THE DEVIL IN THE BLACK BOX: ETHNIC NATIONALISM, CULTURAL IMPERIALISM, AND THE OUTLAWING OF TV UNDER APARTHEID

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South Africa became television's final frontier in the industrialized world. The country first glimpsed TV at Johannesburg's Empire Exhibition in 1936 - the very year the medium was launched in Britain and just four years after its experimental introduction in the USA. [1] Yet there would be a lag of four decades between that first Johannesburg sighting and the inauguration of a South African television service. By 1949, the Broadcast Amendment Act had already placed the introduction of TV under the aegis of the South African Broadcasting Corporation. But such was the National Party's resistance to the medium that this remained an interminably abstract responsibility - by the time South African TV finally went on the air in 1976, over 130 nations could boast a prior service.

The South African ban on TV ranks as the most drastic act of cultural protectionism in the history of the medium. It stands, moreover, as the most extensive act of pre-emptive censorship by a regime notorious for curbing free speech. The ban went well beyond the familiar measures of removing from circulation - in advance of their issuance - an individual writer's books, a politician's words, or an organization's publications. For in the process of barring television from South Africa the ruling National Party anathematized an entire technology.

Dr Albert Hertzog, the cabinet minister responsible for media affairs, convicted the telly in its absence of being nothing more than "spiritual *dagga*" (*ganga*), while another vocal opponent dismissed it as a "school for crime". [2] On several occasions, in parliament and in the press, Nationalists trundled out the warning of a German sage that "while the atom bomb kills the body, television destroys the soul". [3] Hertzog fulminated against "that evil black box; sickly, mawkish, sentimentalistic, and leading to dangerous liberalistic tendencies". [4] And, in one of his more lurid denunciations, he explained to parliament that "inside the pill [of TV] there is the bitter poison which will ultimately mean the downfall of civilizations". [5]

What enabled TV to incarnate, by the late 1950s and the 1960s, menace of such proportions? Afrikaner nationalists were, of course, not alone in implicating TV in the spread of moral turpitude. But their assaults should be distinguished from the protestations of, say, Mary Whitehouse in Britain and Phyllis Shaffley in the USA. For, almost without exception, international critiques of TV's putative debasement of national morality only gathered force after the technology's inception. Television was ordinarily admitted as soon as it was deemed affordable. While the degree of government control varied considerably from one society to the next, the medium was by and large accepted as one more modern convenience; there was no long hiatus of suspicion separating invention from implementation. Only after its introduction did the controversies sizzle over TV's impact on everything from family dynamics and ethnic identity to sleeping habits and living-room decor. Under apartheid, this scenario was played in reverse: a quarter of a century before the monster showed its face, the society was inundated with advance warnings about the social chaos it would unleash.

The prominence of rationalized fantasy in pre-emptive censorship makes it particularly suggestive material for an analysis of nationalism. Censorship, like nationalism, seeks to articulate group identity around a set of exclusions. To narrate and depict who we are

inevitably entails narratives and depictions of who it is that we are not. In other words, censorship and nationalism intersect in so far as they both set the parameters of community by dividing the admissable from the inadmissable, the values, products, and people who belong from those deemed unassimilable and alien. Afrikaner nationalists' protracted, impassioned, and detailed justifications of the ban on TV thus give unusual focus to their intellectual and administrative efforts to reorganize relations between ethnicity, race, cultural identity, national and international community. Moreover, given the indelible imprint of America on the very idea of TV, Afrikaner nationalists' arguments against the technology disclose an uneasy relation to American culture - or at least to those spectres of American culture that haunted their imaginings. Thus, over the course of the TV controversy, the civil rights movement, the Cold War, cowboy films, and the Apollo space mission were all refracted through the anxieties and ambitions of Afrikaner nationalism.

From a theoretical standpoint, the issues raised by the enforced absence of TV under apartheid impinge on many of the focal debates in contemporary cultural studies. They assume, for instance, direct relevance to controversies over cultural imperialism in the media as well as to current inquiry into the inventions of ethnicity, race, and nationhood and relations among these constructs. Because Afrikaner nationalists argued against admitting TV not only into the nation state but into the home as, by implication, a national analogue, their contentions also give focus to current inquiry into the institutionalized, gendered partitioning of public from private space. Finally, the debates emphasize TV's double-edged relation to modernity; forces opposed to the medium presented it as a catalyst of degeneration, while proponents billed it as an agent of progress. Overall, the ferocity and extremity of the South African debates trouble some of the more reductive theoretical assumptions about relations among contradictory formulations of cultural difference.

The most arresting of these disturbances occurs around the discourse of cultural imperialism. For the past few decades, the idea of cultural imperialism has been securely wedded to four assumptions: that such imperialism is principally of American provenance; that its main conduits are the moving images of American TV and Hollywood; that the language of cultural imperialism is an inherently left discourse; and that the appropriate unit of analysis is the nation-state, cultural imperialism arising when the insitutions, products, and values of a powerful nation-state threaten those of a weaker one.

The history of TV's absence under apartheid bears out the first two of these presuppositions: the USA, especially American TV, was indeed cast as the dominant source of cultural imperialism. However, the remaining two assumptions are thrown into disarray. In South Africa, the anti-imperialist cry against *le defi americain* ,which has typically emanated from within a Marxist-socialist spectrum ranging from Herbert Schiller and Fidel Castro to Jack Laing and Ariel Dorfman, was wielded forcefully by the far right. The South African case disturbs the assumption behind most such cultural imperialist theory that national culture and the nation-state are coterminous. This shortcoming is a consequence of the history of this strain of theory. [6] During the 1960s and 1970s, the formative era for such analyses, the anti-capitalism of cultural imperialist thought was coupled to a more romantic view of the progressive potential and internal coherence of "Third World" nation-states than now seems possible. This limitation was sharpened by the emergence of cultural imperialist theories principally out of studies on the impact exerted by US culture on Latin American nation-states. Most of such states exhibit greater religious, ethnic, and linguistic cohesion than almost all their African and many of their Asian equivalents.

The assumed sanctity of the nation-state as the legitimate unit of cultural self-regulation cannot account for circumstances where people give greater weight to the invented international "kinships" of religion (Catholicism, say, or Islam) or of cross-border ethnicity (Kurds, Somalis, Armenians) over the invented "kinships" of nation-state nationalism. Neither can it account for the contest among cultures within the nation-state - a point of fundamental relevance to TV's exclusion from South Africa. For an inquiry into right-wing nationalist invocations of cultural imperialist discourse highlights the difficulty of

accounting, within that paradigm, for circumstances where an ethnic micronationalism seizes state power and invokes the principle of national cultural sovereignty against the putative predations of a foreign culture. To reduce this scenario, in the South African instance, to a clash between a muscular American imperialism and a weaker Afrikaner nationalism is to ignore the complex relations between international and intranational discrepancies in cultural power.

