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


Department of Defense  
**Manpower  
Requirements Report**  
**FY 1994**

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# MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FY 1994

**Prepared by**

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense



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# FY 1994 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR) for FY 1994 in compliance with Section 115a of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.). This report should be read and used along with the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1994 Budget.

#### I. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

This report explains the Department of Defense manpower requirements incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1994. The report is organized into eight chapters, three appendices, and three annexes. The annexes are bound and provided separately. Since this report predates the ongoing (bottom-up) review, changes in force structure and end strengths may occur as a result of this review.

Defense Manpower Requirements (Chapters I through VIII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the Department's FY 1993-94 manpower requirements. Chapters III through VII contain details on manpower requirements for each of the military Services and the Defense Agencies. Chapter VIII summarizes various manpower cost data.

Unit Annex. As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided that describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force.

Officer Flow Annex. Section 115a(e) of Title 10, U.S.C., requires the submission of specified detailed data on the Services' officer corps. These data are contained in the Officer Flow Annex.

Medical Manpower Annex. Section 115a(g)(1) of Title 10, U.S.C., requires the submission of detailed information on medical manpower. This information is contained in the Medical Manpower Annex.

#### II. THE TOTAL FORCE

The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to national defense. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components, the civilian workforce, retired military, host nation support, and DoD contractors.

##### A. Active Component Military

The Active Component military are those full-time military men and women who serve in units that engage enemy forces, provide support in the combat theater, provide other support, and who are in special accounts (transients, student, etc.). These men and women are on call twenty-four hours a day and receive full-time military pay.

## B. Reserve Component Military

Each Reserve component consists of three Reserve categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The exceptions are the Army National Guard and Air National Guard, which do not have a Standby Reserve, or Retired Reserve.

### 1. Ready Reserve

The Ready Reserve consists of Reserve Component units, individual reservists assigned to Active Component units, and individuals subject to recall to active duty to augment the Active forces in time of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve consists of three subgroups: the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard.

a. Selected Reserve. The Selected Reserve is composed of those units and individuals designated by their respective Services and approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority for training, equipment, and personnel over all other Reserve elements. Individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) are members of the Selected Reserve not assigned to a Reserve Component unit but rather assigned to and trained for an Active Component organization, Selective Service System, or Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on or shortly after mobilization.

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR is a manpower pool consisting mainly of trained individuals who have previously served in Active Component units or in the Selected Reserve. IRR members are liable for involuntary active duty for training and fulfillment of mobilization requirements.

c. Inactive National Guard (ING). The ING consists of Army National Guard personnel who are in an inactive status (the term does not apply to the Air National Guard). Members of the ING are attached to National Guard units but do not participate in training activities. Upon mobilization, they would mobilize with their units. To remain members of the ING, individuals must report annually to their assigned unit.

### 2. Standby Reserve

Personnel assigned to the Standby Reserve have completed all obligated or required service or have been removed from the Ready Reserve because of civilian employment, temporary hardship, or disability. Standby Reservists maintain military affiliation, but are not required to perform training or to be assigned to a unit.

### 3. Retired Reserve

The Retired Reserve consists of personnel who have been placed in a retirement status based on completion of 20 or more qualifying years of Reserve Component and/or Active Component service. A member of the Retired Reserve does not receive retired pay until

reaching age 60, unless he or she has 20 or more years active Federal service.

### C. Civilian Workforce

Civilians constitute approximately one-third of the Department's active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not require military incumbents. The civilian workforce repairs airplanes, ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical support; and operates and maintains military installations. Civilians contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces by providing continuity and expertise and by freeing uniformed personnel to perform military-specific tasks.

### D. Retirees

Retired military manpower is a major portion of the Total Force. There are over 1,000,000 retirees under age 60. These individuals can be rapidly recalled at any time by the service secretaries to perform a wide variety of jobs. There are also large numbers of retirees age 60 and over who can make major contributions to our defense effort.

## III. MANPOWER MIX

The Department's policy is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit. Department policy is to employ civilian employees and contractors wherever possible to free our military forces to perform military-specific functions, yet maintaining emphasis on meeting specific requirements such as the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986.

Often the most cost-effective way to meet overseas peacetime and wartime requirements in non-combat activities is to use host nation support (HNS). The agreements we have with the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Italy, and the BENELUX countries to provide port operations, surface transportation and many other support functions are examples of this support. The same type of arrangements also exist with Japan and Korea. Increased reliance on HNS makes strategic warning and allied response even more important. It also allows our strategic lift to focus on the transport of reinforcements and sustainment to the theater of operations.

In considering the most appropriate force mix, focus must be placed on the need for forces to (1) provide peacetime presence, (2) maintain rapid crisis response capabilities, (3) hedge against a need to reconstitute forces, and (4) provide strategic deterrence. Peacetime presence is provided by forward-deployed forces. These forces generally are in the Active Component, and require a rotation base of active duty personnel to permit members of deployed units to shift from overseas assignments to stateside duty.

Since the Total Force Policy was announced in 1973, the Department has increased its reliance on Reserve Component units. The Army relies on Reserve units to provide selected combat, combat support, and combat

service support. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of most mission areas, including surface combatants, carrier air wings, maritime patrol, airlift, and medical support. The Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team with balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support forces similar to active force counterpart units. Air Reserve Component units provide at least half of the air refueling capability, all of the strategic defense interceptor mission, and a significant portion of the airlift and tactical fighter capability.

#### IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

Mobilization manpower is the time-phased build-up of manpower needed above our current peacetime strength to prepare for and conduct wartime military operations. Additional military and civilian personnel are necessary to bring our current peacetime forces up to their full wartime strengths; to man activated units, ships, and squadrons; and to replace casualties. The individual Service chapters describe the wartime manpower requirements and the overall mobilization manpower situation in more detail.

#### V. MANPOWER COUNTING

The discussion of manpower and personnel readiness requires that the reader understand the terms describing manpower counting categories. For that reason, a glossary of defense manpower terms is provided in Appendix B. The basic distinction between "spaces", that is billets or positions, and "faces", people to fill the positions, must be understood. Our forces are made up of a variety of different types of units. Each unit has associated with it a collection of positions that must be filled by qualified people in order for the unit to perform its mission.

During peacetime, it is neither necessary nor desirable to fill all positions in all units. Some units may not be staffed at all, due to a lack of funding or because we can fill them in an expeditious manner following mobilization. Some units may be staffed with a combination of active and reserve people. As a unit is tasked to perform more in peacetime, the proportion of full-time people, whether active, reserve, or civilian, may be expected to increase.

The Department's manning does not change overnight to match changes in the programmed force structure. As the force structure is changed, the programmed manning must be adjusted to best balance the requirements of force changes, available inventory, accession and separation predictions, fiscal constraints, manpower ceilings, etc. The collection of positions authorized to be filled with trained personnel is called the authorized or programmed manning.

#### VI. DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain the Department's manpower requirements and resources. All three types of defense manpower are allocated to specific DPPCs, no position being counted more than once.

DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the eleven Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources that can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber program, but also the base support personnel that sustain these units. The DPPCs on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, personnel support is given separate visibility. The DPPC structure used in this year's report remains the same as was displayed in the FY 1993 Defense Manpower Requirements Report. Definition of the categories is provided in Appendix C.

The Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) entitled "Undistributed" appears in active component DPPC tables throughout this Report. Negative entries project temporary undermanning of the structure at the end of a fiscal year; positive entries project temporary overmanning at the end of a fiscal year. Budgeted manpower cannot be completely distributed to DPPC mission categories because of cyclic variations in the "Individuals" category (non-unit personnel). The Individuals category is comprised of several dynamic components which vary throughout the year, e.g., the number of trainees and students varies daily because most courses of instruction are less than one year. In consonance with the statutory requirement to report military manpower end strength, all DPPC categories, including Individuals, are portrayed as of the last day of the indicated fiscal year.

## CHAPTER II

### MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower requirement trends.

#### I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER

The new defense strategy crafted by President Clinton takes the first steps toward the President's vision of a new security for the post-Cold War Era. It recognizes that fundamental changes in the global security environment necessitate adjustments to our national security policies. "This is in many ways the first truly post-Cold War budget," Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in releasing the proposed spending plan. "It cuts Cold War forces and begins to buy the new capabilities we need to meet the new dangers we face." Within that reduced budget, funding is still added for initiatives aimed at each of four emerging dangers of the new era: regional threats to U.S. interests; the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the failure of democratic reforms, especially in the former Soviet world; and continued poor economic performance at home. Implementation of this new strategy has led the Department to conduct a comprehensive "bottom up review." This will yield detailed guidance for reshaping defense. It should be noted that several separation incentives have been used to reduce the DoD. These incentives require continuing legal authority. If this authority is not extended, changes in accessions or an increased reliance on RIFs will be necessary to achieve end strength.

Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military, civilian, contractor, and host nation support. Manpower requirements are developed based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The composition of defense forces is based on DoD's Total Force Policy, which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to deterrence and success in wartime. In structuring our military forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve, whenever feasible, to maintain as small an Active Component peacetime force as national security considerations permit. Service planning assumes that Selected Reserve units and Individual Mobilization Augmentees will be made available for any contingency for which they are required to bring the total force to its required combat capability.

Civilians are the third essential element of the Total Force. In addition to managing critical defense resources, civilians perform many functions that do not specifically require military incumbents.

The Department also employs a large number of contractors to provide important support services. Work is contracted out whenever it is cost effective to do so except for functions that are inherently governmental or closely tied to mobilization.

The host nation support provided by foreign national civilians represents a cost effective alternative to assigning U.S. citizens to overseas installations.

Productivity improvement initiatives apply to both the military and the civilian work force and are reflected in the Department's programmed manpower structure. The Secretary of Defense Management Review (DMR) process has documented significant manpower reductions in DoD's internal operations.

In addition, the Department continues to employ a variety of tools and techniques to encourage work force motivation and effect continual operational and management improvement. These include the use of efficiency reviews, commercial activities studies, productivity gainsharing, and labor-capital substitution investments.

The following table is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1993 and FY 1994.

Table II-1

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FORCE ELEMENTS

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Strategic</u>			
ICBMs	912	787	667
Bombers (PAA) <u>1/</u>			
Active	242	201	181
Guard/Reserve	0	0	10
Tankers (PAA) <u>1/</u>			
Active	373	293	257
Guard/Reserve	184	222	262
<u>Strategic</u>			
Interceptor Squadrons/PAA			
Guard	12/216	12/216	10/180
Ballistic Missile Submarines	34	22	16
Mobile Logistics Ships	4	2	2
Support Ships	2	2	1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>			
Land Forces			
Army Divisions			
Active	14	14	12
Guard	10	8	6/2
Army Separate Brigades & Regiments			
Active <u>2/3/</u>	9	9	8
Guard/Reserve <u>3/</u>	26	26	17



<b>Marine Corps Divisions <u>8</u>/</b>			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
<b>Tactical Air Forces</b>			
Air Force			
Flights/Missiles	7/112	0	0
Air Force Squadrons/PAA <u>2</u> /			
Active	56/1441	56/1440	52/1270
Guard/Reserve	50/989	48/959	46/858
Navy Squadrons/PAA			
Active	87/786	81/824	77/762
Reserve	14/132	14/132	14/132
Carriers (active only)	15	14	13
Marine Corps Squadrons/PAA			
Active	32/436	32/408	30/386
Reserve	11/128	9/104	9/106
<b>Naval Forces</b>			
Attack Submarines			
(active only)	85	88	84
Surface Combatants			
Active	134	124	123
Reserve (Cat A)	16	16	16
Amphibious Assault Ships			
Active	59	55	52
Reserve	3	2	0
Patrol Ships (active only)	6	2	0
Mine Warfare Ships	10	14	15
ASW and FAD Squadrons			
Active	63/537	57/450	52/396
Reserve	20/150	20/150	15/156
<b>Mobility Forces</b>			
Airlift Squadrons <u>3</u> /			
Active	109/1650	116/1603	152/1435
Guard/Reserve	71/866	65/821	66/831
Sealift Ships			
Nucleus Fleet <u>6</u> /	72	71	72
Chartered Fleet (Longterm) <u>7</u> /	42	43	42

1/Primary aerospace vehicle authorized (PAA).

2/Includes combat coded tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, and tactical air control squadrons, combat/combat support coded special operations and tactical electronic warfare squadrons; and combat support coded tactical tanker/cargo (KC-10) and airborne warning and control squadrons.

3/Includes CH-46, CH-53, H-3, C-17, C-130, C-141, C-5 and C-9s. Excludes rescue and weather.

4/Includes naval fleet auxiliary force. (Underway replenishment ships and support ships).

5/Military Sealift Command Ships

6/Includes helicopter and observation squadrons

## II. MANPOWER REQUEST

The Department's request for manpower is summarized in this section.

### A. Active Component Military Strength

#### Active Component Military Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Army	611	575	540
Navy	542	526	481
Marine Corps	185	182	174
Air Force	470	445	426
Total in the Budget	1808	1728	1621

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

### B. Selected Reserve Strength

The following table shows the manpower request for the Selected Reserve, expressed in end strengths. These figures include Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and full-time Active Guard/Reserve members.

#### Selected Reserve Military Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Army National Guard	425.8	422.7	410.0
Army Reserve	302.7	279.6	260.0
Naval Reserve	142.3	133.7	113.4
Marine Corps Reserve	42.3	42.3	36.9
Air National Guard	119.1	119.3	117.7
Air Force Reserve	81.9	82.3	81.5
Total in the Budget	1114.9	1079.9	1019.5

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

The following table shows the number of personnel involved in full time support of the Reserve Components. The National Guard and Reserve military technicians who are also DoD civilians are included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report.

Full-Time Support to the Selected Reserve<sup>1/</sup>  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<b>Army National Guard</b>			
Active Guard/Reserve	25.0	24.7	24.2
Military Technicians	29.1	27.1	27.3
Civilians	0.5	0.4	0.5
Active Component	1.1	0.6	0.5
Total	55.7	52.8	52.5
<b>Army Reserve</b>			
Active Guard/Reserve	13.1	12.6	12.5
Military Technicians	7.7	7.3	7.4
Civilians	1.0	1.1	1.6
Active Component	0.6	1.2	1.3
Total	22.6	22.3	22.6
<b>Naval Reserve</b>			
Active Guard/Reserve (TAR)	22.9	21.7	19.4
Civilians	2.9	2.8	2.7
Active Component	7.1	5.2	3.4
Total	32.9	29.7	25.4
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>			
Active Guard/Reserve	2.3	2.3	2.1
Civilians	0.3	0.2	0.2
Active Component	4.8	4.6	4.2
Total	7.4	7.1	6.5
<b>Air National Guard</b>			
Active Guard/Reserve	9.0	9.1	9.4
Military Technicians <sup>2/</sup>	24.7	25.4	24.3
Civilians	1.9	1.9	1.8
Active Component	0.9	1.0	1.0
Total	36.5	37.4	36.5
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>			
Active Guard/Reserve	0.6	0.6	0.6
Military Technicians	9.9	10.5	10.5
Civilians	5.0	5.3	5.3
Active Component	0.8	0.7	0.7
Total	16.3	17.1	17.1
<b>DoD Total</b>			
Active Guard/Reserve	72.9	71.0	71.7
Military Technicians	71.2	73.1	69.2
Civilians	11.6	11.6	12.3
Active Component	15.3	13.3	14.8
Total	171.0	169.0	168.0

<sup>1/</sup>Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are included in Selected Reserve strength throughout the report.

<sup>2/</sup>Includes reimbursable military technicians.

### C. Civilian Strength

#### Civilian Manpower 1/ (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Army	333.6	308.3	290.3
Navy	290.5	264.6	250.8
Marine Corps	18.5	17.8	17.8
Air Force	214.4	206.6	198.7
Defense Agencies	<u>149.0</u>	<u>166.8</u>	<u>161.2</u>
Total in the Budget	1006.0	964.1	918.8

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

1/Requested civilian strength includes U.S. direct hire and foreign national direct and indirect hire employees and excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian manpower:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth

Included under this category are: Stay-in-School, Temporary Summer Aid, Federal Junior Fellowship, and Worker Trainee Opportunity programs. Employment in these categories is estimated at 5,000 in FY 1994.

2. National Security Agency

NSA civilian manpower are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions Manpower

Civil functions, administered by DoD, include the Army's Corps of Engineers, Arlington National Cemetery, and the Air Force's Wildlife Conservation Program. Employment in these functions in FY 1994 is estimated at approximately 30,000 employees.

### III. MANPOWER OVERVIEW

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Manpower  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military			
Active	1808.1	1728.3	1620.6
Officer	273.8	258.2	245.6
Enlisted	1521.3	1457.3	1362.5
Cadets/Midshipmen	12.9	12.8	12.4
Selected Reserve	1114.9	1080.0	1019.0
Civilian <u>1/</u>	1006.0	964.2	918.8
Total in the Budget	3928.1	3777.3	3558.9

1/Full time equivalent (FTE) end strength.

A. Military Manpower

The FY 1994 authorization request for Active Component military manpower is 1,620,600. The Selected Reserve authorization request is 1,019,500. Highlights of the military manpower requirements by Service follow.

ARMY

The manpower requirements for the active force, the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, and the civilian workforce are a function of the force structure the Army needs to meet its requirements under the National Military Strategy. The composition and size of the Army are derived from the requirements generated from this strategy. As the strategy evolves to a multi-regional orientation, the Army will rely more on a combination of forward presence and CONUS based forces. The Army will be structured to provide a wide range of land based warfighting and peacekeeping capabilities applicable throughout the operational continuum and stationed at locations to best support strategic requirements.

The new force requirements associated with diminishing threats and changing roles and missions are leading to budget and force reductions throughout the active, reserve and civilian workforces. The Army remains committed to fulfilling its fundamental mission of providing trained and ready forces for prompt, sustained land operations in defense of our national interest.

NAVY

The Navy's manpower management strategy during this period of force reductions is to retain high quality personnel, increase experience levels, maintain acceptable sea/shore rotation, improve training levels and reduce manpower costs during the force reduction. This strategy includes a continued commitment to provide the quality of life for Navy personnel that will contribute to positive retention and readiness. Recruitment and retention of the highest quality men and women remains a high priority.

The Navy, similar to the other Services, is experiencing significant personnel and funding reductions. The manpower management strategy the Navy has adopted for this era is centered on the premise that, as the Navy gets smaller, the opportunity exists to proactively shape the force in order to retain high quality personnel, increase experience levels, gain slightly better sea/shore rotations, improve training levels, and reduce overall manpower costs. The guiding principle for all programs is the commitment to take care of people. Under present reduction plans, no career force personnel will be involuntarily separated prior to reaching retirement eligibility.

In FY 1993 the total ship battle forces decreased by 28 to 438 ships. In FY 1994 the number will decrease to 413.

While the Navy plans to decrease the absolute number of petty officers, this number will remain steady as a percentage of the force. On average, active duty Navy Battle Force (M +1) billets are filled at 90.0 percent of Wartime Manpower Requirements. Of these authorized billets, 71 percent are for petty officers, E-4 to E-9. In FY 1994, fiscal constraints allowed the Navy to recruit and train no more than 69.9 percent of total peacetime billets with petty officers, rather than the 71 percent required. The increased technological requirements which exist in virtually all of the Navy's ratings (afloat and ashore) make the continued manning of petty officer billets with untrained, inexperienced apprentice seamen unacceptable.

In summary, the Navy desires to protect force readiness in the near term by protecting quality people currently on board, maintain sufficient accession levels to preclude a "hollow force" in the future, manage officer accessions and retention to maintain the correct grade/quality mix, improve recruit quality to reduce attrition and ensure long term readiness, and rebalance the enlisted skill mix using existing force management tools.

#### MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps is actively managing its force reductions in an attempt to support the Chairman's Base Force while satisfying the requirements of the National Military Strategy.

The FY 1994 manpower request of 174,100 represents a reduction of 7,800 from the active component's FY 1993 authorization. Meanwhile, the Reserve component decreases 5.4K from its FY 1993 authorization and civilian strength remains constant at 17.8K.

The current reduction scheme, conceived by a force structure planning group and formally approved by the Commandant, provides for a controlled drawdown that preserves balanced warfighting capabilities as the force decreases. That plan, dubbed USMC 2001 by its architects, provides a logical roadmap for the drawdown and restructuring of personnel, units, and equipment. The goal is to provide a force that is ready, relevant, and capable. To achieve this, increased emphasis has been focused on enhancing readiness, training and education, and joint operations capabilities.

Of paramount importance to the Marine Corps is the impact of force reductions on the quality of the force. Because of the significant investment in high-quality, well-trained, career personnel, the goal throughout will be to achieve reductions, to the maximum extent possible, through natural attrition. By recruiting and retaining only the best qualified, the Marine Corps expects to fulfill its charter as an expeditionary force-in-readiness, with a significantly leaner fighting force.

#### AIR FORCE

The Air Force is undergoing its most fundamental reshaping since it was established as a separate Service nearly half a century ago. The broad sweep of change has touched every corner of the Air Force and every aspect of how they do business.

This reshaping has been driven by the demands of a new era -- new thinking, new security challenges and opportunities, new fiscal constraints and new technology. The Air Force began this effort nearly three years ago when we developed a strategic planning framework, Global Reach - Global Power, to set out our vision of what air and space power can bring to the Nation's defense. Simply put, Global Reach - Global Power provides a clear view of aerospace power's inherent strengths -- speed, range, flexibility, precision and lethality -- and helps us focus on what we need to do to create and nurture these strengths. Global Reach - Global Power is the overarching structure within which the Air Force plans, programs and budgets all their activities.

By planning within the Global Reach - Global Power framework vision and managing wisely, the Air Force is able to design a program well suited for what the President and the Nation will need in the future.

As forces are reduced and manpower levels decline in concert with a new reshaping strategy, the Air Force has drawn down the active duty force and shifted a greater percentage of the total mission to the ARC. Every effort is being made to ensure military reductions minimize internal turmoil, afford maximum transition assistance to members and sustain future mission requirements. It is critical to note that manpower reductions in FY 1993 and FY 1994 will not generate significant savings in personnel pays and allowances due to the cost of separation payments associated with the Voluntary Separation Incentive, Special Separation Benefit, and Early Retirement.

The FY 1994 President's Budget calls for a reduction in Air Force active duty military manpower from 444,900 in FY 1993 to 425,700 in FY 1994. The FY 1994 figure represents a 53 percent reduction in manpower from the Vietnam-era high point in 1968 and a 30 percent reduction since the mid-eighties. Civilian manpower levels will fall to 206,608 in FY 1993 and 198,690 in FY 1994. The civilian figure for FY 1994 is 43 percent lower than the all-time high in 1969 and a 25 percent reduction since the mid-eighties.

## B. Civilian Manpower

### 1. Civilian Manpower Management

A major Defense goal is to use civilian manpower in the most economical and efficient manner possible. The Department encourages the efficient and effective use of overtime, temporary employees, and/or contracting to satisfy work of a temporary, non-recurring nature.

The Department continues to manage the civilian work force based on mission requirements and funded work load. The flexibility of operating managers to use appropriation authority to meet unanticipated program requirements allows them to maximize capability with application of minimal resources. The focus of DoD managers has shifted from trying to preserve manpower levels to monitoring and more closely scrutinizing total manpower costs.

### 2. Civilian Manpower

The Department ended FY 1992 at a civilian manpower level of 1,006,054--0.5 percent (or 5,055 strength) below the FY 1992 projected end strength target.

The FY 1993 civilian endstrength estimate is 964,152--4.2 percent (or 41,902 spaces) below the actual FY 1992 year-end strength. The FY 1994 civilian endstrength estimate is 918,774--4.7 percent (or 45,378 spaces) below the FY 1993 estimate and 8.7 percent (or 87,280 spaces) below the actual FY 1992 civilian year-end strength. It has been more than a decade (since FY 1980) that the Department's civilian endstrength level was less than 1 million.

### 3. Civilian Manpower Mix

Civilian manpower mix can refer to DoD occupation, grade, citizenship, employment, and/or pay category. Civilians are managed in a variety of ways including categories relating to how they are employed, how they are paid, and the kinds of work they perform. Although DoD manages civilian manpower in a number of ways, civilian strength estimates are justified programmatically to Congress in terms of how civilians are paid with particular interest in the hire of foreign nationals.

DoD civilians receive either a payroll check "directly" from the Department or they are paid "indirectly" by foreign governments who receive reimbursement from DoD for the cost of their salaries and benefits. All U.S. citizens and approximately 31 percent of the foreign nationals employed by the Department are paid directly by DoD. The remaining 69 percent of foreign nationals are paid indirectly by DoD.

Between FY 1992 and FY 1994, the Department's civilian manpower estimates reflect a decrease of 7.3 percent "direct" hire employees compared to a decrease of 29.4 percent "indirect" hire employment. Between FY 1992 and FY 1994, the Department has projected a 7.1 percent decrease in the hire of U.S. citizens compared to a 25.8 percent decrease in the hire of foreign nationals. Consequently, the



composition of DoD's civilian work force in FY 1994 compared to FY 1992 reflects increased reliance on U.S. citizens hired directly by the Department to execute assigned missions.

#### IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

##### A. Requirements Determination

Wartime manpower requirements are based on estimated requirements to fight a specified scenario. DoD has, for many years, used a worldwide war scenario which had as a primary component, a European conflict. With the changing world environment, such a scenario is no longer particularly plausible. The Joint Staff, OSD, and the Services have worked to construct a new series of scenarios which fit the changing world environment and take into account OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM. These scenarios, together with the Defense Planning Guidance 94-99, will form the basis for a new Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning System (WARMAPS) data base, which will be used to produce new estimates of wartime manpower requirements.

##### B. Military Manpower

Military manpower requirements are based on the total manpower required to field the mobilized force structure, additional manpower required to replace estimated combat casualties and necessary increases in other manpower accounts. Peak demand occurs when the size and configuration of the force has stabilized and when cumulative replacement demand is at its highest point. This will depend upon the scenario and may occur at different times in different Services.

##### C. Civilian Manpower

Civilian manpower requirements are based on the total manpower needed to support and sustain the mobilized force, additional manpower required to replace reserve and retired military members called to active duty, and the increased manpower required to maintain surge operations. As soon as the new illustrative planning scenarios are finalized and the military data base has been developed, the collection of civilian WARMAPS data will begin.

#### V. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

The following tables summarize the FY 1992-1994 Defense manpower requirements. The presentation is by DPPC category.

TABLE II-2  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>			
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	<u>70.8</u>	<u>51.7</u>	<u>46.2</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	58.7	40.2	34.9
Defensive Strategic Forces	2.3	2.1	2.1
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	9.8	9.4	9.1
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	<u>850.9</u>	<u>827.7</u>	<u>777.8</u>
Land Forces	453.5	439	415.5
Division Forces	327.8	310.6	292.1
Theater Forces	33.7	34.9	34.0
Tactical Air Forces	166.1	160.9	152.1
Naval Forces	196.5	190.7	177
Warships and ASW Forces	88.2	85.5	80
Amphibious Forces	33.3	33.5	33.3
Naval Support Forces	75	71.7	63.7
Mobility Forces	34.8	37.1	33.2
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>	<u>56.8</u>	<u>56.4</u>	<u>53.3</u>
Intelligence	31.1	32.7	30.3
Centrally Managed Communication	25.7	23.7	23
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>145.8</u>	<u>115.9</u>	<u>107.4</u>
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	<u>46.4</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>38</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	<u>95.4</u>	<u>94.9</u>	<u>88.7</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>51.6</u>	<u>74.8</u>	<u>76.3</u>
Int'l Military Organizations	8.3	7.9	7.4
Unified Commands	5.7	3.5	5.7
Federal Agency Support	3	3.3	3.1
Joint Staff	1	1	1
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	33.6	59.1	59.1
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>16.4</u>
Supply Operators	6.0	5.5	5.4
Maintenance Operations	1.9	2.5	2.4
Logistics Support Operations	2.9	2.8	2.5
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>19</u>
Combat Commands	11.3	8.8	8.3
Support Commands	12.3	11.5	10.7
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	<u>24.9</u>	<u>24.9</u>	<u>23.4</u>
Research and Development	16.4	17	15.9
Geophysical Activities	8.5	7.9	7.5
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>120.5</u>	<u>113.2</u>	<u>96.6</u>
Personnel Support	30.1	29.3	27.5
Individual Training	90.4	83.9	69.1
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>96.6</u>	<u>88.2</u>	<u>90.1</u>
Support Installations	65.5	58.6	61.8
Centralized Support Activity	31.1	29.6	28.3
<u>PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	<u>1144.2</u>	<u>1085.1</u>	<u>1023</u>
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	<u>-13.6</u>	<u>-17.8</u>	<u>-2.9</u>
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	<u>220.0</u>	<u>217.1</u>	<u>190.4</u>
Transients	47.2	47.1	41.9
Patients, Prisoners, & Holdees	11.6	9.2	8.9
Trainees and Students	148.2	147.9	127.2
Cadets and Midshipmen	13.0	12.9	12.4
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>1820.9</u>	<u>1734.2</u>	<u>1621.8</u>

TABLE II-2  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>			
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	<u>70.8</u>	<u>51.7</u>	<u>46.2</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	58.7	40.2	34.9
Defensive Strategic Forces	2.3	2.1	2.1
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	9.8	9.4	9.1
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	<u>850.9</u>	<u>827.7</u>	<u>772.8</u>
Land Forces	453.5	439	415.5
Division Forces	327.8	310.6	292.1
Theater Forces	33.7	34.9	34.0
Tactical Air Forces	166.1	160.9	152.1
Naval Forces	196.5	190.7	177
Warships and ASW Forces	88.2	85.5	80
Amphibious Forces	33.3	33.5	33.3
Naval Support Forces	75	71.7	63.7
Mobility Forces	34.8	37.1	33.2
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>	<u>56.8</u>	<u>56.4</u>	<u>53.3</u>
Intelligence	31.1	32.7	30.3
Centrally Managed Communication	25.7	23.7	23
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>145.8</u>	<u>115.9</u>	<u>107.4</u>
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	<u>46.4</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>38</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	<u>95.4</u>	<u>94.9</u>	<u>88.7</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>51.6</u>	<u>74.8</u>	<u>76.3</u>
Int'l Military Organizations	8.3	7.9	7.4
Unified Commands	5.7	3.5	5.7
Federal Agency Support	3	3.3	3.1
Joint Staff	1	1	1
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	33.6	59.1	59.1
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>16.4</u>
Supply Operators	6.0	5.5	5.4
Maintenance Operations	1.9	2.5	2.4
Logistics Support Operations	2.9	2.8	2.5
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>19</u>
Combat Commands	11.3	8.8	8.3
Support Commands	12.3	11.5	10.7
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	<u>24.9</u>	<u>24.9</u>	<u>23.4</u>
Research and Development	16.4	17	15.9
Geophysical Activities	8.5	7.9	7.5
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>120.5</u>	<u>113.2</u>	<u>96.6</u>
Personnel Support	30.1	29.3	27.5
Individual Training	90.4	83.9	69.1
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>96.6</u>	<u>88.2</u>	<u>90.1</u>
Support Installations	65.5	58.6	61.8
Centralized Support Activity	31.1	29.6	28.3
<u>PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	<u>1699.9</u>	<u>1528.8</u>	<u>1433.2</u>
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	<u>-13.6</u>	<u>-17.8</u>	<u>-2.1</u>
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	<u>220.0</u>	<u>217.1</u>	<u>190.4</u>
Transients	47.2	47.1	41.9
Patients, Prisoners, & Holdees	11.6	9.2	8.9
Trainees and Students	148.2	147.9	127.2
Cadets and Midshipmen	13.0	12.9	12.4
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>1808.1</u>	<u>1728.3</u>	<u>1620.8</u>

**TABLE II-3**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESERVE MANPOWER**  
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<b><u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u></b>			
<b><u>STRATEGIC</u></b>	<b><u>25.7</u></b>	<b><u>25.9</u></b>	<b><u>26.9</u></b>
Offensive Strategic Forces	15.8	16.7	19.2
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.4	8.7	7.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.5	0.5	0.5
<b><u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u></b>	<b><u>830.1</u></b>	<b><u>820.1</u></b>	<b><u>763</u></b>
Land Forces	623.4	617.1	576.4
Division Forces	574.8	572.3	543.5
Theater Forces	19.5	16.6	8.4
Tactical Air Forces	77.5	76.3	73.5
Naval Forces	67.4	65.2	52.1
Warships and ASW Forces	22.7	21.7	13.3
Amphibious Forces	7.5	6.8	5.2
Naval Support Forces	37.2	36.7	33.6
Mobility Forces	61.8	61.5	61
<b><u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u></b>	<b><u>17.6</u></b>	<b><u>20.5</u></b>	<b><u>18.6</u></b>
Intelligence	4.5	4.4	3.2
Centrally Managed Comm	13.1	16.1	15.4
<b><u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u></b>	<b><u>24</u></b>	<b><u>17.8</u></b>	<b><u>17.5</u></b>
<b><u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>0.5</u></b>	<b><u>0.4</u></b>
<b><u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u></b>	<b><u>31.5</u></b>	<b><u>32.5</u></b>	<b><u>28.1</u></b>
<b><u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u></b>	<b><u>15.1</u></b>	<b><u>19.9</u></b>	<b><u>14.7</u></b>
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2	0.2
Unified Commands	0.7	0.7	0.6
Federal Agency Support	0	0.1	0.1
Joint Staff	0	0	0
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	13.5	18.1	13
<b><u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u></b>	<b><u>7.9</u></b>	<b><u>7.7</u></b>	<b><u>7.1</u></b>
Supply Operations	3.6	3.5	3
Maintenance Operations	3.6	3.3	3.2
Logistics Support Operations	0.7	0.9	0.9
<b><u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</u></b>	<b><u>4.3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>3.7</u></b>
Combat Commands	2.1	1.9	1.8
Support Commands	2.1	2	1.9
<b><u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u></b>	<b><u>1.9</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>1.8</u></b>
Research and Development	0.6	0.6	0.6
Geophysical Activities	1.3	1.4	1.2
<b><u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u></b>	<b><u>81</u></b>	<b><u>63.8</u></b>	<b><u>64.3</u></b>
Personnel Support	5.3	4.8	4.4
Individual Training	75.7	59.4	60.3
<b><u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u></b>	<b><u>50.3</u></b>	<b><u>51.8</u></b>	<b><u>52.6</u></b>
Support Installations	30.4	37.6	42.3
Centralized Support Activity	18.1	13.1	9.2
<b><u>PROGRAMMED MANNING</u></b>	<b><u>934.3</u></b>	<b><u>911.7</u></b>	<b><u>849.8</u></b>
<b><u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u></b>	<b><u>15.6</u></b>	<b><u>14.1</u></b>	<b><u>1.8</u></b>
<b><u>INDIVIDUALS</u></b>	<b><u>7.6</u></b>	<b><u>10.1</u></b>	<b><u>9.2</u></b>
Transients	0	0	0
PPH	0	0	0
Trainees and Students	2	3.3	3.3
Cadets and Midshipment	0	0	0
<b><u>END STRENGTH</u></b>	<b><u>1113.6</u></b>	<b><u>1090.7</u></b>	<b><u>1009.7</u></b>

**TABLE 11-4**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER**  
 (Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	ACTUAL	BUDGET	
	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994
<b>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</b>			
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>15.1</u>	<u>14.8</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	7.6	8.3	8.8
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.5	3.5	3.6
Strategic Control and Surveillance Force	3.2	3.0	3.1
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>63.8</u>	<u>69.5</u>	<u>64.5</u>
Land Forces	20.2	22.5	18.6
Tactical Air Forces	15.7	15.4	15.5
Naval Forces	6.2	6.7	6.0
Mobility Forces	22.6	24.8	24.2
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</b>	<u>22.3</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>22.7</u>
Intelligence	10.5	11.7	11.6
Centrally Managed Communication	11.9	11.8	11.1
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>124.9</u>	<u>111.7</u>	<u>107.9</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.0</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>45.7</u>	<u>48.5</u>	<u>46.4</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>21.3</u>	<u>30.3</u>	<u>25.9</u>
Int'l Military Organizations	3.8	4.0	4.0
Unified Commands	1.0	1.3	1.2
Federal Agency Support	2.6	8.5	8.3
Joint Staff	.2	.2	.3
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	11.0	16.3	15.6
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>323.3</u>	<u>279.7</u>	<u>259.7</u>
Supply Operations	138.8	124.6	116.0
Maintenance Operations	135.6	117.6	102.3
Logistics Support Operations	49.2	43.5	49.2
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>24.3</u>	<u>21.4</u>
Combat Commands	5.6	4.0	4.5
Support Commands	17.2	17.1	16.5
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<u>101.0</u>	<u>98.1</u>	<u>97.7</u>
Research and Development	90.4	87.7	87.3
Geophysical Activities	10.6	10.4	10.3
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>59.2</u>	<u>62.2</u>	<u>59.3</u>
Personnel Support	37.2	39.5	38.4
Individual Training	21.1	21.5	19.8
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>122.8</u>	<u>193.4</u>	<u>180.9</u>
Support Installations	118.9	107.2	105.5
Centralized Support Activity	80.7	86.2	83.4
<b>PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>1004.8</u>	<u>963.2</u>	<u>918.6</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Transients	0	0	0
FPM	0	0	0
Trainees and Students	0	0	0
Cadets and Midshipmen	0	0	0
<b>END STRENGTH</b>	<u>1004.8</u>	<u>963.2</u>	<u>918.6</u>
<b>TOTAL CIVILIAN</b>	<u>1006.1</u>	<u>964.1</u>	<u>918.8</u>

## CHAPTER III

### ARMY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

#### I. INTRODUCTION

##### A. General

The manpower requirements for the Active Army, the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, and the civilian workforce are a function of the force structure the Army needs to meet its requirements under the National Military Strategy. The Army is shaping its forces into a smaller, more CONUS-based force possessing four essential qualities:

- 1) Versatility - the ability to respond to a widening array of challenges, while drawing from a smaller reservoir of forces.
- 2) Deployability - the ability to project appropriate combat power rapidly to wherever American interests are threatened.
- 3) Lethality - the ability to overwhelm all potential adversaries through a Total Force effort.
- 4) Expansibility - the ability to generate additional forces rapidly in response to a deterioration of international order.

The Army has demonstrated its commitment to the Total Force through many cooperative efforts. Operations have included assistance to states during civil disturbances and assisting in earthquake and hurricane recovery operations both nationally and internationally. Larger operations such as OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq and OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia and OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM in Southwest Asia have demonstrated the requirement for each of the Army's essential qualities and has taxed Army resources. In each case, the capability of each part of the force proved invaluable to the success of the operation.

Taking advantage of lessons learned from OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Army has developed a force mix to ensure that the proper capabilities are retained. Rapidly deployable forces generally require a higher density of active forces while reinforcing forces can take advantage of reserve component capabilities.

The programmed reduction in military force structure also generates a reduction of the civilian workforce. Consistent with the Army's personnel management philosophy, commanders influence how to reduce the civilian workforce, taking the most severe actions (e.g., reductions in force and furloughs) as a last resort. When civilians are impacted by reduction actions, job transition (i.e., ACAP) and placement programs are available to assist them in finding continued employment.

As the Army draws down, it will remain committed to the six enduring imperatives which have served the force so well:

- 1) Attract and retain high quality soldiers and civilians.
- 2) Maintain a forward-looking warfighting doctrine.
- 3) Maintain an appropriate mix of armored, light, and Special Operations Forces, Active Component/Reserve Component force structure, and Combat/Combat Support/Combat Service Support structure.

- 4) Conduct tough, realistic training.
- 5) Modernize continually to ensure Army forces have the right warfighting capabilities.
- 6) Develop competent, confident leaders.

Through continued adherence to these six imperatives and a commitment to the Total Force, the Army will continue to fulfill its fundamental mission of providing trained and ready forces for prompt, sustained land combat in defense of our national interests, while being prepared to serve wherever, whenever, and however called to serve the nation.

#### B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

Wartime manpower requirements are based on the total Army worldwide wartime force structure and the number of additional personnel needed to replace estimated combat casualties. Planning scenarios together with Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-1999 will be used to form the basis for a new Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning System (WARMAPS) data base, which will be used to produce new estimates of the Army's wartime manpower requirements.

