DOES GOD CHANGE? RECONCILING THE IMMUTABLE GOD WITH THE GOD OF LOVE A THOMISTICALLY INSPIRED ENQUIRY

Jennifer Herrick

THE ISSUE The immutable God and the God of Love? Are they compatible? Does God change? Does it matter? If God is the immutable God, as interpreted from Classical Christian Tradition, a God who remains unalterable, what is the point of prayer? Does prayer, or any of our actions in the world for that matter, have any affect on God? Can we move God? Is God simply a static Being? Is prayer of use if God is absolutely immutable? Does God respond to prayer or to our actions in the world? Classical Tradition has presented us with a picture of an immutable God, a mono-polar God, who remains unalterable, unchanged, transcendent to our history in the world. Yet scriptural revelation and personal religious experience presents us with a God who, whilst transcendent to the world is also immanent, the God of Love who creates, redeems, a God who is affected by, who responds to, what is happening in the world; a God who listens and relates. PROCEDURE FOLLOWED - an exploratory structure. Taking the reader through an exploratory structure utilizing Scriptural texts, Church documents, historical theological and philosophical debate, together with human Judaeo Christian experience carries the aim of discerning and presenting an interpretation of the nature of God’s immutability which appears best able to afford some reconciliation of the traditional viewpoint with biblical revelation and personal religious experience. The structure of the thesis thus involves methodological aspects of research, exegesis, interpretation, history, and dialectics. RESULTANT STRUCTURE Our journey sets the overall scene of Scriptural revelation and Conciliar documentation. Presented then are discussions of the most polarised views or interpretations of the nature of God’s immutability, that of the traditional interpretation of the Classical view, of a static mono-polar God and the Process view of a dipolar God of becoming. Addressed then in detail is the ensuing immutability debate. Out of this debate emerges that which forms our final focus for discussion and note, a reinterpretation of the Classical viewpoint. MAJOR CONCLUSION William Norris Clarke’s neo-Thomistic consideration of the nature of God’s immutability rests on the basis of the notion of the Dynamic Being of God and forms the final focus and basis for our seeking a reconciliation of tradition, scripture and personal religious experience with respect to the nature of God’s immutability. Discussion of Norris Clarke’s work is supplemented by a consideration of the work of Robert A. Connor, and in support, that of David Schindler. Norris Clarke’s classical reinterpretation gives credence both to scriptural revelation and personal experience of God’s historical relationality and responsiveness to humankind without betraying the Classical Tradition. With independent support by Connor and in dialogue with Schindler, it becomes the favoured viewpoint.

DOES GOD CHANGE? RECONCILING THE IMMUTABLE GOD WITH THE GOD OF LOVE A THOMISTICALLY INSPIRED ENQUIRY JENNIFER ANNE HERRICK M.TH. [HONS] 1997 SYDNEY COLLEGE OF DIVINITY 1 ACKNOWLEGMENTS I wish to acknowledge the invaluable support and guidance of my theological mentor and initial Supervisor, Rev Dr David Coffey, Catholic Institute of Sydney, for setting me on track with this task, guiding me well on its way, and showing belief in its worth. I wish to acknowledge the great assistance and patience of the Veech librarian Mr Hans Arns, for his ever- ready library assistance and skill. I wish to acknowledge the time, skill and affirmation of my proof reader Mrs Pauline Byrne. I wish to acknowledge the kind support of my finishing Supervisor, Rev Dr Stephen Pickard, United Theological College, Sydney, for his encouragement and assistance in completing the task. I wish finally to thank all my family and friends for their patience throughout this journey. 2 ABSTRACT THE ISSUE The immutable God and the God of Love? Are they compatible? Does God change? Does it matter? If God is the immutable God, as interpreted from Classical Christian Tradition, a God who remains unalterable, what is the point of prayer? Does prayer, or any of our actions in the world for that matter, have any affect on God? Can we move God? Is God simply a static Being? Is prayer of use if God is absolutely immutable? Does God respond to prayer or to our actions in the world? Classical Tradition has presented us with a picture of an immutable God, a mono-polar God, who remains unalterable, unchanged, transcendent to our history in the world. Yet scriptural revelation and personal religious experience presents us with a God who, whilst transcendent to the world is also immanent, the God of Love who creates, redeems, a God who is affected by, who responds to, what is happening in the world; a God who listens and relates. PROCEDURE FOLLOWED - an exploratory structure. Taking the reader through an exploratory structure utilizing Scriptural texts, Church documents, historical theological and philosophical debate, together with human Judaeo Christian experience carries the aim of discerning and presenting an interpretation of the nature of God’s immutability which appears best able to afford some reconciliation of the traditional viewpoint with biblical revelation and personal religious experience. The structure of the thesis thus involves methodological aspects of research, exegesis, interpretation, history, and dialectics. RESULTANT STRUCTURE Our journey sets the overall scene of Scriptural revelation and Conciliar documentation. Presented then are discussions of the most polarised views or interpretations of the nature of God’s immutability, that of the traditional interpretation of the Classical view, of a static mono-polar God and the Process view of a dipolar God of becoming. Addressed then in detail is the ensuing immutability debate. Out of this debate emerges that which forms our final focus for discussion and note, a reinterpretation of the Classical viewpoint. MAJOR CONCLUSION William Norris Clarke’s neo-Thomistic consideration of the nature of God’s immutability rests on the basis of the notion of the Dynamic Being of God and forms the final focus and basis for our seeking a reconciliation of tradition, scripture and personal religious experience with respect to the nature of God’s immutability. Discussion of 3 Norris Clarke’s work is supplemented by a consideration of the work of Robert A. Connor, and in support, that of David Schindler. Norris Clarke’s classical reinterpretation gives credence both to scriptural revelation and personal experience of God’s historical relationality and responsiveness to humankind without betraying the Classical Tradition. With independent support by Connor and in dialogue with Schindler, it becomes the favoured viewpoint. 4 DOES GOD CHANGE? RECONCILING THE IMMUTABLE GOD WITH THE GOD OF LOVE A THOMISTICALLY INSPIRED ENQUIRY TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION A Preliminary Sketch The Issue Methodology of approach Structure Linguistic Usage 11 11 11 12 13 CHAPTER ONE Setting the Scene 14 SCRIPTURAL REVELATION OF GOD’S RELATION TO HUMANKIND Implications for God’s Immutability 14 COVENANTAL MODEL 14 14 16 17 18 The Consistent Covenantal God of the Old Testament The Consistent Covenantal Eschatological God of the New Testament The Responsive God of the Old and New Testaments God of the Covenant - God of Love CONCILIAL DOCUMENTATION 19 19 PHILOSOPHICALTRADITION OF IMMUTABILITY 21 DEBATE ON GOD'S IMMUTABILITY 22 22 22 23 23 24 24 IMMUTABILITY IN CHURCH TRADITION Intention of the thesis Inconsistency in thought on Immutability - contributing factors Polarised views Breadth of Response Reinterpreting the Classical view Reflection - Debate - Ineffable Mystery CHAPTER TWO CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY 25 DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL THOUGHT ON GOD’S IMMUTABILITY 25 25 Classical theism – Aristotelian categories EXEMPLAR OF CLASSICAL WESTERN THEISTIC UNDERSTANDING ST THOMAS AQUINAS 26 5 God is stable procession and productive stillness 26 Aquinas’ sources on the immutability of God - Scriptural Sources - Patristic Sources - Philosophical Sources 26 26 27 28 Aquinas reshaping the Sources - Scriptural Commentaries - Philosophical Commentaries - Theological Commentaries 29 29 29 31 A Synthesis of Aquinas’ thought on the immutability of God God the Exemplar Cause Immutability of Supreme Perfection 32 32 33 Aquinas’ thought on the relation of God to the World - Real and logical relations - God’s eternal glance - Limitation of Aristotelian categories 35 35 35 36 EXEMPLAR OF CLASSICAL EASTERN THEISTIC UNDERSTANDING ST GREGORY PALAMAS Manifest in Being Imparticipable in Essence 36 36 Palamas’ thought on Essence and Energies within God - Apophatic theology - Theological Personalism 37 37 38 Critique of Palamite Thought - Palamas’ misunderstanding of the Aristotelian system - Neo-Platonism and Aristotelianism: an unhappy marriage 39 39 40 Dissatisfaction with Classical thought on God’s Immutability 41 CHAPTER THREE OBJECTIONS TO THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY 42 THE VOICE OF OBJECTION 42 PROCESS OBJECTIONS TO THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY 42 God is Utterly Absolute and Totally Related 42 42 Foundational Process Thought God is chief exemplifier not chief exception - A bi-polar God 43 43 43 FATHER OF PROCESS THOUGHT ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD 6 6 CURRENT EXEMPLAR OF PROCESS THOUGHT CHARLES HARTSHORNE God is Abstract Essence and Concrete Actuality 44 44 Development of Process thought - Dual transcendence of God - Panentheism 44 45 45 Process Understanding of Divine Perfection - The Challenge to Perfection as Unchangeability - The Challenge to Perfection as Pure Actuality - The dipolar or dually transcendent panentheistic God 46 46 47 48 Validity of Process concept of God - Flawed underlying philosophical suppositions Further Objections 49 49 49 FEMINIST THEOLOGY OBJECTIONS TO THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY Process feministic objections - God is not a Controlling Power 50 50 50 Current Feminist Theological Voice - She Who Is a relational power - God is Wisdom - The apathic God - a negative concept 50 50 51 52 TRINITARIAN THOUGHT ON GOD’S IMMUTABILITY - Kenosis of God - Overflow of God’s being - I am Who is - Who was - Who is to come 53 53 54 55 Objections - a springboard for debate 55 CHAPTER FOUR THE DEBATE ON GOD’S IMMUTABILITY 56 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE CRITIQUING PROCESS THOUGHT ON GOD’S IMMUTABILITY -Metaphysics of an infinite being -Static metaphysics or static logic? 65 56 56 56 Raising concerns - Process caricature of classical theism - Is God a principle? - Philosophical statement or religious affirmation? 57 57 57 58 LINKS BETWEEN PROCESS AND CLASSICAL THOUGHT 58 7 A philosophic revolution - Analogy of Being - Analysing change - God as Di-polar Perfection - God is becoming in the Other - Plural Unity in God - Panentheism 59 59 60 60 61 62 62 LATENT THOMISTIC RICHES - Relation of intersubjectivity - Irreducible distinction between Personhood and Nature in God - A doctrine of relation proper to person - God’s Immutability is Personal Immutability 63 64 64 66 67 CHAPTER FIVE 68 REINTERPRETING THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY FINDING A WAY FORWARD 68 EXEMPLARS OF CLASSICAL REINTERPRETATION At the cutting edge of classical metaphysics Substance as dynamic and relational 68 68 68 William Norris Clarke Responding to Process thought - Creative adaptation - Two approaches of Norris Clarke 68 68 70 Norris Clarke - Creative Thomistic Metaphysician - Etienne Gilson - forerunner - Personalist theism of Norris Clarke - Real and Intentional Being - Shifting Frameworks - God is Perfectly Loving Personal Being - God is the Supreme Receiver - Divine relational consciousness - Implications for God’s immutability - Reciprocal relations 70 70 71 72 73 73 74 74 75 76 Contentions of Robert A. Connor Act of existence is relational and substantial - Rethinking the notion of Person - Principle of Person - Personal relational energy in God 76 76 76 77 79 William Norris Clarke: further contentions God is perfectly personal being & intrinsically relational To be is to be substance in relation - To be fully is to be personally 79 79 80 81 WILLIAM NORRIS CLARKE & ROBERT A. CONNOR 8 Anticipated objections 81 Norris Clarke at the cutting Edge Substance as centre of activity and receptivity Receptivity as perfection - Primordial substantiality and relationality - Relationality as communicative and receptive 82 82 82 83 83 CONCLUSION 85 ENDNOTES 86 BIBLIOGRAPHY 101 9 ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES for THOMAS AQUINAS Following Dodds, M. J. Unchanging God of Love, Editions Universitaires, Fribourg, Switzerland, 1986, pxii-xiii, in reference to the works of Aquinas, numbers following the title of the work refer to the traditional subdivisions of that work. In multiple references to a single work, the major subdivisions of the work are not repeated in each reference but remain the same as in the previous reference until otherwise indicated. The following abbreviations are used for Aquinas references, including in the first instance. The full title list follows the abbreviations list. Aquinas references Abbreviations: Comp. Compendium theologiae De aeter.mundi De aeternitate mundi De pot. De potentia De ver. De veritate Epis. ad bernardum. Epistola ad Bernardum abbatem Casinensem. In de caelo. Commentarium in libros Aristotelis De Caelo et Mundo. In de div. nom. In librum beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus expositio. In jer. In Jeremiam prophetam expositio. In meta. In metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria. In phys. In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio. In psalmos. In psalmos Davidis expositio. ITOO Opera Omnia ut sunt in Indice Thomistico. Stuttgart, 1975. Principium biblicum. Principium de commendatione et partitione Sacrae Scripturae. Quodl. Quaestiones quodlibetales. SCG. Summa contra gentiles. ST Summa theologiae. Sent. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. Super ad hebr. Super epistolam ad Hebraeos lectura. Super ad rom. Super epistolam ad Romanos lectura. Super I ad tim. Super primam epistolam ad Timotheum lectura. Super de causis. Super librum De Causis expositio. Super de trin. Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate. Super decretalem. Expositio super primam et secundam decretalem. Super ev. joh. Super evangelium S. Ioannis lectura. Super ev. matt. Super evangelium S. Matthaei lectura. Super iob. Expositio super Iob ad litteram. Super is. Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram. 10 Aquinas references Full titles Compendium theologiae. Leonine edition. vol XLII 1979. De aeternitate mundi. Leonine edition. vol XLIII 1976. De potentia. Marietti, 1965. De veritate. Leonine edition. vol XXII/1-3 1972-1976. English translation: Truth. tr. R. Mulligan, et.al. 3 vols. Regnery, Chicago, 1952-1954. Epistola ad Bernardum abbatem Casinsem. Leonine edition. vol XLII 1979. Commentarium in libros Aristotelis De Caelo et Mundo. Leonine edition. vol III 1886. In librum beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus expositio. Marietti, 1950. In Jeremiam prophetam expositio. ed. S. Fretté, in Opera Omnia. volXIX. Paris, Vivès, 1882. In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria. Marietti, 1926. [english translation: Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. tr. J. Rowan,. 2 vols. Regenery, Chicago, 1961]. In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio. Leonine version. vol II 1884. Taken from Marietti edition, 1965. [english translation: Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. tr. R. Blackwell, et al. Yale, New Haven, 1963]. In psalmos Davidis expositio. ed. S Fretté, in Opera Omnia.vol XVIII. Vivès, Paris, 1889. Opera Omnia ut sunt in Indice Thomistico. cur.Robert Busa, SJ, Frommann Holzboog, Stuttgart, 1980. Principium de commendatione et partitione Sacrae Scripturae. cur. P. Mandonnet, in Opuscula Omnia. vol IV. Lethielleux, Paris, 1927. Quaestiones quodlibetales. Marietti, 1949. Summa contra gentiles.Leonine version, vols XIII 1918, XIV 1926 and XV 1930. Taken from the Marietti edition. 3 vols. Marietti. Torino, Rome, 1961. [English translation, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra Gentiles. tr A. Pegis et. al., Image Books, Garden City, New York, 1955-1957. Summa theologiae. Leonine version, vols IV-XII 1888-1905. Taken from the Pauline edition. Editiones Paulinae, Rome, 1962. [English translation: Summa theologica. tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 3 vols. Benziger Bros., New York, 1946. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. cur. E. Fretté et P. Maré, in Opera Omnia. vols. VII-XI. Vivès, Paris, 1882-1889. Super epistolam ad Hebraeos lectura cur. R. Cai, in Super Epistolas S. Pauli lectura. vol II. Marietti, 1953. Super epistolam ad Romanos lectura cur. R. Cai, in Super Epistolas S. Pauli lectura. vol I. Marietti, 1953. Super primam epistolam ad Timotheum lectura cur. R. Cai, in Super Epistolas S. Pauli lectura. vol II. Marietti, 1953. Super librum De Causis expositio. ed. H. D. Saffrey, Société Philosophique, 1954. Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate. ed. B. Decker, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1959. [English translation of QQ5-6 The Division and Method of the Sciences. tr. A. Maurer, PIMS, Toronto, 1953. Expositio super primam et secundam decretalem. Leonine edition. vol XLI 1969. Super evangelium S. Ioannis lectura. Marietti, 1952. Super evangelium S. Matthaei lectura. Marietti, 1951. 11 INTRODUCTION THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD A PRELIMINARY SKETCH Solus Deus est omnino immutabilis THE ISSUE In need of reconciliation are two opposing notions of God. On the one hand, Classical Christian Tradition presents us with the notion of an utterly transcendent God, identified as the purposeful intelligence holding all things together, irrevocably bringing all things to a final end, utterly dependable and stable, the God ‘of lights with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change'. On the other hand, Christian believers are all too aware, via scriptural revelation and personal religious experience, individual and collective, of the antithetical notion of a God to whom we pray with the expectation of response, a God involved with the history of humankind and our personal lives, a God with whom we wrestle, treat as a friend, lover, arbitrator. To the extent that these two concepts of God lie, for some in dormant and unconscious, for others conscious and troublesome, juxtaposition, while for others, in difficult contradiction, we are prompted to ask the question whether we as human beings can meaningfully turn to God and God to us? This is a question at the core of religion. Can a human person be in a loving relationship with an immutable Divine Being? Can a person be in a trustworthy relationship with a God who changes? This is a modern question but the issue is an ancient one. The tension between God's attributes of justice and mercy hark back to the earliest writings of the Old Testament.1 METHODOLOGY OF APPROACH In order to explore how these antithetical notions may be reconciled, an exploratory structure for this thesis has been chosen. The desire to take the reader through this exploration carries the aim of discerning for, and presenting to, the reader an interpretation of the nature of God’s immutability which appears best able to afford hope for reconciliation of the traditional viewpoint with biblical revelation and personal religious experience. Accordingly, the structure of the thesis involves methodological aspects of: research, exegesis, interpretation, history, and dialectics. The understanding of the nature of God's immutability is taken to involve a hermeneutical process, with the two revelatory directionalities, God's irruption from above and human experience from below, both needing accommodation. Our exploratory structure utilizes a combination of scriptural texts, Church documents, historical theological and philosophical debate, together with human Judaeo Christian experience. All of this provides underlying material for interpreting the nature of God’s immutability. It needs to be borne in mind that all data possesses a context which shapes meaning, meanings which in turn come to form patterns, signalled in this thesis by the Based on John O. Mills, Preface, new Blackfriars, 68, no. 805, May 1987, 210-11. 12 chapter headings and sub-headings. Further to this, major and minor themes of each chapter expose connections between theological and philosophical persons, movements, and events. These connections are woven throughout the thesis. The content of the thesis allows for critique and interpretation of theological sources whilst the structure ensures a minimization of personal bias. It will become clear to the reader that a variety of different interpretations and historical judgements draw on the same data, making dialectics necessary. Value stances need to be clarified, along with the exposition of philosophies which underlie various interpretations. Ultimately however a choice needs to be made, by both the writer and the reader. STRUCTURE Pursuant to this introductory chapter, the structure of the thesis comprises two main parts. First part The first part has two functions and comprises three chapters. It sets the overall scene and presents the most polarised views or interpretations of the nature of God’s immutability. Setting the scene Introducing the overall scene sets Scriptural revelation on God’s immutability and God’s relationship with humankind over against Church conciliar documentation on the nature of God’s immutability. This is followed by a brief outline of the ensuing debate and an indication is given of that viewpoint favoured by the writer. Polarised views The two polarized notions concerning God’s immutability are next addressed in some detail. The Classical Thomistic notion of God’s absolute immutability is based on the traditional notion of God’s monopolar nature and static being. Our examination of the Classical view concentrates on the foundational work of Thomas Aquinas from the West, supplemented by a consideration of the work of an alternative Classical theologian, that of Gregory Palamas, from the East. The latter’s consideration of God’s immutability revolves around the notion of divine essence and uncreated divine energies. The contemporary Process view is made in consequent objection to the Classicist notion of absolute immutability. This is a view of God’s immutability based on the idea of God having a di-polar nature, Primordial and Consequent; a view that involves seeing God as non-temporal becoming. Our examination of the objections to Classicist notions treats, in the main, Process thought via the foundational work of Alfred N. Whitehead and his disciple, Charles Hartshorne. Treatment of these objections is supplemented by consideration of feminist views and also trinitarian thought, so far as they air further objections to the traditional notion of God’s immutability and contribute to the exploration of the polarized views. 13 Second Part The second part of the thesis also has two functions, and comprises two chapters. It addresses in detail the ensuing debate and focuses finally on a reinterpretation of the Classical viewpoint. Debate The immutability debate indicates an existent wide range of responses to both Traditional and Process notions of God’s immutability. Our address examines views ranging from those expressing unease with the Traditional notion, through those seeking some convergence between Classical and Process views, to those attempting a reinterpretation of the traditional Classical view with particular focus on the work of William Norris Clarke. Reinterpretation of the Classical view A reinterpretation of the Classical view is considered by the writer to most credibly offer hope for reconciliation of tradition, scripture, and personal experience. Our examination of this reinterpretation concentrates on the work of William Norris Clarke, who reinterprets the Classical view in response to Process objections without betraying the Classical Tradition. We offer a detailed examination of Norris Clarke’s consideration of the nature of God’s immutability, a consideration which rests on the basis of the notion of the Dynamic Being of God. This consideration involves an exploration of God’s relationality, and hence relative immutability, within the wider context of absolute immutability. Discussion of Norris Clarke’s work is supplemented by a consideration of the valuable work of Robert A. Connor and the supportive work of David Schindler. It is contended here that this reinterpretation gives credence both to scriptural revelation and personal experience of God’s historical relationality and responsiveness to humankind without betraying the Classical Tradition with its underpinning of the monopolar nature of God and accompanying consistency, the Eternal God of Being. Conclusion Taking a stand in the face of conflicting positions requires a conversion, a commitment. The commitment in this thesis is the choice of Norris Clarke’s understanding and notion of God’s immutability supplemented by that of Robert Connor. The choice has come to be made from within the Catholic Neo-Thomist Tradition elected by the writer. LINGUISTIC USAGE Linguistically, a definitive choice has been made for all reference to God to be without exclusive gender type. Exclusive gender usage is seen by many to be traditional, usually seen as patriarchal, anthropomorphism, rather than reference to the true nature of God. Given the nature of the thesis’ ambit, source and commentary degenderisation is integral to the need for consistent inclusivity. Whilst degenderising makes at times for cumbersome reading, this is seen as preferable to the traditional, and for many alienating, use of the exclusive male type for God. 14 CHAPTER ONE SETTING THE SCENE SCRIPTURAL REVELATION OF GOD’S RELATION TO HUMANKIND I will be your God and you will be my people Implications for God’s Immutability COVENANTAL MODEL The paradigmatic scriptural model of God's relation with humankind is that of covenant, a term of relationship between a superior and inferior party, the former making or establishing the bond. The God of Israel in the Old Testament is seen by biblical writers as one who is committed to a particular people, who exercises responsibility in mercy and judgement and is bound by that relationship.1 The Torah is a history of this relationship and in it we find God's relation with humankind best expressed in the Sinai Covenant, the ratification of promise and blessing. Sketching through the foundational Covenantal history reveals something of the nature of God in relation to humankind. Interpretation of this nature, with its implication for God's immutability, has become the subject of debate, as our introduction has indicated. What does this covenantal history indicate to us about God’s relation with humankind and thus about God’s immutability? The Consistent Covenantal God of the Old Testament The Great Flood of Genesis 6:5 - 8:22 provides the initial pivotal relational event in God's Plan of Salvation. The focus is on a people who later, through the Sinai Covenant, come to understand themselves as Israel. God's judgement takes the form of a destructive flood and God's mercy is shown in saving a remnant; the seed of a new historical beginning to God's relation with humankind. Noah represents what it means to be in right relationship with God. "God remembered Noah" and the remnant of humans and animals with him, Gen 8:1. The word ‘remembered' signifies for us the nature of God's consistent relation with humankind. Through God's covenant with Noah, in Genesis 9:1-17, the creation blessing is renewed. Preservation of natural order from chaos is covenantly guaranteed. Unlike later covenants, the covenant with Noah is universal and ecological. In Genesis 12:1-9, God's call to Abram is sketched against the background of a broken, divided humankind. Israel, represented by Abram and Sarah, is chosen with a Promise of land, heirs and an ongoing relationship with God; chosen to play a decisive role in God's historical purpose. The covenant with Abraham and Sarah, Genesis 15:1-21, 17:1-27, their new names signifying a new relationship, is like the covenant with Noah, an everlasting covenant, grounded in the will of God not human behaviour. This covenant is to be fully realized in the Exodus and the Sinai Revelation. Unlike the universal Noachic covenant though, this covenant pertains only to the descendants of Abraham and Sarah. Through the role of Joseph, Genesis 45: 1-28, God continues to act to preserve life, that of a remnant, the family bearing the Promise given to Abraham. With the historically decisive descent into Egypt prompted by divine revelation, we see that God renews this Promise to Jacob, making from him a great nation. 15 With the call of Moses, in Exodus 2:23 - 4:17, the God of Israel's ancestors summons Moses in divine commission to lead and deliver Israel. God's word is to be confirmed by a sign, the return of Israel to Sinai for worship, Exodus 3:12. The answer as to the identity of God, "I am who I am" in Exodus 3:14, as an etymology of the cultic name for the God of Israel, YHWH, does not indicate here God's eternal being but rather God's ongoing action and presence in historical affairs2, action signified by the stories of the Ten Plagues, Exodus 7:8 - 11:10. We see now that the God of Promise is a God who Acts, culminating in the final act, deliverance of the people from Egypt, remembered in the Festival of the Passover. The presence and guidance of God, traditionally expressed by cloud and fire, is viewed in faith at the crossing of the Reed Sea, Exodus 13:17 -15:1, and during the various crises in the Wilderness, Exodus 15:22 - 16:36. Ratification of the unconditional covenant, in the Theophany at Sinai, Exodus 19:1-25, marks an agreed relationship involving an obligation experienced. The command "If you obey my voice”, Exodus 19:5, expresses the laws to be given and kept, as a consequence of the covenant. Up to this point, God's relationship with Abraham and his descendants has been based on Promise. At Sinai the covenant is forged and Israel comes truly into existence. Thus we have it that the relation of God to God’s People is sealed, documented in the Ten Words, Exodus 20:1-17, ritually ratified in the Ceremony of Covenant Ratification, Exodus 24: 1-18. The Ark of the Covenant signifies divine nearness, housing the representative tablets of the covenant. The development of this covenantal relationship clearly indicates to us a consistent God working with humankind to bring about our understanding and living out of this relationship. As part of our understanding of this relationship, the role of the righteous such as Noah, Abraham and Moses, traditionally has been read as central to intercession before God. Thus in passages such as Genesis 18:22-33, God is depicted as responding to Abraham's call to save Sodom and Gomorrah for the sake of the righteous, and in Exodus 33 God is depicted as responding to Moses' plea to accompany them to the Promised land. Whilst these passages do provide implicit understanding of a God who responds as part of the covenantal form of relation they are not explicitly concerned with God’s response as a result of human intercession. Rather these passages reflect the tension between God's mercy and God's justice. This tension is expressed in the need for consistency as understood in the covenantal relationship. Interpreted in this light, Genesis 18-33 becomes a theological inquiry, presented in the form of a dialogue.3 Concern that the just appear to meet the same fate as the wicked marks Israel’s zeal for the justice of God. This zeal has its setting in the complex of proverbs dealing with the just and the wicked and belongs to the postexilic period. That doubt can be cast on the justice of God does have a recognizable background, most clearly in the Book of Job. The Book of Job reflects well the antinomy between tradition and historical reality of the plight of Israel. This tension is presented in a way that casts a shadow on the reliability of God. Thus, in Genesis 18-33, political circumstances lead Israel to look forward to a demonstration of divine righteousness and bring conviction that the God of the covenant will demonstrate dependability by bringing in the reign of peace and justice.4 Consistency will win out. What makes the insertion into the Abraham story possible is that the author of Genesis 18:17-32 regards the demise of Sodom as a good example to explain God’s justice in the disposition of history. Abraham, the observer of what is just and right, is the exemplar for recognizing God’s just disposition in history.5 The consistency, reliability, and dependability of God are seen as indicators of the ongoing covenantal relationship. 