Abstract
The analysis presented in the first two chapters of this book critically underscores the importance of establishing a robust legal and regulatory framework to ensure the socioeconomic well-being of a nation that possesses nuclear energy resources. Nevertheless, to craft a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework, it is essential to revisit the fundamental theories and objectives of nuclear energy law. By identifying the key factors and components that underpin nuclear law, we can create an effective and efficient system that seamlessly integrates with a nation’s broader legal framework, allowing it to function at maximum capacity.
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Notes
- 1.
The framework of nuclear laws, regulations, practices, and customs draws upon a combination of legally binding treaties and conventions, as well as non-binding guidance and instruments developed by international organizations, as mentioned in the main text. While a distinction between these instruments exists, often characterized as a dichotomy between “hard” and “soft” law, both are essential to ensuring the safety and security of nuclear activities and facilities worldwide. These instruments are founded on principles developed over time to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
- 2.
Stoiber et al. (2010), pp. 1–8 in general, it is unlikely that national nuclear law can be crafted without some degree of harmonization and changes in order to reflect the principles and obligations of international nuclear law. International nuclear law sets certain norms, standards, and requirements for the safe and secure use of nuclear energy, and national laws must align with these international norms and principles. However, the extent of the necessary harmonization and changes may vary depending on the specific legal system and the international instruments that apply to a particular country. Some countries may already have legal frameworks that align closely with international nuclear law, while others may need to make more significant changes to comply with their international obligations.
- 3.
Koskenniemi (2006).
- 4.
See generally Von Bogdandy et al. (2017).
- 5.
See Warbrick (2002).
- 6.
Ibid.
- 7.
Statute of the International Court of Justice. https://www.icj-cij.org/statute. Accessed 26 Mar 2023.
- 8.
Domestic legislation that does not fully incorporate international nuclear law may not adequately address important safety and security concerns related to nuclear energy. This could result in a lack of consistency and harmonization in the regulatory framework for nuclear power generation within the region, potentially leading to gaps in safety measures and the increased risk of accidents or incidents. Moreover, the limited implementation of international nuclear law in domestic legislation could hinder the ability of countries to cooperate effectively on nuclear safety and security issues. This could lead to a lack of transparency and trust between countries in the region, which are important factors for ensuring effective international cooperation in areas such as nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation.
- 9.
Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentine v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports, 2010, p. 45. See also Lamm (2017).
- 10.
Williams (2019).
- 11.
Posner (2003).
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
See Cook (2014).
- 14.
Stoiber et al. (2003), p. 3.
- 15.
See Langlois (2013).
- 16.
See Couturier et al. (2020).
- 17.
Today, the prevention principle is a fundamental concept in nuclear energy safety and is enshrined in a range of international standards and regulations. These include the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Safety Standards and the Nuclear Safety Convention, which both emphasize the importance of preventing accidents and incidents from occurring in the first place.
- 18.
See Yin and Zou (2021).
- 19.
Ibid.
- 20.
- 21.
See Gonzalez (1992).
- 22.
Ibid.
- 23.
Frane and Bitterman (2020).
- 24.
Ibid.
- 25.
Ibid.
- 26.
Ibid.
- 27.
See Wetherall A, Liang C. Transparency and Openness Through Nuclear Law: Enabling Climate Action. IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/transparency-and-openness-through-nuclear-law-enabling-climate-action. Accessed 31 Mar 2023.
- 28.
Ibid.
- 29.
See Ferguson and Reed (2010).
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
Ibid.
- 32.
World nuclear Association. International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/international-framework-for-nuclear-energy-coopera.aspx#:~:text=The%20International%20Framework%20for%20Nuclear,%2C%20security%20and%20non%E2%80%90proliferation. Accessed 31 Mar 2023.
- 33.
Stoiber et al. (2003), p. 6.
- 34.
Ibid.
- 35.
See Gaukler et al. (2002).
- 36.
See Karim et al. (2018).
- 37.
International nuclear law provides several guidelines to regulate fissionable material and radioisotopic activities, including: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): this treaty aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieve nuclear disarmament; the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM): this convention provides for the physical protection of nuclear material during international transport and storage; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: this code provides guidance for the safe and secure management of radioactive sources; the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management: this convention sets out the international standards for the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste; the Convention on Nuclear Safety: this convention aims to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants and to prevent accidents.
- 38.
Stoiber et al. (2010), pp. 47–48.
- 39.
Karim and Munir (2018).
- 40.
Ibid.
- 41.