#### C. Strength Request

Requested strengths for the Active and Reserve Components and the civilian workforce are shown below:

##### Army Strength Request (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Active Military	575.0	540.0
Army Reserve	279.6	260.0
Army National Guard	422.7	410.0
Civilians*	308.3	290.3

\*Includes Civilian Technicians

#### D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Programs

##### 1. Overview

a. The composition and size of the Army are based on requirements of the National Military Strategy (NMS). As strategy evolves to a multi-regional orientation, we will rely on a combination of forward presence and CONUS-based forces with unique Army capabilities to provide essential Land Forces. The Total Army will be structured to provide a wide range of land-based warfighting capabilities applicable throughout the operational continuum stationed at locations to best support strategic requirements. The Army will support all elements of the NMS - the capability to deter and defend against strategic nuclear attack; forward deployed forces supporting forward presence; rapidly deployable, fully capable contingency forces for crisis response capability; and reconstitution forces to hedge against the possibility of major war.

b. Force structure/manpower plans for FY 1993 - FY 1994 will maintain the Total Army's deterrent capability by continuing emphasis on CONUS-based combat unit readiness and training, continuing and sustaining modernization, improving the equipment posture of the Total Army, and increasing productivity programs. The Army continues to balance and mix its active and Reserve Component forces and mission assignments to provide the optimum blend of wartime/crisis capability and resources consistent with both the projected and current threat. In addition, the Army continues planning and programming efforts to implement the military and civilian end strength estimates reflected in the FY 1993 - 1994 President's Budget for Base Realignments and Closures while maintaining effective and sufficient warfighting capabilities.

c. The civilian manpower program is sized commensurate with force structure changes, Defense Management Report (DMR) initiatives, funded workload, Program Budget Decisions (PBD), Congressional actions and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions.

d. Although the Army manpower program includes both military and civilian strengths associated with Special Operations Force missions, these strengths are controlled by the joint command, USSOCOM, in accordance with Congressional directives. Therefore, all justification of both strengths and variances are included in the "Defense Agencies" portion of this report under USSOCOM.

The following tables display the strength changes by major Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), for the Active and Selected Reserve components and civilian workforce. (Note: Due to rounding, data in the tables may not add to the totals shown.)

Army Active Manpower by DPPC  
(End Strength in Thousands)  
ACTUAL

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Strategic	0.2	0.3	0.3
Tactical/Mobility	361.8	345.8	326.4
Communications/Intel	12.4	12.0	11.5
Combat Installation	19.4	15.6	14.4
Force Support Training	4.5	4.4	4.0
Medical Support	29.5	31.9	26.5
Joint Activities	23.1	23.0	22.8
Central Logistics	2.2	2.6	2.2
Service Mgt Hdqtrs	6.4	5.4	5.0
Research/Development	3.5	4.8	4.2
Training/Personnel	48.0	46.4	42.9
Support Activities	25.5	23.6	21.9
Total Programmed Manning	536.5	515.7	482.0
Undistributed Manning	0.0	-9.5	-1.8
Individuals	73.9	68.9	59.8
Total in the Budget	611.3*	575.0	540.0

\*Includes 855 Selected Reserves called to active duty for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM.



U.S. Army Reserve Manpower by DPPC  
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Tactical/Mobility	194.1	186.0	173.8
Communications/Intell	0.6	0.6	0.6
Medical Support	8.7	8.2	6.5
Joint Activities	11.3	12.6	9.4
Service Mgt Hqtrs	0.4	0.6	0.7
Training/Personnel	73.9	58.6	59.8
Support Activities	13.7	13.0	9.2
Active Guard/Reserve**	(12.6)	(12.5)	(11.0)
Individuals**	(19.6)	(20.1)	(16.4)
Indiv Mob Augmentees**	(13.9)	(13.0)	(13.0)
End Strength in the Budget	302.9	279.6	260.0

\*\*Parenthetical entry for Active Guard/Reserve and Individuals are not additive to total end strength--Active Guard/Reserve, Individuals and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) end strength are allocated among the appropriate DPPCs.

Army National Guard Manpower by DPPC  
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 92*</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Tactical/Mobility	398.9	389.3	373.0
Joint Activities	0.1	2.8	1.2
Support Activities	25.9	29.3	33.6
Training/Personnel	1.4	1.4	1.4
Individuals**	(22.6)	(23.1)	(27.0)
Total in the Budget	426.5	422.7	410.0

\*\*Parenthetical entry for Individuals is not additive to total end strength -- Individuals end strength is allocated among the appropriate DPPCs.

Army Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire) Manpower by DPPC  
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Strategic	0.1	0.1	0.2
Tactical/Mobility	22.2	15.7	11.9
Communications/Intel	4.6	5.5	5.4
Combat Installation	60.2	53.2	51.1
Force Support Training	2.6	2.2	1.4
Medical Support	27.6	29.1	29.3
Joint Activities	4.0	4.3	4.4
Central Logistics	64.2	59.3	55.0
Service Mgt Hqtrs	10.6	10.5	10.1
Research/Development	24.3	25.4	23.0
Training/Personnel	22.6	24.6	23.3
Support Activities	90.4	78.4	75.2
Total in the Budget	333.6	308.3	290.3

## 2. The FY 1993 and FY 1994 Programs

Commensurate with the end of the Cold War two active divisions and one corps were eliminated from Europe in FY 1992. Program adjustments in FY 1993 and FY 1994 eliminate two ARNG divisions. The Reserve Components will convert to predominately armored and mechanized infantry divisions as they field modern, more effective equipment. Modernization and structural changes will enhance the capability of the remaining force despite the reduction in combat divisions. Light divisions continue transition to objective designs. The resulting force structure will be smaller, better manned, and better equipped.

As a result of congressional direction, structural reshaping and manpower budget constraints, the Army's Active Component end strength will be reduced from a high of 781K in FY 1987 to 575K by FY 1993 and 540K by FY 1994. The Army plans to achieve this reduction by maximizing voluntary separations, increasing early retirements, reducing accessions (to the minimum necessary to sustain the force), and minimizing involuntary separations.

The FY 1991 Authorization and Appropriation Acts prohibit the reduction of Active Component Army Medical Department (AMEDD) end strength below the number of personnel serving on 30 September 1989. This restriction was lifted in FY 1993. Therefore, in FY 1993 and beyond, AMEDD reductions will be in consonance with the overall Army drawdown, subject to the certification of the Secretary of Defense that there are no requirements for these resources and that CHAMPUS costs will not grow.

The reshaped Army will be both a total force that is trained and ready to fight, and a strategic force capable of decisive victory wherever, whenever, and however called to serve the nation.

The Reserve Component (RC) continues to provide critical contributions to national security. RC reductions correlate to doctrinal reductions in the Total Force which are based on reduced strategic requirements. The primary thrust is toward improving the readiness of existing RC units while continuing modernization efforts.

Civilian strength adjustments for FY 1993 thru FY 1994 are commensurate with force structure requirements as determined by workload projections and moderated by approved funding levels. The FY 1992 actual civilian employment level was 333.6K. The estimated level for FY 1993 of 308.3K reflects congressionally mandated funding adjustments that affected civilian strength, force structure downsizing and DMR initiatives. Strength levels continue to decline in FY 1994 to 290.3K as base closures and realignments, reduced funding levels, force structure reductions, and more efficient methods of operation are put into effect.

## 3. Active Component

In FY 1993 and FY 1994 active component force structure changes will continue in CONUS, Europe, and the Pacific under the Army's force reduction plan.

a. CONUS. In FY 1992, United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) reflagged the 199th Motorized Brigade to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) ACR(L). The Headquarters and Headquarters Company for the 177th Armored Brigade (Separate) was activated at Fort Irwin, CA to support National Training Center (NTC) operations. The United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) was activated in Atlanta, GA and assumed command of USAR units in the CONUS. In FY 1993, the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) will convert to the 2d Armored Division and begin moving from Fort Polk, LA to Fort Hood, TX. The 2d ACR(L) will move from Fort Lewis, WA to Fort Polk, LA. Additionally, the 7th Infantry Division (Light) will inactivate at Ford Ord, CA, less 1st Brigade with its direct support artillery and forward support battalions which will move to Fort Lewis, WA. An armored brigade from United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) will move to Ft. Lewis, WA in FY94. Equipment modernization fieldings for armed OH58D and AH64 attack helicopters, M1A2 main battle tanks and M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles will continue thru FY 1995 to the smaller, more lethally capable force.

b. Europe

(1) In FY 1992, the U.S. Army in Europe reduced in size from about 178.9K to 115.4K. This 63.5K reduction inactivated a significant number of major combat maneuver formations and support organizations. Inactivated units included: VII Corps Headquarters, 3rd Armored Division, 8th Infantry Division, 2d Armored Division (Forward), 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, VII Corps Artillery and four artillery brigades, 10th Air Defense Brigade, 7th Engineer Brigade, 93rd Signal Brigade, 207th Military Intelligence Brigade, 7th Personnel Group, 7th Finance Group, 2d Corps Support Command and 59th Ordnance Brigade. Additionally, withdrawal of U.S. Army tactical nuclear weapons from Europe was completed in FY 1992.

(2) By the end of FY 1993, the Army in Europe will reduce from 115.4K to about 97.8K and 74.9K in FY94.

c. Pacific

(1) Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) force structure continues to be shaped by commitments to theater operations, congressional directives and the continuing threat of North Korean action. Nunn-Warner Phase I (FY 1990-1992) reductions were completed in FY 1992; however, and the Nunn-Warner Phase II reductions have been suspended indefinitely by the SecDef.

(2) U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). The 6th Infantry Division will convert to a Light Infantry Brigade by the end of FY 1994.

d. Latin America

U.S. Army South (USARSO). The Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan (PC-TIP) provides an orderly draw down of forces in Panama. USARSO force structure remained constant during FY 1993. Defense of the canal, nation building assistance, and the counter drug program remain as major USARSO missions.

#### 4. Reserve Component

##### a. Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Mix.

Composition and size of the Army are based on the National Military Strategy (NMS). Deterrence remains the central motivating and organizing concept guiding US military strategy. Military force contributes to deterrence in four broad areas: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The restructured Army will have a forward presence of four divisions (two in Europe, two in the Pacific) and a CONUS-based crisis response force of five AC divisions, three AC and six RC reinforcing divisions, (to be followed by reconstituted forces during full mobilization).

A basic consideration in determining the AC/RC mix is the availability for deployment, which drives unit readiness, and is largely dependent on warning and response time. AC forces are needed for rapid deployment. Certain RC units will be required to maintain high readiness levels to augment and assist early deploying AC units.

In distributing the projected force reductions in end strength, the Army focused on an appropriate mix of combat and support forces from among the AC and RC to meet the NMS requirements. The exact determination of this mix was the result of a rigorous analytical process called Total Army Analysis (TAA). Reductions bear a direct relationship to the NMS. HQDA determined component selection based on availability, capability, and affordability at acceptable risk.

b. Directed Training Associations (DTA). To improve readiness and warfighting capabilities, the majority of RC units (at a minimum, all battalion-size and above) have a Roundout, Affiliation, or Partnership association with an AC unit.

c. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The majority of the USAR units have combat service support type missions such as medical, transportation, supply, maintenance, military police, and engineering. In some of these areas, USAR units comprise a major part of the Total Force capability. Quality training, modern equipment, more automated systems, and increased full-time support have helped raise these units to higher levels of readiness.

d. Army National Guard (ARNG). The ARNG continues to convert to Army of Excellence (AOE) design in an effort to standardize its structure and equipment. Combat support and combat service support units will be eliminated with the Corps and echelons above corps force reduction. The remaining two standard infantry divisions will be converting to modern heavy divisions by converting and reshaping many units. This transition period will drive realignments in virtually all phases of the ARNG, and reduce the readiness of restructuring ARNG units during their transition.

#### 5. Army Civilians

The projected civilian strength levels of 308.3K for FY 1993, and 290.3K for FY 1994 reflect significant reductions over a short period of time from the FY 1992 level of 333.6. These reduced

strength levels are consistent with the reduced funding and force structure levels. The Army's goal is to continue to maintain optimum civilian force levels necessary to support projected workloads to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

E. Key Manpower Issues

1. Quality

The quality of the Total Army is determined by the quality of accessions and the retention of these personnel across the various military and civilian grade strata. From 1980, when low quality active component accessions resulted in congressionally mandated quality standards for the military services, to the present, a dramatic increase is evident:

<u>HSDG</u>		<u>AFQT I-III A</u>		<u>AFQT IV</u>	
1980	1992	1980	1992	1980	1992
54.3%	100%	26%	77.7%	51.9%	.4%

Quality active component goals for FY 1994 reflect a higher standard than that of the 1980's. During the late 1980's, the quality goals were 90 percent HSDG, 63 percent AFQT I-III A, and a ceiling of 10 percent AFQT IV. First implemented in FY 1991 in anticipation of planned force reductions during the next four years, these goals are at least 95 percent HSDG, at least 67 percent AFQT category I-III A, and no more than 2 percent AFQT category IV. These levels can be maintained only through continued competitive compensation, attractive educational incentives and enlistment bonuses, and by maintaining an effective communications/advertising program to ensure quality prospects are aware of opportunities available through Army service. These programs become increasingly important as there is a decreasing propensity to enlist. Retention, in turn, requires appropriate Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and quality of life programs that will support the needs of the soldiers and their families. Since active component soldiers constitute a significant accession cohort for the Reserve Components, quality active component accessions are an essential element in Total Force readiness. This is of particular importance during the reduction.

2. Stability

The continuation of the ongoing force reduction process will result in increased turbulence and reduced stability. The disruptive effect of these force reductions, exacerbated by the change to a contingency oriented force, present commanders and the personnel community with a unique challenges. It is imperative that the Army maintain strong leader development programs and constantly focus on personnel readiness while managing personnel reductions.

3. Officer Reduction Management

The National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) of 1991, 1992 and 1993 gave the Army the increased management flexibility necessary for downsizing the force through fiscal year 1995. The Army will

continue to encourage a "volunteer first" policy during the reduction period primarily using the voluntary reduction measures available under current statutes and utilizing the involuntary reduction measures, Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERB) for all officers and a regular Army Reduction in Force (RIF) for commissioned officers, only when necessary. (RIF authority for regular Army warrant officers has been drafted and is expected to be enacted in 1994 NDAA).

The Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Benefit (SSB) programs, now known as the Voluntary Separation Incentive Programs (VSIP), were authorized and used in fiscal year 1992. These programs offered monetary and other benefits incentives for officers with more than six but less than twenty years of active federal service to voluntarily leave the service. The success of the program greatly enhanced the FY 92 drawdown and allowed the Army to not only meet the officer endstrength, but it allowed the cancellation of the Captain's RIF board and a reduction in the target for the Major's RIF board because a sufficient number of RIF eligible officers participated in the voluntary program. This program continues in FY 1993 and will continue beyond, focusing on the RIF eligible officers as a means to eliminate or alleviate the burden of involuntary separations.

The FY 1993 NDAA authorizes a voluntary early retirement program. This program, authorized through September 1995, focuses on members with more than fifteen but less than twenty years of active federal service. The Secretary of Defense authorized the service secretaries to implement the program on 11 Mar 93. Eligibility criteria, e.g., years of service, skills, grades, etc., have been determined and announced for implementation during the remainder of FY 1993 and will shortly be announced for FY94. This program is expected to be at least as successful as the VSI/SSB program in generating sufficient voluntary separations to eliminate or alleviate selected involuntary separations.

#### 4. Enlisted Reduction Management

The downsizing plan is on track and working. The enlisted force reduction continues in FY 1993, seeking voluntary separations supplemented by existing involuntary programs, if needed. As in FY 1992, the Army continues to offer a Voluntary Early Transition Program for qualified soldiers with 3 or more years of service. In addition, enlisted soldiers with over 6 years of service and less than 20, may apply for separation with VSI or SSB. The FY 1993 program is smaller than FY 1992, due to the excellent prior year acceptance rates for these programs. Control of grade, skill, quality, and force balance remains the centerpiece of the program.

The FY 1993 National Defense Authorization Act provides additional incentives such as a temporary early retirement authority as discussed in officer section above, Montgomery GI Bill modifications, and improvements to transition benefits. No significant additional incentives are needed for the Army to meet the FY 1993 and programmed FY 1994 active component reductions.

## II. SIGNIFICANT HIGHLIGHTS

### A. Active Component Military Manpower

#### 1. General

The active Army ended FY 1992 with an actual strength of 610.5K; however, the 855 Reserves who were activated for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM and were still on active duty as of September 30, 1992, resulted in a total actual active-duty strength of 611.3K. Active Army military end strength is programmed for 575K in FY 1993 and 540K in FY 1994, down 231.8K from 780.8K at the beginning of FY 1987.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength (details explained in Section III)

#### 3. Readiness Assessment

FY 1992 was the largest year of the U.S. Army reduction. The force restructuring and manpower reductions will net a smaller and stronger Army of higher quality soldiers. New accessions entering the Army during these times will be required to meet higher standards. Retained units will be closely managed to ensure their present high level of readiness.

FY 1993 will be characterized by personnel shortages resulting from the success of the FY 1992 Voluntary Separation programs. Priority units of the contingency force, with priority for personnel fill, will maintain a high level of readiness. Non-contingency force units will be carefully managed to ensure maintenance of highest level of readiness possible with existing personnel shortages. The U.S. Army will remain ready and capable of responding to a national emergency.

In FY 1993, the active component will complete the assignment of 2000 officers and NCO's who will work full time to advise, assist, evaluate and train early deploying RC (USAR and ARNG) units. RC unit and personnel readiness should show a significant improvement as a result of this influx of highly qualified trainers from the AC.

### B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

#### 1. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)

a. General. The USAR end strength in FY 1992 was 302.8K. Programmed manning for FY 1993 is 279.6K, and 260.0K for FY 1994.

**TABLE III-1**  
**ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
**(IN THOUSANDS)**

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	Z MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	Z MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>100%</u>
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces								
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>383.1</u>	<u>361.8</u>	<u>378.8</u>	<u>345.8</u>	<u>91%</u>	<u>367.9</u>	<u>326.4</u>	<u>88%</u>
Land Forces	382.8	361.5	378.5	345.5	91%	367.6	326.1	89%
Division Forces	338.1	327.8	338.6	310.6	92%	327.1	292.1	89%
Theater Forces	44.7	33.7	39.9	34.9	87%	40.5	34.0	84%
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>15.2</u>	<u>12.0</u>	<u>79%</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>88%</u>
Intelligence	8.9	8.9	11.6	8.4	72%	9.6	8.1	84%
Centrally Managed Comm	4.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	100%	3.4	3.4	100%
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>16.4</u>	<u>19.4</u>	<u>19.4</u>	<u>15.6</u>	<u>80%</u>	<u>16.5</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>87%</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>75%</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>71%</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>33.7</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>38.4</u>	<u>31.9</u>	<u>83%</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>26.5</u>	<u>79%</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>23.3</u>	<u>23.1</u>	<u>23.2</u>	<u>23.0</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>23.9</u>	<u>22.8</u>	<u>95%</u>
Int'l Military Org	4.4	4.0	3.7	3.5	95%	3.8	3.1	82%
Unified Commands	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	100%	1.9	1.8	95%
Federal Agency Support	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	100%	0.3	0.3	100%
Joint Staff	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	16.4	16.8	17.0	17.0	100%	17.6	17.3	98%
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>90%</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>92%</u>
Supply Operations	1.1	0.8	1.0	0.9	90%	0.8	0.7	88%
Maintenance Operations	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.7	100%	0.7	0.7	100%
Logistics Support Opns	1.2	1.0	1.2	0.9	75%	0.9	0.8	89%
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>77%</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>79%</u>
Combat Commands	1.9	2.3	2.9	1.6	55%	2.3	1.4	61%
Support Commands	4.1	4.1	4.1	3.8	93%	4.0	3.5	88%
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACT.</b>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>77%</u>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>72%</u>
Research and Devel.	3.9	3.5	6.2	4.8	77%	5.8	4.2	72%
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>50.5</u>	<u>48.0</u>	<u>48.2</u>	<u>46.4</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>45.6</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>94%</u>
Personnel Support	11.5	11.2	11.6	11.6	100%	12.0	10.9	91%
Individual Training	39.0	36.7	36.6	34.8	95%	33.6	32.0	95%
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>27.5</u>	<u>25.5</u>	<u>24.8</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>23.9</u>	<u>21.9</u>	<u>92%</u>
Support Installations	10.4	11.6	10.3	9.1	88%	9.9	8.3	84%
Centralized Support Act'y	17.2	13.9	14.5	14.5	100%	14.0	13.5	96%
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b> 4	<u>564.2</u>	<u>536.5</u>	<u>570.0</u>	<u>515.7</u>	<u>90%</u>	<u>544.4</u>	<u>482.0</u>	<u>89%</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>		0		-9.5			-1.8	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>		73.9		68.9			59.8	
Transients		15.2		12.6			9.5	
Holdees		6.0		4.6			4.3	
Trainees		48.4		47.5			41.9	
Cadets		4.3		4.2			4.1	
<b>RESERVISTS ON ACTIVE DUTY</b>		0.9						
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>611.3</u>		<u>575.0</u>			<u>540.0</u>	



**TABLE III-1A**  
**ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
**(IN THOUSANDS)**

OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>36.6</u>	<u>36.8</u>	<u>42.3</u>	<u>33.6</u>	<u>79%</u>	<u>40.2</u>	<u>31.6</u>	<u>79%</u>
Land Forces	<u>36.5</u>	<u>36.7</u>	<u>42.2</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>79%</u>	<u>40.1</u>	<u>31.5</u>	<u>79%</u>
Division Forces	<u>32.8</u>	<u>33.8</u>	<u>38.0</u>	<u>30.5</u>	<u>80%</u>	<u>35.9</u>	<u>28.5</u>	<u>79%</u>
Theater Forces	<u>3.7</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>71%</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>71%</u>
Mobility Forces	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>76%</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>77%</u>
Intelligence	<u>2.1</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>71%</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>73%</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>73%</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>68%</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>73%</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>69%</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>12.0</u>	<u>11.2</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>11.6</u>	<u>81%</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>78%</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>97%</u>
Int'l Military Org	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>92%</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>91%</u>
Unified Commands	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>100%</u>
Federal Agency Support	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>
Joint Staff	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>97%</u>
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>91%</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>90%</u>
Supply Operations	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>80%</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>75%</u>
Maintenance Operations	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>
Logistics Spt Opns	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>80%</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>82%</u>
Combat Commands	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>56%</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>64%</u>
Support Commands	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>94%</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>90%</u>
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIV.</b>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>79%</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>72%</u>
Research and Development	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>79%</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>72%</u>
Geophysical Activities								
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>91%</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>85%</u>
Personnel Support	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>92%</u>
Individual Training	<u>8.2</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>89%</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>84%</u>
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>89%</u>
Support Installations	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>69%</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>73%</u>
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>7.6</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>92%</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>85.1</u>	<u>80.1</u>	<u>95.1</u>	<u>79.0</u>	<u>83%</u>	<u>90.7</u>	<u>73.5</u>	<u>81%</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>		<u>0</u>		<u>-5.4</u>			<u>-2.0</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>		<u>14.6</u>		<u>14.8</u>			<u>12.6</u>	
Transients		<u>2.8</u>		<u>2.0</u>			<u>1.2</u>	
Holdees		<u>0.9</u>		<u>0.6</u>			<u>0.5</u>	
Trainees/Students		<u>10.9</u>		<u>12.2</u>			<u>10.9</u>	
<b>RESERVISTS ON ACTIVE DUTY</b>		<u>0.4</u>						
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>95.2</u>		<u>88.7</u>			<u>84.4</u>	

**TABLE III-1B**  
**ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
**(IN THOUSANDS)**

ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	I MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	I MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>								
Land Forces	<u>346.5</u>	<u>325.0</u>	<u>336.5</u>	<u>312.2</u>	<u>93%</u>	<u>327.7</u>	<u>294.8</u>	<u>90%</u>
Division Forces	<u>346.3</u>	<u>324.8</u>	<u>336.3</u>	<u>312.0</u>	<u>93%</u>	<u>327.5</u>	<u>294.6</u>	<u>90%</u>
Theater Forces	<u>305.3</u>	<u>294.0</u>	<u>300.6</u>	<u>280.1</u>	<u>93%</u>	<u>291.2</u>	<u>263.6</u>	<u>91%</u>
Mobility Forces	<u>41.0</u>	<u>30.8</u>	<u>35.7</u>	<u>31.9</u>	<u>89%</u>	<u>36.3</u>	<u>31.0</u>	<u>85%</u>
	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>								
Intelligence	<u>10.7</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>80%</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>92%</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>6.8</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>73%</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>89%</u>
	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>14.6</u>	<u>17.4</u>	<u>17.2</u>	<u>14.0</u>	<u>81%</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>12.9</u>	<u>90%</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>75%</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>73%</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>24.1</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>84%</u>	<u>20.5</u>	<u>16.4</u>	<u>80%</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Int'l Military Org	<u>17.2</u>	<u>17.8</u>	<u>17.0</u>	<u>16.8</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>17.7</u>	<u>16.7</u>	<u>94%</u>
Unified Commands	<u>3.2</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>78%</u>
Federal Agency Support	<u>0.9</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>91%</u>
Joint Staff	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>
	<u>12.8</u>	<u>13.7</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>13.7</u>	<u>13.5</u>	<u>99%</u>
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>								
Supply Operations	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>78%</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>93%</u>
Maintenance Operations	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100%</u>
Logistics Spt Opns	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100%</u>
	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>57%</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>75%</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>								
Combat Commands	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>71%</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>68%</u>
Support Commands	<u>0.7</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>55%</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>56%</u>
	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>90%</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>80%</u>
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</b>								
Research and Development	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>77%</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>73%</u>
Geophysical Activities	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>77%</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>73%</u>
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>								
Personnel Support	<u>40.9</u>	<u>39.3</u>	<u>38.6</u>	<u>37.6</u>	<u>97%</u>	<u>36.0</u>	<u>34.7</u>	<u>96%</u>
Individual Training	<u>10.1</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>9.7</u>	<u>91%</u>
	<u>30.8</u>	<u>29.4</u>	<u>28.3</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>97%</u>	<u>25.3</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>99%</u>
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Support Installations	<u>19.0</u>	<u>19.1</u>	<u>17.0</u>	<u>16.2</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>16.3</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>92%</u>
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>9.4</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>91%</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>85%</u>
	<u>9.6</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>479.3</u>	<u>456.2</u>	<u>474.9</u>	<u>436.1</u>	<u>92%</u>	<u>453.8</u>	<u>408.0</u>	<u>90%</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>		<u>0</u>		<u>-4.1</u>			<u>0.2</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>		<u>59.3</u>		<u>54.1</u>			<u>47.0</u>	
Transients		<u>12.4</u>		<u>10.6</u>			<u>8.2</u>	
Holderes		<u>5.1</u>		<u>4.0</u>			<u>3.8</u>	
Trainees/Students		<u>37.5</u>		<u>35.3</u>			<u>30.9</u>	
Cadets		<u>4.3</u>		<u>4.2</u>			<u>4.1</u>	
<b>RESERVISTS ON ACTIVE DUTY</b>		<u>0.5</u>						
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>516.1</u>		<u>486.3</u>			<u>455.4</u>	

b. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and Operating Strength. Both the programmed manning and requirements shown in Table III-2 decline in FY 1993, FY 1994, but manning declines at a faster rate than requirements. Authorizations shown are based upon the FY 1993/1994 Authorization and FY 1993 Appropriations Acts.

c. Trained in Unit Strength. The percentage of trained manpower in units versus requirements declines in the budget years because operating strength declines at a faster rate than force structure. Force structure shown for FY 1993 and FY 1994 is based upon the Total Army Analysis process.

USAR Trained in Unit Strength  
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
End Strength	302.97	279.6	260.0
- Training Pipeline	30.2	20.1	16.4
- IMA	13.9	13.0	13.0
Operating Strength	258.8	246.6	230.6
- Non Unit AGR	4.4	4.0	3.9
+ Unit AC Personnel	1.2	1.2	1.3
Trained Unit Strength	255.6	243.8	225.4
Structure Requirements (Wartime) (Programmed Structure)	300.7	296.8	270.6
% Trained/Requirements	85.0	82.1	83.3

d. Readiness Assessment. The personnel readiness of the USAR improved in FY 1992 as trained in unit strength percentage increased slightly to 85 percent of wartime required. Efforts will continue in FY 1993 and the budget years to acquire and retain quality personnel with the skills needed through continued use of aggressively recruiting high quality NPS soldiers and DMOSQ PS soldiers.

e. Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program. The purpose of the IMA program is to preassign individual Selected Reservists in peacetime to Active Component units, the Selective Service System, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to train for their wartime duties. The IMA program gives the Active Army the necessary manpower resources to expand rapidly in periods of national emergency. Since its inception, approximately 17,000 positions have been identified to support the Active Army. Funding is required to support two weeks of annual training by each soldier assigned to the IMA program and those soldiers designated for drilling positions. Actual IMA strength for FY 1992 was 14,200 and decreased to 13,000 for FY 1993 and FY 1994.

f. Full Time Support Program. The Full Time Support Program assists Reserve Component units in achieving higher levels of readiness by providing drilling reservists the maximum available

**TABLE III-2**  
**U.S. ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
**(THOUSANDS)**

TOTAL ARMY RESERVE MILITARY	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<b>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</b>								
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>194.1</u>	<u>195.2</u>	<u>197.5</u>	<u>186.0</u>	<u>94.2%</u>	<u>180.9</u>	<u>173.8</u>	<u>96.1%</u>
Land Forces	191.2	193.2	195.4	184.1	94.2%	179.0	172.0	96.1%
Division Forces	186.3	188.2	191.9	180.7	94.2%	175.1	168.3	96.1%
Theater Forces	4.9	5.0	3.6	3.4	94.2%	3.9	3.7	96.1%
Mobility Forces	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>94.2%</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>96.1%</u>
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>								
Centrally Managed Comm	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	94.2%	0.6	0.6	96.1%
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	8.7	8.5	8.7	8.2	94.2%	6.8	6.5	96.1%
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>								
Support Cnds	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.6	94.2%	0.7	0.7	96.1%
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>								
OSD/Defense Agencies	11.3	10.8	13.3	12.6	94.2%	9.8	9.4	96.1%
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>73.9</u>	<u>73.6</u>	<u>62.2</u>	<u>58.6</u>	<u>94.2%</u>	<u>62.2</u>	<u>59.8</u>	<u>96.1%</u>
Individual Training	71.8	71.4	60.2	56.7	94.2%	60.3	57.9	96.1%
Personnel Support	2.1	2.2	2.0	1.9	94.2%	1.9	1.9	96.1%
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>13.7</u>	<u>13.8</u>	<u>13.8</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>94.2%</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>9.2</u>	<u>96.1%</u>
Support Installations	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.1	94.2%	3.0	2.9	96.1%
Centralized Support Act'y	10.5	10.6	10.5	9.9	94.2%	6.5	6.3	96.1%
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>302.7</u>	<u>302.8</u>	<u>296.8</u>	<u>279.6</u>	<u>94.2%</u>	<u>270.6</u>	<u>260.0</u>	<u>96.1%</u>
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>		(19.6)		(20.1)			(16.4)	
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</b>		(13.9)		(13.0)			(13.0)	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>302.9</u>			<u>279.6</u>			<u>260.0</u>	

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. Individuals and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are included in the DPPCs.

**TABLE III-2A**  
**U.S. ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
**(THOUSANDS)**

USAR OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992*		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	<u>27.5</u>	<u>26.8</u>	<u>26.9</u>	<u>26.2</u>	<u>97.7%</u>	<u>25.6</u>	<u>25.2</u>	<u>98.6%</u>
Land Forces	26.9	26.2	26.2	25.6	97.7%	25.0	24.6	98.6%
Division Forces	26.5	25.8	25.8	25.2	97.7%	24.7	24.4	98.6%
Theater Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	97.7%	0.2	0.2	98.6%
Mobility Forces	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>97.7%</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>98.6%</u>
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>97.7%</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>98.6%</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>97.7%</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>98.6%</u>
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</u>								
Support Commands	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>97.7%</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>98.6%</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>								
OSD/Defense Agencies	<u>3.2</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>97.7%</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>98.6%</u>
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>20.5</u>	<u>20.2</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>97.7%</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>98.6%</u>
Individual Training	20.3	20.1	17.7	17.3	97.7%	18.1	17.9	98.6%
Personnel Support	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	97.7%	0.1	0.1	98.6%
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>97.7%</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>98.6%</u>
Support Installations	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	97.7%	0.6	0.6	98.6%
Centralized Support Act'y	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.8	97.7%	3.0	2.9	98.6%
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	<u>59.5</u>	<u>57.7</u>	<u>56.6</u>	<u>55.3</u>	<u>97.7%</u>	<u>52.7</u>	<u>52.0</u>	<u>98.6%</u>
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>		0		0			0	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>								
<u>AUGMENTEES</u>		<u>(10.7)</u>		<u>(9.7)</u>			<u>(9.7)</u>	
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>		<u>57.7</u>		<u>55.3</u>			<u>52.0</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. Individuals and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are included in the DPFCs.

**TABLE III-2B**  
**U.S. ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
**(THOUSANDS)**

USAR ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992*		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	<u>165.7</u>	<u>168.4</u>	<u>171.1</u>	<u>159.8</u>	<u>93.4%</u>	<u>156.7</u>	<u>148.6</u>	<u>94.8%</u>
Land Forces	164.3	167.0	169.8	158.5	93.4%	155.4	147.4	94.8%
Division Forces	159.8	162.4	166.5	155.5	93.4%	151.7	143.9	94.8%
Theater Forces	4.6	4.6	3.2	3.0	93.4%	3.7	3.5	94.8%
Mobility Forces	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	93.4%	1.3	1.2	94.8%
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>93.4%</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>94.8%</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>93.4%</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>94.8%</u>
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</u>								
Support Commands	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	93.4%	0.3	0.3	94.8%
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>								
OSD/Defense Activities and Agencies	8.2	8.2	10.1	9.4	93.4%	7.2	6.9	94.8%
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>53.4</u>	<u>53.4</u>	<u>44.0</u>	<u>41.1</u>	<u>93.4%</u>	<u>44.0</u>	<u>41.8</u>	<u>94.8%</u>
Individual Training	51.5	51.3	42.2	39.4	93.4%	42.2	40.0	94.8%
Personnel Support	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.7	93.4%	1.8	1.7	94.8%
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>93.4%</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>94.8%</u>
Support Installations	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.4	93.4%	2.4	2.3	94.8%
Centralized Support Act'y	5.7	5.8	5.5	5.1	93.4%	3.5	3.3	94.8%
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	<u>242.3</u>	<u>245.1</u>	<u>240.2</u>	<u>224.3</u>	<u>93.4%</u>	<u>219.4</u>	<u>208.0</u>	<u>94.8%</u>
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>		(19.6)		(20.1)			(16.4)	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>		(3.3)		(3.3)			(3.3)	
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>		<u>245.1</u>		<u>224.3</u>			<u>208.0</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. Individuals and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are included in the DPPCs.

training time to prepare for the wartime mission. Full-time support personnel (Active Guard/ Reserve personnel, civilian personnel, active Army members, and Military Technicians) improve readiness by assisting in training, supply, maintenance, administration, and mobilization planning.

USAR Full-time Support

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Active Guard/Reserve	13,146	12,637	12,542
Army Reserve Techs*	7,747	7,339	7,159
Active Army with USAR units*	692	1,240	1,251
DA Civilians*	<u>1,010</u>	<u>1,133</u>	<u>1615</u>
TOTAL	22,595	22,349	22,567

\*Includes only DA civilians in support of USAR units.

2. Army National Guard (ARNG)

a. General. The ARNG FY 1993 Selected Reserve Personnel Inventory decreased 14.8K from the FY 1991 level of 441.3K to FY 1992 426.5K or 3.5 percent. This was a result of a directed budgeted end strength reduction of 26.1K paid end strength.

b. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength. The percent of the inventory versus programmed manning requirements dropped due to the reduction of personnel inventory in FY 1992 without a corresponding reduction in wartime requirements.

c. Trained in Unit. Table III-8C reflects the trained personnel assigned to units compared to the wartime unit structure. The percentage trained units lowers as budget end strength does not grow in relationship with structure.

ARNG Trained In Unit Strength

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
End Strength	425.8	422.7	410.0
-Training Pipeline	28.2	23.1	27.0
Operating Strength	398.3	399.6	387.1
-Non Unit AGR	6.2	6.4	6.3
Trained Unit Strength	392.1	394.0	382.0
Structure Requirements (Wartime) (Proposed Requirements)	425.8	422.7	410.0
% Trained in Units	92.0	93.2	93.2

d. Readiness Assessment. ARNG personnel readiness is affected by available strength and MOS qualification and retention programs are dealing effectively with the available strength shortfall. MOS qualification (MOSQ) remains the primary readiness inhibitor. To address this problem, the ARNG is involved in an effort to improve MOSQ through command emphasis and increased management of available school seats to ensure the best use of training resources. However, recent ARNG force modernization has had a significantly negative impact on MOSQ. As MOSs are changed to match new equipment, personnel first undergo new equipment training and become MOS-qualified to support the new modernized equipment. During the transition period from old to new requirements personnel are not MOS-qualified according to new document requirements. Highly technical and professional skill areas (e.g. medical, chemical) requiring lengthy schooling are also a major problem. M-day soldiers frequently experience difficulty obtaining leave from their civilian jobs commensurate with school seat availability.

e. Full-time Support Program. The goal of the Full-time support program is to contribute to the operational readiness of Reserve Component units prior to mobilization. In order to accomplish this, sufficient full time manpower must be available to train, supply, maintain, administer, recruit and manage the force. As there is not sufficient time between mobilization and deployment to correct significant deficiencies, the units must be ready before mobilization. Full time support for ARNG and USAR units consists primarily of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program and the military technician program; active component soldiers and civilian personnel are also involved.

ARNG Full-time Support

	(Actual)		
	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
AGR	25,024	23,341	21,580
Dual Status Military Techs	26,711	24,916	25,248
Non Dual Status ARNG Civ	2,379	2,168	2,011
Active Army with ARNG	538	546	546
Army Civilians	463	449	468

FY 1993 Congressional Floor total technicians 27,084

3. RC Personnel on Active Duty. The FY 1992 (Actual) figures are for those individuals serving on active duty as of the last day of FY 1992 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days.