16 It is clear then that the covenant relation denotes, above all else, consistency. "I will be your God and you will be my people”. Consistency within the tension between God's mercy and justice is found even at times when the relationship is most under stress. Times such as the Exile, when the prophet Ezekiel stresses the divine sovereignty in breaking down and building up the nation, indicate to us the persistent belief that God is consistent in what is demanded. The paradigmatic God of the Covenant in Scripture is a God of fidelity and justice and is attested to in the Psalms of trust and confidence. We are told in Psalm 136:21 that God’s “steadfast love endures forever". Malachi 3:6 states "I am God, I change not". Psalm 25:10 informs us that all the paths of the Lord are steadfast love and faithfulness, for those who keep God’s covenant and decrees. Psalm 33:4-5 confirms that all God’s work is done in faithfulness, God loves righteousness and justice.6 The post-exilic times of Psalm 117 confirm further God’s faithfulness as everlasting and Psalm 116 passes on a lesson by the psalmist that Yahweh fulfils the obligation set to those in covenantal relationship. Psalm 136 too, confirms in a postexilic litany of repeated praise, that God’s love is everlasting.7 This understanding of God’s consistent faithfulness is exemplified in Psalm 89:2-4 as we read: “I want to sing forever of Yahweh’s deeds of loyal-love”, ”use my mouth to make known your faithfulness”, “your loyal-love is built to last forever, ”you have fixed your faithfulness in the heavens. I have made a covenant-obligation to my chosen one”. Indeed, Psalm 89:15 summarises this theme: “Righteousness and justice are the foundation of your throne; Loyal love and Faithfulness stand before you.” This Psalm expresses a major object of praise in Israelite worship, centring on Yahweh’s faithfulness in remembering the covenant obligations. The Psalm clearly presupposes a listening God.8 It can be readily recognized that the theological richness of the psalms emerges from profound knowledge of a God rooted in relationship and the framework of that relationship is rooted in the covenant.9 The heart of the relationship is consistently driven between mercy and justice. Consistency is thus the chief indicator in the Old Testament, of the form God’s relation takes with humankind. What does this imply for our traditional understanding of the immutability of God? Before we attempt to address this question we must first continue our scriptural investigation of God’s relation to humankind. If consistency is the message of the Old Testament with respect to God’s relatedness, how does this translate in the New Testament? The Consistent Covenantal Eschatological God of the New Testament In moving from the witness of the Old Testament to the witness of the New Testament, we find an awareness that God's relation with humankind extends from being that of the God of the Covenant to include being that of the God of Eschatology. Evident throughout the New Testament is the belief that God's Kingdom is going to, and in a sense has already, come. Within this broader New Testament theological understanding of God’s relation with humankind, the continuation of the tension between mercy and justice expressed by consistency, continues. Mark 13:20 reflects that, if the Lord had not shortened the days no human being would be saved; but for the sake of the elect, whom God chose, God shortened the days. The idea of a dependable divinity with whom there is a relationship based on observance of a carefully defined code of conduct, manifests itself in the later Second Temple Period as well as in the New Testament. Early Christianity uses the covenant idea as the basis for its own re-reading of tradition, taking into account the distinctive character of the story of Jesus, whose life consistently bears witness to the new understanding of this relationship. Continuation of the covenantal 17 revelation in Jesus involving the incarnate God furthers the tension between God's mercy and righteousness, between compassion and sovereignty. Nowhere is this pointed up more poignantly than in the hymn to the Philippians 2:6-11, where the true nature of God is demonstrated by Christ. Because he shared the nature of God, Christ did not hold firm to the high position that was his by right but rather stepped down from it.10 Subtlety of tension is reflected also in passages such as Romans 8:15f and Galatians 4:6, in which Paul suggests the relationship between believer and indwelling spirit, and God, offers an intimacy of personal trusting, a relationship resembling that between child and parent.11 Acknowledgment in both the Old Testament and the New Testament that God’s relation with humankind is marked by consistency, expressed with an eschatological focus in the New Testament, invites us now to consider what obvious implications this holds for the notion of God’s immutability. For whilst the nature of the relational God’s immutability may be couched in terms of steadfast, consistent, dependable love housed in covenantal relationship, we cannot escape scripturally that this consistent relation must include, indeed makes unavoidable the question of, the receptiveness and responsiveness of God. The Responsive God of the Old and New Testaments In both testaments we are told repeatedly that God is affected by the action and suffering of human beings or that God allows God’s self to be affected. Both Old and New Testaments make unavoidable the question of the suffering of God We are told that God is affected, or allows God’s self to be affected, by the action and suffering of human beings, through compassion, anger, pity.12 In the Old Testament this is seen through expressions of compassion, such as in Genesis 6:6, which tells us that the Lord is sorry to have placed humankind on the earth and grieves in God’s heart. In Psalm 78:41, we see God’s expression of anger in “they tested God again and again and provoked the Holy One of Israel”. In Isaiah 63:10 we find that “they rebelled” and grieve God’s holy spirit; therefore God becomes their enemy; God fights against them. At other times we note that compassion restrains divine anger, revealing the nature of divine love.13 In Hosea 11:8-9 we find the following: “How can I give you up, Ephraim? How can I hand you over, O Israel? How can I make you like Admah? How can I treat you like Zeboiim? My heart recoils within me; my compassion grows warm and tender. I will not execute my fierce anger; I will not destroy Ephraim; for I am God and no mortal, the Holy One in your midst, and I will not come in wrath.” Similarly, in Jeremiah 31:20 we find “Is Ephraim my dear son? Is he the child I delight in? As often as I speak against him, I still remember him. Therefore I am deeply moved for him; I will surely have mercy on him, says the Lord.” The New Testament continues this Old Testament line of thought. For example, Mark 3:5a tells of the anger of Jesus Christ. “He looked around at them with anger; he was grieved at their hardness of heart”. Mark also tells of the compassion of Jesus in Mark 6:34, “He saw a great crowd; and he had compassion for them, because they were like sheep without a shepherd”. This theme, of God being affected by humankind and expressed as contingent response, is encapsulated in the statement of principle in the Letter to the Hebrews 4:15a: ”We have not a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses”. The previously mentioned hymn to the Philippians 2:6-11 presents for us too, an understanding of the pre-existent son, who regarded equality with God not as excusing him from the task of redemptive suffering and death but rather, uniquely qualifying him for that vocation. 14 An understanding of God’s contingent 18 response is best expressed in the parables of Jesus whereby the nature of God is revealed. The short parable of the Friend at Midnight portrayed in Luke 11:5-8, is an example of Luke’s capacity to evoke circumstances of real life and social relationships15 to express the nature of the relationship between God and humankind. The Lukan theme of prayer used here, stresses persistence in human prayer to God for the purpose of emphasising the certainty that the prayer will be heard. In this parable the friend becomes the foil for God.16 Similarly in Luke 18:1-8, the parable of the widow and the unjust judge is told with the point that it is necessary to pray constantly without giving up. Its moral is made explicit as a logion of the Lord. God’s mercy and long-suffering are not in doubt.17 In this parable the attitude of the widow and the judge are interwoven, the judge, a symbol of God, points up both that God not only hears petitions of those who call but will not delay in response, as did the judge. 18 So too in Matthew 7:7-11 the point is not persistent effort but the good character of God.19 This passage exhibits exhortations and assertions of God’s faithfulness, examples of human faithfulness, and an argument concerning the faithfulness of God to those who call. Once again, this passage focuses on an answering, providing God.20 It would seem clear then that scripturally, we are presented with a God who acts in consistent, contingent, responsive relation to humankind. Such responsiveness on God’s part sits uneasily with an absolutely immutable Being. What are we to make of this contradiction? God of the Covenant - God of Love As an ethical interpretation of the metaphysical, Scripture presents to us a God of steadfast love, a covenantal God, a God in relation with humankind. How we are to understand the nature of such a God in the light of the Doctrine of Immutability is the subject both of ongoing debate and this thesis. As we have seen, some scriptural concepts of God’s immutability are consistent with relative, but not absolute, immutability. To the extent that the Scriptures offer a notion of God as immutable in character in the sense of being consistent, faithful, dependable, the One on whose justice and mercy and covenanted and uncovenanted love we may rely, unlike the fickle gods of nothingness, the concept is not inconsistent with God as responsive, genuinely and literally a God of mercy and compassion. Such an immutable, consistent and dependable character can be relied upon to vary action, response and involvement, through sensitivity. The Incarnation, the God of history and the Divine Involvement can be viewed as the expression of this immutable and dependable character. The scriptural notion would appear though, to be inconsistent with God as absolutely immutable, beyond all change of any sort, not responsive, not literally compassionate but only metaphorically sensitive. When we read in Hebrews 13:8 that Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today, the same and forever, the interpretation ought not be that of an acclamation of Jesus Christ’s ontological immutability but rather the unchangeable nature of the revelation of the transcendent dignity of Christ. Faith in Christ is faith in the enduring efficacy of his redemptive accomplishment; that is, the truth concerning Jesus Christ never changes.21 This truth is the ultimate expression of the God of the Covenant, expressed further in the epilogue of Revelation 22:13 where it is denoted of Jesus that “I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end”. So too, the correlative 19 revelation of God’s identity in the self-disclosure of God to Moses, in Exodus 3:14: “I am Who I Am” is Revelation’s 1:8, “‘I am the Alpha and the Omega’ -- who is and who was and who is to come, the Almighty”, a proclamation of God’s active everlastingness.22 The Christian Church’s Classical Traditional statements regarding this subject sit uneasily beside scriptural assertions indicating the nature of God’s immutability. These statements would appear to support a notion of absolute immutability overagainst relative immutability. They thereby present difficulties when viewed in the light of scriptural indicators. What does Tradition say and what is the background to these statements? IMMUTABILITY IN CHURCH TRADITION The range of scriptural indicators of God’s nature with respect to immutability notwithstanding, official Church statements and documents traditionally and consistently support the notion of immutability but without presenting any explication of what this means. CONCILIAL DOCUMENTATION Historical examples of the context and way in which the Church has traditionally presented God's immutability are as follows23: Leo 1 Letter to Flavian of Constantinople 13 June 449 C.E. “The Tome of Leo”, universally accepted as a rule of faith and exercising later influence on the Council of Chalcedon, states that the impassible God has not disdained to be a man subject to suffering. God suffers no change because of God’s condescension.24 The Council of Lateran 649 C.E.25 The Council of Lateran with the authority of its canons recognized by Pope Martin 1 as a rule of faith, gives us to read of one God in three consubstantial hypostases equal in glory; and for the three, one and the same Godhead, nature, essence, power, Lordship, kingship, authority, will, action, and sovereignty; uncreated, without beginning, infinite, immutable, creator of all beings and holding them in God’s providence--. The Fourth Lateran General Council Symbol of Lateran 11-30 Nov. 1215 C.E. The fourth General Lateran Council, convened by Pope Innocent 111, provides the profession of the "Catholic Faith" approved by the Pope which includes the statement: there is only one true God, eternal, infinite, and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty and ineffable, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; three persons indeed but one essence, substance, or nature, entirely simple.26 20 The Second General Council of Lyons “Profession of Faith of Michael Palaeologus" 7 May - 17 July, 1274 C.E. The second General Council of Lyons, convened by Pope Gregory X, read at its fourth session, "the profession of faith of Michael Palaeologus", the Byzantine emperor. It transcribes a profession of faith proposed to him by Pope Clement 1V in 1267 containing a profession of faith submitted by Pope Leo 1X to Peter, Patriarch of Antioch in 1053 which in turn had leaned on the Statuta Ecclesiae Antiquae, a canonical and liturgical compilation made in Southern Gaul towards the end of the fifth century. In the first part of the profession we read that: this Holy Trinity is not three Gods but only one God, almighty, eternal, invisible and immutable.27 The General Council of Florence 1439 1442 28 At the 17th General Council, held at Florence, The Decree of the Jacobites, 1442, contains an elaborate formulation of the faith. In it we find that:-the holy Roman Church, founded on the word of our Lord and Saviour, firmly believes, professes and preaches the one true almighty, unchangeable and eternal God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, one in essence, trine in persons. Pius 1X Syllabus of Condemned Errors 1864 29 Pius 1X, composing a Syllabus of 80 propositions containing what seemed to be the most dangerous errors of the time lists one such error as being that God is identical with the nature of things, and therefore subject to change. The First Vatican General Council Third Session 30 Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius on the Catholic Faith 1870 The XXth General Council uses the following text in the Constitution Dei Filius: Chapter 1: God Creator of All Things:-there is one God, true and living, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in God’s intellect and will and in all perfection. As God is one unique and spiritual substance, entirely simple and unchangeable, we must proclaim God distinct from the world in existence and essence, blissful in God’s self and from God’s self, ineffably exalted above all things that exist. It is important to note, that despite this range of conciliar teaching, the immutability of God has not been defined dogmatically by the Catholic Church.31 With this in mind, it is acknowledged by the Roman Catholic International Theological Commission that contemporary problems and classical solutions can clarify and enrich each other in productive dialogue.32 Clearly the notion of immutability is a difficult one. We need to inquire into the background of this conciliar teaching if we are both to understand its suppositional base and find a way forward for its reconciliation with contrawise scriptural indicators and personal religious experience. 21 PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION OF IMMUTABILITY Philosophical influence contributing to the process by which the above theological axiom has become established and maintained - ‘to be God is to be absolute and perfect, admitting neither of increase nor diminution in being in contrast to humankind’s becoming’, has its derivation in part in the mindset of the Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle, with some of the arguments going back to Plato. These arguments were then taken up into the Judeo schema by the Jew Philo. They became reinforced by certain mystical experience, and philosophically elaborated by those such as Plotinus and other neo-Platonists The Fathers were compelled to differentiate the God of history as understood in the Bible, from mythological conceptions of gods who undergo becoming, who suffer and change, and from their mythologically interpreted incarnations. In effecting this differentiation the Fathers appealed to motifs of Greek philosophy and its axiom of God’s impassibility. In so doing they were to defend God’s impassibility in ways more consistent with Greek philosophy than with biblical testimony.33 However the Fathers did not simply take over the apathia-axiom, for they often attribute to God such emotions as anger, love, and pity.34 They often let the paradox stand. According to Ignatius of Antioch, “the timeless and invisible one became visible for our sake; the incomprehensible and impassible one became capable of suffering for our sake”.35 Irenaeus, Melito and Tertullian, use similar language.36 The problem is that the Fathers regarded suffering, pathos, as a non-free external passive experience.37 Given such free suppositions, such sufferings pathe, could be ascribed to God only insofar as God freely accepted them38. Origen39 however did move beyond the idea of free acceptance to that of love. If the Second Person had not from eternity felt compassion for our wretchedness, God would not have become human and would not have allowed God’s self as the Second Person to be crucified: first God suffered, then God came down. The culmination of Greek philosophical influence came ultimately however to rest with the early questions of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God in Aquinas. Specifically, this sense of absolute immutability is traceable in the Judaeo-Christian tradition40 to Philo, 20 B.C.E. - 54 C.E., with his double insistence, using Aristotelian categories for certain Old Testament scriptural passages, on divine absoluteness and immutability, and God's omniscient providence. Like Philo, Augustine, 354-430 C.E., combines the scriptural vision of God with Greek philosophy. With acceptance of the wholly immutable needing reconciliation with the scriptural Creator, Augustine attributes the change in God from non-Creator to Creator, to that of a change in the understanding of the created. Likewise Anselm, 1033-1109 C.E., also accepting of complete immutability, reconciles his passionless God of divine perfection with Scriptures’ God of compassion, by placing the compassion into the experience of humankind. The Jewish philosopher Maimonides, 1135-1204 C.E., follows the concepts of Aristotle's unmoved mover and Philo's absolute existence. He argues systematically for belief in the immutable perfection and utter simplicity of God. Together these philosophers pave the way for Thomas Aquinas, 1225-1274 C.E., traditionally viewed as the Aristotelian Christian and the Christian Aristotelian. Question 9, article 1 of the first part of his Summa Theologiae gives Aquinas’ reasons for God's unchangeableness. God is sheerly actual, simple, limitless, perfect. Out of this background and framework then, has emerged the conciliar statements we have outlined. It is clear that the Christian use of the term immutability, when applied to God, has its roots deep within the Greek and Classical philosophical tradition. Within 22 this tradition a philosophy of being has developed in which, in different ways, the immutability of the One is contrasted with the mutability of the many. By using the terms ‘potency’ and ‘act’ to denote change, and ‘substance’ and ‘accidents’ to denote respectively, the immutable and mutable principles of ‘being’ which changes, a notion of the immutable God has developed and come to be expressed in terms of pure act, of absolute, subsistent being without accidents. The problem is that this immutable being is described in the New Testament in terms of love, not in terms of an immutable substance. It would appear then, that Christianity must modify the traditional philosophy of being, which was constructed within a primarily cosmological world view without any developed personalist categories. Patristic and Conciliar categories of nature and person do not do justice to the full scriptural revelation. In spite of real progress there has emerged an essentialism in Christian thought which obscures the dynamic inherent in the description of God as pure act and so presents an overly rigid notion of divine immutability.41 The debate which has ensued from this seeks to grapple with, and in many instances posit positions of escape from, this overly rigid position. This debate is of interest to us both in its own right and as a basis from which to discern the position which best offers hope of reconciling traditional thought with scriptural revelation and personal experience. DEBATE ON GOD'S IMMUTABILITY Intention of the thesis It is true to say that the concept of immutability has been established and maintained with some embarrassment and difficulty. The present day theological enquiry into the issue of God’s immutability is a radical attempt to reassess the validity of the classical position. It is the intention of this thesis to consider varying concepts and interpretations of immutability and in so doing move towards a considered, reconciling and acceptable position within and to the Catholic tradition, to which the writer belongs. At present different concepts of immutability are at work in the tradition, not all of them consistent. Inconsistency in thought on Immutability Contributing factors Four underlying tendencies are operational in contributing to this inconsistency with respect to the notion of God’s immutability. First is the notion of history. Central to modern understanding in the human sciences and assimilated by Christianity both in interpreting scriptural and other theological texts and grasping the relationship between God and God’s people, the notion of history has led us from a consideration of the God of history to that of the history of God. Second, it can be said that within the now held evolutionary framework of the world, the notion of change has come to assume a positive connotation, not formerly held in the cyclical world view of Greek philosophy within which the axiom of divine immutability became established. Mutability can now be seen more easily as a perfection and thus its application to God becomes less objectionable. Third, the anti-metaphysical or at least de-hellinization movement within Christianity this century has brought about insistence on a return to the more basic biblical origins of Christianity. The immutability axiom is especially vulnerable to this 23 thrust. Fourth, even where Christianity does retain its dialogue with philosophy, the influence of Hegel in the last century and that of the Process school this century, means that theologians are calling more into question historical assumptions surrounding divine immutability.42 Polarised views Of fundamental importance to us in the ongoing debate is the discernment of Aquinas’ thinking on God’s unchangeableness. In particular, we note that the understanding of substance has become the subject of concentrated enquiry in more recent times and is, of necessity, crucial to this thesis' enquiry. Also of interest to us is a particular view which has traditionally lain alongside the Western Classical view of God. An Eastern Classical view put forward to explain God in relation, originates with Palamas, 1296-1358 C.E., a theologian as central to the Eastern Church as is Aquinas to the Western. The Palamite view of immutability involves the doctrine of divine essence and uncreated energies. Contemporary debate to which we turn our attention has been sparked by Process theology's refutation of the Traditional understanding of God's immutability as absolute. Spearheaded by A.N. Whitehead, 1861-1947 C.E., and continued in particular by Charles Hartshorne, 1897 -, with the continued support of others such as John Cobb, David Griffin, Santiago Sia, Lewis S. Ford, and David Tracey, Process theologians view as appropriate aspects of divine reality, God as both utterly absolute and totally related, thereby possessing a dual transcendence. The Process understanding of God as dipolar pantheistic stems from their particular analysis of the Classical theistic concepts of perfection, actuality, and God. Whilst the Process view and methodology is itself the subject of refutation, it nevertheless remains worthy of our consideration. It serves as a vehicle for renewed discernment of the Traditional interpretation of the concept of the immutability of God with specific reference to God's relation to humankind. As well as Process objections we note that there are other objections to the Classical theistic approach to God. Feminist theology, represented by those such as Elizabeth Johnson, has its own reconstructive contribution to make, testing the classical attribute of God's impassibility. It is however, the division of God's nature in the Process response to the traditional view, that has particularly brought about an opening up of dialogue and debate. Breadth of Response The current immutability debate is inter-confessional, bringing together progressives, conservatives, moderates, European, North American, Latin American, and Asian theologians.43This debate surrounding God's immutability possesses a breadth of response.44 indicated by the range of names and interests outlined below. Regrettably not all can be afforded space in this thesis. Unease with the Traditional view has been expressed by those such as Walter Stoke, Anthony Kelly and Joseph Donceel. In defence of the Traditional approach has been Michael Dodds and also, but carrying critiques of the Process criticism, H.P. Owen, Eric Mascall, Hugo Meynall and Illtyd Trethowan. Critics of the Process view are such as David Burrell. Proffering a Traditional approach but with a preparedness to dialogue with Process views, fall others such as Ronald Nash, Piet Schoonenberg, William Hill, 24 and William Norris Clarke. The latter's development of the notion of the dynamic being of God is of special relevance for this thesis' consideration of the nature of God's immutability. In line with the French Canadian philosopher Etienne Gilson and the modern Thomist Robert Connor, Norris Clarke, extended by David Schindler45, answers the Process theologians with a dynamic relational model of substance. In so doing he overturns the Process argument by refuting the Kantian notion of substance on which Whitehead’s argument is based. There are other responses in the debate too, responses of a different nature but which deal with the relationality of God. In particular is noted the notion of God as Primal Temporality, represented by the line of Hegel, Heidegger, and Schubert Ogden and, via the Neo-Orthodox Movement, by Wolfhart Pannenberg, albeit with a future orientation. The notion of God as Non-Temporal Becoming, developed by Lewis Ford, follows on from Whitehead and offers further possibilities for the search for correlatives in the debate. Others seek points both of contact and divergence between the two opposing viewpoints, with John R. Stacer representing the former and James Keller the latter. Others, such as Robert Neville, Brian Davies and Richard Creel seek simply to further the debate. Reinterpreting the Classical view Integral to the debate is a consideration of the very philosophy of knowing. Such a consideration as that put forward by Michael Vertin46, allows discernment of suppositional bases of the varying arguments. We examine this philosophy and in its light choose to highlight and focus upon the work of William Norris Clarke. William Norris Clarke’s reinterpretation of the Classical view, made in response to the Process view of God's immutability, offers a vision of a dynamic dimension of relationality for the eternal God of Being. In so doing it offers a way forward for understanding God’s immutability, its nature and expression in relation to humankind. In this it is important to recognize and acknowledge that the subject of God’s immutability and relation to humankind is inextricably linked to debate and thought on the philosophy of being. Reflection - Debate - Ineffable Mystery In attempting to reflect and debate matters surrounding God’s immutability, human and theological reasoning encounter some of the greatest of all difficulties, such as anthropomorphism; yet they also encounter the ineffable mystery of the living God, and realise thereby, the limits of thought itself.47 These limits are apparent as we explore and attempt to discern, the range of conceptual understanding offered by schools of theological and philosophical thought in their effort to understand and interpret the God of Unfailing Faithfulness. 