

*Christian:* Do you think that [truth] is apprehensible in some way other [than through itself] and that it is apprehensible in something other [than itself]?

*Pagan:* I do.

*Christian:* You are obviously mistaken. For apart from truth there is no truth; apart from circularity there is no circle; apart from humanity there is no human being. Hence, truth is not found to exist apart from truth; nor is it found in some way other [than through itself]; nor is it found in something other [than itself].

4 *Pagan:* How, then, do I know what a man is, what a stone is, and so on regarding each of the things of which I have knowledge?

*Christian:* You do not have knowledge of any of these;<sup>2</sup> instead, you only think that you have knowledge [of them]. For if I ask you about the quiddity of some thing of which you think you have knowledge, you will declare that you cannot express the true essence of man [*veritas hominis*] or the true essence of stone [*veritas lapidis*]. The fact that you know a man not to be a stone derives not from any knowledge by which you have knowledge of man and stone and their difference. Rather, it occurs *per accidens*, on the basis of a difference both of the functions and of the visible forms, to which, when you discern them, you give different names. For a movement in our discriminating reason imposes names.<sup>3</sup>

5 *Pagan:* Is there one truth or more than one?

*Christian:* There is only one. For there is only one oneness; and truth coincides with oneness, since it is true that oneness is one. Therefore, just as in a number there is only one oneness,<sup>4</sup> so in a multitude of things there is only one truth. And so, he who does not attain unto oneness will remain ever without a knowledge of number; and he who does not attain unto the oneness-of-truth cannot know anything truly. And although he thinks that he knows truly, he readily experiences that what-he-thinks-he-knows [can] be known more truly. For example, what is visible can be seen more truly than it is seen by you; for it could be seen more truly by eyes having sharper vision.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, it is not seen by you as it is seeable in truth. A similar thing obtains regarding hearing and the other senses. Now, whatever is known, yet not by means of that knowledge by which it *can* be known, is known not in truth but otherwise [than in truth] and in a manner other [than it itself is]. But it is not the case that truth is known otherwise [than in truth] and in a manner other than the manner which it itself is.