**TABLE III-3**  
**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
 (Thousands)

TOTAL ARNG MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>401.5</u>	<u>398.6</u>	<u>405.3</u>	<u>389.3</u>	<u>96.1</u>	<u>389.3</u>	<u>373.0</u>	<u>95.8</u>
Land Forces	401.5	399.1	405.3	389.3	96.1	389.3	373.0	95.8
Division Forces	386.9	384.0	391.4	376.1	96.1	384.5	368.3	95.8
Theater Forces	14.6	14.9	13.9	13.2	95.2	4.7	4.7	98.2
Joint Activities	0.1	0.1	2.8	2.8	99.9	1.2	1.2	99.9
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.1	0.1	2.8	2.8	99.9	1.2	1.2	99.9
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>26.0</u>	<u>25.9</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>29.3</u>	<u>99.2</u>	<u>34.6</u>	<u>34.2</u>	<u>98.6</u>
Support Installations	21.2	21.1	28.4	28.4	99.9	33.5	33.6	99.9
Centralized Support Act'y	4.8	4.8	1.1	0.9	80.2	1.1	0.6	53.7
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>87.5</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>87.6</u>
Individual Training	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.4	87.5	1.9	1.7	87.6
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>429.1</u>	<u>425.8</u>	<u>439.3</u>	<u>422.7</u>	<u>96.3</u>	<u>427.0</u>	<u>410.0</u>	<u>96.0</u>
<b>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</b>		22.6		23.1			27.0	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>425.8</u>		<u>422.7</u>			<u>410.0</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

**TABLE III-3A**  
**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
 (Thousands)

ARNG OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992*		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>38.1</u>	<u>39.4</u>	<u>33.6</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>99.8</u>	<u>34.7</u>	<u>34.6</u>	<u>99.6</u>
Land Forces	38.1	39.4	33.6	33.5	99.8	34.7	34.6	99.6
Division Forces	36.5	37.8	32.2	32.2	99.8	34.1	34.0	99.6
Theater Forces	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.3	99.4	0.6	0.6	99.6
Joint Activities	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	99.9	0.2	0.2	99.9
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	99.9	0.2	0.2	99.9
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>98.6</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>98.3</u>
Support Installations	6.8	7.0	8.5	8.5	99.9	11.2	11.3	99.9
Centralized Support Act'y	0.9	0.9	0.4	0.2	66.7	0.4	0.2	48.7
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>87.7</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>88.4</u>
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	87.7	0.3	0.3	88.4
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>46.0</u>	<u>47.6</u>	<u>43.1</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>99.5</u>	<u>46.9</u>	<u>46.6</u>	<u>99.2</u>
<b>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</b>		4.2		2.9			8.7	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>47.6</u>		<u>42.9</u>			<u>46.6</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

**TABLE III-3B**  
**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(Thousands)

ENLISTED ARNG MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>322.8</u>	<u>320.9</u>	<u>372.4</u>	<u>356.3</u>	<u>95.7</u>	<u>354.4</u>	<u>338.3</u>	<u>95.4</u>
Land Forces	322.8	320.9	372.4	356.3	95.7	354.4	338.3	95.4
Division Forces	311.3	309.4	359.8	344.4	95.7	350.3	334.2	95.4
Theater Forces	11.5	11.5	12.6	11.9	94.7	4.1	4.0	98.0
Joint Activities	0.1	0.1	2.4	2.4	99.9	1.0	1.0	99.9
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.1	0.1	2.4	2.4	99.9	1.0	1.0	99.9
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>16.3</u>	<u>16.3</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>19.3</u>	<u>99.6</u>	<u>23.1</u>	<u>22.7</u>	<u>98.7</u>
Support Installations	12.8	12.7	19.3	19.3	99.9	22.4	22.4	99.9
Centralized Support Act'y	3.5	3.5	0.7	0.6	87.8	0.7	0.4	56.6
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>87.5</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>87.4</u>
Individual Training	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.2	87.5	1.6	1.4	87.4
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>340.3</u>	<u>378.9</u>	<u>396.1</u>	<u>379.8</u>	<u>95.9</u>	<u>380.1</u>	<u>363.4</u>	<u>95.6</u>
<b>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</b>		<u>16.4</u>		<u>20.1</u>			<u>18.3</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>378.9</u>		<u>379.8</u>			<u>363.4</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

USAR and ARNG Personnel on  
Active Duty for Training and Special Work in  
Excess of 180 Days

	<u>USAR FY 92</u>		<u>ARNG FY 92</u>	
	<u>(Actual)</u>		<u>(Actual)</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	9	716	28	1246
Flight Training	22	33	23	184
Professional Training at Military Institutions	23	0	6	19
Professional Training at Civilian Institutions	0	54	3	71
Active Duty Special Work	<u>14</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	68	883	67	1534

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Army civilians provide a major contribution in support of the Army's mission. Civilians, paid from appropriated funds (less those in support of civil works functions) comprise about one-fifth of Army manpower (including reserves and national guard). Civilians help manage and operate bases, depots and laboratories. They support the Army mission by performing a full range of logistics functions, including depot maintenance, supply, transportation and acquisition management. Civilians also provide essential support in training, medical care, research and development, engineering, personnel and administration, and facilities management. Civilians provided direct support in Desert Storm and Somalia. Most recently, through Defense Management Report (DMR) initiatives, the Army has sought to streamline these missions and processes by consolidating functions and operations, improving the performance of the defense acquisition system and more effectively managing resources. The majority of the Army's manpower resource savings brought about through DMR decisions are civilian. It is critical that, once streamlined, the Army has the capability to recruit and retain the high-quality civilian force needed to accomplish these critical missions. The Army is committed to reducing its civilian strength levels commensurate with the reduced measured workload inherent in a smaller Army. The standard tools used to reduce strength to the projected funding levels include: release of non-critical temporary employees; managed hiring freeze; voluntary early retirement authority; voluntary separation incentive pay (VSIP); and reductions-in-force only where necessary. The VSIP is the most recent tool available. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993 authorized the use of VSIP which is a lump sum payment equal to severance pay up to \$25,000. The purpose is to encourage employees to take immediate or early retirement or resign, in order to avoid or minimize involuntary separations. VSIP may be used in connection with Voluntary Early Retirement (where appropriate and after approval by the Office of Personnel Management), optional retirement, and resignations.

**TABLE III-4**  
**ARMY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
**(DIRECT AND INDIRECT HIRE END STRENGTH)**  
(In Thousands)

CIVILIANS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992*		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG REQT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>15.7</u>	<u>87%</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>84%</u>
Land Forces	20.5	19.3	18.0	15.7	87%	14.2	11.9	84%
Division Forces	13.8	13.3	11.0	9.4	85%	8.5	7.3	86%
Theater Forces	6.7	6.0	7.0	6.3	90%	5.5	4.6	84%
Mobility Forces	2.9	2.9	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>87%</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>86%</u>
Intelligence	3.1	2.0	3.2	2.9	91%	3.2	2.9	91%
Centrally Managed Comm	2.2	2.6	3.1	2.6	84%	3.1	2.5	81%
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>61.1</u>	<u>60.2</u>	<u>58.9</u>	<u>53.2</u>	<u>90%</u>	<u>58.9</u>	<u>51.1</u>	<u>87%</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>76%</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>74%</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>28.9</u>	<u>27.6</u>	<u>33.2</u>	<u>29.1</u>	<u>88%</u>	<u>33.2</u>	<u>29.3</u>	<u>88%</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>86%</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>88%</u>
Int'l Military Org	2.8	2.3	2.9	2.5	86%	2.9	2.5	86%
Unified Commands	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.4	67%	0.6	0.5	83%
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.3	87%	1.5	1.4	93%
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>67.7</u>	<u>64.2</u>	<u>68.0</u>	<u>59.3</u>	<u>87%</u>	<u>63.0</u>	<u>55.0</u>	<u>87%</u>
Supply Operations	19.2	16.5	17.0	15.8	93%	14.0	12.7	91%
Maintenance Operations	31.8	31.6	33.0	28.1	85%	31.0	26.4	85%
Logistics Spt Opns	16.8	16.1	18.0	15.4	86%	18.0	15.8	88%
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>83%</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>80%</u>
Combat Commands	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.0	83%	2.4	1.9	79%
Support Commands	8.8	8.5	10.2	8.5	83%	10.2	8.3	81%
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>24.3</u>	<u>28.0</u>	<u>25.4</u>	<u>91%</u>	<u>26.0</u>	<u>23.0</u>	<u>88%</u>
Research and Development								
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>45.3</u>	<u>22.6</u>	<u>28.5</u>	<u>24.6</u>	<u>86%</u>	<u>26.9</u>	<u>23.3</u>	<u>87%</u>
Personnel Support	13.5	11.3	14.5	13.2	91%	13.9	12.9	93%
Individual Training	11.7	11.3	14.0	11.4	81%	13.0	10.4	80%
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>91.8</u>	<u>90.4</u>	<u>90.0</u>	<u>78.4</u>	<u>87%</u>	<u>88.0</u>	<u>75.2</u>	<u>85%</u>
Support Installations	37.5	36.3	35.0	29.8	85%	33.0	29.3	89%
Centralized Support Act'y	54.3	54.1	55.0	48.6	88%	55.0	45.9	83%
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b> (Military Technicians)	<u>341.9</u>	<u>333.6</u>	<u>351.4</u>	<u>308.3</u>	<u>88%</u>	<u>336.0</u>	<u>290.3</u>	<u>86%</u>
		37.0		34.4			34.4	

Effective implementation of VSIP authority will provide savings in the near term and will result in a proper occupational mix of civilian employees in the reshaped Army. Early results indicate that where VSIP is being offered, RIF's are minimized.

Nearly 20 percent of the Army's appropriated fund civilian force is stationed overseas and provides a critical mobilization base needed for transition to wartime operations. Japan has agreed to assume 100% of Foreign National (FN) labor costs by FY 1995. Korea will contribute 33% of personnel costs by FY 1995. USAREUR burdensharing initiatives are still being negotiated.

## 2. Major Changes

The FY 1993 and FY 1994 civilian strength estimates reflect reductions of 25,370, and 43,383. The Army has reduced over 69K civilians since FY 1989 from the FY 1992 actual levels and is projected to reduce a total of 112.6K by FY 1994. Major changes include reductions to logistics support, base operations, and support to force structure. Other adjustments include savings from base closures, functional transfers (to include commissary operation and finance and accounting), reduction in Research and Development infrastructure, transfer of information infrastructure, and civilianization of military positions. Table III-4 shows the civilian employment estimate by DPPC.

### D. Manpower Management Improvements

The Army has restructured or implemented many programs to improve both personnel and manpower management as part of its concerted effort to become more efficient using available resources. Some of these programs are described below.

#### 1. Army Acquisition Corps (AAC)

The AAC resulted from an effort to develop a dedicated corps of military and civilian acquisition specialists and leaders. The challenges of developing, producing, and fielding new systems demand the focused attention of knowledgeable professionals. The AAC will enhance and sustain the acquisition skills of a select group of officers with a solid foundation of operational experience and civilian specialists with proven technical experience.

#### 2. MANPRINT

MANPRINT is an initiative that renews emphasis on the soldier as a key element of man-machine weapon systems performance. The MANPRINT program makes the following domains imperative in the materiel acquisition process: human factors engineering, manpower, personnel, training, system safety, and health hazard assessments. The MANPRINT philosophy is that soldiers are the Army's most important resource. Emphasis on MANPRINT will ensure that soldiers are considered during materiel development from before concept exploration to final product improvement. Recent initiatives undertaken to enhance soldier-machine

interface through system design have been extensive. Efforts include technical tool and MANPRINT data base development, human performance research, and training of government and industry personnel involved in the acquisition process.

Verifiable improvements have been identified as a by-product of the MANPRINT program. Personnel savings have been realized on the Howitzer Improvement Program and significant cost avoidance has been achieved on the Avenger and the Airborne Target Handoff System.

III. ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPPC)

Since March 1988, the Army's manpower accounting, force structure, and Planning/Programming/Budgeting systems have been subjected to a review and restructure. This effort identified some cases of DPPC misclassifications of existing Army tactical units, as well as differences in information for the units contained in the three major Army manpower information systems. This report contains DPPC structure adjustments necessary to correct the classification of existing tactical units with battlefield missions, as well as adjustments to strength levels for Active Army units reflecting the approved budget position in all management systems.

A. Strategic

1. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.2	.3	.3
<u>Civilian</u>	.1	.1	.2

B. Tactical/Mobility

1. Land Forces

	<u>Land Forces</u>		
	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Divisions	16	14	12
Separate Brigades & Regiments	9	9	8
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
Divisions	10	10	8
Separate Brigades & Regiments	26	26	17

a. Division Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	327.8	310.6	292.1
Reserve			
USAR	186.3	180.7	168.3
ARNG	384.6	376.1	368.3
<u>Civilian</u>	13.3	9.4	7.3

The decrease of (-17,184) in FY 1993 and (-18,495) in FY 1994 to active military manpower reflects the continuation of the ongoing initiative to reduce the size of the Active Army.

The decrease to civilian manpower (-3,931) in FY 1993 and (-2132) in FY 1994 reflects program decrements to tactical support-logistical units in support of the ongoing initiative to reduce the size of the Active Army.

The Reserve decrease of -5,553 in FY 1993 and -12,462 in FY 1994 reflect the reductions associated with the downsizing and restructuring of the Army.

b. Theater Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	33.7	34.9	34.0
Reserve			
USAR	4.9	3.4	3.7
ARNG	11.5	11.9	4.0
<u>Civilian</u>	6.0	6.3	4.6

The increase of (1,193) to active military manpower in FY 1993 reflects undermanning in FY 1992 due to early out incentives. The decrease of (-962) in FY 1994 reflects decreases in force structure as an ongoing initiative to reduce the size of the Active Army.

The increase to civilian manpower (292) in FY 1993 reflects underexecution in FY 1992 due to the hiring freeze. The decrease of (-1,732) in FY 1994 reflects force structure reductions in support of the ongoing initiative to reduce the size of the Active Army.

The changes in USAR and ARNG manpower reflect planned reductions through FY 1994.

2. Mobility Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.3	.3	.3
Reserve			
USAR	2.0	1.9	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	0.0	0.0

The decrease of (-2,858) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects the transfer of transportation functions to DOD.

C. Communications/Intelligence

1. Intelligence Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.9	8.4	8.1
<u>Civilian</u>	2.0	2.9	2.9

The decreases in active military manpower (-543) in FY 1993 and (-256) in FY 1994 reflect force structure adjustments to intelligence programs in association with the ongoing initiative to reduce the size of the Active Army.

The increase in civilian manpower (889) in FY 1993 reflects underexecution due to the hiring freeze.

The USAR decreases in FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflect planned end strength and force structure reductions.

2. Centrally Managed Communications Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.5	3.6	3.4
Reserve			
USAR	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	2.6	2.6	2.5



D. Combat Installations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	19.4	15.6	14.4
<u>Civilian</u>	60.2	55.2	51.1

The decrease to active military manpower (-3,774) and in FY 1993 reflects force structure adjustments in association with the ongoing initiative to reduce the size of the Active Army. The decrease (-1276) in FY 1994 reflects the reprogramming of the test base support sites to the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) (-824) and force structure adjustments in association with ongoing initiatives.

The decrease of (-7,023) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects the transfer of finance functions to DOD (-2008) and base operations downsizing in support of reduced force structure (-5,015). The decrease of (-2,091) in FY 1994 reflects the reprogramming of the test base support sites to the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) (-2,541), transfer of information management functions to DOD (-100), and a miscellaneous reprogramming actions (+550).

E. Force Support Training Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.5	4.4	4.0
<u>Civilian</u>	2.6	2.6	2.5

The decrease of (-329) to active military manpower in FY 1994 is attributed to downsizing of training support units in association with the overall effort to downsize the Army.

F. Medical Support Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	29.5	31.9	26.5
Reserve			
USAR	8.7	8.2	6.5
<u>Civilian</u>	27.6	29.1	29.3

The increase (2,422) to active military manpower in FY 1993 reflects undermanning in FY 1992 due to early out incentives. The decrease of (-5,414) in FY 1994 is attributed to downsizing of medical

support units in association with the overall effort to downsize the Army.

The increase of (1,461) in FY 1993 to civilian manpower is due to underexecution in FY 1992 due to the hiring freeze.

The changes in USAR manpower reflect planned end strength reductions and force structure changes.

G. Joint Activities

1. International Military Organization Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.0	3.5	3.1
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	2.5	2.5

2. Unified Commands Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.8	1.8	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	.4	.4	.5

3. Federal Support Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.2	.4	.3

4. Joint Staff Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.3	.3	.3

5. OSD/Defense Agencies & Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.8	17.0	17.3
Reserve			
USAR	11.3	12.6	9.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.3	1.4

Strength adjustments identified in this category will be explained in Chapter VII.

The increase in USAR manpower in FY 1993 reflects the transfer of spaces from another category associated with the USA Special Operations Command.

H. Central Logistics

1. Supply Operations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.8	.9	.7
<u>Civilian</u>	16.5	15.8	12.7

The decrease in civilian manpower of (-612) in FY 1993 and (-3,117) in FY 1994 reflects the reduction of supply operations in support of initiatives to downsize the Army.

2. Maintenance Operations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.4	.7	.7
<u>Civilian</u>	31.6	28.1	26.4

The increase to active military manpower of (+268) in FY 1993 reflects undermanning in FY 1992 due to early separation incentives.

The decrease of (-3,505) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects the transfer of supply functions from Red River and Sacramento Army Depots to DLA (-164), realignment of finance functions to DOD (-514), and management improvement initiatives to streamline operations (-2,827). The decrease (-1,685) in FY 1994 reflects continued reductions in support of initiatives to downsize the Army.

3. Logistics Support Operations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.0	.9	.8
<u>Civilian</u>	16.1	15.4	15.8

The decrease of (-737) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects the reductions to maintenance activities in support of downsizing initiatives. The increase (464) in FY 1994 is in support of reserve maintenance activities.

I. Service Management Headquarters

1. Combat Commands Management Headquarters Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.3	1.6	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.1	2.0	1.9

The decrease to active military manpower of (-706) in FY 1993 and (-175) in FY 1994 results from management headquarters reductions in line with the downsizing initiatives.

The decrease to civilian manpower (-134) in FY 1993 and (-122) in FY 1994 results from management headquarters reductions in line with the downsizing initiatives.

2. Support Commands Management Headquarters Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.1	3.8	3.5
<u>Civilian</u>	8.5	8.5	8.3

The decrease to active military manpower (-261) in FY 1993 and (-303) in FY 1994 results from management headquarters reductions in line with the downsizing initiatives.

The decrease to civilian manpower (-12) in FY 1993 and (-227) in FY 1994 results from management headquarters reductions in line with the downsizing initiatives.

J. Research and Development/Geophysical Activities

Research and Development Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.5	4.8	4.2
<u>Civilian</u>	24.3	25.4	23.0

The increase (1248) to active military in FY 1993 reflects undermanning of (400) in FY 1992 and reprogramming from R&D base support to mission activities (858). The decrease (-576) in FY 1994 reflects a reduction to research and development projects in support of the downsizing initiative.

The increase (1,057) to civilian manpower in FY 1992 reflects reprogramming from R&D base support to mission activities. The decrease of (-2,351) in FY 1994 reflects a reduction to research and development projects in support of the downsizing initiative.

K. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.2	11.6	10.9
Reserve			
USAR	2.1	1.9	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	11.3	13.2	12.9

The increase (333) to active military manpower in FY 1993 represents undermanning in FY 1992 due to early separation incentives. The decrease (-630) in FY 1994 is due to reductions in personnel programs in support of the downsizing initiatives.

The increase (1,922) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects underexecution due to the hiring freeze in FY 1992. The decrease (-302) in FY 1994 reflects reductions in personnel programs in support of force structure reductions.

2. Individual Training Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	36.7	34.8	32.0
Reserve			
ARNG	1.0	1.2	1.4
USAR	71.8	56.7	57.9
<u>Civilian</u>	11.3	11.4	10.4

The decrease (-1,897) to active military in FY 1993 and (-2,878) represents a reduction in training units in support of downsizing initiatives.

The decrease (-967) to civilian manpower in FY 1994 represents the transfer of (-213) to DOD for the establishment of the Defense Acquisition University and (-754) for reduction in support of training units associated with the downsizing of the Army.

The decreases in FY 1993 and FY 1994 from the FY 1992 level reflect planned end strength reductions for both ARNG and USAR.

L. Support Activities

1. Support Installations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.6	9.1	8.3
Reserve			
ARNG	12.7	19.3	22.4
USAR	3.3	3.1	2.9
<u>Civilian</u>	36.3	29.8	29.3

The decrease (-2,473) in FY 1993 reflects reprogramming of research and development maintenance accounts to mission accounts. The decrease (-772) in FY 1994 reflects reductions to base support in support of initiatives to downsize the Army.

The decrease of (-6,558) in FY 1993 represents (-313) for transfer to DOD for finance functions and (-6,245) for reprogramming of research and development maintenance accounts to mission accounts. The decrease of (-431) in FY 1994 reflects reductions to base support in support of initiatives to downsize the Army.

The USAR decreases reflect the congressionally authorized end strength and a reduction of overstrengths.

2. Centralized Support Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.9	14.5	13.5
Reserve			
ARNG	3.5	0.6	0.4
USAR	10.5	9.9	6.3
<u>Civilian</u>	54.1	48.6	45.9

The increase (609) to active military manpower in FY 1993 reflects undermanning in FY 1992 due to early separation incentives. The decrease (-934) in FY 1994 reflects reductions to various centralized support activities in support of initiatives to downsize the Army.

The decrease (-5,507) to civilian manpower in FY 1993 reflects reductions to information management (-1958), transfer of finance functions to DOD (-660), and reductions to various centralized support activities in association with downsizing of the Army (-2889). The decrease (-2,715) in FY 1994 reflects the transfer of information management functions to DOD (-1,573) and continued reductions in association with downsizing the Army (-1,142).

The USAR and ARNG decreases in FY 1993 and FY 1994 reflect planned end strength reductions.

M. Individuals

1. Transients (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.2	12.6	9.5

Transient strengths are based on the projected volume of PCS moves for accessions, separations, and retirements, and on operational, rotational, and training move requirements. The changes in transient strength are a result of changes in volume, timing, and duration of PCS moves.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.0	4.5	4.3

3. Trainees and Students (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	48.4	47.4	41.9
Reserve			
Trainees/Students (Pay categories F, P, Q, T)			
ARNG	22.6	23.1	27.0
USAR	19.6	20.1	16.4

The active component trainee data largely mirror the flow of non-prior service accessions. Trainees and students are particularly subject to change at end year as accessions are managed to meet the overall end strength. Enlisted accessions (trainees) are lower than usual during the build down years.

The Reserve Component training pipeline consists of Troop Program Unit junior enlisted personnel who have not completed initial entry qualification training and are not deployable and personnel who concurrently are enrolled in ROTC.

4. Cadets/Midshipmen (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Cadets	4.3	4.2	4.1

N. Miscellaneous

Undistributed Manpower (in Thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.0	-9.5	-1.8



## CHAPTER IV

### NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

#### I. INTRODUCTION

##### A. General

This chapter outlines the Navy's requirements for active, reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1992 through FY 1994. It addresses manpower trends from actual performance in FY 1992 to projections into FY 1994 and reflects changes contained in the President's Budget submission for FY 1994. Further, it reviews the Navy's initiatives and programs geared to meet the challenge of maintaining their readiness posture within the context of a more fiscally-constrained environment.

Authorized Navy active military end strength in FY 1993 is 526,400 (66,996 officers and 459,404 enlisted) and 480,800 in FY 1994 (62,747 officers and 418,053 enlisted). This represents a reduction of 6,365 officers, and 54,756 enlisted personnel between FY 1992 and FY 1994. Civilian employment in FY 1993 (264,600 end strength) is projected to decline by 13,802 to 250,798 end strength in FY 1994.

The Navy's manpower management strategy during this period of force reductions is to retain high quality personnel, increase experience levels, maintain acceptable sea/shore rotation, improve training levels and reduce manpower costs during the force reduction. This strategy includes a continued commitment to provide the quality of life for Navy personnel that will contribute to positive retention and readiness.

The Navy must be able to fill key positions to perform its mission successfully and safely. Therefore, the recruiting and retention of high caliber officer and enlisted personnel to man our technologically-sophisticated Navy remains a top priority. Retention of experienced enlisted personnel during force drawdown will require stable levels of compensation, continued advancement opportunity and an acceptable quality of life for both the sailor and his/her family.

##### B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

Wartime manpower requirements are based on the total Navy worldwide force structure and the number of additional personnel needed to replace estimated combat casualties. Planning scenarios from Defense Planning Guidance will be used to form the basis for a new Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning System (WARMAPS) data base, which will be used to produce new estimates of the Navy's wartime manpower requirements.

##### C. Strength Request

The Navy resources for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1993 and FY 1994 requested are as follows:

Navy Manpower Requirements  
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	541.9	526.4	480.8
Selected Reserve/TAR	142.3	133.7	113.4
<u>Civilian</u>	290.5	264.6	250.8

The Navy manpower requirement shows only the authorized end strength required to effectively operate the Navy during peacetime, while the wartime requirement, as indicated in paragraph B above, reflects end strength which would be needed during mobilization.

The civilian requirement is the manpower level required to execute funded requirements and comply with concerted effort to contain manpower costs through pursuit of economy, efficiency, and productivity improvement programs.

The Selected Reserve component requirement reflects the difference between the trained manpower needed at the start of a protracted conventional war and the Active Navy we can afford and attain in peacetime.

The Navy reassesses military billet assignments at shore establishments and considers substituting civilians or contractors for all non-military essential billets when it is more cost effective and consistent with sea-shore rotation requirements.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Requirements

1. Manpower Requirement by Major DPPC

The distribution of military manpower from FY 1992 to FY 1994 reflects an end strength reduction tied to force structure reductions. Using programmed end strength for each Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) between FY 1992 and FY 1994, the following tables depict the Navy Active Strength distribution.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The major force structure for the Navy includes Total Battle Forces, Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces, and Naval Aviation Forces.

a. Total Battle Forces. Within Total Battle Forces are five major subcategories: Strategic Forces (SSBN and their support ships), Tactical Air Forces (Carriers), Naval Forces (Surface Combatants, Attack Submarines, Amphibious Warfare Ships, Patrol and Mine Warfare Ships), Mobility Forces/Support Forces (Combat Logistic and Mobile Logistic, Fleet Support Ships), and Mobilization Forces Category "A" (Reserve Surface Combatants and Amphibious Warfare Ships). In

Navy Active Strength Distribution By DPPC  
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1992*</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Strategic	17.1	14.4	12.8
Tactical/Mobility	264.1	259.6	242.3
Communications/Intelligence	15.9	15.5	14.8
Combat Installations	25.1	23.6	22.4
Force Support Training	15.2	13.8	11.8
Medical Support	25.4	25.5	25.2
Joint Activities	10.0	10.3	10.4
Central Logistics	5.6	6.0	5.4
Service Management			
Headquarters	5.3	5.1	4.8
Research and Development	7.4	7.3	6.7
Training and Personnel	37.8	34.9	28.6
Support Activities	27.6	25.5	25.0
Operating Strength			
Deviation		-2.9	-2.3
Individuals	85.4	87.7	73.0
Total in the Budget	541.9	526.4	480.8

\*Includes 34 Selected Reserves called to active duty for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Navy Selected Reserve Strength Distribution by DPPC  
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1992*</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Strategic	1.1	0.5	0.5
Tactical/Mobility	79.7	75.4	61.9
Communications/Intelligence	5.9	5.6	4.0
Combat Installations	9.5	7.5	7.3
Force Support Training	1.0	0.5	0.4
Medical Support	14.3	15.1	12.4
Joint Activities	2.2	2.5	2.2
Central Logistics	7.9	7.8	7.0
Service Management	3.9	3.7	3.4
Headquarters			
Research and Development	1.1	1.0	1.0
Training and Personnel	2.9	2.3	2.2
Support Activities	7.7	7.7	7.3
Individual Mobilization	2.5	0.6	0.6
Augmentee			
Individuals**	2.6	3.4	3.2
Total in the Budget	142.3	133.6	113.4

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

\*End Year Actuals

\*\*Individuals includes students, transients, and trainees.

Navy Civilian Strength Distribution By DPPC  
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Strategic	4.3	4.3	4.2
Tactical/Mobility	11.7	11.7	11.5
Communications/Intelligence	5.0	4.4	3.7
Combat Installations	18.6	17.7	17.6
Force Support Training	1.5	1.4	1.3
Medical Support	9.0	9.6	9.6
Joint Activities	3.1	3.1	3.0
Central Logistics	131.8	109.7	95.9
Service Management			
Headquarters	6.4	6.1	5.8
Research and Development	57.4	54.5	56.5
Training and Personnel	6.5	7.1	6.9
Support Activities	35.2	35.0	34.8
Total in the Budget	290.5	264.6	250.8

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

FY 1993 the total ship battle forces decreased by 28 to 438 ships. In FY 1994 the number will decrease to 413. Changes in each of the five categories are outlined in the following paragraphs.

(1) Strategic Forces. In FY 1993 the total number of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) decreases to 22 with the decommissioning of two James Madison, six Benjamin Franklin, one Lafayette class SSBNs, and the commissioning of one Ohio class SSBN. In FY 1994 the total number of SSBNs decreases to sixteen with the commissioning of one Ohio class SSBN and the decommissioning of four James Madison class, one Lafayette class, one Benjamin Franklin class SSBNs and the conversion of one Benjamin Franklin class SSBN to SSN.

Strategic Support Ships decrease to one in FY 1993 with the transfer of one Simon Lake class submarine tender, to general support forces. In FY 1994 Strategic Support Ships remain constant at one.

(2) Tactical Air Forces. In FY 1993 aircraft carriers decrease to thirteen with the decommissioning of one Forrestal class carrier. In FY 1994 aircraft carriers decrease to twelve with decommissioning of one Forrestal class carrier.

(3) Naval Forces. Surface Combatants decrease by 8 to 124 in FY 1993, decrease by one to 123 in FY 1994. Cruisers increase to 52 in FY 1993 with the commissioning of four Ticonderoga class cruisers and the decommissioning of one Virginia Class Cruiser. Cruisers decrease to 45 in FY 1994 with the decommissioning of one Long Beach, one Virginia, two Belknap, four Leahy class cruisers, and the commissioning of one Ticonderoga class cruiser. Destroyers decrease to 37 in FY 1993 as two Adams and two Farragut class destroyers are decommissioned and the commissioning of one Arleigh Burke class destroyer. In FY 1994 the number of destroyers increase to 43 with the commissioning

of six Arleigh Burke class destroyers. Frigates decrease to 35 in FY 1993 with the decommissioning of 8 Knox class frigates. In FY 1994 frigates remain constant at 35.

In FY 1993 attack submarines increase to 88 with the commissioning of four Los Angeles class and decommissioning of one Sturgeon class submarine. In FY 1994 attack submarines decrease to 84 with decommissioning of one Permit class, one Los Angeles class, and six Sturgeon class submarines, the conversion of one Benjamin Franklin class and the commissioning of three Los Angeles class submarines. In FY 1993 patrol combatants decreased to two with the decommissioning of four Pegasus class patrol combatants. In FY 1994 the two remaining Pegasus class patrol combatants are decommissioned.

In FY 1993 amphibious warfare ships decrease to 55 with the commissioning of one LHD-1 class ship, and the decommissioning of one Charleston class LKA, two Iwo Jima LPHs and two Newport class LSTs. In FY 1994 amphibious warfare ships decrease to 52 with the commissioning of one LSD-41 (Variant) class and, the decommissioning of two Iwo Jima class LPHs and two Newport class LSTs.

In FY 1993 mine warfare ships increase to fourteen with the commissioning of three Avenger class MCMs and one MHC-1 class. In FY 1994 mine warfare ships increase to fifteen with the commissioning of two Avenger class MCMs and the decommissioning of one Aggressive class.

(4) Mobility Forces/Support Forces. In FY 1993 combat logistics ships remain constant at 50. In FY 1994 combat logistic ships decrease to 48 with the decommissioning of two Wichita class AORs, one MARS class AFS, two Kaiser class TAOs and one Nitro class AE, and the commissioning of two AOE-6 class AOE's, and two Kaiser class AOs.

In FY 1993 mobile logistic ships decrease to 17 with the decommissioning of one Dixie class AD, one Fulton class AS and the transfer of one Simon Lake class AS from strategic support. In FY 1994 mobile logistic ships decrease to 14 with the decommissioning of one Hunley class AS and two Dixie class ADs.

In FY 1993 fleet support ships decrease to 33 with the decommissioning of one Bolster class ARS, six Stalwart TAGOSs, one Chanticleer class ASR, and the commissioning of two Victorious class TAGOSs. In FY 1994 fleet support ships decrease to 31 with the decommissioning of one Chanticleer ASR, two Stalwart TAGOSs and the commissioning of one AGOS-23 class TAGOS.

(5) Mobilization Forces Category "A". In FY 1993 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will decrease to 18 with the deactivation of one Newport class LST. In FY 1994 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will decrease to 16 with the deactivation of two Newport class LSTs.

b. Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces

(1) Auxiliaries and Sealift Forces. In FY 1993 auxiliaries and sealift forces will increase to 150 with the addition

of three TAKRs, seven TAOTs, four TAKs, one TACS, two TAGOSs and the deletion of one AVT. In FY 1994 auxiliaries and sealift forces increase to 166 with the addition of four TAKs, four TAKRs and eight TAOTs.

(2) Mobilization Forces Category "B". These forces decrease by two in FY 1993 with the deletion of one Aggressive class and one Acme class MSO. The four remaining Aggressive class MSOs and eight Knox class frigates are deleted in FY 1994 and one MHC-51 class ship is added.

c. Naval Aviation Forces

Active tactical squadrons decrease to 81 in FY 1993 and decreases to 77 in FY 1994. Reserve squadrons remain constant at 14.

ASW/FAD active squadrons decrease to 57 in FY 1993 and to 52 in FY 1994. Reserve squadrons remain constant at 20 in FY 1993 and decrease to 15 in FY 1994.

E. Key Manpower Issues

1. Force Reduction Strategy

The manpower management strategy the Navy has adopted for the 1990s is centered on the premise that, as the Navy gets smaller, the opportunity exists to proactively shape the force in order to retain high quality personnel, increase experience levels, gain slightly better sea/shore rotation for our people, improve training levels, and reduce overall manpower costs. A key element of this strategy is a commitment to take care of the people who are in the Navy, and wish to stay, even as total strength decreases. The Navy can accomplish all of these things while reducing its size as long as the reductions are consistent with the pace and magnitude of the reductions in force structure (ship/squadrons). Under present reduction plans, no career force personnel will be involuntarily separated prior to reaching retirement eligibility.

While the Navy plans to decrease the absolute number of petty officers, this number will remain steady as a percentage of the force. On average, active duty Navy Battle Force (M +1) billets are filled at 90.0 percent of Wartime Manpower Requirements. Of these authorized billets, 71 percent are for petty officers, E-4 to E-9. In FY 1993, fiscal constraints allowed the Navy to fill no more than 69.9 percent of total peacetime billets with petty officers, rather than the 71 percent required. The increased technological requirements which exist in virtually all of the Navy's ratings (afloat and ashore) make the continued manning of petty officer billets with untrained, inexperienced apprentice seamen unacceptable. In FY 1994, the petty officer inventory will be maintained at 69.9 percent of peacetime requirements.

In summary, the Navy desires to protect force readiness in the near term by protecting quality people currently on board, maintain sufficient accession levels to preclude a "hollow force" in the future, manage officer accessions and retention to maintain the correct

grade/quality mix, improve recruit quality to reduce attrition and ensure long term readiness, and rebalance the enlisted skill mix using existing force management tools.

## 2. Recruiting

A key element in manning the smaller, more technical Navy of the future is the ability to successfully recruit to requirements for High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG) and Upper Mental Group (UMG) enlistees. The Navy will need a quality future force.

The Navy has developed a workload model that predicts the average recruiter workload required to meet present and future recruiting goals. The model demonstrates that, despite force downsizing and manpower reductions, the Navy's recruiting workforce needs to remain stable to support necessary accession levels. This is necessary to successfully compete in a much tougher market and to attract high quality recruits.

## 3. Bonus Programs

It is vital that the Navy have the necessary tools available to adequately shape the force. The ability to retain the best and most highly trained officers and petty officers is not only the key to readiness, but is many times cheaper than recruiting and training a new accession. To ensure the right people stay, most of whom have readily marketable skills in the civilian economy, the Navy uses selectively targeted bonus programs. These bonus programs have been vital to the Navy's ability to retain highly skilled officers and petty officers, particularly in specialties that are undermanned. Even while downsizing, these bonuses are essential to retain targeted skills and adequately shape the force to present and future requirements.

## II. SIGNIFICANT HIGHLIGHTS

### A. Active Component Military Manpower

#### 1. General

The Navy's highest priority continues to be the accession and retention of people in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. People are as integral to new weapon systems as hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, the Navy continues to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose talents are in shortest supply.

#### 2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and End Strength

The Navy's programmed manning in FY 1993 and FY 1994 is oriented toward ensuring that personnel are available to meet the manpower requirements established by force structure. The active manpower shown in Table IV-1 reflects the decreasing manpower requirements in response to the reduction in force structure.

**TABLE IV-1**  
**ACTIVE NAVY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH**  
(Thousands)

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992*		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>18.7</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>15.2</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>13.5</u>	<u>12.8</u>	<u>95</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	16.5	15.2	13.0	12.4	95	11.5	10.8	95
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.0	94	2.0	1.9	94
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>272.9</u>	<u>264.2</u>	<u>265.8</u>	<u>259.6</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>253.9</u>	<u>242.3</u>	<u>95</u>
Land Forces	5.1	4.6	5.1	5.0	100	5.1	5.1	100
Tactical Air Forces	66.1	62.6	64.4	63.0	98	61.6	59.3	96
Naval Forces	200.8	196.1	195.0	190.3	98	185.8	176.5	95
Warships and ASW Forces	89.9	88.0	88.3	85.3	97	84.2	79.8	95
Amphibious Forces	34.5	33.1	34.2	33.3	97	33.4	33.1	99
Naval Support Forces	76.4	75.0	72.7	71.7	99	68.3	63.7	93
Mobility Forces	1.0	0.9	1.3	1.2	98	1.4	1.4	99
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>16.1</u>	<u>15.9</u>	<u>16.9</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>16.0</u>	<u>14.8</u>	<u>93</u>
Intelligence	7.2	7.4	7.4	6.7	91	6.5	6.0	93
Centrally Managed Comm	8.9	8.5	9.5	8.8	92	9.6	8.8	92
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>24.3</u>	<u>25.1</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>23.0</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>98</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>14.7</u>	<u>15.2</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>13.8</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>12.2</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>96</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>25.6</u>	<u>25.4</u>	<u>25.6</u>	<u>25.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>25.3</u>	<u>25.2</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>10.4</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>10.4</u>	<u>99</u>
Int'l Military Org.	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.3	97	1.4	1.3	98
Unified Commands	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.4	94	1.5	1.4	95
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	99	1.1	1.1	98
Joint Staff	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.1	100	6.3	6.2	100
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>94</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>96</u>
Combat Commands	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.5	98	2.5	2.5	99
Support Commands	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	97	2.6	2.4	92
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>95</u>
Research and Development	6.1	5.7	5.8	5.5	94	5.4	5.1	95
Geophysical Activities	1.9	1.7	1.9	1.8	96	1.6	1.6	96
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>37.2</u>	<u>37.7</u>	<u>37.3</u>	<u>34.9</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>29.7</u>	<u>28.6</u>	<u>95</u>
Personnel Support	8.7	8.5	8.8	8.1	92	7.5	7.3	98
Individual Training	28.5	29.2	28.5	26.9	94	22.2	21.2	94
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>26.3</u>	<u>27.6</u>	<u>26.61</u>	<u>25.5</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>26.4</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>96</u>
Support Installations	21.2	22.0	21.7	20.7	95	21.5	20.2	95
Centralized Support Act'y	5.1	5.6	4.9	4.8	98	4.9	4.8	98
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>464.9</u>	<u>456.5</u>	<u>454.8</u>	<u>441.5</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>428.3</u>	<u>410.1</u>	<u>96</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/ (Manyears)</b>	-3.4			-2.9			-2.3	
<b>INDIVIDUALS c/ Transients</b>	<u>89.8</u>	<u>85.4</u>	<u>87.7</u>	<u>87.7</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>73.0</u>	<u>73.0</u>	<u>100</u>
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	23.4	20.1	22.7	22.7	100	21.0	21.0	100
Students/Trainees	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.3	100	3.2	3.2	100
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	58.2	57.3	57.2	57.2	100	44.6	44.6	100
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.5	100	4.2	4.2	100
<b>ENDSTRENGTH*</b>	<u>551.3</u>	<u>541.9</u>	<u>542.6</u>	<u>526.4</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>501.4</u>	<u>480.8</u>	<u>96</u>

\*End strength may not equal total of DPFC categories due to rounding.

Note: Active Navy Manpower Structure or requirements consist of peacetime requirements.