25 CHAPTER 2 CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL THOUGHT ON GOD’S IMMUTABILITY Having now an introductory sense of scriptural revelation, concilial statements, philosophical background and the nature, range and extent of debate, we begin in earnest our examination of the issue of God’s immutability. Our detailed examination allows us to discern the best position for reconciling tradition, Scripture and personal religious experience. It is appropriate that our starting point is the longstanding classical perspective. The philosophical and theological development of the doctrine of God's immutability can be traced through the writings of certain classical theists. Their writings, couched in Greek Aristotelian framework, form the basis from which the main classical viewpoint emerges in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The classical practice of couching scriptural revelation in Aristotelian categories has come to prove a difficult one for many contemporary theologians who no longer consider it sufficient or adequate to denote a relation of love in the classical way. Nevertheless, the classical perspective has held dominant sway until recent times and thus deserves close attention if we are to discern both the validity of objections raised against it and the merit of reinterpretation in the light of these objections. Classical theism - Aristotelian categories Philo [ca 20 B.C.E. - 54 C.E.] is regarded by some as the founder of classical theism, with his double insistence on divine absoluteness and immutability with omniscient providence.48 Certain classical theistic themes begin to emerge with Philo, as particular scriptural passages are elaborated using Aristotelian categories. God is seen as one entity without complexity, and the revelation of Yahweh's nature as "I am who I am" in Ex. 3:14, is seen as an identification of essence with existence. For Philo, nothing is future to God. God does not benefit from anyone and does not exist in relation to anything.49 Augustine [354 - 430 C.E.] too, combines the scriptural vision of God with Greek philosophy. He sees God as a wholly immutable and non-temporal actuality. In order to reconcile this view with the scriptural account of creation, Augustine contends that time is in the order of the created.50 God, being outside time, is immutable, unchangeable, eternal. The apparent change then, from non-creator to creator, does not occur in God but on the part of humankind.51 Anselm [1033-1109 C.E.] also appears to accept the truth of God's immutability in his development of the idea of divine perfection. God is self-sufficient, outside of time and space. All things exist in God. For Anselm, God as a perfect being exists necessarily, non-dependent and eternally. Any change is ruled out as it would detract from God's necessity and eternity. Anselm sees God as passionless, and to resolve the difficulty of being the source of consolation, Anselm simply states that God is compassionate in terms of our experience but not in terms of God's being. Without compromising God's immutability Anselm offers an explanation of divine love. As with Augustine the explanation provides for change to be in humankind but not in God.52 God's complete changelessness is affirmed too by the Jewish philosopher, Maimonides [1135 - 1204].53 He also believes in the immutable perfection of God, God's utter simplicity. Interestingly, whilst dismissing the view that God is related, he admits nevertheless that having relations would not require a change in God's essence.54 26 Out of this historical development and tradition emerges the exemplar of western classical theistic understanding of God’s immutability. St Thomas Aquinas [1225 - 1274 C.E.] remains the central source of this understanding in the current day, especially in the West. EXEMPLAR OF CLASSICAL WESTERN THEISTIC UNDERSTANDING ST THOMAS AQUINAS God is stable procession and productive stillness Aquinas considers divine immutability to be a truth established by both faith and reason. Accordingly, he draws on Scripture and the Fathers for his theological sources and the philosophers for his philosophical sources. At no time does he simply acquire another's thoughts but rather, reshapes his sources into his own unique thinking.55 It needs to be recognized that this thinking inserts the scriptural vision into classical Aristotelian based philosophical categories. It is this methodology of his time which has come to be questioned and debated, as it has been found by some to inadequately reflect full scriptural revelation and personal experience of God. The question is whether Aquinas’ methodology is inadequate for ascertaining the immutability of God or whether tradition may not have done him justice in its interpretation of his thinking. Perhaps it is a combination of the two. Aquinas’ sources on the immutability of God Scriptural Sources. In appreciating Aquinas’ understanding of God’s immutability we turn first to his theological sources and in particular his belief in, and use of, the authority of Scripture. Commenting on Baruch 4:1, "And the law which is eternal", Aquinas explains that the eternal and immutable truth of Scripture is founded on the immutable nature of God: "I am God and I am not changed."[Mal 3.6].56 For Aquinas sees that Scripture affirms the immutability of God directly, indirectly, and metaphorically.57 These direct passages pose a challenge to interpret God’s immutability adequately. Use of the indirect and metaphorical passages is more vulnerable to attack in terms of their being valid indicators of immutability. Some scriptural passages which Aquinas interprets as direct affirmations are: "I am God and I am not changed." [Mal 3:6]58 "God is not as a human that God should lie, nor--be changed." [Num 23:19]59 "You will change them and they will be changed, but you are always yourself the same." [Ps 101:28]60 "Every good endowment and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights with whom there is no change nor shadow of vicissitude." [Jas 1:17]61 Elsewhere in Scripture Aquinas sees God's immutability implied or affirmed indirectly. For instance, "You are yourself my king and my God." [Ps 43:6]62, and also the opening words of John's Gospel, "In the beginning was the Word".63 Aquinas also understands certain metaphorical or anthropomorphic usages to signify divine immutability, for instance God's "standing" [Am 7:7] and "sitting" [Is 9:7].64 There are passages though, where Scripture seems to predicate motion or change of God. Some imply divine motion in subtle ways: "Draw near to God and God will draw near to you" [Jas 4:8] and "If that nation repents of its evil, I will also repent." [Jer 18:8].65 In at 27 least one place Scripture would seem to assert God, as Divine Wisdom, is "more changeable than all changeable things." [Wis 7:24]66 Aquinas resolves these contradictions by distinguishing the various senses and usages of Scripture.67 For Aquinas, the truth of Scripture is found first in what he calls the "literal sense" and then in the various "spiritual senses." In the literal sense the words of Scripture are understood to signify certain things and are the foundation for the various spiritual senses. All of Aquinas' arguments for the reality of divine immutability belong to the literal sense. To discover the proper interpretation of passages Aquinas points to internal evidence of Scripture itself and relies also on external authority, the latter residing in the Church and "chiefly in the supreme pontiff".68 In particular Aquinas refers to the external authority of the Church Fathers and so to these we now turn. Patristic Sources Aquinas draws in particular, on Augustine and Dionysius. Aquinas believes the Fathers69 are to be followed "only in so far as they tell us those things which the apostles and prophets have left in their writings."70 Aquinas modifies their teachings and that of the philosophers who influenced them, whenever he sees a deeper truth.71 Aquinas makes use of Dionysius in stating that, by the three ways of causality, negation, and eminence, we may come to know God from humankind. Both Dionysius and Aquinas discover that God may appropriately be called immutable. For neither person, does this predication of God imply a notion of staticity or inertness. Both find the immutable God to be an active God who, in virtue of creative and providential causality, may in some sense be said to "be moved and to proceed towards all things."72 This divine motion is understood as the motion of love,73 the activity of the immovable God being described as a "stable procession” and as "productive stillness."74 This understanding becomes significant to our later discussion when we re-examine the classical theistic view more closely in response to the process theology view of divine immutability. Aquinas' understanding of this active but immutable God is different to Dionysius' who, understanding God in an adaptation of Neoplatonic terms, has difficulty presenting the God of Revelation, the "God who is" [Ex 3:14], due to a philosophy in which being may not properly be predicated of God.75 For Aquinas, God is "above being", but the reason is not the Neoplatonic teaching that the One must be above being. Nor does the fact that God is above being [ens] imply that being, esse, must be denied of God. Rather, God is above the limited being of humankind because God is subsisting being itself.76 It is Augustine's testimony to the fact and uniqueness of God's divine immutability more than that of any other Father, to which Aquinas refers.77 As with Dionysius, the meaning of the phrases borrowed is changed. This can be clearly seen in the interpretation given by each to the divine name in Exodus 3:14 "I am who I am". Augustine interprets this name as a declaration of divine immutability. Being means "to be immutable". For all changing things cease being what they were and begin being what they were not.78 For Aquinas however, the appropriateness of the name lies in the fact that it "does not signify any form, but simply to-be itself, ipsum esse. God's to-be, esse, is God's very existence.79 Where Augustine sees a God who never changes, Aquinas sees a pure act-of-being.80 This deeper perception of Aquinas is significant to our later discussion as we explore a reinterpretation of the classical understanding of divine immutability. 28 Aquinas’ use and adaptation of the Fathers requires a brief understanding of the philosophical sources drawn upon by both the Fathers and, in turn, Aquinas. The influence of these sources is significant for Aquinas' interpretation of God as dynamic but unchanging perfection, as pure esse. This interpretation lies at the heart of the immutability debate both for those who wish to raise objections and those who wish to remain within the Thomistic tradition but see the need to reinterpret Aquinas’ thought to make it accessible to contemporary understanding. Philosophical Sources The philosophical source most often cited by Aquinas in his discussions on divine immutability is Aristotle. There is a certain similarity between the God of Aquinas and the first principle of Aristotle, a similarity apparent in the attribute of immutability. Some theologians have accused Aquinas of presenting a notion of God which too much resembles a Greek philosophical principle.81 Others recognize that Aquinas' God is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and of the Trinity revealed through Jesus Christ.82 As with his use of the Fathers, Aquinas transforms Aristotle's arguments according to his own understanding of God. The insight most significant for Aquinas is that of God as the pure act of existing, ipsum esse subsistens, adopted and developed from Avicenna. It is this which shapes Aquinas’ interpretation of, and underlies the premises for his arguments on, God's divine immutability.83 For Aquinas, God is pure esse and thus is absolutely simple, containing no composition of essence and existence. Since motion implies composition God must be immovable. Whereas Aristotle sees this distinction according to the order of form in his analysis of substantial and accidental change, the immovable mover being the source of all change and free from any potentiality for change, the distinction for Aquinas between changeable and immovable being lies in the order of existence. This distinction is between "the being to whom the act of existence is attributed by essence, that which we call God, and the beings to which the act of existence may be attributed by participation."84 As we shall see, Aquinas' understanding of being leads to his particular understanding of act and potency. It is important to consider how this concept of esse, the act of existing, is to be understood. Things which have being are not just lumps of static essence, inert, immovable, unprogressive, and unchanging. The act of existence is not a state, it is an act, the act of all acts, and must be understood as such. Esse is seen here as dynamic impulse, energy, act, the first, the most persistent and enduring of all dynamisms, all energies, all acts.85 Aristotle and Aquinas both recognize that there is a being which is "pure act", who exists apart from all potency. The "pure act" which Aristotle attributes to this being is the determinate perfection of pure substantial form. The "pure act" which Aquinas affirms of this being is the boundless perfection of pure esse.86 The name by which God is revealed to Moses, "I am", [Ex.3:14] is the most appropriate name for God precisely because it expresses unlimited perfection in being, esse..87. 29 Aquinas reshaping the Sources Examining Aquinas' use and modification of his sources places us in a better position to examine his arguments on divine immutability. A synthesis of Aquinas' arguments is given from his Summa Theologiae Question 9 article 1. We find the establishment and explanation of his arguments in his Commentaries, theological, philosophical and scriptural, as well as his independent works.88 It is not our intention to pass comment on each of these arguments but rather to use them as the platform from which to examine both objections and reinterpretations. Scriptural Commentaries There are a number of Scripture commentaries in which Aquinas provides discussion of his understanding of divine immutability. The Commentary on the Book of Job89, outlines the relationship between being, actuality, and immutability. The reference to divine immutability occurs where Aquinas is considering Eliphaz's statement that no-one may ever justify themselves before God [Job 4:17-18]. A relationship is established explicitly, between actuality and immutability and implicitly, between perfection in act and perfection in being. The immutability which Aquinas is predicating here of God is the immutability of ultimate perfection.90 In The Commentary on the Letter to the Hebrews91, Aquinas explains how the divine properties of eternity and immutability manifest the difference between God and humankind. The occasion for Aquinas' discussion is St Paul’s' statement in Heb 1:10-12: "Yea, O Lord, did found the earth in the beginning, and the heavens are the work of your hands; they will perish but you remain. They will all grow old like a garment, like a mantle you will roll them up, and they will be changed. But you are the same, and your years will never end." Again with reference to a statement of St Paul’s made in 1 Tim 6:14-16, that God "alone has immortality", Aquinas explains in The Commentary on the First Letter to Timothy,92. that the transcendence of God indicated in Paul's statement means that only that which is "completely immutable" is truly incorruptible. Since God alone is "completely immutable", God alone has immortality.93 In the prologue of Aquinas' Commentary on the Gospel of John,94 Aquinas finds four ways that the "loftiness" of the object of John's contemplation are designated. These are the loftiness of "authority", "eternity", "dignity or excellence of nature", and "incomprehensible truth". Aquinas acknowledges that it was through the contemplation of these four things that the philosophers of antiquity came to the knowledge of God. Some, seeing the mutability of things, came to know God as their "immutable and eternal principle". Others, seeing that finite things participate in being and are themselves beings through participation, came to know that there must be some most excellent being which "through its very essence is being itself, ie whose being, esse, is its essence". In particular, Aquinas considers the degrees of excellence among humankind and comes to realize that greater immutability is a sign, for him, of greater excellence. The first principle of all things then is, if it is "supreme and most excellent" it must be "immovable and eternal". This conclusion of the ancient philosophers is confirmed for Aquinas by the testimony of Scripture. It is suggested by the imagery of God's being "seated" [Is 6:1; Ps 44:6], and is applied explicitly to Christ both in Heb 13:8 "Jesus 30 Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever", and in the opening line of the Gospel of John "In the beginning was the Word."95 In Aquinas' Commentary on the Psalms96 a rather different reason from those above is given for predicating immutability of God. The psalmist recounts the wonders that God worked for God’s people in the past and then confesses his own present confidence in God: "You are yourself my King and my God." Aquinas sees the psalmist affirming the "immutability of God". For by his confession that the God of his ancestors is also "his King and his God", the psalmist proclaims that God's power is not diminished. The affirmation here involves no philosophical reasoning but springs spontaneously from a trust in God which is awakened through a reflection upon the covenant experience of God's continuous care.97 Philosophical Commentaries In the Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle.98, argument for an immovable first mover is to be found on two occasions. Firstly, the premise that there can be no infinite regress in movers and things moved is established by showing that the infinite series implied could not be moved in finite time.99 Secondly, it is shown that the first mover is eternal and from the eternity of the first mover its oneness and absolute immutability may be established. It is seen that being totally unchangeable, it does not tire in its moving, thus it can move with "an eternally continuous motion". Aquinas maintains the transcendence of the first mover. Following Aristotle, Aquinas reviews certain qualities of the first mover. The "first immovable mover" must be infinite in power, indivisible, and "in a way, outside the genus of magnitude." Aquinas concludes "thus the Philosopher ends his general discussion of natural things with the first principle of the whole of nature, who is over all things, God, blessed forever, Amen."100 Discussion of the immovable first mover is found too in Aquinas' The Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,101 where he considers the existence and nature of the first immovable substance. Since motion is eternal the substance must not only be eternal and always acting but "its essence must be act." No potentiality may be admitted. "Such a substance must be immaterial -- since matter is always in potency." The attributes deduced from its immovability are discussed. Because this mover is absolutely immovable it does not cause motion as a "natural mover" but as a "desirable and intelligible object." From this, further deductions are possible. Because it is the first cause of motion it must be an actual substance and as such must be the first intelligible and the first appetible good. Because it causes knowledge and love it must itself be able to know and love. Since intellectual activity is a most perfect kind of life, the first mover, now identified as God, and God being actuality itself, allows Aquinas to say that "God's very substance is life". God is incorporeal, infinite in power, and in no way movable. Thus are revealed the existence and nature of that first substance which is "eternal and unchangeable". It is to this immutable cause of the motion of the outermost sphere -- a final cause only, in the Metaphysics of Aristotle, but both a final and efficient cause in the commentary of Aquinas -- that both men give the name "God".102 In The Commentary on Aristotle's On The Heavens.103 Aquinas, in considering why God must be absolutely immovable, uses the argument based upon God's inherent perfection. He begins with the assertion that whatever is moved "is either moved so that 31 it may escape some evil or so that it may acquire some good." Since God is completely perfect there is no evil to avoid and no further good to attain.104 Theological Commentaries In the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard105 Aquinas discusses four arguments based on natural reason which Lombard uses to show the unity of the divine essence. Explaining these in terms of the three ways outlined by Dionysius106 causality, remotion, and eminence107, Aquinas’ explanation of the second argument, by way of remotion, is where he affirms the immutability of God. He takes his argument from Augustine contending that beyond all imperfect beings there must be some perfect being which has no admixture of imperfection.108 He thus treats the question of divine immutability in the context of a discussion on the perfection of divine being.109 Acting on Hilary's statement that "being is not something added to God, but subsisting truth and abiding cause and proper nature of the natural genus"110, Aquinas finds that divine being as abiding cause affirms the perfection of the divine being as cause of all other being, itself abiding unchangingly.111 Aquinas presents two arguments, scriptural and philosophical, to reject that God is in any way mutable. Two scriptural passages are cited, "I am God and I am not changed" [Mal 3:6] and God is that “With whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration" [Jas 1:17]. The philosophical argument is based on Aristotle. Since God is pure act, having no admixture of potency, there can be no change. Yet motion which does not necessarily imply potency may still in some way be predicated of God. Since in God, operation and substance are identical, then as God's substance is eternal, so too is God's operation.112 Aquinas' Exposition on the First and Second Decretals I,.113 a summary of the first and second canons of the Twelfth Ecumenical Council, Lateran IV, 1215, integrated into the Decretals of Gregory IX as part of medieval Canon Law, we find contained within the exposition of the First Decretal a rare instance of Aquinas' affirmation of divine immutability with reference to a Council of the Church. He writes, that by declaring God eternal and unchangeable the Council "shows the excellence of the divine nature or essence." Commenting on the term "eternal" Aquinas explains that the divine essence "is not changed through past and future, for nothing is taken from it nor is anything able to come to it anew". This eternity is signified in the name by which God is revealed to Moses: "I am who I am" [Ex 3:14]. In his brief comment regarding the term "unchangeable" Aquinas shows the statement of the Council to be confirmed by Scripture: "It is shown that the divine nature surpasses all mutability when it is called "unchangeable", incommutabilis, because with God there is no variation according to Jas 1:17: "With whom there is no change or shadow of vicissitude."114 In Aquinas' Commentary on Dionysius' On the Divine Names,115 the discussion points out the positive signification of the term "immutability" as applied to God. Various Scripture passages are cited to show God is said to be "the same" [Ps101:28], "to stand" [Am 7:7], "to sit" [Is9:7], to be "immovable, immobilis" [Mal 3:6], and to "move" [Gen 3:8; Wis 7:24]. In terms of immutability, sameness is attributed to God in several ways. As regards being, divine immutability implies perfection in being. God is "not changed as regards being and non-being." God is neither generated nor corrupted, but is eternally the same or "supersubstantially eternal" and "inalterable", always "the same existing being". As regards alteration, God possesses a perfection of power for resisting change, 32 signified by Dionysius' term "strong", and God has no principle of mutability, suggested by the term "invariable", and indicative of no imperfection. This is so because: the principle of variability may indicate admixture but God is called pure, may be the potency of matter but God is immaterial, may indicate diversity but God is simple, and may be due to an indigent condition but God is not indigent. As regards local motion; Aquinas says that motion, which might be implied by relationship to other things, is excluded from God. God is "always in the same way present to all things." "Otherness" is attributed to God "insofar as God is present to all things as they participate in God through a certain similitude according to the perfections which they receive through God's providence."116 The issue of God's relatedness and otherness, more than any other issue, lies at the heart of the entire debate on God’s immutability. In Aquinas' lecture 4 on The Commentary on Dionysius' On the Divine Names117 it is said that God "exists and remains according to immovable identity." With respect to operation, God is both intrinsically and extrinsically immovable. Intrinsically, "God always acts according to the same wisdom, power, and goodness", extrinsically, God is immovable "both in that God has no cause of motion outside of God’s self and is not able to be moved into a contrary condition by anything external." Having established the appropriateness of attributing immutability to God it is then shown that motion is also in some way predicable of God who is said to be moved in bringing all things into existence and containing all things. In an attempt to explain how these mutually exclusive notions are both predicable of God Aquinas follows Dionysius' attempt to explain how "rectilinear, spiral, and circular motions" are attributable to God. God's motion is rectilinear in that it proceeds "unfailingly" and "unchangingly", spiral in simultaneously involving both "motion and rest", what Dionysius calls "stable procession" and "productive stillness", and circular in God's identity containing both principles and ends, "things containing and things contained," and "the turning to God's self of those things which proceed from God as from a principle."118 Aquinas’ thought on divine immutability, revealed by examining his commentaries, achieves a synthesis in his treatises. These treatises enable us to more readily discern the intent of the argument which upholds divine immutability. The intent has been masked by the use of Aristotelian categories, leaving Aquinas open to criticism and objection. What is Aquinas trying to uphold in general, about God? A Synthesis of Aquinas’ thought on the immutability of God God the exemplar cause Aquinas' synthetic treatises, particularly the Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae, offer us an amalgamation of his thought on divine immutability. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, discussion on the immutability of God is found in the context of arguments for the existence of God.119 In the thirteenth chapter of Book I, one argument taken from Aristotle, demonstrates not only the existence of God but establishes also God's immutability. The argument is that from motion. In the following chapter Aquinas goes on to use the immutability of God as a principle, manifested in philosophy and confirmed in Scripture, from which other divine attributes may be determined. "As a principle of procedure in knowing God by way of remotion, therefore, let us adopt the proposition which, from what we have said, is now manifest, namely that 33 God is absolutely immovable, omnino immobilis. The authority of Sacred Scripture also confirms this. For it is written: "I am God and I am not changed." [Mal. 3:6] "With whom there is no change."