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THE CAUSES AND REASONS FOR THE REMISSION OF TRANSYLVANIA, 1919. (U)


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UNIVERSITY OF SANTA CLARA

6 The Causes and Reasons  
for the Remission of Transylvania, 1919 .

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts in History

9 Master's thesis,  
by

70 Charles Robert Ray

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## INTRODUCTION


On 4 June 1920 Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon formally restoring peace between herself and the victorious Allies of World War I. The Treaty, like those of the other Paris suburbs, was supposedly based on the principles enumerated in Wilson's Fourteen Points, the keynote of which was the principle of self-determination for ethnic minorities. The Treaty of Trianon was based on no such principle.

By signing the Treaty, and later ratifying it, Hungary agreed to cede 232,000 square miles of territory which was homeland for approximately eleven million people. (See map following page) Of the eleven million detached from Hungary, three and a half million were Magyars and one and a half million were Germans. The Treaty of Trianon specifically violated the right of self-determination for 45% of the population of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Among others, the Treaty of Trianon transferred the ancient Province of Transylvania, virtually inseparable from Hungary for 900 years, to the Kingdom of Romania. In so doing the Treaty lost Hungary over two and a half million people, only 55% of whom were Romanian.

Why then did the authors of the Treaty of Trianon fly in the face of the principles upon which it purported to be based? Why did the Treaty flagrantly violate the principle of self-determination in Transylvania for over two million people? Why did it transfer a territory that had been an integral part of Hungary for nearly a millenium and make no attempt to insure the self-determination





Hungary reduced by the Treaty of Trianon from 325,00 square miles 93,000 square miles. From Michael

of 45% of the population of the area?

The answers to these questions lie in the actions and motives of the nations concerned. In the case of Transylvania, the nations were three: Hungary, Romania and France.

Hungary was the colonizer and developer of Transylvania, which it always considered an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary. As such, Hungary ruled and dominated Transylvania in the same manner as other areas within the Kingdom. One factor, however made Transylvania different - that of a steadily growing Romanian population which would attain numerical superiority over the Magyars by the 18th Century. Hungary was never able to assimilate the Romanians in Transylvania. They remained an oppressed minority despite their numerical superiority. After 1848 they were subjected to a policy of Magyarization which attempted to merge them totally and completely into the Magyar state, denying any hint of recognition for a Romanian nationality with attendant rights. This oppression, however, was not a factor in unifying Transylvania with the Regnat: the Romanians in Transylvania looked to Vienna for their salvation, never to Bucharest.

On the other side of the Carpathians, the Kingdom of Romania logically should have been the protector and espouser of the Romanian cause in Transylvania, but she was not. As an ally of the Dual Monarchy, Romania was unable to offer any significant support to Romanian nationalism outside of her own borders. Because of a weak internal situation and late political develop-

ment, Romania offered little support to her ethnic brothers in the Dual Monarchy. Yet despite her insignificant rôle, Romania would triumph in the final accounting.

The search for a preponderant cause leads, therefore, inevitably to France. If Hungary did not self-inflict the loss, and Romania was unable to play any significant rôle; France must have sealed Hungary's fate and denied the principle of self-determination in delivering Transylvania to Romania.

National motives, however, are never established in a vacuum. They are determined by events and circumstances in a given period of time. France could not have played her rôle in Transylvania without an historical catalyst. Such a catalyst was provided by the World War and the defeat of the Central Powers.

In this setting, the rôles of Hungary and Romania were incidental to the final outcome of the Transylvanian question. The rôle played by France was paramount. In a milieu where France's arch-enemy, Germany, and her allies had been defeated, France's actions were no longer motivated out of concern for Romanians or Magyars, but out of French desire for pre-eminence and security in Europe.



CHAPTER I  
BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

PART I  
THE ROLE OF THE MAGYARS

According to evidence of prehistoric remains, Transylvania was an inhabited region in very early times. Herodotus claimed that the first people known in Transylvania were the Agathyrs who lived along the River Maros. Later they were absorbed by the powerful Dacians, a race of Celtic origin, who were, in turn, conquered by the Emperor Trajan between 101 and 107 A.D. The Romans remained for about two hundred years and were finally forced to withdraw when fierce attacks from the East began to assail the Emperor Aurelian who evacuated the area and surrendered it in 275.<sup>1</sup>

The Romanians in Transylvania claim themselves to be the descendents of the Roman colonists of Trajan's time who, in fact, did not leave with Aurelian's retreating army in 275, but remained as shepherds in the Carpathian Mountains for the next 700 years. Such a theory has given rise to a fierce Magyar-Romanian controversy over ethnic origins in Transylvania. The Magyars counter the Romanian claim by pointing out that Roman records showed that Aurelian withdrew with both his army and his "citizens" in 275 and that there were no Romanians in Transylvania when the Magyars entered it at the end of the 10th Century.<sup>2</sup>

On the surface the Romanian argument appears to be essential



for a later consideration of the Transylvanian problem. In actuality it is not significant. At the end of the 10th Century the Magyars pushed up the valleys of the large rivers and established themselves in the western portion of the region. They did not attempt, however, to occupy the entire area themselves - or even what was considered to be its inhabitable portions. They remained in the west and left the frontier to other groups.

The first of these groups were the German "Saxons," who were invited by the kings of Hungary in the 13th Century to settle in Transylvania to assist the feudal Magyar nobility in preserving the area from new invasions. The Saxons received the rights of virtual autonomy which they would retain until modern times. They established themselves in seven major towns fortified as instruments of colonization. Hence the German name for the area is Siebenburgen, i.e., Seven towns.<sup>3</sup>

A second group of settlers known as the Székely moved into Transylvania from the Alföld. Although of minutely different racial stock from the Magyars, for all practical purposes they are identical because both races originated in the grasslands beyond the Urals.<sup>4</sup> Like the Saxons they were granted privileges of self-government in return for duty along the frontier. The Székely in fairly compact masses occupied the headwaters of the Olt, the Maros and the Nagy Küküllő, in the extreme east of Transylvania.

The last group of settlers were the Romanians. No records regarding Transylvania for nearly 1000 years following the Roman

exit have been found. Many invaders, however, did overrun the area and occupy it. Whether or not traces of the Roman colonists remained in Transylvania in the Third Century is not known and cannot be proved.<sup>5</sup> Such a consideration is not a factor for the later problem, however, because the Romanians played no rôle of importance at the time of the Magyar occupation of the Province.

Reference the latter, any Romanians who might have been living in Transylvania in the Middle Ages could not have been numerous or significant because the organization that Hungary adopted for the area took little account of them. The Magyars developed and occupied the land and, per se, had the right to claim it. Romanian claims to ancient ethnic origins in Transylvania do not logically bear on the irrendist issue of the 20th Century. Such claims are only significant from the standpoint of a premise upon which nationalism for all Romanians might be anchored - not on who had the right of possession based on ancient settlements.

In any case, the Romanians did not receive the privileges of the Saxons and Székely. They never came to possess "nation" status because such was only based on privileges originating from the Hungarian Crown. The medieval Magyar conception of "nation" included only the nobility. Romanians nobles were considered merged with the Magyar "nation" since the latter was a rank or class, not an ethnic distinction. All other Romanians in Transylvania, i.e., the serfs, were in the same position as the Magyar peasants.<sup>6</sup>

There arose in Transylvania three nations: the Magyar, the Saxon and the Székely. Although always considered an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary, gradually a separate Transylvania constitutional life developed. In 1437, after a great peasant jacquerie, the three nations formed the "brotherly union" as a defense against all enemies - social, political and foreign. This union was to develop into a type of Federal Diet for settling the common affairs of Transylvania while allowing each of the three nations to continue to enjoy self-government in their internal affairs.

Although justice requires that we credit the Magyars with the development and establishment of modern Transylvania, it is probable that part of the Romanians in Transylvania belonged to the oldest elements of the country. Accordingly the history of Transylvania was really always a Magyar-Romanian history. The Romanians in Transylvania had ever reason to regard the Kingdom of Hungary as their native land. There was every reason that a Romanian irredenta in Transylvania not develop, but that it take another direction. The Austro-Hungarian Empire could have exercised a mighty economic and cultural attraction for all Romanians if it could have secured the unimpeded national development of the Romanians in Transylvania.

The Romanians of Transylvania surpassed in discipline, administration, Western culture and moral restraint the bulk of the Romanians living across the Carpathians in the Regnat who had been corrupted by Phanriot rule by tyrannical Greeks

who governed under Turkish patronage. For all these reasons, if the Monarchy had been capable of satisfying the national needs of its peoples in the spirit of reasonable federalism at the right time, there would have been no discontent among the Romanians of Transylvania, nor any oppression on the part of other peoples.<sup>7</sup> What would prevent this, however, was a policy made public by Louis Kossuth as early as the Revolution of 1848 - Magyarization.<sup>8</sup>

The Magyars were bursting with new energies following the establishment of the Dual Monarchy. While the 1867 Act of Union had deprived them of the special position which they held in Transylvania and theoretically placed the Romanians on equal footing; in reality it removed the danger of interference from the Crown and gave the local Magyars the full weight of the Hungarian State which stood solidly behind them. They therefore attacked the gigantic task of molding Transylvania in the Magyar image with great zest.<sup>9</sup>

Theoretically the Romanians, and the other minority groups of the Kingdom of Hungary, were represented in the Hungarian Parliament. In reality, the Electoral Law of 1874 effectively barred the Romanians by insuring the return of only government-approved candidates through practices of gerrymandering, unequal distribution, a highly complicated franchise, public voting and inadequate legal checks upon corruption.<sup>10</sup>

One of the most interesting aspects of the Electoral Law of 1874 was its maintenance of a special franchise for Transylvania.



Only 3.2% of the population was enfranchised, as opposed to 6.5-7.5% in the central districts of Hungary proper. The more Romanian a county was, the fewer votes it possessed. Out of the 74 deputies sent to Budapest from Transylvania, 35 represented the four Magyar counties and the principal towns which represented 20% of the population. Thirty deputies represented the remaining 72% of the population which was predominantly Romanian. For the Romanians there was one deputy for every 50-60,000 inhabitants; for the Magyars, one for every 4-5,000.

Moreover in Transylvania the qualifications for voting were from three to six times lower in the towns than in the rural districts. The reason for this was that the Romanians formed a hopeless minority in the towns but were numerically superior in the countryside. In the Transylvanian rural districts a peasant had to own at least 14 acres of land to vote. In rural Hungary proper, he merely had to show a net annual income of 159 crowns.<sup>11</sup>

Once the Act of Union was proclaimed in 1867, the Kingdom of Hungary saw for itself a single, solitary goal: the assimilation of all peoples and the creation of a unified national state. From the standpoint of the Magyar ruling class (who, as late as 1910, only comprised 54.5% of the population),<sup>12</sup> the only way such a state could be created was through the Magyarization of the minority peoples throughout the entire Kingdom of Hungary.

Thus a superstructure was erected. Beginning with the

Elementary School Law of 1879, continuing with the Law of Secondary Education of 1883 and terminating with the law regarding kindergarten education in 1891, there was a continuous and ever growing effort to Magyarize the teaching staffs, to expand public education in the Magyar language and to restrict that which was not in the Magyar language. For this purpose the Romanian denominational schools were subjected to great harassment. The state, on the other hand, established extensive public schools in the Magyar language to counter-balance the poor and generally inefficient schools of the Romanians.<sup>13</sup>

By 1914 the steady Magyarization process had resulted in a total inbalance in educational institutions in Transylvania:<sup>14</sup>

<u>Type of School</u>	<u>Magyar</u>	<u>German</u>	<u>Romanian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Primary	1,265	254	1,145	2,664
Apprentice	61	13	1	75
Burger	55	7	3	65
Training Colleges	8	3	3	14
Secondary	30	9	5	44
Special	23	3	1	27
High Schools	7	0	3*	10

\*Romanian theological academies

The above figures must be taken in view of the fact that the 1910 census in Transylvania showed a Magyar population of 918,217; a German population of 234,085 and a Romanian population of 1,472,021.<sup>15</sup>

Another important instrument of Magyarization was the administrative machinery, particularly the local administration of the counties. Instead of rebuilding the former organs

of feudal self-government of the counties in those of popular self-government, they became more and more monopolistic positions of the landed nobility and of the elements attached to it. This tendency on the part of the ruling classes became a chief factor in the growing intensity of the nationality struggle because it was accompanied by the ideology that the Romanian middle class was infiltrated with Daco-Romanian ideas and, therefore, to be kept away from the more important offices and employed only in the lowest grades of the administration. It was estimated in the late 1880's that, in the entire Kingdom of Hungary, out of 9,541 officials employed in the more important branches, only 199 were Romanians. This meant that 2% of these officials were Romanians when the Romanian people represented 20% of the population of the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>16</sup> In 1891 in Transylvania only 6% of the officials were Romanians who then constituted 60% of the Province's population.<sup>17</sup>

The other methods used to build a unitary Magyar state were: the Magyarization of village names, even in wholly non-Magyar regions; the Magyarization of family names which gave the population a false Magyar appearance; Magyar agricultural colonization in the midst of purely Romanian settlements; and the establishment of Magyar cultural associations such as the Transylvanian Magyar Cultural League.<sup>18</sup>

Another means employed to Magyarize the Romanians in Transylvania was the development of industry. A quick check of the educational figures on the preceding page reveals that

apprentices were Magyarized as carefully as young intellectuals, so that the industrial and commercial life should be as Magyar in their upper ranks as the free professions and the administration itself.

All these efforts at Magyarization were only superficially successful. Considering the main nationalities in Transylvania, the Magyars, Germans and Romanians developed as follows:<sup>19</sup>

	<u>1846</u>	<u>1890</u>	<u>1910</u>
Magyars	368,540	697,945	918,217
Germans	222,159	217,670	234,085
Romanians	916,015	1,276,890	1,472,021
Others	6,601	58,711	54,044
Totals	1,513,315	2,257,216	2,678,367

The percentage of Magyars increased from 24.35% in 1846 to 34.28% in 1910. The Germans declined from 14.68% in 1846 to 8.8% in 1910 and the Romanians declined from 60.53% in 1846 to 54.92% in 1910. The Magyar gain, however, was only relative and apparently at the expense of the Germans. The Romanians, whose percentage decreased, gained considerably in absolute numbers.