**TABLE IV-1A**  
**ACTIVE NAVY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH**  
(Thousands)

AC OFFICERS	FY 1992*		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</b>								
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>93</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.3	95	1.2	1.1	92
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	95	0.4	0.3	94
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>23.0</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>21.0</u>	<u>20.2</u>	<u>96</u>
Land Forces	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100
Tactical Air Forces	5.8	5.3	5.5	5.5	99	5.5	5.2	93
Naval Forces	16.4	15.6	15.8	15.3	97	14.4	14.1	97
Warships and ASW Forces	10.2	9.7	9.6	9.4	98	9.0	8.8	98
Amphibious Forces	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.2	93	2.1	2.1	98
Naval Support Forces	4.0	3.7	3.8	3.7	95	3.4	3.2	93
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	97	0.3	0.3	99
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>93</u>
Intelligence	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	92	0.4	0.4	91
Centrally Managed Comm	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.1	93	1.2	1.1	94
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>98</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>99</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>97</u>
Int'l Military Org	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	94	0.5	0.5	95
Unified Commands	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	96	0.8	0.8	92
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
Joint Staff	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	99	1.4	1.4	99
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>97</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>94</u>
Combat Commands	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	97	1.1	1.1	97
Support Commands	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	99	1.8	1.7	91
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>99</u>
Research and Development	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2	99	1.2	1.2	99
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	100	0.3	0.3	99
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>99</u>
Personnel Support	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	98	0.8	0.8	97
Individual Training	5.3	5.2	4.9	4.8	99	4.7	4.6	99
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>99</u>
Support Installations	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.5	90	3.0	3.0	99
Centralized Support Act'y	2.0	2.2	2.0	1.9	99	1.9	1.9	98
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>59.1</u>	<u>56.4</u>	<u>58.0</u>	<u>56.6</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>55.2</u>	<u>53.7</u>	<u>97</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/ (Manyyears)</b>	-0.5			-0.4			-0.3	
<b>INDIVIDUALS c/</b>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>12.7</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>100</u>
Transients	3.1	3.6	3.0	3.0	100	2.8	2.8	100
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Students/Trainees	7.6	9.0	7.7	7.7	100	6.5	6.5	100
Midshipmen/NAVCAD								
<b>ENDSTRENGTH*</b>	<u>69.4</u>	<u>69.1</u>	<u>68.8</u>	<u>67.0</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>64.6</u>	<u>62.7</u>	<u>97</u>

\*End strength may not equal total of DPPC categories due to rounding.

Note: Active Navy Manpower Structure or requirements consist of peacetime requirements.

**TABLE IV-1B**  
**ACTIVE NAVY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH**  
(Thousands)

AC ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993		FY 1994			Z
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	MNG	REQT	AUTH	
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>16.8</u>	<u>15.4</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>12.8</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>95</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	15.0	13.8	11.6	11.1	96	10.3	9.8	95
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.7	94	1.7	1.6	94
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>249.9</u>	<u>242.4</u>	<u>243.6</u>	<u>237.9</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>233.0</u>	<u>222.1</u>	<u>95</u>
Land Forces	4.4	4.0	4.4	4.4	100	4.4	4.4	100
Tactical Air Forces	60.3	57.3	59.0	57.6	98	56.1	54.1	96
Naval Forces	184.4	180.4	179.3	175.0	98	171.3	162.5	95
Warships and ASW Forces	79.7	78.3	78.6	75.8	96	75.2	71.0	94
Amphibious Forces	32.3	30.8	31.8	31.1	98	31.3	31.0	99
Naval Support Forces	72.4	71.3	68.8	68.0	99	64.8	60.5	93
Mobility Forces	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	99	1.1	1.1	99
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>14.6</u>	<u>14.6</u>	<u>15.3</u>	<u>14.0</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>93</u>
Intelligence	6.8	7.0	7.0	6.3	90	6.0	5.6	93
Centrally Managed Comm	7.8	7.5	8.3	7.7	92	8.3	7.7	92
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>23.2</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>21.2</u>	<u>20.7</u>	<u>98</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>12.7</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>96</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>18.4</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>99</u>
Int'l Military Org	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	99	0.9	0.8	99
Unified Commands	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	92	0.7	0.7	98
Federal Agency Support	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	99	0.9	0.9	98
Joint Staff	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	99
OSD/Defense Agencies	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.6	100	4.9	4.9	100
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>92</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>98</u>
Combat Commands	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.3	99	1.3	1.3	100
Support Commands	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	97	0.8	0.7	93
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>94</u>
Research and Development	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.2	94	4.2	4.0	93
Geophysical Activities	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4	95	1.3	1.2	95
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>31.0</u>	<u>31.7</u>	<u>31.6</u>	<u>29.3</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>24.3</u>	<u>23.2</u>	<u>94</u>
Personnel Support	7.8	7.7	7.9	7.3	92	6.7	6.6	98
Individual Training	23.3	24.0	23.7	22.0	93	17.7	16.7	92
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>21.8</u>	<u>21.1</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>21.3</u>	<u>20.1</u>	<u>95</u>
Support Installations	18.5	19.0	18.9	18.2	96	18.4	17.2	95
Centralized Support Act'y	3.1	3.4	3.0	2.9	98	3.0	2.9	98
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>405.8</u>	<u>400.1</u>	<u>396.8</u>	<u>384.9</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>373.1</u>	<u>356.4</u>	<u>96</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/ (Manyyears)</b>	-2.8			-2.4			-2.0	
<b>INDIVIDUALS c/</b>	<u>78.9</u>	<u>72.7</u>	<u>76.9</u>	<u>76.9</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>63.6</u>	<u>63.6</u>	<u>100</u>
Transients	20.2	16.7	19.7	19.7	100	18.2	18.2	100
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.3	100	3.1	3.1	100
Students/Trainees	50.6	48.3	49.5	49.5	100	38.0	38.0	100
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.5	100	4.2	4.2	100
<b>ENDSTRENGTH*</b>	<u>481.9</u>	<u>472.8</u>	<u>473.7</u>	<u>459.4</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>436.7</u>	<u>418.1</u>	<u>96</u>

\*End strength may not equal total of DPFC categories due to rounding.

Note: Active Navy Manpower Structure or requirements consist of peacetime requirements.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

1. Naval Reserve Manpower

The reduced threat of global war, longer warning times, and the ability to rapidly generate certain capabilities have allowed a reduction in Naval Reserve end-strength directly linked to Navy's Force Structure and Infrastructure reductions. Additionally, reductions were taken in those areas where large numbers of requirements supported a global vice contingency war scenario.

Despite the reduction in end-strength, the Naval Reserve remains the principal source of trained units and personnel to augment active forces during initial stages of mobilization. The Naval Reserve is therefore manned, equipped, and trained to a high state of readiness. To ensure effective training and integration of forces, the Naval Reserve provides contributory support to assist active forces in performing their missions while concurrently fulfilling mobilization training requirements.

Naval Reserve Manpower Requirements  
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Total Selected Reserve	142.3	133.7	113.4
Unit Reservists and Trainees	116.9	111.4	93.4
SAM <u>1/</u>	(0.6)	(1.1)	(0.9)
OSAM II <u>2/</u>	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Full Time Support	22.9	21.7	19.4
TARs	(21.5)	(20.5)	(18.2)
Canvasser/Recruiters	(1.2)	(1.0)	(0.9)
Title 10 USC 265	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
IMAs <u>3/</u>	2.5	0.6	0.6

1/Sea and Air Mariner Programs

2/Officer Sea and Air Mariner II Program

3/Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) perform up to 48 paid drills per year, plus two weeks of active duty.

The Sea and Air Mariner program, a non-prior service accession program inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements, is drawing down to maximize the retention of spaces for the more highly trained and skilled veteran personnel. An offshoot of this program, Sea and Air Mariner II (SAM II), was developed specifically to place individuals serving two years on Initial Active Duty Training, onboard FFT 1052 class ships. With the cancelation of the FFT program, the SAM II program draws down in FY 1994.

Naval Reserve Trained in Unit Strength  
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1992*</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
End Strength	142.3	133.7	113.4
- Training Pipeline	3.6	3.4	3.2
- IMAs	2.5	0.6	0.6
Operating Strength	136.2	129.7	109.6
- NON Unit AGR	11.0	10.1	9.8
+ Unit AC Personnel	5.3	4.0	2.7
Trained Unit Strength	130.5	123.6	102.5
Wartime Unit Structure	146.1	143.9	139
% Trained in Units	89.3%	85.9%	73.7%

Note: IMAs include Sea College personnel, who are reported as Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System Category B, MOD T. These individuals have zero drill obligation, but are required to perform Annual Training and are mobilizable assets.

Wartime Unit Structure -

Total Manpower Force Structure - Non Unit AGRs + Unit AC Personnel

\*Does not include 34 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM, not yet released due to medical (33) or legal hold (1).

2. Initial Active Duty For Training

The individuals performing initial active duty for training (IADT) are non-prior service enlisted and officer personnel in the SAM, SAM II and Officer Sea Air Mariner II (OSAM II) programs. All three of these programs start to draw down in FY 1994.

**TABLE IV-2**  
**NAVAL RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH**  
(Thousands)

TOTAL USNR MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992*		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REOT	AUTH	X MNG	REOT	AUTH	X MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>73</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.7	1.1	0.7	0.5	73	0.7	0.5	72
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	<u>80.5</u>	<u>79.7</u>	<u>91.3</u>	<u>75.4</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>87.4</u>	<u>61.9</u>	<u>71</u>
Land Forces	2.5	2.1	2.3	2.3	100	2.2	2.2	100
Division Forces	2.5	2.1	2.3	2.3	100	2.2	2.2	100
Tactical Air Forces	6.7	8.4	12.0	6.4	53	12.0	6.2	52
Naval Forces	69.4	67.5	74.6	65.1	87	70.8	52.1	74
Warships and ASW	24.5	22.7	28.9	21.7	75	26.5	13.3	50
Amphibious Forces	7.6	7.5	7.5	6.8	91	7.5	5.2	70
Naval Support Forces	37.3	37.2	38.2	36.7	96	36.9	33.6	91
Mobility Forces	1.8	1.7	2.4	1.6	67	2.4	1.4	59
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>59</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.2	79	1.5	0.8	55
Intelligence	5.0	4.5	5.2	4.4	84	5.2	3.2	60
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>82</u>
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>48</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	<u>15.4</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>15.1</u>	<u>15.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>12.9</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>96</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>89</u>
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	91
Unified Commands	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	99	0.7	0.6	88
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	94	0.1	0.1	89
OSD/Defense Agencies	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.3	88
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>89</u>
Supply Operations	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5	99	3.6	3.0	84
Maintenance Operations	3.3	3.6	3.4	3.3	99	3.4	3.2	94
Logistics Support								
Operations	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	96
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>88</u>
Combat Commands	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.9	96	2.0	1.8	87
Support Commands	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	97	1.8	1.7	94
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>88</u>
Research and Development	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	93	0.6	0.6	89
Geophysical Activities	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.4	86
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>80</u>
Personnel Support	2.1	2.2	2.2	1.9	88	2.2	1.6	74
Individual Training	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.4	67	0.6	0.7	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>87</u>
Support Installations	6.7	6.1	6.8	6.1	90	6.8	5.8	85
Centralized Support Act's	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.6	96	1.6	1.5	93
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	<u>138.6</u>	<u>137.2</u>	<u>150.0</u>	<u>129.7</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>143.9</u>	<u>109.7</u>	<u>76</u>
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>		<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	
<u>AUGMENTEES</u>								
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.4</u>		<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.2</u>	
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>142.6</u>	<u>142.3</u>	<u>154.2</u>	<u>133.7</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>148.1</u>	<u>113.4</u>	<u>79</u>

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Does not include 34 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM, not yet released due to medical (33) or legal hold (1).

**TABLE IV-2A**  
**NAVAL RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH**  
(Thousands)

USNR OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992*		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REOT	AUTH	X MNG	REOT	AUTH	X MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>89</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	97	0.1	0.1	87
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>13.5</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>13.1</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>62</u>
Land Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
Division Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
Tactical Air Forces	0.9	1.2	1.3	0.9	67	1.3	0.8	62
Naval Forces	8.9	8.4	10.8	8.5	78	10.4	6.2	60
Warships and ASW	5.1	4.6	6.9	4.8	69	6.5	2.9	45
Amphibious Forces	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	89	1.0	0.8	76
Naval Support Forces	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	98	2.8	2.5	89
Mobility Forces	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.7	74	0.9	0.6	71
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>76</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	91	0.1	0.1	62
Intelligence	2.0	2.0	2.1	1.9	92	2.1	1.6	77
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>85</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>87</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>94</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>86</u>
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	87
Unified Commands	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	86
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	94	0.1	0.1	89
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	86
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>87</u>
Supply Operations	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	99	1.1	0.9	84
Maintenance Operations	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	99	0.7	0.6	84
Logistics Support Operations	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>89</u>
Combat Commands	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	96	1.1	0.9	84
Support Commands	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	97	1.2	1.1	92
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>89</u>
Research and Development	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	92	0.3	0.2	87
Geophysical Activities	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	94
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>60</u>
Personnel Support	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	84	0.5	0.2	46
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	88	0.2	0.2	100
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>89</u>
Support Installations	1.0	0.8	1.0	0.9	89	1.0	0.9	84
Centralized Support Act's	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	98	1.1	1.0	94
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>27.6</u>	<u>26.6</u>	<u>30.3</u>	<u>26.6</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>22.7</u>	<u>76</u>
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</b>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>		<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.0</u>		<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.0</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>27.8</u>	<u>27.0</u>	<u>30.5</u>	<u>26.8</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>29.9</u>	<u>22.9</u>	<u>76</u>

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Does not include 7 Selected Reserve officers called to active duty for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM, not yet released due to medical hold.

**TABLE IV-2B**  
**NAVAL RESERVE ENLISTED PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED**  
**MANNING, & END STRENGTH**  
(Thousands)

USNR ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992*		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>71</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.5	70	0.6	0.5	70
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>69.5</u>	<u>69.0</u>	<u>77.8</u>	<u>65.0</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>72.7</u>	<u>53.8</u>	<u>74</u>
Land Forces	2.1	1.7	1.9	1.9	100	1.8	1.8	100
Division Forces	2.1	1.7	1.9	1.9	100	1.8	1.8	100
Tactical Air Forces	5.8	7.3	10.6	5.5	51	10.6	5.4	50
Naval Forces	60.5	59.0	63.8	56.6	89	58.8	45.8	78
Warships and ASW	19.4	18.1	22.0	16.9	77	18.8	10.4	55
Amphibious Forces	6.7	6.6	6.4	5.9	91	5.9	4.5	75
Naval Support Forces	34.4	34.3	35.4	33.9	96	34.0	31.0	91
Mobility Forces	1.1	1.0	1.5	0.9	63	1.5	0.8	52
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>51</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.1	78	1.4	0.8	54
Intelligence	3.0	2.5	3.1	2.5	79	3.1	1.6	50
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>81</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>29</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>10.4</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>97</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>90</u>
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	95
Unified Commands	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	98	0.3	0.3	90
OSD/Defense Agencies	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.2	100	1.2	1.0	89
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>90</u>
Supply Operations	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	99	2.5	2.1	83
Maintenance Operations	2.7	2.9	2.7	2.7	99	2.7	2.6	97
Logistics Support Operations	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.3	84
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>97</u>
Combat Commands	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.9	95	1.0	0.9	90
Support Commands	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	98	0.6	0.5	84
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>87</u>
Research and Development	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	94	0.4	0.3	90
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.3	85
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>79</u>
Personnel Support	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.4	89	1.6	1.3	80
Individual Training	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.3	59	0.6	0.5	75
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>86</u>
Support Installations	5.7	5.3	5.7	5.2	90	5.7	4.9	85
Centralized Support Act's	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	93	0.6	0.5	92
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>111.0</u>	<u>110.6</u>	<u>119.7</u>	<u>103.0</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>112.8</u>	<u>87.0</u>	<u>77</u>
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</b>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>		<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.4</u>		<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.1</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>114.8</u>	<u>115.3</u>	<u>123.6</u>	<u>106.9</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>116.4</u>	<u>90.5</u>	<u>78</u>

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Does not include 27 Selected Reserve personnel called to active duty for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM, not yet released due to medical (26) or legal (1) hold.

\*\*Programmed Requirement reflects the presence of Full-Time Support personnel (TARs) in addition to NAMMOS requirements.

Officers and Enlisted Members Serving on Active Duty for Training

FY 1992      FY 1993      FY 1994

Category

Enlisted

Recruit and Specialized Training (Including SAM Trainees)	617	1129	893
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Officer

Flight Training (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	0	0	0
Professional (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	27	32	16
TOTAL	644	1161	909

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of the Navy's overall resources. A majority of the civilian employees of the Department of the Navy are directly related to our readiness posture. Approximately half of the civilians work in industrial activities, which are primarily engaged in depot level maintenance and repair of ships, aircrafts, and associated equipment. Many of the civilians employed at operation and maintenance activities, such as ship repair facilities, air stations and bases contribute directly to operational readiness. The balance of the civilians provide essential support in functions such as training, medical care, and the engineering, development, and acquisition of weapons systems, all of which have a definite, although longer range, impact on readiness.

The FY 1994 estimate represent a decline from the previous year's estimate. Manpower levels have been structured at a level that assures responsible execution of the Department's programs given reduced resources while complying with Congressional direction to reduce headquarters manpower. Included in the overall year-to-year changes are a number of adjustments and realignments based on planned efficiencies and program considerations. The estimates reflect the further consolidation of the Naval Warfare Centers under Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) and expansion of the Public Work Center regional consolidations as management improvements resulting from the Defense Management Review recommendations. Also reflected are civilian reductions and realignments associated with activity adjustments approved through the FY 1992



base closure process. Decreases in industrial operations reflect workload changes at Naval Shipyards and Aviation Depots.

The FY 1994 request is for 250,798 civilians and is shown by DPPC in Table IV-3.

## 2. Major Program Changes

The civilian end strength budget estimates for FY 1994 reflect an alignment of civilian manpower with workload requirements and funding adjustments associated with force and support structure reductions while complying with congressional direction. The FY 1994 estimate reflects a net reduction of 39,700 from the FY 1992 end strength level. Significant changes in civilian end strength levels are discussed below.

Civilian reductions are based on mission changes and changes to funded programs and comply with Congressional direction to reduce headquarters manpower.

Major work force reductions reflected in the estimates for the Naval Aviation Depots and Naval Shipyards (-17,500 in FY 1994 from FY 1992). These reductions are based on specific workload changes (type of ship and type of work to be performed), workload reductions through consolidations, increased competition, and work force efficiencies identified by Defense Management Review Initiatives. Additionally, civilian reductions and realignments to reflect the activities adjustments approved through the FY 1991 base closure process are reflected in the estimates. Further adjustments in civilian end strength levels are also related to Defense Managements Review Initiatives. Further reductions have been identified related to initiatives for productivity saving at industrial operations first reflected in the FY 1991 President's Budget. Other initiatives identify savings from consolidations of financial accounting operations, supply operations, research laboratories, and aviation depot consolidations. Decreases to Navy programs result from the consolidation of DoD financial and accounting operations and the establishment in 1992 of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) as central manager of the defense information infrastructure. Other initiatives produce dollar savings but increase the number of civilians such as substitution for military billets.

## 3. Improvements and Efficiencies

The Navy estimate of civilian manpower requirements reflects a continuing commitment to increase the efficiency of the civilian work force. The majority of the Navy's efforts in this area are concentrated in the implementation of the recommendations of the Defense Management Report. The purpose of those recommendations is to streamline management, especially in the acquisition process, and to reduce costs without affecting military capability or reducing the quality of management support.

**TABLE IV-3**  
**NAVY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED**  
**MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(Direct and Indirect Hires in Thousands)

CIVILIANS	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ACTUALS</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	4.0	4.0	4.0
Surveillance Forces	0.3	0.3	0.2
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>11.5</u>
Tactical Air Force	0.2	0.2	0.1
Naval Forces	6.2	6.7	6.0
Warships and ASW	0.9	1.1	1.1
Amphibious Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1
Naval Support Forces	5.2	5.5	4.8
Mobility Forces	5.3	4.8	5.4
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>3.7</u>
Intelligence	1.9	1.8	1.7
Centrally Managed Comm	3.1	2.6	2.0
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>18.6</u>	<u>17.7</u>	<u>17.6</u>
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.3</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>9.6</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.0</u>
Int'l Military Org	0.3	0.3	0.3
Unified Commands	0.3	0.3	0.3
OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	2.8	2.8	2.7
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>131.8</u>	<u>109.7</u>	<u>95.9</u>
Supply Operations	<u>22.4</u>	<u>17.3</u>	<u>15.7</u>
Other Logistics Activities	22.4	17.3	15.7
Maintenance Operations	<u>89.1</u>	<u>74.0</u>	<u>66.9</u>
Naval Shipyards	58.4	49.4	43.1
Ordnance Activities	8.0	6.6	5.8
Other Logistics Activities	22.7	18.0	18.0
Logistics Support Activities	<u>20.3</u>	<u>18.4</u>	<u>13.3</u>
Logistic Support Activities	20.3	18.4	13.3
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>5.8</u>
Combat Commands	1.4	1.3	1.3
Support Commands	5.0	4.8	4.5
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	<u>57.4</u>	<u>54.5</u>	<u>56.5</u>
Research and Development	56.1	53.2	55.2
Geophysical Activities	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>6.9</u>
Personnel Support	3.1	3.7	3.6
Individual Training	3.4	3.4	3.3
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>35.2</u>	<u>35.0</u>	<u>34.8</u>
Support Installations	33.4	33.3	33.2
Centralized Support Act'y	1.8	1.7	1.6
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>290.5</u>	<u>264.6</u>	<u>250.8</u>

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

The FY 1991 President's Budget incorporated significant manpower savings based on Phase I of the Defense Management Report Initiatives which identified savings based on the transfer of NAVPROs and productivity savings at industrial funded activities. The FY 1992/1993 amended budget reflected further savings based on Navy initiatives which identified additional savings related to consolidation of aviation depot maintenance operations and associated reduction in workload, research laboratory consolidation, ADP services consolidation and supply depot and inventory control point consolidations.

The current FY 1994 budget reflects savings from new initiatives, primarily from the downsizing of the System Commands. Reductions are also associated with the consolidation of Navy Broadcast Services, the restructure of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, the consolidation of Naval Intelligence Command, establishment of the Defense Information System Agency, and the efficiencies in base operating support areas.

### III. NAVY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

This section summarizes changes in the Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes resulting in year-to-year adjustments in overall requirements.

#### A. Strategic

##### 1. Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.2	12.4	10.8
Reserve	1.1	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	4.0	4.0	4.0

In FY 1993 active military manpower decreases overall by -2791, which includes -1324 to Support Ships and -1233 to Fleet Ballistic Missile Systems. In FY 1994 active military manpower decreases overall by -1550 which includes -2093 to Fleet Ballistic Missile Systems, offset by +514 to the Trident program.

Reserve manpower decreases reflect the decommissioning or transfer schedule of FBM submarine tenders.

There are no significant changes in civilian manpower.

2. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.9	2.0	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.2

There are no major increases or decreases in military or civilian end strength in FY 1993 or FY 1994.

B. Tactical and Mobility

1. Land Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.6	5.0	5.1
Reserve	2.1	2.3	2.2

In FY 1993 active military manpower increases by +471 which includes +273 in Divisions (Marine) and +233 in Force Service Support Groups.

2. Tactical Air Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	62.6	63.0	59.3
Reserve	8.4	6.4	6.2
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.1

In FY 1993 active military manpower increases by +438 which includes +800 in Multi-Purpose Aircraft Carriers, +119 in F/A18 squadrons, -351 in A-6 squadrons and -257 in Sea-based Electronic Warfare squadrons. In FY 1994 active military manpower decreases by -3746 which includes -3211 in Multi-Purpose Aircraft Carriers, and -617 in A-6 Squadrons.

There are no significant changes in civilian manpower.

The reserve manpower decrease in FY 1993 results from the deletion of the funding for junior unskilled positions in aircraft carrier augmentation units, commensurate with the ability to generate this capability from other sources at mobilization.

3. Naval Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	196.1	190.3	176.5
Reserve	67.5	65.1	52.1
<u>Civilian</u>	6.2	6.7	6.0

In FY 1993 Warships and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Forces active military manpower decreases by -2728 including +885 to Guided Missile destroyers, -2293 to non-missile frigates +24 to SH-3/SH-60F Squadrons, -32 to S-3 squadrons, -240 to LAMPS, and -595 to ASW Patrol Squadrons; +1214 to Cruisers, -475 to submarines, and +12 for Non-Missile Destroyers, +489 Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Forces. In FY 1994 Warships and ASW Forces manpower decreases by -5424 including -2819 to Missile Cruisers, +747 to Missile Destroyers, -800 to LAMPS, +17 to Submarines, +94 to MCM Forces, and -375 to Patrol Combatants.

The reserve Warships and ASW Forces manpower decreases in FY 1994 results from various force structure changes, including the deletion of the FFT program, one Reserve Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) squadron, the Craft of Opportunity (COOP) program, active ship decommissionings, four reserve ASW maritime program squadrons, and the phased reduction of junior unskilled positions in active ship augmentation units.

In FY 1993 Amphibious Forces active manpower increases by +213 including +658 to Amphibious Assault Ships, -298 to Amphibious Tactical Support Units. In FY 1994 Amphibious Forces manpower decreases by -246 including +330 to Amphibious Assault Ships, -238 to Amphibious Tactical Support Units and -225 to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces.

The Amphibious Forces reserve manpower decrease in FY 1993 reflects an overall reduction in augmentation requirements primarily associated with the phaseout of junior unskilled positions. The FY 1994 reduction reflects deletion of three Newport class LSTs.

In FY 1993 Naval Support Forces active manpower decreases -3295 including -430 in Support Forces, -17 in Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Depots, -145 in Minor Fleet Support Ships, -2324 in Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA), and +784 in Underway Replenishment Ships. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -8060 including -2432 in Underway Replenishment Ships, -103 in Deep Submergence Systems, -984 in SIMA, -2132 in Support Forces, and -1154 in Direct Support Squadrons Aircraft.

The Naval Support Forces reserve FY 1993 manpower decrease was brought about by strength reductions in junior unskilled positions, and active ship decommissionings. The FY 1994 reduction resulted from active ship decommissionings and an overall reduction in augmentation for active components requirements.

Increases in civilian end strength in FY 1993 are due to a number of factors; Changes in reimbursement policy, 145 civilians that are reflected in Logistics Support in FY 1992 are reflected in Naval Forces category (Fleet Operations Support) in FY 1993. In FY 1994, these civilians are transferred to the Warfare Centers to better reflect their functional areas. Other increases in FY 1993 are for the conversion of Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS) to Naval Engineering Technical Services (NETS), increases to meet hazardous waste and environment compliance and increase for Ship Maintenance at LANFLT. The decrease in FY 1994 is the net result of the transfer to the Warfare Centers, a reduction in the size of the fleet staffs and further increases for environmental compliance.

4. Mobility Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.9	1.2	1.4
Reserve	1.7	1.6	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>			
	5.3	4.8	5.4

In FY 1993 Mobility Forces manpower increases by +295 which reflects +283 in Transportation. In FY 1994 manpower increases by +138.

The reserve decrease in FY 1993 and 1994 reflects a phased downsizing of augmentation for military Sealift Activities.

All changes in Mobility Forces are due to changes in the mix of ships that are civilian mariner manned in the Military Sealift Command. Some specific examples are: from FY 1992 to FY 1993, the MARSHFIELD and KAWISHIWI going offline and the deactivation of the GLOVER and the addition of the WATERS, and T-AFS 6. The increase in FY 1994 is primarily for the activation of the T-AFS 3 and 7, T-AGOS 23, and the T-AO 201 and 204.

C. Communications/Intelligence

1. Intelligence Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.5	8.8	8.8
Reserve	4.5	4.4	3.2
<u>Civilian</u>			
	1.9	1.8	1.7

In FY 1993 active manpower increases by +280 which includes +93 in Cryptologic activities, +65 in service Support to DIA (NFIP), and +90 in Atlantic Command GDIP Activities. In FY 1994 there are no major changes.

The reserve manpower decrease reflects phased reductions.

The civilian end strength reductions in FY 1993 and FY 1994 resulted from the consolidation of the Naval Intelligence Command and general reductions in the National Foreign Intelligence Program that is managed by the National Security Agency.

2. Centrally Managed Communications Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.4	6.7	6.0
Reserve	1.4	1.2	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	3.1	2.6	2.0

In FY 1993 active manpower decreases -714 primarily due to -1029 in Navy Communications. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -679 primarily due to -697 in Navy Communications.

Decreases in reserve end strength in FY 1993 and FY 1994 are due to decrease in augmentation requirements due to restructuring of active telecommunication activities.

Decreases in civilian end strength are the result of general downsizing, staff reductions and overseas closure of communication facilities at NCS H.E. Holt and NCS Thurso.

D. Combat Installations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	25.1	23.6	22.4
Reserve	9.5	7.5	7.3
<u>Civilian</u>	18.6	17.7	17.6

In FY 1993 active manpower decreases -1529 including -1292 in Base Operations. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -1156 including -1054 in Base Operations.

The FY 1993 reserve decrease was caused by overmanning of various programs in FY 1992 and the reduction of Full-time Support at various Reserve aviation Base Operations activities. The FY 1994 Reserve strength decrease reflects a reduction of the Reserve infrastructure.

The decrease in civilian manpower from FY 1992 to FY 1993 occurs in both Real Property Maintenance and Base Operations and reflects the transfer of Public Works functions at Fleet activities (primarily Norfolk, Jacksonville and Pearl Harbor) to the Public Works Centers, which

is reflected in the Support Activities DPPC. The change from FY 1993 to FY 1994 reflects general reductions to staffing levels in the areas of port services and other engineering support as funded programs decline.

E. Force Support Training Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.2	13.8	11.8
Reserve	1.0	0.5	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.4	1.3

In FY 1993 active manpower decreases -1338 primarily due to -1248 in Readiness Squadrons and -63 in Fleet Support Training. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -2034 primarily due to -1453 in Readiness Squadrons and -568 in Fleet Support Training.

The reserve decrease reflects the overall reduction of the Selected Reserve.

There are no significant changes to civilian manpower requirements although there are moderate reductions related to force structure.

F. Medical Support Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	25.4	25.5	25.2
Reserve	14.3	15.1	12.4
<u>Civilian</u>	9.0	9.6	9.6

In FY 1993 active manpower increases +113 including +63 in Other Health activities. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -302 primarily due to -246 in Care In Regional Defense Facilities.

The reserve manpower increase in FY 1993 reflects undermanning in FY 1992. The reduction in FY 1994 is caused by reducing fleet hospitals from seven to six and the restructuring and phased reduction of augmentees supporting CONUS Medical Treatment facilities.

Changes in civilian end strength result from a combination of factors including Congressional direction to sustain medical providers at the FY 1990 level. There is an increase in FY 1993 related to DMR initiatives as third party collections, physician assistants, and health care finders.



G. Joint Activities

1. International Military Organizations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.3	1.3	1.3
Reserve	0.2	0.2	0.2

There are no major manpower changes in this category.

2. Unified Commands Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.4	1.4	1.4
Reserve	0.7	0.7	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3

There are no major changes in this category.

3. Federal Agency Support Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.1	1.2	1.1
Reserve	0.0	0.1	0.1

There are no major manpower changes in this category.

4. Joint Staff Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.3	0.3	0.3

There are no major manpower changes in this category.

5. OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.0	6.1	6.2
Reserve	1.3	1.5	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	2.8	2.8	2.7

In FY 1993 active manpower increases +86 with -196 in Service Support to Defense Commissary Agency (DCA) and +126 in Service Support to Special Operation Forces. In FY 1994 active manpower increases +157 with +323 in Service Support to Special Operation Forces and -125 in DCA.

The reserve manpower adjustments reflect requirements changes in special operations forces.

There are no major civilian manpower changes in this category.

H. Central Logistics Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.6	6.0	5.4
Reserve	7.9	7.8	7.0
<u>Civilian</u>	131.8	109.7	95.9

In FY 1993 Supply Operation active manpower increases +237 primarily +306 Distribution Depots (DBOF). In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -138 primarily -125 in Distribution Depots (DBOF).

In FY 1993 Maintenance Operations active manpower decreases -185 which includes -130 for Depot Maintenance, -12 in Naval Avionics facilities, -60 in ship maintenance, and -195 in Naval Ordnance. In FY 1994 manpower decreases by -226 which includes -192 in Maintenance Support and +44 in Depot Maintenance.

In FY 1993 active manpower increases +306 primarily due to +270 in Logistics Support Activities. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -145 primarily due to -141 in Logistics Support activities.

The decrease in FY 1994 reserve end strength is the result of reduced requirements in Maintenance Operations and Navy Supply activities.

Civilian reductions in supply operations are primarily the result of the transfers within the Department of Defense including the

transfer of accounting personnel from Navy to the Defense Accounting and Finance Service (-1,300), the consolidation of data process services (-1,000), and the beginning of a phased transfer of consumable item supply function to DLA (-300). The remainder of the decrease relates to workload reductions in all areas of supply operations. Decreases in FY 1994 relate to the continuing consumable item transfer (-200 in FY 1994) and general workload reductions.

The decreases in civilian personnel in all years are predominantly in the Naval Shipyards (-8,900 in FY 1993, and -6,300 in FY 1994) as a result of DMR efficiencies and workload reductions. Levels reflect requirements based on shipyard workload phasing. Other decreases include the consolidation of aviation depot maintenance and reduced workload as a result of force structure reductions.

The services provided by the civilian personnel in logistics support operations are related to the procurement and maintenance operations of central logistics. As these programs decline, decreases are also reflected in contract management and other support activities. All decreases in this area are the result of general workload reductions.

I. Service Management Headquarters

1. Combat Commands Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.7	2.5	2.5
Reserve	2.1	1.9	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.4	1.3	1.3

In FY 1993 active manpower decrease -190. There are no significant changes in FY 1994.

The reserve manpower reflects a phased reduction of requirements. Reductions in civilian end strength reflect the downsizing of staff requirements for this category.

2. Support Commands Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.7	2.6	2.4
Reserve	1.8	1.8	1.7
<u>Civilian</u>	5.0	4.8	4.5

In FY 1993 active manpower decreases -58. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -210 primarily -154 in Administrative Associate Activities.

The reserve manpower reflects a phased reduction of requirements.

Decreases in civilian manpower beginning in FY 1993 result from efficiency savings and downsizing of support functions related to reduced force structure.

J. Research and Development/Geophysical Activities

1. Research and Development Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.7	5.4	5.2
Reserve	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>			
	56.1	53.2	55.2

In FY 1993 active manpower decreases by -230 due to -276 in R&D Activities, offset by +76 in Facilities/Installation Support. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -336 which includes -435 in Facilities/Installation Support.

Reserve manpower experienced no significant change.

The consolidation of the Naval Warfare Centers resulted in a greater number of civilian personnel in this subcategory than in previous reports. This increase is first reflected in FY 1992 with additional activities transferring in FY 1993 and includes civilians previously reported in other areas, primarily in the Logistics category. Staffing levels at the Warfare Centers are determined by the funding in the customer accounts (primarily the Fleets) since the centers are operated within the DBOF. Also included in this category are those civilians directly paid from the RDT&EN appropriation. Decreases in FY 1993 are at the Naval Air Warfare Center and Naval Surface Warfare Center in part offset by an increase at the Naval Research Laboratory. Increases in FY 1994 are at the Surface Warfare Center and the Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center. All changes result from a mixture of program cancellations, deferrals from one fiscal year to the next, and other DMRD consolidations and efficiencies.

2. Geophysical Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.7	1.8	1.6
Reserve	0.5	0.5	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>			
	1.3	1.3	1.3

In FY 1993 active manpower increases +65 including +76 in Weather Service. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -238 including -118 in Mapping and Charting, and -112 in Oceanography.

Reserve manpower decreases in FY 1994 reflect a phase down in augmentation support of Weather Service Activities.

There are no significant changes in civilian end strength requirements in this sub-category.

K. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.5	8.1	7.3
Reserve	2.2	1.9	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	3.1	3.7	3.6

In FY 1993 active manpower decreases -434 due to -575 in Recruiting Activities. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -766 including -593 in Recruiting Activities, and -167 in Other Personnel Activities.

The reserve reduction reflects the restructuring of Personnel Mobilization Teams.

Reflecting the increased emphasis on Quality of Life programs within the Navy, there are increased civilian staffing requirements in several areas including increases in the number of child care providers, counselors for the Family Advocacy Program, and in other morale, welfare and recreation programs. These increases occur primarily in FY 1993 with a slight reduction in FY 1994 related to force structure.

2. Individual Training Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	29.2	26.8	21.2
Reserve	0.7	0.4	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	3.4	3.4	3.3

In FY 1993 active manpower decreases -2371 including -1668 in General Skill Training, -1240 in Recruit Training Units and -358 in Education and Training Healthcare. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -5623 due to -3308 in General Skill Training and -2043 in Other Flight Training.

The reserve increase in FY 1994 reflects instructor support at Recruit Training Commands and a decrease in support of Fleet Training Activities.

There are no major changes in civilian end strength requirements in this Subcategory.

L. Support Activities

1. Support Installations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	22.0	20.7	20.2
Reserve	6.1	6.1	5.8
<u>Civilian</u>			
	33.4	33.3	33.2

In FY 1993 active manpower decreases -1261 including +83 in Minor Construction, -948 in Base Operations, and -126 in Navy Exchanges. In FY 1994 manpower decreases -496 including -397 in Base Operations.

Reserve manpower was reduced in FY 1994 commensurate with the overall reduction in requirements.

Decreases in civilian manpower beginning in FY 1993 are the result of reductions in ship maintenance support and the decreased workload at the Navy Public Works Centers due to reduced customer funding. This is somewhat offset by the establishment of PWC Washington, D.C. and PWC Jacksonville as well as the expansion of several other PWC,s in FY 1993 which transfers end strength from Base Operating Support in several DPPCs. Decrease in FY 1993 result from the transfer of support activities accounting functions to OSD. There is a further increase in FY 1994 reflecting the start up of PWC Charleston.

2. Centralized Support Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.6	4.8	4.8
Reserve	1.7	1.6	1.5
<u>Civilian</u>			
	1.8	1.7	1.6

In FY 1993 active manpower decreases -759 due to -425 in Personnel Administration and -342 in service-wide support.

Reserve manpower experienced no significant change.

The decreases in civilian end strength in this sub-category reflect reduced requirement for support functions related to general downsizing and efficiencies in personnel management.

M. Individuals

1. Transients (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	20.1	22.7	21.0
Reserve	0.6	0.7	0.7

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.5	3.3	3.2
Reserve	*	*	*

\*Less than 50

3. Trainees and Students (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	57.3	57.2	44.6
Reserve	1.1	1.5	1.3

There are no major changes in FY 1993. In FY 1994 active manpower decreases -12,620 including -7091 in General Skills Training and -4478 in Recruit Training.

Reserve manpower reductions reflect the phase out of the non-prior service Sea/Air Mariner (SAM), Sea Air Mariner II (SAM II) and Officer Sea Air Mariner (OSAM) programs.

4. Cadets/Midshipmen (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.4	4.5	4.2

N. Undistributed Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	-	-2.9	-2.3
Reserve	0.9	1.2	1.2

\*Less than 50



## CHAPTER V

### MARINE CORPS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

#### I. INTRODUCTION

##### A. General

This chapter describes the Marine Corps' Total Force requirement for Active, Reserve, and Civilian manpower; displays manpower levels authorized for FY 1994; highlights trends in the program; introduces new manpower initiatives; and explains yearly manning fluctuations.

The principal challenge facing the Marine Corps today lies in fulfilling its charter as an expeditionary force-in-readiness with a significantly leaner fighting force, while concurrently preserving the ability to perform enduring missions. Achieving this objective requires a deliberate reduction scheme that emphasizes enhanced warfighting capabilities, while supporting the Chairman's base force and the National Military Strategy. A balanced combined arms force, responsive to global crisis across a broad spectrum of conflict, is at the heart of the Marine Corps' future force structure. To achieve these goals, the Commandant has signed USMC 2001 and USMCR 2001, force structure plans for both Active and Reserve forces that focus on enhanced readiness, training and education, and joint operations capabilities.

Compared to FY 1993 end strength, the Active component's FY 1994 manpower request of 174.1K represents a reduction of 7.8K; the Reserve Component decreases 5.4K from the FY 1993 authorization. The Marine Corps civilian end strength between FY 1993 and FY 1994 appears to remain constant at 17.8K. This fails, however, to take into consideration the mandated growth associated with our quality of life programs, and reestablishment of in-house work forces for defaulted commercial activity contracts.

##### B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

In peacetime, the requirement for civilian manpower is represented by the authorized civilian workforce. On M-day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment. At M-day, the peacetime civilian source is reduced because some civilian employees are subject to call-up as reservists or military retirees. The Marine Corps continuously identifies those individuals who hold key positions in the Federal government and who are either members of the Ready Reserve or retired military personnel eligible for recall.

Wartime manpower requirements are determined by combining wartime force structure demands with strength estimates for combat casualty replacement. New planning scenarios and the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1994-1999 will provide the basis for updating the Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning System (WARMAPS) database, which will produce new estimates of Marine Corps wartime manpower requirements.

