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Z á s a d y p r o v y p r a c o v á n í :

Cílem bakalářské práce je prostudovat užití řečových aktů ve veřejných projevech prezidentských kandidátů USA. Student nejprve na základě odborné lingvistické literatury, zejména z oblasti pragmatiky, vymezí pojem "řečový akt" a "ilokuční síla výpovědi", představí klasifikaci řečových aktů, jednotlivé řečové akty podrobně popíše a shrne jejich užití s ohledem na zdvořilostní strategie. Dále bude charakterizovat proslov jako žánr mluveného projevu, uvede typické jazykové prostředky veřejných mluvených projevů a jejich funkce. Následně provede analýzu vybraných prezidentských projevů s cílem identifikovat nejčastěji se vyskytující řečové akty, porovnat kontexty výskytu jednotlivých aktů, diskutovat jejich možné interpretace a záměr mluvčího v závislosti na daném kontextu. Na závěr student zhodnotí užití řečových aktů a jejich dopad na adresáta a objasní převažující tendence s ohledem na zkoumaný žánr a cíle prezidentských projevů.

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Souhlasím s prezenčním zpřístupněním své práce v Univerzitní knihovně.

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ANNOTATION

This paper deals with speech acts in the political speeches and debates of two US presidential candidates. The theoretical part focuses on speech acts, mainly on the illocutionary act and its classification using the description and comparison of two taxonomies. The goal of the analytical part is to find out which illocutionary acts and forces are the most common in the corpus. In the practical part, the use of politeness strategies connected with the application of various speech acts will be discussed, too.

KEYWORDS

speech acts, illocutionary force, political speeches, perlocutionary effect

NÁZEV

Řečové akty v projevech prezidentských kandidátů USA

ANOTACE

Tato bakalářská práce je zaměřena na řečové akty v politických projevech a debatách dvou prezidentských kandidátů USA. Teoretická část se zabývá řečovými akty, zejména ilokučním aktem a jeho klasifikací a to popsáním a porovnáním dvou taxonomií. Cílem analytické části je zjistit, které ilokuční akty a síly jsou v korpusu nejčastěji se vyskytující. V praktické části bude též probíráno užití zdvořilostních strategií v rámci používání různých řečových aktů.

KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA

řečové akty, ilokuční síla, politické projevy, perlokuční efekt

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is focused on the speech acts present in the speeches of the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump. The goal of this paper is to observe the appearance of the illocutionary acts and forces and identify the most common cases.

This thesis is divided into a theoretical and a practical part. In the theoretical section, the concept of speech acts will be explained. This explanation will be separated into three parts, each for one of the main acts: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. The majority of space will be given to the illocutionary act as it is the essential term of this paper. This act will be explained mainly from two viewpoints – the original one of Austin and then Searle’s development of the theory. Their respective taxonomies will be described and compared, Searle’s in a more detailed manner since it will be used in the analysis. Then, the distinction between direct and indirect acts shall be presented. Politeness theory in connection to speech acts will be mentioned in the theoretical part, too.

In the practical part, the analysis of the corpus consisting of 200 utterances transcribed from the presidential debates and public speeches will focus on the illocutionary acts and their forces. At first, the utterances will be divided into direct and indirect speech acts. For direct speech acts, their classes of illocutionary acts and the illocutionary forces shall be identified. The non-literal illocutionary act will be identified for the indirect speech acts. The perlocutionary effect, if present, will be commented on in the analysis, too, as well as the used politeness strategies.

After the analysis, a conclusion of the work shall be provided. The list of all utterances will be present at the very end of the paper.

1. SPEECH ACTS

1.1. Introduction to Speech Acts

Speech acts and the *Speech Act Theory* are known to be the invention of a British linguist and philosopher J. L. Austin. As Allwood points out (1977, 53), Austin's book *How To do Thing with Words*, in fact a collection of the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955 published posthumously by his students in 1962, introduced the whole Speech Act Theory, including the three crucial aspects of the said theory: *locutionary*, *illocutionary* and *perlocutionary*.

Austin's concept has been praised, criticized and used as the basis for other theories of speech acts countless times. Taking this into account, Austin's thoughts will be provided in a more detailed manner in the following parts dealing with the individual speech acts.

The first Speech Act Theory was extended by an American philosopher and linguist J. R. Searle. This language expert, who was Austin's student (Korta and Perry 2015), wrote *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Not only in this work but in many other essays and articles have Searle been enhancing Austin's theory by adding new concepts, using (in his opinion) more precise terminology and taxonomy as well as trying to negate some of the unclarities made by Austin.

Searle's work on speech acts has been generally well accepted although even his theories have been to some extent criticized in similar terms as Austin's (e.g. Allwood 1977 or Kurzon 1998). In the successive subchapters, there will be Searle's approaches mentioned alongside Austin's to demonstrate the development of the theories.

One notable difference in taxonomy that needs to be addressed for the sake of thoroughness is within the speech acts themselves. Austin (1962) described three speech acts, namely: *locutionary act*, *illocutionary act*, and *perlocutionary act*. Searle, in his own theory, presented some changes to these, making a taxonomy consisting of four speech acts: *utterance act*, *propositional act* (together these two acts substitute Austin's locutionary act), *illocutionary act* and *perlocutionary act* (Searle 1969, 24-25). This variation between the two speech act systems regarding locutionary act will be mentioned in the next part too, however, a different speech act deserves considerably more attention.

1.2. Defining Speech Act

The central speech act for most linguists and even philosophers is the illocutionary act, which is also the main focus of the upcoming analysis, therefore the majority of space in the theoretical part of this paper will be dedicated to this act.

Before the speech acts are described in details separately, an overview of the differences in approaches by the two aforementioned linguists. Table 1, originally created by Helbig, clearly shows the distinctions in their individual taxonomies.

Table 1: Helbig's overview of Austin's and Searle's taxonomies.

	AUSTIN		SEARLE	
Producing sounds of language	Locutionary Act	Phonetic Act	Utterance Act	
Producing words within a specific grammatical structure		Phatic Act		
Producing words about something specific		Rhetic Act	Propositional Act	Reference Act
Speech act connected to the utterance	Illocutionary Act		Illocutionary Act	
Effect caused by speech act	Perlocutionary Act		Perlocutionary Act	

(Helbig 1986, 168, translated from Czech by the author of this paper)

In the table, it is possible to notice several variations. While two acts seem to refer to the same concept, namely illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, the difference visible is in what is generally understood, by Austin's terminology at least, as locutionary act. Austin divided this act making another three minor acts: *phonetic*, *phatic*, and *rhetic*. This may be perceived on

one hand as redundant since the locutionary act is not the aim of analysis very often, compared especially to numerous analysis of the illocutionary act, on the other hand, it provides the understanding of the criteria needed for creating a valid locutionary act. Searle refers to what Austin named phonetic and phatic acts as utterance act. Austin's rhetic act is in Searle's system called propositional act which is then even further divided into *reference act* and *predication act*. Searle's taxonomy appears to be more focused on the important issues of the locutionary – the context of the utterance and that is arguably why Searle created the division of the propositional act. The characteristics of each major and minor acts will be delivered in the next parts.

1.3. Locutionary Act

Let us begin the explanation of the first act by quoting Austin's original definition:

“The act of ‘saying something’ in this full normal sense (which includes the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain ‘meaning’ in the favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e. with a certain sense and with a certain reference) I call, i.e. dub, the performance of a locutionary act.” (1962, 94)

In this definition Austin, in other words, says that when one produces noises to create words (phonetic act) that follow some syntactical structure (phatic) and have a meaning (rhetic), one is then performing the locutionary act. Put differently, it is possible to expect that most of one's utterances produced during daily conversations contain a locutionary act. The restrictions in Austin's definition concerning structure and meaning are supposed to eliminate mindless production of language (e.g. by parrots, robots, computers), as noted in *A Glossary of Semantics and Pragmatics* (Cruse 2006, 167).

As already suggested above, Austin further divided the locutionary act into three more sub-act: phonetic, phatic and rhetic. Austin described them as follows:

“The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises. The phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables or words,(...) as belonging to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to a certain grammar. The rhetic act is the performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference.” (Austin 1962, 95)

The first of the sub-acts, the phonetic act, is, simply put, about making noises. This has received a barrage of criticism as this approach does not consider the communication by other possible means of non-verbal communication (Allwood 1977, 2) or even producing the language by writing and signing (Korta and Perry 2011, 116).

The next sub-act is the phatic act. Following Austin's definition, it may be understood that this act gives the utterance the appearance and structure according to some grammatical rules and within some specific vocabulary. Kissine (2008, 1193), for example, states that the recitation of a sentence in a foreign language as a typical case of the phatic act.

While the phatic act has not raised many questions, the last sub-act Austin suggested, that is the rhetic act, has. According to Austin, this act contains the sense and reference of the utterance, one might say the meaning. Searle (1968, 412) discovered that Austin's description of the rhetic act and some further cases in his work actually already involve the illocutionary act, for that reason, among others, Searle created his own taxonomy. He replaced the three Austin's sub-act of the locutionary act with two different acts that he explained in the following manner:

- (a) Uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance acts.
 - (b) Referring and predicating = performing propositional acts.
- (1969, 24)

By the essence of Searle's definition of the utterance act it may be realized that this act covers both the phonetic and the phatic in Austin's classification. Apart from having one instead of two act, not much changed. Allwood, whose criticism of Austin's sub-acts was mentioned previously, states that the problems apply to Searle's theory as well (1977, 7).

The propositional act, which might be even more divided into the referring and predicating act, corresponds to Austin's rhetic act. Searle, to learn from Austin's weaknesses in taxonomy found in rhetic acts, suggests that the propositional act expresses the proposition with a neutral illocutionary force. He then further describes that the propositional act is not the whole sentence but only those part that do not indicate the illocutionary force (1968, 420-1).

While Austin's and Searle's approach to the locutionary act, and the corresponding divisions of it, clearly differ, the upcoming analysis will not be affected by this, since the locutionary act will not be analyzed itself. In the analysis, the locutionary act will be only used in the form

of the utterance which then will be further analyzed in terms of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

1.4. Illocutionary Act

1.4.1. Austin's approach

Illocutionary act, as introduced in Austin's *How to Do Things with Words*, is a performance of an act in saying something as opposed to the performance of an act of saying something (1962, 99). That gives the notion that the utterance said has a meaning or, in other words, some intention and purpose why it was said. Austin (1962, 120) added a concept of illocutionary force by stating that the illocutionary act has a certain force in saying something.

To prove his point he provided two examples, the first one being the illocutionary act, the second on the perlocutionary which, simply explained, is about the outcome (effect) of the illocutionary act:

“In saying I would shoot him I was threatening him.

By saying I would shoot him I alarmed him.” (Austin 1962, 121)

The distinctive difference between these two utterances and, consequently, these two acts might be perceived this way – while in the first example the agent is threatening *in* saying the utterance, the other one is already the effect of the first one, that is *he* was alarmed *by* the utterance said by the agent.

While Austin's line of thought might be easily followed, some authors, notably for example Bach and Harnish (1979, 4 and 285), point out the fact that the distinction is merely suggestive and a proper explanation of the differences between these two acts was not provided by Austin.

When discussing illocutionary acts, Austin also started mentioning the term *illocutionary* (sometimes also called *conventional*) *force*. This force refers to the different kinds of functions of language (1962, 99-100). This is another one of the essential terms of the Speech Act Theory. To explain this term in the simplest manner, one could say that the illocutionary force is the reason why an utterance is made. Those reasons could involve *making a promise*, *issuing a threat* or *declaring a war*.

Searle and Vanderveken (2005, 109) state that an illocutionary act generally consists of an illocutionary force and a *propositional content*. The duo of authors provide the following examples to explain clearly what is meant by each term: „*You will leave the room*“ vs. „*Leave the room!*“. While the two utterances have the same propositional content of *you* leaving the room, the appearing illocutionary forces are different. In the first example, there is the force of a *prediction* whereas the second instance has the force of an *order*. It is possible to approach these terms from the other angle as well - e.g. when comparing the two following utterances: „*I will try harder*“ and „*I promise I will be there at 5 o'clock sharp*.“ Both utterances have the force of a *promise*, however, the propositional content is completely different. While the content of one sentence is about trying harder, the content of the other one is connected to punctuality.

