says:

- (30) *bé.k^h* *p^hu-dí-yaki-ya*
 3PL.AGENT steal-PL.AGENT-DIR.EV
 'They stole it'

There is not a uniquely visual evidential with which the other evidentials contrast. The direct knowledge suffix *-(y)a* sometimes occurs in situations where visual evidence can be interpreted to be available, but more often occurs in situations where visual evidence cannot be involved, as in (25) to (30) above and (31).

- (31) *bá· wi* *dí-qó-x-a*
 that 1SG.PATIENT forget-DIR.EV
 'I forgot'

In Ralph Holder's performance of 'Bear Kills Her Daughter-in-Law, Deer', Deer's two sons have escaped from their grandmother, Bear, after she has killed their mother. The two boys then go to live with their grandfather on their mother's side, Great Blue Heron. While out playing they hear their mother crying and tell their grandfather they want to go look for her. Their grandfather refuses to let them go, saying:

- (32) *ka-lél-ʔba·* *má·* *šó.-k^h-kil-a*
 nothing-deictic.emphasis 2PL.AGENT hear-PUNCTUAL-HAB-DIR.EV
 'That's nothing you hear'

In Ralph Holder's retelling of his grandfather's account of the visit of the McKee Expedition to Clear Lake, California in 1851 to negotiate a treaty, Mr. Holder suffixes most of the verbs in the telling with the hearsay evidential *-le*. Towards the end of the account, he describes how his then teenage grandfather was attacked by a jealous White man whom his grandfather fought to a bloody draw. His grandfather then ran off to McKee's camp where the soldiers came out to meet him, and Mr. Holder says:

- (33) *bá-ya xól-dí-yaki-qan*
 there-LOC fire.towards-bring-PL.AGENT-then.SWITCH.REF
mi.k^hi-yi'=k^hi t'é.t'el-a ...
 McKee-PATIENT=3AGENT tell-DIR.EV
 'Then [the soldiers] brought him to camp [i.e. where the fire is] and he told McKee ... [what the White man had done to him]'

By using the direct evidential suffix rather than the hearsay evidential, Mr. Holder perhaps emphasizes that he has direct knowledge of this event (through his experience of frequently hearing his grandfather's reminiscences as a boy). The use of the direct form at this point is clearly also dramatically effective. It heightens this climactic event, in which a young Native teenager, attacked unjustly by one of the newly arrived, powerful strangers who are taking over the country, ventures into the lion's den of these strangers – the McKee camp, with its protective force of soldiers. This was a particularly brave thing to do, since United States soldiers only a year earlier had attacked and killed a large number of Native people on an island in Clear Lake in punishment for the killing of two abusive White settlers, Stone and Kelsey. McKee's response, totally supportive of Mr. Holder's grandfather, and a triumph for the nervy teenager which he must have remembered with great satisfaction, is subsequently given as a direct quote. This quote uses the direct suffix as well, emphasizing McKee's intent and perhaps reflecting how McKee's words were translated or understood. McKee spoke no Eastern Pomo but had an Eastern Pomo speaker with him who acted as interpreter. (This man, incredibly, had been taken prisoner by the soldiers the year before while they were attacking the Native peoples at Clear Lake and had served as a servant to officers in San Diego, where he learned some English, before returning to the Clear Lake area with McKee in 1851.)

- (34) “*mí-n ?i-x-ba ?i.-k^hùy há. ka.Nú.l,*
 like.that do-CAUS-to do-NEG 1.SG.AGENT say
ba.yí.l wá.l-a...”
 teach/instruct go.around-DIR.EV
 ‘I didn't tell the people to do a thing like that, I'm going around teaching/instructing people ... [to be good, to get along]’

The use of the direct knowledge suffix at dramatic moments in narratives, especially those of personal experience, is found in the narratives of other speakers as well.

In naturally occurring speech, the direct knowledge suffix is much more frequent in first person constructions and in questions than in third person

constructions, presumably because one knows best one's own knowledge. Occasionally, sentences elicited through English that combine a third person agent or experiencer with a verb suffixed with the direct knowledge suffix can receive a visual evidence reading. However, such readings are rare in natural speech and as the preceding examples show, visual cannot be the primary meaning of the suffix.

5. Co-occurrence of evidential suffixes

These four suffixes form a coherent set semantically, but in fact differ in their co-occurrence possibilities. The direct knowledge evidential $-(y)a$ cannot co-occur with any of the other three suffixes. In one genre, *ma·rú·* 'traditional myths', however, the hearsay evidential, $-le$, can follow both $-(i)nk'e$, the non-visual sensory evidential and $-(i)ne$, the inferential evidential.

When the hearsay $-le$ follows $-(i)nk'e$, the non-visual sensory evidential is understood to indicate the sensory experience of a protagonist experiencer in the scene described, not the speaker. This experiencer is never the agent of the verb suffixed with $-(i)nk'e$. Thus, in Mr. Holder's telling of his grandfather's account of the killing of Stone and Kelsey, when one of the two men was stabbed, he ran into the granary and then upstairs to hide. The Eastern Pomo who ran after him clustered around the bottom of the stairs, wondering what to do, listening. Mr. Holder then says:

- (35) *bá-y=xa* *ba· tó.š-ink'e-le*
 there-LOC=HS that thumping-SENSORY.EV-HS

which he translated as:

[Up] there he's making thumping noises, kicking around'

The sensory evidential $-(i)nk'e$ refers to the sensory experience of the pursuers (of whom one was Mr. Holder's grandfather, from whom he learned this account), while the hearsay evidential $-le$ indicates that Mr. Holder's knowledge of this event was acquired through someone else's (actually his grandfather's) recounting of the experience.

In another *ma·rú·*, the hero has gone into a house where a blind old man, the villain, is lying, and then starts to leave. Mr. Holder then says:

- (36) *bá=xa=k^hi* *xów-aqa-nk'e-le*
 then=HS=3AGENT outwards-move-SENSORY.EV-HS
 'Then he [the hero] starts to walk out' (The old man villain, who is blind,
 heard the hero start to walk out)

The third person agent clitic =*k^hi* refers to the hero who is walking out (the topic of this passage), while *-(i)nk'e* indicates the sensory experience of the one who is experiencing the event (who would of course be the speaker in conversations). There is only one other protagonist present in this scene: the old man villain whom the hero is trying to kill and he is the experiencer. The clitic =*k^hi* cannot refer to the one having the sensory experience, since it obligatorily marks backgrounded agents unspecified as to number or gender, and the one having the sensory experience is not in control⁵ of the experiencing. Therefore when an agent or patient is specifically marked in a clause containing *-(i)nk'e*, another experiencer is always understood to be involved. This is the speaker in conversations, but one of the protagonists in narratives.

This usage gives great immediacy and heightened dramatic effect to the narrative. The listener is focused on the sensory experience (accompanied presumably, by anxiety and anticipation) of the blind and vulnerable old man by *-(i)nk'e*, although it is the hero who is acting. The use of the clitic =*k^hi* to refer to the hero, rather than the independent pronoun *mí-p'*, signals the hero's lack of prominence in this scene. (See McLendon 1996:540–541 for more details concerning =*k^hi*.)

In Ralph Holder's telling of Coyote and the Ground Squirrels, Old Man Coyote has transformed into a beautiful woman, and seduced Buteo-Chief to reveal his secret technique for catching ground squirrels, which is to decorate his hand with dangles of iridescent abalone shell and stick his hand and arm into the ground squirrels' hole. The ground squirrels are attracted to his beautifully decorated hand, grab hold of it, and then can be grabbed in turn and pulled out. Old Man Coyote decorates his hand in the same way and inserts his arm up to his shoulder into the ground squirrel hole. Then Mr. Holder says:

- (37) *bá-y=xa* *bi-Yá-Na xól-k'i-yàki-ink'e-le,*
 there-LOC=HS hand-on towards.goal-do-PL.AGENT-SENSORY.EV-HS
bi-t'ém-k^h-ma-nk'e-le...
 many.cling-PUNCTUAL-EXTENTIVE.PL.AGENT-SENSORY.EV-HS

which Mr. Holder translated:

'[Old Man Coyote] could feel them approaching his hand in there; he could feel many getting on his hand...'

Here again, no agent or patient is explicitly specified in the clause. Old Man Coyote, the topic of this section of the narrative and the agent of the preceding sentence (which describes him sticking his decorated hand down into the ground squirrel's hole), is understood to be the experiencer of the sensory impressions indicated by *-(i)nk'e*.

On another occasion Mr. Holder recounted his grandfather's account of how he and his uncle were chased by a bear one day while out checking traps. Mr. Holder's grandfather, then a boy, was hidden in a thicket of brush where his uncle threw him at the beginning of the chase. This is how Mr. Holder describes the scene:

- (38) *bá· mí·n qa·qó· ka·ná·x, bá·y=xa=k^hi*
 then like.that field/opening chase there-LOC=HS=3AGENT
ka·ná·-m·du·li·nk'e--le
 chase-constantly-CONSTANTIVE-SENSORY.EV-HS
 'He [the bear] was chasing [him, the uncle] around in the field, just chasing him around constantly' (The hidden grandfather who can't see from where he is hidden in the brush, hears the sounds of the bear chasing the man, crashing through brush, panting, etc. from the hot pursuit.)

In the first of the two sentences that precede example (38), Mr. Holder's grandfather, whose foot was sticking out in plain sight from his hiding place, is described as screaming when some of the bear's saliva drips on his foot and burns. The second sentence specifies that the bear paid no attention, but continued to pursue the uncle, both of whom are named with full nouns – the maximally prominent marker of a protagonist in a discourse, and unusual in the middle of a narrative. The agent clitic =*k^hi* in (38) refers to the bear, the marked agent of the immediately preceding sentence, who must be still chasing the uncle, as he was in the preceding sentence. Thus *-(i)nk'e* indicates the teenage grandfather's sensory experience, lying hidden but terrified, listening to what he thinks is his uncle's death chase.

When the hearsay *-le* follows the logical inferential *-(i)ne* in this genre, however, *-(i)ne* seems always to be interpreted as reflecting the narrator's inferences, and suggests perhaps that the narrator is not quite certain as to what happened at this point in the narrative, perhaps because he/she didn't recall exactly what was said by the person from whom he/she had heard the narrative. Thus, in Bill Grave's telling of 'Bear Kills his Daughter-in-Law, Deer', after Bear has killed his daughter-in-law, Mr. Graves says:

- (39) *ka·lél=xa=k^hi* *ma·ʔór-al* *q'á-ne-le*
 simply=HS=3.AGENT daughter.in.law-PATIENT leave-INFR-HS
 'He **must have** simply left his daughter-in-law there, they say'

In 'Old Man Coyote and his Brother Wolf', Ralph Holder describes Old Man Coyote's efforts to go to sleep so that the sticks he has placed in his dance house will become children:

- (40) *mí-n* *ye·hé-l-iday=xa* *si·má· né-k-ine-le*
 like.that do-while.SWITCH.REF=HS sleep extend-PUNCTUAL-INFR-HS
 'He had been doing that, then he **must have** gone to sleep, they say'

Sometimes the use of *-(i)ne* seems to indicate the narrator's distancing himself from the events described. Thus in Leonard Bateman's telling of a borrowed Spanish folktale, *šá pinto?* 'The Spotted Fish,' a fisherman catches a spotted fish which his wife insists on eating. Before the fish is killed, he tells the husband to dispose of the fish bones in a carefully prescribed way – all very bizarre and peculiar from the point of view of Eastern Pomo narrative conventions. The bones are put in the stable and then Mr Bateman says:

- (41) ... *káwaʔ-yéwaʔ-heʔmì-ʔ=xa* *t'a-né-heʔ* *mi·múk-ine-le*
 horse-mare-3SG-FEM.AGENT=HS fish.bone-SPEC smell-INFR-HS
 '... Then the mare must have smelled the fish bones'

The logical inferential can also be followed by the anterior mode suffix *--hi* (*-he* following */el/*) in narratives other than myths. It seems to have the same effect of distancing the speaker from the assertion being made. For example, in a narrative recounting a dream Mr. Bateman had as a boy, the main verbs are suffixed with the anterior mode *--hi*. He dreamed he was walking along by a bridge and saw a lady floating in the water, with her hair spread out around her head. While he was looking at her, she jumped up and came down head first. Then Mr. Bateman says:

- (42) *ʔi-qan* *ba·' dá-heʔè* *ʔi-ne-he'* *šá-yi·bá·*
 do-then.SWITCH.REF that woman-SPEC do-INFR-ANT fish-tail
kó-^h
 long.object/to.be.perpendicular-PUNCTUAL

which he translated as:

'Then, happened to be, the lady had a fish tail, with scales'

In transcribing and translating this text, Mr. Bateman volunteered that *-(i)ne* was wrong here, since he had seen the fish tail. Yet he, an accomplished and

fluent speaker, had used the inferential suffix – presumably to distance himself from the unusual thing he had seen.

Thus the co-occurrence of *-(i)nk'e* with *-le* reflects the multiple points of view in a dramatic performance of a narrative. It takes the listener inside the narrative action, giving the performance drama and realism, just as the use of direct quotes allows the narrator to take on different voices or speech mannerisms for each character, turning a narrative performance into something more like a play than a novel. The co-occurrence of *-(i)ne* with *-le* has the opposite effect, drawing the listener's attention to the speaker's feelings (or reservations) about the narrative action.

6. Evidentials and first person point of view

All four suffixes mark the speaker's source of information for what is asserted and normally imply a first person involvement. The non-visual sensory evidential *-(i)nk'e* indicates the most intense first person involvement. Except in *ma·rú·* 'traditional myths' it always reflects a first person experiencer and is consistently translated into English with a first person subject, as in (1), in the absence of an explicit marker of person. Even when non-first persons are explicitly marked as involved, the presence of *-(i)nk'e* indicates that the speaker is basing his assertion on the evidence of his own senses as in (7), (11) and (12).

The inferential *-(i)ne* reminds the listener that the assertion being made is based on the speaker's inference from the evidence. The hearsay *-le* signals that the assertion is based on the speaker's memory of an earlier recounting by someone else. The direct knowledge suffix *-(y)a* generally reflects the speaker's point of view as well. However, in recounting past events, *-(y)a* is sometimes used to reflect the knowledge of a non-first person participant in the event described, who the speaker knows has had direct knowledge of that event, as in examples (33) and (34) above.

Eastern Pomo speakers from whom I have learned Eastern Pomo since 1959, remembered that when they were children their grandparents constantly reminded them to be careful how they spoke. They were told to be especially careful to speak well to, and about, other people, because if they didn't the person spoken about, or to, might be offended and try to "poison" them, that is, use ritual or other means to bring them misfortune, illness, or even death. Evidentials which distinguish non-visual sensory experience, inference, memory, and knowledge seem a useful means of speaking with care, asserting only what one has evidence for, and making one's evidence clear.

7. Evidentials in questions, negatives, commands, and dependent clauses

Evidentials do not occur in commands, or dependent clauses in Eastern Pomo. They do occur in questions and negative clauses.

7.1 Evidentials in questions

Questions are formed with one of two modal clitics, the interrogative *t'a* or the subjunctive *ti* (sometimes *tiši*), postposed to the constituent that is the topic of questioning. This can be a single word, a phrase, or a clause. When the whole sentence is the topic of questioning the clitic occurs sentence initially as in (27), otherwise it occurs in second position.

The clitic =*t'a* queries current states or activities or ones which happened or existed in the past. Thus:

- (43) *mí=t'a* *ma.ʔáy ma-rá-*
 2SG.AGENT=INTER food want-STAT
 'Are you hungry?' (lit. Are you the one who wants food?)

In contrast, the clitic =*ti* queries states or activities that are possible or desirable, but not yet in existence. The choice between these two clitics distinguishes Realis (marked with =*t'a*) from Irrealis mode (marked with *ti* or *tiši*). Compare:

- (44) *má=ti* *wá.-l-a*
 2SG.AGENT=SUBJ go-CONTINUOUS-DIR.EV
 'Are you going to go?'

with:

- (45) *má=t'a* *wá.-l-a*
 2SG.A=INTER go-CONTINUOUS-DIR.EV
 'Are you going (actually moving)?'

The clitic =*ti* also combines with two Irrealis modals. It marks polite requests, distinct from commands, when combined with the conditional suffix *-yaʔè-le*:

- (46) *má=ti* *di.ʔáq-aʔè-le*
 2SG.A=SUBJ think-COND
 'Could you think?'

It marks supplications (commonly used in praying and speeches by political leaders) when combined with the desiderative suffix *-(V)š*:

- (47) *má=ti* *wélay p^há·Liki-qa-š*
 2SG.AGENT=SUBJ quick be.well-CAUS-DES
 ‘May you get well quickly!’

Two evidentials, the direct knowledge *-(y)a* and the non-visual sensory *-(i)nk’e*, have been found in questions formed with both clitics. The logical inferential *-ine* has only been found in questions formed with the Realis interrogative clitic *=t’a*. No examples have been found of the hearsay evidential with either clitic. Examples of each evidential suffix in questions are given below.

7.1.1 Questions with the direct knowledge evidential *-(y)a*

- (48) *má=t’a* *wá-du·ki·-ya*
 2.SG.AGENT=INTER go-INCEPTIVE-DIR.EV
 ‘Did you go?’

Mr. Holder’s telling of ‘Old Man Coyote begs Black Bread from the Sun’ begins with Coyote walking around with his head down. The Sun Captain up above sees him and asks:

- (49) “*xé ?í·lo, xé ?í·lo, ?á·m=t’a má ma·ká·-l-a*
xé ?í·lo, xé ?í·lo, thing=INTER 2SG.AGENT look.for-CONTINUOUS-DIR.EV
 “*xé ?í·lo, xé ?í·lo, what are you looking for?*”

In another *ma·rú·* told by Mr. Holder, Old Man Coyote has brought back to life the dead and cremated Falcon, his grandson. Falcon is then insulted by Meadowlark, who on entering the Dance House, complains about the burnt smell (from Falcon, who had been cremated). This makes Falcon decide to return to the dead. He then asks:

- (50) *?á·m·iyay=ti há· c^háp^h-ki·ya*
 what/thing-LOC=SUBJ 1SG.AGENT step-SEMELFACTIVE-DIR.EV
 ‘What could I step on/What will I step on?’ (expecting that valuable bead belts will be laid down in a path for him to walk on)

7.1.2 Questions with the non-visual sensory evidential *-(i)nk’e*

- (51) *ki·yá·=t’a ?éč·ink’e*
 who=INTER sneeze-SENSORY.EV
 ‘Who sneezed?’ (I heard, but don’t know who sneezed)
- (52) *ma·rú·=t’a=k^hi ma·rú·-yaq·ank’e*
 myth=INTER=3.AGENT tell.myths-FUT-SENSORY
 ‘Is he going to tell old stories?’ (Are we going to hear him tell *ma·rú·*?)

- (53) *ká-wk-ula-ya ma=ti í-nk'e, Jeff*
 grandchild-AGENT-VOC 2sg.AGENT=SUBJ do-SENSORY.EV Jeff
 'Is that you, Jeff?/Could that be you, Jeff?' (Poholqa, a blind man, said to a younger relative, Jeff, when Jeff tried to slip into a room without his knowing)

7.1.3 Questions with the logical inference evidential *-(i)ne*

- (54) *k'e-héy=t'a mí. ka-dá-k-k'-ine*
 self=INTER 2SG.PATIENT CUT-PUNCTUAL-REFL-INFR
 'Did you cut yourself?' (When seeing bandages, or a bloody knife, etc.)
- (55) *t'a=ma da-wí-ne*
 INTER=2SG.AGENT drill.beads-INFR
 'Are you drilling beads?' (When seeing bead drill and grinding stone out, for example)

In Bill Grave's telling of 'Bear kills his Daughter-in-Law', Bear asks his daughter-in-law:

- (56) *"č^hé.=t'a wa·x qa·wí.-?ba. líl-uhú-ne"*
 where=INTER 1SG.POSS boy-deictic.emphasis far.away-travel-INFR
 "Where did my boy go?"/ "Where has my boy gone?" (Bear is wondering)

7.2 Evidentials in negative clauses

In Eastern Pomo matrix clauses are negated by the insertion of a negative verb *k^húy-* as the first, or more usually, the second, constituent in the sentence. This negative verb is inflected with the appropriate independent-verb forming suffixes, including evidential suffixes, rather than the semantic main verb. The negative verb can also occur in sentence final position, like other finite verbs, to form a negative existential, meaning there is nothing/no-one (McLendon 1996: 208).

Only three of the four evidentials have been found suffixed to the negative verb in first or second position: the non-visual sensory evidential *-(i)nk'e*, the hearsay evidential *-le*, and the direct knowledge evidential *-(y)a*. No examples are known of the logical inferential evidential *-(i)ne* suffixed to the negative verb in second position, but it has been found suffixed to the clause final existential negative verb. For example, Leonard Bateman explained, "if thing is there, but you can't quite find it, or don't know quite where it is (for example if some thing is in the back of a truck, but you can't find it)" you would say:

- (57) ʔi.' bá. k^húy-ine
yes that NEG-INFR
'Yes, it must be gone' (I infer it is gone)

But Mr. Bateman pointed out that if you know it's gone, you would say:

- (58) bá. k^húy-a
that NEG-DIR.EV
'It's gone'

Examples of the evidentials occurring in contrastive affirmative and negative sentences are given below.

7.2.1 *The direct knowledge evidential -(y)a*

- (59) há. ma-šóy-k-kil-a
1SG.AGENT think/guess-PUNCTUAL-HAB-DIR.EV
'I'm guessing at it/ thinking of it'
- (60) há. k^húy-a ma-šóy-k-kil
1SG.AGENT NEG-DIR.EV think/guess-PUNCTUAL-HAB
'I don't think so'

A textual example from Leonard Bateman's telling of 'The Spotted Fish' is:

- (61) "báy ká-wk^h líl-uhù-n k^húy-a xa-má-l qa-šóy
there person far.away-travel-CO.REF NEG-DIR.EV back alive
kál-uhù-kil"
home.to-travel-HAB
'Whenever a person goes over there, they never come back alive'

7.2.2 *The hearsay evidential-.le*

- (62) xa= mí.-ʔ' ka-Nú-.le
HS=3-SG.FEM.A speak-HS
'She spoke, they say'
- (63) xa=k^húy-.le ka-Nú-k^h
HS=NEG-HS say-PUNCTUAL
'She never said a word, they say'

A textual example from Ralph Holder's telling of 'Old Man Sun and Falcon-Young Man' is:

- (64) ...ba=xa k^húy-.le, lá.-bú.c'ike-he?mì.-p' q'o-díy bálk'...
that=HS NEG-HR Sun-Old.Man-3-MASC.AGENT good act
'And Old Man Sun, he didn't act good ... [he acted mad]'

7.2.3 *The non-visual sensory evidential* -(i)nk'e

- (65) *ma·ʔáy qa·bó·-k'-ink'e*
 food full-REFL-SENSORY.EV
 'I'm full (had enough to eat)'
- (66) *k^húy-ink'e ma·ʔáy qa·bó·-k'*
 NEG-SENSORY.EV food full-REFL
 'I'm not full/I don't feel full'

A textual example comes from Leonard Bateman's account of traditional hunting rules:

- (67) *k^húy-ink'e ba· q'o·díy me·ʔél*
 NEG-SENSORY.EV that good know
 'I don't know [the hunting rules] for sure'

7.3 Evidentials in second position, suffixed to ʔí-

All four evidential suffixes can also occur suffixed to ʔí-, a general verb of doing, inserted into the first, or more usually, second position in a sentence, in the same position as the negative verb *k^húy*. Like the negative verb *k^húy*-, ʔí- takes the independent verb forming suffixes, instead of the clause final lexical main verb. For example, in his telling of 'The Spotted Fish' story, Mr. Bateman describes one of the two brothers saying to the other:

- (68) "há·=ʔè ʔó·-y mí·n mi·-dár-iMak' ʔí-ne
 1SG.AGENT=COP over.there-LOC like.that 2SG.POSS-wife-WITH do-INF
há· mér"
 1SG.AGENT lie
 "I must have slept with your wife over there, without knowing it"

8. Co-occurrence with clitics

The hearsay evidential suffix normally occurs with the hearsay clitic =*xa* postposed to the first constituent in the matrix clause as in examples (23), (24), (25), (35), (36), (37), (38), (39), (40), (41), (62), (63) and (64) above (see McLendon 1979 for details). The logical inferential suffix occurs occasionally with a poorly understood clitic =*qa* postposed to the first constituent, as in example (19). The non-visual sensory evidential and the direct knowledge evidential never occur with an evidential-specific clitic (although they do

‘When the bear had gone across to the middle (to that hot rock) he [Great Blue Heron] suddenly twisted his neck to one side and the old lady fell in the water together with those rocks, making a hissing sound’

The clause structure is:

When [the bear] got to the middle=*xa*
 he twisted his neck=*xa*
 the old lady=*xa*
 fell in the water,
 fell with the rocks=*xa*
 making a hissing sound-*le*

The fifth dependent clause, ‘fell with the rocks’, expands on the immediately preceding dependent clause, ‘fell in the water’, so no hearsay clitic =*xa* separates them. (See McLendon 1979 for more examples and details.)

9. Clitics and the classification of independent verb forming suffixes

Evidentials are members of a large group of independent verb forming modal suffixes in Eastern Pomo. They can be grouped into two sets, Realis and Irrealis, on the basis of their patterns of occurrence with one of the four modal clitics, all of which normally occur in second position in the matrix clause, but occasionally occur in clause initial position.

Three of the modal clitics, the hearsay clitic =*xa*, the interrogative clitic =*t'a*, and the subjunctive clitic =*ti*, have already been discussed. The fourth clitic, the concessive =*bi* combines with the singular imperative *-im*, the plural imperative *-me* and the jussive *-ba?* to mark polite imperatives. Interestingly, it is identical in shape to one of two inferential suffixes in Kashaya Pomo (Oswalt 1986: 42). Examples are:

- (71) *xa·ká=bi* *yóx-kil-im*
 flint=CONCESSIVE make-HAB-SG.IMPER
 ‘Make an arrow point, if you will!’
- (72) *mé=bi* *ba·ráp^h-ki-me*
 this=CONCESSIVE several.to.ride-SEMELFACTIVE-PL.IMPER
 ‘You fellows ride in this!’

The independent verb forming suffixes are:

REALIS		IRREALIS	
-(y)a	'direct knowledge evidential'	-(y)aè·le	'conditional'
-(i)nke	'non-visual sensory evidential'	-iš	'desiderative'
-(i)ne	'logical inferential evidential'	-baʔè	'subjunctive'
-·le	'hearsay evidential'	-i·Nàʔ	'intentive'
-·hi	'anterior'	-baʔ	'jussive'
-·	'stative'	-im	'sg.imperative'
-e·	'extensive'	-me	'pl.imperative'

The Irrealis modals code the speaker's attitude towards the action or state expressed by the verb, while the Realis modals state the existence of that action or state, situate it temporally, and/or specify the speaker's evidence for its existence.

The clitic =*t'a* occurs only with suffixes from the Realis set. It does not occur with Irrealis suffixes. The clitic =*xa* occurs only with the Realis hearsay suffix, -·le. The clitic =*bi* occurs only with Irrealis suffixes, specifically the imperative suffixes, and the jussive. It does not occur with Realis suffixes. The clitic =*ti* occurs with Irrealis suffixes, specifically the conditional and the desiderative, and at least three of the evidentials. With the evidentials, it forms polite questions about future acts or events, as in (50) and (53).

Over half the Realis suffixes are evidentials. Of the remaining three suffixes, the anterior suffix -·hi indicates that the action or state began in the past, before the moment of speech. It may refer to an action completed in the past, or still going on, but always begun sometime before the moment of speech. The stative suffix -· describes general states or actions, rather than specific events. The extensive suffix indicates that the state or action referred to has an extended locus.

10. A brief survey of evidentials in other Pomoan languages

Extensive linguistic fieldwork has been carried out with native speakers of six of the seven Pomoan languages (Halpern 1964; Oswalt 1958, 1961, 1964b, 1976b, 1977a, 1977b, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1998; McLendon 1969, 1975, 1977a, 1977b, 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1996; Vihman 1976, 1998; Moshinsky 1974, 1976; O'Connor 1984, 1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1992; Mithun 1988a, 1988b, 1990a, 1990b, 1993, 1997, 1998; Buckley 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994a, 1994b). The seventh language, Northeastern Pomo, ceased

to be spoken in the early 1960s. Less fieldwork had been done on the language and less is known about it than the other languages, so it will not be considered here.

Abraham Halpern is the only linguist to have carried out extensive fieldwork on all seven of the languages. His work is particularly valuable as it took place more than two decades before that of the other of the researchers (in 1939–1940) when most of the languages were still the medium of communication for a large portion of the communities that spoke them, and his phonetic transcriptions are remarkably accurate.

10.1 Subgroupings

Both Halpern (1964:90) and Oswalt (1964a:416) have proposed subgroupings of the languages; Halpern on his understanding of the sound correspondences and lexical resemblances, Oswalt on a statistical analysis of 100 lexical items. They both agree that Southeastern Pomo and Eastern Pomo are the most divergent languages (although they are spoken less than 20 miles apart at opposite ends of the largest natural lake entirely within California, Clear Lake), while Kashaya and Southern Pomo (and possibly Central Pomo) are the most similar.

Halpern and Oswalt differ most significantly on their placement of Northeastern Pomo, the least documented language. Halpern felt that Northeastern belonged together with Northern Pomo, Central Pomo, Southern Pomo, and Kashaya in a subgrouping he called Proto-Russian River Pomo. Oswalt believed that Northeastern Pomo differed so significantly from the four other languages in Halpern's Russian River Pomo that it was a separate development from the proto language, parallel to Eastern Pomo and Southeastern Pomo. Oswalt also identified Northern Pomo as one arm of a "Western Branch", within which Central Pomo, Southern Pomo and Kashaya were more closely related to each other, forming a "Southern Group". Halpern felt there were two possibilities: 1) Northeastern Pomo and Northern Pomo could form one subgroup within Proto-Russian River Pomo, while Central Pomo, Southern Pomo and Kashaya formed a separate subgroup (identical to Oswalt's "Southern Group"). Alternatively, 2) Northeastern Pomo could have had a separate development within Proto-Russian River Pomo, while Northern Pomo and Central Pomo formed one subgroup, and Southern Pomo and Kashaya formed a second subgroup.

10.2 Historical research so far

The detailed synchronic descriptions available now for five of the seven languages (Kashaya, Eastern Pomo, Southeastern Pomo, Northern Pomo and Central Pomo) provide a basis for careful, considered reconstruction of the morphology and syntax of the parent language, Proto Pomo. The first stage of the historical work began in the 1960s and 1970s (Halpern [1962ms], 1964; Oswalt 1964a, 1976a, 1976b; McLendon 1973, 1976; Moshinsky 1976). This provided a good understanding of the sound correspondences that have characterized the changes in these languages, as well as the various phonological processes that have often radically changed the shapes of morphemes. The situation is briefly as follows:

Impressionistically, [the seven Pomoan languages] sound quite different from one another, they are mutually unintelligible, and they frequently demonstrate unexpected grammatical divergences. However, the correspondences ... are characterized by rather small phonetic shifts. This state of affairs results from the operation of two distinct types of sound change ... the phonetic content of the proto phonemes has changed (paradigmatic change) ... [while] many proto phonemes have systematically undergone changes uniquely in certain types of sequential environments, giving rise to adjustments which are classically referred to as assimilation, dissimilation, syncope, apocope, and apheresis (syntagmatic change). Paradigmatic changes of the first type have primarily affected consonants. Syntagmatic changes of the second type have primarily affected vowels.

(McLendon 1973:13)

10.3 Evidentials in comparative perspective

The six languages for which we have descriptions all have evidential systems, but they differ in the number of evidentials they distinguish, their meanings, and their forms. In two languages (Southeastern Pomo and Central Pomo) the evidentials are clitics. In four languages (Eastern Pomo, Northern Pomo, Southern Pomo, Kashaya) they are suffixes. The evidential morphemes and their meanings are charted in Table 1.

The greatest agreement among the Pomoan languages is with the marking of the hearsay evidential. All six languages have a hearsay evidential, with virtually the same shape in five (Pse =*do*, Pe =*·le*, Pn =*(?)do*, Pc =*?do/=?doma*, Ps =*do*, Pk =*do*). Only Eastern Pomo differs.

All six languages have a sensory evidential (Pse =*q'o* [actually always =*n=q'o*], Pe =*nk'e*, Pn =*Vnhe*, Pc =*(V)nne*, Ps =*(V)n²da*, Pk =*(V)nna*). The forms are suggestively similar but don't appear to follow regular sound correspon-

Table 1. A comparison of evidentials in Pomoan languages

	Southeastern	Eastern	Northern	Central	Southern	Kashaya
HEARSAY	-n + =do	-le	-(?)do	=?do. /=?doma	-do	-do
INFERENCE	1	?	-(i)ne	-na	-mna	
	2		[=qa clitic]	=?ka	-ka	-q(a)
	3		[=bi clitic]		-ben	-bi-(na)
SENSORY/ AUDITORY	-n + =q'o [-ɲq'o]	-nk'e sensory	-Vnhe	-(V)nme	-(V)n?da	-(V)nna>(V)n
DIRECT/ PERSONAL	-ya perfective	-(y)a direct knowledge	-ye perfective	=ya 1st hand personal experience, usually visual	-(w)a personal experience	-(w)(a) factual
EXPERIENCE/ PERFECTIVE VISUAL	=ya visual			=ya 1st hand personal experience, usually visual =la personal agency		-yã [=y(a)] visual perfective
PERSONAL AGENCY?						-(w)ela imperfective performative
PERSONAL AF- FECTEDNESS?				=wiya personal affect		-mela perfective performative
ESTABLISHED FACT				=?ma general knowledge		

dences. (However, Southeastern *q'* regularly becomes *k'* in Eastern Pomo before front vowels.) The Northern Pomo form looks tantalizingly similar to the Eastern Pomo form, but the correspondence of Northern Pomo /h/ to Eastern Pomo /k'/ or /q'/ and Southeastern Pomo /q'/ is otherwise unattested. Oswald (1986) has indicated that the geminant /n/ in the Kashaya suffix looks like the product of assimilation of a consonant cluster of two unlike consonants, such as the cluster in Southern Pomo. The agreement in the final vowel of the suffixes in Central Pomo, Northern Pomo and Eastern Pomo (spoken adjacent to one another) cannot be an accident. But the lack of agreement with the final vowel of the suffix in Southeastern Pomo on the one hand, or with the final vowel in Kashaya and Southern Pomo cannot be explained. This evidential appears to mark purely auditory evidence in all languages but Eastern Pomo.

All six languages have at least one inferential, some have more, but the shapes don't correspond neatly. Eastern Pomo, Northern Pomo, and Southern Pomo have resemblant forms: Pe *-(i)ne*: Pn *-na*: Ps *-mna*. The first two languages were spoken next to each other. Their speakers were neighbors who intermarried and often learned each other's languages. Thus the similarities in form could be due to diffusion as well as preservation of an earlier form.

In Central Pomo the inferential evidential clitic has the shape =?ka. It resembles inferential suffixes in the two languages spoken to its south and south-

west: Southern Pomo and Kashaya: Pc =[?]*ka*: Ps *-ka*: Pk *-q(a)*. The rarely occurring, poorly understood Eastern Pomo clitic =*qa* which sometimes co-occurs with the logical inferential evidential *-(i)ne* matches these other affixes in form, although it occurs in a different position in the sentence. The sound correspondence Pe *q*: Pc *k*: Ps *k*: Pk *q* is a widely attested one, so these affixes could be cognate.

A third correspondence involves the Eastern Pomo clitic =*bi*, the Southern Pomo disagential dependent verb marking inferential suffix *-ben*, and the Kashaya inferential *-bi-*. According to Oswalt (1986:41)

the chief difference between *-bi-* and *-qǎ* Inferential I is perhaps distributional; *-bi-* is never verb-final but must be followed by some other suffix. It occurs in four irregularly fused compound suffixes that form subordinate clauses: *-bina* inference plus coreference of the agents of the subordinate and superordinate clause; *-bem* inference with different agents in the two clauses; and *-binati* and *-beti*, which add the meaning ‘although’ to the preceding pair. In (S30) there is a similar type of inference in each clause, but different morphemes are involved because one clause is subordinate to the other:

(S30) duʔk'u-bina cohtoc^h-q^h
 finish-inference. II leave-inference. I
 ‘He must have finished and left (the work is done and he is no longer here).’

The direct knowledge/personal experience/factual evidential consists of a vowel /a/ or /e/ preceded by a not always present glide (either /y/ or /w/) in all six languages. Although there is variation in the meaning of this morpheme between languages, from direct knowledge to personal experience, fact and perfective, they seem on a common semantic trajectory. In two languages, Southeastern and Kashaya, there is a specifically visual evidential with the shape *-ya* or =*ya*. In Central Pomo, the evidential indicates firsthand personal experience, usually visual (Mithun 1999:181). In Northern Pomo *-ye* is a perfective. In Southeastern the suffix *-ya* is perfective, while the clitic with the same shape, =*ya*, always follows the absolutive suffix *-n* and is identified as a visual evidential.⁶

Central Pomo has three, and Kashaya two, additional evidentials. Evidentials seem to have been especially elaborated in what Oswalt has called the “Southern Group” of Pomoan languages: Central Pomo, Southern Pomo, and Kashaya. Southern Pomo appears to have six evidentials, Central Pomo seven, and Kashaya eight. The more northerly languages, Southeastern Pomo and Northern Pomo have three evidential suffixes, while Eastern Pomo has four. It is a pity that more is not known about the grammar of Coast Miwok, the

language spoken immediately south of these Pomoan languages. Did it have evidentials? And if so, how many?

In any case, Eastern Pomo with its four evidentials is both different from, and similar to, the other Pomoan languages with their three to eight evidential morphemes.

Notes

1. This work would not have been possible without the many years of insightful explanations, considered speech and discourse provided by a number of accomplished speakers of Eastern Pomo: Bill Graves, Maude Bateman Boggs, Frances Posh Dennison, Leonard Bateman, Mike Gomez, and Ralph Holder (see McLendon 1999:509, 512–513 for brief biographies). Some of their many insights about their language are presented here. It would also not have been possible without the financial support of a number of institutions over many years: the Survey of California and Other Languages, Department of Linguistics, University of California, Berkeley (1959–1964), the American Philosophical Society, the City University of New York Faculty Research Award Program, grant #11369, the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Mental Health, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. I thank them all.
2. In my grammar of Eastern Pomo (McLendon 1975:98–99) I claimed that when non-first persons are explicitly marked as involved, the sensory evidential *-ink'e* was limited to aural evidence, as in (11). Subsequent fieldwork, however, revealed utterances such as (12) and (13), and established that sound is only the most frequently available source of sensory evidence when other participants are involved, not the only one.
3. Stem internal morpheme analysis will only be given when it is needed to understand the meaning of the sentence, as here.
4. This suffix was called *indicative* in McLendon 1975 and 1996.
5. For more details about this concept see McLendon 1978a.
6. One of the two example forms provided in Moshinsky (1974:71) seems to indicate direct knowledge (as it would in Eastern Pomo), rather than visual evidence:

ʔuyi ʔà ba c`i-n-do
 he.SUBJECT I.SUBJECT SUBJECT.PARTICLE do-ABSOLUTIVE-QUOTATIVE
 nú-n-ya
 say-ABSOLUTIVE-VISUAL
 ‘He said that I did it’ [Interlinear translation is mine]
 (“he-I-SUBJECT-did it, QUOTATIVE-he said, VISUAL” i.e. direct knowledge?)

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Evidentiality in Tariana

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1. Preliminaries

Tariana, an endangered North Arawak language spoken in the multilingual linguistic area of the Vaupés,¹ distinguishes at least four evidential specifications fused with non-future tense-marking enclitics: visual, nonvisual, inferred and reported. The system in Tariana was developed under the areal influence of East Tucanoan languages, mostly Tucano, which is now rapidly gaining ground as a lingua franca of the whole Brazilian Vaupés. Younger speakers of Tariana are developing a fifth, ‘assumed’, evidential, to match a corresponding structure in Tucano. Normally, omitting an evidential results in an ungrammatical sentence. A reduced set of evidentials is found in interrogative clauses, in commands, in apprehensive clauses and in purposives.

A brief typological overview is in order. Tariana is a polysynthetic language which combines head-marking morphology with elements of dependent marking. The open classes are nouns, verbs and adjectives. Tariana distinguishes simple predicates, serial verb constructions, and complex predicates. Every verbal root is either ambitransitive of A=S_a type (prefixed) or intransitive of type S_o or of type S_{io} (both prefixless). Person markers are used only with transitive and active intransitive verbs; no markers occur on prefixless stative verbs, in agreement with the general active-stative profile inherited from Proto-Arawak. The same set of prefixes marks possessors on inalienably possessed nouns (prefixes and personal pronouns are in Table 1). Simple predicates have one prefix position and up to nine suffix positions. Unlike most other Arawak languages, grammatical relations are also marked by cases, on a nominative-accusative basis.

The tense-evidentiality enclitics in Tariana occupy a fixed slot in the structure of the verb shown in Diagram 1. Slot 15, reserved for evidentiality and tense, is in bold. The tense-evidentiality specification is obligatory in ev-

Table 1. Person, gender and number prefixes and corresponding pronouns in Tariana

	Prefix	Pronoun		Prefix	Pronoun
1sg	<i>nu-</i>	<i>nuha</i>	1pl	<i>wa-</i>	<i>waha</i>
2sg	<i>pi-</i>	<i>piha</i>	2pl	<i>i-</i>	<i>ihya</i>
3sgnf	<i>di-</i>	<i>diha</i>	3pl	<i>na-</i>	<i>naha</i>
3sgf	<i>du-</i>	<i>duha</i>			
Impersonal	<i>pa-</i>	<i>paha</i>			

Diagram 1. Verb structure in Tariana

- Prefix
1. Cross-referencing prefixes (A/S_a) (3 persons in singular and in plural), or negative *ma-*, or relative *ka-*
 2. ROOT
 3. Thematic syllable
 4. Causative *-ita*
 5. Reciprocal (rarely: reflexive) *-kaka*
 6. Negative *-(ka)de*
- Suffixes
7. *-ina* ‘almost, a little bit’
 8. Topic-advancing *-ni*, or passive *-kana*, or purposive nonvisual *-hyu* or visual *-karu*
 9. Verbal classifiers
 10. Benefactive *-pena*
 11. Relativizers or nominalizers
 12. Intentional ‘be about to’ =*kasu*
 13. Mood and modality (imperative, declarative, frustrative, conditional, apprehensive, etc)
 14. Aspect ‘zone’ I
 - 14a. Habitual prescribed =*hyuna* ‘what you do and what you ought to do’
 - 14b. Customary =*kape*
 - 14c. Habitual repetitive =*nipe*
 - 14d. Anterior =*nhi*
- Enclitics
15. Evidentiality and tense, e.g. =*mhana* ‘nonvisual-remote.past’
 16. Epistemic =*da* ‘doubt’, =*pada* ‘isn’t it true that’
 17. Aktionsart (manner or extent of associated action, e.g. ‘split open’, ‘step on and feel pain’, ‘wag one’s tail’, ‘away’)
 18. Degree (augmentative (also meaning ‘indeed’), diminutive, approximative (‘more or less’))
 19. Aspect ‘zone’ II
 - 19a. Perfective =*sita* ‘already accomplished’
 - 19b. Prolonged, ongoing =*daka* ‘yet, still’
 - 19c. Repetitive =*pita* ‘once again’
 - 19d. Completive =*niki* ‘totally, completely’
 20. Switch-reference and clause-chaining markers

ery clause. Like most enclitics in Tariana, the tense-evidentiality enclitics frequently – but not always – go onto the predicate; alternatively they may go onto any focussed constituent.

Tariana (like East-Tucanoan languages) distinguishes three tenses in most evidentials: present, recent past and remote past – see Table 2.

Not all moods cooccur with evidentials. Complex predicates express modality-like meanings such as apprehensive, ‘indefinite’ (‘whatever’), admiring (‘surprise’), epistemic (‘probably’); they cooccur with the various evidentials in different ways – we return to this in §5.

As mentioned above, Tariana is spoken in the multilingual area of the Vaupés River basin. This area is known for its institutionalized multilingualism based on the language group exogamy operating between speakers of Tariana and of languages belonging to the East Tucanoan subgroup (including Tucano, Piratapuya, Wanano and Desano). Multilingualism is maintained through a strong inhibition against ‘language mixing’ viewed in terms of using lexical or grammatical morphemes from another language. However, this long-term interaction between East Tucanoan languages and Tariana has resulted in a rampant diffusion of patterns (not so much of forms) and calquing of categories. These include dependent-marking properties (that is, case enclitics for core arguments), classifiers, number marking, aspect, and tense-evidentiality.² Comparison of Tariana with closely related North Arawak languages (Baniwa/Kurripako and Piapoco) helps to distinguish patterns inherited from the protolanguage from those acquired through areal diffusion. Areal diffusion is crucial in establishing the origins of the Tariana evidential system.

The Tariana grammar as used by older and more traditional speakers differs in a number of quite dramatic ways from the structures found with younger and more innovative speakers (see details in Aikhenvald 2001). The main difference lies in the degree of East-Tucanoan influence. Younger people tend to speak mostly Tucano – an East-Tucanoan language which, for a number of historical reasons, is gradually becoming a lingua franca of the area. And innovative speakers tend to introduce new categories and constructions calquing

Table 2. Evidentials and tense in Tariana

	present	recent past	remote past
Visual	<i>-naka</i>	<i>-ka</i>	<i>-na</i>
Nonvisual	<i>-mha</i>	<i>-mahka</i> (from <i>-mha-ka</i>)	<i>-mha-na</i>
Inferred ‘generic’	–	<i>-si-ka</i>	<i>-si-na</i>
Inferred ‘specific’	–	<i>-nihka</i> (from <i>-nhi-ka</i>)	<i>-nhi-na</i>
Reported	<i>-pida</i>	<i>-pida-ka</i>	<i>-pida-na</i>

the patterns of East-Tucanoan languages; these innovations are not employed by more traditional people. The innovations are not as yet established in the language and can be considered instances of on-going change (using the terminology by Tsitsipis 1998:34). They contrast with the contact-induced categories which are fully accepted by speakers of all generations and can be viewed as instances of completed change.

One instance of on-going areally-induced change is the emergence of a fifth evidential term calqued from Tucano by innovative speakers of Tariana – see §2. Another is the treatment of the Tariana impersonal.

Tucano distinguishes between first person inclusive and first person exclusive; traditional Tariana had no such distinction. But younger speakers of Tariana employ the impersonal prefix and the impersonal pronoun in the meaning of inclusive ‘we’. A construction *paha nawiki* (we:inclusive people) ‘us (all the) people’ is often used in general statements about what everyone does, while *waha nawiki* (we:excl people) ‘us the people’ may refer to a group that includes just the speakers, not the addressee (for instance, in dialogues between people and evil spirits). The impersonal prefix can thus have a first person (‘we:inclusive’) reference, and also a non first person reference (‘everyone; one’). Evidentials help disambiguate these two meanings (see §5.2).

2. Organization of the system:

Evidentials in affirmative clauses

In Tariana – just like in any East-Tucanoan language in the Vaupés area – every sentence must contain an indication of how the information was acquired by the speaker: whether they saw the event happen, or heard it, or know about it because somebody else told them, etc. This is achieved through a set of evidential markers fused with tense (see Barnes 1984, 1999; Malone 1988). In Tariana one cannot just say ‘Cecília scolded the dog’. This must be said in one of four ways, depending on the source of information. If one saw Cecília scold the dog, (1) would be appropriate:

- (1) *Ceci tfinu-nuku du-kwisa-ka*
 Cecília dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3SGF-SCOLD-REC.P.VIS
 ‘Cecília scolded the dog’ (I saw it: VISUAL)

If one just heard Cecília shouting at the dog, one would say:

- (2) *Ceci tfinu-nuku du-kwisa-mahka*
 Cecília dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3SGF-SCOLD-REC.P.NONVIS
 ‘Cecília scolded the dog’ (I heard it: NONVISUAL)

If one sees a very unhappy dog (looking abashed and hiding from people), the ‘inferred’ evidential is appropriate. Here, inference is based on general knowledge about how dogs behave.

- (3) *Ceci tfinu-nuku du-kwisa-sika*
 Cecília dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3SGF-SCOLD-REC.P.INFR
 ‘Cecília scolded the dog’ (I inferred it: INFERRED)

And if one learnt the information from someone else, the reported evidential is the only choice:

- (4) *Ceci tfinu-nuku du-kwisa-pidaka*
 Cecília dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3SGF-SCOLD-REC.P.REP
 ‘Cecília scolded the dog’ (I have learnt it from someone else: REPORTED)

That is, traditional Tariana has a C1 type system. Innovative speakers are developing an additional term to match a construction found in Tucano – that is, the system is developing into a different type. This ‘specific inferred’ evidential results from reanalysis of anterior aspect marker *-nhi* and a non-present visual evidential, forming combinations *-nihka* (from *-nhi-ka*) and *-nhina* (from *-nhi-na*) (see §8).³ The ‘specific inferred’ evidential is used to refer to something one has not seen, but which is based on obvious evidence which can be seen. For instance, if one saw angry Cecília with a stick in her hand, and the scared dog running away, one could say (5), as an alternative to (3).

- (5) *Ceci tfinu-nuku*
 Cecília dog-TOP.NON.A/S
du-kwisa-nihka
 3SGF-SCOLD-SPEC.INFR.REC.P. (=ANT+REC.P.VIS)
 ‘Cecília scolded the dog’ (I infer it on the basis of obvious evidence:
 SPECIFIC INFERRED)

The difference between the ‘generic’ inferred (as in (3)) and the ‘specific’ inferred (as in (4)) lies in access to direct evidence of something happening and to the degree of ‘reasoning’ involved. The less obvious the evidence and the more speaker has to rely on reasoning based on general knowledge (or common sense), the greater the chance that the generic inferred will be used (see §3).

3. Semantics and use of evidentials in affirmative clauses

The semantics of evidentials and their main extensions are summarised in Table 3.

Table 3. Semantics of evidentials in Tariana

Term	Information source
Visual – §3.1	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Information obtained through seeing, or data on events which can be observed 2. Events for which speaker takes full responsibility and/or has a personal involvement 3. Generally known (and observable) facts
Nonvisual 'sensory' – §3.2	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Events or states which the speaker has heard, smelt, tasted, or felt but not seen 2. Events or states never seen (but perceived in some other ways, also negative clauses: I did not see) 3. Accidental uncontrollable actions for which no responsibility is taken (hence use with verbs of obligation, feeling, illness, physical processes), as well as with verbs like 'be lost'; actions in dreams, descriptions of uncontrollable actions of evil spirits who cannot be seen but can be felt and heard
Inferred 'generic' – §3.3	Information obtained by reasoning or common sense through observing evidence of an event or a state without directly experiencing it (no present tense)
Inferred 'specific' – §3.3	Information obtained through observing direct evidence of an event or a state (no present tense)
Reported – §3.4	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Information obtained through repetition of information related by someone else 2. A way of 'distancing' oneself from the responsibility 3. Preferred evidential in traditional stories

3.1 Visual evidential

Visual evidentials refer to information obtained through seeing. They are frequently used in pointing things out. The present visual evidential appears in captions for photographs (used as materials for the Tariana literacy workshop organized by the author in 2000). Here and elsewhere evidentials are underlined.

- (6) *hi-naka* *iwi-taku-peni* *talia-seni*
 DEM:ANIM-PRES.VIS salt-point-PL:ANIM Tariana-PL
ha-yakale *duhpani-yakale-naka*
 DEM:INAN-CL:VILLAGE 3SGF+work-CL:VILLAGE-PRES.VIS
 ‘These are the Tariana of Santa Rosa (lit. ‘Point of Salt’)... this is the town
 where she works’ (VISUAL)

Visual evidentials are also used to talk about generally known and observable facts, such as the change of seasons (7).

- (7) *hī* *kuphe ne-ya-naka*
 DEM:ANIM fish 3PL-spawn-PRES.VIS
 ‘(During this month) fish spawn’ (VISUAL)

The visual evidential can be reinforced by lexical explanation (‘I saw it myself’), as in (8). Here, the storyteller used the remote past visual evidential to stress that he had himself seen the stone – one of the traces of the Creator of Manioc – which is still there. The rest of the story is told in remote past reported (normal for a traditional story). This lexical ‘reinforcement’ provides additional evidence in favour of ‘seeing’ as the basic semantics for the visual evidential.

- (8) *di-ruku-i-ta-ka* *diha kainiki-da*
 3SGNF-go.down-caus-caus-sub ART manioc-CL:ROUND
di-wha-na *nu-ka-na* *nuha kasina-misini*
 3SGNF-stay-rem.p.vis 1SG-see-rem.p.vis I now-too
diha-da-nuku
 he-CL:ROUND-top.non.a/s
 ‘Downstream from it (a rapid) there is the manioc stone (VISUAL), I have
 seen this (round object) nowadays, too’ (VISUAL)

Autobiographical stories are told using the visual evidential. An extract from a story about how Raimundo Brito went looking for worms and got bitten by a rat illustrates the opposition between visual and nonvisual. To describe the noise he heard (he could not see what he thought were worms), Raimundo uses nonvisual; nonvisual is also employed to talk about ‘being bitten’ – something that is felt, not seen.

- (9) *haiku-na* *pa:-kena-tuki* *nu-thuka, nu-muru*
 wood-cl:vert one-cl:branch-dim 1SG-break 1SG-stick
nuka-na *nese khameriku na-ni-mhana* *nha*
 1SG+get-rem.p.vis then make.noise 3PL-do-rem.p.nonvis they

katanapiri nese-naku nhupa numa-tha-na
 worms then-TOP.NON.A/S 1SG+grab 1SG+look.for-FR-REM.P.VIS
nese nu-na matja nu-kapi-da i-whida-na-tuki
 then 1SG-Obj good 1SG-hand-CL:ROUND INDEF-head-DER-DIM
niwhã-mhana-niki
 3SGNF+bite-REM.P.NONVIS-CMPL

‘I broke a branch of a tree and stuck (it into the hole) (VISUAL). Then the worms were making a noise (NONVISUAL), then I grabbed (the stick) and looked (for worms) in vain (VISUAL). Then (the rat) bit me right on the tip of my finger.’ (NONVISUAL)

The visual evidential is used when the speaker knows something for a fact, e.g. *karu-ma-naka* (scare-EXC-PRES.VIS) ‘it is very dangerous (to walk in the jungle at night)’. In the mouth of shamans and evil spirits, the visual evidential is associated with their omniscience. Visual and nonvisual evidentials are contrasted in (10): the son of the Creator uses the visual to describe what he could see, and nonvisual to describe what he couldn’t see (but was supposed to):

- (10) *pai mesape-naki ma-keta-de-mahka nuha*
 Dad:VOC turí-CL:BUNDLE NEG-meet-NEG-REC.P.NONVIS I
mawari-mia-ka di-swa
 snake-ONLY-REC.P.VIS 3SGNF-stay
 ‘Dad, I did not find the bundle of turí (NONVISUAL), there is only a snake there’ (VISUAL)

3.2 Nonvisual evidential

The nonvisual evidential is used to talk about things one can hear but not see – as in the second line of (9), or something one can’t see – as in (10), or something one can smell – as in (11).

- (11) *iri puisani-pu-mha*
 blood smell.of.flesh-AUG-PRES.NONVIS
 ‘There is a smell of (human) blood’ (said the evil spirit) (NONVISUAL)

The use of a nonvisual evidential often implies less certainty than the use of visual (see discussion in §3.5).

The nonvisual evidential can be used to describe accidental uncontrollable actions for which no responsibility is taken, e.g. *wa-pika-mahka* (1PL-get.lost-REC.P.NONVIS) ‘we got lost (accidentally)’, and physical states. (12) is a typical way of talking about one’s own sickness.

- (12) *nu-na adaki di-nu-mha-niki*
 1SG-OBJ fever 3SGNF-COME-PRES.NONVIS-CMPL
 ‘I am overcome with fever’ (NONVISUAL)

In (13), from a story where the nasty uncle let the traira fish eat the son of the Creator, the nonvisual evidential is used to downplay the responsibility of the culprit who ‘overlooked’ what had happened. This is an example of how an evidential can be manipulated to tell a lie. See §5.2.