C. Marine Corps Military Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan

The Marine Corps selectively mans its authorized force structure within the confines of fiscal constraint and mission requirement. As the peacetime operating force requirement is lower than that during war, these organizations are typically manned below 100 percent. In time of crisis, these forces will be augmented by realigning Active component assets or using pre-trained manpower, i.e. Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Retirees.

Marine Corps Active, Reserve, and civilian manpower requests for FY 1993 and FY 1994 are as follows:

Marine Corps Manpower Requirement  
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>
	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Active Military	184.5	181.9	174.1
Marine Corps Selected Reserve	42.3	42.3	36.9
Civilian Manpower	18.5	17.8	17.8

The difference between peacetime manpower requirements and the wartime demand for manpower is the necessity to man vacant Fleet Marine Force (FMF) billets, augment supporting establishment (non-FMF) structure, and provide for casualty replacements. To meet the demand for wartime manpower, the Marine Corps will use all available assets: Active Component personnel, Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, retirees, and non-prior service accessions.

D. Major Force Structure Changes

1. Active Component Structure Changes

In FY 1992 the Marine Corps developed a structure drawdown plan, USMC 2001, that established a roadmap for modernization, consolidations, and reductions of selected units through the FYDP. For FY 1993/1994, the plan remains in effect with minor modifications. In keeping with our adherence to the Total Force concept, USMCR 2001 was developed as a complementary plan for Marine Corps Reserve forces that support and augment the Active forces, based on DoD estimated allocations. The downsizing of the force was planned to retain the capability to perform currently assigned roles and missions.

a. Command Element. Adjustments in the Command Element are aimed at increasing command and control through enhanced communication assets, while reducing the overhead of headquarters units during peacetime. As a result, all Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) headquarters will be deactivated by FY 1994. During FY 1994 the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters and Communications Battalions will become more robust to support joint operations. The RPV Companies will transition to UAV Companies with the fielding of the new Short

Range UAVs. The Force Reconnaissance Companies are reduced in size as the Direct Action Platoons (DAP) are deactivated.

b. Ground Combat Element. The Ground Combat Element (GCE) will reorganize and downsize, striving for maximum firepower with the minimum lift footprint available. Artillery battalions have reorganized to enhance flexibility. Reconnaissance battalions will become mounted in LAVs to enhance their mobility and act as a force multiplier. Deactivation of the Reconnaissance Battalion Headquarters and reorganization of the Assault Amphibian Battalions and Divisional Headquarters Battalion provide additional structure savings.

c. Aviation Combat Element. The modernization of the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) continues with the completion of transitioning from A-6E to F/A-18D squadrons. This transition will be completed by FY 1995. F/A-18As will be replaced with night attack capable F/A-18Cs. Planned acquisition of increased numbers of the more capable AH-1Ws continues as a replacement for older models and 25 percent of the UH-1 fleet. The Marine Air Control Groups will reorganize in FY 1994. A fixed wing MAG headquarters and its associated Marine Aviation Logistics and Marine Wing Support Squadrons will be deactivated in FY 1993. All Active and Reserve OV-10 squadrons will be deactivated by the end of FY 1994.

d. Combat Service Support. Reductions in the Combat Service Support forces will parallel those in the supported elements. In FY 1994, one Landing Support Battalion and one Motor Transport Battalion will be reorganized into a newly activated Support Battalion. This reorganization will eliminate one Headquarters and Service company. Other reductions will be achieved by decreasing unit structure while retaining capability in all combat service support functions.

## 2. Reserve Structure Changes

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve FY 1994 programmed end strength is 36,900. This represents a reduction in force of 5,415 reservists from the FY 1993 authorization of 42,315. To meet a reduction of this magnitude and maintain the Selected Marine Corps Reserve at a high level of readiness, programmed deactivation and reorganization of several units must be implemented during FY 1994. Reorganizations are designed to increase interoperability and mobilization support.

Reserve end strength requirements reflect assessments of Total Force capabilities against national security requirements and fiscal constraints. Despite the large reduction, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve will be maintained at a high level of readiness, ensuring rapid mobilization of a capable force. Furthermore, Reserve missions and equipment interoperability are being upgraded to ensure the Active Force is augmented with the necessary capabilities and functions lost due to force reductions.

### 3. Manpower Requirement

#### Marine Corps Active Manpower Requirement (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>
	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Strategic	*	*	*
Tactical/Mobility	111.4	110.1	104.7
Communications/Intelligence	0.9	0.9	0.9
Combat Installations	8.8	8.6	8.6
Force Support Training	2.5	3.5	3.4
Joint Activities	2.1	2.5	2.5
Central Logistics	1.2	0.8	0.8
Service Management Headquarters	1.5	1.4	1.4
Research and Development	0.9	0.9	0.9
Training and Personnel	14.4	13.1	13.0
Support Activities	12.0	10.7	10.4
Individuals	29.0	29.4	26.7
Undistributed	0.0	0.1	0.8
Total in the Budget	184.5	181.9	174.1

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Less than 50

#### Selected Marine Corps Reserve Manpower Requirement (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Tactical/Mobility	37.5	36.6	31.9
Support Activities	.6	.6	.6
Individuals	3.0	3.4	2.7
IMA	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>
Total in the Budget	42.3	42.3	36.9

**TABLE V-1**  
**ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH**  
(in thousands)

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	X MNG	REQT	AUTH	X MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
<b>TACTICAL MOBILITY</b>	<u>112.4</u>	<u>111.4</u>	<u>121.6</u>	<u>110.1</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>119.5</u>	<u>104.7</u>	<u>88</u>
Land Forces	89.8	87.4	97.6	88.5	91	96.5	84.3	87
Tactical Air Forces	22.3	23.6	23.6	21.2	90	22.7	20.0	92
Naval Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	98	0.4	0.4	96
Warships and ASW	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	99	0.2	0.2	97
Amphibious Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Naval Support Forces	*	*	*	*	93	*	*	93
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>100</u>
Intelligence	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	100	0.8	0.8	100
Centrally Managed Comm	0.1	*	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>84</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>100</u>
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Unified Commands	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	97	0.4	0.3	97
Federal Agency Support	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100
Joint Staff	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>94</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS</b>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>97</u>
Combat Commands	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
Support Commands	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	96	1.0	0.9	94
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>95</u>
Research and Development	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	95	0.9	0.9	95
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>13.2</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>13.1</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>98</u>
Personnel Support	4.5	4.8	4.7	4.6	98	4.7	4.6	98
Individual Training	8.7	9.6	8.7	8.4	97	8.7	8.4	97
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>12.0</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>10.4</u>	<u>93</u>
Support Installations	10.2	10.1	9.8	9.2	94	9.6	9.0	94
Centralized Support Act'y	2.2	1.9	2.1	1.5	92	2.1	1.5	92
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>156.7</u>	<u>155.6</u>	<u>166.5</u>	<u>152.4</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>163.9</u>	<u>146.6</u>	<u>90</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>				<u>0.1</u>			<u>0.8</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</b>								
<b>AUGMENTEES</b>		<u>1.2</u>		<u>1.7</u>			<u>1.2</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>		<u>29.0</u>		<u>29.4</u>			<u>26.7</u>	
Transients		5.5		5.5			5.0	
Holderes		1.7		1.0			1.0	
Students		21.8		22.9			20.7	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>188.0</u>	<u>184.5</u>		<u>181.9</u>			<u>174.1</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Less than 50

**TABLE V-1A**  
**ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH**  
(in thousands)

OFFICERS	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REOT	AUTH	% MNG	REOT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</b>								
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
<b>TACTICAL MOBILITY</b>	<u>9.2</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>90</u>
Land Forces	6.9	6.5	6.9	6.4	90	6.6	6.1	90
Tactical Air Forces	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.1	86	2.4	2.0	85
Naval Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	99	0.1	0.1	98
Warships and ASW	*	*	*	*	96	*	*	96
Amphibious Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	98	0.1	0.1	98
Naval Support Forces	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>99</u>
Intelligence	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	98	0.1	0.1	98
Centrally Managed Comm	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>92</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100</u>
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Unified Commands	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Federal Agency Support	0.1	*	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Joint Staff	*	*	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>98</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>97</u>
Combat Commands	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Support Commands	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	95	0.6	0.6	95
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>96</u>
Research and Development	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	96	0.4	0.4	96
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>97</u>
Personnel Support	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	97	0.5	0.4	97
Individual Training	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	97	1.4	1.4	97
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>97</u>
Support Installations	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	99	0.6	0.6	99
Centralized Support Act'y	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	96	0.5	0.5	96
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>15.9</u>	<u>15.5</u>		<u>15.3</u>			<u>14.8</u>	
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>	<u>0.3</u>			<u>0.1</u>			<u>0.1</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</b>	<u>0.8</u>			<u>1.0</u>			<u>0.8</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>3.7</u>		<u>3.0</u>			<u>2.9</u>	
Transients	0.5	0.6		0.5			0.5	
Holders	*	*		*			*	
Students	2.3	3.0		2.5			2.4	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>19.2</u>	<u>19.1</u>		<u>18.3</u>			<u>17.9</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Less than 50

**TABLE V-1B**  
**ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH**  
(in thousands)

ENLISTED	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</b>								
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
<b>TACTICAL MOBILITY</b>	<u>103.2</u>	<u>102.5</u>	<u>112.1</u>	<u>101.4</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>110.2</u>	<u>96.3</u>	<u>87</u>
Land Forces	82.9	80.9	90.8	82.1	90	89.8	78.1	87
Tactical Air Forces	20.1	21.4	21.1	19.1	91	20.3	18.0	89
Naval Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	98	0.3	0.3	79
Warships and ASW	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	99	0.1	0.1	98
Amphibious Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Naval Support Forces	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>100</u>
Intelligence	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100
Centrally Managed Comm	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	*
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>84</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>99</u>
Int'l Military Org	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
Unified Commands	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	92	0.1	0.1	92
Federal Agency Support	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100
Joint Staff	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	*	*	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>91</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>97</u>
Combat Commands	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
Support Commands	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	97	0.4	0.4	97
<b>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>95</u>
Research and Development	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	95	0.5	0.5	95
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>11.4</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>11.2</u>	<u>98</u>
Personnel Support	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.2	99	4.2	4.2	99
Individual Training	7.3	8.1	7.3	7.1	97	7.3	7.1	97
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>93</u>
Support Installations	9.5	9.4	9.2	8.6	93	9.0	8.4	93
Centralized Support Act'y	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.0	90	1.5	0.9	90
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>140.8</u>	<u>140.1</u>	<u>150.7</u>	<u>137.1</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>148.5</u>	<u>131.8</u>	<u>89</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>	<u>0.8</u>			*			<u>0.7</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</b>	<u>0.5</u>			<u>0.7</u>			<u>0.4</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>	<u>24.5</u>	<u>25.3</u>		<u>26.5</u>			<u>23.8</u>	
Transients	5.2	4.9		5.0			4.6	
Holdees	1.1	1.7		1.0			1.0	
Students	18.2	18.7		20.4			18.3	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>166.0</u>	<u>165.4</u>		<u>163.6</u>			<u>156.2</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Less than 50

**TABLE V-2**  
**MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(in thousands)

TOTAL USMCR MILITARY	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</b>								
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>36.8</u>	<u>37.5</u>	<u>40.9</u>	<u>36.6</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>36.8</u>	<u>31.9</u>	<u>87</u>
Land Forces	28.3	29.1	31.1	28.2	91	27.9	24.1	86
Tactical Air Forces	8.5	8.4	9.8	8.4	86	8.9	7.8	88
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Central Support Act'y	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>37.4</u>	<u>38.1</u>	<u>41.5</u>	<u>37.2</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>37.4</u>	<u>32.5</u>	<u>87</u>
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</b>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>		<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.0</u>		<u>3.4</u>			<u>2.7</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>42.4</u>	<u>42.3</u>	<u>43.2</u>	<u>42.3</u>		<u>39.1</u>	<u>36.9</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

**TABLE V-2A**  
**MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(in thousands)

USMCR OFFICERS	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</b>								
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>86</u>
Land Forces	1.7	1.5	1.8	1.5	83	1.8	1.6	86
Tactical Air Forces	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.0	83	1.1	1.0	86
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Central Support Act'y	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>87</u>
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</b>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>		<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.9</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>	0	0	0	0		0	0	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>3.7</u>		<u>4.1</u>	<u>3.6</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.



**TABLE V-2B**  
**MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(in thousands)

USMCR ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>33.9</u>	<u>34.9</u>	<u>37.9</u>	<u>34.1</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>33.9</u>	<u>29.7</u>	<u>88</u>
Land Forces	26.6	27.6	29.3	26.7	91	26.1	22.9	88
Tactical Air Forces	7.3	7.3	8.6	7.4	86	7.8	6.8	87
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Central Support Act'y	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>34.4</u>	<u>35.3</u>	<u>38.3</u>	<u>34.5</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>34.3</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>87</u>
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</b>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>		<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.8</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.0</u>		<u>3.4</u>			<u>2.7</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>38.6</u>	<u>38.8</u>	<u>39.0</u>	<u>38.6</u>		<u>35.0</u>	<u>33.3</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Marine Corps Civilian Manpower Requirement  
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Combat Installations	9.4	9.3	9.4
Force Support Training	0.1	*	*
Central Logistics	3.7	3.7	3.6
Service Management Headquarters	0.4	0.4	0.4
Training and Personnel	1.0	1.1	1.1
Support Activities	3.9	3.3	3.3
Total in the Budget	18.5	17.8	17.8

\*Less than 50

E. Key Manpower Issues

1. Force Drawdown

As described earlier, USMC 2001 provides a logical "road map" for the drawdown and restructuring of personnel, units, and equipment. This revised force structure will ensure a Marine Corps that is ready, relevant, and capable. Through various recruiting, retention, training, and separation policies, the current Marine Corps inventory is already being shaped to meet the requirements of our new structure.

Achieving reduced end strength goals will not be without cost. Operational tempo (OPTEMPO), for instance, will be affected by the drawdown. There is no proportional decrease in operational commitments as the Marine Corps reduces in size. This means that Marines will be deployed more often for longer periods of time. This will in turn have a negative impact on accessions, retention, training, maintenance, readiness, and quality of life.

2. A Quality Force

A key impact of the force reductions is its effect on the quality of the force. We have made a significant investment in high-quality, well-trained, career personnel. We plan to execute a balanced and prudent force reductions. While no reductions-in-force (RIF) are planned, part of the reduction strategy will include asking some career Marines to leave the Marine Corps. Selective early retirements will be used manage officer and enlisted personnel inventories. At the same time, we must continue to actively recruit enough new personnel to ensure an adequate influx of junior Marines to meet our needs now and in the future. The ultimate goal is to achieve reductions through natural attrition while continuing to recruit and train high quality Marines.

3. Overseas Presence

Recent changes to the geo-political environment have altered the makeup of the American military presence overseas. Marine Corps forces are assigned throughout the globe in support of security force and Marine Security Guard missions, but the preponderance of our overseas presence is focused in Northeast Asia. Modifications to the Marine

Corps' overseas presence relative to Northeast Asia and NATO Europe are described below.

a. NATO Europe

Although American military presence in Europe is declining in response to a decreased threat from the former Soviet Union, the Marine Corps authorized strength was increased from 1,236 to 1,290 in FY 1993 with the stand up of a Marine Security Force detachment in Souda Bay, Greece.

b. Northeast Asia

Congressional legislation aimed at reducing America's military footprint in the East Asian Pacific Rim levied phased cuts on all the services. The Marine Corps was affected by only the first phase of these reductions, which imposed a strength ceiling of 22,253 Marines for Japan and Korea which was achieved by 31 December 1992.

II. SIGNIFICANT HIGHLIGHTS

A. Active Component Military Manpower

1. General

The Marine Corps' FY 1992 end strength was 184,529. An end-strength request of 174,100 was submitted for FY 1994.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning

a. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and End Strength

Programmed manning decreases are tied to force structure changes, resulting in 90 percent manning of the Active Force Structure. Table V-1 illustrates the relationship between programmed manpower structure, programmed manning, and end strength, by officer, enlisted, and total manpower categories.

b. Readiness Assessment

Readiness levels will not suffer as a result of end strength reductions. FMF units will continue to be manned at around 90 percent of their wartime structure. Forward deployed and critical units will receive higher staffing priority.

Critical skills will be preserved during the draw down through judicious use of Enlistment Bonuses, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB), and conscientiously devised retention policies. The Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Benefit (SSB) will help assure a balanced force in terms of longevity and skill mix.

Training and education remain among the Marine Corps' highest priorities. All recruits will continue to undergo rigorous

field training upon entry into the Marine Corps. This emphasis on upfront training ensures that Marines arrive at their initial duty stations fully trained and ready to deploy. Follow-on training and continuing professional military education, hone warrior skills and enhance the Marine Corps' readiness posture.

## B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to provide trained and qualified units and individuals for active duty in time of war, national emergency, and other such times as national security may require. The Reserve Component is comprised of three entities: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. Among these, the Ready Reserve, consisting of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve, is the primary source of mobilization manpower.

### 1. Ready Reserve

#### a. Selected Marine Corps Reserve

##### (1) General

The Ready Reserve consists of two components, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Both fall under the authority of the Commanding General, Marine Reserve Force (CG, MARRESFOR). The principal components of MARRESFOR are a Division, an Aircraft Wing, a Force Service Support Group, two Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command Elements, and a Reserve Support Command.

Reorganization of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve throughout the FYDP will emphasize its role in augmenting and reinforcing the Active component as well as providing a reconstitution base. More Selected Reserve units will be devoted to meeting Active component shortfalls. Additionally, Reserve headquarters have been streamlined. Reserves will also be equipped with the same weapons and systems as the Active component.

##### (2) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and End Strength

(a) Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Table V-2 illustrates the relationship between the programmed manpower structure and programmed manning.

(b) Trained in Unit Strength. The following reflects trained in unit strength for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve:

SELECTED MARINE CORPS RESERVE TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH  
(in Thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
End Strength	42.3	42.3	36.9
-Training Pipeline	3.0	3.4	2.7
-IMAs	1.2	1.7	1.7
Operating Strength	38.1	37.2	32.5
-Non-Unit Personnel	0.6	0.6	0.6
+Unit AC Personnel	5.0	4.6	4.4
Trained Unit Strength	42.5	41.2	36.3
Structure Requirement (Wartime)	44.0	43.5	39.2
-Non-Unit Structure	0.6	0.6	0.6
Wartime Unit Structure	43.4	42.9	38.6
% Trained in Units	97.9%	96.0%	94.0%

NOTE: Structure requirement (wartime) and wartime unit structure numbers include active component structure in the tactical air forces.

(3) Selected Reserve Readiness Assessment

Personnel readiness remained high in FY 1992. Percentage trained in unit strength was well above 90 percent of war time requirements. Recruitment of non-prior service and prior service Marines to match specific skill requirements by unit has consistently improved personnel readiness.

Beginning in FY 1994, both programmed manning and requirements decline significantly. Programmed manning declines at a faster rate than requirements, resulting in a lower manning percentage. Despite the programmed reduction, percentage trained in unit strength will remain above 90 percent.

(4) Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)

IMAs are used to provide pre-trained individual reservists to fill critical wartime billets within 24 hours after the appropriate authority is invoked. An increase in the number of IMAs is programmed during FY 1993. The increase will be used to fill identified requirements.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees  
(In Thousands)

<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Actual	Goal	Goal
1.2	1.7	1.7

(5) Full-Time Support

FTS Reservists contribute to mobilization readiness and accomplishment of the Reserve mission. They are qualified Marine reservists on active duty for periods of one to five years in support of the Marine Corps Reserve. Their knowledge and effort assist the Active forces administer policies and regulations affecting the Reserve component, as well as the organization and administration of recruiting, instructing, and/or training the Reserve Component.

a. Full-Time Support Personnel  
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u> Actual	<u>FY 93</u> Goal	<u>FY 94</u> Goal
Reserve (AGR)	2.2	2.3	2.1
Civilian	0.3	0.2	0.2
Active Duty	<u>4.8</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Total	7.5	7.1	6.5

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

The IRR consists of members of the Ready Reserve who have no mandatory training requirement. The IRR provides pre-trained Marines to fill shortfalls in Active Operating Forces and Reserve units, and also provides for the expansion of the supporting base, as necessary, to meet wartime contingency requirements.

Individual Ready Reserve  
(In Thousands)

<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
64.2	66.8	67.8

c. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve consists of members of the Reserve Component other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment Active and Reserve forces in a national emergency declared by Congress. If mobilized, members in the Standby Reserve would require refresher training.

d. Retirees

The retired military population is composed of those members who have completed 20 years of active duty (both Regular and Reserve), Reserve retirees who have completed 20 years of qualifying service and are eligible for Reserve retired pay at age 60, and those retired for disability. Mobilization potential excludes those retired for disability.

Retirees (Mobilization Potential)  
(in thousands)

	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>	<u>FY94</u>
Categories I and II	40.4	41.2	41.7
Category III	30.2	30.5	30.6

e. Marine Corps Reserve Personnel on Active Duty  
for Training in Excess of 180 Days

The Marine Corps did not have Reserve personnel on active duty for training in excess of 180 days in FY 1992, nor are any programmed for FY 1993 through FY 1994.

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Marine Corps military and civilian manpower resources are integrated to maximize efficiency and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Civilian personnel are used to meet supporting activity requirements to the maximum extent possible, freeing Marines to man the operational forces, thereby contributing to overall effectiveness. This method of manpower resource allocation also enhances training, readiness, and sustainability. It ensures operational continuity and provides specialized experience otherwise not available in the military structure. Marine Corps civilian personnel serve in a variety of functional areas including professional, technical, trade and administrative activities. The Marine Corps manpower request for FY 1994 includes 17,818 civilians.

2. Major Civilian Manpower Changes

Marine Corps civilian manpower requirements are in transition for a variety of reasons:

- Congressionally mandated management headquarters reductions
- Management efficiencies achieved through Defense Management Report (DMR) initiatives such as the consolidation of accounting and finance operations and the streamlining of Automated Data Processing operations and Design Centers under new Defense Agencies.
- Civilianization of military billets not requiring Active members
- Impact of Active force reductions on civilian/Marine mix performing support missions.

TABLE V-3  
MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER  
 (Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.4</u>
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	<u>0.1</u>	*	*
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.6</u>
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQ</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Combat Commands	*	*	*
Support Commands	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>
Personnel Support	0.7	0.8	0.8
Individual Training	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>
Support Installations	2.9	2.7	2.7
Centralized Support Act'y	1.0	0.6	0.6
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>18.5</u>	<u>17.8</u>	<u>17.8</u>

\* Less than 50

Centralized management efficiencies such as the DMR are complemented by the efforts of base, depot, and air station commanders. The commanders are free, through management-to-payroll, to determine the number of civilians they require under a given budget. This latitude allows the commander to make the most efficient resource trade-offs.

### 3. Civilian Manpower Management

Removal of statutory civilian personnel end-of-year ceilings permits Marine Corps activities to adjust their work force to workload fluctuations, allowing high priority requirements to be met while maintaining scheduled production on routine workload.

#### D. Manpower Management Improvements

##### 1. Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI)/Special Separation Benefit (SSB) Program

During FY 1992, the Marine Corps instituted the VSI/SSB program to rectify grade and skill imbalances in the force. The program had the additional benefit of improving promotion flows. The scope of FY 1993's program has been expanded to include Captains in selective MOSs who have not yet been in zone for selection to Major. Those officers having failed selection once to Major are also eligible to apply for the program.



VSI/SSB provides a choice of financial incentives to selected quality career Marines who may be affected by downsizing and restructuring decisions. Participation in the program is voluntary. In FY 1992, 11 officers and 933 enlisted took advantage of the incentives. In FY 1993, the program will again be offered, but will be limited to 265 officers and 1,300 enlisted. These readjustment benefits complement our current force management policies, thereby refining the fit between our projected inventory of Marines and our revised force structure.

## 2. Enlisted Force Management

The Enlisted Career Force Controls (ECFC) program remains the mainstay of enlisted force management during FY 1993. ECFC is a comprehensive manpower management program designed to provide Marines with the correct grades and skills to commanders, as well as equitable promotion opportunity and tempo across all Marine Corps skills. The program involves shaping of the grade structure in order to provide structural equitability and to control the flow of Marines into the career force grade structure. By controlling the demand (grade structure) and the supply (Marines with greater than 4 YOS), promotion equitability will result.

In early FY 1992 significant refinements to the ECFC included transitioning to an up-or-out promotion policy for enlisted members and the establishment of variable promotion opportunities dependent upon individual skill promotion tempo. These refinements enhance the ability to ensure the time-in-service goals for each grade are met, which means individual Marines are assured an equitable opportunity to progress through the ranks. The Enlisted Selective Early Retirement Board (ESERB) held during FY 1992 helped to reduce selected overages within grade/skill cells in the retirement-eligible population. The Marine Corps did not conduct ESERB during FY 1993 nor do we expect to in FY 1994. The ECFC's up-or-out policy obviates the necessity for ESERB's for E-8s and E-9s.

## 3. Officer Force Management

The FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act mandated a steep reduction in military manpower during the period through FY 1995. To encourage early voluntary retirements, Congress authorized a limited number of officers to retire in grade following two (rather than the normally required three) years in grade. As many officers as possible will be permitted to retire under that provision. Congress also enhanced the ability of the Services to effect involuntary reductions through an amendment to DOPMA which provides additional officer management flexibility. Among the provisions within the amendment was expanded selective early retirement (SER) authority. The Marine Corps will employ the expanded SER authority in FY 1993 and FY 1994. Other key elements of the plan to reduce officer end strength include reduced accessions and reduced augmentation.

In FY 1993, approximately 16 colonels (12 percent selection rate) and 62 lieutenant colonels (30 percent selection rate) were selected for early retirement. For colonels, the zone of consideration consisted of Regular and Reserve colonels on the active-duty

list who have at least twice been considered but not selected for promotion to brigadier general, are not on a list of officers recommended for promotion, and have neither been approved for voluntary retirement nor are to be involuntarily retired under any provision of law in FY 1993 or FY 1994. In addition, the officers must have had a minimum two years time in grade. For lieutenant colonels, the zone of consideration consisted of Regular and Reserve lieutenant colonels on the active-duty list who have at least twice been considered, but not selected for promotion to colonel, are not on a list of officers recommended for promotion, and have neither been approved for voluntary retirement nor are to be involuntarily retired under any provision of law in FY 1993 or FY 1994. Eligible officers will be annually reconsidered for selective early retirement.

Another element of the officer drawdown includes reduced accessions. The Marine Corps plans to reduce accessions by approximately 350 officers annually in FYs 1993-1995.

The final aspect of the reduction strategy will be to increase the separation of Reserve officers by augmenting to the FY 1997 end strength targets. This will result in the separation of approximately 100 more Reserve officers in FY 1993 and FY 1994 than would have separated without the strength reduction.

#### 4. Recruiting

By downsizing the military, the perception of the American public reflects a misconception that the Armed Forces are no longer recruiting or are recruiting considerably fewer numbers of people. Accession requirements, however, are derived from total overall losses minus any planned manpower reductions. With manpower reductions coming from vertical cuts, recruiting remains a continuous process. In FY 1993, the Marine Corps total force recruiting requirement has increased 19 percent over early estimates due to a higher authorized Reserve end strength and an unexpectedly high FY 1992 loss rate for active duty enlisted personnel. The increased accession requirement imposed on the recruiting service for FY 1993 has focused efforts on improving the recruiting process. Pre-accession qualification screening is being examined in an effort to reduce attrition and thus ensure efficient and more effective recruiting. The increased mission in FY 1993 has elevated recruiter production levels above previous year totals and will add an additional 292 recruiter manyears to the manpower plan.

#### 5. Management Information

The Marine Corps is continuing to consolidate the integrated personnel and pay system used by the Active component (JUMPS/MMS) and the integrated personnel and pay system used by the Reserve component (REMMPS) into a single integrated personnel and pay system called the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). This consolidation is scheduled to be completed in October 1994. This system will enhance overall force readiness and will reduce organizational turbulence when Selected Marine Corps Reserve units are required to mobilize.

The Marine Corps implemented a new Table of Manpower Requirements (T/MR) system during 1992. The T/MR supports the development, validation, and publication of Marine Corps Tables of Organization (T/O). Although a T/MR system has existed since the mid 1970s, the new system will provide planners with capabilities such as on-line development and staffing of T/O change requests that were previously unavailable. The system stores and maintains the Marine Corps Regular and Reserve T/Os and develops a target force. Additionally, it produces the authorized strength report, from which staffing goals are derived. This system enables planners and managers to identify those billets that the Marine Corps will need to carry out its mission. The T/MR system further enhances the identification of inconsistencies and improves tracking methods.

Development of the Enlisted Planning System (EPS) was begun in 1985. The last module of the system will be completed in 1994. EPS is a set of manpower management tools designed to assist enlisted planners develop thoroughly integrated manpower plans. It will enhance the Marine Corps' ability to plan accessions and training, shape the force, and manage enlisted end strength.

In addition to management actions that improve tour stability and support unit deployments, manpower models, dedicated to providing by-grade projections in specific skill areas, and management of the career force are improving both officer and enlisted force management. The Marine Corps has begun work on increasing the functionality and viability of existing manpower models. Re-evaluation and conversion of these models requires extensive and coordinated effort to re-engineer, enhance, and migrate the models from aging mainframe platforms to modern open systems architecture. This conversion will ensure their viability and functionality well into the 21st century.

#### 6. Requirements Determination

The Marine Corps is developing a process to balance critical workload requirements and available manpower resources. The Manpower Requirements Assessment Survey (MRAS) is a structured program designed out of a need for a capability to assign a limited civilian manpower base to prioritized workload requirements. Due to the magnitude of congressionally mandated civilian manpower reductions, the available work force is not always sufficient to perform all required tasks. This process, which will allow us to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of our civilian workforce, was begun in mid-January 1992 and will take approximately 24 months to complete.

#### 7. Conversion of Unaccompanied Billets

The Marine Corps continues to convert unaccompanied tours to three year accompanied tours as part of the Accompanied Tours WestPac Program. This initiative reduces turbulence and increases tour stability and unit cohesion in Western Pacific commands. Overall cost savings for transient and permanent change of station (PCS) moves are also realized as a result of this program. The current plan converts 270 billets in FY 1993, and 129 billets in FY 1994, bringing total accompanied tours to 3,700 by the end of FY 1994.

## 8. Unit Deployment Program

The Unit Deployment Program (UDP) provides virtually all of the combat and combat support units to the Fleet Marine Forces in the Western Pacific, including infantry battalions, artillery batteries, light armored infantry and assault amphibian companies, and tactical fixed and rotary wing aircraft squadrons/detachments. The UDP permits Marines to deploy to WestPac for six month periods while being home based in CONUS or Hawaii. The primary purpose of UDP is to reduce personnel turbulence associated with 12-month unaccompanied tours to WestPac and to facilitate the quest for uniform readiness of tactical units throughout the Marine Corps.

Since implementing the UDP, the Marine Corps has realized several significant benefits. Marines are now stabilized in the same tactical units for up to three years. This has not only strengthened unit cohesion, but has enhanced continuity of training and given Marine operational forces a greater expeditionary posture. All these benefits have together increased combat readiness.

The Marine Corps was able to continue UDP during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM with reduced unit participation and augmentation by SMCR units, but resumed full execution by the start of FY 1992. Force structure reduction decisions may force modifications to the UDP in the future. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps will continue to make maximum use of this successful and beneficial program for manning forces in the Western Pacific.

### III. MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DPPC

#### A. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Marine Corps tactical and mobility forces include land, air, and naval forces. In FY 1994, 104.6K Marines (59.4 percent of the Marine Corps) will fall in this category. Units accounted for here are all rapidly deployable and exist primarily to conduct combat operations. Only military personnel are assigned to these units.

With the exception of Reserves filling Individual Mobilization Augmentation billets, undergoing initial active duty for training, or serving on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Marine Corps Reserve contributes to tactical and mobility forces.

#### 1. Land Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	87.4	88.5	84.3
Reserve	29.1	28.2	24.1

FY 1994 force structure actions include:

Deactivation - 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) headquarters, Direct Action Platoons (DAP) of Force Reconnaissance Companies, and one Headquarters and Service Company from Motor Transport Battalion, 1 Engineer Company, 1 Surgical Support Company, and 1 Collecting and Clearing Company.

Reorganization/Consolidation - Landing Support Battalion and Motor Transport Battalion reorganize to form Support Battalion. Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters and Communications Battalion become more robust to support UAVs.

2. Tactical Air Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	23.6	21.2	20.0
Reserve	8.4	8.4	7.8

FY 1994 force structure actions include:

Deactivation - Remaining OV-10 squadrons in Reserve inventory.

Reorganization/Consolidation - A-6E squadrons transition to F/A-18D squadrons and F/A-18 squadrons and gain night attack capability by replacing F/A-18As with F/A-18C model aircraft.

3. Naval Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.4	0.4	0.4

Accounted for in these decreases are the reduced requirements for Marines aboard naval vessels resulting from the presidential decision of 27 September 1991 concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons.

B. Communications/Intelligence

1. Intelligence Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.8	0.8

2. Centrally Managed Communications Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	*	0.1	0.1

\* Less than 50

C. Combat Installations

Marines in this category are assigned to bases and stations that provide support to tenant Fleet Marine Force units. The type of support provided ranges from maintenance and communications to audiovisual and administrative. Civilians in this category reinforce capabilities directly affecting readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps operating forces and further serve safety and quality of life functions.

Combat Installations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.8	8.6	8.6
<u>Civilian</u>	9.4	9.3	9.4

The Marine Corps assesses fixed and variable manpower requirements to determine combat installation support needs. Only the fixed portion, consisting of those functions and services necessary to support the base, excluding tenant commands, is accounted for in the base operations support manpower request. Road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal are a few such examples. Variable support is linked to tenant activities. To the maximum extent possible, tenant units augment base support roles under memoranda of agreement between local commanders, subject to the approval of Headquarters Marine Corps. This arrangement enables a percentage of Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in garrison prior to deployment, significantly reducing the manpower assigned to base operating support of combat installations.

D. Force Support Training

Force support training units indoctrinate newly designated aviators and flight officers to combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons as well as providing standardized training to other aviation personnel. Additionally, designated Marine Corps combat readiness training units are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower requirements are based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission. This category also includes manpower support to the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines

through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at Mountain Warfare School in Bridgeport, CA.

Force Support Training Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.5	3.5	3.4
<u>Civilian</u>	0.1	*	*

\*Less than 50

The bulk of this manpower is devoted to instructors and staffs at training squadrons. At the end of FY 1992, these units were understaffed due to seasonal manning fluctuations.

E. Joint Activities

1. International Military Organizations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1

2. Unified Commands Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.4	0.3	0.3

3. Federal Support Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.4	1.5	1.5

4. Joint Staff Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1

5. OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.5	0.5

Increases in this category are due to DoD-wide consolidations for the Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS) and the Defense Information Technology Services Organization (DITSO).

F. Central Logistics Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.2	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	3.7	3.7	3.6

Military reductions reflected are due to the civilianization of Marine Corps Industrial Fund billets. Civilian reductions are due to Defense Management Review streamlining of logistic and acquisition functions at Marine Corps Logistics Bases Albany and Barstow.

G. Service Management Headquarters

Since the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, the Marine Corps has aggressively pursued management headquarters reductions and efficiencies. From FY 1986 to 1990, headquarters were reduced by over 10 percent. In accordance with current legislation, these activities will be reduced an additional 13 percent by the end of FY 1993. This reduction plan includes reorganizing Fleet Marine Force headquarters, streamlining Service headquarters, and consolidating DoD-wide management functions.

1. Combat Commands Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

\*Less than 50



2. Support Commands Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.0	1.0	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	0.4	0.4	0.4

H. Research and Development Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.9	0.9	0.9

I. Training and Personnel

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.4	13.1	13.0

Decreased training requirements due to end strength reductions account for the decline in this category.

1. Personnel Support Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.8	4.6	4.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.7	0.8	0.8

Variations in this category illustrate the increased recruiting missions to recover unexpected losses during FY 1992.

2. Individual Training Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.6	8.4	8.4
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3

J. Support Activities

1. Support Installations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.1	9.2	9.0
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	2.7	2.7

Horizontal cuts at Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Real Property Maintenance Activities and Recruit Depots account for the military reductions shown here. The civilian reductions are due to DoD-wide consolidations of dependent schools, Navy personnel offices, and commissaries.

2. Centralized Support Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.9	1.5	1.5
Reserve	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	0.6	0.6

K. Individuals (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	5.5	5.5	5.0
Patients/Prisoners	1.7	1.1	1.0
Trainees/Students	21.8	22.9	20.7
Total	29.0	29.4	26.7
Reserve			
Trainees/Students	3.0	3.4	2.7

The increase to the individuals account in FY 1993 is due to the increased accessions needed to overcome the unexpected losses experienced in FY 1992. The ensuing decreases complete the cycle as accession levels return to normal and the training pipelines adjusts to support a lower end strength requirement.

L. Undistributed (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0	0.1	0.8

## CHAPTER VI

### AIR FORCE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

#### I. INTRODUCTION

##### A. General

This chapter describes the Air Force manpower request in terms of active military, United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR), Air National Guard (ANG), and civilian manpower requirements. The manpower need derives from the force structure estimate to accomplish Air Force missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy. In that light, the chapter identifies wartime manpower requirements, requested manpower strengths for the budget years and major changes by component.

##### B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

Wartime manpower requirements are based on the total Air Force worldwide force structure plus the number of additional personnel needed to replace estimated combat casualties. The Defense Planning Guidance, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the new planning scenarios for Fiscal Years 1995-2000 will be used to form the basis for a new Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning System (WARMAPS) data base. This data base will be used to produce new estimates of the Air Force's wartime manpower requirements.

##### C. Strength Request

The FY 1994 request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower is as follows:

#### Air Force Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Active Military	444.9	425.7
Reserve		
ANG	119.3	117.7
USAFR	82.3	81.5
Civilian	206.6	198.7

##### D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower

The tables below display manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), showing inventory for FY 1992 and the FY 1993 - FY 1994 totals in the FY 1994 request (end strength in thousands).

Active Military

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Strategic	53.5	37.1	33.0
Tactical/Mobility	113.5	112.4	104.3
Communications/Intelligence	27.7	27.9	26.1
Combat Installations	97.7	73.3	66.6
Force Support Training	19.0	14.1	14.7
Medical Support	40.5	37.5	37.0
Joint Activities	16.4	41.3	40.9
Central Logistics	8.6	8.3	8.0
Service Mgt. HQs	10.2	8.2	7.8
R&D/Geophysical Act.	13.1	11.9	11.6
Training & Personnel	20.6	18.8	18.0
Support Activities	31.6	28.4	27.0
Individuals	31.8	31.3	30.9
Undistributed	-13.6	-5.5	0.4
Total in the Budget	470.3	444.9	425.7

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

U.S. Air Force Reserve

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Strategic	3.1	3.5	4.4
Tactical/Mobility	49.2	48.9	47.5
Communications/Intelligence	0.1	0.1	0.1
Combat Installations	10.5	9.8	9.7
Medical Support	4.0	4.2	4.2
Joint Activities	1.3	1.2	1.1
Service Mgt. HQs	0.3	0.2	0.2
R&D/Geophysical Acty	0.2	0.3	0.2
Training and Personnel	0.4	0.6	0.6
Support Activities	0.4	0.1	0.2
Individuals	0.7	1.7	1.7
IMAs	11.8	11.8	11.7
Total in the Budget	81.9	82.3	81.5

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Air National Guard

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Strategic	21.4	21.9	22.0
Tactical/Mobility	69.6	70.6	69.8
Communications/Intelligence	11.0	14.2	13.9
Combat Installations	4.0	0.5	0.5
Medical Support	4.7	5.0	5.0
Joint Activities	0.7	0.8	0.8
Service Mgt. HQs	0.1	0.1	0.1

R&D/Geophysical Act.	0.6	0.6	0.6
Training & Personnel	4.0	2.8	2.2
Support Activities	1.8	1.1	1.1
Individuals	1.2	1.6	1.6
Total in the Budget	119.1	119.3	117.7

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>Civilian</u>		
	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Strategic	9.1	10.0	9.8
Tactical/Mobility	29.9	35.3	34.4
Communications/Intelligence	7.2	7.4	7.3
Combat Installations	36.7	31.5	29.8
Force Support Training	1.8	1.3	1.3
Medical Support	8.8	9.3	9.2
Joint Activities	3.3	3.3	3.3
Central Logistics	61.7	56.5	53.2
Service Mgt. HQs	6.0	5.3	5.1
R&D/Geophysical Act.	10.9	10.0	10.1
Training & Personnel	11.2	11.3	10.5
Support Activities	27.7	25.5	24.8
Total in the Budget	214.4	206.6	198.7

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

The following sections highlight Air Force major force structure areas and include a brief rationale for participation by either the Active or Reserve Component. Specific changes in force structure are detailed in Section III, Air Force Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

#### 1. Strategic Offensive Forces

In FY 1992, these forces consist of strategic bomber aircraft, tanker aircraft, and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Participation by the ANG/USAFR in the nuclear offensive mission is limited to air refueling operations because of the highly time-sensitive nature of bomber and missile operations and the intensive peacetime training requirements. ANG/USAFR tanker units are operationally capable of performing the air refueling mission. In FY 1993, the KC-135 tanker aircraft mission will be transferred from this DPCC to the Tactical Air Forces and Mobility Forces DPCCs. In FY 1994, some B-1 aircraft will transfer from the active forces to the ANG, and some B-52 aircraft will transfer from the active forces to the USAFR. These ANG/USAFR bomber units, which have been incorporated into the Tactical Forces DPCC, will be trained in the conventional bomber role.

