


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ST 30-5-1

ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL SPECIAL TEXT

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

U. S. ARMY



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This text, a combination of unclassified portion of FM 30-5 and current Department of the Army doctrine, is approved for resident and nonresident instruction at the Army General School only pending revision of FM 30-5. It reflects the current thought of this school and conforms to printed Department of the Army doctrine as closely as possible.

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## ERRATA SHEET 1 TO ST 30-5-1 (January 1955)

The following changes are to be made in the Army General School Special Text 30-5-1.

1. P 1, para 1, line 2 -- add: "regiment, and battalion." after "division".
2. P 8, para 17 -- delete parenthetical reference to FM 30-5.
3. P 13, para 29c -- delete parenthetical reference to FM 30-16.
4. P 13, para 29d -- delete parenthetical reference to FM 30-5.
5. P 14, para 29i(2) -- delete parenthetical reference to FM 30-5.
6. P 18, para 33a -- delete parenthetical reference to FM 30-5.
7. P 36 -- following para 49c(3), insert the following:

"In computing the *in what strength* of an enemy course of action, the size of the enemy unit considered varies at different echelons. Divisions generally measure enemy strength by enemy battalions; regiments by companies, and battalions by platoons. Corps practice in this respect varies. In dealing with the divisions subordinate to the corps, the corps intelligence officer usually refers to enemy strengths in terms of *battalions*; whereas, in dealing with the army, he will usually refer to enemy strengths in terms of *divisions*."

8. P 38, para 50a(6) -- delete: ". . .use forced march graph in FM 101-10" and reference to ST 30-102-1.
9. P 38, para 50a(7), line 1 -- change "175 miles" to "120 miles".
10. P 39, para 50a(15) -- delete entire sentence.
11. P 39, para 50b, line 1 -- delete reference to FM 101-10; insert instead: "The following table. . ."  
Delete last sentence of this paragraph. Delete also: "Table 1. (Rescinded)".
12. P 42, para 52c(4) (d)  
line 4 -- change "10 min" to "15 min" and "0020" to "0030".  
  
line 5 -- change "2108" to "2118".  
  
line 11 -- change "012110 July" to "012120 July".
13. P 55, para 69d -- delete entire last sentence.
14. P 80, para 97, line 4 -- delete reference to FM 30-16.
15. P 103 -- delete all references under Chapter 10.
16. P 104 -- delete all references under Chapter 11.
17. P 121 -- delete reference to FM 30-5.

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PART ONE  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION

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**1. PURPOSE**

This text is published for the use and guidance of all concerned with combat intelligence at division.

**2. SCOPE**

*a.* For these echelons this text describes the organization which produces intelligence, the production of intelligence from information, the means and methods of obtaining information, counterintelligence organization and functions, and intelligence training and planning.

*b.* Details of procedures and techniques of many subjects and operations related to combat intelligence are omitted from this text when they are contained in other intelligence manuals and basic branch manuals.

*c.* This text contains samples of forms used by the intelligence officer to aid him in the production of intelligence, and forms and examples of intelligence estimates, reports, plans, and studies for which the intelligence officer is responsible.

**3. INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER**

The commander is responsible for all intelligence activities of his command. He is responsible for seeing that his command, within the limits of its capabilities, gathers all pertinent information of the enemy, the weather, and the terrain, and transmits this information to all other units that require it. The commander is also responsible for the conversion into intelligence of all information that is pertinent to his command, and for the dissemination of this intelligence to higher, lower, and adjacent units. Furthermore, in connection with the security of his command, the commander is responsible for appropriate counterintelligence measures.

**4. MEANING OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER**

The term "intelligence officer," as used in this text, includes the assistant chief of staff, G2, of units provided with a general staff, and, where appropriate, the intelligence officer, or S2, of lower units.

**5. MILITARY INFORMATION**

Military information includes all documents, facts, material, photographs, diagrams, maps, reports, or observations of any kind which may serve to throw light on a possible or actual enemy or theater of operations. No information should be neglected. Information that seems unimportant at first glance may, upon being compared with other information, assume primary importance. The value of information is increased when the circumstances concerning its origin, including the time when it was obtained, are known; in fact, failure of reporting units to include these circumstances will often make the information valueless to the recipient. Negative information is often of great value, and sometimes is more important than positive

information. Negative information may at times be all-important. Information of enemy inactivity in one direction, for example, may lend great weight in analysis of other possible courses of enemy action.

## 6. INTELLIGENCE

*a. Definition.* Military intelligence is knowledge, acquired by the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information concerning a possible or actual enemy or areas of operations (including weather and terrain), together with conclusions drawn therefrom. It includes deductions concerning current and future enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and possible courses of action open to him that can affect the accomplishment of our mission. It is used as a basis for all operational plans and estimates. Military intelligence also includes counterintelligence.

*b. Strategic intelligence.* Strategic intelligence pertains to the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations for use of high level military commanders charged with the planning and execution of national security measures in time of peace and with the conduct of military operations in time of war.

*c. Combat intelligence.* Combat intelligence is military intelligence for use in a combat area, whether based upon information collected locally or provided by higher headquarters. Combat intelligence has two objectives—

(1) To reduce to a minimum all uncertainties regarding the enemy, weather, and terrain, and thus to assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their missions.

(2) To assist the commander in applying counterintelligence and security measures that will conceal from the enemy our intentions and activities and will neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of enemy intelligence activities.

## 7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

*a.* Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligence which comprises civil and military measures, including the collection, processing, and distribution of information, and executive action, designed to counter enemy or potential enemy intelligence, to deceive the enemy, or to prevent sabotage or subversive activities. It is accomplished through passive means such as secrecy discipline and through active means such as participation in certain aspects of a combat deception plan. Counterintelligence includes the detection of treason, sedition, and disaffection within the ranks and among the civilian employees of the Army. It deals with the neutralization or destruction of the effectiveness of actually or potentially hostile intelligence and subversive activities.

*b.* Counterintelligence is inseparable from intelligence. By its very nature, counterintelligence makes valuable contributions to the overall production of intelligence. Surprise, an important principle of war, is not dependent alone on reliable intelligence of the enemy and rapidity of movement; it may also be attained from the efficiency of a well-organized and soundly operated counterintelligence system and from the effectiveness of the counterintelligence measures employed.

## 8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMBAT INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

*a.* Both combat intelligence and strategic intelligence are concerned with significant military information pertaining to foreign powers and with areas of actual or possible operations. Basically, they use the same techniques: available information on the subject of interest is assembled, examined, compared with



other information, and interpreted so as to arrive as closely as possible at the truth. Such distinction as exists is chiefly in terms of scope, perspective, and level of use.

(1) *Combat* intelligence is produced largely in the field in time of war (including armed truce or "cold war"). It is used mainly by tactical commanders and their staffs. Combat intelligence is concerned with a relatively local situation; namely, the enemy forces opposing a combat unit, and the weather and terrain as they affect that unit. The production of combat intelligence generally involves rapid evaluation and interpretation of current information, and prompt dissemination of the intelligence produced.

(2) *Strategic* intelligence is produced continuously, both in peace and in war. The field army produces some strategic intelligence. It is usually produced by theater and higher headquarters, or by agencies under their control. It is used mainly by senior military commanders and their staffs in connection with strategic plans and operations. It is not limited to a local situation. Rather, strategic intelligence is concerned with *all* factors that contribute to the war potential of nations. Unlike combat intelligence, strategic intelligence is seldom produced rapidly. For the most part, it is the result of an assembly of much detailed information. Its production requires the services of specialized personnel and takes much time.

b. Many of the subjects of interest to combat intelligence and strategic intelligence are closely related. In some instances, they are identical. It is important that this be recognized at all echelons.

(1) Although strategic intelligence is used primarily at strategic levels, its influence is felt by all members of the Armed Forces. The determination of national capabilities and vulnerabilities requires the collection and processing of a large amount of detailed information. Much of the resultant intelligence is very useful in localized combat situations. Examples are maps and charts; descriptions and studies of beaches, ports, rivers, towns, and other terrain features; studies of transportation and communication systems; and data on soil trafficability, climate, and hydrography. All this intelligence is initially produced for strategic purposes in peacetime. Most of the strategic intelligence about foreign armed forces is readily translated into combat intelligence. This is clearly seen in the example of detailed studies of the identities, strengths, and command structures of foreign armies, navies, and air forces (order of battle). Such studies are produced for strategic purposes both in peace and war. They are immediately available, on the outbreak of hostilities, to the field commander who must depend on strategic intelligence for his initial material on the enemy and the area of operations. Hence, in the production of strategic intelligence during peace, preparations must be made for its use by field commanders.

(2) Similarly, much information collected by combat intelligence agencies is of great interest at the strategic echelon. Some information, like order of battle, is converted into both combat intelligence and strategic intelligence. Other information may have little use at the combat echelon, but will be very significant for strategic intelligence purposes. Examples are, information obtained from prisoners of war relative to enemy political and economic conditions; and captured materiel that may throw light on the enemy's munitions industries. Commanders and staffs of combat echelons will habitually report such information, or its sources, to higher authority.

## 9. INTELLIGENCE SECURITY

*a. General.* Intelligence security is counterintelligence within the intelligence service. It is an individual responsibility of all persons, military or civilian, who now perform, or *who have ever been engaged upon*, duties or activities of an intelligence nature. This responsibility does not cease with transfer to other duties, retirement, or release to private pursuits.

*b. Object.* The object of intelligence security is the preservation of absolute secrecy regarding the nature, type, extent, and success of our intelligence services and their activities.

*c. Aspects.* Intelligence security embraces five main aspects. These are—

(1) *Sources.* The development of sources of information, sufficiently numerous and dependable to meet the exacting requirements of intelligence, is a long, delicate, and costly process. The disclosure of a source can be accomplished in many startlingly easy ways. Neglect of intelligence security can quickly deprive us of more sources of important, and perhaps vital, intelligence than can the opposing forces of potentially hostile and enemy intelligence services.

(2) *Methods.* Every intelligence service possesses certain methods or techniques which it prizes more highly than others because these particular methods have consistently paid greater dividends than have the others. If, however, the degree of intelligence security surrounding the less productive methods were lowered, it is possible that other national intelligence services would be quick to assume that such methods were not considered valuable. They would immediately intensify their search for, and countermeasures against, the first-class techniques. Furthermore, an intelligence service can never be certain that any currently non-productive method may not suddenly become a valuable source of information. Obviously, even the slightest relaxation of intelligence security must never be condoned.

(3) *Information.* The quantity, type, degree of accuracy, and urgency of information sought or already obtained are sure indications of current interest and possible future intentions. They also reveal the extent of intelligence coverage. Any disclosure of these or of a lack of certain types of information would give a most valuable insight into the objectives, strength, weakness, or failure of our intelligence operations.

(4) *Results.* The results of intelligence operations are elements of the foundation upon which decisions are based. Any alert and efficient intelligence service, once aware of the results of our intelligence activities, could formulate a reasonable estimate as to the direction in which our decisions might lead. In addition, such valuable information would serve to alert an opposing intelligence service to the weaknesses in their counterintelligence system. Corrective measures would then serve to deprive us of further exploitation in that field.

(5) *Personnel.* Because it affects directly all other aspects, the subject of personnel is doubtless the most important element in the field of intelligence security. Individuals entrusted with intelligence duties must be chosen for such assignments not only because of the possession of requisite professional abilities but also because they are considered to be of unimpeachable loyalty, discretion, and integrity. Those responsible for selecting persons for intelligence duties must make a point never to approve any individual, however brilliant or efficient, against whom the slightest doubt exists regarding his loyalty, discretion, or integrity.

## CHAPTER 2

# INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

### Section I. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION

#### 10. GENERAL

Current intelligence organization provides cellular teams or detachments of intelligence specialists for attachment to combat units, and minimum numbers of organic intelligence specialists assigned to combat units. The military intelligence service organization (MISO) assigned to a theater of operations furnishes such specialists as are required by the major units in the theater. The specialists now organic to the intelligence sections of divisions are airphoto interpreters and order of battle personnel. These specialists can be efficiently and economically employed throughout a campaign or war regardless of the mission, the situation, or the language spoken by friendly civilians or allied or enemy military personnel. All other intelligence specialists required by a division G2 section are furnished by the military intelligence service organization, as normally attached detachments or as supplementary detachments, except for Counter Intelligence Corps personnel who are attached by theater. The military intelligence service organization also includes augmentation teams for those specialists who are now organic to the division and higher echelons.

#### 11. COMPOSITION, BASIS OF ALLOCATION, AND FUNCTIONS

a. A military intelligence service organization may be a group, battalion, company, or platoon, consisting of appropriate headquarters and administrative teams and any combination of the many intelligence specialist teams. For composition and basis of allocation of military intelligence service teams, refer to the current TO&E 30-600.

b. The capabilities of the intelligence specialist teams that comprise a military intelligence service organization are shown in the current TO&E 30-600. The capabilities of the specialists who are organic within the type G2 section of division (Fig 2) are identical with those of the military intelligence service teams bearing the same title.

#### 12. MISSION

The military intelligence service organization has a threefold mission—




Figure 1. Typical military intelligence service organization (MISO) in a theater.

a. It furnishes cellular teams of intelligence specialists for normal attachment to intelligence sections of divisions and higher tactical headquarters or to supplement, during operations, intelligence specialists already assigned or attached to these intelligence sections.

b. It furnishes cellular teams of headquarters and administrative personnel.


c. It provides a parent organization for all military intelligence service teams, administering those teams that are awaiting attachment, as well as those which have already been attached to G2 sections. Thus a direct chain of headquarters is provided to administer all teams and individuals wherever they may be operating. This ensures action being taken in such matters as promotions, individual transfers, pay, records, equipment, and other matters.

## Section II. TACTICAL UNITS

### 13. DIVISION

a. The duties of the division intelligence officer (G2) are outlined in FM 101-5.

b. A type organization of the intelligence (G2) section of a division is shown in figure 2. The section contains organic order of battle specialists and airphoto interpreters. Interrogators, normally attached during combat, may become organic if specifically authorized by Department of the Army. When required, military intelligence specialist teams may be provided as attachments.



<sup>1</sup>Attached from Military Intelligence Service Organization.

<sup>2</sup>Organization of G2 section for shift operation should be coordinated with G3 section.

<sup>3</sup>Attached from corps communication reconnaissance battalion.

<sup>4</sup>Attached from theater Counter Intelligence Corps allotment.

Figure 2. Type organization of a division intelligence (G2) section.

### 14. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

a. The branch may be augmented by the attachment of additional military intelligence service specialist detachments from the corps or army organization. The exact strength of the combat intelligence branch will vary with these attachments and with the number of stenographers and draftsmen assigned to the G2 section from the organic pool allotted to the general staff sections in the division tables of organization. The combat intelligence branch is divided into duty teams to permit 24-hour operation. These duty teams are supervised by the officers assigned to the branch. The organic and attached specialists operating with the combat intelligence branch may be assigned to duty teams as the need arises.

b. Functions of the combat intelligence branch are shown in figure 3.

G-2

| COMBAT INTELLIGENCE BRANCH  | G2 AIR BRANCH   | COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH   |
|---|---|--|
| <p>Direct and coordinate the collection effort, including formulation of EEL and preparation and maintenance of the collection plan.</p> <p>Collect and process information and disseminate combat intelligence.</p> <p>Maintain G2 situation map, journal, worksheet, and files.</p> <p>Supervise intelligence liaison activities.</p> <p>Prepare, edit, reproduce, and disseminate intelligence estimates, plans, summaries, and reports.</p> <p>Circulate and disseminate all information and documents from other headquarters.</p> <p>Maintain enemy order of battle records.</p> <p>Conduct briefings on the enemy situation.</p> <p>Arrange for and supervise the interrogation of prisoners of war and refugees.</p> <p>Arrange for and supervise translation of captured enemy documents.</p> <p>Provide interpreters for securing information from friendly civilians and allied military personnel.</p> <p>Coordinate and assist technical service intelligence detachments.</p> <p>Coordinate with G3 on intelligence training, plans, and troops for reconnaissance missions.</p> <p>Coordinate with G3 in, and provide intelligence for, psychological warfare.</p> <p>Coordinate procurement and distribution of maps with division engineer.</p> <p>Prepare appropriate portions of command report.</p> <p>Conduct research and planning for future operations.</p> | <p>Establish air reconnaissance policies and plans.</p> <p>Arrange for air reconnaissance missions.</p> <p>Supervise use and interpretation of aerial photography.</p> <p>Monitor the spot report receiver system.</p> <p>Prepare reports of information obtained from air reconnaissance and submit to combat intelligence branch.</p> | <p>Interrogate friendly and enemy civilians.</p> <p>Maintain record of enemy agents and collaborators.</p> <p>Report pertinent information obtained to combat intelligence branch.</p> <p>Recommend counterintelligence policy.</p> <p>Prepare counterintelligence plans, directives, and reports.</p> <p>Supervise measures for counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversive activities.</p> <p>Check security of headquarters and documents.</p> <p>Supervise censorship regulations.</p> <p>Recommend program and supervise counterintelligence training.</p> <p>Assist in intelligence planning for future operations.</p> <p>Maintain record of counterintelligence funds.</p> <p>Determine credibility of all alleged escapees and evadees and turn them over to combat intelligence branch for further interrogation.</p> |

Figure 3. Functions, division G2 section.