- (13) *ka:cu-ka nuha [nu-a-mahka nu-hña-niki]*
 fear-SUB I 1SG-let-REC.P.NONVIS 1SG-eat-CMPL
 ‘Being scared, I (accidentally) let (the giant fish) eat (your son)’
 (NONVISUAL)

3.3 Inferred evidentials

The innovative Tariana has two inferred evidentials: ‘generic’ and ‘specific’. The ‘generic’ inferred is used to describe an event or a state which the speaker did not observe, but about which they have enough general knowledge or common sense to draw conclusions. The contrast between nonvisual and generic inferred is shown in (14) from the story about a woman who had married an evil spirit; the children from her first marriage decided to kill him by letting him drink poisonous manioc broth. He realises that something is wrong – the broth does not smell right (he comments upon this using a nonvisual evidential), and concludes that it has not been properly cooked (this is marked with an inferred evidential). She answers using the visual evidential – he trusts her, drinks the broth and dies.

- (14) *kesani-ma-mha diha phimaka-kade-sika diha*
 smell-EXC-PRES.NONVIS it ready-NEG-REC.P.INFR it
 [...] *nu-ni-karcu-wani kayu-ka nu-ni nhua*
 1SG-do-PURP.VIS-ABSTR SO-REC.P.VIS 1SG-do I
 ‘It (the broth) has an excessive smell (NONVISUAL), it is (therefore) not
 cooked (INFERRED GENERIC) (he said), [...] I have made it as I always do
 (VISUAL) (she said).’

When Tiago, an indigenous politician, died, the general reaction was: *di-sa-donuku ma:tfi-sika* (3sgnf-spouse-FEM-TOP.NON.A/S bad-REC.P.INFR) ‘it is bad for her (to be left on her own with seven children)’.

The generic inferred is employed in culturally important stories, such as the travels of the Tarianas’ ancestors (who are supposed to have left ‘signs’, such as stones and caves, behind them); it is also used in translations. The specific

inferred is preferred when telling others about the result of one's inferences, as in (15) (a continuation of (9) above).

- (15) *nese inari ma:ʃite di-ña*
 then mucura.rat bad+NCL:ANIM 3SGNF-live
di-wapa-nhina
 3SGNF-wait-SPEC.INFR.REM.P
 'A nasty mucura rat lived there' (SPECIFIC INFERRED)

Neither of the inferred specifications has present tense forms (see §5.1). The nonvisual present forms can be used if one has to make inferences with reference to the present. Once, in the village, we were walking behind a man and couldn't quite see who he was; I asked whether it was Batista, and the answer was *diha-mha* (he-PRES.NONVIS) 'It is him (nonvisual) (we infer it because of his characteristic gait)'.⁷

None of the inferred evidentials have any overtones of doubt or speculation. Specific inference is considered more reliable than generic inference based on reasoning – this goes together with the preference for visually obtained information over any other (if there is a choice).

3.4 Reported evidential

The reported evidential is used for information obtained from someone else. The source of information may be explicitly stated, as in (16), but does not have to be.

- (16) *inarcu puimite-ka ke:ri*
 woman menstruated+NCL:ANIM-SUB moon
ka-sa-do-pidaka pedalia-pe na-sape
 REL-spouse-FEM-REC.P.REP old-PL 3PL-say
 'When a woman menstruates, she has been said to marry the moon, old people say' (REPORTED)

Most stories are told in remote past reported. The typical beginning of a hunting story is:

- (17) *paita-pidana ifiri ka-inu*
 one+NUM.CL:ANIM-REM.P.REP game REL-kill
 'There was one (man), a hunter' (REPORTED)

The reported evidential can be used if one wishes to avoid taking responsibility for the information. In (18), the wife of a man who did not come back from the

jungle tells his friends that he must have been eaten up by the evil spirit. She uses the reported evidential to describe to her husband's friends where he has gone; she does it because she is dubious about the whole business. Since she was there when her husband had gone to the jungle she ought to have used visual evidential; the reported here is a sign of distrust. He did not come back – here she uses visual to describe her own experience; and when mentioning that he must have been eaten up she uses generic inferred: she had not heard (or seen!) him being eaten, and this is the logically obvious thing to have happened to someone who does not return from the jungle.

- (18) *i-kesini* *pune* *ka:-kari* *ka-pida*
 2PL-blood.relative caraná REL+GO-PAST.REL REL+GO-PRES.REP
hyukade-naka *diha* *ñamu* *nihya-sika-niki*
 not.appear-PRES.VIS he evil.spirit 3SGNF+eat-REC.P.INFR-CMPL
di-na
 3SGNF-OBJ
 'Your friend (said that he) went to get caraná palm (from the jungle) (REPORTED). He is not here (VISUAL). The evil spirit has eaten him up (GENERIC INFERRED).'

Tariana speakers have a varied degree of cultural knowledge – this manifested itself very clearly during our work on Tariana place names. Speakers with good cultural knowledge were fully certain about place names and used visual evidentials; those who were not so certain used nonvisual; the least knowledgeable ones used reported. For obscure place names, the responses ranged from (19a) to (19c):

- (19) a. *Manaka-taku-naka hipada nawiki nha*
 açai-point-PRES.VIS stone people they
na-dana-nipe-naka
 3PL-writing-NMLZ-PRES.VIS
 'It is 'Açai-point', there is writing of stone people there (that is, petroglyphs)': VISUAL since the speaker knows it for a fact
- b. *Manaka-taku-mha*
 açai-point-PRES.NONVIS
 'It is 'Açai-point': NONVISUAL since this, younger, speaker is not sure
- c. *Manaka-taku-pida*
 açai-point-PRES.REP
 'It is 'Açai-point': REPORTED since this young speaker does not know; all he does is quote the old man

3.5 How to choose the correct evidential

How is an evidential chosen if one has access to more than one information source? The principles are:

- i. if there is visual evidence, the visual evidential is preferred;
- ii. the nonvisual evidential is preferred if no visual evidence is available;
- iii. the specific inferred is preferred if one can see the ‘proof’ that the action did take place;
- iv. if there is enough evidence to make inference based on common sense or general knowledge, the generic inferred is appropriate.

The reported evidential must be used if the information has been obtained from someone else.

Here is an illustration. In Rafael’s house in Santa Rosa (where we stayed) there was a cuckoo clock which would play a tune on the hour, and a little bird would appear. Inside the room, I was told to say (20), with the visual evidential, to describe this. Since we could see the clock in action, the use of a nonvisual evidential was considered strange.

- (20) *keri-da* *di-rapa-ka-sita*
 sun/moon-CL:ROUND 3SGNF-sing/dance-REC.P.VIS-PFV
 ‘The clock has sung’ (VISUAL)

When one heard the clock from outside the room (without seeing it), the way to describe it was:

- (21) *keri-da* *di-rapa-mahka-sita*
 sun/moon-CL:ROUND 3SGNF-sing/dance-REC.P.NONVIS-PFV
 ‘The clock has sung’ (NONVISUAL)

To say what time it was, one had to say (22a) if one could see the clock; (22b) would be correct for someone outside the room who could hear it (or was not looking at the clock); and (22c) would be correct if we hadn’t heard the tune, for instance, but ‘inferred’ it from counting the number of strokes.

- (22) a. *oito hora-ka-naka*
 eight hour-DECL-PRES.VIS
 ‘It is eight o’clock’ (VISUAL)
- b. *oito hora-ka-mha*
 eight hour-DECL-PRES.NONVIS
 ‘It is eight o’clock’ (NONVISUAL)

- c. *oito hora-ka-sika*
 eight hour-DECL-REC.P.INFR
 ‘It is eight o’clock’ (GENERIC INFERRED)

The preference for visual information – if one has it – accounts for the preferred choice of the specific inferred – rather than the generic inferred – when telling others about one’s inferences (as in (15) above).

Manipulating the choice of evidentials allows speakers to be inventive in telling lies. One can give the right information with a wrong evidential, as in (13); or the wrong information with the correct evidential, as in (23). In this story, a jaguar has actually grabbed a turtle by its foot; however, the smart turtle deceives the jaguar by telling him he had actually grabbed the root of a tree. The turtle uses visual evidential because both participants can see what is happening.

- (23) *awiña i-pari-nuku hipa-naka*
 wacú.tree INDEF-ROOT-TOP.NON.A/S 2SG+grab-PRES.VIS
 ‘You are grabbing the root of a tree (not my leg, as you think)’ (VISUAL)

4. Evidentials in other clause types

Tariana has a three-way evidentiality specification in interrogative clauses. Imperative clauses have just one evidential, while exclamatory clauses do not allow evidentials. Most dependent clauses (that is, complement clauses, relative clauses and subordinate clauses) have no separate tense-evidentiality marking.

4.1 Evidentials in interrogative clauses

Tariana includes a three-way evidential specification in its interrogative marking (like East-Tucanoan languages). The paradigm is given in Table 4.

Yes-no questions do not contain any question word; they are distinguished by rising intonation, and the choice of an evidential. Content questions contain

Table 4. Evidentials and tense in interrogative clauses in Tariana

	present	past	remote past
Visual	<i>-nha</i>	<i>-nihka</i>	<i>-nhina</i>
Nonvisual	<i>-tha, -mha</i>	<i>-mha</i>	<i>(-mhana)</i>
Inferred	–	<i>-sika</i>	<i>-sina</i>

a question word; for innovative speakers the use of evidential is then optional. Traditional speakers do not omit them. The morphemes *-mha* and *-tha* are variants for younger speakers; traditional speakers use just *-tha*.

The use of an evidential in a question presupposes the questioner's assumption about the answerer's source of information. A visual evidential in a question indicates that the person asking assumes the person asked saw the action. Every day in Santa Rosa my Tariana brothers would ask me, on seeing me coming back from the river with a wet towel:

- (24) *pi-pita-nihka* *phia?*
 2SG-bathe-REC.P.VIS.INTER you
 'Have you bathed?' (VISUAL)

Using visual evidential may imply an assumption on the part of the speaker about what the addressee knows. (25) is a question to which (13) is the answer. The Creator – whose son was killed through the criminal negligence of his nasty uncle – is sure that the uncle let the boy be eaten by a fish, and was to blame.

- (25) *nuri* *kani-nihka* *di-a* *diha*
 1SG+SON where-PAST.VIS.INTER 3SGNF-go he
 'My son, where is he gone?' (VISUAL)

The uncle denies his crime by saying (13); but the Creator continues interrogating him using the visual evidential – as in (26). This sounds like an accusation.

- (26) *kwe-nihka* *kay-pi-ni-niki* *phia*
 why-PAST.VIS.INTER thus-2SG-do-CMPL you
 'Why did you do it?' (VISUAL)

Nonvisual interrogatives are used when the speaker presupposes that the addressee does not have access to any visual information. In (27) a present nonvisual interrogative evidential is used in a question about the origin of a peculiar sound.

- (27) *kuite* *yaphini-mha* *kayu pimi:te*
 INTER+CL:ANIM thing-PRES.NONVIS.INTER thus sound+CL:ANIM
 'What thing (that we can't see) could have been making a sound like this?'
 (NONVISUAL)

Inferred evidentials in interrogative clauses are used if the person asking the question assumes that the person being asked has no knowledge whatsoever. When we arrived in Iauaretê (a mission village) after a tiring journey of sev-

eral hours on an overcrowded canoe, it turned out that my classificatory mother Maria was gone, and had hidden the key to the house. The speakers' reaction was:

- (28) *kani-se du-sueta-sika*
 where-LOC 3SGF-stay+CAUS-PAST.INFR.INTER
 'Where on earth has she put it?' (INFERRED)

The preferences for evidentials in interrogative clauses follow similar lines to those in affirmative clauses. A visual evidential presupposes that the addressee has had direct experience; it is the preferred evidential since visual evidence is valued more than any other. However, it may be accusatory – since it implies an assumption on the part of the speaker which the addressee may not agree with (as in (13)). A nonvisual evidential presupposes less direct access to information, while an inferred evidential – which in fact covers any kind of indirect experience – implies that the questioner assumes that the addressee can hardly give an informed answer.

The semantic connotations of evidentials in interrogative clauses are shown in Table 5.

Since asking a question involves making assumptions about the source of the other person's information, it is not culturally appropriate to ask too many questions in Tariana. One asks a question if one is sure the 'responder' can provide the desired information. Otherwise, asking a question may presuppose the 'questioner's' insistence – which is readily interpreted as due to the fact that (s)he suspects that something is wrong.

Table 5. Semantic connotations of evidentials in interrogative clauses

Term	Semantics
Visual	1. You saw something which I also saw, or which I did not see 2. I am sure you know 3. You do know and/or you are responsible for the action: accusation
Nonvisual	1. You haven't seen it (you may have heard it, or smelt it) 2. You may not know 3. You are not really responsible
Inferred	1. You do not have any firsthand information about it 2. You are not knowledgeable (You do not know enough)

4.2 Evidentials in imperatives

Of the nine imperatives in Tariana, only one – secondhand – has an evidential type of meaning. It is marked with the clitic *-pida*, also found in other reported tense-evidentiality specifications (see Table 2). Saying *pi-nu-pida* (2sg-come-IMPV.SEC) means ‘come because somebody told you’.

The secondhand imperative *-pida* can cooccur with other imperative markers, which cannot cooccur with each other.⁴ It easily occurs with the proximate imperative and with the distal imperative, following either marker, e.g. *hi-nuku pi-theta-kada-pida* (DEM:ANIM-TOP.NON.A/S 2sg-correct-DIST.IMPV-IMPV.SEC) ‘correct this (over there) (on her order)’ and *hi-nuku pi-theta-si-pida* (DEM:ANIM-TOP.NON.A/S 2sg-correct-PROX.IMPV-IMPV.SEC) ‘correct this (here, next to the speaker) (on her order)’. This cooccurrence shows that the secondhand imperative may be treated as a category distinct from other imperatives.⁵

4.3 Evidentials in non-affirmative clauses: a summary

We have seen that fewer evidentials are used in questions and in commands than in affirmative clauses. The three different subsystems are summarized in Table 6.

The distinction between reported and inferred evidentials is neutralized in interrogative clauses in Tariana (as well as in East-Tucanoan languages). Evidence for this comes from the ‘conversation sustainer’ question–response pattern. This is the most common strategy for showing a listener’s participation in conversational interaction.

When A (speaker) tells a story, B (listener) is expected to give feedback, after just about every sentence, by repeating the predicate (or the last verb within a serial verb construction) accompanied by an interrogative evidential. These pseudo-questions do not have a question intonation. The existing correspondences are given in Diagram 2.

Table 6. Subsystems of evidentials in Tariana in different clause types

Type of system	Terms in the system	Clause type
traditional: C1 (four term)	Visual, Nonvisual, Inferred, Reported	Affirmative
innovative: five term	Visual, Nonvisual, Inferred ‘generic’, Inferred ‘specific’, Reported	
B2	Visual, Nonvisual, Inferred	Interrogative
A3	Reported (vs everything else)	Imperative

Diagram 2. Evidentials in question–response

A: VISUAL	→	B: VISUAL
A: NON-VISUAL	→	B: NON-VISUAL
A: INFERRED	→	B: INFERRED
A: REPORTED	→	B: INFERRED

A visual–visual pair is illustrated in (30), and a reported–inferred in (31).

- (30) A: *haw di-a-ka*
 OK 3SGNF-say-REC.P.VIS
 ‘He said, “OK”’ (VISUAL)
- B: *di-a-nihka*
 3SGNF-say-PAST.VIS.INTER
 ‘He said it?’ (VISUAL)
- (31) A: *heku-nuku* *du-nu-pidaka*
 yesterday-TOP.NON.A/S 3SGF-COME-REC.P.REP
 ‘She has been said to have come yesterday’ (REPORTED)
- B: *du-nu-sika*
 3SGF-COME-PAST.INFR.INTER
 ‘She is coming?’ (INFERRED)

5. Evidentials and other grammatical categories

In §§5.1–5.4 we consider interactions between evidentials and tense; evidentials and person; evidentials and negation; and evidentials and modalities. There are no restrictions on the cooccurrence of the Tariana evidentials with any of the numerous aspects and aktionsarts. Conditions under which evidentials can be omitted are discussed in §5.5.

5.1 Evidentials and tense

East-Tucanoan languages and Tariana distinguish three tenses in visual and nonvisual evidentials: present, recent past and remote past. These tenses refer to the time when the action or state started and to the time when the information was acquired. Present tense is used for the action or state which has just started and is ongoing; recent past is used for something which started a few minutes to a few days ago, and remote past is used when the action or state started a long time ago – either of these may, or may not, be finished. The clause *itawhya alia-naka* (CANOE EXIST-PRES.VISUAL) means ‘there is a canoe (I can

see it; and/or am pointing at it)', *itawhya alia-ka* (canoe EXIST-REC.P.VISUAL) means 'there has been a canoe', or 'the canoe has been here for a little while' (from few minutes to a couple of days ago), and *itawhya alia-na* (canoe EXIST-REM.P.VISUAL) means 'there was a canoe (I saw it, it is gone now)' or 'there is a canoe (and it has been here for a long while; I can see it and saw it before)'.

Neither of the inferred specifications has present tense.⁶ This makes sense because one can only infer something after it has happened.

The reported evidential differs from other evidentials in that tense specification refers exclusively to the time of the report; the time of the actual happening is irrelevant. (32) was said immediately after we heard a radio message about the untimely death of the indigenous politician Tiago (he had died a few days prior to the message).

- (32) *Tiago di-ñami-pida*
 Tiago 3SGNF-die-PRES.REP
 'Tiago has died'

A couple of days later, another speaker arrived from the mission village; he had learnt the sad news a couple of days prior to his arrival, and said:

- (33) *Tiago di-ñami-pidaka*
 Tiago 3SGNF-die-REC.P.REP
 'Tiago has died'

(34) was said by a speaker who learnt about it a week or so before the time of the utterance.

- (34) *di-ñami-pidana*
 3SGNF-die-REM.P.REP
 'He died'

Present reported is often used like a quotative marker, when something someone just said is repeated. During our work on place names, if I couldn't quite hear the name, José Luis (a younger speaker) would repeat it after his father Cândido using *-pida*, e.g. *manaka-taku-pida* (açai-POINT-PRES.REP) '(the name is) Point of Açai (he says)'.

No evidentials are distinguished in future tense. However, reported evidentials allow a 'double tense' specification whereby one can describe future events reported by someone else. Future nominalizations are used then:

- (35) *du-ñami-karu-pidaka*
 3SGF-die-FUT.NOM-REC.P.REP
 'She was said (a short time ago) to be going to die (in the future)'

- (36) *du-ñami-karu-pidana*
 3SGF-die-FUT.NOM-REM.P.REP
 ‘She was said (a long time ago) to be going to die (in the future)’

We have seen that the reported evidential differs from other evidentials in its tense reference, and in its correlations with clause types: there is no reported specification in interrogative clauses. The reported is unique among other evidentials in that it allows ‘double’ tense marking. These properties indicate separate visual-based and reported-based evidential subsystems in Tariana. There is also diachronic evidence for their separate development: the reported evidential is likely to be inherited from Proto-Arawak, while other evidentials emerged as the result of areal diffusion from Tucano languages. See §8.

5.2 Evidentials and person

There are no special correlations between the use of person and the visual evidential (though, when talking about one’s own experience, the visual evidential is preferred). Nonvisual evidentials are preferred with verbs of mental and physical processes, wanting and feeling, when describing a state experienced by first person subject, as in (37) and in the second clause of (39).

- (37) *nhesi-ci-mha* (nuha)
 like-PRES.NONVIS I
 ‘I like it’ (NONVISUAL)

Nonvisual evidentials are preferred with first person experiencers, as in (12) and (38), and to describe sensations in the speaker’s body parts (39).

- (38) *hape-pu-mha* nu-na
 cold-AUG-PRES.NONVIS 1SG-OBJ
 ‘I am very cold’ (NONVISUAL)
- (39) *nu-sami kai-pu-mha* nu-na-thama⁷ nu-wha
 1SG-back ache-AUG-PRES.NONVIS 1SG-want-FR+PRES.NONVIS 1SG-sit
 ‘My back is aching, I want to sit down’ (NONVISUAL)

Since one cannot ‘feel what the other person feels’, a normal choice for a non-first person subject would be a visual evidential if one can see the signs of a physical or mental state. (40) was used to describe a toddler who liked the way his grandfather was treating him: it was a comment on what one could see.

- (40) *nhesiri-pu-ka diha*
 like-AUG-REC.P.VIS he
 ‘He likes it’ (VISUAL)

Inferred evidential can be used to describe a second or a third person’s feelings if one did not see the person showing any signs of this; but could make inferences. One of the Tariana commented on how I appeared to feel on an overcrowded canoe:

- (41) *wepa-sika duha*
 be.numb(of.limbs)-REC.P.INFR she
 ‘She (that is, her limbs) must be numb’ (INFERRED)

A minute later, Jovino complained (about himself), using nonvisual:

- (42) *wepa-pu-mha nu-a nhua*
 be.numb(of.limbs)-AUG-PRES.NONVIS 1SG-go I
 ‘I (my limbs) are getting very numb’ (NONVISUAL)

Similarly, the nonvisual evidential can be used to describe something that happened accidentally, as in (13). The choice of the visual evidential would imply volition and control on the part of the speaker; in contrast, nonvisual may imply that the action was done ‘accidentally’. If the bad uncle in (13) had said *nu-a-ka* (1sg-let-REC.P.VIS), he would have been assuming full responsibility for his crime.

The first-person-like usage of the nonvisual evidential helps distinguish the two meanings of the impersonal prefix *pa-* and the corresponding impersonal pronoun. When the impersonal is used in the first person inclusive sense, ‘us’, the nonvisual evidential is used with verbs of feeling and wanting, as in (43).

- (43) *yaseni-ku-ne-mia-na pa-sape-hyuna*
 Tucano-DER-INST-ONLY-REM.P.VIS IMP(1ST.INCL)-talk-CUST
kapemani-mhana pha
 feel.shame-REM.P.NONVIS IMPERSONAL(1ST.INCL)
 ‘(We) spoke only Tucano, we felt shame’ (NONVISUAL)

But if the impersonal has a generic non-first person reference, the nonvisual evidential cannot be used to refer to the internal states or feelings; another evidential specification has to be used instead. (44) describes a general fact – and the visual evidential is appropriate here.

- (44) *hiku-naka pa-rena t̄āri*
 thus-PRES.VIS IMP-feel man
 ‘This is how a man feels’ (VISUAL)

The nonvisual evidential occasionally occurs with a second or third person who the speaker is closely observing; this usage implies that the speaker identifies himself with the other person. It is functionally similar to using ‘disjunct’ markers with first person (where conjunct markers would be appropriate), to signal ‘empathy’ or ‘engagement’ with the speaker. (45) was a comment on Jovino’s state: after he had stepped on a nail, he was lying in his hammock exhausted by fever. Everyone seemed to know how he felt.

- (45) *pa-kamia-nipe Juvi-nuku inuna*
 IMP-illness-NMLZ Jovino-TOP.NON.A/S lazy,debilitated
di-ni-mahka
 3SGNF-DO-REC.P.NONVIS
 ‘Illness has made Jovino debilitated’ (NONVISUAL)

Inferred evidentials are used with first person if the first person was unconscious of what was happening to them (and had to make inferences about their situation). I do not have any examples of reported with first person.

5.3 Evidentials and negation

Any evidentiality specification can occur in a negative clause. Nonvisual evidentiality is frequently used to describe what the speaker ‘did not see’, or ‘did not do’ – as in (9). (46) illustrates remote past visual in a negative clause (the use of visual is explained by the fact that the girl was doing this in front of the speaker):

- (46) *kaipeda du-musu kuripua-na dhuma-niki*
 all.the.time 3SGF-go.out not.at.all-REM.P.VIS 3SGF+hear-CMPL
 ‘She had been going out all the time, she had not been listening (to us) at all (and still isn’t)’ (VISUAL)

5.4 Evidentials and modalities

Except for the affirmative, which is unmarked, the declarative-assertive (marked with *-ka*), frustrative (*-tha*) and intentional (*-kasu*) show tense-evidentiality distinctions. The uncertainty marker *-da* and the counterexpectation marker *-pada* can cooccur with any evidential except for present visual. The uncer-

tainty marker with a nonvisual evidential is shown in (47); it occurs with inferred in (48).

- (47) *weperi-pua-se* *di-a-thama-da*
 poison-CL:RIVER-LOC 3SGNF-say-FR+PRES.NONVIS-DOUBT
 ‘He must have said “weperi-pua-se” (but I am not sure I heard it right)’
 (NONVISUAL)
- (48) *aĩ-tha-sika* *na-yaketa-da*
 here-FR-REC.P.INFR 3PL-get.together+CAUS-DOUBT
 ‘It is here that they probably put it’ (said the Eagle who inferred that people
 must have used their plates to store the down they had stolen from him,
 but he was not totally sure) (INFERRED)

The conditional-potential (*-bohta*) bears no evidentiality distinctions. Apprehensive and purposive have a separate system of evidentiality-like meanings, discussed in §§5.4.1–5.4.2.

Tariana has a number of complex predicates with modality-like meanings. Of these, ‘admirative’ – expressing surprise – can occur with any tense-evidentiality specifications. The admirative is expressed with a complex predicate of the following structure: lexical verb plus suffix *-mhe* plus auxiliary verb *-a* ‘go, say, let, give’. Both the lexical verb and the auxiliary receive same subject cross-referencing; no constituent can intervene between the two. (49) describes Olívia’s surprise based on visual evidence. Here and elsewhere complex predicates are in square brackets.

- (49) *Oli yaru-si* *ma-weni-de-ka* [*du-ka-mhe*
 Oli thing-NPOSS NEG-pay-NEG-SUB 3SGF-see-ADM
du-a-ka]
 3SGF-AUX-REC.P.VIS
 ‘Olívia was surprised at things being cheap’ (lit. ‘Olívia, things being
 cheap, looked (at this) in admiration’) (VISUAL)

In (50), an admirative form is marked with nonvisual evidential since it describes the internal feeling of the speaker (cf. §5.2):

- (50) [*hacame-mhe nu-a-mhana*]
 frighten-ADM 1SG-AUX-REM.P.NONVIS
 ‘I could not believe my eyes’ (I was scared in surprise) (NONVISUAL)

An epistemic complex predicate with repetition consists of two occurrences of the same verb with identical cross-referencing without any overt marking of syntactic dependency. Its meaning is ‘maybe, probably’. It can cooccur with any

tense-evidentiality specification except for present visual. The evidential refers to the way the information on the event was acquired. If one cannot see what is happening, (51) is appropriate:

- (51) [*tarada tarada-mha*] *ma-yekana-de-mha*
 alive alive-PRES.NONVIS NEG-KNOW+PASS-NEG-PRES.NONVIS
 ‘It is not known whether he (a drunk lying in the street) is alive or not’
 (NONVISUAL)

In (52) the evidence is visible to the people – who have doubt only as to how to interpret it.

- (52) *hī* [*di-pe-ka-nhi* *di-pe-sita*]
 DEM:ANIM 3SGNF-leave-REC.P.VIS-ANT 3SGNF-leave-PFV
 ‘He must have left (the house and the utensils) already’ (said the people
 who saw the house and the utensils left behind by the otter) (VISUAL)

And if one has enough general evidence to make an inference, a generic inferred would be appropriate. Rafael used to boast about being able to cure coughs by blessing. After one of his children actually stopped coughing, others commented incredulously:

- (53) *kwe di-a* [*di-ñapa* *di-ñapa-sina*]
 how 3SGNF-say 3SGNF-bless 3SGNF-bless-REM.P.INFR
ma-yekade-mha
 NEG-KNOW+NEG-PRES.NONVIS
 ‘Whether he (Rafael) had done the blessing or not, (we) don’t know’
 (INFERRED)

The ‘indefinite’ complex predicate (meaning ‘whatever’) also combines with any evidential except for present visual. Such a predicate has the following structure: subordinator *kani* ‘where’ or *kwe* ‘how’ followed by two occurrences of the same verb. Just as in the case of epistemic complex predicates, the choice of evidential depends on the information on which the statement is based. Rafael said (54), when asked about his whereabouts the previous night. He obviously had visual information on where he had danced (but was not prepared to tell).

- (54) [*kani nu-rapa* *nu-rapa-ka*]
 where 1SG-dance 1SG-dance-REC.P.VIS
 ‘Wherever I danced I danced (and this is none of your business)’ (VISUAL)

Complex predicates of this kind are frequently used with non-visual evidentials, if one has no visual information. In (55), the speaker has no idea about where his sister is – but she must be somewhere.

- (55) [*kani alia alia-mha*]
 where EXIST EXIST-PRES.NONVIS
 ‘She must be somewhere (but I don’t know where she is)’ (NONVISUAL)

The inferred evidential is appropriate if there is sufficient reason to make an inference. Maria used to hide the key to the house whenever she went out for the whole day; she never lost it. This is good enough reason for an inference – she must have put the key somewhere, but we don’t know where.

- (56) [*kani du-sue du-sue-ta-sika*]
 where 3SGF-lie+CAUS 3SGF-lie+CAUS-CAUS-REC.P.INFR
 ‘She must have put (the key) somewhere (but we have no idea where)’
 (INFERRED)

The cooccurrences between various modalities and evidentiality in Tariana discussed throughout this section – and summarized in Table 7 – show that evidentiality and modalities, especially epistemic ones, are plainly different categories. Present visual appears to be the specification having the most restrictions on its cooccurrence with meanings related to uncertainty, doubt and so on. Presumably this has to do with the intrinsic certainty of immediately available visual evidence.

We will now turn to two further modalities which distinguish evidentiality-type meanings of different kinds, forming special subsystems within the language.

Table 7. Cooccurrence of evidentials with modalities in Tariana

Modality	Evidentiality specifications used
Non-future indicative	all specifications
Declarative-assertive <i>-ka</i>	all specifications
Intentional <i>-kasu</i>	all specifications
Frustrative <i>-tha</i>	all specifications
Uncertainty <i>-da</i>	all except present visual
Counterexpectation <i>-pada</i>	all except present visual
Conditional <i>-bohta</i>	none
Admirative	all
Epistemic ‘probably’	all except present visual
Indefinite ‘whatever’	all except present visual

5.4.1 Evidentiality meanings in the apprehensive

The apprehensive (‘lest something happen’) does not combine with any tense-evidentiality markers. Instead, it has its own evidential-type distinctions. The enclitic *-ñhina* marks ‘nonvisual apprehensive’: it implies that, according to the speaker, the addressee cannot see what he or she is doing, or the speaker cannot see what the addressee is doing. Someone who is walking in front can say to a person behind them who might be not cautious enough:

- (57) *nu-pumi pi-pinita mēda pi-wha-ñhina*
 1SG-after 2SG-follow however 2SG-fall-APPR.NONVIS
 ‘Do follow me, or else you might fall down (you are not looking)’

The visual apprehensive *-da* is used if both the speaker and the addressee can see what is happening:

- (58) *matʃa pi-ni pi-wha-da*
 good 2SG-do 2SG-fall-APPR.VIS
 ‘Be careful, lest you fall (we can both see what is happening)’

The apprehensive complex predicate, of the structure VERB-*da* say-SUBORDINATOR-*ka*, is employed if the speaker does not have firsthand information (then the warning is typically attributed to a third person). Or the danger could be common knowledge, as in (59): one does not have to see whether it is raining or not to know that the road will become slippery and one can fall down.

- (59) *iya di-wha-ka matʃa pi-ni [pi-wha-da nu-a-ka]*
 rain 3SGNF-fall-SUB good 2SG-do 2SG-fall-APPR 1SG-say-SUB
 ‘When it is raining, be careful, lest you fall, I am saying’

The three-term evidentiality-like distinction in apprehensive is a subsystem separate from evidentiality in other clause types. Cross-linguistically, a visual versus nonvisual opposition in apprehensives appears to be rare. A similar distinction is attested in Nivkh (isolate) (Gruzdeva 1992:60).

5.4.2 Evidentiality meanings in purposives

Purposive verb forms in Tariana mark the predicate of purpose clauses and of complement clauses for some verbs. Purposives cannot take the tense-evidentiality marking discussed in the main part of this paper. Instead, they distinguish visual and nonvisual. The visual purposive *-karu* is illustrated in (60), and the nonvisual purposive *-hyu* in (61).

- (60) *wasā tarada-peni wehta-karu wa*
 let's.go alive-PL:ANIM 1PL+take-PURP.VIS 1PL+go
 'Let's go and get the living ones (fish) (we can see them)'
- (61) *tarada-peni duhta-hyu du-a-pidana*
 alive-PL:ANIM 3SGF+take-PURP.NONVIS 3SGF-go-REM.P.REP
 'She went to get the living ones (fish) (she cannot see them and they may not be there)'

5.5 Omission of evidentials

Tense-evidentiality marking is usually obligatory: for every sentence, tense and evidentiality should be specified. However, tense-evidentiality can sometimes be omitted. Firstly, if the time-and-evidence frame has been set in the previous clause, the whole sentence can receive just one marker – as is the case in (46). Here, the first clause 'she goes out all the time' does not have any tense-evidentiality: the remote past visual marking goes onto the second clause. The two clauses form one sentence – this is marked through a fall-rise intonation on the predicate of the first clause.

Tense-evidentiality marking can be omitted in short answers, as shown in (62). (Incidentally, *haw* 'OK, yes' and *hāida* 'I don't know' do not take any evidentiality markers; Tariana has no word for 'no'.) Note that a more elaborate answer requires tense-evidentiality – as in (63).

- (62) *kwe pi-ni-ka-hna phia? ma-ni-kade*
 what 2SG-do-DECL-PRES.VIS.INTER you NEG-do-NEG
 'What are you doing?' (asked the jungle woman) 'Nothing (in particular)'
 (lit. 'do not do') (said the man)
- (63) *nuhpani-ka-naka*
 1SG+work-DECL-PRES.VIS
 'I am working' (VISUAL)

6. Evidentiality strategies

As often happens in large evidentiality systems, there are no evidentiality strategies as such: that is, no category acquires the meaning of source of information as an additional sense. We saw in §5.4 that modalities with the meaning of uncertainty or doubt do not have any evidential meanings by themselves; how-

ever, most of them can combine with all the evidentials except for the present visual. There are other ways of saying ‘maybe’ – one is a clause-like complex predicate *pa:pe -ni-* (maybe do) ‘possibly’ used to conjecture future events. If one is talking about one’s opinion, an expression *nuha nu-hmeta-ri-nuku* (I 1sg-thin-REL-TOP.NON.A/S) ‘to my mind, in my thinking’ can be added: this expression is often used with nonvisual and inferred evidentials.

The ‘lexical reinforcement’ of evidentiality – illustrated in (8) – provides metalinguistic justification for associating evidentiality markers with particular sources of evidence. Frequently, if a speaker did see something and tells a story about it in visual evidential, but then realizes that their audience is a bit incredulous, they may choose strengthen their ‘visual source’ by saying ‘I saw it’. The following example comes from a story told by the oldest living speaker of Tariana about a ritual no-one else has seen but him.

- (64) *nha aŋa-mia, ina-nuku na-musu-ita-thui*
 they men-ONLY women-TOP.NON.A/S 3PL-go.out-CAUS-all
na:-niki ina: ma-ka-kade-na, mayakani-ya nha
 3PL+go-CMPL women NEG-see-NEG-REM.P.VIS straight-CONF they
kayu na-ni-ka, nu-ka-na
 thus 3PL-do-SUB 1SG-see-REM.P.VIS
 ‘There (were) only men, they drove women away, women did not see (the flutes), done in a correct way. I saw them do it’ (VISUAL)

Along similar lines, nonvisual information could be reinforced by verbs like *-hima* ‘hear, feel’, or *-himeta* ‘think, feel (sad, etc)’. The verb *-anihta* ‘think, be able to reason’ describes inferences; and a ‘lexical reinforcement’ for reported is ‘this is what people told me/us’.

7. Evidentials, semantic types of verbs and discourse

We have seen that verbs of feeling and wanting require nonvisual evidentials with first person, and visual or inferred with other persons. The choice of evidentials may contribute to a differentiation of lexical meanings of some, polysemous, verbs. The verb *-mañe* means ‘get something wrong, forget’ and also ‘tell a lie, cheat’. If used with a visual evidential, it most likely will mean ‘tell a deliberate lie’ – who would ever get something wrong on purpose? So, when an evil spirit says (65) to a man (who breached a taboo: he went hunting on a Good Friday!), he is plainly accusing the man of telling a lie:

- (65) *pi-mañe-ka-naka* *phia nu-na*
 2SG-get.wrong,lie-DECL-PRES.VIS you 1SG-OBJ
 ‘You are lying to me’ (saying that you did not know today was Good
 Friday) (VISUAL)

The verb *-himeta* means ‘think; say something in one’s mind; feel (sad, scared, etc)’. When used with nonvisual evidentials and first person it necessarily refers to ‘feeling’; and when used with visual evidentials, it is normally interpreted as referring to ‘talking to oneself in one’s mind’, cf. *kawalikupeda nuhmeta-mhana* (sorry 1sg+feel,think-REM.P.NONVIS) ‘I felt sorry’ and *nu-kale-se nuhmeta-na* (1sg-heart-LOC 1sg+feel,think-REM.P.VIS) ‘I thought, saying to myself’.

The choice of evidential has to do with the genre of a narrative. Visual evidentials are used in accounts of one’s own experience. Reported evidentials are used in folk tales and traditional stories. Generic inferred is used in stories which relate important mythological events that are known to have left tangible traces in the surrounding landscape. One such instance is the movements of the Tariana ancestors within the Vaupés area: their traces are there in the form of stones, rapids, and caves. (See Ramirez 1997: 140, on a similar usage of evidentials in Tucano.) No full narrative is ever told using just the nonvisual or the specific inferred.

8. The origin of evidentials

Complex evidentiality systems are a salient feature of the East Tucanoan languages, and of the Vaupés linguistic area as a whole. Tariana is unique among North Arawak languages in having an elaborate evidentiality system. The Tariana evidentials are strikingly similar to the evidentials in East Tucanoan languages, especially in Tucano (see Aikhenvald 2002b).

Data from related Arawak languages indicate that, before the intensive language contact with the East-Tucanoans, Tariana was likely to have had an optional reported evidentiality specification, marked with the clitic *-pida* (which is still used as the only evidential in Baniwa, an Arawak language closely related to Tariana but spoken outside the Vaupés area).

After Tariana came in contact with East-Tucanoan languages, the existing optional tense and mood system was reanalyzed as obligatory tense-marking: the past/perfective *-na* was reanalyzed as a remote past marker, and the erstwhile declarative *-ka* as recent past marker. The unmarked form was reanalyzed as present.

The existing reported specification, *-pida*, came to be reanalyzed as having unmarked present reference. The newly evolved tense markers were added to it.

The generic inferred arose as the result of reanalysis of a dubitative marker, *-si-ka* (used as a marker of doubt and speculation in Piapoco, another Arawak language closely related to Tariana but spoken outside the Vaupés area in Colombia).

The nonvisual evidential developed via grammaticalization of a verb of nonvisual perception, *-hima* ‘hear, feel, seem, perceive’. The visual specification remained formally unmarked.

The recent development of specific inferred involves reanalysis of the Tariana anterior marker *-nhi* (which many younger people pronounce as *-ni*) in combination with the visual evidential. This reanalysis is based on an analogy with a homophonous ‘look-alike’ used in a complex specific inferred construction in Tucano. Such a construction in Tucano involves a nominalization and the auxiliary *nî* ‘do; be’ which takes any visual evidential specification (see West 1980:75–76; Ramirez 1997:140–141, 291–292), as in (66), the Tucano version of (5):

- (66) *Ceci diâyî-re tu'tî-'kî nî-amo*
 Cecília dog-TOP.NON.A/S scold-FEM.SG be-REC.P.VIS+3SGF
 ‘Cecilia scolded the dog’ (I infer it on the basis of obvious evidence)

The system of evidentials in Tariana is etymologically heterogenous – different specifications come from different sources. The origin of interrogative evidentials requires further investigation.

9. Evidentials and cultural attitudes

As I stated in the Position paper for the Workshop, the existence of evidentials in a language presupposes a certain requirement for explicitly stating the source of information, and may go together with certain cultural attitudes and practices.

Speakers’ metalinguistic discourse in the form of comments on the source of information demonstrates awareness of evidentials and their psychological reality. Speakers of Tariana and of Tucano usually comment on how one has to be precise concerning how one ‘knows’ something in their languages; according to them, translations into Portuguese come out as vague and ‘reduced’.

The use of evidentials correlates with cultural stereotypes and with conventionalized attitudes to information. Visual evidentials are associated with

‘omniscience’. Shamans and evil spirits have access to supernatural knowledge and ‘know it all’. They speak using the visual evidential; and the visual evidential is appropriate while talking about their knowledge. Jovino said (67) about the Wanano shaman, Jesús.

- (67) *thui matʃa di-ka-na*
 all well 3SGNF-see-REM.P.VIS
 ‘He (the shaman) sees everything well’ (VISUAL)

Facts which appear in shamanic visions – believed to be the most reliable source of information – are told using the visual evidential, as in the following example which relates a dream of a shaman who ‘knows it all’ with his power. In this case, visual evidential is used to describe the actions of an evil spirit which cannot be ‘seen’ otherwise’ (see below).

- (68) *ne ta:pulí-se di-ká-pidana-sita*
 then dream-LOC 3SGNF-see-REM.P.REP-PFV
wa-hwe-ri-ne ikasu-nuku masi-pu-naka
 1PL-grandparent-MASC-FOC.A/S NOW-TOP.NON.A/S bad-AUG-PRES.VIS
díha, páita nawiki di-na-naka
 he one+NUM.CL:ANIM person 3SGNF-OBJ-PRES.VIS
dhita-niki díha
 3SGNF+take-CMPL he
 ‘Then he (the shaman) saw (REPORTED: the evidential of the whole story) in his dream (which he told his wife): “Our grandfather is in a bad way right now (VISUAL), a man is taking him away (VISUAL).”’

In contrast, dreams by ordinary people are told using nonvisual evidential:

- (69) *nu-we-do-nuku Lurde-nuku*
 1SG-younger.sibling-FEM-TOP.NON.A/S Lurdes-TOP.NON.A/S
tapulisa-mahka nhua
 dream-REC.P.NONVIS I
 ‘I have dreamt about my younger sister, about Lurdes’ (NONVISUAL)

Supernatural actions of evil spirits are described using ‘nonvisual’ evidentials – as in (70), from a story about what had happened in the jungle. The nonvisual remote past tense is used to refer to what the evil spirit had done to the two speakers (he nearly killed them); the visual remote past refers to what they did.

- (70) *amaku-pe wa-tutu wema-na wa-na*
 hammock-PL 1PL-tie 1PL+sleep/close.eye-REM.P.VIS 1PL-OBJ
kayu-mhana di-ni ñamu
 thus-REM.P.NONVIS 3SGNF-do evil.spirit
 ‘We tied our hammocks and went to sleep (VISUAL), this was what the evil
 spirit had done to us’ (NONVISUAL)

New insights on evidentials could be obtained from the ways in which evidentials are used to describe newly emerging cultural practices. One such practice is reading. Literate Tariana speakers tend to use inferred – rather than reported evidential – when retelling stories they have just read, when translating Catholic prayers, or acting as Bible translators during church services. This is because the proof of the validity of the information can be seen as printed in the book.

We can recall that the reported evidential may have a connotation of ‘unreliability’ of information; this may explain why inferred is preferred in translations. However, in written translations of sacred texts – such as the Sunday service – descriptions such as ‘Jesus Christ is among us’ or ‘Jesus Christ is good’ are cast in visual. I did not dare ask questions about this: it is quite possible that statements of this sort are taken to be generally true facts (since all the Tariana, at least on the surface, are devout Catholics). But I suspect that there could be a certain influence of the tradition of translating Catholic texts into Tucano using visual evidentials – the Tariana who insisted that the prayers be translated into the Tariana language had access to the Tucano translation.

I have been able to observe Tariana speakers talking about what they had seen on television – they considered it equivalent to real seeing and believed everything they saw, and so the visual evidential was used. When a few speakers had talked on the phone (in Portuguese, refusing to use either Tariana or Tucano in this context) they described what they heard with nonvisual.

This precision of the source of one’s statement goes together with a tendency to avoid assumptions about evidence that other people might have. Evidentials in Tariana do have a number of epistemic extensions – this also makes interpreting other people’s sources of information more complex. This may (at least partly) explain the cultural inappropriateness of asking questions (see §4.1).

The Tariana use yet another strategy to avoid interpreting other people’s sources of information. When reporting what someone else had said, the preferred strategy is a direct speech complement. This means that the speaker can avoid making a choice of an evidential for another person and run the risk of

undesired implications as to ‘validation’ of the other person’s evidence. Thus, instead of saying, ‘he is coming-reported’, the speaker would prefer saying ‘he said: I am coming-visual’.

Such attitude to information may be related to the fact that in Amazonian society it is held that there is an explicit cause (most often, sorcery) for everything that happens. So as not to be blamed for something that in fact they had no responsibility for, a speaker is careful always to be as explicit as possible about what they have done. This relates to the desirability of stating the evidence for everything that is said, visually obtained information being the most valuable.

An additional observation concerns emergent marking of evidence in Portuguese – the contact language in the Vaupés.

The majority of the Tariana speak Portuguese (only a very few old people claim that they don’t). Portuguese has no evidentiality. But the speakers of Vaupés Portuguese ‘make up’ for this obvious gap by using an array of lexical strategies for different evidentiality specifications. Statements referring to information obtained visually is usually accompanied by a phrase *eu vi* ‘I saw’. The expression *eu tenho prova* ‘I have proof’; or, more rarely, *eu tenho experiência* (‘I have experience’) can be used to ‘replace’ visual or specific inferred. Information obtained by hearing or by other sensory experience can be accompanied by *eu escutei* ‘I heard’ or *eu senti* ‘I felt’. The way of marking inferred information is by saying *parece* ‘it appears, it seems’. And *diz que* ‘it is said that’ is a conventional way of marking reported information.

The use of these expressions makes Vaupés Portuguese sound somewhat obsequious and hedging; and is often judged as weird by monolingual Brazilians from other areas. In Tariana, inferred evidentiality is used in translations and in rendering of what one has just read. But it does sound bizarre to native speakers of Standard Portuguese when an Indian who has just read an announcement about a football match in the Mission centre says: ‘There is a football match on, it appears’.

The phenomenon of transference of evidentiality-type distinctions from one language to another has been documented. In the English spoken by the Yavapai and Paiute, ‘they say’ is effectively used to cover non-firsthand evidentiality specifications obligatory in the two languages (Bunte & Kendall 1981). In the Portuguese of the Vaupés area, *diz que* ‘it is said’ can also be extended to cover all non-firsthand evidentiality specifications. Thus, an Indian who has read an announcement, may just as well talk about it using *diz que* (which sounds equally bizarre for speakers of Standard Portuguese; since for them this

conveys a tinge of incredulity). Thus, the evidentials have made their way even into the contact language – albeit in a roundabout fashion.

We conclude that Tariana combines a number of evidentiality subsystems – C1 or D1 in affirmative clauses; B2 in interrogative clauses and also in apprehensives (albeit with unrelated marking), A3 in imperative, and A1 in purposive. Is this the largest possible number of evidential subsystems a language can have?

Notes

1. Tariana is currently spoken by about 100 people in two villages, Santa Rosa (also known as Juquirá-ponta, lit. ‘Point of Salt’) and Periquitos, on the upper Vaupés. Language loss is more advanced in Santa Rosa. The two dialects are mutually intelligible (the difference is comparable to that between British English and American English; or Portuguese as spoken in Portugal and as spoken in Brazil). I have been working on Tariana since 1991, with over 90% of the speakers of Santa Rosa dialect, and with 70% of those from Periquitos. My corpus contains over 200 stories (about 1500 pages), and also conversations and wordlists. A detailed grammatical description is Aikhenvald (in press); Aikhenvald (2002a) is a dictionary. The fieldwork on which this paper was based was financed by a Wenner Gren Foundation Small Grants project. I owe a considerable debt to all my teachers of the Tariana language: the Brito family of Santa Rosa and the Muniz family of Periquitos. Special thanks go to R.M.W. Dixon, David Beck and all the participants of the Workshop on Evidentiality for insightful comments, and to Elias and Lenita Coelho de Assis for invaluable support in the fieldwork situation. I am grateful to Anya Woods for editorial assistance.
2. A detailed study of the Vaupés linguistic area and patterns of areal diffusion there can be found in Aikhenvald (2002b); also see Aikhenvald (1996; 1999a, b).
3. Older people rarely use this construction. The anterior marker *-nhi* and the specific inferred evidentials can cooccur, in younger people’s speech.
4. The other imperatives are: simple (unmarked) *-Ø*; proximate (‘do here’) *-si*; distal (‘do there’) *-kada*; postponed (‘do some time later’) *-wa*; detrimental (‘do to your own detriment’) *-tupe*; conative precative (‘please try and do’) *-thara*; cohortative (‘let’s do’) *-da*; and polite suggestion (‘please do’) *-nha*.
5. Like most evidential specifications, the secondhand imperative is a calque from Tucano. However, unlike Tariana, the Tucano secondhand imperative marker *-ato* has no connection with any of the evidentiality-tense paradigms (cf. Ramirez 1997: 146), while the secondhand imperative marker *-pida* in Tariana is found throughout the reported evidential paradigm. I return to this in §8.
6. This is also true of the equivalent of the Tariana ‘generic inferred’ in Tucano.
7. Following a phonological rule (similar to Grassmann’s law), the sequence of enclitics *-tha* + *-mha* becomes *-thama*.

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Evidentiality in Jarawara*

R. M. W. Dixon

Evidentiality is marked at three different places within the predicate in Jarawara: (i) a distinction between ‘eyewitness’ and ‘non-eyewitness’ is fused with the three past tenses; (ii) there is a ‘reported’ suffix; and (iii) there is a secondary verb (a kind of auxiliary) with the meaning ‘it seems, it appears’ or ‘I think, I guess’. The non-eyewitness immediate past suffix also has a mirative sense.

The three types of evidential marking are dealt with one at a time, with discussion of their meanings, origin (where known), and interrelations both with each other and with other grammatical categories. But we first need to present some basic information about the language and its grammatical profile.

1. Introduction

The small Arawá family of southern Amazonia (quite distinct from Arawak) consists of five extant languages – Dení, Kulina, Sorowahá, Paumarí and Madi (see Dixon 1999). The Madi language consists of three closely related dialects: Jamamadí (with about 190 speakers), Banawá (about 80 speakers) and Jarawara (about 150 speakers, spread over eight jungle villages). The description of Jarawara given here is based on materials gathered in the course of six field trips, during 1991–1999.

This is a highly synthetic language, basically agglutinative but with developing fusion (particularly in the gender-marking forms of inalienably possessed nouns – see Dixon 1995).

Jarawara is head-marking, with the predicate including obligatory pronouns for S in an intransitive and for A and O in a transitive clause (3sg is always marked by zero). The only obligatory element in a clause is the predicate. It may optionally be preceded by core NPs marking the S argument (in an intransitive clause) and the A and/or O arguments (in a transitive clause);

note that A and O NPs do not occur in a fixed order. Peripheral NPs and subordinate clauses are placed on the fringe of a clause, either at the beginning or at the end.

Each free noun is either masculine (m) or feminine (f). Feminine is the functionally unmarked term in this gender system; for example, all non-zero pronouns are cross-referenced by f, irrespective of the sex of their referent(s). Pronouns distinguish 1st, 2nd and 3rd person; singular (sg) and non-singular (nsg) number; and inclusive (incl) versus exclusive (excl) within 1nsg. There is no gender marking on pronouns.

Verbs are classified according to two independent parameters – transitivity, and whether they are inflecting or non-inflecting. Slightly more than one-third of verbs are inflecting, and take their own prefixes and suffixes. The remainder are non-inflecting, and must be followed by an auxiliary (*-na-* for the majority of non-inflecting verbs, *-ha-* for just a few) to which prefixes and suffixes are added. Compare:

- | | |
|--|---|
| (1) <i>o-fimi-ara</i>
1SGS-be.hungry-IPEF
'I was hungry' | (2) <i>toho o-na-hara</i>
cough 1SGS-AUX-IPEF
'I coughed' |
|--|---|

In (1) 1sg prefix *o-* and immediate past eyewitness feminine suffix *-hara* attach to the inflecting verb root, *-fimi-* (the *-h-* of *-hara* drops by application of a phonological rule), whereas in (2) they attach to the auxiliary *-na-* of the non-inflecting verb *toho*.

The auxiliary *-na-* is omitted from the auxiliary constituent when certain combinations of suffix and prefix occur (details are in Dixon 2002). This happens in examples (5a), (20b) and (47) below.

1.1 Predicate structure

The predicate is the most complex part of the grammar of Jarawara. We can recognise 11 types of elements. They are shown, in order, in Table 1. Note that all the pronouns in slot A are separate words, as are the nsg pronouns in slots B and H, and the secondary verbs in slot I. The forms in slot C are prefixes and those in slots F, G, J and K are suffixes. The verb thus has six possible prefixes, in three positions, and at least 80 suffixes, organised into about 24 positions. Note that all suffixes are optional.

Most suffixes and one of the secondary verbs have distinct f and m forms. These agree in gender with S in an intransitive clause and with either A or O in a transitive clause (details of the rather complex rules determining this choice

Table 1. Predicate structure

A	First pronominal slot; obligatory in all transitive clauses – marks O;
B	Second pronominal slot; obligatory – marks S or A;
C	Prefixes:
C1	First prefix position: one of 1sg S/A <i>o-</i> , 2sg S/A <i>ti-</i> (both transferred from slot B); marker of transitive clause type called O-construction, <i>hi-</i> ; or <i>to-</i> ‘away’;
C2	Second prefix position: applicative <i>ka-</i> ;
C3	Third prefix position: causative <i>na-</i> (on verb), <i>niha-</i> (on auxiliary);
D	Verb root, inflecting or non-inflecting (predicate head) – obligatory;
E	Auxiliary – obligatory if verb is non-inflecting;
F	Miscellaneous suffixes: about 55 organised into six echelons (with one to five ordered positions within each echelon), e.g. ‘upriver’, ‘do all night’, ‘also’, negator – all optional;
G	Tense-modal suffixes: three past tenses (immediate past (IP), recent past (RP), and far past (FP), each portmanteau with an evidentiality specification, eyewitness (e) or non-eyewitness (n)); and five modalities (future, intentional, hypothetical, irrealis, reported) – all optional (either one or two can be shown);
H	Third pronominal slot, repeating information about S in an intransitive, and about A or O in a transitive clause; filled according to certain rules (see Dixon 2000);
I	Secondary verb: <i>ama/ama</i> ‘extended in time’ or <i>awine/awa</i> ‘seems, I think’ – optional;
J	Mood: declarative (<i>-ke/-ka</i>), backgrounding, four imperatives, two interrogatives, etc. – optional;
K	Post-mood suffixes: a number of tense-modal forms (from slot G) and negation (from slot F) can follow mood, under particular circumstances.

are in Dixon 2000). Suffixes are quoted with f form first, then /, then m form; for example, immediate past eyewitness is *-hara/-hare*, showing the allomorphs *-hara* for f and *-hare* for m agreement.

The slots that concern us in a study of evidentiality are G, with tense-modal suffixes (discussed in §2 and §3), and I, with secondary verbs (discussed in §4).

2. Eyewitness/non-eyewitness fused with past tenses

Slot G (the tense-modal suffixes) includes six terms which combine information about past tense and about evidentiality; these are shown in Table 2. Immediate past (IP) is used to describe something which happened between a few seconds and a few months ago, recent past (RP) covers the time from a few months to a few years ago, while far past (FP) extends from a few years ago back to the creation of the world. Note that the initial *-hV-* part of each tense-modal suffix is omitted under certain conditions by phonological rules (or just the initial *-h-* may be, as in (1)).

Table 2. Forms of past-tense/evidentiality suffixes

	feminine (f)	masculine (m)
immediate past eyewitness (IPe)	-(ha)ra	-(ha)re
recent past eyewitness (RPe)	-(ha)ro	-(hi)ri
far past eyewitness (FPe)	-(ha)maro	-(hi)mari
immediate past non-eyewitness (IPn)	-(ha)ni	-(hi)no
recent past non-eyewitness (RPn)	-(he)te	-(hi)ta
far past non-eyewitness (FPn)	-(he)mete	-(hi)mata

2.1 Meanings

The meanings of the eyewitness (e) and non-eyewitness (n) evidentiality values are fairly clear. Anything that the speaker witnessed (in real life or in a dream) will be described by e; otherwise n must be used. The most commonly used suffixes are FPn, RPe and IPe. Traditional stories which have been handed down by word of mouth are always in FPn; and, generally, things located in the far past are less likely to have been witnessed than more recent events – as a consequence, there are many less FPe than FPn in the corpus collected. More recent events that are talked about have most often been witnessed – we find about twice as many instances of IPe as of IPn and far more RPe than RPn.