Moreover the gain in Magyar population was restricted primarily to the towns. The total urban population rose from 217,926 in 1880 to 350,268 in 1910. The Magyar percentage of that urban population rose from 48.6% to 58.7% during the same time frame.<sup>20</sup>

Hungary succeeded in giving the towns of Transylvania her own characteristics. She imposed on Transylvania a Magyarized



upper and middle class, including in the latter group not only officials, tradesmen, industrialists and members of the free professions, but even artisans and skilled workmen in the factories.<sup>21</sup>

The agricultural system in Transylvania also served to the disadvantage of the Romanians. According to the official data of the Hungarian Statistical Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture, the total area of landed property in Transylvania in 1916 was about 5,770,310 acres. The total number of landholders of all nationalities was only 422,367. Even if all these were Romanian (and probably less than ten percent were), that still meant that over 850,000 Romanian peasants were landless. The 1916 statistics also show that approximately 417,330 landowners held plots with an average size of only 10 acres, an amount hardly adequate for a decent income.

Only 4,072 landowners held plots of an average size of 94 acres and 343 landowners held estates larger than 868 acres. Two hundred and seventy five private estates varied between 1,000 and 5,000 acres; 21 between 5,000 and 10,000 acres; six between 10,000 and 20,000 acres; and another six private estates in excess of 20,000 acres!<sup>22</sup>

Magyarization, for all its superficial success in Transylvania was hollow and artificial. It was hollow because it only gave the appearance of a unified Magyar state - not one which was truly substantially integrated. It was artificial because it was actually a device aimed primarily at retaining power for

the Transylvanian Magyars after they had lost numerical superiority. Most importantly, it was unnecessary. The loyalty and integration of the Romanians in Transylvania would have been achieved through satisfaction of their national needs.

The effect of the Magyarization process was completely negative. It alienated, rather than integrated, the Romanians in Transylvania. Worse it provided a catalyst first for disharmony, then for growing nationalism. Magyarization undid the very fabric it was trying to weave, that of a unified, integrated Magyar state. The Magyarization process first planted and then fed the seeds of Romanian nationalism which would provide the circumstances under which Hungary would see her entire Magyar Kingdom disintegrate.

## PART II

### THE ROLE OF THE ROMANIANS

By the 15th Century the Romanians were already numerous in Transylvania. In the centuries to follow, migration across the Carpathians filled the mountainous areas on the frontier, the western mountains and the high-lying parts of the central plateau. In time the Saxon, Székely and some Magyar groups in Transylvania became islands in a Romanian sea.

By the 19th Century the Romanians had become the sole inhabitants of nearly all the highlands; had encroached considerably on the old Saxon and Székely lands in the plain, and began to penetrate the suburbs of the towns. Their constitutional status,

however, remained unchanged. Unless they could enter the nobility, they could not achieve "nation" status. As such, they were no worse off than the Magyar peasantry but other factors made their position peculiarly difficult.

Primary among those was the Romanian religion, the Romanian Orthodox Church. Transylvania had, to be sure, a mixture of religious beliefs. It had been spared much of the effect of the Counter-Reformation so the Saxons remained Lutheran; the Magyars both Roman Catholic and Calvinist; and the Székely Roman Catholic, Calvinist and Unitarian. Just as there were three recognized "nations" in Transylvania: the Magyar, the Saxon and the Székely; there were four received "religions:" Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist and Unitarian. Again the Romanians and their Orthodox Faith were excluded.

With the re-establishment of Hapsburg rule in Transylvania, the Romanian Orthodox Church was persuaded to accept the supremacy of the Pope and establish the Romanian Uniate Church. The original aim of this action was to promote Catholicism in the Orthodox East and to help consolidate Hapsburg political power. The final outcome was quite different from these expectations. The Uniate Church stimulated, rather than extinguished, Romanian national feeling in Transylvania. It raised the standards of education, financed seminaries and printing presses, and established connections between the Romanians in Transylvania and the West.<sup>23</sup>

The lot, however, of the Romanians in Transylvania neverthe-

less remained a wretched one.<sup>24</sup>

"Thus whatever its original justification or purpose, the system in Transylvania had come to rest on a basis of national inequality, in which the largest single element was treated as inferior in every way to the privileged minorities. In the eyes of the haughty Magyar noble and the honest but smug Saxon bourgeois, the 'Vlach' was a mere savage, hardly disntinguishable from the gypsy . . . Measured by the standards of Western Europe, which regarded only the squalor of their wooden hovels, the semi-starvation of their diet, their illiteracy, and their superstition, the Vlachs remained the most backward race of the notoriously backward Dual Monarchy."

Economic oppression, although a very real factor, was not resented by the Romanians as much as the Magyarization process described earlier. Some Romanians wished to actively resist the Hungarian campaign of denationalization in Transylvania but they were overridden by the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Church, which had been granted autonomy in 1867, realized that, as long as the Kingdom of Romanian remained weak, the best hope of the Transylvania Romanians was some form of autonomy within the Hapsburg Empire.<sup>25</sup> The Church knew that the partnership between the Austrians and Magyars was too strong to be challenged directly and instead secured a consitution from the Hungarian Parliament in 1868 which became a highly effective implment for Romanian national representation and defense. The constitution emphasized democratic elections and lay representation at all levels: from the metropolitan at the top, to the village priests at the base. This made it possible for the clergy and the laymen



to work together intimately and harmoniously for the interest of the Romanian "nation" in Transylvania.

In 1881 the Romanian National Party was formed in Transylvania. Its aim, however, was not union with the Regnat - rather reform within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Party's program included the restoration of Transylvania's autonomy, revision of the electoral law, autonomy for all Romanian churches, and the use of the Romanian language in the administration of Romanian districts.<sup>26</sup>

The Romanian National Party was dissolved in 1894 by the Hungarian Government in the aftermath of a spectacular political trial where a committee of the Party was found guilty of "incitement against the Magyar nationality."<sup>27</sup> In 1892 the Party had prepared a memorandum for Emperor Franz Josef listing their greivances and presenting their demands. When the Emperor refused to receive the memorandum, they published it and circulated it widely. Although the final outcome of the trial at Kolozsvár before a Magyar jury was a forgone conclusion, the circulation of the memorandum brought world-wide attention to the situation of the Romanians in Transylvania, particularly on the part of France.<sup>28</sup>

Despite Magyar oppression, the Romanians were making progress in Transylvania. They were able to increase their absolute numbers and maintain their percentage intact despite a fierce effort to assimilate them on the part of the Magyars. Most importantly they were replacing the Magyars demographically.

In 1913 it was reported that the Magyars had been able to colonize only 67,000 yokes of land in a twenty year period in the entire Kingdom of Hungary while the Romanians, over a ten year period in Transylvania alone, had colonized 160,394 yokes.<sup>29</sup>

The Magyar policy towards the Romanians in Transylvania, therefore, began to force the issue of Romanian nationalism. Failure to grant them the privileges of the other "nations" or to "receive" their religion only blocked Romanian absorption in the Magyar State. It was for this reason that the Romanian nationalist movement in Transylvania was able to develop and grow.

Two essential points, however, must be made when discussing the Romanian nationalist movement in Transylvania: the first was the its size, the second its direction.

The movement, except in its final stages, was always small and restricted to a few thousand Romanian intellectuals. Until the end, it never encompassed the peasant mass which made up the bulk of the Romanian population in Transylvania. The extreme backwardness of the population prevented any real nation movement in Transylvania. As late as 1910, 72% of the Romanian population was still illiterate; 1,246,639 out of 1,472,021 were still peasants or herdsmen; and only 22,153 were members of the public professions.<sup>30</sup>

Secondly, the movement sought internal reform. It did not look to Bucharest for delivery; it looked to Budapest and Vienna for reform. It might have been anti-Magyar but it was not anti-Hapsburg. As late as 1913, a leader of the Transylvanian

Romanians denounced the idea of an all-inclusive Romanian state as "beer table" fantasy.<sup>31</sup>

The rôle of the Romanians was not only restricted to those on the western side of the Carpathians; those within the Kingdom of Romania, the Regnat, also must be considered. The Regnat's problem in the 19th Century, however, was not concerned with its kindred people subjugated by foreign powers. It was concerned with the foreign powers themselves.

Romania was constantly threatened by Russia to the north and Bulgaria to the south. Having lost Bessarabia to Russia in the 1830's and ever-fearful of a potentially expanding Bulgaria, Romania's first concern was to insure her own survival and viability as a nation. How to achieve this was her dilemma.

Romania had to check Russian and Bulgarian expansion in the Balkans which logically meant an alliance with Austria-Hungary, the pre-eminent power in that corner of Europe. Such an alliance, however, brought another complication - that of France.

French influence had become important in Romania as early as 1848 when the Kingdom was founded. A large percent of the Romanian intelligentsia was strongly pro-French. Like the French, the Romanians considered themselves members of the group of Romance nations with a common lineage back to ancient Rome. This cultural affinity spread into other areas, particularly politics. The result was that the Romanian Liberal Party and a large section of the Romanian governing class were unofficially

aligned with, and sympathetic to, French policy. An alliance with Austria-Hungary, the foremost ally of Germany, would have flown in the face of this pro-French feeling.

France, however, was not in the position to help Romania in the Balkans in the 19th Century. Geographically she was too far removed and her military prowess had been seriously checked by Prussia in 1870. Accordingly, Romania was forced to link up with the Central Powers.

On 13 October 1883, a secret treaty was signed in Vienna between Austria-Hungary and Romania, to which Germany adhered by a special protocol. The treaty was valid for five, then eight years and was renewable indefinitely. The keynote of the treaty was its extreme secrecy. When it was first signed only the king and two leaders of the Romanian Liberal Party knew of its existence within the Romania. King Charles had last renewed the secret treaty in 1913 but had informed neither the members of the Opposition nor the Parliament about the renewal.<sup>32</sup>

The Treaty of 1883 achieved its desired effect of restraining Russo-Bulgarian advancement in the Balkans, but it also forced the Regnat into a policy of acceptance of the status quo within the Dual Monarchy. Such a policy included, per se, disclaiming any Romanian national movement in Transylvania. This fact, coupled with the Transylvanians' own desires to seek redress within the Empire, precluded the Kingdom of Romania from any rôle in an irredentist movement in Transylvania.

One the eve of the First World War, the situation in



Transylvania appeared frozen. Magyar oppressive policies continued; a few Romanian intellectuals sought relief from the Hapsburgs; Romania stood by unable to play any significant rôle. As long as the power of Austria-Hungary, and her ally Germany, remained pre-eminent; there was no reason to feel that the situation might ever change. What was needed was a catalyst to start the reaction to change the status quo. Such a catalyst did not exist until 1914, when the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand created the possibility for the establishment of that very state which only a year before was nothing but "beer table fantasy."

CHAPTER II  
THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS

PART I  
THE ROLE OF ROMANIA

The outbreak of the First World War in the Summer of 1914 brought the dilemma of Romanian foreign policy to the forefront. By the Treaty of 1883, Romania was obliged to declare war on Russia and fight on the side of the Central Powers. Such a policy, however, was not in consonance with the sympathies of most of the Romanians. On the other hand, if Romania joined the Entente, she would expose herself to all the dangers of an advanced strategic position and cancel any hope of redeeming those kinsmen under Russian domination in Bessarabia.

The situation was further complicated by factors of national sentiment. King Charles was a Hohenzollern and much of the Court, the Conservative Party and the Romanian Army were pro-German. The remainder of the population and the Liberal Party were strongly pro-French in their cultural and political orientation.<sup>33</sup> The events in Romania during the War's first year clearly demonstrated this duality of feeling.

At the height of the crisis, the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, appealed to Bucharest for immediate mobilization against Russia and was promised Bessarabia in return. The next day, 3 August 1914, a momentous council was held at

Sinaia including the members of the Romanian Cabinet, leaders of both Opposition groups, King Charles, and the heir apparent, Ferdinand. As this meeting only Peter Carp urged immediate war on behalf of Germany against Slavdom pointing out that it was useless to show undue consideration for the Romanians across the Carpathians.<sup>34</sup> Alexander Marghiloman, leader of the Conservatives and an eventual Germanophil, argued for neutrality because no casus foederis existed. Ionel Bratianu, Prime Minister and leader of the Liberals, urged Romania to arm herself and wait. This was the policy that Charles reluctantly accepted.

Thus began an undignified and none too scrupulous competition between the two belligerent groups for the favor of Romania. While Germany had offered Bessarabia, Serge Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister, pledged his support in acquiring Transylvania. The Russians actually drafted a convention by which they undertook to make no peace until all Romanian populated areas of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were united with the Regnat. Prime Minister Bratianu knew, however, that the Hohenzollern Charles would never sign such a document.<sup>35</sup>

The struggle for Romania's support in the War hurled Transylvania's potential fate to the forefront very early. What had never been seriously considered in international politics was now being broached as a distinct possibility: union between Transylvania and the Regnat. Such thoughts, with the consideration of the retrocession of Bessarabia

and acquisition of other non-Regnat Romanian populated areas, had an electrifying effect on Bratianu and the Romanian foreign policy makers.

Meanwhile King Charles died in Bucharest to be succeeded by his nephew, Ferdinand. The latter lacked his uncle's prestige and political associations. Though a good judge of character, he was deficient in will power, slow to reach a decision and a natural diffidence made him uncertain in the expression of his opinions. He was thus more amenable to the influence of a powerful minister like Bratianu. Ferdinand's first and natural impulse - in which Queen Marie, despite her natural sympathies with Britain and Russia, wisely encouraged him - was to husband the resources of the country and avoid all complications until it became possible to form a clearer estimate of the main struggle in Europe.