[Jas. 1:17] Again: "God is not as human that God should be changed." [Num. 23:19] [SCG I, c.14, nr. 4] 120 This proposition is here unadorned but the intent of such a proposition becomes more readily apparent in the Summa Theologiae. The latter presents a synthesis of Aquinas' mature thought and, unlike the Commentaries, is not determined in its order of presentation by the requirements of the text of some other author. Immutability of Supreme Perfection In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas presents five ways through which the existence of God may be demonstrated.121 One way is an adaptation of Aristotle's argument from motion and as we have seen, involves the theme of divine immutability. "It is necessary that all things which are changeable and capable of defect be reduced to some first principle which is immovable, immobile, and necessary through itself." This immovable first principle is identified as God.122 The real significance of such a statement is when Aquinas goes on to show how God's immutability is related to and indicative of, perfection in being.123 God's simplicity, perfection, and pure actuality are the premises for Aquinas' major arguments for divine immutability. Aquinas intends to show the dynamic perfection of unbounded actuality that is proper to God as subsistent esse.124 The significant word which is often overlooked in interpreting Aquinas’ teaching on divine immutability is ‘dynamic’. From the very fact that God is the self-subsistent Being it likewise follows that God is absolutely immutable but with an immutability not of inertia but of supreme perfection, belonging to God alone.125 This is an important distinction and one which is taken up by neo-Thomists who, in answer to Process objections to the classical stand, wish to stay within the Tradition yet give credence to a God who does relate on a personal level to humankind. Within his discussion Aquinas provides three reasons for concluding that God must be altogether unchangeable. The first reason is based on the metaphysical principle that actuality precedes potentiality. God, the first existent, must be regarded as sheerly actual and unalloyed with potentiality.126 Because God is the first being, God must be pure act. Anything which is moved in any way is in potency. Thus it is impossible that God be in any way moved. Aquinas establishes God as pure act, actus, from the fact that God is the "first being" and since potency is posterior to act, God must be "pure act without admixture of any potency". That God is pure act, as established earlier,127 is due to the absolute priority of act to potency being established by reference to the fact that "what is in potency is not reduced to act except through a being in act." God's pure actuality is established, not by reference to being the first mover but by reference to being the "first being". Thus it is important to recognize that God as the perfect being, is Aquinas’ context for this argument on divine immutability. The argument which establishes God as the most perfect being and as the source of to-be, esse, is the guiding force behind the first explanation of God's immutability.128 In his second reason Aquinas shows that in anything which is moved there is some sort of composition. Since God is absolutely simple, there can be no composition in God. Thus God cannot be moved. That God is absolutely simple as established earlier,129 is 34 that in God there can be no composition since God's essence is God's existence. In contrast, because the essence of the human person is distinct from its existence, the human person considered in itself, may at some time cease to exist.130 The context here then, is that of God’s essence and existence being one. The third reason shows that everything which is moved acquires something by its motion and attains to something to which it had not attained previously. Since God is infinite, God already contains "the entire plenitude of the perfection of all to-be". Here again, implicit reference is made to God's perfection in being.131 The immobility of inertia which is inferior to motion and our activity, must not be confused with the immobility of perfection, which is the supreme stability of God who is self-subsisting Being, Intelligence, and Love.132 When this distinction fails to be recognized misinterpretation can occur both of Aquinas’ teaching on divine immutability and his intent. Accordingly, it ought to be noted that in the article Aquinas offers replies to three objections to divine immutability. The first objection is concerned with immanent motion. It is based on a statement of Augustine that God in some way "moves God's self". Aquinas explains that the motion involved here is motion in the broad sense, that Augustine is considering knowing, willing, and loving as sorts of motion. Such motion reveals the superabundant perfection of divine life and is thus predicable of God. The immanent actions of knowing and loving play an essential role in Aquinas' discussion of the Trinitarian God of Christian faith.133 He compares the procession of the Son, the Word, from the Father to the procession of the mental word, concept, in our immanent action of human knowing. The procession of the Spirit may be compared to the activity of willing or loving.134 For this reason, the Christian God proclaimed by Aquinas is no static, solitary self-contemplator, but a most blessed Trinity of unbounded wisdom, love, and life.135 The second objection involves action, i.e. transient motion on the part of the agent or doer, and springs from the scriptural teaching that "Wisdom is more movable than all movable things" [Wis 7:24]. Aquinas responds that divine wisdom is the exemplar cause of all things, a procession or motion of divine wisdom into all things and implies no imperfection. The act of a being-in-act may be predicated of God.136 The third objection concerns motion that is like transient action, but considered on the part of the receiver, and implies potency and imperfection.137 This objection argues that "to approach" and "to recede" signify motion, these things being said of God in Scripture "Draw near to God and God will draw near to you".[Jas 4:8] Aquinas replies that the "motion" in question does not refer to something in God, but only to something in the human person, which is then predicated of God "figuratively" or "by transference" and, being metaphorical, implies no imperfection in God.138 This last reply presents a sticking point for those who want to acknowledge a real relationship between God and humankind. For many it is no longer tenable to explain or account for the relationship in this way. There is a call for an analysis of this form of motion in the light of the dynamism of which Aquinas speaks with respect to God’s perfection of being. What does Aquinas have to say on the matter? 35 Aquinas’ thought on the relation of God to the World. Real and logical relations With regard to relations between God and the world139 Aquinas states that a relation of God to humankind is not a reality in God, only in humankind. He distinguishes between "real" and "logical" relations. Humankind is really related to God but in God there is no real, only logical relation.140 How is this to be understood? The divine act is the divine substance.141 Because the divine essence is the divine intellect and will, in acting by essence God acts by intellect and will. Yet the divine will and the divine being, though they are the same reality, still differ in aspect.142 The divine creative act is in no way common to God and humankind. It is of an entirely different order from that of created being since God, as we have seen, "is above being, ens, insofar as being infinite to-be itself".143 As such, no common order of motion is allowed. Thus the relationship between them cannot be a real relationship with respect to both extremes. It is rather, a real relation for humankind which really depends upon God as the cause of its being, and a relation of reason only in God, who is not of the same order as humankind.144 In humankind, creation signifies a real relationship to God as the principle of its existence.145 In God, creation signifies the divine action which is God's substance along with a relationship of reason to humankind.146 What does it mean to say that God has no real relation to humankind? It is frequently misread to mean that God is ontologically removed from, and without concern for, the world God sustains. Aquinas' denial that there can be any real relationship of God to humankind means that the penetration of our being by God cannot be reduced to Aristotle's category of ‘relation' as something accidentally accruing to and inhering within God, except in our thinking, except as a relation of reason.147 It is rather, a sort of relationship which allows for the utter intimacy of God's presence to each human person as the source of the human person’s very to-be, esse. Only substantial esse can be the source of participated esse in others.148The relationship between God and humankind is the sort of relationship which is proper to beings which are not of the same order. We may call it a mixed relation. It is the sort of relationship that exists whenever two things are related to each other in such a way that one depends upon the other, but not the reverse. In the dependent member, the relation is real, in the independent member, the relation is one of reason. Because God is the highest cause, the cause of the very to-be, esse, of the human person, this sort of relationship pertains especially to God.149 The unchanging God who alone in supreme transcendence and total immanence is capable of such an act proceeds causatively towards all things and is placed outside God's self by God's providence for all existing things.150 God’s eternal glance How does this occur? Aquinas says that God knows God's self through God's essence and knows other things in God's self, since God's essence contains the similitude of things other than God's self. God's knowledge of created reality is from eternity. Contingent realities become actual successively but God knows them simultaneously. Eternity, being simultaneously whole, comprises all time. All things that are in time are present to God, therefore from eternity. That is, God has the types of things present 36 within and God's glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. 151 Limitation of Aristotelian categories Upholding God’s perfection in being, with the consequent mixed relation which must exist between God and humankind, is clearly the intent behind Aquinas’ doctrine on divine immutability. It is unfortunate that Aquinas’ understanding of God’s relation to the world as a mixed one is hampered in its explication by the use of Aristotelian categories. The use of these categories has brought about a call in contemporary times to re-interpret divine immutability in a way that more adequately takes account of, and gives expression to, scriptural revelation and personal experience of this relationship, thereby taking seriously the objections raised by such as the Process school of thought. Clearly, the intent to acknowledge the dynamic perfection of God’s being and thus uphold God’s divine immutability is limited in its expression by the reliance on, and use of, Aristotelian categories of philosophical thought. The recognition of the limitations of these Aristotelian categories is not a recent one. The Eastern classical viewpoint on divine immutability, reaching back to the thought of Palamas in the fourteenth century, endeavours to free theology from these Aristotelian categories. As such it deserves our consideration, the more so since Palamas is to the East what Aquinas is to the West. How successful Palamas is can be judged by our examination and critique. EXEMPLAR OF CLASSICAL EASTERN THEISTIC UNDERSTANDING ST GREGORY PALAMAS Manifest in Being, Imparticipable in Essence Whilst Aquinas and thus the West has held sway into this century as the basis of traditional theistic understanding with respect to God’s immutability, the East has its spokesperson on whom they continue to draw for their traditional understanding. In the attempt to reconcile God's immutability or stability with God's becoming or historicity, theology in the East is directed towards a difference-unity model which may be traced back at least as far as Gregory Palamas, of the 14th century. This model relates the immutable essence with the uncreated energies of God.152 Like other theologians, Palamas found himself faced with the problem of the transcendence and the immanence of God. How can the utterly transcendent God enter into a real and personal relationship with human beings? To explore the answer to this question from the Eastern classical perspective, we need to examine Palamas’ doctrine of divine energies. Since Palamas has held sway in the East as significant as Aquinas in the West, and yet remains little known in the West, we present an example of existent critique of Palamite thought. Thus may we better judge the success of Palamas in attending to the question of the transcendent and yet immanent God without couching the answer in Aristotelian categories. 37 Palamas’ thought on Essence and Energies within God As with Aquinas, Palamas turns to within his own tradition, specifically to the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers. Palamas teaches that the distinction of essence and energies is a distinction within God, the essence guaranteeing the transcendence of God and the energies guaranteeing the immanence of God. The distinction, which was officially endorsed by the Orthodox Church at a series of Councils in the fourteenth century, has been a topic of debate and controversy ever since.153 Energeia means operation, and for the Cappadocian Fathers and Palamas, the self-revelation of God takes place precisely as operation or activity. This is also an authentic and central biblical notion consistent with the theology of the covenant and salvation history. Energeia also has a philosophical meaning, the essence in act, the essence manifested, the actual manifestation of the essence.154 For Palamas, the transcendent essence of God would be a philosophical abstraction if it did not possess "power", that is, "the faculties of knowing, of prescience, of creating".155 The God of Palamas is a living God, ultimately indescribable in the categories of essentialist Greek philosophy. Referring to the revelation of the divine Name to Moses on Mt Sinai [Ex. 3:14] "When God was conversing with Moses God did not say, ‘I am the essence' but ‘I am the One Who is'. Thus, it is not the ‘One Who is’ who derives from the essence but essence which derives from God, for it is God who contains all being in God's self, that is, God as the Universal Source of being transcends being in essence.156 The real communion, the fellowship with the ‘One Who is’, is for Palamas the very content of the Christian experience, made possible because the ‘One Who is’ became human. Palamas is concerned to affirm simultaneously the transcendence of God and God's immanence in the free gift of communion in the Body of Christ.157 Apophatic theology In the East two currents of apophatic theology are distinguished.158 The first, directly dependent on Neo-Platonism, conceives the transcendence and unknowability of God as a consequence of the limitations of the created mind. The second asserts divine transcendence as a property of God, the God of the Bible is a hidden God revealed only when God desires. Palamism, and Orthodox theology in general, is seen as an expression of the second current.159 Palamas' adversaries defended the first conception of divine unknowability, having in common an intellectual conception of knowledge of God and an essentialist philosophy as the foundation of their theology. One could point a parallel between their conception of God and that of St Thomas Aquinas, both borrowing from the same Aristotelian or Neo-Platonic sources and given validity by the same authority, Pseudo-Dionysius. The two interpretations coexisted for a certain time in both the East and the West. Palamas however, integrates Dionysius into an authentic Christian synthesis through his particular theological education and Christocentric spirituality.160 Palamas attempts to hold in tension two claims: that our deification is real, and that God remains absolutely transcendent to union with humankind.161 He writes: that "Negation by itself is not enough for the intelligence to reach supra-intelligible things”. The Transcendent remains unknown to us because It is Itself unknown by nature. "Contemplation is not only detachment and negation, it is a union and a divinisation which happens mystically and inexpressibly by the grace of God after detachment".162 38 Accordingly Palamas writes: "God is being and not being; God is everywhere and nowhere; God has many names and cannot be named; God is both in perpetual movement and immovable; God is absolutely everything and nothing of that which is."163 In face of this reality such concepts as ‘the essence' or ‘God', used in the philosophic sense of First Cause, lose their meaning for the God of the Bible is ‘superessential' and more-than-God.164 In this way Palamas deals with the tension of the immutability and relationality of God. Enumerating Aristotle's ten categories of existence, Palamas defines God as a superessential essence in which one can only see the categories of relation and of action. Theological Personalism Theological personalism is the fundamental feature of the tradition to which Palamas belongs and in that lies the key to understanding his doctrine of the divine energies.165 The personalist conception of God is the key to Palamas’ thought. It becomes significant also, as we shall see, to re-interpretation of classical western thinking. The mystery of person is at the core of Palamas’ essence - energy distinction. Personality simultaneously exists on two levels, in itself and in relation. God freely chooses to exist in relation. The acceptance of this fundamental distinction between essence and energies in God denotes an understanding of God and divine truth in terms of personal relationship and knowledge in terms of personal participation.166 God is manifest in being while remaining imparticipable in essence. That is the real significance of what is called ‘Palamism'.167 The divine essence is fully present to humankind through the divine energies which are in some sense distinct but not separate from the divine essence. According to Palamas the divine essence, ousia, is unknowable, incommunicable, unnameable, imparticipable. However God is known, communicated and participated in, through God's uncreated divine energies, energeiai.168 The living God of Palamas is a God who is essentially inaccessible but existentially present. "As God complete is present in each of the divine energies, each serves as God's name."169 "That which is manifest, that which makes itself accessible to intellection or participation, is not a part of God, for God is not thus subject to partition for our benefit; complete God is, manifest and not manifest, complete God is, conceived and inconceivable by the intelligence, complete God is, shared and imparticipable".170 With Palamas' main preoccupation being to free theology from Aristotle's philosophic categories, his thought is to speak of God as an active agent. The Fathers, Palamas writes, "did not say that all this is one sole thing, but that it belonged to one sole God".171 Therefore divine activity remains simple, because God is the sole Actor within all the energies. 172 The divine simplicity expresses itself in the divine Persons: "In essence and energy there is one unique Divinity of God, not only unique but simple".173 With God the three divine hypostases possess one sole energy and every divine act is of necessity the act of the three Persons because of their consubstantiality. The common divine essence is the cause of the energies but these energies remain personal acts, for consubstantiality does not suppress the personal element in God but establishes copenetration. Palamas is defending a living God manifested in concrete Persons and by concrete acts. Although not existing outside the divine hypostases and having no hypostases of their own, the energies can be called enhypostasized in the sense that they 39 have a real and permanent existence as well as a personalized existence. The energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God, they represent God's existence for us. The transcendence of the essence-cause in relation to the caused energies does not break the unity of God.174 Hence God appears complete in the total simplicity of God’s personal being and the real diversity of God’s providential and redemptive activity.175. It is the eastern view that a theology that discounts the possibility of clearly expressing and explaining the paradoxical distinction between essence and energies of God may also prove incapable of accepting any real relationship between temporal creation and eternal Creator. The most tangible illustration of God's love is that of descending into relation with humankind, so rendering God's absoluteness accessible to those relative or related while not ceasing to remain inaccessibly absolute.176 The contemporary Process theologian Charles Hartshorne reinterprets this view in his own Process fashion, maintaining the possibility of affirming without internal contradiction the divine as necessary, absolute, unchanging and eternal while being also contingent, relative, changing, and temporal. It is our intention to explore this Process perspective in some detail but first we offer an example of existent critique of Palamite thought. We do so in an effort towards judging the success of Palamas in releasing thought on God’s immutability and relatedness from Aristotelian categories. For whilst, from the time of Palamas, the distinction between God’s essence and energies has formed part of the official teaching of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and despite the fact that Palamas does not say that the distinction is real,177. it must be acknowledged nevertheless that Palamism is subject to serious criticism. Critique of Palamite Thought Palamas’ thought is subject to criticism in terms of perceived difficulties which stem from late classical philosophy and patristic theology. Rowan D. Williams outlines some of these difficulties and his work178, as such, is worthy of note. This work sets out certain questions and reservations concerning the possibility and propriety of accepting such a system at its own valuation. His work joins that of other critical voices who cast doubt on both the inner coherence and patristic pedigree of Palamism.179 Palamas’ misunderstanding of the Aristotelian system An issue raised by Williams180 is that of the precise sense of ousia in Palamism. He sees two models of dubious compatibility being employed, with a lack of functional predication for the term. Williams points out that this issue derives from Palamas’ misunderstanding of the workings of the Aristotelian system. This misunderstanding is itself derivative from the Greek tendency to regard Aristotelian logic as a pedestrian adjunct to philosophy, the latter being dependent on Plato and thereafter, Plotinus, Proclus and other interpreters. Aristotle’s thought is able to be integrated into the Platonic thought-world only by ontologising his logic, transforming it into a system not of terms, but of real relations.181 Thus a statement such as “God possesses something other than ousia”182 becomes nonsense from an Aristotelian point of view where ousia does not refer to a core of essentiality with qualities added.183 Williams maintains that this is what Palamas is implying in his remarks about ousia and hypostasis, which treat the Persons of the Trinity as distinct from the substance of God. To be fair, Palamas does 40 not want to surrender to Neoplatonism, to an elevation of the ousia above the Trinity,184 yet the logic of his language directs him thus. It seems that the notion of an absolutely transcendent divine interiority can be secured only at the cost of orthodox trinitarianism185. Once ousia has been concretized into a core of essential life it takes on associations of superiority or ontological priority186 despite statements such as that without energeia there is no ousia187. The implication, springing from the Platonic tradition, of Palamas’ contentions that [1] for humankind to share in the divine ousia means their elevation to the level of the persons of the Trinity188, and [2] that the divine ousia, simple and indivisible, is beyond participation, is that the divine ousia is a concrete reality. Neoplatonic metaphysics involves a general structure of ousia, zoi, and nous. A reality, ousia, exercising its reality in relation, zoi, enters the life of another in relation, uniting the second to the first, nous.189 Difficulties ensue when transferring this thought pattern to the thought pattern of the Christian world. This is demonstrated throughout the history of the Dionysian influence. Palamas inherits this structural framework. The dialectic of participable and imparticipable is acceptable in a Neoplatonic context but for the Christian, zoi and ousia have, somehow, to be brought together.190 When ousia is regarded, in Aristotelian fashion, as an abstract or formal notion, then what is known by humankind is ‘substance-in-act’, esse, the existent in relation. In terms of this system, to say that our knowledge is of energeia rather than ousia is obvious. So Aquinas’ teaching that the vision of God after this life is a vision of God’s essentia means that God’s actus essendi is present to us directly. It is not a comprehension of what it is to be God. This account of divine incomprehensibility avoids the problem of participation, understood here as Neo-Thomistic ‘intentional’.191 Neo-platonism and Aristotelianism: an unhappy marriage Despite the best of intentions on the part of Palamas, to release theological thought on divine immutability from the constraints of Aristotelian categorization, Williams’ work argues well that the result is an unhappy marriage of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophic systems. The extreme realism of Neoplatonic metaphysics confuses a terminology better understood in terms of Aristotelian logic. Accordingly in Williams’ view, Palamism has been most fruitful where it has been treated with the least fundamentalism. For writers such as Lossky, Florovsky, Staniloae, Clement and Yannaras, Palamism is not systematically normative but an indispensable means towards an existential Christian theology.192 Even so, the difficulty lies in stating such a theology without capitulation either to a Neoplatonic hierarchical cosmology or an immanentist Process metaphysic.193 The crux of the matter is that Palamas’ distinction hardens an epistemological point into an ontological differentiation in God. He does so in order to safeguard a view of participation-in-God, which is, in Williams’ view, insupportably realist.194 If Palamas is concerned to defend an excessively realist view of participation-in-God this may be in order to rule out an excessively nominalist, extrinsic and conceptual Western notion of the knowledge of God. As we have noted, such a notion gives inadequate acknowledgment to scriptural revelation of God’s nature, in particular God’s nature in Jesus as self-gift, kenotic compassion. Palamas thus witnesses to his own vision of God 41 as self-sharing love.195 Noble as this endeavour is, the desire to hold in tension God’s transcendence and immanence in a non-Aristotelian framework has left Palamas open, as we see from Williams’ critique, to criticism concerning neo-Platonic confusion of terminology belonging to this framework. It thus may be said that, at worst, Palamas offers a confused conceptualization of divine immutability. At best however, the theological personalism from which Palamas operates offers an important insight and encouragement to those looking for a creative adaptation and reinterpretation of western classical thought on divine immutability, thought currently trapped inside Aristotelian language. Dissatisfaction with classical thought on God’s immutability There exists contemporary dissatisfaction with the traditional approaches to the issue of God’s immutability and relatedness to humankind. Points of dissatisfaction to do with inadequacy or contradiction have been noted in our examination thus far. Dissatisfaction has prompted a very different, some might say radical, response to the traditional approaches. This response comes from what is now known as the Process school of thought. We turn now to these main responses and proposals, with respect to thought on God’s immutability, which emanate from within this Process school. We do so with a view to discerning both their main objections to the classical approach and their alternative proposals. 42 CHAPTER THREE OBJECTIONS TO THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY THE VOICE OF OBJECTION Objections to traditional interpretation and understanding of Classical thought occur from the Process school of philosophical and theological thought, the Feminist theological school and some trinitarian theologians. Individually and collectively these objections deserve serious attention. PROCESS OBJECTIONS TO THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY Given that the challenge to the doctrine of divine immutability as formulated by classical theism has come mainly, but not exclusively, from process theology196, we begin with objections from this school of thought. Not only are their objections the most prevalent but they serve as a pivotal focus from which stems both debate and the recognition of a need for reinterpretation. There are certain differences among the adherents of this school of thought but on the whole they share a metaphysical vision of reality expressed in terms of becoming and relatedness. The key figures are A. N. Whitehead [1861-1947] and Charles Hartshorne [b. 1897]. Their insights, in turn, have been developed further and applied to various areas by people such as John Cobb, Schubert Ogden, David Griffin, Lewis Ford, David Tracey, and David Pailin. We explore the Process school of thought on divine immutability in an effort both to discern its objections to the classical system of thought and to examine and gauge what it has to offer as an alternative approach. FATHER OF PROCESS THOUGHT ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD God is Utterly Absolute and Totally Related Alfred North Whitehead, the Father of Process thought, rebukes Christian theologians for their appropriation of the Platonic metaphysical tradition because the concept of God which emerges from this tradition is not religiously available. Whitehead recognizes, along with an increasing number of contemporary theologians, that a God conceived of as non-temporal and impassible is hardly a God one can pray to, since such a God is in principle incapable of being affected by our love or adoration.197 The fundamental difficulty is that the convictions of faith and the demands of reason are seen to be incompatible. Conscious of philosophical considerations, theologians, as we have noted, have talked about God as being absolute, necessary, unchanging, infinite, eternal - in the sense of being beyond or outside time, actus purus - pure actuality without any potentiality, ens realissimum - having all perfections, and impassible. These notions appear to contradict talk about God as creating, loving, pitying, deciding, and acting in relation to the world.198 Herein lies the dilemma. 