A typical conversation went as follows:

- (3) a. *jomee_A tiwa na-tafi-no awa?*
 dog(m) 2SGO CAUS-wake-IPnm SEEMM
 ‘Does it appear that the dog wakened you?’
 b. *owa na-tafi-are-ka*
 1SGO CAUS-wake-IPem-DECLM
 ‘It did waken me.’

In the question ‘Did the dog waken you?’, non-eyewitness tense is used since the interlocutor did not himself hear or see the dog, but was just told about it. The reply uses an eyewitness tense since the speaker did hear (or see) the dog. Compare this with (4) where a sleeper was not wakened by the noise of singing and so uses a non-eyewitness tense:

- (4) [*mee jowiri ni*]_O *o-mita-ra-hani o-ke*
 3NSG sing AUX+COMPL.CL 1SGA-hear-NEGATIVE-IPnf 1SG-DECLf
 ‘I didn’t hear their jowiri-style singing (in the night, when I was asleep).’

Note that the O argument of (4) is a complement clause (shown in square brackets) ‘their jowiri singing’.

Interestingly, going to sleep takes n evidentiality, as in (5a), while waking up takes the e value, as in (5b) and in the causative in (3b). Note that (5a) and (5b) are consecutive clauses in a text.

- (5) a. *amo o-waha-ni o-ke waha*
 sleep 1SGS-NEXT.THING-IPnf 1SG-DECLf NEXT.THING
 ‘The next thing was I fell asleep.’
- b. *manakobisa [jama_S siri-maki jaa]*
 LATER thing(f) be.cold-FOLLOWING+NOMINALISATION AT
o-tafi-ara o-ke
 1SGS-wake-IPef 1SG-DECLf
 ‘Later, when it was cold (in the middle of the night) I woke up.’

Within a single sentence there can be one clause in n and another in e evidentiality. For example:

- (6) *Weros kisa-me-no, ka-me-hiri-ka*
 name(m) get.down-BACK-IPnm be.in.motion-BACK-RPEm-DECLM
 ‘Wero got down from his hammock (which I didn’t see), and went out
 (which I did see).’

Wero had been asleep. He must have descended from his hammock (the narrator infers that this happened, although he did not see it) and then went out of the house (which the narrator did observe). The coupling of IPn with RPe is explained in §2.4.

A further example of n and e evidentiality within a single sentence is:

- (7) *katosos ka-foja-ni, ... o-wa-kiti*
 cartridges(f) APPLIC-be.inside-IPnf 1SGA-APPLIC-take.out
o-na-hara o-ke
 1SG-LIST-IPef 1SG-DECLf
 ‘The cartridges were inside (the bag), I took them out.’

The narrator thought that the cartridges were inside the bag but he could not see them there and so used IPn in the first clause. The second clause, which describes him taking them out of the bag, utilises IPe.

One story describes the drunken captain of a boat taking a wrong turn and getting lost. The narrator dissociates himself from responsibility for this happening by using n evidentiality:

- (8) *jara_A otara to-kana-ke-hita*
 white.man(m) 1NSG.exclO AWAY-take.off.course-COMING-RPNM
ama-ka
 EXTENT-DECLM
 ‘The white man took us off course.’

One way of describing catching a bad cold is to say that it ‘found’ you. But n evidentiality is then always employed:

- (9) *ito_A owa wasi-hani-ke*
 bad.cold(f) 1SGO find-IPNF-DECLF
 ‘A bad cold found me (i.e. I got a bad cold).’

One can contrast e and n evidentiality values with the same verb. Consider the following elicited sentences involving the verb *-hano-* ‘be drunk’:

- (10) a. *o-hano-hara o-ke*
 1SGS-be.drunk-IPF 1SG-DECLF
 ‘I got drunk (deliberately).’
 b. *o-hano-hani o-ke*
 1SGS-be.drunk-IPNF 1SG-DECLF
 ‘I got drunk (and don’t recall it).’

The e specification in (10a) implies that the speaker knew what he was doing when he got drunk. In contrast, (10b), with n evidentiality, could be spoken by someone who woke up drunk (or with a hangover) and didn’t remember what he had done the previous night.

One revealing passage from a narrative text provides a contrast between the use of eyewitness and non-eyewitness tenses. The narrator has been waiting on the riverbank for a motor boat belonging to a Catholic priest. Finally, he hears the noise of a boat and says, in the narrative:

- (11) a. [*moto ati*]_S *ka-tima-re-ka*
 motorboat(m) noise be.in.motion-UPSTREAM-IPEM-DECLM
 ‘The noise of the motorboat was coming upstream (the noise could be heard).’
 b. [*moto ati*]_S *ka-time*
 motorboat(m) noise be.in.motion-UPSTREAM+m
 ‘The noise of the motorboat comes upstream.’
 c. *moto_S ka-time-no*
 motorboat(m) be.in.motion-UPSTREAM-IPNM
 ‘The motorboat was coming upstream (although it could not yet be seen).’

Clause (a) describes the noise of the boat coming upstream and uses e evidentiality since the noise of the boat's motor could be heard. Clause (b) then repeats the same information without tense/evidentiality or mood. Clause (c) has the boat itself (not the noise of the boat) in S function and there n evidentiality is used. The boat itself cannot be seen and so the n value is the one to use in (c).

It will be seen that the evidentiality value I refer to as 'eyewitness' covers not only happenings that the speaker witnesses with the eyes but also something that is heard. However, this 'earwitness' sense is restricted to where there is an NP which explicitly refers to a noise. In (11c) the S NP is 'boat' and the speaker could not see the boat (although he could hear it) so that a non-eyewitness tense is used. In (11a) the O NP is 'noise of a boat'; he can hear that, and thus employs an 'eyewitness' tense. It appears, however, that speakers have some discretion concerning which evidential to choose in borderline cases. Clause (b) in (3) uses an e evidential where the A NP refers just to *jomee* 'dog', stated in the previous clause, (3a) (and not specifically to the noise of the dog – it was the dog's barking that woke the speaker).

There are also instances of the 'eyewitness' choice being used to refer to something that is smelled, when the appropriate NP includes the noun *mahi/maho* 'smell'. Thus, in one story:

- (12) a. [*jao abohi*]_S *home-hino*
 sloth(m) be.dead+COMPL.CL lie-IPnm
 'A dead sloth lay (there) (lit. the sloth's being dead was lying).'
- b. [*jao bete maho*]_S *kita-hare-ka*
 sloth(m) rotteness smell+m be.strong-IPem-DECLM
 'The smell of the rotten sloth was strong (lit. the sloth's rotteness' smell was strong).'

In (12b) the NP in S function has *jao* 'sloth' as its head, modified by two inalienably possessed nouns, *bete* 'rotteness' and *maho* 'smell'. The verb *-kita* 'be strong' takes the eyewitness IP tense suffix, showing that the eyewitness choice is appropriate when reference is to smell (this being shown by the inclusion of *mahi/maho* in the NP). (In (12a) the non-eyewitness IP suffix is used in its mirative sense, to show surprise at encountering a dead sloth; see §2.2.)

2.2 Special meaning and function of immediate past noneyewitness (IPn)

Delancey (1997), in a seminal study, notes that in some evidentiality systems one term may also be used to mark a category he calls 'mirative', to draw atten-

tion to some information being ‘new or surprising’. In Chapter 1 of this volume, Aikhenvald mentions that, in a two-term system, it is the non-eyewitness term which typically also has mirative meaning. Within Jarawara the IPn suffix has a mirative use – it can be employed to indicate that an event or state is surprising to the subject. In this sense IPn is used irrespective of time reference or visibility.

On one occasion, a man had not realised how late it was. Suddenly, dusk was upon him and he said:

- (13) *bahi_S to-ke-hino*
 sun(m) AWAY-be.in.motion-IPnm
 ‘The sun is (surprisingly to me) going away (i.e. setting).’

The text from which (13) is taken was told in FPN; the occurrence of IPn shows that this clause has a mirative meaning. Sentence (14) comes from a personal reminiscence told in FPe. The narrator and some companions had gone up a strange river and come across a patch of forest teeming with game animals. This is described by a clause with IPn marking to indicate the narrator’s surprise.

- (14) *bani_S mee wina-tee-hani*
 animal(m) 3NSG live-HAB-IPnf
 ‘There are surprisingly many animals living (here).’

One day the village chief, Okomobi, thought he was being given a cup of cachaça (a potent cane whisky). When he raised the cup to his lips he discovered that it was just water. The surprise he experienced was coded by using IPn in describing this event:

- (15) *Okomobi_A faha_O hi-fa-hani ama-ke*
 name(m) water(f) Oc-drink-IPnf EXTENT-DECLf
 ‘Okomobi (to his surprise) drank water.’

Another example of the mirative use of IPn is in (12a) where the narrator was surprised to see a dead sloth. Here the marking of surprise (which requires IPn) takes preference over the fact that the narrator saw it (which would be marked by IPe).

Turning now to another use of IPn, it was shown in Table 1 that while tense-modal suffixes typically occur in slot G, before mood (which is in slot J), some of them may alternatively be placed after mood, in slot K. This alternative ordering of suffixes carries a special meaning. Only one of the six past-tense/evidentiality suffixes may occur after declarative mood, this is IPn. The sequence declarative-plus-IPn may indicate uncertainty about the event

or state described by the clause. Thus, in a story where two Jarawara men were waiting for the Padre's boat to pick them up and take them to a meeting, when they did not know whether the boat had already been and gone, we get:

- (16) *otaa to-ka-tima-habone, moto_A*
 1NSG.EXCL.S AWAY-be.in.motion-UPSTREAM-INTENTION.f boat(m)
otara ka-kosa-ka-no
 1NSG.EXCLO APPLIC-leave-DECLM-IPNM
 'We need to go upstream, the boat might have already come and left us (here).'

Then a boat was seen coming up the river. But they did not know if it was the boat that was to take them. The narrator commented:

- (17) [*Batiri mee kaa moto*]_S *ama-ka-no haari*
 Padre 3NSG POSS boat(m) COP-DECLM-IPNM THERE+DEPM
 'It was unclear whether it was the boat belonging to the Padre's people there.'

Each of these sentences carries an overtone of uncertainty, which is shown by placing the IPn suffix *-(hi)no*, after declarative, *-ka*. Compare these with (31), which shows the more normal order of tense followed by declarative mood.

Another meaning that can be attached to declarative-plus-IPn is 'just now', as in:

- (18) *hinakiti_S ahaba-ka-no*
 3SGPOSS+grandfather(m) die-DECLM-IPNM
 'His grandfather just died.'

The full set of six past-tense/evidentiality suffixes is available for main clauses and relative clauses. Complement clauses (filling subject or object slot in a main clause) may not include any tense-modal marker. In the most common type of dependent clause, there can be a tense-modal specification, but only one past-tense/evidentiality suffix is found, IPn. It appears that, in this context, the three past tenses and two evidentiality values are neutralised, with the whole system being represented by the IPn suffix. In (19), the main clause, (a), is marked with FPn tense (in m form), *-himata*, plus reported suffix (also in m form) *-mona*. The dependent clause in (b) simply bears IPn marking (also in m form).

- (19) a. *hi-we-himata-mona-ka,* b. *ka-maki-no-ho*
 Oc-see-FPNM-REPM-DECLM be.in.motion-FOLLOWING-IPNM-DEP
 '[She] saw him, as he was following (along the road).'

Whichever of the six past-tense/evidentiality choices is used in the main clause, a dependent clause will always use the IPn suffix.

Slot G also includes five modal suffixes: future, intentional, hypothetical, irrealis and reported. Now generally only one term can be used from this slot, but there are some instances of a sequence of two terms. The combinations of FPN and RPN plus reported are discussed in §3. We also find some occurrences of irrealis followed by FPN and FPE. And there are a fair number of instances of future followed by IPn (typically in a dependent clause). This appears to be another instance of the six past-tense/evidentiality choices being neutralised and realised as IPn.

Future plus IPn in a dependent clause indicates that the event of the dependent clause followed that of the main clause, both taking place in past time (if IPn were used without future in the dependent clause, this would indicate that the dependent clause refers to the same or an earlier time in the past as the main clause). In (20) the main clause, (a), is marked with FPN *-hemete-*, plus reported *-mone* (both in f form), and the dependent clause, (b), is marked with future plus the neutralised IPn suffix (again both in f form).

- (20) a. *okiti*_A *mee hi-ka-hati-hemete-mone*
 1SGPOSS+grandfather 3NSGO Oc-APPLIC-cast.spell-FPNf-REPf
mee ama-ke,
 3NSG EXTENT-DECLf
 ‘My grandfather is said to have cast a spell over them [the fish in the river],’
- b. *mee fawa tee-haba-ni mati*
 3NSGS disappear HAB-FUT.f-IPNF DEP+3NSG
 ‘(and then) they disappeared.’

Content questions include a content question word (‘who’, ‘what’, etc.) and generally also the content question suffix, *-ri/-ra*, in the mood slot (J from Table 1). This suffix is generally word-final, but it can be followed by either the future suffix or by IPn, as in:

- (21) *Safato!, hika kosi*_O *ti-jaba-ri-ni?*
 name where urucuri(m) 2SGA-pick-C.INTf-IPNF
 ‘Safato!, where did you pick the urucuri (fruit)?’

It is likely that an instance of IPn following the content question suffix is again a neutralisation of the past-tense/evidentiality system.

It will be seen that IPn has a special status within the past-tense/evidentiality system. It alone has a mirative sense; it is the only tense term to follow declar-

ative mood; and it functions as neutralisation of the three past tenses and two evidentiality values both in dependent clauses (either alone, or following the future suffix) and in content questions. It could be said to be the functionally unmarked term in the system.

2.3 Occurrence and correlations

The full set of six past-tense/evidentiality markers is used in main clauses and in relative clauses. A single term (IPn), representing the whole system, is used in dependent clauses and in content questions. There is no tense/evidentiality marking in complement clauses, nor in imperatives. Polar questions referring to the future may take future marking, otherwise a polar question generally lacks a tense-modal suffix. However, a polar question can include one or more choices from the tense-modal slot, covering both evidentiality values. All tense/evidentiality suffixes can occur in both positive and negative clauses; for instance, see (4).

In contrast to the rich morphology of verbs, nouns in Jarawara have a rather simple structure. There are no exclusively nominal suffixes. However a noun (or a NP) may employ a selection of the suffixes which are primarily used with verbs. Of the six past-tense/evidentiality suffixes, four are attested with nominals. Those missing are RPn, which is rather rare on verbs, and IPe, which is common on verbs but – as will be discussed in §2.4 – appears to be a recent addition to the verbal system and has not yet extended its use also to occur with nouns.

When we look at the correlation of person with evidentiality value, the results are pretty much as expected. All persons may occur as subject of a verb with e evidentiality, whereas the great majority of verbs with n evidentiality have a 3rd person subject. There are, however, some exceptions. Example (5a) has first person subject with the verb ‘sleep’, taking n evidentiality since – as mentioned above – one is not aware of oneself going to sleep. And (10b) has first person subject with ‘be drunk’ in n evidentiality when the speaker doesn’t recall getting drunk. Similarly, in (22), n is used with the 1st non-singular exclusive pronoun and the verb ‘get lost’, since one does not see or realise that one is getting lost. As pointed out in Chapter 1 of this volume, n may well be used here as an indicator of lack of control, or of diminished responsibility.

- (22) *otaa to-sawari-hani*
 1NSG.EXCL.S AWAY-get.lost-IPnf
 ‘We got lost.’

Another example of first person subject with n evidentiality is in (23), which also includes the irrealis suffix.

- (23) [kowani jaa] otaa wine-hene-mete otaa ama-ke
 other.side ON 1NSG.EXCL.S live-IRRF-FPNf 1NSG.EXCL EXTENT-DECLF
 ‘We (i.e. our ancestors) could have lived on the other side (of the Purús River) but didn’t.’

On the lexemic level, verbs such as ‘see’, ‘hear’ and ‘know’ will generally take e evidentiality. Exceptions include when the clause involves a negator, as in (4) ‘I didn’t hear their jowiri singing’, with n evidentiality.

2.4 Origin

Rather little can be said about the origin of the past-tense/evidentiality suffixes in the Jarawara dialect of Madi. It is interesting that the other dialects of the language – Jamamadí and Banawá – have only five of the six terms, lacking IPe. It appears that Jamamadí and Banawá use what is the RPe suffix in Jarawara to cover both immediate past and recent past in the e evidential, i.e.:

- (24) EYEWITNESS NON-EYEWITNESS
- (ha)ro/-(hi)ri
 (current RPe
 form in Jarawara)
 }

 IPn -(ha)ni/-(hi)no
 RPn -(he)te/-(hi)ta

It is likely that this applied in Jarawara at an earlier stage. Then the IPe suffixes, -(ha)ra/-(ha)re, were innovated (I do not know from where), to create a symmetrical system.

It is interesting to study the correspondences between the three e and the three n terms in present-day Jarawara:

- (25) EYEWITNESS NON-EYEWITNESS
- | | | | | |
|---------|---|-----|--|-----|
| time | ↓ | IPe | | IPn |
| from | ↓ | RPe | | RPn |
| present | ↓ | FPe | | FPn |

That is, a text which has FPe as the e tense will always have FPn as the n correspondent, and vice versa. Similarly, IPe is always paired with IPn, and RPn (which is rather rare) is always paired with RPe. But IPn can co-occur either with IPe or with RPe – as it does in (6) – and, as a consequence, RPe can co-occur either with RPn or with IPn. These pairings are explainable if the

original system was as in (24). RPe was originally the correspondent of IPn. When IPe was introduced, it became paired with IPn, but links between RPe and IPn – from the stage shown in (24) – still remain. (Further justification for this historical scenario is in Dixon 2001.)

3. The reported suffix

Besides the six past-tense/evidentiality suffixes, slot G also includes five modal suffixes, set out in Table 3.

Table 3. Forms of modal suffixes

	feminine (f)	masculine (m)
Intention	-(ha)bone	-(hi)bona
Future	-(ha)ba(na)	-(hi)ba(na)
Irrealis	-(he)ne	-(hi)na
Hypothetical	-(he)mene	-(hi)mana
Reported (REP)	-(ha)mone	-(hi)mona

The modal term which concerns us here is reported. This suffix is included in the tense-modal system (a) because of its position in predicate structure, and (b) because it has a similar form to other terms in the system, with initial *-ha/-hi-*, final *e/a*, etc., i.e. *-(ha)mone/-hi)mona*.

3.1 Meaning and occurrence

The reported suffix is used to emphasise that what the speaker is relating has been reported by someone else.

One day I was told that a Jarawara man called Kamo had killed a tapir in a distant location. I asked Kamo's father-in-law about this and he responded:¹

- (26) *Kamo_A awi_O naboe-himonaha [Faha.biri jaa]*
 name(m) tapir(m) kill-REPM place AT
 'Kamo is reported to have killed a tapir at Fahabiri.'

That is, the father-in-law had not witnessed the event, and included the reported suffix to indicate this.

Other examples of the reported suffix include:

- (27) *Tafi_S ati ne-mona*
 name(m) speak AUX-REPM
 ‘Someone said that Tafi spoke (calling us to eat) (lit. it is reported that Tafi spoke).’
- (28) [*mee one ihi*] *iti-hamone mee*
 3NSG other+f DUE .TO.f kill-REPF 3NSG+DEP
 ‘The killing was reportedly due to others of them.’

Clauses with the reported suffix are often followed by a clause with the verb ‘say’, as in:

- (29) *Izaki_A Nanatoboto_O mera kejehe-mona, Tioko_S*
 name(m) name(m) 3NSGO trick-REPM name(m)
hi-na-hare-ka
 OC-AUX(say)-IPEM-DECLM
 ‘Izaki is reported to have tricked Nanatoboto’s people, Tioko said.’

The reported suffix can be used to remind someone of what they said about themselves, as in:

- (30) *ti-fimiha-mone, ti-na*
 2SGS-be.hungry-REPF 2SGA-AUX(say)f
 ‘You were hungry, you said.’

Examples (29–30) – and also (35) – illustrate a complexity of Jarawara grammar. The verb *ati -na-* ‘say’ omits the *ati* (the non-inflecting verb component) when its auxiliary, *-na-*, bears a pronominal prefix. The occurrence of the auxiliary with such a prefix and no accompanying non-inflecting verb root indicates that the underlying verb is *ati -na-*.

Note that there is a clear difference between use of an n past tense form, and use of the reported suffix. One morning I went into the forest with a Jarawara friend and saw a tree that had just fallen over. Without thinking properly, I attempted to describe this using the IPE suffix, but was corrected and told to say:

- (31) *awa_O ka-so-hani-ke*
 tree(f) APPLIC-fall-IPnf-DECLf
 ‘The tree has recently fallen (and I didn’t see it fall).’

The n evidentiality is used because the speaker did not himself see it fall. But he did see for himself that it had fallen, and so did not employ the reported suffix.

The narration of traditional tales normally employs FPn, and 90% of the occurrences of these are followed by the reported suffix, i.e. *-(he)mete-mone/*

-(*hi*)*mata-mona*, as in (19a) and (20a). However, when the irrealis suffix is included before FPN, as in (23), then it appears that the reported suffix cannot also be included after it.

The reported suffix cannot be used with any of the three past tense suffixes bearing *e* evidentiality. As just mentioned, it typically co-occurs with FPN and is also well-attested with RPN. Interestingly, reported is never used after IPN. It may be that when the reported suffix occurs without any preceding tense-modal form, the time frame is – in neutral circumstances – implicitly ‘immediate past’.

A clause including the reported suffix most often has a 3rd person subject. However, the subject can be 2nd person, as in (30). And it can be 1st person, as in:

- (32) [*ee kakome-tee-ri*] *-mone*
 1NSG.incl be.scared-HAB-NEGATIVE+NOMINALISATION -REPF
ama-ke
 COP-DECLF
 ‘We shouldn’t be afraid (lit. our being not habitually afraid, is reported to be).’

In (32), the subject of the copula verb, *ama*, is a nominalised clause ‘our habitually not being afraid’, to which the reported suffix is added.

When occurring as a verbal suffix, reported can occur in declarative main clauses, in questions, and in dependent clauses. It is not attested in commands. As mentioned in §2.3, a selection of verbal suffixes may be added to a noun (or to an NP); reported belongs to this set.

Any place that a speaker is not familiar with is likely to be referred to using the habitual suffix *-tee* (slot F in Table 1) plus the reported modality. Example (33) comes from the story of a river journey where the narrator arrives at a place he is told bears the name Canutama.

- (33) [*kanatama-tee-monehe jaa*] *otaa kobo*
 place-HAB-REPF AT 1NSG.EXCL.S arrive
to-nisa-witiha
 AWAY-AUX+DOWN-FROM.PLACE
 ‘At the place said to be Canutama, we arrived down from (a previous) place.’

An NP marked with the reported suffix can make up a complete clause. Okomobi was taken by a Padre on a visit to the Sorowahá village and was told that

they spoke a language genetically related to Jarawara and were thus a kindred people. He said, in his account of this journey:

- (34) [[*otaa kaa one*] *mee*] *-mone makoni*
 INSG.EXCL POSS other+f PLURAL -REFP NO.RESPONSIBILITY.f
 ‘They are said to be our sort of people (lit: they are said to be others of us).’

In (35), reported is used on the O NP of the first clause (and IPn on the noun which makes up the second clause):

- (35) [*makari-mone*]_O *o-na* *haa, rona-ni-ke*
 clothes(f)-REFP 1SGA-AUX(say/think) DEP canvas(f)-IPNF-DECLF
 ‘I thought it was clothing, but it is canvas (lit. it was said to be clothing, ...).’

In one story a man is accosted by what he thinks is his lover, Watati. In fact it is a spirit who has taken on the form of Watati. The spirit is referred to by the narrator as *Watati-mone* ‘the supposed Watati’.

3.2 Origin

It can be shown, by internal reconstruction, that the initial *-hV-* syllable of tense-modal suffixes (in Tables 2 and 3) was originally the final syllable of a preceding root and has been reanalysed to be now part of the affix (Dixon 2001). In looking for cognates of the reported suffix, we thus consider just the forms *-mone/-mona*.

None of the other Arawá languages has a suffix similar in meaning or in form to *-mone/-mona* in Jarawara and the other Madi dialects. However, there appear to be lexical cognates in Paumarí. The dictionary of this language (Chapman & Salzer 1998:317, 320) mentions an adverb *mona* ‘they say’ and also a noun *moni* ‘news’ (with derived verb *ka-moni-ki* ‘tell, recount’). It is likely that in Paumarí the reported adverb ‘they say’ developed out of the noun ‘news’. An earlier stage of Madi may have had a cognate adverb which was then grammaticalised to become a verbal suffix. The exact nature of the grammaticalisation process remains a matter for further study (as does the alternation in final vowels).

4. The secondary verb ‘seem’

One of the unusual features of Jarawara grammar is slots H and I in predicate structure. When slots H and I are not filled, we may get a tense-modal suffix (from slot G) directly followed by a mood suffix (from slot J), as in (3b), (6), (9) and (31), among other examples. However, if there is a 1st or 2nd person pronoun (or, in more limited conditions, the 3nsg pronoun) in subject or object slot, then this may be repeated in slot H. (A full statement of the rules for this repetition, and the forms involved, is in Dixon 2000.) A nonsingular pronoun in slot H is a separate word, and if there is a mood suffix it will be added to it. A singular pronoun in slot H is a prefix, and it forms a word (a ‘rootless’ word) with a following mood suffix, e.g. *o-ke* (1SG-DECLf) in (4), (5a, b) and (10a, b).

There are two forms that I call ‘secondary verbs’, which may occupy slot I. That which occurs most commonly is *ama/ama* (with no distinction between f and m) ‘extended in time’. It occurs in (8) and (15), with no pronoun in slot H; in (20a), with 3nsg *mee* in slot H; and in (23), with 1nsg.excl *otaa* in slot H. It will be seen that a mood suffix attaches to the secondary verb, e.g. *ama-ke* (EXTENT-DECLf).

We shall here focus on the secondary verb which has an evidential-type meaning, *awine/awa*.

4.1 Meaning and occurrence

The secondary verb *awine/awa* has a semantic range that cannot adequately be characterised by a single English gloss. Often it can be translated ‘it seems/appears that’ and I employ SEEM as the interlinear gloss. Other times it can be rendered by ‘in my opinion’ or ‘I think’ or ‘I guess’.

Examples of the ‘seem, appear’ sense include:

- (36) *faha_S kowi-ha awine-ke*
 water(f) be.deep-f SEEMf-DECLf
 ‘The water appears to be deep (at this spot in the river).’
- (37) *[[aba mee]_S kahi]_{COPULA.SUBJECT} to-ha mee awine-ke*
 fish(f) PLURAL be.roasted+COMPL.CL AWAY-COP.f 3NSG SEEMf-DECLf
 ‘It seems that there is roasted fish (lit. fish being roasted appears to be come).’

In one story an Indian heard that a fierce and hostile tribe was approaching, and hid. The narrator commented:

- (38) *habo*_S *baji-re-no* *awa-ka*
 courage+m be.deep-NEGATIVE-IPnm SEEMM-DECLM
 ‘He appeared to lack courage (lit: his courage appeared not to be deep).’

On returning from a visit to the Jamamadí tribe, I described to the Jarawara how I had played a cassette of ajaka-style Jarawara singing, and then the Jamamadí sang for me some of their own traditional ajaka songs. I was asked whether the Jamamadí had understood the Jarawara songs and was instructed to say in reply:

- (39) [[*oko* *fit*]_S *ajaki*]_O *mee* *wato-ha* *mee*
 1SG.POSS cassette(f) sing+COMPL.CL 3NSGA understand-f 3NSG
awine-ke
 SEEMF-DECLf
 ‘They appeared to understand my cassette’s ajaka singing.’

On another occasion, I was trying to investigate the semantic basis of gender assignment. Having noticed that ‘motor’, ‘motor boat’, ‘plane’ and ‘car’ are all m, I wondered if everything with a motor would be m. To try to test this idea, I displayed my rechargeable electric razor, explaining that it had a motor. Speakers agreed:

- (40) *moto*_O *kiha* *awine-ke*
 motor(m) have+f SEEMF-DECLf
 ‘[It] appears to have a motor.’

(But, as will be seen from the gender agreement in (40), the shaver itself was assigned to f gender!)

An example of *awine/awa* with second person subject is:

- (41) [*o-wati*]_O *tee* *mita-ra* *tee* *awine*
 1SG.POSS-voice 2NSGA hear-NEG 2NSG SEEMf
 ‘It appears that you didn’t hear my voice.’

Examples where *awine/awa* can best be translated by ‘in my opinion’ or ‘I think’ or ‘I guess’ include:

- (42) *faja* *ee* *hijara-ba* *ee* *awine-ke*, [[*bahi*_S
 THEN 1NSG.INCL.S talk-FUTURE.f 1NSG.INCL SEEM-DECLf sun(m)
weo *to-ne*] *jaa*]
 be.mid.afternoon AWAY-AUXm AT
 ‘In my opinion we should talk [pretty soon], since it is now mid-afternoon (lit. the sun is mid-afternoon).’

One narrative tells how a man has been lying in his hammock talking for half the night, keeping people awake. They protest that they want to sleep; the chatterbox replies:

- (43) *hiba ee amo na-ba ee awine-ke,*
 WAIT.ON 1NSG.INCLS sleep AUX-FUTURE.f 1NSG.INCL SEEM-DECLF
jama.soki_s jabo-haba awine-ke
 night(f) be.long-FUTURE.f SEEM-DECLF
 ‘Wait on, in my opinion we can still sleep (enough), in my opinion there’s still a lot of the night left (lit. in my opinion, the night will be long).’

As would be expected, the secondary verb *awine/awa* does not co-occur with a past tense marked by *e* evidentiality. It may occur with a past tense bearing *n* evidentiality, as in (38). It is not attested in the same clause as the reported suffix. It appears to allow the subject of its clause to be of any person.

This secondary verb occurs in main clauses but not in any kind of subordinate clause. There is one type of polar interrogative which features *awine/awa*. Examples include (3a) and:

- (44) [*otaa ati*]_s *amosa awine(-ni)?*
 1NSG.EXCL language be.good SEEMf(-P.INTf)
 ‘Is our language good?’
- (45) *fahas tasi na-ke awine(-ni)?*
 water(f) come.out AUX-COMING SEEMf(-P.INTf)
 ‘Has the water come out? (of a pipe, when a pump is being tried out).’
- (46) *Okomobi_s to-ko-me awa(-ne)?*
 name(m) AWAY-be.in.motion-BACK SEEMM(-P.INTM)
 ‘Has Okomobi returned yet?’

Note that the polar interrogative mood marker, *-ni/-ne*, may be included after *awine/awa* in questions of this sort, or it may be omitted.

Another example is:

- (47) *ijo_o mee a’ate o-ra owa awine oo?*
 indian 3NSGO ask 1SGA-NEG 1SG SEEMf 1SG
 ‘Hadn’t I already asked the Indians? (that I could fish in their waters, said by a white man who had been accused of fishing without permission).’

As stated at the beginning of the section, it is not an easy matter to convey the meaning of *awine/awa* within an English translation; this applies particularly to questions. One could render (44) as ‘does our language seem good (to you)?’, but it would be less plausible to include ‘seem’ in the translations of (45) and

(46). (It could be that the *awine/awa* in questions should be treated as a distinct grammatical form, homonymous with the *awine/awa* used in non-questions.) It will be seen that a question marked by *awine/awa* does not carry any particular presumption as to what answer is expected. Example (47) is in the nature of a rhetorical question, the only possible answer being (according to the speaker) ‘yes’; (44–46) do not presuppose that the answer should be ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

In questions, as in indicative clauses, *awine/awa* can occur with a past tense in n evidentiality (but not with one that has the e value).

4.2 Origin

The secondary verb *ama/ama* ‘extended in time’ has identical form to – and morphological properties as – the copula verb *ama* ‘be’, illustrated in examples (17) and (32). The secondary verb *awine/awa* ‘seem’ is identical in form to the ambi-transitive inflecting verb *awa* ‘see, be seen’ plus the suffix (from slot F of predicate structure) *-ine/ø* ‘continuous’. It is likely that a biclausal construction in an earlier stage of the language – in which the second clause featured *ama* or *awa* plus *-ine/ø* – developed into the rather complex predicate structure of the modern language.

Now, the Jamamadí and Banawá dialects of Madi are similar to Jarawara in tense-modal suffixes (except that, as mentioned in §2.4, they lack IPe *-(ha)ra/-(ha)re*). But it appears – from the limited information available – that secondary verbs are less well represented in their grammars. In Jamamadí there are, it seems, clauses including the secondary verb *ama/ama*, with these being glossed ‘X is the one who did it’. This supports the idea of a biclausal origin for secondary verb predicates.

It may be that there were originally biclausal constructions on the pattern:

- (48) *kasasa*_O *mee fawa*, *mee*_{COPULA.SUBJECT} *ama-ke*
 cachaça(f) 3NSGA drink+f 3NSG COPULA-DECLF
 ‘They are drinking cachaça (cane-whiskey), they are.’

The construction in (48) would have the meaning ‘they are the ones who are drinking cachaça’. Then (48) could develop into a single clause with a complex predicate, as set out in Table 1, with the meaning ‘they are drinking cachaça, for an extended period’.

There may also have been biclausal constructions like:

- (49) *kasasa*_O *mee fawa*, *mee*_{COPULA.SUBJECT} *awi-ne*
 cachaça(f) 3NSGA drink+f 3NSG be.seen-CONTINUOUSf
 ‘They are drinking cachaça (cane-whiskey), they are being seen.’

And this could, in similar fashion, have developed into a single clause with a complex predicate (as in Table 1), now meaning ‘they seem to be drinking cachaça’.

I am thus suggesting that the copula verb *ama* ‘be’ and the lexical verb *awa* ‘see, be seen’ (plus continuous suffix *-ine/ø*) were grammaticalised in Jarawara, to become secondary elements within the structure of the predicate. In association with the grammaticalisation, there would have been a readjustment of meanings.

(Such a historical scenario fits well into a comprehensive diachronic scheme that I am developing, which attempts to tie together and explain a number of the unusual grammatical features of Jarawara and of other languages in the Arawá family.)

5. Summary

There are three places in the predicate of Jarawara at which an evidentiality-type specification may be made. Note that all post-root elements in the predicate are optional, so that no clause *must* include a marker of evidentiality.

a. In the tense-modal slot of predicate structure there are three past tenses (immediate, recent and far past), each with one form for eyewitness and one for non-eyewitness evidentiality (and also distinct forms for feminine and masculine agreement). That is, an e/n evidentiality choice must be made with any marking of past tense.


The immediate past non-eyewitness suffix also has a mirative sense (which is independent of the distance in the past of the event, and of whether or not it was witnessed). IPn also functions as a neutralisation of the past-tense/evidentiality system in dependent clauses, and in content questions; it is also the only term in the system to be able to follow declarative mood.

b. Also occurring in the tense-modal slot is a reported marker, *-(ha)mone/-(hi)mona*. This may follow the far past or recent past non-eyewitness tense suffixes but not the immediate past non-eyewitness suffix. The reported marker also occurs without any tense specification and the implicit time reference is

typically then to the immediate past. The reported suffix is also quite common on NPs. It cannot occur in dependent clauses or in questions.

c. A late slot in predicate structure relates to two secondary verbs. One of them, *awine/awa*, has an evidential-type meaning ‘it seems, appears’ or ‘I think, guess’. It occurs with past tense markers having non-eyewitness evidentiality, but not with eyewitness forms. It does not co-occur with the reported suffix. This form (or a homonym of it) is also used to mark polar questions.

Thus, for a clause with past time reference, we have – in essence – the following choices:



Note that while the reported suffix appears to be restricted to past time clauses, the secondary verb ‘seem’ may also occur with a non-past modality, for example future as in (42–43). In addition, both the reported suffix and the secondary verb may occur without any preceding past/evidentiality suffix. (And, as noted above, the immediate past non-eyewitness suffix cannot be followed by the reported suffix.)

The ‘seem’ secondary verb probably comes from grammaticalisation of the lexical verb *awa* ‘see, be seen’, plus ‘continuous’ suffix *-ine/ø*; modern predicate structure involving a secondary verb probably goes back to what was a biclausal construction.

The reported suffix probably comes from grammaticalisation of an adverb ‘they say’, which may in turn derive from a noun ‘news’.

An earlier stage of the language probably lacked the immediate past eyewitness tense, with the present-day recent past eyewitness corresponding to both immediate past and to recent past non-eyewitness. The immediate past eyewitness suffix was innovated rather recently (I do not know from where), and has not yet been extended also to be used with NPs.

Notes

* My major debt is to the Jarawara people who welcomed me as a temporary member of their community, worked at teaching me their language, and answered all of my questions – Okomobi, Mioto, Soki, Kamo, Botenawaa, Kakai, Wero and others. Alan Vogel is assisting

me on a grammar of Jarawara and we have discussed many of the points in this chapter. Alexandra Aikhenvald provided stimulation, asked searching questions, and gave the most helpful comments.

1. The two oldest speakers have allomorphs of the reported suffix as follows: *-(ha)monehe/-(hi)monaha* when predicate-final and before the backgrounding mood suffix *-ni/-ne*, and *-(ha)mone/-(hi)mona* in all other environments. The longer allomorph occurs in (26) and (33). Younger speakers appear to have generalised the *-(ha)mone/-(hi)mona* forms to be used in all circumstances.

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Evidentiality in the Balkans with special attention to Macedonian and Albanian*

Victor A. Friedman

1. Introduction and survey

The term *evidential*, although hinted at in descriptions of Native American languages at the beginning of the twentieth century, was introduced as such by Boas in 1947 (Jacobsen 1986:4), a decade before Jakobson (1957/1971) expanded its meaning to apply to Balkan Slavic. The earliest description of the type of evidential strategy systems (Aikhenvald, this volume) to which Jakobson applied the label, however, goes back to al-Kāšgarī's 11th century *Dīwān luġāt at-Turk*, which describes the Turkic *miş*-past/*di*-past distinction in terms of an unwitnessed/witnessed opposition (Dankoff 1982:412). Such usage is attested in the oldest Turkic data (8th century; Tekin 1968:192–193). In this chapter, however, I shall refer to Turkish only insofar as it helps illuminate the Balkan Indo-European situation. (See the Appendix for a map of the Balkans accompanied by a description of the geographical layout of these languages.)

Of the 'classic' Balkan languages (Albanian, Greek, Romance, and Slavic), only Greek does not possess evidential categories, although the unacceptability of the perfect in nonvolitional contexts requires further research (Friedman 1977:127, based on Kostas Kazazis & Joseph Pentheroudakis p.c.):

- (1) *Khorís ná tó kataláv-o, éspasa *ékh-o*
 without SU it understand-PRES+1SG break+AO+1SG have-PRES+1SG
spás-i tí bukála.
 break-PART the+ACC bottle
 'Without noticing it, I broke/have broken the bottle.' (December 1974).

To this can be added the use of *lé[e]i* 'one says' as a kind of particle expressing a complex of evidential-like meanings including the expected 'reportedly, allegedly' but also a mirative-like emphatic:¹

- (2) – *Í-tan kaló to fagitó? – Kaló, lé-i!*
 be-1M+3SG Good the meal good say-PRES+3SG
 – ‘Was the meal good?’
 – ‘Very good!’ (Kriareas 1995)

Since it lacks clearly grammaticalized evidential strategies, Greek will not be considered further.

Of the remaining three groups, all contain languages with verbal categories participating in evidential strategies without literally specifying source of evidence. For these languages, therefore, *evidential* is understood as referring to evidential strategies. Aronson (1967) proposed the term *confirmative* in place of the misleading *witnessed* to describe Bulgarian evidentials in which the speaker is markedly vouching for the truth of the statement, and I extended this analysis by using the term *nonconfirmative* to refer to evidentials that attenuate personal vouching by means of reportedness, inference, sarcasm, or surprise (e.g. Friedman 1977, 1981, 1986; see also Aronson 1991:116–117).² If we understand *confirmative* to be the strategic equivalent of ‘eyewitness’ in those systems where that meaning is grammaticalized, and *nonconfirmative* to be the strategic equivalent of ‘noneyewitness’ (if it is opposed as unmarked to a marked *confirmative*) or ‘non-firsthand’ (if it is the marked member of an opposition), depending on the system, then the Balkan languages (except Greek) all show systems of Aikhenvald’s type A2 (where nonconfirmative is the marked term), and Balkan Slavic has, in addition, an A1 system (where confirmative is marked and nonconfirmative is the chief contextual variant meaning [Hauptbedeutung] of the unmarked member).

In the case of Balkan Romance, the so-called presumptive mood of Daco-Romanian – which is formed by means of a future, conditional, or subjunctive marker plus invariant *fi* ‘be’ plus the present or past participle of the main verb – has functions of the A2 type (see Friedman 2000):

- (3) *Doar, n-or fi av-înd puric-i!*
 surely not-FUT be have-PRES+PART flea-PL
 ‘Surely he doesn’t have fleas!’ (Ioanna Chitoran, p.c. February, 1998)

The same is true of the inverted perfect of Megleno-Romanian:

- (4) *ă bră, tu fost-ăi mări om!*
 a hey you be+PA+PART-have+PRES+2SG big man
 ‘Hey, you’re an important person!’ (Friedman 1994:81)

Varol (2001) also reports a use of the pluperfect instead of a simple past in Istanbul Judezmo that calques the A2 function of the Turkish *miş*-past:

- (5) *Kuando esta-v-an en l' Amérika, les av-iy-a*
 when be-IM-3PL in the America them+DAT have-IM-3SG
entra-do ladrón
 enter-PA+PART thief
 'When they were in America [i.e. absent], a thief broke into their house.'
 (Varol 2001:91)

A morphologically marked evidential strategy is attested in Aromanian (Vlah) only for the Frasheriole Vlachs of the village of Belā di Suprā (Macedonian Gorna Belica, located northeast of Struga on the Albanian border; Friedman 1994). In the dialect of this group, who migrated to Macedonia from central Albania about a century ago, the evidential is based on the Albanian admira-tive (see §2.2.2) using a calqued participial base plus the 3sg Albanian present admirative marker (-*ka*) reinterpreted as an invariant particle:

- (6) *Abe tora tini fus-ka avut om!*
 hey now you be+PART-ADM rich man!
 'Hey, you're a rich man now!' (August, 1992)

There is some debate over whether the Daco-Romanian presumptive is pa-radigmatic or syntactic, and there is a paucity of data for the Megleno-Romanian and Judezmo phenomena. The Vlah admirative patterns mostly like the Albanian.³

From a morphological standpoint, Balkan Slavic is a dialectal continuum in this respect – as in others. Macedonian and Bulgarian both have an A1 system and an A2 subsystem based on a reinterpretation and subsequent extension of the opposition simple preterite [aorist/imperfect]/perfect.⁴ An additional A2 evidential, the *probabilitive*, has also been reported for the dialect of Novo Selo (Vidinsko), in northwestern Bulgaria near the Romanian and Serbian borders (Mladenov 1969: 108–116). In this dialect, the ordinary future is formed, as in Bulgarian and Macedonian in general, by means of a preposed invariant particle derived from a verb meaning 'want' plus a conjugating main verb. The Serbian future type – which is formed by means of a postposed conjugating clitic auxiliary of the same origin ('want') attached to a stem based on the infinitive – has been retained in this dialect but reinterpreted as an evidential with present, future, and past tenses, probably evolving semantically under the influence of the Romanian presumptive:

- (7) *Što čā ni pituvā-čā-š ti nās...*
 what FUT US+DAT ask-PB-PRES+2SG YOU+NOM US+DAT
 'Why will you ask us...?!' (Mladenov 1969: 111)

Macedonian and Bulgarian dialects show considerable morphological variation in their treatments of evidentials (Friedman 1988; Fielder 2002, forthcoming), but the underlying semantics are fairly consistent. I shall take Standard Macedonian, which in this regard faithfully reflects its West Central dialectal base (Prilep-Veles-Kičevo-Brod), as exemplary of Balkan Slavic for this chapter. The most salient differences between Standard Macedonian and Standard Bulgarian with regard to evidential strategies are the following: 1) Macedonian has developed a new perfect using the auxiliary ‘have’ which participates in the confirmative/nonconfirmative opposition while Bulgarian has developed a new pluperfect using a nonconfirmative auxiliary ‘be’ (3sgm *bil*) producing an A2 subsystem; 2) the Macedonian future/conditional marker derived from ‘want’ is invariant, whereas in Bulgarian the cognate marker is invariant in the present but conjugates in the past (in both languages, the new pluperfect markers and the future markers can interact); 3) the older perfect, from which the (nonconfirmative) unmarked past is derived in Balkan Slavic, completely lost the third person auxiliary in Standard Macedonian whereas the presence versus absence of this auxiliary is manipulated in Standard Bulgarian (and also in Serbo-Croatian and East Macedonian dialects) as a discourse marker associated with narrator involvement. In traditional descriptions of Bulgarian, the absence of the third person auxiliary is said to mark an independent noneyewitness evidential paradigm, but empirical evidence contradicts this analysis (see Friedman 1982, 1986; Fielder 1995, 2002; see also Guentchéva 1996 for a contrasting view).

Albanian has an A2 system using a set of paradigms traditionally termed the *admirative*, first described by Dozon (1879:226–227), who introduced the French *admiratif* on the basis of Kristoforidhi’s Greek *apodókētoi* ‘unexpected’.⁵ The Albanian admirative is a markedly nonconfirmative, morphologically distinct set of paradigms which, while taking ‘surprise’ as its most common meaning (see Note 5), can also express sarcasm, inference, reporting, etc. Jacobsen (1964) used the term *mirative* to describe the marking of surprise in Washo. Although it has been traditional in Balkan linguistics since Weigand (1923–1924) to apply the term *admirative* to the use of the Balkan Slavic unmarked past to express surprise at a newly discovered (but pre-existing) state, (see example 21 cf. also Guentchéva 1996), we can distinguish between *mirative*, which is limited to unexpected or surprising information, and *admirative*, which refers to a set of paradigms for which ‘surprise’ (mirativity) is one of the contextual variant meanings. The Balkan Slavic phenomenon is one use of the unmarked past, whereas the Albanian, like the Vlah, is a complete set of paradigms, including a true present. For Albanian I shall use the standard

language, which in this respect reflects its northern Tosk (South Albanian) dialectal base. Admiratives are absent from pre-sixteenth century diaspora dialects (Italy [Arbëresh], Greece [Arvanitika]) and show different developments in some post-sixteenth century diaspora dialects (Bulgaria, Ukraine, Zadar) as well as in northern dialects (Demiraj 1971:37; Mindak 1980).

Romani, while not a ‘classic’ Balkan language, has been spoken in the region for many centuries and also deserves mention here. Romani does not have a uniformly developed evidential system or strategy. Matras (1995), using data from the Kalderaš and Lovara dialects, analyzes the opposition between 3sg simple pasts of some intransitive verbs that agree with their subjects either for gender or for person (e.g. *avil-o*, *avil-i*, or *avil-as* = ‘came’ 3sgm, 3sgf, or 3sgm/f) as a discourse strategy connected to shared vs. personal knowledge, and Kostov (1973:108) reports that the Romani dialect of Sliven transforms the *-l* of the Bulgarian evidential (equivalent to the Macedonian *l*-past) into an evidential particle, *li*, which is suffixed to past tense forms much like the Vlah phenomenon cited above.

2. Organization

2.1 Category and strategy

The Macedonian evidential type is based on a discourse strategy using inherited forms that acquired evidential meaning which was subsequently extended to new paradigms. The Albanian evidential is expressed by a separate set of paradigms that have their origins in a grammaticalized inverted perfect. Evidential strategies are grammaticalized in both languages in that a meaning which is encoded into certain paradigms cannot be avoided when those forms are used. However, in Albanian, where evidentiality is the unambiguous (invariant) component of a series of paradigmatic sets, usage is never obligatory. On the other hand, Macedonian evidentiality is a strategy that cannot be avoided in ordinary past tense narration. One must indicate one’s degree of commitment to the truth of the statement, and the only way to avoid this is to switch to the historical present. Although literal ‘source of information’ is not the invariant meaning, it is normally taken to be the motivating factor in the speaker’s choice.

2.2 Description of systems

2.2.1 *Macedonian*

The Macedonian evidential system consists of three sets of two paradigms each. The synthetic aorist and imperfect, which are opposed to each other aspectually as non-durational/durational, are marked for speaker's confirmation of the narrated event. There is a parallel set of analytic unmarked pasts (or *l*-pasts, also marking aorist/imperfect aspect) descended from the old perfect, which used the Common Slavic resultative participle in *-l* (based on the aorist stem) with the present tense of 'be' as an auxiliary. The modern set has added a new *l*-form based on the imperfect stem and dropped the auxiliary in the third person. The *l*-form agrees with the subject in gender (in the singular) or number (in the plural). The unmarked past usually implies but does not always express nonconfirmative in opposition to the marked confirmative. A third set is based on a new perfect using the auxiliary 'have' in the synthetic imperfect and *l*-past imperfect plus an invariant neuter verbal adjective (descended from the old past passive participle). This last, newer set is equipollently marked as confirmative/nonconfirmative. In Bulgarian, the new pluperfect (e.g. *bil napravil* 'he [allegedly, etc.] did') is markedly nonconfirmative like its Macedonian equivalent (*imal napraveno*). The inherited pluperfect (synthetic imperfect of 'be' plus the verbal *l*-form, e.g. *beše napravil* 'he had done' in both languages) is outside the system of evidential strategies in Macedonian, whereas in Bulgarian it can be used in reported but not anti-confirmative contexts (e.g. the type illustrated in example (11); Friedman 1986). The Macedonian inherited pluperfect is opposed to the have-pluperfect by the fact that the latter is marked as a resultative of state (see Friedman 1977: 104–106).

The following examples are illustrative.

- (8) *No podocna se sluč-i-ja rabot-i za ko-i ne*
 but later IN happen-AO-3PL work-PL about which-PL NEG
zna-e-v
 know-IM-1SG
 'But after that things happened which I didn't know about' (*Nova Make-*
donija 19.VI.74:5)
- (9) *Zuza: Blaže bi-l vo Moskva. Kosta: Da, b-e-še.*
 Z. B. be-L+MASC in Moscow K. Yes be-IM-3SG
 Zuza: 'Blaže was in Moscow.' Kosta: 'Yes, [I know] he was.' (October, 1986)

- (10) *Mu se jav-i-v na vujko mi. Ne b-e-še doma,*
 him+DAT IN call-AO-1SG to uncle me+DAT NEG be-IM-3SG at.home
na plaža bi-l.
 at beach be-L+MASC
 'I called my uncle. He wasn't home, apparently he was at the beach.' (August, 1992)
- (11) *Ne veruv-a-m deka toj go napravi-l/[*]naprav-i toa.*
 NEG believe-PRES-3SG that he it+ACC do-L+MASC/do-AO+3SG that
 'I don't believe that he did it.' (Friedman 1978: 110)
- (12) *Za-toa što forma-ta B-E-ŠE REŠE-N-O odgovar-a na*
 for-that what form-DEF be-IM-3SG decide-VA-N answer-PR+3SG to
 SE REŠ-I, t.e. na minato-to opredeleno vreme, ko-e
 IN decide-AO+3SG i.e. to past-DEF definite tense which-NOM
go upotrebuv-a-me za označuvanje dejstv-a što
 it+ACC use-PRES-1PL for indication action-PL what
se vrše-l-e ili se izvrši-l-e vo opredelen moment vo
 IN perform-L-PL or IN accomplish-L-PL in definite moment in
minato-to.
 past-DEF
 'It is because the form HAD BEEN DECIDED corresponds to WAS DECIDED, i.e. to the past definite tense, which we use to indicate actions that were performed or accomplished at a definite time in the past.' (Minova-Ćurkova 1984)

In example (8) the speaker knows that the events happened, and therefore uses a confirmative form despite the fact that he did not see them. Examples (9) and (10) demonstrate the way the confirmative and nonconfirmative pasts can be manipulated based on attitude rather than evidence (pace Lunt 1952: 93). In (9), Zuzi introduced a story about Blaže's recent trip to Moscow using the unmarked past since she wished to emphasize that she was not in Moscow herself. Kosta, however, who was also not in Moscow, responded with the confirmative past to indicate that he already knew and accepted the veracity as given. In example (10), the speaker personally vouched for the fact that his uncle was not home because he was certain the latter would have come to the telephone, whereas the speaker chose not to vouch for his uncle's actual location with the same certainty since neither the speaker nor the interlocutor could be sure that the uncle was actually at the beach. This could be taken as a secondhand/thirdhand distinction, but it is the speaker's choice. In context, using the *l*-past to report his uncle's absence would have connoted doubt or surprise.

Thus, the deciding factor is the speaker's attitude toward the information, since the evidence is all from a single report. Example (11) shows that the marked confirmative is unacceptable in an anti-confirmative context. Note that (11) is grammatical if the meaning of 'I don't believe' is infelicitous, i.e. if I am actually certain he did it but am surprised, cf. English *I can't believe I ate the whole thing!* Example (12) illustrates the basically unmarked nature of the *l*-past using it for a general definition.

In ordinary usage, a synthetic past will lead to the assumption that the speaker has a reason to confirm the statement and will not be considered normal if the source of information is a report. The use of the *l*-past usually implies nonconfirmativity and is expected to be used if there is no reason for the speaker to confirm the statement. At the same time, however, the *l*-past still retains its perfect nuances and can be used as a neutral (unmarked) past.

In the case of the have-perfects, the present perfect using 'have' is outside the evidential system, leaving a markedly confirmative pluperfect using a synthetic imperfect auxiliary and an markedly nonconfirmative perfect using the *l*-past of the auxiliary. The following examples are typical:

- (13) *Pusti-ot Selman-Aga ima-l sobra-n-o Arnaut-i za*
 damned-DEF S.A. has-L+MASC gather-VA-N Albanian-PL for
da te grabn-e [...] čovek dojd-e
 SU YOU+ACC kidnap-PRES+3SG [...] person come-AO+3SG
kaž-a,...
 tell-AO+3SG
 'That damned Selman-Aga has gathered Albanians in order to kidnap you
 [...] A man came and said so...' (Krlje 1972:167)
- (14) *Jas do-togaš nem-a-v vide-n-o bel čovek*
 I until-then NEG+have-IM-1SG see-VA-NOM white person
 'I had never yet seen a white person' (*Počinka* 12.IX.72:31)

2.2.2 Albanian

The Albanian present and imperfect admirative are descended from an inverted perfect and pluperfect consisting of the short participle and the auxiliary 'have' conjugated in the present and imperfect tenses, respectively (Demiraj 1971). The present and imperfect admiratives of 'have' can themselves be used as auxiliaries with the participle to form the admirative perfect and pluperfect.⁶ The admirative perfect and pluperfect using a short participle can also form compound analytic pasts. These latter are rare in the standard language. Table 1 is illustrative.

Table 1. 1sg indicative of ‘have’

	Nonadmirative	Admirative
Present	kam	paskam
Perfect	kam pasur	paskam pasur
Imperfect	kisha	paskësha
Pluperfect (IM)	kisha pasur	paskësha pasur
Past Perfect	kam pasë pasur	paskam pasë pasur
Past Pluperfect (IM)	kisha pasë pasur	paskësha pasë pasur
Aorist	pata	–
2nd Pluperfect (AO)	pata pasur	–
2nd Past Pluperfect (AO)	pata pasë pasur	–

The correct interpretation of the Albanian admirative is determined by context, as can be seen in the following examples:

- (15) *Ti kërcye-k-e shumë mirë!*
 you dance-ADM-PRES+2SG very well
 ‘You dance very well!’ (August, 1995)
- (16) – *Sot pas-k-emi drekë të thatë, a? – Po. Si*
 today have-ADM-PRES+1PL supper PC dry Q Yes how
ja qëll-ov-e? – S’ kundërm-o-n as-një e djegur.
 it+ACC+it-DAT guess-AO-2SG NEG smell-PRES-3SG NEG-one PC burnt
 – ‘We have a cold supper tonight, eh?’ – ‘Yes. How did you guess?’ –
 ‘Nothing smells burnt.’ (*Rilindja* 12.VIII.12:8)
- (17) – *Unë për vete nuk kam faj[...] – Si more Loni, s’*
 I for self NEG have+PRES+1SG fault how hey L. NEG
pas-k-e faj?!
 have-ADM-2SG fault
 – ‘As for me, it’s not my fault.’[...] – ‘Hey, Loni, what do you mean it’s not
 your fault?!’ (Buchholz & Fiedler 1987: 155)

Example (15) expresses surprise at unexpected new information based on immediate observation. Example (16) is an inference based on smell. Examples (17, 47) express dubitative usage, i.e. disbelief, sarcasm, irony, etc. Example (46) illustrates a neutral report.

