

~~284~~
~~C53~~

BS
2417
D6
C53
1921

28305

LIBRARY
KNOX COLLEGE
TORONTO

READERS ARE REQUESTED

NOT TO MARK THE TEXT
IN ANY WAY

OR


TURN DOWN PAGE-CORNERS

OR

WRITE ON BLANK END-SHEETS

PROMPT RETURN APPRECIATED

LIBRARY



THE TEACHING
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT
ON DIVORCE

THE TEACHING OF
THE NEW TESTAMENT
ON DIVORCE

BY

R. H. CHARLES, D.LITT., D.D.

ARCHDEACON OF WESTMINSTER
FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

LONDON

WILLIAMS & NORGATE

14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C. 2.

1921

CAVEN LIBRARY
KNOX COLLEGE

28305

1921

PREFACE

I AM publishing this little book on the Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce to meet a long-felt want. A philological study of the passages bearing on this subject in the New Testament, combined with a study of the religious and theological ideas of that period, convinced me that no interpretation yet offered, however right it might be as to its conclusions, had done justice to these fundamental factors of the problem. Though I began the study purely to satisfy a natural interest in a living problem of to-day, I found that the more I studied it the less able was I to relinquish it, though I pursued the study with much reluctance owing to the pressure of other claims on my time. The immediate occasion of my study was a passage in the Talmud on which I lighted

accidentally. Taking this in connection with a variety of other facts, philological, historical, and theological, I began to discover light and order emerge, till at last the Gospel passages ceased to be an enigma. My main lines of argument and conclusions were then embodied in a sermon preached in the Abbey on June 20, 1920. The passages relating to divorce in the Gospels—herein Matthew is to be followed and not Mark—recount a controversy between the Pharisees and Christ as to the legality of divorce “for every cause” other than that of unchastity, which was summarily dealt with in Deut. xxii. 22. The Hillelites maintained, and to a considerable extent quite justifiably, the legality of divorce for a variety of grounds less than that of unchastity on the basis of Deut. xxiv. 1-2; whereas the Shammaites contended that even Deut. xxiv. 1-2 allowed of divorce only on the ground of unchastity. Our Lord embraced the side of the Shammaites, but He would have none of their exegesis. The Shammaites destroyed a good cause by bad

exegesis. If the good cause was to be won, it could not be won by the utterly indefensible exegesis of the Shammaites, nor in fact could it be won at all by those who maintained the validity of the Jewish law in this passage. If this specific law were valid and final, then some form of the Hillelite view was inevitable, and ultimately, as we know, the Hillelites triumphed over their opponents. Hence our Lord rejected this statute of the Jewish law, as He had done others, and proclaimed that Gen. ii. 24 embodied the principle on which the true doctrine of marriage was to be established, a principle which He applied in His Logia within the limits prescribed by the controversy.

The enigma of the Gospel passages being thus solved, there still remained that of the Pauline Epistles on this question. For a long time I could find no satisfactory solution. But at last here, too, the light came in a flash, and it became clear that the whole difficulty in 1 Cor. vii. 10-15 arose from a misleading interpolation. On purely philological grounds I

discovered that this interpolation (vii. 11 α) must be excised. On its excision order took the place of chaos. A true Logion of Christ (1 Cor. vii. 10, 11 b) forthwith leapt to light, and 1 Cor. vii. 10–15 presented no further difficulty.

But the third and final stage was not reached as yet. 1 Cor. vii. 10–15 consists really of answers given by the Apostle to questions put by different members of the Corinthian Church. It does not set forth the essential elements in the Christian doctrine of marriage and divorce. For this I had to go elsewhere, but the desired passage was not far to seek, as it occurs in the preceding chapter, 1 Cor. vi. 13–17. From a comparison of 1 Cor. vi. 16 and vii. 10, 11 b we learn that the Apostle had before him an account of the controversy between the Pharisees and Christ, which we reasonably conclude he found in Q—the lost document used by the first three Evangelists from twenty to thirty years later. In 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11 b Paul gives a Logion of Christ unrecorded elsewhere, while in vi. 16 he follows his Master in founding his doctrine

of marriage and divorce on Gen. ii. 24. But whereas Christ applied the principle underlying this verse within the limits prescribed by the controversy of His day, the Apostle applied it universally, and by his application of it makes it clear that unchastity dissolves the unity of the "one body" (1 Cor. vii. 16), that is, dissolves marriage, which can only be maintained by the perfect loyalty of the wedded pair.

There only remains for me the pleasant task of thanking the many friends, who from different standpoints and vast knowledge in their various departments have read my book in the proof stage. For this good service my most grateful thanks are due to Dr Sutherland Black, formerly assistant editor of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and joint editor of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*; Dr A. E. Cowley, Librarian of the Bodley and formerly Talmudic Reader at Oxford; the Rev. C. W. Emmet, Fellow of University College and Sub-Warden of Ripon Hall, Oxford; the Rev. Dr Milligan, Regius Professor of Divinity in Glasgow University and editor of the *Vocabulary*

of the *Greek Testament* (from Papyri and non-literary sources); the Right Rev. Dr Temple, Lord Bishop of Manchester. But not only to these scholars and theologians, but also to the following lawyers, am I under deep obligations for rendering a like service: Sir Lynden Macassey, K.B.E., K.C., and Mr W. Reeve Wallace of the Privy Council Office.

Finally, I am indebted to Professor Stuart-Jones, D.Litt., F.B.A., editor of the forthcoming revised edition of Liddell and Scott's *Greek Lexicon*, for valuable suggestions on Greek words; to Professor Milligan for similar help from the Papyri; and to the Rev. Dr Darwell Stone, Principal of Pusey House, editor of the forthcoming *Patristic Greek Lexicon*, for two-thirds of the examples given on pp. 107-108.

R. H. CHARLES.

4 LITTLE CLOISTERS,
WESTMINSTER ABBEY,
December 1920.

Note.—Though Dr Temple accepts the secondary character of the Mark account, he is not yet convinced of the legitimacy of remarriage.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

SYNOPTIC passages bearing on divorce, Matt. xix. 3-9, v. 32, Mark x. 2-12, Luke xvi. 18, 1-2. Traditional dogmas as to indissolubility of marriage on ground of unchastity and inadmissibility of remarriage based on misinterpretation of Christ's teaching, 2-3. Luke's account defective because he generally omits anti-Pharisaic passages, 3-4 *n.* Teaching of Matt. xix. 3-9, Mark x. 2-12, and John vii. 53-viii. 11 must be studied in connection with Deut. xxii. 22, xxiv. 1-2, 3-4.

Deut. xxii. 22 prescribes death of adulteress and her paramour: this law abrogated in 30 A.D., when divorce became obligatory: validity of this law recognised in John vii. 53-viii. 11, 5-8. Dissolution of marriage bond by unchastity followed by death or divorce and remarriage as a matter of course, 8-10.

Deut. xxiv. 1-2 allows of divorce on lesser grounds—hence controversy between schools of Shammai and Hillel: former misinterpreted this passage so as to forbid divorce *save* on the ground of unchastity, latter claimed that it justified divorce "for every cause," hence question to Christ, "Is it lawful . . . to divorce for every cause?": expression found in Philo and Josephus, 10-14. Controversy between Pharisees and Christ starts from Deut. xxiv. 1-2, which takes no account of unchastity, hence Logia of Christ deal with question at issue, *i.e.* legality of divorce on lesser grounds, 14-17.

Differences between Matt. and Mark: interpretative additions in former, 17-19. No cognisance of sin of unchastity (which dissolved marriage bond, 20 *n.*) in Matt. or Mark, 19-22. But to Logia, which had one meaning before abrogation of law in Deut. xxii. 22, different and illegitimate meaning came in time to be attached as forbidding divorce not only on lesser grounds but on every ground: to correct this misconception interpretative glosses added in Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, 25-27. Matt. xix. 3-9 historical and trustworthy; Mark x. 2-12 recast and unhistorical in several respects, 27-31.

Principle laid down by Christ, based on Gen. ii. 24, and applied by Him within the limits prescribed by the controversy, but applied later by Paul without any limitation to doctrine of Christian marriage, 31-32. Conclusions. Right of divorce for unchastity and of subsequent remarriage, as was universally customary in Judaism, implicitly allowed by Christ, 33-34.

CHAPTER II

Matt. xix. 10-12 not connected with question of divorce but with need of self-denial for the kingdom of heaven's sake, which in some cases might require renunciation of marriage, 35-38.

CHAPTER III

Rom. viii. 1-3 not connected with the question of divorce: Christian freed from law by death: illustration drawn from case of married woman as affected by Mosaic law, but Paul did not accept this law on divorce, 39-42.

CHAPTER IV

1 Cor. vii. 10-15. Most modern versions wrong. Roman, Syriac, and Armenian Vulgates tolerably accurate, 43-45. Two conclusions stated in advance: *χωρίζεσθαι* = "to desert" and *ἀφιέναι* = "to divorce": vii. 11a an interpolation, 45-46. Of four possible interpretations of vii. 10-15, only one right, 46-51. vii. 11a an interpolation, 51-54.

Original form of Logion of Christ in vii. 10, 11b, 54-57. *οὐ δεδούλωται*, its meaning, 57-58. vii. 10-15, its interpretation, 58-61; and translation, 61-62.

Paul's use of Q in 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11b, 63-65. His teaching in 1 Cor. vi. 13-16 with regard to divorce: illicit intercourse dissolves marriage, 65-70. Dissolution of marriage obligatory in case of deliberate and unrepentant adulterers or adulteresses, 70-71.

CHAPTER V

Three Logia of Christ on divorce derived from Q: (1) Matt. xix. 9 = Luke xvi. 18 (= Mark x. 11 + Matt. v. 32b); (2) Matt. v. 32; (3) 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11b, 72-75. False Logion in Mark x. 12, 75-76.

CHAPTER VI

“What God hath joined together,” words applicable to all true marriages since the world began, whether accompanied by religious services or not, 77-78. Neither Church nor State can make or annul the marriage of true souls; can only assume that the unions they legalise and bless are in accordance with will of God, 79-80. Divorce obligatory in case of persistent unfaithfulness, 81. Pauline justification of divorce in case of desertion under certain circumstances, 81-82.

CHAPTER VII

1 Cor. vi. 16, vii. 10, 11^b presuppose controversy of Pharisees with Christ recounted in Matt. xix. 3-9 and parallels, and derived by Paul directly from Q in its Aramaic form or an independent translation, 83-85.

Text of Mark x. 2-12 secondary in many respects, and not the source directly or indirectly of Matt. xix. 3-9, v. 32, Luke xvi. 18, 85-89.

CHAPTER VIII

μοιχεία and *πορνεία* as distinguished in later Classical Greek, 91-92. *πορνεία* = fornication, wedded harlotry, or sodomy in Classical Greek, 92-94. *μοιχεία* and *πορνεία* in Jewish Greek, in Old Testament, 94-98. *πορνεία* in Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, five meanings, 98-100. In New Testament (and Hermas), five or six meanings, 100-106. In early Christian literature, four meanings, 106-109.

Mistranslations of *πορνεία* in New Testament, 109-111.

CHAPTER IX

ἀπολύειν and *ἀφιέναι* in New Testament and other writings = “to divorce,” 112-114. *χωρίζεσθαι* in New Testament and other writings = “to desert,” 114-115.

CHAPTER X

Summary of conclusions arrived at in above investigations, Nos. (1) to (13), 116-118. The whole matter summarised in (14), 118-120.

THE TEACHING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT ON DIVORCE

CHAPTER I

CHRIST'S TEACHING ON DIVORCE¹

“And there came to him Pharisees, tempting him, saying, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? And he answered and said, Have ye not read, that he which made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife; and the twain shall become one flesh? . . . What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. They say unto him, Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorcement, and to put her away? He saith unto them, Moses for your hardness of heart suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it hath not been so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery; and he that marrieth her when she is put away committeth adultery.”—*Matt. xix. 3-9.*²

¹ This sermon was preached in Westminster Abbey on 20th June 1920. Some minor inaccuracies have been corrected, but none of these affected the main principles maintained.

² The next three verses, *Matt. xix. 10-12*, have no connection of any kind with the question of divorce. They deal with the sacrifice that Christ requires certain of His disciples to make for the kingdom of heaven's sake—a sacrifice which may involve in some cases the renunciation not only of one's kindred but even of one's wife or the desire to marry. See below, pp. 35-38.

“Every one that putteth away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, maketh her an adulteress: and whosoever shall marry her when she is put away committeth adultery.”—*Matt. v. 32.*

“And there came unto him Pharisees, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? tempting him. And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away. But Jesus said unto them, For your hardness of heart he wrote you this commandment. But from the beginning of the creation, Male and female made he them. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother; and the twain shall become one flesh: so that they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. And in the house the disciples asked him again of this matter. And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her: and if she herself shall put away her husband, and marry another, she committeth adultery.”—*Mark x. 2-12.*

“Every one that putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth one that is put away from a husband committeth adultery.”—*Luke xvi. 18.*

THE question of divorce is one of the most practical and yet most stormy questions in the religious world of to-day. It is now being taught in many places that marriage is wholly indissoluble, however flagrant may be the guilt of the husband or wife, and that consequently, should a man divorce his wife or a wife her husband on the ground of adultery and marry again, such a person is guilty of breaking an unquestionable law of Christ, and excludes him-

self or herself thereby from the Communion of the faithful. As for these three statements, I hope to prove that they are mere human traditions based on a complete misinterpretation of Christ's teaching, and without an atom of authority in the Gospels.

The Jewish Law.—Now, I propose, so far as possible, to deal with the evidence bearing on this question in Matthew, Mark, and John. In Luke (xvi. 18) there is only one verse bearing on this subject. It is without its context, which Luke deliberately omits, as he does other anti-Pharisaic discourses.¹ Its meaning, however,

¹ See Hawkins, *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, pp. 70 sq., 134, where he points out Luke's omission in his reproduction of the Sermon of passages against Pharisaic legalism which Matthew has in the Sermon, v. 20-48, vi. 1-6, 16-18, "though the two Sermons have the same general framework." Again: "The same tendency appears no less plainly in the absence from Luke of the whole discussion following upon the Pharisees' question about divorce, as related in Mark in x. 2-12, and reproduced by Matthew in xix. 3-11." Again: Luke omits the discourse on "unwashed hands" (Mark vii. 1-23, Matt. xv. 1-20) on the ground of its anti-Pharisaic character. These observations are just; but that Matt. xix. 10-12 does not refer to the divorce question, and Matthew's account is not based on Mark x. 2-12 but on Q, I hope to prove later.

On these grounds Hawkins (*op. cit.*, 134) infers that it is

can be determined from the parallel expressions in Matthew and Mark. We can therefore safely leave it out of consideration for our present purpose. But to understand the teaching of the Gospels we must go far back. We must begin our study with two indispensable passages in Deuteronomy, one of which led up to the controversy that raged for quite a century in Palestine over divorce, including the period of our Lord's life and ministry. The first of these passages prescribes the penalty of death for the adulterous wife and her paramour; the second allows the husband to divorce his wife for some lesser offence than adultery. The first is in Deut. xxii. 22; the second in Deut. xxiv. 1, 2. The first law, as I have said, prescribed death as the punish-

reasonable to conclude that Luke omitted on the same grounds several anti-Pharisaic passages in Q, such as we find in Matt. v. 17-48; vi. 1-8, 16-18; xv. 12, 13; xxi. 28-32; xxiii. 2, 3, 5, 14-22, 32, 33. Luke, it is true, does not exclude this controversial element wholly: *cf.* v. 30 *sqq.*, vi. 6 *sqq.*, xx. 1 *sqq.*, which are derived from Mark, and other passages without a parallel in Matthew or Mark: *i.e.*, vii. 36 *sqq.*, xiv. 1-14 (where rebukes delivered at the tables of Pharisees are recorded), xvi. 14-15 (Pharisees charged with being "lovers of money").

ment of the adulterous woman and her paramour. This stern law remained on the Jewish statute-book till 30 A.D., as we find in both the Babylonian (*Sanh.* 41*a*) and Jerusalem Talmuds (*Sanh.* 18*a*, 24*b*). After that date the death penalty was abolished, probably owing to the pressure of the Roman authorities. Thus this law was in force during our Lord's ministry and for one or more years after its close. This fact is full of significance. The Mishna (*Sanh.* vii. 2) states on the authority of Eliezer ben Zadok that this penalty was inflicted early in the first century of our era.¹ After 30 A.D. the husband was compelled by Jewish law to divorce his adulterous wife (*Sotah* vi. 1).² He was

¹ It has been concluded that after Judea became a Roman province in 6 A.D., the right of inflicting capital punishment would have become an impossibility for this offence in Judea. It is only necessary by way of answer to refer to India, where, despite the fact that a law was enacted in 1829 declaring that all who abetted suttee were declared guilty of homicide, suttee has continued in isolated parts of India down to the present century (the last suttee was in the year 1905).

² When the divorce was carried out on grounds not affecting the moral character, the two persons involved could remarry (*Edwi* iv. 7), unless the wife had in the meantime married

allowed no other option. That the extreme penalty of the law was frequently evaded through compromise and heavy compensation there can be no doubt. Notwithstanding, this was the only law regarding the adulterous wife acknowledged as valid by the religious authorities of Judaism during our Lord's ministry. This is the first fact which it is important to recognise in the study of this question, and which must always be taken account of in connection with it.

Gospel Recognition of the Jewish Law.—We have next to inquire: Is there any recognition of this law in the Gospels? Unquestionably there is, and that in the Fourth Gospel, in the section which deals with the woman taken in adultery (vii. 53—viii. 11). It is well known that this section did not originally form a part of John's narrative. The best MSS. omit it, and the vocabulary and structure of its sentences are

another man. But *they could not remarry* if the woman had been divorced on the ground, or even on the suspicion, of adultery. Moreover, the woman was in no case allowed to marry her paramour after her divorce (*Sotah* v. 1).

not those of the author of the gospel. But no great scholar or critic entertains any doubt as to this section being a genuine piece of history, and the record of a real incident in the life of our Lord. In this section the Scribes and Pharisees approach Christ and ask Him a question based on this very law. Our Lord's answer shows that He did not question the validity of this law, but that He objected to the jury or judges before Him. Nay more, in keeping with His attitude to the law on other occasions, He refused Himself to accept the rôle of judge, which the Scribes and Pharisees were seeking to thrust upon Him.¹ Under analogous circumstances He declined to intervene in a

¹ Christ's words in John viii. 11, "Neither do I condemn thee," do not convey forgiveness to the sinner. Contrast Matt. ix. 2, Luke vii. 48. These words simply state that He pronounces *no sentence of legal condemnation*. Over against this negative declaration stands the positive admonition, "Go and sin no more." The combined negative and positive statements serve as a call to repentance.