Left- and right-wing critiques of TV imperialism - like those of Schiller on one ideological flank, J A Marais on the other - share some significant common ground. [7] That much is suggested, for instance, by Schiller's assertion that "Television as it operates today is a mortal enemy of national identity. As a market-driven industry, TV practically guarantees the destruction of national identity." [8] Both Schiller and Marais give priority to the nation as a unit of cultural belonging and, moreover, present national culture as an absolute condition. It either exists or it is under threat. There is no accomodation of the possibility that, as Stuart Hall has suggested, culture may simultaneously become more global and more local through what he calls a "double-helical movement". [9] That is, neither the left- nor the right-wing critic acknowledges that the internationalizing of culture may produce not simple homogenization but new melds that can express a national, ethnic, or national sense of cultural belonging in process. Finally, both Schiller and Marais repudiate American TV on grounds of anti-imperialism in tandem with anti-capitalism. Thus, from either end of the political spectrum, they represent monopoly capital and TV as collaborative catalysts for the dissolution of national and/or ethnic bonds, the result being simultaneous economic integration and cultural homogenization.

However, Marais and his anti-TV allies pressed this hostility toward internationalism and cosmopolitanism much further. For, besides projecting monopoly capitalism and TV as corrosive, denationalizing forces, they levelled a related critique against communism and liberalism as well. Indeed, among the most vocal Afrikaner nationalist opponents of the medium, it became an article of faith that TV, like monopoly capitalism, communism, and liberalism, promotes sameness. Television thus came to be cast as an emissary of a Janus-faced Soviet-American challenge to the integrity of Afrikaner nationalism. Any investigation into the TV ban entails an examination of the political circumstances that enabled the technology to feature as such a versatile bearer of ideological subversion.

It was Dr Piet Meyer who came to voice, in its most paranoid form, the nationalist fear of a hydra-headed internationalism. During the era when the TV imbroglio reached its apogee, the intransigent Meyer wielded considerable institutional clout: from 1959 to 1981 he was head of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and, from 1960 to 1972, chaired the Broederbond, the clandestine, neo-Masonic "band of brothers" who exercised substantial influence over apartheid policy, notably during the eras of Verwoerd and Vorster's premierships. In 1959, the year of his appointment as chair of the SABC board of directors, Meyer published a book on the evolution and destiny of Afrikaner nationalism in which he depicted a veritable Niagara of international forces that threatened to inundate Afrikanerdom: "During this period the Afrikaner has been busy ... taking a stand against Russian and Chinese communism, India imperialism, Eastern, Middle Eastern and North African Mohammedanism, West European liberalism, American capitalistic sentimentalism and fervent anti-white Bantu animism in Africa." [10]

This sense of well-nigh universal engulfment should not, however, leave the impression that anti-imperialist objections to TV were articulated only in the name of safeguarding Afrikaner nationalism. The group identities being shielded from TV's corrosive influence shifted substantially from one formulation to the next: these included the Afrikaner nation, the white nation, the white race, the Bantu nation, a constellation of ethnic groups advancing toward self-governing nationhood, Western civilization, Christian Western civilization, and the family. Such varied invocations disclose the contradictions within the rhetorical repertoire of a racist nationalism, for animosity toward TV was voiced through the political registers of ethnic nationalist solidarity, of national racial solidarity, and of multiculturalism, the latter

producing what one might call the racism of cultural respect - that is, racism without enunciated races. [11] Finally, in the most contradictory of these formulations, Meyer, Hertzog and others opposed to TV utilized what Wilhelm Reich has termed "national internationalism", a process whereby an ultra nationalism ordinarily hostile to internationalism designates itself as a defender of an imagined transnational community -- in this case, the white race or Christian Western Civilization. [12] However, one overarching anxiety binds most of the arguments against TV: the fear of what the medium's adversaries called "denationalization" on the one hand, "integration" on the other. Thus, to examine the sundry defences of the ban is to chart the slippage between efforts to circumscribe community imaginatively in ethnic, racial, national, and international terms.

As the Nationalists were at pains to point out, the setting up of TV is far more costly than radio or newspaper initiatives. It has therefore tended - particularly pre-cable - to generate more heavily centralized services than other media. The steep costs of production also makes national television more reliant on foreign, particularly American programming. In combination, these tendencies were used to vindicate Nationalist claims that the very nature of the technology promoted an American ideology of melting-pot assimilation and would erode political programmes that sought to differentiate between groups, whether along Afrikaans-English lines, black-white divides or (particularly after the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill of 1959) along a variety of state-promoted, ethnic, nationalist fractures. In short, the National Party portrayed television as an agent of **cultural fusion** subversive of state efforts to promote **cultural fission**.

The depiction of TV as an imperial catalyst of national dissolution, cultural fusion, and racial integration served as the central objection to the medium, but it was supported by subsidiary claims. South Africa had too many mountains to make it suitable TV terrain. But hadn't Switzerland and Peru found a route around that problem? South Africa had too many languages. Weren't Ethiopia and Ghana, both of which admitted TV before South Africa, linguistically more diverse? The country was too large and sparsely inhabited. What of other, more thinly populated nations - Canada, the Sudan, Australia, Mongolia? As early as 1953 the National Party claimed to be adopting a wait-and-see policy, arguing that, given the inevitability of technological progress, too hasty an adoption of TV would result in a superannuated system. Nationalist spokesmen continued to urge technological caution all the way to the early 1970s. Yet such warnings could be invoked *ad infinitum*; as one proponent of TV remarked with wholly apposite cynicism, "we might just as well not have purchased any aircraft in South Africa for years because the Concord was shortly to be put into service. Or, we should not have abandoned the ox waggon, because who knows what sort of fancy electric motor cars are going to be invented sooner or later." [13] A final variant of the reasons for excluding TV came from Hertzog: the same man who contended that TV would induce a terrible levelling of cultures and mixing of races, disingenuously claimed that its introduction would discriminate against South Africa's "various" black peoples as they would lack access to the medium. Such an argument was consistent with the regime's strategy of invoking the language of democracy, equal rights, and self-government in order to institutionalize the economic and cultural domination of black South Africans by corralling them into purportedly "ethnic national homelands".

Indeed, the Afrikaner nationalist association of TV with foreign domination can only be understood in terms of a longer history of inter-colonial rivalry for control over black territory, labour power, and economic resources, above all, the mines. [14] It has to be seen, too, in terms of rival white imaginings about how the inception of TV in South Africa would change the balance of power - both within the white communities and in relation to the internal and international forces ranged against apartheid.

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To engage with the constitutive absence of TV under apartheid is to begin to redress the tendency for theories of nationalism and theories of the media to arise in isolation from each

other. For if two of the most striking intellectual developments of the past decade have been the growth of media studies and the resurgent fascination with nationalism, these developments have tended to pass each other like ships in the proverbial night. This has occurred despite the media's pivotal place in generating, consolidating, and disseminating images of national belonging. [15] The work most responsible for reanimating theoretical interest in nationalism, Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, provides an invaluable bridge between these two realms by proposing print capitalism as a primary catalyst for the rise of modern nationalism. [16] Anderson's stress on the links between communications technology and the forms of national community notwithstanding, he remains, as Philip Schlesinger has observed, oddly indifferent to the impact of post-Gutenberg technologies on the invention and circulation of rival visions of national community. [17] In a rare comment on non-print media, Anderson concludes rather briskly that in the late twentieth century "advances in communications technology, especially radio and television, give print allies [in generating national solidarity] unavailable a century ago". [18]

The history of apartheid media turns Anderson's comment on its head: prior to the 1970s, there is little indication that ruling Nationalists consider TV a potential ally of print and radio in the cause of national cohesion. While the dominant tendency to consider TV as subversive of print and radio surfaced *in extremis* under apartheid, it was by no means a South African idiosyncracy. Many other governments of small or medium-sized nations have criticized the medium as an agent of international cultural values at the expense of national ones.