When working on the original concept of speech acts, Austin provided a classification for different kinds of utterances typical for the use of the illocutionary act. These classes of utterances were made based on their respective illocutionary force. He created five categories:

1. *Verdictives*
2. *Exercitives*
3. *Commissives*
4. *Behabitives*
5. *Expositives* (Austin 1962, 150)

These kinds were then described in details, a summary of which is in the following paragraph.

Verdicts are typical for verdictives. These verdicts were meant to be given by a jury, umpire, or arbitrator. Other utterances considered as verdictives are estimates, reckonings, and appraisals. Exercitives are used when we exercise some power, right, or influence. Some listed examples are voting, ordering, urging, advising, and warning. When we use commissives, we are committing to do something, therefore promises are typical for this class, but declarations, announcements of intentions, and espousals fall into the same category. Austin admitted behabitives as a rather miscellaneous class, mainly connected to attitudes and social behavior such as apologizing, congratulating, cursing, and so on. The last class, as its creator even marked as troublesome, is expositives. They may be used as connecting devices, making clear the reason or position of our utterance. Those are for example phrases like: ‘I reply’, ‘I concede’, and ‘I assume.’ (Austin 1962, 150-152)

To contrast them with two previously mentioned examples of the performance of locutionary acts, consider now those examples from the viewpoint of illocutions.

“He urged me to shoot her.

He protested against my doing it.“ (Austin 1962, 101-2)

The main difference is that the utterances now contain the *illocutionary force*. The first instance is the case of urging which in Austin’s system is part of the class dubbed exercitives, while the other one is protesting which is expressing a certain disapproval which could be easily placed under behabitives. Austin, however, listed protesting among exercitives while admitting that it is closely connected to behabitives (1962, 155-6). This unclarity, sometimes perceived as uncertainty, in the classification of illocutionary acts has been often criticized. Even Austin himself admitted that some classes were more troublesome than others, that his classification was certainly not definite and that a ‘fresh’ classification was needed. (1962, 151)

One last term should be mentioned before the brief summary of Austin’s contribution is concluded, and that are the *performatives*. Austin described a *performative verb* as which “*indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something*“ (1962, 6-7). Examples of the performative verbs could be: *I promise that...* , *I command you...* , *I declare ...* and many others. One word from Austin’s definition needs to be emphasized and that is *indicates* – in other words, suggests. Searle (1965, 11-12) proves that even as clear a performative as *promise* might have, under the correct circumstances, a different illocutionary force than promising. This was proved by this example:

“*If you don’t hand in your paper on time I promise I will give you a failing grade in the course*“ (Searle 1965, 11)

In this case, it is possible to realize that this utterance does not sound like a proper promise since it seems to be more focused on the hearer than on the speaker as a promise should be. For that reason, this utterance would fall in Austin’s taxonomy under *exercitives* as it could be perceived as a warning or even a threat.

1.4.2. Searle's approach

Austin's approach to illocutionary acts was refined, as it is commonly accepted, after his death by Searle. He states that Austin's classification lacks clearly provided principles for describing each individual classes. Another part that Searle finds unclear is the persistent confusion between illocutionary acts and illocutionary verbs, as well as overlapping of the categories of illocutionaries, and so forth. Altogether, Searle confirmed at least six problems with Austin's taxonomy. (see 1976, 7-10)

Searle presented his own categories of illocutionary acts:

1. *Representatives*
2. *Directives*
3. *Commissives*
4. *Expressives*
5. *Declarations* (1976, 10-14)

The categories will be briefly described in the following paragraphs.

Representatives, sometimes also called *Assertives*, have the purpose of committing the speaker to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition. Some examples of representatives are describing, claims, boasting, and conclusions. A prototypical utterance of representatives is: „*It's Valentine Day*“ and „*He is really talented.*“

Directives are attempts made by the speaker to get the addressee to do something. In this category we may find verbs such as *invite*, *insist*, *order*, *beg*, and *advise*. Sentential examples would be: „*You should come over*“ and „*Get out!*“.

Another class is *Commissives*. Those are, similarly to Austin's commissives, the acts meant to commit the speaker to future action. This may include promising, offering, and threatening. Typical instances of commissives are: „*I will come on time*“ and „*I will come again.*“

Expressives, as the name suggests, have the point of expressing some psychological state. Some traditional examples of this group are: *apologize*, *thank*, *welcome*, *condole*, and *congratulate*. Utterances such as „*Thank you*“ and „*I am terribly sorry*“ are illustrations of this group.

The last item on the list of illocutionary act classes is *declarations*. The defining characteristic of this class is the fact that when you declare something with all the conditions met, in real life some state really changes. For example, if someone successfully performs the act of declaring a war, war is started then. Other examples might be *resign, marry, promote, and sentence*. (Searle 1976, 10-14)

Even Searle's approach has met with mixed reaction. Allwood (1977, 10) makes remarks, which apply to Austin as well, that Searle focuses on single communicative acts rather than on communication as a whole, as communicative acts hardly occur in isolation. This point will be taken into consideration in the upcoming analysis thus the context of each judged utterance will be examined when assigning the relevant illocutionary force.

Searle's taxonomy will be used in the analysis since the boundaries of the created categories are clearly defined (will be further described in 1.3.2.2.), in contrast with Austin's, though other approaches and methods mentioned in these chapters may be referred to in the analysis too, e.g. in order to explain some ambiguous cases or other possible explanations.

A distinctive difference between Austin's and Searle's systems, apart from the apparently different classification, is the approach, as Mey (2001, 124-5) points out, that "*people perform a speech act whenever they use language, irrespective of the 'performative' criterion*". Mey then continues to explain that all acts of speaking have an illocutionary character. These Searle's thoughts make his taxonomy more applicable to a wider range of utterances, rather than those only consisting of a performative verb as is the case of Austin.

1.4.2.1. Function indicating devices

To distinguish the correct illocutionary force means to consider the utterance from several perspectives. Searle and Vanderveken (1965, 226) suggest a set of means they call *function indicating devices*. One should be able to distinguish the illocutionary force by examining these devices. The two authors listed those as follows: *word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and performative verbs* (already discussed in 1.3.1). (1965, 226)

Word order in English may change for quite a wide range of reasons and some of these changes could affect the illocutionary force. For example, consider the difference between these two sentences: „*Peter is a heavy-weight boxer.*“ and „*Is Peter a heavy-weight boxer?*“ The change of word order is caused by the different sentence types, the first example being a

declarative sentence with the declarative structure, the second one an interrogative sentence with the interrogative structure. While the first example could be understood in terms of illocutionary force as a statement with the intention only to inform the hearer or a threat, depending on the context, the second one is quite a simple case of a question. Another frequent example of the change of the word order, also called marked word order, might be *inversion*, which usually shifts the focus of the sentence. (Biber, Conrad and Leech 2002, 398-411)

Other aspects that have the ability to affect the illocutionary force are intonation contours and stresses. Intonation is, as the previous aspect, often connected to the sentence type. A question has a defined intonation (rising) which is different than the one of a simple declarative sentence (falling) (Biber, Conrad and Leech 2002, 248-251). The word stress is also changeable and may alter the meaning of the sentence. By adding stress, in other words emphasizing a word, one is trying to show the importance of the stressed word. Grice (2002, 51) states that “*stress clearly does in fact on many occasions make a difference to the speaker’s meaning; indeed it is one of the elements which help to generate implicatures*“. The following example should illustrate the change in meaning caused only by a different word stress.

“You have seen a lot“ X “You have seen a **lot**“

While the context of the first example, where there is no special stress, may be friends talking about their adventures and experiences, the other sentence with the stressed word *lot* used in the conversation of gang members may give the notion that the person has actually seen too much and may become a burden. The sentence without a special stress could be understood as a simple truth giving statement thus being assigned the force of a representative, while the other one with the stress might be seen as a threat.

These devices will be searched and inspected in the analysis in order to recognize the intended illocutionary force.

1.4.2.2. Dimensions of variations

In addition to those, Searle (1976, 2-7) acknowledges twelve significant *dimensions of variations* in which illocutionary acts are different one from another. Out of these twelve, it is possible to consider three of them as the most important, Searle lists them accordingly as the first trio in his paper, namely the *illocutionary point*, the *direction of fit*, and the *expressed*

psychological state. He even explicitly admits that he builds his taxonomy mostly around these dimensions. (Searle 1976, 4)

Searle's definitions (1976, 3-4) of these terms could be explained as in the following sentences. *Illocutionary point*, which is a part of the illocutionary force, is the point, in other words, the purpose or intended outcome, of the illocution. For example, the illocutionary point of a threat would be scarring the hearer or making the hearer do something (leave the place,...), while the illocutionary point of a typical promise is that the speaker is committing himself to something. These points are already specific to their sub-classes of illocutionary acts, the five general classes have their general point, too. Searle (1976, 10-12) describes the specific points this way: the illocutionary point of representatives is to share some truth of the expressed proposition to the speaker. These could be all kinds of statements, claims, and passing information. Directives' point is to make the hearer do something. They include orders, instructions, and even questions. Commissive have the point of committing the speaker to some future action. That might be a promise, offer, and undertaking (Leech 2014, 180, 309). As Searle (1967, 12) suggests, the point to express a psychological state about the propositional content is the one of expressives. Examples of those could be thanking, accusing, and apologizing (Leech 2014, 309). Finally, the illocutionary point of declarations is to make a change in the real world simply by making the utterance. A declaration is a judge's sentence, parents naming their child, and a politician resigning from his position. (Leech 2014, 309)

The second term called the *direction of fit* represents the relation of the propositional content to the world. There are two directions of fit as explained in Searle 1967 (3-4, 10-15): *words-to-world* and *world-to-words*. Representatives have the direction of fit words-to-world. This means that when producing an utterance with the illocutionary force of representatives (e.g. boasting and complaining), one is trying to match his words to the world. In contrast, when one utters a directive or a commissive, the direction of fit is world-to-words - a change is intended. Expressives do not have a direction of fit because, as Searle explains it, the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed. Declarations have both directions of fit which is explained using the following example. A judge may issue a verdict that someone is guilty and it might, on one hand, match the words to the world in case the suspect really did the crime, on the other hand, it does not matter, at least linguistically speaking, whether the suspect did it or not. When the judge declares him guilty, the judge makes the world match

the words thus in the eyes of law and Searle's approach to illocutionary acts the suspect is guilty.

Even the concept of the *directions of fit* has not avoided some criticism. Katz (2015, 48) suggests that insisting on giving each category a direction of fit is impossible and weakens Searle's theory. She also mentions that the same concept that has been employed for expressives (not having a direction of fit) might be employed in a similar manner for representatives.

The last significant, at least for the following analysis, dimension of variation is the *expressed psychological state* (sometimes also called *sincerity condition*). According to Searle (1976, 4), the speaker expresses some attitude towards the propositional content, provided that there is any. This applies even when the expressed psychological state is insincere. Holdgraves (2008, 13) provides an example of the expressed psychological state by reflecting it on a promise. By performing a promise, the speaker expresses that the promise will be kept, although that expression might be insincere and the promise will be broken.

Generally speaking, the basic expressed psychological states for each class stated by Searle (1967, 4, 10-15) are:

1. Expressing the belief X by representatives
2. Expressing the desire (also want or wish) of the speaker to make the hearer do something by directives
3. Expressing the intention of the speaker to do something by commissives
4. Expressing the psychological state itself by expressives
5. Expressing no psychological state by declarations

In the same paper, Searle notes: "If one tries to do a classification of illocutionary acts based entirely on differently expressed psychological states one can get quite a long way." This statement may sound hopeful for the upcoming analysis, however, this one dimension of variation would not be enough in order to do a thorough work. That is the reason why all of the three dimensions of fit explained in this sub-chapter will be taken into consideration when analyzing the utterances and are believed to aid to find (at least) the primary illocutionary force.

1.4.3. Indirect speech acts

Indirect speech acts are a special kind of acts. Bach (1994, 13) explains those as a case of performing one illocutionary act by way of performing another one. In his other book, Bach together with Harnish (1979, 70) uses a definition that contains the literal aspect of acts – indirect speech act is performed subordinately to another (often literal) illocutionary act. Searle and Vanderveken (2005, 118) offer a similar explanation to which they add the terms primary speech act (non-literal) and secondary speech act (literal).

As may be seen, the problem of indirect speech acts is not their definition but rather their understanding. Before this is explained in details, consider some the following examples of the indirect speech acts.