43 Foundational Process Thought God is chief exemplifier not chief exception In objection to the Classical perspective, Whitehead writes that "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. God is their chief exemplification".199 The point, for Whitehead, is to avoid a view of God which would equate the concept of God with the notion that God is simply the unmoved mover of Aristotle’s day. For such a notion would produce a picture of a deity removed from relationship with creation; self-contained, untouched by what happens in the world. Whitehead's concept of God is one integrally related to his total view of the world. God is neither an addendum to that view nor a logical construct reached by degrees of abstraction in an effort to arrive at some entirely non-temporal and supracosmic first cause. In Process theology the divine metaphysical attributes can only be understood and used adverbially.200 Herein lies the rub. From what premise does this understanding derive? A bi-polar God In contrast to classical understanding, the heart of Process thought contains the idea that to be actual is to be a process. This is the thought and premise from which all their argument derive. Thus, anything which is not a process is an abstraction from process, not a fully-fledged actuality. Since our basic religious drive is to be in harmony with the fully real, the Process school would argue that belief in the fully real being beyond process only encourages a view of escape from full participation in the world. It cannot be ignored however, that the religious implication of reality as processive is in harmony with one of the chief consequences of the Judeo-Christian vision of reality. In this tradition God is viewed as active within the historical process.201 Since the centre of our faith is a God who acts in history and who has become incarnate, suffering death on the cross, Whitehead's objection is a critical one for Christianity. Consequent to his objection to the classical perspective, Whitehead develops an alternative doctrine of God, a bi-polar God, infinite in Primordial nature, finite in Consequent nature. His is a God who enters into real relations with the world, who risks God’s being in dynamic interaction with the world.202 Whitehead's view of process and thus of God has distinctive character. When speaking of the essence of the universe Whitehead primarily has in mind the notion that actuality is process, and that at the root of process is the Primordial nature of God, which he sometimes calls the Divine Eros.203 This is conceived as "the active entertainment of all ideals, with the urge to their finite realization, each in its due season."204 Not all ideal possibilities can be realized simultaneously. This is why there is process.205 Whitehead does not always describe the two natures of God as if they were truly integrated. Sometimes the Primordial Nature is described as if it were a static order of eternal possibilities, with the initial aim for each worldly actuality being derived from this Primordial Nature. From this perspective the creative input of God into the world in each moment would be based upon a completely inflexible vision. It would not be based upon a sympathetic response to the previous state of affairs.206 Yet in other passages, Whitehead makes it clear that the ideals toward which the world is called by God in one moment are based upon God's loving response to the facts of the previous moments.207 44 From this perspective the world does not really have to deal with two natures or poles of God that stand externally related to each other, the one influencing the world and the other being influenced by it. Rather, the Primordial Nature is abstract, while the Consequent Nature is God as fully actual,208 and it is to God as a whole that we are related. The creative activity of God is based upon sympathetic responsiveness. The responsiveness of God is an active receptiveness occurring in the light of an intended creative influence upon the future.209 God is what God does. What God does is produce a stream of influence which has its consequences in creation while also having effect on God's own Consequent nature in accepting or receiving from the world. This finds in God, increased intensity of selfhood. God employs what is received for further activity in the world of temporal actual entities.210 Whitehead’s thought has had strong influence on other philosopher/theologians who now align themselves with the Process school of thought. Chief among these is Charles Hartshorne. Hartshorne has developed Whitehead’s thought further, in ongoing response to difficulties experienced with the traditionally interpreted Classical notions concerning God’s immutability. CURRENT EXEMPLAR OF PROCESS THOUGHT CHARLES HARTSHORNE God is abstract essence and concrete actuality Development of Process thought Whitehead's Consequent Nature of God is in large part, identical with what Charles Hartshorne calls God's concrete actuality. Since the Consequent Nature is God as fully actual211 the term ‘consequent' makes the same point as Hartshorne's term ‘relative', that God, as fully actual is responsive to and receptive of, worldly actualizations.212 While traditional theism speaks only of divine absoluteness, Process theism speaks also of divine relativity. Thus Process theism is sometimes called dipolar theism. This is in contrast to traditional theism with its divine simplicity. For Hartshorne, the two poles or aspects, of God, are the abstract essence of God and God's actuality. The radicalness of such a proposal can be seen in the description of the two poles. The abstract essence is that which is seen to be eternal, absolute, independent, unchangeable. It includes those abstract attributes of deity which characterize the divine existence at every moment. For example, to say that God is omniscient means that in every moment of the divine life God knows everything which is knowable at that time. On the other hand, the concrete actuality is that which is seen to be temporal, relative, dependent, and constantly changing. So, to continue our example, in each moment of God's life there are new, unforeseen happenings in the world which only at each moment become knowable.213 It is important to note, that for Hartshorne, the concrete aspect includes the abstract and not the reverse. It must be understood that the abstract is real only in the concrete,214 and which contains a temporal aspect. The Process account of God's knowing then, being based on the di-polar understanding of God, is clearly in direct contrast to Aquinas' notion of the eternal ‘glance' of God, wherein all things are known to God simultaneously despite their appearing in succession to creation. At the 45 heart of the differing viewpoints then, is the differing understanding of the relation of God to the temporal and to the eternal. Dual transcendence of God In developing his thought on God’s dipolarity over the years Hartshorne comes to use the term dual transcendence rather than dipolarity. Perhaps as an appeasement to negative response to his proposals, or in deference to the classical school, this change of name brings out more forcefully that God does surpass all possible rivals. For, like Classical theism, Hartshorne wants to ascribe to God the usual predicates of absoluteness and immutability yet he also wants to attribute to God features like relativity and mutability. In line with the belief that God is chief exemplifier, God is thus seen to exemplify these latter characteristics in keeping with God’s own nature. What Hartshorne is doing is incorporating fully into his concept of God what religion says about God's social and personal nature. This is in view of the fact that total immutability cannot be reconciled with the religious emphasis of God's concern for us and our duty to reciprocate that love.215 In sum, Hartshorne's position involves a metaphysical determination of what it is to be actual, a consequent definition of God, and a dipolar understanding of the divine nature.216 This position is in response to and in the light of, the Process objection to the traditional notion of God’s perfection interpreted as total unchangeability, completeness, and possession of all possible values. The crux of the matter is Hartshorne’s sharing of Whitehead's view that "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse" but as "their chief exemplification"217. It is based on the former’s view that metaphysics attempts to determine the "unconditionally necessary or eternal truths about existence" and this applies a priori to all possible and hence actual, modes of existence.218 In Process understanding, to be actual is to be a momentary occasion of creative synthesis in a process. To be an enduring object is to have an identity abstracted from a temporally-ordered series of successive events whose constituent actualities change, though minutely, from momentary occasion to momentary occasion.219 If to be real is to be constituted by a temporally-ordered process, then, according to the chief exemplification principle it is argued, this must be true of the divine reality.220 The relation of the temporal order to God is an important part of the debate which has ensued in response to this Process view of reality for the Divine. For the Process God is the being which is "modally coincident with actuality and possibility in general", in that the divine potentiality is coextensive with possibility as such and the divine actuality with actuality as such.221 Panentheism In the light of Process objection to God’s perfection being interpreted as total unchangeability, completeness, and possessing all possible values, how are we to understand the Process perspective of God’s perfection? 46 From the Process perspective God's perfection is expressed in primarily personal modes. This personal mode is what has been picked up on by those wishing to remain in the Thomist tradition yet struggling to reconcile the immutable God of this Tradition with the Biblical God of Love. Such people, whilst unable to concur with the Process stance in general, do wish to give credence and respect to Process objections to the traditional interpretation of God’s immutability. Their inability to align with the Process school involves a rejection of the Process form of theism held by the latter to be the most adequate, panentheism. This concept regards God as eternal in certain respects, temporal in others, consciously self-aware, knowing the world, and including the world as a constituent part of the divine being. The absence of any one of these characteristics is held to result in the concept of a being which fails to exemplify "categorically supreme excellence".222 Accordingly, it is argued, such a being cannot serve as a proper object of unconditional worship because something higher than it can be envisaged. Thus it is that Hartshorne develops a concept of God which does not undermine the proper deity of the divine and which not only allows but requires the recognition of change in certain aspects of the divine reality.223 What it means to be a perfect being lies at the heart of the difference between Process and Traditional understanding of God as Perfect Being and thus impacts accordingly on their respective understandings of God’s immutability. It is to this issue of God’s perfection then that we now must turn in our exploration of alternative understandings of God’s immutability. Process Understanding of Divine Perfection Traditionally, as we have noted, God's perfection has been understood in terms of total unchangeability, completeness, and the possession of all possible values. In the Process view, the third of these notions appears to be intrinsically incoherent and the first two inconsistent with the personal character of the divine being, as maintained in their theistic understanding. In the Process view of things, what is needed is a reappraisal of the significance of these forms of perfection as they apply to an understanding of the divine as personal.224 The implications of this call for an understanding of the Divine in personal terms is taken up strongly in contemporary debate on the nature of God’s immutability. It is this perspective which plays a determining role in re-interpreting the classical viewpoint and accordingly is given heightened credence later in this thesis. In the light of this perspective of a personal God, we look now in some detail at Process objections to the two classical notions of God’s perfection as unchangeability and completeness. We do so with a view to discerning the implications of these objections for the immutability of a God who is also personal. We look in turn at the alternative Process understanding of God as Perfect Personal Being. The Challenge to Perfection as Unchangeability The notion of total unchangeability in God is traditionally regarded as entailed by the perfection of the divine nature.225 God is unchangingly never more nor less than the absolutely divine. From this it is traditionally maintained that God must, in every respect, be unchanging and unchangeable. Even the possibility of such movement could not be conceived as belonging to a reality whose qualities are necessarily perfect. This view of divine perfection stems from a view of change that is associated with 47 disintegration and decay. Process theology maintains however, that change need not always be a movement towards or away from a perfect state. It can also be a necessary condition for being unchangingly perfect in relation to the processes of reality. Understood in this way, God's perfect consciousness of the processes of reality requires in the divine a changeability that is coextensive with all change. Only in having such changeability in practice is it unchangingly true in principle that God is perfectly aware of whatever happens and never forgets anything that has happened. Thus, in the divine consciousness of the contingent events of the processes of reality, perfect awareness involves both the unchanging existence of total awareness of whatever occurs and changing actual awareness correlative to the changes of events in practice. From this perspective, modes of changeability are appropriately ascribable to the concrete actuality of the divine as living and creative, as personal. Such attribution though, is balanced by unchangeability in the abstract existence of the divine. God unchangingly quests for the proliferation and integration of value in the processes of reality. The Challenge to Perfection as Pure Actuality The perfection of the divine reality has been traditionally understood also, as a state of total completion, actus purus, pure actuality without any element of potentiality.226 It is traditionally argued that a being which has potentiality must lack something which may or may not be later actualized. Thus, as one whose reality is perfect, God cannot lack anything. Therefore the divine must be considered to be without potentiality. Unless God is now complete, the divine must be moving either towards or away from such a state and therefore is not truly God. The notion of potentiality in God has been traditionally attacked also on the grounds that it implies that God is open to influence by others; that believers cannot be sure that God will remain forever the same. From the Process point of view, in terms of abstract existence, God is always complete. This completeness is in the sense of the divine always actualizing in some appropriate form the fullness of what it is to be God. On the other hand, from the Process perspective, the notion of God as complete in all respects rules out any significant talk of the divine as personal. Such a description, they maintain, might be appropriate for an ideal but is incompatible with a personal mode of being, for the latter involves being directed by the search for values, responding to situations, enjoying novel experiences, and developing relationships with what else exists. Process adherents would want to argue however, that God does not need to be thought of as either personal or complete but rather, that a proper notion of divine completeness indicates God is to be conceived as the one who is eminently and completely personal. God is always present as the individual with an unrestricted capacity for consciously seeking value, responding to events, and evoking novelty. It follows then, from the Process point of view, that God is not to be thought of as having experienced everything that is possible, as actual. For to say that all possible values are actual in God, thereby ruling out all potentiality or change, is to make possibility and actuality completely coextensive, eliminating the very meaning of actualisation. If all possible values are actual in God, Process adherents see no sense in our doing anything at all. In Hartshorne's view, it is meaningless to actualise possibilities, if in the Supreme Being, they are actual from the beginning.227 Thus concrete actuality, including divine actuality, cannot be pure actuality but can only be actuality with inexhaustible possibility of further actuality. Hence, and herein lies the rub, only becoming is actual in the world of process. 48 The dipolar or dually transcendent panentheistic God The understanding of God’s immutability that Process theology, begun by Whitehead and developed in particular by Hartshorne, offers us then, belongs in the context of a dipolar or dually transcendent panentheistic God. The advantage afforded by the Process position is the possibility of being able to affirm, without being internally contradictory, that the divine is necessary, absolute, unchanging and eternal in certain respects and yet contingent, relative, changing and temporal in other respects. How this is to be understood involves a differentiation between existence and actuality. In differentiating between existence and actuality, Hartshorne points out that an essence may be said to exist if it is instantiated in some reality in some appropriate form but that its actuality is the particular, specific form in which that essence is concretely realized.228 Thus, in the case of all realities except the divine, their existence as well as their actuality is contingent, relative, changing, and temporal. God, in contrast, is the unique individual whose existence is necessary, absolute, unchanging, and eternal. However, whilst these qualities distinguish the divine existence they do not entail that the divine actuality must be similarly described. The particular form of the concretion of that existence, the divine actuality, must be contingent, relative, changing, and temporal. How Hartshorne's concept of God as a personal, self-conscious agent results in an understanding which does both justice to the deity of the divine and allows for appropriate modes of change in the divine reality can be illustrated by brief analyses of the ascription of knowledge and love to God. In the case of knowledge, in principle, God's knowledge is necessary, absolute, unchanging, and eternal. Granted however, that to be actual is to be in process, in practice the concrete actualisation of the divine knowledge of the world is contingent, relative, changing, and temporal. Similarly, the divine love is in principle necessary, absolute, unchanging and eternal though in practice the divine love is expressed, and has to be expressed, in concrete ways which are contingent, relative, changing, and temporal.229 What Hartshorne wants to affirm is an understanding whereby all that happens in the world is experienced by God. God is thus said to be "the subject of all change".230 In affirming this Hartshorne does not deny the respective autonomy of humankind as contributing to the divine experience nor the Creator as aware of, and responsive to, humankind. It has to be admitted that such a God is more in line with Biblical revelation of the God of Love and human religious experience than is the traditionally understood absolutely immutable God. However, the position reaches beyond what those wishing to remain within the Thomist tradition are comfortable with in that the perfection of the divine is partly constituted by embracing all that happens in the world within the divine experience. The "principle of dual transcendence"231 thus, is that later states of the divine being may surpass earlier states in their incremental value.232 This perspective, attributing as it clearly does, a temporal aspect to God, is seen to be the disadvantage afforded by the position. It is both subject to debate itself and integral to the wider debate on the nature of God’s immutability. 49 Validity of Process concept of God Judgement on the validity of Hartshorne's analysis of the concept of God can be made in two ways. There is first the judgement as to whether the logical analysis of the terms is correct. It is a question of whether the distinction between existence and actuality and the consequent dipolar exposition of the material qualities of the divine are to be accepted. Secondly, there is the judgement as to whether Hartshorne has correctly identified and expounded the nature of the divine. Here the question is fundamentally that of whether the ultimate in being, value, and rationality is also to be regarded as significantly personal, self-aware, conscious of others and agential. On both counts the Process justification of Hartshorne's position is that it makes it possible to think in a rationally coherent manner of the God of the biblical witness and of the practice of theistic belief.233 Judgement as to the first consideration is described by those outside the Process school of thought as highly debateable. Judgement as to the second consideration is, however, far more favourable, even viewed as a valuable insight and impetus for reinterpreting the Classical viewpoint. Flawed underlying philosophical suppositions Appealing as the Process position may be in its attempt to reconcile the doctrine of God’s immutability with the Biblical God of Love, it has to face a serious analysis of its philosophical and theological underpinnings. Many Classical theologians contend that Process theological thinking is seriously flawed because the underlying philosophical suppositions about God are gravely defective, being based in turn on the mistakenness of Process‘ more general philosophical suppositions. Such an analysis of Process underpinnings has been masterfully undertaken by Michael Vertin.234 The stated aim in his paper, “Is God in Process?”, is the clarification of the philosophical differences underlying the theological disagreements between the two traditions, Classical and Process. Rather than address at this point however, these philosophical suppositions and differences, we leave Vertin’s analysis235, for that stage in our exploration when it becomes a necessary prelude to, and justification for, our detailed examination of a contemporary reinterpretation of the Classical approach to God’s immutability. Suffice be to say here though, that Vertin’s examination indeed reveals grave flaws in the Process school’s underlying philosophical suppositions both about God, and in general. Further objections The above notwithstanding, debate has ensued as a result of Process objections to the Classical interpretation of God’s immutability. We shall address this debate but beforehand we turn to a brief examination of further objections to the Classical approach to God’s immutability. These objections come from the feministic theological school of thought. In so doing we complete setting the scene of combined impetus which has led to the wide-ranging debate on the issue. The debate is worthy of our examination to grasp within its wide-rangingness, those particular developments of trends and insights that assist our unfolding understanding of the nature of God’s immutability. From this we aim to discern that approach which best offers insight for a reconciliation between tradition, biblical revelation, and personal experience regarding God’s immutability. 50 FEMINIST THEOLOGY OBJECTIONS TO THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY Process feministic objections God is not a Controlling Power There is a convergence of protest thought between the Process and Feminist schools of theology, revolving around the traditional theistic notion of God as the Controlling Power. As these protestations would have it, the doctrine that God is completely independent of the world, with its corollary of God being unchanged by that which occurs in the world, implies that divine knowledge of the world cannot be dependent upon it. Further to this, the doctrine of divine simplicity, involving the assertion that all the divine attributes are identical; implies God's knowing the world is identical with God's causing it. As noted, the Biblical record is quite ambivalent on the question of whether God is in complete control of the world. There is much in the Bible which implies that divine providence is not all-determining. However, as we have seen, the interpretation of the Biblical God in terms of valuations about perfection is derived from Greek philosophy. As a result, this side of the Biblical witness is ruled out in traditional Classical thinking. By contrast, Process thought with, as noted, its quite different understanding of perfection, sees the divine creative activity as based upon responsiveness to the world. This is understood as so since the very meaning of actuality involves, for Process theologians, internal relatedness. From this it is drawn that God, as an actuality, is essentially related to the world. Also, since actuality as such is partially self-creative, future events are not yet determinate. So even perfect knowledge cannot know the future. This means, from the Process viewpoint, that God does not wholly control the world. Any divine creative influence must be persuasive, not coercive.236 Process and Feminist theology are in agreement then, that God is not a controlling power, unresponsive to that which occurs in the world. God is not absolutely immutable. Feminist theology protest in particular, rests on the inescapable fact that the traditional concept of the immutable God is derived from the notion of what it is to be stereotypically masculine. God is conceived as active, unresponsive, impassive, inflexible, impatient, and moralistic. This Being has none of the stereotypically feminine traits, passive, responsive, emotional, flexible, patient and does not balance moral concern with an appreciation of beauty. Nevertheless feminist theologians would claim that positive aspects of the masculine attributes can be retained provided they are incorporated into a revolutionized concept of God where feminine traits are integrated.237 Current Feminist Theological Voice She Who Is a relational power The base from which feminist theology works is depicted in a God with the divine title, She Who Is.238 This title signifies the creative, relational power of a being who enlivens, suffers with, sustains, and enfolds the universe. Such a being is a far cry from the immutable God as traditionally interpreted. Classical theology, as exemplified by Aquinas, uses the term "being" to define incomprehensible liveliness. In God essence 51 and existence are one. God's very nature is esse, to be. God is self-subsisting being, being itself, ipsum esse subsistens.239 The notion of being, when traditionally attributed to God, does not immediately call to mind anything relational. To most Western minds the language of being connotes something static, limited, abstract and impersonal; unfit to signal the dynamic and inherently relational nature of incomprehensible mystery.240 Despite this traditional understanding, the Feminist theologian Elizabeth Johnson suggests that the ontological language of being does provide for an all-inclusive category for reality. Connected with the idea of God, language about being indicates that all things that exist are related to God as their source of existence, and hence related to each other. It is thus a code word for the universe's status as creation. Predicated of God, Johnson argues that here being symbolizes sheer livingness which is also a going forth, an act of communion that issues in everything. It is thus a code word for God as source of the whole universe, past, present, and yet to come. In this light the notion of being has a contribution to make to feminist discourse about God,241 and thus about God’s immutability. As an aside, if feminist discourse wishes to be heard effectively on this in the scholastic camp, it will need to be through the use of ontological language. Such an example is in Catherine LaCugna’s structural study of the questions on God in Aquinas' Summa. Her work translates the pivotal term, esse, not as a noun but as the predicate nominative to-be.242 It is the feminist theological view that the traditional patriarchal notion of the divine follows closely the dualistic view of the self. Both the being of God, standing over against the world, and the classical attributes of the divine, as understood by the feminist tradition, with implicit stress on solitariness, superiority, and dominating power-over, speak about holy mystery in an essentially unrelated way. Feminist theologians want to argue that, if moral autonomy is grounded on relationship, if mutuality is a moral excellence, then language emerges that sees holy mystery as at once essentially free and richly related, the two being not opposites but correlatives.243 God is Wisdom With the above in mind then, one way of speaking about the mystery of God in female symbol is the biblical figure of Wisdom. This is the most developed personification of God's presence and activity in the Hebrew Scriptures. The term itself is of feminine grammatical gender: hokmah in Hebrew, sophia in Greek, sapientia in Latin. The biblical depiction of Wisdom is consistently female and cast as sister, mother, female beloved, chef and hostess, preacher, judge, liberator, establisher of justice, and other roles wherein she symbolizes transcendent power, ordering and delighting in the world.244 Feminist theology accepts that Sophia is a female personification of God's own being, in creative and saving involvement with the world. The chief reason for arriving at this interpretation is the functional equivalence between the deeds of Sophia and those of the Biblical God. What she does is already portrayed elsewhere in the Scriptures as the field of action of Israel's God under the revered, unpronounceable name YHWH.245 Given the immediate religious context of the Wisdom texts, namely monotheism, the idea that Sophia is Israel's God in female imagery is most reasonable. Rabbinic specialists argue that Wisdom was not introduced into Judaism as secondary hypostases to offset the utter transcendence of the divine. Rather, it is one way of asserting nearness to the world in a way that does not compromise divine 52 transcendence.246 This is a form of the reconciliation being sought between the traditional interpretation and biblical witness as regards God’s immutability. For as we are well aware, God's indwelling nearness, spoken of as immanence in philosophical terms, is greatly neglected by classical theism. Far from being simply distant, above and beyond the world, Sophia is the living God closest to the world, pervading each human person to awaken life and mutual kinship.247 The apathic God - a negative concept As part of feministic theological difficulty with the patriarchal derivation and presentation of the immutable God, this school of thought calls into question that particular stereotypical male attribute, impassibility, as attributable to God. In metaphysical discourse characteristic of scholasticism, theological insights are expressed in the notion of a God who is being itself, actus purus; whose very nature is to be, to be totally in act while unmoved by any other. To say that God cannot suffer or be affected by the suffering of humankind is then, a Classical philosophical deduction from this view of divine nature. Since suffering is a passive state requiring that one be acted upon by an outside force, there is no possibility, from the Classical viewpoint, of this occurring in divine being which is pure act. Since, as traditionally interpreted, God is totally in act, the divine being is altogether unchangeable, never passing from act to potency or vice-versa. As pure act or the fullness of being, God has no potentiality for either gaining or losing, therefore change is impossible - the attribute of immutability. Consequently, since suffering implies responsive movement from one state to another, it is traditionally seen to be impossible for God.248 It needs to be recognized that both theologically and philosophically, language about the apathic God, from the Greek a-patheia, meaning no pathos or suffering, seeks to preserve divine freedom from a dependency on humankind that would render God finite. Incapable of being affected by outside influences, the Classical apathic God acts, not out of need or compulsion, but from self-sufficiency. Feminist theology249, noting that the concept is aimed at removing from God the kind of suffering that implies finitude and humankind-ness, in itself does not block the idea that God may suffer in a way appropriate to divine being. Prizing connectedness, feminist analysis perceives how deeply the idea of the apathic God is shaped by the patriarchal ideal. For men in a dominant position, freedom has come to mean being in control, existing self-contained and self-directed. This stance is not theoretically capable of integrating freedom with genuine mutual relationship to others, posing them as incompatible states of being. Thus, God is either free or genuinely related to and affected by the world and its suffering. This is a dualistic position. Furthermore, traditional