Amidst their general accusations that TV rides roughshod over proud national distinctions, Hertzog, Marais, J C Otto, and others hostile to the technology reserved a special concern for the impact it might have on press and radio services. Beneath this concern lay the perception that TV acted as an agent of linguistic imperialism that would jeopardize other media forms upon which the survival of the Afrikaans language depended. Afrikaans newspapers and magazines had played a vital role in standardizing the language between 1902 and 1925, enabling it to become a respectable and indispensable resource in the anti-imperial labour of binding the discordant Afrikaner classes, regions, and political factions. [19] Television threatened to reverse Afrikaans's historically shallow, precarious parity with English. It threatened do so, first, by eroding the advertising base on which Afrikaans newspapers depended and, second, by extending the authority of English, given that the majority of programmes would have to be imported from the USA and Britain. Thus the TV debates helped reanimate anti-imperialist anxieties, as Afrikaner nationalists saw the media issue as a showdown against that old enemy duo, the English language and foreign-controlled monopoly capital.

If Afrikaner nationalists voiced particular anxiety was over the fate of their press, the campaign to obstruct TV was also marked by their relentless advocacy of radio. After Hertzog had appointed the ultra-nationalist Meyer chairman of the SABC in 1959, the state-controlled radio services came to be seen as central to the wellbeing of the Afrikaans language and nation. In the year when he acceded to that office, Meyer declared that "Of all communications media ... the warm, human spoken word is and remains (*sic*) the most powerful and influential. Whatever is carried in the other media, and however these media do it, the influence and effect depends in the last instance on whether the substance is taken up in human conversation, and how it is passed, processed and spread in living conversation." [20] When Meyer opined in an SABC annual report a decade later that "radio distinguishes itself [from TV] by the fact that it does not enslave and does not want to enslave the human spirit" he was not merely implying that TV is addictive. [21] The invocation of slavery set up resonant historical echoes: by implication, TV threatened to reverse the course of Afrikaner national destiny, returning the *volk*, its language, and culture to the thrall of imperialism. Television was repeatedly projected as an imperial force beyond Afrikaner control, while the less costly radio service was advocated for its adaptability to local linguistic differences that were invoked as markers of national differences. [22]

Between 1958 and 1968 Hertzog used his authority as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs to become TV's most outspoken and adamantine opponent. Hertzog's opponents dubbed him the Mad Hatter, Mother Grundy, Chief of the Luddites, and King Canute, for seeking to fight back the tides of technology. [23] However, Meyer, a fellow Broederbonder and an idiological ally of Hertzog's since the mid-1930s, may ultimately have been the more decisive figure in the entangled histories of Afrikaner nationalism and telephobia. For almost half a century - between his role as co-founder of the *Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond* in 1933 and his retirement as chair of the SABC in 1981 - Meyer exercized influence in an astonishing array of Afrikaner cultural institutions. Organizations in which he held office at one time or another included the *Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond, Afrikaner Nasionale Kultuurraad,* the Economic Institute of the *Federasie van Afrikaner Kultuurverenegings,* and the *Nasionale Raad van Trustees.* He edited *Volkshandel* and numerous other publications and in 1938 helped found the *Ossewa Brandwag.* He went on to lead the organization's labour front, the *Arbeidsfront,* and emerged as one of the OB's principal strategists and demagogues. In the mid-forties, he campaigned alongside Hertzog in the Mine Workers Union in an effort to win over Afrikaans workers to the Christian National Unions. [24] By the late 1950s he had become the second most powerful figure in the Broederbond. He went on to become the rector of the Rand Afrikaans University and to chair the Dutch Reformed Church's Inter-Church Anti-Communist Action Committee. The highwater mark of his influence was the period between 1960 and 1972 when he was simultaneously chairman of the Broederbond and of the South African Broadcasting Corporation and was responsible for the influential propraganda programme, Current Affairs. Between 1969 and 1971 he headed the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to Television and in 1976 he oversaw the introduction of the medium he had so long opposed.

Like Hertzog, Verwoerd, and other leading Broederbond opponents of TV, Meyer had emerged, in the 1930s, as a leading proponent of a philosophy of nationalism that Dunbar Moodie has called neo-Fichteanism. [25] From the perspective of the TV debates, one of the most salient articulations of neo-Fichteanism was Dr Nico Diederichs's *Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing en Sy Verhouding tot Internasionalisme* (Nationalism as World-View and its Relationship to Internationalism) (1935). Diederichs's formulation is particularly illuminating because, as his title indicates, it theorises the interface between ethnic nationalist and international allegiances which was to become a flashpoint issue during the TV debates. Shortly after the publication of *Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing,* Meyer came out publicly in defence of Diederichs's ideas, many of which were echoed both in Meyer's early tracts, like *Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker* (1941), and in works that appeared during the peak years of the TV controversy, like *Trek Verder* (1959) and *The Spiritual Crisis of the West* (1966). [26]

Diederichs argued that internationalism was inherently decadent and materialistic, for it violated the Creator's partition of the species into distinctive nations. Full self-realization was a spiritual impulse that could only be achieved through the spiritual form of national culture, the divinely ordained marker of difference. "An effort to obliterate national differences thus means more than collision with God's natural law. It also means an effort to shirk a divinely established duty or task." [27] Thus, individual freedom could only be achieved through the higher freedom of the nation - indeed, the individual was a more abstract, insubstantial concept than the nation. [28]

Neo-Fichtean conceptions of the nation came to be adjusted through their intellectual and institutional fusion with Kuyperian Calvinism as well as through the competing needs and definitions of the Afrikaner nationalist project. None the less, many transmuted neo-Fichtean ideas about national identity were carried forward into the 1960s by cultural conservatives like Meyer and Hertzog. Thus, for instance, their anti-imperialist ardour arose not just out of a fear of external domination but from the conviction that the nation - as marked off by culture and language - was a sacred unit of difference. In this sense, TV was not just a profane technology in the loose sense that it spread swear words, nakedness, and blasphemy, but was profane in its enmity toward the nation as an institution sanctified in heaven. TV

posed a cosmopolitan threat to the fundamental, divine system of differences by fomenting intercultural (that is, international) mixing, and by setting the needs, freedoms, and desires of the individual above those of the nation. Diederichs had spoken of the creation as God's endorsement of "the multiplicity and diversity of nations, languages, and cultures", and as evidence of his enmity toward "deadly uniformity". *Verkramptes* like Meyer, Hertzog, and Marais used related arguments in the 1960s, when they opposed not just racial mixing, but the dilution of the Afrikaaners' ethnic identity through increasing cultural, political, and economic collaboration with English South Africans. Opposition to TV as a channel for "deadly uniformity" thus became integral to the broader struggle against ethnic national dilution in all its varieties - through liberal individualism, racial mixing, communism, monopoly capitalism, commercialism, and the cosmopolitanism of the Jewish and Indian diasporas.