**15. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH**

a. The counterintelligence branch assists the G2 in formulating and supervising counterintelligence measures or activities, which include counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversive operations within the division and in the division area. Specific functions are shown in figure 3.

b. There are no organic commissioned or enlisted counterintelligence personnel in the G2 section of divisions; however, the counterintelligence branch block in figure 2 is shown by a solid line, because normally it will be a functional part of the division G2 section. The branch is headed by an organic officer of the G2 section, assigned by G2. However, if none is available, the commander of the normally attached Counter Intelligence Corps detachment may act as the counter intelligence branch chief as well.

**16. ALLOCATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE UNITS**

Each division will normally receive the attachments shown in figure 2, and additional teams needed to supplement the organic specialists. Teams are allocated on the basis shown in current tables of organization and equipment.

**17. ARMY SECURITY AGENCY**

(See FM 30-5, Para 17.)

**18. UNITS BELOW DIVISION**

a. The intelligence officer (S2) of regiments, battalions, and commensurate units keeps his commander informed of the enemy situation. He determines the enemy capabilities, their relative probability of adoption, and their effect upon the accomplishment of the mission of the unit. He collects and disseminates information and intelligence concerning the enemy, weather, and terrain. He assists his commander in the formulation and supervision of counterintelligence measures.

b. Generally, the detailed duties of a unit S2 are similar to the duties discussed in this text and those outlined in FM 101-5 for the G2 of division and higher units. The unit S2 is assisted in the performance of duties by organic intelligence personnel, troops, and in some instances intelligence specialists attached from higher headquarters. For the specific intelligence organization within various type units, refer to appropriate branch field manuals and tables of organization and equipment.

PART TWO  
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS  
CHAPTER 3  
PRODUCTION OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

---

### 19. STEPS

a. The production of combat intelligence may be divided into four steps—

- (1) Collection of information.
- (2) Processing of the collected information to produce intelligence.
- (3) Use of the resulting intelligence.
- (4) Direction of the collection effort.

b. These steps are concurrent. At the same time that new information is being *collected*, other information is being *processed*, and intelligence is being *used*. The entire operation must be constantly *directed*.

c. The four steps are the lowest common denominator of the operational cycle of intelligence. Each step is indispensable. If one step fails, the entire intelligence process will fail.

### 20. COLLECTION

For purposes of logical presentation only, this text will consider the collection of information as the first of the four steps in the operational cycle. Collection is the systematic exploitation of sources of information by collecting agencies and the delivery of the information thus obtained to the proper intelligence section. Provision is made for the necessary collecting agencies in tables of organization and equipment and by the attachment of intelligence specialists. (Collection sources and agencies are discussed in detail in Chap 4.)

### 21. PROCESSING

After the information has been collected and delivered, it must be processed into intelligence. Information is *not* intelligence. Information is converted into intelligence by recording, evaluation, and interpretation. Recording is subordinate to, and must not hamper, evaluation and interpretation. Recording is the least critical component of processing. Evaluation and interpretation are the decisive actions that transform information into combat intelligence. The intelligence officer is assisted in evaluation and interpretation by the organic intelligence section, by attached specialist teams, and by other members of the staff. (Processing is discussed in detail in Chap 5.)

### 22. USE

a. The chief use of combat intelligence is its immediate integration by the commander into his continuing estimate of the situation. This use requires the intelligence officer to concentrate on the intelligence estimate so that he can give the commander an appraisal of the enemy situation or weather and terrain at any moment. The only way he can be assured of doing this is by using every significant item of newly produced intelligence to keep his estimate current. The intelligence estimate must always be directed toward the mission of the unit so that the commander can analyze the effect of this intelligence on his own possible courses of action and thus reach a decision.

*b.* If intelligence is to be used effectively, it must be disseminated. The object of dissemination is to ensure that intelligence reaches the individuals or units concerned in time to serve their purposes. Urgent information and intelligence should be transmitted promptly to the commander and other staff sections and to lower, higher, and adjacent headquarters. Intelligence reports, conferences, and messages are the general headings under which the many methods of dissemination may be grouped. (Use of combat intelligence is discussed in detail in Chap 6.)

### 23. DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

*a.* The fourth step of combat intelligence production, direction of the collection effort, becomes operative after the intelligence officer presents the intelligence estimate to the commander. The estimate includes all pertinent intelligence currently available. The commander will then indicate to the intelligence officer the additional intelligence required to arrive at a decision regarding the best method of carrying out his mission. These intelligence requirements are expressed as questions and are known as essential elements of information (EEI). They announce to the command and its agencies the items of information that are necessary to a *working* understanding of the situation. The intelligence officer, in coordination with other staff officers, assists the commander in determining the EEI.

*b.* The collection plan is the intelligence officer's program for securing the answers to the EEI. In the plan, the EEI are broken down into component questions, and a scheme of collection is formulated. The end products of the collection plan are the actual orders and requests to the selected collecting agencies. These orders and requests indicate the information desired and the time and place of reporting it.

*c.* The third procedure in the direction of the collection effort is transmitting specific orders and requests to the collecting agencies. This is the direct impetus that keeps the cycle in constant operation.

*d.* The final procedure of direction of the collection effort is supervising the activities of the collecting agencies. The intelligence officer must make a practice of following up his orders and requests to make sure that collection of information progresses vigorously and resourcefully.



## CHAPTER 4

### COLLECTION-SOURCES AND AGENCIES

---

#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

#### 24. SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTION

The commander must be assured of continuing reliable information as to the disposition, strength, composition, and movement of hostile forces, as well as information on weather and terrain. He must use every means at his disposal to gain information of the enemy forces on his front, and of enemy forces on other fronts and in other areas, which may affect the preparation and execution of his plans. A failure to exploit every source of information may deny important information of hostile dispositions, movements, and operations, and consequent decisive exploitation of enemy weaknesses. Because his primary function is to keep the commander and others informed of the enemy situation and capabilities and the area of operations, the intelligence officer is faced with the continuing problem of employing efficiently all available collecting agencies to gather this necessary information.

#### 25. DIFFICULTIES IN COLLECTION

The difficulties involved in obtaining adequate information and in arriving at reliable conclusions based thereon are many. These difficulties are due principally to the fact that the interests of the enemy demand that he make every possible effort to foil attempts made to gain information. He will conceal his movements by every means possible. To do this he will make use of ground, cover, darkness, and weather conditions; and he will supplement natural cover with camouflage. He will resort to any tactical measures that offer a reasonable chance of obtaining secrecy or surprise. He will enforce both a strict censorship and communication security measures to prevent leaks of information. He may distribute false information and institute other measures to deceive our collecting agencies. He will sometimes adopt a course of action that may appear illogical. The opposition of the enemy's interest to our own, as well as the independence of his will, makes him more or less an unknown factor in every situation. To a lesser degree, the weather and the terrain also are unknown factors.

#### 26. SOURCES AND AGENCIES

Sources of information differ from collecting agencies in that agencies are the means employed to obtain enemy information; whereas the source is the actual *origin* from which the desired information is obtained. Agencies are under our guidance and control; sources as a rule are not.

#### Section II. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

#### 27. GENERAL

a. Sources of information are the person, thing, or action from which information of the enemy, weather, or terrain is derived. Sources are extensive and varied. The chief sources of information of the enemy are derived from observation and contact with the enemy. At the outset of operations the intelligence officer will not be devoid of information from which to produce intelligence for initial estimates since many sources of information will be available to him. These include order of battle books, enemy weapons and equipment handbooks, terrain studies, and other reference materials prepared by or for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2,

Intelligence, General Staff, US Army, and similar agencies. Other sources must be uncovered or developed by the intelligence officer and his collecting agencies as operations progress. Considerable effort and ingenuity are required if full advantage is to be taken of all possible sources.

b. Through his collecting agencies and from sources of information, the intelligence officer obtains information in three categories—the enemy, the weather, and the terrain. Some of the types of information collected are—

- (1) Unit identifications.
- (2) Boundaries and other details of the enemy's dispositions.
- (3) Movement of enemy troops.
- (4) Location of enemy observation posts and command posts.
- (5) Emplacements of artillery and automatic weapons.
- (6) Presence of armor.
- (7) Location of supply points.
- (8) Location of defensive works and obstacles.
- (9) Daily routine of the enemy.
- (10) Routes most frequently used by the enemy.
- (11) The effect of weather on terrain and visibility; for example, trafficability, fog, or haze.
- (12) Light data (for an example, see App II, Para 2).
- (13) Status of roads, bridges, and rivers.
- (14) Favorable observation points of the terrain.
- (15) Soil trafficability.
- (16) Areas which afford concealment or cover.

c. Information can be evaluated only if there is knowledge of the degree of accuracy and reliability of the source, the circumstances under which the information was obtained, and the relationship of the source and the collecting agency. (Evaluation is discussed in Chap 5.)

## 28. DETERMINATION OF SOURCES

In determining which sources of information to exploit, the following questions must be considered:

- a. What type of information is required?
- b. Of the available sources, which are the most reliable?
- c. Will the appropriate agencies be able to exploit the sources in time?

## 29. DESCRIPTION OF SOURCES (Chap 9.)

a. *Enemy military personnel* (FM 30-15).

(1) One of the best sources of information available to ground units is enemy military personnel, including prisoners of war, wounded, dead, and deserters. From prisoners of war, information is obtained on enemy identifications, troop dispositions, combat efficiency and training, contemplated movements, arms, equipment, morale, roads, fortifications, and effects of our psychological warfare. In order to obtain maximum information, care must be taken to handle prisoners of war skillfully from the time of their capture throughout all interrogations.

(2) Enemy deserters are handled as prisoners of war, but are segregated from them. However, since the enemy may "plant" false deserters, reports of examination of deserters should bear a notation at the head of the report: "Information from deserter."

(3) Enemy wounded and dead are searched for documents and marks of identification and provide an excellent source for order of battle and other information.

(4) Prisoner of war interrogators operate under the supervision of G2 to obtain information from enemy military personnel. The G2 will furnish his interrogators with appropriate guidance concerning the specific information desired and with the EEI. Interrogators base their interrogation plan on specific information desired by G2 and on current EEI.

*b. Enemy documents* (FM 30-15). When examined systematically by competent personnel, captured documents reveal information on the enemy's order of battle, plans, organization, armament, morale, tactical methods, and on his codes, ciphers, and other cryptomaterial. Documents are cataloged, examined, and handled so as to obtain maximum information of immediate tactical value. This procedure is followed by a more detailed study for strategic implications. Information from documents is more authentic and reliable than that from enemy military personnel because it is less biased and less representative of personal opinion than is information obtained from prisoners of war.

*c. Enemy materiel* (FM 30-16). Information of technical, tactical, and strategic value can be obtained from items of equipment captured from the enemy or overrun by our own troops. When properly processed, it furnishes all echelons with intelligence for both immediate and future use. Reports on the enemy use of materiel against our forces provide technically trained specialists information with which to determine the characteristics or functions of materiel. Such reports thereby enable the commander's technical staff to advise him on countermeasures or methods of exploiting new ideas for our own benefit.

*d. Enemy signal communication.* (See FM 30-5, Chap 4, Para 29d.)

*e. Enemy activity, weather, and terrain.* These sources are usually exploited as a result of direct observation by such agencies as observers, reconnaissance patrols, listening posts, and gas sentries.

*f. Airphotos.* Airphotos provide information on the terrain, the enemy's use of the terrain, and enemy activity. In conjunction with maps, airphotos provide reliable and recent information on the terrain, and, in addition, information as to enemy fortifications, installations, lines of communications, location of his forces, gun positions, and similar activities. Trained airphoto interpreters study and make detailed analyses of the airphotos for the intelligence officer.

*g. Maps and terrain models.*

(1) Maps are the basic source of information used by the intelligence officer in making tactical terrain studies and preparing terrain estimates. The intelligence officer prepares and maintains defense and situation maps. Defense maps are maps overprinted with detailed information on enemy fixed defensive installations. Situation maps show the current disposition of enemy forces.

(2) A terrain model is a three dimensional graphic representation of an area, showing the conformation of the ground, modeled to scale and usually colored to emphasize the various physical features. The vertical scale is usually exaggerated

without severe distortion to convey the aspect of relief. Terrain models with exaggerated scales may be used for special studies and in oral presentation of special estimates.

*h. Weather forecasts and studies.*

(1) A weather forecast is a prediction of weather conditions at a point, along a route, or within an area for a specified period of time.

(2) Climatological studies and special weather forecasts for specific needs may be obtained upon request to appropriate agencies.

(3) Weather service is furnished to the Army by the Air Weather Service, whose detachments are available at corps and higher headquarters. Divisions and lower units receive weather forecasts through intelligence channels.

*i. Miscellaneous.*

(1) Refugees, civilians, escapees, and evadees are possible sources of information on communication centers, supply dumps, troop concentrations, location of defenses, weapons emplacements, command post signs and symbols, artillery positions, and other matters. Information from these sources will vary in importance to the commander, depending on the time element, the locale, and the type of operation.

(2) (See FM 30-5, Chap 4, Para 29*i*(2).)

(3) Other sources of information include strategic and tactical terrain studies prepared by various agencies, all intelligence studies of other echelons or units, and reference materials prepared by or for the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence, General Staff, US Army, and similar agencies.

### Section III. INFORMATION COLLECTING AGENCIES

#### 30. GENERAL

*a.* A collecting agency is any person, unit, or instrumentality that acquires information by research, observation, or interrogation of a source, and through which information may be obtained. At all echelons of field command from the battalion upwards, the intelligence officer is aided in the performance of his duties by *specialized collecting agencies*. In a broad sense, however, *all* troops are in a position to collect information. Intelligence is not solely the affair of a few specialists.

*b.* Commanders depend on their intelligence officers to exploit the means at their disposal to gain information of the enemy and the area of operation. Intelligence officers therefore must effectively employ all available intelligence agencies.

*c.* Figure 4 shows the intelligence agencies organic, attached, or available to an infantry division. Other divisions are similar, with slight modifications to conform with differences in organization.

#### 31. TYPES OF COLLECTING AGENCIES

Collecting agencies are of three types—intelligence personnel, troops, and special information services.

*a. Intelligence personnel.* This type includes the intelligence section and attached personnel with exclusive intelligence duties. Some of this personnel—observers, interrogators, translators, and interpreters—collect information.




Figure 4. Intelligence agencies, infantry division.

b. *Troops.* The term "troops" refers to the organic and supporting units of divisions and lower units which collect information, for the most part, by actual contact with the enemy. This type comprises ground reconnaissance units, and infantry, artillery, engineer, and tank units. All of these units are capable of collecting information from the battle area. Normally, this is accomplished by patrolling; by capturing prisoners; by securing enemy documents, equipment, and materiel; and by ground and aerial observation.

c. *Special information services.* Special information services are those agencies that are, in general, technical or highly specialized. They are operated by the branches usually in the interest of the branch concerned. They may be attached, organic, or available at higher echelons. Usually special information services do not depend upon actual contact with the enemy to gain information. Close liaison is maintained between these agencies and the intelligence officer. Special information services include military police, quartermaster, ordnance, signal, medical, transportation, and chemical units; cooperating air forces; and technical service intelligence detachments.

**32. TYPES OF TROOPS**

a. *Reconnaissance units* (Para 81). Reconnaissance units normally found within ground combat elements include an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon in each infantry regiment, a reconnaissance platoon in each tank and armored infantry

battalion, a reconnaissance company in each infantry and airborne division, a reconnaissance battalion in each armored division, an armored cavalry regiment in each corps, and in some instances an armored cavalry regiment in each army. Reconnaissance units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform mounted or dismounted missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and movement. They possess excellent radio communication facilities, great mobility on roads, good cross-country mobility, great firepower, and trained reconnaissance personnel. However, the effectiveness of their operations is dependent upon favorable road conditions, favorable weather, and a constant fuel supply. Mechanized reconnaissance patrols do not operate quietly or with maximum effectiveness at night. Reconnaissance units are capable of performing the following types of missions:

- (1) Searching within assigned zones or areas or along designated routes.
- (2) Covering an exposed flank or gap between units.
- (3) Gaining contact in meeting engagements.
- (4) Patrolling dismounted.
- (5) Manning observation posts.

*b. Infantry units.*

(1) Because of the infantry combat role of closing with the enemy, every infantry unit has opportunities to collect information by various means. Infantry fights for information or uses other means, such as scouting, patrolling, and observing from the ground and air; interrogating prisoners of war, civilians, and repatriates; and examining captured documents and materiel. With regard to the collection of information, an infantry unit has the following advantages:

- (a) It maintains physical contact with the enemy.
- (b) It operates under all weather conditions.
- (c) It obtains detailed information of the enemy by fighting, observing, and listening.
- (d) It operates efficiently at night.

(2) The infantry's principal limitation is that its mobility is restricted to the speed and distance of its foot elements. It cannot obtain as broad a picture of the enemy situation as can mounted reconnaissance units, armor, and air units. Suitable intelligence missions for an infantry unit are those that can be performed concurrently with its combat mission, such as determining the local enemy situation (to include location, strength, dispositions, identifications, attitudes, combat effectiveness, and local reserves) and the characteristics of the area of operation to the immediate front.

