

# ADP 3-0

## OPERATIONS



**OCTOBER 2017**

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This publication supersedes ADP 3-0, dated 11 November 2016.

**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

# Foreword

The Army's contribution to Joint Operations is Unified Land Operations executed through Decisive Action and guided by Mission Command. ADP 3-0, *Operations*, is the Army's capstone doctrine that captures the most critical lessons from a decade of continuous small scale land combat. In this edition, we retain lessons of the past but also look to a future where large-scale ground combat against peer threats is a distinct possibility. This publication builds on the idea that success requires fully integrating Army operations with the efforts of Unified Action partners, across all domains, to achieve enduring outcomes.

ADP 3-0 provides a common operational doctrine for Army forces operating across the full range of military operations in multiple domains. Army forces comprising over 180,000 Soldiers are currently conducting operations in more than 140 countries to shape operational environments, prevent aggression, defeat enemies in combat, and consolidate battlefield gains. Army forces not engaged in ongoing operations are focused on their readiness for future operations which requires effective training and professional education built on doctrine. ADP 3-0 informs the preparation for, and execution of, operations. All leaders need to understand and be familiar with it.

The central idea of Unified Land Operations is that, as part of a joint force, Army forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage in order to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win our Nation's wars. ADP 3-0 discusses the principles of Unified Land Operations—Mission Command, Develop the Situation Through Action, Combined Arms, Adherence to the Law of War, Establish and Maintain Security, and Create Multiple Dilemmas for the Enemy. ADP 3-0 incorporates the tenets of Unified Land Operations—Simultaneity, Depth, Synchronization, and Flexibility. It emphasizes operational art as the connection between strategic objectives and tactical actions, and it supports a common construct for organizing both Joint and Army operations. The construct consists of the Army operations process, an operational framework for visualizing and describing operations, and combat power.

ADP 3-0 serves as the common operational doctrine for the Army. Its central idea, adapted to the unique conditions of each operational environment, represents the Army's unique contribution to Unified Action. It will permeate our doctrine, our training, and our leader professional development programs.



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GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY  
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# OPERATIONS

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## PREFACE

ADP 3-0 is one of the Army's two capstone doctrine publications. ADP 3-0 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. It constitutes the Army's view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications.


The principal audience for ADP 3-0 are all the members of the Profession of Arms. ADP 3-0 provides operational guidance for commanders, staffs, civilian leaders of the Army, trainers and educators at all echelons and forms the basis for Army education system curricula. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. (See figure 1 on page iv for a chart of the logic of ADP 3-0.)

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ADP 3-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. ADP 3-0 is not the proponent publication (the authority) for any Army term. ADP 3-0 is now the proponent publication for terms for which the previous ADP 3-0 was the authority. For definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ADP 3-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ADP 3-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to [usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil); or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.



**Figure 1. ADP 3-0 unified logic chart**



## ARMY OPERATIONS

1. An *operation* is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1). Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to the joint fight through the conduct of unified land operations. *Unified land operations* are simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win our Nation's wars as part of unified action (ADRP 3-0). ADP 3-0 is the Army's basic warfighting doctrine and is the Army's contribution to unified action.

## MILITARY OPERATIONS

2. Army forces are employed in accordance with the character of the threat and friendly force capabilities. They conduct operations to preserve vital national interests, most important of which are the sovereignty of the homeland and the preservation of the U.S. constitutional form of government. Army forces are prepared to operate across the range of military operations, and integrate with unified action partners as part of a larger effort.

## AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3. An *operational environment* is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders at all levels have their own operational environments for their particular operations. An operational environment for any specific operation is not just isolated conditions of interacting variables that exist within a specific area of operations. Operational environments involve interconnected influences from the global or regional perspectives (for example, politics and economics) that impact on that area of operation. Thus, each commander's operational environment is part of a higher commander's operational environment.

## OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES

4. Army planners describe conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment, but also the population's influence on it. Using Army design methodology, planners analyze an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT). As soon as a commander and staff have an indication of where their unit will conduct operations, they begin analyzing the operational variables associated with that location. They continue to refine and update that analysis throughout the course of operations.

## THREATS AND HAZARDS

5. For every operation, threats are a fundamental part of the operational environment. A *threat* is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADRP 3-0). Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. Commanders and staffs must understand how current and potential threats organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. They must continually identify, monitor, and assess threats as they adapt and change over time.