1. The door is over there.
2. Your foot is on my coat, sir.
3. Do you have a penny?

All of these three cases have a clear structure and a simple meaning. These two aspects alone significantly help to identify the individual classes of illocutionary acts. While the first two are members of *representatives* and might be comprehended as simple *statements*, the third example is clearly a question, which is a directive as Searle (1976, 11) explains them as an attempt of the speaker to get the hearer to answer. These are the *literal secondary speech acts*.

What may aid to decipher the intended *primary speech act* is often the context. In example A, it is without a doubt possible to say that the statement with the mere intention to inform the hearer about the location of the door is the illocutionary point. The classification would end at this point as this would be the only illocutionary act. However, in a different context, e.g. after having an argument, this could be the indirect way of asking someone to leave. In that case, the primary illocutionary act would be *directive* – the force of *a request* or *an order*.

It is not easy to imagine the context for the example B where this utterance could be used only with the literal intention to inform the hearer. Rather than that, the speaker most like wants the hearer to move his foot away. Thus, the primary indirect act would be again *directive* – this time most likely a *request*.

In the last example C, there is a question. Again, there are some possible situations where this question could be meant literally but let us assume this is not the case. Instead, imagine a

beggar asking this question. Most probably, the beggar is, in fact, asking *for* the penny. The literal secondary act is *directive* as is the primary, but a different illocutionary point makes the difference this time. That is, in the literal meaning the appropriate reaction would be a *yes/no* answer, but for the indirect meaning, the ideal reaction (from the viewpoint of the beggar) would be an extra coin in his hand.

These examples should illustrate how important is the context in order to successfully assign the correct illocutionary class and force.

1.5. Perlocutionary Act

Perlocutionary act is closely connected to illocutionary act. As Austin described, uttering something usually has a certain consequential effect on the actions, thoughts, and feelings of the audience. This performance is the perlocutionary act. (1962, 101)

The captain commanded his men to leave the ship. = illocutionary act

The captain's men jumped overboard. = perlocutionary act (effect)

These two examples should provide the notion of the most significant difference between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary act. While, as was in detail described above, the illocutionary act contains the force of the utterance – in this case, it is clearly a directive: order – the perlocutionary act is about the consequence of the utterance – in this example the men obeyed the order and jumped. In other words, these two acts could be understood as the purpose of an utterance (illocutionary) and the outcome or effect of an utterance (perlocutionary). In Newton's words, the illocutionary could be the action of an utterance and the perlocutionary the subsequent reaction.

In a similar approach to Austin's, Levinson defined the perlocutionary act as bringing about of effects on the audience by means of uttering the sentence, such effects being special to the circumstances of utterance. (1983, 236)

To make it completely clear, let us provide another example of the contrast of the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act and its effect. The illocutionary act, with the class specified as directives, would appear in the utterance "*Frank invited Mary to see the play.*" If the speaker succeeded, one could say the perlocutionary effect of the act is the following: *Mary was persuaded to go*, or simply, while having the appropriate context, *Mary went to the*

theater. When this is completed, the main condition for the perlocutionary act is fulfilled and the utterance becomes such act.

Austin later in his work went into more details about the description of the perlocutionary act.

The perlocutionary act may be either the achievement of a perlocutionary object (convince, persuade) or the production of a perlocutionary sequel. Thus the act of warning may achieve its perlocutionary object of alerting and also have the perlocutionary sequel of alarming. [...] What is the perlocutionary object of one illocution may be the sequel of another. For example, a warning may produce the sequel of deterring and saying 'Don't', whose object is to deter, may produce the sequel of altering or even alarming. (Austin 1962, 118)

In this extract, we can see the example of further division of perlocution using the terms perlocutionary object, which one could describe as the goal of the utterance, and the perlocutionary sequel, which is the achieved effect of the utterance. Austin's explanation above might bring some light into the creation and successful usage of the perlocutionary act.

Kurzon, building his thesis on the thoughts of Davis and Gu, uses the terms perlocutionary uptake, which is the correct understanding of the illocutionary act, and perlocutionary effect, which is the outcome. That is further divided into intended and unintended perlocutionary effect. (1998, 573)

When referring again to Davis, Kurzon (1998, 274) states that a successful perlocutionary act should reflect the achievement of the speaker's communicative goals. This point could be addressed in the analysis when discussing the perlocutionary effects of some said utterances, provided that there is a clear indication of the speaker's communicative goal.

1.6. Speech Acts from the Viewpoint of Politeness

Holtgraves (2008, 34) explains politeness as "*a theoretical construct invoked as a means of explaining the link between language use and the social context.*" To put it differently, it is the set of elements that is behind the reason why one says an utterance the way one says it, depending on the context, hearer etc. Holtgraves continues his explanation by stating:

„To perform an act other than in the clearest and efficient manner possible is to implicate some degree of politeness on the part of the speaker.“ (Holtgraves 2008, 41)

That means that every request that has been ever made, for example, with the word please is already, by embracing this opinion, not the most efficient, yet polite. There is a broad range of different kinds of politeness, one of the most well acknowledged is the set of politeness strategies by Brown and Levinson.

They mentioned four politeness strategies (e.g. 2006, 315-17): *bald-on-record*, *positive politeness*, *negative politeness*, and *off-record politeness*. The reason for the application of these strategies is to minimize the face threatening acts. Face (Brown and Levinson 2006, 311-12) is described as the public self-image. Brown and Levinson distinguish two faces: a negative face that concerns, for example, claims to territories, rights to non-distraction etc. whereas positive face is more about the need to be appreciated and approved. Holtgraves (2008, 40) argues that a lot of acts that people perform on a daily basis threaten one's face. Requests threaten the hearer's negative face by invading his autonomy while disagreements threaten the positive face by lessening the solidarity between the participants of the discussion.

The four strategies vary in the way they threaten the hearer's face. According to Leech (2014, 33), the riskiest strategy is *bald on-record*. The essence of this strategy is that it is the most direct one. Brown and Levinson (2008, 69) explain that this strategy is used when the speaker is not afraid of the retribution from the hearer. An example of this strategy would be "*Give me your phone!*". *Positive politeness* is then oriented toward the positive face of the hearer and should give the notion that both persons are in a way similar, e.g. part of a group, friends, etc. A case of positive politeness could be "*Hey, friend, can you give me a hand?*" What is explained essentially as avoidance-based and oriented toward partially satisfying the hearer's negative face is *negative politeness*. (Brown and Levinson 2008, 70). Leech (2014, 34) uses this sentence as an example of this strategy: "*Could you possibly give me a lift to the station?*" In this case, it can be seen that this strategy employs so-called *redressive strategies* which mean using the language devices that avoid a direct approach to the hearer and make, in this example, the request 'softer'. *Off-record politeness* which is the most indirect strategy is the use of hints, metaphors, and sentences with many possible meanings, as described in Brown and Levinson (2008, 69). Using this strategy, one might indirectly ask for a snack by saying "*I feel rather hungry*" or "*What a shame I left my burger at home*". These sentences do not necessarily oblige the hearer to give away his snack, however, that might be one of the possible implicatures. Leech (2014, 34) also notes that the least face-threatening strategy is not saying anything at all.

The off-record politeness is often present in one kind of speech acts – in those indirect ones. One may say “*It is quite cold here*“ which is a representative statement. However, this utterance might have a non-literal meaning, thus an indirect speech act which could be interpreted this way: “*Close the window.*“ This indirect act is a directive order that is hidden within the original sentence and is only implied by using the off-record strategy.

In the upcoming analysis, when examining the speech acts, these explained politeness strategies may be identified for specific illocutionary acts and then will be commented on.

2. PUBLIC SPEAKING

Public speaking is a specific kind of speech. Lotko (25-29) describes a set of five characteristics typical for public speaking. The utterance has to be spoken (1), has to be produced in public (2) in front of an audience. The language of the utterance should be appropriate and formal (3), the language and the content adequately fitting for the audience and situation (4), and, finally, be of a suggestive manner (5). The last point means that the purpose of the speech is not only to inform but might as well be to persuade the hearers.

Crystal (2003, 294) points out the fact that public speaking is typically in a form of a monolog. Also, more often than not, it is originally a prepared written text that is read aloud in front of an audience. That is why the structures of the speech may be more elaborated than the structures of a common dialogue. Speakers also often repeat the keywords of their speeches, may be playing with their intonation, word stress and pauses in between words or sentences.

Political speeches are a special type of public speaking. Their main goal is to persuade the hearer that e.g. the party represented by the speaker is the one the hearer (a potential voter) should trust and eventually choose over the other parties. Charteris-Black (2014, xii-xiv) recognizes two kinds of political speeches – one is policy-making, the other one consensus-building. The type that will be presented as part of the analysis will be consensus-building, as the speakers will try to build a consensus among the voters to select them as the candidate they would vote for.

Šmajsová Buchtová (2010, 103) states several typical features of political speeches. According to her, the speech should be clearly structured, logical, and easy to follow. The opinion of the speaker should be clear and is quite often advocated within the speech. Also, politicians regularly address the audience to show the interest in them and connect with them.

There are some aspects and language features common for public speaking. Among those, there are *rhetorical questions* which are often used to bring up a problem or repeat an idea (Dickson and Hargie 2006, 137). Frequent *repetition* of the main idea is another typical aspect with the goal to make the audience remember the key concepts of the speech. As Šmajsová Buchtová (2010, 129-140) notes, *metaphors*, *sayings*, and *similes* are used to help the audience understand the message and *quotations* are commonly used to support the speaker's opinion.

This brief overview of public speaking should help to understand the structure of speeches that will partly appear in the analysis, even though they will be fragmented into individual utterances.

3. ANALYSIS

3.1. Introduction to Analysis

The main goal of the analysis is to identify the illocutionary acts and define which illocutionary force is the most dominant one in the speeches of US presidential candidates. To achieve that, 200 utterances were chosen from public discussions and speeches of the two traditional party candidates Clinton and Trump. 100 utterances by each candidate examined in terms of illocutionary acts and their force and whether the act is direct or indirect. After that, various interpretations and possible ambiguity shall be described, as well as the reaction of the opponent in the debates or the audience, if present and helpful to the purpose of the analysis. This would concern the perlocutionary act and its effects. Furthermore, the politeness strategies will be identified and commented on for some of the cases of illocutionary acts.

The analysis will be conducted via the usage of the knowledge gained in the theoretical part of this paper. Since it is mainly the analysis of the illocutionary acts, they will be given the majority of space in this part, too. For classification of the illocutionary acts, Searle's taxonomy will be used. The classification will be done by the use of identification of the illocutionary force and illocutionary point by the examination of the utterance. To achieve that, the above-mentioned function indicating devices may be localized and inspected. Not only will the illocutionary acts be divided by their class and force, but also by the distinction of being either direct or indirect. If the illocutionary act will be indirect, both primary and secondary illocutionary acts will be analyzed. Also, in some specifically suitable examples, there will be examined the perlocutionary act as well.

The discussions of the presidential candidates provide a unique source of data for the analysis of the speech acts. Usually when one analyses any communication process, one of the vital requirements for the success of such analysis is to clearly define the hearer. This might be considered unclear in the discussions. While a candidate may talk to the audience in the speaker's hall and to the audience watching the broadcast of the discussion as well, in the next utterance the same candidate might be addressing her rival. Even more troubling is the fact that when the candidate talks to the other candidate the speaker still realizes they are watched by a numerous audience and may be talking, although indirectly, to them too.

Another thing that deserves to be pointed out is what may be in this thesis called the absolute illocutionary force. Given the purpose of the discussions, that is to show the opinions, behavior, and other characteristics of each candidate and, subsequently, for voters to choose one of them to throw their name into the ballot, one could assume that the candidates know about this purpose and will try to embrace it. This could easily lead to the belief that everything the candidate says may be understood as a tool of persuasion. In the vast majority of utterances, it would be an indirect speech act, as the original utterance may have any form and structure not necessarily related to directives. Thus, when accepting this thought, everything the candidate says could be paraphrased as: “Vote for me!” or “Do not vote for the other candidate!” However, the analysis will be considered from more angles than just this one, in order to have more than just one illocutionary force for every utterance.

In the same manner, what might be called the absolute perlocutionary effect could be taken into consideration. By that is meant the fact that Trump was elected the president of the USA. Therefore, it could be assumed that the perlocutionary outcome of all the utterances (not only mentioned in the analysis) could be that the needed majority in the individual states in the USA was persuaded to vote for Trump and thus he became the president.