*c. Counterfire units.* Counterfire platoons of infantry regiments and counterfire squads of armored infantry battalions locate enemy machineguns and mortars by sound-ranging methods. These methods permit locating targets that cannot be detected visually by reason of being masked by enemy defensive positions, ground forms, vegetation, darkness, smoke, haze, or fog.

*d. Tank elements of armored units.*

(1) Tank elements of armored units seldom operate dismounted and, therefore, are normally limited to observation from their tanks or vehicles in gathering information. Tank elements have the following advantages for collecting information:

- (a) They travel at moderate speeds on roads and have cross-country mobility.

- (b) Their armor provides considerable protection against fire.
- (c) They have an excellent system of radio communication.
- (d) They are capable of rapid penetration of enemy areas.

(2) Tank elements have the following limitations:

- (a) Their operations are limited by minefields and other obstacles.
- (b) Their operations are limited by unfavorable weather, certain types of terrain, poor visibility, and darkness.
- (c) Continuous operation is dependent upon constant resupply of fuel, spare parts, and ammunition.

(3) Collecting missions appropriate to tank elements are essentially similar to infantry collecting missions, although wider and deeper coverage can be expected in many cases. Dismounted patrolling may be conducted in stabilized situations when detailed information of the enemy or enemy-held terrain is desired.

*e. Field artillery units.* Field artillery is an organic component of all divisions. Artillery units have contact with the enemy in a visual sense; they maintain constant observation of the enemy and of enemy-held terrain. In carrying out its primary role of supporting the infantry by fire, the artillery locates and destroys enemy targets. The field artillery observation battalion with its sound and flash and radar equipment is employed to assist the artillery with the corps by locating hostile installations (particularly hostile artillery). It also provides ballistic meteorological data for friendly artillery. The primary duty of the artillery intelligence system is to locate, analyze, and evaluate enemy targets. Artillery intelligence officers obtain these data from forward observers, liaison officers with frontline infantry units, air observers in light aircraft organic to division artillery, countermortar radar sections of direct support battalions, survey and reconnaissance elements, shelling reports and shell fragment analysis, and ground observation posts. The artillery wire and radio communication system permits rapid signal communication. Unlike the infantry, however, artillery does not have the ability to obtain enemy identifications and other detailed information from physical contact with the enemy. Among the types of information which intelligence officers may expect to receive from the artillery are the location of enemy artillery, mortars, machineguns, antitank guns, antiaircraft artillery, troop concentrations and movements, strong points, assembly areas, observation posts, command posts, and terrain information.

*f. Antiaircraft units.* Antiaircraft units provide the intelligence officer with such information of enemy aerial activity as the number, type, and activity of enemy aircraft; friendly targets attacked; and number of enemy planes destroyed or damaged. All antiaircraft units are in the communication net of the antiaircraft artillery intelligence service (AAAIS), which operates an aircraft warning service throughout the army area. The subordinate antiaircraft intelligence officer can relay these attack warnings to the intelligence officer.

*g. Countermortar radar sections, division artillery.* The primary mission of these sections is to locate enemy mortars so that counterfire may neutralize or destroy them. A secondary mission is to detect enemy movements. Countermortar radar sections depend on radar to locate enemy mortars. There are several factors that limit the operating efficiency of a radar set, among which are adverse weather conditions (especially heavy rain), physical obstructions, and enemy countermeasures.

*h. Engineer units.* Each division has an assigned engineer combat battalion and may obtain support from engineer units at higher echelons. Engineers engage primarily in duties requiring technical skill and special equipment. In the course of such duties, they obtain information on the transportation routes, soil trafficability, topography and resources of the area of operations, and on enemy fortifications and installations. Engineer units furnish information and intelligence on the tactical effect of new engineer materiel in the hands of the enemy (or a novel use of some already known enemy equipment), and on aspects of terrain from an engineer point of view, particularly stream forecasts and hydrographic, trafficability, and terrain studies. They prepare technical terrain studies used in the preparation of tactical studies of weather and terrain. Special engineer units prepare terrain models and topographic maps and map supplements.

*i. Shelling report personnel.*

(1) Shelling report and crater analysis personnel determine the activity, location, caliber, and method of employment of enemy artillery. Although shelling report teams are not provided in tables of organization and equipment, each artillery battalion and artillery headquarters usually maintains one or more of them. Shelling report teams and all other personnel of units have a continuing duty to submit reports of shelling in their area to their supporting artillery, no matter how meager their information may seem.

(2) By analysis of shelling reports the artillery intelligence officer collects information on the disposition and activities of enemy artillery. He provides the division intelligence officer with such information. A study of the movement and grouping of the enemy artillery, of the areas which the enemy artillery has shelled, and of the enemy artillery activity, is of particular value in arriving at an estimate of enemy capabilities and at the relative probability of adoption of a particular course of action.

### 33. DESCRIPTION OF SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICES

*a.* (See FM 30-5, Chap 4, Para 33*a.*)

*b. Military police units.* Military police units, by patrolling rear areas, controlling refugees and the civilian population, and handling prisoners of war, frequently obtain information of both intelligence and counterintelligence value.

*c. Ordnance and quartermaster units.* Ordnance and quartermaster units furnish intelligence and information regarding the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the enemy's ordnance and quartermaster materiel. The information collected by division ordnance and quartermaster units will probably be hasty and incomplete. Detailed intelligence on enemy materiel will come from studies made by technical service intelligence detachments at higher echelons.

*d. Signal units.* Signal units assist the intelligence officer by providing information and intelligence on enemy signal equipment. Photographers of signal units may be used for intelligence purposes.

*e. Medical units.* Medical units furnish information and intelligence on medical and public health aspects of the enemy and of the area of operations. They may also obtain information and documents from wounded personnel, enemy as well as friendly.

*f. Chemical units.* Chemical units furnish information of enemy chemical, biological, and radiological activity to include the kind of agent used; location; size, and duration of concentration or contamination; effect of agents; chemical



tactics; the presence of gas munitions or biological or radiological agents in captured enemy munitions dumps and other installations; and the appearance of any new or unusual enemy chemical equipment. They also assist in gas alerts.

*g. Transportation units.* Transportation units, in the course of normal operations, obtain and report information concerning the characteristics, capacities, adequacy, and military use of transportation routes, structures, and equipment in the area of operations, with particular reference to railroads, highways, waterways, ports, and beaches. Intelligence elements of transportation special staff sections obtain, process, maintain, and/or provide transportation information and intelligence required for transportation planning or G2 intelligence purposes.

*h. Tactical air force* (Chap 8). A tactical air force normally operates with the army. Its information-collecting facilities are available to intelligence officers of divisions and lower echelons through intelligence channels. It can reach far behind the enemy frontlines and by either photo or visual reconnaissance missions can obtain information otherwise not available. Airphoto interpretation furnishes information regarding the enemy and the terrain. Visual reconnaissance missions provide information primarily on terrain and on transient targets.

*i. Technical service intelligence detachments (TSID).*

(1) These detachments are composed of representatives of the various technical services and furnish information concerning various types of enemy equipment. Detachments may be attached to the appropriate special staff sections of corps and armies. In general, they are not attached to divisions because of the small area under division control. The division intelligence officer, however, will receive their reports through the respective technical services, and intelligence produced as a result of their activity through intelligence channels.

(2) There is a difference between the work of technical service intelligence detachments and the information which all technical service personnel can offer. For example, an ordnance maintenance officer in a combat area may observe an abandoned enemy tank and give the local S2 or G2 information which will lead to the identification of a new enemy unit in the area. The same tank, when inspected by the ordnance technical service intelligence detachment, may then provide the theater intelligence officer with detailed data as to the characteristics of that particular tank model.

## CHAPTER 5

### PROCESSING INFORMATION

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#### 34. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROCESSING

*a.* Processing is the means by which information is transformed into intelligence. Processing includes recording, evaluation, and interpretation. After information has been collected, the intelligence officer will sort, group, and record it by subjects in order to facilitate comparison and study; he will evaluate it in order to determine its pertinence, credibility, and accuracy; and he will interpret it to determine its significance. Only then does the processed information become intelligence.

*b.* Proper recording, evaluation, and interpretation of information produces intelligence that is concise, free from irrelevant matter, and ready for immediate use. Such intelligence will convey not only facts but also the significance of those facts, together with all deductions drawn from their study in the light of other intelligence already at hand.

*c.* The time at which information is recorded depends upon its urgency; and the extent to which it is evaluated and interpreted depends upon the reliability of its source and the agency reporting it. For example, a report from a subordinate unit commander that an enemy massed tank attack was overrunning his positions would be disseminated without delay because of its urgency and would require only the most rapid evaluation or interpretation because of the reliability of the reporting agency. Recording would be the final step. On the other hand, information obtained from an enemy deserter is recorded without delay and would be carefully evaluated and interpreted prior to its dissemination because of the doubtful reliability of its source. The more urgent the information, the more rapid is its processing. Even if the procedure is hasty, the reliability, meaning, and significance of the information is weighed as carefully as the urgency of the situation permits.

*d.* The intelligence officer is assisted in the process of recording, evaluation, and interpretation by the intelligence personnel organic to his unit, by attached intelligence specialist teams, and by other members of the unit staff.

#### 35. RECORDING

*a.* Recording arranges information in a systematic manner to facilitate its being processed into intelligence. Incoming information is examined at once by the intelligence officer on duty for items of immediate tactical importance before any recording is done. On these items he takes necessary action promptly (Para 22*b*), after which the information is systematically arranged, sorted, grouped, and listed by subjects, so that items of the same kind may be kept together for convenience of comparison, study, and reporting. From the standpoint of combat intelligence, there are four general aids by means of which the mechanics of recording are accomplished—

- (1) Intelligence (or G2) journal (Para 36).
- (2) Enemy situation map (Para 37).
- (3) G2 worksheet (Para 38).
- (4) Intelligence files (Para 39).

*b.* The aids listed in *a* above are necessary in the preparation of intelligence reports and serve as convenient means of reference for the commander and for members of his staff. However, the intelligence officer of every unit should adapt his procedures to the needs of his unit. Simplification of procedures will be especially

necessary at the battalion and regimental echelons. An efficient intelligence officer will not allow himself to be engulfed in a mass of paperwork. In all situations the maintenance of records is subordinate to the mission of assembling and interpreting information and producing and using intelligence. Action comes first; records are of secondary importance.

### 36. INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL

*a.* The intelligence journal (or G2 journal) is the daybook of the division intelligence section. The intelligence staff of battalions and regiments record their activities in the unit daily journal, maintained by the executive. The journal contains briefs of important written and oral messages received and sent, as well as notations of periodic reports, orders, records of important conferences, and similar matters pertaining directly to the intelligence section. It is an official permanent record of a unit and the primary record of operations of the intelligence section of the headquarters. The journal is closed daily or at the end of a phase or period as directed. At division one copy is submitted to the chief of staff for consolidation with the other journals of the headquarters. At the close of each day a summary of important events should be entered as the last item. The summary should include particularly the reasons "why" behind decisions and happenings. These daily summaries are the basic data for incorporation into the command report. (FM 101-5.)

*b.* After examination by the intelligence officer on duty for any items of information of immediate tactical importance, and subsequent action, all incoming items of information are next recorded in the journal. The original entry is never altered, but may be supplemented by subsequent entries. If the item is received or issued in oral form, it should be summarized in written form and handled as a regular message. If the item is in documentary form, the entry may consist of a reference and brief synopsis of contents. (See Fig 5 for sample journal sheet.)

### 37. ENEMY SITUATION MAP

*a. General.* The enemy situation map is kept by the intelligence officer of each combat unit. Upon it is recorded graphically pertinent information of the enemy for reference and study. The situation map supplements, but does not take the place of, the worksheet.

*b. Scale.* The situation map should be of a scale appropriate to the size and mission of the unit. Generally, the smaller the unit, the larger the scale required because of the amount of detailed information which must be recorded. Higher headquarters should have on hand copies of all maps used by subordinate units, so that there will be no danger of reports or messages referring to places not shown on maps available at the higher headquarters. Each major unit should prescribe the operation map for use in its own and next subordinate headquarters. This standardization will reduce chances for error. When reports refer to a map other than the prescribed operation map, the map used will be identified unless the grid reference system specified for the operation is used.

*c. Scope.* The map area should include the terrain in possession of our own troops as well as that held by the enemy. Information of the enemy that is of importance to the command is placed on the map by means of symbols or conventional signs. Care is taken to prevent the map from becoming too cluttered. The information posted will vary with the size of the unit; the smaller the unit, the more detailed will be the information recorded. The location of the command posts of higher, lower, and adjacent units; the boundaries between major subordinate units; the location of friendly reconnaissance units; and (when there is an appreciable

## MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONAL

distance between our lines and those of the enemy) the trace of our frontline, constitute the minimum friendly information that should be shown on the enemy situation map. Division enemy situation maps should show the location of enemy units down to battalions. To be useful, the situation map must be current. Old information, no longer of value, must be removed from the situation map.

(Classification)

G2 Sec, 101st Inf Div  
LANCASTER, SC  
211200 Jun 19\_\_  
to  
221200 Jun 19\_\_

| Time |      | Serial No | Time dated | Incidents, messages, orders, etc.  | Action taken |
|------|------|-----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In   | Out  |           |            |  |              |
| 1300 | --   | 1         | 1245       | <u>101st Recon</u> —At 020320 moving S on Hwy 521. No En encountered.                                  | MS           |
| 1340 | --   | 2         | 1330       | <u>101st Recon</u> —Brg at 027292 destroyed; creek 5 ft wide, maximum 1½ ft deep. Fordable.            | MST          |
| 1525 | --   | 3         | 1500       | <u>V Corps</u> —Estimated En rifle Regt moving NW on Hwy 341 on foot. Head of Colm at KERSHAW at 1435. | MST          |
| 1620 | --   | 4         | 1540       | <u>302d Inf</u> —Document. Document (En withdrawal order) captured at En roadblock at 032287 1530.     | ST           |
|      | 1705 | 5         | —          | <u>V Corps</u> —Document. Document (En withdrawal order) captured by 302d Inf 1530.                    |              |

(Classification)

Entries in the G2 journal are made as follows:

*Under the column headed "Time" . . . enter the actual time the message arrived at your section or departed from it, in the "In" and "Out" columns, respectively.*

*Under the column headed "Serial number" . . . enter the journal number of the message, numbering consecutively for each journal period.*

*Under the column headed "Time dated" . . . enter the time the message was dated or both the time and date of the message, if the date is other than for the existing journal period.*

*Under the column headed "Incidents, messages, orders, etc." . . . enter and underline the agency from which the message was received or to which it was sent; then enter briefly the substance of the message in topic form. Use only one line of the journal if possible.*

*Under the column headed "Action taken" . . . enter the dissemination which was made of the information contained in the message. Use the symbols, M, S, and T: M (map), posted on the situation map; S (staff), disseminated to the commander and the appropriate staff members; T (troops), disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent echelons. When pertinent, specific staff officers and specific units may be indicated.*

*\*Figure 5. Example of journal sheet for division intelligence section.*

*d. Cooperation with operations officer.* All information concerning the enemy is furnished to the operations officer (G3 or S3). By mutual agreement between the intelligence officer and the operations officer, draftsmen of one section may enter pertinent information on the situation map of the other section. In order that the intelligence officer may estimate enemy capabilities that may affect our future plans, he keeps abreast of operational planning.

*e. Timeliness.* The situation map is kept constantly up to date, new sheets being used when necessary. A tracing or copy of the information on the map, showing the situation as known at the close of the period, may accompany the periodic intelligence report.

*f. Joint situation maps.* In some headquarters, particularly in those of battalions and regiments, a single situation map may be kept jointly for all staff sections under the supervision of a designated officer. At division it is advisable for the intelligence and operations sections to maintain separate situation maps in order not to interfere with each other and to keep the amount of detail on each map at a minimum.

*g. Materials.* The current situation is preferably posted on a transparent substance, such as tracing paper or acetate. This method preserves maps, and the tracing paper provides simplicity in transcription of map data. The transparent material is placed on top of the map and the desired information is traced or posted on the tracing paper. This is known as an "overlay." In rapidly moving situations, data may be posted on the map itself; however, in more stable situations, this is not the best procedure because of map shortage, waste, and because the map soon becomes cluttered with symbols. Where photographic facilities are available, prints of the situation map may accompany the periodic intelligence report (Para 33d).

*h. Symbols (FM 21-30).* The situation map or overlay should be kept as simple as possible. Authorized conventional signs, military symbols, and abbreviations are used. When symbols are required other than those authorized, they may be improvised, provided they are readily recognizable; otherwise, it is better to make a written notation on the map itself. An alternative method of referring to items for which there are no symbols or which require some explanation is to note the journal entry number pertaining to the item on the margin of the map with an arrow pointing to the location of the item on the map.

*i. Clarity.* Neatness and clarity are essentials to a good situation map. All symbols and signs are posted clearly and accurately. Symbols should be sufficiently large to be seen from a reasonable distance, so as to allow several persons to study the map at the same time. Symbols should be posted horizontally, that is, so that they may be read without turning the map or overlay. In some cases this is not possible; for example, the symbols for trenches, minefields, tank traps, and barbed wire must conform to their actual position on the ground.