Classical thought classifies relation in the category of accident, thereby rendering it unsuitable for predication to the divine nature, in which nothing accidental inheres. As we have noted, the relationship between God and the world is understood to be real on the world's side towards God but not real, in a mutual way, from God to the world. The effective history of theological speech about this non-relational God, supported by rigorous philosophical argument in a patriarchal system, invites widespread repugnance today. From a feminist perspective the denial of divine relation to the world codified in 53 the highly specialized scholastic language reflects the disparagement of reciprocal relation characteristic of patriarchy in its social and intellectual expressions. In such a system, to be connected in mutuality with others introduces deficiency in the form of interdependence, vulnerability, and risk. It is therefore not accidental, in feminist eyes, that Classical theism insists on a concept of God with no real relation to the world. Even though traditionally interpreted as an affirmation of divine transcendence, there is another human experience that finds self-transcendence enacted through affinity rather than quarantine, another interpretation of fullness of being that includes rather than excludes genuine, reciprocal relations with others who are different, another pattern of life that values compassionate connectedness over separation, another understanding of power that sees its optimum operation in collegial and empowering actions rather than through controlling commands. TRINITARIAN THOUGHT ON GOD’S IMMUTABILITY The contemporary Catholic German theologian, Walter Kasper, in his book “The God of Jesus Christ” 250, represents a school of thought which stresses that, in the immutability debate, our starting point must be the experienced identity in salvation history of the economic and immanent Trinity. This identity is seen in the unity of the eternal Logos and the human Jesus and also in the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Kenosis of God As with Feminist theology, it is precisely in considering God as radically free and yet open to suffering that Kasper considers our dilemma in understanding the nature of God’s immutability. He sees that trinitarian theology, rooted in the paschal mystery, must address this dilemma. In his book “The God of Jesus Christ”, Kasper takes the testimony of the New Testament consistently as his starting point, seeing the cross, not simply as the consequence of the earthly ministry of Jesus but the very goal of the incarnation. This is explicated as the giving of the Second Person by the First Person and the self-giving of the Second Person to the First Person and for the many; this rather than the generation of the Second Person by the First Person, as conceived according to the analogy of the production of the intellectual world.251 Basic to such a christological approach is the hymn to Christ in Phil. 2:6-11, which speaks of the kenosis or emptying of God, who was in the form of God and accepted the form of a slave. Kasper accepts Augustine’s interpretation of this: It was thus that God emptied God’s-self, by taking the form of a slave, not by losing the form of God; the form of a slave was added, the form of God did not disappear.252 In terms of God’s immutability, this interpretation makes clear the real problem. We must negotiate the narrow path of making the person who is God’s equal the subject of the emptying. How is it possible, then, that the immutable God should be, at the same time, mutable? How can the history of God in Jesus Christ be so thought that it really affects God and is God’s very own history, while at the same time God remains God? How can the impassible God suffer?253 We turn here to the thought of Jürgen Moltmann. Moltmann believes that it is important to develop a trinitarian theology of the cross along two lines: God as a community of Persons and God’s divine historicity.254 Importantly, Moltmann writes of the history of the world being God’s passion but not the process of 54 God’s self-realization.255 According to Moltmann256 God is determined by God’s own nature. In God, freedom and necessity coincide. God is pure, unbounded love. Thus it is according to God’s own nature to have a history, for love is not closed in upon itself but open. Overflow of God’s being Is the cross which symbolizes God’s suffering incompatible with divine transcendence? Kasper replies that it is not, for God’s suffering is the result of a sovereign decision to be placed in relation to humankind, the result of God’s omnipotence. This omnipotence and freedom of God must be understood in terms of love.257 The love of God that is revealed on the cross is the expression of God’s unconditional fidelity to God’s promise. Precisely as the God of history, God remains true to God’s self and cannot deny God’s self [2 Tim 2:13]. The revelation of God’s omnipotence and God’s love are not contraries. It requires omnipotence to be able to surrender oneself and give oneself away. It requires omnipotence to be able to take oneself back in the giving and to preserve the independence and freedom of the recipient.258 Contrary to Process thinking the argument is that, to predicate becoming, suffering and movement of God does not mean that we have a developing God who reaches the fullness of being only through becoming. To predicate becoming, suffering and movement of God is to understand God as the fullness of being, as pure actuality, as overflow of life and love.259 Taking self-communicating love as a starting point for understanding the Trinity, Kasper argues, does greater justice to the phenomenon of selfemptying, which is essential to love, than taking from Tradition, the Word as the starting point. Love involves, in this very self-communication, a self-differentiation and selflimitation. The lover allows the other to affect the lover. The suffering of love is not a passive being-affected but an active allowing others to affect. The eternal intra-divine distinction of First and Second Person is the transcendental theological condition for the possibility of God’s self-emptying in the incarnation and on the cross.260 Kasper sees that such a Christian conception of God is not a surrender to Aristotle’s notion of divine a-patheia but rooted in the paschal mystery. God is not the impassible God of Greek metaphysics but the compassionate and sympathetic God who suffers with humankind.261 It signifies that from eternity there is a place in God for humankind, a place for a genuine sym-pathy with the suffering of human beings. What is occurring is that God redeems suffering, for God’s own suffering, springing as it does from the voluntariness of love, conquers the fateful character of suffering. The omnipotence of God’s love removes the weakness of suffering, it is interiorly transformed into hope.262 The immutability of God may be seen in this God of overflowing Love, this sympathetic God whose Self is revealed in Jesus Christ as indeed God in Relation. Eberhard Jüngel, reflecting on God’s historicity in trinitarian terms in two works, “The Doctrine of the Trinity, God’s Being is in Becoming”263 and “God as the Mystery of the World”264 rejects the tenets of Classical philosophical theism. For Jüngel, Christian faith is rooted in the crucified God, and the classical attributes of apathy, impassibility and absoluteness, as traditionally understood, collapse in the face of God’s Revelation of God’s Self in the suffering of the cross. Jüngel makes the important point that if God has really revealed and identified God’s self with this event, then God really is as revealed. 55 However, Jüngel carefully differentiates between God’s being, and God’s being-for-us. God’s being-for-us does not define God’s being, but interprets it.265 The cross event enables us to think of God’s Being as relatedness, to us and to God’s Self. This relatedness of God is seen by Jüngel as selflessness in the midst of self-relatedness. God as self-relationship, in freedom goes beyond, overflows, and gives God’s self away. I am Who is - Who was - Who is to come So Jüngel wants to think God’s Being strictly from the event of revelation but this implies God’s Being is in becoming, which in turn presupposes a movement in God. God is eternally coming to God’s self. Jüngel then interprets this movement in trinitarian terms. God’s coming to God’s Self is the coming of the First Person to the Second Person but as the Holy Spirit. Because this movement is an open movement to the world and to history, Jüngel believes we can say that God is God’s own future, the Spirit is God’s openness to the future, citing Revelation 1:8: I am the alpha and the Omega, who is, who was, and who is to come.266 The key difference here to that of the Process doctrine of God, is that for Whitehead God is necessarily related to some world and God’s Being is constituted by God’s temporality. For Jüngel, in his trinitarian comprehension of God, God’s primordial movement is a movement within the divine life itself and, significantly, the relationship to the world has its ground in God’s relationship to God’s self. As Jüngel says, so long as the becoming in which God’s being is, is understood as the becoming proper to God’s being, the statement ‘God’s being is in becoming’ remains guarded from misunderstanding that God would first become that which God is, through God’s relationship to ‘an other than God’.267 Objections: a springboard for debate Criticism stemming from Process, Feminist and Trinitarian thought, together with widespread dissatisfaction concerning the traditional interpretation of Classical thought regarding God’s immutability, has led to enlivened debate on the subject. These objections serve to encourage critical review of the traditional interpretation of the Classical approach. The ensuing debate becomes our next focus and from this the need to reinterpret the Classical viewpoint emerges. 56 CHAPTER FOUR THE DEBATE ON GOD’S IMMUTABILITY RISING TO THE CHALLENGE OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY For those adhering to the Classical tradition, Process, Feminist and Trinitarian theology set a challenge, to consider and reconsider their inherited Classical standpoint. Criticisms require responses that take seriously their complaints. Many, whilst remaining with a general unwillingness to forego the inherited Classical tradition, are making a real attempt to grapple with these valid criticisms. This has led to a range of responses and debate. In particular, a number of contemporary theologians who take the WhiteheadianHartshornean challenge seriously feel pressed in response, to seek and exploit implicit, latent resources within Aquinas' texts. By so doing they seek to explicate a more adequate Thomist conception of God's immutability as it involves God’s interrelationship with humankind.268 CRITIQUING PROCESS THOUGHT ON GOD’S IMMUTABILITY Process theology's viewpoint on the immutability of God, whilst throwing out a challenge to Classical theologians, is not itself accepted by the latter as a valid alternative. Bernard Lonergan provides the fundamental reason for this. Metaphysics of an infinite being In answer to a question concerning his thought on the concept of God as derived from Process philosophy, and whether such a God who changes in perfection, is compatible with the Christian notion of God discussed in systematics, Bernard Lonergan responds thus: Is the metaphysics of an infinite being the same as the metaphysics of a finite being? That is the fundamental form of the question. Everyone admits that there are contingent predications of God. God created the world and need not have. This is a contingent predication about God. Does that imply there is a real change in God? If you are a Process philosopher you will say yes and if you are not you will say no. The questions concerned with the basis of the contingent predication about God started out in Aristotle. With Aristotle the action is in what is moved, not in the mover. Predications imply not a reality in the agent but a reality in the effect. That is the basis of the Thomist doctrine that creation is a notional relation in God and a real relation in us.269 Static metaphysics or static logic? In responding to a further question concerning the place of Process philosophy/theology in the current debate and the role Process thought might play in our own development of thought, Lonergan replies thus: 57 We have to get over the notion that metaphysics is static: what is static is logic. There are conceptions of substance that are ludicrous, and often current. There is a purification of metaphysical concepts that is needed that Process philosophy attempts. I do not think that they have succeeded in effecting the purification they want.270 Raising concerns Lonergan is acknowledging the pivotal role Process philosophy/theology is playing in forcing a reassessment of longheld metaphysical concepts, particularly to do with substance. Such a re-assessment may hold profound implications for our understanding of change with respect to God. Recognition of the catalytic role played by Process philosophy/theology notwithstanding, concerns are held on a number of fronts regarding the validity and sustainability of the Process argument, within which resides the Process understanding of change in God. As such, it is of direct relevance to us. We set out some of these concerns below. David Burrell271 puts forward a proposal concerning three misunderstandings which he argues are endemic to Process thought. He proposes that Process theology is based on a mistake if [1] its founding polemic against Classical theism is found to be wide of its mark; [2] its claims to offer a superior philosophical synthesis for Christian faith are seriously questioned; and [3] its capacity for illuminating central elements of the Christian tradition are found to be deficient. Process caricature of classical theism Burrell claims that Hartshorne's caricature, as the former calls it, of Classical theism, reveals a lack of sensitivity to the medieval context. Burrell maintains that such sensitivity could have prevented Hartshorne drawing the conclusion he did from Aquinas' insistence that God was not really related to the world. Indeed, William Norris Clarke's neo-Thomist explication272 of the distinction between real and intentional being, as sometimes implicit but always operative in the medieval context, offers assistance in unravelling this misunderstanding. It would seem Hartshorne has unwittingly exposed an embedded theological misconception. As Burrell points out, such an historical misidentification can serve only to sharpen our lookout for the real problems. For those who have directed their energies to a re-interpretation of the Classical viewpoint, Process’ founding polemic against Classical theism indeed appears wide of the mark. This will be verified later in our exploration. If Process’ founding polemic is wide of its mark, can it nevertheless offer a superior philosophic synthesis for our Christian faith? Is God a principle? Burrell points out that William Norris Clarke's studies show more patience with unravelling Whiteheadian categories than most philosophers yet raise one critical question after another to those who presume to have found a superior conceptualization of Christian faith or of divinity. William Hill273 is another who uncovers serious philosophical deficiency in the Whiteheadian philosophical scheme. This deficiency is that, despite constant reference to relatedness, the notion of an agent remains 58 undeveloped in Process thought. The God of Process theology in loving the world is not a person but a principle. Hill finds, despite what they may want to say, that the Process alternative has difficulty giving any genuine meaning to the notion of personhood. Whilst one contemporary Process theologian, John Cobb, does attempt to introduce personhood into God by presenting God's Consequent nature as temporal, Whitehead consistently prefers to speak of it as everlasting. Even if Cobb is a legitimate correction of Whitehead, it still leaves God as a person only in the non-substantive sense in which Whitehead will allow that humans are persons. So it is seen as dubious by those outside its sphere, whether Process theology can offer a superior philosophic synthesis for Christian faith. What then of its capacity for illuminating central elements of the Christian tradition? Philosophical statement or religious affirmation? In our Christian religious faith we recognize that whoever confesses to "believe in one God, creator of heaven and earth" is not usually making a philosophical statement but a religious affirmation. Burrell indicates that Process thought wavers on this confession for systematic reasons. It thereby fails to illuminate the Tradition. The reasons are philosophical, having to do with Whitehead's insistence that creativity, or creative process, reigns supreme. The role reserved to God is described as giving to all actual events the initial aims that are highest and best possible in their concrete circumstances.274 In so doing, God aims at depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfilment of God's own being.275 Such a one cannot be described as "the beginning and end of all things and of reasoning humankind especially".276 Interaction is purchased at the price of an initiating, gratuitous actor, and the price is paid in the name of philosophical consistency.277 With respect to this, William Hill makes an observation that the infinity ascribed to God in God's Primordial nature is nothing more than pure possibility, it is not an actual infinity at all. Distinguishing mental and physical poles, as Whitehead does, means that the former is unbounded only at the cost of being unreal. Its ideal values disappear into a Platonic world and can be realized only as physical and thereby as limited. It is non-actual timelessness and not the purely actual embracing, in eminent simultaneity of past, present and future.278 It is thereby argued thus that Process is deficient in its ability to illuminate central elements of the Christian tradition. Further to this, a related area of concern in the Process system, expressed by Hill, surrounds the question of God's love for the world. In the Process system, God's love, conceived either ideally as offering lures to feeling or physically as superjecting content for actual entities, is Eros and not Agape. The motive is the self-fulfilment of the Divine Lover. This is not the understanding of God's love that is grounded in God as Creative Act.279 The real difficulty though, as pointed out by Greg Moses, is that divine responsiveness, even if perfect, would seem to make God dependent on the world for God's own perfection.280 With the raising of concern about the Process viewpoint in general comes concern about the specific Process understanding of change in God. For this understanding is couched within the wider framework of a system claimed by some, as we have seen, to be philosophically deficient. As already indicated, this deficiency is further explored as a prelude to, and justification for, our detailed examination of a re-interpretation of the Classical viewpoint. Despite grave reservations expressed by many concerning the 59 Process system of thought, many classical and neo-Thomist theologians nevertheless want to keep the dialogue open with the Process school. LINKS BETWEEN PROCESS AND CLASSICAL THOUGHT ON GOD’S IMMUTABILITY A philosophic revolution Having examined some concerns expressed with regard to the Process system, concerns which carry inherent questions about the validity of its understanding of change in God, we turn now to those discussions where effort is made to bring about a link, negatively or positively, between the two traditions, Classical and Process. James Felt believes that the traditional Thomist formulation of the doctrine of divine immutability leads to the unacceptable conclusion that all humankind’s activity is, all the same, neither here nor there, to God. Yet God's self-revelation in Christ, together with our religious sensibilities, contradicts such a position. Accordingly, Felt invites us to a "philosophic revolution", convinced that a larger viewpoint can be found in which the fruitful conceptualization of both Aquinas and Whitehead may be found complementary rather than antithetical.281 The extent to which this is possible may be judged by exploring the thought of those who have attempted to link, in some way, the two systems. Analogy of Being Piet Schoonenberg links the two traditions via the insight that both use analogy, albeit in opposite ways and from different starting points. His allegiance appears to vacillate between the two traditions. He starts from two presuppositions, first that speech about God is always mythical or at least symbolic and second, that this speech really enunciates the transcendent reality, God.282 In Schoonenberg's thought there are two ways of approaching God.283 There is the way that starts from worldly reality and proceeds by analogy, and the way of reflecting on the concepts already present in a religious tradition. The way of thinking about God starting from earthly reality is preferred by Process thinkers. Schoonenberg maintains that fundamentally, the Process approach is the same as the one in which Hellenistic and Scholastic metaphysics came to its concept of God as immutable. Ancient metaphysics has a strong awareness of all the changes that happen in the world and in human existence, of all the transitions from potency to act. Yet, underneath the mutations lies a stable entity, the substance. For Classical metaphysics, change is real but stability is more real, it is pure perfection. Hence God is uniquely stable and immutable. Process philosophy follows the same method of thinking but the starting point is different. One can consider Process philosophy as the metaphysical translation of the insight that there are no such things as stable kernels. For Scholasticism, becoming, change and temporality are acknowledged in the world but not as pure perfections, hence they are not said to be in God. Process philosophy considers becoming as a real and pure perfection, hence for it God is mutable. This does not mean however, that all immutability is removed from its image of God. Thus for both traditions there is an analogy of speech founded on an analogy of being. Nevertheless, the outcome of the process of analogizing is different with each of the two philosophies. 60 Analysing change Whilst Schoonenberg is content simply to acknowledge different starting points for each of the two traditions, another, John Wright284 goes further, questioning the very legitimacy of the starting point for Process theology, in terms of the coherence of its analysis of change. He does this within an interesting and insightful examination of the notions of substance, being and change, linking the two traditions, Classical with its philosophy of substance, Process with its analysis of change, via the thought of Aristotle. Wright acknowledges that Process theology, in its general teaching on God, opens up some important insights such as God's presence and activity throughout the world, God's guidance of the temporal process through persuasion not coercion with full respect for created freedom, and God's loving concern for, and responsiveness to, all humankind. He finds thereby, that Process theology offers a corrective to views of God that would, at least logically, make God remote, indifferent, unconcerned, unrelated, and unaffected by the events of the created world. The final judgment however, in Wright's evaluation of the speculative framework provided by Process theology, a theology which takes change seriously and avoids the difficulties of certain kinds of substantialist thinking, lies in the legitimacy of its starting point.285 Wright points out that if it seems necessary to ask why there is this universe of interacting, changing realities, and if it is insufficient to inquire only how this changing process works, then it is apparent that, being rather than change, is the most basic aspect of experience. This is a crucial insight. Wright backs this insight up with an analysis of the experience of change. In process language, such analysis leads to affirming a linear series of events, each an actual entity constituted as subject/superject through various phases of concrescence, beginning with conformal feelings and culminating in satisfaction. This understanding of change is offered by Process thinkers as a substitute for a philosophy of substance. By stressing the interrelatedness of every actual entity it rightly rejects the idea of substance as the selfsufficient subject. Where the need to offer an alternative comes unstuck however, is, as Wright points out, that since the time of Aristotle, substance has had a meaning of that which is not in a subject. Thus it can be viewed that each of the actual entities of Whitehead's system is an Aristotelian primary substance. For Aristotle the relations of dependence and activity were not excluded by the nature of substance but were implied by it.286 Such a recognition is crucial if we are to interpret more adequately Aquinas’ use of the term substance, drawing as he does, on the thought of Aristotle. We can see that Wright successfully challenges, by a process of nullification, the very heart of the process assumption, the very basis of their fundamental differentiation. He thereby calls into question the validity of the Process view of change in God. It is important to recognize that the view taken up by Wright, of a God who is supremely active with an essence that is to be, to know, and to love, as Aquinas teaches, is neither Traditional theism as understood by Process thinkers, nor a doctrine about a God in process of development. Wright’s is a view however, which offers reconciliation between Tradition, process objections and biblical revelation. God as Di-polar Perfection To return to Schoonenberg, he considers that Process thinkers offer three unique points in their proposal of mutability in God.287 Firstly, they see the failure of Western 61 metaphysics and Christian religion to be caused almost exclusively by the static concept of God. Yet we have noted how Burrell indicates Process polemic against a substance ontology falls wide of the mark of Aristotle and Aquinas. Secondly, God's mutability belongs at the very core of the Process system. In all reality they replace substance by process or event, and God, as the supreme reality, is the chief exemplification of this structure of reality. Yet we have shown how Wright has indicated this replacement to be invalid. Thirdly, Process thinkers deny the infinity of God in that their conception of God's perfection includes finitude and hence mutability. Yet we have mentioned that Moses has indicated the difficulty with this is that it implies a dependence of God on creation for God's own perfection. The above notwithstanding, Schoonenberg, from linkages drawn between the two systems, develops an image of God that is dipolar but admitting only of that which is really perfect. Schoonenberg both critiques and adheres to the Process image of God. In the analysis of Process thinking, it becomes clear, he maintains, that the relations and changes in God are affirmed, not although God is perfect, but because God is perfect. Schoonenberg thereby affirms relations and changes in God which are the consequence of God's perfection. He remains critical however, of the Process concept of God as prehending and assuming values realized in the world into God's Consequent nature and thereby receiving satisfaction from the world. This is because he believes it is more consistent with a really divine perfection first to give and to communicate, and to find satisfaction in that. William Norris Clarke and David Schindler take up this matter in their dialectical quest to re-interpret the Classical notion of God’s immutability, with particular reference to the place of receptivity in God. Schoonenberg takes the standpoint of Process thinking when considering the world as a series of events but among these events he considers the events of giving, of self-communication in a special way. In the becoming of a giving person lies for him, a starting point for thinking of God as related and becoming.288 Thus God is not relative as opposed to absolute. God is, though, relational, involved, involving God's self. In this way Schoonenberg sees that God really changes in perfect outward activity and relation without any imperfection or dependence.289 Schoonenberg’s contribution to the debate on God’s immutability is valuable in the sense that it affords a development of thought with regard to the relationship between God’s perfection and God’s relations to creation. God is becoming in the Other Karl Rahner looks at the immutability of God in a dynamic and relational context, rather than statically and in isolation. Transcendental Christology is his immediate setting.290 Rahner asks: What does it mean to say God becomes human? God is immutable and then God becomes human. Both must be maintained in dialectical tension, as mutually clarifying and correcting.291 For Rahner, God is actus purus, the infinite fullness of being, unchangeable and unchanging in eternally complete fullness but the term "being" for him, points to the dynamic, active, unlimited fullness of actuality and reality.292 God is not subject to growth or to change in the sense of a movement towards a greater actuality. Yet Rahner feels traditional scholasticism falls into a dilemma and becomes prey to the other extreme of failing to acknowledge God's becoming. It has neglected the incarnation in speaking of the immutability of God, Scholastics declaring that becoming and change are on the side of created reality only, not on the side of the eternal, immutable Logos.293 For Rahner, God's self is not subject to change but is subject to 62 change in something else.294 This becoming in the other does not imply a need or deficiency but the height of perfection. It is a self-bestowal, a giving away of self, a kenosis.295 Thus like Schoonenberg, Rahner is pointing to a development of thought in our understanding of the relationship between God’s perfection and God’s relation to creation. Plural Unity in God King and Whitney296 provide an interesting and enlightening comparison between the thought of Rahner and Hartshorne respectively. In their view both Rahner and Hartshorne see the divine nature as dipolar or a plural unity. The decisive difference though, is that for Hartshorne the polarity is constituted by the God-world relationship whereas for Rahner it is situated within the divinity itself and reflected in the God-world relationship. This difference impacts on their respective interpretations of divine immutability. For both, God cannot be affected by humankind in the dimension of God's nature which is not defined in relation to humankind. Humankind affects God only in that aspect of God's divinity by which God is related to the finite other. For Hartshorne, the relationship to the finite other is part of God's internal structure and in this way humankind's decisions and actions do make a difference to God's internal being. For