3. Semantics

3.1 Inference, supposition, report, epistemic, hypothetical

In Macedonian, the choice of evidential in inferences and suppositions depends on the conviction of the speaker. The confirmative form can be used for any type of evidence (sight, sound, smell, etc.; Friedman 1977:39). Consider the following example:⁷

- (18) – *Kade e Violeta?! [...]*
 – where is V. [...]
 – *Vo bolnica, drugar inspektor [...]*
 – in hospital comrade inspector [...]
 – *Znač-i im-a-še i puka-nje?!*
 – mean-PRES+3SG have-IM-3SG and shoot-VN
 – *Ne...*
 – no
 – *Što se sluč-i?*
 – what IN happen-AO+3SG
 – *Vinko se obid-e da ja ubi-e.*
 – V. IN try-AO+3SG SU her-ACC kill-PRES+3SG
 – ‘Where is Violeta?!’ [...] – ‘In the hospital, Comrade Inspector’ [...]
 – ‘So then there was shooting, too?!’ – ‘No...’ – ‘What happened?’
 – ‘Vinko tried to kill her.’ (*Počinka* 21 X 74:27)

In example (18), the inspector’s *imaše* involves a confirmative inference based on a report. Moreover, Svetislav’s confirmative *ubie* is based on an inference from a witnessed result of an unwitnessed act. He did not actually see Vinko’s attempt at murder. He was chasing Vinko’s car, lost sight of it, and then found Violeta lying by the road. The speakers are both emphasizing their being convinced of the inferences. The *l*-past will be used if such emphasis is not desired as in (19), where the speaker uses the nonconfirmative *pretstavuval* ‘supposed’ because he is speculating on Bob’s assumption, the present *imaat* ‘they have’ in reporting what he thinks Bob said since that would have been the original tense of the statement, but the confirmative *raboteše* ‘worked’ because the speaker knows that Liddy was spying:

- (19) *Misl-am deka Bob prepostavuva-l oti tie im-a-at*
 think-PRES+1SG that B. suppose-L+MASC that they have-PRES-3PL
nešto ovde, nekakv-a operacija za sobira-nje na
 something here some-FEM operation for gather-VN of
informaci-i, na koj što rabot-e-še Lidi
 information-PL on which what work-IM-3SG L. Liddy
 ‘I think Bob was assuming that they had something over there, some intelligence operation that Liddy was operating.’
 (*Nova Makedonija* 16.VI.73:27)

In Albanian, because the admirative is a marked nonconfirmative, its use in inference always carries a nuance of surprise, doubt, etc. as in (16) above.

In the case of Macedonian, epistemic modals can themselves be either confirmative or nonconfirmative, followed by a subjunctive clause in the present tense (see example 28 below). However, a speculation that the speaker wishes specifically not to confirm can be in the *l*-past, as in example (20):

- (20) *Iako s-i-te vel-at deka naj-golem-i-te problem-i*
 although all-PL-DEF say-PRES+3PL that most-big-PL-DEF problem-PL
na Makedonija se vnatrešn-i, se-pak, mene mi se
 of Macedonia are internal-PL all-again me+DAT me+DAT IN
čin-i deka atentat-ot treba da
 seem-PRES+3SG that assassination.attempt-DEF must+PRES+3SG SU
bi-l izvrše-n od nadvor.
 be-L+MASC complete-VA from outside
 ‘Although everyone says that Macedonia’s greatest problems are internal, nonetheless it seems to me that the assassination attempt [against President Kiro Gligorov] must have been effected from outside.’
 (November, 1996)

In Albanian, admirativity is not attested in co-occurrence with epistemic modality, but in principle could occur as an expression of speaker nonconfirmativity (report, surprise, sarcasm, etc.).

3.2 Mirative and dubitative

Both the Albanian admirative and the Macedonian *l*-past can be used to express surprise and various shades of unreliability: doubt, disbelief, irony, sarcasm etc. (Friedman 1981). Examples (14) and (16) above illustrate the ‘surprise’ and ‘unreliable’ readings of the Albanian admirative.

Examples (21) and (22) are typical of the mirative and dubitative uses of the Macedonian *l*-past:

- (21) *Ti si bi-l Rom! Ne sum*
 you be+PRES+2SG be-L+MASC Rom NEG be+PRES+1SG
znae-!
 know-L+MASC
 ‘You’re a Rom! I didn’t know!’ (Response to a blond person saying he is a Rom; October, 1973)
- (22) *Ti Vlah si bi-! Laž-e-š!*
 you Vlah be+PRES+2SG be-L+MASC lie-PRES-2SG
 ‘You’re a Vlah [you claim]! You’re lying!’
 (Humorous banter; September, 1997)

The fact that the correct translation in these contexts must be an English present tense has been used to argue that the Macedonian evidential (*l*-past) does not mark tense. However, there is always some sort of past reference involved in such usage. In Balkan Slavic mirative usage, apparent present meaning is restricted to the discovery of pre-existing states, i.e. the meaning is ‘it has been the case that ... but until now I did not know it’. Similarly, dubitative usage with an apparent present meaning always refers to a real or putative previous statement, i.e. it is refutation predicated upon repetition (example 16 is typical in this respect).

Evidence for this analysis can be found in comparisons with Albanian. Example (23) was uttered by a Kosovar colleague upon taking a sip of a local brandy whose quality had declined in recent years. In examples (24)–(25), taken from the Albanian translation of Konstantinov (1895/1973), it is precisely when a mirative statement refers to the discovery of a pre-existing state that Albanian permits the use of any past admirative form in addition to the normal present admirative of the type illustrated in (14). In all of these examples, where Albanian has an admirative, Bulgarian and Macedonian use the *l*-past, and Turkish uses the *mış*-past:

- (23) *Pas-k-a qe-në e mirë!*
 have-ADM-PRES+3SG be-PT PC good
 ‘Why, it turns out that it’s good!’ (June, 2001)
- (24) *Ore, fare gomar pas-k-ësh që-në ky njeri!*
 hey complete ass have-ADM-IM+3SG be-PT this person
 ‘What an complete ass that guy is!’ (Xoxa 1975:98)

- (25) *Ama njerëz fare pa mend qën-k-ësh-in kë-ta...*
 but people completely without mind be-ADM-IM-3PL these-PL
 ‘What fools are these...’ (Xoxa 1975:24)

4. Correlations with other grammatical categories

4.1 Interrogatives

The use of evidentials in interrogatives is crucial in supporting my preceding claim that mirative use of the *l*-past always involves reference to a past state. In example (26), a man walks into a barbershop and sees the apprentice but not the boss. He asks:

- (26) *Ku qen-k-a mjeshtr-i?*
 where be-ADM-PRES+3SG boss-DEF
 ‘Where is the boss?’ (*Rilindja* 8.VI.92:8)

He is asking with surprise where the boss is at the actual moment in time, not at some pre-existing time. In such a context, the sentence cannot be translated with an *l*-form into Macedonian or the *miş*-past of Turkish:

- (27) *Kade bi-l majstor-ot. Usta neredë-ymiş*
 where be-L+MASC boss-DEF boss where-be+MIŞ.PA+3SG
 *Where is the boss?/Where was the boss?

As indicated in the translation, the sentence in Macedonian (or, mutatis mutandis, Bulgarian) or Turkish means ‘Where was the boss?’, although a dubitative interpretation of the type ‘Where did you say the boss is [implied – I don’t believe you]?’ in response to an answer that has already been given would also be possible. The fact that the Macedonian *l*-past in its mirative function cannot be used to request present information, whereas the Albanian present admirative can, supports my analysis that any apparent present meaning of the *l*-past requires past reference.

In Macedonian, the choice of tense for a question will either be determined by the speaker’s expectations concerning the addressee’s knowledge (28, 29), the speaker’s own certainties (30, 31), or by the speaker’s intentions in engaging the addressee (32, 33).

- (28) *Ti treb-a-še da dojd-e-š tuka?*
 you must-IM-3SG SU come-PRES-2SG here
 ‘Were you supposed to come here?’ (August, 1976)

- (29) *Dali taa saka-l-a da go zem-a?*
 Q she want-L-FEM SU it+ACC take-PRES+3SG
 'Did she want to take it?' (September, 1997)
- (30) *Kade ja kup-i kola-ta?*
 where it+ACC buy-AO+2SG car-DEF
 'Where did you buy the car?'
- (31) *Kade si ja kupi-l kolat-a?*
 where be+PRES+2SG it+ACC buy-L+MASC car-DEF
 'Where did you buy the car?'
- (32) *Solana dojd-e vo Skopje?*
 S. come-AO+3SG in S.
 'Did Solana come to Skopje?'
- (33) *Što, pak došo-l Solana vo Skopje?*
 what again come-L+MASC S. in S.
 'What, did Solana come to Skopje again?'

In (28), the speaker used the confirmative past since she expected me to be able to answer on the basis of personal knowledge, whereas (29) was asked in the course of a party game using a fictional story which therefore proceeded entirely in nonconfirmative forms. The difference between (30) and (31) is that in (30) the speaker is likely to have seen the car or have some other reason to be certain that the addressee has a new car, whereas in (31) s/he may have simply heard that the addressee has a new car or may be expressing mirativity or dubitativity. The difference between (32) and (33) is that (32) is a simple request for information and is not intended to lead to further conversation, whereas (33) is more of an invitation to conversation, or even a request for confirmation of something the speaker may already know. In this sense, (33) can have a nuance of mirativity. If evidential strategies are not implicated, the older preterite/perfect opposition applies: A synthetic past question will refer to a specific event and an *l*-past question to a general state, as in English *Were you there?* vs *Have you [ever] been there?*

In Albanian, an admirative question always carries an additional nonconfirmative nuance in which the speaker expresses an attitude toward some aspect of the question (examples 17, 26).

4.2 Commands

In all the Balkan languages, the subjunctive particle can be combined with a present tense verb form to produce an optative, which can have the force of

an imperative. These particles can also be used with the *l*-past or admirative. In Macedonian, such usage can have the force of a reported imperative, as in example (34), which could be a report either of a true imperative or of a second person optative usage:

- (34) *Reč-e vo 'Bastion' da sum došo-l*
 say-AO+3SG in B. SU be+PRES+1SG come-L+MASC
 'He said I should come to "The Bastion"' (June, 2001)

The choice of tense here, however, is facultative. The speaker could also have used a 1sg present tense (*da dojdám*). The *l*-form can also have the function of an emphatic optative, usually in prohibitions, warnings, and curses, without any nuance of evidentiality. Such usages appear to be archaisms connected to ancient uses of the resultative participle (*l*-form).

- (35) *Nemoj da ste se skara-l-e!*
 NEG+IV SU be+PRES+2PL IN quarrel-L-PL
 'Don't quarrel!' (Koneski 1967:474)

In Albanian, the admirative can occur after the subjunctive marker with the illocutionary force of an imperative, but only as a mirative or dubitative report of someone else's words:

- (36) – *Të shko-sh në pazar!*
 SU go-SU+2SG to market
 – *Të shko-k-am unë në pazar?!*
 SU go-ADM-PRES+1SG I to market
 – 'Go to the market!' – '[What, are you telling me that] I should go to the market?!'

In fact, however, no such examples are attested in literature or conversation, and the use of the admirative after *të* in any meaning is rare (Buchholz & Fiedler 1987: 154–160; Lafe 1977).

5. Negation, modality, person, tense, aspect

5.1 Negation

In Macedonian, the *l*-past is preferred to the synthetic past when negation does not involve volition or a definite point in time. Thus, for example 'I didn't know' is normally rendered '*Ne sum znael*' rather than '*Ne znaev*' when mak-

ing a general statement about something one does not know. Similarly, when describing an involuntary act, the *l*-past is normally preferred:

- (37) *Ni-što da ne set-am, sum go*
 NEG-what SU NEG notice-PRES+1SG be+PRES+1SG it+ACC
skrši-l šiše-to
 break-L+MASC bottle-DEF
 ‘Without noticing anything, I broke the bottle’ (Lunt 1952:97)

This is in keeping with the sense of DISTANCE, a term introduced by Lunt (1952:91) to describe the combination of resultative and nonconfirmative meanings.

In Albanian, where the Indo-European distinction between indicative negator (*nuk*) and modal negator (*mos*) is preserved, the admirative is used with the indicative negator unless it is preceded by the modal particle *të* or introduced by *mos* in its non-modal function as the marker of a negative tag-question:

- (38) *Sigurisht nuk pas-k-a dëgj-uar as-një qebap-xhi.*
 surely NEG have-ADM-PRES+3SG hear-PART NEG-one kebab-seller
 ‘Surely no kebab-seller has heard.’ (*Rilindja* 10.XII.83:13)
- (39) ...*të mos e pas-k-ish thirr-ur, zot-i e*
 ...SU NEG him+ACC have-ADM-IM+3SG call-PART lord-DEF it+ACC
di, sa gjatë do të kishte mbet-ur
 know+PRES+3SG how long FUT SU have+IM+3SG remain-PART
ashtu.
 that.way
 ‘If she had not called him, Lord knows how long he would have stayed like that.’ (Buchholz & Fiedler 1987:159)
- (40) *Th-ashë, mos e pas-k-a ndërr-uar*
 say-AO+1SG NEG it+ACC have-ADM-PRES+3SG change-PART
vend-in e punë-s...
 place-DEF+ACC PC work-DEF+GEN
 ‘I said, he hasn’t changed his work place, has he...’ (Buchholz & Fiedler 1987:160)

Although there are no particular restrictions on the co-occurrence of admirativity and negation, in practice it is infrequent. In a selection of approximately 200 Albanian-language news reports containing admiratives, none were negated.

5.2 Nonindicative modalities and the future tense

In the Balkan languages in general, the markers of futurity also mark conditional modality (with the imperfect, perfect, or pluperfect), and therefore we shall treat these two together. Both Lunt (1952) and Kramer (1986) treat all clauses with the Macedonian future/conditional marker *ќе* as modal (see also Friedman 1993: 268–273). Examples using the future/conditional markers with evidentials are possible albeit unusual. In Macedonian, the *l*-form is unambiguously (markedly) nonconfirmative in such contexts. As with the have-perfect, these *l*-form usages are of post-medieval (early modern) origin and constitute a type of evidential subsystem. It should also be noted that *ќе* plus the synthetic imperfect is not marked as confirmative, and there is also an inherited conditional in Macedonian that uses the particle *bi* plus the verbal *l*-form and does not enter into evidentiality strategies. The Albanian admirative always carries its nonconfirmative meaning. The following examples are illustrative:

- (41) *Ljudmil reč-e deka ќе sme se sretne-l-e kaj*
 L. say-AO+3SG that FUT be+PRES+1PL IN meet-L-PL at
nego vo kancelarija-ta
 him-ACC in office-DEF
 ‘Ljudmil said that we are supposed to meet in his office’ (December, 2000)
- (42) – *Sega ќе gled-a vesti.*
 now FUT look-PRES+3SG news
 – *Što? – Sega ќе gleda-l vesti.*
 what now FUT look-L+MASC news
 – ‘He’s going to watch the news now.’ – ‘What?’ – ‘[He said] he’s going to watch the news now.’ (June, 2001)
- (43) *Tani edhe çupa-t do të shko-k-an në shkollë!*
 now and girls-DEF FUT SU go-ADM-PRES+3PL to school
 ‘Now girls will go to school, too!’ (Buchholz & Fiedler 1987: 157)
- (44) *Si do t-a pas-k-ësha njoh-ur, po të mos*
 how FUT SU-IT+a have-ADM-IM+1SG know-PART if SU NEG
m-a kishe treg-uar ti!
 me+DAT-it+ACC have+IM+2SG tell-PART you+NOM
 ‘How would I have known it, if you had not told me!’ (Lafe 1977: 479)

In (41), the speaker knew that we had agreed to assemble in Ljudmil’s office, but since we were sitting in the dean’s office the situation was awkward. When the question arose regarding where we should be, the speaker chose to

distance herself by using an *l*-form as an expression of uncertainty and non-responsibility. Sentence (42) shows the use of a future evidential for emphasis. Macedonian friends in Holland called a friend in Skopje for news about the fighting in Aračinovo (a village 5 km east of Skopje), and the one on the telephone in Holland was reporting the conversation to the others. The effect of the repetition was neither dubitative nor mirative but rather emphatic in the same sense as that rendered by the brackets in the English translation. Sentence (43) is a future admirative expressing surprise. Examples (44) and (39) illustrate that admiratives can occur in the protasis and apodosis of conditionals. The examples express speaker surprise.

In Macedonian, the nonconfirmative (*l*-past) cannot be used with a true future reported meaning, thus, for example, (45) cannot mean ‘he will say that he does not know’ but only ‘he will say that he did not know’.⁸

- (45) *Toj će reč-e deka ne znae-l*
 he FUT say-AO+3SG that NEG know-L+MASC
 ‘He will say he did/*does not know’

5.3 Restrictions with tenses and aspects

In Macedonian, the confirmative past is a reinterpretation of the synthetic past (aorist/imperfect) and as such is limited to it, except for the extension into the use of the imperfect of ‘have’ as an auxiliary in the confirmative pluperfect. The development of nonconfirmativity began in opposition to confirmativity but then developed a life of its own and was extended to newly created verbal forms. In terms of aspect, evidential strategies are not subject to any limitations that are not already present in the system, but in terms of tense, even when they have apparent present or future meaning, nonconfirmative evidentials always carry an element of past reference. In Bulgarian, there is a correlation between pairing for superordinate aspect and the manipulation of the third person auxiliary in the old perfect (unmarked past). In narratives, unpaired imperfective verbs are more likely to be used for backgrounding and occur with the auxiliary, while perfective verbs will lack the auxiliary and be used for foregrounding and advancing the narrative unless they are used to denote resultant states, in which case the auxiliary will be present (Fielder 1995, 2002). However, these are discourse functions not connected to evidentiality per se, since the source of information (and speaker attitude toward the veracity of the information) can be the same throughout the narrative.

In Albanian, the admirative paradigms are not limited for tense but they do contain an aspectual gap: there are no admirative forms corresponding to the aorist, only the imperfect-based forms are used. This contrasts with Aikhenvald's generalization – insofar as the aorist is more perfective in meaning than the imperfect – and may be related to the fact that 'be' and 'have', which are the auxiliaries crucial to admirative formation, are more amenable to imperfect than to aorist meaning. Although Albanian has both aorist and imperfect for 'be' and 'have', the aorists are rare and do not occur in all dialects.

6. Evidentiality and discourse types

Evidentiality is connected with genre and manipulated as a stylistic device. In Macedonian, the *l*-past is the normal tense for folk tales but the narrative switches easily into the synthetic past for vividness. An interesting example of the interaction of discourse genres and style is a book on Alexander the Great by Vasil Tupurkovski, a Macedonian politician. Many Macedonians saw the book as a nationalist ploy and criticized the excessive use of the synthetic past. While it is acceptable to use the synthetic past for well-established historical facts, the effect of Tupurkovski's usage was felt to be bombastic, as if he were trying to present himself as the direct heir of Alexander the Great. (Cf. the use of shamanic speech described in Aikhenvald, this volume.)

Macedonian newspapers also have house styles that involve evidential strategies. The relatively independent newspaper *Dnevnik* uses far more *l*-pasts than the government-owned paper *Nova Makedonija*. *Nova Makedonija* – like papers in other East European countries during the communist period – is more likely to use synthetic pasts, or else nominalizations in order to avoid having to make a choice that would be required by a finite verbal construction. This strategy is also used in the Turkish press (cf. Feuillet 1996 and Fielder 2002 on Bulgarian).

Another connection between evidentiality and genre is seen in the Albanian-language internet news reports of the Kosovo Information Center (QIK), which later became the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (KMDLNj), as well as news reports from the Albanian communist party newspaper *Zëri i popullit*. In these news sources, the admirative is extremely rare and almost always dubitative. In the Kosovar news reports from 1994–1999, the admirative was used to report accusations and other items from Serbian sources that the authors wished to cast doubt on. After the Treaty of Kumanovo (June, 1999) accusations against Albanians from KFOR and UNMiK replaced those

from Serbian sources as the objects of admirative usage. Following the rise of the KLA (identified as ‘a previously unknown terrorist group’ in Open Media Research Institute’s Report No. 35, Part II, 19 February, 1996), however, Kosovar news sources would occasionally use the admirative for unvouched for but neutral reporting:

- (46) [...] *nga Nënëshill-i ynë në Istog, u njoft-ua-m se*
 [...] by branch.council-DEF our in Istog IN inform-AO-1PL that
në vit-in e kaluar nga kjo komunë qen-k-an
 in year-DEF+ACC PC past from this district is-ADM-PRES+3PL
vra-rë edhe:
 kill-PART and
 ‘[...] we were informed by our subcommittee in Istog that last year in that community have also been killed.’ [a list of names follows] (*KMDLNj Informata* nr. 453, 12.I.99)

The connection between evidentiality and volitionality was noted in (37). Other than the restriction noted above against using a Macedonian confirmative (felicitously) in subordination to a verb of explicit nonconfirmation, there are no restrictions tied solely to the relationship of evidentiality to the semantics of the verb.

7. Strategies

Aside from obvious lexical strategies, an interesting Albanian phenomenon is the use of a 1pl dative pronoun to increase a sense of dubitativity as in (47):

- (47) *Sipas një neokomunist-i serb Kosov-a na*
 according one neocomunist-GEN Serb KOSOVO-DEF US+DAT
qen-k-a “pjes-a më e sigurt e Serbi-së.”
 be-ADM-PRES+3SG “piece-DEF most PC secure PC Serbia-DEF+GEN”
 ‘According to a Serbian neocomunist, Kosova is “the most secure part of Serbia”’ (*Kosovo Information Center, Informatori ditor*, nr. 1167, 26.IX.95)

It is worth noting that the admirative introduces the quotation and is thus a comment on it. The narrative dative is common at the beginnings of folk tales, but when used with the admirative it increases the nonconfirmative effect. If the narrative dative is a device for involving the listener in the narration, then its use with an admirative invites the listener to share the speaker’s disbelief.

8. Origins

In strictly structural terms, both Balkan Slavic and Albanian developed evidential strategies using native past tense forms, and as the contextual variant meanings became invariant the strategies became grammaticalized. In Albanian, the inverted perfect was associated with nonconfirmativity and lost its marking for pastness and became the basis of a new set of nonconfirmative paradigms. In Balkan Slavic, however, the simple preterite developed marking for confirmativity, and the old perfect became associated with the nonconfirmative meaning by contrast. As a result, new paradigms that developed out of the old perfect were markedly nonconfirmative, but the old perfect itself never completely lost its nonevidential meanings, except in regions where a new perfect replaced it entirely (see below).

Given the fact that the Turkish evidential system was already in place by the time the Ottomans invaded the Balkans whereas medieval Slavic documents only hint at the possibility of usages resembling evidential strategies,⁹ the influence of Turkish on the Slavic development seems reasonable, although the calquing was probably not as simple as is sometimes claimed (Friedman 1978). Our earliest extensive Albanian data (16th century) is unclear, but the conversion of the inverted perfect into a separate admirative paradigm seems to have taken place precisely during the Turkish occupation. The absence of the admirative from Arbëresh and Arvanitika supports this, although Arbëresh does have some presumptive uses of the perfect. The Vlah admirative is clearly based on the Albanian and is thus a borrowing.

Macedonian evidentiality is most highly grammaticalized in the southwest (Ohrid-Struga region), where the *l*-past is a marked nonconfirmative and the have-perfects have completely replaced all other functions. As one moves further to the southwest to the Macedonian dialects of the Korça (Albanian Korçë)-Kostur (Greek Kastoria) region in Albania and Greece, the *l*-past is completely lost and the have-perfects completely replace them. The result is a system recapitulating that of Common Slavic and virtually devoid of evidentials (see Friedman 1988). In the east, where the have-perfect did not develop, the *l*-past is more likely to be used as a perfect or unmarked past (Friedman 1977: 93). On the other hand, the Standard Bulgarian system is based on Northeast Bulgarian dialects centered around Tărnovo, which were also in close contact with compact Turkic populations. The influence of cities in general, where Turkish was the dominant language and where urban dialects of other languages had prestige among the rural populations – may have contributed to the rise of grammaticalized evidential strategies as we see them in the Balkans

today. During the Ottoman period, living in a town was a privilege that required special permission, and Turkish was associated not only with Islam and the Ottoman state but also with urbanity and high culture in general. This attitude has persisted among long-established town-dwellers.

At the same time, however, the widespread phenomenon of perfects developing into nonconfirmative evidentials (and a similar but not as widespread phenomenon of synthetic pasts developing into confirmatives) suggests a typological universal tendency. The connection between a perfect's focus on result and the preceding act being treated as unwitnessed (*sensu largo*) goes back to the Sanskrit grammarians, although it is noteworthy that many of the varied languages where the strategy developed had been in contact with some form of Turkic (Friedman 1978: 108). In the end, except for obvious cases like Vlah, we must allow for the effect of contact reinforcing typological tendencies.

9. Cultural Attitudes

Aside from the conventionalized attitudes and dialectal differences described above, Macedonians from the southwestern town of Bitola, which historically had a large Aromanian population, are much more likely to use the synthetic past where Macedonians from other western areas would use a nonconfirmative *l*-form.¹⁰ This is said to be due to the influence of the local Aromanian dialects, which like most other Vlah dialects, has only an aspectual perfect/aorist and imperfect distinction with no evidential nuances or strategies.

A point worth considering is the fact that speakers of Turkic and Balkan Slavic languages have reported feeling the absence of a nonconfirmative verb form when speaking English. Although adverbs such as *apparently* carry the same type of distancing semantics lexically, their use is felt to be gross and intrusive compared to selecting a verb form. I have felt this same lack myself when I have returned to the US after spending several months in Macedonia.

Dreams are normally reported in the confirmative, since the speaker has witnessed them. (In Macedonian, dreams are described as 'seen'.) However, the *l*-past can be used if the speaker wishes to create a sense of distance. Example (48) illustrates clearly how confirmative and nonconfirmative are manipulated in reporting a dream:

- (48) *Ne zna-m kolku spi-e-v, no koga se*
 NEG know-PRES+1SG how.much sleep-IM-1SG but when IN
razbud-i-v si spomn-a-v deka sum
 awaken-AO-1SG self+DAT remember-AO-1SG that be+PRES+1SG
sonuva-l. Vid-o-v deka jas ne sum bi-l
 dream-L+MASC see-AO-1SG that I NEG be+PRES+1SG be-L+MASC
jas, no edn-o dete bez braća i rodnin-i. B-e-v
 I but one-N child without brothers and relative-PL be-IM-1SG
sam so majka mi, među tuđi luđe i samo
 alone with mother me+DAT among foreign people and only
od-e-vme peški.
 go-IM-1PL on.foot
 ‘I don’t know how long I slept, but when I awoke I remembered that I had
 dreamt. I saw that I was not I but a child without brothers and relatives.
 I was alone with my mother, among strangers, and we just kept walking
 and walking.’ (Vocis 1999: 110)

In a society where people are aware that television is used as a propaganda device and that the same footage is used for different news stories, reports of news seen on television depend on the trust of the reporter. As one friend put it:

- (49) *Nad Kumanovo puk-a-a ili puka-l-e, zavis-i dali*
 above K. shoot-IM-3PL or shoot-L-PL depend-PRES+3SG Q
veruv-a-š vo televizijsk-i slik-i ili ne.
 believe-PRES-2SG in television-PL picture-PL or NEG
 ‘Above Kumanovo they were shooting or they were allegedly shooting, it
 depends whether you believe television pictures or not.’ (June, 2001)

10. Conclusion

There is a fundamental difference between the grammaticalized evidential strategies of the Balkans and adjacent areas and the evidential markers of North and South America, Tibeto-Burman, and Papua-New Guinea. However, the Balkan phenomena go beyond contextual uses of e.g. the German subjunctive, conditionals in French, Hungarian, or Japanese, English modals, etc. Grammaticalized Balkan evidential strategies can be divided into two major types: modal – which are all of Aikhenvald’s A2 type – and past tense. The Daco-Romanian presumptive mood and the Novo Selo probabilitive mood look very much like modal strategies, but unlike them, these moods have no other

uses and so are arguably evidential modals. Within past tense we can distinguish between Aikhenvald's A1 and A2 systems i.e. those that approximate witnessed/nonwitnessed and those that approximate non-firsthand/other. The presence of A1 implies the presence of A2, but not vice versa. Albanian and South Danubian Romance (Aromanian and Megleno-Romanian) are limited to A2 systems, whereas Balkan Slavic developed an A1 system out of which A2 oppositions arose. This suggests that there are two different paths for grammaticalizing evidentials – a confirmative and a nonconfirmative. Although the nonconfirmative meanings are arguably the more salient (in Turkic languages – see Johanson, this volume – this is the meaning that keeps surfacing using different participial forms), the fact that in most of Balkan Slavic the perfect never made the complete transition found in Albanian whereas the simple preterites are markedly confirmative argues that when marked confirmativity develops in a system, marked nonconfirmativity will arise, but if nonconfirmativity develops first, confirmativity does not necessarily follow. Although grammaticalized strategies of past tense origin are associated with perfects and perfectivity (see also Section 5), the absence of admirative aorists in Albanian suggests that the association of perfects with resultant states (which are more amenable to durational, i.e. imperfect, meaning) is a competing factor.

Finally, there is the issue of literal source of information versus the speaker's attitude to the information. In a sense, it is always the speaker's 'mediation' (Guentchéva 1996) that determines the choice of verb form and thus the difference between 'source of information' and 'speaker attitude' is a continuum. Nonetheless, just as tense/aspect/mood categories can be described as discrete entities while overlapping in actual usage, so, too, evidentiality involves a complex of meanings from extensions of tense/aspect/mood to true evidentials. The relevant verbal categories of the Balkan languages – of which Macedonian and Albanian represent basic types – constitute a distinct type that can be called the 'grammaticalized strategy', located between tense/aspect/mood and true evidentiality. The effect is that of a true evidential, and the choices are obligatory, but the underlying semantics are a step removed from literal evidence.

Notes

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1. I am indebted to César Montoliu for bringing this to my attention. All examples come from natural conversation or texts unless a source is given. Examples from conversation are followed by the month and year they were recorded. Translations are mine. Citations are given after the translations for the sake of convenience. In some examples, the preceding material which sets the context will be given in the English gloss, while only the relevant material will be given in the original. In Macedonian interlinear glosses, stem vowels are segmented for the present and the synthetic pasts but not the (unmarked) *l*-pasts. Albanian textual examples reflect the spelling inconsistencies of the originals. Newspaper sources are given in italics followed by day.month.year:page and are not listed in the references.
2. In Friedman (1981:24), I argued: '[W]hen speakers choose admirative forms [in Albanian] they are either refraining from vouching for the truth of the assertion by expressing doubt, irony, or by attributing the statement to someone else's words, or they are expressing the fact that at some time in the past they did not expect the statement to be true and that they are therefore surprised.' This same type of argument for the connection between surprise and other types of nonconfirmative meanings was subsequently adduced for languages such as Turkish and Japanese.
3. Although (3), (4), (6), and (7) are all mirative, these forms can all express the entire complex of nonconfirmative meanings (see §2.2.2).
4. The former Serbo-Croatian is said to use the simple preterite for a single term system of the type 'eyewitness/everything else' (Samilov 1957). All Slavic languages have a superordinate aspectual opposition perfective/imperfective inherent in the stem. The subordinate aorist/imperfect opposition remains only in South Slavic (except Slovene) and Lusatian.
5. The native grammatical term for this set of paradigms is *habitore* from *habi* 'surprise'.
6. In the mediopassive, 'be' replaces 'have' as the auxiliary.
7. Cf. also examples (8, 9, 10).
8. As with (27), apparent present meaning is acceptable as a dubitative repetition.
9. Van Wijk (1933:243) cites as possible evidence contrasting uses of the perfect and aorist to evaluate reports in the aorist in the oldest Slavic Paterikon.
10. It is worth noting that Aromanian was also an important contact language in the Korča-Kostur region during much of the Ottoman period and Greek was the language of literacy and religion for Christians. On the other hand, Turkish was especially important in Ohrid.

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Appendix: The Balkan Peninsula

This is a freehand rendition. Only towns and regions relevant to the text are noted.



A note on terminology and language distribution

In the context of the Balkans, even the term BALKANS is disputed and politicized, to say nothing of what is counted as a language and where it is spoken. After the break-up of the SFR Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia emphatically rejected being counted as part of the Balkans. In 1923, however, parts of what is today Slovenia were labeled BALKANIC ITALY (Encyclopedia Britannica). In a region where the ideological formula language=nation=territory=state continues to influence both politics and scholarship, on the one hand, and where, on

the other hand, multilingualism and ethnolinguistic distributional complexity are both interlocking and contested, a map that tries to place language labels over geographical space would be either misleading or unreadable. I am therefore listing here the languages of the region referred to in this chapter with an indication of the status and geographic distribution of each. All languages labeled OFFICIAL are majority languages in their nation-states. All minority languages except Judezmo are also majority languages at some administrative level ranging from sizable districts to villages.

Albanian – The official language of Albania, also spoken by majorities in adjacent parts of southern Montenegro, most of Kosovo, three districts in southwestern Serbia at the Macedonian border, and parts of western Macedonia. Pre-twentieth century Albanian enclaves survive in Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Italy, and in the village of Arbanassi near Zadar.

Greek – The official language of Greece, also spoken by a minority in southern Albania, an enclave in Istanbul, and by Sarakatsani (Karakachani) in Macedonia and Bulgaria as well as remnant populations in Romania and the former Soviet Union (many of whom have left for Greece in recent years).

Romanian (=Daco-Romanian) – Official language of Romania and Moldova, also spoken in eastern Serbia, northern Bulgaria, and Ukraine.

Aromanian (=Vlah) – Spoken in southern Albania, northern Greece, eastern and western Macedonia, and southwestern Bulgaria as well as by immigrants in Romania.

Megleno-Romanian (=Vlah) – Spoken in a few villages in southeastern Macedonia and adjacent parts of Greece (the Meglen). The largest village was Muslim and ended up in Greece after World War One, so the inhabitants (except for one family that converted to Christianity) were all deported to Turkey as part of the exchange of populations in the 1920s. Megleno-Romanian and Aromanian are separate languages, but Megleno-Romanians do not have an ethnic consciousness separate from Aromanians and use the ethnonym *Vla* (< Vlah), which is the Slavic term for Aromanians and Megleno-Romanians, and, in some contexts, also Daco-Romanians.

Judezmo – Descended from the Spanish spoken by Jews expelled from Spain in 1492, sometimes also called Ladino, although among specialists this label is reserved for a form of literary Judezmo that calques Hebrew word for word. Spoken by sizable Jewish populations in towns throughout the former Ottoman Empire, most speakers were murdered by the Nazis and their collaborators during World War II. Enclaves survive throughout the Balkans, although most survivors have emigrated to Israel.

Bulgarian – The official language of Bulgaria, officially recognized as the majority language in two districts in Serbia, a significant minority language in northeastern Greece and in European Turkey, and also spoken by enclaves in Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine. According to the 1994 Macedonian census, there are 1,682 Bulgarians in Macedonia. Bulgarian linguists, however, claim that all the Slavic dialects of Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Albania and eastern Serbia belong to Bulgarian. In earlier works, these claims were apparently based on the isogloss for the postposed definite article, but the most recent Bulgarian dialectological atlas (2002), excludes Kosovo according to its political boundaries and is thus not, in this respect, based on any sort of linguistic criterion. Needless to say, Serbs and Macedonians do not consider their dialects to be Bulgarian, nor do most Slavic linguists outside of Bulgaria.

Serbian – The South Slavic continuum can be divided, for heuristic purposes with a basis in historical phonological, morphological, and syntactic developments, into East South Slavic (Macedonian and Bulgarian) and West South Slavic (Slovenian and the former Serbo-Croatian, now sometimes referred to as Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian). All those dialects south of Slovenian, north of Macedonian, and west of Bulgarian can thus be classified as Southern West South Slavic (SWSS). The differentiation of SWSS dialects is based on geographic distribution rather than ethnicity. For the purposes of Balkan linguistics in general, however, and this paper in particular, only Serbian dialects are relevant. Serbian is the official language of Serbia and Montenegro and the Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is also spoken in Macedonia, by a small minority in Albania, by once sizable but now remnant populations in Kosovo and Croatia, and enclaves in Romania, Austria, and Hungary.

Macedonian – the official language of the Republic of Macedonia, spoken by minorities in eastern Albania, northern Greece, and southwestern Bulgaria. The dialects of the Muslim Gorans of southwestern Kosovo and adjacent Albania are transitional between Serbian and Macedonian. They were classed with Serbian until the late 1980's and are now classed with Macedonian.

Romani – Spoken throughout the Balkans and beyond.

Turkish – The official language of Turkey, spoken by sizable minorities in eastern Bulgaria, northeastern Greece, Macedonia, Kosovo, as well as urban remnants in Albania. The closely related Gagauz is spoken by Christians in Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Evidentiality in Yukaghir

Elena Maslova

1. Introduction¹

The Yukaghir languages, Kolyma (Southern) and Tundra (Northern) Yukaghir, are spoken in three small multi-lingual villages in the Saha (Yakut) Republic (in northeast Russia). Both varieties have an evidential suffix (*-l'el-*) signalling that a situation was not witnessed by the speaker (Jochelson 1905:400–401; Krejnovich 1982:140–144), but inferred on the basis of indirect evidence. The combination of this suffix with the Future marker (*-te-*) expresses hypothetical meaning. Krejnovich cites his Kolyma Yukaghir consultant (1) demonstrating these basic distinctions:

- (1) a. *tudel qodo-j* ‘He is lying [if we see a person lying]’
- b. *tudel qodo-l'el* ‘He has lain [if we see traces of a hunter’s lying on the snow and know exactly whose traces they are]’
- c. *tudel qodo-l'el-te-l* ‘Probably, it was he who has lain [if we are *not sure* that these are his traces]’ (Krejnovich 1982:140)

The Evidentiality systems in the Yukaghir languages are essentially the same; for the reasons of space, it is impossible to illustrate each point for both languages in this chapter. In absence of explicit indications to the contrary, the prose description below covers both Yukaghir languages, but is exemplified by Kolyma Yukaghir data. All points of divergence are explicitly mentioned and illustrated by Tundra Yukaghir examples.

This chapter is based on published descriptions (Jochelson 1905; Krejnovich 1958, 1982); text corpora (Jochelson 1900; Nikolaeva 1988; Nikolaeva 1997; Maslova 2001); and my own field records and informal observations during two field trips (1987, 1992). It should be stressed that the most essential source of information for a study of an essentially deictic category, i.e. naturally occurring dialogues, is virtually non-existent in this corpus. At present,

the Yukaghir languages are scarcely used for everyday communication, which makes recording natural dialogue virtually impossible.² As a result, the present study relies heavily on other types of evidence to infer information about the basic deictic usage of the Evidential; this includes conversations within narratives, which are most often rendered in the form of direct speech dialogues; short narratives relating episodes of the narrator's own life; and native speakers' comments. Other (non-deictic) meanings associated with the category of evidentiality are described on the basis of the entire corpus of available texts.

2. An overview of verb inflection

The Yukaghir verb has the following morphological structure ("S" stands for stem):

- (2) Polarity-Mood-S-Aspect-*Evidentiality*-Number-Tense-Clause.Type/Person

There are two overt polarity markers, Negative (*el-*) and Affirmative (*me-*). The absence of an overt polarity marker signifies affirmative.

The Mood position distinguishes Irrealis (*et- ~ ot-*) and Realis (no overt marking). The Irrealis marker is incompatible with the Future suffix (*-t(e)-*), which is the only overt morpheme that can fill the Tense position. These morphemes thus constitute a single Tense/Mood category with three meanings: Realis (non-Future), Future, and Irrealis, e.g.:

- (3) a. *a:-m* 's/he made/has made'
 b. *a:-te-m* 's/he will make'
 c. *m-at-a:-m* 's/he would make (if...)' ; 's/he might make'

There is no obligatory past vs. present distinction (see §4.1 on temporal interpretation of non-Future forms).

The Evidentiality position class comprises two overt suffixes, Inferential (*-l'el-*) and Prospective (*-moži-*);³ these are opposed to unmarked Direct form, e.g.:

- (4) a. *mid'-u-m* 's/he took/has taken (I saw it)'
 b. *mil-l'el-u-m* 's/he took/has taken (I did not see it)'
 c. *min-moži-m* '(then) s/he is going to take (as a consequence of something else)'

The Prospective is incompatible with overt Tense/Mood markers and thus could be analyzed as a member of the Tense/Mood category. Formally, the anal-

ysis adopted here is justified by position class considerations: the Prospective takes the same linear position as the Inferential (before the Plural marker), whereas the Future follows the Plural marker, cf.:

- (5) a. *amde-moži-ŋi* '(then) (they) will/are going to die'
 b. *amde-ŋi-te-j* '(they) will die'

For semantic motivations of this analysis, see Section 5.

The Aspect position class comprises two suffixes: general Imperfective (-*nu*-) and Habitual (-*nun*- ~ -*nunnu*-), e.g.:

- (6) a. *juö-m* 's/he looked, saw'
 b. *juö-nu-m* 's/he is/was looking; looks/looked (always, regularly)'
 c. *juö-nunnu-m* 's/he used to look; always looks now (in contrast with the past)'

In Tundra Yukaghir, the suffix -*nu*- expresses only progressive meaning, e.g. *wie-nu-m* 's/he is/was making' vs. *wie-nun-u-m* 's/he makes, used to make.'

The clause type position subsumes markers of illocution, transitivity, and information packaging structure (the location of grammatical Focus) in finite clauses, as well as markers of various sub-types of non-finite clauses (medial, relative, etc.). The verb agrees with the subject in person and number. The Number position serves to distinguish singular and plural third person subjects (cf. (5)) and addressees of Imperative. Other person/number distinctions are expressed in the final structural position; these markers are present only if the subject is not marked as grammatical Focus.

Transitive and intransitive verbs have different clause type/person paradigms. The Inferential suffix triggers two deviations from regular agreement patterns. First, the 3sg Inferential form of intransitive verbs follows the transitive agreement pattern, as in (7b), or simply lacks overt clause type/person marker, as in (7c); the corresponding Direct form is shown in (7a).

- (7) a. *sög-i* enter-INTR:3SG
 b. *söw-ʔel-u-m* enter-INFR-0⁴-TR:3SG
 c. *söw-ʔel* enter-INFR(3SG)

Conversely, the first person Inferential forms of transitive verbs follow intransitive agreement pattern (Krejnovich 1982: 143).

- (8) a. *t'ine* chop(TR:1SG)
 b. *t'ine-ʔel-d'e* chop-INFR-INTR:1SG

- (9) a. *t'ine-j chop-TR:1PL*
 b. *t'ine-l'el-d'el'i chop-INFR-INTR:1PL*

These deviations may have a phonological motivation, since the 3sg intransitive and 1pl transitive clause type/person markers are formally (and probably etymologically) identical (*-j/-i*), which means that functionally opposite deviations occur in identical phonological contexts. On the other hand, the switch to intransitive agreement in the first person forms correlates with a certain decrease in semantic transitivity triggered by the Inferential marking (see Section 5.2 on the semantics of first person Inferential forms).

3. The category of evidentiality

3.1 Eyewitness vs. noneyewitness

The core of the Evidentiality system is formed by the morphological opposition between Direct Realis and Inferential forms. Two major classes of contexts which require the Inferential marking are *inference* from visible traces of the situation and reported information, or *hearsay*, e.g.:

- (10) a. *taŋ me:me naha: motlorqo-j-ben=ŋo:-l'el*
 that bear very thin-ATTR-NR=COP-INFR(INTR:3SG)
 'That bear was very thin' [as can be seen from his traces] (N54:10)⁵
- b. *mieste-ge alaŋcin aŋil'-ge nodo nojdi:-t*
 place-LOC Alanchin mouth-LOC bird watch-SS:IPFV
modo-l'el-ŋi.
 sit-INFR-3PL:INTR
 '[As people who once roamed together with him in their youth told,]
 they were sitting at a place called Alanchin mouth, watching for birds.'
 (K4:72–73)

Thus, the Yukaghir Direct vs. Inferential distinction instantiates the A1 Evidentiality system, as defined in Chapter 1 of this volume (eyewitness vs. noneyewitness). Similar to other languages of this type (cf. (Dixon, this volume) on Jarawara), the concept of 'eyewitness' depends on the nature of the situation. In particular, it does not necessarily imply visual evidence: the situation is conceived of as witnessed if it is perceived by means of the appropriate sense, cf. the contrasting forms in the following example:

- (13) a. *emej=tanpe kel-ŋi, lebejdi:-le ningo:*
 mother=ASC come-3PL:INTR berries-ACC lots.of
šaqal'e-š-l'el-ŋa:
 gather-CAUS-INFR-3PL:TR
 'Our mother and her companions came, they had gathered a lot of
 berries' [The speaker saw the berries when they came.] (K5:103)
- b. *mit-in pugedan'd'e šöri-lek jal-l'el-mele...*
 1PL-DAT tzar letter-FOC send-INFR-OF:3SG
 'The tzar has sent us a letter ...' [which is already received] (K1:26)

Thus, the Inferential can be used to signal that the speaker did not witness the event as it was going on, even if she has firsthand eyewitness evidence of that event by the time of speech. Although examples like (12)–(13) could be subsumed under the notion of inference from visible traces, they are clearly distinct from genuine instances of (non-trivial) inference, as in (11a). In such examples, the Inferential suffix appears to express *deferred evidence* meaning (see (de Reuse, this volume) on past deferred evidence marker in Western Apache), i.e. it signals just that the information on the situation was obtained after the situation had taken place, independently of the source of this information (eyewitness vs. noneyewitness).

The deferred evidence semantics is particularly clear in descriptions of a speaker's own actions, which cannot be accounted for in terms of inference, e.g.:

- (14) a. *ataq-un kun'il-get ningo: i:die-l'el-d'i:l'i*
 two-AT ten-ABL lots.of catch-INFR-INTR:1PL
 'It turned out that we had caught more than twenty' [The speaker participated in fishing, yet the fish was counted only afterwards.] (K5:92)
- b. *ta: ejre-t met me:me: abut anjil'-ge ta: cha:j-e*
 there walk-SS:IPFV I bear lair inlet-LOC there tea-ACC
o:ža:-l'el-d'e
 drink-INFR-INTR:1SG
 'While walking there, I drank tea near the lair of a bear' [The speaker noticed the lair later.]

On the other hand, examples like (11), where situations *S* and *E* are simultaneous, show that the Inferential can also express purely noneyewitness meaning. Thus, the noneyewitness and deferred evidence meanings are expressed by means of the same grammatical form, which is opposed to the unmarked 'simultaneous eyewitness' form.

3.3 Prospective vs. direct future

The Prospective form encodes a situation in the future (*S*) viewed as a consequence of an earlier situation (*E*), e.g.:

- (15) a. *met qollume tinj lebie-get kewe-j-moži:-je*
 I soon this earth-ABL go-PFV-PRSP-INTR:1SG
 'I am to leave this earth soon' [since I am very old]
- b. *met albo:-je, met uke-j-moži:-je*
 I lose-INTR:3SG I go.OUT-PFV-PRSP-INTR:3SG
 'I have lost, (this means that) I have to go out' (N21:28)

Thus, the Prospective resembles the Inferential in that it implicitly refers to an additional situation (*E*), which serves as the source of information on *S*. This semantic feature determines the semantic contrast between the Prospective and the Direct Future, which expresses a hypothesis about the future without any reference to the evidence on which this hypothesis is based. The semantics of this opposition is thus parallel to the Inferential vs. Direct Realis distinction, cf.:

- | | | | |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|--|
| | [−Future] | [+Future] | |
| [+Evidential] | Inferential | Prospective | |
| [−Evidential] | Direct Realis | Direct Future | |

The eyewitness vs. noneyewitness distinction is neutralized in the Future contexts.

To sum up, the morphological category of Evidentiality subsumes two interrelated semantic parameters, the presence of a source of information (*E*) distinct from the situation being described (*S*) and relative tense of *S* with regard to *E*, as summarized in the following scheme:

- | | | |
|--------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | Source of Information | Relative Time of Evidence |
| Direct | eyewitness ($E = S$) | simultaneous evidence |
| Inferential | noneyewitness | deferred evidence ($t_E > t_S$) |
| Prospective | (noneyewitness) | anterior evidence ($t_E < t_S$) |

The relative time of evidence correlates with absolute tense: simultaneous and deferred evidence meanings are limited to non-future situations, anterior evidence, to future situations.

4. Interaction with other grammatical categories

4.1 Tense and aspect

Since the correlation between Evidentiality and the morphological category of Tense (Future vs. non-Future) is described in §3.3, this section focuses on the past vs. present interpretation of non-Future forms, which, to a certain extent, depends on their Evidential semantics.

In order to describe this dependency, it is necessary to distinguish three aspectual types of predicates (Comrie 1976:25):

- (18) **Perfective predicates:** telic verbs without Imperfective markers.

Imperfective predicates:

Habitual: verbs marked for habitual/generic meaning and predicates signifying stable properties.

Continuous: atelic verbs and telic verbs marked for progressive meaning.

The temporal semantics of non-Future forms is summarized in (19):

(19)	Direct Realis	Inferential
Perfective:	past	past
Continuous:	past/present	past
Habitual:	past/present	past/present

The Inferential form entails past time reference for any non-habitual predicate (as shown by virtually all examples in this paper), whereas the Direct Realis form allows present interpretation of any Imperfective predicate, cf. (1a) and (6). Thus, the Direct Realis and Inferential forms differ only with regard to temporal interpretation of continuous predicates. This distinction seems to be determined by the deferred evidence meaning of the Inferential suffix: if the situation being described precedes the time of evidence, and the evidence is available at the time of speech, then the situation itself must precede the time of speech. Thus, for all situations viewed as temporally limited, the deferred evidence meaning implies past time reference. If, however, the situation is conceived of as a characteristic feature of a protracted period of time, this implication does not apply, since such a period can easily include both the time of acquiring the evidence and the time of speech, cf. examples (22) and (24).

In Tundra Yukaghir, the Inferential is incompatible with the Progressive marker (*-nu-*), so that the constraint on a present interpretation of Continuous predicates applies only to atelic verbs. In Kolyma Yukaghir, the same suffix

serves as a general Imperfective marker (see (6b)) and can be combined with the Inferential in both progressive (20) and habitual (22) meanings. In this morphological context, the Inferential suffix can be used only in its hearsay meaning, i.e. the notion of inference from visible traces (or deferred visual evidence) is incompatible with the Imperfective marking.

4.2 Tense and mood

The Irrealis Inferential forms are possible but extremely rare in natural discourse. They occur only within stretches of discourse related in the Inferential form throughout, i.e. if the whole description of the episode is based on hearsay (see Section 5), e.g.:

- (20) *tamun-gele el-l'uo-l'el-ŋi juö-l'el-ŋide*
 that-ACC NEG-see-INFR-3PL:INTR see-INFR-SS:COND
m-et-aji:-nu-l'el-ŋa.
 AFF-IRR-shoot-IPFV-INFR-3PL:TR
 [Two swans passed by (INFR)]. ‘They did not see that (INFR). If they had seen it, they would be shooting at them (IRR+INFR).’ (K4:94–95).

The Irrealis falls within the scope of Inferential in all examples of this sort, i.e. the Inferential signals that the complex fact expressed by the conditional construction as a whole has been learned from hearsay.

The combination of Inferential and Future markers expresses hypothetical modality (Krejnovich 1982: 140–141). The following examples show that it can be used to encode hypotheses about present (21a) and past (21b) situations:

- (21) a. *a:che chuge-ge jo:dude-t ejrie-l'el-te-j.*
 deer track-LOC turn-SS:IPFV walk-INFR-FUT-INTR:3SG
 ‘He is probably walking along deer tracks.’ (K3:48)
 b. *locil-ŋin lebie-d emej-ŋin tadi:-nu-l'el-te-m.*
 fire-DAT soil-AT mother-DAT give-IPFV-INFR-FUT-TR:3SG
 ‘Probably, he used to give it to the Fire, to Mother of the Earth.’
 (K4:57)

This form cannot be used with future temporal reference, i.e. a hypothesis about future must be expressed by means of the Direct Future form.

This use of the Inferential suffix may seem to indicate that it can acquire epistemic meaning. However, the meaning of hypothesis can also be taken as the invariant semantic component of the Future suffix, i.e. the Hypothetical (Inferential Future) and Direct Future forms can be assumed to have the same

epistemic meaning and to differ in time reference only. Under this assumption, the Inferential suffix in the Hypothetical form contributes the temporal meaning of non-Future, but does not bear the epistemic meaning, preserving its basic meaning of non-witnessed past/present situation. Essentially the same approach seems to be taken by Krejnovich, who describes the Inferential Realis and Hypothetical forms as two variants of the “noneyewitness mood”, “certain” and “uncertain” respectively (1982: 140).

4.3 Clause type

The Evidential suffixes do not occur in Imperative sentences. In questions, the Inferential marking is possible, but extremely infrequent. It is attested in specific questions only and applies to the *presupposition* of the question: in (22), for example, the Inferential indicates that the speaker has not witnessed people going away from his current location:

- (22) *qodo ti:-t kebej-nu-l'el-ŋi?*
 how here-ABL go-IPFV-INFR-3PL:INTR
 ‘How do people go away from here?’ (N35:513)

In contrast with most languages that allow Evidential marking in interrogative sentences (see Chapter 1 of this volume), the Inferential form of question does not involve any assumptions about the addressee’s source of information.

5. Semantic extensions of the Inferential suffix

5.1 Inferential with predicates of internal properties: Mirativity

Strictly speaking, internal properties (being clever, kind, bad, etc.) can only be inferred on the basis of their external manifestations; however, predicates signifying such properties can occur in both Direct and Inferential form. It seems that a morphological distinction is drawn between properties that are displayed and/or acknowledged by the speaker for the first time (Inferential) and properties that have been established earlier and are therefore known to be present (Direct). For example, in a narrative about the speaker’s very first hunting experience, whereby he was supervised by his elder brother, the brother makes two encouraging statements, first (23a) (right after the hunting was over) and then (23b):

5.3 Inferential in non-finite forms: Relative past

In Tundra Yukaghir, the Inferential suffix is used in non-finite forms as a marker of relative past; in this function, it is paradigmatically opposed to the Progressive suffix, which expresses relative present, e.g.:

TUNDRA YUKAGHIR

- (26) a. *sew-l'el-da-ha mon-i...*
 enter-INFR-3-DS say-INTR:3SG
 'When he had come in, she said:...' (T1:231)
- b. *arej neri-nu-da-hane sal'hari:-gi*
 suddenly bite-PROG-3-DS:COND tooth-POSS
me-lepege-t'
 AFF-fall.off-PFV:INTR:3SG
 'Suddenly, as it was gnawing like that, its tooth fell out.' (T8:51)

TUNDRA YUKAGHIR

- (27) *wie-l'el-d'e köde* 'person who has/had made'
wie-nu-je köde 'person who is/was making'

This usage of the Inferential suffix is clearly related to the temporal (deferred evidence) component of its primary meaning. Both the Inferential and Progressive meanings imply the existence of a temporal reference point distinct from the time of situation and the time of speech, time of evidence and reference time respectively. For non-finite forms, the temporal reference point is identified with the time of the situation expressed by the main clause, which leads to an interpretation of the Progressive as relative present, and the Inferential, as relative past. Grammaticalization of this distinction in non-finite forms may have determined the constraint on the compatibility of the Inferential and Progressive suffixes in finite forms (see §4.1).

In Kolyma Yukaghir, the use of the Inferential suffix in non-finite forms is limited to conditional forms in counterfactual conditional constructions (cf. (20)); there is no relative tense opposition of the kind exemplified in (26)–(27).

6. Discourse strategies: Shift of the deictic center

Given the eyewitness semantics of the Direct form, one would expect to find whole narratives related in the Inferential form throughout whenever a speaker describes events which they learned about from someone else, including all

sorts of oral heritage. Indeed, this form of narrating events is quite common: speakers do consistently use the Inferential form to signal that they learned about the events from someone else.