3.2. Sources of the Corpus

The following analysis is dealing with 200 utterances from four different sources. The majority of the corpus is taken from the presidential debates as they were transcribed from the television broadcast. 100 utterances, half of them by each candidate, were randomly chosen from the first Clinton-Trump presidential debate at Hofstra University, New York. The same random selection occurred in the transcript of the third presidential debate at the University of Nevada, only this time 50 utterance (25 each) were picked. The last part of utterances, again 25 by each candidate, were taken from their individual public speeches. As for Clinton, her utterances were picked from her Nomination Speech at Democratic National Convention in 2016. Trump’s utterances were taken from his version of the same kind of speech, that is from Trump’s Nomination Acceptance Speech delivered at Republican National Convention in 2016.

3.3. Illocutionary Acts

The main aspect of the analysis is the illocutionary act and the ratio of its classes within the examined utterances. At first, the overall results will be provided and commented on. Then,

the utterances will be explained based on their categorization, possible ambiguity will be identified and the key features important for the decision of the final sorting of the utterances to each particular classes shall be mentioned. The difference between the direct and indirect illocutionary force will be discussed, too.

After the research, it was discovered that out of the 200 utterances of the whole corpus 69 (34,5%) have an indirect illocutionary force in addition to the direct one, as shown in Table 2. It may be believed that there are more cases of indirect speech acts within the corpus but, when considering the context of the utterances in contrast with the utterances themselves, the indirect force is often expressed directly in the preceding sentences. Simply because of this reason, there might be fewer indirect forces than could have been expected.

Table 2: The division of direct/indirect speech acts.

	NUMBER OF OCCURANCES	PERCENTAGE
Direct speech act	131	65,5%
Indirect speech act	69	34,5%
Total	200	100%

Before a deeper analysis of the direct and indirect acts is provided, allow a brief commentary on the similarity in the outcome of the research for each candidate in respect to the directness of speech acts. In Table 3, it is possible to see that there is not a significant difference between the results – Clinton’s 67% of direct speech acts compared to Trump’s 65%. Such similarity was originally not expected as the style of speech as well as the personality of the speakers differs considerably. One of the reasons why the directness dominates might be the fact that it benefits the clarity and understanding of the utterance which allows the audience to comprehend the idea expressed by the speaker. The clarity of the ideas of the speech is one typical feature of public speaking.

Table 3: The division of direct/indirect speech acts between Clinton and Trump.

	HILLARY CLINTON	DONALD TRUMP
Direct speech act	66	65
Indirect speech act	34	35

3.3.1. Direct speech acts

As mentioned above, the more numerous part of the corpus contains direct speech acts without another indirect force. In this part, all 5 categories of illocutionary acts with their respective features explained in 1.3.2. will be shown on examples from the corpus. Before each class of illocutionary act is addressed, the results and ratio between the illocutionary classes will be shown in Table 4 and in Chart 1 (for Clinton) and 2 (for Trump) for better illustration, too.

Table 4: The appearance of direct speech acts.

	REPRESENTATIVES	DIRECTIVES	COMMISSIVES	EXPRESSIVES	DECLARATIONS
Clinton	36	10	10	9	1
Ratio	54,5%	15,2%	15,2%	13,6%	1,5%
Trump	34	11	13	6	1
Ratio	52,3%	16,9%	20%	9,2%	1,5%
Total count	70	21	23	15	2




Chart 1: Clinton's use of direct illocutionary acts.




Chart 2: Trump's use of direct illocutionary acts.

In these charts and table might be seen that, once again, only slight differences occurred in the classification of the utterances. The most notable difference, yet only by four instances, is in the class of commissives. While 20% of Trump's utterances could be assigned to this category, only 15% of Clinton's fit into this class. Based on this data it could be assumed that Trump was promising more than Clinton, although this generalization does not concern other commissives as, for example, pledges. The same margin of 5% is present in expressives – Clinton has 14% while Trump 9%. This may be caused by the fact that Clinton expressed her psychological state (feelings and emotions) more directly than Trump.

As the differences are insignificant, the similarities in the results might be, as when comparing direct and indirect acts, surprising. Both candidates have more than a half of all direct illocutionary acts consisting of representatives and thus the analysis of this dominant class of illocutionary acts will be the most detailed.

3.3.1.1. Representatives

As was mentioned above in 1.3.2.2., the illocutionary point of representatives is to share some truth of the expressed proposition to the speaker. Their direction of fit is words to the world which means that the words should describe the reality (or a perception of it). Finally, by uttering a representative, one expresses a belief (even if it is an insincere one). This short summary contains the basic features of dimensions of variations typical for representatives.

Given the essence of the presidential debates and political speeches, that is to tell the possible voter as many reasons as possible why one is the best candidate for him, it might be understandable that this class of illocutionary acts is, in fact, the most numerous. Even this class, up to this point rather straightforward, may get little complicated. Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 182-3) defined at least 32 assertive (representative) verbs, thus at least 32 illocutionary forces, which will be recognized in this analysis. There is no space for a proper description of each one of these verbs/forces of representatives, not to speak of the other four illocutionary acts and their respective forces. A master thesis, on the other hand, could provide a complex overview of all these differences within each illocutionary acts as there is more space for detailed descriptions.

Before the representatives from the corpus will be further divided and this division commented on, an example will be provided, one that illustrates the above-mentioned dimensions of variations that are typical for the class of representatives.

Example 1:

HC: I've laid out a platform that I think would begin to remedy some of the problems we have in the criminal justice system. (1)

The speaker shares some information, which is the propositional content, with the hearer. This might be the general illocutionary point of representatives. It could be seen that the whole Example 1 is about the mentioned platform. One part of the utterance says that the platform was laid out, the other one describes the platform while referring to future. All in all, Clinton definitely shared some information with the hearers which confirms the correct illocutionary point.

According to the theory, the direction of fit should be words-to-world. At least the first part of the utterance indeed has this direction of fit as it describes something that was done in real life. The other part of the sentence starting with *I think* on one hand explains something abstract, which could be still considered as words-to-world, on the other hand, it is a hypothetical theory about future and, as the audience probably assumed, Clinton wanted this to actually happen which would make it world-to-words. Nevertheless, the first part of the sentence, arguably the main part, meets the requirements of the direction of fit for representatives.

Any representative should express the belief of the speaker, basically a belief that the content is true. In this example, the belief is even emphasized by the use of the verb *think*. These three features combined clearly suggest that this utterance is a member of representatives. Exactly this approach was used when determining the class of the illocutionary acts of the rest of the corpus, too.

As was already suggested above, representatives have at least 32 typical illocutionary verbs and subsequently the same number of forces. All 70 instances of representatives found in the corpus were analyzed even further in order to assign a valid illocutionary force to each of them. It may be not so hard to believe that there is a number of ambiguous and unclear cases, the essence of which shall be at least mentioned in the following lines. Chart 3 provides the overview of the division of the representatives appearing in the corpus.




Chart 3: The appearances of the illocutionary forces of representatives.

In this chart, one may see the results of the analysis of the illocutionary forces of representatives. Claims lead the statistics with the count of 9 instances, the second most common is informing behind which are accusations and reports, both with 7 occurrences. Blaming, insisting, lamenting, reminding, and retrodicting appears only rarely in the corpus, each of them has only a single instance.

Given the nature of the political speeches and, in the case of the sources for this analysis, presidential discussions, claims would be indeed expected to appear quite often, as politics always tend to claim something. As these sub-classes of illocutionary acts were not addressed

in the theoretical part, a brief description of claims as given by Searl and Vanderveken (1985, 183) and Smith (1991, 87) shall be provided. Simply put, they state that a claim expresses a view of the speaker who may be expecting some kind of objections as claims are often not proved. As was noted above, the differences between the classes are in some cases, as for example between claiming, informing, and stating, rather small and unclear and the force often changes based on the context and even on the knowledge of the hearer. The next examples show this ambiguity.

Example 2:

HC: I do not add a penny to the national debt. (30)

This case is categorized as a claim, it fits perfectly to the simple description of a claim. A paraphrase of this utterance could look like this: *Clinton claimed she did not add a penny to the national debt.* This paraphrasing was used as one kind of re-checking whether the assigned force actually works. If a different verb was used in the paraphrase, such in this case: *Clinton informed/reported she did not add a single penny to the national debt,* the meaning and the implicature could change, too. As noted in Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 185-7) informing is typical for stating new information that is proved (provable) whereas reporting refers mainly to the past.

Example 3:

HC: I know Donald's very praiseworthy of Vladimir Putin, but Putin is playing tough, long game here. (17)

This utterance could be easily recognized as claiming, as some objections to this statement could be expected and it might be a subject for debate, at the same time it could be identified as stating which is in a way neutral (regarding emotions and connotation) and the hearers themselves should decide what to make of it. But, the context must be considered, in this case, the two previous sentences are more than sufficient: *„The most recent and troubling of these has been Russia. [...] and I am deeply concerned about this.“* After taking this context into consideration, the assigned force was the one of criticizing. Omitting the context could mean changing the illocutionary force significantly.

Example 4:

DT: That makes me smart. (47)

Example 4 is defined as boasting which is a class that is employed when one expresses pride or satisfaction in something (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 191-2). This interpretation of the utterance is quite clear and probably the most obvious one, although others are possible, too. This utterance could express Trump’s opinion about himself that may or may not be shared among others. Another interpretation might be that Trump informed the audience about what made him smart (in this context it was avoiding paying income taxes) and the implicature is that other people could get smart by following Trump’s example, too. These possible interpretations, together with many others not mentioned, should demonstrate several things. One of them is that the context is absolutely vital, the other one that some utterances, if not most, have multiple possible meanings.

As the differences between the used illocutionary acts by each candidate were shown and commented on in the previous part, the differences and similarities of the employed illocutionary forces shall be shown now in Chart 4.




Chart 4: The used illocutionary forces of representatives compared by each speaker.

It is possible to see that Clinton’s most frequent forces were stating, accusing, claiming, informing, and stating an opinion, while Trump’s were claiming, criticizing, informing, and reporting. Even though the most common forces are not always the same for both candidates, it is possible to find some correlations between them. For example, Clinton’s accusing and

Trump's criticizing are both focused on attacking the opponent's history, deeds, and opinions. Put differently, this illocutionary forces could raise doubts about the opposing candidate and, presumably, exactly that was the point of the speaker. Both candidates used claiming and informing, forces that have been briefly addressed above and that are typical for speeches thanks to their nature of sharing information.

Similarities put aside, this part should also deal with the differences of the used forces. Finally, something that meets the expectations is the use of boasting by Trump. With 3 instances out of his 34 representatives, the ratio of this force is 9% of all his cases, Clinton had zero examples of this force in the analyzed corpus of 200 utterances. Overall, Trump used a majority of forces that carry some personal tones as when he was accusing, the focus is against the person who is the subject of the accusation, or when admitting. The exceptions to this approach are informing and reporting, both of these are rather about stating facts than personal views. When comparing the use of forces by Trump with the one by Clinton, the most notable difference is in stating. While Clinton had 5 occurrences of those, Trump did not have any. Considering stating, informing, and reporting together as forces expressing facts more than personal stances, Clinton had almost a half of her representatives focused this way, while the other half consists of those of a more personal nature, as for example accusing or expressing an opinion. This shows that Clinton's division and use of illocutionary forces were balanced between giving information and personal views, Trump employed more personal forces, however, shared some information, as well.

3.3.1.2. Commissives

Commissives appeared to be the second most numerous class of illocutionary acts with 21 instances within direct speech acts. Before the results of the analysis are presented, a brief summary of the main attributes of commissives is needed. As explained in 1.3.2.2., the direction of fit of commissives is world-to-word. This means that when someone makes a promise, which is the paradigmatic example of this class, the world must change in order to match the propositional content. Commissives always express some intention (sincerity condition) and, at last, the illocutionary point is that this group commits the speaker to some future action. Example 5 demonstrates these features and the way they were recognized.

Example 5:

HC: I will defend planned parenthood. (75)

When examining this utterance, one might say without any doubts that it indeed expresses an intention – in this example that Clinton will defend planned parenthood. Something would have to happen in order to defend the planned parenthood which confirms that the direction of fit is world-to-word. Also, by uttering this sentence the speaker committed herself to the fact that she would actually defend planned parenthood, which was definitely understood by the audience and Clinton’s voters could expect it to happen. This way, all of the three vital dimensions of variations typical for commissives are met and this utterance may be classified accordingly.