The IAEA Safeguards play a significant role in preventing nuclear proliferation by independently verifying states' compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments. The safeguards are based on several bilateral agreements, and the regulatory system includes various components. These components consist of the IAEA Statute, States' obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, and safeguards tools like safeguard agreements, protocols, and subsidiary arrangements to those agreements. Additionally, the decisions made by the IAEA Governing Board are also part of the regulatory system for IAEA Safeguards.
- 42.
In case of a nuclear accident or damage, the operator is held solely responsible, primarily because they are in the best position to prevent accidents from occurring. Additionally, the cost of damages resulting from a nuclear accident can be incredibly high, and the operator is the party that has the resources and expertise to manage and respond to such incidents. Under the Civil Liability Convention of Nuclear Damage, nuclear operators are held strictly liable for any nuclear damage that occurs as a result of their activities. This means that they are held responsible for all damage caused, regardless of whether or not they were at fault for the incident. This strict liability standard ensures that nuclear operators take all necessary precautions to prevent accidents and damages from occurring in the first place. The Civil Liability Convention of Nuclear Damage also requires nuclear operators to maintain insurance or other financial security measures to cover their potential liability for nuclear damage. This helps to ensure that the costs of any damage resulting from a nuclear incident are adequately covered and that those affected by the incident are compensated for their losses. See IAEA. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-liability-conventions/vienna-convention-on-civil-liability-for-nuclear-damage. Accessed 2 April 2023.
- 43.
See NEA. Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention or PC). https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_20196/paris-convention-on-third-party-liability-in-the-field-of-nuclear-energy-paris-convention-or-pc#:~:text=The%20Paris%20Convention%20provides%20for,substances%20to%20and%20from%20installations. Accessed 2 April 2023.
- 44.
The Brussels Supplementary Convention of 1963 is an international treaty that supplements the Paris Convention of 1960. The Paris Convention established a nuclear liability regime for most of Western Europe, which required nuclear operators to have liability insurance and set limits on their liability in the event of a nuclear accident. The Brussels Supplementary Convention was created to provide for greater compensation to victims of nuclear accidents than the Paris Convention guaranteed. It increases the amount of compensation that a nuclear operator must pay to victims of a nuclear accident and expands the scope of the Paris Convention to cover damage caused by nuclear fuel in transit or storage.
- 45.
Strict liability for nuclear damage is a legal principle that holds nuclear operators responsible for any damage that results from their activities, regardless of whether they were at fault or negligent. This means that in the event of a nuclear accident, the operator is automatically liable for any harm caused to people, property or the environment. Strict liability for nuclear damage shifts the burden of proof from the victim to the nuclear operator. In other words, the operator must prove that they were not at fault or negligent, rather than the victim having to prove that the operator was at fault. This helps ensure that victims of a nuclear accident receive prompt and adequate compensation for any harm they have suffered.
- 46.
Exclusive liability for the operator of the nuclear installation is a legal principle that holds the operator of a nuclear facility solely responsible for any damage that results from their activities. This means that if a nuclear accident occurs, the operator is the only party that can be held liable for any harm caused to people, property, or the environment. By channeling all liability exclusively to the operator, the legal principle of exclusive liability helps ensure that victims of a nuclear accident receive prompt and adequate compensation for any harm they have suffered. This also helps encourage nuclear operators to take steps to minimize the risk of accidents and to maintain the highest standards of safety and security at their facilities.
- 47.
Exclusive jurisdiction for courts in the state where the accident occurs is a legal principle that specifies that only the courts of the state where a nuclear accident occurs have the authority to hear and decide any claims for compensation arising from the accident. By limiting the jurisdiction to the courts of the state where the accident occurred, the legal principle of exclusive jurisdiction helps avoid the potential for conflicting or overlapping legal proceedings in different jurisdictions, which could lead to inconsistent results or delays in compensation for victims. However, in cases where the nuclear accident occurs in one state but causes damage in another state, the principles of international law require that the courts of the state where the damage occurred also have jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation.
- 48.
Limited liability amounts and timeframes for claiming damages refer to the principle in international nuclear liability law that sets a maximum limit on the amount of compensation an operator of a nuclear installation is liable to pay in the event of a nuclear incident, and a deadline for victims to make their claims for compensation. The amount of liability that an operator of a nuclear installation is required to have under the conventions is limited to a certain amount, beyond which the state may assume liability for the remaining damages.
- 49.