Thus the subject of TV often became the occasion for a detailed cataloguing of the Afrikaans nation's enemies. In such listings, the Soviet Union and the West - above all, the USA and Britain - were characteristically fused into a composite antagonist. Liberals were merely the shock troops of communism and, in combination, the two forces rendered TV an inherently pink technology. [30] As Dr J C Otto explained to parliament in 1966, "liberalists, communists and leftists all use television to influence people. In many programmes the white man is presented as a bad person, as the suppressor and exploiter of the black man. The white man is depicted as the person causing misery and frustration for the black man." [31] When, in August, 1969 a *Washington Post* editorial advocated that South Africa adopt TV as a way of modernizing its racial attitudes, Jaap Marais responded fiercely in *Hoofstad*: "Do not install a TV service. South Africa is not open to Russian or American controlled propaganda. That way the people will not be abandoned to the forces of commercialization." [32]

The reference to commercialization offers a clue to the deeper historical reasons for the National Party's twinning of "Russia" and America as enemies. During the decade-and-a-half prior to their ascent to power in 1948, Afrikaans nationalists repeatedly articulated the *volk's* destiny in anti-imperial terms that isolated as the leading enemies of Afrikaner unity communism and foreign-controlled monopoly capital, the term "foreign" here being stretched to include English-speaking South Africans. [33] Both communism and monopoly capitalism were condemned for advancing imperialist internationalism: they shared an antipathy toward nationalism as the primary, natural, and divinely ordained unit of cultural, political, and economic identity. In the case of communism, the international working class served as the decisive imagined community - in keeping with Marx's conviction that "the workers have no fatherland". Concomitantly, under capitalism, imperial corporations wrenched people from their national moorings, violating the nation by propagating commercial individualism. As Dan O'Meara has cogently argued, during this formative phase of Afrikaner nationalism hostility was directed toward international monopoly capitalism and seldom towards capitalism *per se*: indeed, the rise of an ethnic nationalist capitalism was central to the consolidation and empowerment of the Afrikaner nation. [34]

The fear of both communism and monopoly capital suffused Meyer's *Ossewa Brandwag* pamphlets of the early 1940s, where he laboured to dissuade Afrikaner workers from identifying with class over *volk* in the fight against the international capitalists who dominated the South African economy. [35] Similar claims braced the case against TV as a technology that fomented anti-national identities, be they class or the individual. The old spectre of Hoggenheimer was also trundled out as a warning against those who took TV's dangers too lightly. Hoggenheimer, an Afrikaner nationalist caricature of a composite Jewish-English capitalist imperialism, was a derogatory corruption of Oppenheimer, the name of South Africa's most powerful mine-owning magnates. Thus when Harry Oppenheimer sought to advance the cause of TV in 1964, Hertzog swiftly intervened, warning, with barely veiled anti-semitism, that "the overseas money power has used television as such a deadly weapon to undermine the morale of the white man and even to destroy great empires within fifteen years, that Mr Oppenheimer and his friends will do anything to use it here". [36]

Hertzog's assault on Oppenheimer illustrates the slippage between the contention that television would subvert the Afrikaner nation and the quite different claim that it would destroy white South Africa. Clearly some of the projected threats to Afrikaners could not apply to English South Africans: above all, in the arena of language. So the attacks on TV cast English South Africans in the contradictory roles of Afrikanerdom's cultural and economic enemies whom TV would fortify, and as Afrikanerdom's racial allies whom TV would undermine.

This contradiction dogged the efforts of the anti-TV crusaders to bridge their sense of TV as a national threat and a racial one. (Indeed, on occasion, they would portray the technology as menacing something called the "white nation".) [37] To press their case, the nationalists charged that TV was suffused with "integration propaganda". The principal advocates of integration were a collective front comprising communists, the African nations who gained independence in growing numbers after 1957, liberals, and the United States. The fact that the rise of the civil rights movement in the US coincided with increasing pressure on the Nationalists to admit TV only augmented anxieties over TV's "integration propaganda". Television could thus be readily portrayed as a symptom of America's lax complicity in the decline of the white race and western civilization. [38]

During the 1960s and early 1970s, this hostility toward America was redoubled by a perception of it as going through a particularly degenerate phase. The society that was supposedly leading the West seemed to be undergoing every manner of moral relapse: racial integration, R & R, feminism, the peace movement, anti-Vietnam War protests, civil rights struggle, flower power, drugs, and satanism, all of which TV would pass on to South Africa. Thus the National Party continued to outlaw the box in large measure because it was thought to transmit such contagion. Television's assailants spoke of the risk of citizens contracting the "TV virus"; they feared, too, that it would "contaminate" children. [39] Cumulatively in these polemics, the alarm over "foreign transmissions" acquired an over-determined force: it became the site where the discourse of media technology dovetailed with the discourse of epidemiology.

In 1965 Meyer, in a flash of hubris, suggested that the USA had become so mired in degeneracy that Afrikaner nationalism ought to take over as interim custodian of Western values. Persuaded that the Afrikaners exhibited "the strongest Western nationalism, in the world today", Meyer reasoned that an Afrikaner-led South Africa could offer the West "the lead in the racial struggle of the present and the future. South Africa will make a decisive contribution to the consolidation of the entire West as a white world united in its struggle against the joint forces of the yellow and black races of the earth. When America reaches this level of maturity in the emergent world period, overcoming the transitional sickness and taking over the leadership of the whole white world, the West will be very favourably placed to win the racial struggle on a global scale." [40] Thus, having rationalized his objection to TV on the grounds that it was ineluctably international, Meyer ended up advocating international solidarity in a coalition that merged the causes of Afrikaner nationalism, white South Africa, and western civilization. What happened to the imperialist domination - linguistic, communist, liberal, and monopoly capitalist - that was meant to flow from concessions to transnational identities? Meyer's arguments are rife with the contradictions of nationalist internationalism, where the more virulently xenophobic a nationalism becomes the more it aligns itself imaginatively with an international "race".

Repeatedly in these debates, appeals to racial solidarity contradict efforts to vindicate the ban by distinguishing between the legitimate claims of national sovereignty and the illegitimacy of internationalism as an ineluctably imperial and anti-national force. Such contradictions became doubly acute once the bantustan policy gained impetus during the 1960s. With the advent of the bantustan system, anti-TV crusaders could fortify their case by making it sound less self-interested: TV would not merely threaten Afrikaner national sovereignty but the multiple sovereignties of all South Africa's kaleidoscopic ethnic communities. Thus even Hertzog, who elsewhere argued that TV led to racial degeneration, came to claim that TV

would prejudice the interests of blacks, as its prohibitive costs would prevent their diverse national cultures from achieving adequate representation. [41] In a similar vein, an official advertisement placed in *The Times* in 1970 declared that "within the borders of South Africa there are more different nations, more different races, creeds and colours than in any other country. The main task of the South African Broadcasting Corporation is to provide an enriching, ennobling service to all, differing[*sic*] from one another with respect to language and cultural identity."[42] Thus the bantustan system allowed Afrikaans *verkramptes* to justify their resistance to TV by parading the kind of sensitivities to difference that would scarcely seem incongruous in a contemporary American manifesto of multiculturalism.

