DE-SECTING ETHNOMETHODOLOGY *

HUGH MEHAN

University of California, San Diego

HOUSTON WOOD

White Mountain Center, Honokaa, Hawaii

I am caught in the middle of trusted friends and critics. Aaron Cicourel, Carolyn Mullins, Nick Mullins, Margaret Riel, and Marshall Shumsky, among others, offered candid advice. Because I did not always accept their counsel, they are not responsible for my position. I want what seems impossible: room for each and all to practice their are without dogmatism. I recoil from positions that say: my way is the way; it is the only way it should be done. I am not sure there is *a* way; at least there is not one that has shown itself to me. In the meantime, or forever, I want this enterprise to be big enough for the various ways. But in doing so, I fear that I did not do it to the satisfaction of any.

Coser (1975) attacks ethnomethodology because it (1) is a sect (2) ignores the sociological tradition and (3) fails to enlighten its practitioners. I cannot reply to these criticisms on behalf of all ethnomethodologists; I represent but one minor faction of the sect. As I enjoy sharing the work with others, I am willing to respond to Coser by reference to readily available works in a public language without "esoteric ruminations."

1. Ethnomethodology the Sect

Coser characterizes ethnomethodology as a sect. He says ethnomethodology (a) has

* This paper emerges from an earlier collaboration which continues even though our practical circumstances diverge. The first person singular has been adopted to emphasize that we speak in unison.

charismatic leaders, (b) has an esoteric language which unites followers and excludes outsiders, (c) ignores the larger group of sociologists, and (d) is split with factions. Although Coser claims ethnomethodology eschews relations with sociology, he sees ethnomethodology as (e) a danger to sociology.

I am surprised that Coser is surprised that ethnomethodology is a sect. The history of Western intellectual thought is the history of the development, routinization, sometimes the assimilation, and sometimes the dissolution of the intellectual groups. Bacon, Einstein, Freud, Galton, Piaget are but some of the original thinkers who have gathered around them true believers who learned to speak in a new and obscure way and call their glossolalia "the new way."

(a) The august Comte, whom Coser invokes, set the precedent for the charismatic leaders in sociology that Coser deplores in ethnomethodology. Every original thinker in sociology since Comte has recapitulated this pattern. Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Mead, especially Parsons (Gouldner, 1970; Mullins, 1974) began by gathering followers. The group then had to create a public for their "esoterica." In the process, the esoteric became exoteric, the charisma routinized.

Ethnomethodology is such an intellec-

tual movement. It began in obscurity and is only now beginning to find a public. It is unfortunate that Coser lambasts ethnomethodology's sectarian qualities just as it is losing this private mien.

(b) Coser claims that outsiders cannot penetrate the esoteric literature of ethnomethodology. Yet in the course of his address, Coser belies this claim by exhibiting some knowledge of ethnomethodology's factions, findings, and disputes. In the past few years, several "readers" in ethnomethodology have appeared (Douglas, 1970; Sudnow, 1972; Turner, 1974; Avison and Wilson, 1974; Weingarten, et al., 1975; Schenkein, et al., forthcoming). Mehan and Wood (1975) have even attempted to survey all of the literature.

(c) Coser attacks ethnomethodology's private mien, but the routinization of charisma and institutionalization of ethnomethodology's ideas are now far advanced. The institutionalization of ethnomethodology into sociology is what Coser fears. Ironically, institutionalization is just what Garfinkel fears as well (see, for example, his remarks in Hill and Crittenden, 1968).

(d) Coser says that ethnomethodology's "splits and fissions" are a sign of its weakness. I, on the contrary, see the increasing diversity in ethnomethodology as one of its greatest strengths. The diversity arises in response to the ceaseless reflexivity of the social world. As more minds reflect on the problems that reflexivity poses, more programs and solutions appear. I invite you to peruse the disparate work of Blum and associates (Blum and McHugh, 1971; McHugh, et al., 1974; Blum, 1975); Castaneda (1968, 1971, 1972); Cicourel, (1964, 1968, 1973, 1974, 1975); and Sacks and associates (Sacks, 1972a, 1972c, 1973; Sacks, et al., 1974; Schegloff, 1968, 1972); to choose but four arbitrarily. Consider that such diversity grew from a single source, and that among ethnomethodologists it is agreed that the "real work" has yet to be found.