*j. Colors.* Enemy information is normally posted in red and friendly information in blue. When one color is used for both, enemy unit symbols are shown in double lines (FM 21-30). Symbols for minefields, demolitions, roadblocks, and other engineer obstacles, when installed by our own troops, are posted in green. Gassed areas are posted in yellow.




Figure 6. Method of indicating date and time a unit is reported.

*k. Time.*

(1) The date and time a unit was reported or identified is posted below the symbol (Fig 6). This is very important when the information concerns a moving unit such as a column of troops. The indication of time has no reference to the time the information was posted.

(2) Information is posted at the earliest practicable time after receipt (Para 34). Delay may cause incomplete or late dissemination. Delay may also lead to omission and consequent inaccuracy in the intelligence estimate and periodic intelligence report.

*l. Keeping map up to date.* Only current information should appear on the situation map. Before removing information from the map, however, make sure that it is of no further value, or, if it is of value for report purposes, that it has been properly recorded.

*m. Posting unconfirmed information and unknown details.* It is desirable to use a consistent method for posting unconfirmed information and unknown details. One method is to show unconfirmed information by question marks, and simply to omit posting symbols for any details that are unknown (Fig 7). The symbols shown in figure 7 would be posted in red (*j* above).







|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>Presence of unit unconfirmed.</b>   |    |
| <b>Unit is known to be present, but size and type are unknown.</b>   |   |
| <b>Infantry unit confirmed, size unknown.</b>  |  |
| <b>Infantry battalion confirmed, identification unknown.</b>   |  |
| <b>Infantry battalion confirmed; reported (but not confirmed) to be element of 26th Rifle Regt; identification of battalion unknown.</b> |  |
| <b>2d Bn, 26th Rifle Regt.</b>   |  |

Figure 7. Method of indicating unconfirmed information or unknown details.

*n. Enemy order of battle.* An identification list kept at the top margin of the situation map shows which enemy units are facing our own. This list is known as an order of battle list or chart. Use of such a list may not be necessary if an order of battle section is available.

*o. Crowding of map.* Every effort should be made to avoid crowding symbols on the situation map. When the situation map becomes too cluttered with symbols it should be revised, and identified units consolidated where possible. The use of a supplemental situation map of a different scale will be of value in static situations.

### 38. G2 WORKSHEET

*a. Purpose.* The purpose of the worksheet is to facilitate systematic arrangement of information received by the intelligence section, so that all items bearing on a particular subject will be grouped together for ready reference and comparison. In this respect, the worksheet differs from the journal, in which information is entered *chronologically*. The worksheet is an aid to the preparation of estimates, summaries, and reports. It is a convenient memorandum for the intelligence officer, but is not a permanent document. It should be kept up to date—obsolete items being lined out or withdrawn. Whenever an intelligence officer has need for a personal memorandum to assist him in keeping abreast of a changing situation, the worksheet is a useful device.

*b. Form.* No specific form is prescribed for worksheet. Regardless of form used, items of information are extracted from incoming messages and reports and are recorded on the proper page of the worksheet, so they may be subsequently studied. For convenience, the worksheet may consist of pages of a looseleaf notebook that are indexed along the side with the headings used in the periodic intelligence report (see Fig 8). All items (messages) bearing upon the same subject are entered on the same page of the worksheet. Some messages may relate to more than one subject and therefore provide entries for more than one worksheet page. In using the form, enter the serial number of the message (same number as entered in the journal), the time the activity occurred, the source of the information, and an extract of the message itself. An illustrative entry for the worksheet is as follows: "J2, 091200 Apr, from 1st Engr Bn (C): Bridge at YUTAN (2146) bombed and destroyed. Estimated out of action for 30 hours." This item comes from journal entry number 2. The incident happened at 1200 on 9 April and the information was received from the 1st Engineer Combat Battalion. Many intelligence officers, in actual practice, find it advisable to underscore the more important elements of an entry. When one item of information confirms another, a notation of that fact should be made in both entries, either by noting the journal entry number or the page and paragraph of the worksheet.

### 39. INTELLIGENCE FILES

*a.* The journal file contains the original or a copy of all messages or documents that are entered in the intelligence journal. It supports the journal.

*b.* The information file is a suitably indexed and cross-referenced file of all information that may be of future value. It should include supplementary situation maps or overlays taken from the situation map. For instance, during a period of stabilization or inactivity, much information will be collected that is of no immediate interest, but which may become invaluable when an attack is ordered. If this information is published solely in periodic reports as it comes in, it may be disregarded and forgotten, and may not be available when needed. It should therefore be placed in a file, where it will be available for immediate check against new information. Such information will cover enemy order of battle information; defenses; condition of roads, railways, and bridges; location and contents of supply establishments; location of enemy reserves; and other similar items.

(Classification)

## G2 WORKSHEET

From: \_\_\_\_\_  
*hour and date*

To: \_\_\_\_\_  
*hour and date*

Headquarters: \_\_\_\_\_

Place: \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTES:**

1. Numbers on tabs refer to paragraphs in periodic intelligence report.
2. The classification will be stamped at the top and bottom of each page.
3. A looseleaf notebook with tabbed separators may be used. As pages become obsolete they may be discarded.

(Classification)

|  |
|--|
| 2a. Strengths and dispositions   |
| 2b. Order of battle  |
| 2c. Reserves and reinforcements  |
| 2d. New enemy tactics, weapons, and equipment                          |
| 2e. Air forces   |
| 2f. Administrative units   |
| 2g. Airborne units   |
| 2h. Antiaircraft defenses  |
| 2i. Antitank units   |
| 2j. Armored units  |
| 2k. Artillery  |
| 2l. Cavalry  |
| 2m. Atomic, biological, chemical, electronic, and radiological warfare |
| 2n. Engineers  |
| 2o. Guerilla   |
| 2p. Guided missiles  |
| 2q. Infantry   |
| 2r. Reconnaissance   |
| 2s. Other elements   |
| 3. Other intelligence factors  |
| 4. Counterintelligence   |

Figure 8. Typical G2 worksheet.



c. The order of battle files consist of unit history cards for recording enemy unit identifications, history, and other pertinent details. A unit history card is started when a new enemy unit is identified. As additional information is received, it is entered on appropriate cards. These cards will aid an intelligence officer to determine what portion of an identified enemy unit is engaged, or may be engaged against his unit, and to estimate its combat efficiency from the approximate strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment.

#### 40. EVALUATION

Evaluation is the appraisal of an item of information in order to determine its pertinence, the credibility of the source or agency, and the accuracy of the information.

a. *Pertinence of information.* Immediately after receipt by the intelligence section, information is examined in order to determine the degree to which it is relevant, and its possible value. This involves a consideration of the following:

- (1) Is it information of the enemy or of the characteristics of the area of operation?
- (2) Is it information needed immediately and, if so, by whom?
- (3) Is it information of future value?
- (4) Is it information of value to this unit or to lower, higher, or adjacent units?

b. *Credibility of source and agency.* The credibility or worthiness of belief of the source and collecting agency is also determined before the intelligence officer can evaluate the information. The following are some of the important points considered:

- (1) To what extent is the source accurate and reliable?
- (2) Has the collecting agency sufficient training, experience, and ability to report accurately the information in question?
- (3) Under conditions existing at the time (such as time and space, means employed, and visibility), could the information have been obtained?

c. *Accuracy of information.* The accuracy or truth of the information itself must be determined separately from the credibility of the source and agency. This is determined by considering the following:

- (1) Is the purported fact or event *at all* possible?
- (2) Is it confirmed or corroborated by other information from a different source or agency?
- (3) In what respects does it agree or disagree with available information covering the same point, particularly information known to be correct?
- (4) If it is at variance with information from another source and agency, and the conflicting items cannot be reconciled, which information is more likely to be correct?

#### 41. RATING THE SOURCE, AGENCY, AND THE INFORMATION

a. *Credibility.*

(1) The credibility of the source and agency is rated by the intelligence officer according to the following standard system:

A—Completely reliable.

B—Usually reliable.

C—Fairly reliable.

D—Not usually reliable.

E—Unreliable.

F—Reliability cannot be judged.

(2) An "A" rating for a source should be given only under the most unusual circumstances; when, for example, an informant is an intelligence officer of long experience and wide background. A rating of "B" indicates an informant of known integrity; "C," "D," and "E" ratings indicate a proportionately decreasing degree of reliability. An "F" rating is assigned when nothing is known concerning the background or reliability of the informant.

(3) Ratings of agencies will generally fall in categories "A," "B," or "C."

*b. Accuracy.*

(1) The accuracy of an item of information is indicated by the use of numerals, as follows:

1—Report confirmed (by other sources and agencies).

2—Report probably true.

3—Report possibly true.

4—Report doubtfully true.

5—Improbable report.

6—Truth cannot be judged.

(2) It is important to remember that the numerical ratings are independent and distinct from the lettered ratings. When these ratings are used together, the number "1" need not necessarily accompany the letter "A"; number "2," the letter "B"; and so on. An improbable report may come from a reliable source or agency; or a report which is probably true or confirmed by other information from an unreliable source or agency. Furthermore, with regard to "1" *report confirmed by other sources or agencies*, it should be noted that the sources or agencies must be *independent*. For example, if a report by an enemy prisoner that his artillery battery is located at a certain point is confirmed by interpretation of an airphoto of the point—*the prisoner and the airphoto are independent sources*.

## 42. INTERPRETATION

*a. General.* Up to this point, the intelligence officer is concerned with assembling, cataloging, and evaluating information. He is now faced with the problem of analyzing the evaluated information to determine its significance with respect to information or intelligence already at hand. This process of critical analysis is known as interpretation.

*b. Significance of information.*

(1) Interpretation of evaluated information requires determination, first, of its conformity or nonconformity with existing information, and second, of its effect upon the existing estimate of the situation. Pertinent considerations are—

(a) What does this information mean in connection with what is already known?

(b) Does it alter, confirm, refute, or add significance to information previously received?

(c) Does it tend to confirm or refute the existing estimate of the enemy situation?

(2) Correct interpretation leads to accurate conclusions concerning the enemy's capabilities and his probable courses of action.

*c. Bearing on current intelligence estimate.* As each new item of information is processed, the interpretation placed upon it affects in some way the current intelligence estimate. The conclusions already drawn are altered or confirmed; new capabilities are determined, old ones are discarded; the relative probability of adoption of the enemy's capabilities becomes clearer. The estimate is continuously revised and kept up to date in the light of new intelligence.

## CHAPTER 6

### USE OF INTELLIGENCE

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#### Section I. EMPLOYMENT BY G2

#### 43. INTRODUCTION

The ultimate *use* of intelligence is to assist the commander in making sound and timely decisions. It also assists the troops and the staff to execute their missions and to meet their responsibilities. In order for intelligence to be of use, it is given to the commander and to all others who need it, in the *form* that will furnish the greatest assistance and in *time* to serve their purposes. It is presented to the commander in the *intelligence estimate*. It is transmitted to lower, higher, and adjacent units for their possible use. This process is known as *dissemination*.

#### 44. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

a. The commander makes his decision on the basis of his continuing estimate of the situation. The more complete and up to date the estimate, the more effective will be the selected course of action. The estimate of the situation must therefore embody significant conclusions from all available intelligence. The intelligence officer arrives at his conclusions and presents them to his commander in the *intelligence estimate*. In substance, the intelligence estimate brings together significant aspects of the weather and terrain in the area of operations and the enemy situation, presents, analyzes, and discusses the enemy capabilities, his weaknesses as well as his favorable qualities, and, if warranted, draws conclusions as to the relative probability of the adoption of the enemy capabilities and their effect on our mission. With the intelligence estimate, the commander is able to balance these factors against his own possible courses of action and thereby to choose his own most favorable course of action. This is stated in his decision. Like the estimate of the situation, the intelligence estimate is a *continuing process*. As the factors with which it is concerned change, it is revised. Preparation of the intelligence estimate is a constant and basic responsibility of the intelligence officer.

b. An intelligence estimate will be given to the commander by the intelligence officer either upon the initiative of the intelligence officer (that is, when he deems that the situation so warrants) or when required by the commander. It may be comprehensive or fragmentary. Regardless of the manner of presentation, it should so far as practicable be based on a prescribed form. Such a form is desirable in that it furnishes a checklist which helps to prevent omission of important items.

c. The presentation of the intelligence estimate may be simplified, particularly at battalion and regiment, by employing the overlay technique. By presenting the material graphically wherever possible, the written portion may be reduced to a minimum.

#### 45. FORM OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The following is the prescribed form of an intelligence estimate. (App II is an example of an intelligence estimate.)

(Classification)

Issuing section and headquarters  
Place  
Date and time

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO \_\_\_\_\_

Map or chart references: (As necessary for understanding of the estimate.)

## 1. MISSION

(State task and its purpose. If the mission is multiple, state priorities; if there are intermediate tasks, such tasks should be listed.)

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS<sup>1</sup>

(In this paragraph list the factors that exist in the area, their effect on enemy capabilities, and their effect on our own mission.)

## a. Weather (or climatic conditions) (annex, if applicable).

- (1) Existing situation (including forecast and light data).
- (2) Effect on enemy capabilities.
- (3) Effect on own mission.
- (4) Effect on atomic weapons and/or CBR.

## b. Terrain (annex, if applicable).

- (1) Existing situation, to include--
  - (a) Critical terrain features.
  - (b) Observation and fields of fire.
  - (c) Obstacles.
  - (d) Concealment and cover.
  - (e) Avenues of approach.
- (2) Effect on enemy capabilities.
- (3) Effect on own mission.
- (4) Effect on atomic weapons and/or CBR.

## 3. ENEMY SITUATION

- a. Composition.
- b. Strength.
- c. Dispositions.
- d. Recent and present significant activities (including enemy's knowledge of our situation, his employment of new type weapons, techniques or tactics, and innovations in the employment of existing enemy tactics, techniques, or material).
- e. Logistics.

<sup>1</sup>At echelons above the division the following additional factors may be considered, as appropriate, under appropriate subparagraphs of paragraph 2: c. Sociology; d. Politics; e. Economics; f. Psychology; g. Hydrography; h. Other factors such as science, techniques, material, transportation, manpower, etc. They are analyzed under the same headings as are weather and terrain.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(Short title identification)

- f. Reinforcements.
  - g. Peculiarities and weaknesses.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES
- a. Enumeration of enemy capabilities. (List all specific capabilities that can be deduced from the foregoing factors.)
  - b. Analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities.
5. CONCLUSIONS
- a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities. (List, in order, if indications justify a conclusion, the relative probability of adoption of the enemy capabilities. If the indications do not justify a relative probability, so state.)
  - b. Effect of enemy capabilities on our mission.  
(In writing this paragraph, the G2, using his knowledge of enemy tactical doctrine, strengths and weaknesses, presents his conclusions as to the effect of those enemy actions which can influence the mission to a marked degree.)

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
G2

Annexes

(Classification)

**46. PREPARATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE**

The following instructions explain the preparation of the intelligence estimate.

- a. If the estimate is published for circulation *within* the headquarters, the heading shows "G2 Section, \_\_\_ Division"; if the estimate is published for circulation outside the headquarters, the heading drops the "G2 Section" and shows only the unit designation, that is, " \_\_\_ Division."
- b. Paragraph 1 states the *mission* of the commander or unit.
- c. Paragraph 2 presents the *characteristics of the area of operations*. These characteristics may include weather, terrain, sociology, politics, economics, and any other factors that affect the friendly mission or the enemy capabilities. Discussion of each characteristic is arranged as follows—first, the existing situation with regard to the factor; second, the tactical effects of the factor on the enemy capabilities; and, third, the tactical effects of the factor on our mission; and, fourth, the effect of the factor on the use of atomic weapons and/or chemical, biological, or radiological warfare. All of the characteristics named above may not be applicable in a particular situation at the lower echelons of command. For example, an infantry division G2 would normally consider only *weather* and *terrain*. On the other hand, at theater all the characteristics named (and possibly others) would be considered. In some cases they might be elaborated on to such an extent that an annex would be required.
- d. Paragraph 3 deals with the *enemy situation*. The enemy composition, strength, dispositions, significant activities, logistics, reinforcements, and peculiarities and weaknesses are covered.

(1) *Composition* of the enemy forces covers the structure or makeup of all enemy units that can affect the accomplishment of the mission. This includes information on enemy units in contact, reinforcements, supporting units, and as much information of enemy units known to be committed in adjacent areas as is necessary to determine the structure or makeup of the enemy units that can affect the accomplishment of the mission. In addition, if known, the identification of the air units supporting the enemy forces is included under *composition*.

(2) *Strength* is an estimate of the enemy units "locally available" and their supporting units. In addition, enemy morale, combat effectiveness, status of personnel and equipment, and available air support are listed under *strength*.

(3) *Dispositions* (including fire support) are the arrangement on the ground of the various units of the enemy force. Dispositions are normally covered by reference to an overlay or overprinted map.

(4) *Recent and present significant activities (including enemy's knowledge of our situation)*. This summarizes significant current enemy activities. Furthermore, if it is reasonable to believe that the enemy has specific knowledge of our situation and intentions, this should be noted. An example would be the enemy's capture of certain of our personnel known to have been bearing a current operation order.

