Organizational Extensiveness and Political Clientelism:

The Formal and Informal 'Ties that Bind'

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that party leaders' ability and incentives to deploy clientelistic strategies will vary according to their respective parties' *organizational form*. We argue theoretically, and find empirically, that parties whose primary means of connecting with voters at the local level is through delegation to non-affiliated local notables will be especially prone to clientelistic linkage. On the other hand, parties whose primary local presence is maintained via a dense network of local branch organizations staffed by party militants will be more prone to programmatic strategies. Finally, ties to civil society organizations of a non-encompassing variety tend to exert the expected positive influence and clientelist linkages, and this effect is particularly relevant when it comes to the effectiveness of such strategies. We look forward to further developing these preliminary results in future work.

I. Introduction

Clientelistic forms of electoral competition and democratic governance have been the subject of much recent scholarly attention. While conceptual nuances vary according to author and setting, at its most general level clientelism is a form of democratic accountability characterized by *direct exchange* between citizens and politicians, in which the former provide the latter with votes and/or other forms of electoral support in exchange for targeted access to a variety of material advantages (gifts, jobs, social benefits, business contracts and regulatory favors). By contrast, "programmatic" accountability relations prevail where winning parties offer club and collective goods, the enjoyment of which is not based on the voter's delivery of the vote or other services.

One agenda within this larger field seeks to identify the political and economic *consequences* of clientelism, noting its effect on the provision of 'public goods' (Keefer 2007), a variety of development indicators (Pierskalla and Fernandez 2009), or the politicization of ethnicity (Wantchekon 2003). A second line of investigation the social, historical, and institutional phenomena which impel political parties to adopt clientelistic campaign and governance strategies (Shefter 1994; Piattoni 2001; Kitschelt and Stevenson 2007). While our paper may be closer to this latter concern, it focuses more particularly on the organizational complementarities that make possible the sustained pursuit of clientelistic politics. More particularly, we will argue that party leaders' ability and incentives to deploy clientelistic strategies will vary according to their respective parties' *organizational form*. Some organizational forms are more "productive" in both staging a clientelistic effort to win votes and ensuring that voters abide by the terms of a clientelistic exchange than others.

The theoretical argument is broadly grounded in new institutional economics (e.g. Williamson 1985), which emphasizes the ways in which firms' internal structures may serve to mitigate the various contracting problems which arise in economic markets. Institutional

economics seeks to determine the complementarities between the organizational design of contractual relations among self-interested actors and the task structure they are facing in the pursuit of income maximization. In economic markets these contractual challenges emerge between firms, suppliers, labor, etc. The pursuit of credible contractual relationships in democratic politics, in contrast, revolves around the demands of voters and the facilities politicians have at their disposal to satisfy such demands. Just as distinct firm structures facilitate distinct forms of economic contracting, we argue that distinct party structures will be more or less effective in establishing distinct forms of electoral linkage between citizens and elites.

In this paper, the parameter of interest will be *organizational extensiveness,* a concept first formulated by Duverger (1959) and subsequently elaborated by Harmel and Janda (1982). It refers to a political party's relative 'reach' or territorial 'presence', its ability establish connections with voters across a country's geographic expanse. Highly extensive parties will have a local presence in all or most of a country's electoral districts, while less extensive parties will be characterized by the absence of a local presence in some non-negligible portion of districts. Let us further distinguish between three forms of extensiveness, each of which represents a distinct 'transmission belt' through which political parties may reach voters and consummate relationships of democratic accountability: *formal* extensiveness, *informal* extensiveness, and *civil society* extensiveness.

Formal extensiveness most closely resembles the territorial organization originally implied by Duverger and Janda, and refers to the maintenance of local branch offices and affiliated ancillary organizations (youth groups, sports clubs, women's groups, etc), staffed by partisan cadre and militants with formalized and official ties to the national-level party organization. Informal extensiveness is in some sense the mirror image of this 'official' local presence, in which the business of developing relationships with voters is delegated to non-

partisan 'notables' (neighborhood leaders, religious leaders, etc) who secure voter support and campaign participation without maintaining formalized and symbolic ties to particular organizations, but who nonetheless maintain an iterated relationship with local party leadership.[1] Finally, politicians may also contract out their capacity to reach the public more explicitly, through the mechanism of civil society organization. They might be able to draw on the support of interest groups and social associations that serve functional interests in the economy and socio-cultural sphere of a polity. Civil society extensiveness, then, refers to a party's ability to reach voters via more or less routinized relationships with key civil society organizations (unions, business associations, women's groups, etc). Note from the outset that these distinct forms of extensiveness are not mutually exclusive. That said, subsequent sections demonstrate the importance of maintaining these distinctions in explaining the complementarities between clientelistic linkage strategies and organizational forms.

Our motivating question is thus as follows: how does a political party's profile of organizational extensiveness affect its leaders' decision to engage (or not to engage…) in clientelistic linkage strategies? Section II develops a theoretical framework which suggests that informal extensiveness, as effectuated by non-partisan operatives, will be particularly productive in generating clientelistic incentives. The incentives produced by formalized local organizations are likely to be mixed, as are their empirical consequences. Finally, we expect the effect of routinized ties to civil society associations should depend on the type of group in question, and should be particularly relevant for the relative success with which politicians convert clientelistic efforts into actual votes. Section III presents the data used to operationalize and test these predictions statistically. These data come from a novel data set on patterns of party organization and democratic accountability in 88 contemporary countries, which allows us to test the relationship between organizational form and clientelism with

[1] Such parties tend to be more "cadre" organizations with a limited number of formal members, but still a broad reach into society through affiliated external brokers.

individual parties as the unit of observation. Beyond describing the survey instrument, this section provides descriptive statistics demonstrating substantial cross-national variance in organizational form and clientelism, variance which itself is in no way 'over-determined' by exogenous structural conditions, and in particular by economic development. Section IV then investigates our theoretical hypotheses in a controlled statistical setting, uncovering evidence which is strongly supportive of our claims regarding the varying effects of distinct forms of extensiveness on both clientelistic effort and effectiveness. Among other things the analysis both identifies and explains the phenomenon, particularly common in Latin America, of political parties who devote extensive effort to clientelistic appeals, but exhibit only moderate success turning that effort into actual voter support. Section V concludes.