Furthermore, our Lord's action in this case did not affect her legal position in regard to her husband. By her sin the woman has dissolved the bond uniting her to her husband, and by Jewish law her husband was obliged to divorce her.

dispute about property, when one of His hearers besought Him : “ Master, bid my brother divide the inheritance with me ” (Luke xii. 13 *sqq.*), and rejoined : “ Who made me a judge and a divider over you ? ” Had our Lord regarded this law as invalid, we know from analogous passages in the Sermon on the Mount that He would have made His standpoint clear with regard to it. Thus in the Sermon on the Mount we find, “ It was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not kill . . . but I say unto you.” Again, “ It was said, Thou shalt not commit adultery, but I say unto you.” His attitude to any Jewish law that He objected to shows no sign of accommodation or opportunism. This comes out clearly alike in what He said regarding the Sabbath and things clean and unclean.

Christ and Judaism.—We conclude, therefore, that in all our Lord said in regard to divorce and remarriage He recognised the validity of this law, which we know was still accepted as valid by the religious leaders of Judaism. According to this law the adulteress and her paramour were

to be put to death.¹ In this case there was no doubt as to the dissolution of the marriage. The law treats the marriage bond as absolutely broken and therefore as dissolved by the act of adultery, and even to the drastic means of inflicting the penalty incurred our Lord takes no exception. Remarriage, of course, in such a case would follow. But if the extreme penalty of the law was evaded, as in the section in John, and only divorce followed on the absolute breach of the marriage tie, remarriage followed as a matter of course in Judaism. To this, again, our Lord makes no objection. He does not say : "If the man wishes to marry again he must not only divorce his wife, he must carry out the law and have her stoned to death." Jewish law, civil and religious, made divorce compulsory in the case of adultery, as we have already observed. Thus the dissolubility of marriage in the case

¹ The manner of the death is not prescribed in Deut. xxii. 22, but according to John viii., Josephus, *Ant.* iv. 8. 23, they were to be stoned to death ; according to the Rabbis (*Sanh.* xi. 1) to be strangled ; but if the woman was a priest's daughter she was to be burned (*Sanh.* 66b).

of adultery, and the right of remarriage, are implicitly recognised by our Lord in the section in John. Such are the inferences to be drawn from John. Now as to Matthew and Mark. In Matthew, the text as it stands confirms the conclusion we have drawn from John. Matthew twice categorically maintains the right of divorce on the ground of adultery. But it is said that it is forbidden in Mark. We shall examine this question presently.

A Jewish Ground of Divorce.—Before we deal with this question we must discuss briefly another problem. This problem arises out of the second passage in Deuteronomy to which I drew your attention at the outset. This passage (Deut. xxiv. 1-2) runs as follows:—"When a man taketh a wife and marrieth her, then it shall be, if she find no favour in his eyes because he hath found some unseemly thing in her, that he shall write her a bill of divorcement and give it into her hand and send her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his house she may go and be another man's wife." These verses

gave the Jew the right to divorce his wife on the ground that he had found in her "some unseemly thing." Now, that this unseemly thing did not mean adultery is clear from the fact that the adulterous wife and her paramour were to be put to death, whereas the wife in this case is divorced on the ground of some unseemly thing, and set free to marry another man. The meaning of the phrase "unseemly thing" is obscure. It seems to have involved something indecent, but certainly something short of adultery. Of the confessedly obscure character of the phrase the Jews took full advantage, and held themselves justified in divorcing their wives on the slightest pretext. The hopelessly lax interpretation of this verse, and the scandals that followed inevitably thereon, led, shortly before the Christian era, to a controversy that lasted for full a hundred years within the Jewish Church. This controversy was raging during the public ministry of our Lord, and the question put to Him by the Pharisees regarding divorce was the burning question of the day. The controversy originated with the severe inter-

pretation given to Deut. xxiv. 1-2 by the school of a Galilean scholar named Shammai, who challenged the right of the husband to divorce his wife on any lax interpretation of this passage. The phrase "some unseemly thing" in this verse was illegitimately pressed by the school of Shammai to mean actual unchastity (*Gitt.* ix. 10 : 90a (*cf.* note, p. 34)). Now, we cannot but sympathise with the Shammaites' attempt to stem the degradation of marriage and of family life, which was undoubtedly fostered by the interpretation put on Deut. xxiv. 1-2 by the Hillelites. For Hillel and his school taught that on the ground of this passage the husband had the right to divorce his wife on any ground whatever, and divorce her without assigning any reason whatever in the bill of divorce. Hillel, in fact, committed himself to the extreme statement that a man could justly divorce his wife for burning his food ; and a much later Pharisee, Rabbi Aqiba, maintained that he might divorce his wife if he met with another woman who pleased him better. These sayings were, no doubt, paradoxical, but,

however interpreted, they maintained the absolute authority of the husband to divorce his wife on trifling grounds. The contentions of these two schools, the schools of Shammai and Hillel, which differed on a multitude of questions, grew so fierce that at last they refused to worship together, and on one occasion, when they met for discussion, many of the Hillelites were done to death by the Shammaites.

Christ and a Test Question.—This brief account enables us to appreciate the serious controversy that lay behind the words of St Matthew, xix. 3: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" These words do not reflect a mere passing interest of the day, nor are they a trap devised on the spur of the moment to ensnare the young prophet. Rather they express simply one of the most burning questions of the time and form a test question, and they require Christ to state His attitude towards it. Almost the same words are found in Philo (*De Spec. Leg.* iii. 5 (II. 304)), who was a contemporary of our Lord, who speaks

without disapproval of "a woman being divorced . . . on any pretext whatever" [ἀνδρὸς ἀπαλλαγείσα γυνή καθ' ἣν ἂν τύχη πρόφασιν], and in Josephus, who uses the following words: "He that desires to be divorced from his wife for any cause whatever" [γυναικὸς δὲ τῆς συνοικίσεως βουλόμενος διαξευχθῆναι καθ' ἃς δηποτοῦν αἰτίας. *Ant.* iv. 8. 23 (iv. 253)]. The phrase "for any cause whatever" was evidently a religious catchword of the day, the slogan or war-cry of the Hillelites.

Having now completed our necessarily short study of the laws in Deuteronomy on the question before us and of the controversy on divorce which was approaching a virulent stage during our Lord's ministry, we can understand more clearly the problem proposed by the Pharisees to our Lord in Matthew and Mark.

The Validity of the Law in Deuteronomy.—Having shown that the law in Deut. xxii. 22, relating to the adulterous woman and her paramour, was still valid, and that its validity is recognised in John viii., we have next to prove that the principles and rules laid down by our

Lord on the question of divorce took no account whatever of divorce on the ground of adultery, but only of divorce on lesser and inadequate grounds. If we study the passages in Matthew and Mark this can hardly fail to become obvious if we do so with an open mind. The controversy within Judaism was based wholly on Deut. xxiv. 1-2—that is, on the law which gave a man the right to divorce his wife on certain grounds, which fell short of the act of adultery. Now, that the controversy between the Pharisees and our Lord starts from this very passage (Deut. xxiv. 1-2) even the most confirmed dogmatist cannot deny. In Mark, where the text has been much edited, this is still clear. The Pharisees in Mark actually quote this passage in support of their view: "Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement and to put her away." It is still clearer in Matthew, where the Pharisees open their debate with the words: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" And later, in the same passage, the Pharisees fall back on this

text as their sheet-anchor: "Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorcement and to put her away?" Again, in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 32) this passage from Deuteronomy recurs in the same connection, which, if we omit the clause, "saving for the cause of fornication," reads as follows: "It was said also, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement; but I say unto you that every one that putteth away his wife maketh her an adulteress: and whosoever shall marry her when she is put away committeth adultery." All these passages relate to divorce on inadequate grounds, and in these our Lord teaches that if a man put away his wife on the inadequate grounds advocated by the Pharisees he made his wife an adulteress, and the man who married her became an adulterer.

Divorce for "Lesser Offences."—The controversy, then, between our Lord and the Pharisees is based on this passage in Deuteronomy, which takes no account of adultery, but only of lesser offences, as the ground of divorce.

The sin of adultery is not in question at all. Our Lord's pronouncements in their original form did not deal with those guilty of adultery, but of lesser offences. Accordingly He branded as adulterers both the man who put away his wife on such grounds and married another, and likewise the man who married a woman who had been put away on such grounds. Marriage is indissoluble save on the ground of adultery, as the section in John vii. 53—viii. 11 recognises.

The Passages in Matthew and Mark.—But it is necessary to deal with the passages in Matthew and Mark more in detail. You are aware that the teaching of our Lord in Mark conflicts verbally with that in Matthew. Not to speak of other divergencies, Matthew twice has clauses which expressly justify divorce in the case of an adulterous wife. There is no equivalent of these found in Mark. On the ground of this fact it is urged that Mark's account teaches the absolute indissolubility of marriage. We have already in general terms shown that such an inference is wrong. But the difficulty calls for

more detailed examination. It may at once be admitted that Matthew's narrative shows signs of editing in the additions referred to. But it can be shown to demonstration that Mark's text has undergone several editorial changes. Now, there are two kinds of editing. One editor by inserting certain phrases may only make more clear the original meaning of the text; another editor may by his additions and changes give quite another meaning to his text. To which category Matthew and to which Mark belongs in regard to this narrative will become clear as we advance. First as regards Matthew. In xix. 9 we find: "Whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery." And in v. 32 we have a like statement: "Every one that putteth away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, maketh her an adulteress." Now, since Mark omits these two saving clauses, and since Mark is admittedly the older Gospel, several modern critics definitely maintain either that these clauses were added by the Evangelist

himself or are glosses added by an early scribe, and that in either case they change the whole meaning of the context in which they occur, and that Matthew accordingly misrepresents the teaching of Christ on this question.

Apparent Contradictions Reconciled.—Now, if we did not know that the law requiring the adulterous woman and her paramour to be put to death was still in force, and that our Lord implicitly recognised its validity in the Fourth Gospel, there would be some difficulty in refuting the contention of these critics that the statements attributed to our Lord in Matthew are incorrectly given owing to the misleading glosses inserted, and that the true tradition is preserved in Mark. But, knowing as we do that the law which required the death of the adulterous woman and her paramour was still valid, and was recognised as such by our Lord, it follows that, whatever meaning we attribute to Mark's narrative, such criminals do not come within its scope. The sin of actual adultery is not so much as thought of in Mark. In Mark our Lord deals

with divorce on grounds less serious than that of adultery. The sin of adultery of itself dissolved the marriage bond¹ and entailed, according

¹ Though in Christianity no less than in Judaism the sin of adultery of itself dissolves the essential relation in marriage (see below, p. 67 *sqq.*), Christianity does not, like Judaism, insist on the divorce of the guilty one. Just as the essential relation in every true marriage originates in the faithful troth of man and maid either to other, while the relation next in importance consists in the Church's recognising and blessing this mutual consecration of each to the other with a view to its full fruition, so unfaithfulness on the part of either breaks the essential relation, *though not the official relation established by the Church (or State)* until the divorce is carried out. But just as the two persons concerned initiate the essential relation by their mutual troth, so it lies in their power, when married, to renew this essential relation when it is dissolved by unfaithfulness on either side. The forgiveness of the guilty by the guiltless on the repentance of the former makes the continuance of true marriage possible. Otherwise, if one of the two is unfaithful, and if this unfaithfulness comes to the knowledge of the other, the other cannot condone it. Unless the sin is repented of by the guilty and forgiven by the guiltless, subsequent marital relations, *though still civilly and ecclesiastically legitimate*, are from the standpoint of true Christian marriage irregular, and must continue so till spiritual reconciliation is secured. In fact, the guilty and *unrepentant* husband is, so long as he continues such, an adulterer and a polygamist, and the guilty and *unrepentant* wife an adulteress and a polygamist. For though there be no repetition of the act of adultery, the guilty and unrepentant husband or wife is living in an adulterous condition, *from the standpoint of the Sermon on the Mount: cf. Matt. v. 28*, "Whoso looketh upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery already with her in his heart." The faithful husband who is unacquainted with the secret sin of his wife, and the

to the recognised law of the day, capital punishment. If the offence was proved, and the executive was faithful to its duties, there was no possibility of avoiding the penalty of death. The marriage bond was effectually dissolved and remarriage could follow. But even if the extreme penalties of the law were evaded, divorce became compulsory and remarriage could follow divorce. When we recognise that Mark's narrative takes no cognisance of the case of adultery, but only of the other and inadequate grounds advanced for divorce, the chief apparent contradictions between Matthew and Mark cease to exist. What is implicit in Mark is made explicit in Matthew. Both gospels therefore teach that

faithful wife who is unacquainted with the secret sin of her husband, is of course guiltless in this matter, and the purity of their conjugal relations is unaffected by the secret sins of their spouses.

On the teaching of St Paul, which agrees with the above, see chap. iv. §§ 12-15. At Athens the citizen who failed to divorce a wife taken in adultery was deprived of civil rights: see Demosthenes, p. 1374, *C. Neær.* § 115. It was no adultery for a man to have intercourse with a married woman who prostituted herself: *op. cit.*, p. 1367, § 87. By the Julian Law in Rome a man who failed to divorce an adulterous wife was held to be guilty of the offence of *lenocinium*.

marriage is indissoluble for all offences short of adultery.

The Statements of Christ.—Now, it was impossible to misinterpret the plain words of Christ, as stated in Mark, at the time they were uttered, and so long as the law relating to the infliction of death on the adulteress and her paramour was not abrogated. But, as we know, this law was abrogated a few years later. The natural result was that to our Lord's words, which had one meaning before the abrogation of this law, a different meaning was in many quarters attached after its abrogation, and they came to be regarded as forbidding divorce under all circumstances, though really and originally they referred only to divorces procured on inadequate grounds—that is, grounds not involving adultery. Now, it was just to correct such a grave misconception, or the possibility of such a misconception, of our Lord's words, whether in Mark or other early documents, that Matthew (v. 32, xix. 9) edited the narrative afresh and inserted the clause, “saving for the cause of

unchastity." You will observe here that I translate "saving for the cause of unchastity," and not "for the cause of fornication." For the Greek word here, *πορνεία*, which usually means "fornication," has a different use in several writers in the first century of our era and earlier, and often quite definitely means different forms of unchastity. In fact, in some writers it means either "adultery," "incest," "sodomy," or "fornication," according to the context, as in the LXX. of Hosea, Amos, Sirach, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the Shepherd of Hermas, and to these we may add Matthew, and also Acts, the Pauline Epistles, Jude, Revelation, where it means either adultery, or incest, or sodomy, as well as fornication, or sexual vice generally.¹ In the Testaments of

¹ The history of the word *πορνεία* in Jewish writings has never to my knowledge been investigated, nor have its manifold meanings been ever definitely recognised. The peculiar history of *πορνεία* comes to the front most in Jewish and Christian writings, but the word was used of different sexual sins in classical Greek. Since this question is one of peculiar importance, I have dealt with it in a special chapter (see p. 91 *sqq.*). From that chapter the conclusion is inevitable that *πορνεία* could be used of sexual sin in a generic sense, or of any specific sexual sin.

the Twelve Patriarchs, where the specific word for "adultery" (*μοιχεία*) does not occur, *πορνεία* has both meanings. The fact that some derivatives from the root of *μοιχεία* do occur makes this writer's use of *πορνεία* in the sense of *μοιχεία* all the more significant.¹ In Matthew the specific word for adultery (*μοιχεία*) only occurs in one passage borrowed from Mark. Otherwise he uses *πορνεία* as meaning "adultery" or as sexual sin generally. But to proceed with our subject. By the insertion of these clauses Matthew preserves the meaning of our Lord's statements on this subject for all subsequent generations that had lost touch with the circumstances and limitations under which they were originally made. Matthew's additions are therefore justifiable. Without them the reader is apt to misunderstand the passages on divorce.

¹ In the Testaments we find *μοιχός* twice, *μοιχεύειν* thrice, and *μοιχαλís* once. But in T. Joseph. iii. 8, Joseph says of Potiphar's wife: *εἰς πορνείαν με ἐφελκύσατο*, whereas Potiphar's wife, v. 1, describes the same sin in the words: *εἰ μοιχεύσαι οὐ θέλεις*. In fact, the Greek translator of the Testaments uses *πορνεία* of four different sexual sins. For full information, see Chapter VIII. p. 90 *sqq.*

Our Lord's teaching is therefore conveyed in the words: "Every one that putteth away his wife, saving for the cause of unchastity¹ maketh her an adulteress, and whosoever marrieth her when she is put away committeth adultery."

Interpretative Additions. — Now, Matthew's insertion of phrases in his text is not confined to these two passages. When he was convinced that there was a risk of misunderstanding Christ's words, he followed the same practice elsewhere. I will take only one example, the first beatitude in Luke and Matthew. Luke records only four beatitudes. The terms of these require to be carefully studied in order to apprehend them

¹ "Saving for the cause of unchastity." In any case the translation "fornication" is absolutely wrong in this and several other passages in the New Testament, see p. 109 *sqq.* This phrase which Matthew has inserted affects only the clause in which it occurs. It has saved the meaning of Christ's teaching at the cost of its logic. For if a man's wife has been guilty of adultery, her divorce does not make her an adulteress; for she is that already. When once we understand the context aright in Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, it would improve the text to omit the interpolated phrases.

For when they are removed, the text of Matt. v. 32 can only be interpreted of a woman put away on some ground less than that of adultery. By divorcing her, her husband makes her what she was not before, an adulteress. The presumption here is, of course, that she will marry again.

aright. Else they may be grossly misinterpreted. Thus it is clear that we are not to take literally the first beatitude, "Blessed are ye poor; for yours is the kingdom of heaven." These words appear to pronounce a blessing on actual poverty. But this, of course, is not the meaning. The Hebrew scholar at once recognises that the word "poor" here has a spiritual meaning belonging to the word for "poor" in Hebrew, and means "humble." Matthew, seeing that this word would be misinterpreted by Greek readers, rightly added the phrase "in spirit" after "poor." "Blessed are the poor in spirit; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." By the addition of this phrase misinterpretation of the text becomes impossible. This is an exact parallel to the addition "saving for the cause of unchastity." This latter addition does not change the meaning of the text, but removes it—or, at all events, should have removed it—beyond the possibility of misinterpretation; but, as we see from the unhappy controversies of our own and earlier times, Matthew did not succeed in his

object, and the very people he tried to save from misconceiving the text now turn on Matthew and charge him with wresting the meaning of the text by his addition and so with perverting the teaching of Christ. To Matthew's interpretative addition the Church is under deep obligation, though, now that we understand the subject to which our Lord's words were directed, we could dispense with it and by so doing improve the text. In respect of this difference of Matthew from Mark, it is clear that Matthew has fully justified himself. But there are several other differences between the two Evangelists in this account, and the study of these tends to prove that in this discourse at all events Matthew is much more trustworthy than Mark. In these divergencies from Mark we may presume that Matthew followed Q, a lost document written between 35 and 50 A.D.