(5) *Logistics* contains information relative to the enemy's ability to support his forces logistically in the impending operation.

(6) *Reinforcements*—complements the information contained in the *strength* paragraph. All enemy combat units, other than those listed under *strength*, that can logically close with our forces in time to affect the accomplishment of our mission are listed as reinforcements.

(7) *Peculiarities and weaknesses* summarizes significant peculiarities and weaknesses of the enemy forces.

e. Paragraph 4 lists the *enemy capabilities*. (See Para 47 for a detailed discussion of enemy capabilities.) Having determined the enemy capabilities, the intelligence officer then analyzes each one in paragraph 4b in order to justify, when possible, the selection of the *relative probability of adoption* which is stated in paragraph 5a of the intelligence estimate. This justification usually must consist of definite information of enemy dispositions and activities which favor one or more capabilities and militate against others. Under exceptional circumstances, even though the enemy dispositions and/or activities may not favor any particular capability, a thorough knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine, recent performances, national psychology, and the character and mentality of the enemy commander may justify an indication of priority. The basis for indicating a priority must be clearly stated.

f. Paragraph 5 contains *conclusions*. Paragraph 5a is the *relative probability of adoption of the enemy capabilities*. Selection of relative probability of adoption is based on interpretation of intelligence that indicates future enemy action and must be justified by indications listed and discussed in paragraph 4b. For example, if enemy troop movements toward the frontlines are reported by reconnaissance, this might indicate that the enemy does not plan to withdraw, but rather is preparing to attack, or to strengthen his defense. The manner in which artillery is employed is another example of an indication of the future actions of the enemy. If the major part of the enemy's artillery is well forward, offensive action is indicated. If, on the other hand, the bulk of his artillery is echeloned

in depth, defense or withdrawal is indicated. By analyzing indications (Para 4b) it is possible for the intelligence officer to determine the relative probability of adoption by the enemy of a particular capability. Care must be taken that relative probability is stated *only when it can be justified by indications*. If there are no indications to justify the selection of a particular enemy capability as the most probable of adoption, the intelligence officer should state that fact. The bases for determining the relative probability are sound indications and known facts, not guesswork. Paragraph 5b contains the *effect of enemy capabilities on our mission*. This paragraph contains the G2's conclusions as to the effect of only those enemy actions which can influence our mission to a marked degree.

g. If the estimate is published for circulation *within* the headquarters only, G2 signs it and no authentication is required. If the estimate is published for circulation *outside* the headquarters, it is over the commander's name and G2 must authenticate it.

#### 47. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. *General*. Enemy capabilities are considered in the commander's estimate and are discussed in the intelligence estimate and the periodic intelligence report. Their most important application is the use made by the commander in his estimate of the situation.

b. *Definition*. Enemy capabilities are those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. Two requirements must be present: the enemy *must be physically capable* of adopting the particular course of action; if adopted, the course of action *must* affect the accomplishment of our mission.

c. *Meaning of affect*. It is readily understood that all possible enemy courses of action that might *interfere* with the accomplishment of our mission are of interest to the commander. Their consideration, in conjunction with other factors, assists greatly in making correct plans and decisions. However, in some instances, enemy courses of action that would actually *favor* the accomplishment of our mission become important. One of these may become dominant in a particular situation. Knowledge of a possible course of action that favors the accomplishment of our mission may prepare the commander to take advantage of a weakness developing in the enemy situation. This may enable him to save his men, time, and materiel. He may also be able to gain a more favorable position from which to continue action against the enemy. The intelligence officer is alert to situations in which favorable enemy capabilities may have an important bearing on the action. Enemy capabilities that favor the accomplishment of our mission must not be overlooked.

d. *Doctrine of capabilities*. Commanders must be certain that they base their actions, dispositions, and plans upon *estimates of enemy capabilities rather than upon estimates of enemy's intentions*. An estimate of the enemy capabilities can be objectively formulated because it is based upon knowledge of enemy strength, dispositions, activities, organization, and means. But enemy intentions can seldom be determined. The enemy commander may change his mind frequently, or higher commanders may change his orders. Furthermore, the enemy may promulgate false orders and rumors, which in themselves would indicate an action different from that which he actually intends. The enemy may also take measures to give a false impression of his capabilities, but it will be more difficult to do this than to spread false information about his intentions.



*e. Capability work sheet.* The following is an extract of an enemy capability worksheet. It provides a means of recording the answers to the four questions for any one capability discussed in paragraph 49. A form such as this is of value, at least until experience is gained, in that it facilitates simplicity and completeness of the formed statements.

### ENEMY CAPABILITY WORKSHEET

What: \_\_\_\_\_

Where: \_\_\_\_\_

In what strength: \_\_\_\_\_

When: \_\_\_\_\_

#### 48. STEPS IN THE DETERMINATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

The following steps will assist in the determination of enemy capabilities:

*a.* From consideration of the mission, determine the general enemy capabilities.

*b.* Under the general capabilities of attack and defense, determine the specific capabilities that are applicable to the situation. These may be dependent to some extent on the *areas of tactical significance*.

*c.* Determine where the specific capabilities can be initiated (areas of tactical significance determined from weather, terrain, and enemy locations).

*d.* Enemy strength considered in specific capabilities under attack and defense includes only enemy troops locally available and supporting units.

*e.* All other enemy units in or near our zone of action or opposite our sector of defense are listed in a reinforcement table (Para 49*c*). The time and place each unit can be committed will be included in the table.

#### 49. DETERMINATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

The statement of enemy capabilities, must provide the answers to WHAT, WHERE, IN WHAT STRENGTH and WHEN. In dealing with the capabilities to *attack, defend, reinforce (or employ guerillas, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) warfare, special weapons, etc.)* the four elements are invariably expressed. When concerned with the delay and *withdrawal* capabilities, the IN WHAT STRENGTH and WHEN are often omitted; which implies the operation can be executed with the entire command at any time. In reference to the *air* capability, omission of the WHEN implies that it can be executed at any time.

*a. What?* The what is a capability that will interfere with or favor the accomplishment of our mission.

(1) Four broad capabilities are generally available to the enemy—to attack, to defend, to reinforce (in conjunction with attack or defense), or to withdraw.

(2) General capabilities may be broken down into specific capabilities. For instance, an attack might be a penetration, an envelopment, or a piecemeal attack. The number of specific capabilities selected is dependent, to some extent, on the answers to the other three questions.

*b. Where?* The *where* designates the point or area of possible activity by the enemy. This is determined from three factors: the area of operations (including weather and terrain), enemy dispositions, and our own situation. Exceptions arise in the case of reinforcement or withdrawal. In reinforcement, the *where* is some logically chosen point which reserves must reach in order to reinforce the enemy or to affect our mission. In withdrawal, the *where* may be simply "beyond our unit objective."

(1) *Weather and terrain.* Under existing and predictable conditions of weather, the terrain may provide avenues of approach, logical corridors, or favorable routes of entry into our position from the front, flanks, or rear. Likewise, cross compartments may furnish defensive positions to the enemy. Certain terrain, possibly in conjunction with weather and its effects on terrain, may prohibit or curtail types of enemy action such as armored attack or motorized cross-country movement. If terrain subdivisions are made, then each subdivision, in conjunction with a specific course of action, becomes an *area of tactical significance*. If the terrain does not lend itself to subdivision, the entire area may be considered as one unit. There is no governing the selection of *these areas of tactical significance*. However, all potential areas of enemy action will be covered, and the number of areas of tactical significance selected must not be so great that the enemy capabilities become confusing.

(2) *Enemy dispositions.* Known enemy dispositions may emphasize certain areas even though such emphasis may violate logical terrain subdivisions. The direction and point of an attack and the location of a defensive position might be indicated from enemy dispositions.

(3) *Own dispositions.* Dispositions of our own and adjacent friendly units also have a bearing on selection of areas. Gaps in the line which provide danger spots may be present within our own unit or between our unit and an adjacent unit. Open flanks permit an envelopment by the enemy. Secure flanks deny this course of action to the enemy.

*c. In what strength?* The current enemy situation provides us with the present enemy strengths and dispositions. By using these data and ascertaining what enemy units can be moved to given points, the strength the enemy can employ in carrying out any particular capability is determined. This calculation is made as follows:

(1) First, constitute the enemy organization. Logical assumptions may be necessary in order to decide which reserve units belong to the regimental reserves and which belong to the reserve of division and higher echelons.

(2) Second, use enemy troops locally available to compute strengths for the attack and defense capabilities. "Locally available" units are enemy units in contact and the reserves of such units at the echelon next lower than that of the estimator. At division levels enemy units considered "locally available" are measured in terms of battalions; at corps in terms of regiments or divisions; at army in terms of divisions.

(3) Third, list all reinforcements (reinforcements are reserves estimated to be under control of enemy commanders of comparable or higher echelon than the echelon of the estimator), their location, and the time each was last reported, in a reinforcement table (see Fig 10). Calculate the data required to complete the reinforcement table by applying rules given in *d* below and in paragraph 50.

## REINFORCEMENTS

| Unit | Location | Time last reported | Point of reinforcement | Time (motor) | Time (on foot) | Remarks |
|------|----------|--------------------|------------------------|--------------|----------------|---------|
|      |          |                    |                        |              |                |         |
|      |          |                    |                        |              |                |         |
|      |          |                    |                        |              |                |         |

Figure 10. Suggested form for reinforcement table.

(4) Troops already committed to action in another zone or sector are not considered.

(5) The estimate of enemy strength must be accurate to assist the commander in arriving at his decision. When positive information of enemy casualties is available, a close approximation of strength can be made. Serious depletion of enemy units may be reported to the commander either as a percentage of normal (TO&E) strength, or by translating the strengths into equivalent enemy units. For example, an enemy regiment only 30 percent effective is roughly equivalent, in combat effectiveness, to one battalion. No attempt should be made to guess the enemy strength, if it is not known and cannot be estimated. A statement such as "with a force of *unknown size*" is preferable to that of "with three battalions" *if there is no basis for the latter assumption.*

(6) Troops that may be employed to close with our own forces should be used as the basis for determining strength. Aggressor rifle and armored units can close with our forces. Artillery is a supporting arm. Supporting arms, designated as such, should be included, however, in the statement of strength. The following is an example: ". . . with 6 battalions of infantry supported by 4 battalions of artillery."

*d. When?* The *when* of a particular capability is derived from calculations of time and space with due regard for conditions of weather and light. As a result of time and space calculations, certain enemy capabilities may be eliminated from further consideration if the possible time of enemy action is too late to interfere with or favor the execution of our mission. These calculations are made in the same manner in which we compute time and space for our own units except that certain factors are not included in enemy time. When appropriate, a statement of the time required by the enemy to carry out, as well as to start, a particular capability, once he begins to move, should be included. This is especially pertinent when the enemy is defending, in order to give a true picture of the enemy's capabilities after we have penetrated or enveloped the flank of the enemy's position.

(1) The following rules are used in making time and space calculations:

(a) Select some logical point which the enemy must reach in order to initiate a particular capability.

(b) Determine nearest enemy unit that can initiate the capability, and its present location.

(c) Compute the minimum time required to move from present position (b) to position determined in (a).

(d) Add time required to close sufficient portion of enemy unit to affect our mission.

(e) Add the preceding times to the *time last reported*. This will give earliest time at which the enemy capability can be put into effect.

(2) Factors considered in computations are—

(a) Distance between enemy force and friendly positions.

(b) Available routes of approach (consider more than one route if available to enemy.

(c) Type of unit.

(d) Rate of march of unit under most favorable conditions.

(e) Closing time for column.

(3) Factors *not considered* in computations are —

(a) *Entrucking or detrucking time*. When motor transportation is available, no additional time allowance is made for this operation because the enemy may be entrucked and ready to move at the time he is located and is capable of detrucking while his column is closing.

(b) *Time required to issue extra ammunition*. This could have been accomplished prior to the start of movement.

(c) *Time required for detailed reconnaissance*. This could have been accomplished in advance.

(d) *Time required to issue orders to subordinate units*. This could have been completed prior to commencing operation.

(e) *Time required for deployment*. The enemy can deploy as he approaches the line of departure.

## 50. RULES FOR CALCULATING ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Following are rules for calculating Aggressor capabilities:

(1) Starting time and place are time and place unit was last reported.

(2) Select logical point unit must reach to start a particular capability.

(3) March distance is distance from (1) to (2) above.

(4) Arrival time is starting time plus march time plus closing time. This total time is rounded off to the nearest 5 minutes. In case of a piecemeal action, compute the arrival time of the nearest enemy unit that can *initiate* the action; closing time is not computed.

(5) Compute foot marching time for reinforcements for all distances; compute motor marching time for distances greater than 5 miles only. If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor marching time.

(6) Consider a foot march of over 20 miles as a forced march; use forced march graph in FM 101-10; and see ST 30-102-1, paragraph 271.

(7) Consider motor march of over 175 miles as a forced march for motorized rifle units and over 140 miles as a forced march for tank and mechanized units. This *cannot* be continued indefinitely but must be adjusted to actual conditions.

(8) At the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from night to day. If the column is in the process of closing at BMNT, continue to close the column at the night rate of march.

ADDENDUM 1 TO ST 30-5-1, COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

50. RULES FOR CALCULATING ENEMY CAPABILITIES

c. This table is to be incorporated into the Army General School Special Text 30-5-1 following paragraph 50b, page 39. It will be used for calculating enemy movement capabilities.

Time Lengths and Rates of March

| Unit        | Time lengths (minutes)   |                  |                |                  |   |  |
|-------------|--------------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|---|--|
|             | Men on foot <sup>1</sup> |                  |                |                  | Motors                                    |  |
|             | Cross-country            |                  | Roads          |                  | Night                                     | Day                                      |
|             | Night<br>1 mph           | Day<br>1½<br>mph | Night<br>2 mph | Day<br>2½<br>mph | Close<br>column<br>75<br>veh/mi<br>10 mph | Open<br>column<br>20<br>veh/mi<br>15 mph |
| Inf Div- -  | 324                      | 216              | 162            | 130              | 382                                       | 703                                      |
| Inf Regt- - | 108                      | 72               | 54             | 44               | 45  | 90                                       |
| Inf Bn- - - | 36                       | 24               | 18             | 15               | 10  | 19                                       |
| Tk Bn- - -  | - - - - -                | - - - - -        | - - - - -      | - - - - -        | 17  | 33                                       |
| Arty Bn- -  | - - - - -                | - - - - -        | - - - - -      | - - - - -        | 15  | 29                                       |
| Armd Div-   | - - - - -                | - - - - -        | - - - - -      | - - - - -        | 266                                       | 512                                      |
| Armd CC-    | - - - - -                | - - - - -        | - - - - -      | - - - - -        | 68  | 136                                      |

<sup>1</sup>  
Figures are for column of twos.



(9) At the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT) if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from day to night. If the column is in the process of closing at EENT, continue to close the column at the day rate of march.

(10) To move an enemy rifle battalion, move and close entire unit.

(11) To move an enemy rifle regiment or combat team, move and close two rifle battalions (except when part of a division movement (12) below).

(12) To move an enemy rifle division, move and close two entire rifle regiments.

(13) In determining the *when* of an enemy capability, consider that a rifle unit of regimental size or larger is ready for coordinated action when two-thirds of the combat elements of the unit have closed.

(14) In determining enemy time and space factors for a marching column (foot or motor), the head of the column is the point from which measurements are made.

(15) For more details with respect to Aggressor capabilities, see ST 30-102-1.

b. FM 101-10 presents time lengths and rates of march for units organized like US units. In actual operations, it will be necessary for the intelligence officer to make his own tables of march rates and time lengths based on experience with the particular enemy concerned. For calculations employing Aggressor, see ST 30-102-1.

#### **Table I. (Rescinded.)**

### **51. AIR CAPABILITY**

In addition to the enemy land capabilities, there must always be included in the list an air capability, if one exists.

a. In the case of division and corps, the data for this capability are taken from the army intelligence estimate. For example, an intelligence estimate might read—

\* \* \* \* \*

4.a.(...)Enemy air capability. The enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with 150 fighter, 100 ground attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily, although the enemy can mass all aircraft within an operational radius of the army area and make a maximum of 1,250 fighter, 500 ground attack, and 400 bomber sorties daily, based on an estimated strength of 750 fighters, 250 ground attack aircraft, and 400 bombers.

\* \* \* \* \*

b. Information on enemy air capabilities is furnished to G2 of the field army by A2 of the tactical air force, and to G2 of the army group by A2 of the tactical Air Command.

### **52. EXAMPLE OF STATEMENT OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES**

a. *General situation.* At 011900 July, the US 1st Infantry Division captured Hill 100. At this time, an order was received from corps. Extract of order states — "Corps continues attack in zone at 020600 July. The 1st Infantry Division will attack in assigned zone, seize Hill 101, prepared to continue the advance to the north." Both flanks of 1st Infantry Division are secure.