II. Organizational Extensiveness and Clientelism

While there is an extensive literature on the causes of clientelism, the organizational form of political parties has never been investigated as a necessary ingredient accounting for the effort politicians make in offering clientelistic inducements or the success they experience in mobilizing votes. Net of deeper historical antecedents, does political party organization matter for the viability of clientelistic accountability relations in competitive democracies? Or are organizational forms primarily epiphenomenal, leaving parties' linkage strategies entirely determined by economic and political priors that cannot be manipulated by politicians? One obvious candidate here is economic development, which has been invariably found to constitute a powerful predictor of clientelism, although data generated in the Democratic Accountability project for the first time provide some direct global comparative evidence to this effect. A second candidate is democratic experience. It takes time and iterations of party competition to make politicians partisan labels and policy stances associated with them credible to mass publics. In young democracies electorates thus face exceptional uncertainty

about the programmatic claims of competing elites (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). When voters demand the "sure thing," politicians will oblige with a clientelistic accountability strategy. They offer selective, targeted benefits that can easily be observed instead of the illusive and long-term benefits of good pubic policy delivering collective goods that improve the well-being of large audiences. For this reason, Keefer (2007) homes in on the age of democracy as a theoretically critical variable determining the viability of clientelistic or programmatic strategies, net of other considerations.

Though sympathetic to this argument, we suspect that the relationship between democratic experience and clientelism is in fact more complicated. Firstly, just like programmatic policy platforms, neither are the dense networks necessary to consummate clientelistic linkages likely to appear overnight. Clientelistic modes of democratic accountability raise difficult challenges of credibility and uncertainty, challenges which may be resolved by repeated interaction over time (Stokes 2005). Even the delegation to local notables of distribution and monitoring responsibilities requires iteration and regularity to be effective, so as to minimize the risk that non-partisan operatives siphon targeted resources for their personal use, as well as the likelihood that they shop their services to competing party organizations. Of course, not all political parties in new democracies start from scratch. They may, for example, be steeped in organizational infrastructures inherited from authoritarian regimes, ready to be redeployed in clientelistic transmission belts (cf. Shefter 1994). Thus, the effect of democratic experience on the incentives to employ clientelist strategies ought to depend on the historical legacy of its political parties, and may weaken when controlling for this historical legacy. In addition to a measure of democratic experience, below we investigate the effect of a distinct indicator which captures the *historical legacy of particular party organizations*.

Extensiveness, Distribution, and Monitoring

We acknowledge that both economic development and the historical legacy of democratic competition and/or organizational forms are likely to be relevant determinants of clientelistic effort, and control for them in the below statistical analyses. However, we also believe that organizational form will exert an independent and robust effect on politicians' linkage strategies. Let us then turn to the critical theoretical task of detailing how a particular organizational design may make it more likely that politicians invest in clientelistic effort, and furthermore may impact the extent to which these investments lead to electoral success. Clientelist political entrepreneurs face the dual challenge of effectively *distributing* targeted resources; and then of establishing, through processes of *monitoring* and *enforcement*, that recipients of clientelistic benefits are in fact holding up their end of the bargaining (voting for the party, participating in campaign rallies, etc). On the distributive side of things, the challenge is not simply one of handing out benefits. Firstly, individual handouts often have a 'multiplier' effect: for each individual who receives a targeted benefit, party leaders may hope that, in addition to that individual's support, the handout will indirectly garner the support of his or her family members, friends, co-workers, etc. Clientelism will thus be most effective when those distributing goods at the local level are able to do so in a way that maximizes this multiplier effect.[2] Furthermore, a distinct body of research investigates whether or not particularistic benefits are most effective when targeted to loyal ideological supporters as opposed to undecided voters (Stokes 2005, Nichter 2008, Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). Regardless of which side of the debate one takes, clientelism will clearly be more

[2] For example, by ensuring that targeted benefits go to household heads who hold political sway over their immediate family, and that no two members of a single household receive benefits (which would be 'redundant'…).

effective when those distributing benefits are able to distinguish between committed and undecided voters.

Having distributed goods and realized their side of the clientelist exchange, political parties then must ensure that recipients of targeted benefits hold up their end of the bargain, and most importantly, that they cast their vote for the party in question or at least abstain from supporting a competitor. While in most democracies the secrecy of the vote is formally maintained, there are numerous (often ingenious…) informal mechanisms by which local operatives can ascertain individuals' vote choice. These mechanisms range from creating party-specific ballots (often via the use of 'color-coding'), to having individual voters photograph their vote choice with cellular telephones, to probing micro-level networks for information and 'gossip'. If through these monitoring processes political operatives detect instances of non-compliance, they may employ any number of mechanisms to sanction defecting voters, which at the extreme may even imply ex-post withdrawal of the original targeted benefit (for example, discontinuing a particular client's access to social programs, or physically removing a gifted washing machine from their home). These processes of distribution, monitoring, and enforcement are nearly impossible to implement without a knowledgeable and expansive team of local operatives, whose presence in their respective communities is more or less consistent over time (i.e. independent of electoral cycles). Put otherwise, *clientelism will be more effective in parties which maintain extensive organizations*. While this claim is neither surprising nor counterintuitive, the question then becomes: do different forms of extensiveness impact clientelism differently?

Formal vs. Informal Organizational Extensiveness

We begin with the relative advantages of formal or informal organization for clientelistic efforts in political linkage building. Faced with a status quo profile of formal and

informal local networks and of external constituency demands, how will political leaders decide whether investments in clientelistic efforts or other linkage strategies will be the best way to use their limited resources? Expressed in the counterfactual language of regression analysis, how will marginal increases in formal and/or informal organizational extensiveness alter a party's optimal allocation of resources to clientelism? For the purposes of clientelistic, discretionary resource mobilization and allocation, informal organization appears to have several advantages.