Unwarrantable Changes in Text.—Where Mark diverges from Matthew on this subject, his text is edited, and not in a good sense. In x. 12 Mark speaks of a woman divorcing her husband. But such a statement is unhistorical, and would

have been incomprehensible to a Jew. The law allowed no Jewish woman to divorce her husband, and this right was not accorded to her for a thousand years later.¹ This unwarrantable change introduced into the text by Mark may be

¹ The claim that divorce was the act only and solely of the husband was formally abrogated in the eleventh century by Rabbi Gershon of Mainz. See *Jewish Encyc.* iv. 625. The unrestricted right of the husband to divorce his wife (*cf.* Joseph., *Ant.* xv. vii. 10) was modified by certain regulations in the Mishnah. He could not divorce his wife if she were insane (*Yeb.* xix. 1), or in captivity (*Ket.* iv. 9), or when she was a minor or too young to understand the technicalities of the law. Otherwise "a woman could be divorced with or without her will, but a man only with his will" (*Yeb.* xiv. 1).

Josephus tells of two women, Herodias, who deserted, and Salome, who divorced, their respective husbands, both daughters of the house of Herod. Josephus emphasises the fact that each was guilty of a flagrant breach of Jewish law. As such it never formed a precedent. Herodias, according to Josephus (*Ant.* xviii. 5. 4), deliberately confounded the laws of her country (*ἐπὶ συγχύσει φρονήσασα τῶν πατριῶν*), and, deserting (*διαστᾶσα*) Herod (Philip?), son of Herod the Great, married Herod Antipas, her husband's brother by the same father. The second woman was Salome (*Ant.* xv. 7. 10), sister of Herod the Great, who sent her husband Costobarus a bill of divorce dissolving the marriage (*πέμπει . . . γραμμάτιον ἀπολυομένη τὸν γάμον*)—an act which Josephus states was contrary to Jewish law. These two breaches of Jewish law never became precedents, and no careful exegete would attempt to explain Mark x. 12 by making it refer to what were merely the exceptional and lawless acts of two abnormal women. See "Herodias" in Index I.

due to the fact that he wrote his gospel in Rome and wished to give the words a wider application; for Roman women could divorce their husbands. But there is a further objection to this statement. It forms an intolerable anticlimax. If a husband were forbidden to divorce his wife on certain grounds, it was wholly unnecessary to add that a wife was likewise forbidden to divorce her husband on similar grounds, seeing that by the law she never had the right to divorce her husband at all. Our Lord does not indulge in such inconsequential absurdities.

An "Unhistorical" Question.—Again, the question put by the Pharisees to our Lord, as it appears in Mark, is likewise unhistorical. Mark represents the Pharisees as asking: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?" Mark has here generalised the question in order to appeal to a larger world than Judaism.¹ He has omitted

¹ An analogous instance of Mark's editing his materials will be found in his omission of Matt. xv. 24. As a disciple of Paul, and as he is writing in Rome, he omits the words which we find in Matt. xv. 24, "I was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel." The genuineness of those words can hardly be disputed.

The whole text of Mark x. 2-12 appears to be drastically re-

the technical phrase "for every cause," the full force of which was unintelligible outside Judaism. But thereby he has removed it from its historical setting and robbed it of its local colouring. But this is not the main offence of Mark: he represents the Pharisees as asking a question which no orthodox Scribe or Pharisee could have asked. For the law expressly allowed divorce. A devout Mohamedan might just as reasonably ask his religious authorities if he might marry a second wife, though all the time he knows he could marry four. Here Matthew unquestionably preserves the question in its original form: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" This was the question, the burning

edited and secondary, see below, pp. 85-90. For other instances of Mark's re-editing the text, and to its hurt, we might compare Mark iv. 24, ἐν ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε, μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν καὶ προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν, with Matt. vii. 2, Luke vi. 38. Here it is at once obvious that Matthew and Luke give the first five words in their original setting. As for the last three, their original context is given rightly in Matt. vi. 33, Luke xii. 31, and not as in Mark. See Hawkins and Streeter, *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, pp. 32, 172. Again, on pp. 169-170 Streeter shows that Mark iii. 22-26 is a mutilated excerpt from Q, which is more faithfully preserved in Mark xii. 22, 24-28, 30=Luke xi. 14-15, 17-20, 23.

question, of the day. The Pharisees put Christ to the test by asking Him which side He took in the controversy which was then dividing the religious world of Judaism. To this question Christ does not reply directly, but, as His custom was, lifts the whole matter into a higher plane, and reminds His hearers that in the beginning God made them male and female; that in marriage they became one flesh—a unity which could not be broken by anything save adultery. The Pharisees, amazed by the boldness of Christ's reply, rejoin: But how can you forbid divorce on lesser grounds than adultery, seeing that Moses commanded a man to give his wife a bill of divorcement on such grounds, should he so desire it, and put her away? Whereunto Christ replies: Moses did not command you, as you say: he only suffered you to do so owing to the hardness of your hearts. Hence whosoever shall put away his wife on such grounds, and shall marry another, committeth adultery.

The Principle thus laid down by Christ applied universally as the Pauline Teaching.—

In the reply thus given to the Pharisees our Lord deals only with the question of divorce on inadequate grounds, and settles it in conformity with the principle embodied in the words, "For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave unto his wife; and the twain shall become one flesh" (Gen. ii. 24). But in relation to marriage this principle was one capable of universal application, though in His controversy with the Pharisees it could only be applied within the limits prescribed by that controversy. Hence it was left to the great Apostle of the Gentiles to apply this principle without reservation or limit to the doctrine of Christian marriages. In 1 Cor. vi. the Apostle expounds this principle in reference to Christian marriage, and in so doing uses the very words of Gen. ii. 24, on which our Lord had based it. It is to 1 Cor. vi., therefore, that we must look for the principle applied in its entirety to the doctrine of Christian marriage.¹

¹ See Chap. IV., §§ 12-15. The above paragraph was not included in the Sermon as originally delivered.

The Right to Divorce.—We conclude, therefore, that the teaching of our Lord on divorce is truly and explicitly set forth in Matthew. Matthew, we have found, is supported by the Johannine Gospel, and implicitly by Mark if his words are construed from the original standpoint of the debate between our Lord and the Pharisees. We have seen further that Matthew has corrected some errors in Mark's account, and, in order to avoid a very natural misinterpretation of Mark's text, has added the phrase, "saving for the cause of unchastity." Thus Christ, by accepting the Jewish law relating to the adulterous wife and confining His own enactments to less grievous offenders, implicitly allows the right of divorce on the ground of adultery, as well as subsequent remarriage on the part of the guiltless person concerned, but forbids divorce on any lesser ground, as well as the remarriage of those divorced on any such lesser ground. Since, therefore, our Lord's statements on divorce condemned only those who put away their wives on inadequate grounds, and since these state-

ments explicitly in Matthew and implicitly in Mark admit the right of divorce on the ground of adultery, it follows that there is no justification whatever in Christ's teaching for the attitude assumed by a large body of ecclesiastics who, at the present day, deny the right of divorce in the case of adultery, and the right of subsequent remarriage to the guiltless person, and, in the case of such remarriage, refuse such persons Communion — in other words, excommunicate them. Of these ecclesiastics, who lord it so mercilessly over the heritage committed to them, we may say, with the Old Testament prophet, that by their misrepresentations, unconscious for the most part, "they have made the heart of the righteous sad, whom God hath not made sad," and that, like their forerunners in the New Testament, they are making void the teaching of Christ by their traditions.¹

¹ Our Lord does not base His teaching on divorce on the indefensible exegesis of Deut. xxiv. 1-2 maintained by the Shammaites, but on Gen. ii. 24. It is wholly wrong, therefore, to state that He adopted the teaching of the Shammaites. Christ's use of the Old Testament differs wholly from its mechanical use by the Jewish Rabbis, the Rabbinically-minded Matthew, and the early Christians in general: *cf.* Burkitt, *Gospel History*, 202 *sq.*

CHAPTER II

MATT. XIX. 10-12 NOT CONNECTED WITH THE QUESTION OF DIVORCE

“The disciples say unto him, If the case of the man is so with his wife, it is not expedient to marry. But he said unto them, All men cannot receive this saying, but they to whom it is given. For there are eunuchs, which were so born from their mother’s womb : and there are eunuchs, which were made eunuchs by men : and there are eunuchs, which made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven’s sake. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it.”—*Matt.* xix. 10-12.

THE introductory words show that the dialogue is now confined to Christ and His disciples. Mark in x. 10 assigns *Matt.* xix. 9 to a subsequent conversation “in the house.” Here I accept, as the best explanation of this difficult passage, that given by Prof. M’Neile (*St Matthew*, p. 275), who suggests that “10-12 originally stood in another context, following *some utterance on self-denial* for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, *which might include the renunciation of marriage* (cf. *Luke* xiv. 26, xviii. 29).”¹ This

¹ The italics are mine.

explanation adequately meets every difficulty. In the face of such an utterance the disciples say that it were better not to marry than to marry and then to be obliged to renounce wife and children ; but our Lord rejoins that only a limited number are called to make this renunciation—only those “ to whom it is given.”

I accept this explanation ; for no satisfactory interpretation of the phrase “ this saying ” has yet been given, if we are obliged to interpret 10-12 in connection with the preceding verses. We cannot take it as referring to the words of the disciples, “ It is not expedient to marry,” seeing that our Lord in xix. 4-5 has just based his whole argument on the fact that marriage is a divine ordinance and that for this cause a man shall leave his father and mother and cleave unto his wife (Gen. ii. 24). Nor can this phrase refer satisfactorily to this quotation from Genesis which declares that marriage is a divine ordinance and that man should observe it as such. If this reference were right, then it would be impossible to attribute such an ineptitude to our Lord ; for

it would practically amount to this: Yes, the statement as to marriage is quite true, but certain individuals cannot avail themselves of it for physical reasons and certain others for spiritual reasons—say about 1 in 20,000 or thereabouts!

With Prof. M'Neile's view on this passage, therefore, I wholly agree.

Furthermore, it seems possible to explain the reason for the insertion of xix. 10-12 in its present context. Matthew rearranged his materials, as we know (Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ*², 161 *sqq.*), and brought together discourses uttered on different occasions. Now, there were apparently two grounds for combining xix. 2-9 and xix. 10-12. (1) There was a seeming affinity between the subjects of the two passages. (2) The keyword of each passage is the same, *i.e.* αἰτία, and occurs in the first verse of each passage. This fact suggests an affinity, if not an identity, of subject. But the suggestion is misleading; for, whereas αἰτία = "cause" in xix. 3, it = "case" in xix. 10. In xix. 10 it is most probably a Latinism. In Matt. xii. 14, xxii. 15, xxvii. 1, 7,

xxviii. 12, there is the Latinism *συμβούλιον λαμβάνειν* (cf. *consilium capere*). Apparently *αἰτία* has the same meaning in many cursives in Mark v. 33, which read *αἰτίαν* instead of *ἀλήθειαν*. Moulton and Milligan (*Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament*) adduce two passages from the Papyri which give some support to this meaning.

CHAPTER III

ROMANS VII. 1—3 NOT CONNECTED WITH THE QUESTION OF DIVORCE

“1. Or are ye ignorant, brethren (for I speak to men that know (the) law,¹ how that the law hath dominion over a man so long time as he liveth? 2. For the woman that hath a husband is bound by law to the husband while he liveth; but if the husband die, she is discharged from the law of the husband. 3. So then if, while the husband liveth, she is joined to another man, she shall be called an adulteress: but if the husband die, she is free from the law, so that she is no adulteress, though she be joined to another man.”

THIS passage is frequently cited as setting forth St Paul's view on divorce. But, if we study the passage carefully, it would appear that in reality it has nothing to do with this subject directly or indirectly. In this chapter the Apostle teaches that the Christian is freed from

¹ Sanday and Headlam on Rom. ii. 12 point out that $\delta \nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\varsigma$ = the Mosaic law, whereas $\nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\varsigma$, which stands here, = law in general, or the Mosaic law *in its quality as law*. To the Jew, even the Jewish Christian, the Mosaic law was the definite embodiment of law. Hence in ver. 1, though the word is without the article ($\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\iota \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\nu \lambda\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}$), Paul's readers would associate the word "law" with the Mosaic law. In Gal. ii. 19 $\nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\varsigma$ = the Mosaic Law.

the law by death. As an illustration of this principle he takes the case of a married woman in verses 2-3.

Now, in order to understand the illustration we must determine first of all who are the persons who are said to "know (the) law," and in the next place what is the meaning of the term "law" in this passage. The persons addressed are, of course, the Jewish and Gentile members of the Church in Rome, to whom the epistle is addressed. In the next place, the law specified here signified, not only to the Jewish Christians but even to the Gentile Christians, first and chiefly the Mosaic law as the most perfect embodiment of the principle of law in general. To the Apostle's readers law in general as expressed in the legislation of other nations would only in a limited degree approach the perfection found in the Mosaic law. The Gentile Christians looked upon the Mosaic law as sacred. The Old Testament was from a very early date read at their church services. It constituted for many decades their only

Bible. The great mass of the Galatians (Gal. iv. 8) were Gentiles, and yet Paul (iv. 21) addresses them as familiar with the law. Hence, though Paul's argument rests theoretically on the nature of law in general, practically it is based on the Mosaic law.

Again, the illustration would not hold good if the law referred to were Roman or Greek law, or the general idea of law as prevailing amongst civilised Gentile nations. For everywhere amongst the Gentiles the right of divorce was accorded to the wife as well as to the husband. Hence the Apostle could not truly argue from pre-Christian or contemporary Gentile law that "the woman that hath an husband is bound by law to the husband while he liveth." For the woman could in accordance with Gentile law break the bond by procuring a divorce.

But though Gentile law permitted a woman to divorce her husband, the law of Moses did not. Hence, if the Apostle's illustration is to be in the least degree pertinent to the question at

issue, we must assume that he has drawn his illustration from the Mosaic law.¹

We conclude, therefore, that the Apostle drew his illustration from the Mosaic law. But, though he drew his illustration from this law, he did not accept the teaching of that law on divorce, since it would have obliged him to admit the right of the husband to divorce his wife on inadequate grounds.

From the above facts the important conclusion follows that, *since the illustration* (Rom. vii. 2-3) of his great theme—that the Christian through his fellowship in the death of Christ has died to the law—is based wholly on the Mosaic law of marriage, it has no bearing whatever on the doctrine of Christian marriage and divorce. It is an illustration and nothing more. If we would discover the Apostle's teaching on marriage and divorce we must seek it elsewhere.

¹ There is a contingency which the Apostle appears not to have taken into account. Though the wife could not divorce her husband, the husband might divorce the wife, and she would then cease to be bound by the law.

CHAPTER IV

I CORINTHIANS VII. 10-15 (R.V.)

“10. But unto the married I give charge, *yea*, not I, but the Lord, That the wife depart not (*μὴ χωρισθῆναι*) from her husband 11. (but and if she depart (*χωρισθῆ*), let her remain unmarried (*ἄγαμος*), or else be reconciled to her husband); and that the husband leave not (*μὴ ἀφιέναι*) his wife.

“12. But to the rest say I, not the Lord: If any brother hath an unbelieving wife, and she is content to dwell with him, let him not leave (*μὴ ἀφιέτω*) her. 13. And the woman which hath an unbelieving husband, and he is content to dwell with her, let her not leave (*μὴ ἀφιέτω*) her husband. 14. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother: else were your children unclean; but now are they holy. 15. Yet if the unbelieving departeth (*χωρίζεται*), let him depart (*χωριζέσθω*): the brother or the sister is not in bondage (*οὐ δεδούλωται*) in such cases: but God has called us to peace.”

THIS passage is a reply of the Apostle to certain questions put to him by members of the Christian Church at Corinth (1 Cor. vii. 1). Its teaching, therefore, furnishes no complete doctrine on the question of Christian marriage and divorce. Nay more, the more thoroughly we study this passage, the more incomplete and indefinite its teaching appears, unless taken in conjunction

with certain statements in 1 Cor. vi. When studied together, it is quite possible to draw certain valid inferences from them on the subject before us.

§ 1. *Many of the versions are misleading or actually wrong.*—But the difficulty of arriving at just conclusions on the questions involved is intensified by the fact that scholars have as a rule failed to recognise that the Greek verbs *χωρίζεσθαι* and *ἀφιέναι* are used technically with regard to marriage. Luther's German version takes these words to be exact synonyms in every case but one (vii. 11*b*), and renders the first by *sich scheiden* always, and the second twice by the same word.¹ The A.V. is more accurate. It renders the first verb "to depart" and the second by two renderings: "to put away" when used of the husband, and "to leave" when used of the wife—a distinction without any justification in the context. The R.V. is more logical:

¹ Even in the modern German translation edited by Johannes Weiss, 1908, *χωρίζεσθαι* is rendered by *sich scheiden* in vii. 10, and by *sich trennen* in vii. 11.

it agrees with the A.V. by translating the first verb "to depart," but renders the second in the three passages where it occurs by "to leave." But such renderings practically make the two verbs synonymous. Moreover, the rendering of ἀφιέναι is certainly wrong in this context.

§ 2. *The Roman, Syriac, and Armenian Vulgates are accurate on the whole.*—The Roman Vulgate is very accurate. Thus it renders the first verb by *discedere* and the second by *dimittere*. The latter verb technically means "to divorce," both in ordinary Latin and in the Vulgate itself: *cf.* Mark x. 2, 4, 11, 12; Matt. v. 31, 32, xix. 3, 7, 8, 9; Luke xvi. 18, where the Greek has ἀπολύειν. The Syriac Vulgate is also accurate, but in the Gospels, alike in the ancient and Vulgate versions, the renderings are inconsistent.

§ 3. *Two conclusions stated in advance as to the translation and the text of 1 Cor. vii. 10-15.*—In order to make the argument easier to follow I will here state the conclusions at which I have arrived from a study of the text and the

Jewish and Greek and Roman law bearing on the questions it deals with. These conclusions are:—

(1) *χωρίζεσθαι* = “to desert,” and *ἀφιέναι* “to divorce,” exactly as it is in the Vulgate.

(2) From the recognition of this fact it follows that vii. 11*α* is an interpolation in the text; for, whereas vii. 10 treats only of “desertion,” *i.e.* *χωρίζεσθαι*, on the part of the woman, vii. 11*α* presupposes its theme to be “divorce” and attaches the meaning of divorce to *χωρίζεσθαι*.

It is not until we render the two verbs in their technical sense in connection with marriage, and excise vii. 11*α*, that we can interpret 1 Cor. vii. 10–15 aright.

We shall now apply ourselves to a critical examination of the translation, and in a subordinate degree of the text, of 1 Cor. vii. 10–15.

§ 4. 1 Cor. vii. 10–15 admits of four different interpretations according to the meanings assigned to the verbs *χωρίζεσθαι* and *ἀφιέναι*.—This passage admits of four distinct interpretations according to the meanings we assign to

these verbs. Now since *χωρίζεσθαι* can mean (1) "to depart" (*i.e.* "to desert"), (2) "to divorce," and *ἀφιέναι* can also bear these two meanings (see Chapter IX., p. 113 *sq.*), and since both these verbs can be used of the husband deserting or divorcing his wife and of the wife deserting or divorcing her husband, it appears at first sight that no absolutely conclusive interpretation can be given. The words in the text seem too indefinite in meaning to admit of any incontrovertible conclusion.