(e) But ethnomethodology is more than a sect within sociology; for Coser, it is

a danger to sociology. The president of the ASA would never waste his time attacking ethnomethodology if it were just a sect.

Coser senses what Gouldner (1970) and Mullins (1974), among others, have pointed to as a crisis in contemporary sociology. While "new causal theorists," structuralists, and ethnomethodologists, among others, are re-examining the roots of the sociological enterprise, Coser recoils from radical considerations. Instead, he sounds a retreat to the very "fatigued ideas" that are the cause of the crisis in the old order. Given our present practical circumstances, radical inquiry seems preferable to the theoretical uniformity that Coser proposes for sociology.

2. Ethnomethodology and the Sociological Tradition

Coser says that ethnomethodology is not sociology in that it (a) does not address traditional sociological phenomena, (b) is radically subjectivistic, and (c) is psychologically reductionist.

(a) Social order and social organization have been enduring concerns of sociology since its inception. Ethnomethodology addresses these phenomena, but from a different perspective, which places ethnomethodology in a dialectical relation with sociology.

Sociology studies social structures. Social structures are treated as "objective and constraining social facts." At the empirical level, sociology treats these structures as variables. Conventional sociological studies seek the relationships among these variables.

Ethnomethodologists claim that the objective and constraining social structures of the world are constituted by "social structuring activities" (variously called "practices," "methods," "procedures," "reality work"). Ethnomethodology says that sociology ignores these structuring activities when they measure the degree of association among variables. One way of reading ethnomethodology is to see it countering this omission: ethnomethodologists study the social structuring activities that assemble social structures.

Early ethnomethodology arrived at this constitutive position through an adoption of Schutz's (1962, 1964, 1966) and Gurwitsch's reading of Husserl. Schutz (e.g., 1962:11) and Gurwitsch (e.g., 1966:xvi) spoke of the everyday world as constituted by "mental acts of consciousness." Garfinkel transformed these phenomenologists' mental acts into public, scenic, interactional activities, and ethnomethodology was born. The "objective reality of social facts" is treated as an "ongoing accomplishment of concerted activities of everyday life" (Garfinkel, 1967:xii). Social interactional activities constitute social facts; the facts do not exist independently of constituting practices.

I see a number of ethnomethodological studies examining the social accomplishment of social facts in institutional and everyday settings. I must emphasize that the coherence that I find in these studies may not be those authors' intent, but the pattern I find in the literature is a heuristic way to show the dialectic relationship that ethnomethodology has with sociology.

In each study, the ethnomethodologist locates and describes the structuring activities that assemble that particular scene's external and constraining social facts. For example, some of the objective social facts of the judicial system are the number of people detained as suspects, brought to trial, and convicted or retained. A series of studies (Sudnow, 1965; Bittner, 1967a, 1967b; Garfinkel, 1967: 104–115; Cicourel, 1968; Emerson, 1969; Sacks, 1972b; Wieder, 1973; Pollner, 1974, 1975) describe the practices employed by police on the beat and judges and lawyers in the courtroom which produce these objective social facts.

The objective social facts of American education include career patterns and school performance. These facts are generally presented as arrays of statistics displaying the number of successful and unsuccessful students by age, ethnicity, SES, or other social variables. A series of studies of schools have used ideas from ethnomethodology to describe the practices that school officials and students employ to produce these reified phenom-

ena. These studies show that placement groups and counselors and students work together to produce outcomes like the number of students in college preparation, vocational or general education categories (Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963; Leiter, 1974; Shumsky and Mehan, 1974; Erickson, 1975); the practices of testers and students assemble answers to each test question and also produce the total score which ordinarily is presumed to constitute a measure of academic achievement (Mehan, 1973; MacKay, 1973, 1974; Roth, 1974). The organization of the classroom and the teacher's view of students as good performers or "pariahs" is produced in concert by teachers and students (Mehan, 1974a, 1974b; MacDermott, 1974; Mehan, et al., 1975).