This class of illocutionary acts might be divided even further, based on the strength, slight changes of orientation either toward speaker or hearer, and the essence of the commitment. Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 192-8) described 17 different forces out of which, however, only 3 appeared within the direct acts of the corpus. These 3 forces occurred in a total of 23 instances this way: there were 17 promises, vows were present 5 times, and there was 1 pledge. When divided between the two candidates, the results are shown in Table 5. Promising, by having 17 occurrences, is the most numerous illocutionary force in the whole corpus. This force will be examined further using examples from the corpus.

Table 5: The used illocutionary forces of commissives.

	Clinton	Trump	Total
Promise	10	7	17
Vow	0	5	5
Pledge	0	1	1
Total	10	13	23

In this table might be seen that Clinton’s every single commissive is a promise. As was noted before, a promise is a typical example of this class, therefore, it could be expected to appear rather often. A dominance of this sort might be suspicious but the examples in the corpus have been analyzed thoroughly and are expected to be correct, although other interpretations within or even outside the group of commissives are possible. Some of them will be discussed in the next paragraphs. Promises often appear in political speeches, especially before election, in this way the high occurrence of this for is understandable.

Example 6:

HC: First, we have to build an economy that works for everyone, not just those at the top.
(71)

This is not a typical example of commissives because the subject in this sentence, and therefore the literal subject of the promise, too, is the first-person plural *we*. Promises are mostly used with the first-person singular *I* but, as for example Bach (2006, 164) notes, it is possible to use the plural, too. One of the reasons why the *we* was used instead of *I* is connected to one of the characteristics of political speeches, that is to show the interest and connection with the audience. When both Clinton and Trump used *we* in their promises and vows, they probably intended to make the possible voter feel included in some propositioned change or event, despite the fact that the voters did not have the authority to actually change anything.

Example 7:

DT: As soon as she releases them, I will release. [applause] (86)

This is a case of a vow. Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 193) explain that a vow differs from a promise in several aspects, the most important of which is that vowing is not done for the benefit of the speaker and that a vow is stronger than a promise in the way it commits the speaker to the future action. Example 7 could be identified as a promise but since it seems that this utterance is, even more, speaker-oriented and that fulfilling it does not necessarily benefit the hearer (not in a direct way), the decision to assign it to vows was made based on these facts. Admittedly, Example 7 could be also assuring, that would be in case the hearers (which is in this instance, when there are millions of hearers, not possible to absolutely determine) had doubts about it and were asking for assuring.

Example 8

HC: We will not build a wall. (80)

This utterance is a promise, it has a future reference committing the speaker (again with the above-addressed *we*) not to do something. This time, however, the propositional content is negative which is expressed by the adverb *not*. Simply put, instead of promising to do something, the negative propositional content is expressed by promising *not* to do something. Again, similar ambiguity as the one mentioned in the previous example concerns this case,

too – this promise could be as well a vow (when not beneficial for the hearers and committing only the speaker, although strongly) or assuring (in case the audience needed to know for sure that no wall would be built).

Example 9:

DT: I pledge to never sign any trade agreement that hurts our workers, or that diminishes our freedom and independence. (93)

As Example 8, this case has a negative propositional content, too, but now expressed by the adverb *never*. Using *never* instead of *not sign* increases the emphasis of the speaker. There is a performative verb in this utterance which reveals the sub-class of this commissive – pledge. According to Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 193-4), a pledge is a strong commitment which is mostly neutral in connection with the hearer, in other words, not done for or against the hearer. This explanation suggests that the use of *pledge* in this sentence may not be the best possible option. A simple promise would be better because it is (usually) more focused on the positive outcome for the speaker.

3.3.1.3. Directives

Directives are the third most frequent class of direct illocutionary acts in this analysis, appearing 21 times. Before they are examined further, the summary of their main attributes shall be provided. The illocutionary point of them is an attempt of the speaker to make the hearer do something. Requests and orders are typical examples of this class – both trying to convince the speaker to do something, using different strength and authority. Directives' direction of fit is world-to-words – the same one as was for commissives. When one utters an order, the order has to be done so that the acts is considered fulfilled. Finally, the expressed psychological state is *want* (also wish or desire), thus, for example, when asking someone about their day, one expresses the desire to get the information. Example 10 illustrates these vital aspects of directives.

Example 10:

HC: You have to judge us, who can shoulder the immense, awesome responsibilities of the presidency, who can put into action the plans that will make your life better. (96)

This utterance could be identified both as representative and directive, the directive interpretation shall be described. It might be believed that Clinton wished (insisted) that the

voters would judge the two possible candidates, probably hoping for the outcome that she would be the appropriate choice for the voters after such consideration. If this wish was not identified, the utterance would be just a statement about what the voters are supposed to do. For this insistence to be fulfilled, the viewers had to judge the two candidates. If that happened, the world would change based on the words which would meet the requirements of the direction of fit. The illocutionary point would be met, too, since the hearers would be persuaded and did the thing that was the subject of the attempt.

Again, Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 198) describe 24 directives out of which 7 types were identified in this part of the corpus. Their occurrences are shown in Table 6.

Table 6: The used illocutionary forces of directives.

	Clinton	Trump	Total
Ask	2	3	5
Insist	1	0	1
Request	1	2	3
Suggest	2	3	5
Tell	1	2	3
Urge	2	1	3
Warn	1	0	1
Total	10	11	21

Once again, the similarities outnumber the differences between the used directives by each candidate. Every instance of the illocutionary force present in the table varies between Clinton and Trump only by a single appearance in the corpus. The only notable difference is that Clinton used insisting and warning, both once, whereas Trump did not. The utterance with the insistence (Example 10) was commented on above and the warning will be addressed in the following lines (Example 11). The most numerous forces of this class of illocutionary acts are asking and suggesting, both with 5 cases, that is why one example of each force will be examined, too.

Example 11:

HC: But let's not assume that trade is the only challenge we have in the economy. (98)

When interpreting this utterance as a warning, one then accepts the possible desire of Clinton to make the hearers realize that there were more challenges in the economy and that she wanted people not to focus only on trade.

Example 12:

DT: Have you seen what's happened to Aleppo? (112)

As explained in the theoretical part, questions are always directives, because they require an answer from the hearer. The rhetorical questions, which are often used in political speeches, might be perceived as a partial exception. The difference is that they require the hearer not to answer, that is in the case the hearer understands it is a rhetorical question. Another approach may be adopted, too. This time the utterance would have all the qualities of the typical question but an indirect speech act would be employed, as well. The indirect force could be a vow: „I will tell you what happened to Aleppo.“ In this case, not much change depending on the perception of the illocutionary act as both ways the response of the hearer is not anticipated and the speaker will continue with his speech.

Example 13:

DT: Take a look at the start-up that they signed. (111)

This example is categorized as a suggestion. A suggestion is in the description by Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 202) a weaker directive. In all the instances of suggestions it was analyzed that the speaker does not press the hearers to make them do something, rather it is a suggestion which may be completely ignored, but could be beneficial for the hearers. In this example, Trump suggested that the hearers could get some more information about the discussed subject.

3.3.1.4. Expressives

Referring back to 1.3.2.2., the illocutionary point of expressives is to express the psychological state about the propositional content. As was suggested, there is no direction of fit. The expressed psychological state is the psychological state itself. Based on these major and other minor dimensions of variations, Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 211) describe 13 illocutionary forces: *apologize, thank, condole, congratulate, complain, lament, protest, deplore, boast, compliment, praise, welcome, and greet*. This is the first truly problematic part of the analysis since their taxonomy of expressives seems to be incomplete in terms of

expressed psychological states. Simply put, it might be believed that there are other psychological states that are not addressed by Searle and Vanderveken (in 1985). However, in order to keep the analysis and the division of the forces unified (based on the same source), it was decided not to use any other taxonomy of expressives. Instead, as there are many cases of an unassigned illocutionary force, the lack of suitable force will be addressed on an example basis with a suggested addition to the taxonomy provided.

Before the examples are described, Table 7 shows the assigned and unassigned illocutionary forces, together and separately for each candidate.

Table 7: The used illocutionary forces of expressives

	Clinton	Trump	Total
Praise	2	0	2
Protest	0	1	1
Thank	2	1	3
Unassigned	5	4	9
Total	9	6	15

In this table, it is possible to notice the difference between Clinton’s use of praises (twice) and Trump’s use of a protest (once). Admittedly, the number of occurrences is quite low to make a serious conclusion based on these results, although, when combined with the familiarity with the behavior of the candidates in their campaigns, it might be considered adequate. Clinton used more praises and positive attitude while Trump based his campaign on strong statements including a considerable number of protests and criticism. Since the examples that fit the taxonomy of Searle and Vanderveken are rather clear, the instances commented on in this part are the cases with unassigned force.

Example 14:

HC: I hope that I will be able to earn your vote on November 8th. (117)

This utterance expresses the hope of the speaker that the propositional content (earning votes) happens as hoped for. While the concept of hope, in this case, might be substituted with the one of a wish or a desire, which are typical for directives, this utterance is definitely not a directive, at least not in a direct form. Also, the idea of hoping seems to be quite unique and

commonly used in a conversation that it might deserve to have its own category within expressives.

Example 15:

HC: And I look forward to having that opportunity. (118)

Looking forward expresses a positive attitude and anticipation of the speaker toward the propositional content. More than just sharing information, which is the case of representatives, this utterance shares the psychological state of the speaker which is the reason why it fits into expressives. This example seems to be unambiguous as no other forces are believed to be identifiable in this utterance.

Example 16:

DT: We wish you a lot of luck. (124)

What needs to be discussed first is the possible irony in this utterance. The context is that Trump talks about companies leaving the USA and setting their factories elsewhere. Basically, he says: „If you go abroad, we wish you a lot of luck.“ If it was indeed an irony, the real psychological state of the expression would be the exact opposite of the one that is expressed, thus they would not be wishing any luck at all. Also, as mentioned above, wishes are typical for directives but not even a directive force fits this utterance. The closest one might be a prayer but, obviously, it is not an accurate identification of the force. Sincere or not, wishes in the form similar to the one of Example 16 express a psychological state, thus are expressives, although no further classification was successful.

3.3.1.5. Declarations

The last and the smallest part of the direct illocutionary acts present in the corpus is declarations. They have only one instance for each candidate. As was explained before, the direction of fit for declarations is both words-to-world and world-to-words. The illocutionary point is to make a change in the world and they do not express any psychological state. Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 205) discussed 21 declaration forces out of which 2 different kinds appeared in the corpus.

Example 17:

HC: I call it trumped-up trickle-down, because that's exactly what it would be. (130)

This one is a case of calling, giving something a name. Example 17, as well as many other declarations, employs a performative verb which clearly indicates the illocutionary force.

Example 18:

DT: I humbly and gratefully accept your nomination for the presidency of the United States. (131)

For the lack of a better declaration, this example was identified to be a confirmation. Accept is a performative verb for commissives but in this case, the illocutionary force is, at least partially, different. While Trump is definitely committing himself by accepting the nomination, it might be believed that by accepting it he becomes a formal (legal) nominee for the Republican Party. By doing so, he changed something in the real world which fits the description of declarations. This is the reason why this example was unprecedentedly placed among declarations instead of commissives.

3.3.2. Indirect speech acts

As explained in 1.3.3., indirect speech acts have a non-literal meaning in addition to the literal one. This means that such acts have two illocutionary forces that are different (usually in terms of various illocutionary classes). In the corpus, 69 instances of indirect speech acts were identified and some cases might be discussed in this part. The classification of these acts is shown in Table 8.

Table 8: The appearances of indirect speech acts

Indirect Speech Act	Clinton	Trump	Total
Representatives	1	0	1
Directives	2	0	2
Commissives	13	23	36
Expressives	18	12	30
Declarations	0	0	0
Total	34	35	69

The key feature of indirect speech acts is that the indirect force is only implied (more or less) and there is a room for doubts in every utterance. This avoidance of the direct approach, from

the perspective of politeness it is using the off-record strategy (see 1.5.), is often the reason why was the utterance produced the way it was – to give the speaker some space for a possible maneuvering. In Table 8, two classes of illocutionary acts significantly dominate the statistics – commissives and expressives. For expressives, the reasons for the indirect approach are difficult to find. The formal political setting probably encourages the neutral (indirect) expressing of emotions and psychological states, that is why these emotions are expressed often only as an implication. Commissives might have different reasons to appear as frequently. One of them could be that the speaker does not want to commit himself directly so that this, for example, promise would be held against him in case it was broken. This may be, in a way, a great tactic of some politicians. On one hand, they risk to persuade fewer voters by using this indirect approach, on the other hand, they may not be held accountable for something they did not explicitly promise. However, this identification of indirect speech acts is always only an assumption as only the speaker may be absolutely sure about the real meaning of the utterance.