Figure 11. Tactical situation.

b. Special situation. Aggressor situation and other data, as known by the intelligence officer, are as follows:

- (1) Aggressor situation at 011900 July. See figure 11.
- (2) Foot elements of a reinforced rifle regiment moving south, now at point just north of Hill 102, marching in column of twos.
- (3) Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with 150 fighter, 100 ground attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily, although the enemy can mass all aircraft within an operational radius of the army area and make a maximum of 1,250 fighter, 500 ground attack, and 400 bomber sorties daily, based on an estimated strength of 750 fighters, 250 ground attack aircraft, and 400 bombers.
- (4) The 1st Infantry Division commander directs the intelligence officer to be prepared to present the enemy capabilities at 012000 July.
- (5) End of evening nautical twilight is 012130 July.



c. *Determination of enemy capabilities.*

(1) The friendly mission is to attack in zone at 020600 July, seize Hill 101, and be prepared to continue advance to the north. The enemy can delay the accomplishment of this mission by attacking, by defending against attack, and by reinforcing the enemy troops now in contact. The enemy can favor the accomplishment of the friendly mission by withdrawing beyond the division objective prior to the attack.

(2) Under attack, only one specific capability is selected, that is, a frontal attack. Both flanks are secure and no other form of enemy ground attack appears feasible. On an enemy capability worksheet under *what*, *frontal attack* is entered. The *where* is *along our front*. The *in what strength*, considering forces locally available, is *three rifle battalions supported by one artillery battalion*. The reinforced rifle regiment north of Hill 102 is probably in division reserve and will be treated under the reinforcement capability. The *when* of the attack capability is *now*. This capability appears below on the worksheet.

What: Frontal attack

Where: Along our front

In what strength: Three rifle battalions supported by one artillery battalion

When: Now

Statement form: "The enemy can attack now along our front with three rifle battalions supported by one artillery battalion."

(3) Under defense, again only one specific enemy capability is selected. That course of action is to defend on Hill 101. The *what* is to *defend*; the *where* is *on Hill 101*; the *in what strength* is *three rifle battalions supported by one artillery battalion*; the *when* is *now*.

What: Defend

Where: On Hill 101

In what strength: Three rifle battalions supported by one artillery battalion

When: Now

Statement form: "The enemy can defend now on Hill 101 with three rifle battalions supported by one artillery battalion."

(4) The next general capability open to the enemy is his capability of reinforcing his present units in contact. The *what* is to *reinforce*; the *where* is any logical point which the reinforcement must reach in order to reinforce the elements in contact. Road Junction 200 is selected. The *in what strength* is the reinforced rifle regiment reported at 011900 July near Hill 102. The *when* involves enemy time and space computations and is determined as follows:

(a) Point at which reinforcement becomes effective—Road Junction 200.

(b) Only the arrival of foot elements of infantry is *computed*, since it is customary in enemy time and space calculations to assume that all motorized and armored elements of the reinforced rifle regiment can be in place to support foot elements by the time the foot elements are in position.

(c) Only travel and closing time are computed.

(d) Example:

|   |             |
|---|-------------|
| Time last reported- - - - -                 | 1900        |
| Travel time (4½ miles at 2½ mph)- - - - -   | 0148        |
| Closing time (2 Bn at 10 min each)- - - - - | <u>0020</u> |
| (See ST 30-102-1)                           |             |
| Arrival time - - - - -                      | 2108        |

What: Reinforce

Where: Road Junction 200

In what strength: Reinforced rifle regiment

When: 2110

Statement form: "The enemy can reinforce his attack or defense on Hill 101 with a reinforced rifle regiment by 012110 July."

(5) Withdrawal capability. Statement form: "The enemy can withdraw beyond the division objective any time prior to our attack."

(6) Air capability. Statement form: Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with 150 fighter, 100 ground attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily, although the enemy can mass all aircraft within an operational radius of the army area and make a maximum of 1,250 fighter, 500 ground attack, and 400 bomber sorties daily, based on an estimated strength of 750 fighters, 250 ground attack aircraft, and 400 bombers.

## Section II. DISSEMINATION

### 53. REQUIREMENTS FOR DISSEMINATION

a. One object in disseminating intelligence is to ensure that the various intelligence staffs at different echelons of command have the same information with regard to the enemy and the area of operations. This will ensure that commanders at various echelons of command have the same general intelligence picture and will not be at variance with each other in planning their operations on the basis of intelligence received or produced.

b. In the dissemination of intelligence, there are two general problems—dissemination to lower and adjacent units, and dissemination to higher units and within the producing headquarters. Of these two problems, *dissemination to lower and adjacent units is the more difficult and the more critical*. This is because—

(1) The requirement of *timeliness* is generally more critical because of the greater rapidity of change of the intelligence picture at the lower echelon.

(2) A much greater amount of *detail* is required. This requirement of detail complicates that of timeliness.

(3) All pertinent intelligence produced at higher headquarters by specialized means at their disposal must be disseminated to lower echelons.

(4) Intelligence for higher echelons is limited to a relatively few recipients, while that for lower echelons includes a much larger number.

### 54. CRITERIA FOR DISSEMINATION

The adequacy of intelligence dissemination may be judged in order of priority, by the following criteria:

a. Information and intelligence must be placed in the hands of the ultimate user in *time* to permit his evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and initiation of action under the existing situation before the intelligence picture has

changed. If the information is disseminated without processing, it must be clearly stated that such information is unevaluated. The source should be given if security permits.

b. Only *essential* intelligence that can be used by the unit concerned will be disseminated.

c. The importance and priority of the intelligence furnished will be carefully considered. The means selected for dissemination will provide a minimum of interference with other signal communication traffic.

d. The disseminated matter should be in such *form* that the recipients may readily locate details of interest to them.

## 55. METHODS OF DISSEMINATION

a. *Conferences.* The exchange of information between the various intelligence sections of higher, lower, and adjacent units is facilitated by frequent personal contacts (including telephone calls) or conferences between the staff officers concerned. Liaison officers should be used to the utmost. It is good practice for the intelligence officer at each echelon periodically to visit, send liaison officers, or to call by telephone or radio each subordinate intelligence officer. The frequency will vary with the intensity of activity and with the number of reports sent in by subordinate units.

b. *Messages.* When it is impossible for the intelligence officer to transmit important information in person or by telephone, special messages may be transmitted by airplane, motorcycle, or motor messenger; radio, telegraph, or other rapid means of signal communication. All messages must be clear, concise, and complete. Communication security measures accorded a message must be commensurate with the classification of its content and adequate for the protection of the sources and agencies which furnished the information for the message.

c. *Intelligence documents.*

(1) *Periodic intelligence report* (PERINTREP). This document sums up the information that has been collected, evaluated, and interpreted during a given period. It is a convenient means for keeping higher, lower, and adjacent units informed of the enemy situation and pertinent aspects of the area of operations as determined by the unit preparing the report. It frequently contains important information that has been disseminated by means of special messages (Para 56 and App III).

(2) *Intelligence annex.* Paragraph 1 of this annex may contain a summary of the enemy situation, or it may refer to an appendix, usually in overlay form, or to intelligence estimates, or to the latest periodic report. Paragraph 1a of the operation order may contain a brief summary of the enemy situation; however, if this intelligence is more than 6 to 8 lines in length, it is preferable to place it in an intelligence annex (Para 75 and App V).

(3) *Intelligence estimate.* Information known to or made available to the commander from his staff or other sources is the basis for the formulation of planning guidance for the operation. Intelligence estimates are designed to provide the basis for planning and to assist the commander to make his decision. The entire estimate may be committed to writing, or the form may be used only as a checklist (Para 45 and App II).

(4) *Maps.* Maps are essential and valuable instruments of dissemination if they are accurate. They should be used in conjunction with photos to ensure that data on them are up to date.

(5) *Situation maps and overlays.* These documents depict in graphic form the location and disposition of enemy forces and installations. They lend themselves readily to rapid interpretation of intelligence, thereby saving much time. Special situation maps and overlays are used for dissemination whenever the enemy situation changes rapidly.

(6) *Technical intelligence summaries.* These publications offer a complete resumé of intelligence on such subjects as enemy weapons, equipment, and technical methods. They are not intended for use by other than interested specialists because of the comprehensive scope of their contents.

(7) *Tactical studies of the weather and terrain.* These studies furnish detailed information on weather and terrain in respect to climate and weather, drainage, relief, soil, vegetation, and lines of communications. The bulk of these studies may appear on maps or overlays. Weather information is usually disseminated to subordinate units by means of radio reports, messages, or bulletins (Para 116 and App VI).

(8) *Order of battle books and pamphlets.* The designations, identifications, strengths, and compositions of units as well as the personalities and histories of commanders, are contained in order of battle books and pamphlets (Para 122).

(9) *Prisoner of war interrogation reports.* The information included in these reports must be carefully processed before being disseminated as intelligence. Prisoners are not considered a wholly reliable source, and all information must be checked against that obtained from other sources. However, once a true evaluation has been made, the intelligence is often of great value as the prisoner has actually operated in the situation he describes.

(10) *Airphoto interpretation reports.* These reports present and identify enemy activities and installations and are the most reliable source of current information of terrain under the enemy's control. Airphotos have limited value until interpretation has been performed and reported (Para 113).

(11) *Translations of captured documents.* When properly evaluated, captured documents furnish accurate and valuable information inasmuch as they are written by the enemy and provide definite enemy plans, orders, or results of operations.

(12) *Special reports.* Particular enemy tactics and personalities are contained in special reports which are transmitted to using agencies by the most rapid means.

(13) *Intelligence summary (ISUM).*

(a) An intelligence summary is a compilation of important items of intelligence information to include negative information. It is transmitted through signal channels by the quickest means. It contains a brief estimate of the enemy situation with deductions and it should assist lower units in assessing the situation. In tactical units, intelligence summaries are used as brief consolidated reports of intelligence compiled during a prescribed period. The contents of the intelligence summaries may, or may not, have been previously disseminated.

(b) No specific form for an intelligence summary is prescribed. Its organization varies according to purpose and content. It contains a telegraphic condensation of the principal important items of intelligence that have resulted from information received and disseminated over a certain period. The summary does not take the place of regular and spot dissemination of information, but

provides a means by which the unit intelligence officer can periodically review the information received and consolidate all items into a resume for the period. The intelligence summary will include--

1. Issuing unit.
2. Time and date of issue.
3. Brief estimate of the enemy situation with deductions.

The intelligence summary may include so much of the following as is applicable:

4. Summary of enemy activity for the period including enemy air activity.
5. Estimated enemy personnel and equipment losses.
6. Location of enemy minefields and roadblocks.
7. Enemy administrative activities indicating offensive action.
8. New enemy identifications.
9. Enemy movements.
10. Estimated number of enemy vehicles.
11. Weather and condition of ground.

(c) An example of an intelligence summary is--

"To VI Corps

"100th Inf Div ISUM for period ending 030730 Jan 55. Aggressor continued defensive attitude in division zone except for local attack with estimated 400 men, 5 medium type tanks, and no repeat no artillery support at 0515 in vicinity of X487850. Attack repulsed. Four tanks destroyed. Twelve prisoners taken identifying Aggressor 1st Bn, 17th Rifle Regt. Estimate purpose of attack to seize stronger defensive terrain in vicinity of Hill 405. Two Aggressor jet fighters bombed and strafed in vicinity of X592863 at 0800; one shot down. No identification. Patrol reports battery of 150s at X603292. Unconfirmed IPW reports state ammunition supply in frontlines running low. Snow continues. Ground frozen hard and will support all types of vehicles. Enemy is capable of defending his present position including making local attacks to improve his defensive position or withdrawing to stronger position. Continued defense is indicated.

SMITH, G2"

(d) The period covered by the intelligence summary and the time of dissemination are prescribed by each higher headquarters for its next subordinate unit. Summaries are usually disseminated to lower units, the next higher headquarters, unit staff and commander, and to adjacent units.

## 56. PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

### a. General.

(1) The periodic intelligence report is the main means of disseminating intelligence. It sums up the general situation in readable form and provides a convenient means of circulating detailed information. It is a summary of the enemy situation in forward and rear areas, operations and capabilities, and the weather and terrain. It is prepared by intelligence sections of division and higher headquarters. Intelligence sections of units below the division usually do not submit

a periodic intelligence report; however, they prepare the intelligence paragraph(s) for inclusion in the situation report. The period of time to be covered by the report is either designated by the next higher headquarters or is specified by the unit commander in the absence of such instructions. Normally, the report is prepared and submitted daily for each preceding 24 hours; however, a longer period may be covered by the report, especially in higher headquarters.

(2) If the report is for 24 hours, the period covered should be from 1800 one day to 1800 the following day, in preference to a 2400 to 2400 period. This period will ensure timeliness in the dissemination and receipt of intelligence on enemy activities for that part of a day which is generally most active. Reports will be received at other units in time to compare them and to use intelligence they contain in planning operations for the following day. The 1800 to 1800 period avoids harassing the limited number of intelligence and liaison personnel, and messengers, in division and lower staffs.

(3) Periodic intelligence reports are intended primarily for use during contact with the enemy. They also assist units not engaged, for they permit all commanders to keep in touch with the general situation of the enemy and with the local situation at points where the unit is likely to be engaged.

*b. Importance.* The periodic intelligence report is the primary means of disseminating military intelligence. Although intelligence contained in the summary will have been disseminated previously in the form of "spot reports," and in brief telephone or teletype summaries covering a shorter period of time, the periodic report is nevertheless unique in its completeness and scope. It contains a summation of these former reports, and presents as well the enemy activity over the longer interval. In addition it presents other data such as enemy capabilities, and intelligence to include order of battle, translation of captured documents, interrogation of prisoner of war reports, counterintelligence, and similar miscellaneous items.

## 57. FORM OF PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

One form is used by all commands by merely deleting those parts which are not applicable for the using unit. Certain subjects may be presented on sketches, overlays, or maps; other subjects, because of their detail or because a limited distribution is required, are presented in annexes. In the discussion following the illustrative form, its use by ground combat units receives primary consideration. (App III is an example of a periodic intelligence report.)

(Classification)

Issuing headquarters

Place of issue (may be in code)

Date/time (to include month and year)

Periodic Intelligence Report No \_\_\_\_\_

Period covered: (Date and time to date and time.)

Maps: (Country, scale, and sheet numbers of maps.)

Disposal instructions: (If any; i.e. DESTROY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RECEIPT.)

### 1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

Give a brief review of the whole enemy front, to include general enemy activity and major changes which have taken place during the period. (Show on map or overlay when possible.)

(Classification)

(Classification)

(Short title identification)

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. Strengths and dispositions.
- b. Order of battle.
- c. Reserves and reinforcements.
- d. New enemy tactics, weapons, and equipment.
- e. Air forces.
- f. Administrative units.
- g. Airborne units.
- h. Antiaircraft defenses.
- i. Antitank units.
- j. Armored units.
- k. Artillery (including rockets).
- l. Cavalry.
- m. Atomic, biological, chemical, electronic, or radiological warfare.
- n. Engineers.
- o. Guerilla.
- p. Guided missiles.
- q. Infantry.
- r. Reconnaissance.
- s. Other elements (list alphabetically in separate subparagraphs).

## 3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

(This paragraph or parts thereof should be issued as an annex if a limited distribution is required.)

- a. Enemy identifications.

(Show in tabular form:)

## (1) Confirmed

| Unit | Location | Time | Source |
|------|----------|------|--------|
|------|----------|------|--------|

## (2) Unconfirmed

| Unit | Location | Time | Source |
|------|----------|------|--------|
|------|----------|------|--------|

- b. Enemy organization and strength/combat efficiency.

(May be mainly in an annex or appendix.)

- c. Equipment.
  - d. Personalities.
  - e. Casualties.
  - f. Morale.
  - g. Enemy defenses, minefields, etc.
- (Show on maps or overlays if possible.)

(Classification)

(Classification)

(Short title identification)

- h. Details of administrative installations and support.
- i. Topography/terrain.  
(Mainly in the form of reports, defense maps, and overlays.)
- j. Weather.
- k. Any pertinent factors not otherwise covered.

## 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

(This paragraph or parts thereof should be issued as an annex if a limited distribution is required.)

## a. General.

Give a brief resumé of counterintelligence situation during the period.

- b. Espionage.
- c. Sabotage.
- d. Political.
- e. Propaganda and rumors.
- f. Miscellaneous.

## 5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Make a brief estimate of the enemy situation. If required give his most probable future action.

---

 Signature

Annexes:

Distribution:

Authentication:

(Classification)

**58. PREPARATION OF THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

*a. Paragraph 1. General enemy situation* fulfills the need of a brief summary or thumbnail resumé of enemy operations, with special stress on how these operations indicate enemy capabilities. Preparation of this paragraph should be withheld until the rest of the report has been completed. It is prepared for the convenience of commanders, staff officers, and others, who are interested in the overall picture of the enemy's activities and what they indicate. It supplies the essence of the enemy operations during the period. Only the main enemy operations are considered. The significance of these operations by the enemy is stressed to indicate the continuing of a current capability or the adoption of new capabilities. Intelligence for this paragraph is obtained by analyzing the intelligence listed in the worksheet and the remainder of this report. Only the highlights or critical items of intelligence are included, and then in condensed style. Information which can be shown graphically should be indicated on an overprinted map, sketch map, or overlay. For higher headquarters four convenient and logical subparagraphs for a resumé of the enemy situation are forward area, rear area, defensive organization, and administrative installations.