Ethnomethodological studies in medical settings have examined health professionals, informal and formal categorization of patients (Garfinkel, 1967:186–207; Wood, 1968), decisions to treat patients in emergency rooms (Sudnow, 1969) and hospitals (Garfinkel, 1967:186–207; Cicourel, 1975). One example of this work (Cicourel, 1975) examines the practices which the doctor employs to diagnose the patient in a medical interview, transforms the data into brief summary statements on medical charts, employs the medical summaries to treat other cases, and collapses the data into aggregate statistics which correlate diseases and causes of death with social structural variables. Other studies of social structuring practices within institutional settings can be found in Zimmerman (1969, 1970a, 1970b) and Molotch and Lester (1974).

The concern for *how* practitioners assemble facts in institutional settings is recapitulated in the ethnomethodological investigation of social science research. Ethnomethodologists have studied the processes by which researchers gather materials from everyday life or official records, transform these materials into data by employing certain coding practices, and manipulate the objectified data abstracted from everyday life into correlational matrices (Cicourel, 1964; Kitsuse

and Cicourel, 1963; Garfinkel, 1967:20–24. 262–83: Cicourel, 1974; Douglas, 1967).

These ethnomethodological investigations illustrate the social construction of social research. Researchers decide truth through discussions, arguments, and other practical human activities. An organized consensus decides what is and what is not warranted as knowledge in accordance with procedural rules. The truths of social science are argued, not revealed.

Ethnomethodological studies of the social structuring activities that assemble objective social facts have been conducted outside of institutional settings as well. Garfinkel (1967:116–185) described the passing and management practices of an intersexed person. Sacks and his colleagues (Sacks, 1972a, 1972c, 1973, 1974, 1975; Shegloff, 1968, 1972: Sacks, *et al.*, 1974; Schenkein, 1972; Turner, 1970, 1972) are examining the conversational practices that assemble the organized character of conversational openings, closings, turn taking, topic selection. The practices which organize and maintain the coherence or oracles (Pollner, 1975); sorcery (Castaneda, 1968, 1971, 1972); astrology (Wedow, 1975); religious rituals (Jules-Rosette, 1975); secret societies (Bellman, 1975); as well as social science (TenHouten and Kaplan, 1973); have been described.

(b) Coser is correct when he says that ethnomethodology has tended to ignore the "real world" in its investigations. In its attempt to counter much of standard sociology's exclusive concern for macrosocial structures, early ethnomethodology developed an exclusive concern for social structuring. Pollner (1970), Schwartz (1971), Bauman (1973), Bittner (1973), Goldthorpe (1973), Shumsky and Mehan (1974), and Cicourel (1975) have previously criticized ethnomethodology on similar grounds.

A major concern in my ethnomethodology at this moment is to construct a theory that accounts for both the structures and the structurings of everyday life. The structuring activities described by ethnomethodologists "exist in empir-

ical multitude" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970:343). The practices are scene-specific; different scenes are assembled by different practices. For example, the organization of pairs of utterances in a conversation, the organization of judges' or teachers' decision making, and the organization of social science researchers' assembly of tables of statistics, and the rest, appear to be at different levels of abstractness. Because scenes are continually being created, the enterprise of assembling scenic practices seems endless. Besides, a compilation of an exhaustive list of practices would not provide us with a general theory of social order and social ordering.

The recent work of Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), Shumsky and Mehan (1974), Sacks *et al.* (1974), Cicourel (1975), and Mehan and Wood (1975) can be read as attempts to resolve this difficulty. For example, Mehan and Wood's (1975:179–191) solution to this problem is to seek the properties that all the structuring practices have in common. The properties of the practices would be reflexive, and invariant across the occasioned, context bound practices that constitute the various social facts. The discovery of some invariant properties of practices would constitute the beginning of a general theory of social ordering that addresses both structures and structuring activities.