Beaumont Schoeman's article, "TV: a Powerful Medium of Integration", exemplifies this sophistical style of reasoning; it also exemplified the ease with which the paternalism of bantustan multiculturalism would revert into overt racism. Schoeman maintained that "[TV] doesn't respect differences and stresses uniformity. It breaks and loosens up cultures, it sweeps aside borders and eats away at the values of communities. The propagandists call it a powerful agent of democratization which is a sweet-sounding equivalent of calling it an agent of homogenization ... There is no more powerful medium for dismantling the population groups' sense of identity. Nor is there a more effective instrument for the furtherance of integration." [43] "Integration" becomes the swivel term, rotating Schoeman's argument away from a defence of multiple, parallel community identities and toward a crude, binary, hierarchical vision of racial degeneracy. Once TV has created homogeneous humanoids and with them a lowest common denominator culture, Schoeman continues, the medium will inevitably "drag the spiritual standards of the whites down to the level of the non-whites".

Commentators on the ban have sometimes expressed bafflement at the National Party's reluctance to harness TV's propaganda potential. In the words of one such commentator, "tyrants do not fear television; they use it". [44] However, South Africa from the late fifties to the early seventies was no orthodox tyranny. The Nationalists recognized that TV's centralized, internationalist tendencies ran counter to their programme of political domination bent on proliferating, not containing, ethnic nationalist differences.

After the giddy success of his *Understanding Media* in 1964, Marshall McLuhan came to dominate popular perceptions of TV well into the seventies, a development that only entrenched National Party fears that the medium would subvert state efforts to dominate black South Africans by dispersing them among a set of atomized ethnic "homelands". For a regime determined to devise or reinvent "pure" Xhosa villages in Transkei, Zulu villages in kwaZulu, and so forth, across ten ethnically "authentic" bantustans, McLuhan's image of TV as productive of a "global village" represented not technological utopianism but a grim nightmare.

However, the prevailing Nationalist view on the incompatibility of TV and "multi-national development" did not go unopposed. A strong pro-TV lobby emerged among white English-speaking South Africans, whose case was advanced by the United Party and the white English-language press. By 1966, TV had become such a decisive issue for the United Party that it ran a national parliamentary campaign on the slogan: "Want TV? Vote UP." National Party supporters responded by doctoring the opposition's electoral posters. The resulting "Want TB? Vote UP" was certainly more consistent with the regime's perception of TV as a viral technology. [45]

The ongoing TV fracas became a forum for an intense contest over the criteria of civilization and modernity. For the Nationalist spokesmen and Afrikaans press, civilization's continuance required TV's exclusion; for the United Party and English press the resistance to TV was a resistance to civilization itself. Would TV induce degeneration or was its absence a mark of backwardness? This conflict stemmed in part from divergent conceptions of national identity. Unlike Afrikaners, English-speaking whites never generated a strong ethnic nationalism and, for reasons of language, culture, and class, their sense of projected community tended to be

more inclusive of international, particularly British and American, elements. Moreover, given the disparity between their economic preeminence and their weakness in the corridors of formal political power, English-speaking South Africans were inclined to favour TV as a potential capitalist and cultural ally.

If the National Party's claim that it was protecting putatively discrete black cultural identities from the cosmopolitan solvent of TV was manipulative and self-serving, so, too, was the United Party's obsessive linkage between TV and civilization. The UP and English press repeatedly portrayed the absence of TV as a threat to South Africa's claim to be a civilized nation, as if the medium were a kind of a membership badge guaranteeing passage into the inner circle of the truly advanced. [46]

The implications of this position are exposed most clearly by Senator Crook's insistence that "it is in the country's interest and that of the people of South Africa that we should have this most modern and powerful of all communications. It is in the interest of South Africa and in the interest of the prestige and good name of South Africa that we should not be bracketed with the most backward peoples of the world such as the Eskimos who have not got television." [47] The sudden guest appearance of the Eskimos exemplifies the tendency within the UP and the English press to invoke criteria for civilization, modernity, and progress that are not merely technological but ethnic. The Eskimos, like the "Bushmen", the Pygmies, and the Zulu, have long served as shorthand for "civilization's" racial-technological antithesis. What emerges, then, is a proclivity among English-speaking South Africans in the late 1950s and the 1960s to fixate on TV as a surrogate barometer of South Africa's civilization and advancement, displacing more basic criteria like universal suffrage and racial equity.

The United Party was a fundamentally conservative organization: during the height of the TV debates, it was to be found supporting the banning of the ANC and the PAC, the introduction of detention without trial, and opposing "one person one vote". Television offered the UP and its allies the chance to shift the criteria for civilization from the awkward, disturbing realm of racial policy to what, from an English perspective, was the far less threatening realm of technology. One can see this at work in a 1969 editorial from the *Rand Daily Mail*: "This deprivation has been deliberately imposed on the people of this country ... The extent of the stultification to which South Africans have thus been subjected is practically incalculable." [48] Deprivation and stultification here refer not to the consequences of apartheid but to the consequences of no TV.

Who precisely was being deprived? Even judging South Africa's advancement by technological standards alone, the society was crippled by a desperately uneven access to older, more basic criteria of modernity - like electricity, for one. In the mid-sixties, fewer than ten per cent of black homes were electrified. Thus the call to remedy South Africa's backwardness by introducing TV would mean widening the technological gulf, exchanging black candlelight and white electricity for black candlelight and white TV. For this reason, although the ANC and the PAC were committed to introducing TV the medium, they could scarcely foreground it as a policy priority. Nor did they assume any vocal role in the controversy. The issue concerned, overwhelmingly, rival efforts within the white ruling classes to define their parameters of allegiance and interest in ethnic, racial, national, and international terms.

The apogee of the TV debates been 1958 and 1971 coincided with the rise of independent states in Africa, a process that formed a significant backdrop to both the Nationalists' and the United Party's attitudes toward the media. The Nationalists were alarmed that African decolonization might allow Radio Moscow and Radio Peking increased penetration of South African airwaves and that countries like Ghana, Zaire, Nigeria, and Zambia might beam in anti-apartheid propaganda. [49] Furthermore, given the increased radicalism of the liberation movement in the post-Sharpeville era, Verwoerd's regime in particular feared any further opening of the channels of communications to international influence.

Thus, despite its standing as Africa's industrial leviathan, South Africa was only the 23rd African country to accept TV - in the wake of such economic minnows as Uganda, Zambia, and Ethiopia. [50] The United Party's principal response to this disparity was to cry shame that South Africa should be "left behind by countries like Rhodesia, India, Nigeria, even Ghana". [51] Cumulatively, in the context of African and, beyond that, Third-World decolonization, the United Party's insistence on the "shame" of South Africa's inability to flaunt such an icon of technological progress took on a rather explicit racial dimension.

In 1969, the National Party appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to Television. Nine of the twelve commissioners were Broederbonders, with Meyer in the chair. The report contrasted the organization of TV in fifteen countries, the United States, Britain, Italy, Japan, and Germany among them, and, after nearly two years of deliberation, issued a recommendation that TV be admitted into South Africa. There was to be, however, a five year gap between this recommendation and the big switch-on in 1976.