Slowly the Romanian Government, under Bratianu's leadership, began to see the very real possibility for realizing territorial ambitions in the Dual Monarchy - foremost among them Transylvania. Motivation for these ambitions came not from any consideration of the nationality principle but over possible attainment of great power status for Romania. Romania's weakness when restricted to the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia had been all too readily apparent throughout the 19th Century. Annexation of Austro-Hungarian lands populated by Romanians became an exciting possibility in the mind of the Bratianu Government.



If Romania were to jettison the alliance, made in good faith with the Central Powers and renewed only a few short years before, she would have to sure of a decisive Entente victory. Anything short of that would leave Hungary too strong for Romania to annex the former's territories.<sup>36</sup> Romania's consideration came down to not which alliance would liberate her kindred Romanians, but which alliance would advance the aggrandizement of Romania.

Equally important to the decision of which alliance to join was the consideration of when to make the decisions. It would have done Romania little good to join either side immediately prior to victory because she would not benefit from the spoils. Bratianu decided to wait.

Sensing the moment opportune in March 1915, the Romanian minister in London was instructed to tell the British that Romania was ready to enter the War against the Central Powers in May if Italy would do so. In return Bratianu made the following territorial demands on the Allies: all Transylvania, the Bánát, a frontier in the west running past Szeged and Debreczen to the Carpathians, then east to the line of the Pruth, including all the Bukovina.<sup>37</sup> Bratianu saw his possibility and was ready to capitalize on it.

As far as the Allies were concerned, they were prepared to concede to Bratianu's maximum territorial demands as early as 1915. A seriously worsened Allied military situation, however, forced the opportunistic Bratianu to drop negotiations.

Military successes by the Central Powers made him opt for continued Romanian neutrality. The thought of territorial expansion was still foremost in his mind as evidenced by the fact that he continued to negotiate with the Central Powers from whom he asked Transylvania and the Bukovina. In view of their favorable military situation, it looked as if no sacrifice to the Romanians would be necessary and the Central Powers dropped negotiations on their own.<sup>38</sup>

Internally Romania became politically divided as to her position in the War. The pro-German elements had their champion in the Conservative Party led by Marghiloman. The latter, now a mainstay of the Central Powers among Romanian politicians, personally assured Count Ottokar Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Bucharest, that in return for a written pledge of the Bukovina and concessions to the Transylvanians, he could promise intervention against Russia by a certain date.

On the side of the Entente powers, stood Prime Minister Bratianu and his Liberal Party. The pro-French leanings of this group made their preference for the Allies a foregone conclusion. Since the War was obviously not yet favoring either alliance and since the Allies clearly offered Romania more than the Central Powers, Bratianu and the Liberals continued to hold the real power in the Bucharest Government. Still Romania remained neutral.

In the Summer of 1916 the War changed directions militarily and offered Bratianu his opportunity to move. The Austrian

Chief of Staff attempted to knock Italy out of the War by concentrating all of his forces against them at the Battle of Asiago. To do this he had to dangerously denude Galicia. Seeing their opportunity, the Russians under General Brusilov counterattacked at Lutsk and destroyed the Austrian hopes of finishing the War in Italy. In the process, the Austrians lost 200,000 men and the Russians moved within reach of the Carpathian passes into Hungary.

The possibility that Austria-Hungary might go down to defeat before Romania had staked her claim to the spoils appeared so real in mid-1916 that Bratianu's Government in Bucharest was stirred to a desperate flurry of bargaining. Bratianu himself informed the Entente Ambassadors that, if their governments did not agree to his terms for entering the War, he would resign and leave the conduct of Romania's affairs to his Germanophil rivals.<sup>39</sup>

On 17 August 1916 a secret agreement was signed by which Romania undertook to declare war against the Central Powers on five conditions: the cession to Romania of all Transylvania, the Bănát, a section of the Hungarian Plain up to the Tisza River, and the Bukovina; equal status at the Peace Conference with the other four Great Powers; the immediate launching of an offensive by the armies in Salonika; a continuation of the Brusilov Offensive against Austria; and the dispatch of Russian troops to the Dobrudja to protect southern Romania from a Bulgarian invasion.<sup>40</sup>

The Allies accepted this high price for Romanian participation partly because of their hope that it might be possible to cut off the routed enemy forces in the Bukovina, but also because the loss of Romanian oil and grain to the Central Powers would intensify the rigors of the blockade against them.

The German and Austrian High Commands, however, had long anticipated the possibility of Romanian intervention on the side of the Allies; although at the actual moment when the Romanians invaded Transylvania, General von Arz, the Austrian commander, had only 25,000 troops to defend the frontier.<sup>41</sup>

In Transylvania the result of the Romanian invasion was panic and flight on the part of the Magyar population. Violent attacks were launched against the Hungarian Premier, Count István Tisza, in the Budapest Parliament for allowing Transylvania to become so denuded of troops and vulnerable to Romanian attack. Tisza, however, held his ground and wisely concentrated his efforts on mobilizing German support to save the situation.<sup>42</sup>

Marshal Mackensen was able to muster an army of Bulgarians, Turks and Germans in the Dobrudja and began an advance up the lower Danube in September 1916. General von Falkenhayn meanwhile assisted von Arz in throwing the Romanians out of Transylvania. By the beginning of October the Romanians were everywhere on the defensive. The Russians had sent only 20,000 men to defend the Dobrudja, many of them Czech and Yugoslav volunteers from the prisoner-of-war camps who were shot as traitors when captured by



Mackensen's forces.

Constanta and the great bridge across Danube at Cernavoda fell to Mackensen on 25 October and the Germans entered an undefended Bucharest on 6 December. By the end of the year the Romanians held only the section of Moldavia east of the Sereth River. Three-quarters of the Regnat was occupied by the Central Powers, including all the fertile grain land.<sup>43</sup>

Although forbidden by the Treaty of 1916 from signing a separate peace, Romania's conduct in international affairs had long been characterized by opportunism and she would not change now. Accordingly she accepted and signed the draconian Treaty of Bucharest on 7 May 1918.

With the defeat of the Romanian Army, the Liberals and Francophils under Prime Minister Bratianu, gave way to the Conservative, pro-German elements led by Marghiloman. Time was to run out, however, before his government would be able to ratify the Treaty which condemned Romania to an entirely negative rôle in the final months of the War.

## PART II

### THE ROLE OF HUNGARY

For the Kingdom of Hungary the First World War was an utter tragedy in all its aspects. Although able to eliminate the Balkan military threat early, there was constant pressure from Russia in the north and Italy in the south. Years of Magyarization of the nationalities had apparently been for nought

when fear and antagonism spread throughout those areas inhabited by Magyar minorities. The integrated Magyar state which Hungary sought was shown never to be further from reality than when threatened from all sides by foreign powers.

And yet throughout the War, the Magyarization process continued - in fact, accelerated. Fearful of dissent at a time when national solidarity was essential, and now more concerned than ever over losing their position of power; the Magyar nobility hardened their policy in Transylvania against any sign of conciliation with the Romanians.

From outside Hungary, this seemed like idiocy. The Central Powers were pleading with Romania to honor the 1883 Treaty and join the Alliance yet Hungary was refusing to give up anything in order to placate the Romanians within her borders and thus win the support of their brothers in the Regnat. Almost tragically blind to reality, the Magyar Government appeared indifferent to anything except its own position of privilege within the Kingdom.

Stunned by their disastrous defeat at Lemberg by the Russians, General Conrad von Hötzenndorf, Chief of the Austrian General Staff, urged Count Berchtold to get Count Tisza to make some arrangement with the Romanians over Transylvania and release garrisoned troops there for use elsewhere. Tisza, already alarmed by the extent to which Transylvania had been stripped of troops, refused to make any concessions. Germany further proposed the granting of a charter to the Romanians in

Transylvania at this time but Tisza at once made it clear that such a move was impractical because "the Romanian question is not a Transylvanian question, almost 40% of th its population being Magyars and Germans, whereas almost half the Hungarian Romanians live outside Transylvania."<sup>44</sup>

Vienna and Berlin continued to urge concessions upon Tisza. By the end of Spetember 1914 there were only 7000 Imperial troops in all Transylvania, and the strange idea was broached that neutral Romanians from the Regnat occupy the area to avert a Russian invasion. To this Tisza replied that he would prefer a Russian occupation to a Romanian one.

In the Fall of 1914 when the possibility of ceding territory came up, Tisza told Ambassador Czernin in Bucharest that anyone who ceded one square yard of Transylvanian soil would be shot. Bucharest should be warned beforehand that any attack would be resisted to the death and that there was no hope of a mere military promenade.<sup>45</sup>

In 1915, although much relieved by the favorable military turn of events against the Russians and the failure of the Italian Campaign, Czernin still sought to bring Romania over to the Central Powers. He begged Tisza to abandon his his rigid policy of rejection and discuss an offer of territory to the Romanians. Tisza replied that the loss of Transylvania would mean the end of the Monarchy as a great power in Europe and any idea of ceding any portion of Hungarian soil would be rejected a limine.

Later in 1915 Tisza finally consented to modify the franchise in such a way that the Romanians might hope for 35 or 40 seats in the Budapest Parliament. But he refused to even discuss Transylvanian autonomy and poured derision on Czernin's suggestion of a Romanian university as a "cultural monstrosity which would injure the practical interests of the Romanian youth and create an impossible situation towards the other nationalities of Hungary."<sup>46</sup>

Early in November, the Hungarian Government announced a series of mediocre concessions to the Romanians - the official use of national colors, the extension of the Romanian language in church, school and law courts and a political amnesty. Two weeks later, Hindenburg transmitted an appeal to Tisza for further concessions as the only means of winning Romania over to the Alliance. Tisza reacted somewhat acrimoniously when he replied that he had "already made all imaginable concessions and, in any case, Romania's aim was not to improve the lot of her kinsmen, but to annex Transylvania and the Bukovina, so that to beat Russia was the real way to win her over."<sup>47</sup>

The ill-starred Romanian invasion of Transylvania in August 1916 only increased the fury and intensity of the Magyar policy towards the Romanians. The Magyar population which suffered many privations returned in the wake of von Falkenhayn's army, full of hatred from the Romanian Transylvanians.<sup>48</sup>

In June 1917 Tisza fell from power and was replaced by Count



Maurice Esterházy. Esterházy appointed Count Albert Apponyi as Minister of Education and thus marked the beginning of an eleventh hour Magyarization of Transylvania that now makes one seriously question the general rationality of the Budapest Government. Apponyi closed all denominational schools in the border area between Romania and Transylvania. He expressly omitted the Romanian Orthodox and Uniate Churches from state endowment and then withdrew state aid from all Orthodox schools in 18 border areas. One of Apponyi's last acts was to notify the Romanian Church authorities that he planned to inspect Church assemblies. Hungary pursued such a policy to the very last. As late as August 1918, Baron Szterényi, the Minister of Commerce, was threatening Church authorities with actual confiscation of school buildings in Transylvania.<sup>49</sup>

In the autumn of 1917, the Ministry of Agriculture had issued a decree which effectively forbade the selling of any additional land in Transylvania to a Romanian. The Ministry of the Interior was considering a scheme which would exclude all Romanians from public life. Esterházy fell soon thereafter to be succeeded by Dr. Wekerle whose Minister of Justice, Dr. Vázsonyi drafted a new franchise bill in December 1917. The new bill succeeded in reducing the franchise among Romanians in Transylvania from 36.3 to 29.6% and increasing that of the Magyars from 49.8 to 53.6%.

The absurdity of the situation is summed up quite well by Oscar Jászi in his following description of the Magyar

ruling class:<sup>50</sup>

"The Transylvanian politicians, led by Count István Bethlen, were especially indescribably narrow in their outlook. At the very moment when universal collapse was imminent, when every intelligent Hungarian was trembling for his country, this company of pashas, blinded by class pride and apprehensive of limitations of their absolute rule in the counties, were still dreaming of peace with annexations!"

By October 1918, the fate of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was no longer in doubt. It had begun with the swift collapse of Bulgaria in the second week of September and raced along gaining more speed each day. By mid-October Count Tisza admitted openly in the Budapest Parliament that the war was lost - an admission which spread like wild fire throughout the Empire and along the front.

During the month of October 1918, national councils sprang up throughout the entire length and breadth of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On 12 October 1918, the executive committee of the Romanian National Party met at Nagyvárad (Oradea Mare) and solemnly proclaimed the right of self-determination of the Romanians in Hungary. On 18 October, Dr. Vaida Voevod informed the Budapest Parliament that its decisions were no longer binding on Romanians within the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>51</sup>

On 30 October 1918, the Kingdom of Hungary was overthrown and Count Michael Károlyi proclaimed the Hungarian Republic. In a desperate attempt to save the situation, he sent his Minister for Nationalities, Oscar Jászi, to Arad to meet with

the Romanians on 13 November 1918. Dr. Jászi offered the Romanian leaders Transylvanian independence and complete racial equality as the basis of a new Danubian Confederation of free peoples. The commune, no longer the county, was to be the unit of political organization. But both Jászi and Károlyi knew that the offer had come too late. It was refused by Dr. Julius Maniu who had the unanimous Party behind him in demanding complete separation.<sup>52</sup>

At a memorable meeting at Alba Iulia (Gyulafehévár) on 1 December 1918, the Romanians of Transylvania proclaimed themselves in favor of a union of all Romanians in a single state. The declaration was more symbolic at this point because Romania had already redeclared war on the Central Powers on 9 November and was moving her troops into Transylvania to insure that what was declared at Alba Iulia would become a reality.

### PART III

#### THE ROLE OF FRANCE

Realizing that the War was lost, the Austrians sent their Chief of Staff, General von Weber, to the Italian lines to initiate an armistice. This he did at Padua on 3 November 1918. The representatives of the newly formed Hungarian Republic were unable to reach Padua in time but considered the Austrians to be acting on their behalf and thus the Armistice at Padua was valid for Hungary too.<sup>53</sup> However, with the exception

of Fiume, the Padua Armistice did not concern Hungary and did not refer to Serbia or Romania. It confined itself only to the Austro-Italian front.

The Padua Armistice, however, was to mean little because the following day Marshal Foch took over supreme command of all fronts and the part played by Italy thus far in the negotiations reached its end. Henceforth France was to be the deciding power.