Notwithstanding this fact, it is possible to arrive at the Apostle's teaching by considering the four possible interpretations that the passage admits of, owing to the different meanings attaching to these two verbs. These different interpretations become possible by taking (1) both these verbs to mean "to desert"; (2) both to mean "to divorce"; (3) the first (*χωρίζεσθαι*) to mean "to desert," and the second (*ἀφιέναι*) to mean "to divorce"; (4) the first to mean "to divorce," and the second to mean "to desert."

§ 5. *But only interpretation (3) is admissible in this context.*—But, as we at once discover, interpretations (1), (2), and (4) are impossible. For in 1 Cor. vii. 10–11 the Apostle cites our Lord's authority for the Logion or saying, *γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς μὴ χωρισθῆναι . . . καὶ ἄνδρα μὴ ἀφιέναι.* *The right interpretation of this Logion provides the key for the right interpretation of these verbs throughout vii. 10–15.* Now, since these words of our Lord were addressed to Jews, and since amongst the Jews the husband could divorce his wife but a wife could not divorce her husband (see p. 28 *n.*), though she could desert him, these facts determine the respective meanings of *χωρίζεσθαι* and *ἀφιέναι* as being “to desert” and “to divorce” in this passage. Of this conclusion, valid in itself, we find external confirmation in Josephus, *Ant.* xv. 7. 10, where these verbs are used exactly as in our text. Josephus, it is true, uses a compound of *χωρίζεσθαι*, but this does not affect the evidence. Josephus writes *ἀνδρὶ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεστιν παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν (i.e. πέμπειν γραμματίον), γυναικὶ δὲ οὐδὲ διαχωρισθείση*

καθ' αὐτὴν γαμηθῆναι μὴ τοῦ πρότερον ἀνδρὸς ἀφιέντος.

I have underlined the words which are parallel in these two passages, and which are *decisive* in favour of interpretation (3). Josephus here asserts: "With us it is lawful for a husband to do so [*i.e.* to send a bill of divorce]; but a wife, if she deserts her husband, cannot of herself marry (another man) unless her former husband divorce her."

Since our Lord was speaking to Jews, His words quoted by the Apostle in 1 Cor. vii. 10 cannot justly bear any other meaning than that which they bore when they were uttered and which they bear in Josephus, and which they must bear, as we have learnt independently from the Old Testament and the Talmud. In other words, we are obliged to fall back on interpretation (3) as the only one admissible.¹

¹ Should it be argued that the Apostle misunderstands the saying of Christ and takes both words as meaning "to divorce," the rejoinder is easy. In that case the Apostle would have used one and the same word in relation to both husband and wife. That is, he would have used either *χωρίζεσθαι* in reference to both, or *ἀφιέναι*. As a matter of fact, each verb preserves its distinct meaning: *χωρίζεσθαι* = "to desert" in vii. 10 of the wife and in

§ 6. *Interpretation (3) of 1 Cor. vii. 10-15, based on the fact that χωρίζεσθαι = "to desert" and ἀφιέναι = "to divorce."*—1 Cor. vii. 10-11. In the case of believers Christ's command is that the wife is not to desert (χωρισθῆναι) her husband [but if she has deserted (?) him she is to remain unmarried, or to be reconciled to him], and the husband is not to divorce (ἀφιέναι) his wife. vii. 11α I have bracketed as an interpolation (see § 7). It could not have been addressed to Jews. No Jewish woman could remarry, unless her husband divorced her. This fact was familiar to and unquestioned by every Jew or Jewess from childhood onwards.

In § 7 it is shown that χωρισθῆναι in this clause must be translated "if she has divorced her husband"; and since no Jewess could legally do vii. 15 of her husband, and ἀφιέναι = "to divorce" in vii. 10, 12 of the husband, and in vii. 13 of the wife.

The same rejoinder holds against the argument that the Apostle is giving a new application of Christ's words by using them in reference to his Corinthian converts, who were acquainted with the Greek laws of marriage, which permitted a woman to divorce her husband. Here again, if this argument held good, the Apostle would have used one and the same verb, if he had been speaking of divorce in both cases.

so, it follows that this clause could not have belonged to the original Logion of Christ. In the next section we shall prove that it could not have come from the hand of the Apostle.

1 Cor. vii. 12-15. In the case of mixed marriages the Apostle, speaking on his own authority and addressing Gentiles, forbids the believing husband to *divorce* (ἀφιέναι) his unbelieving wife, and the believing wife to *divorce* (ἀφιέναι) her unbelieving husband. But, if the unbelieving partner (husband or wife) deserts (χωρίζεται), the believing partner is not to be in bondage (οὐ δεδούλωται) under such circumstances.

In this interpretation the meaning is clear save in the clause vii. 11a, εἰ δὲ καὶ χωρισθῆ, μενέτω ἄγαμος, ἢ τῷ ἀνδρὶ καταλλαγήτω, and the words οὐ δεδούλωται in vii. 15. Let us now study these.

§ 7. *Clause vii. 11a is an interpolation—an interpolation which has been the direct cause of the unintelligibleness of the Pauline teaching on marriage and divorce from the earliest days down to the present, and which contains the only words in the New Testament which forbid remarriage*

after divorce.—This clause appears to have been a marginal and misleading gloss, which was subsequently incorporated into the text. For χωρίζεσθαι in this clause ought to mean “to desert,” as it does immediately before in the Logion of Christ. But it does not mean “to desert,” but “to divorce.” Since this is so, this clause did not form part of the Logion of Christ here cited, nor, as we shall see, was it an addition of the Apostle. It means “to divorce,” for the words μενέτω ἄγαμος (*i.e.* “let her not marry again”) require this meaning. But no Jewish woman who deserted her husband could remarry till her husband *divorced* her. This is stated categorically by Josephus (see § 5 above), and was, as we know from other independent evidence, the universal law of Judaism. Hence in this clause χωρίζεσθαι must mean “to divorce” in order to justify the words μενέτω ἄγαμος which follow. Possibly the word καταλλαγήτω has here a technical meaning, *i.e.* “let her remarry,”¹ see-

¹ *i.e.* her first husband. Professor Milligan informs me that this meaning of καταλλάσσεσθαι is probably supported in a

ing that ἀπαλλάσσεθαι = “to divorce” and is used both of the husband and of the wife: *cf.* Plato, *Leges*, ii. 868, ἀπαλλάττεσθαι γυναῖκά τε ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀπὸ γυναικός.

It is thus manifest that this clause, which requires that a woman who had divorced her husband should remain unmarried, did not proceed from Christ. No more can it have come from the hand of the Apostle. That St Paul, as a learned Jewish scholar, understood aright the words of Christ (γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς μὴ χωρισθῆναι) as referring to the desertion by a Jewish wife of her husband, we cannot for a moment doubt. This being so, he could not

papyrus of the late third or early fourth century: P. Oxy. xii. 1477. 5 sq., where we find, amongst a list of questions addressed to a deity or oracle, the two following:—εἰ δέδοται μοι ἐτέρῳ συναλλάξαι; εἰ καταλλάσσομαι εἰς τὸν γογον; which Grenfell and Hunt translate: “Has it been granted to me to make a contract with another person? Am I to be reconciled (?) with my offspring (?)?” But, as Professor Milligan suggests, it should perhaps be rendered: “Has it been granted to me to have intercourse with another (ἐτέρῳ); Am I to remarry with a view to offspring?” In line 19 we have εἰ ἀπαλλάσσομαι τῆς γυναικός; “Am I to divorce my wife?” The questions are addressed by different people, men and women, and not by one particular individual. Professor Milligan’s suggestion is highly probable.

have added, as a qualification of Christ's command, a statement which had nothing to do with it, and which in fact presupposed that Christ's command referred to a wife divorcing her husband. Christ's words regarding the wife relate only to the question of *desertion*: this clause considers only the question of *divorce*. This clause, therefore, cannot have come from the hand of St Paul, but from some scribe who misunderstood wholly the words of Christ as quoted by the Apostle. Accordingly, it must be excised from the text as an interpolation, and one that has served to make the text a hopeless enigma to all serious students of the Pauline teaching on this question. It is notable that the only words in the New Testament which forbid remarriage after divorce are to be found in the interpolation of an ignorant scribe.

§ 8. *The original form of the Logion of Christ recovered, and also its meaning.*—When the interpolation is excised from the text we are enabled to recover the original form of this Logion of Christ, which is not recorded elsewhere: *i.e.*

<ή> γυνή ἀπὸ <τοῦ> ἀνδρὸς μὴ χωρισθήτω καὶ <ὁ> ἀνὴρ <τὴν> γυναῖκα μὴ ἀφιέτω—“Let not the wife desert her husband, and let not the husband divorce his wife.” That this and none other is the right rendering of this Logion of Christ we could rightly and adequately infer from the fact that a Jewish wife might desert but could not divorce her husband. But happily we find in Josephus, as we have already observed, exactly the same verbs (save that the first is a compound) used technically in regard to desertion and divorce. Thus Josephus, *Ant.* xv. 7. 10, writes: *γυναικὶ δὲ οὐδὲ (ἔξεστιν) διαχωρισθείση καθ’ αὐτὴν γαμηθῆναι μὴ τοῦ πρότερον ἀνδρὸς ἀφιέντος*¹ = “But if the wife desert her husband she cannot of

¹ Niese, the last editor of Josephus, makes a bad blunder in this passage. Not recognising the technical terms used here by his author, he wrongly follows PE and reads *ἐφιέντος*. The subject of the text itself proves that this is a corruption. For if *διαχωρίζεσθαι* = “to be divorced” here, then the husband had no further control over her. Hence *ἐφιέντος* would therefore be inadmissible. If, on the other hand, it = “to desert”, then *ἀφιέντος* (= “divorce her”) must follow; for till he divorced her she could not marry again. Besides, *ἀφιέντος* is supported by FLAMVW and the Lat. *dimittatur*. In vol. iii. Niese says that the scribe of P was *imperitus*, and that he *sæpe vix intellexisse quæ scripsit*.

herself marry another unless her former husband divorce her."

The Logion, then, "let not the wife desert her husband and let not the husband divorce his wife," is the law laid down by our Lord for His hearers. The second half of the Logion is, like other Logia of our Lord (Matt. v. 32, xix. 9; Luke xvi. 18) on the question of marriage and divorce, to be interpreted most naturally, as they are, in relation to the controversy between the Hillelites and the Shammaites. The Logion was, therefore, restricted in its bearing, and was directed against those *who divorced their wives on inadequate grounds*. What should be done in the case of actual unchastity is not here considered by the Apostle. He has already dealt with that contingency in the preceding chapter (1 Cor. vi. 13*b*, 15-17; see § 12 below). The first clause of the Logion is to be interpreted analogously. As the husband is not to divorce his wife, so the wife is not to desert her husband on inadequate grounds. The words of Christ do not apply with the same fitness to Greek as to

Jewish women, seeing that Greek women could divorce their husbands. But the Apostle does not dare to make any change in his Master's words, and therein shows the fidelity with which he transmits the Logion. Herein his text stands out in strong contrast with Mark x. 12, who, though professedly giving an exact historical account of our Lord's words, consciously or unconsciously changes them and adapts them to his Gentile readers (ἐὰν αὐτὴ ἀπολύσασα τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς γαμήσῃ ἄλλον, μοιχᾶται), unless here we adopt the text in D and some Latin MSS. For a short discussion of this text of D, see Chap. V. 75-76.

§ 9. οὐ δεδούλωται. — The meaning of these words in vii. 15 has been the cause of no little controversy. Since we now know the meaning which the Apostle attaches to χωρίζεσθαι, we accordingly translate: "If the unbelieving (husband) deserteth, let him desert: the brother or the sister *is not under bondage* in such cases." Now, a comparison of this verse and vii. 39 suggests that οὐ δεδούλωται bears the same

meaning as ἐλευθέρα in that verse, where we read: "The wife is bound (δέδεταί) by law so long as her husband liveth, but, if her husband die (κοιμηθῆ), she is free (ἐλευθέρα) to marry whom she will, only in the Lord." The use of ἐλευθέρα in this sense is attested also in Rom. vii. 3, where it bears the same meaning in a like context. οὐ δεδούλωται and ἐλευθέρα thus appear to have the same meaning. This fact suggests that the right of remarriage is here conceded to the believing husband or wife who is deserted by an unbelieving partner.

§ 10. *Hence the only admissible interpretation of 1 Cor. vii. 10-15 appears to be as follows.*—vii. 10, 11b. In reference to believers the Apostle states the command of Christ, that the wife is not to desert her husband and the husband is not to divorce his wife. Taken strictly, this command, as we have seen, was applicable only to Jews and to Jewish Christians who accepted the Jewish law of marriage. Its original reference was to wives who deserted their husbands, and to husbands who divorced

their wives *on inadequate grounds*. The Apostle makes no attempt to remove the limitations prescribed both by the controversy in connection with which it was originally uttered and by its actual terms, which presuppose desertion to be the only right within the reach of the woman, while the right of divorce was restricted solely to the man. Nor does the Apostle attempt to adapt this Logion to his Gentile readers. Hence, if the original sense of the Logion is to be preserved, all that it means is that in Christian marriage desertion and divorce are alike forbidden on inadequate grounds. But, since many Christian marriages were essentially vitiated by the unfaithfulness of one or of both parties, it is obvious that, if the Apostle states anywhere the essential principles on which Christian marriage is based, these must be looked for not here but elsewhere—*i.e.* in 1 Cor. vi. 13-17 (see § 12).

vii. 12-15. In the case of mixed marriages the Apostle forbids the believing husband or wife *to divorce* the unbelieving partner. But if

the unbelieving partner *deserts* the believing partner, the latter is not in bondage (οὐ δεδούλωται) under such circumstances, and is apparently at liberty to remarry. But this inference is not certain. In any case the Apostle sanctions the right of permanent separation, which is in certain respects equivalent to divorce.

In ver. 14 the Apostle is evidently replying to a question of the Corinthian Church: "Will the believer be defiled and the limbs of Christ desecrated by intercourse with a heathen?" The Jews absolutely forbade such marriages. Should not, therefore, the Christians not only forbid but also declare them null and void? *This verse furnishes the key to the right interpretation of vii. 12-15, and makes it clear that these verses do not deal with any question based on a breach of the marriage bond such as adultery. The question at issue is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of marriage with a heathen.*

In ver. 13 the Apostle, by issuing the command that the believing wife was not to divorce her unbelieving husband, if he were content to

dwell with her, shows how far he has advanced beyond the Jewish conception of marriage, to which alone the Logion in vii. 10, 11b is applicable, and in accordance with which the wife could desert but not divorce her husband. Here the right of divorce on the part of the wife as well as of the husband is recognised as an existing fact, but believers are forbidden to avail themselves of it in regard to their unbelieving partners, in case the latter are content to dwell with them. *The mere fact that they were unbelievers could not justify their being divorced.*

§ 11. 1 Cor. vii. 10-15 *critically and literally translated.*—10. But unto the married I give charge, (yet) not I, but the Lord, That the wife is not to desert her husband,¹ 11. And that the husband is not to divorce his wife. 12. But to the rest say I, not the Lord: If any brother hath an unbelieving wife and she is content to

¹ Here is added an interpolation: "But and if she divorce ($\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\theta\eta$) (him), let her remain unmarried, or else be remarried (?) to her husband." On this interpolation and the necessity of rendering $\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\theta\eta$ as meaning "divorce" here and not "desertion" as in vii. 10, 15, see above, §§ 7-8.

dwell with him, let him not divorce her. 13. And a woman which hath an unbelieving husband and he is content to dwell with her, let her not divorce her husband. 14. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother else were your children unclean; but now are they holy. 15. But if the unbeliever deserteth, let him desert: neither the brother nor the sister is in bondage under such circumstances.

THE APOSTLE'S TEACHING ON DIVORCE, §§ 12—14

§ 12. *The principles laid down as regards marriage by the Apostle in 1 Cor. vi. 13—17. St Paul's use of Q in vi. 16, vii. 10—11.*—From 1 Cor. vi. 13—17 we can gather the Apostle's judgment as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of divorce on the ground of unchastity. In the next chapter, vii. 10—15, the Apostle treats of the duty of believers in regard to marriage, but takes no account of the question of unfaithfulness. But none knew better than he that all Christian marriages were not ideal in this re-

spect. If then we wish to learn his judgment in the case of conjugal unfaithfulness, we have only to study vi. 13-17, and, if we study these verses in connection with vii. 10, 11*b*, we shall recognise that the Apostle had in his mind or before him the account given in Q of our Lord's controversy with the Pharisees on the question of divorce.

The Apostle's use of Q.—Let us deal with the latter question first. It was from Q (or some such collection of these Logia of our Lord) that the Apostle derived his knowledge of our Lord's treatment of this subject. This may be reasonably inferred from the following facts. None of the Gospels were yet written, but most scholars are agreed that Q was written between 35 and 50 A.D. It is not contended by any scholar that Q was exploited exhaustively by either of the first three Evangelists. Hence we may with great probability trace 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11*b* to Q. 11*b* has parallels in Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, Mark x. 11, Luke xvi. 18, but vii. 10 has none. But it represents a true Logion that possibly appears

in a distorted form in Mark x. 12. Again, the Apostle follows the precedent of Christ in basing his argument on Gen. ii. 24*c*; for to enforce the fact that he that is joined to a harlot is one body, in vi. 16*b*, he quotes Gen. ii. 24 (LXX.), ἔσονται γάρ, φησίν, οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν, as our Lord did according to Matt. xix. 5, Mark x. 8. Thirdly, the Apostle's words, ὁ κολλώμενος τῇ πόρνη ἐν σῶμά ἐστιν (1 Cor. vi. 16*a*) are clearly an echo of Gen. ii. 24*b*, but not as this clause appears in the LXX., *i.e.* καὶ προσκολληθήσεται τῇ γυναικὶ αὐτοῦ. Now, two things should be observed here. The first is that this important clause, which Mark has omitted, probably for the sake of brevity, as he does frequently elsewhere, has been preserved by Matt. xix. 5*b*, and derived from Q. The highly probable hypothesis that Paul has twice in dealing with this subject drawn upon Q (*i.e.* in 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11*b*, and in vi. 16*b*) is good evidence that he is again drawing on the same source in vi. 16*a*. This third parallelism, moreover, in itself confirms the hypothesis. Hence we conclude that Q quoted Gen. ii. 24 in

full, and that it has therein been rightly reproduced in Matt. xix. 5, and not defectively as it is in Mark x. 8. The second point to observe is that Paul's use of *κολλᾶσθαι* shows that he is translating Q independently and not basing his argument on the LXX. of Gen. ii. 24, which uses *προσκολλᾶσθαι*, and which he quotes literally in Eph. v. 31. *προσκολλᾶσθαι* occurs only in these two passages in the LXX. and the New Testament *in this sense*, and nowhere in Classical Greek nor in the Koine so far as I am aware. But *κολλᾶσθαι* is so used in 1 Esdr. iv. 20, *πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν γυναῖκα κολλᾶται*, and in Sir. xix. 2, where we find exactly the same phrase as that used by Paul—*ὁ κολλώμενος πόρναις*. Accordingly it is quite natural to find the translator of Q in Matt. xix. 5 using *κολληθήσεται* and not *προσκολληθήσεται*.