The principle of mandatory financial security aims to ensure that operators have sufficient funds to compensate victims in the event of a nuclear accident. Operators can demonstrate their financial security by either obtaining insurance coverage or by setting aside financial reserves, such as a special fund, to cover their potential liability. The amount of mandatory financial security required under the conventions is limited and varies depending on the size and type of the nuclear installation, as well as the potential risks and damages that could arise from a nuclear accident.
- 50.
Stoiber et al. (2003).
- 51.
Stoiber et al. (2010).
- 52.
Mishra (2017).
- 53.
IAEA (2018).
- 54.
Ibid., p 155.
- 55.
Ibid.
- 56.
World Nuclear Association. Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx. Accessed 3 April 2023.
- 57.
Ibid.
- 58.
IAEA. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment. https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/conventions/convention-physical-protection-nuclear-material-and-its-amendment. Accessed 3 April 2023.
- 59.
IAEA. Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf. Accessed 3 April 2023.
- 60.
NTI. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/global-initiative-combat-nuclear-terrorism-gicnt/#:~:text=The%20GICNT%20is%20an%20international,of%20nuclear%20and%20radiological%20materials. Accessed 3 April 2023.
- 61.
See Gill (2020).
- 62.
The Statute of the IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/about/statute. Accessed 6 April 2023.
- 63.
See Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/convention-early-notification-nuclear-accident. Accessed 6 April 2023; McBrayer (1987).
- 64.
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/convention-assistance-case-nuclear-accident-or-radiological-emergency. Accessed 6 April 2023.
- 65.
Convention on Nuclear Safety. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/convention-nuclear-safety. Accessed 6 April 2023.
- 66.
Szasz (1994).
- 67.
Ibid.
- 68.
See Caruso (2018).
- 69.
See Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-safety-conventions/joint-convention-safety-spent-fuel-management-and-safety-radioactive-waste. Accessed 9 April 2023.
- 70.
Article 3, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
- 71.
See Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. https://www.iaea.org/publications/6956/code-of-conduct-on-the-safety-and-security-of-radioactive-sources. Accessed 9 April 2023.
- 72.
See Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors. https://www.iaea.org/publications/7380/code-of-conduct-on-the-safety-of-research-reactors. Accessed 9 April 2023.
- 73.
See Guidance for the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/8901_web.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2023.
- 74.
See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1979/infcirc274r1m1c.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2023.
- 75.
See International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/English_18_15.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2023.
- 76.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/. Accessed 9 April 2023.
- 77.
To get more information, see United Nations Treaty Collection. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-15&chapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en. Accessed 9 April 2023.
- 78.
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/. Accessed 10 April 2023.
- 79.
Ibid.
- 80.
Ibid.
- 81.
IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/actionplanns.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2023.
- 82.
Ibid.
- 83.
Ibid.
- 84.
Ibid.
- 85.
Ibid.
- 86.
Brunnée (2018).
- 87.
Faruque (2020).
- 88.
These international environmental norms or principles derived from customary international law: this refers to the rules and practices that have been established by the consistent conduct of states over time; treaties and conventions: agreements between states that establish rules and standards for environmental protection; general principles of law: the legal systems of different countries are recognized by most legal systems; judicial decisions: These decisions are made by international courts and tribunals and may contribute to the development of international environmental law; soft law instruments: these are non-binding instruments such as declarations, guidelines, and principles that may serve as a basis for the development of international environmental law; scientific knowledge and expertise.
- 89.
The substantive and procedural principles and implementation processes of environmental law relating to nuclear energy are inter-related because they work together to ensure the protection of the environment and human health from the harmful effects of nuclear energy. For example, the principle of “prior informed consent” requires that communities and individuals are consulted and provided with information before any nuclear project is approved or implemented. This principle works together with the principle of “effective public participation” which requires that communities and individuals have access to information and the ability to participate in decision-making processes. Similarly, the principle of “polluter pays” requires that those responsible for the harmful effects of nuclear energy bear the costs of remediation and cleanup. This principle works together with the principle of “state sovereignty, responsibility and liability” which holds states responsible for the environmental impacts of nuclear energy and the need to establish effective liability regimes. Overall, the principles and implementation processes of environmental law relating to nuclear energy are inter-related and work together to ensure the protection of the environment and human health from the harmful effects of nuclear energy.
- 90.
- 91.
See Gupta and Schmeier (2020).
- 92.
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/Espoo_Convention_authentic_ENG.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2023.
- 93.
1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (as amended in 2006). https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/PROTOCOLAmended2006.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2023.
- 94.
Sobenes and Devaney (2022).
- 95.
Ibid.
- 96.