When parties delegate distribution and monitoring duties to non-affiliated notables, they are delegating to agents with a pre-established relationship to the social and/or geographic constituencies in which they operate. By virtue of their position as community arbiters and power brokers, most have immediate access to the information and networks described above. On the other hand, for a variety of reasons, the activists and staff who man formal organizational structures will often lack this direct connection. The opportunity of relying on informal social networks will thus be a natural advantage for clientelistic politics. This advantage concerns both the input in resources they receive from wealthy supporters, as well as the disbursement of resources to citizens whose electoral conduct will need to be monitored at least indirectly. Informal networks are uniquely conducive to maintaining this informal surveillance, and thus for policing opportunism in clientelistic exchange.

Furthermore, informal association allows local leaders and activists to act as partisans, while also projecting a non-partisan image to the local community. Formal party membership would put an end to the special quality of non-partisan appeals in local politics. Many local notables therefore would not want to shed their non-partisan status, even though they may be quite willing to assist a party to gain influence or sustain political supremacy. As a consequence, leaders of formal local branch organizations may be at a relative disadvantage when compared to these notables. Branch leaders are often 'implants' from distinct

communities, as national leaders distribute such positions as rewards for party service and personal loyalty. Local agents whose status is based on formal affiliation with a local branch will thus often have to invest additional time and effort to develop the network necessary for effective distribution and monitoring, whereas non-affiliated agents will have these networks already at hand. From the perspective of cost and capacity alone, extensiveness of the informal variety should give clientelistic accountability strategies a nudge compared to formal organizational reach.

A distinct mechanism which may disadvantage formal organization *vis a vis* informal organization has to do with the perspective assumed by formal entrants into a party. Formal party members do not find themselves spontaneously in a party, but by explicit choice. This choice may come with a sense of entitlement that expresses itself in a variety of aspirations, some of which may have to do with a desire to control the fate of the organization rather than only to be paid off, at a higher rate, than other supporters of the party who are not members. For one thing, at least some formal members may demand some transparency of and say over the parties' resource flow. For another, in addition to selective material and social incentives, at least some subset of party entrants will harbor "purposive" incentives that involve programmatic, if not ideological aspirations and altruistic objectives, such as promoting a genuine commitment social progress and community service by providing collective goods. For example, Scwarzberg (2011) documents the narratives of committed militants in the Argentine Peronist party, who not only express dismay with clientelistic politics, but also often forgo the use of targeted goods and organize instead on programmatic grounds. In addition to lacking the informational advantage of embedded local notables, such militants have motivational orientations incompatible with effective and credible clientelistic targeting.

The preceding discussion highlights aspects of both formal and informal organization which should make the latter more effective than the former at maintaining clientelistic

linkages. A separate line of reasoning arises from considering the consequences of both and informal organization for distinct forms of democratic accountability, and in particular for programmatic accountability. Parties with primarily informal organization place few limits on the national party leaders' desires to make rapid policy shifts, as there is no formal organizational cadre that could confront them, let alone one that might harbor programmatic policy demands. This capacity for unconstrained policy shifts is reinforced by the absence of semi-regularized rules and procedures, which make defection from programmatic stances both more cumbersome and more risky. Together, these two dynamics will inhibit the *ex post* credibility of campaign platforms in primarily informal parties. On the other hand, dense formal organization is likely to make such radical policy shifts less likely. Extensive formal membership roles typically entail other aspects of organizational formalization, such as a reliance on regularized rules and procedures. Especially if party membership is large, it is likely that these procedures make an organization less flexible and nimble in the hand of powerful organizational personalities. We will pursue in another paper whether clientelistic linkage strategies also coincide with more centralized rather than only more informal party organization.[3] For now, however, the relevant implication is that formal rules impede the discretionary and idiosyncratic mobilization and allocation of resources vital in clientelistic exchanges. As a necessary, but far from sufficient condition, the presence of formal party organization will thus help to provide voters greater confidence in the fact that programmatic election platforms are credible, and in turn will make such strategies more attractive to party leaders.

Beyond the issue of credibility, parties with primarily informal organizations will be disadvantaged in other ways when it comes to the consummation of programmatic linkages.

[3] Basically, formal organization is likely to improve the credibility of programmatic commitments by tying leaders down and reducing their strategic degrees of freedom. See on organizational form and strategic flexibility Panebianco (1989) and Kitschelt (1989; 1994: chapter 5).

Without formal organizational structures, ideologically-minded citizens have will have no outlet for their aspirations in parties without local branch structures, which provide a forum for the expression and cultivation of such preferences. As well, the lack of formal branch offices and ancillary groups leaves a symbolic void which complicates the appropriation of programmatic cues, and their association with particular party organizations. Absent both ideological 'militants' and a clear symbolic presence necessary for disseminating programmatic stances at the local level, parties will be unable to reinforce messages disseminated through impersonal media with ground-level organizing and policy promotion. Put simply, while we expect informal extensiveness to be better-suited to clientelistic linkage than formal extensiveness, we expect the opposite when it comes to programmatic linkage.

The reason it is important to point out the relative effectiveness of formal and informal extensiveness for establishing programmatic linkages is that, to the extent that parties have the programmatic option, this may lead them to divert time, effort, and resources which would have been used for clientelism towards the development and dissemination of programmatic messages. We do not mean to suggest that there is a direct tradeoff between the two, such that every unit of 'effort' taken from clientelistic targeting goes definitionally to programmatic campaigning. Many parties are able to effectuate both types of strategies simultaneously, and there a number of distinct linkage strategies on which campaign resources may be spent (not to mention that such resources may be appropriated for personal use…). However, the data below do demonstrate a strong negative correlation between clientelism and programmatism. As such, while we do not posit a direct tradeoff between clientelism and programmatism, we suspect that increases in a party's formal organization may, at the margins, lead to the diversion of resources from the former to the latter.