Except for the relationship with Romania, France entered the Balkan political arena in an indirect way. Since the loss of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, France's sole desire was to regain her stature as a great European power. In the pursuit of this policy, financial strength was a precious asset. France first turned to Russia where French firms invested widely in Russian private industry, particularly mining and metallurgy. French investment soon reached the point where one third of all non-governmental loans in Russia were of French origin.<sup>54</sup> French banks also took up a substantial proportion of Russian government loans. At the time of the outbreak of the World War, almost half the loans issued by the Russian Government were held by foreigners of whom the French held 80% of this amount.<sup>55</sup>

France secured her financial investments with an alliance with Russia in 1904. French logic was to form a partnership with the most formidable political power in Eastern Europe and thereby check the growing power of her adversary, Germany.

The Franco-Russian partnership, however, dissolved in 1917



with the Bolshevik Revolution. Not only did the new Soviet Regime renounce repayment of all French held loans, Lenin's Government broke the political alliance as well. France's traditional check to German influence and expansion in the East had vanished.

Deprived of her investments and alliance with Russia, France was forced to seek new partners in the European power struggle. Previously the power of Austria-Hungary precluded the expansion of French influence in the Balkans but now the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 provided France with the opportunity to capitalize on the establishment of a new power base - the Successor States - born out of the ashes of the defeated Dual Monarchy.

France, who had fought the War for four years and suffered enormously at the hands of Germany, was merely days away from victory. Marshal Foch, nor anyone else however, knew this. Accordingly, Foch was totally preoccupied with the remaining struggle against Germany and its successful conclusion. Nothing else mattered to the French in November 1918.

Foch's primary fear was the possibility of a link-up between General Mackensen's German army in the Balkans and that of von Hindenburg in western Germany. The Allied Southern Armies under General Franchet d'Esperey had to be in a position to block such a potential link-up. This they could only do by occupying the southern and eastern border regions of Hungary.<sup>56</sup> To facilitate this occupation, Foch sought a reaffirmed armistice

signed by the new Republican Government in Budapest. To comply, Count Michael Károlyi, President of the Hungarian Republic, decided to send a delegation to General d'Esperey in Belgrade immediately. Károlyi himself would head the delegation.

Károlyi and his small group left Budapest for Belgrade where they met with d'Esperey in the latter's private residence on 7 November. Károlyi's description of the event gives startling insight into the future rôle and motives of the French:<sup>57</sup>

"His entrance was like that of a victorious general on the stage; I felt that he had rehearsed it beforehand. He wore a light blue uniform and top-boots and had a row of decorations on his chest. He was a bulky, middle-sized man, with broad shoulders, sparkling eyes and a small, turned-up moustache. He came straight up to us with a sprightly, martial walk . . . After being presented to the general, I introduced the members of the delegation. At each name, he nodded curtly; but when Baron Hatvany's name was mentioned he looked displeased, not even trying to hide his anti-semitism. When the President of the Soldiers' Council was introduced, he exclaimed in horror: 'You have fallen so low as this?' When I asked if I could read the text of our manifesto, he took a Napoleonic pose and, leaning with his elbow on the mantelpiece, his hand in the opening of his coat, his legs crossed, he followed each word I read with vivacious mimicry."

Károlyi made his plea to d'Esperey having no illusions that Hungary would have to be sacrificed now for what she had done in the past. He hoped, however, that as leader of a new Republican Government in Budapest, he might have one chance in a hundred of weaning some degree of understanding from the French. If

anywhere, Károlyi's illusion was in this fantasy evidenced by d'Esperey's reply to his manifesto:<sup>58</sup>

"The General now stood straight in front of the fireplace; when he was not looking at his notes, he stared fiercely into our eyes. He emphasized that in the days of Tököli, Rákóczy and Kossuth, Hungary was respected by the French, for then she was fighting for independence from Germany. But since 1867 she had become an accomplice of Germany and of her lust for power. 'You marched with them, you will be punished with them! Hungary will pay; it won't harm the rich' he repeated, 'who can always get off, but the poor . . . You suppressed the national minorities and made enemies of them. I hold them in the palm of my hand, the Czechs, Romanians, Yugoslavs and Slovaks. A word from me and then annihilate you. I have only to give the sign, I unleash them and you are destroyed. You offended France and we will not forget how your press insulted us.'"

Thus d'Esperey forewarned of French policy in the months to come. Apparently it did not strike him as odd not to condemn Hungary for alliance with the Monarchy who began the War and devastated much of the Balkans. D'Esperey's reference to the minorities was almost secondary. What was paramount to him was Hungary's alliance with Germany! Although few Hungarians had ever fought on French soil, their alliance with the hated adversary was sufficient to bring down on them the full wrath of an avengeful victor.

After d'Esperey's martinet tirade, Károlyi and Oscar Jászi followed the general into his private study and received the terms of the armistice. The conditions were grim; Germany was

still fighting the Allies and d'Esperey still intended apparently to march on Berlin for he demanded the occupation of all strategic points and the seizure of all means of communication. Article I of the Convention provided that "the Hungarian Government shall withdraw all troops within eight days, north of a line drawn through the upper valley of the Szamos, Maros-Vásárhely, Bistritz, the river Maros to its junctions with the Tisza, Maria-Theresiopel, Baja, Pécs (these places not being occupied by Hungarian troops), course of the Drave, until it coincides with the frontier of Slavonia-Croatia."<sup>59</sup> In general terms, the Belgrade Armistice divided Transylvania in half along the Maros River.

What France failed to consider in the Belgrade Armistice, however, was the position of Romania with whom France had made an exorbitant agreement by the Treaty of 1916. France's reason for such disregard is not clear. Pre-occupation with a final victory over Germany is a possibility. Certainly the fact that Romania had only re-entered the War on 9 November and did not participate in the final hostilities on the Hungarian front was an important consideration. Nevertheless the French sin of omission would have serious consequences in the months to follow.

Not only was the French oversight of Romania's position tragic for the parties of the Armistice, the line of evacuation drawn up by the French in Transylvania was inane. It ran counter to every known principle of race, geography or strategy.<sup>60</sup>



To this day, it is not sure how d'Esperey delineated the line other than perhaps on the advice of the Serbians who were with him at Belgrade. The line gave the the capital of the Province, Kolozsvár, and the Székely counties to the Romanians, but left many purely Romanian areas under Magyar control!

France was soon relieved of her agony over a continued struggle with Germany when both parties signed the Armistice of 11 November 1918. French policy must have taken a second look at itself in the week that followed. Complete French victory now secured permitted bolder steps against the defeated powers.

In the case of Transylvania, France must have realized the oversight at the Belgrade Armistice; and, in deference to continued Romanian protests over Hungarian military resistance to Romanian occupation of Transylvania, Lieutenant Colonel Vxy, head of the French Military Mission in Budapest as a result of the Belgrade Armistice, sent a stunning note to the Hungarian Government on 16 December 1918. It informed of the decision of the Chief of the Romanian General Staff to cross the Maros River line and advance to the Szatmárnémeti-Nagykároly-Nagyvárad-Békéscsaba line. The reason for the advance was allegedly to protect the lives and fortunes of the Romanian peasants.<sup>61</sup>

The Hungarian Government protested but was met two days later with the dictate to evacuate their administration from Kolozsvár so the Romanians might occupy it until French

forces could be sent in. Hungarian protests were to no avail, and, apart from sporadic and spontaneous resistance in isolated sections, Hungarian troops fell back slowly towards the center of the country. The replacement of Romanian by French troops never took place.

The continued advance of the Romanians in Transylvania was viewed with increasing concern and growing bitterness in Hungary. Such advances often occurred without Allied approval and more often without any prior notification to Hungarian authorities. Frequently now they began to be accompanied by conflicts between Hungarian and Romanian troops.<sup>62</sup>

Finally two months after the Belgrade Armistice, on 12 January 1919, the Paris Peace Conference was convened. The delay, although perhaps the fault of no one, was tragic for Hungary and her position in Transylvania. The delay allowed the internal Hungarian situation to worsen dismally while the Romanians were able to strengthen and consolidate their position across the Tisza River. In Hungary, more than elsewhere, the two month delay prevented territorial stabilization in an area that was seething with unrest and pulstating with revolution.<sup>63</sup>

It also had a second deleterious result for Hungary: it prolonged the arbitrary and ever-changing lines of armistice. What began as the Maros River line in early November, gave way to the western Transylvanian border in

December, and extended to the Tisza River the following February. Throughout this period of time no decision on Hungary's frontiers had been made known by the Peace Conference. In fact, the Conference had just begun to formally consider the Transylvanian question. While the Conference's delay cannot be credited to any single nation, failure to finalize the territorial lines of demarcation which she established was clearly that of France.

The organization of the Paris Conference was clearly based on the recognition of the primacy of the Great Powers. As Clémeuceau liked to remind the smaller states, the Great Powers disposed in the aggregate a military force of twelve million sailors and soldiers.<sup>64</sup> Delegates from the smaller states and the Successor States were told to put their demands (territorial and other) into writing or to present their claims orally before the Supreme Council.

Among the five Great Powers, the one who would come to exercise the greatest influence - particularly in Southeast Central Europe - was France. The reasons for this were many. Supreme command of all Allied forces in the area rested in the hands of Marshal Foch. France continued to maintain two divisions of her own troops in the area following the Armistice, still under the command of General d'Esperey, Commander of the Allied Southern Armies.

More importantly, however, France was the strongest Continental Power among the five. The United States and Japan were

not European powers; Britain's foremost interest was her Empire; and Italy had barely survived the War intact. Further, France, among the five, had suffered most at the hands of the Central Powers. Having the strongest military presence on the Continent and having been the most devastated by the War, France naturally would seek to play the paramount rôle in the victory settlement.

It would appear on the surface that France should have welcomed the creation of the new Hungarian Republic under Michael Károlyi. It was the antithesis of the nobility-dominated Imperial regime of the pre-War and War years. Yet she did not. Repeated attempts by the Károlyi Government for recognition by the Conference went unanswered. More importantly French refusal to delineate a final demarcation line and stop Romanian encroachment on purely Magyar territories was slowly but surely destroying the Károlyi Regime.

For its own the Károlyi Government was unable to cope with the onerous task of governing the defeated country. Day after day, processions representing different strata of Hungarian society streamed up the hill to Buda and clamored for the immediate realization of impossible claims. The demobilized soldiers considered themselves a privileged caste after having spent five years in the trenches and were the most exacting. Officers of the reserve, lawyers, doctors, university students, industrialists, shopkeepers, all aware of the weakness of the Government, united together in the hopes of obtaining their demands.



Refugees streamed into Hungary where there was insufficient shelter for them during the bitter Winter of 1918-1919. Further, Vxy refused to report to Paris the numerous territorial violations of the Armistice committed weekly by the Romanians in Transylvania and the Czechs in the north. Throughout the five months of the Károlyi Regime, these violations were virtually continuous. Each time the explanation came that the change in the frontier was merely a strategic move. After 24 hours, however, political, economic and administrative representatives of the Romanians and Czechs followed their military forces. In a short time, three-fifths of Hungary was in foreign hands.<sup>65</sup>

On 14 February 1919, General d'Esperey went a wire to André Tardieu, Chairman of the Committee, established by the Supreme Council, for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Romania. In the wire, d'Esperey advised Tardieu of a planned Romanian military advance on those territories whose allocation was under the Committee's consideration. It also stated that the Hungarian Army was massed to oppose such a Romanian advance which had already reached the line Mărmăroșsziget-Zilah-Csucsá-Nagyszeben. The Committee accordingly decided to make two recommendations to the Supreme Council: (1) that Romania be warned that any aggressive action on her part would prejudice her cause and (2) that a neutral zone be established between the Hungarian and Romanian forces. Tardieu presented this proposal to the Supreme Council on 21 February; but, for some reason not known, he omitted the warning to Romania.<sup>66</sup>

By 26 February 1919, the Conference formulated the following plan of boundaries for the neutral zone (See map on the following page):<sup>67</sup>



"Eastern boundary: The public road from Arad to Nagyszalonta; the Nagyszalonta-Nagyvárad-Nagykároly-Szatmárnémeti Railway line in this wise that these towns cannot be kept occupied by either Hungarian or Romanian troops, while the lines of communication may be used by the Romanian army and by the civilian population under interallied supervision for purposes of economic traffic.

Northern boundary: The Rivers Szamos and Tisza, to a point situated at 5 kms to the north-west of Vásárosnamény.

Western boundary: This begins at the Tisza, at 5 kms to the northwest of Vásárosnamény and passes at 5 kms to the west of Debreczen, at 3 kms to the west of Dévaványa, to the west of Gyoma, and 5 kms to the west of Orosháza, Hódmezővásárhely and Szeged.

Southern boundary: The Maros River, in this wise that Arad and Szeged shall be occupied by interallied troops, to the exclusion of Hungarian and Romanian troops."

The above was communicated to Count Károlyi by General Lobit, Provisional Commander of the Allied Armies in Hungary, via Lieutenant Colonel Vxy. On 20 March 1919, Vxy presented the ultimatum to Károlyi ordering him to withdraw all Hungarian troops from the eastern border and to allow the Romanians to occupy several thousand square miles of Hungarian territory and many purely Magyar areas. The ultimatum had to be accepted within 24 hours and conclude within 10 days.<sup>68</sup> In the presence of several witnesses, Vxy added orally that the new line was not to be regarded as merely an armistice line, but as a definite



REFERENCE

- ① Hungarian Armistice line, 13<sup>th</sup> November 1918
- ② Extension of Rumanian line, February 1919
- ③ Rumanian Treaty line of 17<sup>th</sup> August 1916
- ④ Permanent boundary of Czecho-Slovakia as announced by the Supreme Council, 13<sup>th</sup> June 1919
- ⑤ Approximate line of greatest Rumanian advance

NOTE On the 19<sup>th</sup> March 1919 Col Vix in the name of the Allies summoned the Hungarian Government to withdraw its forces to line ③. The area between ② and ③ was to be treated as a neutral zone. On the 13<sup>th</sup> June 1919 the Conference ordered the Soviet Government at Budapest to withdraw its forces behind the lines of permanent frontiers accorded to Czecho-Slovakia ④ and to Rumania approximately that of ⑤.

political frontier. He later denied having made such a comment.<sup>69</sup>

The Vxy Memorandum served as the coup de grâce for the Károlyi Government and the Hungarian Republic. Michael Károlyi described his own reaction to the Memorandum:<sup>70</sup>

"It was impossible for my Government to satisfy this demand. The remaining bourgeois members of my Cabinet, representing the nationalist element in the Government, could not accept the responsibility of giving up such extensive territories before the Peace Treaty was signed. Our adversaries whispered that the cause of our harsh treatment at the hands of the Entente was our radicalism. The friendship of Count István Bethlen and Marquis Pallavicini with the head of the French Mission and their continual visits to the Entente Headquarters made one wonder whether or not they had a direct influence on the drafting of the ultimatum. One fact was known to us - that they had been informed of its contents earlier than we had.