Gadkowski (2021).
- 97.
See Anastassov (2014).
- 98.
Ibid.
- 99.
See Stone (2004).
- 100.
See Lindskog et al. (2011).
- 101.
To know more on how substantive environmental principles/rights complement the procedural environmental principles/rights, see Daly (2012).
- 102.
See Nanda (2006).
- 103.
Duvic‐Paoli and Lueger (2022).
- 104.
Ibid.
- 105.
See Articles 14, 16, and 17 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc449.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2023.
- 106.
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. https://unece.org/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2023.
- 107.
Ibid.
- 108.
Ibid.
- 109.
Peiry (2011).
- 110.
To understand how storage and disposal of nuclear waste can have significant long-term impacts on the environment and local communities, see Kelleher (2017).
- 111.
1995 I.C.J. 288. On May 9, 1973, Australia and New Zealand initiated legal proceedings against France regarding its proposed nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific region. France refused to appear at the public hearings or submit any pleadings, stating that it believed the International Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction. On June 22, 1973, the Court issued provisional measures at the request of Australia and New Zealand, which included a directive that France should avoid any nuclear tests that could cause radioactive fallout on Australian or New Zealand territory until a judgment was reached. On December 20, 1974, the Court issued two judgments in which it determined that the applications of Australia and New Zealand were no longer applicable because the objective of both countries had already been achieved. The Court found that France had announced its intention to cease carrying out any further atmospheric nuclear tests on the completion of its 1974 series, which rendered the applications of Australia and New Zealand moot.
- 112.
Even though the ICJ did not decide on the substance of New Zealand’s claims in the Nuclear Tests Case, the Court made it clear that its decision does not undermine the “obligations of States to respect and protect the natural environment, obligations to which both New Zealand and France have in the present instance reaffirmed their commitment.” See Tokarz (1998).
- 113.
In the 1880s, a fishery dispute between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States resulted in an arbitration. Throughout the conflict, the United States Revenue Cutter Service, presently known as the United States Coast Guard, seized several Canadian sealer vessels. After the initial three ships were captured, the British imperial government, still responsible for foreign affairs for the Dominion of Canada, issued an order for release, but no action was taken to stop the seizures, and the ships were not released. Consequently, the U.S. claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the Bering Sea sealing industry, leading to negotiations outside of the courts. Ultimately, the award favored the British, and the Americans were denied exclusive jurisdiction. The British received compensation for the damage inflicted on their vessels, and the American sealing zone remained at its pre-conflict size of 60 miles.
- 114.
The Trail Smelter dispute is a landmark transboundary pollution case that involved the Canadian and US federal governments, ultimately leading to the establishment of the Harm principle in environmental law. The smelter in Trail, British Columbia, operated by the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company (COMINCO) until its merger with Teck in 2001, had been processing lead and zinc since 1896, with smoke from the smelter causing extensive damage to the surrounding forests and crops, including across the Canada-US border in Washington. This led to complaints and demands for compensation from distressed residents, with no resolution reached between the smelter operators and the affected landowners. As a result, the case was referred to an arbitration tribunal and, after negotiations and litigation, was finally settled in 1941.
- 115.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, pp. 241–242, para. 29. See also World Court Digest. https://www.mpil.de/de/pub/publikationen/archiv/world-court-digest.cfm?fuseaction_wcd=aktdat&aktdat=214000000301.cfm. Accessed 11 April 2023.
- 116.
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997). See also Preiss (1999).
- 117.
Takano (2018).
- 118.
Ibid.
- 119.
Ibid.
- 120.
Environmental law principles and legal doctrines are related concepts in the legal field but differ in their scope and nature. Environmental law principles are the fundamental concepts or values that guide the development, interpretation, and application of environmental law. They are the basic rules and standards that establish the ethical, moral, and legal obligations of governments and individuals towards the environment. Environmental law principles are typically broad and abstract, such as the polluter pays principle, the precautionary principle, and the principle of sustainable development. They are not codified in statutes but are often developed through international treaties, court decisions, and other legal instruments. On the other hand, legal doctrines are specific legal rules or theories that govern the application and interpretation of law in particular areas of the law. Legal doctrines are typically more concrete and specific than environmental law principles and are developed through court decisions, statutory law, and legal precedents. For example, in tort law, the doctrine of strict liability holds a person liable for damages caused by their actions regardless of fault.
- 121.