6. A peer threat describes an adversary or enemy with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains world-wide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power in geographical proximity to a conflict area with U.S. forces. A peer threat may also have a cultural affinity to specific regions providing them relative advantages in terms of time, space, and sanctuary. Peer threats generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges in order of magnitude more challenging militarily than those the U.S. Army has faced since the Cold War.

7. A *hazard* is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation (JP 3-33). Hazards include disease, extreme weather phenomena, solar flares, and areas contaminated by toxic materials. Hazards can damage or destroy life, vital resources, and institutions, or prevent mission accomplishment. Understanding hazards and their effects on operations allows the commander to understand better the terrain, weather, and various other factors that best support the mission. Understanding hazards also helps the commander visualize potential impacts on operations. Successful interpretation of the environment aids in correctly opposing threat courses of action within a given geographical region.

## WAR AS A HUMAN ENDEAVOR

8. War is chaotic, lethal, and a fundamentally human endeavor. It is a clash of wills fought among and between people. All war is inherently about changing human behavior, with each side trying to alter the behavior of the other by force of arms. Success requires the ability to outthink an opponent and ruthlessly exploit the opportunities that come from positions of relative advantage. The side that best understands an operational environment, that learns and adapts more rapidly, and that acts more quickly, is most likely to win.

9. Because war is a fundamentally human endeavor, it is inextricably tied to the populations inhabiting the land domain. All military capabilities are ultimately linked to land and, in most cases, the ability to prevail in ground combat becomes a decisive factor in breaking an enemy's will. Understanding the human context that enables the enemy's will, which includes culture, economics, and history, is as important as understanding the enemy's military capabilities. Commanders cannot presume that superior military capability alone generates the desired effects on the enemy.



Commanders must continually assess whether their operations are influencing enemies and populations, eroding the enemy's will, and achieving the commanders' intended purpose.

## UNIFIED ACTION

10. *Unified action* is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). *Unity of effort* is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). *Unified action partners* are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after operations. The Army's contribution to unified action is unified land operations.

## Land Operations

11. An *operation* is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1). The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat operations and perform such other duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be prescribed by the President or the Secretary of Defense (as described in Title 10, United States Code). The Army does this through its operational concept of unified land operations (see ADRP 3-0). Army doctrine aligns with joint doctrine and is informed by the nature of land operations. The command and control of operations on land fundamentally differs from other types of military operations.

12. Army forces, with unified action partners, conduct land operations to shape security environments, prevent conflict, prevail in ground combat, and consolidate gains. Army forces provide multiple options for responding to and resolving crises. Army forces defeat enemy forces, control terrain, secure populations, and preserve joint force freedom of action.

## Scope

13. Land operations occur across the entire expanse of the land domain and across the range of military operations. Land combat can occur between forces comprising hundreds of thousands of combatants representing multiple nations or small units in a single neighborhood. Large-scale ground combat is the most demanding and lethal end of the conflict continuum and the benchmark against which the Army is equipped and trained. However, the Army is routinely employed all over the world for operations more limited in scope and lethality.

## Duration

14. Land operations are repetitive and continuous. Army forces remain in contact with enemy forces almost continuously until they resolve the conflict. The effort required to commit Army forces implies the willingness to persevere as long as necessary to achieve the operational goal. To achieve the goal requires units with endurance and the capabilities to sustain them.

## Terrain

15. The complex variety of natural and manmade features of the land environment contrasts significantly with the relative uniformity of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace environments. Weather and climate variations contribute significantly to the considerations of ground combat.

## Permanence

16. Land operations generally involve seizing or securing terrain. With control of terrain comes control of populations and their associated activities. Those whose behavior U.S. forces wish to change are resident on land and must ultimately be controlled there. Civil control requires Army forces to conduct operations that make the temporary effects of other operations enduring.

## Civilian Presence

17. Land operations affect civilians by disrupting routine life patterns and potentially placing civilians in harm's way. Additionally, land combat often impacts civilian access to necessary items such as food, water, and medical supplies. There are few uninhabited places in which the Army is likely to fight, so Army forces must plan to conduct minimum-essential stability tasks (providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment) as an integral part of land combat.

