


Deanonymization of TOR HTTP Hidden Services

Ionut Cernica

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whoami





CTF Player












The Onion Router



Hidden Service

Allow users to publish their service without revealing their identity

Configuration

HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80

Hidden service address

mhphb7utr2eqmul5mgggk5apf6dyjlldgujfvxohjiqu5pd2b7scg6qd.onion












Known Deanonymization Techniques



http://*.onion/server-status



Clas	DID	Ctannina	Cor	nections	Thre	eads	Async connections writing keep-alive closing							
Slot	PID	Stopping	total	accepting	busy	idle	writing	keep-alive	closing					
0	291368	no		yes	1	24	0	0	0					
1	291369	no	0	yes	0	25	0	0	0					
Sum	2	0	0		1	49	0	0	0					

	W.				_					_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	•	 		•	٠	•	•	٠	٠	٠	٠
•	•	• •	•	•	• •	•	•	•	•		• •	•	•		•			•						•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	 					•	•	•	•	•

Scoreboard Key:

[&]quot;I" Idle cleanup of worker, "." Open slot with no current process


\mathbf{Sr}	v PID	Acc]	M CPU	SS	Req	Dur	Conn	Child	Slot		Client	Protocol	VHost	Request
0-0	291368	0/1/1	0.00	13	0	0	0.0	0.00	0.00	127.	.0.0.1	http/1.1	mhphb7utr2eqmul5mgggk5apf6dyjll	GET /server-status HTTP/1.1
													wheeld 7mt 2earnul 5mgggk5apf6dyjll	GET /server-status HTTP/1.1
1-(291369	0/1/1	0.00	3	0	0	0.0	0.00	0.04	185.	.220.101.62	http/1.1	45.32.144.187:80	GET /leak HTTP/1.1

[&]quot;_" Waiting for Connection, "S" Starting up, "R" Reading Request,

[&]quot;W" Sending Reply, "K" Keepalive (read), "D" DNS Lookup,

[&]quot;c" Closing connection, "L" Logging, "G" Gracefully finishing,

Key Certificate



about:certificate?cert=MIIEhzCCA2%2BgAwIBAgIQJMvy8 \subset \diamondsuit





Public Key Info

Algorithm Elliptic Curve

Key Size 256

Curve P-256

Public Value 04:69:B9:5C:4A:B7:83:23:23:09:46:BE:0A:B1:74:69:EF:93:BE:84:07:5...

Miscellaneous

Serial Number 24:CB:F2:F1:C9:76:19:09:0A:B9:AD:3D:A4:68:45:87

Signature Algorithm SHA-256 with RSA Encryption

Version 3

Download PEM (cert) PEM (chain)

Key Certificate

- TLS certificate might be indexed on the surface web and can lead to the same resource from the dark net or other services of the same actor
- Shodan indexes information from the internet including TLS information



Search for the onion address



- Very little chance of success
- Just search the onion address on search engines like Google, Bing, DuckDuckGo or Shodan

Gzip Compression


- Jose Carlos found that around 10% of the webservers leak the remote date when compressing HTTP Responses with gzip
- Its not a problem in TOR and its not a bug in the protocol as well and is not a problem with the GZIP
- It helps you get an idea of where one or another server is hosted.



favicon.ico matching

- favicon is that tiny icon that users see in the browser's URL bar
- It is possible to match favicons found on dark web with favicons on the internet using Shodan
- The Quantum ransomware group is an example:

Using its favicon from the dark web, Talos found its equivalent on the surface web and could locate the threat actor's web server



Hack the server



Find vulnerabilities in order to deanonymize the server

Remote Command Execution

Local File Inclusion

Make a research on the server and look for other vulnerabilities that can leak the servers IP

Downgrading The HTTP Protocol

- How did I find this?
- Strange requests in my access.log file using HTTP/1.0 protocol: "GET /NotFoundNotFou
 - Same behavior on my honeypots
 - The requests keep coming for days
 - I dumped the hole request
 - I replicated and got an internal virtual host of mine that I didn't want to be public
- This was the moment when I realized the potential of this flaw, both on the internet and dark web
- Started to develop an improved version of this /NoTFound.... request in order to exfiltrate the IP or unknown domains

Downgrading The HTTP Protocol


Why this behavior?

- Is not because of a security problem in apache-based servers like: apache2, nginx or tomcat
 - Is all about configuration
 - The server must choose one of the domains to forward the request
- The client doesn't supply a "**Host: example.com**" header and to do that we can choose the first version of HTTP protocol -> HTTP/1.0
 - The server will choose the first virtualhost
- In the response we can find first declared virtualhost. Which might be a domain or an IP or just localhost


The leak

- The leak is in the:
 - Triggered exceptions
 - Doesn't work on all apache-based servers
 - HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
 - HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden
 - Even the 404 NotFound sometimes discloses the IP
 - Server redirects
 - The best way to leak the IP
 - works in servers like nginx, apache2, tomcat


Don't forget to downgrade



Don't forget to downgrade



HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request – Long Header



HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request

The same result with a long URL or a file upload that exceeds the server limit

HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden

- Very easy to trigger
- I used the ^.ht* rule and you can visit /.html to not attract attention
- The rule above is for .ht files, like .htacces or .htpasswd, etc




Server redirects

- The best way to trigger redirect is to search for directories that serves static files
 - servers based on apache must put a / at the end
 - Exampe: if we visit http://server.com/dir it will auto redirect to http://server.com/dir
 - most cases you can find on the first page directories
- if there is an app without directories that serves something, then try some predefined directories that exists in some servers like "/img", "/css", "/icons", "/js"
- this directories are available only if you visit with the IP 127.0.0.1, which most of the time in TOR this is the IP that you access the application

Trigger the redirect

Trigger the redirect

Trigger the redirect and leak the IP



Apply this on the Internet

- I didn't make a research on this. I suppose is at the limit of legality
- It appears that others did this before, but I don't know if they followed this problem
- I expect to exfiltrate domains that normally you cannot get from an IP. It's a kind of reverse DNS on a specific IP

Other techniques - ETag

- The ETag or entity tag is part of HTTP, the protocol for the World Wide Web
- Downgrade the protocol has nothing to do with this one
- It suppose to take the ETag of the default domain and search it on the internet
- We can find ETag in the response header
- This can be done if the first page is static and not dynamic
- We can use Shodan
- The chance of success is quite small, but it's worth a try

Example of ETag



Other techniques - Same Network Technique

- This technique involves domain enumeration on a given host
- Because the number of known .onion address on TOR is small, then it is doable to search on the same server other TOR domains
- If we find multiple domains on a single server then is enough to find the IP address of one of the domains to find the others
- I remember I found a hosting provider on TOR for hidden services, but the owner didn't used a good sandbox and I was able to find the IP address. Then if I would make a domain enumeration on that server I would find the other hidden services hosted on that server
- To achieve that we need to change in "Host:" header the name of the hidden service with the ones from the list, one at a time and look for the response if is the same



Closing Remarks

- We saw how many possibilities are there to trigger an exception in order to leak an IP or a
 domain in a server. If you are luck enough, the IP can be 127.0.0.1 or a domain that doesn't
 specify something
- · Also, how easy is to trigger a redirect in order to leak the IP
- Keep in mind to create a virtual host for localhost or 127.0.0.1 to be sure that all the traffic for http/1.0 will go through it
- Try not to reuse certificates from other projects
- Disable server-status page
- All of this are configuration problems and is important that any sysadmin to know about this



Thanks

Do you have any questions?

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