The Apostle's Principles with regard to Divorce.—In vi. 13–17 the Apostle deals with the illicit intercourse of men (married or unmarried) with harlots. His treatment of this question is called forth by the need there was for vigorous teaching on this question in Corinth,

but not by specific questions of the Corinthians themselves. In vii. 1-16 the Apostle deals with specific questions on marriage, divorce, etc., addressed to him by the Corinthian Church. Hence, whereas definite subjects are in turn dealt with in vii., in vi. 11-17, on the other hand, the principles that should regulate the relations of men (married or unmarried) to harlots are treated generally. It is from the latter passage that we must learn the Apostle's doctrine of the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of divorce.

§ 13. *The sin πορνεία condemned by the Apostle is that of men, married and unmarried, with harlots.*—Now, first of all the Apostle declares in 1 Cor. vi. 13 that the body is not for fornication—that is, unchastity in the full sense of the word, embracing, therefore, adultery (see Chapter VIII.). πορνεία is the word Jews and Greeks would have used of the illicit relations of married and unmarried men with harlots, if they used any word. For they could not have used μοιχεύειν of the illicit relations of a married man

with a harlot. In Jewish Greek it could, as I have shown in Chapter VIII., have been used of any sexual vice or of all sexual vices collectively. just as it was in a more limited degree used in Classical Greek.

§ 14. *Such illicit intercourse constitutes an absolute breach of communion with Christ and an absolute breach of the marriage bond—that is, it dissolves it.*—Now that we understand that what the Apostle says applies to all men in relation to harlots, we proceed to his next statement, vi. 15–17 : “ Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take away (*ἀρας*) the members of Christ, and make them members of a harlot? God forbid. Or know ye not that he that is joined to a harlot is one body? for, The twain, saith he, shall become one flesh. But he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit.” The Apostle here teaches that the Church is the body of Christ—the organism by which His will is fulfilled on the earth. Hence every Christian is a member of this body, and therefore an organ of Christ Himself. From this

fact it follows inevitably that if a married man joins himself to a harlot, he becomes one body with her and thereby severs at one and the same time the bond that unites him to his wife and the bond that unites him to Christ. This breach, we repeat, of the natural union between the man and his wife by the disloyalty of the former takes effect at the same time with the breach of the spiritual union with Christ. There cannot be one body formed by the union of one man and two or more women, or, *vice versa*, of one woman and two or more men. The unity of the one body formed by marriage is destroyed by the union of one or other of the two persons united in marriage with another person. Hereby arises a new body which displaces the old. "He that is joined to a harlot is one body (with her)." If the marriage were a true marriage to begin with, and subsequently one of the two persons becomes guilty of unfaithfulness, then that person—and not the Church nor the State—puts asunder those whom God has joined together.

The man who has taken the members of Christ

and made them the members of a harlot has essentially divorced himself alike from his wife and from Christ. The breach is just as complete in the one case as in the other. What is true of one is true of the other. Hence till a spiritual reconciliation is effected there is no true marriage and no true communion with Christ.¹

This interpretation of the essential relation of man to woman in marriage and of man's relation to Christ, as set forth by the Apostle, is confirmed by the teaching of the prophets in the Old Testament on the relation of Israel and Judah to Yahweh. Israel and Judah stood in a wedded relation to Yahweh. Now, in the New Testament *the individual* takes the place of *the nation* in the Old Testament, and stands in a spiritual

¹ Till the guilty partner in such a marriage repents and is reconciled, the breach is not healed. Divine forgiveness is, of course, granted to the truly repentant offender. Whether true repentance and the confession of such a sin to God, with the consciousness of forgiveness that follows thereon, are adequate without confession to the wronged spouse and forgiveness on his or her part, is questionable; but the teaching of Christ on analogous offences would imply that human forgiveness should precede the divine in such a case, or at all events should follow immediately in its wake. See Matt. v. 23-24.

relation to Christ. As the spiritual bond was dissolved by unfaithfulness, so likewise was the natural bond. (See p. 97 sq.)

§ 15. *The principles laid down by the Apostle teach that the marriage tie is essentially dissolved by intercourse with a harlot. Where the offender persists in his wrong-doing they would naturally both justify and require the official enforcement of this dissolution.—* By intercourse with a harlot or other illicit intercourse with women the marriage bond is essentially dissolved. Herein civil law has the authority of the New Testament behind it in pronouncing divorce in such cases. No other conclusion can be drawn from the Apostle's premises. Hence we cannot but infer that, *in the case of deliberate and unrepentant adulterers or adulteresses, the Apostle would not only have allowed divorce, but would have insisted on it.* This is the teaching we find also in the *Shepherd of Hermas*, Mand. iv. 1. 4 : see p. 104 sqq., below.

Any Church, therefore, that teaches the in-

dissolubility of marriage under such circumstances, does so in direct opposition to the principles of Christian marriage laid down in the New Testament. As we have just seen, the principles laid down by St Paul would require the dissolution of marriage where one of the partners in such a marriage is a deliberate and unrepentant adulterer or adulteress.¹

¹ When both husband and wife are guilty of adultery and persist in their evil courses, they are no longer truly married either before God or man, but are on a level with the common prostitute, or rather on a lower level, since they conceal their sin under the honourable guise of marriage.

It is true that when both are guilty and persistently guilty, the State refuses to grant a divorce, and treats them as still united in marriage. But so far as it does this, it does so, not on the ground of any Christian principle, but on that of expediency, in the hope of setting some limit to the infamies of the so-called wedded pair. But this practice of the State does not concern us here.

CHAPTER V

THE LOGIA OF CHRIST ON DIVORCE

THESE Logia are found in Matt. v. 32, xix. 9; Mark x. 11-12; Luke xvi. 18; 1 Cor. vi. 16, vii. 10, 11*b*.

§ 1. *Original sources of these Logia.*—As regards Matt. v. 32 and Luke xvi. 18, it is generally admitted that these are drawn from Q. I have given grounds for the hypothesis (see pp. 63 *sqq.*, 84 *sq.*) that St Paul had Q in an Aramaic form before him when writing 1 Cor. vi. 16, vii. 10, 11*b*. There remains only for our consideration the relation of Matt. xix. 9 to Mark x. 11-12. So far as I am aware, scholars have hitherto held that Matt. xix. 3-9 is based on Mark x. 2-12. But I think I have shown (see pp. 85-90) that this is practically impossible, seeing that Mark's account is at once defective (see p. 86 (c) for the Pauline evidence

on this question) and unhistorical. If I am right in my contention, we must conclude that Matt. xix. 3-9 and Mark x. 2-12 are drawn independently from Q also (see p. 89 *sq.*). That the author of Mark (or its final redactor) used Q may be regarded as a well-established conclusion, seeing that it is maintained by such scholars as B. Weiss, Sanday, Loisy, Bousset, Bacon, Harnack, Streeter, and Allen. For a scientific and elaborate proof of this hypothesis see Streeter in *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, pp. 165-183. But, though scholars are for the most part agreed on this question, the further question—as to the contents of Q and the extent to which the Synoptists laid it under contribution—is still unsettled. On the grounds given above I contend that Q and not Mark x. 2-12 is the source of Matt. xix. 3-9 (see pp. 85-90). Hence I conclude that *all the above Logia are derived from Q*. That real doublets, not merely literary doublets, occurred in Q bearing on this question may be reasonably concluded.

§ 2. *There are three distinct Logia of our Lord on divorce:—*

(1) *The first Logion, Matt. xix. 9 and Luke xvi. 18, which consists of two clauses:—*

Matt. xix. 9.

Luke xvi. 18.

ὅς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ . . .¹
καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην μοιχᾶται,
καὶ ὁ ἀπολελυμένην γαμήσας
μοιχᾶται.²

πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ
καὶ γαμῶν ἐτέραν μοιχεύει,
καὶ ὁ ἀπολελυμένην ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς
γαμῶν μοιχεύει.

The first clause in this Logion is supported by Mark x. 11: ὅς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην μοιχᾶται ἐπ' αὐτήν, and the second clause by Matt. v. 32b: καὶ ὅς ἐὰν ἀπολελυμένην γαμήσῃ μοιχᾶται.

(2) *Second Logion, Matt. v. 32: πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων*

¹ Here follows the scribal interpolation *μη ἐπὶ πορνεία* (see pp. 24–25).

² This clause is omitted by many MSS. and versions through *homœoteleuton*: but it is supported by BC¹INZ and other uncials, most cursives and versions. The change from ὅς ἂν with the verb in the preceding clause to ὁ with the participle is paralleled by Matt. v. 32, but in reverse order. This interchange of construction probably goes back to Q. Luke as a literary man will have none of it here. Again, μοιχᾶται is replaced by Luke by the more classical μοιχεύει and ἄλλην by ἐτέραν, the latter word being a favourite of Luke. Both words, μοιχᾶται and ἄλλην, may reasonably be traced to Q in its Greek form.

τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ¹ . . . ποιεῖ μοιχευθῆναι, καὶ ὅς ἐάν ἀπολελυμένην γαμήσῃ μοιχᾶται.

The second clause of this Logion agrees, as I have already pointed out, with the second clause of the first Logion.

(3) *Third Logion*, 1 Cor. vi.³ 10, 11b: γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρός μὴ χωρισθῆναι² . . . καὶ ἄνδρα γυναῖκα μὴ ἀφιέναι = "The wife is not to desert her husband, and the husband is not to divorce his wife." (See above, pp. 54-57.)

§ 3. *The Logion in Mark x. 12 is not authentic in any sense.*—This false Logion, ἐὰν αὐτὴ ἀπολύσασα τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς γαμήσῃ ἄλλον μοιχᾶται, has been already dealt with (see pp. 27-29). Its true form is no doubt that which is preserved in the second clauses of the first and second Logia. The consciousness that our Lord could never have issued such a command with regard to Jewish women led probably in the second century to an emendation of the text. Thus

¹ Here follows scribal interpolation παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας (see pp. 22-25).

² Here follows ἐάν δὲ καὶ χωρισθῆ, μενέτω ἄγαμος ἢ τῷ ἀνδρὶ καταλλαγήτω (see above, pp. 51-54).

we find in D, 13, 28, 69, 124, 346, 565, *a*, *b*, *c*, ff², *g*², *q*, *arm*, καὶ ἐὰν γυνὴ ἐξέλθῃ (*b*, *d*, *exiet*: *q*, *exierit*, *a* *discesserit*) ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμήσῃ. Wellhausen (*Evangelium Marci*, p. 84) accepts this reading as original, but it is no better than an early emendation, and a wrong one. For even if ἐξέρχεσθαι could be used rightly of desertion on the part of a wife, she could not marry another man until she was divorced, as we have seen above, p. 55 *sq.*

CHAPTER VI

WHOM DOES GOD JOIN TOGETHER?

“What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.”—*Matt. xix. 6.*¹

§ 1. *To whom are these words applicable?*—
In an ideal community divorce would be impossible; for in such a community those who were joined in holy wedlock would be joined by God, and marriage would invariably be held to be indissoluble. Happily, such ideal marriages exist, and that in very large numbers, in this our own country.

¹ It was a favourite belief of the Rabbis that marriages were made in heaven. They based this belief on such passages as Gen. xxiv. 50, where it is said of the marriage of Isaac and Rebecca, “the thing proceedeth from the Lord,” and Prov. xix. 14, “A prudent wife is from the Lord”; see also Judges xiv. 4. In Tobit vi. 17, Tobit is bidden by Raphael to take Sarah to be his wife, “for she was set apart for thee before the world was.” Rabbi Jose bar Chalafta, a pupil of Rabbi Aqiba, is quoted by George Eliot on this subject in *Daniel Deronda*. This Rabbi is represented in Gen. R. lxviii. 3 as discussing certain religious questions with a Roman matron, who asked him how long it had taken God to create the world. When the Rabbi answered six

But the above words were not spoken primarily in reference to the marriage service. They hold good of the marriage of every true man and maid since the world began, whether celebrated by religious services, heathen, Jewish, or Christian, or unaccompanied by any special religious service at all. This is of course an obvious fact, but one not generally realised. Yet it is implied in our Lord's words (Matt. xix. 4-6): "And he answered and said, Have ye not read that he which made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother and shall cleave to

days, she next inquired what God had been doing since that time. To which the Rabbi replied, "The Holy One sitteth in heaven arranging marriages," and that even God found this task as difficult as dividing the Red Sea (see *Sotah 2a*, *Sanh. 22a*). Whereupon the lady exclaimed that she could do the business as well herself. The Midrash proceeds to tell that she did try her 'prentice hand on this task in mating all her vast household of slaves, some 2000, but with the most disastrous results. But notwithstanding this belief that marriages were made in heaven, the Rabbis, in accordance with the Mosaic law, believed that the marriage tie could be dissolved, and that on grounds falling wholly short of unfaithfulness of any kind. On this question see Bacher, *Die Agada der Tannaiten*, ii. 169-170; *Jewish Quarterly Review*, ii. 172-177, "Marriages Made in Heaven" (I. Abrahams); I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism*, 68-69 (1917).

his wife? . . . What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."

§ 2. *The State can only divorce those who through unfaithfulness have already divorced themselves.*—The essential element, then, in such a marriage is the choice made by true man and true maid of each other, and not the official recognition and benediction of this choice by the Church or by the State. Hence, if they are put asunder, it is not the Church or State that does so: for neither Church nor State can annul the marriage of true souls. The Church or State can only legalise officially by its decree of divorce a divorce that has already and essentially taken place in the relation of the wedded pair through the unfaithfulness of one or both to their marriage vows.

§ 3. *God does not join together all that are joined by the marriage service.*—We must, therefore, not regard every marriage celebrated in Christian or other Churches as a joining of man and woman by God. Every Church assumes that the union it is celebrating is in

accordance with the will of God. If it is not in accordance with God's will, not all the Churches in the world can make it so. The Church cannot by its blessing transform unions which are entered into lightly and irresponsibly, and make them marriages such as God would have them—unions which are due to some transitory attraction, or to passing passion, or to sheer vanity, or to greed of gain or power, or to caprice, or to the mood of the moment in which men and women, disappointed of the love they sought, are caught in the rebound and married before they are conscious of their criminal folly.

§ 4. *Yet marriages which had no divine element in their initiation may in due time become such.*—Yet past forgetfulness of God when entering into the holy estate of matrimony happily proves no insuperable bar to the faithful fulfilment of its duties in the years that follow, and innumerable multitudes have further learnt for themselves that on such fulfilment of its obligations there followed in due course an experience of its joys and blessedness.

§ 5. *Persistent unfaithfulness must be punished by divorce.*—But unhappily there is a large minority whose low moral standard renders quite impracticable the ideal of an indissoluble marriage. Sometimes the husband is unfaithful to his marriage vows: sometimes the wife. Where the offender persists in such unfaithfulness, the ultimate and inevitable penalty must be divorce, as we have learnt from the Pauline teaching (pp. 65–71). But sometimes both husband and wife are unfaithful to their marriage vows. Where this is so, their continued union is only a legalised infamy.

§ 6. *Is divorce justifiable for certain grave offences short of unfaithfulness?*—But another question is constantly pressing itself on the attention of the Church and the nation. It has been recognised that legal separation granted on various grounds has but led to the contracting of illicit unions and the creation of a vitiated atmosphere destructive alike to the persons so separated and to their children. Should, then, the State intervene and grant divorce on certain

definite grounds other than unfaithfulness? If hardness of heart warranted a relaxation of the marriage law under the Mosaic dispensation, it is reasonably asked if the hardness of heart so prevalent in the present day does not warrant some relaxation of a marriage law which presupposes an ideal state of society? There are many husbands and wives who are separated, not by any decree of the State, but by grave offences such as desertion,¹ or by irremediable evils such as habitual intoxication or hopeless insanity. In the case of deliberate desertion extending into many years,¹ it seems not unreasonable that the Church should legislate specially for such cases, as did St Paul, and release the believer from the yoke of bondage. Adequate grounds could be adduced for like action on the part of the State.

¹ We have seen that St Paul legislates *specially* for such cases where the one who deserts is an unbeliever. Can we call all who desert to-day believers?

CHAPTER VII

Q—THE SOURCE OF THE SYNOPTIC AND PAULINE LOGIA ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

§ 1. 1 *Cor.* vi. 16, vii. 10, 11*b* presuppose a controversy of our Lord with the Pharisees such as that recounted in *Matt.* xix. 3–9 (and parallels): for—

(a) The Logion quoted in 1 *Cor.* vii. 10, 11*b*, “But unto the married I give charge, yet not I, but the Lord, That the wife do not desert her husband, and that the husband do not divorce his wife,” recalls exactly the situation which is described in *Matt.* xix. 3–9, and is really at the foundation of *Mark* x. 2–12. The first part of the Logion, it is true, is not found in the gospels; but since it takes exactly the form it must have taken if our Lord issued any command to women in relation to the marriage question, we may justly assume its genuineness, and par-

ticularly since its genuineness is attested by the Apostle.

(b) The second half of the Logion, "that the husband do not divorce his wife," finds support in Matt. v. 32*a*, xix. 9*a*, Mark x. 11, Luke xvi. 18.

(c) Hence it is no accident that in 1 Cor. vi. 16*b* the Apostle applies to marriage the words that our Lord had already used in His controversy with the Pharisees: "The twain shall become one flesh": *cf.* Matt. xix. 5, Mark x. 8.

(d) Furthermore, his words in vi. 16*a*, ὁ κολλώμενος τῇ πόρῃ, recall by way of strong contrast the words which our Lord quoted from Gen. ii. 24, κολληθήσεται τῇ γυναικὶ αὐτοῦ (LXX.), in connection with the controversy on the question of divorce: see Matt. xix. 5.

§ 2. *Since the gospels were not yet written, St Paul most probably found this account in Q.*—Whether in Q or some other document, an account of this controversy existed before any of the Synoptic Gospels. Moreover, this document, which we may reasonably assume to have been Q, was before the Apostle in its original

Aramaic form, or in a Greek translation distinct from that used by the Evangelists. We are forced to some such assumption; for otherwise we could not explain his using ἀφιέναι (= "to divorce") where the Evangelists use ἀπολύειν.¹ Hence either St Paul translated directly from Q in its original Aramaic form, or found ἀφιέναι already in his Greek version of Q.