What pressures prompted the National Party to appoint the commission in the first place? What circumstances produced such a volte-face on the part of a regime whose hostility to the box had, prior to 1968, shown no sign of softening? One immediate answer was Prime Minister Vorster's sacking of Hertzog from his cabinet that year. Hertzog had come to personify the ultra-nationalist, technophobic, xenophobic, anglophobic, and racist face of the anti-TV coalition. Prior to Verwoerd's assassination in 1966, Verwoerd as Prime Minister, Hertzog as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and Meyer as chair of the SABC had formed a powerful triumvirate of resistance to TV.

Yet Hertzog's fall from power was less the root cause of a greater openness toward TV than an epiphenomenon, a symptom of deeper shifts in Afrikaner attitudes to the idea of international community which TV symbolized. Over the course of the 1960s, a breach had developed within Afrikanerdom between the *verligtes* who argued for expansionism and the *verkramptes,* led by Hertzog, who advocated the kind of isolationism that had shored up Afrikaner power since the late 1930s. Ironically, this rift within the ranks was a measure of Afrikaner nationalism's success in consolidating political power and extending its economic power by favouring Afrikaner businesses, providing sheltered employment for unskilled Afrikaner labour in the labyrinthine apartheid bureaucracy, and holding down black wages by mounting unprecedently violent, multifaceted assaults on the resistance movements in the decade following the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. By 1964 such repression had temporarily but effectively routed mass opposition and with it enhanced South Africa's reputation among international corporations as an attractive, stable area of investment. During the 1960s, South Africa's growth rate was surpassed only by that of Japan.

In real terms black wages fell over the decade, while white wealth grew incrementally. The emergence of a powerful Afrikaner capitalist stratum altered the class composition of the *volk*, provoking clashes of interest within the alliance that had bound Afrikaner nationalism since the late 1940s. The petty bourgeois, Transvaal-based forces associated with Verwoerd, Meyer and Hertzog began to lose ground to the more flexible capitalists who backed Vorster. Compared to the *laager* politicians, the petty bourgeoisie, and small farmers, this newly confident entrepeneurial class of Afrikaner tended toward a less involuted, defensive vision of the national interest. They were profiting from and advocating expanded links with non-Afrikaner capital, be it English-South African or foreign. Concomitantly, such Afrikaners were apt to see economic growth as the best guarantee of continued white domination and to consider TV as a potential asset for commerce. Thus this increasingly muscular class of urbanized, cosmopolitan, corporate Afrikaners was less susceptible to the standard admonitions that TV would provoke internationalization, commercialization, imperialism, anglicization, and secular deviations from the *volk*'s destiny of divine election. This rapprochement between Afrikaner and English capital interests was clearly signalled by the fact that in 1969 the Annual Congresses of the *Afrikaanse Handels Instituut* and the Association of Chambers of Commerce both called upon the government to commit itself to TV. [52] In that same year, the *verkramptes* - who included TV's most adamantine

opponents like Hertzog and Marais - broke with the Nationalists to form the far-right *Herstigte Nationale* Party which, however, was quickly reduced to a marginal force in white politics. Ultimately, the tensions between white economic success and mounting world pressures to isolate apartheid encouraged the Vorster regime to engage in more assiduous efforts at outreach.

On top of these changes, two extraterrestrial happenings - the Apollo 11 mission and innovations in satellite technology - suddenly augmented the prospects of South African TV. On 21 July 1969, Neil Armstrong strolled across the face of the moon. The event became - like TV itself - a powerful constitutive absence in South African society. Amidst a booming economy in which Afrikaner capitalists had become increasingly enamoured of the "American way", the moon landing further tilted the balance of power away from the rejection of the USA as a culturally degenerate imperialism and toward a rival view of it as a technologically advanced world leader. In 1968, just a year before the moon landing, the American student revolts had fuelled the cause of *laager* nationalists who sought to prevent TV from imposing American decadence on South Africa. Armstrong, Edwin Aldrin and Michael Collins unwittingly helped turn that view around. There was, of course, an explicitly Cold War context for the landing: astronauts 1, cosmonauts zero, a rematch after America's earlier defeat. But the South African media presented Apollo 11 principally as a great triumph for humankind, as if on the moon the astronauts had found a third, extraterrestrial space for pure human discovery, untrammelled by the fraught dialectics between internationalism and nationalism. Whether the landing was interpreted as a defeat for communism or an apolitical triumph for the species, the media angles on the event made it unassimilable to the dominant *verkrampte* view of the USA as an anti-national, imperialist force.

Armstrong's words - "One small step for man, one giant leap for mankind" - combined two very powerful appeals: to the ideology of the family of "man", and to the ideology of the march of progress. Both applied salt to white wounds, quickening the pain of spacial ostracism from the "family" of nations and of temporal abandonment - of being "behind the times".

More dramatically than any prior event, the moon landing impressed upon people TV's power to produce the sensation of simultaneous, "global" community. It allowed each watching living room family the illusion of participating in the unity in variety of the species. Around the world, 800 million people were riveted by their TVs while South Africans were reduced to twiddling the dials on the radio. For many whites - already rendered paranoid by the force of their exile from world affairs - their inability to partake of such a singular moment of "global" community came to seem like an exasperating, self-inflicted disinvitation. A *Rand Daily Mail* editorial captured this sense of let-down perfectly with the snappy title "Out of this World". [53]

A journalist had once complained that Hertzog and the twentieth century seemed not to be on speaking terms. [54] The Apollo 11 mission generalized that sense of incommunicado: white South Africans had become non-participants in the twentieth century. Such anxieties were exacerbated by most whites' investment in believing that they belonged on the classy side of their obsessive divides between progress and backwardness, the modern and the "tribal", the civilized and the uncivilized. As the drawn-out wranglings over TV illustrated, the traffic between scientific and racial calibrations of modernity had been freely licensed under apartheid. The exclusion of white South Africans from an event that the media billed as a scientific rite of passage into an unbounded future thus threatened both their technological self-assurance and their sense of racial superiority.

Shortly after the moon landing, the Johannesburg Planetarium offered public screenings of the spectacle. The TV footage drew mile-long queues and the crowds - separate days for blacks and whites - were so vast that the police were called in to disperse them. But not before 100,000 people had witnessed the landing and - to judge from newspaper interviews -

had come away feeling, for the most part, not merely unsullied by their contact with Hertzog's demonic box but defrauded by their exclusion from the live event. [55] Pro-TV letters and editorials clogged the newspapers, the Television Society drew up a petition, a successful chain letter appeal was launched, and the United Party called for a "national" (i.e. white) referendum on the issue, claiming that the majority - by which, again, they meant merely a majority of the white minority - now favoured TV. Even Dirk Richard, a prominent hardline editor of an Afrikaans newspaper, announced his conversion to TV. [56]

After the earlier Apollo 10 mission in 1968, the SABC had embarked on a rearguard effort at damage control. Its annual report, marvelled at how the corporation had transported the Apollo mission into "the homes and meeting places of all people possessing radios, not only in South Africa but also in the rest of Africa, Europe, the East and even the United States. Sharing this experience in such an intimate, and communal manner would not have been possible through any other medium." [57] The report proceeded to extol the "wonder of radio": "With the advent of television, which is essentially a radio technique (although used mainly as a film medium in the intial stages) it seemed as if sound radio would be forced into an obscure background position in mass communications. This tendency did not last long. In recent times, sound radio has been moving into first position ... Radio distinguishes itself by the fact that it does not enslave or want to enslave the human spirit." [58]