## ARMY FORCES—EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY AND CAMPAIGN QUALITY

18. Swift campaigns, however desirable, are the historical exception. Whenever objectives involve controlling populations or dominating terrain, campaign success usually requires employing landpower for protracted periods. The Army's combination of expeditionary capability and campaign quality contributes sustained landpower in support of unified action.

19. Expeditionary capability describes the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces on short notice to any location in the world, capable of conducting operations immediately upon arrival. Expeditionary operations are dependent upon joint air and maritime support. *Operational reach* is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). Adequate operational reach is a necessity for forces to conduct decisive action (see ADRP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of decisive action). Extending operational reach is a significant concern for commanders. To achieve a desired end state, forces must possess the necessary operational reach to establish and maintain conditions that define success. Commanders

and staffs increase operational reach through deliberate, focused planning—well in advance of operations when possible—and the appropriate sustainment to facilitate endurance.

## CLOSE COMBAT

20. The nature of close combat in land operations is unique. Combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational environments comprising all types of terrain. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and destroy or capture them. The outcome of battles and engagements depends on the ability of Army forces to prevail in close combat. *Close combat* is that part of warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets (ADRP 3-0). Units involved in close combat employ direct fire weapons supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Units in close combat defeat or destroy enemy forces as well as seize and retain ground. Close combat at lower echelons contains many more interactions between friendly and enemy forces than any other form of combat.

## READINESS THROUGH TRAINING

21. Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations, and is the cornerstone of combat readiness. Training is the foundation for successful operations. Effective training must be commander driven, rigorous, realistic, and to the standard and conditions that units are expected to fight. Realistic training with limited time and resources demands that commanders focus their unit training efforts to maximize repetitions under varying conditions to build proficiency. Units execute effective individual and collective training based on the Army's principles of training as described in ADRP 7-0. Through training and leader development, units achieve the tactical and technical competence that builds confidence and allows them to conduct successful operations across the conflict continuum. Achieving this competence requires specific, dedicated training on offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks. Training continues in deployed units to sustain skills and to adapt to changes in an operational environment. (See ADRP 7-0 for training doctrine.)

22. Army training includes a system of techniques and standards that allows Soldiers and units to determine, acquire, and practice necessary skills. The Army's training system emphasizes experiential practice and learning to build teamwork and cohesion within units. It recognizes that Soldiers ultimately fight for one another and their units. Training instills discipline. It conditions Soldiers to operate within the law of war and rules of engagement. Training prepares unit leaders for the harsh reality of land combat by emphasizing the fluid and disorderly conditions inherent in land operations. Commanders emphasize the principles of mission command during training. Effective training accounts for cyberspace, space, and information-related capabilities that influence the warfighting functions. Well-rounded training combined with candid assessments, after action reviews, and applied lessons learned produce quality leaders and versatile units.

## OPERATIONAL ART

23. Army commanders use operational art and the principles of joint operations to envision how to establish conditions that accomplish their missions and achieve assigned objectives. *Operational art* is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). For Army forces, operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. Operational art applies to all types and aspects of operations. It integrates ends, ways, and means while accounting for risk.

24. The twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of operations across the levels of warfare. The principles are broadly applicable considerations whose relevance varies in each case; they are not a checklist. Commanders generally consider all twelve principles but may not apply them in the same way in every operation. The principles summarize the characteristics of successful operations throughout history. Their greatest value lies in educating military professionals. While considering the principles of joint operations, commanders determine if or when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation. (See JP 3-0 for a detailed discussion on the principles of joint operations.)

25. When applying operational art, commanders and staff ensure a shared understanding of purpose. This requires open, continuous collaboration between commanders at various echelons of command to define accurately the problems and conditions of an operational environment. Effective collaboration facilitates assessment, fosters critical analysis, and anticipates opportunities and risk.

26. Operational art encompasses all levels, from strategic direction to tactical actions. It requires creative vision, broad experience, and a knowledge of capabilities, tactics, and techniques across multiple domains. It is through operational art that commanders translate their operational approach into a concept of operations. A *concept of operations* is a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources (JP 5-0). Commanders then position and maneuver forces to conduct tasks that best achieve a desired end state.