However, if the context unambiguously rules out the speaker as a potential witness of the events being described, the speaker can choose another strategy, whereby the story is narrated in the Direct form and the Evidentiality marking is reoriented towards another potential recipient of information, usually the main protagonist of the story. In other words, the “reference point” with regard to which the eyewitness vs. noneyewitness distinction is defined may be shifted from the speaker to a different observer (cf. Krejnovich 1958: 127). This phenomenon is illustrated by the following example:

- (28) *chaj lolha-j-ge cha:j-ek o:že-ŋile. oqonastie pulut tude jouje*
 tea boil-PFV-DS tea-FOC drink-3PL:OF Afanasiy old.man 3SG net
juö-t bicun anil-gele cumu i:die-l'el-u-m.
 see-SS:IPFV various fish-ACC all catch-INF-0-TR:3SG
 ‘When the tea was ready, they drank it. Afanasiy the old man had checked
 his net and it turned out that he caught all kinds of fish.’ (K4: 124–125)

The Direct form in the first sentence is admissible since it has been made clear earlier in the text that this part of the story is based on hearsay. The immediate context sets one protagonist (Afanasiy) as the deictic center of the situation. The Inferential form is used to indicate that the situation was not witnessed by the observer singled out by the context: Afanasiy did not see fish get into his net.

The choice between ‘Direct’ and ‘Inferential’ discourse strategies seems to be determined by the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the whole story, but in a somewhat unexpected way: the consistent Inferential marking is used to highlight the positive epistemic stance and to stress that the listener is supposed to take the story as truthful. For example, an episode of Yukaghir history which had happened before the speaker’s lifetime or a mythological story would almost certainly be narrated in the Inferential form: since it is clear that the speaker has no firsthand information, they would consistently indicate that they do have some other source of reliable information. On the contrary, a fairy tale can be easily told in the Direct form (although the Inferential strategy is possible as well). There seems to be a slight difference between Kolyma and Tundra Yukaghir conventions: the Inferential marking used throughout a narrative (including fairy tales) appears more common in the former, so that the “shifted” usage figures more prominently in Tundra Yukaghir. However, the number of narrators is so small that it is easy to take an accidental difference in their personal narrative styles for a difference between languages.

At another level, even a story narrated in the Inferential form can occasionally switch to the Direct form for an episode or two, most often when the speaker goes into vivid details of some episode (as if they were an actual witness of the situation). Moreover, the deictic center may shift multiple times in the course of a narrative between several potential observers (including the speaker), the result being a quite complex interplay of speaker-oriented and shifted Inferential marking. Some instances of the Inferential marking in Tundra Yukaghir appear not to invoke any specific observer; consider the following example:

TUNDRA YUKAGHIR

- (29) *tide talhuo-d'e t'i: qu:dej-nu-reŋ endu ma:rqa-n*
 that hide-AT people climb-PROG-SS:IPFV each one-AT
t'awjuol-ek lew-l'el-ŋu-mle sawhaq=enmu-t.
 piece-FOC eat-INFTR-PL-TR:OF.3 plate=DSTR-ABL
 'It turned out that those hidden men, before they climbed up the tree, had eaten a piece from each plate.' (T1:395)

The discourse context of (29) contains two groups of protagonists, the primary participants of the situation (A) and the owners of the plates (B). The sentence appears immediately after the information that the B-group found out that some food was missing from their plates. The Inferential suffix cannot be interpreted with regard to the A-group (they did witness their own eating), nor to the B-group, since they are unable to find out, at this point of the story, who had eaten the food. It appears that the Inferential is used because the situation occurred before the current reference time of narrative, i.e. to signal a deviation from temporally iconic presentation of events. In other words, the deferred evidence meaning is reinterpreted with regard to the speaker-listener interaction (the relevant information is provided later than suggested by the storyline). This use of the Yukaghir Inferential seems to resemble the commentative function of evidential markers in Abkhaz (Chirikba, this volume); however, such examples are too rare for any positive conclusions.

It seems worth mentioning that the deictic shift phenomenon has somewhat paradoxical implications with regard to the grammatical status of Evidentiality in Yukaghir. On the one hand, the possibility of using the Direct form to describe situations that were not witnessed by the speaker seems to indicate that the Evidentiality distinction proper is not obligatory (hence, not grammatical); on the other hand, the shift of deictic center is quite common for deictic categories (cf. e.g. the “narrative present” phenomenon) and seems to

show that the category has been extended to cover a broader range of contexts and to thus indicate a more advanced grammaticalization.

7. An Evidentiality strategy: Result Nominal?

Krejnovich (1982: 140, 208–209) mentions constructions with the Result Nominal (the suffix *-o:l*) in a predicative function as a strategy used to indicate that the source of the information about the situation is based on its visible traces. The primary function of this construction is to present a state of affairs as a result of a preceding action:

- (30) a. *tabun poŋžube lukil eju:-l-o:-gi*
 that wood.grouse arrow get-0-RNR-POSS
 ‘It is the trace of wood grouse’s arrows’ (N6:38)
- b. *met-kele met es’ie jad-o:-gi* [...] [*...*]
 I-ACC my father send-RNR-POSS
 ‘It was my father who had sent me . . . ’ (lit. (My being here) is a result of my father’s having sent me. . .) (N22:35)

As shown by these examples, the situation itself may (30b), but need not (30a), be witnessed by the speaker (example (30a) is the conclusion of a mythological story intended to explain the origin of the white spots on pike’s skin). In neither case is it assumed that the information about the preceding situation is (or can be) inferred from the observable state of affairs: the speaker has this knowledge from some other source. In most cases, it is assumed that the listener can observe the result (e.g. the speaker being at a certain place, as in (30b)), but not the situation that brought about this result (his father having sent him there), and the latter constitutes the information conveyed by the sentence. It seems that this construction neutralizes the Evidentiality distinctions that otherwise must be encoded morphologically (by choosing between the Direct and the Inferential forms), yet it cannot be considered an Evidentiality strategy.

8. Conclusion

According to the classification adopted in this volume, the Inferential vs. Direct morphological opposition in Yukaghir instantiates the binary ‘eyewitness vs. noneyewitness’ (A1) Evidentiality system and features some semantic overtones characteristic of such systems cross-linguistically, such as mirative con-

notations and inadvertent interpretations of first person Inferential forms. On the other hand, this opposition is built into a morphological category with a strong temporal dimension, so that the noneyewitness term can also signify deferred eyewitness evidence. The resulting Evidentiality system is comprised of three terms: simultaneous eyewitness evidence (unmarked), noneyewitness and/or deferred evidence, and anterior evidence (for future situations only). The deferred evidence meaning of the noneyewitness term accounts for semantic extensions which seem to be cross-linguistically unusual for A1 systems, the shift of deictic center and the relative past meaning in non-finite forms.

The data presented here suggest that temporal semantics play a more significant role in Tundra Yukaghir, where some instances of the Inferential marking seem to display a perfect-like meaning. Since the noneyewitness meaning figures saliently in all native speaker accounts of the semantics of the Inferential suffix and can be thus taken to constitute its semantic prototype, the situation in Tundra Yukaghir appears to display the mirror-image of a more cross-linguistically common situation where Perfect forms are used as an Evidentiality strategy. However, the available data is insufficient to reconstruct the diachronic development of the Inferential suffix, in particular, to find out whether the temporal semantics of this suffix results from grammaticalization of a noneyewitness marker or vice versa.

Notes

1. I am grateful to all participants of the Workshop on Evidentiality at RCLT (2001) for insightful and encouraging discussion of the previous version of this paper and of Evidentiality in general.
2. Both languages are on the verge of extinction: Kolyma Yukaghir is spoken by ca. 50 people, and Tundra Yukaghir by ca. 150 people (Vakhtin 1991).
3. In Tundra Yukaghir, the Prospective suffix has the form *-mori-*.
4. 0 in glosses indicates that the vowel is epenthetic.
5. Reference to published text corpora are organized as follows: the letter refers to the text corpus (N for (Nikolaeva 1988), K for the Kolyma Yukaghir corpus of (Maslova 2001), T for the Tundra Yukaghir corpus in the same book); it is followed by text number and sentence number(s) within the text. All examples without explicit references are taken from my unpublished field records. The relevant context information for text examples is summarized in brackets [].
6. Krejnovich (1982:208) claims that inference on the basis of auditory information can be marked by suffix *-že-* (in Subject-Focus constructions). In actual fact, this suffix is a non-productive detransitivizer (used with a very small group of verbs), and thus cannot function as a regular Evidential marker.

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CHAPTER 10

Evidentiality in M̃ky

Ruth Monserrat and R. M. W. Dixon

1. Introduction

M̃ky is a language isolate, spoken on the Upper Juruena River in the state of Mato Grosso, Brazil (Iranxe is another dialect of the language); there are currently about 70 speakers, who are increasingly becoming bilingual in Portuguese. This report was written by Dixon and is entirely based on Monserrat (2000), which is the result of extensive field work by Ruth Monserrat, commencing in 1980; the report has been read and approved by Monserrat.

There are 17 consonant phonemes: *p, t, k, m, n*; palatalised *pj, tj, kj, mj, nj*; glottal stop ^ʔ (written as ^ʔ); fricatives *s, f* (written as *x*), *h*; semi-vowels *j, w*; liquid *r* (the Iranxe dialect also has a contrast between *r* and *l*). There are seven vowel phonemes, each of which can be either short or long and/or either plain or nasalised; they are *i, ε* (written as *e*), *ĩ* (written as *y*), *a, a, u* and *o* (written as *o*).

The verb in M̃ky may take a single productive prefix (with iterative meaning) and no less than 11 orders of suffixes; these are set out in Table 1. There is a visual/non-visual distinction coded in suffix set 7, while other evidentiality values are included (with negation) in suffix set 4. In addition, suffix 9 indicates uncertainty, which can relate to an evidentiality system in other languages.

2. Visual/nonvisual

There are three paradigms of subject pronominals in suffix slot 7: (I) referring to present and immediate past, in declarative mood; (II) referring to non-immediate past, in declarative mood; (III) 'irrealis', referring to future time in declarative mood, and to interrogative and imperative moods.

Table 1. Verb structure in M̄yky

prefix		iterative VERB STEM (may involve compounding)
suffix	1	aspect – perfective, progressive, frustrative (‘tried but failed’), non-lasting, absolutely, etc.
	2	pronominal form referring to object, showing whether (i) 1st, 2nd or 3rd person or reflexive; and (ii) sg or nsg
	3	pragmatic marker (first set), indicating whether speaker and subject belong to different classes; for example, male and female, adult and child, human and non-human animate, human and spirit
	4	evidentiality/negation – see §3
	5	habitual marker – impersonal (for example, ‘one plants peanuts’) or personal (‘I eat corn’)
	6	tense – remote past, immediate future, general future
	7	pronominal form referring to subject, indicating (i) 1st, 2nd or 3rd person; (ii) sg, du or pl; (iii) present, past or irrealis; (iv) (only if 2nd or 3rd person, and present or past) visual (observed by speaker) or non-visual
	8	mood – declarative, interrogative (with present and past forms), imperative, mirative (surprise or admiration), plus emphatic (this only for 1st person subject and present tense)
	9	marker of uncertainty (‘I think so’)
	10	pragmatic markers (second set) – similar to suffix 3, marking whether speaker and subject belong to the same class, and also whether a question, command or response
	11	marker of discourse organisation; for example, <i>-nā</i> in example (3)

There is no further marking for present/immediate past; that is, slot 6 is left vacant for this tense choice. Remote past involves suffix *-kare* (sg subject) or *-ka* (nsg subject) in slot 6, followed by a choice from paradigm II in slot 7. If there is no suffix in slot 6, then a form from paradigm II in slot 7 is taken to refer to non-immediate non-remote past. Future is shown by a suffix in slot 6, followed by a form from paradigm III in slot 7.

In paradigms I and II of slot 7, there are different subject pronominals for ‘visual’ (speaker sees it) and ‘nonvisual’ (speaker does not see it), when the subject is 2nd person – see Table 2. When the subject is 3rd person, a visual/nonvisual distinction is made just in paradigm II. There is no visual/nonvisual distinction in paradigm III. That is, 2nd person marks visual/nonvisual in present and past declarative, and third person just in past declarative. For 1st person subject (that is, when the subject is identical with the speaker) there is never any visual/nonvisual specification.

Table 2. 2nd person subject pronominals in slot 7, paradigms I and II

subject	paradigm I, present/immediate past		paradigm II, non-immediate past	
	visual	non-visual	visual	non-visual
2sg	-si	-hmī	-xu	-hmjū
2du	-mé-xi	-mé-hmi	-mé-xu	-mé-hmjū
2pl	-m ó-xi	-m ó-hmī	-m ó-xu	-m ó-hmjū

Examples include:

- (1) *jamā -pju-si* *ka*
give-3PL0-2SG.SUBJECT+PRESENT+VISUAL arrow
'you (sg) just gave them (an) arrow' (and the speaker saw it)
- (2) *matosi manā -ø-méhmī*
monkey kill-3SG0-2DUSUBJECT+PRESENT+NONVISUAL
'you two just killed (a) monkey' (and the speaker didn't see it)
- (3) *jontje to kare-méxu-nā*
yesterday go hunt-2DUSUBJECT+PAST+VISUAL-DISCOURSE
'yesterday, you two went out hunting' (and the speaker saw it)
- (4) *jontje xahtaka-méhmjū*
yesterday return-2DUSUBJECT+PAST+NONVISUAL
'yesterday, you two returned' (the speaker knows it, but wasn't there at the time to observe it)

The personal habitual suffix, *-na/-ne*, in slot 5, takes paradigm II in slot 7, and can co-occur with visual or non-visual:

- (5) *katētiri tutu-na-máxu*
flute play-HABITUAL-2PL.SUBJECT+VISUAL
'you all play the flute' (the speaker has observed this)
- (6) *sēi kuratu āka-né-hmjū*
2SG maize eat-HABITUAL-2SG.SUBJECT+NONVISUAL
'you (sg) habitually eat corn' (the speaker knows this, but hasn't really seen it)

3. The evidentiality/negation system

There are four suffixes in slot 4. The system is optional. (Alternatively, there could be said to be a fifth term with zero marking, showing that none of the positive specifications apply.) The four non-zero suffixes are:

- a. *-ǎra, -rǎra*, negative;
- b. *-maka*, reported ('someone said this'), typically used in myths and traditional stories;
- c. *-aka*, inferred ('it appears that');
- d. *-hé* (with allomorph *-étiro*), speculative ('it is likely that').

What is noteworthy is the occurrence of negative in the same system as the reported and inferred evidentiality specifications, and the speculative marker.

Examples of (b–d) are:

- (7) *alȳ-maka-∅*
die-REPORTED-3SG(III)
'it is said that he just died'
- (8) *kǎja=kao-aka-∅*
be.delicious=LOTS-INFERRED-3SG(III)
'it appears to be delicious'
- (9) *maromȳ mǎnǎ-étiro-o-∅*
tomorrow rain-SPECULATIVE-FUTURE-3SG(III)
'it'll probably rain tomorrow'

The negation/evidentiality suffixes in slot 4 are attested with a variety of suffixes from the three paradigms in slot 7. However, there appears to be no possibility of a visual/non-visual distinction in conjunction with any of the set 4 specifications. The mirative mood suffix (in slot 8) appears to take visual forms from paradigm I in slot 7; again, there is no visual/non-visual distinction.

4. Summary

The evidentiality values shown in the grammar of Mȳky span two distinct suffix systems:

- (1) Visual versus nonvisual – for 2nd person subject in paradigm I, and for both 2nd and 3rd person subjects in paradigms I and II; never for 1st person subject. That is, the distinction applies:

Table 3. Interrelation of person with visual/nonvisual evidentiality

paradigm II – declarative mood, non-immediate past tense	2nd and 3rd person subject
paradigm II – declarative mood, present and immediate past tense	2nd person subject
interrogative and imperative moods	not applicable

(2) Reported or inferred (plus speculative), in the same system as negation, in slot 4.

It appears that the two systems cannot be combined. That is, a visual/non-visual specification cannot be combined with a reported or inferred evidentiality specification (nor with negative or speculative).

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Evidential category and evidential strategy in Abkhaz

Viacheslav Chirikba

1. Abkhaz: General information¹

Abkhaz, together with Circassian and the recently extinct Ubykh, belongs to the small Abkhazo-Adyghean (or West Caucasian) language family. West Caucasian is one of three indigenous language families spoken in the Caucasus, the others being East Caucasian, or Nakh-Daghestanian, and Kartvelian, or South Caucasian.

Abkhaz consists of three dialect groups: the northern one, including Tapanta Abaza, the southern one, or Abkhaz proper (with such dialects as Abzhywa, Bzyp, Sadz and Ahchypsy), and Ashkharywa, which, though closer to the southern group, can in general be regarded as intermediate between the northern and the southern groups.

Abkhaz has an elaborately developed verbal system. The verb is characterized by polypersonalism, the verb-form being able to encode up to 4 arguments. The striking feature of Abkhaz is that it operates its ergative strategy without the use of overt case-marking, the ergativity being expressed by virtue of form and position of class/person prefixes. Verbs are grouped into dynamic or stative, which differ, in particular, in the number of tenses: stative verbs lack the majority of tenses possessed by their dynamic counterparts. Verbs distinguish also finite and non-finite forms.

Polysynthesis is another salient feature of Abkhaz; the verb-form consists of a long string of prefixes (expressing grammatical and directional meanings), while less numerous suffixes serve as bearers of temporal, aspectual and some other meanings.

Abkhaz tenses form two symmetrical groups, the formal criterion for the distinction between them being the use of either *-t'* or *-n* as the ending of fi-

nite forms of dynamic verbs. The general scheme of the dynamic verb tenses is as follows:

First Tense Group: Present, Aorist, Future I, Future II, Perfect.

Second Tense Group: Imperfect, Past Indefinite, Future Conditional I, Future Conditional II, Pluperfect.

Abkhaz is the only West Caucasian language which has a category of grammatical noun class, subdivided into the class of humans (HUM) and non-humans (NHUM). The former is further subdivided into masculine (MASC) and feminine (FEM). The class system finds its expression in verbal, pronominal and number systems.

2. Evidential category and evidential strategy

Abkhaz has a straightforward and in most cases grammatically autonomous (i.e. not overlapping with other categories) system of coding evidentiality. In Abkhaz evidentiality is an obligatory grammatical category.

The Abkhaz evidential forms were briefly discussed already in the first Abkhaz grammar written by the Russian general and linguist Baron Peter Uslar. Uslar (1887:23) seems to have noticed the presence of Inferential II forms only (with suffix *-za[a]rən*), which he mistakenly identified as belonging to the domain of the conditional mood (*‘zavisimoe ot uslovija’* = ‘dependent on condition’). The Georgian linguist Lomtadze in her two important articles (1954; 1955, cf. also 1988) discussed the origin of inferential markers in Abkhaz(-Abaza). The Abkhaz linguist Chkadua (1970:201–202) regards inferentials as intermediate formations between the temporal forms of indicative and the mood forms. According to her colleague Aristava (1982:86), though the inferential category in Abkhaz is not regarded in the specialist literature as belonging to the ‘mood’ domain, it can be qualified as one of the forms of the indicative, “combining the objective-real meaning with the subjective-problematic meaning”.

The 1979a article by Hewitt is specially devoted to the inferential category in Abkhaz. Hewitt discusses the semantics of Abkhaz inferentials and possible explanations of the origin of this category. In his Abkhaz grammar, Hewitt (1979b:196) describes the inferential mood under the sub-rubric of ‘authority for assertion’, specifying it as expressing an assertion made as a result of inference or hearsay.

The evidential category is a pan-Caucasian phenomenon, present in one or another form in the majority of, if not all, Caucasian languages. From a broader areal perspective, the Caucasus is known to form a so-called ‘evidentiality belt’ encompassing also Asia Minor and the Balkans. Donabedian (2001:429) calls this area the ‘Balkan-Caucasian continuum’.

Of recent publications on evidentiality in Kartvelian languages, see the discussion of Svan by Sumbatova (1999) and of Georgian by Boeder (2000). On evidentiality in Daghestanian languages see, in particular, publications on Tsakhur edited by Kibrik and Testelets (1999), on Lak by Friedman (2000), and a more general survey by Tatevosov (1998).

Evidential category in Abkhaz, according to Aikhenvald’s classification, can be generally determined as a basic two-term system A2 (cf. Aikhenvald, Chapter 1), i.e. ‘non-firsthand and everything else’, though evidentials in Abkhaz have also unwitnessed and reported readings.

Evidential Category

Inferential. Verb stem + inferential suffixes *-zaap’* (Inferential I)/*-zaarən* (Inferential II).

Evidential Strategy. Besides having a distinct morphological category, Abkhaz also uses a range of other grammatical and lexical means to express the evidential strategy. These are: (a) the quotative particle *h^oa* (cf. §4.1) and (b) the reportative verb *a-h^oa-ra* ‘to tell, say’ (§4.2).

3. Inferential

3.1 Formal expression

Inferential meanings are expressed by adding to the verbal stem of the compound suffixes *-z+aa+p’* or *-z+aa+rə+n*, sometimes referred to as Inferential I and II. The frequency of the suffix *-zaarən* is much lower than that of *-zaap’*. Both forms are neutral as to the tense distinctions and can refer either to past, present or future, the bearer of temporal (and aspectual) meaning being the stem provided by appropriate suffixes. In the verb-form inferential markers occupy the right-most position, reserved for the ending slot. The rare exception to this rule is the adding to the verb-form of the emphatic particle *-aj* (cf. example (9) below).

3.2 Semantics of inferentials

Three main meanings of Abkhaz inferentials can be singled out: (a) *unwitnessed (reported)*, (b) *commentative* and (c) *mirative*. Within the scope of these three terms, a variety of subtler contextually determined nuances can be encountered, such as uncertainty as to the information conveyed, speculation, conjecture, logical deduction, tentative conclusion, summary or judgment, surprise discovery, sudden realization, a guess, etc. On the other hand, the non-inferential, zero-marked term would refer to ‘everything else’.

The speaker uses inferential forms to emphasize the fact that they do not take responsibility or authority over the assertion, or that they were not a witness or direct participant in the event described, or to give additional background information to the narrated event. The Inferential can refer to situations when certain (past) facts or events are inferred, assumed, presumed or logically deduced from their observable results. The speaker can be an actual observer of the action, but, as a norm, not a direct or conscious participant of the event. Inferential forms can be translated into English as ‘apparently’, ‘evidently’, ‘seemingly’, ‘as it turns/turned out’.

Below are examples of a range of evidential nuances, grouped under the sub-rubrics of *unwitnessed*, *commentative* and *mirative*.

3.2.1 *Unwitnessed (Reported)*

Here the Russian term *zaglaznoe naklonenie* (‘out-of-sight mood’) is justified, as ‘unwitnessed’ refers to events of which the narrator was not a direct observer or a witness, their knowledge being based on what they heard from other people (hearsay), or came to know in a way other than direct observation. Sometimes the reported aspect of inferentials is reinforced by expressions like *jə-z+la-r-h^oa-wa a-la* ‘as they say’. The following are some of the nuances of the ‘unwitnessed/reported’.

- (1) a-laša+ra-x', a-mca-x' d-an-aa-j-ø,
 ART-light-DIR ART-fire-DIR (s)he-when-hither-come-AOR:NFIN
 lə-la-k^oa ø-q'apš'-za jə-q'a-n, d-c^oəwa-zaarən.
 her-eye-PL it-red-ADV it-be-PAST (s)he-cry-INFER2
 ‘When she came up to the light, to the fire, her eyes were very red; apparently, she had been crying.’ (DG)

- (2) l-x°əč°ə d-anə-l-ba-ø a-c°əwa-ra
 her-child him/her-when-she-see-AOR:NFIN ART-cry-DN
 d-a-la+ga-zaap'.
 (s)he-it-begin-INFER1
 'When she saw her child, she reportedly started crying.' (Aristava 1982: 88)
- (3) ø-až°ə+t°+w-aa jə-z+l-a-r-h°-wa a-la,
 ART-old+human-PL it-how-about-they-tell-PRES:DYN:NFIN it-by
 a-p'ap' jə-w+aa+h°-c°a a-h°a øə-r-q'aa-nə, a-la
 ART-priest his-helper-PL ART-pig it-CAUS-shriek-PABS ART-dog
 ø-r-zə-j-š'-zaap'.
 it-them-for-he-kill-INFER1
 'As it was recounted by old people, having made the pig cry, the priest reportedly killed (and served) the dog for his helpers.' (Anshba 55)

3.2.2 Commentative

When used in the 'commentative' function, the inferential forms serve to concentrate the listener's attention on certain focal points of the unfolding intrigue or to give background-information known to the narrator, but not to the listener. Though sometimes the inferential form in this function contains a tinge of inference or the unwitnessed (reported), the main meaning of the form in question is rather provision of background information or comment, which allows us to regard 'commentative' as a relatively independent meaning, on a par with inference and unwitnessed.

(4) A giant observes the battle of two protagonists and then makes a tentative conclusion:

"ar+t ø-nə-(a)j+ba-r-c°a-wa-zaap",
 these they-PREV-REC-CAUS-perish-PROGR²-INFER1
 ø-jə-h°a-n, až°
 it-he-say-PINDEF ONE:HUM
 d-aa-š'tə-j-xə-n j-arʔa mag°
 him/her-hither-from.ground-he-take-PINDEF his-right boot
 d-ta-jə-r-t°a-ø-jt'.
 him/her-inside-he-CAUS-sit-AOR-DYN:FIN
 "'They are apparently killing each other," having said (this), he picked up one of them and put him into his right boot.' (Marr 13)

Note that in (4) the inference (assumption) is based on a direct observation by the protagonist, who however, until a certain moment, was not a direct participant, but only an outside observer of the action.

(5) In a story about a person who gained power over a mermaid by cutting off and hiding a lock of her hair, the verb forms used are non-inferential until the narrator comes to an important remark that the person's little daughter saw where her father hid the mermaid's hair:

a-x°əč'ə jə-l-ba-zaap'.
 ART-child it-she-see-INFER1
 'The child, as it turned out, saw it.' (Anshba 79)

The choice of this particular verb to be marked by an inferential marker is strategically important, as this knowledge led to a dramatic consequence. Cunningly, the mermaid makes the naïve child tell her the whereabouts of her hair, takes possession of it, kills the child and disappears.

(6) A young man is visited in his dreams by a devil woman who insists on marrying him. The man tells his friend about the nightmare and adds that he is going to kill the she-devil. Soon the news about the man's suicide comes. The story ends with the narrator's comment, which might as well reflect the victim's friend's thoughts:

pxəʒ-la jə-jə-ba-wa+z a-ph°əs
 dream-INSTR it-he-see-IMPERF:NFIN ART-woman
 d-l-aj+x+sə-z ø-ʒ+š'a-ø, rəcha, jə-xə
 (s)he-her-shoot-PINDEF:NFIN it-think-PABS:NFIN poor.soul his-head
 j-a-g°ə+də-j-c'a-zaap'.
 it-it³-PREV-he-put-INFER1
 'Having thought that he was shooting at the woman in his dream, he, poor soul, as it turned out, shot himself.' (Anshba 81)

3.2.3 *Mirative*

An inferential *can*, depending on the context, acquire mirative overtones, which imply a sudden realization or a surprise discovery, a surprise confirmation of a certain knowledge or reputation.

(7) The Prince of Abkhazia is visiting a peasant. The latter is entertaining the high guest with stories, while the prince sometimes asks about the details. Apparently they were speaking loudly, because the host's child started crying in its cradle. The prince is surprised, as he was not aware of the presence of the child. He exclaims:

sa+ra jə-s-ajha+bə-w a-wa+j^o-dəw-c^oq^oa abra
 I it-me-elder-PRES:STAT:NFIN ART-man-big-really here
 də-q^oa-zaap^o.

(s)he-be-INFERI

'It turns out (unexpectedly) that there is really a great person here who is more important than me!' (DG 175)

Mirative semantics can be reinforced by the use of emphatic words or the emphatic particle *-aj*.

(8) A person, having met another character called Arsana after some time, is perplexed by the fact that Arsana's hair had turned grey. Though the person does not doubt the actual exactness of his observation, he expresses his surprise at this fact by means of the inferential form combined with the emphatic interjection *ǰəm*:

arsana, wə-xə ø-šla-zaap^o, ǰəm.
 Arsana your-head it-grey-INFERI INTERJ
 'Arsana, your hair (lit. head) is apparently grey, man!'
 (Aristava & Chkadua 1966: 154)

(9) The use of the emphatic suffix *-aj*:

j-a+ba-ǰ^oa-sə-m-š^oa-wa – a-g^oə+m+š^oa
 it-INTER-PREV-I-not-evaluate-PRES:DYN:NFIN ART-brave
 w-ak^o-zaap^o-aj.
 you-be-INFERI-EMPH
 'Why shouldn't I be surprised – you are evidently (really) a brave soul.'
 (Hewitt & Khiba 1998: 96, 207)

3.3 Correlation of inferentials with other grammatical categories

3.3.1 *Tense*

As previously stated, the inferential markers are temporally neutral, the bearer of temporal meanings being the stem. Inferentials I and II possess a symmetrical tense system, Inferential I being used in the first tense group, Inferential II in the second. In contrast to indicative forms, inferentials lack Future I and Future Conditional I, respectively. In narrations, the inferentials refer primarily to present and past events, future inferentials being quite rare.

(a) *Dynamic Verbs*. Dynamic verbs designate actions rather than states. Their marker in positive declarative forms in the First Tense Group is *-jt'*, which oc-

cupies the right-most position in the verb-form (if not followed by the emphatic clitic *-aj*). In the inferential form, the inferential marker replaces the finite marker, cf. Present *də-r-ga-wa-jt'* 'they are taking her/him' vs. *də-r-ga-wa-zaap'* 'apparently they are taking her/him', Aorist *də-r-ga-ø-jt'* 'they took her/him' vs. *də-r-ga-zaap'* 'apparently they took her/him', Future II *də-r-ga-š-t'* 'they will take her/him' vs. *də-r-ga-ša-zaap'* 'apparently they will take her/him', etc. In the Second Tense Group the finite marker is *-n*, which is replaced in the inferential form by the suffix *-zaarən*, cf. Imperfect *də-r-ga-wa-n* 'they were taking her/him' vs. *də-r-ga-wa-zaarən* 'apparently they were taking her/him', Past Indefinite *də-r-ga-n* 'they took her/him and. . . ' vs. *də-r-ga-zaarən* 'apparently they took her/him and. . . ', Future Conditional II *də-r-ga-ša-n* 'they would (have) take(n) her/him' vs. *də-r-ga-ša-zaarən* 'apparently they would (have) take(n) her/him', etc.

Note that the Future II inferential form is rather rarely used, and the Future Conditional II inferential is only theoretically possible, being regarded as 'artificial' (cf. Chkadua 1970:75).

(b) *Stative Verbs*. Stative verbs possess an elementary tense system, consisting of present and past, cf. *də-c^oa-wə-p'* '(s)he is sleeping' vs. *də-c^oa-zaap'* 'apparently (s)he is sleeping', *də-c^oa-n* '(s)he was sleeping' vs. *də-c^oa-zaarən* 'apparently (s)he was sleeping'.

(c) *'Derived' Future Tenses*. Stative verb stems can form future tenses when the suffix *-zaa* is added, but in this case they acquire formally dynamic morphology (cf. Hewitt 1979b:204). Such formations are said to lack inferential forms, though the 'Derived' Future I marker *-zaa-p'* (cf. *də-q'a-zaa-p'* '(s)he will be') is actually the same Inferential I suffix used in the (original) temporal function (see §3.11). Use of the 'Derived' Future I form with a temporal rather than inferential meaning is quite rare, and here too the shade of inferentiality is not altogether absent.

- (10) *mj^oa-k'* *ø-a-lə-j-x-wa-jt'*, *abrəj a-mj^oa*
 way-INDEF.SG it-it-PREV-he-take.off-PROG-DYN:FIN this ART-way
sə-k^o-zaap' . . .
 I-be.on.top-INFER1
 'He chooses a certain way, I shall be following this way.'
 (Aristava & Chkadua 1966:156)

- (11) *Sa+ra š°-sə-la-z,* *Sa+r-g'ə š°a+ra*
 I you(PL)-(in)me-be.amidst-IMPER:STAT I-and you(PL)
s-š°ə-la-zaap'.
 I-(in)you-be.amidst-INFER1
 'Abide in me, and I shall abide in you.'
 (John 15.4; cited from Lomtadze 1988)

The Inferential II suffix can also express temporal (future) semantics, which is especially clear in sentences containing conditional clauses:

- (12) *ha+ra ha-q'a-m-za+r,* *j-ag'araan*
 we we-be-not-COND it-many times
ə-aj+mə-r-c°a-x'a-zaarən arəj š°ə-dg'əl.
 they-PREV-CAUS-ROB-PERF-INFER2 this your(PL)-land
 'If it were not for us, they would probably have robbed your land many times.' (Ixxu asarkial 18)

These examples are remarkable in the sense that here the evidential forms shift from pure evidential semantics void of any temporal dimension to the expression of tense with some evidential extension.

3.4 Negation

Negation adds nothing specific into the formation of evidential forms. In dynamic verbs the negative particle *-m-* occupies a pre-radical position (in present tense a (less preferable) variant is possible with the negation suffix postposed). As in other languages with negated inferentials, in Abkhaz too the scope of negation is the action itself, not the source of information, cf. *d-rə-m-ga-wa-zaap'* him/her-they-not-carry-PROGR-INFER1 'apparently they are not taking him/her', *d-rə-m-ga-x'a-zaarən* him/her-they-not-carry-PERF-INFER2 'apparently they have not taken him/her', etc. In stative verbs: *də-c°a-m-zaap'* (s)he-sleep-not-INFER1 'apparently (s)he is not sleeping'.

3.5 Person

Inferentials in Abkhaz can be used without restriction with all persons, first person included. When used with the 1st person, the inferential suffix emphasizes the distance or detachment between the speaker and their action(s). This can refer to such situations as dreams, actions carried out under the influence of alcohol, or when the speaker's actions have been performed without their

conscious control and come to them as a surprise. The combination of the 1st person with Inferential often creates mirative overtones. Even when directly and consciously involved in a certain situation, by using an inferential in the first person, the speaker undergoes a kind of personality split and, making a mental sidestep, makes a comment on their own action(s) as if observed or judged by an outside observer. Examples:

(13) This is a variant of the sentence in (4), this time with the 1st person plural. Being directly involved in the fight, the speaker comments on the situation:

ha+ra h-nə-(a)j+ba-r-c°a-wa-zaap’.
 we we-thither-together-CAUS-exterminate-PROGR-INFER1
 ‘We are apparently killing each other.’

- (14) *jə-s-š°a-x’a-zaap’, wə-m-ba-wa-j, nas, a-para-k°a.*
 it-I-pay-PERF-INFER1 you-not-see-PROGR-INTER then ART-money-PL
 ‘Don’t you see, apparently I have already paid the money.’
 (Chkadua 1970:203)

3.6 Mood

Inferentials do not combine with those moods whose markers occupy the same (final) slot as the inferential suffixes. These are Conditional, Optative, Intentional, (present) Debitive, and Subjunctive. Inferentials and Imperative are also mutually exclusive, as the latter is based on non-finite forms. At the same time, there are no restrictions on combining inferentials with those moods which are marked with prefixes rather than suffixes.

3.6.1 *The potential category*

The potential category, which expresses (im)possibility or (in)capability, is formed by means of the potential prefix *zə-*. Inferential and potential markers can coincide within one verb-form:

- (15) *jə-s-z-aj+lə-m-k’+aa-ə-jt’* vs. *jə-s-z-aj+lə-m-k’+aa-zaap’*
 it-I-POT-PREV-not-ROOT-AOR-DYN:FIN it-I-POT-PREV-not-ROOT-INFER1
 ‘I did not understand it.’ ‘Apparently I did not understand it.’

Analytic formation of potential, making use of the auxiliary verb *a-l+ša-ra* ‘to be able, capable’, is also possible:

- (16) *a-ca-ra* *ø-jə-l+ša-wa-jt'* vs. *a-ca-ra* *ø-jə-l+ša-wa-zaap'*
 ART-GO-DN it-he-able-PROGR-DYN:FIN ART-GO-DN it-he-able-PROGR-INFER1
 'He can go.' 'Apparently he can go.'

3.6.2 *The debitive mood*

The debitive mood, whose semantics is the expression of necessity or obligation, is formed by the Conditional plus the present or past form of the copular verb. The debitive is incompatible with the inferential unless it is formed analytically (as, in particular, in the past tense), whereby the debitive marker is placed on the main verb, and the inferential marker on the auxiliary.

- (17) *jə-ca-r* *ø-ak^oə-n* vs. *jə-ca-r* *ø-ak^o-zaarən*
 it/they-go-COND it-be-PAST:STAT:FIN it/they-go-COND it-be-INFER2
 'It/they had to go.' 'It/they apparently had to go.'

The same principle applies with other auxiliary verbs under the debitive construction. The debitive inferential is also possible when the debitive is formed by means of the 'transformative' suffix *-t^oə*:

- (18) *jə-ga-t^oə-wə-p'* vs. *jə-ga-t^oə-zaap'*
 it-carry-DEB-PRES:STAT:FIN it-carry-DEB-INFER1
 'It must be taken.' 'Apparently it must be taken.'

3.6.3 *The pretensive mood*

Pretensive mood is formed by adding the pretensive suffix *-š^oa* 'as if' to the stem of the main verb plus an appropriate form of the auxiliary verb. Its main semantics is to express a semblance of an action or state.

- (19) *la+r-g'ə* *d-aa-gəla-š^oa* *ø-l-wə-ø-jt'*
 she-and (s)he-hither-stand.up-as.if it-she-do-AOR-DYN:FIN
 'She also pretended she were standing up.'
- (20) *la+r-g'ə* *d-aa-gəla-š^oa* *ø-l-wə-zaap'*
 she-and she-hither-stand.up-as.if it-she-do-INFER1
 'She also apparently pretended she were standing up.'

3.6.4 *The nonvolitional mood*

Abkhaz has morphological devices to express involuntary, nonvolitional or unintentional actions, which can also include the first person. For this purpose the prefix *-amxa-* is used, which denotes actions performed without the will of the referent. Inferentiality can combine with this category.

- (21) *s-amxa-c°a-ø-jt'* vs. *s-amxa-c°a-zaap'*
 I-NVOL-sleep-AOR-DYN:FIN I-NVOL-sleep-INFER1
 'Involuntarily I fell asleep.' 'Apparently I involuntarily fell asleep.'

3.6.5 *The detrimental mood*

Actions which occur to the detriment of the person affected, are marked by the prefix *-c°ə-*:

- (22) *jə-s-c°ə-j-ga-ø-jt'* vs. *jə-s-c°ə-j-ga-zaap'*
 it-I-DETR-he-take-AOR-DYN:FIN it-I-DETR-he-take-INFER1
 'He took it from me against my will.' 'Apparently he took it from me against my will.'

3.7 Restrictions on clause types

Formally inferentials are finite verbs and occur exclusively in declarative (both positive and negative) main clauses. Inferentials are not possible in relative (subordinate) clauses, which include nonfinite verb-forms. The only exceptions concern finite clauses containing the emphatic suffix *-aj* (phonetically *-ej*), one of the few elements, which can appear after the finite marker. Cf. *d-ca-jt'* '(s)he went' vs. *d-ca-jt'-aj* '(s)he did go!' vs. *d-ca-zaap'-aj* '(s)he evidently did go!'. Adding the emphatic suffix does not change the finite status of the form in question.

Inferentials are however quite normal in compound sentences where both clauses contain finite forms:

- (23) *aʒ°ə jə-zə j-aša-w j-ag'ə jə-zə*
 one:HUM he-for it-bitter-PRES:STAT:NFIN it-another he-for
jə-xaa-zaap', *aʒ°ə jə-zə jə-xaa-w j-ag'ə*
 it-sweet-INFER1 one:HUM he-for it-sweet-PRES:STAT:NFIN it-another
jə-zə j-aša-zaap'
 he-for it-bitter-INFER1
 'What is bitter for someone, appears to be sweet for the other, what is sweet for someone, appears to be bitter for the other.'
 (Aristava & Chkadua 1966: 155)

Inferentials are not possible in interrogative or imperative clauses, which are based on nonfinite verb-forms. On the other hand, inferentials can be used in echo-questions formed with the help of the interrogative clitic *ba*, used when the questioner is seeking confirmation for the statement, and which do not per se require a non-finite form. Consider, for instance, a statement con-

taining an inferential form and a reaction to this statement in the form of an echo-question: *a-j^onə-q'a d-ca-zaap'* 'apparently he went home'; *a-j^onə-q'a d-ca-zaap' ba?* '(you say) he apparently went home?'. Note that the clitic *ba* in echo-questions brings in a tinge of disbelief.

Inferentials can be combined with quotatives (see example (37) in §5.2).

3.8 Aspect

There are no obvious restrictions on the co-occurrence of inferentials with any of the aspectual forms, aspectual affixes occupying the slot preceding the final position reserved for inferentials. Consider repetitive forms with the suffix *-la*: *d-ca-la-wa-zaap'* '(s)he apparently goes regularly'; excessive forms with the suffix *-c^oa*: *də-pxa+š'a-c^oa-zaap'* 'apparently (s)he is extremely shy'; intensive forms with the suffix *-za*: *jə-l-g^o+a+pxa-za-zaap'* 'apparently she liked it very much'; emphatic forms with the suffix *-c^oq'a*: *jə-l-g^o+a+pxa-c^oq'a-zaap'* 'apparently she really liked it', etc.

3.9 Stylistic remarks

Inferentials are quite usual in all kinds of narratives, especially in stories, fairy-tales, legends, personal accounts, everyday conversations, and various literary genres, including prose and poetry. Sometimes folklore texts are introduced by an inferential form signaling the fact that the narrator heard the story from somebody else and does not vouch for its actual truth. Consider, for instance, the initial phrase of the story no. 384 in Anshba's collection of Abkhaz folklore:

- (24) *jə-q'a-zaarən xac'a-k'ə-j ph^oəs-k'ə-j.*
 they-be-INFER2 man-INDEF.SG-and woman-INDEF.SG-and
 'There lived reportedly a husband and wife.' (Anshba 1995: 262)

Depending on the context, inferential forms can underline a slight irony, uncertainty, or distance from the assertion the speaker makes. As well, they can be used as a 'challenging' device to make a narration more vivid, or to focus attention on important parts of the story.

3.10 Discourse-pragmatic aspects

From the point of view of pragmatic functions, inferentials are characterized by a high degree of focality: they are more usual in the focus/comment part of the sentence than in its topical part, which can be seen in the following examples:

- (25) *sa+ra a-šk'ol-ax' s-ca-wa-zaap'*
 I ART-SCHOOL-DIR I-go-PROGR-INFER1
 'Apparently I am going to school.' (the focus is on the inferential verb)

vs.

- (26) *sa+ra s-ak^o-zaap' a-šk'ol-ax' jə-ca-wa.*
 I I-be-INFER1 ART-SCHOOL-DIR who-go-PRES:DYN:NFIN
 'Apparently it is I who is going to school.' (the topic is the inferential form of the copular verb)

3.11 Historical and etymological remarks

Lomtatidze (1955; 1988: 183), Aristava and Chkadua (1966: 155–156) and Hewitt (1979a) proposed the temporal origin of the inferential suffixes in Abkhaz and indicated, in particular, their historical connection with future tenses. More specifically, Hewitt (1979a: 91) suggested that the suffixes of Inference I and II were originally the markers of Future I (in the First Tense Group) and Future Conditional I (in the Second Tense Group) of stative verbs. It is from the stative Future and stative Future Conditional that they penetrated the dynamic forms to express the new category, Inferentiality. Following is a discussion of the origin of inferential markers in some more detail.

3.11.1 Suffix *-z+aa+p'*

The Inferential I suffix consists of three segments: *-z+aa+p'*. The last of these is most probably related to the suffix *-p'* of dynamic verbs belonging to the First Tense Group, which serves as the marker of both finiteness and of Future I tense (*s-ca-p'* 'I shall (shortly) go'). As well, it is probably etymologically connected with the finite marker *-p'* of present stative forms: *s-t^oa-wə-p'* 'I am sitting' (cf. Lomtatidze 1988: 142). Lomtatidze (1988: 154) quite plausibly suggested the origin of the element *-p'* in all these formations from the copular verb *ak^o-be*, which has undergone the phonetic transformation $k^o > p'$.

There is less clarity as to the etymology of the compound segment *-z+aa*, regarded by Spruit (1986: 105) as the dynamic intransitive root *zaa* 'to be'. Beside inferentials, this element is found in such verbal formations as:

- Deverbal Noun (Masdar) of *a-q'a-zaa-ra* 'to be, exist';
 Stative and Inversive Verbs: *a-ma-zaa-ra* 'to have, possess';

'Derived' Future II Stative	<i>də-q'a-<u>zaa</u>-š-t'</i> 'he will be';
and Dynamic Subjunctive:	<i>də-q'a-<u>zaa</u>-j+t'</i> 'let him/her be!'; <i>d-ca-<u>zaa</u>-jt'</i> 'let him/her go!'
Stative Conditional of	<i>jə-ma-<u>zaa</u>-ra-zə</i> 'in order for him to have'
Purpose, Stative Purposive:	<i>də-š'ta-<u>zaa</u>-r(a)+t'°</i> 'in order to be lying'.

It seems that the intrusion of the element *aa* into the inferential suffix *-zaap'* is a relatively late phenomenon, as it does not figure in Tapanta Abaza, cf. Tapanta inferential/probability suffix *-za+p'*. This can also be confirmed by comparison with Abkhaz Conditional suffix *-za+r* (cf. *s-ca-za+r* 'if I go'), which contains the same fricative element as in *-z+aa*.⁴ As well, as pointed out by Lomtadze (1988: 141), the element *z+aa* used as a stative deverbal noun marker has a less common variant *za*, which must represent its older form (cf. such parallel forms as the deverbal abstract noun *aps+ta-za-ra* and *aps+ta-zaa-ra* 'life' in early Abkhaz texts (John 3.16), as well as stative deverbal noun forms with *-za-ra* as used in the Abkhaz-Russian Dictionary published by Marr in 1926, instead of modern *-zaa-ra*). These facts suggest the reconstruction of the Common Abkhaz inferential suffix **-za+p'*, preserved unchanged in Tapanta Abaza, but later complicated in southern Abkhaz by the additional element *aa*.

With reference to the etymology of *-za-* in the aforementioned Tapanta Abaza suffix *-za+p'*, Genko (1955: 139) suggested its derivation from the (untested) verb **-za*, envisaged in such (Abkhaz-)Abaza compounds as *pə-za* 'leader' (cf. *pə* 'nose, front'), *ʒa-nə-za* 'spleen' (cf. *ʒa* 'side, rib'), etc. Shakryl (1961: 73) regards **-za* as one of the markers of participial forms, whereas Aristava and Chkadua (1966: 154) see in *-za-* a temporal suffix. According to a plausible suggestion by Chkadua (1970: 290), this element was originally a feature of stative verbs only, but was later expanded to dynamic verbs as well. She proposes interpreting the main meaning of *-za-* as the expression of anteriority.

Lomtadze (1954: 267) connects together *-z < *-za-* as the marker of durativity (cf. such stative imperative forms as *də-q'a-z* 'let him be!'), the element *-za* in various temporal and aspectual forms, as well as the 'participial' suffix *-za*⁵ in formations like *a-š'ta-za-j'ə* (ART-ground-*za*-agent suffix) 'the path finder'. And in her 1955 article (p. 222–223), Lomtadze proposes etymologically connecting the element *-za* in conditional and other morphemes (thus, also in inferentials) with the past tense non-finite suffix *-z*.

As to the original meaning of the suffix *-za* in all these formations, Lomtadze regards it as the expression of durativity. But such a conclusion probably needs a more thorough argumentation.

Concerning the element *-aa-*, Lomtadze (1954:267) suggests its original meaning was the marker of the future tense, a claim which also needs to be substantiated. On the other hand, the element *-aa-* is probably historically related to the suffix *-aa-* known as ‘root-extension’, found in such forms as *a-xə+r+k’+aa-ra* ‘enclosing around’, *a-s’t+pr+aa-ra* ‘flying out from beneath’, etc.

3.11.2 Suffix *-z+aa+rə+n*

This suffix contains the segment *-z+aa*, discussed above and the element *-rə+n*. As suggested by Hewitt (1979a:90), the latter is most probably the Future Conditional I (i.e. a past tense of the Future I) suffix of the Second Tense Group (*s-ca-rə+n* ‘I would go’), to which the ‘modal’ element *-z+aa* was added. The first element in *-rə+n* is the future suffix, the original unreduced form (*-ra*) can be seen in such non-finite forms as *s-an-ca-ra* ‘when I shall go’ (cf. Hewitt 1979a:90; Lomtadze 1955). The final *-n* is probably the past tense marker of stative verbs (cf. *sə-q’a-n* ‘I was’). The Common Abkhaz form of this suffix can be reconstructed as **-za+rə+n*.

Whatever the concrete etymological solutions for the elements which form the inferential suffixes, there seems to be little doubt that they came to be used to mark the new category of inferentiality due to the semantic expansion of originally future temporal meanings.

4. Evidential strategy

Besides having the distinct evidential category described above, Abkhaz employs other means to express evidential-like meanings, such as reported, inferred, distanced, etc., which do not form a separate category and thus fall under the rubric of evidential strategy. These are: (a) the quotative particle *h^oa*, and (b) the reportative verb *a-h^oa-ra* ‘to tell, say’.

4.1 Quotative particle *h^oa*

The quotative particle *h^oa* is an archaic past absolutive of the verb *a-h^oa-ra* ‘to say’, whose original form must have been **jə-h^oa* ‘having said it’. The particle *h^oa* is fully grammaticalized, which is corroborated by the fact that it no longer takes the object marker *jə-*, which is obligatory in the past absolutive of transitive verbs, cf. a more regular past absolutive form *jə-h^oa-nə* ‘having said it’. The grammaticalized character of this particle is even more obvious in the Bzyp dialect, where it is often used in a delabialized form (*ha*). The lack of the object

4.2 Reportative vs. introductory verb

The functions of the introductory verb *a-h°a-ra* ‘to say, speak’ are close to those of the particle *h°a*, with which it is etymologically connected. As an introductory verb indicating the author of a quotation, *a-h°a-ra* can take all forms and tenses of dynamic verbs. When used as a reportative device, in narratives, stories, fairy-tales, etc., the verb *a-h°a-ra* is always in Aorist, usually in 3SG HUM:MASC (*jə-jə-h°ə-θ-jt’* lit. ‘it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN’), but sometimes in the 3PL, which in Abkhaz does not distinguish gender or grammatical noun class (*jə-r-h°ə-θ-jt’* ‘it-they-say-AOR-DYN:FIN’). The form *jə-r-h°ə-θ-jt’/jə-jə-h°ə-θ-jt’* displays certain grammaticalization features: though it is formally third person singular human/masculine, its reference to number or grammatical class is purely grammatical (i.e. the actual source of the information can be a female, or more than one person), and it can be translated with an impersonal as ‘they say’, (French) ‘*on dit*’, or ‘reportedly’. Its chief meaning is to indicate the reported, unwitnessed nature of the described event. In narrations, the introductory and reportative verbs often co-occur within one clause, the introductory verb, which refers to the author of the quote, coming first, and the (sometimes homophonic) reportative verb, expressing the unwitnessed, reported, non-firsthand character of the described event, following it. Consider the following examples:

a. Direct quotation with the introductory verb *a-h°a-ra* ‘to say’:

- (30) *s-an d-aa-θ-jt’, a-p’at’əw*
 my-mother (s)he-come-AOR-DYN:FIN ART-respect
θ-lə-k°-s-c’a-r-a-wə-p’, *θ-jə-h°a-θ-jt’*.
 it-her-PREV-I-put-COND-be-PRES:STAT-FIN it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN
 ‘‘My mother came, I have to show my respect for her,’’ he said.’
 (Anshba 239)

b. Reportative verb *jə-jə(θ/r)-h°ə-θ-jt’* ‘he/they said’:

- (31) *də-q’a-n, θ-jə-h°ə-θ-jt’, č’k°əna x°əč’ə-k’*.
 (s)he-be-PAST:FIN it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN boy little-INDEF.SG
 ‘There was reportedly (lit. ‘he said’) a little boy.’
- (32) *amnəj, wəbrəj θ-jac°a-nə jə-q’a+lə-θ-jt’,*
 that(by.you) that(yonder) it-star-PABS they-become-AOR-DYN:FIN
θ-r-h°ə-θ-jt’.
 it-they-say-AOR-DYN:FIN
 ‘Those ones reportedly (lit. ‘they said’) turned into stars.’ (Anshba 40)

Both reportative and introductory verbs can co-occur with the Inferential, cf. example (37). Note also that in some varieties of Abkhaz, and regularly in the Bzyp dialect, the vowel *a* of the verb ‘to say’ (*h^oa*) in the Aorist changes into *ə* (hence *ə-jə-h^oə-ə-jt’* instead of *ə-jə-h^oa-ə-jt’*).

4.2.1 *Distancing*

In the narrative speech the reportative verb can signify the speaker’s intention to distance themselves from the information they convey or to emphasize the distance from the source of information. In order to achieve this, the speaker often repeats the reportative verb.

Examples:

- (33) *x-j^oə-k’* *a-γəč’-c^oa*, *ə-jə-h^oə-ə-jt’*, *aj+c+nə*
 three-HUM-INDEF.SG ART-thief-PL it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN together
γəč’+ra jə-ca-ə-jt’, *ə-jə-h^oa-ə-jt’*.
 theft they-go-AOR-DYN:FIN it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN
 ‘Three thieves reportedly together went thieving.’ (Anshba 40)

The distinction between the introductory and reportative verb is illustrated by the following examples. (34) is a dialogue between a man and a woman, (35) represents an utterance by a goat (in a fairy-tale). All speakers have different noun class marking:

- (34) Man: “*h-aj+c-nəq^oa-p*” *h^oa* *ə-jə-h^oa-ə-jt’*,
 we-together-walk-FUT1 QUOT it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN
ə-jə-h^oa-ə-jt’.
 it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN

Woman: “*sa+ra jə-s-taxə-w* *wa+ra w-a-wə-p*”
 I what-I-want-PRES:NFIN you you-be-PRES:STAT-FIN
ə-l-h^oa-ə-jt’, *ə-jə-h^oa-ə-jt’*.
 it-she-say-AOR-DYN:FIN it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN

‘Man: “Let’s walk through life together”, he reportedly said.

Woman: “The one I want is you”, she reportedly said.’ (Anshba 246)

- (35) “*sa-ra s-s’ap’ə* *ə-p-c^oa-wə-p’*, *axa s-nəq^oa-n*,
 I my-foot it-PREV-break-PRES:STAT-FIN but I-walk-PABS
r-apx’a *s-gəla-n* *s-ca-wa-t’*”, *ha*
 their-front I-stand-PABS I-go-PROG-DYN:FIN QUOT

ø-a-h°ə-ø-jt', *ø-jə-h°ə-ø-jt'*, *anəj*
 it-it(goat)-say-AOR-DYN:FIN it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN that
ø-ab.

ART-billy-goat

“‘My foot is broken, but (anyway) I do walk and, standing before them (the herd), I (keep on) going,’ having said, the billy-goat reportedly said.’

In (34) and (35) the introductory verb refers to the authors of the quoted words and reflects their gender/noun class (*ø-jə-h°ə-ø-jt'* ‘he(HUM:MASC) said’, *ø-l-h°ə-ø-jt'* ‘she(HUM:FEM) said’, *ø-a-h°ə-ø-jt'* ‘it (NHUM) said’). By contrast, the reportative verb, which is formally the aorist form of 3SG HUM:MASC (*ø-jə-h°ə-ø-jt'*), does not indicate a specific referent, and serves only to mark the hearsay source of an utterance.

Consider also the example where both inferential and the ‘distancing’ reportative verbs are used in one sentence, obviously putting extra emphasis on the ‘distanced’ character of the information:

- (36) *wəs wa+j°ə+š'a-s ø-jə-ma-zaarən, ø-jə-h°ə-ø-jt'*.
 such character-as it-he-have-INFER2 it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN
 ‘He apparently did possess such a character, as they say.’ (Anshba 242)

Some narrations can be excessively loaded with reportative verbs and quotative particles, creating a specific ‘hearsay’ or ‘distanced’ narrative style.

5. Evidentiality: Some typological and areal remarks

5.1 The origin of evidentiality

The cross-linguistic comparison of the origin of evidential systems shows that in the majority of cases they result from a semantic extension or transformation of temporal (more specifically, perfect) tenses. Comrie (1976: 110) provides an explanation for the connection between evidentiality and the perfect tense: ‘the semantic similarity (not, of course, identity) between perfect and inferential lies in the fact that both categories present an event not in itself, but via its results’.