It should be understood, however, that such an improved ethnomethodology will still differ fundamentally from Coser's sociology. He thinks of the "real world" as a hypothetical realm of "socioeconomic groups," "sociopolitical mechanisms," "functions and dysfunctions," "manifest and latent," independent of the quotidian actions of concrete persons. Ethnomethodologists maintain that these concepts and theoretical notions do capture a version of social life; but much is left out by that equation. Ethnomethodology seeks to make these notions more meaningful by seeing how concepts like "political power" and "institutional factors" exert their "behavior-altering force" in everyday social nexuses. (For an explicit ethnomethodological treatment of the

problem of power in everyday life, see Pollner, 1975 and Filmer *et al.*, 1975.)

(c) Coser accuses ethnomethodology of psychological reductionism, but the notion of constitutive practice does not reduce the problem of social order to psychology. The structurings are not psychological variables. As Garfinkel (1963:190) has said:

> . . . there is no reason to look under the skull since there is nothing of interest to be found there but the brains. The 'skin' of the person will be left intact. Instead questions will be confined to the operations that can be performed upon events that are 'scenic' to the person.

Ethnomethodologists study *social* phenomena, those that are available in embodied, sensuous, human activity, in talk, and in actions. Though we may disagree on other matters, that principle binds ethnomethodologists.

Coser's equation of ethnomethodology with a version of phenomenological reductionism implies that ethnomethodology uses that single research technique. While some ethnomethodologists have explored the use of the reduction (Wieder, 1973), others have also employed virtually every other research method and are pioneering the use of still other techniques. Some ethnometholodogists have employed laboratory experiments (Zimmerman and Wilson, 1973; Crowle, 1971; Jennings and Jennings, 1974); traditional field ethnographies (Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963; Cicourel, 1968; Castaneda, 1968, 1971, 1972; Emerson, 1969; Bittner, 1967a, 1967b; Handel, 1972; Jules-Rosette, 1975; Ramos, 1973; Wieder, 1973; Zimmerman, 1969, 1970a, 1970b); and (even!) surveys (Cicourel, 1974). Others have been exploring the use of film and videotape as a research tool (Mehan, 1973; Cicourel, *et al.*, 1974; Shumsky and Mehan, 1974; Mehan, *et al.*, 1975; Bellman and Jules-Rosette, forthcoming).

Though ethnomethodology is neither confined nor defined by a single method, its investigations are rigorous. Audio-visual techniques are often used as data gathering devices. Hard data, often in the form of film, videotape, audiotape, and transcripts derived from these sources, are used to display findings. Intensive analysis of the complete course of interaction across social situations is made. Transcripts are often provided along with the analysis of the materials. The videotape and transcripts provide the grounds of interpretation as researchers move up the ladder of abstraction from raw materials to coded data to summarized findings. This practice enables others to follow the logic of analysis and allows the possibility of alternative interpretations to be made on the same materials.

3. Ethnomethodology and Enlightenment

Coser claims that while ". . . our discipline will be judged . . . on the basis of the substantive enlightenment which it is able to supply about the social structures in which we are enmeshed . . ." ethnomethodology does not supply "substantive enlightenment." I believe it is standard sociology that fails to enlighten. Much of standard sociology is too often divorced from the lived social realities of the everyday lives it seeks to enlighten.

Some of us in the academy, and more outside it, have turned to ethnomethodology because it, and not Coser's sociology, enlightens us "about the social structures in which we are enmeshed." Ethnomethodology reveals the practices that structure everyday life, including oppression, dogmatism, absolutism. Knowing how these social structures operate in everyday life enables people to change them.

Different generations of social scientists must create their own styles of sociology to find the enlightenment Coser rightly demands. The sociology Coser represents is of a different era than that of today. It began with the belief that the methods of natural science are the best way to acquire knowledge and to improve society.

Standard sociology arose in an age when technology was man's best friend and when positivism's atom was the basic stuff of the universe. Today that basic stuff is swarming. Contemporary physicists claim that the universe is made of quarks (Glashow, 1975) that have

"charm," and "flavor," and which exist only when the physicist magically summons them, while our old friend and pet, technology, bites our hand charmlessly.