Example 19:

HC: And I think it's time that the wealthy and corporations paid their fair share to support this country. (141)

While this utterance is originally a representative, it is possible to interpret it some other way. For example, one might say that, by uttering this sentence, Clinton indirectly promised she would make the corporations pay. As was mentioned above, the reason for saying the promise this way could be that Clinton wanted to avoid stating it directly.

Example 20:

HC: And the Russians need to understand that. (147)

Similarly to the previous example, this one is a representative which could be understood as a commissive. The utterance is a representative but it may not be expected that the Russians would suddenly understand *that*. Instead, what is implied is that someone needs to make them understand, in this case, the speaker herself. That is what lead to the identification of this example as a promise.

Example 21:

DT: Our jobs are fleeing the country. (170)

Statements as this one are typical for representatives. However, it could be doubted that Trump wanted to share just the information of the propositional content. What might be more probable is the explanation that Trump indirectly committed himself to the improvement of the situation – to keep the jobs in the USA. One explanation of this use of indirect act may be that in political speeches one central idea (this time keeping the jobs in the USA) might be presented using several direct and indirect ways – this repetition should make the hearer remember the idea.

Example 22:

HC: So I sure hope you will get out and vote as though your future depended on it, because I think it does. (132)

The issues of the expressive hope are suggested above, this utterance may have another meaning, too. Instead of just expressing her hope, Clinton might be using an indirect directive act. This could be a command, an urge, and a piece of advice. Any of these interpretations is possible and the use of an indirect act may be caused by adopting the off-record politeness strategy. However, even if Clinton had said „*Go vote!*“ it would not have been considered rude or inappropriate.

Example 23:

HC: We've covered this ground. (149)

Once again, a representative statement that has another indirect meaning. While the statement does not even bring new information to the hearers, it hides an indirect act. This act could be a command (directive). That command could be paraphrased this way: “*Do not talk about this again*“ or “*Switch to another topic.*“ This time, it is definitely the off-record politeness strategy applied in the discussion. Instead of using a direct approach, Clinton probably wanted to use a less face-threatening strategy.

Example 24:

DT: Give me a break. (188)

This is, in contrast, the use of bald-on-record politeness strategy, the most direct one. Not only that Trump wants Clinton to *give him a break*, he also expressed (or at least implied) his

psychological state in this utterance. This state could be protesting (as explained above, for the lack of better force).

Example 25:

HC: You know, just join the debate by saying more crazy things. (137)

The irony was already addressed in Example 16, now it is even more apparent. The irony changes the propositional content to its negation which means that what was truly meant was for Trump to stop saying those *crazy things*. That is not the indirect act, however. The indirect act is an expressive – Clinton expresses astonishment and absurdity in what she heard and wanted to share these emotions with the audience, although indirectly.

Example 26:

DT: I mean, can you imagine, we're defending Saudi Arabia? (185)

In its nature, this example is a directive – ask, as it is a question. What is also expressed in this utterance is the absurdity of the statement which may be best seen on the video record of the discussion (context, intonation). This means that the indirect act is an expressive.

3.4. Perlocutionary Acts

The perlocutionary acts, or rather effects, are not present in the corpus itself very often. In the 200 utterances, there are only 2 cases of the perlocutionary effect. These are Examples 27 and 28.

Example 27:

*DT: I think we've never had a situation so bad. (**applause**) (58)*

Example 28:

*DT: As soon as she releases them, I will release. [**applause**] (86)*

Both of these examples contain a note, added by the writer of the transcription, after the utterances. These notes identically say *applause*. This is one of the immediate perlocutionary effects when having a live audience which reacts to what is being said. By clapping, at least a part of the audience expressed their agreement with the statement of the speaker.

Other perlocutionary effects present at the presidential discussions were the reactions of the opponent. These reactions may be expressed by the body language or by another subsequent statement by the opponent. Even some of the reactions of the moderator would count as perlocutionary effects, though none of them are present in the transcripts.

As was suggested in 3.1., another perlocutionary effect is that Donald Trump is now the president of the USA. Only a complex analysis of the pre-election polls before and after the debates could give the notion of the importance of the presidential debates and then a chance to examine this particular perlocutionary effect even further, although it may be believed that these debates persuaded some people to vote for one of the candidates.

4. CONCLUSION

The main goal of this paper was to examine the occurrence of speech acts, out of which most importantly the illocutionary acts, in the public speeches and debates of the presidential candidates Clinton and Trump. In addition, the perlocutionary effects and politeness theory were discussed in connection to the corpus.

Speech acts were generally introduced in the first part of the theoretical part. After the brief explanation of the locutionary act, the main part of the theoretical part was presented – the illocutionary act. At first, the initial Speech Act Theory as devised by Austin was described and after that compared with Searle's approach. Both taxonomies were examined and compared, Searle's providing a basis for further research into illocutionary acts and their function indicating devices. Then, the three main dimensions of fit which are crucial for determining the correct illocutionary class were defined and their attributes for every illocutionary class stated. The differences between the direct and indirect speech act were covered in the theoretical part, too. The perlocutionary act and effect were explained in the next chapter. The politeness theory of Brown and Levinson was explained in connection with the speech acts and the overview of the main politeness strategies provided.

The last part of the theoretical part dealt with public speaking. It was described as a style and the key elements of it were presented. Then, some typical aspects of public speaking and political speeches were mentioned.

The analytical part started with the analysis of the illocutionary acts and forces in the direct speech acts which were the majority of the corpus, having 131 examples. It was detected that the most frequent class of illocutionary acts was representatives with 70 occurrences. The most common forces in this class were claims with 9 instances and informing with 8 cases. However, the most common illocutionary force of the whole corpus was from the class of commissives, the second most numerous class with 23 appearances, and it was with 17 cases the force of promising. As promises are typical for political speeches, the results might meet the original expectations. The class with the fewest occurrences was declarations with only 2 instances.

After that, the analysis of indirect speech acts was given. It was found out that the most numerous class of indirect illocutionary acts was commissives (36 occurrences). Expressives had 30 examples in the corpus, other classes had a minimal or zero share of the occurrences.

The high ratio of commissives was caused because of the possibility to interpret the force of the primary act as promising (or vowing) more than any other. However, the illocutionary forces of the indirect speech acts were only suggested for those utterances presented as examples because this identification is more ambiguous compared to the one of direct speech acts. For that reason, only the primary and secondary illocutionary acts are described in Appendix.

The use of off-record politeness strategy was suggested and analyzed on an example of indirect speech acts which was then contrasted with the bald-on-record strategy. In the end, there was not enough space for a proper analysis of the speech acts from the viewpoint of politeness, thus no general conclusion was reached in this respect.

It needs to be mentioned that the results and conclusions of this paper are mostly suggestions since the interpretation of speech acts might be in many cases perceived differently by different people.

5. RESUMÉ

Tato bakalářská práce se zabývá řečovými akty, konkrétně jejich výskytem v politických projevech a debatách dvou kandidátů na úřad prezidenta Spojených států Hillary Clinton a Donalda Trumpa. Cílem práce je zjistit, které ilokuční akty se v uvedeném korpusu vyskytují nejčastěji, zda-li to jsou akty přímé či nepřímé, a v neposlední řadě, které ilokuční síly se v případě přímých aktů objevují nejvíce. Součástí těchto cílů bylo také prozkoumat perlokuční akt, a to zejména jeho efekty, pokud se v korpusu objevily. Na řečové akty se také v analýze nahlédlo s ohledem na zdvořilostní strategie.

Tato práce je rozdělena na teoretickou a praktickou část. První kapitola teoretické části se zaměřuje na řečové akty. Tato kapitola je rozdělena do šesti oddílů. První dva z nich stručně představují vznik a historii řečových aktů a jejich teorií a seznamuje čtenáře s rozdílností dvou uvedených taxonomií.

Třetí oddíl první kapitoly se zabývá detailněji prvním z řečových aktů – aktem ilokučním. Je zde opět použit kontrast přístupů Austina a Searla. Tato část je vzhledem k jasnosti a nízké důležitosti tohoto aktu pro průběh analýzy popsána stručně. Daleko obsáhleji je popsán následující oddíl.

V tom je popsán ilokuční akt. Tento oddíl je rozdělen do tří pododdílů, přičemž pododdíl 1.4.2., který se věnuje Searlovu náhledu na tento akt, je ještě dále dělen do dalších dvou částí. První pododdíl, tedy 1.4.1., uvádí Austinův přístup k ilokučnímu aktu a popisuje jeho klasifikaci. Jeho pohled je doplněn o názory dalších jazykovědců, například Bach, Harnish a Vanderveken. Z tohoto pododdílu se plynule přechází na následující, který obsahuje Searlovu taxonomii, která vychází právě z Austinových poznatků. Searlovi je věnováno nejvíce prostoru, jelikož se jeho myšlenky a klasifikace uplatňují v praktické části práce. I proto je tento pododdíl dále dělen, v těchto částech práce se popisují způsoby rozpoznávání ilokučních aktů a sil, uvádějí se typické aspekty jednotlivých aktů za použití tří klíčových tzv. „dimensions of variations.“

Následující pododdíl se zaměřuje na nepřímé řečové akty. Uvádí se zde jejich vysvětlení a zdůrazňuje se důležitost kontextu pro různé možnosti pochopení dané výpovědi, tedy přidělení různých ilokučních sil. Další oddíl se věnuje poslednímu aktu – perlokučnímu. Tento akt je stručně popsán spolu s perlokučním efektem.

Poslední oddíl této kapitoly představuje další z možných náhledů na řečové akty, tentokrát z pohledu zdvořilostních strategií. Pro tuto práci byla vybrána teorie Brown a Levinson, jejíž strategie jsou popsány a jsou zohledněny v analytické části.

Druhá kapitola se věnuje proslovu jakožto žánru mluveného projevu. Jsou uvedené charakteristické rysy tohoto žánru a dále je tato kapitola zaměřena konkrétně na politické projevy. Kromě typických vlastností tohoto projevu jsou také představeny hlavní cíle politických řečníků. Tato kapitola posléze uzavírá teoretickou část této práce.

V praktické části se uplatňují získané znalosti uvedené v teoretické části. Celkově je analyzováno 200 výpovědí, které byly nejprve rozděleny na dvě části – přímé a nepřímé akty. Přímé akty se vyznačují tím, že mají pouze jednu doslovnou ilokuční sílu. Nepřímý akt má k této přímé doslovné síle také sílu nepřímou, která je pouze naznačena. U přímých aktů je dále analyzována ilokuční třída dle Searlovy klasifikace a následně ilokuční síla. U nepřímých aktů jsou u všech případů zkoumány přímé a nepřímé ilokuční třídy, ilokuční síly jsou navrhnuty pouze u případů, které se objevily přímo v analýze a byly okomentovány.

Při rozdělování všech výpovědí se zjistilo, že 65,5% ze zmíněných dvou set patří mezi přímé akty. Toto zjištění bylo překvapivé, jelikož se očekávala převaha aktů nepřímých. V analýze je však brán ohled na to, že i v případech, kdy by se (teoreticky) dala další ilokuční třída a síla skutečně přiřadit, byl rozhodující kontext. Pokud se například v následující větě objevila síla předtím nepřímá nyní jako přímá, bylo usouzeno, že nepřímá síla pravděpodobně zamýšlena nebyla.

U přímých aktů se projevila většinová převaha reprezentativ, a to jak v celkovém součtu, tak u jednotlivých kandidátů. Většinový podíl právě této skupiny byl spojován s podstatou politických projevů a brán byl také ohled na účel předvolebních debat, kdy se kandidáti snaží seznámit maximální množství potencionálních voličů s jejich názory. Jak bylo také znázorněno na grafech č. 1 a č. 2, oba kandidáti vyšli z této části analýzy překvapivě podobně. Největší rozdíly měly hodnotu pouhých 5% (= 3 případy) ze všech výskytů přímých aktů, a to v případě komisiv (více Trump) a expresiv (více Clinton). Representativům bylo věnováno v analýze nejvíce prostoru, vzhledem k jejich početnému zastoupení.