Abkhaz seems to be one of the few languages where evidentiality is historically based on future, not on perfect. Other cases include Romanian, where the presumptive is formed from the bases of the future or conditional auxiliary or the subjunctive of the future particle plus the non-finite form *fi* ‘be’ and the gerund or past participle of the main verb (cf. Friedman 1998). Con-

sider also Afghan Persian dialects, where a periphrastic ‘future tense’ is used as a basis for inferential presumptive or speculative modes (Perry 2000: 243). A close analogue to the Abkhaz suffix *-zaap*’ seems to be the evidential suffix *-boti/-beti* in Hill Patwin, a Wintun language of North America, which is analyzed as a combination of the auxiliary *-bo/-be* ‘to be (locational)’ with the definite future suffix. In some contexts the original future sense of this evidential suffix can still be seen. Despite its origin, the suffix was generalized to apply to predicates in the present or past tenses (cf. Whistler 1986: 70–71). Consider also evidentials in Akha (Tibeto-Burman), where some markers evolved from copulas with (assumptive and speculative) future meanings (Thurgood 1986: 221–222), the West Greenlandic sentential affix with inferential semantics *-(sima)ssa* ‘inferred’, which contains the future marker *-ssa* (Fortescue, this volume), and some Latin American varieties of Spanish, where, under the influence of Quechua, the future is developing an evidential reading (Escobar 1997).

That future as much as perfect can be used for the formation of an evidential category is not by itself something extraordinary.⁶ In his 1979a paper Hewitt explains the connection between inferentiality and the future tense:

[I]f an action is inferred to have occurred, to be occurring or to be likely to occur, the possibility remains that the inference may be proved wrong by the subsequent acquisition of more information. This is precisely and necessarily the case with each and every pronouncement concerning an event in the future; the same lack of certainty attaches to statements about the future which attaches to descriptions of events not witnessed, or being witnessed, by the speaker personally. (p. 91)

There is thus nothing unusual in the future tense serving as a basis for the formation of the inferential category. What *is* interesting is that perfect seems to be by far a much more frequently used tense than future as a basis for an evidential category, as demonstrated by the majority of languages in which this category occurs. The connection between perfect and evidential, called ‘pan-Eurasian evidential perfect’ by Nichols (1986: 253), is sometimes even regarded as a linguistic (near) universal (cf. Bulut 2000: 148; Johanson 2000: 63).

In the Caucasian linguistic area, where the evidential category is found in the majority of the indigenous languages (i.e. both North Caucasian and Kartvelian), I am aware of only Abkhaz where this category is historically based on the future tense. The closely related Circassian shows an intermediate situation: in Common Circassian the inferential suffix **-ɣa-n* was built on the ba-

sis of the perfective suffix *-γa* plus the future marker *-n*, cf. Adyghe *k[∞]a-γa-n*, Kabardian *k[∞]a-γa-n-ś* ‘apparently he went’ (Kumakhov 1989: 199).

It seems that the semantic invariant which unites the perfect and future tenses, and which makes it possible to use them to form the evidential category, is the *time distance* between the event and the speech act describing this event, and the impossibility of verifying the information about the (past or future) event by direct observation.

5.2 Distancing category

Among the views concerning the nature of evidentiality two major opinions prevail: to regard this category as referring to (a) the source of information, or (b) to the speaker’s attitude towards the information. Without going into discussion of these (conflicting) views which reflect the complex phenomenon of evidentiality, I would emphasize the role of *distance* as critical in the explanation of the nature of evidentiality, which has been pointed out by a number of authors. Chkadua (1970: 201–202) implicitly points to the role of distance while describing the semantics of inferentials in Abkhaz. In her treatment of evidentiality, Kozintseva (1994: 95) speaks about ‘self-distancing of the speaker from the situation, about which a surprise is being expressed’. Kibrik and Testelet (1999: 230–233) in their description of evidentiality in Tsakhur use the term ‘effekt otstraneniija’ (the effect of keeping away), while Lazard (1985) demonstrates the relevance of the notion of distance in explaining the various meanings as conveyed by the Persian ‘distant past’.

The importance of the notion of distance as an essential semantic component inherent in the phenomenon of evidentiality and probably also of some other categories (such as mirativity) perhaps necessitates the postulation of a special *distancing* strategy or category (the corresponding noun being *distancive*). The term would mean that by using certain grammatical or lexical means the speaker can distance himself from the information he conveys, disclaim responsibility for the truthfulness or exactness of his statement or defer authority over his statement to somebody else. In terms of time specification, the speaker might refer to past or future events which are either already not directly observable, or are not yet observable. In distancing terms, evidentiality can be regarded as one step forward from objective reality (*realis*) towards subjective reality (*irrealis*).

Distancive:

neutral/unmarked: the speaker assumes full authority over his statement, he is, or speaks as being, a direct witness of an event.

distancing: the speaker disclaims responsibility for his statement either by shifting it to someone else (reported speech), or by using evidential markers.

For example, in Abkhaz narrations the neutral/unmarked degree is characterized by present, simple past/aorist, or other tenses, cf. *d-aa-wa-jt'* '(s)he is coming/comes', *d-aa-ø-jt'* '(s)he came', etc. The distancing is expressed (a) by using quotatives (*d-aa-jt' h^oa ø-jə-h^oə-jt'/jə-s-aha-jt'* 'he said/I heard that (s)he came') or (b) by using the inferential form (*d-aa-zaap'* 'presumably/it looks as if/apparently (s)he came'). The following example shows a combination of inferential, quotative particle and introductory and reportative verbs, which has an accumulative distancing effect:

- (37) “*waž^oə d-aa-zaap'*” *h^oa ø-jə-h^oə-ø-jt'*,
 now (s)he-come-INFER1 QUOT it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN
ø-jə-h^oə-ø-jt'.
 it-he-say-AOR-DYN:FIN
 “Now (s)he apparently came,” he reportedly said.

5.3 Areal aspects

While dealing with languages within one linguistic area it is always a dilemma whether to treat a certain shared trait as a contact-induced or independently formed phenomenon. In the case of evidentiality in the Caucasus, this dilemma seems to be almost unsolvable, as the majority, if not all indigenous Caucasian languages possess the evidential category in one form or another. At least in some Caucasian languages evidentiality is an inherited category. In other cases, when it can be shown to be a relatively recent phenomenon, its appearance can be tentatively attributed to the influence of genetically related neighbouring languages. As well, some Caucasian idioms had quite close contact with Turkic languages which have this category and from which it could have been borrowed.

There is a tendency in the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia to hold the Turkic languages responsible for the development of the evidential category. In a number of cases this explanation can obviously be justified, cf., for in-

stance, Friedman (2000:357) for the description of the situation in the Balkans. According to Bulut (2000):

With regard to Turco-Iranian language contact, the Turkic influence has been held responsible for certain changes in the tense-aspect system of a number of Iranian languages, which led to the formation (grammaticalization) of the so-called inferential categories. (p. 147)

Kozintseva (2000:414) thinks that the development of evidentiality in Eastern Armenian is partially explained by areal contact with Iranian and Turkic languages (cf. also Donabedian 2001). Discussing evidentiality in Georgian, Boeder (2000:277) regards Turkish influence as a possible stimulating factor in the development of this category in both Georgian and the related Megrelian. As for the other Kartvelian language, Svan, which was developing without any direct influence from Turkish, Boeder suggests here the mediating role of Megrelian: if the Megrelian evidential system was developed partly due to Turkic language contact, this “may have been a mediating model for Svan” (Boeder 2000:277; cf. also Friedman 2000:357).

Whereas for certain cases the Turkic influence can indeed be regarded as relevant, the problem is that in some Caucasian languages the evidential category is likely to have been formed before any significant contact with Turkic languages had taken place. This is certainly the case with the West Caucasian languages. In both Abkhaz and Circassian evidentiality is an inherited category, which can be reconstructed for both Proto-Abkhaz and Proto-Circassian periods (see §§3.11 and 5.1 above). The time depth of both proto-languages can be estimated at ca. 8th–9th centuries AD. Though Proto-Circassian might have had some areal contacts with the Kypchak branch of the Turkic languages, like Crimean Tatar or early Karachay-Balkar, these were not prominent in the time of the existence of Proto-Circassian. On the other hand, Proto-Abkhaz had contacts with Byzantine Greek, Alanic (Proto-Ossetic) and Kartvelian languages, but not with Turkic languages. Any discernible Turkish presence in Abkhazia can be traced back to a period not earlier than 16th century, when Ottoman Turkey had established its hegemony over the Caucasian Black Sea coast. This means that at least Circassian and Abkhaz formed this category independently of any foreign (specifically Turkic) influence.

It is surprising that Ubykh, the West Caucasian language geographically situated between Circassian and Abkhaz, which both possess the evidential category, does not have any traces of evidentiality (cf. Charachidzé 1989:402). Interestingly, in an Ubykh text translated from Abkhaz and published by Dumézil (1967:147–156), the Abkhaz inferential form *ak'ə ø-l-taxə-zaap'* ‘one it-she-

want-INFER1' = 'she apparently wants something' is translated into Ubykh as *za-g°ara q'aša-γə-n čə+ma* 'she probably wants something', i.e. with epistemic *čə+ma* 'probably'. Given that Ubykh served as a 'bridge' between the Circassian- and Abkhaz-speaking areas, the majority of Ubykhs being bi- or even tri-lingual, it seems surprising that Circassian and Abkhaz have failed to induce the formation of the evidential category in Ubykh, otherwise heavily influenced by its sister-languages (especially by Circassian).

The evidential system in Georgian differs from that of other Kartvelian languages. As noted by Hewitt (1979a:87–88), in Georgian the semantic feature of evidentiality is restricted to the perfect tense-group (i.e. perfect and pluperfect), 'and even then these tenses are not, of necessity, endowed with this feature'. By contrast, in Svan, Megrelian and Laz evidentiality is not restricted to perfect tenses, extending to other tenses as well (cf. Hewitt 1979a: 87–88). In this sense evidentiality in Georgian is typologically closer to that present in the neighbouring Armenian, where it is also restricted to perfective tenses. Incidentally, by analogy with split ergativity in Georgian and some other languages, which have ergative construction in past tenses and nominative in non-past tenses, one can, in a similar fashion, call the Georgian or Armenian type of evidentiality 'split evidentiality'.

The situation in Megrelian, which possesses a fully generalized system of inferentials not restricted to perfect tenses, more closely resembles the situation in the neighbouring Abkhaz, rather than in the related Georgian. The question arises, therefore, whether the influence of Abkhaz (as much as Turkish), could be held responsible for the formation of the tense-neutral type of evidentiality system in Megrelian.

Notes

1. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to G. Hewitt, Z. Khiba and L. Kulikov for useful comments and suggestions on the first draft of this chapter.
2. The suffix *-wa-* is regarded either as a dynamic, or as a present tense marker. According to Hewitt (1979a:89, fn) it must more correctly be determined as the non-stative marker. I gloss it here as 'progressive', as it refers to continuous non-stative actions.
3. A dummy object required by the preverb.
4. The digraph *aa* represents an underlying voiced laryngeal (*h̥*) realized as a long *ā*. Abkhaz does not tolerate vocalic clusters, therefore the combination *za+aa* [*za+ā*] inevitably yields *z+aa* [*zā*].
5. In Circassian its possible cognate is the present absolutive suffix *-ze*: *k°e-ze* 'going'.

6. A rare case of evidentiality based on the 3sg present form of the verb ‘to be’ in Chinese Pidgin Russian is described by Nichols (1986).

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Correspondences between the special symbols adopted here in the Caucasian transcription and the SIL IPA:

SIL-IPA	Caucasian	Description
b	b	voiced bilabial stop
p ^h	p	voiceless (aspirated) bilabial stop
p'	p'	voiceless glottalized bilabial stop
dz	ʒ	voiced dental affricate
dz ^w	ʒ ^o	voiced dental labialized affricate
dz _l	ʒ̣	voiced retroflex alveolar affricate
dʒ ^j	ʒ'	voiced alveolar palatalized affricate
ts	c	voiceless dental affricate
ts ^w	c ^o	voiceless dental labialized affricate
ts'	c'	voiceless dental glottalized affricate
ts' ^w	c' ^o	voiceless dental glottalized labialized affricate
d	d	voiceless dental stop
d ^w	d ^o	voiceless dental labialized stop
g	g	voiced velar stop
g ^j	g'	voiced velar palatalized stop
g ^w	g ^o	voiced velar labialized stop
h	h	voiceless laryngeal
h ^w	h ^o	voiceless labialized laryngeal
j	j	palatal semi-vowel
j ^w	j ^o	palatal labialized semi-vowel
k ^h	k	velar voiceless (aspirated) stop
k ^{hj}	k'	velar voiceless (aspirated) palatalized stop
k ^{hw}	k ^o	velar voiceless (aspirated) labialized stop
k'	k'	velar voiceless glottalized stop
k' ^j	k''	velar glottalized palatalized stop
k' ^w	k' ^o	velar glottalized labialized stop
q'	q'	uvular glottalized stop
q' ^j	q''	uvular glottalized palatalized stop
q' ^w	q' ^o	uvular glottalized labialized stop
ʂ	ʂ	retroflex voiceless alveolar fricative
ʂ ^j	ʂ'	voiceless alveolar palatalized fricative
ʂ ^w	ʂ ^o	voiceless alveolar labialized fricative
t ^h	t	voiceless (aspirated) dental stop
t ^{hw}	t ^o	voiceless (aspirated) labialized dental stop
t'	t'	glottalized dental stop
t' ^w	t' ^o	glottalized labialized dental stop
w	w	bilabial semi-vowel
χ	x	uvular voiceless fricative
χ ^j	x'	uvular voiceless palatalized fricative

SIL-IPA Caucasian Description

χ ^w	x ^o	uvular voiceless labialized fricative
z	ž	retroflex voiced alveolar fricative
ʒ ^j	ʒ'	voiced alveolar palatalized fricative
ʒ ^w	ʒ ^o	voiced alveolar labialized fricative
ə	ə	Schwa

Evidentiality in Turkic

Lars Johanson

1. Introduction

The present chapter aims at summarising the essential features of the grammatical categories of evidentiality found in Turkic languages. Other epistemic categories such as presumptives and dubitatives will not be included. The data will be dealt with along the principles suggested in Chapter 1, with special regard to the distinctive devices of each particular system type. Systems will be taken to be paradigmatic sets of evidential forms, fitting together in a contrastive way, systematically opposed to each other with respect to their functions.

Since the survey concerns a whole language family, numerous language-specific details will be omitted. Today's Turkic-speaking world extends from Turkey and its neighbours in the Southwest, to Eastern Turkistan and further into China in the Southeast. From here it stretches to the Northeast, via Southern and Northern Siberia up to the Arctic Ocean, and finally to the Northwest, across Western Siberia and Eastern Europe. Most Turkic languages may be classified as belonging to a Southwestern, a Northwestern, a Southeastern or a Northeastern branch. Khalaj in Central Iran and Chuvash in the Volga region constitute separate branches. Of the peripheral languages in the Southeast, Yellow Uyghur and Fu-yü are related to dialects of the Northeastern branch, and Salar to the Southwestern branch.

Turkish examples will be cited according to the official script of Turkey. Quotations from other languages will be given in traditional Turcological transcription. In the standardised morpheme notation, capital letters and segments in brackets indicate morphophonemic variation. Thus, *I* and *A* stand for harmonic variation of high and low vowels, respectively. In the examples, morphemes will be divided by hyphens, though this does not correspond to the orthographic practice in the languages concerned.

2. Indirectivity as an evidential category

Despite system differences, almost all known older and recent stages of Turkic possess the grammatical means of expressing *indirectivity*. This firmly integrated cognitive category covers various notions traditionally referred to as ‘hearsay’, ‘inferential’, etc. It implies that the statement is ‘indirect’ in the sense that the narrated event E^n is not stated directly, but in an indirect way, by reference to its reception by a conscious subject, a recipient R . This core meaning may be paraphrased ‘as R becomes (became, etc.) or is (was, etc.) aware of E^n ’. The result is two-layered information: ‘it is stated that E^n is acknowledged by R ’. The recipient may be the speaker as a participant of the speech event, or a participant of the narrated event, e.g. a protagonist in a narrative.

Examples: Turkish *Eşek öl-üyor-muş*, Uyghur *Işek öl-üwèt-iptu* [donkey die-INTRA-IC] ‘The donkey is/was obviously dying’, Turkish *Eşek öl-müş*, Uyghur *Işek öl-üptu* [donkey die-IPAST] ‘The donkey has/had obviously died’.

The notion of indirectivity is in accordance with the crosslinguistic definition of evidentiality as ‘stating the existence of a source of evidence for some information’. The crucial element of indirectivity, the presentation of an event ‘by reference to its reception by a conscious subject’, is certainly not unique to Turkic. It may be basic to many other evidentiality systems, and even qualify as a crosslinguistic definition of evidentials (see Comrie 2000: 1).

3. Sources

Specification of the source of information – the way in which the event is acknowledged by R – is not criterial for indirectivity as such. The reception may be realised through (i) hearsay, (ii) inference, or (iii) perception.

- i. Reportive uses: ‘ E^n or its effect is reported to R ’. The basis of knowledge is a foreign source, reported speech, hearsay, e.g. Turkish *Bakan hastaymış* (minister sick-IC) ‘The minister is reportedly sick’, said by somebody informed about the sickness. English translation equivalents include *reportedly, allegedly, as they say/said, etc.*
- ii. Inferential uses: ‘ E^n or its effect is inferred by R ’. The basis of knowledge is pure reflection, logical conclusion, e.g. Turkish *Uyu-muş-um* (sleep-IPAST-1SG) ‘I have obviously slept’, said by somebody just waking up. English translation equivalents include *as far as R understands/understood, etc.*

- iii. Perceptive uses: ‘Eⁿ or its effect is perceived by R’. The basis is first-hand knowledge, direct sensory perception of the event or indirect perception on the basis of traces or results, e.g. Turkish *İyi çal-ıyor-muş* (good play-INTRA-IC) ‘(S)he is, as I hear, playing well’, said by somebody just listening. English translation equivalents include *it appears/appeared that, it turns/turned out that, as R can/could see, hear, etc.*

All these readings can be translated by *evidently, obviously*, etc. If the Turkish sentence *Ali bu-nu bil-iyor-muş* [A. this-ACC know-INTRA-IC] is rendered as ‘Ali evidently knows/knew this’, *evidently* may be interpreted as judging from (i) hearsay, (ii) inference, or (iii) appearance.

In their perceptive uses, indirectives express that the event or its effect turns out to be the case, becomes manifest, visible, or apprehended through one of the senses and thus open to the recipient’s mind. These uses cannot be derived from reportive or inferential meanings or be subsumed under ‘non-first-hand knowledge’. Indirectivity markers thus do not fit into evidential schemes distinguishing between ‘the speaker’s non-firsthand and firsthand information’. Their primary task is not to express the foreign origin of the speaker’s knowledge.

Some more elaborated Turkic systems distinguish between ‘reported’ and ‘non-reported’ (inferential/perceptive) indirectivity. There are, however, no systematic differences relating to other types of sources, e.g. visual versus other kinds of sensory information.

4. Marked and unmarked terms

Turkic languages display basic contrasts between marked indirectives and their unmarked counterparts. Functionally marked terms, expressing the evidential notions explicitly, stand in paradigmatic contrast to non-evidentials. Thus, Turkish exhibits items signalling indirectivity, e.g. *gel-miş* [come-IPAST] ‘has obviously come/obviously came’ and *gel-iyor-muş* [come-INTRA-IC] ‘is/was obviously coming, obviously comes’. It has corresponding unmarked items such as *gel-di* [come-DPAST] ‘has come/came’, *gel-iyor* [come-INTRA] ‘is coming/comes’.

Although the relations between marked and unmarked terms vary across languages, the unmarked ones always exhibit neutral uses in cases where the speaker considers the evidential distinction unessential and thus chooses not to use it. The widespread opinion that unmarked items such as *gel-di* ‘has

come/came' consistently signal 'direct experience' or 'visual evidence' is incorrect. Unmarked items simply do *not* signal that the event is stated in an indirect way, i.e. acknowledged by a recipient by means of report, inference or perception.

5. Formal types of markers

The coding of indirectivity in Turkic is 'scattered', morphologically realised by two types of markers:

- i. Inflectional markers: Verbal suffixes filling obligatory slots and opposed to other inflectional morphemes, e.g. -MIŞ, -GAN, -IBDIR.
- ii. Copula particles: Enclitic or suffixed elements, occurring after predicate cores, filling non-obligatory slots and opposed to zero forms, e.g. ERMIŞ, ERKEN.

6. Turkish examples

Turkish possesses the simple inflectional marker *-mİş*, which is suffixed to verbal stems and marks main clauses. It is capable of carrying high pitch. It is a rather stable marker of indirectivity, mostly with past time reference, e.g. *gül-'müŝ* [laugh-IPAST] '(has) evidently laughed' (*gül* 'to laugh' + *-mİş*). It is homonymous with the postterminal participle suffix *-mİş*, which does not, however, express indirectivity.

Turkish also possesses the copula particle *imiş*, which cannot be added to verbal stems, but may follow nominals, including nominal stems of the verb. It is not capable of carrying high pitch, a characteristic of enclitic particles. Like its equivalents in other Turkic languages, it is temporally indifferent, i.e. ambiguous between past and present time reference, and a stable marker of indirectivity. Since *imiş* normally exhibits suffixed allomorphs in the shape of *-(y)mİş*, some of its written realisations coincide with those of the inflectional marker *-mİş*, e.g. '*gülümüŝ* [rose-1C] 'it is/was evidently a rose' (*gül* 'rose' + *imiş*). In spoken language, the variants of the two morphemes are distinguished by different pitch patterns (cf. Csató 2000a).

This copula particle may, for example, form indirective intraterminals, i.e. presents and imperfects, e.g. *gel-iyor-muş* [come-INTRA-1C] 'is/was evidently arriving', prospectives such as *gel-ecek-miş* [come-PROSP-1C] 'will/would evi-

dently arrive' and unequivocally indirective postterminals such as *gel-miş-miş* [come-POST-IC] 'has/had reportedly arrived'.

7. Aspectual values

The deceptive similarity of certain allomorphs has led linguists to confuse the two markers *-mİş* and *imiş*, referring to both as 'the suffix *-miş*', allegedly attachable to both verbal and nominal stems, or to speak of an 'evidential perfect' that would include both markers. In view of such misunderstandings, some comments on the aspectual values of the respective items may be appropriate. The perspectives of *intraterminality* and *postterminality* – two marked aspectual ways of envisaging events with respect to their limits – are grammaticalised in Turkic as well as in many other languages (Johanson 1996a, 2000).

The intraterminal perspective envisages, at a given aspectual vantage point, an event within its limits, e.g. Azerbaijani *gel-ir-em* [come-INTR-1SG] 'I am coming, I come'. Intraterminals are marked 'imperfectives' with 'relative present' meanings of 'the state of verb-ing'.

The postterminal perspective implies that, at a given aspectual vantage point, the decisive limit of the event is already passed over, e.g. Azerbaijani *gel-miş-em* [come-PPAST-1SG] 'I have [already] arrived'. Postterminals express 'the state of having verb-ed' and can thus refer to preexisting events in an indirect way. The event is totally or partly absent from the view, depending on the actional content, but it is still relevant at the vantage point, possibly through observable results or traces.

In many languages, postterminals, e.g. 'perfects' expressing past events with present relevance, tend towards indirective readings (Johanson 1971: Chapter 8, 2000:121–123). Even if the event is wholly or partly outside the range of vision, traces, results or other forms of present knowledge of it may obtain at the vantage point. Postterminals may thus suggest that information becomes available post factum, that a preexisting state is discovered, etc. These secondary meanings are pragmatic side effects that can be used as 'evidential strategies'. What indirectives share with 'perfects' as a common core meaning is not the notion of 'distance', but rather that of postterminality.

The functions of Turkic indirective markers such as *-mİş* derive from the indirect postterminal perspective. However, they should not be equated with pure postterminals used as 'evidential strategies'. Although some of them may vacillate with respect to their semantics, they are, as a rule, more explicit and stable evidentials, whose indirect aspectual value has been reinterpreted as in-

directivity. On the other hand, copula particles such as *imiş* have, through grammaticalisation processes, completely lost their relationship to the post-terminal value and cannot possibly be considered ‘perfect’ markers, as some linguists have assumed.

8. Semantic types of inflectional markers

Two or more of the following semantic types of inflectional markers are generally found in Turkic languages:

- IPAST-1. Unequivocal indirective pasts, e.g. -IBDIR: Kazakh *-(I)ptI*, etc.
- IPAST-2. Less stable indirective pasts, e.g. -MIŞ, -GAN: Turkish *-mİş*, Tatar *-GAn*, etc.
- PPAST. Postterminal pasts with secondary indirective readings, e.g. -MIŞ, -GAN: Azerbaijani *-mİş*, Kazakh *-GAn*, etc.
- DPAST. Direct pasts, not signalling indirective meanings: -DI.

9. Semantic types of copula particles

The temporally indifferent indirective copula particles express indirectivity without any synchronic association with postterminality. In certain systems, two copula particles divide the area of indirectivity between themselves according to the pattern reportive versus non-reportive (inferential + perceptive) uses. We thus find the following semantic types of indirective items.

- IC-1. General indirectives, e.g. ERMIŞ: Turkish *-(y)mİş*, etc.
- IC-2. Indirectives with reportive meanings, e.g. ERMIŞ: Turkmen *-mİş*, etc.
- IC-3. Indirectives with non-reportive meanings, e.g. ERKEN: Kazakh *eken*, etc. A similar type, frequent in spoken registers, is BOLIBDIR ‘evidently is/was’: Kazakh, Noghay *bolıptı*, Uzbek *bolip*, Altay *boluptır*, *boltır*, Khakas *poltır*, Tatar *bulyan*, etc.

10. System types

The types of evidentiality systems and their organisation vary considerably across the modern Turkic languages. Most systems possess clearly evidential

categories with indirectivity as the primary meaning. The following survey will begin with the more comprehensive systems and proceed to the simpler ones.

10.1 Three-term systems

The most comprehensive evidential systems are represented by modern languages such as Uyghur and Uzbek of the Southeastern branch, Kazakh of the Northwestern branch, and Turkmen of the Southwestern branch.

Languages of this type exhibit three-term subsystems of inflectional markers, consisting of an indirective past in *-IBDIR*, a postterminal in *-GAN*, and a direct past in *-DI*.

The marker *-IBDIR* is a stable indirectivity marker of the type *IPAST-1*: ‘has evidently done, evidently did’, e.g. Uyghur *yèz-iptu*, Uzbek *yâz-ibdi* [write-*IPAST*] ‘has evidently written, evidently wrote’, Kazakh *tüs-ipti* [fall-*IPAST*] ‘has evidently fallen, evidently fell’, Turkmen *gid-ipdir* [go-*IPAST*] ‘has apparently gone’.

The marker *-GAN* is a postterminal of the type *PPAST*, displaying perfect-like meanings with occasional indirective readings, e.g. Uyghur *yaz-yan*, Uzbek *yâz-yan* [write-*PPAST*] ‘has written’, Kazakh *öltir-gen* [kill-*PPAST*] ‘has killed’, Turkmen *öylön-ön* [get.married-*PPAST*] ‘has married’, ‘is married’.

In languages of this type, two indirective copula particles, *ERKEN* and *ERMIŞ*, combine with various predicates to express ‘is/was obviously’. *ERMIŞ* tends towards reportive uses (type *IC-2*), and *ERKEN* towards non-reportive, i.e. inferential and perceptive, uses (*IC-3*).

ERKEN combines with intraterminals, i.e. presents and imperfects, prospectives, non-verbal predicates, etc, e.g. Uyghur *yèz-ivatqan iken* [write-*INTRA IC*] ‘is/was evidently writing’, Kazakh *kel-edi eken* [come-*INTRA IC*] ‘is/was evidently writing’, *üyde eken* [at.home *IC*] ‘is/was obviously at home’. It combines with postterminals to express ‘has/had obviously been or done’, ‘turns out/turned out to have been or done’, e.g. Uyghur *tüget-ken iken* [finish-*POST IC*] ‘has/had obviously finished’, Uzbek *yâz-yan eken* [write-*POST IC*] ‘has/had obviously written’, Kazakh *tüs-ken eken* [fall-*POST IC*] ‘has/had obviously fallen’.

ERMIŞ expresses corresponding reportive meanings, e.g. Uyghur *yèz-ivatqan-miş* [write-*INTRA-IC*] ‘is/was evidently writing’, Kazakh *kel-edi-mis* [come-*INTRA-IC*] ‘is/was reportedly arriving’. With postterminals, it forms unequivocally indirective past items, e.g. Uyghur *yaz-yan-miş* [write-*POST-IC*] ‘has/had allegedly written’, Turkmen *gid-ip-miş-in* [go-*POST-IC-3SG*] ‘has/had reportedly gone’.

There are also items of the structure *-IBDIR + ERMIŠ*, which apply reportive meaning to inferential or perceptive statements, ‘is/was reportedly evident’, e.g. Kazakh *kel-ipti-mis* [come-IPAST-IC]. Uyghur *yêz-ipti-miš* [write-IPAST-IC] ‘has/had allegedly written’ is thus interpretable as a more reliable statement than *yaz-yan-miš* [write-POST-IC], since it suggests the existence of something perceived or inferred.

The distribution discussed here allows three-term subsystems of copula particles of the type ‘indirective’ [‘reportive’ versus ‘non-reportive’] versus ‘unmarked’. However, the opposition ‘reportive’ versus ‘non-reportive’ is often limited to certain dialects or registers. Thus, *ERMIŠ* is not used in all varieties of Uyghur and Uzbek, and its role in Kazakh is also rather limited.

10.2 Split three-term/two-term systems

Some languages exhibit three inflectional markers, indirective, postterminal and direct past, but a simplified subsystem of copula particles: ‘indirective’ versus ‘unmarked’.

Noghay, of the Northwestern branch, has *IPAST-1*, *PPAST*, and *DPAST*, e.g. *kel-ipti* [come-IPAST] ‘evidently arrived’, *kel-gen* [come-PPAST] ‘has arrived’, *kel-di* [come-DPAST] ‘arrived’. Its copula particle *ERKEN* is a general indirective marker of the semantic type *IC-1*, thus covering both reportive and non-reportive meanings. It combines, for example, with intraterminals, e.g. *kel-e-di eken* [come-INTRA-3SG IC] ‘is/was obviously arriving’, and with postterminals and indirective pasts to form indirectives signalling relative anteriority, e.g. *kel-gen eken* [come-POST IC], *kel-ipti eken* [come-IPAST IC] ‘has/had obviously arrived’. *BOLIBDIR* has a similar function, e.g. *qal-yan bolipti* [remain-POST IC] ‘has/had obviously stayed’.

Certain other languages exhibit a simplified subsystem of inflectional markers, while maintaining a richer subsystem of copula particles, distinguishing between reportive and non-reportive.

In Tatar and Bashkir, of the Northwestern branch, *-GAN* is used without a competing *-IBDIR*, thus representing the type *IPAST-2*. It displays postterminal uses but may also suggest indirectivity, e.g. *yaz-yan* [write-IPAST] ‘has [evidently] written’. The neighbouring language Chuvash has a similar marker *-nĀ* with postterminal and indirective meanings, e.g. *kala-naĀ* [speak-IPAST] ‘has [evidently] spoken’.

Tatar, Bashkir, and Chuvash possess both *ERMIŠ* (reportive) and *ERKEN* (non-reportive), e.g. Chuvash *kil-nĕ imeš* [come-POST IC] ‘has reportedly arrived’, *kil-nĕ ikken* [come-POST IC] ‘has evidently arrived’. The Tatar parti-

cle *bulyan*, which belongs to the type BOLIBDIR, has functions similar to those of ERKEN, combining, for example, with intraterminals, postterminals, and prospectives: *bar-a bulyan* [go-INTRA IC] ‘is/was evidently going’, *bar-yan bulyan* [go-POST IC] ‘has/had evidently gone’, *bar-açaq bulyan* [go-PROSP IC] ‘will/would evidently go’.

10.3 Two-term systems

A few systems just consist of one inflectional marker and one copula particle plus their unmarked opposition partners. An inflectional marker -MIŞ of the type IPAST-2 is used in the western subgroup of the Southwestern branch, e.g. Turkish *-miş*. The cognate item *-BIT* is used in Yakut, the northernmost language of the Northeastern branch, spoken at the opposite extreme of the Turkic world. The languages in question also possess ERMIŞ particles of the type IC-1, e.g. Turkish *imiş*, Yakut *ebit*.

Since -MIŞ lacks a competing -IBDIR, and ERMIŞ lacks a competing ERKEN, these languages display two-term subsystems of the type indirective versus non-indirective. The inflectional markers allow reportive, inferential and perceptive readings, thus corresponding to several items in more comprehensive systems, e.g. Kazakh *-(I)ptI*, *-(I)ptImIs*, *-GAn eken* and *-GAn*.

Turkish -MIŞ, which mainly displays indirective uses, is opposed to an unmarked simple direct past in -DI, which negates the notion of indirectivity but also displays neutral uses. Since Turkish lacks a competing pure postterminal, this item covers both ‘perfect’ and ‘preterite’ functions, e.g. *gel-di* [come-DPAST] ‘has come/came’. The copula particle is a stable general indirectivity marker with reportive, inferential and perceptive uses. A complex item -MIŞ + ERMIŞ applies an explicitly indirective type of evidentiality to a postterminally envisaged event. It is often used for rumours, gossip, etc., e.g. *gel-miş-miş* [come-POST-IC] ‘has/had reportedly arrived’.

Yakut has a similar system (see Buder 1989). The inflectional marker -BIT conveys reportive, inferential and perceptive nuances, e.g. *kel-bit* [come-IPAST] ‘has [obviously] arrived’. The temporally indifferent indirective particle *ebit* is similar to Turkish *imiş* and allows similar combinations with intraterminals, postterminals, etc., e.g. *tur-ar ebit* [stand-INTRA IC] ‘evidently stands/stood’, *kel-bit ebit* [come-POST IC] ‘has/had evidently arrived’.

There are still smaller evidentiality systems, in which the inflectional marker represents the type PPAST, i.e. a postterminal with secondary indirective readings. Thus, Azerbaijani possesses, like Turkish, an indirective copula particle ERMIŞ of the semantic type IC-1, *imiş*. However, the status of its inflec-

tional marker *-mİş*, which forms a common mixed paradigm with *-(I)b*, is different from that of Turkish *-mİş*. It represents an ambivalent type with postterminal meanings, e.g. *gel-miş-em* [come-PPAST-1SG] ‘I have arrived’, *yaz-ib-sin* [write-PPAST-2SG] ‘you have written’. The unmarked term *-DI* thus tends towards ‘preterite’ rather than ‘perfect’ functions, e.g. *gel-di* [come-DPAST] ‘came’ versus *gel-ib* [come-PPAST] ‘has come’. The type *-MIŞ + ERMIŞ* unambiguously applies indirectivity to postterminally envisaged events, e.g. *yaz-mış-mış* [write-POST-IC] ‘has/had reportedly written’.

11. Contextual interpretations and semantic extensions

The motives for using Turkic indirectives may vary. They may get various contextual interpretations and display various pragmatic extensions of their central meaning.

11.1 Testimony, involvement, control

Indirectives may evoke the impression that the recipient does not or did not witness the event, perceive it, or participate in it consciously; that (s)he is or was not present at the event, not in control of it, not directly involved in it. However, despite the indirect way of presentation, these meanings are not signalled explicitly. The indirectly marked event may indeed be apprehended by the recipient through the senses, consciously taken part in, etc. Lack of participation or control is limited to certain contexts and cannot be the common core meaning of indirectives. The source of information may be direct evidence, personal, even visually obtained knowledge. A sentence such as Turkish *Ahmet gel-miş* or Uyghur *Exmet ke-ptu* [A. come-IPAST] ‘Ahmed has [as I note] arrived’ can be felicitously uttered by a speaker who has witnessed the arrival in reality. The indirective statement just expresses the conscious reception. As is often the case with linguistic devices, it does not tell us how something is in reality, but rather how the speaker chooses to present it.

On the other hand, evidentially unmarked terms may suggest that the source of information is direct experience, that the speaker takes/has taken part in the event consciously, is/was in control of it, etc. Again, the unmarked terms do not signal these meanings explicitly, but may also be used for unwitnessed, uncontrolled, reported or inferred events, e.g. Turkish *Çok büyü-dün* [much grow-DPAST-2SG] ‘You have become very big’, *Kemal Paşa, Selânik’te doğdu* [Atatürk(Kemal Paşa) Salonika+LOC be.born+DPAST] ‘Atatürk was born

in Salonika'. They just lack the two-layered information typical of indirectives, and may thus be used whenever this specific information seems unessential.

11.2 Factuality

Turkic indirectives may also have epistemic connotations in the sense of reservations about the validity of the event as a fact. The indirect way of referring may create uncertainty concerning the realisation of the event and be interpreted as non-testimonial reference. Indirectives, in particular reportive items, can be used to disclaim direct responsibility for the truth of the statement, suggesting that the speaker is not the originator of the information or does not vouch for it. By contrast, unmarked terms may suggest that the speaker is certain of the truth of information and even responsible for it.

'Supposition' is sometimes claimed to be the main meaning of Turkic indirectives. The corresponding unmarked items are said to signal that the speaker regards the event as certain. However, indirectives are not presumptives or dubitatives reducing the factuality of the statement. Their task is not to express the speaker's attitude to the truth of the content, to signal doubt or conjecture concerning the information conveyed.

Turkic languages have other ways of expressing supposition or conjecture, e.g. the particle *-DIR*, added to postterminals, intraterminals and other forms, e.g. Turkish *yaz-mış-tır*, Uzbek *yâz-yan-dir*, Uyghur *yaz-yan-du* [write-POST-SUPP] 'has presumably written', Turkish *oku-yor-dur*, Turkmen *oqo-ya:n-nîr* [read-INTRA-SUPP] 'is presumably reading', Uyghur *işle-vatqan-du* [work-INTRA-SUPP] 'is presumably working'.

11.3 Distance

'Distance' is another possible contextual realisation. It has sometimes even been suggested as the common core meaning of Turkic indirectives. Thus, Turkish *-MIŞ* and its counterparts, e.g. in Old East Turkic, have been referred to as 'preterites of distance'. It is true that some kind of distance is likely to be involved if one does not refer directly to the event itself, but rather to the reception of it. By virtue of their central value, indirectives may imply cognitive or emotional distance from the event. Speakers may use them in order to distance themselves from the event, to distinguish themselves from the responsibility for it, or as a way of being vague about sources that they do not want to lay open to view. The notion is, however, too vague to possess any explanatory force.

11.4 Irony

Indirectives may, in particular contexts, display pragmatic extensions of an attitudinal nature. One kind of dissociation from the event may be an ironic relation to it, reservation interpretable as sarcasm, disdain, etc. e.g. *Bunu yap-acak-mış-sın* [this-ACC DO-PROSP-1C-2SG] ‘You will obviously (as you think) do this’.

11.5 Caution, modesty, summarising

The limitation to an indirective statement may be motivated by caution, modesty, need for a summarising view, etc. Thus, indirective inflectional markers may represent events in a complexive, experiential, summarising way, frequently with nuances of modesty, e.g. Turkish *Ben her zaman vazife-m-i yap-muş-um* [I each time duty-POSS.1SG-ACC DO-IPAST-1SG] ‘I have [as it appears] always done my duty’, cf. Uyghur *Men daim vezipe-m-ni ada qi-pti-men* [I always duty-POSS.1SG-ACC fulfilment do-IPAST-1SG], Turkish *Önemli bir konu ele al-muş-sın* [important a topic hand-DAT take-IPAST-2SG] ‘You have [if I may summarise] addressed an important topic’. Readings of these kinds derive from the indirect postterminal perspective.

11.6 Mirative connotations

Indirectives of the types *-IBDIR*, *-MIŞ*, *ERKEN* and *ERMIŞ*, etc. may convey mirative connotations. Their use may, in particular contexts, be interpreted in terms of new knowledge, discovery, sudden awareness of revealed facts, surprise, mental unpreparedness, perception contrary to one’s expectations, admiration, etc. Such readings follow naturally from the notion of indirectivity. The conscious reception (‘as it turns out/turned out’) may be sudden or unexpected; what the recipient turns the mind to may come as a surprise. The statement that Turkish indirectives may convey new information that is not yet part of the speaker’s integrated picture of the world (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986) is compatible with the central value of indirectivity. But this does not mean that ‘mirativity’ is their central meaning from which the other uses may be derived (DeLancey 1997). Surprise, novelty and contrariness to the speaker’s expectation are not necessary elements of indirectivity. So-called ‘hot news’ is typically expressed by the direct past marker *-DI*. On the other hand, certain Turkic languages possess other means of expressing unexpected events, e.g. miratives particles such as Altay Turkic *turbay*.

In sentences such as Kazakh *Ol ket-ip qal-ipti*, Uyghur *U kêt-ip qa-ptu* [(s)he go-CONV remain-IPAST] ‘(S)he has left [as I note]’, or exclamations such as Turkish *Bu kız ne güzel-miş!* [this girl what beautiful-1C] ‘How beautiful this girl is!’, Uyghur *Bu qiz çirayliq iken!* [this girl beautiful 1C] ‘This girl is beautiful!’, Turkish *Büyü-müş-sün!* [grow-IPAST-2SG], Uyghur *Çoñ bol-up sen!* [big become-IPAST 2SG] ‘You have grown!’, the indirective marker just adds the meaning ‘as I am/become aware of’, which is the central value of the category. Contrariness to the speaker’s expectation is, however, not part of this value.

12. Differences between persons

Although evidential specifications are possible in all persons, certain interdependencies with the person systems may be observed. The semantic interpretations vary according to the degree of the recipient’s involvement in the event. There are often differences between the first person singular and other persons. Reportive or inferential uses are naturally most common with third persons.

The traditional definition of indirectivity as the expression of ‘the speaker’s non-firsthand information’ is problematic because of its frequent incompatibilities with the first person. The use of indirectives when speaking of oneself then necessarily implies lack of awareness, volitionality, consciousness or control due to inattention, sleep, drunkenness, coma, etc. However, with a definition based on the presentation of the event ‘by reference to its reception by a conscious subject’, it is by no means contradictory to use indirectives with firstperson subjects whose referents are aware of the event in question.

In Yellow Uyghur, a small Turkic language spoken in Western China, the second and third person of certain tenses tends to take the evidential form $-(i)pti$, $-(i)tti$ = -IBDIR, denoting that the event is beyond control of the speaker, whereas the first person takes the corresponding non-evidential form, $-(^h)ti$ = -DI. Thus, a unified past tense paradigm has been suggested, in which the first and non-first persons take different suffixes, e.g. *men pa^hr-ti* ‘I went’ = -DI, *sen part-tti* ‘you went’ = -IBDIR (Roos 1999: 105–106). In earlier descriptions, however, these two types were dealt with as two separate tenses (Teniřev 1976: 92–93).

13. Correlations with other grammatical categories

Turkic evidentials are limited to main clauses with an asserted, contradictable content. They are not allowed in non-indicative moods such as optative and imperative.

They may, however, cooccur with necessitives or debitives, e.g. Turkish *Git-meli-ymiş-sin* [go-NEC-IC-2SG], Uyghur *Sen kêt-iş-in kèrek iken* [you go-NOM-2SG necessary IC] ‘You evidently ought to go’.

In negative sentences, evidentials are not within the scope of negation. The narrated event itself is negated, not its reception by the conscious subject, e.g. *U kel-me-ptu* [(s)he come-NEG-IC] ‘(S)he has not arrived [as I note]’.

Turkic indirectives may also occur in interrogative sentences, e.g. Turkish *O böyle de-miş mi?* [(s)he so say-IPAST Q], Uyghur *U mundaq de-ptu-mu?* [(s)he so say-IPAST-Q] ‘Did (s)he reportedly/evidently say so?’, Kazakh *Kel-e mi eken?* [come-INTRA Q IC] ‘Is (s)he, as it appears, coming?’, Üyde *mi eken?* [at.home Q IC] ‘Is (s)he, as it appears, at home?’ Noghay *Ne-ge kel-gen eken-ler?* [what-DAT come-POST IC-PL] ‘Why have they, as it appears, come?’. Indirectives may also be used in questions asked on behalf of someone else. They do not express the speaker’s assumption about the addressee’s source of information.

Though evidentiality specifications are relatively independent of aspect-tense choice, there are certain cooccurrence restrictions. Indirective copula particles are incompatible with the simple past -DI and the related copula forms *edi*, *idi* etc. ‘was’, e.g. Turkish **-DI-ymIş*, **(y)di-ymIş*.

14. Modal uses of ERKEN

Certain uses of ERKEN seem to be exceptions to the last rule of the preceding section. In some languages, ERKEN may also be used as a modal particle meaning ‘indeed’, etc., in which case it does not take personal suffixes, but is added to complete main clauses. In this function, ERKEN may also cooccur with -DI, e.g. Kazakh *Kel-di eken!* [come-DPAST MOD] ‘(S)he has indeed arrived!’. It can also combine with conditional markers to form modal sentences expressing modest, polite or timid wishes, e.g. Noghay *Yaz-sa-η eken*, Uyghur *Yaz-sa-η iken* [write-COND-2SG MOD] ‘If you would write it up [it would be fine]’.

With interrogative elements, the modal variant of ERKEN forms rhetorical questions, with readings such as ‘I wonder’, e.g. Kazakh *Ne et-ti-m eken?* [what do-DPAST-1SG MOD] ‘I wonder what I have done’, Noghay *Nege bol-ma-y-di eken?*, Uyghur *Nemişqa bol-ma-y-di-ken?* [why become-NEG-INTRA-3SG MOD]

‘I wonder why it does not come about’. Two examples from Noghay may illustrate the difference between the modal and the evidential use of ERKEN. *Ne-ge kel-gen-ler eken?* [what-DAT come-POST-3PL MOD], where the particle is added to the complete main clause, is a rhetorical question meaning ‘I wonder why they have come’. In the corresponding indirective sentence, ERKEN takes the personal suffix: *Ne-ge kel-gen-ler-er?* [what-DAT come-POST 1C-3PL] ‘Why have they reportedly [etc.] come?’ (Karakoç 2001: 38).

15. Evidentiality and discourse

Indirectives may play various roles according to different discourse types. In traditional story-telling, e.g. in fairytales, they play the role of detaching the narrator from the narrated events, e.g. Uyghur *Burun bir padiša öt-üptü; un-ij bir bali-si bar iken* [formerly a ruler live-IPAST; (s)he-GEN a child-POSS.3SG existing 1C] ‘Once upon a time there was a king who had a son’. On traditional -MIŞ-based narratives in Turkish, see Johanson (1971: 79–80). Independently of their status as genuine indirectives or indirectly interpretable postterminals, -MIŞ, -IBDIR and -GAN may serve as propulsive, ‘plot-advancing’, basic items of this discourse type. In historical narratives, however, direct pasts of the type -DI are used as the basic items; as mentioned, also for events unwitnessed by the speaker. Evidentials are not typically used for describing dreams or content conveyed by written, auditory or visual media.

16. Origins

Turkic indirective markers of the inflectional type originate in postterminals. The development of more stable indirective meanings may be seen as the grammaticalisation of an evidentiality strategy, a semantic extension in the sense of conventionalised implicatures. The markers -MIŞ and -GAN are of unknown origin, but may have developed from lexemes. For example, it is conceivable, though hardly provable, that -MIŞ goes back to a form of a verb of the type *bış-* ‘to ripen, to mature’ (attaining a final state such as ‘ripe’, ‘cooked’ or ‘done’).

Markers of the formal type -IBDIR, e.g. Uyghur *yöz-ipti* ‘evidently wrote’, Salar *gel-du* ‘evidently came’, Tuvan *ber-iptir* ‘evidently gave’, go back to the postterminal periphrasis *-(I)b tur-ur*, consisting of a converb of the lexical verb plus *tur-ur* ‘stands’, e.g. *yaz-ıb tur-ur* (‘stands having written’) ‘is in the state of

having written', 'has written'. The type BOLIBDIR consists of *bol-* 'to become, to be' plus the indirective suffix -IB[DIR].

The copula particles ERMIŠ and ERKEN are derived from *er-* 'to be', though not regular forms in -MIŠ and -GAN. Both may be of postterminal origin, if *er-* was originally an initiotransformative verb (see Johanson 2000:62–63) expressing (i) an initial dynamic phase 'to become' and (ii) a subsequent stative phase 'to be'. The postterminal perspective of such a verb may envisage the event as still going on at the aspectual vantage point: *er-miš* 'has become (evident)', 'has appeared' = 'is (evident)', 'appears'.

17. Contact-induced codecopying

Indirectives play a central part in almost all Turkic languages. However, due to influence from Indo-European languages such as Persian, Greek and Slavic, a few languages and dialects only exhibit 'evidentiality strategies'. The tendency of Azerbaijanian *-mİš/-(I)b* towards pure postterminal ('perfect') readings is most probably due to Persian influence, e.g. *yap-īb* 'has done', cf. Persian *karde(-ast)*. There are also other influences. For example, the Yellow Uyghur system is reminiscent of the Tibetan verbal paradigm (DeLancey 1986). Evidentiality systems are lacking in a few Turkic languages and dialects which have been strongly influenced by Indo-European, e.g. Karaim in Lithuania, under Slavic and Lithuanian impact (Csató 2000b), and the Turkish dialects of the Trabzon province on the east Black Sea coast, under the impact of Greek (Brendemoen 1997).

Features of Turkic evidential systems have proven highly attractive in language contact situations and have been copied into non-Turkic languages in Southwestern and Central Asia, Southeastern and Northeastern Europe, etc. Indirective categories similar to the Turkic ones typically appear in contact areas such as the Balkans, Anatolia, Caucasus, the Volga region, and Central Asia, e.g. in Bulgarian, Macedonian, Albanian, Kurdish, Western Armenian, Georgian, Tajik, and Eastern Finno-Ugric. For example, Northern Tajik has developed a comprehensive evidential system on the Uzbek model. Indirective functions have been copied (i) onto postterminals of the 'perfect' type (as opposed to 'aorists'), and (ii) onto related participles, on the model of the temporally indifferent ERKEN or ERMIŠ, e.g. Bulgarian *bil* (Johanson 1996b) and Western Armenian *eyer*. I also suggest that Hungarian *igen* 'yes' goes back to a Turkic form ERKEN 'evidently'.

Differences in markedness sometimes seem to speak against the assumption of contact influence. The basic evidential oppositions of Bulgarian and Macedonian are described as relying on marked ‘confirmative’ items indicating unequivocal and direct assertion, whereas the corresponding unmarked items convey indirective meanings in particular contexts. The question is whether systems based on marked confirmatives may have emerged through areal contact with Turkic systems based on marked indirectives. Comrie considers the possibility that the semantic distinction can be reduced to a single prototype with markedness inversion: “one of the systems, almost certainly the Balkan one, has undergone a shift whereby an old indirective was reinterpreted as unmarked, with the originally unmarked non-indirective then becoming a marked confirmative” (2000: 8). This suggestion is in line with the basic principle of the Code Copying framework (see, e.g., Johanson 2002) to the effect that a code copy is never identical with its model.

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Evidentiality in West Greenlandic

A case of scattered coding

Michael Fortescue

1. Organisation¹

Evidentiality as such can hardly be said to be systematized in West Greenlandic – at least not in any obvious sense. The category manifests itself in ‘scattered coding’ in this language (see Aikhenvald, this volume, Chapter 1), in the form of various kinds of bound affixes, a single quotative enclitic, a single adverbial ‘particle’, and, more peripherally, in part of its demonstrative system (as well as through adverbial and syntagmatic means).² It does not appear to display any ‘evidentiality strategy’ either, if by that is meant secondary evidential meanings of non-evidential categories (see Aikhenvald, this volume, Chapter 1). The situation is virtually identical in all other languages of the Eskimo-Aleut family.

The closest thing to a systematized area of evidentiality is in the choice of certain ‘sentential affixes’ (a formal category intermediate between derivation and inflection) that have epistemic meaning (two out of half a dozen or so), namely *-gunar-* ‘it seems’ and *-sima-* in its ‘reportative’ sense (signalling a past event the speaker was not present at in person), but the overlap here with ‘true’ epistemic (inferential/judgmental) senses is egregious and the whole category of epistemic affixes is, like all other main clause verbal affix categories in Eskimo apart from mood-person-number inflections, optional in West Greenlandic. The other (non-sentential) derivational affixes – verb-extenders or verbalizers – with an evidential meaning (such as ‘one can hear the sound of...’) are also optional, as is the quotative (reportative) enclitic *-guuq*. Note that some relevant affixes have an evidential and a non-evidential sense (notably *-sima-*, which also has an aspectual and a tense – perfect – sense) but these are distinguishable by commutation with other affixes.³ In other words, the be-

haviour of such morphemes may be ‘systematic’ without their forming complete paradigmatic sets and without their being obligatory – this will be returned to in the conclusion. More broadly, these various types of evidentiality codings form a cline of subjectivity, ranging from objective sensory-specific derivation through epistemic modality to subjective attitudinal affixes, ordered from left to right within the verb complex (the quotative enclitic, being purely pragmatically controlled, falls outside of this).

2. Semantics

The coding of evidentiality in West Greenlandic is spread amongst the following items then:

a. sentential affixes (of the epistemic sub-category)

-*gunar*- ‘it seems that’ (from sensory information – usually visual but also auditory, etc.), or ‘presumably, probably’ (by logical inference)

-*sima*- ‘apparently’ (speaker not present, but inferred from verbal report or visual evidence left of event)

The two senses of *-gunar-* are only distinguished by context. Although in its evidential sense *-sima-* is not usually used with 1st person subjects, it can be in its other, aspectual or temporal senses (and note that there is no interaction between person and other sentential affixes). In actual texts, the three meanings (for non-1st person at least) are most often all conflated, i.e. when speaking of an event that happened in the past when the speaker was not present himself/herself and that resulted in some persisting state. The only way they can be differentiated is, as mentioned, by permutation, though in most contexts there will not be sufficient (non-obligatory) surrounding affixal material to ‘disambiguate’. If two tokens expressing more than one sense are present, the first must be aspectual and the second either tense or epistemic modality (the ‘sentential’ meanings).⁴ There do not seem to be any restrictions on the nature of the stem to which it may attach (e.g. as regards inherent aspect).

Other epistemic affixes potentially filling the same non-obligatory ‘slot’ in the morphology include:

-*junnarsi-* ‘probably, no doubt’ (about the present, on the basis of general expectations)

- nnguatsiar*- ‘presumably, I suppose, as far as one can tell’ (about the present on the basis of expectations and experience – more subjective than the preceding)
- junnanngit*- ‘I don’t think that . . . , probably will not’ (speaker is convinced of a present or, more usually, future negative potentiality)
- qquuqi*- ‘undoubtedly, must have -ed’ (not much used by younger people today)
- (*sima*)*ssa*- ‘must (have -ed)’ (inferred)⁵

There is some semantic overlap between these items, and there are a few others (less usual or dialectal or restricted in combination) that may fill the position. As discussed below, some specialization of meaning in combination with negative affix *-nngit*- is found.

Here follow a few examples:⁶

- (1) (*taangaarami*) *unnua-a-gunar-puq*
(it is so dark) night-be-gunar-3SG+INDIC
‘It must be night (to judge from the light).’
- (2) (*taa*) *siallir-unar-puq*
(listen!) rain-gunar-3SG+INDIC
‘It must be raining (to judge from the view through the window or the sound on the roof).’
- (3) (*takuuk masak*) *siallir-sima-vuq*
(look it is wet) rain-sima-3SG+INDIC
‘It appears to have rained (said when going outside and seeing a pool of water after it has stopped raining).’
- (4) *savik una ipik-kunar-puq*
knife.ABS this be.sharp-gunar-3SG+INDIC
‘This knife looks sharp.’
- (5) (*kingusinnirusukkut sianirvigigiuk*) *niri-gunar-puq*
(call him later) eat-gunar-3SG+INDIC
‘He is probably eating (a logical inference, e.g. from the present time and one’s knowledge of the person’s habits).’
- (6) (*akurnusirsurnagu*) *qasu-junnarsi-vuq*
(don’t disturb him) be.tired-junnarsi-3SG+INDIC
‘He is no doubt tired (from what we know of his endurance and what he has been through).’