## THE ARMY'S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

27. The *operational concept* is a fundamental statement that frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct operations (ADP 1-01). The Army's operational concept is unified land operations. Unified land operations is the Army's contribution to unified action. *Unified land operations* are simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities' tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win our Nation's wars as part of unified action (ADRP 3-0). The goal of unified land operations is to establish conditions that achieve the JFC's end state by applying landpower as part of a unified action to defeat the enemy. Unified land

operations is how the Army applies combat power through 1) simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability, or DSCA tasks, to 2) seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and 3) consolidate gains. Military forces seek to prevent or deter threats through unified action, and, when necessary, poses the capability to defeat aggression.

## **DECISIVE ACTION**

28. *Decisive action* is the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities' tasks (ADRP 3-0). Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense.

## **SEIZE, RETAIN, AND EXPLOIT THE INITIATIVE**

29. Army forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by forcing the enemy to respond to friendly action. By presenting the enemy multiple dilemmas across multiple domains, commanders force the enemy to react continuously until driven into an untenable position. Exploiting the initiative pressures enemy commanders to abandon their preferred options, react to friendly actions, and make mistakes. As the enemy makes mistakes or weakens, friendly forces seize opportunities that create new avenues for exploitation. This exploitation with combat power destroys and defeats enemy forces, consolidates gains, and protects populations, friendly forces, and infrastructure.

## **CONSOLIDATE GAINS**

30. *Consolidate gains* are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities. (ADRP 3-0). Army forces exploit operational success by consolidating gains for the JFC. Consolidate gains is an integral part of winning and achieving success across the conflict continuum and the range of military operations. It is the follow-through to achieve the commander's intent and essential to retaining the initiative over determined enemies and adversaries. To consolidate gains, Army forces reinforce and integrate the efforts of all unified action partners.

31. Consolidate gains is not a mission. It is an Army strategic role defined by the purpose of the tasks necessary to achieve enduring political outcomes to military operations and, as such, represents a capability that Army forces provide to the JFC. Army forces consolidate gains by executing area security and stability tasks when the operational emphasis in an area of operations shifts from large-scale combat operations. Consolidating gains enables a transition from the occupation of a territory and control of populations by Army forces—which occurred as a result of military operations—to the transfer of control to legitimate authorities. Activities to consolidate gains occur across the range of military operations and often continue through all phases of a specific operation.

## PRINCIPLES OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

32. A *principle* is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization or function approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations (ADP 1-01). By integrating the six principles of unified land operations—mission command, develop the situation through action, combined arms, adherence to the law of war, establish and maintain security, and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy—Army commanders increase the probability of operational and strategic success. Success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of unified action partners. Success also requires commanders to exercise disciplined initiative to rapidly exploit opportunities that favorably develop the situation through action and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy.

### Mission Command

33. *Mission command* is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). Mission command is the Army's leadership philosophy. It blends the art of command and the science of control while integrating the warfighting functions to conduct the tasks of decisive action.

### Develop the Situation Through Action

34. During operations, commanders develop the situation through action. Developing the situation requires information. Commanders fight for information while in contact with the enemy and gather information through close association with a population. Developing the situation through action to collect information is inherently part of displaying disciplined initiative. Commanders enhance situational awareness and understanding by assigning information collection tasks (reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations) to collect information requirements.

### Combined Arms

35. *Combined arms* is the synchronized and simultaneous application of all elements of combat power that together achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially (ADRP 3-0). Combined arms integrates leadership, information, and each of the warfighting functions as well as joint capabilities. Used destructively, combined arms integrates different capabilities so that counteracting one makes the enemy vulnerable to another. Used constructively, combined arms uses all assets available to multiply the effectiveness and efficiency of Army capabilities used in stability or DSCA tasks.

### Adherence to Law of War

36. *Law of war* is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities (JP 1-04). The main purposes of the law of war are to protect combatants, noncombatants, and civilians; provide certain fundamental protections for persons who



fall into the hands of the enemy; facilitate the restoration of peace; assist military commanders in ensuring the disciplined and efficient use of force; and preserve the profession and humanity of combatants.

### **Establish and Maintain Security**

37. Army forces conduct area security to ensure freedom of movement and action and to deny the enemy the ability to disrupt operations. Commanders combine reconnaissance, offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to protect friendly forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities critical to mission accomplishment. Army forces integrate with partner military, law enforcement, and civil capabilities to establish and maintain security. The Army's ability to establish control is critical to consolidating gains in the wake of successful military operations.