(1) The *forward area* paragraph contains a resume of the enemy situation from the line of contact back to and including the positions of the enemy supporting artillery.

(2) The paragraph on the *rear area* includes the enemy situation behind his supporting artillery. It is concerned mainly with the reserves of divisions and higher units, which can affect the operations. Consequently, intelligence of enemy units in this area should be presented as for units in the forward area. In considering enemy reserves, however, the intelligence officer should not mention every known reserve along the entire front. The list should include only those enemy units, which, according to location and organization, are physically capable and can be reasonably expected to be employed against one's own unit. Judgment and experience are necessary to prepare this paragraph accurately.

(3) Enemy *defensive organization* considers the enemy's organization of the ground for defensive purposes, and the location of obstacles, roadblocks, minefields, observation posts, command posts, and fortifications.

(4) The last paragraph contains intelligence of the enemy *administrative installations* for support, to include their location, kind, scale of activity, and size.

b. Paragraph 2. *Enemy operations during period*, contains intelligence on the enemy strengths, disposition, reserves, and order of battle much of which can be shown graphically. Intelligence which is not suited to graphic presentation should be written. Here also is the intelligence of new enemy tactics, weapons, and equipment, dissemination of which is essential in order that countermeasures can be developed and employed by our troops. While paragraph 1 contains the highlights or a summary of enemy activity, this paragraph includes a detailed and explicit account of the operations of enemy component elements during the period. This paragraph furnishes the broad intelligence coverage which is desired by the intelligence specialists. Component elements are listed alphabetically in separate subparagraphs. Here can be found detailed intelligence of a particular part of the enemy operations in this section during the period. Again, only the more important items should be included. If the operations of a certain component are of no intelligence value during the period, then that subparagraph should be omitted. The decision to include a component in the report will be a matter for each individual writer to determine.

c. Paragraph 3. *Other intelligence factors* includes subheadings for enemy losses, combat efficiency, and morale. Additional paragraphs include status, location, and type of administrative installations. Other factors, including weather and terrain, are also listed in this paragraph. Changes to the already published terrain information as well as current weather conditions and forecasts are items included under these factors. Some of these features because of their detail or because a limited distribution is required are presented in annexes and appendixes. If any of these features have been covered in other parts of the report, then they should not be included a second time.

d. Paragraph 4. Normally, the content of the paragraph on *counterintelligence* is relatively limited in a division periodic intelligence report. However, in each successive higher headquarters, the details contained in this paragraph increase. The feature of considerable counterintelligence detail will be particularly applicable to a service unit periodic intelligence report originating in a communications zone headquarters. Regardless of the headquarters a brief summary of the counterintelligence situation during the period is presented. Such other subparagraphs as are required present the details of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and enemy propaganda.

*e. Paragraph 5.* This paragraph, *enemy capabilities*, usually has three parts. First, is a listing of the enemy capabilities. These can be determined only after a careful analysis has been made of all available intelligence. Only those capabilities which are considered of high priority or of reasonable likelihood should be included. The two remaining parts of this paragraph are a brief analysis and discussion of the capabilities and their relative probability of adoption.

*f. Annexes.* Much pertinent intelligence, which is too detailed for inclusion in the main body of the report, can be included in annexes. A reader interested in more detail on a particular item—such as order of battle summaries, prisoner of war interrogation reports, intelligence of a technical nature, enemy document translations, weather forecasts, and other specific intelligence subjects—finds amplification in the annexes on these special aspects. One caution in the preparation of annexes is that each one be carefully considered to ensure that the report does not become unreasonably bulky.

*g. G2 worksheet (Para 38 and Fig 8).* An important aid to the intelligence officer in the preparation of the periodic intelligence report is the G2 worksheet. The form of the worksheet provides a means of indexing and cataloging information for easy inclusion in the report. The arrangement of the pages of the worksheet follows the sequence of the paragraphs in the periodic intelligence report.

## 59. QUALITIES OF THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The periodic intelligence report must have four principal qualities—brevity, clarity, interest, and pertinence. It must be easily readable but must not depart from the evidence available. It must not contain details of our troops which might be of value to the enemy. Terms such as "our infantry" with coordinates are preferable and should be used. The value which the enemy would obtain from the information contained in the report will dictate its security classification.

*a. Brevity.* An intelligence report should be brief but complete. In this respect, there are two aims (brevity and detail) to be satisfied by the periodic intelligence report, and these conflict. Brevity is needed for the commanders, staff officers, and others who require a brief summary of the enemy operations and the significance of these operations in relation to current and future probable courses of enemy action. This requirement can be met by paragraph 1 of the report. On the other hand, detail is needed by many other readers, who are keenly interested in the most complete information concerning various aspects of enemy activity. This is accomplished in paragraph 2 and 3 of the report.

*b. Clarity.* This may be obtained by stating the known intelligence and admitting the lack of desired information. Many intelligence officers, and other staff officers, write ambiguous and confusing statements to conceal a lack of information. Such a practice must be avoided. Furthermore, unconfirmed information must be so labeled. Unless such a policy is followed, other headquarters, using the information as a basis for plans, may become victims of a false enemy situation.

*c. Interest.* One way to make the report interesting is to consider the news appeal of the intelligence. Some items not only are interesting, but occasionally entertaining as well. A second way to maintain interest is to eliminate abbreviations and unnecessary references to coordinates. Any reader who finds a mass of abbreviations or coordinates in the report, and who may not have a map immediately available, soon will lose interest in reading the report. Some coordinates are essential and are included; however, their constant repetition should be avoided. Abbreviations are seldom necessary. Another way to create interest is to make frequent use of illustrations. Sketches, overlays, maps, photos, and other forms of

pictorial presentation add to the attractiveness and interest of the report. Division reproduction facilities are not as readily available as at higher echelons; nevertheless, a resourceful division G2 can always find an expedient to vary the method of presenting his material and thus add to the interest of his report. Although the report should be interesting, it must also achieve a high professional standard. Interest is a desirable feature but not at the expense of quality.

d. *Pertinence.* Intelligence in the periodic report must be both relevant and timely. The scope of enemy activity to be included will vary with each headquarters, as small units will include considerably more detail of the enemy opposing them than will a higher headquarters.

#### **60. DISSEMINATION OF THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

Distribution of the periodic intelligence report includes, as a minimum, staff sections of the unit headquarters, headquarters of the next two higher and subordinate echelons, and the adjacent units. Further dissemination may be made as deemed necessary. At the division, such a distribution would include headquarters from battalions through army. The report is sent by the most suitable means preferably liaison officer or messenger.

## CHAPTER 7

### DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

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#### 61. SIGNIFICANCE OF DIRECTION

a. The intelligence officer is constantly revising his plans for collecting information. Items of information secured by the collection agencies will indicate new lines of investigation. Lack of success by one agency will necessitate new orders or requests for the desired information. New essential elements of information will require revision of the collection plan. *Direction* of the collection effort must be dynamic and continuing throughout an operation.

b. Direction consists of four successive procedures—

- (1) Determination of the essential elements of information.
- (2) Preparation of a collection plan.
- (3) Issuance of orders and requests for information to the agencies concerned.
- (4) Followup of orders and requests issued to collecting agencies.

#### 62. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Essential elements of information (EEI) comprise the specific information of an actual or potential enemy and of the terrain, hydrographic, and meteorological conditions which a commander needs in a particular situation in order to accomplish his mission. In effect, EEI are the commander's current, high-priority intelligence requirements. They may also include requirements for information or intelligence based on requests from higher, lower, or adjacent units. EEI focus the attention and activities of all collecting agencies and intelligence personnel on specific information which is required at a particular time.

b. While the primary mission of all collecting agencies is to satisfy the requirements arising from the EEI, these agencies must also transmit all additional information that comes to their attention. This primarily concerns the basic order of battle, terrain, and other data which are necessary for the understanding and appreciation of information which comes in answer to EEI. Also, much information about the enemy must be collected for the primary purpose of aiding the collection effort itself. For instance, information about the enemy's vehicle numbering system must be collected and processed into intelligence which is then sent forward to the collecting agencies so that they may collect current order of battle information, based on specific application of the developed numbering system.

#### 63. FORM AND CONTENT OF EEI

a. EEI are preferably stated in question form. The questions stimulate the thinking of all concerned and also indicate the inquiring attitude of the commander. They should be in clear, concise, simple language. Generally they refer to—

- (1) Enemy capabilities elaborated upon as to details of time, place, and strength.
- (2) Enemy strength, composition, disposition, and reinforcement not covered by enemy capabilities.
- (3) Terrain, including natural and artificial obstacles.
- (4) Meteorological conditions.
- (5) Information desired by higher, adjacent, or lower headquarters.

b. Of the factors that the commander considers in making his own estimate of the situation, those pertaining to the enemy, the weather, and the terrain are at the best changeable, and at the worst unknown. Having reached and announced his decision, therefore, the commander's knowledge of the latest situation and the enemy capabilities may be inadequate to provide a sound basis for the future employment of his unit. He must consider the possible enemy reaction to his contemplated course of action. He must consider the things that the enemy may do between the time the decision is announced and the time the course of action is to be executed. He must also consider the effects of weather and terrain on his plans. Finally, he must consider the directives or requests for information from higher or adjacent headquarters.

#### 64. DESIGNATION OF EEI

a. *Responsibility.* The commander is responsible for the designation of the EEI. In designating the EEI, the commander is assisted by his staff, principally by his intelligence officer. The latter, in cooperation with other staff officers who are concerned, must be prepared at all times to recommend appropriate EEI, and to present the important considerations that govern their selection. The EEI are normally announced by the intelligence officer at staff conferences, after approval by the commander.

b. *EEI from higher headquarters.* The EEI for a given situation will not be the same at all echelons comprising an integrated unit such as a division. At each echelon, from the division to the battalion, the EEI will change in character at each lower echelon and as the combat situation changes. EEI announced by a higher headquarters, therefore, are not copied verbatim by a lower headquarters. However, they may be used as a checklist by the lower headquarters to ensure that no enemy capability is overlooked. In addition, the lower headquarters can determine what information is of particular importance to the higher headquarters. Some of the EEI may be the same, based upon similar capabilities of their respective opposing forces. EEI must be compatible with the missions of the lower unit, and within the physical capability of the unit to obtain answers to them. The capabilities of the enemy opposed to the lower unit may be different from those of the enemy opposing the higher unit. For example, the capabilities of the enemy opposing a division might be limited to "defense," "delay," or "withdrawal." On the front of a subordinate battalion, the enemy might not only have the capability of "attack" but might do so in order to cover the withdrawal of the larger force.

#### 65. DETERMINATION OF EEI

a. Sound judgment, for which no rules can be substituted, is essential in determining EEI appropriate to a current mission and situation. The following will be useful as guides in determining EEI:

(1) What enemy courses of action will most seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission or the operation of the plan?

(2) What is the next major decision which can be foreseen at this time?

(3) What information is required to prevent surprise of the command?

(4) What information of the enemy, weather, or terrain is required in order to plan future maneuvers?

(5) What information compatible with our mission has been requested by higher or adjacent units?

b. In determining the EEI pertaining to the enemy, no guess as to the enemy intentions is desired (Para 47d). Instead, a systematic search is directed for facts

that will disclose progressively the confirmation or elimination of adoption of enemy capabilities to which the inquiries relate.

#### 66. DISSEMINATION OF THE EEI

The EEI are disseminated to the command in any or all of the following ways:

- a. Paragraph 3 of the operation order.
- b. Paragraph 2 of the intelligence annex to the operation order (App V).
- c. Fragmentary form to units of the command.
- d. Orally by the commander to members of his staff.

#### 67. ANSWERS TO EEI

a. *Relative to the enemy.* EEI concerning the enemy may be answered only after a careful check of evaluated and interpreted information against all possible courses of action open to the enemy. The intelligence officer endeavors to verify or disprove the hypothesis relative to each enemy capability. To do this he assembles all available facts possible concerning the enemy situation. By eliminating as many of these hypotheses as possible, in the light of ascertained facts, the intelligence officer narrows down the original courses of action open to the enemy to those courses of action that are still available to him. Changes in the situation may result in new capabilities, resulting in changes of the EEI. Unless the enemy has irrevocably committed himself, any attempted deduction as to his probable intentions is a guess that is likely to prove misleading and to result in faulty decisions. Commanders should not require their intelligence officers to attempt such deductions.

b. *Relative to weather and terrain.* EEI relating to the weather and terrain may be answered as soon as sufficient credible information is available upon which to base a conclusion.

#### 68. EXAMPLE OF EEI

a. Based on the situation given in the example in paragraph 52 and figure 11, the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, announced his decision to attack with two regiments. He further announced the EEI for the attack to be—

(1) Will the enemy reinforce the unit now on Hill 101 before 0600 tomorrow? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the reinforced rifle regiment on Hill 102.

(2) Will the enemy attack us in our present positions prior to 0600 tomorrow? If so, when, with what troops?

(3) Will the enemy continue to defend in his present positions? If so, how will he organize his defenses; with what troops?

(4) Will the enemy withdraw beyond the division's objective prior to our attack?

(5) What antitank obstacles or natural barriers to tank employment are there in the division zone, north to and including the division's objective?

b. After receiving the EEI the intelligence officer analyzes them, listing as *indications* items that will be needed to answer the questions asked or implied by the wording of the EEI.

#### 69. INDICATIONS

a. *Definition.* Indications are those evidences of enemy activities, either positive or negative, or conditions of the weather and terrain, that may point toward the adoption or rejection of a particular course of action by the enemy, or

influence our adoption of a particular course of action. The absence of positive indications in one direction may tend to strengthen those pointing in another.

*b. Application.* In their application to military intelligence, indications may reveal progressively the impending course of action of the enemy. Before the enemy can adopt a certain general course of action, certain preparations must be made by him. The maxim "coming events cast their shadows before" expresses the relationship of indications to the answers for the EEI. We seek the events that cast the "shadows" in order to determine what events will follow. The events we look for include the dispositions and actions of the enemy. We seek to determine how he and the terrain will appear, and what he will be doing if he adopts the capability referred to by the particular EEI. In the collection plan, indications are arrived at by a detailed analysis of the EEI and include all details needed to obtain the information to answer the particular EEI under consideration.

*c. Determination of indications.* The analysis of the EEI by the intelligence officer points to the specific items of information that will be clues to the answers for the EEI. These specific items of information are determined in the light of—

(1) An understanding of the terrain and the use made of it by the opposing forces. This includes an appreciation of the enemy's probable knowledge of the terrain held by our own forces.

(2) A thorough knowledge of the organization, equipment, and tactical and logistical methods of the enemy.

(3) A knowledge of the personalities of commanders and the performance record or history of enemy units.

*d. Guide to determination of indications.* It is impracticable to prescribe a rigid set of indications that would be applicable for a given set of EEI— just as a standard set of EEI will not suffice for every tactical situation. However, examples of indications for EEI concerned with attack, defense, withdrawal, reinforcement, delaying action, local defeat, and terrain are included in Appendix IV, *Guide to Determination of Indications*. In operations these must be modified according to knowledge gained of the enemy's actual tactical doctrine and procedures. Indications listed in appendix IV apply to US forces. For indications applicable to Aggressor, see ST 30-102-1.

## 70. EXAMPLE OF INDICATIONS

*a.* Following are some indications for the first EEI in the example given in paragraph 68:

- (1) Movement south of the reinforced rifle regiment now at Hill 102.
- (2) Increased traffic toward our position.
- (3) Identification of new units.
- (4) Increased aggressive patrolling.
- (5) Additional command posts and supply or evacuation installations.

*b.* The EEI, and their analysis to determine appropriate indications, form the basis of the collection plan.

## 71. THE COLLECTION PLAN

*a.* After the EEI are announced, definite and precise orders or requests for obtaining the required information are given to the collecting agencies. To prevent omission or conflict, the intelligence officer prepares the collection plan; which consists first of an analysis of the EEI, and second of the collection

scheme based on this analysis. It is usually made in chart form, and is available for reference to all personnel of the intelligence section. It is solely a worksheet and is not disseminated. A suggested form for the collection plan is shown in figure 12a.

b. The intelligence officer, during combat, may limit his collection plan to a mental analysis of the EEI and then a decision as to the assignment of collecting agencies to procure the information. He may also prepare fragmentary notes that may develop into an abbreviated collection plan. However, when time and other conditions permit, it is desirable to complete a detailed plan. In any event, the intelligence officer follows an orderly process of considering each fundamental factor (EEI), the indications, the orders or requests to the collecting agencies, and the time and place at which the information is to be reported. Thereby he avoids omission of details and prevents conflicts in the assignment of orders or requests to collecting agencies.