The preceding discussion can be summarized in the following Figures, which plot our expectations as to the relative impact of formal and informal extensiveness on political parties' linkage strategies:

(Figures 1a and 1b here)

In both cases, the figures' x-axes represent extensiveness levels, and are increasing from left to right. The figure's y-axes represents programmatic effort allocations (Figure 1a) and clientelistic effort allocations (Figure 1b) respectively. Each plot contains two lines, one capturing expected levels of clientelism associated with various levels of formal extensiveness, and the other capturing expected levels of clientelism associated with various levels of informal extensiveness. With regards to formal extensiveness, we see that the relationship is moderate and upward sloping in both figures (though slightly steeper in the case of programmatic effort). This is due to the fact that increased formal extensiveness could conceivably facilitate both types of democratic linkage. As already noted increased formal extensiveness is likely to improve both the dissemination and credibility of programmatic messages, thus making such strategies more palatable to party leaders.

With regards to Figure 1b, note that despite the tenor of the preceding discussion, our goal was not to suggest that increasing the breadth of party's local branch structure and membership would be unequivocally 'bad' for clientelism. Given the importance of citizen-elite 'proximity' for distribution and monitoring processes, an increased local presence of any variety is likely to have some positive consequence for the effectiveness of clientelist strategies. That said, the slope of this line is quite modest, as the improvements arising from increased proximity may be offset by both: a.) the muted clientelistic inclinations of ideologically-minded, formally-affiliated party members; and b.) the potential that, at the margins, party leaders will substitute effort from clientelistic strategies to programmatic strategies as formal extensiveness increases. Indeed, the fact that we use a dashed line to plot

this relationship is designed to indicate heightened uncertainty as to the actual *direction* of the effect. Although we suspect it will positive, it is not inconceivable that the effect of mechanisms (a) and (b) above will outweigh the greater citizen-elite proximity that comes from increasing the presence of local branch structures, leading in fact to a negative relationship.

Moving to informal extensiveness, our predictions are somewhat more pronounced, reflecting the more unequivocal effect of increased informal delegation to local notables on the distinct linkage strategies. With regards to Figure 1a, informal extensiveness carries with it none of the improvements to programmatic dissemination or credibility associated with formal extensiveness. As such, the derivative of this plot is effectively zero, although we again employ a dotted to indicate uncertainty as to the effect's precise direction. The source of this uncertainty is similar to that of the plot for formal extensiveness in Figure 1b, and can be gleaned by looking at this latter figure. When it comes to clientelistic effort, the discussion above leads us to expect unequivocal (and fairly 'steep') increases in clientelistic effectiveness as informal extensiveness increases. This suggests that at the margins, holding levels of formal extensiveness constant, increases in informal extensiveness may lead party leaders to divert effort and resources previously geared towards programmatic policy promotion to the distribution of targeted benefits. In turn, given the absence of any increased incentives for programmatism, it may be that increased delegation of local organizing responsibilities to non-affiliated notables actually has a negative impact on the extent to which electoral candidate run programmatic campaigns.

The paper's primary objective is to identify the organizational foundations of clientelistic accountability, as captured in Figure 1b. However, one of the mechanisms generating our expectations thereon comes from Figure 1a, namely the distinct effects of formal and informal extensiveness for programmatic linkage. In the empirical Section IV

below, we not only summarize and test the hypotheses implied by Figure 1a; we also use a measure of programmatism to test the hypotheses implied by Figure 1b, thus allowing to establish whether one of the primary mechanisms generating our expectations as to the relationship between organizational form and clientelism is operating as expected.

Regularized Links with Civil Society Groups

Civil society associations—such as interest groups organizing labor or business, religious or ethnic groups, neighborhoods or women—are neither purely informal social networks nor formal partisan organizations. Like networks of notables, they abstain from the partisan arena of electoral competition and tend to promote interests in a functional, thematically specialized fashion, while political parties cannot limit their agenda to particular political questions. Civic associations and notables therefore can build group consensus across a broader range of people than programmatic parties, because they are able to coordinate them around a narrower scope of issues. Moreover, by not being primarily focused on the acquisition and discharge of power, but the provision of membership benefits and specialized advantages, they may abstain from issues that concern the provision of collective goods and large-scale club goods altogether. The “special interest” character of civic associations is likely to make them more amenable to engage with clientelistic political parties whose main technique it is to provide direct material benefits to their followers than to excite them with complex and divisive issues of public policy. At a general level, ‘special interest’ politics and clientelistic political exchange have a natural affinity.

The extent to which civic associations are weary of programmatic partisan linkages and amenable to clientelistic linkage may, however, vary depending on the cause they organize and the political economic structure into which they are inserted. Where unions and employers organize entire sectors of large-scale production units in a centralized fashion,

they are unlikely to settle for special interest politics, whether cast in a clientelistic exchange that targets individuals and small groups who vote for a party, or in a politics of 'pork' provision without clientelistic contingency. In a similar vein, "postindustrial" civic groups, like women's and environmental organizations that struggle for the provision of large-scale public goods, may be intrinsically inaccessible to clientelistic propositions.

Furthermore, even civic associations conducive to clientelistic political exchange share a trait that makes them unlike networks of local notables, though their respective key personnel may be overlapping. Civic associations often operate at a scale and develop organizational capacities that far exceed those of local networks of notables. This may uniquely qualify them to serve as amplifiers or "transmission belts" of clientelistic politics. These capabilities may come in handy in the process of organizing politicians' efforts to distribute clientelistic advantages to target constituencies. Even more so, the scale of civic associations may uniquely qualify them in helping with the *monitoring* and *enforcement* of clientelistic linkage patterns. Notables can both effectively distribute goods and monitor the conduct of local recipients. But if citizens act opportunistically and do not support the party that bestowed benefits on them, it may take little more than moving into another neighborhood to escape from monitoring and sanctions. By contrast, members of religious or ethnic organization cannot so easily evade the reach of an associationally mediated political commitment. Particularly in physically and socially more mobile societies, where improved transportation and urbanization have weakened the reach of notables, the presence of civic associations may become a welcome facilitator to build and sustain clientelistic exchange relations. While the availability of civic associational links thus should leave a positive imprint on politicians' effort to offer clientelistic benefits to electoral constituencies, the impact of civic associations may be especially strong on the monitoring and enforcement side of clientelistic exchanges, and thus on the *effectiveness with which such efforts generate*

votes. We examine this more nuanced hypothesis below with a measure of the extent to which parties turn their clientelistic efforts into actual electoral gain.