Rahner, the immanent nature of God does not include reference to humankind, though humankind is the finite expression of God. In influencing the finite other, humankind does not change the internal life of God. At the same time, in having a bearing upon God's self-expression in Jesus and in all creation bound up with God, humankind makes a difference to God's finite reality as "in the other", and to that extent affects God. Panentheism Bringing us to tintacks with the real issue, Joseph Donceel argues for a real relation between God and humans. Donceel suggests that if God remains immutable whether God creates or does not create, then the whole of creation makes no difference to God. Thus envisaged, creation adds nothing and can add nothing to the eternal fullness of being which is God. Donceel points out that there is a real enigma here in upholding the following paradox: If we claim that God is immutable it is difficult to see why we may not conclude that God is unaffected by human suffering, that evolution, human history, and even the Incarnation make no difference to God. If we are told that God is affected by all of these then why may we not say that God changes, that God is not strictly immutable? If the doctrine of divine immutability implies neither that God is unaffected by human fate nor affected by it, this doctrine seems unfalsifiable, in fact it does not seem to mean anything at all.297 Just as Aquinas takes Aristotle's idea of God and modifies it considerably to fit better the God of his faith, in like manner Donceel, considers we need to proceed beyond Aquinas, removing from his conception of God features which have become unacceptable to many modern theists. Accordingly, he believes an acceptable philosophy of God seems to be possible only if we boldly advance in the direction of pantheism but without crossing the boundary line. Between pantheism and traditional theism lie intermediate forms Donceel believes deserve serious consideration.298 63 To this end Donceel describes the difference between traditional theism and panentheism. For traditional theism there are two distinct cycles, the cycle constituted by the inner processions of the eternal Trinity, and a smaller cycle, attached to the former, an epicycle, in which the whole of creation derives from and returns to, the Triune God. For panentheism there are also two cycles. The immanent inner-trinitarian cycle is complete in itself, but the smaller cycle of creation is a concentric inner cycle, interior to the trinitarian one, an inner modification and manifestation of God. In panentheism, relations are reciprocal between God and the universe. God is intrinsically, though freely, constituted by God's relation to the world. Donceel acknowledges his indebtedness to William Norris Clarke for this insight,299 but goes further than Norris Clarke in his own description. He speaks of God's essence, the transcendent cycle, predicating thereby all traditional attributes to God such as Pure Act, Being itself, eternity, infinity, perfect simpleness, omnipotence, omnipresence, immutableness, the universal cause of all reality. He also speaks of God's interior modification and manifestation, the created inner cycle, the otherness of God’s inner manifestation, predicating thereby also to God the attributes of potency, becoming, everlastingness, finiteness, multiplicity, change, being in process, being in time and history, struggling, suffering, being affected by all reality.300 Donceel truly endeavours to reconcile through panentheism, the need to accommodate traditional theism with biblical revelation of God’s relation with humankind. However, the traditional theist may inquire how a being who is acknowledged as infinitely simple, Pure Act, supreme Unity, can have two aspects. That this question is asked strikes at the heart of the matter. For Donceel understands that those who uphold in its totality the traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic logic and metaphysics would see a hopeless case. One way out he offers is to examine Hegel's claim that what looks like a contradiction for the understanding is not a contradiction for reason.301 We note that with regard to this, Hans Kung uses Hegel's philosophy to understand God's nature and the Incarnation. Of the Incarnation Kung writes that it is not because God is in potency that God sets God's self in motion; not because God needs it that God changes; not because God is imperfect that God becomes. To think christologically within the framework of Greek metaphysics, it is because God is Pure Act, superabundant fullness, immutable perfection that God can undergo self-emptying.302 It would seem indeed that we need to look deeper, beyond the contradictions. LATENT THOMISTIC RICHES Anthony Kelly us warns against failure to see openings provided for a better presentation of Classic and Thomistic theism, one more in accordance with contemporary thought and values.303 Kelly is aware of the effort required to explicate the richness, flexibility and relevance of the Classical tradition of thought, currently too concealed within a system overly rigid and exclusive.304 To further his own explication of latent Thomistic riches, Kelly utilizes the work of Schubert Ogden.305 Ogden is a theologian who gives expression to neo-Classical theism by drawing on the work of Whitehead and Hartshorne306. Neo-Classical theism attempts to establish the intrinsic relatedness of the Divine Reality to humankind and the world307. Of particular interest to Kelly is Ogden's distinction, along Hartshornean lines, between existence in God, the non-variable, the abstract constant, and actuality in God, the variable verifying the existent in the concrete. As we have seen, this distinction opens the way to a dipolar affirmation of God. Ogden 64 sees this as favourable to Traditional theism's monopolar affirmation of God, related in a purely nominal way308. Ogden introduces the reformed subjectivist principle of Whitehead, whereby the paradigm of reality consists in the self which develops through relatedness. The temporality of the human self replaces ideas of substance and being with those of creative becoming and being in process. God is viewed as the supreme instance, eminently social, temporal, related, and absolute in this relativity.309 Kelly views the ideas of Ogden as an explicit challenge to reactualizing the riches of the Classic and Thomistic affirmation of God.310 In doing so, though, he warns of a distracting element in the neo-Classical position; that current thought, whilst being comfortable with an existential account of reality interpreted in a broad evolutionary and dynamic sweep, cannot necessarily conclude that God is like that.311 Relation of intersubjectivity Kelly is interested, nevertheless, in exploring the nature of the relation between God and humankind. He acknowledges that a relation of "reason alone" is all Classic theism can allow, for the pith of the argument lies in the absolute "Is-ness" of God. This notwithstanding, he points out that Aquinas' category of relation is used in an objective sense in reference to one object to another object. In view of this Kelly asks whether the nature of the relation between two objects is the same as between two persons? If the answer is no then significantly, on the question of God's relationship to humankind, the relationship of reason is open to interpretation in terms of intersubjectivity. Such an interpretation would be in broader sympathy with the neo-classical approach.312 Exploring this interpretation, Kelly sees that God is related to us as Creator and Redeemer and we are thus really related to God as the created and redeemed. God freely relates humankind to God's self. God relates to humankind as total love which calls, exacts, redeems, consoles and judges. God does not change, God is free; freely and totally related to humankind. The term relation of reason in Kelly’s view though, remains valid on its own level.313 God is absolutely immutable yet freely choosing to relate to humankind. In this sense it can be said that we do affect God's reality as God has qualified God's self in this way.314 Given that traditional affirmation of God as esse subsistens is characterized as impersonal, abstract and static, Kelly believes there must be a reinterpretation along more dynamic lines. Following the indications of Aquinas315, the is-ness of a being is the radical actualization of all its reality. Thus, to realize the reality and the concreteness of our affirmation of God as ipsum esse is to realize God's complete relatedness to us.316 Kelly would thus replace the term relation of reason with relation of inter-subjectivity. Irreducible distinction between Personhood and Nature in God William J. Hill also takes the stand that in some sense our choices do seemingly determine God, if God is "the Lord of History". This view means the concept of God must embrace contingency and temporality, qualities heretofore understood as nondivine.317 Like Kelly, Hill theorizes on the latent thought in Aquinas, drawing our attention to Aquinas' distinction between two orders; the order of the entitative, objective being-there-ness, and the order of the intentional, subjective event of meaning as immanent to consciousness.318 On this, J.B. Metz states that the thought of Aquinas goes far beyond a thematic enrichment of Greek metaphysics. It changes the whole horizon of 65 the understanding of being and self.319 In God the two orders merge, distinguishable only conceptually. In line with Kelly, Hill proposes that God's creation brings into existence humankind capable of dialogic relationship to God. As such we are called to intersubjective, interpersonal relationships with the divine Persons. Such relationships are self-determining and self-defining. In this sense God is determined by the community of human persons. God is willing to be determined on this level of ontological freedom and personhood without any corresponding mutation or determination on the level of nature.320 Hill’s position is based upon an understanding of freedom as self-positing and self-constituting act which, in the finite sphere, is made possible, limited, and controlled by, the creativity of God. In dialectical encounter God, in ontic situation outside history, operating kenotically, enters it and interacts with humankind on the level of temporality. To the extent that this implies God being determined by humankind in response to the dialogue, Hill offers three qualifications. God wills to be so determined. The determining powers of humankind are highly conditioned. The area of determination regards not God's nature but God's intentionality. This pertains to the concept of person, of self-constitution, of the root source of subjectivity from which arises creative relationality.321 Hill goes further than Kelly, proposing that the relationality between God and humankind is real in a mutual sense. He points out though, and this is significant, that the reality is of an order other than Aquinas' category of relation which, defined, is the accidental alteration of a substance.322 Hill emphasises that conceiving God as eternal and so immutable does not preclude allowing God being really related to the world. This brings us to the subject of God’s eternity, a matter of some debate, given its implications for God's relation to humankind. It is of direct relevance to our understanding of the immutability of God. Kelly draws attention to a particular piece of Ogden's work323, a development of a note in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit/Being and Time324, in which the eternity of God is considered more as a primal and infinite temporality than as the ‘stationary now’. In like fashion, Hill also makes reference and gives consideration, to Heidegger's suggestion that God's being might better be construed in categories of infinite primal temporality than eternity.325 Reconceiving God thus derives from the contemporary modern experience that temporality is not a defect but a boon. Metaphysically the pendulum has swung from being as absolute value, to that of becoming. Yet, theologically, an extrapolation has occurred from anthropological considerations to God. Classical thought, with its preference for permanence over change, understands temporality as a diminution of being. In Classical thought, the pure actuality of God grounds God's immutability which is the foundation of God's eternity, the negation of any succession.326 Eternity means timelessness, interchangeable with the dynamism expressed in the pure act of to be, inclusive of all time.327 It needs to be understood within the metaphysical system of Aquinas which pivots on the real distinction between essence and esse. The former, explaining the nature of something, is merely potential towards existence, whereas the latter is its actus essendi. Esse is thus the first perfection and the act of all acts, nothing attains actuality except by way of existing, and the act of existing is the ultimate actuality of everything.328 The ultimate source is the subject-person. Divine reality is therefore seen as a dynamism. In relation to this and in attempting to give due credence to this dynamism, Hill seeks to find a way to acknowledge God as beyond suffering in God's inner being and yet, in love, as open to freely experiencing human suffering in a way that does not diminish God's beingness. Hill suggests, as an 66 alternative to the Process dipolar answer, an irreducible distinction between nature and person in God. This affords an understanding that, in God's nature God is eternally the infinite act of being, incapable of enrichment or impoverishment of being, while in God's personhood, God's being is freely chosen as self-relating, an intersubjective disposing of self that is self enactment and self-positing, changing in a mode consonant with eternity, the mode of simultaneity.329 Hill’s contribution to the ongoing debate of change in God is invaluable. The insight of the distinction between nature and person in God is crucial to a developing understanding of God’s relatedness to humankind that does not compromise God’s Beingness. This distinction is to be explored at greater length in the work of William Norris Clarke. A doctrine of relation proper to person Walter Stokes also explores the notion of personhood in God as a means to understanding God's relation to the world and thus to a more adequate understanding of God’s immutability. Stokes believes that the constant appeal to nature in Aquinas' thought, with the consequence of God's nature being essentially ordered to the world, suggests that personal relation and a doctrine of relation proper to person may not have been adequately considered in the traditional scheme.330 In this he is clearly in line with Kelly, Hill, and Norris Clarke. Stokes sees the possibility of such a new perspective in and through Aquinas, as indicated by Metz' thesis331 that Aquinas' basic understanding of reality is Christian rather than Greek. In this he is in line with Hill. Even though Aquinas, as we have noted, works in the categories of nature, substance and matter he does not value nature over person. Stokes correctly considers that to which we have already drawn attention. The use of Greek categories creates a tension within the articulation of the Christian experience. Aquinas' doctrine of relation may be a prime example of this, the Greek conceptual tools being forged exclusively in the Greek world of necessary natures.332 If God is a personal, self-relating being, God can in part, be understood to be what God is by an eternal, free decision to create this universe. God's nature and personal being as infinite actuality also determine God to be what God is. By God's decision to create, God becomes a distinct, subsistent being in a new way which could not be realized apart from that historical situation with its relation of opposition. Since this opposition is real, God's relation to the world, Stokes maintains, is real. The mystery of God's creation is thereby placed, not in the immutability of God's nature, but in God's personal activity. God is really related to the world in a way not demanded by the necessity of God's nature. Stokes points out that the only perfection such an understanding destroys is that perfection conceived in the Greek world, where a being is more perfect by necessity than by spontaneity.333 Stoke’s argument allows us to see that, in God's self-giving, God eternally orders God's self to this world, choosing to be in part constituted by this real relation to the world. The autonomy of humankind's free response is both God's gift of Self to humankind, and the completion of God's gift.334 This thinking of Stokes is in line with that of Kelly. Stoke’s thinking is supported by another, Martin D'Arcy, who also draws together ideas concerning the tools used by Aquinas and the idea of personhood in God. D’Arcy, like Stokes, contends that Aquinas was indeed hampered by Aristotle's impersonal, metaphysical framework with the Greek idea of personality being immature. 67 God’s Immutability is Personal Immutability It is clear that a viable interpretation of God's infinite perfection requires that we consider the perfection of a person instead of a thing. The notion of God’s immutability is to be thought of in this context of God as personal. In this it needs to be noted that the person becomes properly a person by reaching beyond self and communicating with others.335 The implication of this for our understanding of God and God’s immutability is fleshed out by the neo-Thomist, William Norris Clarke. From Norris Clarke’s work on the subject of God’s immutability, the notion of personhood in God, involving selfcommunication and receptivity, emerges as central to reconciling the traditional notion of God’s immutability with biblical revelation and personal religious experience of God’s relatedness to humankind. Accordingly, the work of William Norris Clarke, in conjunction with the work of another neo-Thomist, Robert A. Connor, now becomes our emergent focus. 68 CHAPTER FIVE REINTERPRETING THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY FINDING A WAY FORWARD FOR UNDERSTANDING GOD’S IMMUTABILITY Conscious of the need to find a way forward to adequately reconcile the demands of tradition, biblical revelation and personal religious experience when considering the notion of God’s immutability, we turn now, in particular, to the work of the neo-Thomist William Norris Clarke to examine a contemporary reinterpretation of the Classical viewpoint of God’s immutability. Norris Clarke’s work is independently supported by another neo-Thomist Robert A. Connor. Through their work, supported by others, we offer a reinterpretation of the Classical viewpoint on God’s immutability that, we believe, offers reconciliation between tradition and Scripture without betrayal to a supportable metaphysics. EXEMPLARS OF CLASSICAL REINTERPRETATION WILLIAM NORRIS CLARKE & ROBERT A. CONNOR at the cutting edge of classical metaphysics Substance as dynamic and relational It is our contention that the insights and thoughts of William Norris Clarke and Robert A. Connor, together, offer contemporary theistic metaphysics an ability to recover and express authentically Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of substance in respect to God. At the heart of this recovered understanding lies the notion that substance is dynamic and relational Such an understanding of substance is the key to a more adequate understanding of the notion of God’s immutability. Such an understanding lends itself to being convivial to and harmonious with, both biblical understanding of the nature of God and contemporary protest at the traditional interpretation of the immutability of God. William Norris Clarke Responding to Process thought Creative adaptation Emerging from the immutability debate then, comes a neo-Thomist theologian who, writing extensively on the issue of, and surrounding, the immutability of God, forges links with Process philosophers/theologians such as Lewis Ford, earning their respect whilst not relinquishing his own tradition. We have already noted that William Norris Clarke stands out in taking time and energy to grapple with Process thought, using it as a 69 springboard to reinterpret, without betrayal, Classical thought on the immutability of God. Of those who are endeavouring to reinterpret the Classical viewpoint, Norris Clarke’s work stands out as systematically rigorous. Its rigour attends both to dealing with Process objections and alternatives to the Classical view of God’s immutability and developing, in response, a coherent reinterpretation of the Classical viewpoint. We explore Norris Clarke's contentions by drawing from a range of his writings, together with writings of those upon whom he has drawn, of those with whom he has dialogued, and of those with which his fall into line. Norris Clarke’s reinterpretation of the Classical view, in conjunction with the philosophic thought of Robert Connor, seems best able to provide the means, from within the neo-Thomist tradition, of working towards reconciling traditional understanding of God’s immutability with that of biblical revelation and personal religious experience. His work takes seriously the need for this reconciliation. To this end he recovers the notion of substance as dynamic and relational, he utilizes the distinction between the nature and the personhood of God, and he explores the correlative aspects of communication and receptivity within the latter. The fundamental underlying problem for Norris Clarke is that Whitehead, father of Process thought, gives no evidence of familiarity with the dynamic AristotelianThomistic version of substance, only with the versions of the self-sufficient type of Descartes and the static type of Locke336. On the other hand, the major contribution offered by Process thought337, in Norris Clarke’s eyes, is its insistence that philosophical concepts do justice to the biblical revelation of God as involved in personal, mutual relations of love and responsiveness with humankind. This requires the recognition that God is really related and really affected. It calls for a new concept of divine perfection, one that would include mutability and mutual real relations. In an effort to meet this challenge thrown out to traditional Catholic thinking, Norris Clarke offers an exciting response338. He considers that the main contribution of Process thought may turn out to be, not the displacement of theistic metaphysics but the stimulation given towards creative adaptations of the theistic system from within its own latent resources. This certainly is what he himself attempts. Norris Clarke actually contends that, in order to make intelligible the belief that what happens in the world does make a significant, conscious difference to God, the Thomistic metaphysical doctrine of no real relations in God to the world should be quietly shelved because it is no longer illuminating. Norris Clarke explains that the term ‘real relations’ carries a narrow technical meaning for Aquinas, one implying intrinsic change in the real intrinsic, nonrelative perfection of the subject of relation and the independent existence of the other term. Since neither of these requirements can be applied to God, Aquinas allows ‘intentionality relations’, in the purely relational order of knowledge and love in God towards the world, but technically refuses to call these ‘real relations’. Whilst defensible on technical grounds, Norris Clarke believes this perspective to be so narrow and incomplete, so difficult to convey, that this point of conflict with Process thought should be dropped. Norris Clarke affirms that it should be unambiguously stated that God is truly, ‘really’, personally related to the world by relations of knowledge and mutual love and affected in consciousness, but not in abiding intrinsic perfection of nature, by what happens in the world. 70 Two approaches of Norris Clarke To explicate this contention Norris Clarke offers two possible approaches339. The more traditional approach proposes that, while God’s consciousness is different for every response humankind makes, there is no requirement that God change over time. These differences in God’s consciousness could be present in God without temporal succession in God. God knows in God’s Now, seeing it taking place, but since God’s Now is incommensurable with any created nows, the two ‘nows’ are equivocal and their meanings cannot be interchanged. His other approach, whilst not traditional, is nevertheless open to being an orthodox Catholic position. Within this approach he distinguishes two kinds of immutability. The traditional interpretation of immutability implies no alteration or difference of any kind, even in the relative sphere of God’s knowledge and love of others, as in the Prime Mover of Aristotle or the Plotinian One. Clearly, this immutability would be inappropriate to the fullness of perfection proper to a truly personal, loving being. Hence, it must be argued, it is inappropriate to the concept of the Christian God. Another kind of immutability however, would be appropriate to God as the infinite perfection of personal being. This would be an immutability in God’s own intrinsic, absolute, nonrelative perfection of nature, the eternally faithful God of Revelation, that allows a mutability in the relative dimension of knowledge, love, compassion, joy. Hence, in this approach God is seen to be immutable in the absolute order, mutable in the relative order. The difference to the Whiteheadian God, which is immutable in the Primordial nature and mutable in the Consequent nature is that, in this approach of Norris Clarke’s, the world is not needed for God’s completion. All the novelty of knowledge, love, joy would be only new finite participations and expressions of God’s infinite fullness of being. It is significant that Norris Clarke’s approach perceives that the logic of the infinite transcends Aristotelian categories of change modelled on the physical and biological. More on this will be discussed later. Norris Clarke - Creative Thomistic Metaphysician Etienne Gilson - forerunner Preceding William Norris Clarke, Etienne Gilson, a French Canadian philosopher, recovers the authentic Thomistic idea of substance as dynamic and relational. Gilson writes in his book, “Being and Some Philosophers”340, that essential possibility is not sufficient reason for existential possibility. Since the essence of a being is what a being is going to become if it exists, then existence itself necessarily enters the calculation of its essential possibility. Essences may well represent fulfilled essential possibilities, but actual existences are their very fulfilling. This is why essences are actually becoming in time; this despite the fact that a time-transcending knowledge eternally sees them as already fulfilled. Actual and individual essences then, following Gilson,341 are not static, because their own becoming is presupposed by their very definitions. Their progressive selfdetermination through acting and operating, through change, of which time is but the numbering, is not extraneous to their eternal ideas but eternally included in them. 71 God is an immobile knowledge of becoming qua becoming. If it is so, says Gilson, there is no antinomy between eternity and existence in time. For God Who Is, there is no time, because God is to God’s self God’s own essence, so that God’s own ‘now’ is God’s own ‘is’. God, being ‘Is’ cannot ‘become’, God is eternity. If God is esse, God‘s ‘to be’ constitutes God’s own essence, both in unicity and singularity. As such, fully posited by its ‘to be’, essence here entails neither limitation nor determination. In contrast, finite essences entail limitation and determination. Yet, even in the order of finite being, maintains Gilson, the primacy of existence still obtains. Its act of existing is what insures its unity. Matter, form, substance, accidents, operations, everything in it, directly or indirectly, shares in the act of existing. Temporal existence is progressive achievement through becoming. Becoming through esse is the road to fully determined being, just as time is the road to eternity.342 From the above, a characteristic of existential being, noted by Gilson343 and of particular pertinence to us, is its intrinsic dynamism. Because abstract essence is static, while existence is dynamic, such a metaphysics of being needs to be a dynamic one. The very existence of finite essence is the first and immediate effect of the first and absolute existential Act. Born of an existential act, ‘to be’ is itself an existential act, and just as it is effect so is it cause. As noted by Aquinas in his Summa Contra Gentiles III, 69, not ‘to be’ then, ‘to act’, but ‘to be is to act’. Thus with natural essence each of them is the progressive becoming of its own end. The actual perfecting of essences is the final cause of their existences and it takes many operations to achieve it. Existence can perform those operations. Because ‘to be’ is ‘to be act’, it also is ‘to be able to act’. As an act is, so will be its operation. Because God is pure act of existence, God’s first effect is existence.344 From this, in any relation of efficient causality, something of the esse, ‘to be’, of the cause, is imparted to its effect. Such a relation is an existential one. We pursue the philosophical implications of understanding God as pure act of existing in existential relation when we examine the work of Robert Connor. With Gilson’s thought acknowledged however, we return to the theistic work of Norris Clarke, self-called Thomistically inspired metaphysician. Personalist theism of Norris Clarke Norris Clarke’s earlier writings, such as “A New Look at the Immutability of God” and “Christian Theism and Whiteheadian Process Philosophy: Are They Compatible?”, show rapid development of thought, largely as a result of concerted dialogue with Process philosopher/theologians.345 Norris Clarke’s intention in these earlier writings is to explore the resources of the Thomistic metaphysical system, to gauge the extent to which it can accommodate a God able to enter truly personal relations with humankind. With Thomistic metaphysicians traditionally being content to assert and defend the absolute immutability of God by relegating all change and diversity to the side of humankind, they have not been able to explain how God can enter into truly personal dialogue with created persons. They have not been able to explain how God’s loving of us and our response to God, in the particular contingent ways proper to a free exchange between persons, can make a difference to God.346 Against this background, Norris Clarke rightly has no doubt that the primary positive contribution of Process thinkers to the philosophical elucidation of the Christian, and indeed any personalist, conception of God, is their notion of God as profoundly involved in, and personally responsive to, the 72 ongoing events of creation. This is particularly so with respect to the conscious life of created persons as expressed in the mutuality, the mutual giving and receiving, that is proper to interpersonal relations. All metaphysical explanations must accommodate these exigencies in any form of personalist theism.347 Real and Intentional Being Accordingly, and