Na začátku analýzy reprezentativ (stejně tak jako u všech dalších ilokučních tříd) došlo velmi stručnému shrnutí teorie, která se zabývá tzv. „dimensions of variations“ – došlo k shrnutí tří hlavních atributů, dle kterých se daná třída rozlišuje. Dle tohoto shrnutí byly následně tyto

atributy ukázány prakticky a vysvětleny. Na základě analýzy ilokučních sil, která u všech případů kvůli zachování jednotnosti analýzy vycházela z poznatků Searlea a Vandervekena (1985), se zjistil nejčastější výskyt síly tvrzení, těsně následovanou silou informování. Vysoký výskyt těchto sil opět splnil očekávání, která byla s politickými projevy a debatami spojována. Znovu přišlo na řadu i porovnání užitých sil obou kandidátů (graf č. 4). Zatímco síly tvrzení a informování, které se v součtu u obou kandidátů lišily o jediný výskyt, potvrdily důležitost zastoupení těchto typů sil v projevech, našly se zde i markantní rozdíly. U Trumpa byla identifikována síla kritizování v pěti případech, kdežto Clinton měla jediný úkaz. Clinton měla naopak pětkrát sílu konstatování (či uvedení - state), Trump neměl jediného zástupce této síly. Na závěr analýzy reprezentativ bylo vyvozeno, že Clinton použila rovnovážné rozdělení mezi silami s osobním (kritizování, nařknutí, vyjádření názoru,...) a informativním zaměřením (uvést, informovat, podat zprávu). Trump měl převahu sil osobních, nicméně síly s informativním zaměřením se u něj také objevily.

Následovaly analýzy dvou tříd s velmi podobným výčtem výskytů, komisiva měly 23 úkazů, direktiva 21. U komisiv se objevila dominance jejich vzorové síly – slibování. Nejenže 17 případů této síly z ní udělalo nejpočetnější sílu této skupiny, ale i celé analýzy. Dá se předpokládat, že toto číslo by se ještě znásobilo, pokud by se v této analýze přiřazovala ilokuční síla i aktům nepřímým. Tak častý výskyt této síly opět odpovídá typickému stylu projevu politiků, obzvláště v období voleb, kdy se snaží přivést co nejvíce voličů na svou stranu.

U direktiv se vyvodit žádný závěr nepodařilo, jelikož se celkových 21 případů rozložilo mezi sedm sil. I kandidáti spíše potvrdili převládající tendenci podobnosti výsledků oproti jejich rozdílnosti. U všech sedmi sil se počet výskytů u jednotlivých kandidátů lišil vždy pouze o jeden případ. Nejpočetnější síly návrhu a ptání se měly shodně po pěti výskytech.

Při zkoumání expresiv se narazilo na problém s uvedeným seznamem sil (Searle a Vanderveken 1985, 211), kdy daných 11 sil nepokrývalo pocity a psychické stavy vyjádřené mluvčím. Při této komplikaci bylo zvažováno užití alternativního zdroje, který se věnuje ilokučním silám či přímo třídě expresiv. Posléze však bylo od tohoto nápadu upuštěno z důvodu zachování jednoty zdroje seznamů ilokučních sil. Bohužel, v analýze se to projevilo tím, že devět ze všech expresiv nebylo možné do žádné z uvedených sil zařadit. I z tohoto důvodu byly právě případy s nezařaditelnou silou uvedeny jako příklady analýzy této třídy a potenciaální nová síla byla naznačena a okomentována.

Poslední třídou přímých aktů byla deklarativa. U těch byly okomentovány všechny případy, jelikož byly pouze dva. V každém případě byla jiná síla, objevila se zde síla pojmenování a potvrzení.

Další část analýzy se věnovala nepřímým aktům. Zde převládaly třídy komisiv, které měly celkově 36 výskytů, a expresiv, ta se objevila mezi nepřímými akty v 30 případech. Nyní se potvrdily individuální tendence z předešlé části analýzy, a to tím, že Clinton měla opět víc expresiv než její protivník, naopak Trump zopakoval převahu v třídě komisiv. Důvod převahy komisiv může být stejný s důvodem převahy ilokuční síly slibu, ostatně právě tato síla je předpokládána u velké části nepřímých aktů této třídy, tedy ten, že se oba kandidáti snaží na poslední chvíli oslovit a zaujmout co možná nejvíce voličů. Častý výskyt expresiv jako nepřímých aktů byl zdůvodněn tím, že politické projevy mají spíše neutrální zabarvení emocí a ty jsou tak vyjádřeny nepřímo tímto způsobem.

V této části analýzy se zkoumaly především ilokuční třídy, jelikož identifikace ilokučních sil byla ztížena tím, že byly pouze do různé míry naznačeny a daly se vyložit různými způsoby. Z tohoto důvodu je přiložená část korpusu týkající se nepřímých aktů doplněna pouze o primární a sekundární ilokuční třídu. Ilokuční síla však byla okomentována a naznačena v rámci osmi případů nepřímých aktů, které byly zmíněny v analýze.

Poslední část analýzy se věnovala perlokučním aktům, především perlokučnímu efektu. Bohužel, náhodný výběr 200 výpovědí možná stojí i za tím, že se objevily pouze dvě, které obsahují poznámku o reakci publika. Touto reakcí byl v obou případech aplaus, který se dá pochopit jako vyjádření souhlasu s proneseným výrokem a podpory mluvčího. Byly zmíněny další možné perlokuční efekty, které se dají vypořádat například při sledování záznamů debat. Mezi ně patří kromě reakcí publika také reakce oponenta a moderátora. Jak bylo naznačeno v úvodu analýzy, je také možné považovat zvolení Trumpa prezidentem USA jako další perlokuční efekt.

V analýze se také věnovala pozornost zdvořilostním strategiím v rámci řečových aktů. Této tématice nebyl vyhrazen celý oddíl praktické části, místo toho byly příklady zdvořilostních strategií komentovány přímo u konkrétních případů. Z těchto několika jednotek případů se závěry vyvodit nedaly, určitě si ale tato tematika zaslouží více prostoru.

V poslední řadě je potřeba zmínit, že výsledky analýzy je nutné brát spíše jako návrhy, jelikož pochopení (interpretace) řečových aktů se mohou lišit dle daného posluchače a jeho znalostí, v závislosti na kontextu a dalších aspektech.

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7. APPENDIX

7.1. Direct Speech Acts

7.1.1. Representatives

1.	Clinton:	<i>I've laid out a platform that I think would begin to remedy some of the problems we have in the criminal justice system.</i>	claim
2.	Clinton:	<i>I don't buy that.</i>	deny
3.	Clinton:	<i>Now, we have come back from that abyss.</i>	claim
4.	Clinton:	<i>I think science is real.</i>	assure
5.	Clinton:	<i>And here's what we can do.</i>	state
6.	Clinton:	<i>We can deploy a half a billion more solar panels.</i>	inform
7.	Clinton:	<i>We can have enough clean energy to power every home.</i>	inform
8.	Clinton:	<i>Well, actually, I have thought about this quite a bit.</i>	report
9.	Clinton:	<i>I kind of assumed that there would be a lot of these charges and claims, and so...</i>	retrodict
10.	Clinton:	<i>No, no, you're telling the enemy everything you want to do.</i>	accuse
11.	Clinton:	<i>If you're too dangerous to fly, you are too dangerous to buy a gun.</i>	state
12.	Clinton:	<i>New York—New York has done an excellent job</i>	state
13.	Clinton:	<i>I give credit across the board going back two mayors, two police chiefs, because it has worked.</i>	inform
14.	Clinton:	<i>I prepared to be president.</i>	report
15.	Clinton:	<i>And I could tell how much it bothered him and annoyed him that this was being touted and used against him.</i>	remind
16.	Clinton:	<i>But increasingly, we are seeing cyber attacks coming from states, organs of states.</i>	lament
17.	Clinton:	<i>I know Donald's very praiseworthy of Vladimir Putin, but Putin is playing tough, long game here.</i>	accuse
18.	Clinton:	<i>Donald supported the invasion of Iraq.</i>	accuse
19.	Clinton:	<i>Well, first of all, I support the second amendment.</i>	assure
20.	Clinton:	<i>So I see no conflict between saving people's lives and defending the second amendment.</i>	opine
21.	Clinton:	<i>I do not think the United States government should be stepping in and making those most personal of decisions.</i>	opine
22.	Clinton:	<i>Now, what I am also arguing is that bringing undocumented immigrants out from the shadows, putting them into the formal economy would be good.</i>	insist
23.	Clinton:	<i>If you went on to read the rest of the sentence, I was talking about energy.</i>	criticize
24.	Clinton:	<i>The plan he has will cost us jobs and possibly lead to another great recession.</i>	predict
25.	Clinton:	<i>That is not the way our democracy works.</i>	opine
26.	Clinton:	<i>It just shows you're not up to doing the job.</i>	accuse
27.	Clinton:	<i>He's unfit.</i>	claim
28.	Clinton:	<i>I think he's right.</i>	opine
29.	Clinton:	<i>This would not be done just on the first day.</i>	predict
30.	Clinton:	<i>I do not add a penny to the national debt.</i>	claim
31.	Clinton:	<i>There's a lot of work to do.</i>	state
32.	Clinton:	<i>I get it that some people just don't know what to make of me.</i>	admit
33.	Clinton:	<i>Our economy is so much stronger than when they took office.</i>	inform
34.	Clinton:	<i>Some of you are frustrated — even furious.</i>	report
35.	Clinton:	<i>I refuse to believe we can't find common ground here.</i>	deny
36.	Clinton:	<i>Yes, the world is watching what we do.</i>	state

37. Trump:	<i>Now, look, I'm a great believer in all forms of energy, but we're putting a lot of people out of work.</i>	inform
38. Trump:	<i>I built an unbelievable company.</i>	boast
39. Trump:	<i>But I take advantage of the laws of the nation because I'm running a company.</i>	admit
40. Trump:	<i>I just got today the, as you know, the endorsement of the Fraternal Order of Police, we just—just came in.</i>	report
41. Trump:	<i>Now, as far as the lawsuit, yes, when I was very young, I went into my father's company, had a real estate company in Brooklyn and Queens, and we, along with many, many other companies throughout the country—it was a federal lawsuit—were sued.</i>	admit
42. Trump:	<i>They're building some of the biggest plants anywhere in the world, ...</i>	inform
43. Trump:	<i>It's going to be a beautiful thing to watch.</i>	predict
44. Trump:	<i>I do not say that.</i>	deny
45. Trump:	<i>You are going to approve one of the biggest tax cuts in history.</i>	criticize
46. Trump:	<i>Now, look, we have the worst revival of an economy since the Great Depression.</i>	criticize
47. Trump:	<i>That makes me smart.</i>	boast
48. Trump:	<i>You don't have good community relations in Chicago.</i>	criticize
49. Trump:	<i>Secretary Clinton also fought it</i>	report
50. Trump:	<i>I notice you bring that up a lot.</i>	accuse
51. Trump:	<i>But Hillary was extremely upset.</i>	report
52. Trump:	<i>They're coming in illegally.</i>	inform
53. Trump:	<i>She's been proven to be a liar on so many different ways.</i>	accuse
54. Trump:	<i>And they actually fact checked and they said I was right.</i>	report
55. Trump:	<i>I did not say that.</i>	deny
56. Trump:	<i>I think it would be a great gesture because she takes a tremendous amount of money.</i>	opine
57. Trump:	<i>And frankly, you should have changed the laws.</i>	criticize
58. Trump:	<i>I think we've never had a situation so bad (applause)</i>	blame
59. Trump:	<i>I agree with both.</i>	inform
60. Trump:	<i>Nobody can believe how stupid our leadership is.</i>	criticize
61. Trump:	<i>We cannot take four more years of Barack Obama, and that's what you get when you get her.</i>	claim
62. Trump:	<i>We've heard this before, Hillary.</i>	accuse
63. Trump:	<i>What happened to the FBI, I don't know.</i>	claim
64. Trump:	<i>But unfortunately for them, I think the voters are seeing through it.</i>	affirm
65. Trump:	<i>I am your voice.</i>	claim
66. Trump:	<i>Nobody knows the system better than me.</i>	boast
67. Trump:	<i>In this race for the White House, I am the Law And Order candidate.</i>	claim
68. Trump:	<i>I have a different vision for our workers.</i>	assure
69. Trump:	<i>I choose to recite a different pledge.</i>	affirm
70. Trump:	<i>I have had a truly great life in business.</i>	claim