I believe that sociology must be reinvented to resonate with the new image of rigorous inquiry that has emerged from the philosophers of the hermeneutic-dialectic tradition (Radnitsky, 1973) — philosophers like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and the later Wittgenstein. Feyerabend (in Radnitsky, 1973:417) summarizes this view as the belief that:

> ... science is only one of the many monsters which has been created by man, and I am not at all sure that it is the best. There may be better ways of finding the 'truth.' And there may be better ways of being a man than trying to find the truth.

Ethnomethodology is a synthesis of logico-empiricism and hermeneutic dialecticalism, two traditions that are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive. It has borrowed its methodology from logico-empiricism and its theory from hermeneutic-dialecticalism. As a result, both traditions find ethnomethodology anathema.

Ethnomethodology derives from the hermeneutic-dialectic tradition a commitment to study concrete scenes rigorously, with the recognition that the researcher is a reflexive participant and not mere observer of those scenes. But my ethnomethodology is not like critical Marxist theory, merely a theoretical rebuttal of science; I adopt the vision of science to transcend that vision. Just as ethnomethodology recoils from the logico-empiricist commitment that science is the superior way of knowing, it reacts against the hermeneutic-dialectic belief that dialectic theory alone is sufficient. Both these positions are not reflexive enough for me; every mode of inquiry is supported by secondary elaborations of their commitments.

Those who are satisfied with sociology would do well to listen to Coser and ignore ethnomethodology. But those who think that sociology can achieve something greater than it has so far accomplished should look beyond my "promiscuous discussions of theory" (cf. Garfinkel, 1967:vii) with Coser and go to the work of ethnomethodologists themselves. My ethnomethodology is not primarily a reading, writing, and talking discipline; it can be best understood by being done.

REFERENCES

Avison, N. H. and R. J. Wilson (eds.)
1974　Ethnomethodology, Labelling Theory and Deviant Behavior. London: Routledge and Kegan-Paul.

Bauman, Zygmunt
1973　"On the philosophical status of ethnomethodology." The Sociological Review 21 (February):5–23.

Bellman, Beryl
1975　Village of Curers and Assassins. The Hague: Mouton.

Bellman, Beryl and Bennetta Jules-Rosette
forth-　Paradigm for Looking: Cross-Cultural
coming　Research with Visual Media. New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Bittner, Egon
1967a　"The police on skid row." American Sociological Review 32: 699–715.
1967b　"Police discretion in emergency apprehension of mentally ill persons." Social Problems 14:278–292.
1973　"Objectivity and realism in sociology." In George Psathas (ed.), Phenomenological Sociology. New York: Wiley.

Blum, Alan
1975　Theorizing. London: Routledge and Kegan-Paul.

Blum, Alan and Peter McHugh
1971　"The social ascription of motives." American Sociological Review 36 (February): 98–109.

Castaneda, Carlos
1968　The Teachings of Don Juan. Berkeley: University of California Press.
1971　A Separate Reality. New York: Simon and Schuster.
1972　A Journey to Iztlan. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Cicourel, Aaron V.
1964　Method and Measurement in Sociology. New York: The Free Press.
1968　The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice. New York: Wiley.
1973　Cognitive Sociology. London: Macmillan.
1974　Theory and Method in a Study of Argentine Fertility. New York: Wiley Interscience.
1975　"Discourse and text: Cognitive and linguistic processes in studies of social structure." Portions of this paper presented at 1975 ASA meeting to appear in Versus.

Cicourel, Aaron V., Kenneth H. Jennings, S. H. M. Jennings, *et al.*
1974 Language Use and School Performance. New York: Acadamic Press.

Cicourel, Aaron V. and John Kitsuse
1963 The Educational Decision Makers. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Coser, Lewis A.
1975 "Two methods in search of a substance." American Sociological Review 40 (December):691–700.

Crowle, Anthony
1971 Post Experimental Interviews: An experiment and a Sociololinguistic Analysis. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Santa Barbara: University of California.