§ 3. In §§ 1-2 the evidence favours the assumption that the account of our Lord's controversy with the Pharisees on divorce was already in Q. But most, if not all, recent scholars assume that Matt. xix. 3-9 is derived from Mark—an assumption which is against the evidence. Mark's account, x. 2-12, which is defective and unhistorical, cannot be the source of Matt. xix. 3-9; for—

(a) Mark omits the phrase κατὰ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, "for every cause," the presence of which is essential to the right understanding of the whole

¹ This word is not found once in Classical Greek in this sense, nor in the Papyri, but in Jewish Greek in 1 Esdras ix. 36, which is not later than the first century B.C., and late Greek: see Chapter IX.

section, and makes the Pharisees ask our Lord the impossible question, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?" Since the Mosaic law expressly allowed divorce, such a question is inconceivable on their part. (See above, p. 29 *sqq.*)

(b) *Mark* x. 12 ascribes an impossible statement to our Lord: "If she herself shall put away her husband." But Jewish law did not allow a woman to divorce her husband till the eleventh century A.D. (See above, p. 27 *sqq.*) Here 1 Cor. vii. 10 preserves the true form of a Logion of Christ with regard to women. (See pp. 54-57.)

(c) *Mark* omits the clause καὶ κολληθήσεται τῇ γυναικί αὐτοῦ. Now, this clause is preserved in *Matthew*, and is, as we have seen above in § 1 (d), indirectly attested as having stood in Q. That *Mark* used Q is generally agreed.¹

¹ See also p. 64 *sqq.* Canon Streeter has proved that *Mark* made use of Q (*Oxford Studies on the Synoptic Problem*, pp. 166-183). In the same chapter (p. 166) he has established the following thesis, which I give in his own words: "The Marcan version is almost invariably the shorter, but the brevity is caused by the omission of features in the Q version which are obviously original. The Q version is not an expansion of the Marcan: the Marcan is

(d) *The order of the events in this controversy is wrongly recorded in Mark.*—In Matt. our Lord replies to this question—“Is it lawful to put away a wife for every cause?”—by quoting Gen. ii. 24, and thereby raises the whole discussion from the standpoint of a casuistical debate to a high spiritual level, and concludes therefrom that “they are no more twain, but one flesh: What therefore God hath joined together, etc.” Thereupon the Pharisees naturally fall back on an indisputable statement of the Mosaic law: “Why then did Moses *command* to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away?” To this rejoinder Christ replies: “Moses for your hardness of heart *suffered* you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it hath not been so.” Here the order of thought in the discussion is perfectly natural, and every argument advanced is given its full weight, and that also in keeping with the situation.

But in Mark disorder is rampant. Even the a mutilation of the Q version.” Now, the omission of the above clause is exactly in keeping with Mark’s method. See also *op. cit.*, p. 178.

briefest examination of x. 2-12 proves that its characteristics are exactly those of other extracts which Mark has made from Q—only in an intensified degree. Now, to the unhistorical question, “Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?” the most natural and adequate reply would have been the quotation of Gen. ii. 24, which would have formed a direct prohibition of divorce on principle, and that from the highest level and from an unquestionable source. Instead of that, Mark represents our Lord as *weakly* asking, “What did Moses command you?”—a question which at once suggested Deut. xxiv. 1-2, where divorce on inadequate grounds is allowed. Of this suggestion the Pharisees at once avail themselves, but yet in a fashion incomprehensibly *weak* and inconceivably *incredible*; for the hostility of the Pharisees to Christ was at this stage approaching its climax, and would have led them to state their case in the strongest terms. Yet Mark represents them as tamely replying in an apparently chastened mood, “Moses *suffered* (us) to write a bill of

divorcement, and to put her away," and our Lord as quoting Gen. ii. 24, and that *defectively*;¹ for Mark omits a clause most pertinent to the argument of Christ.

(e) In (d) I have drawn attention indirectly to Mark's wrong attribution of the verbs "commanded" (ἐνετείλατο) and "suffered" (ἐπέτρειψεν) to Christ and the Pharisees respectively. The reader will further observe the attribution by Mark to Christ of words which rightly belonged to the Pharisees:—

Matt. xix. 7-8.

"They say unto him, Why then did Moses *command* to give a bill of divorcement? . . . He saith unto them, Moses . . . *suffered* you."

Mark x. 3-4.

"He . . . said unto them, What did Moses *command* you? And they said, Moses *suffered* to write a bill of divorcement."

(f) *πρός*, meaning "because of," in the phrase *πρὸς τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν*, does not occur elsewhere in either Matthew or Mark. But if this use of *πρός* belonged originally neither to Matthew nor Mark, it may have been derived by both writers independently from another source, *i.e.* Q.

§ 4. Hence *Matthew* v. 32, xix. 3-9, and *Luke*

¹ See (c), p. 86.

xvi. 18 *are not derived from Mark x. 2-12, but all these are independently based on Q, though Mark's account is very untrustworthy. Q may be taken to be the source also of 1 Cor. vi. 16, vii. 10, 11b.* Q is thus the source from which the Evangelists, and most probably Paul, drew their statements as to our Lord's words on the subject of marriage and divorce.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GREEK WORDS *μοιχεία* AND *πορνεία*

§ 1. *In later Classical Greek.*—In *μοιχεία* and its cognates *μοιχεύειν*, *μοιχός*, as distinguished from *πορνεία* and its cognates, there is the idea of appropriating the property of another man, (1) in respect of his wife, or (2) of his mistress. Hence it involves the idea of seduction. The second offence, *i.e.* of seducing a man's mistress, is frequently referred to in the recently discovered *Περικειρομένη* of Menander (lines 167, 180, 200, 408). In Roman law, also, a man was guilty of *adulterium* if he had illicit relations with another man's *concubina*, as well with his *uxor*.

(3) Possibly also it is used of a third offence, *i.e.* of sodomy, in Papyri Oxy. viii. 1160. 24 *sqq.* (iii.–iv. A.D.), where a son writes to his father in very illiterate Greek: ἔγραψές μοι δὲ ὅτι κάθη ἐν Ἀλεξανδρίαν μετὰ τοῦ μωχο[ῦ] σου · γράψον μοι δὲ

τίς ἐστίν ὁ μυχός μου: "You wrote to me, 'You are staying in Alexandria with your paramour.' Write and tell me who is my paramour."

In Jewish Greek *μοιχεύειν* appears to be used only in the first sense, *i.e.* of seducing another man's wife. *μοιχεύεσθαι* (passive) is used of the woman.¹

But *μοιχεύειν* and its cognates are not used by the Greeks of the illicit intercourse of a man with an unmarried or unattached woman. In such a case *φθορά* (*stuprum*) was used. *Neither the Greeks nor the Jews had any word to express the unfaithfulness of a husband to his wife, unless this unfaithfulness was of the nature of (1) or possibly of (2) above. But in the case of the married woman, intercourse on her part with any other man than her husband constituted μοιχεία alike in Jewish, Greek, and Roman law.*

§ 2. *πορνεία* (*πορνεύειν, πόρνος, πόρνη*). *In Classical Greek.*—In *πορνεία* and its cognates as dis-

¹ This is the rule. But there are exceptions. Thus in Lev. xx. 10 (*bis*) *μοιχεύεσθαι* (middle) is used of the man; and *μοιχεύειν* of the woman, Hosea iv. 13, 14: Sir. xxiii. 23 (MS. 248).

tinguished from *μοιχεία* and its cognates there is the idea of barter, traffic in sexual vice. Here the *πόρνη* and the *πόρνος* sell their bodies for what they can get.¹ The distinction of *μοιχεύειν* and *πορνεύειν* is admirably brought out in Dio Cassius' account of Messalina, 60. 30 : *ἐμοιχεύετο καὶ ἐπορνεύετο*, i.e. she not only carried on adulterous amours, but she plied for hire as a harlot in the public brothels. Hence even from classical times onwards *πορνεία* includes (1) harlotry (including the harlotry of a married woman) and (2) sodomy.

In Demosthenes *πορνεύειν* and *πορνεία* are used in sense (2): cf. 413. 29–414. 1, *τούτον ὡς πεπορνευμένον κέκρικεν* : 433. 25, *οἱ περὶ πορνείας . . . λόγοι*. In Æschines (*Κατὰ Τιμάρχου*) we find the verb thus used : 5. 4 *πεπορνευμένος ἢ ἑταιρηκῶς* : 10. 25 *πρὸς τὸν πόρνον πεπορνεῦσθαι*. Here Hegesander is charged with being the male paramour of

¹ Not only was Israel betrothed to God, as in the Old Testament, but in the Talmud the Law was betrothed to Israel and was therefore forbidden to every other nation under heaven : cf. Exod., Rab., and Sanh. 59a, where it is said that any Gentile who studied the law was guilty of death.

a sodomite: 22. 11 μὴ δημηγορεῖν Τίμαρχον πεπορνευμένον.

§ 3. *πορνεία and μοιχεία. In Jewish Greek.*—In Jewish Greek *πορνεία* and its cognates develop until these terms can be used of sexual vice in general, or of any specific sexual vice, whereas *μοιχεύειν* (apart from its use in a spiritual sense) appears to be confined to the intercourse of a married woman with a man other than her husband.

I will now deal with *πορνεία* and *μοιχεία* (and their cognates) as used in the Old Testament, § 4; *πορνεία* in the Jewish Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, § 5; in the New Testament, *Hermas*, § 6; summary of the uses of *πορνεία* and *μοιχεία* in Classical, Jewish, and New Testament Greek, § 7.

§ 4. *πορνεία and μοιχεία (and their cognates) in the Old Testament.*—(a) To *μοιχεύειν* and *πορνεύειν* are given apparently one and the same spiritual significance of idolatry in the Old Testament. They are renderings of *הָנָח* (= *μοιχεύειν*) and *הָנָח* (*πορνεύειν*). Since in Hosea

the relation of God and Israel is represented as that of a marriage, the former is used of idolatrous worship (*i.e.* unfaithfulness to Yahweh) in Ezek. xxiii. 37, Jer. iii. 8, Is. lvii. 3, and the noun (= *μοιχεία*) in Ezek. xxiii. 43, Jer. xiii. 27. Yet still more frequently *πορνείειν* and its cognates are used of the same idolatrous worship in Exod. xxxiv. 16, 2 Chron. xxi. 11, 13, Is. i. 21, Jer. iii. 8, and constantly throughout Ezek. xvi., xxiii.

In fact, in Jer. iii. 2, 3, 6, 8, 9 *πορνεία* or some cognate word is used of idolatry, and in ver. 8 of the same chapter *μοιχᾶσθαι* of exactly the same sin. Still more striking in this respect is Ezek. xxiii., where *πορνεία* and its cognates are used nearly twenty times of idolatry, and *μοιχᾶσθαι* (*μοιχαλῖς*) is used four times of the same sin. The same phenomena may be observed already in Ezek. xvi. In the corrupt verse Ezek. xxiii. 43, both words occur. Whether they are synonymous there is not clear, but they appear as synonyms in the same verse in Jer. iii. 8.

(*b*) In Ezek. xvi., xxiii. the charges of adultery and fornication are brought against the Jews for

their confederacies with the different heathen nations, which naturally involved temptations to the sin of idolatry (Ezek. xvi. 26).

But *idolatry and confederacies with heathen nations were frequently accompanied by sexual vice*, and πορνείειν (= זנה) and its cognates are constantly used of such worship. It goes without saying that *such worship was not confined to unmarried Jews* (male or female).

(c) πορνεία and μοιχεία are used almost as synonyms also in a literal sense. In Hosea ii. 4, 6, 7 these words and their cognates (as renderings of זנה and נאף) are used of the same person—Hosea's wife. Again, in Amos vii. 17 we have the strong statement—אשתך בעיר חזונה, ἡ γυνή σου ἐν τῇ πόλει πορνείσει. The meaning here is that, when the husband is carried into exile, his wife will support herself by playing the harlot. Here the adulteress is also a harlot. But this passage can be paralleled by that quoted from Dio Cassius, § 2 above. In Num. xxv. 1–2 the thousands of Israel (including its leaders) who committed fornication (πορνείειν) with the

daughters of Moab were not all unmarried. But from the Jewish standpoint such men were not adulterers, though they are from the Christian.

In the Old Testament, therefore, there was a tendency to assimilate πορνεία in some respects to μοιχεία. But, while πορνεία takes on further meanings, μοιχεία in Jewish writings is apparently limited to the intercourse of a married woman with any man other than her husband. The later Jews, so far as I am aware, would not have used it of intercourse with another man's mistress, as did the Greeks and Romans.

In reading the short account given above in (1) of the symbolical use of *μοιχεύειν* and *πορνεύειν* in reference to the relation of Israel and Judah to Yahweh as that of marriage, we should bear in mind two important facts. These are:—

(a) *In the Old Testament this spiritual marriage of Israel with Yahweh was not indissoluble. It is cancelled in Jer. iii. 8, and Israel is divorced: "For this very cause that back-sliding Israel had committed adultery, I had put*

her away and given her a bill of divorcement." In Ezek. xxiii. 45 it is said of Oholah (*i.e.* Israel) and Oholibah (*i.e.* Judah) that they shall be judged "with the judgment of adulteresses."

(b) In the Old Testament the nation was the religious unit: in the New Testament the individual is in the most essential sense the religious unit. Hence what is absolutely and unconditionally true of the religious unit in the Old Testament is true likewise of the religious unit in the New Testament.

§ 5. *πορνεία* and its cognates in Jewish Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha.—*πορνεία* and its cognates become generic terms for sexual vice, but they are also used of different specific sexual vices.

In this section these words bear five meanings, and five also in § 6.

πορνεία (*πορνεύειν, πόρνος, πόρνη*) in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha = (1) *Fornication*.—Very frequently.

(2) *Adultery*.—Sir. xxiii. 23, ἐν πορνείᾳ ἐμοιχείθη = "she became an adulteress by play-

ing the harlot." T. Reub. v. 5. Here Reuben on his deathbed at the age of one hundred and twenty-five bids his married sons *φεύγετε . . . πορνείαν*, and in vi. 1 *φυλάξατε (i.e. φυλάξασθε) . . . ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας*. So also in T. Jud. xviii. 2; T. Dan. v. 6 (β); T. Iss. vii. 2. Again, in T. Jos. iii. 8, Joseph says of Potiphar's wife: *εἰς πορνείαν με ἐφελκύσατο*, whereas Potiphar's wife in v. 1 says to Joseph, *εἰ μοιχεῦσαι οὐ θέλεις*. In T. Levi xiv. 6 the high priests are charged with having intercourse alike with unmarried and married women: *πόρναις καὶ μοιχαλίσιν συναφθήσεσθε*. In both cases they are guilty of adultery from the Christian standpoint, for the priests (almost without exception) were married men; but only in the latter case from the Jewish standpoint.¹ In T. Ash. ii. 8 the same combina-

¹ In Jewish law a married man was not regarded as guilty of adultery unless he had intercourse with the wife of another man: if he had intercourse with an unmarried woman, he was only guilty of fornication. But a married woman was guilty of adultery if she had intercourse with any man other than her husband. See Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, p. 73. In Christianity it is otherwise. Intercourse of a married man with any woman other than his wife is adultery.

tion of sexual sins is referred to: ἄλλος μοιχεύει καὶ πορνεύει.

(3) *Incest*.—T. Reub. i. 6, πορνεία ἐν ᾧ . . . ἐμίανα κοίτην τοῦ πατρός μου Ἰακώβ (iv. 8), T. Jud. xiii. 3.

(4) *Sodomy*.—T. Benj. ix. 1, πορνεύσετε πορνείαν Σοδόμων.

(5) *Sexual sin generally*.—Asc. Is. ii. 5, ἐπλήθυνεν <ἡ> φαρμακεία καὶ ἡ μαγεία καὶ ἡ μαντεία καὶ οἱ κληδωνισμοὶ καὶ ἡ πορνεία. Pss. Sol. ii. 13, ὁ θεὸς ἔστησεν τοὺς υἱοὺς Ἱερουσαλήμ ἀντὶ πορνῶν (?). Cf. viii. 9–14.

§ 6. πορνεία (πορνεύειν, πόρνος) in the New Testament = (1) *Fornication*.—Very frequently.

(2) *Adultery*.—Matt. v. 28, πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτήν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν. The preceding verse might suggest that only the question of adultery was at issue here. But since the word γυναῖκα stands wholly unqualified, it denotes any woman married or unmarried, and the πᾶς inserted before ὁ βλέπων extends the subject to each and every man. Hence πορνεία and μοιχεία are here declared to be essentially

one and the same sin. 1 Cor. vi. 13b, τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐ τῆ πορνεία; 16, ὁ κολλώμενος τῆ πόρνῃ ἐν σῶμά ἐστιν. So also in 18. In these three passages *πορνεία* must include adultery from the Christian standpoint. It was not only unmarried men that resorted to harlots in Corinth. In 1 Cor. x. 8 the 23,000 Israelites (in Num. xxv. 9, 24,000) are referred to who died of the plague because they committed fornication with the daughters of Moab. These 23,000 (embracing the chiefs of the nation) were alike married and unmarried: μηδὲ πορνεύωμεν καθὼς τινες αὐτῶν ἐπόρνευσαν. 1 Tim. i. 10, ἀνδροφόνοις, πόρνοις, ἀρσενοκοίταις. Here *πόρνοις* must include adulterers. *πόρνοι* similarly must embrace adulterers also in Rev. xxi. 8, xxii. 15. But, as in 1 Tim. i. 10 just quoted, it does not include sodomites, since these are expressly mentioned as ἀρσενοκοίταις (1 Tim. i. 10), ἐβδελυγμένοις (Rev. xxi. 8), and κύνες (Rev. xxii. 15).

Again, in Rev. ii. 21, οὐ θέλει μετανοῆσαι ἐκ τῆς πορνείας αὐτῆς, and 22, τοὺς μοιχεύοντας μετ' αὐτῆς, the same woman is referred to in both passages.

Hence *πορνεία* = *μοιχεία*. But of supreme importance are Rev. ii. 14, *φαγεῖν εἰδωλόθυτα καὶ πορνεῦσαι*, and ii. 20, *πορνεῦσαι καὶ φαγεῖν εἰδωλόθυτα*. Both passages refer to married and unmarried persons, and are manifestly derived from the decree of the Apostolic Council in Jerusalem, Acts xv. 20, *ἀπέχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλισγημάτων τῶν εἰδώλων καὶ τῆς πορνείας*; 29, *ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων . . . καὶ πορνείας*; xxi. 25, *φυλάσσεσθαι αὐτοὺς τότε εἰδωλόθυτον . . . καὶ πορνείαν*. Here *πορνεία* includes *μοιχεία*, but not improbably it is used generically for all sexual vice.

(3) *Incest*. 1 Cor. v. 1, *πορνεία ἣτις οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*.

(4) *Sodomy*. Jude 7, *ἐκπορνεύσασαι*.