### **Create Multiple Dilemmas for the Enemy**

38. Simultaneous operations across multiple domains—conducted in depth and supported by military deception—present the enemy with multiple dilemmas. These operations degrade enemy freedom of action, reduce enemy flexibility and endurance, and upset enemy plans and coordination. Such operations place critical enemy functions at risk and deny the enemy the ability to synchronize or generate combat power. The application of capabilities in a complementary and reinforcing fashion creates more problems than the enemy commander can hope to solve, which erodes both enemy effectiveness and the will to fight.

## **TENETS OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS**

39. *Tenets of operations* are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations and are directly related to the Army's operational concept (ADP 1-01). Tenets of unified land operations describe the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power across the range of military operations during decisive action. An operation is a military action, consisting of two or more related tactical actions designed to achieve a strategic objective in whole or in part. A tactical action is a battle or engagement employing lethal and nonlethal actions designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entities. Operations can include an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a population, and the training of other militaries to assist security forces as part of building partner capacity. In the homeland, Army forces apply the tenets of operations when supporting civil authorities to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property. The four tenets of unified land operations are simultaneity, depth, synchronization, and flexibility.

### **Simultaneity**

40. *Simultaneity* is the execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across multiple locations and domains (ADRP 3-0). Army forces operating simultaneously across the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains presents dilemmas to adversaries and enemies, while reassuring allies and influencing neutrals.

The simultaneous application of joint and combined arms capabilities across the range of military operations overwhelms the enemy physically and psychologically. Simultaneity requires creating shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force. Commanders balance tempo and momentum to produce simultaneous results throughout their areas of operations.

## Depth

41. *Depth* is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results (ADRP 3-0). Army forces engage the enemy throughout their depth, preventing the effective employment of reserves, and disrupting command and control, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with friendly forces. Operations in depth can disrupt the enemy's decision cycle. They contribute to protection by destroying enemy capabilities before the enemy can use them. Empowering subordinates to act with initiative decentralizes decision making and increases operational tempo to achieve greater depth during operations.

42. Cyberspace operations, space-based capabilities, and military information support operations provide opportunities to engage adversaries and enemies across the depth of their formations. Each have planning considerations with regard to timing, authorities, and effects relative to physical actions in the land domain which should be factored into friendly courses of action.

## Synchronization

43. *Synchronization* is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). Synchronization is not the same as simultaneity; it is the ability to execute multiple related and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time. These actions produce greater effects than executing each in isolation. For example, synchronization of information collection, obstacles, direct fires, and indirect fires results in the destruction of an enemy formation during a defense. When conducting offensive tasks, synchronizing forces along multiple lines of operations temporarily disrupts the enemy organization and creates opportunities for exploitation.

## Flexibility

44. *Flexibility* is the employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations (ADRP 3-0). To achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success, commanders must be able to adapt to conditions as they change and employ forces in a variety of ways. Flexibility facilitates collaborative planning and decentralized execution. Leaders learn from experience (their own and that of others) and apply new knowledge to each situation. Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances in operations.

45. Flexibility and innovation are essential elements of an operation as are creative and adaptive leaders. Army forces continuously adapt to changes in an operational

environment. Such adaptation enhances flexibility across the range of military operations. Army forces require flexibility in thought, plans, and operations to succeed.

## SUCCESS THROUGH UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

46. Ultimately, the operational concept of unified land operations seeks to accomplish the mission. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative requires commanders to interpret developments and shift the weight of effort throughout their operations to achieve decisive results. As they interpret, the assigned forces and priorities for each task of decisive action change. Throughout an operation, commanders constantly adapt and perform many tasks simultaneously. Commanders change tactics, modify their exercise of mission command, change task organization, and adjust the weight placed on each task of decisive action. These actions keep the force focused on accomplishing the mission and enable it to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Commanders base each action on their understanding of the situation, available resources, and the force's ability to execute multiple, diverse tasks. After each action, commanders assess the results. Assessments include the progress of ongoing operations, changes in the situation, and effects the rules of engagement have on the force's effectiveness. Commanders not only assess how well a current operation is accomplishing the mission, but also how its conduct is shaping the situation for subsequent missions.