III. Democratic Linkage and Party Organization around the World

To operationalize our theoretical arguments, we employ the data from an expert survey administered in 88 countries, (almost) each of which yielded a minimum of ten expert responses from political scientists and three from journalists covering national election campaigns for the country's quality newspapers. Precise question wordings, correlation matrices, and summary statistics for all of the following linkage and organizational variables are contained in the Data Appendix, where one can also find details about the survey and its likely limitations. Here we briefly address the measurement of clientelism, programmaticism, and the organizational features of political parties. To operationalize clientelistic and programmatic linkage strategies, we employ measures of *operational effort* in which expert responses allow us to create a summary index that indicates the extent to which parties target resources to electoral constituencies (clientelism) or coordinate around successfully around cohesive policy objectives that are bundled in party programs (programmaticism).

With regard to clientelism, the survey questions never actually employ the term itself, as especially among intellectuals, it often evokes negative connotations, opening the door to bias in expert scoring. Instead, experts are asked to assess the efforts parties make to provide or promise to provide certain goods and services to voters. Questions ask experts to assess these efforts for (1) consumer goods, (2) preferential access to social policy entitlements, (3) employment in public or regulated sectors, (4) preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities and finally (5) influence over regulatory procedures. The five classes of goods and services are not perfectly collinear (something that would make measuring each separately redundant), but sufficiently strongly related (at better than .70) to

aggregate the experts' scores on all five of them into a single index of clientelistic effort (b1_b5) for each party.

The survey also asks experts to estimate how *successful* parties are in converting clientelistic effort into actual vote gain (b11). Figure 1 provides the distribution of our study's 88 party systems across a field created by the dimensions of clientelistic effort and effectiveness. National summary indices are created by averaging all parties' clientelistic effort scores, weighted by the proportion of votes each party received in the most recent national legislative election. The two indices are strongly, but not perfectly correlated (r = .628; r-square = .395). In general, clientelist effort and effectiveness are pretty low in most affluent (post-industrial) democracies, whereas both are quite intense in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Regions with widely dispersed national averages are the post-communist sphere of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the—admittedly amorphous—residual category of Asia-Middle East. Note also the Latin American exceptionalism here. Experts score the clientelistic efforts of parties in the region as mostly high (except in Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile and Peru where they are in the intermediate range), but the electoral effectiveness of clientelistic efforts often much lower (except in Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Argentina and Colombia). Below, we provide we provide an explanation of this gap grounded in a particular organizational feature of Latin American parties.

(Figure 2 here)

Our second more 'operational' measure of democratic linkage applies to the programmatic appeal of political parties. Rational, policy-motivated voters, who wish to support the party that is closest to their own programmatic positions, need to know that a party: a.) has a unified position on a policy ("cohesion"); b.) cares about that policy ("salience"), and (3) has a position on that policy distinctive from that of other parties ("polarization"). When all three elements come together, rational voters will have a reason to

choose among parties based on programmatic appeals. Based on the expert's scores of parties on a range of policy issues, a whole paper is devoted to the construction and exploration of a composite index of programmatic policy coordination in political parties, which includes all three above elements (cf. Freeze and Kitschelt 2010). Suffice it here to underline that the index constitutes a measure of the actual policy coordination accomplished within political parties, as seen through the lens of experts' judgments of parties' policy positions. It is not simply a measure of the "enthusiasm" that parties show for the discussion of policies compared to their declarations of support for other linkage mechanisms, but more precisely captures the *realization of programmatic coordination*. We label this index PROG, which is a summary measure of programmatic effort at the level of individual parties but can also be aggregated to the national level with the same procedure applied to other indices (weighted national average of parties). Figure 2 shows the relationship between the weighted national averages of parties' operational efforts to provide clientelistic linkages (b1_b5) and programmatic linkages (PROG) in the 88 countries of our study. What emerges is a robust trade-off between parties' deployment of clientelistic effort and programmatic effort when measured at the national level (r = -.65; N=88). Even when taking the "noise" of individual party variance into account, the negative correlation between the deployment of the two linkage strategies is still fairly robust, although somewhat weakened (r = -.51; N=506).[4]

(Figure 3 here)

[4] Note that the clientelism/programmaticism trade-off at the country level would be even stronger were it not for a small group of outliers: affluent Western democracies, where parties' clientelistic effort is very low, but also their realized programmatic appeal is at best moderate (especially the Scandinavian countries Norway and Sweden, and the UK, as well as to a lesser extent Finland, New Zealand, and Ireland). Despite this aggregate level tradeoff, disaggregation also shows that there are some parties that can combine clientelistic and programmatic linkage strategies, and it will be interesting to explore what sort of organizational production function they are deploying.

We present two measures of the formal extensiveness of a party's party organization. The first concerns the estimated share of a country's municipalities in where a party has a physical presence through a district office. The second measure is a simple dummy where respondents could indicate whether a party has ancillary functional group organizations, such as youth or women's groups, retail cooperatives or athletic clubs. The organizational field extensiveness and the presence of ancillary organizations are rather strongly correlated (r = .67). We label these indices Local_Office and Local_Ancil respectively.

Survey item a3, our primary measure of informal extensivness, measures the extent to which a party delegtes local organizing reponsibilities to local intermediaries (e.g. notables, religious leaders, or neighborhood leaders). We lable this variable Local_Notable. A distinct measure asks experts to indicate whether parties have "strong linkages to one or more of a set of "civil society organizations," with a list on which for each party one or several of the following could be checked off by respondents: labor unions, business or professional associations; religious organizations; ethnic/linguistic organizations; urban neighborhood or rural associations/movements, and women's organizations. For each of these civil society groups, we create a variable which captures the *percentage* of expert respondents who claimed that a party maintains more or less regularized relationships.

We now present a series of descriptive plots of the relationship between party organization, economic development, and party size. Figures 3a-3c begin with the organization-development relationship.