They had been doing their best to convince the Missions of the Entente that the Károlyi regime was a Boshevik one in disguise and that it would be preferable to have Béla Kun, against whom a holy crusade could be waged; for if Károlyi succeeded in carrying out his land reform and if he won the elections to be held on 13 April 1919, there would be little chance of getting rid of him.

It was a strange paradox that the Socialists, the Reactionaries and the Entente Missions were equally apprehensive of a democratic land reform. To exasperate the country to such a pitch that it was driven into the arms of Bolshevism was the only way for the old regime to regain power.

Later on, curious scenes were witnessed in one of our main streets, the Váci utca. Our nobles were seen falling into each other's arms in joy that the Dictatorship of the



Proletariat had been declared. 'Now their end has come' they whispered."

France, therefore, destroyed the possibility for the Károlyi Regime to retain its viability. The first and last truly republican government to come to Hungary in many years had all the earmarks of what France should have wanted in that part of Europe. The alternates to Károlyi were either the far left or the far right. The former offered the Boshevik cause recently triumphant in Russia and now a specter raising its head over Europe. The latter offered the return of the very factions in Hungary which supported the policies antipathetic to France during the War and pre-War years.

France, however, could not have supported the Hungarian Republic and still followed her own "game plan" in the days following the War. Such a "game plan" called first and foremost on the settlement of the German question. Consideration of Austria-Hungary was secondary. What Károlyi needed to survive was recognition and support from the West. France would have had to rechannel her energies and efforts away from a consideration of Germany to that of Hungary to have rendered such support. Further, France would have had to table and decide the Hungarian question immediately to stabilize the situation. Not only was Romania to prevent such a possibility by her actions in the months to come, but France herself was unwilling to push aside

the larger question of Germany to save a former enemy about whom she knew little except on whose side Hungary had fought.

In the larger context, the fall of the Károlyi Government would remove the best hope of the moment for a relatively favorable settlement of the Transylvanian question. If the government in Budapest had remained democratic and pro-West, the Conference could not have used the fact of the existence of an "unsavory regime" against Hungary in the final decision on Transylvania. This was not the case once the failure of Károlyi gave rise to the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Once the latter had occurred, France could cry, "Red menace!" and the Conference could cover the actions taken concerning Transylvania with real or imagined fears.

In any case, the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 provided the catalyst without which the situation in Transylvania existant since 1848 might not have changed. Unlike 1914, the "frozen" situation in Transylvania had radically melted away by 1918. The catalyst of Hungarian defeat opened the doors for a new order in Central Europe - an order which only had to be finalized in Paris.

### CHAPTER III

#### REMISSION BECOMES A REALITY

##### PART I

##### THE ROLE OF ROMANIA

Romania saw her opportunity and knew that she had to move quickly. All her hopes were vested in the Treaty of 1916 and she planned to secure all that had been promised her regardless of what had transpired in the intervening two years. Her logic was, however, faulty. Romania had made a separate peace with the Central Powers in 1918 - something expressly forbidden by their secret alliance with the Entente. Such action, France maintained, negated the terms of the 1916 Alliance.

This negation infuriated Bratianu and he refused to accept it.<sup>71</sup> He refused to accept it because he could not accept it. To do so would be to sacrifice everything which he hoped to achieve for Romania as a result of the defeat of the Central Powers: a Greater Romania with "Great Power" status.

In early February 1919, Bratianu presented Romania's claim to former Hungarian territories to the Supreme Council. Citing Hungarian statistics from before the War for Transylvania, the Máramaros, the western slopes of Bihar Mountains and the lowlands at their foot; Bratianu gave the following population breakdown:<sup>72</sup>

"Romanians	2,505,958	54%
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Magyars	1,092,719	23.6%
Szeklers	450,000	9.7%
Germans	276,335	5.9%
Jews	187,987	4.0%
Slavs	73,416	1.6%
Others	55,838	1.2%

The Romanians form, therefore, even according to these statistics, the absolute majority in the whole of the territory revendicated by Romania. But the official Hungarian statistic is without a doubt established on purposely forged bases, and it is necessary to rectify it. Indisputable rectifications bring the number of Romanians at least at 2,900,000 or 62.5% and reduce the number of Magyars to 700,000 or 15.0% not including the Szeklers. The Romanian population is above all a rural population: 95% of this population dwell in the villages, only 5% in the towns."

Based on the population statistics that Bratianu quoted to the Conference, he requested that the Supreme Council validate the Act of Union made by the Transylvanian Romanians at Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918.

The Conference, however, voiced some doubt as to the legality of this act, and, beyond it, to the validity of the 1916 Treaty between the Allies and Romania in view of the latter's separate peace with the Central Powers in 1918. The French felt that this peace cancelled the Allied Treaty with Romania; Britain felt that Romania was asking for too much territory; and Italy was general sympathetic to Bratianu's claims.<sup>73</sup>

The Romanians, that is to say Bratianu, based their entire stand on the "treaty of 1916, the whole treaty and nothing but the treaty." From this nothing could move them.



Deeply resenting the Allies' initial refusal to still regard the 1916 Treaty as binding, Bratianu was cut to the quick to find that his favorite design of ranking Romania as one of the Great Powers was also destroyed.<sup>74</sup>

After hearing Bratianu and discussing the issues presented, the Supreme Council decided to set up the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Romania, composed of two representatives of the four Great Powers and headed by André Tardieu. This Committee later established a subcommittee which dealt exclusively with the question of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.

It was only after the presentation of the Romanian claims to the Supreme Council that the Romanian Government brought to the attention of the Peace Conference its desire to occupy at once all the Hungarian territory claimed. In communications addressed to Clémenceau on 8 and 9 February 1919, Bratianu specifically requested permission to occupy territories which Romanian claimed in Hungary, where, according to Bratianu, "the Budapest Government is encouraging Bolshevik propaganda." In the second letter Bratianu complained about Hungarian activities in Transylvania, such as alleged incursions of armed Hungarian bands "spreading terror" and "forcing the defenseless population" to join their ranks. No proof was ever offered by the Romanians to substantiate these claims. No proof was ever demanded by the Peace Conference.<sup>75</sup>

From the events that followed it is clear that Romania

planned to take such military action regardless of any permission granted or withheld by the Conference. The movement of the Romanian Army in February 1919 towards a line held by the Hungarians in western Transylvania is what prompted the "neutral zone" decision discussed earlier.

Romania's presence at the Paris Conference, to include even that of the beautiful Queen Marie, was, however, of questionable significance. Bratianu came to Paris seeking all that was promised by the 1916 Treaty which his country had invalidated. Since it was not in the Allies interests to grant such sweeping concessions, Romania was not going to get them. Obviously, however, France and the other Allies were not going to treat Romania as an enemy - despite the fact of her separate peace with Germany. What they would give Romania would be a compromise - something between the maximum demands of the 1916 Treaty and the minimum no change in the status quo. That this would not please Bratianu did not concern the Conference very much.

In fact, Bratianu was almost universally disliked among the Powers at the Conference. President Wilson had not yet met him by March 1919 and constantly put him off via messages delivered through Colonel House. An interesting meeting between Bratianu and House sheds some light on the personality and mannerisms of the Romanian Prime Minister:<sup>76</sup>

"Last week . . . the Colonel said to me: 'Bratianu insists upon an interview with me and I do not think it wise to put him off any longer. I have every reason to think that it will be stormy and I want you to be present. Misu, the Romanian Ambassador is coming with him but I prefer you to interpret.'

The interview was more stormy and the language of the Bucharest 'Bull,' as he was sometimes called, was even more outrageous than had been anticipated. Little Misu did what he could to soften the words of his chief, and in asides to me was often apologetic, but it is difficult for a mere ambassador to stand up against his chief, a prime minister.

Bratianu's blast began by a violent and yet by no means untrue account of how, after entering the War, Romania had been let down by the promising Allies. 'Solemn pledges were given to us that a great Russian army would come to our aid, and that, as the Germans would be held by intensive operations on the Western Front, the invading army of Mackensen would be not **any** larger than we could cope with. Now what happened? The Grand Duke did not move, and on the Western Front the Allies went to sleep. An unholy calm settled down on that sector, and Mackensen drew from there all the divisions he needed to overwhelm our gallant resistance. But mark you, we have learned our lesson; it has cost us the complete devastation of our country; so for its restoration we are demanding naturally something more substantial than verbal pledges. We know now what these are worth.'"

Harold Nicholson summed Bratianu up as follows:<sup>??</sup>

"No man could have been more foolish, unreasonable, irritating or provocative than Ion (sic.) Bratianu. And yet the almost universal antipathy he inspired did not, **in fact**, prejudice the claims of his country at the Peace Conference. Romania obtained 'all and more than all' and she obtained this on wholly impersonal grounds."

Certain clauses of the Peace Treaty which materially affected Romania were often drafted without the knowledge of the members of her delegation. When the clauses were ready, Bratianu was summoned to hear them and whenever he disagreed with them he would naturally voice his protest. But hardly would he begin when Clémenceau would rise and exclaim, "Monsieur Bratianu, you are here to listen not to comment."<sup>78</sup>

It is perhaps for this reason that the real rôle played by Romania in the final settlement of Transylvania was not played at Paris, but in Transylvania and in Eastern Hungary. It was not played by Bratianu (who resigned before the Conference ended) and the Romanian diplomats, but by the Romanian Army. Romania apparently soon came to realize that she stood to gain more by seizing the military initiative early, than by trusting in the promises of allies who had not kept faith with her in 1916.

## PART II

### THE ROLE OF HUNGARY

It is beyond our scope to discuss the fall of the Károlyi Government and the establishment of the Soviet Republic in detail. Károlyi resigned rather than accept the Vxy Memorandum. He thought he was yielding the government to the Socialists; but, in fact, was sold out to Béla Kun and the Communists.

On 21 March 1919, the Hungarian Soviet Republic, under the nominal head of Sándor Garbai and the actual direction of



Béla Kun, was established in Budapest. The new government openly announced its policy of furtherance of an international campaign for the "establishment of the Proletariat" throughout Europe. It formed an alliance with Moscow and overtly stated the intention to carry the revolution into every country in the world.<sup>79</sup>

Although some diplomats like Lloyd George clearly saw the reason why Kun was able to come to power in Hungary, many were terrified of what they considered to be a growing "Bolshevik menace" to all Europe. For the latter, the Kun Regime in Budapest did inestimable damage to the Hungarian cause both in Transylvania and elsewhere. Not only did the presence of a Bolshevik regime affect the Committee's recommendations, it prevented the Conference from even recognizing the Budapest government during the Soviet reign.<sup>80</sup>

For this reason and the fact that Béla Kun refused to accept the Vyx Memorandum,<sup>81</sup> Field Marshal Smuts was sent to Budapest by the Conference to appraise the situation and the stability of the regime.

Smuts left by train for Budapest in April 1919. He was ever conscious that he could take no action whatever to imply recognition by the Allies of the Bolshevik Government. Accordingly, he refused to leave his train once in Budapest and remained lodged in his Pullman car during his entire stay in Hungary. Smuts and Kun met several times, though always on the train. Smuts made it a point to let the head of the Hungarian Government

come to him and declined all invitations of the Soviet Government, even a banquet in his own honor.

Béla Kun, nevertheless, made the most of the visit. Local newspapers noticed that, until recently, the Entente had refused to engage in any negotiations with Hungary and had merely sent ultimata. Now they had entered into negotiations with the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

The new Soviet regime had indeed forced the Allies to give immediate attention to Hungary's problems and had thus succeeded where the Republican Károlyi Government had failed.<sup>82</sup> While Michael Károlyi, despite persistent attempts, had neither been invited to the Peace Conference nor secured the visit of a highly placed Allied spokesman for exploratory talks or negotiations, now such a distinguished spokesman had been sent to Soviet-dominated Budapest.

In two telegrams to Paris on 4 and 6 April, Smuts reported his activities in Budapest. In the first he related that he had explained the purpose of the new line of demarcation to Kun and the fact that the neutral zone was necessary to maintain peace and order but not meant to prejudice Hungary's case for retention of her territory. Kun's reply to Smuts as reported to Paris explained that Hungarian compliance with the Memorandum would bring about the immediate fall of the government and that such orders for compliance would never be enforced due to the large numbers of Magyars living in the areas under question. Further, insistence on compliance would force the resignation

of the Kun Regime leaving all Hungary in utter chaos.

In the second telegram, Smuts outlined a counterproposal offered to Kun with a new armistice line further east than the Vyx line but well to the west of what the Conference was already planning to give Romania. Kun's Government almost signed a draft of this latter agreement but changed its mind at the last minute. Béla Kun countered with the demand that the Romanians withdraw behind the Maros River, the line originally set by the Belgrade Armistice. Smuts couldn't accept this because he knew that he could never get the Romanians to agree to such a requirement.<sup>83</sup>

In conclusion, Smuts expressed his conviction that the Soviets were not hostile to the Allies; that they were weak and rent by internal divisions which were likely to lead to their fall at an early date. He believed that they were too frightened to accept Vyx's line of demarcation.