## OPERATIONS STRUCTURE

47. The operations structure consists of the operations process, warfighting functions, and the operational framework. This is the Army's common construct for unified land operations. It allows Army leaders to organize efforts rapidly, effectively, and in a manner commonly understood across the Army. The operations process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The warfighting functions provide a common organization for critical functions. The operational framework provides Army leaders with basic conceptual options for arraying forces and visualizing and describing operations.

## OPERATIONS PROCESS

48. The operations process is a commander-led activity informed by mission command. It consists of the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. These activities may be sequential or simultaneous. They are rarely discrete and often involve a great deal of overlap. Commanders use the operations process to drive the planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their unique operational environments; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. (See ADRP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of the operations process.)

49. *Army design methodology* is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). The Army design methodology is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual thinking about unfamiliar problems. To produce executable plans,

commanders integrate the Army design methodology with the detailed planning typically associated with the military decisionmaking process. Commanders who use the Army design methodology may gain a greater understanding of an operational environment and its problems, and then they can visualize an appropriate operational approach.

50. The military decisionmaking process is also an iterative planning methodology. It integrates activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners. This integration enables them to understand the situation and mission; develop, analyze, and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation order for execution. The military decisionmaking process applies both conceptual and detailed approaches to thinking, but it is most closely associated with detailed planning.

51. Troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. Heavily weighted in favor of familiar problems and short time frames, organizations with staffs typically do not employ troop leading procedures. More often, leaders use troop leading procedures to solve tactical problems when working alone or with a small group. For example, a company commander may use the executive officer, first sergeant, fire support officer, supply sergeant, and communications sergeant to assist during troop leading procedures.

## THE WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

52. To execute operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through warfighting functions using leadership and information.

## ARMY OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

53. Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. They do this through an operational framework and associated vocabulary. An *operational framework* is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). An operational framework establishes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the commander and provides a way to visualize how the commander will employ forces. To understand the framework is to understand the relationship between the area of operations and operations in depth. Proper relationships allow for simultaneous operations and the massing of effects against an enemy.

### Area of Operations

54. An *area of operations* is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect

their forces (JP 3-0). For land operations, an area of operations includes subordinate areas of operations assigned by Army commanders to their subordinate echelons. In operations, commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control combat operations. A *control measure* is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADRP 6-0). One of the most important control measures is the assigned area of operations. The Army commander or joint force land component commander is the supported commander within an area of operations designated by the JFC for land operations. Within their areas of operations, commanders integrate and synchronize combat power. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders designate targeting priorities, effects, and timing within their areas of operations.

### Deep, Close, Support and Consolidation Areas

55. A *deep area* is the portion of the commander's area of operations that is not assigned to subordinate units (ADRP 3-0). Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. The *close area* is the portion of a commander's area of operations assigned to subordinate maneuver forces (ADRP 3-0). Operations in the close area are operations that are within a subordinate commander's area of operations. The *support area* is the portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations (ADRP 3-0). Commanders assign a support area as a subordinate area of operations to support functions. Finally, the *consolidation area* is the portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains (ADRP 3-0). Commanders may establish a consolidation area, particularly in the offense as the friendly force gains territory, to exploit tactical success while enabling freedom of action for forces operating in the other areas.

### DECISIVE, SHAPING, AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

56. The *decisive operation* is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission (ADRP 3-0). It determines the outcome of a large scale combat operation, battle, or engagement. A *shaping operation* is an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain (ADRP 3-0). Shaping operations may occur throughout the area of operations and involve any combination of forces and capabilities. Finally, a *sustaining operation* is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power (ADRP 3-0). Sustaining operations differ from decisive and shaping operations in that they focus internally (on friendly forces) rather than externally (on the enemy or environment).

57. Throughout decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, commands and their staffs ensure that forces maintain positions of relative advantage, integrate operations with unified action partners, and maintain continuity.

58. A *position of relative advantage* is a location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage (ADRP 3-0). Positions of relative advantage provide an opportunity for a unit to compel, persuade, or deter an enemy decision or action.

59. Positions of relative advantage may extend across multiple domains to provide opportunities for units to compel, persuade, or deter enemy decisions or actions. Commanders maintain momentum through exploitation of opportunities to consolidate gains, and they continually assess and reassess friendly and enemy effects for further and future opportunities. A key aspect in achieving a position of advantage is *maneuver*, which is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy (JP 3-0).

60. Army leaders integrate Army operations within this larger effort. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force.