- (7) (*takusarusunngilara*) *api-nnguatsiar-puq*
 (I don't want to go and look) snow-nnguatsiar-3SG+INDIC
 'It is probably/no doubt snowing (that is my personal feeling or expectation).'⁷
- (8) *naasu-kasik* *una alli-unnanngil-aq*
 flower-miserable+ABS this grow.big-junnanngit-3SG+INDIC
 'I don't believe this miserable little flower will grow bigger/you can be sure it won't grow any bigger (speaker's conviction based on experience, etc.).'
- (9) (*naak puuqattara?*) *tammar-simassa-aq*
 (where is my bag?) get.lost-simassa-3SG+INDIC
 'It must have got lost (logical conclusion from the object's absence from its expected place).'⁷

There are also a few (non-epistemic) sentential affixes of a mirative meaning such as *-riallar-* expressing the protagonist's (or the narrator's own) surprise at some event (see Fortescue 1984: 31 for examples), but these do not function as evidentials (or cooccur with them).

b. non-sentential affixes

- (r)paluC-* 'look V' (e.g. good; also 'look, sound, act like an N')
- (r)palaar-* 'one can hear (someone or something) V-ing' (also 'one can hear an N, look like, act like an N')
- (r)pallaC-* 'one can hear (someone or something) V-ing' or 'they say he has V-ed'

Especially the last of these has a clear evidential sense (evidence from rumour or some other kind of unconfirmed spoken report), but *-(r)paluC-* can also be used in this sense, and *-(r)pallaC-* can also be used of evidence from other senses than hearing (for example tactile or kinaesthetic).

These are all typically used to describe a state of affairs or event, either in the present or reported in a narrative context.⁸ Here follow a few examples:

- (10) *napparsima-rpalup-puq*
 be.ill-(r)paluC-3SG+INDIC
 'He looks ill.'
- (11) *arnar-palup-puq*
 woman-(r)paluC-3SG+INDIC
 'He seems effeminate (because of his behaviour or appearance).'

- (12) *angir-pallap-puq*
say.yes-(r)pallaC-3SG+INDIC
'He is supposed to have said yes (I have heard).'
- (13) *katap-pallap-puq*
fall-(r)pallaC-3SG+INDIC
'One can notice that something has fallen off (e.g. from the sled, which therefore feels lighter or more sensitive to steer).'
- (14) *ani-rpallap-puq*
ani-(r)pallaC-3SG+INDIC
'One can/could hear him going out.'
- (15) *qia-rpalaar-puq*
cry-(r)palaar-3SG+INDIC
'One can/could hear someone crying.'
- (16) *naaja-rpalaar-puq*
seagull-(r)palaar-3SG+INDIC
'One can/could hear (the cry of) seagulls.'

There are other such affixes like *-nirar-* 'say that someone/something V-s' and *-suri-* 'think that someone/something V-s' which are added to verbal stems and introduce their own subject participant (the reporter or thinker) – they report events or thoughts but are not strictly evidential, stating (quasi-) objective facts rather.⁹ A single example will suffice:

- (17) *Tuumasi iqiasun-nirar-paat*
Tuumasi.ABS be.lazy-nirar-3PL/3SG+INDIC
'They said that Tuumasi is/was lazy.'

c. quotative enclitic

Sentential/phrasal enclitic *-guuq* (after consonant usually *-(n)nguuq*), 'one/he says/ they say. . .', is used for 'mediated' illocutions of all sorts: it moves responsibility for a speech act away from the speaker. Reports with *-guuq* suggest displaced responsibility for veridity rather than unreliability (it may be a matter of true but unwanted news, say), the source of the information being left unspecified. With imperatives it expresses indirect commands and with interrogatives indirect questions. Here follow examples with all three moods:

- (18) *Tuumasi-n-nguuq qilalugaq pisar-aa*
Tuumasi-REL-guuq beluga catch-3SG/3SG+INDIC
'Tuumasi caught a beluga (they say).'

- (19) *filmiiir-sinnaa-ppan-nguuq*
 see.film-can-3PL+INTER-guuq
 ‘They want to know whether they can see a film.’
- (20) *inuullua-ri-lin-nguuq*
 live.well-NON.IMM-3PL+OPT-guuq
 ‘Give my greetings to them.’

d. quotative particle

The uninflectable particle *unnia* ‘just think, they say that...’ is the impersonal (and mildly mirative) equivalent to an inflected form of verbal stem *unnir-* ‘say that’ and – like the mirative construction mentioned in note 12 – takes a complement clause in the participial mood:

- (21) *unnia Qaanaa-mi najugaqar-tuq*
unnia Qaanaaq-LOC live-3SG+PART
 ‘They say he lives at Qaanaaq (would you believe).’

Unlike quotative *-guuq*, this has a ‘gossipy’, subjective flavour to it. The corresponding full verb *unnir-* inflected in the indicative is used (like more common *uqar-* ‘say’) in an ordinary syntactic construction of indirect speech with specified subject and a subordinate mood complement clause.

e. demonstratives

As mentioned in (1), the demonstrative system is more peripherally involved with evidentiality. Thus deictic prefix *aa-* on demonstratives ‘(that one) over there, in there, up there, etc.’ contrasts with anaphoric *ta(C)-* ‘(that one) afore-said’. There is also amongst the demonstrative roots an item *im-* ‘that invisible, that long ago’ though this is archaic today. Thus *angut aa-juna* ‘this man (here – pointing)’ is opposed to *angut ta-anna* ‘that man (recently/just referred to)’, both from the same demonstrative pronominal form *una* of a nearby thing or person. *Angut inna* (with *im-*) in the older language would refer to someone invisible (for example because of belonging to the legendary past). The distinction between visible and invisible/obscured in the original Eskimo demonstrative system is still fully alive in Alaskan Yupik (see Reed et al. 1977:256).

3. Correlations with other grammatical categories

As regards interaction with the (inflectional) category of mood, the use of quotative *-guuq* with an interrogative clause to produce an indirect question has already been mentioned. Of the other evidential morphemes listed, the sentential ones are not used in questions, but the non-sentential ones may, since they merely produce derived predications (e.g. the sound of seagulls being heard in (16) could well be questioned in the interrogative mood). Similar statements apply to commands (see *-guuq* in (20) above) and also to dependent clauses, since *-guuq* can be attached enclitically to any initial sentential constituent – including a dependent verb-form. No sentential affix (apart from special ‘conjunctive’ ones) can be added to dependent clauses, but there is no restriction on other non-sentential ones of an evidential nature doing so.

In Fortescue (1995) can be found a discussion of other means of expressing indirect reports, commands and questions in West Greenlandic. Apart from syntactic constructions of the usual subordinating kind, there are also morphological constructions, including *-nirar-* illustrated above in (17). Notice that the latter (as also *-suri-* ‘think that’) can exceptionally take whole ‘propositions’ containing epistemic and tense sentential affixes in its scope, verb-internally, thus:

- (22) *Maalia-p miiraq irniinnaq*
 Maalia-REL child right.away
sini-li-ssa-gunar-nirar-paa
 sleep-begin-FUT-probably-say.that-3SG/3SG+INDIC
 ‘Maalia said that the child would probably fall asleep right away.’

Less productively, there is also an affix of reported direct speech *-Vr-* following common fixed phrases as base (here a whole indicative sentence *kalippuq*):

- (23) *nukappiaraq kalippu-ur-puq*
 boy.ABS he.is.towing.something-say-3SG+INDIC
 ‘The boy said/cried, “He’s towing something” (e.g. when announcing that he had caught sight of a returning hunter towing a seal behind his kayak).’

West Greenlandic (like all Eskimo languages) further has a range of attitudinal sentential affixes like *-kasiC-*, which expresses that the subject of the action acted clumsily or in an annoying or stupid way (often used ironically about oneself), or *-nnguar-*, which expresses affection or compassion when the subject is a small or weak person (typically a child) – for examples see Fortescue

(1984:295f.). These may combine with the epistemic sentential affixes above (which they always follow).

4. Combination with negation

The only restrictions on combination with negation concerns the sentential affixes listed above under 2a, insofar as there is a certain degree of lexicalization in some combinations with negative affix *-nngit-* (with non-sentential affixes there is the usual transparent scope relation whether negation follows or precedes). Either following or preceding *-gunar-* (*-gunanngit-* or *-nngikkunar-*) this produces a lexicalized ‘certainly/probably not’ meaning, whereas following *-sima-* (it cannot precede it) *-nngit-* will usually force one of the other two readings of that morpheme, namely resultative (aspect) or perfect (tense). Compare also *-junnanngit-* listed under 1a (it is a compound of the initial element of *-junnarsi-* and negative *-nngit-*), which is if anything somewhat more subjective or tentative in meaning than *-gunanngit-* above (the two have become somewhat entangled historically). *-nnguatsiar-* is different from these by always being attached after *-nngit-* (transparently – there is no lexicalization):

- (24) *qimaguti-nngi-nnguatsiar-puq*
 leave-NEG-nnguatsiar-3SG+INDIC
 ‘I don’t think he’s left/ he’s probably not left.’

5. Discourse

As mentioned above, *-sima-* is not usually used of a 1st person subject, but it can be so used in a jocular manner (e.g. suggesting one was drunk at the time of an event one is reporting), e.g.:

- (25) *ippassaq Nuum-miis-sima-vunga*
 yesterday Nuuk-be.in-sima-1SG+INDIC
 ‘Yesterday I was in Nuuk apparently.’

It is also commonly used to distance oneself from responsibility for an event, for example a child found next to a broken vase might say:

- (26) *asirur-sima-vuq*
 break-sima-3SG+INDIC
 ‘It got broken (i.e. not by me).’

An interesting use of quotative enclitic *-guuq* also typical of children is in ‘pretend’ situations such as the following, where one child is proposing a game (not reporting someone else’s words):

- (27) *illin-nguuq nakursaq uanga-lu napparsimasuq*
 you-guuq doctor I-and patient
 ‘You are (to be) the doctor and I am the patient.’

Heavy use of *-guuq* is also typical of the traditional narrative genre, being often repeated (enclitic to the first word or phrase of successive sentences) for stylistic rather than informational purposes (compare de Reuse, this volume, on a parallel in Western Apache). Miratives and other ‘subjective/attitudinal’ affixes are also often used in this genre to add vividness, but these are not strictly speaking evidential.

6. Evidentiality strategies

It is not really possible to say that any of the morphemes in WG expressing evidentiality are secondary uses of other modal meanings, i.e. the result of an ‘evidential strategy’, on the way to (primary) grammaticalization. Thus evidential *-sima-*, for example, developed historically from a non-modal resultative (and has further developed a tense sense), but has not produced an obligatory evidential ‘system’ nor replaced the earlier meaning. At most one can say that certain of the epistemic affixes of the language have developed narrower evidential senses. The Proto-Eskimo source of *-gunar-* thus apparently had the meaning ‘probably’ (see *-yuknar-*, from *-yuke-* ‘think that’ and *-nar-* ‘be such as to cause’, in Fortescue et al. 1994: 437), and *-sima-* can only be reconstructed to this stage in its (secondary) epistemic sense as a general inferential, ‘apparently’ (the link to specific modalities as in (3) is thus presumably later).¹⁰ The basic category here in all forms of Eskimo is epistemic modality (as perhaps also in Eastern Pomo – see McLendon, this volume).

There is nothing in West Greenlandic analogous to the use of the participial mood for evidentiality as reported for mainland Central Siberian Yupik (Vakhtin 1995). Jacobson (1990: 57), in describing the closely related Saint Lawrence Island variety of the language, links this use of the participial mood

to the presence of preceding affix of epistemic modality *-(i/u)ma-*, which corresponds to West Greenlandic *-sima-*. Coupled with other mood inflections it has the aspectual (resultative) sense of WG *-sima-*. Apparently the affix is optional on the mainland, although the examples of this usage given by Vakhtin (1995:232f.) actually do all include preceding *-(i/u)ma-* or other affixes with modal or tense meanings like *-yaXqa(a)-* ‘must’, immediate past *-nXa(a)-*, or past/perfective *-ka(a)-* ‘to have V-ed/ to have been V-ed’ (combinations not specifically reported by Jacobson). So the situation could in fact well be just the same as on Saint Lawrence Island. The situation does at all events reflect – if indirectly – the general replacement of sentential affixes in Central Siberian Yupik by particles under the influence of neighbouring Chukchi (which has possibly been stronger on the mainland than on the island) – compare de Reuse (1994), who names several Chukchi loan particles of an epistemic nature (e.g. *agnepa* ‘probably, must have (inferred from circumstances)’, from *ewnəpe* on p. 366).¹¹ Evidentiality is in general expressed by particles in Chukchi. In Central Alaskan Yupik there is a different epistemic affix, *-llini-*, corresponding to *-sima-*, glossed as ‘it seems that, I found out that, I discovered that...’ (Reed et al. 1987:237) and the use of the participial mood as an indicative is described as ‘exclamatory’ (Reed et al. 1987:250).¹² For Central Siberian Yupik (on Saint Lawrence Island) Jacobson describes it as ‘a past tense in continuing discourse’ (Jacobson 1990:57).

7. Historical sources

The various affixes with evidential meaning cannot be traced back to earlier independent stems (even for proto-Eskimo-Aleut). As mentioned above, the source of epistemic *-sima-* lies in a resultative affix, whose reconstructed form for Proto-Eskimo is *-(u)ma-* (see Fortescue et al. 1994:410). The direction of change is that expected from grammaticalization theory, but with no ultimate source in any independent verb (the form *-sima-* reflects the allomorph originally found after *t-*stems). Compare Anderson (1986:275) for the common source of ‘circumstantial-inference’ evidentials in resultative perfects.

The situation as regards the lack of any obvious lexical source is similar with the other affixes discussed above. The origin of *-gunar-* has been mentioned in §6, and *-nnguatsiar-* was an attitudinal affix at an earlier stage;¹³ *-ssa-*, which has both an epistemic and a tense meaning, derives from **-tya-* ‘intend to, be about to’, related to Proto-Eskimo root modal affix **-ya-* ‘be apt to’. As for *-(r)paluC-* (and other related non-sentential affixes), one might sus-

pect an original independent verb meaning ‘hear’, but apart from a tantalizing verb stem *valom-* ‘hear’ (and *palomtel-* ‘listen’) in Chukchi there is no evidence for this (a purely internal relationship between reconstructed **-valuk-*, after C **-paluk-*, and Proto-Eskimo denominal affix *-var-/par-* ‘go towards’ is suggested in Fortescue et al. 1994: 432).

Enclitic *-guuq* (in Central Siberian Yupik *-nguq*) may have arisen from verbalizing affix *-(ng)u-* ‘be’ plus a 3sg indicative inflection (i.e. ‘it is so that...’), for which there is a near-parallel in Aleut *aXtakuX* ‘apparently be’ from *a-* ‘be’ (originally *u-* as in Eskimo) plus stative/resultative affix *-Xta-*, here in the present indicative (cf. Bergsland 1997: 119, 123, 217). The adverbial ‘particle’ *unnia* ‘it is said that’ is derived from verb stem *unnir-* ‘say (that)’, as mentioned above.

The situation in remotely related Aleut is, incidentally, similar to that in West Greenlandic, with at least one affix of epistemic modality (*-masu-/musu-*, that may be related in part to *-sima-*), but it lacks a quotative enclitic, and generally has more analytic/syntagmatic means of expressing evidentiality (e.g. with ‘auxiliary’ verb *aXta-* ‘apparently’ mentioned above).

8. Cultural attitudes

One can only speculate as to whether the wide-spread use of the quotative enclitic as a ‘responsibility shifter’, leaving vague the source of information, could reflect the often noted diffidence of Greenlanders and other Inuit, which is manifest in periphrastic (impersonal) expressions for first person reference as well as in the phenomenon here at issue. Presumably life in very small, scattered Arctic communities, where everyone is likely to know of everyone else’s doings and where rumours spread easily, is such as to make being vague about one’s source of information (and attitude towards its veracity) a generally sensible strategy. Related to this is assuredly also the fear of ridicule (the major form of social sanction in such loosely organized communities).

As regards evidential markers in connection with modern media such as newspapers, radio and television, Greenlanders use the means available in much the way one would expect from usage in oral contexts. In particular, the distinction between hearing and seeing (including reading) is maintained, such that quotative *-guuq* is used for reports of what one has heard from both radio and television, whereas one would not normally use it in reporting something one has read in the newspaper (unless it was a quoted speech, say).¹⁴ Report-

ing the recent death of the queen mother, for example, to an acquaintance who may not know of the fact, one could say:

- (28) *Dronning Ingrid tuqu-sima-vu-ruuq*
 Queen I. die-sima-3SG+INDIC-guuq
 ‘Queen Ingrid has died (apparently).’

This would be suitable whether one heard it from an individual or on the radio or television news. The epistemic affix *-sima-* is not obligatory here, but is normally used to emphasize that the reporter was not present him/herself when it happened, so one has here the possibility of expressing a double ‘distanting’ from the reported event, both of oneself and of the intermediary one got it from. One could also use derivational affix *-(r)pallaC-* from §2b to distance oneself still more from responsibility for the validity of the information by reducing it to objectively reported hearsay: *tuqu-rpallap-puq* ‘it is said/they say that she is dead’.

9. Conclusion

To return briefly to the general nature of the ‘scattered coding’ of evidentiality in West Greenlandic, let us consider again the problem raised at the outset of the chapter of defining the category in this language (and other varieties of Eskimo) in terms of ‘systematicity’ and ‘obligatoriness’. In the context of a discussion of ‘grammaticalizable’ categories, Slobin (2001) reminds us that the distinction between ‘content’ and ‘function’ words – where the latter typically form small systematized sets of items of very general meaning and paradigmatically related to each other by mutually exclusive choice – is fuzzier and more language-specific than many would like to believe. He specifically mentions English modal auxiliaries – extended by quasi-auxiliaries – which clearly form such a system (the result of well charted grammaticalization processes), pointing out that this category is not obligatory in English. In most actual instances of speech one chooses the ‘zero option’ of leaving the precise modality of the utterance open (Slobin 2001:436). In other words, systematicity and obligatoriness do not necessarily go hand in hand. Systems may furthermore have rather ragged edges at some stage of their diachronic development.

Epistemic modality – and therewith the principal means of expressing evidentiality in Eskimo languages – is no more nor less ‘systematized’ than other sub-types of ‘sentential affixes’, namely those for tense, polarity and subjective attitude.¹⁵ It is optionally expressed: the speaker may choose to express it

or not in a given utterance. The same applies *a fortiori* to the isolated quotative enclitic *-guuq*. This in itself is not enough to write off the category as unsystematic, however – in fact the pragmatic use of *-guuq* is itself quite systematic, if hardly constituting a ‘system’. The principles governing the presence or absence of *-sima-*, for example, as described above, are perfectly systematic, and the affix itself belongs to a rather clear cut paradigmatic set of affixes of epistemic modality, which can be used with any verbal sentence. But it is only *part* of a broader category in Eskimo languages (that of epistemic modality). Also the non-sentential affixes of ‘seeming’ under §2b form part of a broader set of optional items, namely verb-extending affixes of ‘judging and saying’ – but this is defined purely by their common semantics (in fact there are two groups morphosyntactically – those that attach to nominal stems form a separate verbalizing sub-group of ‘seeming/acting like’ affixes).

The situation is apparently similar in other polysynthetic languages of North America that code this category morphologically (e.g. the Wakashan ones such as Kwakwala as described by Boas 1911:496 – actually amongst the first to be described as displaying affixes of evidentiality).¹⁶ On the other hand, one would want to distinguish the situation in Eskimo languages from that in Chukotko-Kamchatkan and Athabaskan ones, where the category is in a broad sense only lexically expressed (by particles, adverbials and syntagmatic constructions). The only truly universally applicable criterion for distinguishing the two cases would appear to be quite simply whether the category is expressed morphologically or not (irrespective of obligatoriness). Enclitics are still a problem: whether these count as ‘morphological’ or not is largely a matter of definition. If West Greenlandic *only* had its quotative clitic (which adheres to the first word in the clause) one would have to make a fairly arbitrary choice as to whether to include it among languages that do systematically display evidentiality. As it is, the further involvement of ‘sentential’ affixes *-sima-* and *-gunar-* is probably enough to state that this language does indeed belong among such languages. Sentential affixes like these command a unique position half-way between (optional) derivation and (obligatory) inflection in Eskimo languages; such a stable, quasi-paradigmatic but non-obligatory formal category may only be possible in languages with very rich verbal morphologies, of course.

The formal ‘system’ utilized for expressing ‘core’ evidentiality in West Greenlandic is thus its distributionally defined category of ‘sentential affixes’, which covers the heterogenous – but semantically contiguous – area of tense-modality-polarity-attitude (*not* inflectional mood, note). The common semantic area which allows comparison with other languages can be called epis-

temic modality in the broadest sense. It can be directly correlated with what Whitehead calls the ‘subjective form’ that adheres to all propositional judgments (Whitehead 1978:231–233) – note that this also covers what is expressed by attitudinal markers in West Greenlandic (and *-nnguatsiar-* at least does bridge both epistemic and attitudinal senses historically), but hardly the pragmatic use of *-guuq*. It is surely too much to expect, however, that formal and semantic ‘systematization’ in this overall area should coincide neatly in all individual languages, given the indeterminacies of historical change, and West Greenlandic is no exception in this respect.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Frederikke (Naja) Blytmann Trondhjem for assistance with the example sentences. Note the following orthographic conventions (close to those of the ‘new’ standard orthography but with the five orthographic vowels reduced to the phonemic three, which are lowered and centralized before uvulars): g [ɣ], r [R], ll [ʎ], nng [ɲŋ], and ti [tʰi]. C refers to an always assimilated (or truncated) morpheme-final consonant (historical /g/ or /t/), and (r) to an intrusive /r/ after morpheme-final vowels.
2. All these elements fall within Anderson’s (1986) definition of evidential morphemes as not being predicates of clauses themselves but ‘about something else’, typically expressed inflectionally or by clitics (or other free syntactic elements) rather than by derivation – provided, that is, that one realizes that West Greenlandic ‘sentential affixes’ are (at least semantically) closer to inflection than to derivation (Anderson 1986:274f.). Non-sentential affixes such as *-(r)paluC-* below still betray their derivational origins outside of true evidentiality.
3. Sentential affixes – indicating tense, epistemic modality, negation and subjective attitude (in that order if more than one is present) – must occur just before the obligatory inflection, so cannot be followed by others (cf. Fortescue 1984:313ff.). Note that scope is transparently cumulative from ‘left to right’.
4. Thus *isir-sima-sima-vuuq* (come.in-sima-sima-3SG+INDIC) means ‘he has apparently been in/come home’, the first *-sima-* indicating state and the second indicating that the speaker has not himself/herself witnessed this. Compare first person *isirsimavunga* ‘I am at home’ (with aspectual *-sima-*).
5. More certain than *-gunar-*. Note that *-ssa-* also fills the preceding tense slot as an affix of pure futurity, its original meaning (Danish future *skal* also has this epistemic sense, so there may have been some influence). More common in the epistemic sense – especially of a continuing perfective state – is the combination *-simassa-*, which contains resultative (or perfect) *-sima-*.
6. See Berthelsen et al. (1997) – the latest Greenlandic-Danish school dictionary – for further examples. The translations there of the morphemes involved are more reliable than in earlier dictionaries.

7. Compare this with *aqagu tiki-ssa-sima-vuq* (tomorrow come-FUT-sima-3SG+INDIC) ‘he will apparently come tomorrow’, where the two affixes are reversed and *-ssa-* has its usual future meaning.

8. As an example of the (non-evidential?) use of these affixes in a subordinate object clause of sensory perception observe the following:

ilaanikkut angallati-irar-palut-tuq tusar-tar-paat
 occasionally vehicle-small-sound.like-3SG+PART hear-HAB-3PL/3SG+INDIC
 ‘Occasionally they would hear the sound of a small vehicle (passing by).’

9. These so-called ‘double transitivizers’ can be added to either intransitive or transitive stems (see Fortescue 1984: 84f. for examples).

10. Note also hypothetical affix *-ssagalar-* ‘would ... if’, from future/epistemic *-ssa-* mentioned above, as in (*ilinnut takutikkukku tupigutsa-ssagalar-putit* (be.surprised-ssagalar-2SG+INDIC) ‘(if I showed it to you) you would be surprised’.

11. Others are *lureq* ‘maybe’, *enmen* ‘they say, it is said’, and *et’əm* ‘apparently’. The only affix of such a meaning is nominal prefix *mel-/mil-* ‘it seems’ as in *mel-umqə* ‘apparently a polar bear’ (Skorik 1961: 325).

12. Compare the West Greenlandic mirative construction consisting of exclamatory particle plus verb in the participial mood, as in:

sunaaffa piili-qar-tuq
 why! car-have-3SG+PART
 ‘Why, there is a car!’

13. This probably explains why it follows *-nngit-* of sentential negation (which usually follows epistemic modality and precedes attitudinal affixes).

14. Interestingly, the Greenlandic news program on television in Greenland is called *Qanuruuq* (*qanuq* ‘how’ plus quotative *-guuq*), which means either ‘what did he/they say?’ or – as a fixed expression of greeting – ‘what’s new?’.

15. Though future meaning *must* be expressed by a suitable affix if a future event is described.

16. More recently Jacobsen (1986) has described the similar situation in related Makah, where evidentiality is expressed by a heterogenous variety of (at least) two different types of non-obligatory suffix, namely incremental (inflection-like) and formative (lexical) suffixes. The former correspond to WG epistemic sentential affixes, the latter – ‘where the focus of the predication shifts from the suffix to the stem ... to provide merely a kind of epistemological orientation’ – to the WG non-sentential affixes treated above, which like them commonly derive predicates from ‘incorporated’ nominal bases (Jacobsen 1986: 24f.).

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CHAPTER 14

Evidentials

Summation, questions, prospects

Brian D. Joseph

Introduction

Summing up the results of as interesting a set of reports as are presented in the chapters of this volume is a daunting task to be sure, especially since the topic of evidentiality does not particularly fall within my area of expertise, my primary language of specialization being Greek, a language that does not show any active participation in the grammatical marking of evidentiality. Thus, to borrow an evidential technique of trying to distance myself from responsibility for the task at hand, I must say up-front that I have no firsthand experience with the notion to draw on here. But one does not have to be an expert to appreciate both fine research and interesting linguistic phenomena, and the range of perspectives on evidentiality treated in these chapters is both impressive and stimulating to anyone with an interest in language, all the more so if the topic falls outside one's usual linguistic line of sight.

There are several areas covered in these chapters that deserve some comment, especially with regard to certain recurring issues that appear throughout: the semantics of evidentiality, the categorial status of evidentiality in particular languages, the fate of evidentiality in contact situations, the origins of evidentiality, and the methodology employed in studying the phenomenon. I address these seriatim below, and then in closing, I signal some directions for further research. I do this in part by applying lessons learned about evidentiality from the works contained herein to a novel language not usually thought of in the context of discussions of evidentiality and in part by mentioning some issues that have not been definitively addressed in the preceding chapters.

1. Semantics

A basic issue to confront with regard to evidentials is whether there is a core meaning that covers all the various systems, categories, strategies, and techniques that natural languages show for this phenomenon, and if so, what that essential meaning is. Among other things, this task aims at finding the intersection of a number of functions and values that certain types of markers in a language can have and trying to see which of these are basic, primary notions and which are reasonably treated as extensions.

Some authors in this volume, e.g. Michael Fortescue (Chapter 13), have located evidentiality at least in part in “epistemic modality”, i.e. having to do with inferential judgments about knowledge (evaluating it as factual necessity, probability, possibility, etc.), whereas others, e.g. R.M.W. Dixon (Chapter 7) and Viacheslav Chirikba (Chapter 11), have seen it more as a matter of reception to information, assimilation of information, judgment regarding source of information, or degree of certainty about the information, and one, Lars Johanson (Chapter 12), uses the characterization of indirectivity for the basis of evidential marking. These various concerns – all of which undoubtedly are valid for some language or other and actually in no way mutually exclusive – in turn bring to mind the Jakobsonian notion of “shifters”.¹ That is, the ‘truth value’ as it were, of a shifter differs according to context – the referent of *I* uttered by me is different from that of *I* uttered by Paul McCartney for instance – just as the ‘truth value’ imputed to a statement can shift according to the context in which it is embedded and the perspective on an action that a speaker takes, e.g. whose point of view is adopted. Since shifters typically involve deixis (e.g. pronouns or demonstratives), evidentiality in part at least may well be thought of therefore as connected to matters of deixis,² in that in systems that overtly mark evidentiality, utterances typically include indicators pointing directly to particular sources or away from potential sources, as the speaker takes a particular point of view in describing an action.

While it is suggested below that searching for a core invariant meaning for any category may be the wrong approach in general to take, nonetheless I offer here my own hypothesis about the essence of the notion of evidentiality, drawing in part on the notion of shifting of deixis.

Let me start by introducing yet another term that I consider to be a reasonable characterization of what is going on with evidentiality: as suggested above, marking for evidentials involves the speaker’s adopting a particular point of view – I hereby call this a *stance*³ – with regard to information sources. This is

consistent with the idea of looking at evidentiality as deixis, and especially with thinking about it in terms of perspective and point of view.

Interestingly, some seemingly contradictory characterizations of what evidentials allow or require one to do are given in various chapters in this volume. In some languages/cultures, e.g. the Tariana that Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald describes so richly (Chapter 6), speakers appear to use a highly developed evidential system to be as precise as possible about information sources whereas in other languages/cultures, e.g. West Greenlandic Eskimo as described by Fortescue (Chapter 13), speakers use a less developed evidential system as a way of distancing themselves from having to be precise about information source; e.g., Fortescue (§2) describes the use of the “quotative enclitic” *-guuq* for what he calls “mediated illocutions” and states that “reports with *-guuq* suggest displaced responsibility for veridity”.

Are these contradictory functions compatible? I would argue that they are indeed, and further that they represent two different but equally functional responses – or, better, *stances* – to a basic constraint/principle of human interaction, and a basic stance: namely HEAR NO EVIL/SEE NO EVIL/(and especially) SPEAK NO EVIL, or in other words, AVOID (POTENTIAL) TROUBLE (= AVOID NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES).⁴ Both of these responses are ways of avoiding possible negative outcomes. In the one type of response, by being specific the speaker is giving him-/herself an out, as if stating “I didn’t say that X was true; someone else did – I am just reporting things as I heard them or inferred them”; in the other, by being vague the speaker is also giving him-/herself an out, as if stating “This may be true; I don’t know for sure and it isn’t clear where the information comes from but I pass it along to you in case it interests you or is important to you”.

There are linguistic parallels for looking for a common denominator in seemingly contradictory phenomena. These isofunctional ways of satisfying an AVOID TROUBLE constraint are like the situation in phonology, where, for instance, one language might satisfy an AVOID CONSONANT CLUSTERS constraint by cluster reduction and another might accomplish the same goal by vowel epenthesis.

More tellingly, in the realm of semantics, the range of meanings – whether primary meanings or secondary extensions – seen in various evidentiality systems compares very interestingly in its scope with the wide range of meanings found with diminutivity as a “category” (cf. Jurafsky 1996). Note for instance that it is common for diminutives to have a physical sense (presumably but not necessarily the primary sense) but also various extended senses, including an endearing value as well as a directly opposite derogatory value, with quite

a range in between (ordinariness, nonthreateningness, powerlessness, etc.), together with the possibility for irony and sarcasm thrown into the mix as well. To some extent, the semantics of diminutivity can be viewed in terms of a stance that a speaker takes toward some object, an evaluation of the speaker's merits and strengths, so to speak, compared with those of the object. In that way, there is a situational and structural parallel with the semantics of evidentiality (though there is no implication here that the semantics of one have anything to do with the semantics of the other).

2. Category status

Another question that arises several times in the preceding chapters, though perhaps without a definitive answer, is how much and what sorts of evidence are needed to permit talking about a *grammatical* category in the case of evidentiality marking. This is of course a broader question that goes beyond just evidentiality, namely how do we argue for linguistic categories in general? This question is relevant to the issue of how to distinguish between English-type circumlocutory indication of evidentiality from the Turkish-type described by Lars Johanson (Chapter 12) or the Tariana-type. Is it enough just to talk about obligatory marking vs. optional marking, or does affixal vs. periphrastic marking matter? Is paradigmaticity relevant here, i.e., whether the marking is part of a recognizable verbal paradigm? Do we focus on form, as Fortescue suggests (§9) by emphasizing morphological expression, or on meaning, as Aikhenvald implies (though perhaps does not wholeheartedly endorse), or both?

It is probably worth noting that two recent dictionaries of linguistic terminology, Trask (1993) and Matthews (1997) are quite vague in their definitions of the term 'category':

Trask (p. 37) – 'a term of very wide and diverse application, variously denoting any of several classes of formal objects'

Matthews (p. 48) – 'any class or system of grammatical or lexical units distinguished at some level in the structure of a language'

Moreover, Trask goes on to say that 'usage of the term is so varied that no general definition is possible; in practice, a category is simply any class of related grammatical objects which someone wants to consider'.

Clearly, if there is no agreement as to what is needed to constitute a category, a decision as to whether some entity or set of entities is a category is not going to be possible.

This situation does not mean that anything goes, however; the general criteria mentioned above – obligatoriness, morphological vs. lexical, etc. – are all worth considering, but it is not clear that they will advance the cause at all, or even bring it to any sort of satisfying point.

Part of the problem is that probably all languages have some means of indicating one's degree of taking a covering stance towards statements and events that are not a matter of category or grammar per se. This insight is what is behind the distinction made by Aikhenvald in her position paper (Chapter 1) between an evidentiality strategy and an evidentiality system. We run the risk of vitiating the whole enterprise of examining evidentiality if we are so broad in our investigation and classification as to include every means under the sun, strategies as well as systems.⁵

Thus the matter of defining and identifying categories becomes especially important as a way of deciding whether one is confronting in a particular language a strategy or a system, since category status implies a degree of embedding in the grammatical apparatus of a language and thus true systematicity. Still, one key issue brought out by Aikhenvald in Chapter 1 is the fact that the realization of evidentiality can be manifested across different parts of the grammar, what she referred to as 'scattered realization', a phenomenon also exemplified in this volume by West Greenlandic Eskimo (see Fortescue's Chapter 13) and by Western Apache (as described by Willem de Reuse in Chapter 4). My suggestion here is that such cases can indeed be a cognitive "system" and can in fact be a significant linguistic category, what we might informally call a 'scattergory' (to borrow from the name of the Milton Bradley board game, *Scattergories*).

Of particular relevance here is the construct that I have argued for elsewhere in a number of publications with my colleague and collaborator Richard Janda, namely the linguistic *constellation*, as discussed, e.g., by Janda & Joseph 1986, and Joseph & Janda 1988. The basic problem that a constellation is designed to solve can be summed up as how to capture 'unity-in-diversity, diversity-in-unity' among linguistic objects, i.e. situations in which a group of potentially relatable elements show both similarities and differences. We define a (*rule*) *constellation* as a set of elements which share at least one characteristic property of form but are distinguished by individual idiosyncrasies – both of form and of function – that prevent their being collapsed with one another, and we posit moreover that the identity of the shared formal elements is shown by a *meta-(level) redundancy-rule*, or '(partial) meta-template', which equates (or "parses") all relevant instances of a particular formal configuration that share certain properties. Moreover, these two constructs are related,

in that morphological constellations are ensembles of distinct or uncollapsible word-formational rules or morphemes united by meta-templates which express the formal and functional identities these morphological rules or morphemic elements share. The constellation then recognizes the differential properties among elements and the meta-(level) redundancy rule expresses their similarities.

Examples of this construct discussed in the literature include Sanskrit reduplication (Janda & Joseph 1986), the Modern Greek sometime negator *mi(n)* (Janda & Joseph 1999), Arapesh plural marking (Dobrin 2001), and Hindi postpositional *ko* (Vasishth & Joseph 2002), and in each such case, the elements or processes in question show enough similarity to warrant wanting to unify them but also enough differences to prevent collapsing them easily into a single element at some level of analysis. In a sense, with such elements, we thus locate the ‘category’ in their union rather than (as is more customary in linguistic analysis) in their intersection. In this way, one does not have to look, as attempted above regarding the semantics of evidentiality, for a core/invariant/primary meaning, since ultimately, that can prove to be a tricky enterprise at best.

Thinking of categories in terms of constellations, moreover, might help to solve some minor problems that come up in the analysis of evidentials in particular languages. For instance, under a constellational point of view, the situation that Johanson describes for Turkish in Chapter 12 may be interpreted somewhat differently. That is, he argues (§§6–7) that the Turkish inflectional suffix *-mİş*, a ‘marker of indirectivity, mostly with past time reference’, and the allomorphs of the copula *imİş* (with suffixal forms *-(y)miş*) are different entities synchronically, since, among other things, they attach to different categories of host, though many ‘linguists ... confuse the two’. Yet, given their similarity in form and similarities in function, any such differences in and of themselves need not be a basis for rejecting a connection between two elements – Greek *mi(n)(-)*, for instance, has realizations as an affix and as a separate word, thus with very different distributions, but they are nonetheless relatable, constellationally. A definitive assessment remains to be made of course, as not all potentially connectable elements are in fact to be connected, even under a constellational approach. Still, if the notion of ‘sameness’ and thus categorization is broadened constellationally, then if there are some features that link two elements, it may be that they can be connected, even in the face of some differences.

Morphological constellations are more like ‘family resemblance’ sets or a ‘fuzzy category’ in the sense of Rosch (1975) – interestingly, this latter con-

struct is referred to by de Reuse Chapter 4 (§8) in his characterization of the Western Apache evidential system – or the formal side to Lakoffian radius-and-hub semantic networks (as in Lakoff 1987) than they are like morphemes in the sense of structural linguistics, yet they provide a useful addition to the range of linguistic basic entities. Importantly, the “constellation” seems to be useful here with regard to evidentials. The ‘scattered realization’ of evidentiality within various languages would seem to be exactly the sort of linguistic phenomenon that would lend itself to treatment – and unification in the face of difference – under a constellational approach.

Yet another side of the category question is what constraints or limits there are – if any – on the range of evidential (etc.) categories a language might encode. The preceding chapters present systems with a number of categories – from two-term systems (see Aikhenvald, Chapter 1, §1)⁶ to five-term systems, Tariana being the most complex described in detail. But is five the upper limit? Aikhenvald (Chapter 1) does refer to the system in the Papuan language Fasu (see also Foley 1986) that has 6 distinctions, as shown by these 6 ways of translating the English sentence ‘It is coming’:

apere	‘I see it’
perarakae	‘I hear it
pesareapo	‘I infer it from other evidence’
pesapakae	‘Somebody says so, but I don’t know who’
pesaripo	‘Somebody says so, and I know who’
pesapi	‘I suppose so’

Of course, it is not clear that these are all *grammatical* distinctions, and there are languages which are said to have more distinctions (e.g. Makah, cf. Jacobsen 1986, reportedly with 8 distinctions) but not necessarily all of a fully grammatical nature. Still, this question of upper limits is one that cannot be ignored.

More generally, it is well-known that systems that encode perception of the world can be very elaborate. The situation with noun classes (‘gender’) is a case in point, for there are certainly languages with more than 6 classes (e.g. many Bantu languages, where even more noun classes, as many as 23, are often reported, though the actual number depends on how one measures what counts as a ‘different’ class),⁷ and there is no clear upper limit cross-linguistically.

Furthermore, when one moves out of the realm of perception-encoding classes, and looks to such areas as morphological noun class or verb-stem class, ‘systems’ (or at least sets of forms) can be found that are far more numerous in their membership. For instance, the Latin classification into 5 noun declensions and 4 verb conjugations can be cited, especially when one considers how

artificial these are and how one really needs instead to recognize numerous subclasses within the Latin 3rd declension.⁸ And, the situation can get even worse if Gross (1979) is taken seriously about the number of ‘frames’ (read: ‘(sub-) categories’) needed for a full description of French verbal complement subcategorization – there are some 2000 or so distinct patterns of complementation, by his reckoning.

These cases are perhaps different since they involve arbitrary classes, but they do show that speakers can juggle sets of entities with a rather large number of members. It is unlikely therefore that any real limit could ever be recognized. Moreover, in this regard, if there were such a limit, it would need to be asked if it is a practical limit, i.e., a limit imposed by independent forces of discourse and human interaction and human cognition, or instead is one that is somehow a purely linguistic universal.

3. Diffusibility

I turn now to evidentials and language contact. Several chapters point to the extreme diffusibility of evidentials and suggest that they are ‘handy’ and useful in some sense. And, there certainly are numerous documentable instances of the diffusion of evidentials, as Victor Friedman shows for the Balkans (Chapter 8) and Aikhenvald for Amazonia (Chapter 6). Thus it behooves us to pay attention to evidentiality and contact. In particular, it is fair to ask why evidentiality should be a category that is easily borrowed/diffused between languages (or at least relatively so).

Going out on a limb somewhat, let me suggest a reason, namely that it might have to do with the pragmatics of what would go on in a contact situation involving imperfect bilinguals.

Consider the contact scenario between speakers of a language that has evidentiality marking (E) and of one that does not (N), where both have a rudimentary command of the other’s language (an essential in contact if there is to be any contact-induced change) – E says something (UE for ‘utterance by E’) and it has evidentials in it as marking for evidentiality is an obligatory part of E’s grammar; N is caught unawares by the extra information that is present in E’s utterance and struggles to figure out what is there. Moreover, when N says something (UN) to E in E, and does not include any marking for evidentiality, E will feel that something is missing and may query N about it, leading N to realize that he had better include something to that effect another time.⁹ Therefore, even though we might think a priori that there would be simplification in

such a situation, and that the more complex utterance-type would be given up in favor of the less complex, it seems plausible that to meet the communicative needs of both speakers in such a situation, the grammar that provides more information would actually prevail.

This outcome would not necessarily be the case with all linguistic features in contact situations, but rather only those that bear directly on transfer of information – for instance, the placement of a definite article, a feature which has been involved in language contact in the Balkans, is not contentful, in and of itself.¹⁰ As a result, while such a feature could spread, and the postposed certainly seems to have spread in the Balkans,¹¹ its spread would not be tied to pragmatics in any way. Thus, informativeness cannot be all there is to grammatical diffusion, and further, simplification does take place in some contact situations.

Nonetheless, these considerations might lead one to predict that evidentials will always spread, though with the added condition that the contact must be of the right type in terms of intensity and cultural pressure (cf. the ‘borrowing scale’ of Thomason & Kaufman 1988: 74–75). However, counter-examples appear immediately: Aikhenvald in Chapter 1 (§8) points out that evidentials have been lost under contact in Retuarã, Johanson in Chapter 12 (§17) refers to the loss of evidentials in Turkish dialects and Turkic languages in contact with Indo-European in Trabzon and in Lithuania, and there is as well the failure of Greek and Romani in the Balkans (a hotbed of evidentiality diffusability) to take on Turkish evidentials, and so on. So perhaps the hypothesis here is simply wrong, but some insight can be gained by looking to socio-historical reasons for the lack of diffusion of evidentials – in the case of Balkan Greek,¹² it probably has to do with the attitude Greek speakers have about their language (i.e., a *stance* different from that indicated in §1 but still not irrelevant), the literary tradition of Greek, the identification of Greek with religion, the importance of religion in identity formation among Greeks, and the like; regarding Romani, it is relevant that its speakers are involved in one-way not reciprocal bilingualism; with regard to Greek in Trabzon, it must be borne in mind that it was the dominant language in the speech community that speakers would eventually have to assimilate into.¹³ That is, in these cases, as in all contact situations, as Thomason and Kaufman (1988) have repeatedly stressed, social factors rule – there are no purely structural imperatives that guide outcomes in contact situations.

In any case, in a substratum situation in which there is language shift, rather than adstratal contact, the prediction might be different. If an E speaker has to shift to a non-E language, s/he has to learn to suppress E’s if the contact is going to be mainly with real non-E speakers and the E group’s population is

not large (or powerful) enough to make an impact in the overall speech community. If on the other hand, *s/he* uses non-E mainly with other nonnative speakers of non-E who come from E-language backgrounds (e.g. Turks and Bulgarians in a *Gastarbeiter*-type situation in Germany), then it seems possible that an E-version of the non-E language could emerge for use among those various E and non-E speakers, again in response to their communicative needs and expectations.

One other significant concern with regard to language contact involving evidentials, besides attending to the exact nature of the contact situation and social/communicative interaction involved, is the determination of which forms would be used most frequently by speakers in a contact situation. It stands to reason that frequency could well play an important role in guiding the outcome of language contact, since speakers most likely have no access to structural markedness, except insofar as it is reflected in frequency of usage.

4. Origins

In light of the spread of evidentiality, it must be realized that evidentials can also arise independently in a language; in one sense, they have to be able to since without independent origin in at least one language, there would never be such a category anywhere in any language that could diffuse. It is thus appropriate to consider the issue of the kinds of sources for evidentials that can be found.

The preceding chapters give examples of past, perfect, and future forms all apparently serving as elements that feed into the marking of evidentiality. Similarly, elements having to do with saying have been linked to quotative and reportive markers. Other possibilities must surely be considered – Botne (1995), for instance, has argued for a pronominal origin for an evidential marker in the Bantu language Lega – especially once evidential strategies are taken into account, as the range of available adverbials is quite broad. Such developments are generally considered, these days at least, under the rubric of ‘grammaticalization’.

It in fact need not be disturbing that a few different ‘pathways’ for the emergence of evidentials are available, as long as a plausible link can be demonstrated amongst them and/or the logic of a particular development can be defended. If there can be manifestations of the expression of evidentiality that are as different as those catalogued in the various languages presented in this volume, then it is reasonable that there could be many different ways to reach those points.

Still, a cautionary note about ‘grammaticalization’ and ‘pathways’ is in order. A tacit assumption that many linguists make and seem to accept quite readily is that if there is a main verb or lexical item with a given form and an appropriately evidential-like meaning, as well as a grammatical piece such as an affix that had an appropriate meaning in the same language or a related language, then one is justified to say that the affix was derived historically from the fuller lexical item. In fact, claims have even been made, e.g. by Hopper and Traugott (1993: 128–129) that all affixes and grammatical material have a ‘prior lexical history’. Given the belief that many proponents of grammaticalization have that the only movement one finds with grammatical elements is from less grammatical to more grammatical (the so-called ‘unidirectionality principle’ – see Hopper and Traugott 1993 and Haspelmath 1998 for discussion, and Janda 2001 for a compelling contrary discussion), this is a natural assumption to make. However, it is incontrovertible that ‘counter-directional’ movement, from more grammatical to less grammatical, is indeed possible and is reasonably well-attested, even if less frequent in absolute terms than the reverse. Some 70 or more cases in the literature are cited and discussed in Janda (2001) and other examples are given in Joseph (2001) and Newmeyer (2001).

That being the case, we have to be cautious in inferring a lexical source for affixal evidentiality, however reasonable it may seem. That is, a grammatical marker -X and a lexical item XY with similar meanings could in principle be related to one another not via reduction of XY to give X but instead via a reanalysis/resegmentation/liberation/demorphologization of -X and an augmentation of the newly freed or recognized base to give XY. Since delocutive derivations are possible, in which an element involved in a speech act becomes the basis for a derivative,¹⁴ and since a piece of a word can be liberated (by whatever process – the exact means is irrelevant) as with *-ism* being cut off of *communism/socialism* etc. and being treated as a lexical item (as in *the great isms of the modern world*), why in principle could an affix with a discourse function not be extracted out of that discourse and treated as the basis for lexical derivation? Thus even if reconstruction of a lexical source for an affix is reasonable, it is not 100% certain and should never be treated as such.¹⁵ In this context, an observation made by Fortescue in Chapter 13 is particularly important: he states (§7) that at least some affixal evidential elements in modern Eskimo languages are reconstructible as affixes for Proto-Eskimo-Aleut, thus dating back some 3000 years as such, with no (obvious or likely) lexical sources.

5. Methodology

All of these musings would not be possible without the right methods to get at the data. Just about everything discussed in this volume is based on naturally occurring conversation or narration or on textual evidence; only very rarely did a researcher have to resort to the elicitation of data cold from informants. Furthermore, in the discussion at the workshop, it was noted overtly by many how hard it is to elicit data on the use of evidentials, yet it was also recognized that sometimes there is no other way – sometimes the situations that would test whether evidentials are used in a particular way simply do not occur often in the course of natural and ordinary conversational interactions or in texts. Thus, in some instances, one has to resort to whatever means one can, and elicitation is often the answer. Moreover, as Pilar Valenzuela notes in Chapter 2 (§1), elicitation can be useful in indicating the need for evidentials, since ‘it becomes evident that any declarative sentence [in Shipibo] requires the use of either *-ra* or *-ronki* to be considered fully acceptable; their omission would simply yield “incomplete” sentences’. Also, there can be some real value to knowing what can not be said or used, and that is something that is not derivable simply from texts.¹⁶

A real issue though – appropriate enough to ask in the context of discussing evidentiality – is what can we know here? Speakers clearly can manipulate evidentiality markings/strategies for dramatic or narrative or pragmatic effect, e.g. to convey irony (noted by Friedman in Chapter 8, e.g., §§2.2.2, 3.2); if so, the analyst is thus seemingly placed in the role of literary critic or narratologist, moving out of science and the objective and into more subjective evaluations of materials. This is perhaps inevitable, but one has to wonder whether at such a point we are entirely engaging in ‘the science of language’, to use a common characterization of the field of linguistics.

Thus there would seem to be a danger in reading too much into examples found in texts and in conversations, but also in relying too heavily on the reflective statements of native informants. To some extent, though, there is a real dilemma here. On the one hand one has to look to texts and spontaneous speech for ‘real’ data, yet at the same time also do some elicitation. In the latter case, one can argue that native speakers are the authorities, but linguists have also long recognized that native speakers’ knowledge of their language generally involves knowledge that is not readily accessible to them for reflection and discussion.¹⁷ If so, can we ever expect to get fully reliable information by asking informants why they chose a particular marker or phraseology?

There is no obvious solution to this problem, other than simply being aware of the methodological limitations: we have to mine all of the potential sources of information but also be cautious not to rely too heavily on any one type of data. We have to be open to the possibility that we might not be able to know all that we might like to about these elements – this is not necessarily an agnostic stance, but rather a realistic one.

One very promising methodological angle is to test what happens with evidentiality marking when speakers are confronted with new technology; thus, television or the telephone or even books, or other advances still to come (3D graphics or olfactory internet sites, etc.) offer an exciting prospect for testing hypotheses about evidentials, and intriguing data on that topic is to be found in Chapter 3 by Randy LaPolla on Qiang and in Chapter 6 by Aikhenvald on Tariana.

This particular methodology sparks some random but interrelated thoughts. It is fair to wonder, for instance, if there might be changes in a relatively short period of time in how technological innovations are treated from an evidential point of view as speakers grow more accustomed to them and see them more as an everyday sort of piece of their material culture. The situation with photography in the mid-19th century is instructive in this regard: when this new technology first came into the public's consciousness, photographs were thought to be unassailable records of what actually happened, the ultimate in fully verifiable and confirmatory technology, until, that is, someone came up with the further technology of trick photography. One could imagine speakers of an evidentiality language using one sort of evidential at first with photos until they learn more about them and come to realize that looks can be deceiving even in photographs; perhaps they would then switch to a different kind of evidential at that point. Again, a speaker's stance towards the photograph is at issue, and that conceivably could also be a personality issue, subject to individual differences, e.g., if someone were regularly a 'doubting Thomas'.

The reference in Aikhenvald's Chapter 1 (§9) to dreams and evidentiality in a sense provides a glimpse into reactions to technological advances, and so also with the effects of alcohol or any intoxicant,¹⁸ since these situations might be thought of as the first kind of 'technology' that speakers with an evidential system had to figure out what to do with. Alcohol is of course a very old 'technology' and mind-altering substances occur in nature, but at some point speakers must have realized that things happen while one is under the influence and that it is possible to talk about those events; so also are dreams of course common to all humanity, but there must have been a point where speaking humans realized that what goes on in their heads while asleep is a shared expe-

rience that they can talk to others about. If those speakers spoke an evidentiality language, then some choices would have to be made, and that would have been a novel testing ground for studying evidentials, something that is not readily available in the same way now.¹⁹

Or is it? In a sense, studying the acquisition of evidentials by children is a fertile testing ground: when, for instance, does a child learn to talk about his/her dreams? Are there changes in the way children talk about them – or other sensory-based ‘knowledge’ – at different stages of their cognitive development? And so on – we can thus keep child language acquisition as an area for future research regarding evidentials.

6. Towards a conclusion – Applying new insights?

By way of testing if the insights contained in this volume have extension beyond the languages discussed herein, we can consider the enterprise of the reconstruction of Proto-Indo-European (PIE). In particular, PIE is not generally reconstructed as having anything like evidential marking; indeed, one of the telling pieces of evidence that points to the appearance of evidentiality in three different branches of Indo-European in the Balkans (Albanian, Italic (via Romanian and Vlah), and Slavic, as Friedman so convincingly argues in Chapter 8) and in Lithuanian (cf. Aikhenvald in Chapter 1, §8) as being an innovation, possibly contact-induced, is the overwhelmingly agreed upon reconstruction of PIE as not having evidential marking.

Even though the chronology and the geography of the appearance of evidentiality in these branches of Indo-European would require that they be treated as an innovation, and thus relatively recent developments, it is interesting to reconsider the question of evidentiality in PIE, to see if there might be any basis for reconstructing the proto-language differently. As it happens, there are a few assorted facts from various Indo-European languages that point in the direction of some sort of at least primitive evidential system early on in the family. As such, they provide a useful case-study, showing what applying the results of the investigation of evidentiality to a novel domain can lead to.

First, the oldest attested branch of IE, namely Anatolian, has a well-entrenched bound-word²⁰ element that is generally called a ‘quotative’ marker and which is used to indicate direct speech; this is the form *-wa(r)* that occurs in Hittite (*-wa* before consonants, *-war* before vowels), Luvian, and Palaic. The presence of a quotative marker in and of itself need not tell anything about evi-

dentiality, except that under each of its possible etymologies, there is something striking from the point of view of systemic evidential marking.

One hypothesis – the standard view, cf. Friedrich (1952: s.v.) – derives *-war* from the verb ‘say’ (**werH-* as in Latin *ver-b-um* ‘word’, Greek *éiro*: < **werH-*yo:, and Hittite *weriya-* ‘say’). Under this view, the development of *-war* is like other quotative strategies discussed in previous chapters, and may involve a direct assertion about the truth of what follows, or else a way of marking clearly at least who is responsible for the truth of the words in question. The other competing hypothesis, argued for most recently by Joseph (1981), takes *-war* to be from an adverbial **-wo* (maybe a disjunctive marker, cf. Sanskrit *va*: ‘or’) plus an adverbial suffix **-r* (as in English *where/here/there*). Under that view, the use of a cognate form, Sanskrit *iva* (thus, **i-wo*) ‘like; thus’ is interesting, since *iva* can be used in a mitigating sense in the oldest layers of Sanskrit (Vedic Sanskrit), e.g. *rebhati iva* ‘he is making noise, as it were’ – the mitigation here may reflect a type of equivocating about the truth of the asserted statement, and if so, may suggest some distancing on the speaker’s part from the content of the statement. To get from that distancing to a direct quote use in Hittite, if that is indeed the path of development, would involve treating the Hittite usage as a way of distancing oneself from the direct statement that follows by being specific about the source (i.e., these are not my words, but rather are what X says).

Second, in Vedic Sanskrit there is a special verbal mood, referred to in many discussions as the ‘injunctive’, which has past tense endings but no past tense prefix, e.g. *gamam* (1sg of *gam-* ‘go’) which is used among other things for timeless truths and statements in the mythic past; this is paralleled by the so-called ‘gnomic aorist’ in Greek, in which a past-tense form (the aorist) is used for timeless truths. In Greek the past tense prefix became obligatory and so the simple past with the prefix continues functionally the form seen in the Vedic injunctive, which can thus be projected back into PIE. Interestingly, some languages with evidential systems, e.g. Jarawara as discussed by Dixon (Chapter 7) and Tariana as discussed by Aikhenvald (Chapter 6), have a special marking for the expression of timeless statements, essentially unwitnessed but part of common knowledge, as part of that system. To the extent, then, that the PIE injunctive had such a function, it may well be yet another piece suggesting that evidentiality was relevant in PIE.