Douglas, Jack
1970 (ed.) Understanding Everyday Life. Chicago: Aldine.
1967 The Social Meaning of Suicide. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Emerson, Robert
1969 Judging Delinquents. Chicago: Aldine.

Erickson, Frederick
1975 "Gatekeeping and the melting pot: Interaction in counseling encounters." Harvard Educational Review 45:44-70.

Filmer, Paul, Michael Phillipson, M. Roche *et al.*
1975 Stratifying Practices. London: Routledge and Kegan-Paul.

Garfinkel, Harold
1963 "A conception of and experiments with 'trust' as a condition of concerted stable actions." Pp. 110–143 in O. J. Harvey (ed.), Motivation and Social Interaction. New York: Ronald Press.
1967 Studies in Ethnomethodology. New York: Prentice-Hall.

Garfinkel, Harold and Harvey Sacks
1970 "The formal properties of practical actions." Pp. 337–366 in John C. McKinney and Edward Tiryakian (eds.), Theoretical Sociology. New York: Appleton, Century-Crofts.

Glashow, Sheldon Lee
1975 "Quarks with color and flavor." Scientific America 233 (October):38-50.

Goldthorpe, John H.
1973 "A revolution in sociology?" Sociology 7 (3):449–462.

Gouldner, Alvin W.
1970 The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. New York: Basic Books.

Gurwitsch, Aaron
1966 Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Handel, Judith
1972 Learning to Categorize. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Santa Barbara: University of California.

Hill, R. C. and K. S. Crittendon (eds.)
1968 The Purdue Symposium on Ethnomethodology Monograph #1. Institute for the Study of Social Change. Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University.

Jennings, Kenneth and Sybillyn Jennings
1974 "Tests and experiments." In A. V. Cicourel, et al. Language Use and School Performance. New York: Academic Press.

Jules-Rossete, Bennetta
1975 African Apostles: Ritual and Conversion in the Church of John Maranke. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Kitsuse, John and Aaron V. Cicourel
1963 "The use of official statistics." Social Problems 11 (2):131–139.

Leiter, Kenneth
1974 "Ad hocing in the schools." In A. V. Cicourel, *et al.* Language Use and School Performance. New York: Academic Press.

MacKay, Robert
1973 "Conceptions of children and models of socialization." Pp. 27–43 in Hans P. Dreitzel (ed.), Childhood and Socialization. New York: Macmillan.
1974 "Standardized tests: Objective and objectivized measures." Pp. 218–247 in A. V. Cicourel, *et al.*, Language Use and School Performance. New York: Academic Press.

McDermott, R. P.
1974 "Achieving school failure." Pp. 82–119 in George D. Spindler (ed.), Education and Cultural Process. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

McHugh, Peter, Stanley Raffel, Daniel C. Foss, *et al.*
1974 On the Beginning of Social Inquiry. London: Routledge and Kegan-Paul.

Mehan, Hugh
1973 "Assessing children's language using abilities." Pp. 301–346 in J. Michael Armer and Allen D. Grimshaw (eds.), Methodological Issues in Comparative Sociological Research. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
1974a "Accomplishing classroom lessons." Pp. 76–142 in A. V. Cicourel, *et al.*, Language Use and School Performance. New York: Academic Press.
1974b "Ethnomethodology and education." Pp. 141–219 in David O'Shea (ed.), Sociology of the School and Schooling. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Education.

Mehan, Hugh, Sue Fisher, and Nick Maroules
1975 "Students' formulating practices and instructional strategies." To appear in The Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences.

Mehan, Hugh and Houston Wood
1975 The Reality of Ethnomethodology. New York: Wiley Interscience.

Molotoch, Harvey and Marilyn Lester
1974 "News as purposive behavior." American Sociological Review 39:101–112.

Mullins, Nicholas J.
1974 Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary American Sociology. New York: Harper and Row.

Pollner, Melvin
1970 On the Foundations of Mundane Reason. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of California, Santa Barbara.
1974 "Mundane reasoning." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4:35–54.
1975 "Feaures of reality disjunctures and their resolution." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6. (In Press.)

Radnitzsky, Gerard
1973 Contemporary Schools of Metascience. Chicago: Henry Regnery.