After the much more spectacular Apollo 11 venture the following year, the SABC was at least in a position to announce, alongside its account of the landing, the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the "desirability or otherwise" of admitting a TV service. [59] However, the corporation persisted with the excesses of the annual eulogy to radio - by now a set-piece of the report. But it all sounded like a hymn sung in the dark. While praising the technological power of radio to bond the human race in an act of instant communion, the report maintained a studied silence over the fact that anyone anywhere had actually **observed** the landing. Instead, it flattered radio's sensory repertoire, bestowing on it a visual capacity that rendered, by implication, TV superfluous. "Radio brings events closer to the public and offers a **glimpse** of the drama of life. No other medium achieves this so effectively; and if there is a challenge in the Seventies, it is that radio must employ technical aids and so co-ordinate its internal organisation that it gives its audience a **view** - an intimate **view** - of the world around us ... It is hoped that in building upon these foundations in the decade ahead, radio will further distinguish itself as the foremost medium for permitting an audience to **observe** history in the making." (my emphases) [60]

1969 saw a second extraterrestrial development strengthen the case for TV. The increasing sophistication of satellite technology ensured that as of September that year any South African family who could afford both a TV set and a R150 rooftop aluminium bowl could have international TV beamed in, circumventing the absence of a national service. [61] In *verkrampte* circles, this fresh threat set familiar alarm bells ringing. Jaap Marais warned that satellite broadcasts "will be a mighty force in the hands of the Russians and Americans ... [T]hey will try to give greater actuality and striking power to the propaganda issuing from the platform of the U.N." [62] Marais proceeded to paint a nightmare tableau: "To form a rough image of what could happen, one must picture the events of Sharpeville and the whole international propaganda hell that came together so neatly around it, projected against South Africa in circumstances wherein the population is equipped with television receivers through which American or Russian controlled satellites can broadcast." [63] In an account that resurrected the old dread of a Trojan Horse in the living room, Marais issued a call for arms in this war of stealth which he considered to be doubly subversive because it went undeclared and was waged with unconventional weapons in the war zone of psychology. "There is no more powerful instrument of persuasion", he continued, "than TV, and a nation who can be reached by its enemies through TV finds itself on the most dangerous battlefield imaginable, because it is forced on to the defensive and is up against an invisible enemy whom it cannot attack unless it can also direct satellite broadcasts against the enemy powers."

In a companion piece, Marais argued that South Africa was psychologically just as ill-prepared for the introduction of TV as it was technologically incapable of launching a voyage to the moon. [64] He insisted, therefore, that to launch a nationally controlled TV service as a defence against propaganda issuing from foreign satellites would be to play into the hands of the "Russians" and Americans. However, when Marais published these opinions in September 1969, he, along with Hertzog, had recently been evicted from the Nationalist Party as part of Vorster's purge of *verkramptes*. The baton of intransigence towards TV had passed from the National Party to the *Herstigtes*. Just as Hertzog, in 1969, continued to warn that the introduction of TV would spell the end of the white race, so too, Marais's stance on the satellite issue was out of kilter with the reformed thinking on the issue within a realigned National Party. [65]

Nationalist cabinet ministers were just as panic stricken as Marais by the prospect of satellite broadcasts, but they recommended a contrary solution: national TV should be the first line of defence. So in an ironic volte-face, Nationalist leaders could now argue that the introduction of state-controlled TV was necessary for the preservation of "the South African way of life". [66] Thus TV came to be reconceived as an anti-imperial device and an integral part of the nation's defence network. In the impassioned words of one convert, anyone who tried to withhold TV from South Africa would "be the biggest saboteur of the national defence the country has known". [67]

So advances in satellite technology helped reduce the contradictions between the pro-TV and anti-TV lobbies, between those who sought wider community and those who wished to confine community to narrow Afrikaner nationalist or white terms. The regime could introduce the technology as a strategy for expanding international economic and cultural contacts, but it was also in a position to rationalize such action as a protectionist measure against foreign invaders.

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Notes

1   Piet Meyer, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to Television* (Pretoria, 1971), p 2.

2   Novelist Stuart Cloete, quoted in *Republic of South Africa. House of Assembly Debates (Hansard)*, 19 March 1969, col 2855.

3   Dr G C F Weiszuker, quoted by Engelbrecht, *Hansard* (South Africa), 9 February 1970, cols 533-35.

4   *Hansard* (South Africa), 19 September 1966, cols 2406-408. Cf Albert Hertzog's remark that "Television will destroy the salvation of the South African and the white man in South Africa." *Ibid.*, 11 February, 1970, cols 830-32.

5   *Hansard* (South Africa), 20 September 1966, col 41.

6   One of the few media critics to take up this issue has been John Tomlinson. See especially, his *Cultural Imperialism* (London, 1991), pp 68 ff.

7	See, for example, J A Marais, "Ruimte-TV sal vyand in ons huise bring" ("Satellite-TV will bring the enemy into our houses"), *Hoofstad*, 8 September 1969, as well as his comments in *Hansard* (South Africa), 19 March 1969, col 2858.

8	Herbert I Schiller, "Fast Food, Fast Cars, Fast Political Rhetoric", *Intermedia* 20, 4-5 (August-September 1992), p 21. See, too, Schiller's earlier work like *Mass Communications and American Empire* (New York, 1970) .

9	Stuart Hall, "Our Mongrel Selves", *New Statesman and Society*, 19 June 1992, p 8.

10	P J Meyer, *Trek Verder: Die Afrikaner in Afrika (Trek Further: the Afrikaner in Africa)* (Cape Town, 1959), p 25.

11	On the subject of such deferential, submerged racism, see Balibar in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (1988; London, 1991), p 43.

12	For a discussion of "nationalist internationalism", see Wilhelm Reich, *Les Hommes dans l'Etat* (Paris, 1978), pp 23-27 .

13	Helen Suzman, *Hansard* (South Afric), 19 March 1969, col 2875.

14	I explore these considerations at greater length in a fuller version of this essay, forthcoming in *Critical Inquiry*.

15	For some suggestive comments on the need for more integrated studies of the media and nationalism, see Philip Schlesinger *Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities* (London, 1991), p 172 .

16	See, for example, Benedict Anderson's remark that "Print-language is what invents nationalism ..." *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1983; rpt London, 1985), p 122.

17	Schlesinger, *Media, State and Nation*, p 164 .

18	Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p 123.

19	For an excellent account of this process, see Isabel Hofmeyr, "Building a Nation from Words: Afrikaans Language, Literature, and Ethnic Identity, 1902-1924", in Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (eds), *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa* (London, 1987), pp 95-123 .

20	Unpublished address to a leader's course, Stellenbosch, SABC archives. Quoted Ruth Tomaselli *et al*, *Broadcasting in South Africa* (London, 1989), p 71.

21	*SABC, Annual Report* (Johannesburg, 1968), p 7 .