Kun erred in his refusal. What Smuts wanted Kun to accept was basically Romanian occupation of all of Transylvania and the establishment of a neutral zone between Hungarian and Romanian forces. Yet Smuts' proposal was infinitely better than the Vyx Memorandum because the former shifted the eastern line of demarcation everywhere in Hungary's favor to an extent of eight to ten kilometers - in some places even 20 kilometers! It was asserted that the new line would have no effect on the final peace terms and it left Debreczen in Hungary and placed Nagyvárad, Arad and Szatmár in the neutral zone.

Béla Kun foolishly rejected Smuts' offer comparing it to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. His counter-proposals, however, would require Hungarian occupation of Romanian dominated areas of Transylvania. Smuts could do little with such an offer and returned home to Paris.<sup>84</sup>

Disgusted with France and the other Allies, Romania continued her military advance into Hungary. She reached the Tisza River in April 1919 and, from there, was prepared to march on Budapest and destroy the Communist Regime. At this point the Allies vetoed any further military advance towards the Hungarian capital. Clémenceau personally prohibited Bratianu from ordering any further advance of Romanian troops. The Czechs meanwhile marched down on Miskolcz from the north.

Many former Hungarian army officers, who had no liking for the Soviet Government, were nevertheless prepared to defend Hungarian soil from the Romanians and Czechs. In June 1919, the newly formed and organized Hungarian Soviet Army launched an offensive against the Czechs, retook Miskolcz and penetrated the foothills to Kassa where they set up the Soviet Republic of Slovakia. Now Paris became genuinely worried.

In response to frantic telegrams from the Czechs, Clémenceau forwarded two separate ultimata to Béla Kun on 8 and 13 June. The first message ordered the Hungarian Army to cease any further military action against the Czechs or face extreme measures from the Allies. The second message ordered a withdrawal behind Hungary's newly established - and newly



announced - frontiers.

The second wire ordered Béla Kun to withdraw his forces from Slovakia within four days or face Allied military action against Budapest. The Romanians were to be ordered to withdraw to Transylvania as soon as Hungarian troops had evacuated Slovakia.<sup>85</sup>

In spite of the warnings of the Hungarian military leaders and against the urgings of die-hard Communists in the Soviet Government, Hungary, recognizing the superiority of Allied power, ordered the withdrawal of its forces from Slovakia. Romania, however, did not leave the Tisza.

The increasing scarcity of food and lack of the most urgent necessities throughout the country, the breakdown in administration and the growing anarchy all contributed to undermining the morale of the Hungarian people and was sooner or later bound to sweep away the Kun Government. Yet it was the Regime's own reckless military aggressiveness which dug its grave.

On 11 July 1919, Béla Kun's Government made diplomatic presentations to the Conference reference Romania's refusal to dislodge her troops from the Tisza River. The Allies ignored the presentations. Accordingly on 21 July the Hungarian Army attacked the Romanian forces dug in along the Tisza River and Béla Kun sent the following message to Clémenteau:<sup>86</sup>

"In the face of the attitude of the Romanians who have been aggressive in defiance of the will of the Entente, we were forced to cross the Tisza and try to make the will of the Entente respected by the Romanians."

Reconquest of territory which was rightfully Hungary's aside, Béla Kun was apparently eager to seize the proceeds of the harvest in Romanian-held Hungary. While the Hungarian military offensive was undertaken for the immediate purpose of dislodging the Romanians from the Tisza, if successful, it probably would not have stopped until it reached the Maros.

Initially the Hungarian Red Army was able to break through the Romanian lines to a depth of between 15 to 35 kilometers but their success was short lived. The Romanian Army successfully counterattacked, broke the Hungarian lines, and forced them back across the Tisza on 26 July. From then until 8 August, when the Romanians occupied Budapest, the Hungarians fought a losing battle. On 1 August 1919, Béla Kun quit Budapest and the Hungarian Soviet Republic was finished.<sup>87</sup>

In the first days of August, during the Romanian occupation and looting of Budapest, Bratianu avenged himself for what he considered to have been a long series of affronts on the part of the Allies. The Romanians calmly occupied Budapest and the surrounding Hungarian countryside in the face of constant "thunderbolts" from Paris. Bratianu, acting under the assumption that the "Big Three" were "unconscious agents of Bolshevism" did not make the slightest effort to conciliate the Allies.<sup>88</sup>

The breach between Paris and Bucharest was now complete. France had only two divisions in the Balkans, a force insufficient to impose her will on the course of events. Romania, fully aware of this, ignored all French directives.

When the Treaty of St. Germaine was signed Bratianu resigned because Romania had not been made a party to the Treaty's drafting. King Ferdinand, to everyone's surprise, refused a total break with the Allies despite Bratianu's feelings. Eventually a subsequent Romanian government had to submit to an ultimatum from the Allies or face complete diplomatic rupture.<sup>89</sup>

The events following the Romanian occupation and looting of Budapest need not be detailed for our purposes here. However, to round out the story, it should be mentioned that a series of governments followed in the chaotic days of Autumn 1919. Eventually the National Army, formed under Admiral Nicholas Horthy in French-held Szeged, wove its way to Budapest which it entered on 16 November. The Romanians had left the city two days before after having avenged themselves for the plunder committed by the Central Powers in the Regnat the two years previous.

At the same time, the Peace Conference became sufficiently assured that the new coalition government in Budapest under Károly Huszár was stable and representative enough to be invited to Paris to receive the terms of peace.<sup>90</sup>

The political amateurism and military adventurism of Béla Kun totally undermined any possibility for a consideration

of the Transylvania question even relatively favorable to Hungary. Although the Soviet Government was the product of those who undermined the Károlyi Regime, the presence of a Communist government in Budapest turned even the most sympathetic ear to the Hungarian cause deaf.

Kun's initial policy of carrying the world revolution to the rest of Europe was both naïve and counterproductive. His alliance with Moscow brought him nothing except French consideration for possible military intervention by Marshal Foch. Béla Kun's failure to accept the Smuts proposal gave up the last vestiges for saving even the purely Magyar areas of Transylvania. His reckless militarism against the Czechs and Romanians, for whatever motives, could never have conceivably brought Hungary the territorial satisfaction she sought.

What the Kun Regime forced the Conference to do was to consider the territorial issue on other than its own merits. Even if the Conference had attempted to be guided genuinely by consideration for the self-determination principle, it was prejudiced by the reckless and threatening situation that Hungary, under Kun, was spreading throughout East Central Europe.

What was needed so desperately in this time of delicate yet dangerous balance of diplomacy was not a Hungarian regime which would further alienate the Allies, but one which would accommodate and temporize with them. Had Károlyi possessed Kun's initial obstinacy, he might have gotten some Allied recognition and the offer of a Smuts-type compromise. Béla Kun



succeeded where Károlyi failed and then threw it all away by his own political immaturity and false sense of reality.

### PART III

#### THE ROLE OF FRANCE

While the political fortunes of Michael Károlyi and Béla Kun were rising and falling, the work of the territorial committees, under French direction, was continuing. It is important to note that the statistics available to the Conference were those of the Hungarian Government's official 1910 census. Despite Bratianu's claims that Transylvania was 72% Romanian, the exact figures of the 1910 census for Transylvania were 1,472,021 Romanians, 918,217 Magyars and 234,086 Germans. Bratianu, therefore, made an error of more than one million in favor of the Romanians and misinformed the Conference to this degree.<sup>91</sup> The actual breakdown in the 15 counties of Transylvania according to the 1910 census is as follows:<sup>92</sup>

<u>County</u>	<u>Magyars</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Germans</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Romanians</u>	<u>%</u>
Alsó-Fehér	39,107	17.6	7,269	3.3	171,483	77.4
Besztercze-Naszód	10,737	8.4	25,609	20.0	87,564	68.5
Brassó	35,372	35.0	29,542	29.2	35,091	34.7
Csik	125,888	86.4	1,080	0.7	18,032	12.4
Fogaras	6,466	6.8	3,236	3.4	84,436	88.7
Háromszék	123,518	83.4	617	0.4	22,963	15.5
Hunyad	52,720	15.5	8,101	2.4	271,675	79.9
Kis-Küküllő	34,902	30.1	20,272	17.5	55,585	47.9
Kolozs	60,735	26.9	6,710	3.0	153,717	68.0
Maros-Torda	111,376	57.4	7,706	4.0	70,192	36.2
Nagy-Küküllő	18,474	12.2	62,224	41.8	60,381	40.6

Szeben	10,159	5.7	49,757	28.1	113,672	64.3
Szolnok-Doboka	52,181	20.7	6,902	2.7	189,443	75.2
Torda-Aranyos	44,630	25.6	576	0.3	125,668	72.1
Udverhely	118,458	95.4	2,203	1.8	2,840	2.3
Totals	918,217	34.3	234,085	8.7	1,472,021	55.0

Statistics, however, are dry and cold; they are inanimate; they are given to subjective interpretation. What would have advanced the Hungarian cause in Transylvania infinitely more would have been to allow Hungarians to be present in Paris, prior to May 1919 before the final decision in the matter had been made.

For all the benefit of the doubt given to Tardieu and his Committee, their recommendations were made almost entirely without benefit of first hand knowledge. No attempt was made to visit the area in question (much less to consider a plebiscite to determine the borders) to observe first-hand if the claims and counterclaims made by the parties concerned were based on fact or fancy. The very same procedures used in East Prussia to determine the new Polish-German frontier was never considered for Hungary. The money and energies expended in behalf of settling the paramount German question were simply not available to decide Hungary's fate.

The Committee's lack of first hand knowledge was reflected in a serious inability to grasp the reality of the situation, manifested by the "neutral zone" decision of February 1919. Although it secured the assent of the Military Committee in its recommendation, Tardieu's Committee showed utter lack of reality

when no consideration was given on how such a recommendation could be enforced. Who was to check that the Romanians did not advance beyond the line allotted to them or that the Hungarians would remain where they were supposed to be?

The last fact points out a wider shortcoming - that of a general French inability to realize that her influence to dictate events was directly proportional to her willingness to back up those dictates with diplomatic and military pressure. France came upon this realization in November 1919 with her final ultimatum to Romania but by then it was too late.

One must also be realistic about the objectivity of Tardieu's Committee despite whatever statistics or first hand knowledge was available. Completely objectivity, treating friend and foe alike, was not **possible**, especially in view of wartime pledges.<sup>93</sup> A French delegate on Tardieu's Committee put the case of supporting an ally against a former opponent succinctly when he asserted: "Having a choice to make between an Allied and an enemy country, the Commission must not hesitate, however strong its desires of legitimate impartiality may be, to favor the Allied side." Very much in the meaning of the words of d'Esperey at Belgrade in 1918, "the French treated the Hungarians as an enemy people who could not be depended on in any future struggle against the Teuton."<sup>94</sup>

The reports of the territorial committees came before the Council of Five on 8 May 1919. André Tardieu, explaining the recommendation of the territorial committee over which he

presided, pointed out that the acceptance of the Romanian claims, i.e. all the territory promised by the Allies in 1916, would have resulted in allotting a very large number of aliens to both sides. After discussing the matter through twelve meetings, his Committee agreed upon a frontier which, he said, halved the number of aliens included within the new frontiers. This, Tardieu thought, was ethnologically satisfactory.

Secretary of State Lansing, US representative on the Foreign Ministers Council, inquired where the true ethnic line would be. Tardieu replied that the population was very mixed and that a truer line might be drawn in some cases about 20 kilometers to the east, but that the Committee's recommendations represented an equitable compromise. A more ethnic solution would cut the railway and suppress communications for Romania.<sup>95</sup>

Pressed further on the ethnic question, Tardieu said that his recommendation would place some 600,000 Magyars under Romania and some 25,000 Romanians under Hungary. When Lansing said that the distribution did not seem very just and that, in every case, the decision seems to have been taken against the Hungarians; Tardieu retorted that any other adjustment would have been in favor of Hungary and to the detriment of Romania.

Thereupon Lansing withdrew his objections. Mr. Balfour then stated that the Council of Five could not possibly go over the entire work of the Committee and the others agreed. Mr. Balfour stated that, since the Council was satisfied with the fact that the Committee had done everything in its power to find



an equitable solution and since the decision of the Committee had been unanimous, nothing could be done to improve the frontiers recommended. The Hungarian-Romanian frontier as recommended by the Territorial Committee was accepted by the Council of Foreign Ministers without further debate.<sup>96</sup>

This last point elucidates another serious shortcoming in the overall process of Conference decision-making - not only regarding Transylvania, but for all such questions so decided. The final decisions appear to have been made, in reality, by the territorial committees. The Council of Four and the Supreme Council, at least in the case of Transylvania, unquestionably accepted Tardieu's recommendation in toto. A functionary of the French Government was intrusted with the eventual determination of hundreds of thousands of acres of land and the lives of millions of people. Of course, Tardieu never had the final say in the matter but the Councils did not make any attempt to validate his claims or verify his recommendations. There was just not enough time, interest or concern.

In December 1919 after the invitation for Hungary to attend the Conference had been received, Pál Teleki sent a young Hungarian lawyer, Dr. Károlyi Halmos and Count Andor Semsey to Kassa to establish contact with the French Mission in that city. Teleki's intended purpose of the visit was to obtain whatever support he could from the French for Hungary's cause. Both individuals were received by Dr. Eck, Chief of the Political Department of the Mission, who met twice with the Hungarians.

On 20 December, Eck informed Halmos and Semsey of the changed attitude of "very influential French circles" towards Hungary. According to Eck, this change was, in part, to the recent conduct of Romania which had evoked widespread French criticism.

Count Teleki's actions in this matter credit him with having a very realistic approach to the Hungarian problem. He, like many others, knew from the Clémenceau wire to Kun in June of the previous year what the Conference had in store for Hungary relative to her new frontiers. Teleki realized that the sole nation able to save Hungary and salvage some of the former Crown Lands was France. It was for this reason that he took the action he did.

Without further preliminaries, Eck proposed a political and economic alliance between Hungary and Czechoslovakia realized by direct negotiations between the two countries under French mediation. Eck went on to say that such an arrangement would probably call for voluntary cession of extensive territories to the Czechs by Hungary, the latter being compensated for such sacrifices by territories now allotted to Romania.