(Figure 4 about here)

Each point represents one of the data set's 506 organizational observations. As seen in the plots themselves, there is very little correlation between a party's socio-economic context and the extensiveness of its party organization. Neither formal nor informal extensiveness varies systematically with GDP; both extensive and non-extensive parties can be found at any level

of development. On the other hand, and consistent with the modest correlations presented in the Appendix, there is weak positive relationship between economic development and organizational decentralization.

We turn now to Figures 4a-4c, which present the descriptive relationship between a party's size and its organizational features.

(Figure 5 here)

Not surprisingly, there is a fairly positive strong relationship between a party's electoral size and its extensiveness. In fact, in both plots there appears to be a curvilinear effect by which increases in party-size have a greater marginal impact on extensiveness among smaller parties (L-shaped relationship). The relationship between party size and centralization is less clear, and spotted with outliers, but on the whole smaller parties tend to be more centralized than larger parties.

IV. Testing the Theoretical Framework

We now employ the data just described to test the theoretical framework developed in Section II. Figures 1 and 2 above summarize our theoretical expectations as to the relationship between organizational extensiveness and a party's linkage profile. Firstly, regarding effort allocations to clientelist linkage, we have the following hypotheses:

> **H1: Increases in Informal Extensiveness should lead to substantively and statistically significant lead to increases in clientelist effort.**
>
> **H2: Increases in Formal Extensiveness should lead to increases in clientelist effort, but these increases should be more modest than those associated with increases in informal extensiveness.**

Moving now to programmatic linkage strategies, we have the following hypotheses:

> **H3: Increases in Informal Extensiveness should have little to no effect on the use of programmatic strategies.**
>
> **H4: Increases in Formal Extensiveness should increase the use of programmatic strategies.**

Finally, we present a series of hypotheses which address the distinct nature of ties to civil society organizations and their impact on linkage strategies.

> **H5: Increases in ties to civil society organizations should have a positive effect on clientelistic linkage, although that effect should be smaller for 'encompassing' organizations such as trade unions.**
>
> **H6: Increases in ties to civil society organizations should be particularly valuable for ensuring that clientelistic effort is actually turned into electoral success, i.e. for making clientelistic effort effective.**

The following analyses will also control for economic development, measured by the natural logarithm of per capita GDP, as low levels of development are ubiquitously invoked as a determinant of clientelism. Urbanization levels, measured as the share of a country's population living in rural areas, are also included in the below regressions, to examine whether or not the population concentration characteristic of urban environments facilitates clientelistic strategies. Furthermore, we will make it even harder for our claim that organizational extensiveness matters for the effort and success of clientelistic accountability strategies by controlling for the possibility that democratic institutions affect the choice of clientelistic strategies. Clientelism requires the discretionary authority of politicians and their agents ("brokers") to direct resources to specified individuals. The institutional argument essentially claims that where procedural rules personalize political competition, institutions open up more opportunities for clientelistic politics than in institutional regimes where politics is a collectivist team sport. In this vein, presidential democracy is said to be more conducive to clientelism than parliamentary democracy, as may be personalizing party systems that operate through single-member districts or the combination of multi-member districts with open ballot formats (cf. Carey and Shugart 1995).

Finally, in line with the above discussion on the importance of iteration for credibility in both programmatic and clientelistic linkages, the following regressions contain the 'stock' of democracy, as first measure by Gerring et al. (2006), which aggregates a country's score

on the well-known Polity index over the entire 20th century, thus generating a measure of democratic experience. This indicator is different both from a simple measure of current democratic status, as well as an 'age of democracy' variable which doesn't account for distinct pre-authoritarian experiences. As a control the following analyses will also include a country's most recent score on the Polity Index. Finally, to complement this country-level 'legacy' variable, we introduce into the following analyses a measure taken from the same data source as our key dependent and independent variables, which captures whether or not political parties have at their disposal a 'historical' legacy with which to attract voters. We use this measure as an admittedly rough measure of party age.

The regression model is in all analyses is ordinary-least-squares. However, we will employ 'clustered' standard errors to correct for the fact that error terms are likely to be highly inter-correlated among political parties of the same country. The clustering correction is different from the more common 'Huber-White' heteroskedasticity correction in that, not only does it correct for the fact that standard errors may vary systematically with an observation's profile on chosen independent variables; but also for the fact that this systematic error correlation may be clustered according to some parameter not specified in the estimation equation's right-hand side. When using the current data set, the anchor point problem makes it particularly important to correct country-level clustering of standard errors: it may be that country experts systematically under- or over-report party scores on one or more of our dependent variables, due to the fact that their reading of our questions is filtered through country-specific political idioms. Using the cluster correction allows us to account for and adjust for this potential bias, making our estimates of the error covariance matrix consistent.

The first set of analyses, presented in Table 1, contain cluster-corrected results using our measure of clientelistic effort as a dependent variable. The first column contains a

baseline regression without any of the listed controls, and provides evidence largely in line with Hypotheses 1-5 above. Most basically, it suggests that informal extensiveness has a strong and robust positive effect on the use of clientelistic linkage strategies. Moving from the minimum value of '1' to a maximum value of '3' on this index leads to an increase of almost two units on b1_b5, which itself ranges from '0' to '4' (unlike in Figures 2 and 3, where b1_b5 ranges from '0' to '20', for the regression analyses we divided the measure by '5' to get an average across all 5 clientelism indices; this will be harmonized on the next iteration). On the other hand, the effect of the variable Local_Office is miniscule and insignificant, while the maintenance of ancillary organizations in fact has a negative impact on clientelistic effort allocations. Among civil society groups, ties to unions, women's groups, and religious organizations have no effect, while ties to business groups, religious groups, and ethnic associations have a positive and significant impact.