#### 2. Strategic Defensive Forces

These forces include aircraft and ground radars for surveillance, control, and defense. Air defense of the United States is a

traditional mission of the Air Reserve Component (ARC). For over 30 years, ANG units have performed air defense alert in the United States. The ANG now performs 100 percent of the air defense fighter interceptor mission.

### 3. Tactical Air Forces

To meet current regional commitments, the Air Force must have credible, responsive forces to support crisis response requirements. Overseas basing represents roughly 25 percent of our total fighter forces, another 33 percent provides stateside rotational units. The remaining is provided by the ARC. The ARC are able to provide a responsive military capability during a national crisis. In our fighter force, ARC units will grow from one-third to 43 percent of the total force by 1994. The ARC fighter force is being modernized simultaneously with the active force with F-15 and F-16 aircraft. This force posture has been developed so that the rotation base of training and operational fighter units supports overseas fighter force commitments. The ANG provides 100 percent of the RF-4C reconnaissance forces. The USAFR also contributes KC-10 associate aircrews. In FY 1993, a major portion of the active duty KC-10 mission will be transferred to the Mobility Forces DPPC, the TR-1 mission will move to the Intelligence DPPC, and a minor portion of the KC-135 tanker mission will transfer into this DPPC from the Offensive Strategic Forces DPPC. In 1994, B-1 bomber forces assigned to the ANG and B-52 bomber forces assigned to the USAFR will also transfer into this DPPC from the Offensive Strategic Forces DPPC.

Training requirements must be considered in developing the total fighter force structure. Close air support, interdiction, counterair and strategic attack bomber missions are complex and require high levels of training and, in many cases, specialized training ranges to retain proficiency. The part-time nature of the ARC and proximity of individual units are carefully assessed when assigning roles and missions that require skills that must be continually exercised to achieve and maintain essential levels of proficiency.

### 4. Mobility Forces

The proper mix of active and reserve force units is necessary to maintain a non-mobilized surge and contingency support capability in addition to performing day-to-day airlift missions. Peacetime airlift augmentation and wartime surge missions are well suited to the ARC. In addition to providing strategic and tactical airlift aircraft units and associate C-5, C-9, and C-141 units, the ARC also provide substantial capabilities in aeromedical evacuation, rescue and recovery, aerial port operations, and weather reconnaissance. In FY 1993, a major portion of the KC-10 and KC-135 missions will transfer into this DPPC.

### 5. Other Forces

There are several missions which are full-time functions required for support of the combat forces, such as centralized logistics, and research and development. Because of their nature, these missions require full-time personnel. Transfer of these missions to the

Air Reserve Components would not diminish the desired level of support, but would increase the number of ANG/USAFR full-time personnel required, offsetting intended cost savings. Other types of activities have been and will continue to be established in the ARC when the active peacetime requirements are satisfied, but the wartime requirements are not. Some examples of units of this type include ANG and USAFR communications and civil engineering units, and ANG weather units.

#### E. Key Manpower Issues

The Air Force is undergoing its most fundamental reshaping since it was established as a separate Service nearly half a century ago. The broad sweep of change has touched every corner of the Air Force and every aspect of how we do business.

This reshaping has been driven by the demands of a new era -- new thinking, new security challenges and opportunities, new fiscal constraints and new technology. The Air Force began this effort nearly three years ago when we developed a strategic planning framework, Global Reach - Global Power, to set out our vision of what air and space power can bring to the Nation's defense. Simply put, Global Reach - Global Power gives us a clear view of aerospace power's inherent strengths -- speed, range, flexibility, precision and lethality -- and helps us focus on what we need to do to create and nurture these strengths. Global Reach - Global Power is the overarching structure within which we plan, program and budget all our activities.

Our second major initiative was to incorporate the principles of modern management into every aspect of the Air Force -- streamlining and delayering organizations, removing roadblocks to improvement and empowering people from bottom to top. The newly created Air Force Materiel Command is the flagship of many of these changes, but we have also cut headquarters' staffs, restructured numbered air forces, eliminated air divisions, consolidated laboratories and given our wings and squadrons an entirely new look.

By planning within our vision and managing wisely, we have been able to design a program well suited for what the President and the Nation will need in the future. This leaner, meaner Air Force is more efficient in peacetime. In war, it will be even more lethal than it was in the Gulf.

Our experience in the Gulf underscored the need to change outdated distinctions between strategic and tactical -- for airframes and for major commands. As a result, Air Combat Command (ACC) now blends the airborne firepower of the Air Force into one command, erasing outdated distinctions that matched tactical aircraft to armies and long-range aircraft to a strategic nuclear mission. ACC's bombers now train for a variety of conventional roles where their crews will practice to be as proficient at hitting tanks as they are at hitting enemy warmaking capacity. Likewise, Air Mobility Command now lines up most of our mobility and refueling assets on the same team, enabling the American response to reach its destination anywhere on the globe.



The Gulf also proved that the real source of victory is competence -- the kind of competence that can only be gained from years of realistic training and exercises. Our ongoing year of training initiatives will help preserve this winning edge, even in the face of severe personnel drawdowns, by improving our training structure and raising training standards. In 1993, for example, we will transfer all weapon system crew training to Air Training Command (to form Air Education and Training Command) to enable the operational commands to concentrate on their mission of combat preparation. Action is also being taken to strengthen Air Force technical training and education responsibilities. The planned changes will ensure a single, coherent education and training structure for all Air Force personnel from initial entry through retirement.

As forces are reduced and manpower levels decline in concert with our new reshaping strategy, the Air Force has drawn down the active duty force and shifted a greater percentage of the total mission to the ARC. Every effort is being made to ensure military reductions minimize internal turmoil, afford maximum transition assistance to members and sustain future mission requirements. It is critical to note that manpower reductions in FY 1993 and FY 1994 will not generate significant savings in personnel pays and allowances due to the cost of separation payments associated with the Voluntary Separation Incentive, Special Separation Benefit, and Early Retirement.

The FY 1994 President's Budget calls for a reduction in Air Force active duty military manpower from 444,900 in FY 1993 to 425,700 in FY 1994. The FY 1994 figure represents a 53 percent reduction in manpower from the Vietnam-era high point in 1968 and a 30 percent reduction since the mid-eighties. Civilian manpower levels will fall to 206,608 in FY 1993 and 198,690 in FY 1994. The civilian figure for FY 1994 is 43 percent lower than the all-time high in 1969 and a 25 percent reduction since the mid-eighties. Although civilian reductions have not kept pace with military reductions due to such actions as military-to-civilian conversions, contracting initiatives, and Congressionally directed increases to civilian intensive areas (e.g., medical and morale, welfare and recreation), the Air Force perspective is continually adjusted to preserve the optimum mix of active, reserve, and civilian manpower to ensure peak readiness within constrained budgetary limits.

Responding to Congressional intent, Air Force manpower requirements were adjusted for underexecution in civilian accounts and the officer-to-enlisted mix has been closely monitored. Additionally, manpower documents have been adjusted to reflect the permanent reduction of 250 colonels. Further, between 1973 and 1994, the Air Force has reduced total management headquarters manpower by over 24,000. The net effect is a 60 percent reduction in the management headquarters, compared to a corresponding reduction of 36 percent in the combined active duty military and civilian manpower levels during the same period.

The Air Force hopes to minimize the impact of involuntary military reductions in 1994 by offering voluntary separation incentives to selected military members and utilizing the temporary 15-year retirement authority granted by Congress in the FY 1993 National Defense

Authorization Act. Regional involuntary separations in the civilian work force will occur due to resizing and base closures; however, every effort will be made through the DoD Priority Placement Program to lessen the impact on affected personnel.

## II. SIGNIFICANT HIGHLIGHTS

### A. Active Component Military Manpower

#### 1. General

Military manpower end strength in the FY 1994 President's Budget is 444,900 in FY 1993 and 425,700 in FY 1994.

The FY 1994 military manpower decreases are primarily related to three types of actions. Force structure reductions are projected across many weapon systems and proportionate manpower reductions are reflected. Three successive rounds of base closures have required significant reductions in base operating support manpower. Finally, efficiency initiatives and the Defense Management Report program have streamlined our organizations and support functions, eliminated management layers, and initiated new technologies to save manpower. Accession levels have been adjusted to assure our future force will have the skills required to support a smaller Air Force.

#### 2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and End Strength

Table VI-1 reflects Air Force Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and End Strength.

### B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

#### 1. Ready Reserve

##### a. Selected Reserve

##### (1) U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR)

(a) General. The USAFR programmed end strength will decrease by 800 spaces between FY 1993 and FY 1994. This reduction was driven by the following: Aerial Port Squadrons (-191), Civil Engineering Flights (-121), C-141 Airlift Squadrons (-609), A-10 Squadrons (-991), C-130 Tactical Airlift Squadrons (-185); Aeromedical Evaluation Units (-66), F-16 Squadrons (-1444), and Service Support to Special Operations Forces (-109). Some of the decrease was offset by realignments into the following areas: Tactical Air Control System - Air (672), Aerospace Rescue and Recovery (221), C-17 Airlift Squadrons (474), B-52 Squadrons (725) and KC-135 Squadrons (862).

**TABLE VI-1**  
**ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	% INV	REOT	AUTH	% MNG	REOT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>53.5</u>	<u>53.5</u>	<u>37.4</u>	<u>37.1</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>33.3</u>	<u>33.0</u>	<u>99</u>
Offensive Strat Forces	43.5	43.5	28.0	27.8	99	24.2	24.1	99
Defensive Strat Forces	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	95	2.1	2.1	100
Surveillance Forces	7.7	7.7	7.2	7.1	99	7.0	6.9	99
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>113.5</u>	<u>113.5</u>	<u>113.3</u>	<u>112.4</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>105.2</u>	<u>104.3</u>	<u>99</u>
Tactical Air Forces	79.9	79.9	77.3	76.7	99	73.3	72.8	99
Mobility Forces	33.6	33.6	36.0	35.6	99	31.9	31.5	99
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>27.7</u>	<u>28.1</u>	<u>27.9</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>26.3</u>	<u>26.1</u>	<u>99</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	13.7	13.7	11.3	11.2	99	10.8	10.7	99
Intelligence	15.8	14.0	16.8	16.8	100	15.5	15.4	99
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>97.7</u>	<u>97.7</u>	<u>77.8</u>	<u>73.3</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>71.3</u>	<u>66.6</u>	<u>93</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>19.0</u>	<u>19.0</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>14.1</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>99</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>41.8</u>	<u>37.5</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>41.3</u>	<u>37.0</u>	<u>90</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>16.9</u>	<u>16.4</u>	<u>42.3</u>	<u>41.3</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>41.8</u>	<u>40.9</u>	<u>98</u>
Int'l Military Org	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	100	2.9	2.9	100
Unified Commands	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.2	96	2.2	2.2	100
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Joint Staff	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	11.2	10.7	36.5	35.5	97	36.0	35.1	98
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>100</u>
Supply Operations	5.2	5.2	4.6	4.6	100	4.7	4.7	100
Maintenance Operations	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.8	100	1.7	1.7	100
Logistics Support Ops	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	100	1.7	1.7	100
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>96</u>
Combat Commands	5.8	5.8	4.2	4.2	100	3.9	3.9	100
Support Commands	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.1	93	4.2	3.9	93
<b>R&amp;D GEOPHYSICAL ACTVS</b>	<u>13.1</u>	<u>13.1</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>11.6</u>	<u>98</u>
Research and Development	6.3	6.3	5.8	5.8	100	5.7	5.7	100
Geophysical Activities	6.8	6.8	6.3	6.1	97	6.1	5.9	97
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>19.8</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>19.0</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>95</u>
Personnel Support	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.0	91	5.2	4.7	90
Individual Training	14.9	14.9	14.3	13.8	97	13.8	13.3	96
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>31.6</u>	<u>31.6</u>	<u>30.5</u>	<u>28.4</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>28.9</u>	<u>27.0</u>	<u>93</u>
Support Installations	21.9	21.8	21.5	19.6	91	20.3	18.5	91
Centralized Support Act'y	9.8	9.7	8.9	8.8	99	8.6	8.5	99
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANPOWER</b>	<u>454.6</u>	<u>452.2</u>	<u>434.2</u>	<u>419.2</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>409.4</u>	<u>394.4</u>	<u>96</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>		<u>-13.6</u>		<u>-5.5</u>			<u>0.4</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>		<u>31.8</u>		<u>31.3</u>			<u>30.9</u>	
Transients		6.4		6.3			6.4	
Patients, Prisoners & Holdees		0.4		0.4			0.4	
Trainees and Students		20.7		20.4			20.0	
Cadets		4.3		4.2			4.1	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>470.3</u>		<u>444.9</u>			<u>425.7</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

**TABLE VI-1A**  
**ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

AC OFFICERS	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	Z MNG	REQT	AUTH	Z MNG
<b>DPPC</b>								
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>98</u>
Offensive Strat Forces	8.1	8.1	4.9	4.8	98	4.4	4.3	98
Defensive Strat Forces	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	100	0.5	0.5	100
Surveillance Forces	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.8	100	1.7	1.7	100
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>15.8</u>	<u>15.6</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>15.6</u>	<u>15.4</u>	<u>99</u>
Tactical Air Forces	9.8	9.8	9.7	9.6	99	9.9	9.8	99
Mobility Forces	4.7	4.7	6.2	6.0	97	5.7	5.6	98
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>100</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.4	100	1.4	1.4	100
Intelligence	2.8	2.3	2.9	2.8	97	2.7	2.6	96
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>95</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>95</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>13.5</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>87</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>96</u>
Int'l Military Org	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100
Unified Commands	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	100	1.2	1.2	100
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Joint Staff	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	3.1	2.8	5.8	5.5	95	5.5	5.2	95
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>100</u>
Supply Operations	4.4	4.4	4.0	4.0	100	4.0	4.0	100
Maintenance Operations	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	100	0.6	0.6	100
Logistics Support Ops	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	100	0.7	0.7	100
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>98</u>
Combat Commands	3.2	3.2	2.3	2.3	100	2.2	2.2	100
Support Commands	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.8	93	2.9	2.7	93
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTVS</b>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>100</u>
Research and Development	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	100	1.8	1.8	100
Geophysical Activities	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	100	1.5	1.4	93
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>5.6</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>98</u>
Personnel Support	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	83	0.5	0.5	100
Individual Training	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.1	98	5.0	4.9	98
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>96</u>
Support Installations	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.8	90	1.8	1.7	94
Centralized Support Act'y	3.6	3.6	3.2	3.1	97	3.0	3.0	100
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANPOWER</b>	<u>84.1</u>	<u>83.2</u>	<u>81.3</u>	<u>78.1</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>78.1</u>	<u>74.9</u>	<u>96</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>		<u>0.1</u>		<u>-1.5</u>			<u>-1.6</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>		<u>7.1</u>		<u>7.5</u>			<u>7.6</u>	
Transients		0.9		0.9			1.1	
Patients, Prisoners, & Holdees		0.1		0.0			0.0	
Trainees & Students		6.1		6.5			6.5	
Cadets		0.0		0.0			0.0	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>90.4</u>		<u>84.1</u>			<u>80.9</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

**TABLE VI-1B**  
**ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

AC ENLISTED	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	X MNG	REQT	AUTH	X MNG
<b>DPPC</b>								
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>42.8</u>	<u>42.8</u>	<u>30.1</u>	<u>29.9</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>26.7</u>	<u>26.4</u>	<u>99</u>
Offensive Strat Forces	35.4	35.4	23.1	23.0	99	19.8	19.7	99
Defensive Strat Forces	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.5	94
Surveillance Forces	5.7	5.7	5.4	5.3	98	5.3	5.2	98
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>99.0</u>	<u>99.0</u>	<u>97.5</u>	<u>96.7</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>89.6</u>	<u>88.9</u>	<u>99</u>
Tactical Air Forces	70.1	70.1	67.6	67.2	99	63.7	63.0	99
Mobility Forces	28.9	28.9	29.8	29.6	99	26.7	26.0	97
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>23.7</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>23.7</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>22.1</u>	<u>99</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	12.0	12.1	9.8	9.7	99	9.4	9.3	99
Intelligence	13.0	11.7	14.0	13.9	99	12.8	12.8	100
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>91.6</u>	<u>91.5</u>	<u>73.1</u>	<u>68.9</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>67.1</u>	<u>62.7</u>	<u>93</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>16.3</u>	<u>16.3</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>12.2</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>99</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>27.9</u>	<u>27.9</u>	<u>28.4</u>	<u>25.8</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>27.9</u>	<u>25.3</u>	<u>91</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>33.8</u>	<u>33.1</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>33.6</u>	<u>33.0</u>	<u>100</u>
Int'l Military Org	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	100	1.9	1.9	100
Unified Commands	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	100	1.1	1.0	91
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Joint Staff	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	8.0	7.9	30.7	30.0	98	30.5	29.9	98
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>100</u>
Supply Operations	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	100	0.7	0.7	100
Maintenance Operations	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100
Logistics Support Ops	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	100	1.0	1.0	100
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>94</u>
Combat Commands	2.6	2.6	1.9	1.9	100	1.7	1.7	100
Support Commands	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	86	1.4	1.2	86
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</b>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>99</u>
Research and Development	4.4	4.4	4.0	4.0	100	3.8	3.8	100
Geophysical Activities	5.2	5.2	4.7	4.5	96	4.6	4.5	95
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>14.1</u>	<u>13.2</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>13.5</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>93</u>
Personnel Support	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	90	4.7	4.2	89
Individual Training	9.5	9.5	9.1	8.7	96	8.8	8.4	95
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>25.9</u>	<u>25.9</u>	<u>25.3</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>22.3</u>	<u>93</u>
Support Installations	19.8	19.8	19.6	17.8	91	18.5	16.8	91
Centralized Support Act'y	6.1	6.1	5.7	5.7	100	5.6	5.5	98
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANPOWER</b>	<u>370.5</u>	<u>369.0</u>	<u>352.9</u>	<u>341.1</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>331.2</u>	<u>319.5</u>	<u>96</u>
<b>UNDISTRIBUTED</b>		<u>-13.7</u>		<u>-4.1</u>			<u>2.0</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS</b>		<u>24.7</u>		<u>23.8</u>			<u>23.3</u>	
Transients		5.5		5.4			5.4	
Patients, Prisoners, & Holdees		0.4		0.4			0.3	
Trainees & Students		14.6		13.9			13.5	
Cadets		4.3		4.2			4.1	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>379.9</u>		<u>360.8</u>			<u>344.8</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and End Strength. Table VI-2 displays by DPPC category the USAFR programmed manpower structure, programmed manpower and end strength. The USAFR structure decreases by 333 drill spaces and 12 IMA spaces, and increases by 12 full-time support spaces between FY 1993 and FY 1994.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. The following displays Air Force Reserve end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to the wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units. The results show the Air Force Reserve is able to yet maintain a high percentage of trained personnel.

USAFR TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH  
(in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
End strength	81.9	82.3	81.5
- Training Pipeline*	0.7	1.7	1.7
- IMAs	11.8	11.8	11.7
Operating Strength	69.4	68.8	68.1
- Non Unit AGR	0.6	0.6	0.6
+ Unit A/C Personnel	0.8	0.7	0.7
Trained Unit Strength	69.6	68.9	68.2
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	69.6	71.4	71.2
% Trained In Unit	100	96	96

\*Includes categories F and P

(d) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program. The IMA program provides highly skilled individual augmentation to active units during wartime or emergency situations. All IMA positions are reviewed as part of the Wartime Manpower Planning Exercise (MANREQ) and justified solely on the basis of wartime or contingency requirements for which the active forces are insufficient. IMA requirements decreased by 12 positions in FY 1994 due to a reduction in wartime required skills.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 92</u>		<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Total	12,781	11,783	11,758	11,746
48 Drill	800	775	785	806
24 Drill	11,660	10,695	10,652	10,619
Other	321	313	321	321

**TABLE VI-2**  
**U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE.**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

TOTAL AFR MILITARY	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>DFFC</b>								
<b>STRATEGIC</b>								
Offensive Strat Forces	<u>2.2</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>								
Tactical Air Forces	<u>11.3</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>11.2</u>	<u>11.2</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>99</u>
Mobility Forces	<u>38.4</u>	<u>38.2</u>	<u>39.4</u>	<u>37.7</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>39.1</u>	<u>37.3</u>	<u>95</u>
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>								
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>								
	<u>10.4</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>9.7</u>	<u>99</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>								
	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>98</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>								
OSD/Defense Agencies	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>								
Support Commands	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</b>								
Geophysical Activities	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>								
Personnel Support	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>
Individual Training	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>66</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>								
	<u>69.6</u>	<u>69.4</u>	<u>70.9</u>	<u>68.8</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>70.2</u>	<u>68.1</u>	<u>97</u>
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</b>								
AUGMENTEES		<u>11.8</u>		<u>11.8</u>			<u>11.7</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees &amp; Students)*</b>								
		<u>0.7</u>		<u>1.7</u>			<u>1.7</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>								
		<u>81.9</u>		<u>82.3</u>			<u>81.5</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*This figure is not included in "Total Programmed Manning" because the individuals are not yet assigned to one of the above DFFCs.

**TABLE VI-2A**  
**U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

AFR OFFICERS	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>DPPC</b>								
<b>STRATEGIC</b>								
Offensive Strat Forces	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>86</u>
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>96</u>
Tactical Air Forces	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	100	1.3	1.2	92
Mobility Forces	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.4	98	5.4	5.3	98
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>								
Centrally Managed Comm	*	*	*	*	<u>100</u>	*	*	<u>100</u>
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>90</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>								
OSD/Defense Agencies	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>								
Support Commands	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</b>								
Geophysical Activities	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>								
Individual Training	*	*	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
Personnel Support	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.2</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>97</u>
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</b>								
AUGMENTEES		<u>6.8</u>		<u>6.6</u>			<u>6.6</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>16.1</u>		<u>15.8</u>			<u>15.6</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Less than 50



**TABLE VI-2B**  
**U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

AFR ENLISTED	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>DPFC</b>								
<b>STRATEGIC</b>								
Offensive Strat Forces	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>								
Tactical Air Forces	<u>10.1</u>	<u>9.7</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>100</u>
Mobility Forces	<u>32.8</u>	<u>32.7</u>	<u>33.9</u>	<u>32.3</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>33.7</u>	<u>32.1</u>	<u>95</u>
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>								
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>								
	<u>9.9</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>99</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>								
	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>97</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>								
OSD/Defense Agencies	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>								
Support Commands	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</b>								
Geophysical Activities	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>								
Personnel Support	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100</u>
Individual Training	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>
	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>50</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>								
	<u>59.6</u>	<u>60.1</u>	<u>61.5</u>	<u>59.7</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>60.9</u>	<u>59.1</u>	<u>97</u>
<b>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</b>								
<b>AUGMENTEES</b>								
		<u>5.0</u>		<u>5.1</u>			<u>5.1</u>	
<b>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees &amp; Students)*</b>								
		<u>0.7</u>		<u>1.7</u>			<u>1.7</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>								
		<u>65.8</u>		<u>66.5</u>			<u>65.9</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*This figure is not included in "Total Programmed Manning" because the individuals are not yet assigned to one of the above DPFCs.

(e) Full-Time Support Programs. Statutory Tour personnel are Reservists on active duty for periods in excess of 179 days who provide full-time support to the Reserve Component and are paid from Reserve personnel appropriations. They serve on the staff of active component headquarters organizations responsible for Reserve component management, policy, planning, programming, and training; assist in developing and implementing Reserve Forces policies, procedures, and programs; and assist in organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the Reserve component.

In the USAFR, Statutory Tour personnel are not assigned to unit level. Full time support at the combat and combat support unit level is provided by Air Reserve Technicians (ARTs) serving in dual status. As civil service civilians they provide full time day-to-day support to a Reserve unit. As members of the Air Force Reserve, they are integral members of their reserve unit, participate in all military training and duty in their unit, and are available to enter active duty should their unit be mobilized. Because actual assigned strength is used in FY 1992, not all programmed growth between FY 1992 and FY 1994 is real growth. Actual assigned strength is often less than programmed strength due to recruiting and hiring difficulties.

USAFR Full Time Support  
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>	<u>FY94</u>
Statutory Tour	0.6	0.6	0.6
Air Reserve Technician	9.9	10.5	10.5
Civilians	5.0	5.3	5.3
Active Component	0.8	0.7	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>17.1</b>

(2) Air National Guard

(a) General. The Air National Guard (ANG) has a programmed decrease of 1,600 between FY 1993 and FY 1994. This includes a decrease of 1,863 drilling guardsmen and an increase of 263 full-time active guard/reserve (AGR) personnel. The revised strength reflects force structure changes and reductions in Communications Units.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and End Strength. Table VI-3 displays ANG programmed manning and end strength by DPPC category. The Air National Guard programmed end strength of 117,700 in FY 1994 will allow for an overall manning level of 95 percent when compared to total requirements.

**TABLE VI-3**  
**AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

TOTAL ANG MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REOT	AUTH	Z MNG	REOT	AUTH	Z MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>20.2</u>	<u>21.4</u>	<u>22.5</u>	<u>21.9</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>22.5</u>	<u>22.0</u>	<u>98</u>
Offensive Strat Forces	11.0	11.6	12.8	12.7	99	14.3	14.3	100
Defensive Strat Forces	8.7	9.4	9.1	8.7	96	7.7	7.2	94
Surveillance Forces	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>71.2</u>	<u>69.6</u>	<u>73.6</u>	<u>70.6</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>73.1</u>	<u>69.8</u>	<u>95</u>
Tactical Air Forces	51.3	49.7	53.1	50.3	95	52.4	49.3	94
Mobility Forces	19.8	19.9	20.5	20.3	99	20.8	20.5	99
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>								
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>12.2</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>13.9</u>	<u>93</u>
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>98</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>R&amp;D/GEOFYSICAL ACTYS</b>								
Geophysical Activities	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>96</u>
Personnel Support	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	100	0.5	0.5	100
Individual Training	2.5	3.5	2.4	2.2	92	1.7	1.6	94
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>85</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>116.6</u>	<u>117.9</u>	<u>122.5</u>	<u>117.7</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>121.4</u>	<u>116.1</u>	<u>96</u>
<b>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees &amp; Students)*</b>		<u>1.2</u>		<u>1.6</u>			<u>1.6</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>119.1</u>		<u>119.3</u>			<u>117.7</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*This figure is not included in "Total Programmed Manning" because the individuals are not yet assigned to one of the above DPPCs.

**TABLE VI-3A**  
**AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

ANG OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>97</u>
Offensive Strat Forces	1.5	1.6	1.9	1.8	95	2.0	1.9	95
Defensive Strat Forces	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	100	0.8	0.8	100
Surveillance Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>98</u>
Tactical Air Forces	4.9	4.7	4.8	4.7	98	4.7	4.5	96
Mobility Forces	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.2	97	3.3	3.2	97
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>								
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>90</u>
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</b>								
Geophysical Activities	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>100</u>
Personnel Support	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
Individual Training	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100	0.3	0.3	100
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>86</u>
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>15.1</u>	<u>14.6</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>14.9</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>97</u>

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Less than 50

**TABLE VI-3B**  
**AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE,**  
**PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

ANG ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	INV	REQT	AUTH	Z MNG	REQT	AUTH	Z MNG
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>19.2</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>19.2</u>	<u>98</u>
Offensive Strat Forces	9.4	9.9	11.0	10.9	99	12.3	12.3	100
Defensive Strat Forces	7.8	8.4	8.0	7.8	98	6.9	6.4	93
Surveillance Forces	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>63.2</u>	<u>61.8</u>	<u>65.6</u>	<u>62.7</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>65.1</u>	<u>62.0</u>	<u>95</u>
Tactical Air Forces	46.5	45.1	48.4	45.6	94	47.7	44.7	94
Mobility Forces	16.7	16.7	17.2	17.1	99	17.4	17.3	99
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>								
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>11.5</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>14.1</u>	<u>13.2</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>14.1</u>	<u>12.9</u>	<u>91</u>
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>R&amp;D/GEOFYSICAL ACTYS</b>								
Geophysical Activities	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>88</u>
Personnel Support	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
Individual Training	2.1	3.1	2.0	1.9	95	1.4	1.3	93
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>								
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>67</u>
<b>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</b>	<u>102.3</u>	<u>103.6</u>	<u>107.5</u>	<u>103.1</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>106.6</u>	<u>101.6</u>	<u>95</u>
<b>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees &amp; Students)**</b>		<u>1.2</u>		<u>1.6</u>			<u>1.6</u>	
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>104.8</u>		<u>104.7</u>			<u>103.3</u>	

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

\*Less than 50

\*\*This figure is not included in "Total Programmed Manning" because the individuals are not yet assigned to one of the above DPFCs.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. The following displays ANG end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units.

ANG TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH  
(in thousands)

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
End strength	119.1	119.3	117.7
- Trained Pipeline*	2.8	2.6	2.6
Operating Strength	116.7	116.7	115.1
- Non Unit AGR	0.5	0.5	0.5
+ Unit A/C Personnel	0.9	1.0	1.0
Trained Unit Strength	117.1	117.2	115.6
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	122.4	122.5	121.4
- Non-Unit Structure**	0.5	0.5	0.5
Wartime Unit Structure	121.9	122.0	120.9
% Trained In Unit	96	96	96

\*Includes categories F and P

\*\*AGR in Management Headquarters, ANG Support Center, and ANG State Headquarters.

(d) Full-Time Support Program. Full-time manpower consists of military technicians, active Guard and Reserve (AGR), Active Component and civil service personnel performing the day-to-day duties necessary for mission accomplishment and readiness objectives. Half of the full-time manpower available to the ANG is dedicated to equipment maintenance. The remainder is dedicated to training, logistics, administration and other support functions. The elements of full-time manpower programmed for the ANG are as follows:

	<u>ANG Full-Time Support</u>		
	(In Thousands)		
	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Military Technicians*	24.7	25.4	24.3
Civilians	1.9	1.9	1.8
Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR)	9.0	9.1	9.4
Active Air Force with ANG	0.9	1.0	1.0
Total**	36.5	37.4	36.5

\*Includes non-dual status National Guard civilian technicians.

\*\*Numbers may not total due to rounding.

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR)

The IRR consists of people who have recently served in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have remaining a period of obligated service or have volunteered to remain beyond their statutory obligation. They are subject to being called to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress. IRR end strength for FY 1992 was 108.2K, and is projected to be 107.0K and 111.0K for FY 1993 and FY 1994 respectively.

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve consists of people who have completed their statutory military obligation and have chosen to maintain a reserve status, or who have been designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary hardship disability. They are not in a pay status and do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs, but are available for active duty in time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress. The Standby Reserve end strength for FY 1992 was 13.6K, and is projected to be 16.0K and 16.2K for FY 1993 and FY 1994 respectively.

3. Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty

The following charts depict the number of officers and enlisted members serving on active duty for training as of the last day of FY 1992 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days and an estimate for FY 1993 of the number that will be ordered to such duty.

Air Force Reserve

	<u>FY 1992</u>		<u>FY 1993</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	-	741	-	1693
Flight Training	53	-	53	-
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	24	-	24	-

Air National Guard

	<u>FY 1992</u>		<u>FY 1993</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	-	481	-	234
Flight Training	319	-	318	-
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	27	-	27	-

## C. Civilian Force Management

### 1. General

Civilians comprise approximately one third of Air Force manpower. Civilian end strength includes Air Force Reserve military technicians, who serve their units as civilians during peacetime, and as uniformed members upon mobilization. The civilian work force supports the Air Force mission in numerous capacities. Their largest concentration is in Air Force Materiel Command, where they perform depot level maintenance on major weapons systems, materiel management and distribution, basic scientific research and technology development. However, all major commands and organizations depend on the contributions of civilian employees to accomplish the mission, with civilians assigned to virtually every Air Force installation worldwide, particularly in base operating support functions.

### 2. Major Program Changes

Air Force civilian manpower levels for FY 1992 reflect the continuing effects of hiring restrictions and significant reductions taken in the FY 1992 President's Budget including transfers. Requirements are drawing down concurrent with force structure and continue into FY 1993. Loss management tools were limited in FY 1992 to hiring freezes to reduce accessions, reduction-in-force, and early retirement authority. These tools have been enhanced in FY 1993 with legislation authorizing incentive bonuses for separations. The Air Force plans maximum application of these incentives within the law to increase voluntary separations and reduce the impact of RIF.

Programmed manning increases partially offset the reductions and, in fact, tend to mask the size of the reduction. For example, the FY 1992 to FY 1993 decrease in Operations and Maintenance authorizations totals 11,000, while the programmed increases total 6,500 or a net decrease of 4,500. Increases occur in military/civilian conversions; medical; Morale, Welfare and Recreation and Childcare; civil engineering restructuring; and in miscellaneous and balancing actions across the Air Force.

Although no bases closed in FY 1992, planning actions continued for closures in FY 1993 and the outyears for the 16 CONUS and 21 overseas bases identified for closure to date. Reduction-in-force notifications were made to Congress where required, employees were registered in priority placement programs, and retraining activities were initiated in coordination with the host States and the Department of Labor under the Job Training Partnership Act.

Other major program actions impacting civilians in FY 1992 included the standdown of Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Military Airlift Command and the standup of Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command. Aggressive management and civilian personnel office actions reduced adverse impact to a minimum. Air Force Logistics Command and Air Force Systems Command were merged into Air Materiel Command effective 1 July 1992, again with minimal adverse impact on civilians. Only two employees were involuntarily separated.



**TABLE VI-4**  
**AIR FORCE CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH**  
(In Thousands)

CIVILIAN	FY 1992		FY 1993			FY 1994		
	AUTH	X INV	REQT	AUTH	X MNG	REQT	AUTH	X MNG
<b>DPPC</b>								
<b>STRATEGIC</b>	<u>9.2</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>99</u>
Offensive Strat Forces	4.4	4.4	5.2	5.1	98	5.5	5.5	100
Defensive Strat Forces	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	100	3.0	3.0	100
Surveillance Forces	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.3	93	1.4	1.4	100
<b>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</b>	<u>30.4</u>	<u>29.9</u>	<u>35.4</u>	<u>35.3</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>34.6</u>	<u>34.4</u>	<u>99</u>
Tactical Air Forces	15.3	15.5	15.3	15.2	99	15.5	15.4	99
Mobility Forces	15.1	14.4	20.1	20.1	100	19.0	19.0	100
<b>COMMUNICATIONS/INTEL</b>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>97</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	4.4	4.9	5.1	4.9	96	5.0	4.9	98
Intelligence	2.6	2.3	2.5	2.5	100	2.4	2.4	100
<b>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</b>	<u>38.1</u>	<u>36.7</u>	<u>35.5</u>	<u>31.5</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>33.7</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>88</u>
<b>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</b>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>87</u>
<b>MEDICAL SUPPORT</b>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>9.2</u>	<u>94</u>
<b>JOINT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>100</u>
Int'l Military Org	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100
Unified Commands	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	100	0.4	0.4	100
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Joint Staff	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0
OSD/Def Agencies	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2	100	1.3	1.3	100
<b>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</b>	<u>64.0</u>	<u>61.7</u>	<u>56.6</u>	<u>56.5</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>53.3</u>	<u>53.2</u>	<u>99</u>
Supply Operations	42.5	38.0	37.1	37.1	100	36.7	36.7	100
Maintenance Operations	9.7	11.9	10.5	10.5	100	9.0	9.0	100
Logistics Support Ops	11.8	11.8	8.9	8.9	100	7.6	7.6	100
<b>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQs</b>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>98</u>
Combat Commands	2.1	2.1	1.5	1.4	93	1.3	1.3	100
Support Commands	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.8	95	3.9	3.7	95
<b>R&amp;D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</b>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>99</u>
Research and Development	8.7	9.5	8.4	8.4	100	8.5	8.5	100
Geophysical Activities	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	94	1.7	1.6	94
<b>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</b>	<u>11.2</u>	<u>11.2</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>93</u>
Personnel Support	5.5	5.5	5.3	5.1	96	5.3	5.1	96
Individual Training	5.7	5.8	6.8	6.1	90	6.0	5.4	90
<b>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</b>	<u>27.9</u>	<u>27.7</u>	<u>27.8</u>	<u>25.5</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>26.9</u>	<u>24.8</u>	<u>92</u>
Support Installations	22.5	22.2	21.3	19.4	91	20.6	18.8	91
Centralized Support Act'y	5.4	5.5	6.5	6.1	94	6.4	6.0	94
<b>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</b>		<u>214.4</u>		<u>206.6</u>		<u>198.7</u>		

Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding.

### 3. Civilian Employment

Constraints on overseas employment continue to be a problem for Air Force. External actions in an effort to force host nation labor cost sharing through arbitrary budget cuts, workyear ceilings, and ceilings on indirect hire end strength are having a debilitating impact on mission accomplishment and an orderly drawdown. The Air Force overseas civilian reduction is programmed according to force structure decisions. Accelerating civilian cuts impacts the capability to provide base operating support and strains relations with host nations and labor organizations.

### III. AIR FORCE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPPC)

#### A. Strategic

##### 1. Offensive Strategic Forces

#### Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA) 1/

<u>Active Force</u>	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-52	158	117	95
B-1B	84	84	82
B-2	0	0	4
<u>Tankers</u>			
KC-135	373	293	257
<u>Missiles</u>			
Minuteman	862	737	617
Peacekeeper	50	50	50
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
<u>Bombers</u>			
ANG B-1B	0	0	2
AFR B-52	0	0	8
<u>Tankers</u>			
ANG KC-135	154	172	202
AFR KC-135	30	50	60

1/Does not include Training Aircraft

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Air Combat Command (ACC). ACC's primary mission is to deter nuclear/conventional war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear/conventional weapons to any part of the world.

Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	43.5	27.8	24.1
Reserve			
ANG	11.6	12.7	14.3
AFR	3.1	3.5	4.4
<u>Civilian</u>	4.4	5.1	5.5

The FY 1993 active military manpower decrease results from bomber force structure adjustments (-1658), transfer of KC-135s to the ANG and AFR (-1547), reduction of air launched missiles (-346), continued retirement of Minuteman II ICBMs (-506), transfer of KC-135s to Tactical and Mobility forces (-10,923), and a reduction in operational headquarters (-718). The FY 1994 decrease results from bomber force structure adjustments (-1434), reduction of air launched missiles (-935), and Minuteman II ICBM retirement (-1371).

The Air National Guard air refueling capability increase in FY 1993 reflects the conversion of two additional units from Tactical forces (+1125). The ANG increase in FY 1994 (+1594) results from three additional unit conversions to the tanker mission.

In FY 1993, Air Force Reserve received additional KC-135 E/R tanker aircraft (+422). The AFR increase in FY 1994 also reflects additional growth in KC-135 Squadrons (+862).