61. Commanders balance priorities carefully between current and future operations. They seek to accomplish the mission efficiently, while conserving as many resources as possible for future operations.

## MAIN AND SUPPORTING EFFORTS

62. Commanders designate main and supporting efforts to establish clear priorities of support and resources among subordinate units. The *main effort* is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADRP 3-0). It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. A *supporting effort* is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort (ADRP 3-0). Commanders' resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission.

## COMBAT POWER

63. *Combat power* is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADRP 3-0). To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. These elements facilitate Army forces accessing joint and multinational fires and assets. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information. Operations executed through simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities' tasks require the continuous generation and application of combat power.



## INFORMATION AND LEADERSHIP

64. Commanders apply leadership through mission command. Leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. The Army defines *leadership* as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22).

65. Information enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power. Ultimately, this creates opportunities to achieve definitive results. Knowledge management enables commanders to make informed, timely decisions despite the uncertainty of operations. Information management helps commanders make and disseminate effective decisions faster than the enemy can.

## THE SIX WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

66. A *warfighting function* is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADRP 3-0). Warfighting functions are the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by superior tactical and operational-level commanders. The purpose of warfighting functions is to provide an intellectual organization for common critical capabilities with other warfighting functions to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

67. The *mission command warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0). Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force through mission command.

68. The *movement and maneuver warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADRP 3-0). Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. *Maneuver* is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy (JP 3-0). Commanders use maneuver for massing effects to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination of fires and movement. Both tactical and operational maneuver require sustainment support.

69. The *intelligence warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of an operational environment (ADRP 3-0). Other significant aspects of an operational environment include threats, adversaries, and operational variables, which vary with the nature of operations. The intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection with the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. The Army executes

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through the operations and intelligence processes, with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and information collection.

70. The *fires warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through targeting processes (ADRP 3-0). Army fires systems deliver fires in support of offensive and defensive tasks to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target.

71. The *sustainment warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADRP 3-0). The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of sustainment, which determines the depth and duration of Army operations. Sustainment is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative and provides the support necessary to continue operations until mission accomplishment.

72. The *protection warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADRP 3-0). Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners, including the host nation. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force's integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations in order to counter or mitigate those threats before they can act. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. Effective physical security measures, like any defensive measures, overlap and deploy in depth. Protection activities include maintaining the critical asset list and defended asset list.

## ORGANIZING COMBAT POWER

73. Commanders employ three means to organize combat power: force tailoring, task-organizing, and mutual support.

74. *Force tailoring* is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADRP 3-0). It involves selecting the right force structure for a joint operation from available units within a combatant command or from the Army force pool. Commanders then sequence forces into the area of operations as part of force projection. JFCs request and receive forces for each campaign phase, adjusting the quantity of Service component forces to match the weight of effort. Army Service component commanders tailor forces to meet land force requirements as determined by JFCs. Army Service component commanders also recommend forces and a deployment sequence to meet those requirements. Force tailoring is continuous. As new forces rotate into the area of operations, forces with excess capabilities return to the supporting combatant and Army Service component commands.

75. *Task-organizing* is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADRP 3-0). Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not

limited to, training, experience, equipment, sustainability, operational environment, enemy threat, and mobility. Task-organizing includes allocating assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. This occurs within tailored force package as commanders organize subordinate units for specific missions and employ doctrinal command and support relationships. As task-organizing continues, commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions. The ability of Army forces to task-organize gives them extraordinary agility. It lets commanders configure their units to best use available resources. It also allows Army forces to match unit capabilities to tasks. The ability of sustainment forces to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have freedom of action to change with mission requirements.

76. Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing forces, assigning areas of operations, and positioning units. *Mutual support* is that support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31). Understanding mutual support and the time to accept risk during operations are fundamental to the art of tactics. In Army doctrine, mutual support is a planning consideration related to force disposition, not a command relationship. Mutual support has two aspects-supporting range and supporting distance. When friendly forces are static, supporting range equals supporting distance.

77. *Supporting range* is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems (ADRP 3-0). It depends on available weapons systems and is normally the maximum range of the supporting unit's indirect fire weapons. For small units (such as squads, sections, and platoons), it is the distance between two units that their direct fires can cover effectively. Visibility may limit the supporting range. If one unit cannot effectively or safely fire in support of another, the first may not be in supporting range even though its weapons have the required range.