Although there is no available information on what Eck's motives might have been, it is logical assumption that he was trying to protect French interests in the area in view of the cooled relations with Romania. The replacement of Romania with Hungary in the French scheme was a possibility if Romania were to continue her intransigence and Hungary was willing to lose face to save land.

On 28 December the two Hungarians went to Paris with Eck and were joined there in mid-January by Baron Adolf Ullmann, an executive officer of the Hungarian General Credit Bank. Whatever might have been on Eck's mind in Kassa, the plan which Ullmann and Halmost began to pursue in Paris was one of directing the attention of French business to Hungary. The hope was that, by attracting French capital, Hungary might assure some measure of political support. Accordingly, Ullmann and Halmos got in touch with several leaders of the French business world, the most important of whom was the Comte de Saint-Sauveur, Chairman of Schneider-Creusot.<sup>98</sup>

Meanwhile on 5 January 1920, Count Albert Apponyi left Budapest by special train heading the Hungarian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. The delegation travelled accompanied by several officers from the British and Italian Military Missions in Budapest. The Hungarians were on excellent terms with these officers but the etiquette observed by the French was very different from that of the military delegates of other countries. The French considered themselves to be dealing with an enemy until the peace treaty had been signed. Hence all friendliness, beyond the demands of common courtesy, was undesirable. No sooner had the delegation reached Paris than they realized that this rule was to be maintained.<sup>99</sup>

The choice of the Hungarian delegates to the Conference did not appear to be a very wise one from the standpoint of political orientation. It included, among others, Count Pál

Teleki, Count István Bethlen, Count Imre Csáky and Sándor Popovic. It had a heavy Transylvanian and noble flavor. Worse, it was almost totally representative of the far right in Hungarian politics. Ironically it contained the very type of men who had waged the War against the Allies and fought so long and hard for their own special rights and privileges in Hungary. To the objective by-stander it did not contain the type of men who could argue objectively about the loss of Hungarian territory - particularly Transylvania - because nearly all the delegates had a vested interest in retaining such land.

The Liberal or Republican representation in the delegation was nonexistent or meaninglessly insignificant. It was all the more ironic that Count Apponyi and his colleagues, former apostles of compulsory Magyarization in Transylvania and "national war" were compelled to adopt and advocate the very nationalities policy they were damning the year previous.<sup>100</sup> Surely Apponyi's past record as Minister of Education and his attitude towards the Romanian denominational schools in Transylvania was not unknown to the Conference.

The delegates arrived in Paris on 7 January and were quartered at Neuilly located in the middle of the Bois de Boulogne where they stayed at the Hôtel Château de Madrid. The delegation was allowed complete freedom in Neuilly and in the Bois de Boulogne but was not allowed to visit Paris without permission and escort.

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The delegates arrived in Paris on 9 January and were quartered at Neuilly located in the middle of the Bois de Boulogne where they stayed at the Hôtel Château de Madrid. The delegation was allowed complete freedom in Neuilly and in the Bois de Boulogne but was not allowed to visit Paris without permission and escort.

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credentials had been exchanged by both sides, Apponyi noticed that those of the American representative were missing. Apponyi wrote Clémenceau to this fact and received a written reply saying that, "If we wanted to make trouble, we had better say that we would not negotiate at all."<sup>101</sup> Apponyi ignored the insult and wrote back that, since Hungary desired to make peace with the United States, he wished to insure the presence of an American representative. At the same time, Apponyi asked if he might be granted the opportunity for personal negotiation, instead of receiving written statements on the peace conditions. In answer to this, a written reply came inviting the Hungarians to the Quai d'Orsay to receive the terms of peace.

Apponyi described what happened in his own words:<sup>102</sup>

"We, of course, presented ourselves punctually at the hour mentioned, and were shown into a large waiting room from which a door led directly into the room where the Supreme Council was already sitting, and where the remaining events were to take place.

This was a lengthy room, down one long side of which, with their backs turned to the five or six windows which lighted it, the members of the Supreme Council were sitting on a platform in the following order: Lloyd George, Lord Curzon and Bonar Law, representing England; Nitti representing Italy; then Japan. America had already withdrawn from the general peace negotiations and had also refused to deal directly with us. At the head of the room, Clémenceau was sitting in front of a table, surrounded by several members of the French Cabinet and a crowd of senior officials from the French ministries concerned . . . At a little distance from Clémenceau's presidential seat, armchairs were set out

for me and the other members of the Hungarian delegation taking part in the ceremony, while in front of mine stood a table. This arrangement had the very considerable disadvantage for me that I could not see the faces of the Allied representatives, apart from Clémenceau's, for all them had their backs to the light, and only the outlines were recognizable. We bowed to one another without speaking, and when we had taken our places, Clémenceau spoke a few words to me, which amounted to no more than an announcement of the handing over to Hungary of the suggested peace terms. The terms were handed over at once by a senior official."

While Apponyi's account may make the reader feel that he is reading something that took place in the 19th, rather than the 20th, Century; the fact of France's ever-present and predominating rôle is clearly portrayed. The number of French Cabinet members and senior ministry officials had no counterparts among the Italians or the British.

After the terms were handed to Apponyi, Clémenceau informed him that he would not be allowed to discuss the peace terms as he had requested, but he would be allowed to make a speech about the situation in Hungary. Accordingly, Apponyi returned to Neuilly to prepare his exposé verbal. Three days later the delegation returned to the Peace Conference and Count Albert Apponyi delivered a most most eloquent and convincing oral declaration against the terms of peace which had been handed to Hungary.

In essence he attempted to prove how completely mistaken the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Trianon were from an

ethnographical standpoint. He showed convincingly how some of the proposals were a direct affront to the principle of nationality which the Conference was espousing.<sup>103</sup> Using Pál Teleki's excellent ethnographic map of the Kingdom of Hungary (see following page for a reproduction of the Transylvanian quadrant of the map), Apponyi showed clearly how purely Magyar areas were being delivered to the Successor States in defiance of the nationality concept. Teleki's map showed the gigantic problem of lack of homogeneity among the population which is demonstrated on the following page where the white areas show lack of habitation, the dark grey areas Magyar predominance and the lighter grey areas Romanian predominance. The map clearly showed the large Magyar concentration in eastern Transylvania as well as along the border areas next to Hungary proper.

It is interesting to note at this point that, although many of the Hungarian delegates knew the nationality question was not the dominant issue (otherwise the overtures to French industry and government would not have been on-going), the nationality question was the method chosen to attack the Treaty. The reason for this line of reasoning was probably that there was no other course open to the Hungarians. They could hardly openly discuss what was happening behind the scenes between the French Foreign Office, Schneider-Creusot and the Hungarian businessmen. Therefore, although they realized that the final decision would not be made foremost on the basis of any question of nationality, they nevertheless followed this approach.





Apponyi, for all his faults, was a master parliamentarian and his speech in beautiful French prose is a masterpiece. It was very well received by all in attendance. Even the French, who were contemptuous at first, changed their demeanors. The Italians and the British were positively impressed. Bonar Law complimented Apponyi on his eloquence. Apponyi was told later that the British and Italians complained to the French that they had been led into an unpleasant situation by being made party to gross errors. Nitti made a serious attempt to change the more seriously absurd clauses of the Treaty but the French resisted saying that an alteration of one part of the map arranged by the Treaty would cause the collapse of the entire structure.<sup>104</sup>

Clémenceau informed the Hungarians that their statements would be given close and careful attention and asked how long they would require for their reply to the peace terms. Apponyi asked for, and received, four weeks. Having nothing more to do in Paris for the moment, the delegation returned to Budapest on 18 January 1920.

It arrived in Budapest to be greeted by a city decked out in black crêpe in mourning over the terms of the proposed treaty. The delegates were met by Admiral Horthy, not yet Regent, but Commander of the Army. The delegation worked feverishly over the Treaty and returned to Paris on 12 February. There they handed their reply over to the Supreme Council and awaited the decision.

Meanwhile, for a period of about six weeks (from the end of January to the middle of March, 1920) Halmos, Ullmann and Semsey met with French businessmen and must have made substantial progress because the Hungarians were finally allowed contact with the delegates of the Peace Delegation in the Hôtel Château de Madrid when the latter returned to Paris.

On 16 March, the Hungarian businessmen gained access to Ambassador Maurice Paléologue, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They outlined for Paléologue a vague plan which envisioned French political support for amelioration of the Treaty of Trianon in return for economic concessions to French interests in Hungary and the coordination of Hungary's foreign policy with that of France.<sup>105</sup> Paléologue agreed to bring the matter before the French Cabinet that very day. The day following the Cabinet meeting, the Hungarian businessmen were authorized contact with the Hungarian Peace Delegation as unofficial liaison officers between the latter and the French Government.

Following this, Counts Teleki, Bethlen and Csáky dealt directly with the Quai d'Orsay. Around 19 March, the Delegation decided that, from all Hungary's neighbors, a settlement with the Romanians was the most urgent. This feeling was due to the presence of several Transylvanians among the delegates and the fact that Hungary stood to lose most to Romania. Accordingly, Counts Csáky and Bethlen drew up a memorandum which, when approved by the Delegation, would be used as guidance for the conduct of negotiations with the French.<sup>106</sup> The memorandum basically supported

the return of territories where the population was wholly or in the majority Magyar, the granting of autonomy for other territories in which there were Hungarian minorities, and broad protection where such minorities were scattered.

What the Hungarians were seeking at this point was exactly what Tardieu's Committee denied them "because any other adjustment would have been in favor of Hungary and to the detriment of Romania." The Hungarians specifically sought the retention of parts of western Transylvania and the large cities of Arad, Nagyvárad and Szátmar; the Székely regions; and parts of the Bánát which were purely Magyar inhabited. Based on the nationality principle alone, such demands were not unreasonable. Had, in fact, the Conference acted foremost on such a principle, these territories would have remained with Hungary in the first place.

After the memorandum was drafted, Halmos met with Paléologue and the latter indicated that the memorandum would constitute a suitable starting point. Then the following conversation took place between Halmos and Ambassador Paléologue:<sup>107</sup>

Paléologue: 'We have confidence in you and we understand what you desire but what can you offer us in exchange.'

Halmos: 'A lasting peace and stability.' Then seeing that this answer did not wholly satisfy Paléologue, he added: 'Please indicate yourself what you desire.'

Paléologue: 'Can you offer us an alliance?'

Halmos: 'Offer one no, but accept one, perhaps.'"

Paléologue's comments, coming on the heels of the meeting in



which he presented the possibility of a joint Franco-Hungarian effort to the French Cabinet, obviously sought assurances of Hungarian support for French policy in Southeastern Europe. The tenor of the conversation admittedly showed the tentative nature of the French proposal, yet it underscored French willingness to negotiate the Treaty if it suited their own best interests.

On 29 March, Count Csáky and Halmos luncheoned with Paléologue and Saint-Sauveur. The latter asked what Hungary could offer that would be attractive to French business interests. Halmos mentioned the lease of the Hungarian State Railways and exploitation of navigation on the Danube by French concerns. Saint-Sauveur requested that the Hungarians draw up a memorandum relative to Hungarian resources which might be of interest to France. He referred to the far-flung interests of the Schneider-Creusot Group in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania and expressed the belief that Hungary could also be brought into this sphere of influence. The center of this tremendous regrouping would be Budapest, and, as a result, Hungary would become the cornerstone of French policy in Europe.<sup>108</sup>

Although the conversations between the French and the Hungarians dealt with broad questions of policy rather than with details, the Hungarians felt that, behind the French interests in economic exploitation, there was a carefully thought out politico-economic plan of major significance which might conceivably serve as Hungary's avenue of escape from the dreaded mutilation and the political and economic servitude that the peace conditions

spelled out for her. So it was that, at the end of March 1920, the official Peace Delegation left Neuilly and returned home to Budapest.<sup>109</sup>

On 13 April Halmos submitted an official memorandum to Ambassador Paléologue which outlined the Hungarian position on her frontiers with the Successor States. This memorandum put in official channels what had been given orally to Paléologue the month before. Two days later Paléologue answered with a French memorandum essentially the same as the Hungarian except on two minor points.<sup>110</sup>

Agreeing basically with the French memorandum, the Hungarian Government sent a delegation to Paris on 28 April to meet with the French in order to draw up an official understanding based on the Hungarian and French memoranda. On the same day, the Hungarian Peace Delegation (those few who had remained behind after Apponyi departed) were informed that the final peace conditions were to be presented the following week. Time appeared to be running out for Hungary if she wished to save part of Transylvania.

For some unknown reason, the Hungarian plenipotentiaries were not given access to Ambassador Paléologue until 5 May when the first meeting was held. At this meeting, Paléologue showed the Hungarians the draft of a French note which was to be presented to them officially at a later date. The note was a dire disappointment to the Hungarians. It upheld the right of Hungary and her neighbors to meet for purposes of revising certain

ethnic and economic injustices contained in the Peace Treaty but implied that France would do nothing to disturb the general structure of the Treaty.<sup>111</sup> All had finally come to nothing.

Although the inside story of the events just related are extremely clouded and source material pertaining to them is extremely rare, what had apparently happened was as follows:<sup>112</sup>

Word of the secret negotiations had leaked out in both Hungary and France - possibly as early as March 1920. The British were furious over the contemplated deal regarding the Hungarian railways because all the Allies held a joint lien on the railways for reparations.<sup>113</sup> It was not only the British, however, as Regent Horthy had serious doubts about signing away the railways. The French, for their part, suddenly realized that they could never get the Treaty of Trianon revised before it was signed. They, therefore, offered the promises made in the draft note presented to the Hungarians on 5 May in order to keep the business negotiations open.

There is also a probability (which might explain the five day delay for an appointment with Paléologue) that France realized she do just as well in Romania, whose former alliance made her a known quantity while Hungary was still an unknown risk. In the closing days of the War, the French sought financial concessions from the Romanians in the grain and oil industries. At the time, they indicated to Bratianu that he would have an easier time securing all the pledges of the 1916 Treaty, if he would cooperate with French industry. This suggestion infuriated

Bratianu who refused further dealings with French businessmen. French commercial interests in Romania following the War, however, hint at the possibility that the Romanians might have been willing to concede a little in return for all they were to get.