Increases in civilian manpower for FY 1993 accompany KC-135s transferred to the ANG and AFR (+885). This is partially offset by the realignment of KC-135s to Tactical and Mobility forces (-120) and reductions in operational headquarters (-94). The FY 1994 increase reflects additional KC-135 transfers to the ANG and AFR (+328).

2. Defensive Strategic Forces

Defensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ANG F-16	180	180	144
ANG F-15	36	36	36

Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces include aircraft and ground radars of Air Combat Command and Air National Guard, and ground radars of Pacific Air Forces for atmospheric tactical warning/attack assessment, airspace control and limited defense.

Defensive Strategic Force Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.3	2.1	2.1
Reserve ANG	9.4	8.7	7.2
<u>Civilian</u>	3.5	3.6	3.0

The decrease in the Air National Guard manpower in FY 1993 is due to unit overstrength (+653) in FY 1992 manning. The FY 1994 decrease reflects force structure adjustments (-1520).

The FY 1994 decrease in civilian manpower is also due to force structure adjustments in the ANG (-586).

3. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

In FY 1992, Control and Surveillance Forces include nine PAA EC-135 Post Attack Command and Control System aircraft, which are used by the Air Combat Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers. Three PAA E-3B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft serve as the most survivable part of the National Military Command System. Ground surveillance assets include the Distant Early Warning line, North Warning System, and Joint Surveillance System (47 FAA radars, aerostats, ground system connectivity, and Region Operational Control Centers/Sector Operational Control Centers). Additionally, the ground environment activities include the NORAD Command Post, the missile warning center, and space surveillance centers in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, CO; the Consolidated Space Operations Center at Falcon AFB, CO; three ballistic missile early warning sites; five Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile detection and warning sites; six SPACETRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; and space-based Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (Defense Support Program) and its associated ground and mobile support system.

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.7	7.1	6.9
Reserve ANG	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.3	1.4

The FY 1993 active military decrease is associated with drawdown of the Primary Airborne Command and Control System (PACCS)

mission and retirement of EC-135s aircraft (-458) and a reduction in automated data processing support for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (-146). The FY 1994 decrease reflects additional reductions in the PACCS mission (-198).

The FY 1994 civilian increase is primarily due to growth in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (+20).

B. Tactical/Mobility

1. Tactical Air Forces

Tactical Air Forces (PAA) 1/

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Fighter Wing Equivalents	16.33	16.08	13.8
Tactical Fighter Aircraft	1176	1158	996
Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C)	6	6	0
Special Operations Aircraft	81	96	94
Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (E-3)	29	29	29
Airborne TACS Aircraft (OV-10, OA-37, OA-10)	58	60	60
Electronic Combat Aircraft 2/	34	34	34
Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (KC-10)	57	57	57
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ARC TAC Fighter Wing Equivalents	12.08	11.3	10.5
ANG Fighter Aircraft	648	612	576
AFR Fighter Aircraft	222	204	180
ANG Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C)	72	72	36
AFR Special Operations Aircraft	14	14	9
AFR TACS Aircraft (OA-10)	0	18	18
ANG Airborne TACS Aircraft (OA-37, OA-10)	24	30	30
ANG Special Operations Aircraft (EC-130)	6	6	6
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10) (AFR-Assoc) 3/	3	3	3

1/ Combat Coded Only

2/ Includes EF-111A and EC-130H (Compass Call) squadrons.

3/ Associate squadrons currently provide 43% of the wartime required aircrews for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, conventional bomber, special operations, and command and control aircraft (for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance), tanker/cargo aircraft, and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces includes air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, weapon systems security, and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control System, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, civil engineering RED HORSE (Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer) squadrons and tactical intelligence squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces Manpower (in Thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	79.9	76.7	72.8
Reserve			
ANG	49.7	50.3	49.3
AFR	11.0	11.2	10.1
<u>Civilian</u>	15.5	15.2	15.4

The FY 1993 active duty military decrease is associated with reductions in force structure (-3025), War Reserve Materiel (WRM) (-311), tactical air control (-575), tactical cryptological program (-466), operational headquarters (-321), and deployable C3 systems (-177). The military also decreases due to the movement of TR-1 squadrons to the Intelligence DPPC (-909) and the transfer of some KC-10 force structure to the Mobility Forces DPPC (-1186). The reduction is partially offset by the movement of KC-135 force structure into the Tactical Forces DPPC (+3778).

The FY 1994 active military reduction is the result of further reductions in force structure (-3850), tactical air control (-165), WRM (-450), and the combat communications program (-460). These reductions were partially offset by growth in KC-135 Squadrons (+135), tactical air intelligence system activities (+387), and creation of the contract administration/audit program (+457).

The FY 1993 Air National Guard manpower increase is due to a growth in tactical air control systems (+580) and civil engineering squadrons (+180), which is partially offset by force structure adjustments (-200). The FY 1994 decrease is due to a reduction in RF-4 aircraft (-1743), F-16 aircraft (-159), and F-15 Squadrons (-94). These decreases are partially offset by the addition of B-1 bomber aircraft (+977).

In FY 1994, USAFR manpower decreases due to reductions in F-16 squadrons (-1444) and A-10 squadrons (-991). These reductions were partially offset by increases in the tactical air control system (+672) and the addition of B-52 bomber aircraft (+725).

The FY 1994 civilian increase results from growth in advance program technology (+370) and USAFR tactical air control systems (+270), which was partially offset by force structure adjustments (-423).

## 2. Mobility Forces

### Mobility Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Airlift Aircraft	160	150	154
Strategic Airlift Aircraft	280	239	243
Aeromedical Aircraft*	18	18	18
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ANG Tactical Airlift Aircraft	173	166	168
AFR Tactical Airlift Aircraft	116	96	100
Strategic Airlift (AFR-unit equipped)	40	60	64
Strategic Airlift (ANG-unit equipped)	23	27	27
ANG Rescue Aircraft	24	24	24
AFR Rescue Aircraft	25	25	31
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) <u>1/</u>	17	16	16
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) <u>1/</u>	1	1	1

\*Manpower to support Aeromedical activities is counted in the Medical DPPC.

1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5 squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons in FY 1992. The AFR adds a C-17 associated squadron and loses two C-141 squadrons with the closure of Norton AFB, CA, in FY 1993.

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Air Mobility Command and the ARC. Manpower supporting these forces includes crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations, Air Force special airlift missions, and administrative airlift.

### Mobility Forces Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	33.6	35.6	31.5
Reserve			
ANG	19.9	20.3	20.5
AFR	38.2	37.7	37.3
<u>Civilian</u>	14.4	20.1	19.0

The FY 1993 increase in active military manpower results from increases in C-130 Airlift Squadrons (+2562) and Transportation

activities (+2841). This increase is partially offset by reductions in non-industrial funded airlift mission activities (-1970), operational support aircraft (-473), and command/control systems (-967). The FY 1994 decrease results primarily from reductions in Transportation activities (-4044) and operational support airlift (-130), which is partially offset by an increase in aerospace rescue and recovery (+100).

The FY 1993 increase in ANG military manpower results from growth in C-141 squadrons (+337), C-5 squadrons (+139), and aerial port units (+190). This growth is partially offset by a reduction in C-130 squadrons (-313). The FY 1994 increase reflects a growth in C-130 squadrons (+347), which is partially offset by a reduction in operational support airlift (-154).

The AFR decrease in FY 1993 is primarily due to a reduction in aerial ports (-366) and C-130 airlift (-987). These actions were partially offset by increases for C-141 airlift (+296), C-17 airlift (+226), C-5 airlift (+84), aeromedical evacuation (+202), and rescue (+90). In FY 1994, further reductions were caused by C-141 airlift (-609), aerial ports (-191), C-130 airlift (-185), and aeromedical evacuation units (-66). These reductions were partially offset by increases to C-17 airlift (+474) and rescue (+221).

The civilian increase in FY 1993 results from growth in Transportation activities (+5585) and C-141 airlift adjustments (+325), which were partially offset by a reduction in non-industrial funded airlift mission activities (-209). The FY 1994 decrease results primarily from adjustments to the Transportation activities (-1381), which is partially offset by adjustments to C-130 airlift (+144) and C-141 airlift (+98).

C. Communications/Intelligence

1. Centrally Managed Communications Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.7	11.2	10.7
Reserve			
ANG	11.0	14.2	13.9
AFR	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	4.9	4.9	4.9

The active military decrease in FY 1993 is due to the Air Mobility Command conversions to the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) (-1309), Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) divestiture (-523), DMRD initiatives (-217), Air Force restructure initiatives (-259), the Engineering and Installation reduction (-113), and the F-117 aircraft relocation (-72). The decrease in FY 1994 is due to base closure actions (-105), a management headquarters adjustment in AFCC (-289), and DMR initiatives (-128).



The growth in the Air National Guard in FY 1993 reflects a realignment of spaces from the Combat Installations DPPC (+3184) to reflect Air Force organizational structure changes. The FY 1994 decrease results from a restructure in fulltime support and drill requirements for communications units (-291).

2. Intelligence Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.0	16.8	15.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	2.5	2.4

The active military increase in FY 1993 (+1002) is primarily due to the transfer of the TR-1 program into the Intelligence DPPC. The remainder is due to unit understrength (-1813) in FY 1992 manning. The active military decrease in FY 1994 results from programmatic reductions in classified programs (-1374).

The FY 1994 civilian decrease results from NFIP reductions directed by the Director of Central Intelligence (-75).

D. Combat Installations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	97.7	73.3	66.6
Reserve			
ANG	4.0	0.5	0.5
AFR	10.5	9.8	9.7
<u>Civilian</u>	36.7	31.5	29.8

The active military decrease in FY 1993 results from base closure actions (-7476), DMR efficiency initiatives (-1474), and force structure adjustments (-3403), and transfer of mobility base support to DBOF (-12,074). The FY 1994 decreases are base closures (-5361) and DMR efficiency initiatives (-1382).

In FY 1993, the ANG realigned 1933 spaces to the Communications DPPC to reflect changes in the Air Force structure. The remaining reduction reflects prior restructuring of Communications manpower.

In FY 1993, the AFR reduced civil engineering (-419), information systems (-106) and miscellaneous support (-107). In FY 1994, civil engineering was reduced further (-121).

The civilian increase in FY 1993 is primarily due to transfer of mobility base support to the DBOF (-5436). The civilian decrease in FY 1994 is attributed to base closure actions (-1737).

E. Force Support Training Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	19.0	14.1	14.2
<u>Civilian</u>			
	1.8	1.3	1.3

The FY 1993 active military decrease is due to reductions in CAF/Airlift training requirements (-4561) and the regionalization of field training detachments (-603). These decreases are partially offset by the transfer of the Air Weapons School from the Individual Training DPPC (+236). The FY 1994 increase is a continuation of adjustments to the CAF/Airlift training requirements (+143), which are partially offset by further reductions to field training detachments (-74).

The FY 1993 civilian decrease is due to reduced training requirements (-495).

F. Medical Support Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	40.5	37.5	37.0
Reserve			
ANG	4.7	5.0	5.0
AFR	4.0	4.2	4.2
<u>Civilian</u>			
	8.8	9.3	9.2

The decrease in FY 1993 active military is primarily caused by military-to-civilian conversions (-535) and programmatic reductions for base closures and force structure decreases (-2480). The FY 1994 decrease is primarily caused by base closures (-680) and manpower adjustments for economies and efficiencies (-435). These decreases are partially offset by a PDM adjustment to the medical baseline to bring them to their Congressionally-mandated September 1989 floor (+600).

The increase in FY 1993 civilian manpower is primarily due to growth in regional defense health facilities (+162), station hospitals/medical clinics (+152), human systems technology (+34), and other health activities (+85). The decrease in FY 1994 (-10) civilian manpower levels results from further base closure actions.

G. Joint Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.4	41.3	40.9
Reserve			
ANG	0.7	0.8	0.8
AFR	1.3	1.2	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.3	3.3	3.3

The active military increase in FY 1993 is caused primarily by Foreign Military Sales (+125), the American Forces Information Service (+129), Special Operations Forces (SOF) (+789), and the transfer of in-service Air Force authorizations to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (+1394) and US Transportation Command (+22,469). In FY 1994, the decrease is attributable primarily to reductions in AF service support to defense agencies (-448).

The FY 1994 decrease in AFR manpower results from a reduction in service support to Special Operations Forces (-109).

H. Central Logistics Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.6	8.3	8.0
<u>Civilian</u>	61.7	56.5	53.2

Active military reductions in FY 1994 were caused by force structure reductions (-352).

Several actions drove reductions in civilian end strength in FY 1993. AFMC restructure initiatives (-1742), an arbitrary civilian adjustment (-804), transfer of supply management to the Defense Logistics Agency (-3606), and force structure reductions (-1360). These reductions were partially masked by unit understrength (-2276) in FY 1992 manning. Major actions which reduced the civilian end strength in FY 1994 included AFMC restructuring initiatives (-1530), an arbitrary civilian adjustment (-257), and force structure changes (-1719). These decreases were partially offset by the implementation of two level maintenance (+172).

I. Service Management Headquarters Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.2	8.2	7.8
Reserve			
ANG	0.1	0.1	0.1
AFR	0.3	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	6.0	5.3	5.1

Active military and civilian decreases between all fiscal years exceed OSD-directed ceiling constraints to comply with Congressional direction to reduce management headquarters and headquarters support end strength in accordance with Section 906 of the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act. The Air Force has reduced its manpower below OSD/Congressionally-directed ceiling constraints by various restructuring actions to implement its Global Reach-Global Power strategic planning framework during sharply reduced budgets. In addition, self-imposed reductions also have been programmed to ensure that management headquarters and headquarters support end strengths are reduced commensurate with reductions taken in the total force.

J. Research and Development/Geophysical Activities

1. Research and Development Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.3	5.8	5.7
<u>Civilian</u>	9.5	8.4	8.5

The active military decrease in FY 1993 results primarily from the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) restructure (-238), contracting actions (-80), and reduced test aircraft support (-133). The decrease in FY 1994 is due to test aircraft support reductions (-164), which is partially offset by an increase in the civil engineering and environmental program (+35).

The civilian manpower decrease in FY 1993 is primarily due to reductions in advanced weapons (-144), aerospace avionics (-48), materials (-37), and test and evaluation support (-852). The FY 1994 increase is due to the civil engineering and environmental program (+42) and test and evaluation support (+73).

2. Geophysical Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.8	6.1	5.9
Reserve			
ANG	0.6	0.6	0.6
AFR	0.2	0.3	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.6	1.6

The active military decrease in FY 1993 is primarily due to the Air Mobility Command conversion to the Defense Business Operating Fund (-298), base closures (-109), operational streamlining in weather functions (-175), and Defense Management Review (DMR) actions (-72). The FY 1994 decrease results from further base closures (-113) and operational streamlining in weather functions (-57).

The AFR manpower decrease in FY 1994 is due to a reduction in weather service (-57).

K. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.6	5.0	4.7
Reserve			
ANG	0.5	0.6	0.5
AFR	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	5.5	5.1	5.1

The active military manpower decrease in FY 1993 results from a reduction in recruiting activities (-108), American forces information services field activities (-37), family centers (-24), off-duty/voluntary education programs (-144), and other personnel activities (-287). The FY 1994 decrease is primarily due to reductions in examining activities (-248) and other personnel activities (-27).

The ANG manpower decrease in FY 1994 is due to a reduction in recruiting activities (-31).

2. Individual Training Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.9	13.8	13.3
Reserve			
ANG	3.5	2.2	1.6
AFR	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	5.8	6.1	5.4

Active duty military decreases in FY 1993 are caused primarily by reductions in accession driven general skills training (-537), undergraduate pilot training (-347), recruiting (-55), ROTC (-88), training support and training development (-61), and other professional education (-40). The FY 1994 decrease is due to a reduction in undergraduate pilot training (-212) and a further draw down of accession driven general skills training (-286).

The Air National Guard manpower decrease in FY 1993 (-1229) is due to a force structure reduction of 18 aircraft and a phase-down of drill positions. The ANG manpower decrease in FY 1994 (-602) results from further aircraft reductions and a conversion to a new mission.

In FY 1994, the civilian decrease results from reductions in the ANG training aircraft program (-704).

L. Support Activities

1. Support Installations Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.8	19.6	18.5
<u>Civilian</u>	22.2	19.4	18.8

The FY 1993 military decrease is primarily due to base closure actions (-1479), transfer of Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) manpower to the OSD/Defense Activities DPPC (-502), and a training tail base support adjustment (-176). The FY 1994 decreases are base closures (-783) and DMR efficiency initiatives (-289).

The FY 1993 civilian decrease results from base closures (-1370), DMR efficiency initiatives (-172), and transfer of resources to the DFAS (-1466). This decrease was partially masked by unit under-strength (-224) in FY 1992 manning. The FY 1994 decreases are base closures (-415) and civilian reductions (-193).

2. Centralized Support Activities Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.7	8.8	8.5
Reserve			
ANG	1.8	1.1	1.1
AFR	0.4	0.1	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	5.5	6.1	6.0

The active military decrease in FY 1993 is due to efficiencies at 21 Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) (-192), Joint Strategic Target and Planning Staff (-244), military-to-civilian conversions (-226), a transfer to the Joint Activities DPPC (-186), and operational test and evaluation (OT&E) (-66). The FY 1994 decreases are the FOAs (-197), OT&E (-48), and miscellaneous adjustments (-39).

The FY 1993 ANG decrease results from overstrength (+694) in FY 1992 manning.

The FY 1994 AFR increase is due to a small growth in miscellaneous support (+23).

The civilian increases in FY 1993 are due to environmental restoration (+476) and military-to-civilian conversions (+226). This increase was partially masked by unit overstrength (+54) in FY 1992 manning. The FY 1994 decrease is primarily due to a reduction in test ranges (-80).

M. Individuals

1. Transients (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.4	6.3	6.4

While overall Air Force end strength continues to decrease in FY 1994, an increase in overseas rotational moves from FY 1993 to FY 1994 causes an increase in transient end strength.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.4	0.4	0.4

3. Trainees and Students (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	20.7	20.4	20.0
Reserve			
ANG	1.2	1.6	1.6
AFR	0.7	1.7	1.7

In FY 1994, active military end strength decreases are due primarily to a programmed decrease in accessions which drives a reduction in initial skills training (-293), recruiting (-182), and undergraduate pilot training (-77). These decreases are partially offset by increases in professional military education (+40) and pilot requalification training (+61).

The AFR increase reflected in FY 1993 is actually due to unit understrength (-952) in FY 1992 manning.

4. Cadets/Midshipmens (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.3	4.2	4.1

Cadet decreases reflect implementation of congressional direction and intent to reduce cadets in concert with total end strength reductions.

N. Undistributed Manpower (in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 93</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	-13.6	-5.5	0.4



## CHAPTER VII

### DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

#### I. INTRODUCTION

In 1958, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to integrate as a separate organizational entity, "any supply or service activity common to more than one military department, whenever (he) determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency". Since that time, the Secretary has utilized that authority several times to create most of the organizations contained within this chapter. Those organizations that did not receive their charters from the Secretary of Defense were created by Public Law. The missions of Defense Agencies vary widely, ranging from communications, mapping, intelligence, education, logistics, and other support to the Military Services and other parts of the federal government. Functional consolidations increase the Department's efficiency and permit the Services to devote a greater portion of their resources to their primary military missions. The Secretary continues to use this management philosophy to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Defense operations.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), assisted by the Joint Staff (JS), oversees, assigns responsibilities, and periodically evaluates the organizational effectiveness of Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and other organizational entities that exist outside of the Military Departments.

#### II. MISSIONS AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The missions and associated manpower requirements of a number of Defense-related operating components that exist outside of the Military Services, are discussed within this chapter, including:

- A. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD);
- B. Joint Staff (JS);
- C. 16 Defense Agencies; and
- D. 7 DoD Field Activities.

The manpower data depicted reflects the actual end strength assigned on the last day of FY 1992 and the programmed/budgeted end strength projected for FY 1993 and FY 1994. The military strength figures represent uniformed personnel allocated to organizations outside of the Services, and are also counted in Military Service total force levels. It is appropriate to display the military personnel strength contribution to these organizations since this manpower represents an essential element of each organization's total force requirement. The manpower data, displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), is portrayed at the end of this chapter.

**DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS**  
**CONSOLIDATED MANPOWER**

(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	42,541	71,912	180,558
Officer	(11,033)	(15,539)	(52,762)
Enlisted	(31,508)	(56,373)	(127,796)
Civilian	<u>148,997</u>	<u>166,813</u>	<u>161,211</u>
Total	191,538	238,725	341,769

Defense Agency manpower, as a whole, is projected to increase by 43 percent (or 103,044 spaces) between FY 1993 and FY 1994. The aggregate increase is comprised of a military strength increased of 151.1 percent (or 108,646 spaces) offset by a civilian strength decrease of 3.4 percent (or 5,602 spaces).

The net increase in Defense Agency manpower, as a whole, primarily reflects the functional transfer from the Services of Defense Health Program resources. The consolidation includes all medical resources with the exception of support to field/numbered medical units, hospital ships, and ship-board operations. In addition, manpower increases associated with creation of a new intelligence agency for centralized imagery and a Defense Acquisition University for centralized acquisition training are also reflected.

The net increase in overall Defense Agency strength has been offset by manpower decreases due to reduced levels of program support associated with reduced military force structure and Congressionally-directed reductions in management headquarters strength.

An explanation of the changes in each Component's operating strength level between FY 1993 and FY 1994 is provided below along with the year-end actual strength for FY 1992.

**A. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)**

OSD is the principal staff element of the Secretary, responsible for overall policy development, planning, resource management, and program evaluation.

**OSD Manpower**

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	661	561	564
Officer	(503)	(473)	(467)
Enlisted	(158)	( 88)	( 97)
Civilian	<u>1,533</u>	<u>1,549</u>	<u>1,470</u>
Total	2,194	2,110	2,034

The OSD FY 1994 manpower level reflects the congressionally-directed management headquarters reduction of 4 percent per year for FY 1991 through FY 1995.

B. JOINT STAFF (JS)

JS Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	1,199	1,244	1,198
Officer	(831)	(885)	(859)
Enlisted	(368)	(359)	(339)
Civilian	<u>246</u>	<u>246</u>	<u>246</u>
Total	1,445	1,490	1,444

The Joint Staff FY 1994 manpower level reflects their allocated share of the congressionally-directed management headquarters reduction of 4 percent per year for FY 1991 through FY 1995.

C. DEFENSE AGENCIES

There are currently 16 Defense Agencies under the Department of Defense. The Central Imagery Office, created on May 6, 1993, represents the most recent Defense Agency creation. Civilian manpower associated with the National Security Agency is exempt from this chapter in accordance with Public Law 89-36.

1. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)

ARPA manages and directs advanced basic research and development projects which involve high risk and high payoff technologies.

ARPA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	22	22	22
Officer	(22)	(21)	(21)
Enlisted	( 0)	( 1)	( 1)
Civilian	<u>130</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>157</u>
Total	152	150	179

The ARPA FY 1994 manpower level reflects increased contract oversight associated with new and expanding initiatives, including the Technology Reinvestment Program and the Air Defense Initiative.

2. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)

DISA is responsible for planning, developing and supporting the command, control, communications, and information systems that serve the needs of the National Command Authorities under all conditions of

peace and war. Formerly the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), DISA received an expanded charter in 1991 to provide the technical support for DoD's Corporate Information Management program effort.

3. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The mission of DIA is to satisfy the military foreign intelligence requirements of DoD and other authorized recipients, and to provide the military intelligence contribution to national intelligence.

4. Central Imagery Office (CIO)

CIO was established as a combat support Defense Agency on May 6, 1992. The CIO mission is to ensure that United States government requirements concerning imagery relating to national security are met.

Communications/Intelligence Manpower<sup>1</sup>

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	8,524	10,310	10,525
Officer	(2,469)	(2,990)	(3,005)
Enlisted	(6,055)	(7,320)	(7,520)
Civilian	<u>9,038</u>	<u>15,529</u>	<u>15,382</u>
Total	17,562	25,839	25,907

The FY 1994 manpower level identified to this activity reflects creation of the CIO offset by manpower reductions associated with information technology streamlining and management headquarters strength.

5. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

DCAA is the Department's "contract" auditor, responsible providing audit and financial advisory services to DoD Components involved in procurement and contract administration operations.

	<u>DCAA Manpower</u>		
	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Civilian	5,877	5,524	5,410

The DCAA FY 1994 manpower level reflects projected decline in contract funding and implementation of the congressionally-directed management headquarters reduction of 4 percent per year for FY 1992 through FY 1995.

<sup>1</sup> Includes DISA, DIA and CIO manpower

6. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS is DoD's law enforcement, personnel investigative, and industrial security arm. DIS also provides industrial security services to over twenty Federal civilian agencies.

DIS Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1994</u>
Civilian	3,651	3,598	3,134

The DIS amended FY 1993 manpower level reflects projected declines in personnel security investigative workload (due to reductions in DoD military and civilian end strength), projected declines in industrial security requirements (due to reductions in DoD contract funding), and reduction of 4 percent per year in management headquarters strength.

7. Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)

DLSA provides centralized legal advice, services, and support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and all of the other organizational entities that exist outside of the Military Departments.

DLSA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1994</u>
Military	6	7	5
Officer	(2)	(0)	(0)
Enlisted	(4)	(7)	(5)
Civilian	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>79</u>
Total	87	89	84

The DLSA FY 1994 manpower level reflects implementation of congressionally-directed reduction in management headquarters strength of 4 percent per year for FY 1991 through FY 1995.

8. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common support supplies and worldwide logistic services across DoD and to other federal agencies and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence, medical goods, industrial and construction material, general and electronic supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services include contract administration and management, surplus personal property reutilization and disposal, documentation services to the Research and Development (R&D) community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	1,193	1,436	1,459
Officer	973	(1,155)	(1,140)
Enlisted	220	(281)	(319)
Civilian	<u>64,494</u>	<u>57,033</u>	<u>53,332</u>
Total	65,687	58,469	54,791

The DLA FY 1994 manpower level reflects efficiencies resulting from streamlining depots, modernizing/automating materials handling, and a projected decline in contract administration and management workload (due to anticipated reductions to DoD's procurement funding).

9. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA provides mapping, charting, and geodetic (MC&G) services in support of the Department's strategic and tactical military operations and weapon systems. DMA also compiles general aeronautical and marine navigation data.

DMA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	314	292	272
Officer	(127)	(152)	(147)
Enlisted	(187)	(140)	(125)
Civilian	<u>7,856</u>	<u>7,572</u>	<u>7,518</u>
Total	8,170	7,864	7,790

The DMA FY 1994 manpower level reflects two functional transfer actions associated with creation of DoD's Central Imagery Office and consolidation of personnel security adjudication function, as well as, DMA's allocated share of military strength and management headquarters reductions.

10. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA acts as the principal staff advisor on matters concerning nuclear weapons; acquisitions; effects on weapon systems and forces; land-based storage facilities; and arms control verification, compliance, development, testing, and evaluation.

DNA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	497	498	417
Officer	(314)	(327)	(280)
Enlisted	(183)	(171)	(137)
Civilian	<u>808</u>	<u>867</u>	<u>690</u>
Total	1,305	1,365	1,107

The DNA FY 1994 manpower level reflects the functional transfer of the Armed Forces Radio-biology Research Institute to the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and DNA's allocated share of Congressionally-directed management headquarters reductions.

11. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for the management of DoD's Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs.

DSAA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	20	27	27
Officer	(17)	(24)	(24)
Enlisted	( 3)	( 3)	( 3)
Civilian	<u>106</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>97</u>
Total	126	127	124

The DSAA FY 1994 manpower level reflects implementation of Congressionally-directed management headquarters reduction.

12. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)

SDIO was organized in FY 1984 as a research activity designed to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles, and to increase the contribution of defense systems to U.S. and allied security.

SDIO Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	108	117	117
Officer	( 98)	(106)	(106)
Enlisted	( 10)	( 11)	( 11)
Civilian	<u>139</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>243</u>
Total	247	260	360

The SDIO FY 1994 manpower level reflects staff increases associated with converting contract service support to in-house civilian capability.

13. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)

The OSIA was created in 1988 to conduct on-site inspections, portal monitoring, escort activities, in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, Chemical Weapons Agreements, and Open Skies Treaty. OSIA is also responsible for support of in-country nuclear test monitoring and conduct of inspections pursuant to the Vienna Document of 1992.

OSIA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	481	711	702
Officer	(179)	(311)	(307)
Enlisted	(302)	(400)	(395)
Civilian	<u>220</u>	<u>360</u>	<u>360</u>
Total	701	1,071	1,062

The OSIA FY 1994 manpower level reflects implementation of the Congressionally-directed management headquarters reduction of 4 percent per year for FY 1991 through FY 1995.

14. Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA)

DeCA was created in November 1990 to provide a more efficient and effective worldwide resale system of groceries and household supplies to members of the Military Services, their families, and other authorized patrons. DeCA also provides a peacetime training environment for food supply logisticians needed in wartime and troop issue subsistence support to military dining facilities.

DeCA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	1,922	1,849	1,572
Officer	(61)	( 79)	( 68)
Enlisted	( 1,861)	(1,770)	(1,504)
Civilian	<u>21,796</u>	<u>20,136</u>	<u>19,695</u>
Total	23,718	21,985	21,267

The DeCA FY 1994 manpower level reflects reductions associated with the European force structure drawdown and additional consolidating and streamlining initiatives.



15. Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)

DFAS was created in November 1990 in order to consolidate, standardize, and integrate finance and accounting requirements, functions, procedures, operations, and systems across DoD and ensure their proper relationship with other functional areas.

DFAS Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	408	2,189	1,838
Officer	( 89)	(147)	(116)
Enlisted	(319)	( 2,042)	(1,722)
Civilian	<u>10,475</u>	<u>21,567</u>	<u>20,983</u>
Total	10,883	23,756	22,821

The DFAS FY 1994 manpower level reflects organizational streamlining initiatives associated with DoD's finance and accounting consolidation effort.

D. DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

DoD Field Activities perform designated DoD-wide services which are more limited in scope than those of a Defense Agency. Seven of these organizations currently exist, including the following:

1. Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support (including space management, budget and accounting, personnel, and security) to OSD and to various other DoD Components, as assigned.

WHS Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	140	157	153
Officer	(55)	(71)	(69)
Enlisted	(85)	(86)	(84)
Civilian	<u>1,741</u>	<u>1,745</u>	<u>1,766</u>
Total	1,881	1,902	1,919

The WHS FY 1994 manpower level reflects increased staffing associated with consolidation of DoD's personnel security adjudication function.

2. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the operation and management of DoD's Armed Forces Information Program and its Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.

AFIS Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	22	419	400
Officer	( 3)	(63)	(60)
Enlisted	(19)	(356)	(340)
Civilian	<u>163</u>	<u>256</u>	<u>264</u>
Total	185	675	664

The AFIS FY 1994 manpower level reflects military to civilian conversions and minor functional transfers associated with the Defense Information School and public affairs activities.

3. The Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS) administers civilian health and medical care programs for retirees, dependents, and survivors of active duty, retired, and deceased Service members. OCHAMPUS also administers a similar program for selected beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration.

OCHAMPUS Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	7	9	9
Officer	(7)	(8)	(8)
Enlisted	(0)	(1)	(1)
Civilian	<u>232</u>	<u>224</u>	<u>227</u>
Total	239	233	236

Minor growth in the OCHAMPUS' manpower level, relative to claims processing, is reflected in FY 1994.

4. The Defense Medical Program Activity (DMPA) is responsible for all aspects of DoD information systems used to support military health care and medical facility construction projects.

DMPA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	48	45	45
Officer	(42)	(42)	(42)
Enlisted	( 6)	( 3)	( 3)
Civilian	<u>78</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>62</u>
Total	126	130	107

The DMPA FY 1994 manpower level reflects streamlining associated with DoD medical information management systems.

5. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) provides economic advice and assistance to communities significantly affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, or substantial Defense-oriented growth.

OEA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	4	2	2
Officer	(3)	(1)	(1)
Enlisted	(1)	(1)	(1)
Civilian	<u>36</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>30</u>
Total	40	32	32

6. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas; it also operates schools in CONUS and Puerto Rico where state and local school systems are unable to either accommodate military dependents or provide a comparable public education. The Family Advocacy Program, under DoDDS, involves military child and spouse abuse initiatives.

DoDDS Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	0	2	2
Officer	(0)	(2)	(2)
Enlisted	(0)	(0)	(0)
Civilian	<u>17,103</u>	<u>17,238</u>	<u>16,580</u>
Total	17,103	17,240	16,582

The DoDDS' FY 1994 manpower level reflects the projected decline in student workload as a result of DoD's overseas troop strength withdrawals.

7. The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) administers the DoD technology security program including processing export license applications.

DTSA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	40	40	39
Officer	(20)	(18)	(18)
Enlisted	(20)	(22)	(21)
Civilian	<u>85</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>90</u>
Total	125	130	129

The DTSA FY 1994 manpower level reflects their share of military strength reductions.

E. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

1. Inspector General (IG) serves as an independent and objective official within the Department of Defense responsible for the prevention and detection of fraud, waste and abuse.

DoD Inspector General Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	30	32	32
Officer	(30)	(32)	(32)
Enlisted	( 0)	( 0)	( 0)
Civilian	<u>1,546</u>	<u>1,581</u>	<u>1,580</u>
Total	1,576	1,613	1,612

The IG's FY 1994 manpower level reflects implementation of the Congressionally-directed reduction in management headquarters strength.

2. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) is a fully accredited four year School of Medicine whose primary mission is to select, educate, and train qualified applicants to become "military" physicians. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees in basic medical sciences and public health.

USUHS Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	609	803	871
Officer	(532)	(729)	(768)
Enlisted	( 77)	( 74)	(103)
Civilian	<u>677</u>	<u>843</u>	<u>1,039</u>
Total	1,286	1,646	1,910

The USUHS's FY 1994 manpower level reflects the functional transfer of the Armed Forces Radio-biology Research Institute from the Defense Nuclear Agency.

3. Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is a consortium of DoD schools that provide for centralized and enhanced acquisition training mandated by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990. Prior to FY 1994, the Department of the Army was the designated executive agent for centralized acquisition training.

DAU Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	0	0	139
Officer	(0)	(0)	( 96)
Enlisted	(0)	(0)	( 43)
Civilian	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>259</u>
Total	0	0	398

4. Defense Business Management University (DBMU), modeled after the Defense Acquisition University, is designed to provide for financial management education and training requirements throughout DoD.

DBMU Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Civilian	0	19	30

5. Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) supports Defense research and development efforts by providing access to and transfer of scientific and technical information to DoD personnel, DoD contractors, and other U.S. government agency personnel. Prior to FY 1992, the DTIC mission was assigned to the Defense Logistics Agency.

DTIC Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Civilian	385	410	410

6. U.S. Court of Military Appeals (USCMA) serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

USCMA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Civilian	50	59	59

7. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified combatant command with worldwide responsibilities to train, maintain, and provide Special Operations Forces (SOF) in support of DoD contingency plans developed by its five regionally-oriented unified commands. The manpower totals reflected for USSOCOM do not include approximately 3,000 civilians involved in special operations activities accounted for in Service civilian strength levels.

USSOCOM Manpower  
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	26,275	27,505	28,855
Officer	(4,648)	(4,981)	(5,244)
Enlisted	(21,627)	(22,524)	(23,611)
Civilian	<u>(2,691)</u>	<u>(2,888)</u>	<u>(2,991)</u>
Total	26,275	27,505	28,855

The SOCOM FY 1994 manpower level reflects growth in tactical and mobility active component forces. Major drivers of the land force growth includes building up the 528th Special Operations Forces Support Battalion and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Naval force growth represents continued fielding of coastal patrol boats and force standardization of 60 SEAL platoons.

In addition to the active manpower component force reflected above, SOCOM has programmed for approximately 14,000 Reserve end strength for FY 1994. (See Table VII-6). SOCOM's reserve component manpower level is projected to decrease by approximately 18 percent between FY 1993 and FY 1994 due to changing world and warfighting CINC requirements. The reductions include deactivation of one National Guard special forces group, one Army Reserve special forces group and one National Guard aviation battalion.

8. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

On February 14, 1992, the Secretary of Defense transferred responsibility for DoD's common transportation mission from the Military Departments to the Commander-in-Chief of USTRANSCOM. The CINCTRANS was designated to the single DoD resource manager of all transportation assets that are not Service-specific or theater-assigned. The manpower associated with this transfer is reflected below.

USTRANSCOM Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	0	23,614	23,211
Officer	(0)	( 2,903)	( 2,856)
Enlisted	(0)	(20,711)	(20,355)
Civilian	<u>0</u>	<u>6,791</u>	<u>6,709</u>
Total	0	30,405	29,920

The reduced manpower level in FY 1994 is primarily the result of the Air Force drawdown of C-141s.

9. Defense Support Activities (DSAs) perform specialized technical services that support DoD functional oversight authorities in such areas environmental cleanup, weapon system improvement, and personnel management. This account aggregates approximately 13 different DSAs under the operational control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the DoD Comptroller, and selected Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides administrative support to most of these organizations. DSAs include such offices as the Defense Manpower Data Center, the Defense Procurement Support Office, and the Defense Environmental Support Office. The manpower levels reflected below exclude DSAs that support program analysis/evaluation and intelligence activities.

DSAs Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	11	21	15
Officer	( 8)	(19)	(14)
Enlisted	( 3)	( 2)	( 1)
Civilian	<u>451</u>	<u>585</u>	<u>824</u>
Total	462	606	839

The DSA FY 1994 manpower level reflects increased staff associated with consolidation of common DoD administrative personnel functions.

10. Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities (DICA) implements the President's National Drug Control Strategy. DoD acts as the single lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. This account aggregates, for programming and budgeting purposes, the total civilian strength that is required by various DoD Components to execute this program. DoD Components contributing to this effort include the Military Services and selected Defense Agencies.

DICA Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Civilian	2,288 <u>1/</u>	2,423	2,486

The DICA FY 1994 manpower level reflects minor growth in intelligence-related activities.

1/Reflected in Military Service and selected Defense Agencies civilian strength totals for FY 1992.

11. Defense Health Program (DHP) includes all DoD medical resources with the exception of field/numbered medical units, hospital ships, and ship-board medical operations. In addition to the military strength allocations reflected below, the DHP budget funds manpower allocated to the Defense Medical Program Activity (DMPA), the Office of

the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS), the Uniformed University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) and approximately 53,000 civilian employees accounted for in Military Service FY 1994 civilian strength totals.

DHP Manpower

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military	0	0	108,067
Officer	(0)	(0)	( 37,012)
Enlisted	<u>(0)</u>	<u>(0)</u>	( 71,055)
Civilian	—	—	<u>( 53,966)</u>
Total	0	0	108,067

III. MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPPC)

The following tables portray military and civilian manpower of the Defense Agencies and related organizations by DPPC.