The second column in this table introduces controls for GDP and party size, demonstrating that development levels have the expected negative effect on clientelistic linkage, while party size somewhat surprisingly has no effect, probably due in part to this effect being usurped by the extensiveness measures. As for the extensiveness measures, the only changes to appear have to do with the civil society group indicators: unions (women's groups) are now positively (negatively) and significantly associated with clientelism, while the effect of ethnic associations (religious groups) loses (gains) significance. In the third control all additional controls are added. While this has no effect on the sign of our extensive measures, now all indicators of ties to civil society groups are statistically significant (at least at the level $p<.10$). Among controls, district magnitude, the rural population, and democratic experience have a negative effect, in line with expectations. On the other hand, current levels of democracy and our tracer of party age both have a positive effect. The following two columns rerun the regression from column 3 but include only one of our 3 core extensiveness

measures, to ensure that our results are not being driven by the inclusion of collinear indicators. We use the marker 'S' to denote situations in which neither the sign nor the statistical significance of regression coefficients changes from those of column 3. To summarize these results, our findings on the variables Local_Office and Local_Notable remain unchanged, but the coefficients on the variables 'Union', 'Ethnic', and 'Religious' lose their statistical significance. The final column reruns the regression from column 3, but omits all countries whose score on dem_stock is greater than 350, which amounts to omitting the set advanced industrial democracies except for Spain, Italy, Greece, and Mexico (it also omits Costa Rica, unique among the 'developing' world for its long democratic history). Once we do so the variable dem_stock loses significance, suggesting that democratic experience is useful for explaining the aggregate level differences between the '1st world' and everybody else, but not for explaining differences among states outside of the advanced industrial belt.

Table presents analyses which employ as a dependent the variable the indicator b11, which captures the 'effectiveness' with which political parties are able to turn clientelistic effort into tangible electoral gains.

(Table 2 here)

Naturally, this measure will exhibit significant co-variance with the 'effort' measure studied in Table 1, since parties which are scored as devoting little effort to clientelism will by definition also be scored as having little success gaining votes with clientelistic effort. However, the two measures are susceptible to greater distinction among parties who actually attempt to effectuate clientelistic linkages, some of which will invariably be more effective than others at turning this effort into increased electoral market shares. The first two columns here look much like those from Table 1, with the exception that, in keeping with hypothesis H6 above, the effect of ties to civil society organizations, and in particular ties to 'non-

encompassing' and 'non-ideological' groups (business, ethnic, religious, and unions) exert a more positive and significant and impact on parties' clientelistic effectiveness than was the case for clientelistic effort (ties to women's groups actually exhibit a negative and significant coefficient). Column 3 reinforces this finding, and highlights the unique effect of ties to non-encompassing civil society groups in sustaining effective clientelistic strategies. Indeed, here the variable Local_Notable, so persistently important in Table 1, loses statistical significance. Note also that the effect of GDP is much weaker than in Table 1, while the dem_stock variable no longer exhibits any predictive capacity.

Columns 4, 5, and 6 rerun the analyses but now include on the right-hand side our measure of clientelistic effort, so as to isolate the statistical effect of distinct key independent variables on effectiveness net of their effect on the adoption of clientelist strategies. These three models demonstrate, once again, that ties to the relevant civil society groups outweigh ties to local notables in making clientelism an efficient strategy. Furthermore, and unexpectedly, one of our measures of formal organization here demonstrates a positive effect, namely the maintenance of local-level ancillary groups. While such groups, for reasons addressed in Section II, do not exert a significant impact on politicians' incentives to use clientelism rather than other linkage mechanisms, given the choice to use clientelism their presence aids in its implementation. Indeed, in column 5 this effect in fact replaces the effect of ties to neighborhood associations. Finally, note that the variable dem_stock now exerts a positive and significant impact, i.e. while young democracies may at the margins tend to be more clientelistic than old democracies, they are not necessarily more effectively clientelistic than older democracies. Column 6 repeats the analysis omitting the variables Local_Office and Local_Ancil as a robustness check for multi-colinearity, and further reinforces the fact that, while Informal Extensiveness is crucial for incentivizing clientelism, ties to civil society groups are crucial for turning this effort in votes.

Table 3 conducts an identical set of statistical tests as those conducted in Table 1, except now using our measure of programmatic effort as a dependent variable.

(Table 3 here)

In line with Hypotheses H3 and H4, the maintenance of formalized branch structures exerts a positive and significant impact on our programmatism index in all but one of the analyses, that in which we omit the variables Local_Notable and Local_Ancil. So, while the effect is not as consistent as that uncovered with regards to the measure Local_Notable in Table 1, on the whole we find good deal for support for the notion that formal organization positively influences a party's programmatic effort allocations. Similarly, we find that both GDP and a country's district magnitude exert a positive and consistent effect. District magnitude in particular emerges as an important predictor in both Tables 1 and 3, and its effect are largely in line with previous game theoretic predictions as to the relationship between district size and accountability patterns (Kselman 2011). In contrast, neither a country's democratic experience nor a party's historical legacy have much effect on programmatism, a result which contradicts both expectations and past research cited above, and which we will investigate more closely in future work.

V. Conclusion

While very preliminary, this paper begins to uncover the relationship between a party's organizational extensiveness and its choice of strategies for establishing relationships of accountability with voters. We argue theoretically, and find empirically, that parties whose primary means of connecting with voters at the local level is through delegation to non-affiliated local notables will be especially prone to clientelistic linkage. On the other hand, parties whose primary local presence is maintained via a dense network of local branch organizations staffed by party militants will be especially prone to programmatic strategies.

Finally, ties to civil society organizations of a non-encompassing variety tend to exert the expected positive influence and clientelist linkages, and this effect is particularly relevant when it comes to the effectiveness of such strategies. We look forward to further developing these preliminary results in future work.