The story of the Hungarian-French negotiations continued after the signing of the Treaty of Trianon on 4 June 1920 which lost Transylvania to Romania. Such negotiations, however, never came to anything and they played no part in any retrocession or adjustment in the Transylvanian question.

The rôle of France, however, in the entire matter was pre-eminent. The Romanian feeling which developed in the 19th Century owed much to the encouragement of France. It was even limited for a time to young intellectuals who had been strongly influenced by the writings of the French Enlightenment and had come to think of their country as an eastern outpost of Romance culture. They came to the realization that Romania, like France, had been part of the Roman Empire whose culture, they fondly dreamed, had survived in the mountains of Transylvania, while Magyar barbarism swirled around this region of refuge. Nations are built upon illusions regarding their past, and Romania is no exception.<sup>114</sup>

The fact that the average intellectual in France at the time of the Peace Conference was in complete sympathy with Romania's cause in Transylvania is depicted clearly in a letter Emile Boutroux, a member of the Académie Française, wrote Senator Draghiceşcu in May 1918 for use as a preface to his book on



Transylvania:<sup>115</sup>

"Transylvania, you show in a such a pre-emptive way, was the cradle of the Romanian race; she was the trunk on which grew the two branches of Moldavia and Wallachia. On the other hand, the development of Austria-Hungary, such as it is, and such as it would be if the Central Powers are victorious, is the Germanization to the extreme of one half of the empire and the Magyarization of the other. Therefore, to leave Transylvania to Austria-Hungary is to allow the complete Magyarization of the trunk and even the roots of the Romanian nation, is to menace to death the soul of Romania."

In a much broader sense, however, Hungary was a pawn in France's power struggle against Germany. Bratianu, for all his shortcomings, saw this clearly and took advantage of it when he presented Romania as the power in the Balkans to play the rôle of "a fortress against pan-Germanism" and the "bulwark against the German drive to the East."<sup>116</sup> France accepted Romania's offer despite the fact that the latter towed the line behind the Central Powers and had been an ally of the German Empire since the secret Treaty of 1883! There might have been some small hope for Hungary during the period when France became disillusioned with Romania and appeared willing to let Hungary assume the latter's rôle in France's grand anti-German strategy, but this was short lived.

France continually associated Hungary with Germany in her own mind. This is evident from such statements as those made by d'Esperey at Belgrade and the members of the Territorial Committee in Paris: 'You marched with them, you will be punished

with them!' The Hungarians knew this as well. When Count Apponyi played a trick on his fellow countrymen in the Bois de Boulogne, he hid behind a tree and yelled out at them, "Sales boches!"<sup>117</sup> He should have said, "Sales hongrois!" Apponyi, fluent in the French language, knew exactly what he was saying. Such an anecdote demonstrates that men like Apponyi were very much convinced that France did not differentiate between the two nationalities.

## CONCLUSION

In the broader sense, the remission of Transylvania was not made in consideration of the principle of the right of self-determination of nationalities. Had it been so made, the Romanian-Hungarian frontier would have been drawn much differently. The forced cession of many purely Magyar lands, homeland for over a million and a half non-Romanians, shows that self-determination could hardly have the principle applied to determine Transylvania's future. Her loss was incurred as part of a much wider political struggle.

✓ The Allies saw the War foremost as a struggle against Germany. France saw the War as a struggle against Germany and all else that was anti-French in Europe. Accordingly, France sought to insure the debilitation of both Germany and those allied with her in the War. Hungary clearly fell into the latter category.

Ever cognizant of Hungary's past perfidy by her alliance with Germany, France could never be sure of Hungary's position in a future encounter. The safest course, therefore, would be to weaken Hungary and strengthen those nations on whom France felt she could rely. This was the rationale of French foreign policy throughout the 1920's. This was the reason for the Little Entente and the Franco-Romanian, Polish, Czech and Yugoslav Alliances. This was the reason that Transylvania was ceded to Romania in 1919. Hungary's loss was one more means by which France sought to secure her own pre-eminence and → over

security in Twentieth Century Europe.



NOTES

CHAPTER I - BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

PART I - THE ROLE OF THE MAGYARS

1. Jenő Horváth. Transylvania and the History of the Romanians (Budapest, 1935), p. 5.
2. C. A. Macartney. Hungary and Her Successors (London, 1937), p. 254.
3. Alan W. Palmer. The Lands Between (London, 1970), p. 11.
4. Like the Magyars whom they closely resembled, the Székely originated in the grasslands beyond the Urals, and like the Saxons, they were granted privileges of self government in return for duty along the frontier. Although there were occasional clashes between the Magyars, mainly plainsmen, and the Székely, mainly mountaineers, both groups of people came to think of themselves as Hungarian, determined to preserve a common front against the Romanian peasantry and generally receiving the support of the Saxons. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
5. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 256.
6. Ibid., p. 257.
7. Oscar Jászi. The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929), p. 398.
8. On March 15, 1848, the Hungarian Parliament adopted its famous reform program which boldly swept away the old order with all its special privileges and exemptions. In its place the Hungarians decreed annual parliaments, responsible ministerial government, direct franchise, liberty of the press, religious equality, and trial by jury. They also voted that Transylvania be united with Hungary, and at the same time they affirmed their readiness to maintain "all those special laws and liberties of Transylvania which, without hindering complete union, are favorable to national liberty and unity." L.S. Stavrianos. The Balkans Since 1453 (New York, 1958), p. 361.
9. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 263.
10. All this enabled Koloman Tisza's Liberal Party to acquire almost automatic control of the 250 constituencies in the non-Magyar districts. Paradoxically enough, the Liberal Party was the most intolerant towards the minorities, so that, in

effect, the non-Magyar constituencies were being utilized to enforce a program of Magyarization. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, p. 492.

11. R. W. Seton-Watson. History of the Romanians (New York, 1963), pp. 403-404.
12. Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 274.
13. Ibid., p. 328.
14. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 264.
15. Ibid., p. 252.
16. Jászai, The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 331.
17. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 398.
18. Ibid., pp. 408-409.
19. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 264-265.
20. Ibid., p. 265.
21. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 406.
22. These figures have been translated from hectares into acres by the author. Original figures appear in Francis Deák. The Hungarian-Roumanian Land Dispute (New York, 1928), pp. 2-3.

#### PART II - THE ROLE OF THE ROMANIANS

23. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, p. 359.
24. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 261.

25. After 1867 the Magyars were left to make their own settlements with the Romanian majority in Transylvania. Transylvania was refused a Diet of its own; the Romanians were invited to send deputies direct to the parliament in Budapest although the franchise was so rigged that few Romanians had the vote. Autonomous rights, however, were granted to the Romanian Orthodox Church which thereafter served as the standard bearer for the movement of Romanian nationalism. So long as the Romanian Kingdom itself remained weak, the main inclination of the people of Transylvania was towards some form of autonomy within the

Hapsburg Empire; to achieve this objective their leaders looked to Vienna. Palmer, The Lands Between, p. 75.

26. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 410.

27. The Romanians took advantage of the trial and appealed for world support: "What is under discussion here is the very existence of the Romanian people, and the national existence of a people is not discussed but affirmed . . . By your spirit of medieval intolerance, by a racial fanaticism which has not its equal in Europe, you will, if you condemn us, simply succeed in proving to the world that the Magyars are a discordant note in the concert of European nations." Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, p. 493.

28. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 415.

29. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 266.

30. Ibid., p. 267.

31. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 379.

32. Ibid., p. 365.

## CHAPTER II - THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS

### PART I - THE ROLE OF ROMANIA

33. The Balkan Wars had left untouched Romania's irredentas in Transylvania and the Bukovina on one hand, and Bessarabia on the other, and the king still regarded the Russian danger as the more formidable, and as imposing on Romania cooperation with the Central Powers; indeed, he had renewed the Triple Alliance as recently as January 1913. But the enthusiasm for the German orientation was confined to the Court and part of the Conservative Party, which was itself on the decline. The Liberals were francophile, and public opinion in general was - partly under the influence of the émigrés, of whom far more, and mostly of far higher intellectual quality, entered Romania from Transylvania than from Bessarabia - much more interested in Transylvania than in Bessarabia, and far more hostile to the Magyars than the Russians. C. A. Macartney. Independent Eastern Europe (London, 1962), p. 36.

34. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 476.

35. Ibid., p. 478.

36. The Romanian Government, which had ambitious territorial aims in Hungary, extending far beyond Transylvaia, as well as in the Bukovina, and was unembarrassed by any feelings of genuine respect for the nationality principle which it regarded as a mere tool, having disregarded the idea of remaining loyal to its alliance with the Central Powers, was well aware of the far-reaching consequences of the decision with which it was faced; it intended making war on the Central Powers only if it could be sure than an Entente victory would reduce Hungary to such small proportions as to make it impossible for her to try to regain what she had lost. Leo Valiani. The End of Austria-Hungary (London, 1973), pp. 96-97.

37. Macartney, Independent Eastern Europe, p. 56.

38. Ibid., p. 57.

39. Palmer, The Lands Between, p. 132.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 496.

43. Palmer, The Lands Between, p. 132.

#### PART II - THE ROLE OF HUNGARY

44. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 479.

45. Ibid., p. 480.

46. Ibid., p. 486.

47. Ibid., p. 482.

48. Ibid., p. 522

49. Ibid., pp. 522-523.

50. Oscar Jászi. Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary (New York, 1969), p. 4.

51. Alfred D. Low. The Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference (Philadelphia, 1963), p. 7.

52. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 532.



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THE CAUSES AND REASONS FOR THE REMISSION OF TRANSYLVANIA, 1919. (U)

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
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PART III - THE ROLE OF FRANCE

53. Michael Károlyi. Faith Without Illusion. (London, 1956), p. 130.
54. Felix Gilbert. The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present (New York, 1970), p. 56.
55. Ibid.
56. Low, The Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference, p. 13.
57. Károlyi, Faith Without Illusion, p. 132.
58. Ibid., pp. 133-134.
59. Deák, The Hungarian Romanian Land Dispute, p. 4.
60. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 532.
61. Francis Deák. Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1942), p. 12.
62. Ibid., p. 38.
63. Low, The Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference, p. 31.
64. Ibid., p. 32.
65. Károlyi, Faith Without Illusion, pp. 146-147.
66. The concrete suggestion of the Committee was that there should be established two lines, beyond which Hungarian and Romanian troops respectively might not penetrate, thus setting up a zone free of military occupation by the contestants which might be occupied by Allied troops for the maintenance of order if deemed necessary by the Supreme Council. Deák, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 41.
67. Originally in The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, Vol I, p. 393. Ibid., p. 394.
68. Károlyi, Faith Without Illusion, p. 152.
69. Jászi, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, p. 92.
70. Károlyi, Faith Without Illusion, pp. 152.-153.

CHAPTER III - REMISSION BECOMES A REALITY

PART ONE - THE ROLE OF ROMANIA

71. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 540.
72. Roumania Before the Peace Conference. Territorial Claims, p. 8.
73. Low, The Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference, p. 34.
74. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 540.
75. Deák, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 40.
76. Stephen Bonsal. Suitors and Suppliants (New York, 1926), p. 169.
77. Harold Nicholson. Peacemaking 1919 (New York, 1965), p. 137.
78. Emile Joseph Dillon. The Inside Story of the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1920), p. 236.

PART II - THE ROLE OF HUNGARY

79. H. W. V. Temperley ed. A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. I. (London, 1969), p. 353.
80. Deák, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 79.
81. Low, The Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference, p. 49.
82. Ibid., p. 53.
83. Ibid., p. 54.
84. Ibid., p. 55.
85. Ibid., p. 69.
86. Ibid., p. 83.
87. Temperley ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. I., p. 356.
88. Seton-Watson, History of the Romanians, p. 548.



90. Albert Apponyi. The Memoirs of Count Apponyi (New York, 1935), p. 252.

PART III - THE ROLE OF RANCE

91. István Czakó. How the Hungarian Problem Was Created (Budapest, 1934), p. 50.

92. Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference. Delegation Information: Supplementary Information. No. 1, p. 3.

93. Low, The Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference, p. 35.

94. Ibid.

95. Deák, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, pp. 66-67.

96. Ibid., pp. 67-68.

97. Ibid., pp. 254-255.

98. Macartney, Independent Eastern Europe, p. 127.

99. Apponyi, Memoirs of Count Apponyi, p. 257.

100. Jászi, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, p. 60.

101. Apponyi, Memoirs of Count Apponyi, p. 261.

102. Ibid., pp. 262-263.

103. Count Albert Apponyi. Exposé verbal du comte Albert Apponyi (Budapest, 1920), p. 5.

104. Apponyi, Memoirs of Count Apponyi, p. 270.

105. Deák, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 257.

106. Ibid., p. 259.

107. Ibid., p. 260.

108. Ibid., p. 262.

109. Apponyi, Memoirs of Count Apponyi, p. 280.

110. Deák, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 268.

111. Deak, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 274.

112. Apponyi was reluctant to discuss them in his Memoirs, published in 1935, for fear of undermining then current Franco-Hungarian business undertakings. Apponyi, Memoirs of Count Apponyi, p. 274.

113. Macartney, Independent Eastern Europe, p. 128.

114. Norman J.G. Pounds. Eastern Europe (Chicago, 1969), p. 531.

115. Dimitrie Draghicescu. La Transylvanie (Paris, 1918), p. i. Translation from the French made by the author.

116. Walter Kolarz. Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe (London, 1946), p. 184.

117. The French slang term "boches" is now used as an insulting word for "German" in the French language. The origin of the slang word is not known but may have originated from a German rubber manufacturer who employed German nationals in his Paris factory prior to the Franco-Prussian War. The original term "boches" merely was a French reference to "German" but after the War it became a derisive word. Apponyi's use of "boches" instead of "hongrois" shows that the French thought of the Hungarians as one and the same with the Germans at that time. Apponyi, Memoirs of Count Apponyi, p. 260.

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