The doctrine of nuisance is a legal principle in tort law that deals with the interference with the use and enjoyment of land. It states that if one person's use of their property unreasonably interferes with another person's use and enjoyment of their property, then the affected person may seek legal remedies to stop the interference or receive compensation for the damages caused. The interference may be due to noise, odor, pollution, or other factors that impact the health or well-being of the affected party. The doctrine of nuisance aims to balance the competing interests of property owners and prevent one person from unreasonably infringing on the rights of another. The doctrine of nuisance is relevant to nuclear law in situations where the operation of a nuclear facility causes harm or interferes with the use and enjoyment of neighboring properties. For instance, the emission of radiation or nuclear waste from a nuclear plant could pose a risk of harm to nearby communities or property owners.
- 122.
The doctrine of trespass in environmental law states that a person or entity can be held liable for damages caused by their intentional or unintentional intrusion into another person's property without permission. In the context of nuclear law, the doctrine of trespass can be relevant when it comes to nuclear waste disposal. If a nuclear power plant disposes of nuclear waste in a manner that results in contamination of the soil or water of neighboring properties, it could be considered a trespass. Similarly, if nuclear waste is transported through an area without proper authorization or in a manner that causes harm to nearby residents, it could also be considered a trespass. Under the doctrine of trespass, the impacted property owner may have the right to seek damages or injunctive relief against the entity responsible for the trespass. This could include measures such as cleanup of contaminated areas or compensation for damages to property or health.
- 123.
The doctrine of negligence is a legal principle that holds individuals or organizations liable for harm caused to others due to their failure to exercise reasonable care. In the context of nuclear law, the doctrine of negligence can be applied in cases where a nuclear facility or operator fails to take reasonable measures to prevent accidents or mitigate their consequences. For example, if a nuclear power plant operator fails to properly maintain the facility, resulting in a radiation leak that harms nearby communities, they may be found liable for negligence. Similarly, if a nuclear waste storage facility is improperly managed, leading to contamination of groundwater or other environmental damage, the facility operator may be held liable for negligence.
- 124.
The doctrine of neighbourhood law is related to the principle of good neighbourliness in environmental law. This principle requires countries to act in a way that does not cause harm to other countries, particularly in cases of transboundary environmental harm. In the context of nuclear law, the doctrine of neighbourhood law can apply in situations where a nuclear power plant is located near the border of another country. If the nuclear power plant is not operated with due care and causes harm to the environment or the population of the neighbouring country, the doctrine of neighbourhood law could be invoked to hold the country responsible for the harm caused.
- 125.
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): the MOX plant case (Ireland vs. United Kingdom). https://www.jstor.org/stable/20694237. Accessed 11 April 2023.
- 126.
Ibid.
- 127.
Ibid.
- 128.
Ibid.
- 129.
The Espoo (EIA) Convention sets out the obligations of Parties to assess the environmental impact of certain activities at an early stage of planning. It also lays down the general obligation of States to notify and consult each other on all major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries.
- 130.
The Kiev Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers became international law binding its Parties on 8 October 2009. It is the only legally binding international instrument on pollutant release and transfer registers. Its objective is to enhance public access to information through the establishment of coherent, nationwide pollutant release and transfer registers (PRTRs).
- 131.
Common law countries are those that have a legal system based on common law, which is a system of law developed through the decisions of courts and judges, rather than through statutes or codes. Some examples of common law countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and many others.
- 132.
The civil law system is used in many countries around the world, including France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, China, Brazil, Mexico, and many others.
- 133.
International Legal Framework for Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. https://www.iaea.org/nl-webinars/7-international-legal-framework-for-civil-liability-for-nuclear-damage. Accessed 11 April 2023. See also McIntosh (2022).
- 134.
Prominent legal scholar Noah Sachs has argued that the international community has not done enough to provide tort remedies for those affected by cross-border environmental disasters. See Sachs (2007).
- 135.
Tort laws are designed to provide compensation for the harm suffered by an individual or entity due to the wrongful act or negligence of another party. In the case of a nuclear disaster, the harm caused can be widespread and complex, making it difficult to identify and quantify the precise injuries suffered by an individual or entity. For instance, a nuclear accident can cause various types of damages such as property damage, personal injury, loss of income, loss of business opportunities, and even emotional distress. To seek compensation under tort law, the plaintiff must prove that they suffered harm and that the harm was caused by the defendant’s wrongful act or negligence. In the case of a nuclear accident, it can be challenging to determine which specific entity or entities caused the harm, as well as the extent of the harm caused by each entity. Additionally, the harm caused by a nuclear disaster may not manifest immediately, but instead develop over time, making it even more difficult to identify and quantify. Moreover, a nuclear disaster can have a transboundary impact, affecting multiple countries and different entities from diverse jurisdictions. This makes it challenging to apply the traditional tort laws, as the determination of liability requires a clear identification of the entity or entities responsible for the harm, which is difficult to establish in the case of a nuclear disaster.