There are as well various sorts of lexical evidence which might point to evidentiality marking in PIE, e.g. seemingly synonymous but formally distinct roots for ‘know’ (**g^hneH-*, as in Greek *gnó:-sko:*, and **weyd-*, as in Greek *oída*) that invite the possibility of the encoding of different types of knowledge or

modes of knowing. Overall, though, the evidence is at best suggestive, and clearly a lot more remains to be worked out before one can say that these bits and pieces scattered here and there across the whole family actually add up to a supportable claim that PIE is to be reconstructed with even an evidentiality strategy let alone a system (discussed further in Joseph 2002c). Still, this discussion shows that the insights that have emerged from this volume are applicable to novel domains and can at the very least make practitioners in all language families, even those languages that have not been significant players on the evidential pitch – diggers in the evidential trenches, so to speak – sit up and take notice; evidentiality clearly is a response to a basic human desire and to the dynamics of human interaction, and as such, is something that all languages may well have some reflection of in some way.

7. Conclusion – Some unanswered (and maybe unasked) questions

To bring these remarks to a close, by way of pointing to some prospects for future research, I signal here some issues and questions that are unanswered or unaddressed and possibly, for some of them, even unasked before this:

- a. As already mentioned, there is the intriguing matter of language acquisition (about which more can be learned, though Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986 offer a start in that regard).
- b. Why do evidentials develop in language X but not in language Y even under similar stimuli? Is it in their “group psychology”, their shared culture, their shared attitudes, etc.? We may have a partial answer to that in regard to the resistance of some languages (e.g. Greek, see §3 above) to borrowing evidentials, but clearly more is needed here.
- c. If one were to map evidentials on a global basis, are there geographically coherent areas that are devoid of evidentials? An even more basic question: is mapping even a fruitful enterprise here? Is there something to be learned from the geography of evidentiality-marking languages? How would this exercise interact with the matter of deciding categorial status for evidentiality? Is it important to focus also on the time-period the mapping might refer to?
- d. Does the size of the speech community have any correlation with the size or nature of the evidential system?²¹ Here we have to realize that even in a language with thousands or even millions of speakers, there can be pockets of very limited interaction where speakers are in a relatively closed

- community even if there are potential links to larger numbers outside the community.
- e. What happens when there are multiple sources of information present? Is there a hierarchy that speakers follow? Is it culturally determined or is it possibly universal? Does the apparent default status of visually based information hold across all languages and cultures?
 - f. Clearly, ‘distancing’ matters with respect to evidentiality, and it is usually a mental or cognitive distancing or perhaps a temporal distancing (note the Jarawara remote past that Dixon describes in Chapter 7) – is ‘distance’ just a metaphor here, or can we talk of physical distance mattering too? What about being physically removed from the source of information – does that affect evidentiality marking at all? Is auditorily based information perhaps the physical analogue (no immediate visual stimuli) to the metaphorical distancing?
 - g. Are there other types of distancing ploys that speakers might utilize that are not evidentially based, and if so, do they have any relation to evidentiality? For example, 1996 U.S. presidential candidate Bob Dole had the habit of referring to himself in the 3rd person (e.g. he would say ‘Bob Dole will work for you’ instead of ‘I will work . . .’) – is this a type of stepping out of oneself, distancing oneself as an individual from oneself as speaker/narrator?²² More generally, what about the very large area involving social distancing that politeness strategies and honorific systems provide? Are they at all (to be) connected with evidentials? An intriguingly suggestive bit of data comes from Shipibo-Konibo, where, as described by Valenzuela in Chapter 2 (§5), one of the functions of the speculative marker *mein* is a courtesy use in interrogatives.

Putting all these remaining issues together, we see that there is still more to be learned about evidentiality, despite the very considerable progress towards an understanding of this phenomenon that the papers in this volume collectively constitute. Such a situation is actually a positive note to end on, though, since it both validates the utility of the investigation to date and points to its on-going vitality.

Notes

1. This term, from Jakobson (1957), was mentioned explicitly by Sally McLendon in the context of evidentiality during the general discussion at the end of the workshop that this

volume is based on, quite reasonably of course since the 1957 paper is where Jakobson discusses evidentiality in his treatment of the Slavic verb.

2. This very notion was brought out explicitly in the general discussion by Dr. Ilana Mushin of The University of Melbourne. Moreover, Elena Maslova (Chapter 9) refers in her §1 to evidentiality as an ‘essentially deictic category’.

3. Much to my surprise and delight, I learned only after first formulating these thoughts at the workshop itself that Mushin (2001) comes to the same conclusion and uses this same term; I am happy to have been anticipated by her and feel that to some extent, our each coming up with this characterization of evidentiality independently is an indication of it being on the right track.

4. More crudely put, perhaps, this can be called a “cover one’s rear” stance.

5. This very apposite point was made explicitly by Bob Dixon during the general discussion at the end of the workshop that this volume is based on.

6. Timothy Curnow (p.c.) suggested that one might view a two-term system of the sort X vs. non-X as really a one-term system, so that could be taken to be the most basic (and in any case would contrast with a zero-term ‘system’, i.e. a language with no marking for evidentiality).

7. I would like to thank my colleague David Odden for help interpreting the Bantu facts.

8. There is at least the traditional distinction between *i*-stems and non-*i*-stems in that class, and the *-io-* vs. non-*-io-* distinction in the 3rd verbal conjugation, and those are far from the only sub-distinctions one has to make.

9. Without belaboring the point, by the same token, if an E-speaker uses N, s/he might feel obliged to add in more information, to find a way in N to say E-type material; these strategies could then get encoded into the grammar of N if an N-speaker uses them in speaking N to an E-speaker, accommodating to the E-speaker’s usage and/or expectations. In the discussion at the workshop, two anecdotal references to this phenomenon were reported: Sasha Aikhenvald noted that Tariana speakers in their Portuguese give the impression of including far more information than might be expected or ordinarily called for, and Victor Friedman reported the excessive use in his own English of disclaiming and confirmatory adverbs whenever he returns from the Balkans. It is as if crucial information is felt to be missing when one shifts from an evidential language to a nonevidential one. See also Friedman’s Chapter 8 (§9) where he notes that ‘speakers of Turkic and Balkan Slavic languages have reported feeling the absence of a nonconfirmative verb form when speaking English’.

10. Definiteness clearly carries communicative content, but the placement of the marking of definiteness is not obviously tied to content and instead seems somewhat arbitrary.

11. In this case, however, the spread may have been a matter of substratum influence, not the adstratum sort of situation envisioned here in this hypothetical scenario involving evidentiality.

12. As suggested by Victor Friedman in the discussion at the workshop.

13. This is the case also with the Tariana eventually learning correct Portuguese or with Victor Friedman returning to normal English usage (see Note 9 above); under those circumstances, ultimately the more prestigious and dominant norm prevails.

14. Consider for instance a verbal use such as *My sons can please-and-thank-you with the best of them!* or Benveniste's famous example of French *tutoyer* 'talk down to' from the use of *tu* and *toi* as markers of lower status and lack of respect/politeness.
15. We might even think of assigning a probability quotient to such 'unidirectionality-based' reconstructions instead of an asterisk; on this suggestion for comparative reconstruction in general, see Janda & Joseph (2002: §1.3.1).
16. In the discussion at the workshop, this limitation on natural conversational data was noted by Victor Friedman. Timothy Curnow added the important caveat regarding the use of large textual corpora that while statistics on a large corpus can be suggestive as to what is unlikely or impossible, the absence of an item from a corpus is not the same thing as that item being absolutely impossible in the language.
17. This important point was brought out by Bob Dixon in the workshop discussion.
18. As suggested by Aikhenvald in her presentation of material for the introduction at the workshop itself.
19. The persistence of common strategies for talking about dreams and mind-alteration in evidentiality languages despite the age of these 'technologies' suggests that there might not be adaptation and change as a technology becomes more ingrained and more familiar. Still, the fact that each speaker learns about these anew in his/her life might mean that the technology never really gets old or too familiar.
20. This element is traditionally referred to as an 'enclitic', though for various theoretical reasons I deliberately avoid the designation 'clitic'; see Joseph (2002a, b) for discussion of this position.
21. Sasha Aikhenvald brought this question up during general discussion at the workshop.
22. Note the use of the term 'commentative' by Viacheslav Chirikba in Chapter 11, with reference to one of the functions of evidentiality in Abkhaz.

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Index of authors

A

- Aikhenvald, A. Y. 1–31, 34, 42, 56,
58 n. 1, 59 n. 7, 79, 97, 131–164,
172, 189–190, 207, 211–212, 245,
291, 309–311, 313–315, 319–321,
324 n. 9, 325 n. 18, 325 n. 21
Aksu-Koç, A. A. 284, 322
Ama, R. 51, 58 n. 1
Anderson, L. B. 23–24, 90, 300,
304 n. 2
Anshba, A. 247–248, 255, 259–262
Aoki, H. 2, 10–11, 72
Aristava, S. K. 244, 247, 249–250,
254, 256–257
Aronson, H. I. 190
Austin-Garrison, M. 96

B

- Barnes, J. 6, 24, 26 n. 1, 134
Bari, S. 42, 45, 47–48, 58 n. 1, 59 n. 9
Bashir, E. 3–4, 12
Basso, K. H. 96
Begishe, K. 96
Bergsland, K. 301
Berthelsen, C. 304 n. 6
Bhat, D. N. S. 11
Boas, F. 1, 189, 303
Boeder, W. 245, 266
Botne, R. 316
Bray, D. 98 n. 2
Brendemoen, B. 288
Buchholz, O. 197, 203–205
Buckley, E. 121
Buder, A. 281
Bulut, C. 264, 266
Bunte, P. A. 162
Bybee, J. 24

C

- Camargo, E. 54, 60 n. 15
Campbell, L. 21, 26, n. 1
Canayo, A. 42
Chafe, W. 2, 19, 27 n. 8
Chappell, H. 26 n. 1
Chapman, S. 180
Charachidzé, G. 267
Chelliah, S. L. 77 n. 2, 97 n. 1
Chirikba, V. A. 243–272, 325 n. 22
Chisholm, J. S. 96
Chitoran, I. 190
Chkadua, L. P. 244, 249–250, 252,
254, 256–257, 264
Chung, S. 24
Comrie, B. 16, 26 n. 1, 58 n. 1, 226,
263, 274, 289
Csató, É. Á. 26 n. 1, 276, 288
Curnow, T. 324 n. 6, 325 n. 16

D

- Dahl, Ö. 90
Dankoff, R. 189
Dawson, J. 98 n. 7
Day, D. 43, 48, 59 n. 11
de Haan, F. 25, 79
de Reuse, W. 79–100, 224, 299–300,
311, 313
Décsy, G. 4, 21
DeLancey, S. 2, 77 n. 3, 77 n. 5, 79,
81, 98 n. 3, 171, 229, 284, 288
Demiraj, S. 196, 196
Dendale, P. 18
Derbyshire, D. C. 7
Dickinson, C. 5, 7, 9, 14, 27 n. 4, 65,
86

Dixon, R. M. W. 4–5, 7–8, 11, 19, 21,
56, 97, 165–187, 222, 237–241,
308, 321, 323, 324 n. 5, 325 n. 17

Dobrin, L. 312

Dobrushina, N. 3

Donabédian, A. 12, 245, 266

Dozon, A. 192

Dumézil, G. 267

E

Edgerton, F. E. 88

Egerod, S. 16, 75, 77 n. 2

Escobar, A. M. 263

F

Faust, N. 43

Fernandez-Vest, M. M. J. 19

Feuillet, J. 207

Fiedler, W. 197, 203–205

Fielder, G. E. 192, 206–207

Floyd, R. 4, 14, 23

Foley, W. A. 313

Fortescue, M. 97, 263, 291–306,
308–311, 317

Fox, B. 19

Frawley, W. 26 n. 2

Friedman, V. 18, 20, 21, 189–218,
324 n. 9, 324 n. 12, 324 n. 13,
325 n. 16

Friedrich, J. 321

Fucshico 39

G

Genko, A. N. 251

Givón, T. 19

Goddard, P. E. 79–80, 87

Gomez, G. G. 4

Gomez-Imbert, E. 23

Gordon, L. 21

Gralow, F. L. 7

Greenfeld, P. J. 96

Gronemeyer, C. 21

Gross, M. 314

Gruzdeva, E. Yu. 155

Guentchéva, Z. 2, 192, 212

H

Haile, B. 98 n. 6

Haller, F. 72 n. 2

Halpern, A. M. 106, 121–123

Hansson, I.-L. 76, 77 n. 2

Hardman, M. J. 4, 40

Hargreaves, D. 77 n. 2

Harris, A. C. 59 n. 3

Haspelmath, M. 4, 21, 59 n. 3, 317

Hewitt, B. G. 4, 244, 249–250, 256,
258, 263, 267

Hill, F. 88

Hoijer, H. 87

Hongladarom, K. 77 n. 2

Hopper, P. 317

Huber, B. 77 n. 2

I

Inuma, T. M. 44–46

J

Jacobsen, W. H. Jr. 1, 5, 10, 22, 189,
192, 305 n. 16, 313

Jacobson, S. 299–300

Jakobson, R. 27 n. 7, 189, 308,
323 n. 1

Janda, R. D. 311–312, 317, 325 n. 15

Jisma, K. 51

Jochelson, W. 22, 219

Johanson, L. 2–3, 8, 12, 21–22, 86,
212, 264, 273–290, 308, 312, 315

Joseph, B. D. 307–327

Jurafsky, D. 309

K

Karakoç, B. 287

Kaufman, T. 315

Kazazis, K. 189

Kendall, M. B. 162

Khiba, Z. K. 249

Kibrik, A. E. 9, 245, 264
 Kimenyi, A. 19
 Kneeland, H. 43, 53–54, 60 n. 4,
 60 n. 16
 Koneski, B. 203
 Konstantinov, A. 200
 Kostov, K. 193
 Kozintseva, N. 264, 266
 Kramer, C. E. 205
 Krejnovich, E. A. 219, 221, 223,
 227–229, 231, 233, 234 n. 6
 Kriareas, E. 190
 Krle, R. 196
 Kronning, H. 2, 18
 Kumakhov, M. 264
 Künnap, A. 4
 Kuznetsova, A. I. 4

L

Laanest, A. 19
 Lafe, E. 203, 205
 Lakoff, G. 313
 Lang, A. 4
 LaPolla, R. J. 4, 17, 23, 63–78
 Lauriault, E. 43, 48, 59 n. 11
 Lazard, G. 18, 20, 27 n. 5, 264
 Lehiste, I. 15, 26 n. 1
 Liebe-Harkort, M.-L. 79
 Loeweke, E. 6
 Lomtatidze, K. V. 244, 251, 256–258
 Loos, B. 55
 Loos, E. 53, 55
 Lorient, J. 43, 48, 59 n. 11
 Lowe, I. 6
 Lunt, H. 195, 204–205

M

MacDonald, L. 4, 21
 Malone, T. 14, 20, 26 n. 1, 134
 Marr, N. J. 247, 257
 Maslova, E. 20, 26 n. 1, 37, 219–235,
 324 n. 2
 Matras, Y. 193
 Matthews, P. H. 26 n. 3, 310

May, J. 6
 McLendon, S. 5, 9, 16, 97, 101–129,
 299, 323 n. 1
 Meni, R. 49, 58 n. 1
 Merlan, F. 18
 Miller, W. 4
 Mindak, J. 193
 Minova-Āurkova, L. 195
 Mithun, M. 121, 125
 Mladenov, M. 191
 Monserrat, R. 237–241
 Montoliu, C. 213 n. 1
 Morgan, W. 94
 Mortensen, C. A. 4
 Moshinsky, J. 121, 123, 126 n. 6
 Mushin, I. 324 n. 2, 324 n. 3
 Muysken, P. 89

N

Navarro, M. 55
 Newmeyer, F. 317
 Nichols, J. 2, 27 n. 8, 264, 268 n. 6
 Nikolaeva, I. 4, 12, 219, 234 n. 5
 Noël, D. 19
 Noonan, M. 19

O

O'Connor, M. C. 121
 Odden, D. 324 n. 7
 Oswald, R. 120–125

P

Palmer, F. R. 24
 Parker, S. 55
 Parks, D. 5, 7
 Perrot, J. 4, 21, 27 n. 6
 Perry, J. R. 263
 Perry, R. J. 96
 Pentheroudakis, J. 189
 Plungian, V. A. 24
 Poa, D. 77 n. 2
 Potter, B. C. 79, 92, 98 n. 7
 Prost, G. 54–55

R

Rakhilina, E. 2
Ramírez, C. A. 55
Ramirez, H. 158–159, 163 n. 5
Reed, I. 296, 300
Rhodes, R. 59 n. 4
Rice, K. 79, 97 n. 1, 98 n. 3
Rombandeeva, E. I. 4
Roos, M. E. 285
Rosch, E. 97, 312
Rushforth, S. 96

S

Salzer, M. 180
Samilov, M. 213 n. 4
Samuels, D. 97 n. 1, 99 n. 10
Sani, Y. 47, 52, 58 n. 1
Schlichter, A. 5
Serebrjannikov, B. A. 20
Shakryl, K. S. 257
Shell, O. 43, 53, 59 n. 6
Sherzer, J. 22
Shipley, W. F. 4
Silver, S. 4
Sinuiri, N. A. 55
Skorik, P. J. 305 n. 11
Slobin, D. 284, 302, 322
Soi, R. 43
Spruit, A. 256
Squartini, M. 18, 26 n. 2
Stolz, T. 4
Strom, C. 5
Sumbatova, N. 245
Sun, T-S. J. 77 n. 2

T

Tatevosov, S. G. 3, 245
Tekin, T. 189
Tenišev, Ė. R. 285
Testelets, J. G. 245, 264
Thiesen, W. 10
Thomason, S. G. 315
Thurgood, G. 77 n. 2, 263
Timberlake, A. 24
Tournadre, N. 60 n. 17
Tournon, J. 51, 59 n. 8

Trask, R. L. 310
Traugott, E. 317
Tsitsipis, L. D. 134

U

Uplegger, F. J. 88, 90
Uslar, P. 244
Utas, B. 2

V

Vakhtin, N. 26 n. 1, 234 n. 2,
299–300
Valenzuela, P. M. 33–61, 318, 323
van den Berg, H. 4
van der Auwera, J. 24
van Wijk, N. 213 n. 9
Varol, M-C. 190
Vasishth, S. 312
Vihman, E. 121
Vocis, P. G. 211

W

Watters, D. E. 4, 17
Webster, A. K. 79
Weigand, G. 192
Werner, O. 96
West, B. 159
Whistler, K. W. 263
Whitehead, A. N. 304
Wierzbicka, A. 27 n. 8
Willett, T. 5, 12, 21, 24, 26 n. 2
Willie, M. 79
Wistrand, L. M. 43
Woodbury, A. C. 26 n. 1, 77 n. 2

X

Xoxa, D. 200–201

Y

Young, R. 94

Z

Zeisler, B. 77 n. 5

Index of languages and language families

A

- Abkhaz (Northwest Caucasian) 4, 9,
11–13, 16–18, 20–21, 24, 86, 232,
243–272
see also Abzhywa, Ahchypsy,
Bzyp, Common Abkhaz,
Proto-Abkhaz, Sadz
- Abkhaz-Abaza (Northwest Caucasian)
244, 257
see also Tapanta Abaza
- Abkhazo-Adyghean (or Northwest
Caucasian) 243
- Abzhywa, dialect of Abkhaz
(Northwest Caucasian) 243
- Adyghe (Northwest Caucasian) 243,
264
- Afghan Persian (Iranian,
Indo-European) 263
- Ahchypsy, dialect of Abkhaz
(Northwest Caucasian) 243
- Akha (Tibeto-Burman, Sino-Tibetan)
16, 75, 263
- Alanic (Iranian, Indo-European)
266
- Alaskan Yupik (Eskimo-Aleut) 296
- Albanian (Indo-European) 14, 20,
189–218, 288, 320
see also South Albanian,
Standard Albanian
- Aleut (Eskimo-Aleut) 301
- Altay Turkic (Turkic) 278, 284
- Amazonian linguistic area 23, 162
- Anatolian 320
- Apache (Athabaskan, North America)
91, 94, 96
see also Western Apache,
Chiricahua Apache, Cibecue
Western Apache, San Carlos
Western Apache, Tonto Western
Apache
- Arapesh (Toricelli phylum, Papuan
area) 312
- Arawá family (South America) 165,
180, 185
- Arawak family (South America)
131, 158–159
see also North Arawak,
Proto-Arawak
- Archi (Northeast Caucasian) 9
- Armenian (Indo-European) 267
see also Eastern Armenian,
Western Armenian
- Aromanian (Romance,
Indo-European) 191, 210, 212,
217
- Aromanian dialects
see Aromanian
- Arvanitika (Indo-European) 193,
209
- Ashkharywa (central Abkhaz,
Northwest Caucasian) 243
- Athabaskan (North America)
79–100, 313
see also Western Apache,
Northern Athabaskan family,
Pacific Coast Athabaskan,
Proto-Athabaskan, Southern
Athabaskan
- Aymara (Jaqi, South America) 4, 40
- Azerbaijani (Turkic) 22, 277–278,
281, 288

B

- Balkan Greek (Indo-European) 315
see also Greek
- Balkan Romance (Indo-European)
 190, 212
see also Romance
- Balkan Slavic (Indo-European) 18,
 189–218
see also Slavic
- Balkan-Caucasian (linguistic area)
 245
- Balkans (linguistic area) 18, 20–21,
 189–218, 245, 266, 288–289,
 314–315, 320
- Balto-Finnic (Finno-Ugric, Uralic) 4
- Banawá, dialect of Madi (Arawá,
 South America) 165, 176, 184
- Baniwa (North Arawak, South
 America) 133, 158
see also Kurripako
- Bantu (Niger Congo) 313, 316
- Barbacoan (South America) 7
- Bashkir (Turkic) 280
- Beaver (Athabaskan, North America)
 80
- Bora (Bora-Witoto, South America)
 10
- Boumaa Fijian (Austronesian) 19
- Brazilian Portuguese (Romance,
 Indo-European) 22
- Bulgarian (Slavic, Indo-European)
 190–194, 200–201, 206–207, 209,
 218, 288–289
see also Northeast Bulgarian,
 Standard Bulgarian
- Byzantine Greek (Greek,
 Indo-European) 266
- Bzyp, dialect of Abkhaz (Northwest
 Caucasian) 243, 258, 261

C

- Caddoan (Caddoan) 5, 7
- Caucasian (linguistic area) 21, 245,
 264, 266

- see also* East Caucasian,
 North Caucasian, Northeast
 Caucasian, pan-Caucasian, South
 Caucasian, West Caucasian
- Central Alaskan Yupik
 (Eskimo-Aleut) 300
- Central Pomo (Pomoan, North
 America) 24, 122–125
- Central Siberian Yupik
 (Eskimo-Aleut) 299–301
- Central Tucanoan (Tucanoan, South
 America) 5–6, 22
- Chakobo (Panoan, South America)
 53–56
- Chipewyan (Athabaskan, North
 America) 80
- Chiricahua Apache (Athabaskan,
 North America) 79
- Chukchi (Chukotko-Kamchatkan,
 North America) 300–301
- Chukotko-Kamchatkan (North
 America) 303
- Chuvash (Turkic) 273, 280
- Cibecue Western Apache
 (Athabaskan, North America)
 95
- Circassian (Northwest Caucasian)
 243, 266–267
see also Common Circassian,
 Proto-Circassian
- Coast Miwok (Miwokian, Utian,
 North America) 126
- Common Abkhaz (Northwest
 Caucasian) 257–258
- Common Circassian (Northwest
 Caucasian) 264
- Common Slavic (Indo-European)
 194, 209
- Crimean Tatar (Turkic) 266

D

- Daco-Romanian (Romance,
 Indo-European) 21, 190–191,
 211, 217

Daghestanian (Northeast Caucasian)
245
Dardic (Indo-European) 3–4
Dení (Arawá, South America) 165
Desano (East Tucanoan, Tucanoan,
South America) 133

E

East Caucasian (or
Nakh-Daghestanian, Northeast
Caucasian) 243
East Macedonian (Slavic,
Indo-European) 192
East Tucanoan languages (Tucanoan,
South America) 5–6, 131, 133,
158
Eastern Armenian (Indo-European)
266
Eastern Finno-Ugric (Uralic) 288
Eastern Pomo (Pomoan, South
America) 5, 11, 13–18, 97,
101–129, 299
Enets (Samoyede, Uralic) 4
Enga (Engan family, Papuan area) 4
English (Germanic, Indo-European)
1–2, 18–19, 24, 76, 85, 87,
102–103, 109, 113, 162, 181, 183,
196, 200, 202, 206, 210–211, 246,
274–275, 302, 310, 313, 321
Eskimo (Eskimo-Aleut) 97,
291–306, 309
see also Proto-Eskimo
Eskimo languages (Eskimo-Aleut)
11, 291, 297, 302–303, 317
Eskimo-Aleut family 291
see also Proto-Eskimo-Aleut
Estonian (Balto-Finnic, Finno-Ugric,
Uralic) 4, 15, 19, 21
Eurasian
see pan-Eurasian
European languages 24, 95–96

F

Fasu (Papuan area) 6, 313

Finnish (Balto-Finnic, Finno-Ugric,
Uralic) 19
Finno-Ugric family 3, 20, 288
see also Eastern Finno-Ugric
French (Romance, Indo-European)
2, 18–19, 54, 97, 192, 211, 260,
314
Fu-yü (Turkic) 273

G

Georgian (South Caucasian)
244–245, 266–267, 288
German (Germanic, Indo-European)
211
Godoberi (Northeast Caucasian) 3
Greek (Indo-European) 189–190,
192, 209, 217, 288, 312, 315,
321–322
see also Balkan Greek,
Byzantine Greek
Greenlandic (Eskimo-Aleut) 97
see also West Greenlandic

H

Hare (Athabaskan, North America)
81
Hill Patwin (Wintun, North America)
263
Hindi (Indic, Indo-European) 312
Hittite (Anatolian, Indo-European)
320–321
Hixkaryana (Carib, South America)
7
Hungarian (Ugric, Finno-Ugric,
Uralic) 211, 288
Hunzib (Northeast Caucasian) 4
Hupa (Athabaskan, North America)
79

I

Indo-European 22, 189, 204, 288,
315, 320
see also Proto-Indo-European
Iranian (Indo-European) 3, 18, 266

Iranxe, dialect of M̄ky (isolate, South America) 237,
see also M̄ky
 Iroquoian language family 19
 Italic (Indo-European) 320

J

Jamamadí, dialect of Madi (Arawá, South America) 165, 176, 182, 184
 Japanese 2, 10, 72, 211
 Jaqaru (Aymara, South America) 40
 Jaqi family (South America) 4
 Jarawara, dialect of Madi (Arawá, South America) 3, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–17, 20, 22, 71, 165–187, 222, 321, 323
 Judezmo (Indo-European) 190–191, 217

K

Kabardian (Northwest Caucasian) 264
 Kalasha (Dardic, Indo-European) 3–4, 12
 Kalderaš, dialect of Romani (Indic, Indo-European) 193
 Kapanawa (Ucayli Panoan, South America) 53, 55–56
 Karachay-Balkar (Turkic) 266
 Karaim (Turkic) 22, 288
 Kartvelian (or South Caucasian) 243, 245, 264, 266–267
 Kashaya Pomo (Pomoan, North America) 24, 120, 122–125
 Kashibo-Kakataibo (Panoan, South America) 43, 53–54, 56
 Kashinawa (Panoan, South America) 53–56
 Kastoria (or Macedonian dialect spoken in Greece, Indo-European) 209
 Kato (Athabaskan, North America) 79

Kazakh (Turkic) 278–281, 285–286
 Khakas (Turkic) 278
 Khalaj (Turkic) 273
 Kham (Tibeto-Burman, Sino-Tibetan) 4, 17
 Khanty (Ugric, Finno-Ugric, Uralic) 4
see also Northern Khanty
 Khowar (Dardic, Indo-European) 3–4, 12
 Kinyarwanda (Bantu, Niger-Congo) 19
 Kolyma Yukaghir (Yukaghir, Paleo-Siberian isolate) 219, 223–224, 226–227, 230–231
 Komi (Finno-Ugric, Uralic) 20
 Korča Macedonian (or Korçë) 209
see also Macedonian
 Korçë (or Macedonian dialect spoken in Albania, Indo-European) 209
see also Macedonian
 Koreguaje (Tucanoan, South America) 7
 Kostur Macedonian (or Kastoria) 209
 Kulina (Arawá, South America) 165
 Kurdish (Iranian, Indo-European) 288
 Kurripako (North Arawak, South America) 133
see also Baniwa
 Kwakwala (Wakashan, North America) 303
 Kypchak branch (Turkic) 266

L

Ladakhi (Tibeto-Burman, Sino-Tibetan) 11
 Lak (Northeast Caucasian) 245
 Latin (Romance, Indo-European) 313–314, 321
 Laz (South Caucasian) 267
 Lega (Bantu, Niger-Congo) 316

Lezgian (Lezgian, Northeast Caucasian)
4, 21

Lithuanian (Baltic, Indo-European)
21–22, 288, 315, 320

Livonian (Balto-Finnic, Finno-Ugric,
Uralic) 4, 19

Lovara, dialect of Romani (Indic,
Indo-European) 193

Luvian (Anatolian, Indo-European)
321

M

Macedonian (Slavic, Indo-European)
20, 191–196, 298–310, 212, 281,
288–289
see also East Macedonian,
Korča Macedonian, Kostur
Macedonian, Standard
Macedonian

Macedonian dialects (Slavic,
Indo-European) 191–192, 209

Madang-Adelbert Range (Papuan
area) 4

Madi (Arawá, South America) 165,
176, 180, 184
see also Madi

Maidu (Maidu, South America) 4

Makah (Wakashan, North America)
10, 313

Mangarayi (Australian area) 18

Mansi (Finno-Ugric, Uralic) 4

Mari (Finno-Ugric, Uralic) 20

Maricopa (Yuman) 21

Matses (Panoan, South America)
43, 53–54, 56–57

Medieval Slavic (Indo-European)
209

Megleno-Romanian (Romance,
Indo-European) 190–191, 212,
217

Megrelian (Kartvelian) 266–267

Mýky (Brazilian language isolate) 3,
8–9, 11, 15–16, 237–241
see also Iranxe

N

Nakh-Daghestanian (or East
Caucasian) 243

Nambiquara (South America) 6

Native American languages 87, 189

Navajo (Athabaskan, North America)
79, 95–96

Neenets (Samoyede, Uralic) 4, 21

Nivkh (Paleosiberian isolate) 155

Noghay (Turkic) 278, 280, 286–287

North Arawak (Arawak, South
America) 22, 131, 133, 158

North Caucasian 264

Northeast Bulgarian (Slavic,
Indo-European) 209

Northeast Caucasian 3–4, 9

Northeastern Pomo (Pomoan, North
America) 121–122

Northern Athabaskan 79–80

Northern Embera family (South
America) 4, 8, 17

Northern Khanty (Finno-Ugric,
Uralic) 12

Northern Pomo (Pomoan, North
America) 5, 121–125

Northern Tajik (Iranian,
Indo-European) 288

O

Old East Turkic (Turkic) 283

Ossetic (Iranian, Indo-European)
see Proto-Ossetic

P

Palaic (Anatolian) 320

pan-Caucasian 245

pan-Eurasian 264

Panoan (South America) 33, 43,
53–58
see also Proto-Panoan

Papua 4, 6, 313

Papua New Guinea 211

Paumari (Arawá, South America)
165, 180

- Pawnee (Caddoan, North America) 5, 7
- Persian (Iranian, Indo-European) 22, 263–264, 288
see also Afghan Persian
- Piapoco (North Arawak, South America) 133, 159
- PIE
see Proto-Indo-European
- Piratapuya (East Tucanoan, Tucanoan, South America) 133
- Pomo
see Central Pomo, Eastern Pomo, Kashaya Pomo, Northeastern Pomo, Northern Pomo, Proto-Pomo, Proto-Russian River Pomo, Southeastern Pomo, Southern Pomo
- Pomoan (North America) 101, 121–126
- Portuguese (Romance, Indo-European) 19, 159, 161–162, 237
see also Brazilian Portuguese, Standard Portuguese, Vaupés Portuguese
- Proto-Abkhaz 266
- Proto-Arawak 131, 149
- Proto-Athabaskan 94
- Proto-Circassian 266
- Proto-Eskimo 299–300
- Proto-Eskimo-Aleut 300, 317
- Proto-Indo-European 320–321
- Proto-Osetic 266
- Proto-Panoan 43, 56
- Proto-Pomo 123
- Proto-Russian River Pomo 122
- Q**
- Qiang (Qiangic, Tibeto-Burman, Sino-Tibetan) 4, 7–8, 13–17, 19, 21–23, 63–78, 319
- Qiangic (Tibeto-Burman, Sino-Tibetan) 63
- Quechua (Quechuan, South America) 4, 14, 23, 263
- R**
- Retuarā (Tucanoan, South America) 5, 22, 315
- Romance (Indo-European) 189
see also South Danubian Romance
- Romance family (Indo-European) 18
- Romani (Indic, Indo-European) 193, 218, 315
see also Kalderaš, Lovara, Vlah
- Romanian (Romance, Indo-European) 191, 217, 263, 320
- Russian (Slavic, Indo-European) 2, 246
- S**
- Sadz, dialect of Abkhaz (Northwest Caucasian) 243
- Salar (Turkic) 273, 287
- Samoyede family (Uralic) 4, 11, 16
- San Carlos Western Apache (Athabaskan, North America) 95
- Sanskrit (Indic, Indo-European) 210, 312, 321
- Selkup (Samoyede, Uralic) 4
- Serbian (Slavic, Indo-European) 191, 218
- Serbo-Croatian (Slavic, Indo-European) 192, 218
- Shasta (Shastan, North America) 4
- Shipibo-Konibo (Panoan, South America) 3, 9–10, 13–20, 22–23, 33–61, 318, 323
- Sino-Tibetan family 63
- Slave (Athabaskan, North America) 79
- Slavic (Indo-European) 218, 288, 320

see also Common Slavic,
 medieval Slavic
 Slavic dialects 218
 Sliven, dialect of Romani
 (Indo-European) 193
 Sorowahá (Arawá, South America)
 165, 178–180
 South Albanian family 193
 South American languages 4, 11,
 165, 211
 South Caucasian (or Kartvelian) 243
 South Danubian Romance (or
 Aromanian and
 Megleno-Romanian,
 Indo-European) 212
 Southeastern Pomo (Pomoan, North
 America) 122–125
 Southeastern Tepehuan
 (Uto-Aztecan) 5
 Southern Amazonian 56
 Southern Athabaskan (Athabaskan,
 North America) 79
 Southern Pomo (Pomoan, North
 America) 122, 124–125
 Spanish (Romance, Indo-European)
 55, 112, 217, 263
 Standard Albanian (Indo-European)
 192, 196
 Standard Bulgarian (Slavic,
 Indo-European) 192, 209
 Standard Macedonian (Slavic,
 Indo-European) 192
 Standard Portuguese (Romance,
 Indo-European) 162
 Svan (Kartvelian) 245, 266–267

T

Tadjik (Iranian, Indo-European) 20
see also Northern Tajik
 Tadjik (Iranian, Indo-European)
 288
 Tapanta Abaza (Northwest Caucasian)
 245–246, 257
see also Abkhaz-Abaza

Tariana (North Arawak, South
 America) 5–8, 12–24, 42, 79,
 131–164, 309–310, 313, 319, 321
 Tatar (Turkic) 278, 280
 Tauya (Madang-Adelbert Range
 Subphylum, Papuan area) 4, 21
 Tibetan, 81, 288
 Tibeto-Burman family (Sino-Tibetan)
 4, 63, 211, 263
 Tosk (Albanian, Indo-European)
 193
 Tsafiki (Barbacoan) 5, 7, 9, 14–15,
 65, 86
 Tsakhur (Northeast Caucasian) 245,
 264
 Tucano (East Tucanoan, Tucanoan,
 South America) 6, 13–14, 18,
 24, 131, 133–135, 158–159, 161
 Tucanoan (South America) 5, 22,
 149
see also Central Tucanoan,
 East Tucanoan
 Tundra Yukaghir (or Northern
 Yukaghir, Paleosiberian isolate)
 219, 221, 223, 226, 230–232, 234
 Turkic languages 3, 12–13, 16–18,
 22, 86, 189, 210, 212, 266,
 273–290, 315
 Turkish (western subgroup of
 Southwestern Turkic, Turkic)
 19, 81, 189–191, 200–201,
 209–210, 281, 266–267, 274–278,
 281–288, 310, 312, 315
 Turkmen (Southwestern Turkic,
 Turkic) 278–279, 283
 Tuyuca (Tucanoan, South America)
 6, 14, 20, 24

U

Ubykh (Northwest Caucasian) 243,
 267
 Ugric family (Uralic) 4
 Ukrainian (Slavic, Indo-European)
 22
 Uto-Aztecan 5

Uyghur (Turkic) 274, 279–280,
283–287
Uzbek (Turkic) 278–280, 283, 288

V

Vaupés Portuguese (Romance,
Indo-European) 162
Vedic Sanskrit (Indic, Indo-European)
321

see also Sanskrit

Vlah (Indic, Indo-European)
191–193, 209–210, 217, 320,
see also Romani

W

Wakashan (North America) 10–11,
303
Wanano (East Tucanoan, Tucanoan,
South America) 133
Wariapano (Panoan, South America)
53, 55–56
Washo (Washo, North America) 5,
192
West Caucasian 243–244, 266–267
West Greenlandic (Eskimo-Aleut)
10–11, 263, 291–306, 309, 311
Western Apache (Athabaskan, North
America) 6–8, 10, 12, 15–17,
20–21, 79–100, 224, 299, 311, 313

Western Armenian (Armenian,
Indo-European) 12, 288
Wintu (Wintun, North America) 5
Wintun family (North America) 263

X

Xamatauteri (Yanomami, South
America) 5

Y

Yakut (Turkic) 219, 281
Yanam (Yanomami, South America)
4
Yellow Uyghur (Turkic) 273, 285,
288
Yucuna (North Arawak, South
America) 22
Yukaghir (Paleosiberian isolate)
219–235
see also Kolyma Yukaghir,
Tundra Yukaghir
Yupik
see Alaskan Yupik, Central
Alaskan Yupik, Central Siberian
Yupik
Yuman family 21

Index of subjects

A

absolute 33, 125, 258
acquisition of evidentials 320, 322
addressee 17, 73, 134, 144–145, 155,
201–202, 228, 286
admirative 14, 133, 152, 154,
191–193, 196–197, 199–200, 212
affirmative clauses 8, 117, 134–143,
146–147, 151, 163
agglutinative 33, 63, 101, 166
agreement 19, 33, 123–124, 131,
166–167, 182, 185, 193, 194,
221–222
aorist 191, 194, 197, 206–207, 210,
212, 244, 250, 260–262, 265, 288,
321
apodosis 206
apprehensive 8, 131–133, 152, 155,
163
asserted 84, 88, 91, 93–94, 113, 286,
321
assertive 151, 154
assumed evidential 5–6, 14, 131
see also inferred evidential
assumed knowledge 5–6, 8, 14, 17,
54, 67, 71, 73, 89, 144–145, 161,
196, 198, 228, 233, 246, 248, 286
assumption 17, 67, 71, 73, 89,
144–145, 161, 198–199, 228, 248,
286
assumptive 263
auditive 21
auditory 3, 5, 19, 124, 223, 287, 292
see also evidence – nonvisual
awareness 85–87, 159, 175, 211,
248–249, 274, 284–285, 314

B

belief, degree of 19
see also disbelief, speaker's
commitment to truth of
statement
borrowing 112, 209, 265–266, 307,
314–315, 322

C

certainty
see epistemic modality
circumstantial evidence 6, 11, 101,
105, 300
lack of circumstantial evidence
54
cognition 14, 19, 22, 314
combining evidentials 9, 34–35, 37,
40, 44, 46–49, 57, 65, 76, 94, 241,
275
see also double marking of
source
commands 8–9, 17, 96, 114, 131,
146, 179, 202–203, 238, 295, 297
see also imperative
commentative 86, 232, 246–248
complement clause 19, 21, 40, 89,
143, 155, 168, 173, 175, 296
complementizer 2, 19, 21
concessive 120
conditional 2, 5, 11, 18, 24, 75, 90,
114, 121, 132, 152, 154, 190, 192,
205–206, 211, 227, 230, 244,
249–253, 256–258, 263, 286
conditional-potential 152
confirmative 190, 192, 194–196,
198–199, 202, 205–206, 208, 210,
212, 289

continuative 63–64, 106, 114–115,
 184–186, 226–227
 continuum 20, 191, 212, 218, 245
 control 3, 13–15, 150, 282–283
 lack of control 16, 110, 136,
 138–139, 175, 251–252,
 282–283, 285
 copula 10, 35, 72, 179, 184–185,
 253, 256, 263, 276, 278–281, 286,
 288, 312
 counterfactual clause 90, 230
 cultural attitudes 22–23, 25, 50–52,
 159–163, 210–211, 301–302
 cultural practices/knowledge 18, 48,
 50, 23, 26, 50, 87, 93, 96, 118,
 139, 141, 159, 161, 319
 cultural stereotypes 14, 22, 26
 culturally inappropriate 17, 93–94,
 145, 161

D

declarative 9, 33–35, 39, 43, 47, 49,
 54–55, 132, 158, 167, 172–175,
 179, 185, 237–238, 240, 249, 254,
 318
 declarative-assertive 151, 154
 deferred realization 12, 17, 84–88,
 93, 95–97, 224
 dependent clause 34–35, 114,
 119–120, 143, 173–175, 179,
 185–186, 297
 dependent-marking 131, 133
 desiderative 114–115, 121
 diffusion 21–22, 124, 133, 149,
 314–315
 direct evidence 3–6, 13–14, 23–24,
 37, 53–57, 64, 69, 81, 101–102,
 106–109, 113, 135–136, 145, 223,
 252, 264, 275–276
 direct evidential 4–5, 13, 16, 18,
 35–37, 43, 49–50, 56–58, 72,
 101–102, 106–109, 113, 115–118,
 121, 124–125, 220–223, 225–226,
 228–233, 265
 see also visual evidential

disbelief 37, 68, 197, 199, 208, 255
 distancing 12, 18, 112–113, 136,
 204–206, 210, 251–252, 255, 258,
 261–262, 264–265, 277, 283,
 298–299, 302, 308–309, 321, 323
 double marking of evidentiality
 8–10, 55, 174, 302, 323
 double marking of tense 148–149
 dreams 22, 50, 58, 70, 112, 136, 160,
 168, 210–211, 248, 251, 287,
 319–320
 dubitative 56, 88, 98, 159, 197,
 199–201, 203, 206–207, 273, 283

E

epistemic markers 35, 57, 84, 94,
 132, 267, 297, 299–300, 302,
 epistemic meaning/extension 2,
 11–12, 13–16, 20, 23–24, 72,
 82–83, 88, 98 n. 3, 152, 161,
 227–228, 231, 283, 292–293, 300
 epistemic modality 1, 13–14, 20, 24,
 33, 91–92, 97, 133, 154,
 198–199, 273, 300, 302–304,
 308
 certainty 12–13, 35, 54–57, 66,
 69, 72, 76, 83, 86, 88, 138,
 154, 195, 201–202, 228, 283,
 308
 uncertainty 13–15, 18–19, 44,
 46, 57, 66, 69–72, 111, 141,
 151–152, 154, 156, 172–173,
 206, 228, 237–238, 246, 255,
 263, 283
 evidence
 see assumed knowledge,
 circumstantial evidence, direct
 evidence, general knowledge,
 hearsay evidence, indirect
 evidence, indirect speech,
 inferred knowledge, nonvisual
 evidence, personal knowledge,
 physical evidence, reported
 evidence, visual evidence
 evidentiality and aspect

- see* continuative, extensive,
 - habitual, imperfect,
 - intraterminal, perfect,
 - postterminal, prospective,
 - resultative
 - evidentiality and belief
 - see* belief, disbelief
 - evidentiality and culture
 - see* cultural attitudes,
 - cultural practices/knowledge,
 - cultural stereotypes, culturally inappropriate
 - evidentiality and mood
 - see* apprehensive, assertive,
 - conditional, declarative,
 - frustrative, hypothetical, mood system, non-declarative, optative, presumptive, probabilitive, purposive, subjunctive
 - evidentiality and negation
 - see* negation
 - evidentiality and person
 - see* first person, non-first person
 - evidentiality and politeness
 - see* politeness
 - evidentiality and tense
 - see* future tense, non-future tense, past tense, perfect tense, present tense, tense system, tense-aspect, tense-evidentiality, tense-mood, double marking of tense
 - evidentiality in questions
 - see* questions
 - evidentiality systems
 - A1 3, 8–9, 12, 16, 163, 190–191, 212, 222, 233–234
 - A2 4, 9, 12, 16, 190–192, 211–222, 245
 - A3 4, 8–9, 11–12, 17, 146, 163
 - B1 4, 8, 64
 - B2 5, 8, 146, 163
 - B3 5
 - C1 5, 8, 135, 146, 163
 - C2 5, 9
 - C3 5
 - C4 5–6
 - two-term system 1–4, 13–14, 16, 24, 146, 172, 245, 280–282
 - two systems in one language 8–10, 280
 - three-term system 4–5, 13–14, 64, 76, 146, 155, 234, 246, 279–280
 - four-term system 5–6, 9, 14–15, 146, 239
 - multi-term system 1, 6, 13–15, 24, 80, 135, 146, 167, 176, 313
 - evidentials and commands
 - see* commands
 - evidentials and imperatives
 - see* imperative
 - evidentials
 - see* assumed evidential, assumptive, direct evidential, hearsay evidential, indirect evidential, indirectivity, inferred evidential, nonvisual evidential, physical inferential, reportative, reported evidential, scattered coding, visual evidential
 - exclamatory 143, 300
 - extensive 112, 121
 - eyewitness evidential
 - see* direct evidential, visual evidential
 - eyewitness
 - see* direct evidence, visual evidence
- F**
- first person 13, 16, 24, 68–69, 91, 93, 103, 105, 108, 113, 134, 149–151, 157–158, 175–176, 221–222, 229, 234, 251–253, 285, 301
 - formal markedness 5, 7–8, 13, 159, 260, 275–276, 303
 - frustrative 132, 151, 154, 238

functional markedness 7–8, 166,
175, 275–276
future events 35, 37, 43, 70, 121,
148, 157, 175, 225, 227, 234, 237,
245, 251, 258, 263–265
future tense 16, 21, 92, 131, 148,
174, 177, 186, 190–191, 219–220,
225–227, 245, 249–251, 256–258,
263–264, 316

G

gender 6, 19, 110, 132, 165–168,
177, 182, 186, 193–194, 244, 262,
313
general knowledge 5, 13–14, 18, 35,
50, 54, 56, 66, 124, 135–137, 139,
141–142, 150–151, 155, 161, 321

H

habitual action 35, 67, 179, 227, 293
habitual marker 132, 179, 221, 226,
239
head-marking 131, 165
hearsay evidence 4–5, 7, 12, 15, 19,
70, 73, 222, 227, 231, 244, 246,
259, 262, 274–275, 302
hearsay evidential 2, 4–5, 10–11, 15,
19, 21, 52, 64–65, 70–73,
75–76, 101, 105–109, 111,
113, 116–121, 123–124
second degree hearsay 42–43
hypothetical 90–91, 95, 167, 174,
177, 198–199, 220, 227–228

I

imperative 11, 34–35, 42, 75, 88–89,
120–121, 132, 143, 146, 163, 167,
175, 202–203, 221, 228, 237–238,
240, 252, 254, 257, 286, 295
see also commands
imperfect 95, 124, 191, 194,
196–197, 205–207, 210, 212, 221,
226–227, 244, 250, 276–277, 279

indirect evidence 1, 3, 12, 14, 18, 44,
86, 145, 219, 246, 248, 259, 265,
275
indirect evidential 167
indirect speech 40, 295–297
see also reported evidence
indirectivity 3, 12–13, 16–17, 22, 25,
86, 274–289, 308, 312
inferential 5–21, 37, 44–7, 56, 58,
64–75, 80–83, 86, 88, 93–97,
101–125, 220–234, 244–258,
260–267, 274–275, 278–282,
285, 291, 299, 308
inferential/judgmental 291
inferential/perceptive 275
inferential/probability 257
inferential/mirative 64, 68,
90–91, 83, 86, 93, 95, 97
non-mirative/inferential 21,
80–81, 95
inferred evidential 4–11, 14–18,
20–21, 23, 37, 44–47, 56–58, 64,
66–71, 73–75, 80–83, 86, 88,
93–97, 101–102, 104–105, 109,
111–113, 115–116, 118–121,
124–125, 131, 133, 135–136,
139–148, 150–154, 157–159,
161–162, 220–234, 240–241,
244–258, 260–267, 274–275,
278–281, 285, 292–293, 299
inferred knowledge 1, 3–6, 11, 14,
17, 23, 34, 53–54, 57, 64–65,
67–69, 73–75, 81–82, 86, 91, 101,
104–105, 111, 113, 117, 135,
139–140, 142–143, 148, 150–154,
157, 159, 69, 190, 192, 197–199,
219–220, 222–224, 227, 233, 244,
246–248, 258, 263, 274–277, 280,
282, 291–293, 299–300, 309, 313
initiotransformative 288
intonation 41, 89, 143, 146, 156
intraterminal 276–277, 279–281,
283

irrealis 18, 24, 90–91, 95–96, 114,
120–121, 167, 174, 176–177, 179,
220, 227, 237–238, 265

L

lexical reinforcement of evidentiality
13, 96, 137, 157, 246, 249

lie 17, 41, 139, 143, 157
see also speaker's
commitment to truth of
statement, belief

M

markedness
see formal markedness,
functional markedness,
zero-marking of evidentiality

médiatif
see mediative

mediative 3, 54, 56

mediativity
see medative

mirative 2, 12, 14–16, 48–49, 65,
67–68, 81, 83, 86, 89, 95–97, 165,
171–172, 174, 185, 189, 199–201,
203, 206, 229, 233–234, 238, 240,
246, 248–249, 252, 284–285, 294,
296, 299

mirative/inferential
see inferential

mirativity
see mirative

modality 2, 11, 15–16, 19–20, 24,
34, 75, 91–92, 133, 151–152, 154,
156, 179, 186, 199, 205–206, 227,
292, 299–304, 308
see also epistemic modality

mood system 8, 158

morphologically unmarked
see zero-marking of evidentiality

multiple sources of evidence
142–143

N

negation 11, 16, 75–76, 79, 94,
116–118, 136, 151, 175–176,
203–204, 237–241, 251, 254, 286,
293, 298

nonconfirmative 204–206, 208–210
see also confirmative

non-declarative 18, 24

non-eyewitness evidential 80, 82,
165, 167–168, 170–172, 185–186

non-first person 37, 69, 93, 103,
113, 134, 149–151, 251, 285

non-firsthand evidence
see reported evidence,
hearsay, indirect evidence

non-future tense 131, 226–228, 240

non-mirative inferential
see inferential

nonvisual evidence 5–6, 13–16, 22,
37, 65, 157, 239

nonvisual evidential 5–10, 13–14,
16–17, 20–21, 65, 80, 95,
101–104, 109, 113, 115–116, 118,
121, 131–133, 135–136, 137–155,
157–161, 237–241

O

optative 202–203, 252, 286

P

past deferred realization
see deferred realization

past tense 3, 7, 9, 15, 18, 20, 90–92,
94, 96, 133, 147, 160, 165,
167–178, 183–186, 193, 206, 209,
211–212, 240, 253, 257, 285, 300,
321

perceptive 275, 278–282

perfect 2, 15–16, 18, 20, 63, 67, 72,
95, 124–125, 132, 158, 189–194,
196–197, 202, 205–207, 209–210,
212, 226, 234, 238, 244, 262–264,
267, 277–279, 281–282, 288, 291,
298, 300, 316

person
 see first person, non-first person
 personal knowledge 4, 8, 24, 35, 43,
 54, 56, 65, 108–109, 193,
 201–202, 233, 275
 see also direct evidence
 shamanic knowledge 22
 supernatural occurrences 167
 physical evidence 5–6, 9, 65
 see also direct evidence,
 indirect evidence
 physical inferential 21, 80, 82, 95
 politeness 17, 48, 88–89, 114,
 120–121, 286
 polysynthetic languages 11, 131,
 243, 303
 postterminal 16, 18, 276–284,
 287–288
 present tense 20, 133, 136, 140,
 143–144, 147–148, 151, 153–157,
 157–159, 191–203, 206, 226,
 237–238, 240, 249–250, 276, 294
 presumptive 21, 190–191, 209, 211,
 263, 283
 probabilitive 21, 191, 211
 probability 2, 13–14, 16, 19, 44, 55,
 57, 133, 152, 267, 292–293,
 298–300, 308
 prospective 63–65, 220–221, 225,
 276, 279, 281
 protasis 90, 206
 purposive 8, 131–132, 152, 155–156,
 163, 257

Q

questions 9, 16–17, 49, 55, 73, 83,
 88–89, 108–109, 114–116,
 144–147, 168, 179, 183–186,
 201–202, 228, 286, 297
 content 17, 48, 143–144,
 174–175, 185
 echo 254–255
 indirect 295, 297
 polar 175, 183, 186
 pseudo-questions 146

question markers 40, 72–73, 88,
 114–115, 119, 174, 183
 response to 73, 144–147
 rhetorical 49, 73–74, 88–89,
 183–184, 286–287
 yes-no 17, 88–89, 143

R

realis 24, 114–115, 120–121, 220,
 222, 225–226, 228, 265
 reliability 2, 37, 41, 57, 140, 160,
 231, 280
 unreliability 23, 161, 199, 295
 reportative 6, 22, 26, 35, 37–44,
 46–47, 49–58, 80, 101, 245, 258,
 260–162, 265, 274, 291
 reported evidence 1, 3–6, 9, 12,
 18–19, 21, 23, 37–43, 57, 65, 67,
 71, 86, 101–102, 135, 140, 148,
 157, 161–162, 190, 192, 194,
 206–207, 211, 222, 245, 247, 258,
 260, 275–276, 278–282, 292,
 294–295, 298–299, 301–302, 309
 reported evidential 1, 4–6, 8–12,
 14–18, 21, 23–24, 37–43, 52, 64,
 131, 133, 135–137, 140–142,
 146–149, 151, 158–162, 165, 167,
 173–174, 177–180, 183, 185–186,
 190, 196–199, 203, 206, 240–241,
 246–247, 259, 265, 274–275, 278,
 283, 285, 297, 316
 resultative 18, 20, 194, 203–204,
 298–301

S

scattered coding 10–11, 25, 97, 276,
 293, 302, 311, 313
 scattered coding of evidentiality
 10–11, 25, 97, 276, 291–305, 311,
 313
 shaman
 see sorcery
 sorcery 22–23, 42, 51, 138, 160, 162,
 167, 207

speaker's commitment to truth of
 statement 12, 190, 194, 231,
 255, 265, 283, 321
 see also lie, belief
 speculation 33, 35, 49, 57, 140, 159,
 198–199, 246
 speculative 47–49, 240–241, 263,
 323
 subjunctive 114, 120–121, 190, 199,
 202–203, 211, 252, 257, 263
 supernatural
 see sorcery
 surprise 2, 5, 12, 24, 48, 54, 68, 81,
 83, 86, 89, 133, 152, 171–172,
 190, 192, 195, 197, 199, 201, 206,
 238, 246, 248–249, 252, 264, 284,
 294
 see also mirative

T
 tense 81, 143, 147–149, 154, 191,
 198, 201, 207, 225, 243–244, 251,
 260, 285, 300
 tense system 8, 249–250
 tense-aspect 1–2, 15, 34, 57, 266,
 286
 tense-evidentiality 84, 131–134, 143,
 151–153, 156, 167–177
 tense-mood 91–92, 167–177, 179,
 185, 220, 303
 traditional knowledge
 see cultural practices/knowledge

U

uncertainty
 see epistemic modality
 unintentional action 13, 66–67, 70,
 76, 136, 138–139, 150, 229,
 253–254
 unmarked for evidentiality 38,
 65–66, 70, 151, 159, 175, 190,
 192, 194–196, 206, 209, 220, 224,
 234, 265, 275–276, 280–283, 289
 see also zero-marking of
 evidentiality

V

verificational 1, 7
 visual evidence 3–7, 9, 12–33, 16, 23,
 37, 65–67, 69, 73, 75, 84, 91, 93,
 107, 109, 140, 142–145, 151–154,
 157, 159–160, 162, 222, 227, 239,
 275–276, 282, 287, 292, 232
 visual evidential 4–9, 13–14, 16,
 22–23, 64–66, 69–70, 73, 75–76,
 93, 97, 107, 124–125, 131–139,
 141–162, 237–241

Z

zero-marking of evidentiality 7–8,
 57, 66, 165, 239, 246, 302
 see also unmarked for
 evidentiality

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