Table 1: Clientelistic Effort

	b1_b5	b1_b5	b1_b5	b1_b5	b1_b5	b1_b5 (dem_stock) <350)
Local_Office	.051 (.123)	.039 (.094)	-.026 (.090)	-.009 (.077)		S
Local_Ancil	-1.428 *** (.232)	-.706 *** (.183)	-.625 *** (.157)			S
Local_Ntbl	.949 *** (.147)	.531 *** (.135)	.492 *** (.119)		.236 ** (.091)	S
Union	.070 (.136)	.217 ** (.125)	.161 * (.096)	S	.152 (.098)	.057 (.117)
Women	-.256 (.174)	-.585 *** (.147)	-.380 *** (.122)	S	S	S
Business	.493 *** (.146)	.515 *** (.140)	.538 *** (.114)	S	S	S
Religion	.192 (.133)	.204 * (.120)	.170 * (.100)	S	S	S
Ethnic	.321 ** (.149)	.084 (.104)	.154 * (.092)	.091 (.098)	.137 (.099)	.104 (.099)
Neighbor	.444 ** (.189)	.416 *** (.151)	.232 * (.125)	.146 (.119)	.111 (.124)	.211 (.165)
Vote_Share		.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.004 * (.002)	S	S
Ln_GDP		-.251 *** (.032)	-.248 *** (.059)	S	S	S
Rural			-.007 ** (.003)	S	S	S
Pres			.112 (.097)	S	.183 * (.100)	S
Maj_Leg			.041 (.103)	S	S	S
Magnitude			-.001 *** (.000)	S	S	S
Open_List			-.068 (.085)	S	S	-.170 * (.094)
Dem_Stock			-.001 *** (.000)	S	S	.0001 (.0002)
Polity			.033 *** (.011)	S	S	S
Party_Legacy			.122 ** (.060)	S	S	.028 (.059)
CONS	1.29 *** (.207)	3.79 *** (.289)	3.50 *** (.577)	S	S	S

Table 2: Clientelistic Effectiveness

	b11	b11	b11	b11	b11	b11
b1_b5				.491 ***	.605 ***	S
				(.047)	(.062)	
Local_Office	.068	.050	.064	.043	.081	
	(.083)	(.080)	(.095)	(.069)	(.076)	
Local_Ancil	-.358 ***	-.062	-.125	.343 ***	.253 **	
	(.131)	(.129)	(.142)	(.108)	(.113)	
Local_Ntbl	.463 ***	.212 *	.166	-.003	-.132	S
	(.109)	(.117)	(.119)	(.099)	(.100)	
Union	.124	.151	.136	.089	.038	S
	(.106)	(.099)	(.103)	(.080)	(.078)	
Women	-.153	-.283 **	-.293 **	-.027	-.046	S
	(.128)	(.121)	(.113)	(.100)	(.101)	
Business	.459 ***	.403 ***	.424 ***	.217 ***	.099	S
	(.107)	(.109)	(.112)	(.078)	(.082)	
Religion	.322 ***	.340 ***	.320 ***	.228 ***	.217 ***	S
	(.095)	(.096)	(.099)	(.068)	(.065)	
Ethnic	.586 ***	.501 ***	.470 ***	.428 ***	.378 ***	S
	(.118)	(.115)	(.107)	(.090)	(.090)	
Neighbor	.261 **	.285 **	.279 **	.043	.138	.186 *
	(.124)	(.112)	(.120)	(.095)	(.101)	(.107)
Vote_Share		.006 ***	.002 ***		.006 ***	S
		(.002)	(.002)		(.001)	
Ln_GDP		-.094 ***	-.129 **		.022	S
		(.028)	(.052)		(.042)	
Rural			-.001		.004 *	.003
			(.003)		(.002)	(.002)
Pres			-.061		-.129 *	S
			(.095)		(.077)	
Maj_Leg			.001		-.024	S
			(.108)		(.083)	
Magnitude			-.001 *		.0003	S
			(.000)		(.0003)	
Open_List			.043		.085	S
			(.078)		(.069)	
Dem_Stock			.0001		(.0004) ***	S
			(.0002)		(.0001)	
Polity			.014		-.007	S
			(.010)		(.009)	
Party_Legacy			.068		-.005	S
			(.054)		(.046)	
CONS	1.88 ***	2.79 ***	2.80 ***	1.25 ***	.624	S
	(.136)	(.290)	(.569)	(.130)	(.504)	

Table 3: Programmatic Effort

	Prog	Prog	Prog	Prog	Prog	Prog (dem_stock) <350)
Local_Office	.056 ** (.028)	.056 ** (.022)	.046 * (.028)	.016 (.021)		.073 ** (.032)
Local_Ancil	.123 ** (.060)	-.041 (.054)	-.061 (.058)			S
Local_Ntbl	-.125 *** (.038)	-.045 (.035)	-.033 (.035)		S	S
Union	.041 (.029)	.000 (.022)	-.006 (.023)	S	S	S
Women	-.069 (.047)	.006 (.038)	.011 (.035)	S	S	-.069 * (.040)
Business	.025 (.032)	.008 (.023)	.003 (.022)	S	S	S
Religion	-.060 ** (.029)	-.061 *** (.021)	-.067 *** (.020)	S	S	S
Ethnic	-.018 (.037)	.038 (.032)	.016 (.031)	S	S	S
Neighbor	-.001 (.040)	.012 (.033)	.015 (.030)	S	S	S
Vote_Share		.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	S	S	S
Ln_GDP		.059 *** (.009)	.067 *** (.016)	S	S	S
Rural			.001 (.001)	S	S	S
Pres			-.016 (.026)	S	S	S
Maj_Leg			.028 (.031)	S	S	S
Magnitude			.0003 *** (.0001)	S	S	S
Open_List			.004 (.028)	S	S	S
Dem_Stock			.000 (.000)	S	S	S
Polity			.003 (.003)	S	S	S
Party_Legacy			.012 (.014)	S	S	.028 * (.015)
CONS	.259 *** (.052)	-.333 *** (.094)	-.489 *** (.189)	S	S	S

Figure 1: Extensiveness and Linkage Strategies

Figure 1a: Programmatic Effort



Figure 1b: Clientelistic Effort



Figure 2: Clientelist Effort and Clientelist Effectiveness



B11nwe = 1.71 + .086 B15nwe + e R-squared: .395

Figure 3: The Tradeoff Between Linkage Mechanisms



Figure 4: Organizational Structures and Development



Figure 4a: Formal Extensiveness and GDP



Figure 4b: Informal Extensiveness and GDP



Figure 4c: Decentralization and GDP

Figure 5: Organizational Structures and Party Size



Figure 5a: Formal Extensiveness and Vote_Share



Figure 5b: Informal Extensiveness and Vote_Share



Figure 5c: Centralization and Vote_Share

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