(5) *Sexual sin generally*. 1 Cor. vii. 2, *διὰ τὰς πορνείας* (*i.e.* various forms of *πορνεία*, natural or unnatural, on the part of the man or the woman).¹ Rev. ix. 21, *οὐ μετενόησαν . . . ἐκ τῆς*

¹ *πορνεία* (*πορνεύειν*, *πόρνος*) is a hard-worked word in the Pauline Epistles. As we have seen above, he uses it of practically every sexual sin. He never uses *μοιχεία*; *μοιχός* only once (1 Cor. vi. 9); *μοιχαλὶς* twice: *μοιχεύειν* only in a quotation from the Old Testament. (See Rom. ii. 22, xiii. 9.)

πορνείας αὐτῶν. The Apostolic decree, Acts xv. 29, etc., should probably be placed under this heading and not under (2) as is done above.

§ 7. *Summary of the uses of πορνεία in Classical, Jewish, and New Testament Greek.*—From the evidence above given it follows that from the fourth century B.C. in Greece and from 200 B.C. amongst Greek-speaking Jews down to 96 A.D., *πορνεία* and its cognates were used not only of fornication but of practically every other specific sexual sin, as well as of all sexual sins taken collectively. *μοιχεία*, on the other hand, came to have a more limited connotation in Jewish Greek and to be used only of adultery.¹ In Christianity, as we have seen, the term “adultery” had a wider comprehension than in Judaism. In Judaism a married woman was guilty of adultery if she had intercourse with

¹ There is one great exception to this rule in the Christian use of the Ten Commandments. According to this use, *μη μοιχεύσης* includes *μη πορνεύσης* in accordance with Matt. v. 28. In fact, certain early scribes, not recognising that the Jewish commandment was to be reinterpreted in accordance with the teaching of Christ, added *μη πορνεύσης* after *μη μοιχεύσης* in Mark x. 19. So in the uncial D^{Gr}, Γ, and the Latin c.

any man other than her husband. But this did not apply to the married man in Judaism. Only when he sinned with a married woman was he guilty of this sin. In Christianity this limitation was removed. For a man to have intercourse with any woman other than his wife was defined as adultery in Christianity. Nay more, in Matt. v. 28 our Lord goes further and treats fornication and adultery as essentially one and the same sin.

Possibly we might add to the above meanings of *πορνεία* (*πορνεύειν*) a sixth one, *i.e.* adultery persistently committed either for hire or through wantonness. In Amos vii. 17, *ἡ γυνή σου ἐν τῇ πόλει πορνεύσει*; Sir. xxiii. 23, *ἐν πορνείᾳ ἐμοιχεύθη*; *Acts of Thomas* (ed. Bonnet, p. 42), *οἱ δὲ μοιχοὶ μηκέτι πορνεύεωσαν*, and in *Hermas*, Mand. iv. i. 4, *εἰ γυναῖκα ἔχων τις . . . ταύτην εὖρη ἐν μοιχείᾳ τινί, ἄρα ἀμαρτάνει ὁ ἀνὴρ συνζῶν μετ' αὐτῆς*; 5, *Ἄχρι τῆς ἀγνοίας, φησίν, οὐχ ἀμαρτάνει · ἐὰν δὲ γνῶ ὁ ἀνὴρ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν αὐτῆς, καὶ μὴ μετανοήσῃ ἢ γυνή, ἀλλ' ἐπιμένῃ τῇ πορνείᾳ αὐτῆς, καὶ συνζῆ ὁ ἀνὴρ μετ' αὐτῆς . . . γίνεται . . . κοινωνὸς τῆς μοιχείας αὐτῆς*. 6, *Τί οὖν, φημί, κύριε,*

ποιήσῃ ὁ ἀνὴρ, ἐὰν ἐπιμείνῃ τῷ πάθει ἡ γυνὴ; Ἐπολυσάτω, φησὶν, αὐτήν, καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ μενέτω· ἐὰν δὲ ἀπολύσας τὴν γυναῖκα ἑτέραν γαμήσῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς μοιχᾶται, 7, Ἐὰν οὖν, φημί, μετὰ τὸ ἀπολυθῆναι τὴν γυναῖκα μετανοήσῃ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ θελήσῃ ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἄνδρα ὑποστρέψαι, οὐ παραδεχθήσεται; 8, καὶ μὴν, φησὶν, ἐὰν μὴ παραδέξῃται αὐτήν ὁ ἀνὴρ, ἀμαρτάνει καὶ μεγάλην ἀμαρτηκότα καὶ μετανοοῦντα· μὴ ἐπὶ πολὺ δέ· τοῖς γὰρ δούλοις τοῦ θεοῦ μετάνοιά ἐστὶν μία. διὰ τὴν μετάνοιαν οὖν οὐκ ὀφείλει γαμεῖν ὁ ἀνὴρ.

In the passage quoted from Amos above, the wife becomes a harlot apparently in order to procure a subsistence. The motive in Sir. xxiii. 23 (see above) is not clear. Passing over the *Acts of Thomas*, where *πορνευέτωσαν* appears to mean a persistent course of adultery, we come to the interesting discussion in *Hermas*. In *Hermas* the principle is laid down that, if a man discovers his wife in the act of *adultery*, he is to refrain from intercourse with her, unless she repent, else he becomes a partner with her in her *adultery*. But, should she persist in her

unfaithfulness (*πορνεία*), he is to divorce her. Here also *πορνεία* appears to mean a persistent course of adultery. Again, should she repent after being divorced, the husband is to take her back *once*. And in order to give her this opportunity of repentance he is not to marry again. Here Hermas does not say what the husband is to do in case he is obliged to divorce her *a second time*. But, since he was not to marry again *in order to give her an opportunity to repent*, and since she was to be offered this opportunity only once, it follows that the reason against his remarriage had ceased to exist. Yet, according to the use he makes of the saying of our Lord, based partly on Matt. xix. 9 and partly on Luke xvi. 18, remarriage after divorce appears to be absolutely forbidden. There is thus a lack of consistent thought on the subject in Hermas. It is clear, moreover, that he was completely unaware of the original limitations under which our Lord pronounced the Logia on this subject.

§ 8. *πορνεία* and its cognates in early

Christian literature = (1) *Fornication*. — In early Christian literature, where fornication and *μοιχεία* are distinguished, fornication is the illicit intercourse of two unmarried persons. Herein Christianity breaks with Judaism and the heathen religions in making the sin of the married man equal in guilt to that of the married woman. But, as we have already seen, the teaching of Christ in Matt. v. 28 and St Paul in 1 Cor. vi. 13*b*, 15–16, treats fornication and adultery as one and the same sin *essentially in principle*.

(2) *Adultery*.—Hermas, Mand. iv. 1. 5, ἐπιμένη τῇ πορνείᾳ, used of a married woman. See this passage discussed above, p. 105 *sq.* Tatian, *Orat.*, 10, τὴν ἐκπορνεύσασαν, of a married woman. *Acts of Thomas* (ed. Bonnet), p. 42, οἱ δὲ μοιχοὶ μηκέτι πορνεύετωσαν. Heracleon, quoted by Origen, *In Joan.*, xiii. 15, πῶς . . . ἀπαλλαγείη τοῦ πορνεύειν, of the woman of Samaria. See also 11. Origen, *In Matt.*, xiv. 17, ἐπόρνευσε ἐκείνη ἢ γυνὴ μοιχευθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. Basil, in *Ep.* cxcix. can. 46, writes thus of a woman who had unwittingly

married a married man : ἐπόρνευσε μὲν, ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ δέ. Chrysostom, *In Matt. Hom.*, xvii., ὁ γὰρ μὴ βλέπων ἑτέραν γυναῖκα (*i.e.* uxorem alienam) ἀκολάστοις ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐ πορνεύσει. Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, xxxvii. 8, where πόρνη is used of an adulterous wife ; *Ep.* cxcix. can. 21, where πόρνος is used of an adulterous husband. In the Latin translation *De fugienda fornicatione* Gregory speaks of Joseph as one *qui Ægyptiacam fornicationem fugiit*.

(3) *Sodomy* (as well as other sexual vice).—Justin Martyr, *Apol.*, i. 27, τοὺς πάντας σχεδὸν ὀρῶμεν ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ προάγοντας . . . τοὺς ἄρσενας.

(4) *Sexual vice generally*.—Asc. Is. (*i.e.* *Testament of Hezekiah*), iii. 28, τῆς πλάνης καὶ τῆς πορνείας καὶ τῆς κενοδοξίας. Justin Martyr, *Apol.*, i. 14, οἱ πάλαι μὲν πορνείαις χαίροντες : 27, ὀρῶμεν ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ προάγοντας, οὐ μόνον τὰς κόρας ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄρσενας . . . παῖδας εἰς τὸ αἰσχρῶς χρῆσθαι μόνον· καὶ ὁμοίως θηλειῶν καὶ ἀνδρογύνων καὶ ἀρρητοποιῶν πλῆθος κατὰ πᾶν ἔθνος ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ ἄγους ἔστηκε. Tatian, *Orat.*, 11, τὴν πορνείαν μεμίσηκα. *Acts of Thomas* (ed. Bonnet), p. 21, ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες, παῖδες καὶ

κόραι, νεανίσκοι καὶ παρθένοι . . . ἀπέχεσθε τῆς πορνείας.

§ 9. *Conclusions based on the foregoing evidence.*—From the above evidence drawn from the New Testament and some of the early Christian writers we conclude that—

(1) *πορνεία* was used not only of fornication but also of other specific sexual sins.

(2) *πορνεία* was the generic term for sexual sin as a whole.

(3) The context in which it occurs must in all cases determine the meaning to be assigned to it.

§ 10. *Mistranslations of this term in the New Testament.*—From the evidence furnished above these conclusions are inevitable. Hence the reader can recognise how frequently *πορνεία* is mistranslated in all current translations of the New Testament. It is, however, much more easy to recognise what is wrong in such renderings than to replace them by what is right. The reason, of course, is that we have no word in English which can at once

be used generically for all sexual sin, and likewise for each specific sexual sin, according to the context in which it occurs. Accordingly, though we may render *πορνεία* by "fornication," where the context makes unmistakable the real meaning it bears, such as incest in 1 Cor. v. 1, and sodomy in Jude 7, in other passages such a rendering would be wholly misleading. Hence, in Acts xv. 29, ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων . . . καὶ πορνείας should be rendered "to abstain from things sacrificed to idols . . . and from unchastity." Here unchastity embraces not only fornication and adultery, but every form of sexual sin. Cf. xv. 20, xxi. 25. The same rendering should be given of these phrases in Rev. ii. 20, which are derived from the Apostolic decree. Again, in Matt. v. 32, πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας should be rendered "every one that putteth away his wife saving for the cause of unchastity," or possibly "of adultery." But the former rendering, as supplying a generic term for sexual sin, is to be preferred. So also in xix. 9. In Rev. ix.

21, οὐ μετενόησαν . . . ἐκ τῆς πορνείας αὐτῶν, *πορνεία* is used generically of all sexual sin. "Of their unchastity," or "lewdness," is the best equivalent in English. In 1 Cor. vii. 2, διὰ τὰς πορνείας = "because of sins of unchastity." In Rev. xxii. 15, οἱ κύνες καὶ οἱ φαρμακοὶ καὶ οἱ πόρνοι καὶ οἱ φονεῖς, the πόρνοι seem to embrace only fornicators and adulterers, since the κύνες no doubt are sodomites. Similarly in xxi. 8, where the ἐβδελυγμένοι are the same as the κύνες in xxii. 15. But how to translate the word is a difficult question. Yet even here it would be better to render οἱ πόρνοι as "the unchaste," with an explanation attached.

CHAPTER IX

VERBS MEANING "TO DIVORCE" AND "TO DESERT" IN THE NEW TESTAMENT¹

ἀπολύειν. This is the word used in the Gospels in this sense. It occurs most frequently in Matt., *i.e.* i. 19, ii. 31, 32 (*bis*), xix. 3, 9 (*bis*), but also in Mark x. 2, 4, 11, [12, where we have *αὐτὴ ἀπολύσασα τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς*], Luke xvi. 18 (*bis*). Since on various grounds we have concluded that all the Gospel accounts of our Lord's controversy were derived from Q, it follows

¹ There are many words in Greek signifying "to divorce." In Classical Greek *ἀποπέμπειν* or *ἀποπέμπεσθαι*, *ἀπόπεμψις*, *ἀποπομπή* are used of the man divorcing his wife; *ἀπολείπειν*, *ἀπόλειψις* of the woman deserting her husband. *ἀπαλλάττεσθαι* is used both of husband and of wife divorcing or deserting each other: *cf.* Plato, *Leges*, ii. 868 D, *ἀπαλλάττεσθαι γυναῖκά τε ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀπὸ γυναικός*. It is used also by Philo.

In the LXX., Deut. xxi. 14, xxii. 19, 29, xxiv. 4, Jer. iii. 8, *ἐξαποστέλλειν* is used.

In Josephus, *ἀφίστασθαι*, *παραλύεσθαι*, *διαζεύγνυσθαι* are found. But there are others.

further that Q used this verb. This verb is rarely used in this sense, only—so far as we can discover in existing literature—twice before its occurrence in Q. The earliest occurrence is in 1 Esdr. ix. 36, ἀπέλυσαν αὐτὰς σὺν τέκνοις. The women here referred to are the Gentile women whom the Jews had married. These they divorced when Ezra brought the Mosaic law to bear upon them. But the word may not yet here have reached the technical meaning it has in the Gospels. That it has this technical meaning in the Gospels, the question put to our Lord by the Pharisees puts beyond the possibility of doubt. The second passage is in Diod. xii. 18, ἀπολύειν τὸν ἄνδρα. The editor, to whom we owe Matthew in its present form, naturally availed himself of it in i. 19.

ἀφιέναι, 1 Cor. vii. 11. This verb is first used in Herod. v. 39, ταύτην ἀπέντα ἄλλην ἐσαγάγεσθαι : also in Joseph., *Ant.*, xv. 7. 10, γυναικὶ δὲ οὐδὲ διαχωρισθείσῃ καθ' αὐτὴν γαμηθῆναι μὴ τοῦ πρότερον ἀνδρὸς ἀφιέντος. The noun ἄφεςις (=“divorce”) occurs in Plut., *Pomp.*, 44. This technical mean-

ing of ἀφιέναι, therefore, is a better established one than that of ἀπολύειν.

χωρίζεσθαι, 1 Cor. vii. 10. This verb can mean in relation to married persons (1) "to separate" or "to desert." In a marriage contract of A.D. 66, P. Ryl. ii. 154. 24 ff., we find: ἐὰν δὲ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῖς γεναμένης [χ]ωρίζονται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ἤτοι τοῦ Χαιρήμονος ἀποπέμποντος τὴν Θαισάριον ἢ καὶ αὐτῆς ἐκουσίω[ς ἀ]παλλασσομέν[η]ς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ = "If on the occasion of any difference they separate the one from the other, either Ch. divorcing Th., or Th. of her own free will disespousing herself from him." This use of χωρίζεσθαι is very common in marriage contracts. Yet it is difficult at times to determine which of the two meanings should be adopted. When the separation is mutually agreed upon, then probably it should be translated "to separate." Cf. B.G.U. iv. 1102. 7 ff. (13 B.C.): συνχωροῦσιν Ἀ[πο]λλωνία καὶ Ἐρμογένης κεχωρίσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων.

In Joseph., *Ant.*, xv. 7. 10 (quoted above under ἀφιέναι), διαχωρίζεσθαι clearly means "to

desert.” This is its meaning also in 1 Cor. vii. 10.

(2) = “to divorce.” *Cf.* Polyb. xxxii. 12. 6, where it is said of Scipio’s mother, *κεχωρίσθαι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Λευκίου.*

CHAPTER X

SHORT SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT IN THE ABOVE INVESTIGATION

(1) IN the Synoptic Gospels the two Logia (pp. 74-75) on the question of divorce refer only to divorces taken out on inadequate grounds (Deut. xxiv. 1-2), and not on the ground of unchastity, which was dealt with by an independent law (Deut. xxii. 22), which the Hebrews in common with most peoples of ancient times had laid down in their statutes, and which is acknowledged implicitly as still valid in John viii. 1-11. (See pp. 16-22.)

(2) Another Logion of our Lord is preserved in 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11^b which presupposes the same limitations as those under which He pronounced the Logia in the Synoptics. (See pp. 54-57, 75.)

(3) Matt. xix. 1-9 is not based on Mark x.

2-12, as all scholars apparently at the present day assume ; for Mark x. 2-12 is here untrustworthy owing to the drastic editing it has undergone from the Gentile Christian standpoint, but both accounts are based independently on Q. (See pp. 85-90, 27-31.)

(4) Q, as is universally admitted by scholars, is the source also of Matt. v. 32, Luke xvi. 18.

(5) Matt. xix. 10-12 has nothing whatever to do with the subject of divorce. (See pp. 35-38.)

(6) Q is in all probability the source of the Pauline teaching in 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11*b*, vi. 16. (See pp. 63-65.)

(7) 1 Cor. vii. 11*a* is an interpolation, and has led to endless conflicts amongst scholars as to the meaning of the Pauline teaching. (See pp. 51-54.)

(8) Remarriage after divorce on the ground of unfaithfulness is not forbidden anywhere in the New Testament save in an interpolation, *i.e.* 1 Cor. vii. 11*a*. (See pp. 31, 54.)

(9) The State can only divorce those who

through unfaithfulness have already divorced themselves. (See pp. 77–80.)

(10) 1 Cor. vi. 15–18 clearly teaches that unchastity dissolves essentially the bond of marriage, though officially it may still be recognised by the Church and State. The true renewal of the essential bond lies in the hands of the pair directly concerned. (See pp. 20 *n.*, 67–71.)

(11) 1 Cor. vii. 15 allows that desertion in certain cases is equivalent to divorce. Whether in such cases remarriage was allowed on the part of the believing partner, who has been deserted, is not clear. (See pp. 59–60, 81–82.)

(12) The meaning of *πορνεία* can only be determined from the context. It can be used generically of all sexual sin or of any specific sexual sin. (See pp. 91–111.)

(13) *χωρίζεσθαι* and *ἀφιέναι* are used as technical terms in 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11*b*, a Logion of our Lord. (See pp. 48–57.)

(14) The main results of this investigation can be summarised in a few sentences. The

principle affirmed by our Lord in His Logia on divorce is based on Gen. ii. 24, and not on the indefensible exegesis of the Shammaites (p. 34 *n.*), and is applied in the Gospels within the limits prescribed by the controversy of His time, *i.e.* to divorce on inadequate grounds (p. 31 *sq.*). But this principle, which is really valid universally, was taken up by the Apostle of the Gentiles (pp. 67–71), and applied without limit or reservation, and therefore to the question of divorce, on the ground of unfaithfulness. When the offender persists in such unfaithfulness, divorce becomes obligatory (p. 70 *sq.*).

In the case of divorce on the ground of unfaithfulness the guiltless is of course at liberty to marry again. The right of remarriage was universally recognised by the Jewish Church. It was, therefore, implicitly acknowledged by Christ (p. 33) and St Paul, seeing that not a single clause in the New Testament forbids such marriage save one that occurs in an interpolation (pp. 51, 54). Those who deny the right of divorce and remarriage confuse the essence of

marriage (pp. 20 *n.*, 69 *n.*) with its public recognition by the Church or State. They do not care how often the essential principle of marriage is outraged and destroyed, so long as the outer and lifeless husk of it is preserved.