Ramos, Reyes
1973 "A case in point." Social Science Quarterly 53:905–919.

Roth, David
1974 "Intelligence testing as a social activity." Pp. 143–217 in A. V. Cicourel, et al., Language Use and School Performance. New York: Academic Press.

Sacks, Harvey
1972a "An initial investigation of the usability of conversational data for doing sociology." In David Sudnow (ed.), Studies in Interaction. New York: The Free Press.
1972b "Notes on police assessment of moral character." Pp. 280–293 in David Sudnow (ed.), Studies in Interaction. New York: The Free Press.
1972c "On the analyzability of stories by children." Pp. 219–254 in J. J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds.), Directions in Sociolinguistics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
1973 "On some puns with some imitations." In Roger Shuy (ed.), Monograph #25, Linguistics and Language Science. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
1974 "An analysis of the course of a joke's telling in conversation." Pp. 337–353 in Richard Bauman and Joel Sherzer (eds.), Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking. New York: Cambridge University Press.
1975 "Everybody has to lie." Pp. 57–80 in Mary Sanchez and Ben Blount (eds.), Sociocultural Dimensions of Language Use. New York: Academic Press.

Sacks, Harvey, Emmanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson
1974 "A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking in conversation." Language (50):696–735.

Schegloff, Emmanuel
1968 "Sequencing in conversational openings." American Anthropologist 70:1075–95.

1972 "Notes on a conversational practice: Formulating place." In David Sudnow (ed.), Studies in Interaction. New York: The Free Press.

Schenkein, James
1972 "Towards an analysis of natural conversation and the sense of heheh." Semiotica VI (4):344–377.

Schenkein, James, Fritz Sack, and Elmar Weingarten (eds.)
forth-   Issues in Conversational Analysis, Bercoming   lin: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Schwartz, Howard
1971 Mental Disorder and the Study of Subjective Experience: Some Uses of Each to Elucidate the Other. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles.

Shumsky, Marshall and Hugh Mehan
1974 "The comparability practice of description in two evaluative contexts." Paper presented at VIIIth World Congress of Sociology. Toronto, Ontario.

Schutz, Alfred
1962 Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
1964 Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
1966 Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Sudnow, David
1965 "Normal crimes." Social Problems 12: 255–276.
1969 Passing On: The Social Organization of Dying. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
1972 (ed.) Studies in Social Interaction. New York: The Free Press.

Tenhouten, Warren and Charles Kaplan
1973 Science and Its Mirror Image. New York: Harper and Row.

Turner, Roy
1970 "Words, utterances, and activities." Pp. 169–187 in Jack Douglas (ed.), Understanding Everyday Life. Chicago: Aldine.
1972 "Some formal properties of therapy talk." Pp. 367–396 in David Sudnow (ed.), Studies in Social Interaction. New York: The Free Press.
1974 (ed.) Ethnomethodology. Middlesex, England: Penguin.

Wedow, Susan
1975 From the Zodiac to Everyday Life. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of California, Santa Barbara.

Weingarten, Elmar, Fritz Sacks, and James Schenkein (eds.)
1975 Ethnomethodologie. Beiträge zu einer Soziologie des Alltagslebens. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Wieder, D. Lawrence
1973 Language and Social Reality. The Hague: Mouton.

Wood, Houston
1968 The Labelling Process on a Mental Hospital Ward. Unpublished master's theses. University of California, Santa Barbara.

Zimmerman, Don H.
1969 "Tasks and troubles." Pp. 237–266 in Donald A. Hansen (ed.), Explorations in Sociology and Counseling. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
1970a "Record keeping and the intake process in a public welfare agency." Pp. 311–354 in Stanton Wheeler (ed.), On Record. New York: Basic Books.
1970b "The practicalities of rule use." Pp. 221–238 in Jack Douglas (ed.), Understanding Everyday Life. Chicago: Aldine.

Zimmerman, Don H. and Thomas P. Wilson
1973 "Prospects for experimental studies of meaning-structures." Paper presented at American Sociological Association meetings, New York.