78. *Supporting distance* is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation (ADRP 3-0). Factors that affect distance are terrain and mobility, distance, enemy capabilities, friendly capabilities, and reaction time. To exploit the advantage of supporting distance, units must synchronize their maneuver and fires more effectively than the enemy can.

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# Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|             |                                     |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>ADP</b>  | Army doctrine publication           |
| <b>ADRP</b> | Army doctrine reference publication |
| <b>DA</b>   | Department of the Army              |
| <b>FM</b>   | field manual                        |
| <b>JP</b>   | joint publication                   |
| <b>U.S.</b> | United States                       |

## SECTION II – TERMS

### **area of operations**

An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)

### **Army design methodology**

A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0)

### **close area**

The portion of a commander's area of operations assigned to subordinate maneuver forces. (ADRP 3-0)

### **close combat**

Warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets. (ADRP 3-0)

### **combat power**

(Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. (ADRP 3-0)

**combined arms**

The synchronized and simultaneous application of all elements of combat power that together achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially. (ADRP 3-0)

**consolidate gains**

Activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.. (ADRP 3-0)

**decisive action**

The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. (ADRP 3-0)

**decisive operation**

The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. (ADRP 3-0)

**deep area**

The portion of the commander's area of operations that is not assigned to subordinate units. (ADRP 3-0)

**depth**

The extension of operations in time, space, or purpose, to achieve definitive results. (ADRP 3-0)

**fires warfighting function**

The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through targeting processes. (ADRP 3-0)

**flexibility**

The employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations. (ADRP 3-0)

**force tailoring**

The process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander. (ADRP 3-0)

**hazard**

A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. (JP 3-33)

**intelligence warfighting function**

The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of an operational environment. (ADRP 3-0)

**law of war**

That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. (JP 1-04)



**leadership**

The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. (ADP 6-22)

**main effort**

A designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. (ADRP 3-0)

**maneuver**

The employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy. (JP 3-0)

**mission command**

(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

**mission command warfighting function**

The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. (ADRP 3-0)

**movement and maneuver warfighting function**

The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. (ADRP 3-0)

**mutual support**

That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 3-31)

**operation**

A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1)

**operational concept**

A fundamental statement that frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct operations. (ADP 1-01)

**operational environment**

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

**operational framework**

A cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations. (ADP 1-01)

**position of relative advantage**

A location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage. (ADRP 3-0)

**principle**

A comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization or function approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations. (ADP 1-01)

**protection warfighting function**

The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. (ADRP 3-0)

**shaping operation**

An operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. (ADRP 3-0)

**simultaneity**

The execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across multiple locations and domains. (ADRP 3-0)

**support area**

The portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations. (ADRP 3-0)

**supporting distance**

The distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation. (ADRP 3-0)

**supporting effort**

A designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. (ADRP 3-0)

**supporting range**

The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems. (ADRP 3-0)

**sustaining operation**

An operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power. (ADRP 3-0)

**sustainment warfighting function**

The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. (ADRP 3-0)

**synchronization**

The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)

**task-organizing**

The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. (ADRP 3-0)

**tenets of operations**

Desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations and are directly related to the Army's operational concept. (ADP 1-01)

**threat**

Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADRP 3-0)

**unified action**

The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

**unified land operations**

Simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win our Nation's wars as part of unified action. (ADRP 3-0)

**unity of effort**

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

**warfighting function**

A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (ADRP 3-0)

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# References

All URLs accessed on 15 August 2017.

## REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

ADRP 1-02. *Terms and Military Symbols*. 16 November 2016.

*DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. August 2017.

## RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

## JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online:

[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jointpub.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm).

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FM 27-10. *Law of Land Warfare*. 18 July 1956.

## **UNITED STATES LAW**

Most acts and public laws are available at <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php>.  
Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces.

## **PRESCRIBED FORMS**

This section contains no entries.

## **REFERENCED FORMS**

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site: <http://www.apd.army.mil/>.  
DA Form 2028. *Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*.



By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

**MARK A. MILLEY**  
*General, United States Army*  
*Chief of Staff*

Official:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gerald B. O'Keefe". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Gerald" being the most prominent.

**GERALD B. O'KEEFE**  
*Administrative Assistant to the*  
*Secretary of the Army*  
1724012

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