## 72. PREPARATION OF THE COLLECTION PLAN (FIG 12)

a. *Period covered.* The collection plan is prepared to cover the period of operations required by the mission of the commander. It will be subsequently modified to conform to new decisions required by the development of the situation.

b. *EEI (column 1).* In this column are listed the EEI as announced for the projected operation or situation.

c. *Indications (column 2).* In this column the intelligence officer briefly records the analysis of the EEI, setting down as indications those items which answer the questions asked or implied by the wording of the EEI. These indications of possible enemy action will furnish the basis for definite reconnaissance missions. Certain EEI will require very little analysis by the intelligence officer in order to transform them into suitable reconnaissance missions. If the information to be obtained gives a direct answer to the inquiry contained in an EEI, analysis is unnecessary. For example, EEI relating to the existence of natural obstacles usually require no analysis other than a map study, supplemented by information from other sources, to determine whether or not the obstacles exist. Other EEI, however, are subjected to careful analysis in order to determine what indications will answer the inquiries contained therein.

d. *Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action (column 3).* After analyzing the EEI and recording the indications corresponding to each, the intelligence officer next writes the basis for the specific orders to the collecting agencies and the requests to be made to higher, adjacent, or supporting units. The actual orders or requests are then prepared from notes contained in this column. Often two or more of these entries may be combined into one message or paragraph of an order to an agency. In order that he may give each agency specific instructions as to the exact information to be secured and where it is to be sought, the intelligence officer makes a careful study of the situation map. Several agencies with differing characteristics and limitations may be employed in establishing one definite fact that bears on an EEI.

e. *Agencies to be employed (column 4).* In this column, the intelligence officer lists, in the spaces provided at the top, all agencies he may employ. He assigns them missions which will be stated in orders or requests, by checking the agency or agencies that have or can get this information. To employ the available collecting agencies properly in the search for information, it is essential that the intelligence officer be thoroughly familiar with their characteristics and that he cooperate closely with the operations officer. Care is taken to select the agencies



best suited to get the information desired, and to prevent overloading any agency with missions. Whenever possible, more than one agency or source of information should be used in obtaining each item required. The agencies selected should be circled, as shown in figure 12.

f. *Time and place at which information is to be reported (column 5).* From a knowledge of the plan of operations gained by close cooperation with the operations officer, the intelligence officer determines when and where necessary information must be reported in order to be of use to the commander. In determining the time at which information must be available, the intelligence officer is guided by the fact that information arriving too late is of no value, and information arriving in advance of its actual need is likely to be out of date and inaccurate at the time projected operations are undertaken. In determining when information will be reported, the intelligence officer considers the time required to issue necessary orders to all echelons of command involved in the mission, the time required to execute the mission, and the time required to report its results.

g. *Remarks (column 6).* Frequently it will be helpful to add a remarks column on the right of the collection plan. As the agencies report the information, notes may be entered in the remarks column opposite the pertinent indication. When the information is complete enough to give a definite answer to an indication, a check is made opposite the indication with a colored pencil. Thus a series of check marks opposite one EEI will alert the intelligence officer that the EEI in question may now have been answered. The use of this technique will also point out when the specific orders and requests are not producing the desired information. The use of this technique is an aid to both the direction of the collection effort, and the processing step of the intelligence cycle.

UNIT:

Period covered: From: \_\_\_\_\_ To: \_\_\_\_\_

| (1)<br><i>Essential elements of information</i>   | (2)<br><i>Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)</i>  | (3)<br><i>Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action</i>  | (4)<br><i>Agencies to be employed</i>  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (5)<br><i>Place and time at which information is to be reported</i> | (6)<br><i>Remarks</i> |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|-----------------------|
|   |  |  | <i>List all agencies to be employed in the collection of information required</i>  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |                       |
| List the EEI announced for the operation, situation, or mission, spaced sufficiently to permit entry in column (2) of all indications pertinent to the EEI. | Record opposite respective EEI in column (1) those indications which will best provide an answer to the question asked or implied by the EEI. (See App IV, Columns (2) and (3).) | Record in notes or fragmentary form the specific information sought to substantiate each indication. (See App IV, column (4).) | Place an X under each agency that has or can get the information bearing on each indication. The agency (or agencies) finally selected as recipients of specific orders or requests for information will be indicated by circling (X). |  |  |  |  |  |  | Place: Headquarters or staff section to which information is to be reported.<br>Time: May be a specific time, periodically, or as the information is obtained. |   |                       |

Figure 12a. The collection plan (suggested form for collection plan).

Unit: 1st Infantry Division.  
 Period covered: 011900 July to capture of Hill 101.

## COLLECTION PLAN

| (1)<br>Essential elements<br>of information  | (2)<br>Indications<br>(analysis of essential<br>elements of information) | (3)<br>Basis for specific orders<br>or requests and notes<br>for future action  | (4)<br>Agencies to be employed |        |        |              |           |          |            |             | (5)<br>Hour and destination<br>of reports | (6)<br>Remarks   |         |
|--|--|---|--------------------------------|--------|--------|--------------|-----------|----------|------------|-------------|---|--|---------|
|  |  |   | 1st Inf                        | 2d Inf | 3d Inf | 1st Recon Co | 1st Tr Bn | Div Arty | 3d Inf Div | 9th Inf Div |   |  | 1 Corps |
| 1. Will the enemy reinforce the unit now on Hill 101 before 0600 tomorrow? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to reinforced rifle regiment on Hill 102. | a. Movement south of the reinforced rifle regiment now at Hill 102.      | (1) Report location, activity, and rate of movement of reinforced rifle regiment last observed north of Hill 102 at— (coordinates). |                                |        |        |              |           | X        |            |             |   | (1) Report at 2000 ___ to division command post.                         |         |
|  | b. Increased traffic toward our position.                                | (2) Report volume and type of traffic on roads approaching Hill 101 from the north or northeast.                                    | X                              |        |        |              | X         |          |            |             |   | (2) Report at 2000, 2400, ___ and 0500 ___ to division command post.     |         |
|  | c. Identification of new units.  | (3) Same as (2) on road approaching Hill 101 from the west.   | X                              |        |        |              | X         |          |            |             |   | (3) Same as (2).   |         |
|  | d. Increased aggressive patrolling.                                      | (4) Report new identifications.   | X                              |        |        |              |           |          | X          |             |   | (4) Report as obtained. Negative 2400 and 0500 to division command post. |         |
|  | e. Additional command posts, supply or evacuation installations.         | (5) Report number, size, composition, routes of enemy patrols encountered in your zone.   | X                              |        |        |              |           |          |            |             |   | (5) Same as (4).   |         |
|  |  | (6) Report locations of command posts, supply and evacuation installations vicinity Hills 101 and 102.                              | X                              |        |        |              |           |          |            |             |   | (6) Same as (2) and as obtained.   |         |

NOTE: Items circled in column (4) indicate the agencies finally selected as recipients of specific orders or requests for information.

Figure 12b. The collection plan (sample collection plan (extract)).

**73. EXAMPLE OF COLLECTION PLAN**

a. Figure 12b is an example of a partial collection plan based on the situation, mission, and the first EEI and its indications given in the preceding examples (Para 52, 68, and 70). It is lacking in detail because of the schematic nature of the situation. It reveals some of the thought processes and other steps in preparing the collection plan.

b. Columns (3), (4), and (5) of the collection plan are the basis for the collection scheme, and furnish the data for specific orders and requests to collecting agencies.

**74. ORDERS AND REQUESTS**

a. *General.* In addition to his own requirements for information, a commander may receive reconnaissance missions or demands for specific information from higher headquarters as well as requests for information from lower and neighboring units. Positive action for securing this information is taken by the intelligence officer. He is authorized by his commander to issue orders for the collection of information to subordinate units of the command (coordinating such directives with the operations officer), and to request specific items of information from neighboring and higher units.

b. *Purpose.* Orders and requests are necessary to obtain the desired results from the collection plan. They may or may not be repeated in the intelligence annex, depending on the time available.

c. *Form.* Orders or requests may be in the form of written messages, overlays, or marked maps.

(1) *Message.* Figure 13 is an example of a message directing the collecting of information based on items (4) and (5), columns (3), (4), and (5), figure 12b.

|   |                |             |   |
|---|----------------|-------------|---|
| TO: CO 1st Inf  |                |             |   |
| FROM: CG 1st Inf Div  |                |             |   |
| PRECEDENCE<br>0   | CLASSIFICATION |             | DATE/TIME SIGNED<br>012000 Jul 19...                |
| AUTHORIZED TO SEND IN<br>SIGNATURE  | CLEAR          | MOD CLEAR   | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF DRAFTER<br>/s/ Smith, Lt Col |
| COMMCEN<br>USE<br>ONLY  | TIME FILED     | COMMCEN NO. | HOW SENT  |
| AS OBTAINED, NEGATIVE DAILY AT 0500 AND 2400, STARTING<br>012400 JUL 19..., REPORT NUMBER, SIZE, COMPOSITION,<br>ROUTES OF ENEMY PATROLS ENCOUNTERED YOUR ZONE; NEW<br>IDENTIFICATIONS. |                |             |   |
|   |                |             |   |
|   |                |             |   |
|   |                |             |   |

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(Submit in duplicate)

Figure 13. Message directing collection of information.

(2) *Overlay or marked map.* Overlays and marked maps are issued to amplify messages by indicating graphically the areas or localities to be reconnoitered.

d. *Transmittal.* Two methods of transmitting orders to subordinate units and agencies for the collection of information are through fragmentary orders and paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex to the operation order. In view of the infrequency of issue of the operation order as compared to the *continual* need for information, the most common method of issue is by fragmentary order. Requests for information to neighboring and higher units may be transmitted through personal contact, radio, telephone, teletype, or any other means that will ensure prompt and adequate receipt of the necessary information. The means of transmission to be employed will be governed by the urgency of the situation and the security classification required.

(1) *Fragmentary orders.* The basis for orders requesting specific information from the various collecting agencies is found in column (3) of the collection plan, figure 12. Maps, sketches, or overlays having brief instructions written on them may accompany orders or may themselves be the orders.

(2) *Intelligence annex.* The intelligence annex is a means of disseminating intelligence and of issuing intelligence instructions to a command for an impending operation. It may or may not confirm the orders and requests for information that have been made in fragmentary form, depending on whether or not the orders or requests are obsolete by the time the annex is issued. As indicated earlier, paragraph 3 of the annex is the formal means of implementing the collection plan. Annexes are normally prepared for all operations. They are indispensable in operations preceded by long periods of planning.

## 75. FORM OF INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

a. Following is the form for the intelligence annex. (See App V for example of an intelligence annex.)

(Classification)

Copy No \_\_\_\_\_  
 Issuing headquarters  
 Place of issue  
 Date and time  
 Message reference number

Annex--(Intelligence) to Operation Order \_\_\_\_\_

References: (Maps, charts and relevant documents.)

### 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

Refer to overlay (or map) and latest periodic intelligence report (or documents) showing the enemy situation.

### 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

Each essential element of information will appear under a separate subparagraph in the intelligence annex.

### 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

- a. Orders to subordinate and attached units. A separate numbered paragraph covering detailed instructions for each unit from which a report to this headquarters is required.
- b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units. A separate numbered paragraph pertaining to each unit, not organic or attached, from which information is requested.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(Short title identification)

## 4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL

- a. Prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, inhabitants, and other persons.
- b. Captured documents.
- c. Captured materiel.

## 5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

List maps and photographs, vertical and oblique, that will be supplied, with number of each class to each unit; instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution.

## 6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

## 7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

Acknowledgement instructions.

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 (Commander)

Appendixes.

Distribution.

Authentication.

(Classification)

b. The form of an intelligence plan is the same as that of an intelligence annex, with the addition of an eighth paragraph as follows:

(Classification)

## 8. AUXILIARY AGENCIES

- a. Instructions for agencies assigned to the command.
- b. Instructions and recommendations for agencies supporting the command.
- c. Recommendations for other agencies.

(Classification)

c. A ninth paragraph, titled "MISCELLANEOUS," may be added if necessary. Its use should be avoided by lower echelons. At army or higher levels it may be required in order to include such matters as training, intelligence funds, and other subjects that cannot be appropriately discussed under other paragraphs.

**76. PREPARATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX**

a. *Heading.* The number for the operation order and the letter for the intelligence annex are assigned by the operations officer (G3).

b. *Summary of enemy situation.* If reference is not made to an overlay or the latest intelligence reports, a brief summary of enemy information should be given. It must be pertinent to the operation covered by the operation order, and may include the location, identification, strength, organization, disposition, and movements of enemy forces, including reserves, installations for administrative support, and capabilities.

*c. Essential elements of information.*

(1) This paragraph is included primarily to focus the attention of lower unit commanders and others who receive the annex on the items of information with which the commander is primarily concerned. Units and agencies receiving the annex extract any EEI that pertain to their missions and that they are physically capable of answering. Lower units add these EEI to their own for incorporation into their orders.

(2) Certain EEI will appear in paragraph 3 of the operation order, as well as in the intelligence annex, if the commander desires to emphasize their importance. All EEI appear in paragraph 3 if the intelligence annex is not published.

*d. Reconnaissance and observation missions.* If any particular paragraph of the intelligence annex can be called most important, it is this paragraph. Current orders and requests for information are confirmed, and the collection plan formally implemented. In this paragraph the commander directs his subordinate commanders to gather the specific information required to answer the EEI. Here, too, the commander requests the same type of vital information desired from higher, adjacent, and cooperating units. In both paragraphs 3*a* and 3*b*, the units are listed in the same sequence as they appear in the operation order.

*e. Measures for handling personnel, documents, and materiel.* (Chap 9.) This paragraph is partly a matter of standing operating procedure. However, changes required by a particular situation must be added.

(1) Paragraph 4*a* contains instructions, including special provisions, for segregating and handling enemy personnel, refugees, and repatriates, that will ensure their maximum exploitation as sources of information. Special types of information required from prisoners may be included. Preparation of the subparagraph is coordinated with G1 and G4.

(2) Paragraph 4*b* contains instructions for handling and processing captured documents from the time of their acquisition to their receipt by specified intelligence personnel. Special instructions for forwarding documents or search for a special type document may be included.

(3) Paragraph 4*c* designates items or types of enemy materiel required for examination and includes specific instructions for processing and disposition. Specific types of materiel desired may be listed. Preparation of this paragraph is coordinated with G4 and pertinent technical services.

*f. Maps and photographs.* (Chap 9.)

(1) G2 must consolidate the requests and requirements for both maps and photos. Map distribution is somewhat standardized and prescribed in a table such as that found in FM 101-10. Theaters of operation will prepare similar tables to suit their needs based on experience. Current availability of maps may curtail issue. Airphoto distribution requires a great deal of planning because of the many factors that must be considered.

(2) Preparation of paragraph 5 is coordinated with G3.

*g. Counterintelligence.* This paragraph is largely covered by standing operating procedure. Many special operational instructions having counterintelligence aspects will be listed in the operation order or in other annexes. An example is radio silence which appears in paragraph 5 of the operation order. This item also may be included in the counterintelligence paragraph of the intelligence annex.

*h. Reports and distribution.* Any or all of the following items may be covered in this paragraph:

- (1) Period to be covered by routine reports, and distribution.
- (2) Routine and special reports required from subordinate units.
- (3) Distribution of routine and special reports from higher headquarters.
- (4) Periodic or special conferences of intelligence officers.
- (5) Distribution of special intelligence studies, such as defense overprints, airphoto intelligence reports, and order of battle overlays.
- (6) Special intelligence liaison when indicated.

*i. Appendixes.*

(1) The number and type of appendixes will be determined by the echelon and by the type of the projected operation. Appendixes will contain material of limited interest, or which involves considerable detail. Higher headquarters—theater and army—will generally employ more appendixes than divisions because of the volume of detailed instructions and the number of subordinate agencies and commands involved. Material covered in great detail in an appendix is covered only by a few general statements in the appropriate paragraph of the annex and by a reference to the appendix.

(2) Appendixes that may be included are—

(a) Enemy situation, which may be a map, overlay, summary, or combination thereof whenever a current estimate, summary, or periodic intelligence report has not been published separately.

(b) Combat intelligence plan, which includes EEI and reconnaissance and observation missions. This appendix is used when detail and volume are too great for inclusion in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the annex.

(c) Air reconnaissance plan, including both visual and photo missions and procedures for submitting requests.

(d) Weather and terrain studies, disseminated by higher headquarters or prepared by G2, assisted by the engineer officer.

(e) Map and photo plan, covering the distribution of maps and photos.

(f) Time, tide, and light tables.

(g) Counterintelligence plan, when instructions are too detailed for complete coverage in paragraph 6.

(h) Special theater studies.

(i) Intelligence administrative plan, which may cover reports, funds, special intelligence, liaison, and other administrative details.

*j. Distribution.* The annex is not always distributed with the operation order, although it usually has the same distribution. It may accompany the operation order, or it may be issued before or after the operation order.

*k. Authentication.* Since the annex is published over the name of the commander, the G2 of the issuing unit personally signs his last name.

## 77. COMPLETING THE CYCLE

The issuance of orders and requests to collecting agencies rounds out the operational cycle of combat intelligence, and collection of information begins anew. Meanwhile the intelligence officer checks the orders and requests which he has

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issued to collecting agencies to ensure that positive action is being taken to obtain the information requested or ordered. Experience has proved that the issuance of orders and requests will not by itself always produce satisfactory results; best results are obtained by a continuous check on the actual progress in productive activity by the collecting agencies. The intelligence effort is guided generally by the mission of the command and more specifically by the EEI. When additional EEI or new missions are announced, the intelligence officer must redirect the collection effort in accordance with them. Thus the cycle functions continuously.