7.1.2. Commissives

71. Clinton:	<i>First, we have to build an economy that works for everyone, not just those at the top.</i>	promise
72. Clinton:	<i>I want us to invest in you</i>	promise
73. Clinton:	<i>We also have to look at how we help families balance the responsibilities at home and the responsibilities at business.</i>	promise
74. Clinton:	<i>We have to make sure they respect the communities and the communities</i>	promise

	<i>respect them.</i>	
75. Clinton:	<i>I will defend planned parenthood.</i>	promise
76. Clinton:	<i>I also will not add a penny to the debt.</i>	promise
77. Clinton:	<i>And I will defeat ISIS.</i>	vow
78. Clinton:	<i>We will rise to the challenge, just as we always have.</i>	promise
79. Clinton:	<i>And we will transform the way we prepare our young people for those jobs.</i>	vow
80. Clinton:	<i>We will not build a wall.</i>	promise
81. Trump:	<i>Well, I have to respond.</i>	promise
82. Trump:	<i>And we can't allow it to happen anymore.</i>	vow
83. Trump:	<i>We have to renegotiate our trade deals.</i>	promise
84. Trump:	<i>So I will tell you this.</i>	promise
85. Trump:	<i>I'm going to cut regulations.</i>	promise
86. Trump:	<i>As soon as she releases them, I will release. [applause]</i>	promise
87. Trump:	<i>And I'll tell you why I'm satisfied with it.</i>	promise
88. Trump:	<i>We have to have strong borders.</i>	promise
89. Trump:	<i>We're going to get them out.</i>	promise
90. Trump:	<i>We will be a country of generosity and warmth.</i>	promise
91. Trump:	<i>I will present the facts plainly and honestly.</i>	promise
92. Trump:	<i>We will honor the American people with the truth, and nothing else.</i>	promise
93. Trump:	<i>I pledge to never sign any trade agreement that hurts our workers, or that diminishes our freedom and independence.</i>	pledge

7.1.3. Directives

94. Clinton:	<i>So you've got to ask yourself, why won't he release his tax returns?</i>	urge
95. Clinton:	<i>Let's be sure we have affordable child care and debt-free college.</i>	suggest
96. Clinton:	<i>You have to judge us, who can shoulder the immense, awesome responsibilities of the presidency, who can put into action the plans that will make your life better.</i>	tell
97. Clinton:	<i>Well, let's stop for a second and remember where we were eight years ago.</i>	suggest
98. Clinton:	<i>But let's not assume that trade is the only challenge we have in the economy.</i>	request
99. Clinton:	<i>That's a—that's—go to the—please, fact checkers, get to work.</i>	tell
100. Clinton:	<i>What kind of opportunities will we provide for our citizens?</i>	urge
101. Clinton:	<i>I just want everybody to go google it.</i>	warn
102. Clinton:	<i>Ask yourself: Does Donald Trump have the temperament to be Commander-in-Chief?</i>	ask
103. Clinton:	<i>So let's be stronger together.</i>	request
104. Trump:	<i>All you have to do is take a look at Carrier air conditioning in Indianapolis.</i>	urge
105. Trump:	<i>Secretary, is it President Obama's fault?</i>	ask
106. Trump:	<i>And take a look at mine, also, and you'll see.</i>	suggest
107. Trump:	<i>Let her release the e-mails.</i>	ask
108. Trump:	<i>It would be squandered, too, believe me.</i>	tell
109. Trump:	<i>No, wait a minute.</i>	suggest
110. Trump:	<i>Believe me.</i>	tell
111. Trump:	<i>Take a look at the start-up that they signed.</i>	ask
112. Trump:	<i>Have you seen what's happened to Aleppo?</i>	urge
113. Trump:	<i>Let's review the record.</i>	suggest
114. Trump:	<i>What about our economy?</i>	ask

7.1.4. Expressives

115. Clinton:	<i>I can only say that I'm certainly relieved that my late father never did</i>	praise
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	<i>business with you.</i>	
116.Clinton:	<i>I'm glad that we're ending private prisons in the federal system.</i>	praise
117.Clinton:	<i>I hope that I will be able to earn your vote on November 8th.</i>	unassigned force
118.Clinton:	<i>And I look forward to having that opportunity.</i>	unassigned force
119.Clinton:	<i>I would hope that the Senate would do its job and confirm the nominee that President Obama has sent to them.</i>	unassigned force
120.Clinton:	<i>And ... I want to thank Bernie Sanders.</i>	thank
121.Clinton:	<i>I believe that with all my heart.</i>	unassigned force
122.Clinton:	<i>You might have noticed, I love talking about mine.</i>	unassigned force
123.Clinton:	<i>Thank you and...</i>	thank
124.Trump:	<i>We wish you a lot of luck.</i>	unassigned force
125.Trump:	<i>I'm very proud of it.</i>	unassigned force
126.Trump:	<i>Wrong.</i>	protest
127.Trump:	<i>So I'm very honored by all of that.</i>	unassigned force
128.Trump:	<i>Yeah, I doubt it, I doubt it.</i>	unassigned force
129.Trump:	<i>At this moment, I would like to thank the evangelical and religious community in general who have been so good to me and so supportive.</i>	thank

7.1.5. Declarations

130.Clinton:	<i>I call it trumped-up trickle-down, because that's exactly what it would be.</i>	call
131.Trump:	<i>I humbly and gratefully accept your nomination for the presidency of the United States.</i>	confirm

7.2. Indirect Speech Acts

		Direct Illocutionary Act Expressives	Indirect Illocutionary Act Directives
132.Clinton:	<i>So I sure hope you will get out and vote as though your future depended on it, because I think it does.</i>		
133.Clinton:	<i>You know, I made a mistake using a private e-mail.</i>	representatives	expressives
134.Clinton:	<i>But I'm not going to make any excuses.</i>	commissives	expressives
135.Clinton:	<i>And, indeed, I have met a lot of the people who were stiffed by you and your businesses, Donald.</i>	representatives	expressives
136.Clinton:	<i>Look, one murder is too many</i>	representatives	expressives
137.Clinton:	<i>You know, just join the debate by saying more crazy things.</i>	directives	expressives
138.Clinton:	<i>That is your opinion.</i>	representatives	expressives
139.Clinton:	<i>I've heard from so many of you about the difficult choices you face and the stresses that you're under.</i>	representatives	expressives
140.Clinton:	<i>That is not how we grow the economy.</i>	representatives	commissives
141.Clinton:	<i>And I think it's time that the wealthy and corporations paid their fair share to support this country.</i>	representatives	commissives

142.	Clinton:	<i>I have a feeling that by, the end of this evening, I'm going to be blamed for everything that's ever happened.</i>	representatives	expressives
143.	Clinton:	<i>Unfortunately, race still determines too much,...</i>	representatives	expressives
144.	Clinton:	<i>I want to see them ended in the state system</i>	expressives	commissives
145.	Clinton:	<i>Well, just listen to what you heard. [laughter]</i>	directives	expressives
146.	Clinton:	<i>We don't want to engage in a different kind of warfare.</i>	expressives	commissives
147.	Clinton:	<i>And the Russians need to understand that.</i>	representatives	commissives
148.	Clinton:	<i>That is just unacceptable.</i>	representatives	expressives
149.	Clinton:	<i>We've covered this ground.</i>	representatives	directives
150.	Clinton:	<i>Well, I strongly support Roe v. Wade which guarantees a constitutional right to a woman....</i>	representatives	expressives
151.	Clinton:	<i>I find it ironic that he is raising nuclear weapons.</i>	representatives	expressives
152.	Clinton:	<i>Let me translate that if I can, Chris.</i>	directives	expressives
153.	Clinton:	<i>I want us to have the biggest jobs program since World War II.</i>	expressives	commissives
154.	Clinton:	<i>Of course, there's no way we can know whether any of that is true because he hasn't released his tax returns.</i>	representatives	commissives
155.	Clinton:	<i>That's part of my commitment to raise taxes on the wealthy.</i>	representatives	commissives
156.	Clinton:	<i>We all know the story.</i>	representatives	commissives
157.	Clinton:	<i>So don't let anyone tell you that our country is weak.</i>	directives	representatives
158.	Clinton:	<i>And you know how the community responded?</i>	directives	commissives
159.	Clinton:	<i>We have to look out for each other and lift each other up.</i>	commissives	expressives
160.	Clinton:	<i>I remember meeting a young girl in a wheelchair on the small back porch of her house.</i>	representatives	expressives
161.	Clinton:	<i>In this campaign, I've met so many people who motivate me to keep fighting for change.</i>	representatives	expressives
162.	Clinton:	<i>I'm proud to stand by our allies in NATO against any threat they face, including from Russia.</i>	expressives	commissives
163.	Clinton:	<i>None of us can do it alone</i>	representatives	commissives
164.	Clinton:	<i>He's forgetting every last one of us.</i>	representatives	commissives
165.	Clinton:	<i>...may God bless the United States of America!</i>	directives	expressives
166.	Trump:	<i>I know a lot of wealthy people that have never been audited.</i>	representatives	expressives
167.	Trump:	<i>And in a way, I should be complaining.</i>	representatives	commissives
168.	Trump:	<i>I do want to bring up the fact that you were the one that brought up the words super-predator about young black youth.</i>	expressives	commissives
169.	Trump:	<i>But I think it was a terrible thing to say.</i>	representatives	expressives
170.	Trump:	<i>Our jobs are fleeing the country.</i>	representatives	commissives
171.	Trump:	<i>Our country's in deep trouble.</i>	representatives	commissives
172.	Trump:	<i>Let me give you the example of Mexico.</i>	directives	commissives
173.	Trump:	<i>I want you to be very happy.</i>	expressives	commissives
174.	Trump:	<i>It's very important to me.</i>	representatives	expressives
175.	Trump:	<i>That's called business, by the way.</i>	representatives	expressives
176.	Trump:	<i>And, Hillary, I'd just ask you this.</i>	representatives	commissives
177.	Trump:	<i>Excuse me.</i>	directives	expressives
178.	Trump:	<i>Typical politician.</i>	representatives	expressives

179.Trump:	<i>All talk, no action.</i>	representatives	expressives
180.Trump:	<i>I don't mind releasing.</i>	representatives	expressives
181.Trump:	<i>And we need law and order.</i>	representatives	commissives
182.Trump:	<i>But I think we have to look very strongly at no-fly lists and watch lists.</i>	representatives	commissives
183.Trump:	<i>I'd like to respond to that.</i>	expressives	commissives
184.Trump:	<i>We cannot be the policemen of the world.</i>	representatives	commissives
185.Trump:	<i>I mean, can you imagine, we're defending Saudi Arabia?</i>	directives	expressives
186.Trump:	<i>It is going to totally help you.</i>	representatives	commissives
187.Trump:	<i>But I feel that it is absolutely important that we uphold because of the fact that it is under such trauma.</i>	expressives	commissives
188.Trump:	<i>Give me a break.</i>	directives	expressives
189.Trump:	<i>Excuse me, Chris.</i>	directives	expressives
190.Trump:	<i>In our nation's capital, killings have risen by 50 percent.</i>	representatives	commissives
191.Trump:	<i>Another 14 million people have left the workforce entirely.</i>	representatives	commissives
192.Trump:	<i>The budget is no better.</i>	representatives	commissives
193.Trump:	<i>This is the legacy of Hillary Clinton: death, destruction, terrorism and weakness.</i>	representatives	expressives
194.Trump:	<i>This will all change when I take office.</i>	representatives	commissives
195.Trump:	<i>I have joined the political arena so that the powerful can no longer beat up on people who cannot defend themselves.</i>	representatives	commissives
196.Trump:	<i>My opponent will never meet with them, or share in their pain.</i>	representatives	commissives
197.Trump:	<i>But they are alone no longer.</i>	representatives	commissives
198.Trump:	<i>Our country is going to start building and making things again.</i>	representatives	commissives
199.Trump:	<i>This new wealth will improve the quality of life for all Americans.</i>	representatives	commissives
200.Trump:	<i>It's time to deliver a victory for the American people.</i>	representatives	commissives