Deliberate and prolonged desertion under certain conditions formed according to the Apostle a just ground for divorce and not improbably for remarriage; for such desertion constitutes an essential breach of the marriage vows (pp. 59 *sq.*, 82 *n.*).

INDEX I

SUBJECTS AND NAMES

- Abrahams, 78 *n.*
- Adulterer, definition of, in Judaism, 92, 99 *n.*
in Christianity, 104.
- Adulteress, definition of, 97, 99 *n.*, 103-4.
and her paramour to be put to death by Mosaic law, 4-8, 19, 22.
this law recognised in John viii., 6-10.
abrogated, 5.
not forgiven in John viii., 7 *n.*
- Adulterous husband (or wife) has by own action divorced himself or herself though marriage may still be ecclesiastically or civilly valid, 20 *n.*, 67-70.
wife, divorce of, obligatory in Judaism, 5.
when divorced not allowed to marry her paramour in Judaism, 6 *n.*
- pair, continued wedlock of an unrepentant and, an infamy, 71 *n.*, 81.
- Adultery, limited connotation in Judaism, 103.
essentially sin of married woman in Judaism, 99 *n.*
not sin of married man unless through intercourse with another man's wife, 99 *n.*
wider connotation in Christianity, 103-4.
- Adultery, sin of any man or woman through intercourse with another's wife or husband, 99.
= sin of idolatry in Israel, 95.
= of confederacies with Gentiles, 96.
divorce of wife in case of, obligatory in Judaism, 5.
divorce of husband or wife in case of *persistent*, obligatory in Christianity, 70-81.
and fornication essentially the same in principle, 103 *n.*, 107.
- Anti-Pharisaic passages in Q, Matt., Mark, omitted by Luke, 3-4 *n.*
- Aqiba, 12.
- Controversy between Hillelites and Shammaites regarding divorce on lesser grounds, 10-13, 15-16.
between Pharisees and our Lord, 15-17.
- Desertion by wife dealt with in Logion in 1 Cor. vii. 10, 54-57.
by wife or husband, 59-60.
by wife had to be followed by divorce in Judaism to justify remarriage, 48-49, 55-56, 76.
justifies divorce in certain cases in Christianity, 59-60, 82 *n.*

Dissolubility of marriage recognised by Mosaic law, 13-16, 29-31.
 taught by St Paul on ground of unchastity, 67-70.
 of desertion, 59-60.
 recognised in interpolated passage, 1 Cor. vii. 11*a*, 51, 54.

Divorce allowed by Mosaic law on lesser grounds—controversy between Hillelites and Sham-maites, 10-14, 29-31.
 right of, limited to husband in Judaism, 27-29.
 of adulterous wife obligatory in Judaism after abrogation of Mosaic law of capital punishment, 5, 9, 21.
 right of, on ground of unfaithfulness, recognised by Christ on ground of Gen. ii. 24, 31-34.
 obligatory in Christianity after repeated unfaithfulness, 65-71, 81.
 not justifiable on ground of unbelief, 51, 59, 61.
 justifiable on other grounds than that of unfaithfulness ?, 81-82.
 Pauline teaching on, based on that of Christ (31-32), 66-70.
 pronounced by the State only on those who have first divorced themselves, 77-79.

Essential relation in marriage based on faithful troth of man and maid, 20 *n*.
 dissolved through unchastity, 20 *n*., 67-70.
 breach of, can be healed by repentance, 20 *n*., 69 *n*.

Fornication—see *πορνεία*, of which it is a frequent mistranslation, 109-111.
 =sin of idolatry in Israel, 95.
 =confederacies with Gentiles, 96.
 =sin of married or unmarried Jew with unmarried woman,¹ 99 *n*.
 =adultery, 23-25, 98, 100-01, 104, 107.
 =persistent course of adultery, 104-105.
 =incest, 100, 102.
 =sodomy, 100, 102, 108.
 =sexual sin generally, 100, 102, 108.

Hawkins, 3 *n*., 30 *n*., 37.

Herodias, 28 *n*.²

Hillel and his school, 10-13, 29-31.

Interpolation in 1 Cor. vii. 11*a*, 51-54, 61 *n*., 75 *n*.

Interpretative additions in Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, 74 *n*., 75 *n*.

¹ In Christianity fornication cannot be used of the sin of a married man as in Judaism and the heathen religions (p. 107).

² Grotius, Wetstein, and no doubt earlier scholars have quoted the cases of Herodias and Salome in connection with Mark x. 12. With Salome we have dealt sufficiently already (p. 28 *n*.). But, since some scholars of note in the past have construed Mark x. 12 as a reference to Herodias, it is advisable to discuss the question more in detail. Scholars have assumed that Herodias *divorced* her husband on the basis of the statement in Josephus, *Ant.*, xviii. 5. 4. But Josephus makes no such statement. What he does say is this: "Herodias . . . *deserted* her husband while he was alive (*διαστῆσα* (*αὐτός*)) and married Herod, her husband's brother by the same father." There is no authority, so far as I can discover, for

Law, Mosaic, relating to marriage, 4-5, 10-16.

Logia in Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, Mark x. 11-12, Luke xvi. 18, 1 Cor. vi. 16, vii. 10, 11*b*, derived from Q, 83-90.

two in Gospels on divorce, 72-75.

Logion, third, in 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11*b*, on desertion and divorce, 48, 54-57, 75.

its original form, 54-56.

false, in Mark x. 12, 75.

Luke omits most anti-Pharisaic passages in Q and Mark, 3-4 *n*.

Luke omits, therefore, controversy regarding divorce, 3.

M'Neile, 35-38.

Mark x. 2-12 claimed to be original of Matt. xix. 2-9, 18-19.

edited and unhistorical, 27-31, 85-89.

similarly edited elsewhere, 29 *n*., 30 *n*.

Marriage bond between God and Israel destroyed by unfaithfulness, 97-98.

human, destroyed by unfaithfulness, 67-70.

taking *δίσπασθαι* to mean "to divorce." This verb is used by Josephus in the same sense as *διαχωρίζεσθαι*, which means "to desert"—cf. *Ant.*, xv. 7. 10. Since John the Baptist said to Herod, "It is not lawful for thee to have thy brother's wife" (Mark vi. 18; Matt. xiv. 4), it seems that Philip did not divorce her after her desertion and remarriage. But even if he had divorced her, her marriage with her brother-in-law Herod Antipas was contrary to the law (cf. Lev. xviii. 16, xx. 21) and the teaching of the Talmudists (see Lightfoot *in loc.*). John's denunciation of Herod's marriage is *not based on the ground that Herodias had divorced her husband* (an offence nowhere laid to her charge), but *that she had married the brother of her husband*, a marriage inadmissible by the Mosaic law, as she had borne a child to her first husband. If a man died *leaving no children*, his brother could marry the widow to raise up children to him. Hence there is no reference of any kind to Herodias in Mark x. 12. But further, even if Philip had been already dead (as he was not), when Herodias married Herod, the marriage would still have been an abomination in the eyes of the Jews. In Josephus, *Ant.*, xvii. 13. 1, the marriage of Archelaus with the *widow* of his brother Alexander is declared to be *ἀπάμοστον . . . Ἰουδαίοις*, as she had borne children to Alexander (*xvii. 1. 2*).

Some recent commentators think that the illegality of Herodias' marriage was in part caused by the fact that Herod was already married. But this did not constitute an illegality in Judaism. The illegality consisted in Herod's taking to wife his brother's wife—whether divorced or not matters not. A Jew at the beginning of the Christian era could marry two or more wives, though monogamy had become customary, and all but universal. Yet according to Justin Martyr, *Dial. c. Tryph.*, 134, a Jew could have four or five wives at the same time. Josephus (*Ant.*, xvii. 1. 2) speaks of this practice in his own time, and apparently had two wives himself (*Vita*, 75). The Mosaic law allowed it (Exod. xxi. 10), and the Talmud did not forbid it.

- Marriages said to be made in heaven,
77 *n.*
all, not made by God, 77-80.
- Matt. xix. 3-9 said to misrepresent
Christ's teaching, 17-19.
reproduces Q but not Mark x.
2-12, 27, 85-90.
- xix. 10-12 does not deal with
divorce, 1 *n.*, 35-37.
probable explanation of its in-
sertion in its present context,
37-38.
- Milligan, 38, 52, 53.
- Mistranslations of *χωρίζεσθαι*, 44-
50, 55, 61-62.
of *ἀφιέναι*, 44-50, 55, 61-62.
of *πορνεία*, 109-111.
- Pauline teaching on marriage and
divorce based on that of
Christ, 31-32, 66-70.
requires divorce in case of per-
sistent and unrepentant
adulterers, 70-71.
implicitly allows remarriage on
part of the guiltless, 51, 54.
allows divorce on ground of per-
sistent desertion, 59-60, 82.
- Philo supports school of Hillel, 13-
14.
- Principle laid down by Christ on
divorce necessarily applied
within the limits prescribed
by the controversy—hence
not to divorce on ground of
adultery: applied by Paul
to this ground of divorce,
31-32, 62-63, 67-70.
- Q, anti-Pharisaic passages in,
omitted by Luke, 3 *n.*, 4 *n.*
direct source of Matt. xix. 3-9,
27, 73, 85-90.
v. 32, 72.
- Q, direct source of Mark x. 2-12,
85-90.
Luke xvi. 18, 72.
1 Cor. vi. 16, vii. 10, 11*b*, 83-85.
used by Paul in Aramaic (?), 63-
65, 84-85.
- Remarriage, always legal in
Judaism after divorce, 21.
illegal unless preceded by divorce,
48-49, 50, 52.
of woman (divorced for adultery)
with her paramour forbidden
by Judaism, 6 *n.*
right of, of the guiltless after
divorce on ground of adultery
implicitly recognised in New
Testament, 33-34.
not forbidden save in an
interpolation, 51, 54.
on being deserted—pos-
sible (?), 59-60, 82 *n.*
- Romans vii. 1-3 not bearing on
divorce, 39-42.
- Salome, sister of Herod the Great,
breaks Jewish law, 28 *n.*
- Shammai and his school, 10-13.
their exegesis of Deut. xxiv. 1-2.
indefensible, 12, 34 *n.*, 119.
- Streeter, 30 *n.*, 73, 86.
- Suttee, 5 *n.*
- Unfaithfulness (= *πορνεία*) severs
bond of communion with
Christ, 67-70.
dissolves the marriage tie, 67-
70
- Unit, religious, originally nation,
98.
later individual, 98.
- What God hath joined together,
77-81.

INDEX II

GREEK WORDS

αἰτία, 37-38.

ἀπολύειν = to divorce,¹ 112-113.

ἀφιέναι = to divorce, 44, 48, 49, 55,
113-114.

act of husband, 50 *n.*

of wife, 50 *n.*

διαχωρίζεσθαι = to desert, 48-49,
114-115.

δίστασθαι, 28, 130.

ἐξέρχεσθαι (reading of D in Mark
x. 12) = to desert,² 76.

καταλλάσσεσθαι, 52 *n.*, 53.

κολλᾶσθαι, 64-65.

μοιχαλῖς,

μοιχεία,

μοιχεύειν,

μοιχός,

νόμος = Mosaic law, 39.

πορνεία
πορνεύειν
πόρνη
πόρνος

= (1) (a) Fornication, 93
98, 100, 107.

(b) Spiritual forni-
cation, 94-96.

(2) (a) Adultery, 92, 93,
96, 98-100,
100-102, 107-
108.

(b) Spiritual adul-
tery, 94-96.

(3) Incest, 100, 102.

(4) Sodomy, 93-94,
100, 102, 108.

(5) Persistent unchas-
tity on part of
married men or
women, 104-106.

(6) Sexual vice gener-
ally, 23 *n.*, 100,
102-103, 108-109.

πρός = "because of," 89.

προσκολλᾶσθαι, 64, 65.

φθορά, 92.

χωρίζεσθαι = to desert, 48-53, 114-
115.

= to divorce, 50-53.

¹ For other Greek words with this meaning see 112 *n.* *

² Abbott suggests (*Corrections of Mark*, 317 *n.*) that "if we read Mark x. 12 thus: *και εαν αυτη απολυσασα τον ανδρα αυτης γαμηση αλλος* (for *ελλδ*) *μοιχαται*, the active will then be rightly used ('take to wife') and Mark will agree with Matt.-Luke." But this text is just as impossible as that followed by Wellhausen (see pp. 75-76 above), for a Jewish woman could not divorce her husband.

INDEX III

PASSAGES REFERRED TO OR DEALT WITH IN SCRIPTURE AND OTHER EARLY LITERATURE

Old Testament.

- Gen. ii. 24, 32, 36, 67-70, 84, 87.
 Num. xxv. 1-2, 96.
 Deut. xxii. 22, 4, 14.
 xxiv. 1-2, 4, 10, 15.
 Hosea ii. 4, 6, 7, 96.
 Amos vii. 17, 96, 104.
 Is. lvii. 3, 95.
 Jer. iii. 8, xiii. 27, 95.
 Ezek. xvi., xxiii. 95.
 xxiii. 37, 43, 95.
 45, 98.

Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha.

- Sirach xxiii. 23, 98, 104, 105.
 1 Esdras ix. 36, 113.
 Test. Reub. i. 6, 100.
 v. 5, vi. 1, 99.
 Levi. xiv. 6, 99.
 Jud. xiii. 3, xviii. 2, 99, 100.
 Iss. vii. 2, 99.
 Dan. v. 6, 99.
 Ash. ii. 8, 100.
 Jos. iii. 8, v. 1, 24 n., 99.
 Benj. ix. 1, 100.
 Ascension of Isaiah ii. 5, 100.
 iii. 28, 108.
 Psalms of Solomon ii. 13, 100.

New Testament.

- Matt. v. 28, 20 n., 100, 103 n., 104,
 107, 110.
 32, 2, 16, 18, 22, 25, 89.
 xix. 3, 13, 37.
 3-9, 1, 3 n., 89-90.
 4-5, 36.
 5, 65, 84.

- Matt. xix. 9, 18, 22, 23 n., 110.
 10, 37.
 10-12, 35-38.
 Mark x. 2-12, 2, 17-22, 27-31, 85-
 90.
 19, 103 n.
 Luke xvi. 18, 2, 3, 89-90.
 John vii. 53-viii. 11, 6-7, 14, 17.
 Acts xv. 20, 29, xxi. 25, 102,
 110.
 Rom. vii. 1-3, 39-42.
 1 Cor. v. 1, 102.
 vi. 13b-16, 62-69, 101, 107.
 vii. 2, 102, 111.
 10, 46, 48-49.
 11a, 46, 50-54.
 10-15, 43-62.
 x. 8, 101.
 Gal. ii. 19, 39.
 iv. 8, 21, 41.
 Jude 7, 102.
 Rev. ii. 14, 20, 102.
 20, 110.
 21, 22, 101.
 ix. 21, 102, 110-111.
 xxi. 8, xxii. 15, 101, 111.

Jewish Writers.

- Philo, *De Spec. Leg.*, iii. 5, 13, 14.
 Josephus, *Ant.*, iv. 8. 23, 9 n., 14.
 xv. 7. 10, 28 n., 48, 55, 113, 114.
 xvii. 13. 1, 123 n.
 xviii. 5. 4, 28 n., 122 n.

Greek Writers.

- Æschines (*Adv. Tim.* 5. 4 : 10. 25),
 93.

- Demosthenes (ed. Reiske, p. 1374),
21 *n.*
(p. 413), 93.
Dio Cassius, 60, 30, 93.
Diodorus Sic., xii. 18, 113.
Herodotus, v. 39, 113.
Menander, *Perikeiromene*, 91.
Plato, *Leges*, ii. 868, 53, 112 *n.*
Plutarch, *Pomp.*, 44, 113.
Polybius, xxxii. 12. 6, 115.
Papyri quoted, 91, 114.
- Early Christian Writers.*
- Justin Martyr, *Ap.*, i. 14, 27, 108.
Tatian, *Orat.* 10, 11, 107, 108.
Hermas, *Mand.*, iv. 1. 4, 70.
4-8, 104-106.
1. 5, 107.
Heracleon (Origen, *In Joan.*, xiii.
15), 107.
Origen, *In Matt.*, xiv. 17, 107.
Acts of Thomas (ed. Bonnet, p. 42),
104, 105, 107, 108.
Basil (Cæsariensis), *Ep.*, 199, can.
46, 107.
- Chrysostom, *In Matt. Hom.*, xvii.,
108
Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, xxxvii. 8,
108.
- Mishna and Talmud* (Babylonian).
- Edui. iv. 7, 5 *n.*
Gitt. ix. 10, 12.
90*a*, 12.
Ket. iv. 9, 28 *n.*
Sanh. vii. 2, 5.
xi. 1, 9 *n.*
22*a*, 78 *n.*
41*a*, 5.
59*a*, 93 *n.*
66*b*, 9 *n.*
Sotah v. 1, 6 *n.*
vi. 1, 5.
2*a*, 78 *n.*
Yeb. xiv. 1, 28 *n.*
xix. 1, 28 *n.*
- Talmud* (Jerusalem).
- Sanh. 18*a*, 24*b*, 5.

From WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S LIST

MAKING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Prof. B. W. BACON, LL.D., D.D. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

PAPACY AND MODERN TIMES. By Rev. Dr. W. BARRY. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

HANDBOOK OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN FATHERS. By ERNEST LEIGH-BENNETT. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 21s. net.

SPIRITUAL PILGRIMAGE. By Rev. R. J. CAMPBELL. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 7s. 6d. net.

RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS. By the Venerable R. H. CHARLES, M.A., D.Litt. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

DEATH AND THE AFTER LIFE. By the Rt. Rev. J. W. DIGGLE. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

FOUNDATIONS OF DUTY. By the Rt. Rev. J. W. DIGGLE. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 3s. 6d. net.

EVOLUTION IN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. By Prof. P. GARDNER, D.Litt. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 6s. net.

HISTORY OF DOGMA. By ADOLF HARNACK, D.D. Edited by the late Rev. Prof. A. B. BRUCE, D.D. 7 vols. Demy 8vo. Cloth. Each, 10s. 6d. net.


LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Prof. G. F. MOORE. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

THE CHURCHES AT THE CROSS ROADS. By Rev. J. H. SHAKESPEARE. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 7s. 6d. net.

BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Prof. H. VON SODEN, D.D. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 6s. net.

THE SYSTEM OF ANIMATE NATURE. (GIFFORD LECTURES, 1915-16.) By Prof. J. A. THOMSON, M.A., LL.D. 2 vols. Large 8vo. Cloth. 30s. net.

CHURCH OF ENGLAND. By Canon E. W. WATSON. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth. 2s. 6d. net.



PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

~~UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY~~

KNOX COLLEGE LIBRARY

LIBRARY
ANDY COLLEGE
TORONTO