22	See, for example, Fynoor, "Wat Gaan Gebeur met Beeldradio en Afrikaans?" ("What Will Happen with TV and Afrikaans?"), *Hoofstad*, 12 May, 1969. The one-language-one-channel argument is also advanced by Dirk Richard, in "TV Kom Dalk Gouer as Wat Ons Dink" ("TV May Be Coming Sooner Than We Think"), *Dagbreek en Landstem*, 11 May 1969, and in the editorial, "Wie Arrogant is Oor TV?" ("Who is Presumptuous About TV?"), *Vaderland*, 31 July 1969.

23	*Hansard* (South Africa), 24 March 1961, col 3646; *ibid.*, 19 March 1969, col 2839; *ibid.*, 19 September 1966, col 2409 .

24   Rob Davies *et al, The Struggle for South Africa*, Vol 2 (London, 1984, pp 247-48 .
      See also, "'Little Bioscope' Man' s Career", *Rand Daily Mail* 3 February, 1968.

25   T Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner
      Civil Religion* (Berkeley, 1975), pp 154-55.

26   For Meyer's defence of Diederichs against Kuyperian Calvinist criticisms that he
      deified the nation, see Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, p 161.

27   Quoted; *ibid.*, p. 159.

28   Diederichs initially represented race, as opposed to ethnic culture, as an unreliable,
      indeed irrelevant, guide to the demarcation of nations. By the early 1940s, however, he
      was decreeing that race as well as ethnic culture was an index of fundamental, divinely
      imbued national differences.

29   Nicolaas Diederichs, *Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing en sy verhouding tot
      Internationsionalisme* (Bloemfontein, 1935), pp 23-24.

30   See Johan van der Spuy, "Die Feite Getuig Teen TV" ("The Facts Argue Against TV"),
      Transvaler, 21 February, 1968; and Dr J C Otto, *Hansard*(South Africa), 19 September
      1966, cols 2406-08.

31   *Hansard*(South Africa), 19 September 1966, cols 2406-08. Cf Senator Frey's view that
      TV "offers the opportunity for the spreading of liberalistic, and where necessary, covert
      Communist ideologies. The whole of the Western world is today holding particularly
      liberalistic ideas which are nothing less than the agenda, the preparers of the way for
      Communism which is behind these things." *Hansard*(South Africa), 22 May, 1961,
      cols 4756-57. "Kophou", writing in *Hoofstad*, carried the argument somewhat further:
      US liberalism had gone so soft on communism that American TV channels were
      clogged with "anti-Nazi propaganda like The Sound of Music". ("Ons Moet Die
      Implikasies Van Beeldradio Ken" ["We Must Recognise the Implications of TV"],
      Hoofstad, 23 March, 1969.)

32   Editorial, *Washington Post*, 28 August 1969. J A Marais, "Afrikaner sal TV nie
      voordelig kan aanwend" (The Afrikaner Won't Be Able to Employ TV
      Advantageously"), *Hoofstad*, 10 September 1969.

33   See especially Dan O'Meara, *Volskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the
      Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934-1948* (Cambridge, 1983).

34   *Ibid.*

35   See P J Meyer, *Demokrasie of Volkstaat?* ("Democracy or *Volksaat'*") (Stellenbosch,
      1942); *Arbeidsordening Binne die Volksbeweging en Volkstaat* (Stellenbosch, 1943);
      Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker: Die Vooraand Van Ons Sosiale Vrywording
      ("The Struggle of the Afrikaans Worker: the eve of our social liberation")
      (Johannesburg, 1944).

36   Cf the kindred remarks by Dr J C Otto, *Hansard*(South Africa), 19 September 1966,
      cols 2406-08.

37   See, "Gevare van Beeldradio" ("The Dangers of TV"), *Transvaler*, 15 March, 1969.

38   In *verkrampte*, Conservative Party circles such arguments persisted well after TV's
      introduction. In 1986, CP member of parliament Tom Langley accused SATV of trying
      to "denationalize" white South Africans and Americanize them: "Nowadays you only

find American film material ... and it is for one very obvious reason - they all have at least one black in them and it is all aimed at conditioning us and our children. If we allow our children to watch these programmes uncensored, they are going to lose their identity in the end." "Langley Thumbs His Nose at SABC", *Daily Dispatch*, 27 October, 1986. Cf the objection by another Conservative Party MP, Chris Jacobs, to the showing of The Imposters - a black-white love affair - which he cites as an instance of "integration propaganda". For the threat which American TV's allegedly "heroic" treatment of the civil rights threat would pose to white South Africans, see Otto, *Hansard*, col 2407.

39   Otto, *Hansard*; Albert Hertzog, *ibid.*, 20 September 1966, col. 2482.

40   P J Meyer, *The Spiritual Crisis of the West* (Johannesburg, 1966), p 15.

41   *Hansard*(South Africa), 24 March 1961, cols 3665-66.

42   *The Times*, 26 October 1970.

43   Beaumont Schoeman, "Beeldradio: magtige integrasiemiddel" (TV: a powerful medium of integration"), *Hoofstad*, 23 April 1968. My translation.

44   Trevor Philpott, "The End of an Innocent Age?" *The Listener*, July 1976, p 5.

45   *Hansard* (South Africa), 19 September 1966, col 2406.

46   This tendency to associate civilization and television extended to the more liberal Progressive Party and its supporters. The *Rand Daily Mail*, for instance, deplored South Africa's isolation from this "essential part of civilised living" ("Out of This World", 21 July 1969).

47   *Hansard*(South Africa), 7 March 1969, col 517.

48   "Out of This World", *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 July 1969.

49   Cf B Coetzee's remark that "there are more and more broadcast from Africa to our border areas. We have Radio Accra, we have Radio Leopoldville, we have Radio Cairo and I understand there is a host of others who are continually inundating the Bantu of South Africa with propaganda from outside". *Hansard* (South Africa), 2 May 1961, col 5734.

50   Sydney Head, *Broadcasting in Africa* (Philadelphia, 1974), p 27.

51   *Hansard* (South Africa), 7 June 1962, col 7313; cf *Hansard* , 24 March 1961, col 3646.

52   "Trade Body Wants TV", *Natal Witness*, 8 May 1969; "TV Call", *Daily Mail*, 24 October 1969.

53   *Rand Daily Mail*, 21July 1969.

54   Douglas Alexander, "TV Ban Was Not Mine Alone - Hertzog", *Sunday Express*, 11 February 1968.

55   "Public's First Taste of TV-Viewing", *Sunday Times* , 27 July 1969.

56   "*Dagbreek* Editor Backs Clamour for TV", *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 July 1969.

57   *SABC: Annual Report* (Johannesburg, 1968), p 7.

58 *Ibid.*

59 *SABC: Annual Report* (Johannesburg, 1969), p 8.

60 *Ibid.*, pp 8-9.

61 Advance notice of this development appeared in "TV - Yes or No", *Sunday Express*, 18 May 1969.

62 J A Marais, "Afrikaner sal TV nie voordelig kan aanwend" ("The Afrikaner Won't be Able to Employ TV to Advantage"), *Hoofstad*, 10 September 1969.

63 *Ibid.*

64 *Ibid.*

65 "TV End of White Race - Hertzog", *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 June, 1969.

66 See the comments by Minister of National of Education, Senator J P van der Spuy, "Minister Explains the TV Delay", 28 April 1971.

67 Mr Nissen, quoted in "TV Vital in National Defence", *Star*, 13 April 1972.