TABLE VII-1  
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

CIVILIAN AND ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER  
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.4</u>
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			
Land Forces	<u>22.6</u>	<u>53.9</u>	<u>53.8</u>
Tactical Air Forces	10.7	11.0	11.3
Naval Forces	8.3	8.8	8.5
Mobility Forces	3.6	3.7	4.0
	0.0	30.4	30.0
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>			
Centrally Managed Communications	<u>13.8</u>	<u>15.7</u>	<u>16.2</u>
Intelligence	3.1	3.6	3.9
	10.7	12.1	12.3
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>			
	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2.5</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>			
	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>91.8</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Unified Commands	<u>14.2</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>23.3</u>
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.2	0.2
Joint Staff	2.5	9.0	8.9
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	1.2	1.3	1.2
	10.4	13.1	13.0
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>			
Supply Operations	<u>64.2</u>	<u>57.1</u>	<u>53.6</u>
Logistics Support Operations	62.9	55.7	52.2
	1.3	1.4	1.4
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/ GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>			
Research and Development Activities	<u>9.0</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>8.7</u>
Geophysical Activities	0.8	1.0	0.9
	8.2	7.8	7.8
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Individual Training	<u>18.5</u>	<u>19.4</u>	<u>31.8</u>
Personnel Support	1.2	1.4	1.4
	17.3	18.0	17.4
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Support Installations	<u>45.8</u>	<u>56.4</u>	<u>58.7</u>
Centralized Support Activities	25.0	23.3	25.9
	20.8	33.1	32.8
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>			
	<u>191.5</u>	<u>238.7</u>	<u>341.8</u>
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>			
	0.2	0.5	0.5

TABLE VII-2  
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

CIVILIAN MANPOWER  
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			
Mobility Forces	<u>0.0</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>6.7</u>
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>			
Centrally Managed Communications	<u>5.6</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.3</u>
Intelligence	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>
	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.6</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>			
	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.3</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Federal Agency Support	<u>10.9</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>18.8</u>
Joint Staff	<u>2.4</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.1</u>
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>
	<u>8.3</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>10.4</u>
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>			
Supply Operations	<u>62.9</u>	<u>55.5</u>	<u>52.0</u>
Logistics Support Operations	<u>61.9</u>	<u>54.4</u>	<u>50.9</u>
	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>10.1</u>
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/ GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>			
Research and Development Activities	<u>8.3</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>8.1</u>
Geophysical Activities	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>
	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>7.5</u>
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Individual Training	<u>17.9</u>	<u>18.1</u>	<u>17.5</u>
Personnel Support	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>
	<u>17.3</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>16.8</u>
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Support Installations	<u>42.4</u>	<u>51.2</u>	<u>50.8</u>
Centralized Support Activities	<u>23.1</u>	<u>21.4</u>	<u>20.9</u>
	<u>19.3</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>29.9</u>
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>149.0</u>	<u>166.8</u>	<u>161.2</u>

TABLE VII-3  
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER  
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.7</u>
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			
Land Forces	<u>22.6</u>	<u>47.1</u>	<u>47.1</u>
Tactical Air Forces	10.7	11.0	11.3
Naval Forces	8.3	8.8	8.5
Mobility Forces	3.6	3.7	4.1
	0.0	23.6	23.2
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>			
Centrally Managed Communications	<u>8.2</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>9.9</u>
Intelligence	1.8	2.0	2.2
	6.4	7.5	7.7
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>			
	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2.5</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>			
	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>91.5</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Unified Commands	<u>3.3</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.5</u>
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.2	0.2
Joint Staff	0.1	0.7	0.7
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	1.0	1.0	1.0
	2.1	2.1	2.6
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>			
Supply Operations	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Logistics Support Operations	1.0	1.3	1.3
	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/</u>			
<u>GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>			
Research and Development Activities	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Geophysical Activities	0.3	0.3	0.3
	0.4	0.3	0.3
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Individual Training	<u>0.6</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>14.3</u>
Personnel Support	0.6	0.8	13.7
	0.0	0.5	0.6
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Support Installations	<u>3.4</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>7.9</u>
Centralized Support Activities	1.9	1.9	4.9
	1.5	3.3	3.0
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>			
	<u>42.5</u>	<u>71.9</u>	<u>180.6</u>
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>			
	0.2	0.5	0.5

TABLE VII-4  
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE OFFICER MANPOWER  
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1992</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			
Land Forces	<u>3.4</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>6.6</u>
Tactical Air Forces	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Naval Forces	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Mobility Forces	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
	<u>0.0</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>			
Centrally Managed Communications	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>
Intelligence	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>
	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>			
	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>			
	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>31.2</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Unified Commands	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.7</u>
Federal Agency Support	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Joint Staff	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.7</u>
	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.8</u>
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>			
Supply Operations	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.3</u>
Logistics Support Operations	<u>0.8</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>
	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/ GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>			
Research and Development Activities	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Geophysical Activities	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>
	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Individual Training	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>5.5</u>
Personnel Support	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>5.4</u>
	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Support Installations	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Centralized Support Activities	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.9</u>
	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>			
	<u>11.0</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>52.8</u>
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>			
	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>

TABLE VII-5  
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE ENLISTED MANPOWER  
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	<u>19.2</u>	<u>40.6</u>	<u>40.5</u>
Land Forces	9.1	9.3	9.5
Tactical Air Forces	6.9	7.4	7.1
Naval Forces	3.2	3.2	3.6
Mobility Forces	0.0	20.7	20.3
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>12.7</u>
Centrally Managed Communications	1.3	1.3	1.5
Intelligence	4.7	5.4	5.6
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>2.1</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>60.3</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Unified Commands	0.0	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.6	0.6
Joint Staff	0.3	0.2	0.3
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	0.7	0.7	0.8
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Supply Operations	0.2	0.3	0.2
Logistics Support Operations	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/ GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Research and Development Activities	0.1	0.1	0.0
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.1	0.2
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>8.8</u>
Individual Training	0.0	0.1	8.3
Personnel Support	0.0	0.4	0.5
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>6.5</u>
Support Installations	1.8	1.8	4.0
Centralized Support Activities	1.1	2.8	2.5
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>31.5</u>	<u>56.4</u>	<u>127.8</u>
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1

TABLE VII-6  
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY MANPOWER <sup>1/</sup>  
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY:</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>17.4</u>	<u>14.3</u>
Land Forces	13.7	13.5	11.1
Tactical Air Forces	2.7	2.4	1.9
Naval Forces	1.5	1.5	1.3
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES:</u>			
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>17.4</u>	<u>14.3</u>

SELECTED RESERVE OFFICER MANPOWER

<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY:</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>3.4</u>
Land Forces	3.3	3.3	2.8
Tactical Air Forces	0.7	0.4	0.3
Naval Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES:</u>			
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>3.4</u>

SELECTED RESERVE ENLISTED MANPOWER

<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	<u>13.6</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>10.9</u>
Land Forces	10.4	10.2	8.2
Tactical Air Forces	2.0	2.0	1.7
Naval Forces	1.2	1.2	1.0
<u>END STRENGTH IN THE BUDGET</u>	<u>13.6</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>10.9</u>

<sup>1/</sup>Includes Reserve and National Guard personnel.

## CHAPTER VIII

### COST OF MILITARY MANPOWER

#### I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the DoD military manpower program from a fiscal perspective. It provides a concise statement of the Department's FY 1992 and FY 1993 cost of military manpower. (Note: Civilian cost data not available at this time.)

The remainder of the chapter is organized into three sections.

Section II Summary costs and trends.

Section III Detailed Manpower Costs

- FY 1992

- FY 1993

- FY 1994

Section IV Pay tables for military and civilian employees.

#### II. SUMMARY COSTS AND TRENDS

Table VIII-1 shows military manpower costs and total DoD end strength data included in the FY 1994 Amended Budget. Table VIII-2, Percentage Pay Raises, presents a historical display of pay raises for each year since 1974 for the military, general schedule and wage board pay structures. Definitions of the summary cost categories are at the end of this section.

TABLE VIII-1  
DEFENSE MANPOWER COST  
(Budget Authority, \$ Billion)

<u>Military Manpower Costs</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Military Personnel Appropriations	69.6	67.1	60.9
Military Retired Pay Appropriation			
Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations	9.6	9.2	9.2
Less Operation DS/DS			(1.0)
<b>TOTAL COST</b>	<b>78.2</b>	<b>76.3</b>	<b>70.1</b>
 <b>END STRENGTHS</b>			
Active Military	1,809	1,728	1,620
Selected Reserve	1,120	1,007	1,020
Civilian Direct Hire	940	915	876
Civilian Indirect Hire	65	49	43
Total Civilian	1,001	964	919
Retired Military	1,711	1,722	1,746



TABLE VIII-2  
PERCENTAGE PAY RAISES<sup>a/</sup>

<u>FY</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>General Schedule</u>	<u>Wage Board</u>
74	4.8	4.8	10.2 <sup>b/</sup>
75	5.5	5.5	8.9
76	5.0	5.0	9.0
77	4.8	4.8	8.3
78	7.1	7.1	7.9
79	5.5	5.5	5.3
80	7.0	7.0	6.4
81	11.7	9.1	9.1
82	14.3 <sup>c/</sup>	4.8	4.8
83	4.0	4.0	4.0
84	4.0	3.5	3.5
85	4.0	3.5	3.5
86	3.0	0.0	0.0
87	3.0	3.0	3.0
88	2.0	2.0	2.0
89	4.1	4.1	4.1
90	3.6	3.6	3.6
91	4.1	4.1	4.1
92	4.2	4.2	4.2
93	3.7	3.7	3.7
94	0.0	0.0	0.0

<sup>a/</sup>This table expresses percentage increases over the previous year's pay scale. General Schedule and Wage Board percents are for base salary only. The military figures are the overall average percentage increase in basic pay, basic allowance for quarters, and basic allowance for subsistence.

<sup>b/</sup>Includes approximately 4 percent catch-up increase upon the release from economic controls effective the first pay period after April 30, 1974.

<sup>c/</sup>Enlisted basic pay raises for FY 1982 ranged from 10 percent for pay grade E-1 to 17 percent for E-7 through E-9. All warrant officers and commissioned officers received a 14.3 percent increase.

### III. DETAILED MANPOWER COSTS

The costs in this section are derived from detailed budget exhibits submitted to Congress and, therefore, are stated as total Budget Authority (BA).

Tables VIII-3 through VIII-5 provide details of manpower costs by DoD Component. Key elements are indexed in the margin of these tables and defined below.

#### Definition of Cost Categories

The manpower cost categories discussed in this section are described below:

### 1. Military Personnel Appropriations

There is one appropriation for each Service which funds active component military pay, cash allowances, matching Social Security contributions (FICA), enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, permanent change of station travel expenses, the cost of feeding military people (subsistence-in-kind), the cost of individual clothing and retired pay accrual costs. Beginning in FY 1991, subsistence-in-kind costs are funded in the Operation and Maintenance appropriation rather than the Military Personnel appropriation based on a realignment of funding responsibility reflective in the FY 1991 budget.

### 2. Military Retired Pay

Prior to FY 1985, military retired pay was funded by the Military Retired Pay appropriation. This appropriation, managed by DoD, provided funds for the compensation of military personnel retired from previous service. Commencing in FY 1985, DoD implemented a new accrual accounting system for military retired pay. Under this concept, accrual costs are budgeted in the Military Personnel accounts (Active and Reserve Components) and subsequently transferred to a new Military Retirement Trust Fund. Retired pay is paid from the trust fund. Beginning in FY 1987, separate accrual calculations are made for members on active duty and members of the Ready reserve who serve in a part-time status. Unfunded liability for retired pay will be liquidated over a period of time to be determined by the DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries. This Board of Actuaries also determines an amortization schedule for the transfer of funds from the general fund of the Treasury to the new DoD Military Retirement Trust Fund. Retirement accrual costs are further reduced by the significant revision to the Military Retirement system in 1986 for new entrants on or after August 1, 1986. This revision reduced retirement benefits in comparison to the pre-existing system thereby reducing accrual costs.

### 3. Reserve and Guard Personnel Military Appropriations

There is one appropriation for each of the six Reserve Components which funds inactive duty drills; active duty for training; ROTC; full-time guard members and reservists for organization, administration, training, maintenance and other logistical support; educational and bonus programs; training; the Health Professions Scholarship Program; and management and training of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

#### Definition of Cost Categories (by Index Number)

The manpower cost categories discussed in this section are described below (keyed to the index numbers in Tables VIII-3 through VIII-5).

1. Active Component Basic Pay is the only element of compensation received in cash by every active duty military member. The amount of basic pay a member receives is a function of pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total cost of basic pay is

determined by the number of manyears distributed across grade and length of service.

2. Active Component Retired Pay Accrual provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to fund the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 USC Chapter 74. Under the accrual concept, each Service budgets for retired pay in the Military Personnel account and transfers funds on a monthly basis to the new Military Retirement Trust fund from which payments are made to retirees.

3. Active Component Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing or when the government housing occupied is declared inadequate. There are two BAQ rates for each military grade: one for members without dependents and another for members with dependents. Members without dependents who are provided government quarters, or who are assigned to field or sea duty, receive a partial BAQ payment. BAQ costs are a function of overall strength, the grade and dependency status distribution of the force, and the numbers and condition of units of government housing.

4. Active Component Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) is paid to military members receiving BAQ who reside in areas of the United States (including Alaska and Hawaii) where housing costs exceed 80 percent of the national median housing cost or who are assigned overseas, but whose dependents reside in those areas qualifying for VHA. The cost of VHA is a function of the number of military members, by grade and dependency status, or their dependents, residing in the VHA qualifying areas.

5. Active Component Subsistence represents both the cost of food for military personnel eating in military messes and cash payments to military members in lieu of food (called Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS)). All officers receive BAS at the same rate. Enlisted members receive either "subsistence-in-kind" in military messes or BAS at one of three rates applicable to the following conditions: when on leave or authorized to mess separately, when a mess is not available, or when assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no U.S. messing facilities are available.

6. Incentive Pay, Hazardous Duty, and Aviation Career Incentive Pay provide incentive for service in aviation and certain hazardous duties. Included are aviation career incentive pays for rated and nonrated crew members, parachute jump pay, and demolition pay.

7. Special Pays include bonuses provided to certain medical and selected other occupations as further inducement for continued service. Also included in this category are Enlistment Bonuses, Overseas Extension Pay, Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay, Foreign Language Proficiency Pay, Overseas Extension Pay, and Special Duty Assignment Pay. Special Duty Assignment Pay is authorized for enlisted personnel who have been assigned to demanding duties or duties requiring an unusual degree of responsibility. The Secretaries of the Military Departments designate the skill areas that meet these criteria

8. Active Component Other Allowances include uniform allowances, overseas station allowances, and family separation allowances.

9. Separation Payments provide disability and non-disability Separation Pay, Terminal Leave Pay, Lump-sum Readjustment Pay, and Donations which may be given to enlisted members involuntarily discharged. In addition, the FY 1992 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) and the Special Separation Benefit (SSB) programs. These programs will minimize the involuntary separations which would have otherwise been required to align existing personnel inventories to the smaller force structure.

10. Active Component FICA Contributions are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law.

11. Active Component PCS Travel is the cost of moving people and their households when they enter the Service, move for training, leave the Service, are reassigned to a new duty station, or are part of a unit movement to a new duty location.

12. Cadet Pay and Allowances includes the pay and allowances of those cadets and midshipmen attending the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, and Naval Aviation Cadets.

13. Miscellaneous Costs include death gratuities, unemployment compensation, survivor benefits, Montgomery GI Bill education (MGIB) benefit costs, adoptions expense reimbursement, and apprehension of deserters. Death gratuities are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. Funds for apprehension of deserters cover the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control. Unemployment compensation is for payment to eligible ex-service personnel. Survivor benefits provides funds for payment of benefits provided by the Veteran's Administration to spouses and children of deceased service members. MGIB costs reflect future costs for benefits budgeted on an accrual basis. Adoption expense costs reflect reimbursement of a military member for qualifying expenses.

14. Reserve Component Basic Pay includes drill pay, pay for periods of active duty for training of reserve component people, and the pay of reserve component full-time support personnel.

15. Reserve Component Retired Pay Accrual provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to fund the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 U.S.C. 74, the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94). Under the accrual concept, each Service budgets for retired pay in the Reserve and National Guard Personnel accounts and transfers funds on a monthly basis to the Military Retirement Trust Fund from which payments are made to retirees.

16. Reserve Component Allowances and Benefits include BAQ, subsistence, other allowances including special and incentive pays, and

FICA payments; monthly student stipends (ROTC, Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarships, Branch Officers Basic Course, and Platoon Leader Class); Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) educational benefits; disability and hospitalization benefits; death gratuities; administrative duty pay; adoption expense reimbursement; and management and training costs for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

17. Reserve Component Clothing includes both cash allowances and in-kind clothing issued to recruits.

18. Reserve Component Travel includes the cost of travel and transportation of reserve component personnel.

19. Family Housing Appropriation (Non-Pay) funds leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. The total appropriation includes funds for paying civilians, which are counted in this report under civilian costs. To avoid double counting, this civilian pay has been excluded from the Defense Family Housing cost category.

20. Civilian Salaries are the direct monetary compensation paid to civilian employees including basic pay, overtime, holiday, incentive, and special pays.

21. Civilian Benefits includes the government share of the DoD Civilian Health and Life Insurance programs, FICA, Retirement programs (Civil Service Retirement System and Federal Employees Retirement System), severance pay, disability compensation, and other such payments.

22. Personnel Support Costs include individual training, medical support (including CHAMPUS), recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, 50 percent of all Base Operating Support costs, and other miscellaneous personnel support costs. Direct personnel costs are not included in this category since they are already included in other cost categories.

TABLE VIII-3  
**SUMMARY OF ENTITLEMENTS REPORT**  
**FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FY 1994/1995 BUDGET**  
**FISCAL YEAR 1992**  
**(\$ IN THOUSANDS)**

<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>TOTAL DOD</u>
<u>MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>					
Basic Pay	12,423,973	9,783,698	3,097,584	9,980,712	35,285,967
Retired Pay Accrual	5,305,037	4,171,235	1,320,418	4,261,764	15,058,454
Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,479,963	1,495,138	377,384	1,349,796	4,702,281
Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	255,019	601,765	142,158	276,268	1,275,210
Subsistence Allowance (In-Kind and Cash Allowance)	1,019,778	737,114	242,622	950,638	2,950,152
Incentive Pays	136,118	255,062	36,559	269,915	697,654
Special Pays	332,115	822,170	67,750	234,977	1,457,012
Other Allowances	895,670	501,216	172,835	670,848	2,240,569
Separation Pays	1,410,233	293,974	123,889	651,449	2,479,545
FICA	1,094,457	856,110	272,826	894,389	3,117,782
PCS Travel	1,380,171	652,550	221,214	948,849	3,202,784
Cadets	36,299	37,590	0	36,823	110,712
Miscellaneous	304,375	103,888	49,995	91,072	549,330
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>26,073,208</b>	<b>20,311,510</b>	<b>6,125,234</b>	<b>20,617,500</b>	<b>73,127,452</b>
Less Reimbursables	(146,800)	(345,884)	(23,115)	(1,213,000)	(1,728,799)
<b>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</b>	<b>25,926,408</b>	<b>19,965,626</b>	<b>6,102,119</b>	<b>19,404,500</b>	<b>71,398,653</b>

TABLE VIII-3a

FY 1992 ACTIVE COMPONENT PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS  
 (\$ MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	88.9	49.5	25.5	41.1	205.0
Training travel	58.9	64.0	6.8	39.0	168.7
Operational travel	95.8	157.5	51.2	143.2	447.7
Rotational travel	807.1	232.8	78.5	456.1	1,574.5
Separation travel	233.3	99.0	54.4	110.4	497.1
Travel of Organized Units	52.6	28.5	.7	20.6	102.4
Non-Temporary Storage	34.1	12.9	3.3	21.9	72.2
Temporary Lodging Expense	<u>9.5</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>.8</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>38.3</u>
Total Obligations	1,380.2	652.6	221.2	851.9	3,105.9
<u>Less Reimbursements</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>12.3</u>
Total Direct Obligations	1,374.2	651.2	218.7	849.7	3,093.6

TABLE VIII-4  
**SUMMARY OF ENTITLEMENTS REPORT**  
**FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FY 1994/1995 BUDGET**  
**FISCAL YEAR 1993**  
**(\$ IN THOUSANDS)**

<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>TOTAL DOD</u>
<b><u>MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u></b>					
Basic Pay	11,327,657	9,731,048	3,119,596	9,574,696	33,752,997
Retired Pay Accrual	4,123,267	3,545,451	1,118,718	3,485,189	12,272,625
Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,476,538	1,485,528	371,896	1,328,537	4,662,499
Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	244,479	604,995	139,332	271,628	1,260,434
Subsistence Allowance (In-Kind and Cash Allowance)	931,083	724,564	235,174	914,073	2,804,894
Incentive Pays	132,972	246,464	36,584	267,775	683,795
Special Pays	337,592	778,370	66,611	245,425	1,427,935
Other Allowances	780,215	499,233	185,462	752,404	2,217,314
Separation Pays	1,301,626	416,964	182,526	865,472	2,766,588
FICA	1,008,000	844,015	269,183	857,061	2,978,259
PCS Travel	1,251,488	646,046	215,388	1,062,451	3,175,373
Cadets	36,356	37,752	0	39,493	113,601
Miscellaneous	450,305	150,797	57,282	103,211	761,595
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>23,401,578</b>	<b>19,711,164</b>	<b>5,997,752</b>	<b>19,767,415</b>	<b>68,877,909</b>
Less Reimbursables	(165,900)	(359,300)	(24,246)	(1,289,200)	(1,790,154)
<b>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</b>	<b>23,235,678</b>	<b>19,351,864</b>	<b>6,021,998</b>	<b>18,478,215</b>	<b>67,087,755</b>



TABLE VIII-4a

FY 1993 ACTIVE COMPONENT PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS  
(\$ MILLIONS - TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	98.0	56.1	27.0	39.0	220.1
Training travel	59.9	64.9	6.5	39.5	170.8
Operational travel	101.5	154.7	51.6	176.2	484.0
Rotational travel	669.1	219.6	71.1	500.7	1,460.5
Separation travel	183.7	97.1	53.2	93.5	427.5
Travel of Organized Units	91.8	31.7	1.8	25.4	150.7
Non-Temporary Storage	30.7	13.2	3.1	23.1	70.1
Temporary Lodging Expense	18.4	8.7	1.1	37.1	65.3
Total Obligations	1,251.5	646.0	215.4	934.7	3,047.6
Less Reimbursements	3.0	2.0	2.3	56.0	63.3
Total Direct	1,248.5	644.0	213.1	878.7	2,984.3

TABLE VIII-5  
**SUMMARY OF ENTITLEMENTS REPORT**  
**FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FY 1994/1995 BUDGET**  
**FISCAL YEAR 1994**  
**(\$ IN THOUSANDS)**

<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>TOTAL DOD</u>
<u>MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>					
Basic Pay	10,770,051	9,238,153	3,013,352	9,228,808	32,250,364
Retired Pay Accrual	3,877,219	3,326,650	1,082,914	3,322,372	11,609,155
Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,412,163	1,378,571	358,737	1,285,270	4,434,741
Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	235,068	560,074	136,789	261,667	1,193,598
Subsistence Allowance	897,166	686,136	232,914	850,110	2,666,326
(In-Kind and Cash Allowance)					
Incentive Pays	132,944	233,634	35,408	236,681	638,667
Special Pays	313,299	723,875	39,284	239,783	1,316,241
Other Allowances	615,356	375,861	157,272	543,619	1,792,108
Separation Pays	863,315	538,609	122,523	303,396	1,827,843
FICA	950,413	808,324	262,629	814,819	2,836,185
PCS Travel	1,148,303	615,178	205,083	916,620	2,885,184
Cadets	36,729	37,220	0	36,038	109,987
Miscellaneous	204,374	71,215	51,844	80,080	407,513
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>21,456,400</b>	<b>18,693,500</b>	<b>5,698,749</b>	<b>18,119,263</b>	<b>63,967,912</b>
Less Reimbursables	(249,800)	(336,600)	(20,049)	(2,489,633)	(3,096,082)
<b>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</b>	<b>21,206,600</b>	<b>18,356,900</b>	<b>5,678,700</b>	<b>15,629,630</b>	<b>60,871,830</b>

TABLE VIII-5a

FY 1993 ACTIVE COMPONENT PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS  
 (\$ IN MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	98.6	48.1	26.7	41.0	214.4
Training travel	60.9	53.9	6.8	26.9	148.5
Operational travel	89.1	149.4	41.4	165.0	444.9
Rotational travel	623.4	212.9	72.3	492.7	1,401.3
Separation travel	192.9	105.9	50.0	99.8	448.6
Travel of Organized Units	35.6	23.9	3.8	34.0	97.3
Non-Temporary Storage	29.5	12.9	3.1	22.6	68.1
Temporary Lodging Expense	<u>18.4</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>18.5</u>	<u>45.9</u>
Total Obligations	1,148.3	615.2	205.1	900.4	2,869.0
<u>Less Reimbursements</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>104.1</u>	<u>111.9</u>
Total Direct Obligations	1,145.3	613.2	202.3	796.3	2,757.1

IV. CURRENT PAY TABLES FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES (As of January 1, 1993)

Active component military pay rates are shown in Table VIII-6.

Pay per training weekend for military reserve personnel is shown in Table VIII-7. A training weekend is defined as four 4-hour training periods. The annual pay for reserves is a function of the number of drills, which varies by individual according to his level of authorized participation.

Current civilian pay rates are shown in Tables VIII-8 (General Schedule), VIII-9 (Wage Board-Appropriated Fund), and VIII-10 (Wage Board-Non-appropriated Fund). Note that the Wage Board pay table entries are national averages. Each wage area has its own distinct pay table.



TABLE VIII-6 (Continued)

PAY GRADE	MONTHLY BAQ RATE		BAS RATES	
	SINGLE CASH	MARRIED CASH	CASH IN KIND	CO (MONTHLY)
C/S	714.90	879.60	139.39	139.39
0-10	714.90	879.60	139.39	139.39
0-9	714.90	879.60	139.39	139.39
0-8	714.90	879.60	139.39	139.39
0-7	714.90	879.60	139.39	139.39
0-6	655.80	792.30	139.39	139.39
0-5	631.50	763.50	139.39	139.39
0-4	585.30	673.20	139.39	139.39
0-3	469.20	557.10	139.39	139.39
0-2	372.00	475.80	139.39	139.39
0-1	313.20	425.10	139.39	139.39
0-3E	506.40	598.50	139.39	139.39
0-2E	430.50	540.00	139.39	139.39
0-1E	370.20	498.90	139.39	139.39
<b>WARRANT OFFICERS</b>				
W-5	594.30	649.50	139.39	139.39
W-4	528.00	595.50	139.39	139.39
W-3	443.70	546.00	139.39	139.39
W-2	393.90	502.20	139.39	139.39
W-1	330.00	434.40	139.39	139.39
<b>ENLISTED MEMBERS</b>				
M/S	433.80	571.50	6.65	6.65
E-9	433.80	571.50	6.65	6.65
E-8	398.40	526.80	6.65	6.65
E-7	339.90	489.30	6.65	6.65
E-6	307.80	452.40	6.65	6.65
E-5	283.80	406.50	6.65	6.65
E-4	246.90	353.70	6.65	6.65
E-3	242.40	329.10	6.65	6.65
E-2	197.10	313.20	6.65	6.65
E-1>4	175.20	313.20	6.65	6.65
E-1<4	175.20	313.20	6.14	6.14

TABLE VIII-7

RESERVE PAY FOR 1 DRILL

EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1993

PAY GRADE	<2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26	
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS																
~10	221.84	229.64	229.64	229.64	229.64	229.64	229.64	238.45	238.45	251.66	251.66	251.66	269.66	269.66	287.72	305.65
0-9	196.60	201.75	201.75	206.05	206.05	206.05	206.05	211.29	211.29	220.08	220.08	220.08	238.45	238.45	251.66	269.66
0-8	178.07	183.41	183.41	187.76	187.76	187.76	187.76	201.75	201.75	211.29	211.29	211.29	229.64	229.64	244.33	244.33
0-7	147.96	158.02	158.02	158.02	158.02	158.02	158.02	165.11	165.11	174.68	174.68	183.41	201.75	201.75	215.63	215.63
0-6	109.67	120.49	120.49	128.39	128.39	128.39	128.39	128.39	128.39	128.39	128.39	132.75	153.74	153.74	174.68	189.45
0-5	87.71	102.98	102.98	110.11	110.11	110.11	110.11	110.11	110.11	113.44	113.44	127.56	137.11	137.11	149.36	154.58
0-4	73.93	90.03	90.03	96.04	96.04	96.04	96.04	97.82	97.82	109.10	109.10	120.49	125.78	125.78	149.36	154.58
0-3	68.70	76.82	76.82	82.12	82.12	82.12	82.12	82.12	82.12	82.94	82.94	82.94	82.94	82.94	82.94	82.94
0-2	59.91	65.42	65.42	78.61	78.61	78.61	78.61	81.25	81.25	82.94	82.94	82.94	82.94	82.94	82.94	82.94
0-1	52.02	54.14	54.14	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42	65.42
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER																
0-3E	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	90.86	90.86	95.21	98.62	103.96	103.96	109.10	113.44	113.44	113.44	113.44	113.44
0-2E	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	81.25	81.25	82.94	85.57	90.03	90.03	93.48	96.04	96.04	96.04	96.04	96.04
0-1E	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	65.42	65.42	69.90	72.48	75.10	75.10	77.71	81.25	81.25	81.25	81.25	81.25
WARRANT OFFICERS																
W-5	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
W-4	70.00	75.10	75.10	75.10	76.82	76.82	80.31	83.85	87.37	87.37	93.48	97.82	101.25	103.96	107.32	113.44
W-3	63.62	69.01	69.01	69.01	69.90	69.90	70.71	75.89	80.31	80.31	82.94	85.57	88.12	90.86	94.40	96.04
W-2	55.72	60.28	60.28	60.28	62.04	62.04	65.42	69.01	71.63	71.63	74.26	76.82	79.52	82.12	84.71	88.12
W-1	46.42	53.23	53.23	53.23	57.67	57.67	60.28	62.87	65.42	65.42	68.13	70.71	73.35	75.89	78.61	81.25
ENLISTED MEMBERS																
E-9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
E-8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	68.29	70.24	72.09	73.96	75.92	77.66	79.57	81.44	83.26
E-7	47.67	51.47	51.47	53.37	55.24	55.24	57.12	58.94	60.83	62.73	64.63	66.57	68.43	70.20	72.09	73.96
E-6	41.02	44.71	44.71	46.57	48.55	48.55	50.37	52.18	54.10	56.09	58.07	60.07	62.07	64.09	66.11	68.13
E-5	35.99	39.18	39.18	41.09	42.87	42.87	44.69	46.55	48.43	50.37	52.18	54.07	56.07	58.07	60.07	62.07
E-4	33.57	35.46	35.46	37.54	39.18	39.18	40.44	42.04	43.70	45.43	47.18	49.07	50.97	52.87	54.77	56.67
E-3	31.63	33.37	33.37	34.70	36.07	36.07	37.44	38.81	40.18	41.55	43.07	44.54	46.07	47.54	49.07	50.54
E-2	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44	30.44
E-1	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16	27.16
E-1*	25.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

NOTE--BASIC PAY IS LIMITED \$300.56 BY LEVEL V OF THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE OASD(FM&P)M&PP(C)

FY 1993 3.7% Pay Rate Increase

**TABLE VIII-8**  
**MAJOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN WHITE-COLLAR PAY SCHEDULES EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1993**  
**GENERAL SCHEDULE (3.7%)**

STEP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Within-Grade Increase Amounts
GS-1	\$11,903	\$12,300	\$12,695	\$13,090	\$13,487	\$13,720	\$14,109	\$14,503	\$14,521	\$14,891	VARIES
2	13,382	13,701	14,145	14,521	14,683	15,115	15,547	15,979	16,411	16,843	VARIES
3	14,603	15,090	15,577	16,064	16,551	17,038	17,525	18,012	18,499	18,986	\$487
4	16,393	16,939	17,485	18,031	18,577	19,123	19,669	20,215	20,761	21,307	546
5	18,340	18,951	19,562	20,173	20,784	21,395	22,006	22,617	23,228	23,839	611
6	20,443	21,124	21,805	22,486	23,167	23,848	24,529	25,210	25,891	26,572	681
7	22,717	23,474	24,231	24,988	25,745	26,502	27,259	28,016	28,773	29,530	757
8	25,159	25,998	26,837	27,676	28,515	29,354	30,193	31,032	31,871	32,710	839
9	27,789	28,715	29,641	30,567	31,493	32,419	33,345	34,271	35,197	36,123	926
10	30,603	31,623	32,643	33,663	34,683	35,703	36,723	37,743	38,763	39,783	1,020
11	33,623	34,744	35,865	36,986	38,107	39,228	40,349	41,470	42,591	43,712	1,121
12	40,298	41,641	42,984	44,327	45,670	47,013	48,356	49,699	51,042	52,385	1,343
13	47,920	49,517	51,114	52,711	54,308	55,905	57,502	59,099	60,696	62,293	1,597
14	56,627	58,515	60,403	62,291	64,179	66,067	67,955	69,843	71,731	73,619	1,888
15	66,609	68,829	71,049	73,269	75,489	77,709	79,929	82,149	84,369	86,589	2,220

**SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE**

(3.2%)

ES-1	\$92,900
ES-2	97,400
ES-3	101,800
ES-4	107,300
ES-5	111,800
ES-6	115,700

**EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE (EX)**

(3.2%)

level I	\$148,400
level II	133,600
level III	123,100
level IV	115,700
level V	108,200

**SENIOR LEVEL (SL & ST)**

Minimum	\$79,931 (3.7%)
Maximum	115,700 (3.2%)

**CONTRACT APPEALS BOARDS (CA)**  
(3.2%)

Chairman	\$115,700
Vice Chairman	112,229
Other Members	108,758

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW**

**JUDGES (3.2%)**

AL-3/A	\$75,205
AL-3/B	80,990
AL-3/C	86,775
AL-3/D	92,560
AL-3/E	98,345
AL-3/F	104,130
AL-2	109,915
AL-1	115,700



TABLE VIII-8a

SALARY TABLE NO. 93-IGA

**INCLUDING 8% INTERIM GEOGRAPHIC ADJUSTMENTS**  
Effective January 1993

**ANNUAL Rates by Grade and Step**

STEP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS-1	\$12,855	\$13,284	\$13,711	\$14,137	\$14,566	\$14,818	\$15,238	\$15,663	\$15,683	\$16,082
2	14,453	14,797	15,277	15,683	15,858	16,324	16,791	17,257	17,724	18,190
3	15,771	16,297	16,823	17,349	17,875	18,401	18,927	19,453	19,979	20,505
4	17,704	18,294	18,884	19,473	20,063	20,653	21,243	21,832	22,422	23,012
5	19,807	20,467	21,127	21,787	22,447	23,107	23,766	24,426	25,086	25,746
6	22,078	22,814	23,549	24,285	25,020	25,756	26,491	27,227	27,962	28,698
7	24,534	25,352	26,169	26,987	27,805	28,622	29,440	30,257	31,075	31,892
8	27,172	28,078	28,984	29,890	30,796	31,702	32,608	33,515	34,421	35,327
9	30,012	31,012	32,012	33,012	34,012	35,013	36,013	37,013	38,013	39,013
10	33,051	34,153	35,254	36,356	37,458	38,559	39,661	40,762	41,864	42,966
11	36,313	37,524	38,734	39,945	41,156	42,366	43,577	44,788	45,998	47,209
12	43,522	44,972	46,423	47,873	49,324	50,774	52,224	53,675	55,125	56,576
13	51,754	53,478	55,203	56,928	58,653	60,377	62,102	63,827	65,552	67,276
14	61,157	63,196	65,235	67,274	69,313	71,352	73,391	75,430	77,469	79,509
15	71,938	74,335	76,733	79,131	81,528	83,926	86,323	88,721	91,119	93,516

TABLE VIII-9

Regular Wage Schedule for U.S. Citizen Wage Employees in Foreign Areas (Appropriated Fund)

WG WL-WS GRADE	WG-RATES					WL-RATES					WS-WD-WN RATES					WD-WN PAY LEVEL
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	
1	7.66	7.98	8.30	8.62	8.94	8.43	8.78	9.13	9.48	9.83	11.53	12.01	12.49	12.97	13.45	
2	8.31	8.66	9.01	9.35	9.70	9.15	9.53	9.91	10.29	10.67	12.18	12.69	13.20	13.71	14.21	
3	8.95	9.32	9.69	10.07	10.44	9.84	10.25	10.66	11.07	11.48	12.82	13.35	13.88	14.42	14.95	
4	9.56	9.96	10.35	10.76	11.15	10.52	10.96	11.39	11.84	12.27	13.43	13.99	14.55	15.11	15.67	
5	10.15	10.57	10.99	11.42	11.84	11.16	11.63	12.10	12.56	13.03	14.02	14.60	15.18	15.77	16.35	
6	10.71	11.16	11.61	12.05	12.50	11.79	12.28	12.77	13.26	13.75	14.58	15.19	15.80	16.41	17.01	
7	11.27	11.74	12.21	12.68	13.15	12.39	12.91	13.43	13.94	14.46	15.14	15.77	16.40	17.03	17.66	
8	11.82	12.31	12.80	13.29	13.79	13.00	13.54	14.08	14.62	15.16	15.69	16.34	16.99	17.65	18.30	
9	12.36	12.87	13.38	13.90	14.41	13.59	14.16	14.73	15.29	15.86	16.22	16.90	17.58	18.25	18.93	
10	12.90	13.43	13.97	14.51	15.05	14.19	14.78	15.37	15.96	16.55	16.77	17.47	18.16	18.87	19.56	
11	13.42	13.98	14.54	15.10	15.66	14.77	15.38	16.00	16.62	17.23	17.31	18.04	18.76	19.48	20.20	
12	13.95	14.53	15.11	15.70	16.28	15.34	15.99	16.63	17.26	17.90	18.04	18.79	19.53	20.29	21.04	
13	14.47	15.07	15.67	16.28	16.88	15.91	16.58	17.24	17.90	18.57	18.93	19.72	20.51	21.29	22.08	
14	14.99	15.61	16.23	16.86	17.49	16.49	17.18	17.86	18.55	19.24	19.99	20.82	21.65	22.49	23.32	
15	15.51	16.15	16.79	17.45	18.09	17.05	17.77	18.48	19.19	19.91	21.21	22.09	22.97	23.86	24.74	
						WS-16					22.59	23.53	24.48	25.42	26.36	
						WS-17					24.16	25.16	26.17	27.17	28.18	
						WS-18					25.88	26.96	28.05	29.12	30.20	
						WS-19					27.73	28.94	30.05	31.22	32.39	

TABLE VIII-10

Regular Wage Schedules for U.S. Citizen Wage  
Employees in Foreign Areas (Nonappropriated Fund)

NA NL-NS GRADE	NA-RATES					NL-RATES					NS-RATES				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1	4.58	4.78	4.97	5.16	5.35	5.05	5.25	5.46	5.68	5.87	6.13	6.39	6.65	6.90	7.16
2	5.05	5.25	5.46	5.68	5.87	5.55	5.78	6.01	6.25	6.48	6.60	6.87	7.14	7.42	7.69
3	5.52	5.75	5.98	6.22	6.45	6.07	6.32	6.57	6.83	7.06	7.08	7.37	7.66	7.96	8.25
4	5.97	6.22	6.47	6.72	6.97	6.57	6.84	7.11	7.39	7.66	7.52	7.83	8.14	8.46	8.77
5	6.42	6.69	6.96	7.23	7.49	7.03	7.33	7.64	7.90	8.24	7.97	8.30	8.63	8.96	9.30
6	6.86	7.15	7.44	7.72	8.01	7.55	7.87	8.18	8.47	8.81	8.37	8.75	9.10	9.45	9.81
7	7.29	7.60	7.90	8.21	8.51	8.02	8.36	8.69	9.03	9.36	8.83	9.21	9.58	9.95	10.32
8	7.74	8.06	8.38	8.70	9.03	8.52	8.87	9.22	9.58	9.93	9.28	9.67	10.06	10.44	10.83
9	8.18	8.52	8.86	9.20	9.54	9.00	9.37	9.74	10.12	10.49	9.81	10.22	10.63	11.04	11.45
10	8.62	8.98	9.34	9.70	10.06	9.48	9.88	10.28	10.67	11.07	10.34	10.78	11.21	11.64	12.07
11	9.05	9.43	9.81	10.18	10.56	9.96	10.37	10.78	11.20	11.61	10.87	11.32	11.77	12.23	12.68
12	9.48	9.88	10.28	10.67	11.07	10.44	10.87	11.30	11.74	12.17	11.39	11.86	12.33	12.81	13.28
13	9.92	10.33	10.74	11.16	11.57	10.91	11.36	11.81	12.27	12.72	11.90	12.40	12.90	13.39	13.89
14	10.35	10.78	11.21	11.64	12.07	11.39	11.86	12.33	12.81	13.28	12.42	12.94	13.46	13.98	14.49
15	10.78	11.23	11.68	12.13	12.58	11.86	12.35	12.84	13.34	13.83	12.94	13.48	14.02	14.56	15.10
						NS-16					13.48	14.04	14.60	15.16	15.72
						NS-17					14.02	14.60	15.18	15.77	16.35
						NS-18					14.55	15.16	15.77	16.37	16.98
						NS-19					15.09	15.72	16.35	16.98	17.61