- 136.
Sachs (2007).
- 137.
The Paris Convention was a crucial step towards addressing the issue of nuclear liability, as it provided a framework for liability and compensation in the event of a nuclear incident. However, the Convention only applied to the signatory states and did not cover all aspects of liability and compensation. In particular, the Convention did not address issues related to transboundary harm or long-term effects of radiation exposure. Furthermore, the Convention did not prescribe specific limits of liability for nuclear damage, leaving it up to each state to determine its own limits. This led to a lack of consistency in national laws and difficulty in ensuring adequate compensation for victims of nuclear accidents.
- 138.
See Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-liability-conventions/vienna-convention-on-civil-liability-for-nuclear-damage. Accessed 11 April 2023.
- 139.
Handl (1988).
- 140.
Ram Mohan (2015).
- 141.
Ibid.
- 142.
Ibid.
- 143.
Schwartz (2010).
- 144.
See Heffron et al. (2016).
- 145.
See also McIntosh (2022).
- 146.
Ibid.
- 147.
But it should be noted that while some countries have indeed continued to pursue nuclear power, others have moved away from it or slowed down their efforts due to concerns about safety and the long-term storage of nuclear waste.
- 148.
The potential for liability claims through bilateral agreements is also a complex issue that may depend on the specific terms of those agreements.
- 149.
Smith (1987).
- 150.
Dissenting opinion of Vice-President Schwebel. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-09-EN.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2023.
- 151.
The NPT is a universal agreement aimed at achieving these goals. Opened for signature in 1970 and in force since 1970, the NPT has been ratified by almost all countries in the world. Its main objectives are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and eventually achieve nuclear disarmament. The NPT is considered the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and is reviewed every five years. The most recent review conference was held in 2021.
- 152.
Lee and Karim (2022).
- 153.
Ibid.
- 154.
See Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty). https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons-latin-america-tlatelolco-treaty. Accessed 12 April 2023.
- 155.
See United Nations. Treaty of Rarotonga. https://www.un.org/nwfz/fr/content/treaty-rarotonga#:~:text=The%20Treaty%20of%20Rarotonga%20contributes,member%20states%20(Article%205). Accessed 12 April 2023.
- 156.
See United Nations. Treaty of Bangkok. https://www.un.org/nwfz/fr/content/treaty-bangkok. Accessed 12 April 2023.
- 157.
See United Nations. Treaty of Pelindaba. https://www.un.org/nwfz/content/treaty-pelindaba#:~:text=The%20African%20Nuclear%2DWeapon%2DFree,force%20on%2015%20July%202009. Accessed 12 April 2023.
- 158.
See United Nations. Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. https://www.un.org/nwfz/content/treaty-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-central-asia#:~:text=The%20Central%20Asian%20Nuclear%2DWeapon,test%2C%20or%20possess%20nuclear%20weapons. Accessed 12 April 2023. See also Lee EYJ, The Complete Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Chinese Journal of International Law 9(4), 811–812.
- 159.
For example, see IAEA Safeguards. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/safeguards_web_june_2015_1.pdf. Accessed 12 April 2023.
- 160.
See Safeguards agreements. https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-agreements. Accessed 12 April 2023.
- 161.
Dillon and Baute (2001).
- 162.
In the case of North Korea, the country withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and expelled IAEA inspectors from its nuclear facilities. This led to concerns that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons. However, the IAEA continued to monitor the situation through satellite imagery and other means. This monitoring provided important information about North Korea's nuclear program, which was used in diplomatic efforts to address the issue. Despite these efforts, North Korea continued to develop its nuclear program and conducted several nuclear tests.
- 163.
In the case of Iran, the country was suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons in the early 2000s. In response, the IAEA conducted a series of inspections and investigations to determine the nature of Iran's nuclear program. These efforts ultimately led to the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, which placed significant limitations on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions. The IAEA continues to monitor Iran's compliance with the JCPOA.
- 164.
See Scheinman (2009).
- 165.
Ibid.
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Karim, R., Lee, E.Y.J. (2023). The Global Quest for Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguard, and Liability: An Analysis of International Legal and Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Energy. In: Navigating Nuclear Energy Lawmaking for Newcomers. International Law in Asia. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5708-8_3
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