to this end, Norris Clarke writes in his article, “A New Look at the Immutability of God”, that it seems quite possible to draw upon the latent resources of the Thomistic system, so that the loving dialogue of God with humankind becomes truly intelligible. This seems to Norris Clarke, and to ourselves, a wiser strategy than substituting a totally new metaphysical framework of Process philosophy which would appear to be based on faulty suppositions and itself introduces a host of new difficulties. The strategy of drawing upon latent Thomistic resources is allowing creative Thomistic metaphysics to adapt an incomparably rich and profound metaphysical system to newly felt and better understood exigencies of the domain of inter-personal being.348 This is done by developing the traditional distinction between the orders of real and intentional being in order to adapt the notion of immutability to fit the perfection appropriate to personal being. In both his article mentioned above and his follow-up, expanded and emended article, “Christian Theism and Whiteheadian Process Philosophy”, Norris Clarke tries to mitigate opposition to the traditional Thomistic position on God’s immutability by distinguishing between these two orders of God:349 the order of real being, esse naturale, which is God’s intrinsic, real perfection, remaining Infinite Plenitude, and the order of intentional being, esse intentionale, which takes in the contents of the divine field of consciousness as related to humankind. Even for Aquinas, God’s consciousness is contingently different in content in correspondence to God’s decision to create this particular world as opposed to any other, and also differs according to what actually happens in this particular created world, especially with respect to the free responses of rational humankind. By making this distinction between the two orders in God it can be seen that the world can and does make a difference to the conscious and hence personal, life of God. For since the divine consciousness, as knowing and loving, is truly related, by distinct and determinate relations in the intentional order, to humankind, relations which are based on God’s distinct ideas of them, it follows then that God is truly, personally related to the world. Whilst such relations are true and authentic it remains that in Aquinas’ strict terminology and theoretical framework such relations cannot be called ‘real relations’, since real relations for Aquinas require as their foundation some change or difference in the real intrinsic ‘absolute’ being of the subject related. This would not be compatible with the divine infinity, which allows no increase or diminution of its intrinsic plenitude of real perfection. For Aquinas, difference in the divine consciousness, as intentionally related to humankind, does not entail any change in the divine consciousness, let alone any change in the intrinsic real being of God. These relations are simply present, without change, in the eternal Now of God which itself is present to all points of time. This eternal Now is outside the flow of our motion-dependent time, but present in its own time-transcending way to all points of time, without internal succession in God. The all important point is that difference: this rather than that, does not logically imply change: this after that. 73 Shifting Frameworks With respect to the Thomistic understanding that God’s intentional relations to the world are true and yet not real, we note the significant emendation Norris Clarke offers in his follow-up paper.350 Whilst still willing to defend in theory the position as outlined above, Norris Clarke believes that for such adherence the price has become too high, the returns too diminishing. The wiser strategy is to shift frameworks. The doctrine of an absence of real relations between God and the world is highly technical and narrow in meaning, it leaves so much unsaid. To tell people that God is truly personally related to the world but still not really related strikes them as counterintuitive. It is in conflict with the meaning of religious and revelationary language. People generally, are not disposed to make the effort to enter into a difficult technical doctrine that opens a chasm between technical and ordinary language, that opens a chasm between the assertions of metaphysics and those of religious devotion.351 Accordingly, Norris Clarke goes on record at this point as saying that the doctrine should be quietly dropped, that we should say that “God is really and truly related to the world in the order of personal consciousness”. This framework shift involves a fundamental shift in the primary models from which metaphysical concepts are drawn. The shift is from the model of the physical and biological world, the prime analogates of the metaphysical concepts for Aristotle and Aquinas, to the model of the person and interpersonal relations, the prime analogates of the metaphysical concepts for the Contemporary Western metaphysician.352 In this shift, Norris Clarke acknowledges the support and convergence, as we too have noted, of contemporary Thomists such as Anthony Kelly, William Hill, and John Wright. This support is thus for toning down Aquinas’ doctrine on the absence of real relations between God and the world. Most try to show that one can loosen the strict interpretation of Aquinas and enrich his doctrine, by saying more than he does.353 Only then can the traditional doctrine of immutability be reconciled adequately with biblical revelation and personal religious experience. God is Perfectly Loving Personal Being What is significant about Norris Clarke’s stance as a creative Neo-Thomist or, selfcalled, “Thomistically inspired metaphysician”, is that he believes our metaphysics of God must allow us to say that, in some real and genuine way, God is affected positively by what we do, that God receives love from us and experiences joy because of our responses; that God’s consciousness is contingently and qualitatively different because of what we do. It is our belief as well, that this is what is called for, if we are to find a metaphysical way to reconcile what to date has remained at odds; the traditional notions about God’s immutability and the biblical revelation and personal experience of God’s personal love of, and loving relations with, humankind. On the point of God being affected by what we do, Norris Clarke rejects the contemporary Process philosopher, Lewis Ford’s interpretation of his position. In Ford’s paper “The Immutable God and Fr Clarke”, 354 Ford says, “it is clear that the contents of God’s intentional consciousness are not derived from the external world”. In response to this, Norris Clarke asserts that God’s knowledge of the actions of human persons, especially their free action, is due to, is determined by, and is derived from, human persons. This occurs by God’s acting with them.355 However this difference remains on the level of God’s relational consciousness 74 and does not involve increase or decrease in the infinite Plenitude of God’s intrinsic inner being and perfection, that which Aquinas calls the absolute, non-relative, aspect of God’s perfection. This said, the mutual giving and receiving that is part of God’s relational consciousness, as knowing and loving that which is other than God’s-self, is the appropriate expression of the intrinsic perfection proper to a perfect, hence perfectly loving, personal being.356 God is the Supreme Receiver In terms of this giving and receiving, to receive love as a person is precisely a dimension of the perfection of personal being as lovingly responsive. On this point Norris Clarke makes a further concession to, in his own words, his Whiteheadian friends. He writes that it has long been a special claim by Ford and other Whiteheadians that God is not just the supreme Cause of the world but the supreme Effect, in the sense of being the supreme receiver from all things that exist, and this is one of God’s supreme perfections. Such language, whilst foreign to Thomistic and other traditional ways of speaking about God, can nevertheless be understood in the light of Norris Clarke’s concession, that in God’s consciousness God is different and is affected because of what humankind does. Understood in this way, God is the supreme Receiver. God knows the acts of human persons by acting along with them.357 Not only can the Process view thus be accommodated Thomistically but in addition, the Thomistic interior symbiosis of divine and human act avoids the serious problems of Process’ passive and extrinsic conception of divine receiving.358 Divine relational consciousness We now must ask ourselves the pivotal question. Does all this mean that God undergoes change, that God is mutable? Does contingent difference in God’s relational consciousness necessarily imply change, i.e. temporally successive states in that consciousness? Process thinkers insist on this as necessarily following from the admission that God is really related to the changing world and positively affected by what happens in it. Norris Clarke’s answer is two-fold: firstly, it is not clear that contingent difference in the divine relational consciousness of the world necessarily involves temporally successive states in God. Norris Clarke does not see, and nor do we, how Process thinkers have ruled out the possibility that the divine consciousness is present to the contingent changing world in a mode of presence that transcends our timesuccession.359 This, to our mind, is the fundamental issue. For our time succession is based, not principally on the pure succession of contents of consciousness of intentional being, but on change in our real, physical and psychic being. In God there is only the succession in the order of relational consciousness of intentional being.360 A Thomist would say that God knows and responds to the world in God’s eternal Now. The key point is that our ‘nows’ exclude each other whereas the divine Now includes all others.361 No time adverb can be applied to situate God’s knowledge in our timesequence. The above notwithstanding, an alternative to a non-temporal view of the divine relational consciousness, a version of the Process view of God as changing, is considered by Norris Clarke to be possible as an orthodox Christian view, provided that change is restricted to the relational dimension of God’s consciousness.362 In either case 75 the crux of the issue is that we need to come to understand God’s immutability in terms of a personal loving relatedness to humankind. Implications for God’s immutability To this end of understanding God’s immutability in terms of personal loving relatedness to humankind and in line with Norris Clarke, it would seem that one may not have to compromise Thomistic principles to accept that some kinds of mutability and some kinds of immutability are appropriate to a perfect person, and some are not. This understanding is supported by the German Catholic theologian, Heribert Mühlen, writing prior to Norris Clarke, but from whom Norris Clarke’s writing remained independent.363 Mühlen claims that the immutability attributed to God must be proper to a perfect personal being having an immutable intention to love and to save. Such an immutability must carry all those adaptations and responses necessary for this intention to be expressed in personal dialogue with humankind. The key point is that personal immutability here seems to include relational mutability. How are we to understand this? Perhaps we need to remember again our framework shift; a shift that involves deriving our metaphysical principles from personal rather than physical analogates. Norris Clarke364 agrees with Lewis Ford365, that in a personalist interpretation of infinite perfection, we must say that the infinite can be enriched by the finite. The old correlation that infinite equals no enrichment is too simplistic. It is not suited to the unique characteristics of infinite perfection of personal being as truly loving. Norris Clarke insists however, that this enrichment can only be new determinate modalities of expression of the already infinite intensity of actual interior joy in God, never rising higher in qualitative intensity of perfection than the already infinite Source, of which all finite modalities are only limited participations. In admitting that God can be affected by new modalities of joy Norris Clarke recognizes too that we must also have the courage to be consistent and admit in the divine consciousness something corresponding to compassion but purified of all genuine imperfection.366 Connected with this matter of God’s loving relations, Process thinkers have enormous difficulty with Aquinas’ doctrine of divine simplicity. Hartshorne, Ford, Griffin and others, all feel that this doctrine renders void the religious concept of God as involved in mutual loving relations. Norris Clarke’s reply is that Process thinkers fail to recognize the profound transformation that the attribute of divine simplicity has undergone in medieval Christian metaphysical thought, culminating in Aquinas. The simplicity of the divine being, properly understood, means that there are no really distinct ontological parts making up divine being itself. Simplicity thus postulated is restricted to the absolute intrinsic being of God. It is explicitly compatible with the triple relational distinctness of the three divine Persons. It is clear that for Aquinas and all traditional Christian metaphysicians, divine simplicity of nature does not exclude real multiplicity in the order of relations. Relation is unique in that its addition to a being does not necessarily add or subtract anything from its absolute real being and perfection. It relates the subject to its term but does not necessarily change or modify it internally in any nonrelative way. In concession to his Process friends however, Norris Clarke admits that interpretation of the simplicity attribute of God has remained too rigid. It too is in need of further qualification and distinction similar to that proposed for the notions of real relatedness to humankind, relational mutability and enrichment in God. An adjustment is 76 needed to fit simplicity properly to the perfection of a loving personal being367 whose relations to humankind needs to be taken seriously by metaphysicians. Reciprocal relations It needs finally to be noted that, in distinguishing the relational and intentional aspects of the divine consciousness from the intrinsic real perfection of God, with the accompanying acceptance that the latter does not undergo a strict Aristotelian type of change involving a movement to a qualitatively higher level of inner perfection, Norris Clarke admits that this does not of itself deny that God’s inner being is genuinely affected in a truly personal, conscious, relational way by relations with humankind. As Norris Clarke points out, it may well be that Hegel’s original dialectical conception of the Infinite as intrinsically related to the finite, with the notion, as Rahner puts it, that God changes in the other, is more adapted to handling this question of reciprocal relations of finite and Infinite than is the more Aristotelian language of Aquinas.368 Contentions of Robert A. Connor Act of existence is relational and substantial Resting with the acknowledgment, from the work of Norris Clarke, that God’s inner being is genuinely affected in a truly personal relational way by relations with humankind we feel it is timely to turn and consider the thought of a contemporary Thomistic philosopher, Robert A. Connor. Connor examines the relationship between the act of existence, esse, and the person, in his paper “Relational Esse and the Person”.369 He proposes that the Thomistic act of existence is the explanation of the relational dimension of person as well as the explanation of its unique substantiality. In Connor’s proposal, both relation and substantiality are equal dimensions of the act of existence. Relation is not considered as the predicamental accident but as the constitutive expansiveness of the act of existence, understood intensively. According to Connor, this act of existence, when it is intensively intellectual, is the person.370 Thus can we infer, if God is both personal perfection and the ground of act of existence, the profound ramifications this proposal has for understanding the nature of God’s immutability in terms of both God’s substantiality and God’s relationality. Rethinking the notion of Person In an important insight, Connor sees that, just as the act of existence may involve the revealed notion of creation, so also the notion of person involves the revelation of the Trinity of three Persons in one God. If the One God is considered substantial Being, then the Three Persons, revealing themselves in dialogue, can only be subsistent relationalities, dialogue being a relational ontologic.371 As Cardinal Ratzinger comments in his book “Introduction to Christianity”372, when the First Person begets the Second Person it is an act of begetting. Only as this act is it person. What is being affirmed here is the notion of person as constitutively expansive as relation. 77 Accordingly, the notion of person needs to be rethought and reformulated in the dyadic terms of substance or intrinsic existence, and its constitutive relationality.373 As William Hill notes in “The Historicity of God”374, in God’s personhood we are dealing with God’s being in its freely chosen self-relating to others, in that inter-subjective disposing of the self that is self-enactment and self-positing. Aquinas’ understanding, with Aristotelian roots, that all relations of God to the world are rational not real relations, rests upon an understanding of real as implying causal dependence. Hill points out that such relations nonetheless remain actual ones and in this sense there is no problem in designating such relations as real. Aquinas is simply avoiding any notion of ontic relations accidentally accruing to God’s being.375 As Walter Kasper, in “Postmodern Dogmatics”, discerns, theology needs a metaphysics which has been developed precisely within theology. Without a transcendent ground and point of reference, statements of faith are finally only subjective projections of social and ecclesial ideologies.376 As long as the metaphysical model for describing a person is Aristotelian substance, and relation is always an accident, then being as relation will never be able to pass from its immanentized domestication within the Trinity to humankind and thereon to all reality as relational being.377 Thus Connor’s proposal is to accept the theological elaboration of person as constitutively relational as expansive and to offer the Thomistic esse as the ontological explanation of that expansiveness. Connor assumes the dynamic character of the Thomistic esse as expounded by Gerard Phelan in his paper “Being, Order and Knowledge”. The latter comments on his joy at reading in the first article of Aquinas’ Quaestio Disputata De Veritate that reality, unity, truth and all transcendentals are general modes of being, not properties or attributes of beings, and that substance, quantity, quality, relation and the like are also modes of being.378 Hill indeed, recognises that the whole metaphysical system of Aquinas pivots on the real distinction between essence and esse. The former explains nature and is the potential towards existence, the latter is its actus essendi. The ultimate source of such exercise is the hypostasis379. Principle of Person The proposal then is to see this “to be”, esse, not as an actuality of a substance but as an intensive act in its own right, of which substantiality is a mode. By intensive, Connor means that esse is expansive as an agere, and expansiveness as an agere is another mode of that same esse. Agere is “esse-becoming” and so constitutive of “esse’s fulfilment”. Thus there is proposed here a transference of agency from essence to esse. When esse is intelligere the agent is the person.380 In establishing the priority of esse as origin and source of all reality, we take time to flesh out Connor’s thought. Connor is considering what kind of act esse is; that it might be a constitutive relationality because of its intensity as intelligible act. As such it would be a worthy candidate for the ontological category of person. Where there is intensity there is relationality. Relationality means intensity. If personality is defined by relationality, as offered in trinitarian theology, then the principle of relationality should be the principle of personality as intensity. Thus if the Thomistic esse can be shown to be intensive and therefore relational, it should be the principle of personality.381 78 Having considered esse as intensive act Connor goes on to consider esse as expansive. Esse as expansive and hence relational must do so as agere. Connor thereby considers the relation between esse and agere. On this, Gilson, in “Being and some Philosophers”, plumbs the mind of Aquinas: Not to be, then to act, but: to be is to act. The first thing which “to be” does is to make its own essence to be, that is, “to be a being”. Next, “to be” begins bringing its own individual essence nearer its completion. Gilson makes it clear that the primacy of esse as dynamism radically transforms the Aristotelian dynamism of form. To be, esse, is to act, agere, and to act is to tend, tendere, to an end wherein achieved being may ultimately rest.382 This is a critical point of the proposal because expanding esse, that is, relational esse, which is implied in the magisterial formulations concerning the Trinity, is axiomatic to Thomistic metaphysics. To see substance as a subject receiving, specifying and exercising esse with agere and intelligere as accidents of it is to miss the intensive character of the Thomistic esse.383 If Phelan is correct in his evaluation of De Veritate, 1,1, then substance is a mode of being, a limited way of seeing esse.384 Instead of seeing agere as the manifestation of the nature of a substance and hence an accident of the substance, it would be truer to see it as esse itself, at various levels of limitation. Where there is no limitation, esse is agere, as in the person of Christ and the inner life of the Trinity. Seen in this light esse and agere are thereby connected as states of one another, perfectly identified only where they reach infinity.385The union of action and its agent is therefore much closer than that of subject and its accidents. Is there a perfect existential unity? Does the same esse bring about the substance and its act at the same time? It seems so. Operation, agere, will truly be more being, not another being.386 Thus it is that esse / agere correspond to the two states of esse itself: intrinsic existence and relationality. Up to this point, the positive aspect of the proposal has consisted in highlighting the intensive character of esse as well as its expansive tendency as agere. The negative side of the proposal is to suggest that essence be downgraded from its traditional role as limiting and exercising subject to be restricted to the lesser role as limit of esse. Two theories of essence as limit exist. The “thin” theory propounded by G.B. Phelan, William Carlo,387 and W. Norris Clarke,388 maintains that essence is an intrinsic principle of limitation only, making no positive contribution of its own but merely limits or contracts what would otherwise be the de se plenitude of existence.389 The traditional or “thick” Thomistic notion of essence as the limitation of esse consists in esse limiting itself mediately, through essence which in this case is positive, distinct from esse but derived from it. Esse autodetermines itself, both conferring and limiting a perfection. The thin theory is coherent with the vision that esse is all the act there is in being. It fails to explain though, what limits esse to be this “chunk” of esse, and to explain the “tending” of esse. By denying the reality of a distinct potency, it introduces, without warrant, potency into esse. The thick theory, even when essence is not presumed real, affords the awkward situation of esse limiting itself, awkward because it has recourse to distinct levels of causality. On the positive side, it does give an explanation of limit of esse and potency of being. The point for us is that in both cases, Connor maintains that essence, as limit, should be disqualified as the ontological candidate for personality because person derives from its theological origin as an expansive dynamic, not as a limiting principle. Hence if essence is only a limit of expanding esse, it cannot be the principle of personality.390 79 Connor’s proposal thus presents the act of existence positively as intensive and expansive and essence as reduced to limit and specification of that act. This gives way to a Thomistically heterodox but crucial conclusion. If esse is intensive, intelligere is relational, and person is characterized by relationality, then esse should be the principle of personality. Essence as the principle of limit of act and therefore of limit of relationality should be rejected as subject of being and hence person.391 This pinpointing of esse as the intersection of intensiveness and relationality is made clear by Josef Pieper in his book “Living the Truth”. wherein he comments on Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles 4,11. Here he shows the direct proportionality between esse as intrinsic existence and its outreach agere, as relation; the greater the relationality of the agere the more intensive the esse. Commenting on Aquinas, who states that the higher the nature the more intimate to the nature is that which flows from it, Pieper states that the notion of having an intrinsic existence corresponds to being able to relate. The most comprehensive ability to relate, that is, the power to conform to all that is, implies the highest form of intrinsic existence, of selfness.392 Personal relational energy in God The principle that Connor is being faithful to is the principle which sees person both, as the relational energy in God, and the image and likeness of God in humankind.393 The ramifications of such a proposal as Connor’s are many. Esse as person subject is the principle of expansion and relation, not the principle of limit. If relation is a dimension constitutive of being itself, then love and ultimately relation to others will not be accidental but constitutive. The migration of subject and person from the limiting essence to the expanding esse redefines the relationship between God, humankind, and reality. It provides the common ontological ground: infinite esse and expanding esse. Being has become love.394 The ramifications of this proposal are profound for a renewed understanding of the nature of God’s relatedness to humankind and thus for the nature and design of God’s immutability. William Norris Clarke: further contentions God is perfectly personal being & intrinsically relational. Robert Connor’s work allows us to more fully appreciate the import of Norris Clarke’s contention, made in his later paper, “Person, Being, and St Thomas”,395 that the perfection of being, and therefore of the person, is dyadic, culminating in communion. With this noted, it is a suitable point at which to take up again with recent thought of William Norris Clarke. Quoting Aquinas, that person is that which is most perfect in all of nature,396 Norris Clarke recognizes that personal being then, is the highest mode of being. It often fails to be recognized that Aquinas has an explicit, powerful dynamic notion of being, intrinsically self-communicative and relational through action. Not only is activity, which is active self-communication, the natural consequence for Aquinas, of possessing an act of existence, esse, but he maintains further, self-expression through action is the whole point, the natural perfection of being itself, the goal of its very presence in the universe. Operation is the ultimate perfection of each thing.397 Unfortunately Aquinas 80 does not apply this understanding explicitly and thematically to his philosophical notion of person. So Norris Clarke combines Aquinas’ explicitly developed dynamic relational notion of being as active, with the notion of person, which is rooted by Aquinas in the act of existence. In so doing Norris Clarke brings out the intrinsically relational character of the person precisely as the highest mode of being.398 Following Norris Clarke then, God, as perfect personal being, must be intrinsically relational. Any notion of immutability must be able to accommodate this intrinsic relatedness. To be is to be substance in relation In his considerations, Norris Clarke acknowledges the role of Etienne Gilson in rediscovering the centrality and dynamism of the act of existence in contemporary Thomism. To be is to act.399 Gerald Phelan, following on from Gilson, also exhibits in his paper, “The Existentialism of St Thomas”, this sensitivity to the expansive character of being through action. Esse is dynamic, the act of being is the consubstantial urge of nature carrying each being, ens, forward from within the depths of its own reality to its full self-achievement.400 Aquinas speaks of an intrinsic dynamism in every being to be self-communicative. This is what Jacques Maritain, in his book, “Existence and the Existent”, has aptly called the basic generosity of existence.401 Existence itself, esse, becomes for Aquinas the ultimate root of all perfection with unity and goodness its transcendental properties or attributes, facets of the inexhaustible richness of being itself. Aquinas’ Supreme Being, the pure subsistent Act of Existence, can become identically Intelligence and Will, and the intrinsic self-diffusiveness of the Good, Love, self-communicative Love. Herein lies the ultimate reason why all beings, by the very fact that they are, possess this natural dynamism toward action and selfcommunication. They are all diverse modes of participation in the infinite goodness of the one Source, whose very being is identically self-communicative Love. Existence is power-full, energy-filled presence. The corollary is that relationality is a primordial dimension of every real being, inseparable from its substantiality, just as action is from existence. Action, passion, relations, are inseparably tied together even in Aristotelian categories. All action and passion necessarily generate relations. Relationality and substantiality go together as two distinct but inseparable modes of reality. Substance is seen here as the primary mode in that relations depend on it as their ground. Being as substance flows over into being as relational. To be is to be substance-in-relation. Within the divine being, substantiality and relationality are equally primordial and necessary dimensions of being itself at its highest intensity.402 The primordial existence of substantiality and relationality is taken up in debate between David Schindler and Norris Clarke. We address this a little later. First however, we observe how it is that this understanding has only been recovered in recent times. This dynamic polarity between substance and action-plus-relations has become submerged since Descartes in the post-medieval period. Three major distortions of the classical notion of substance broke the connection between the dynamic polarity. These distortions were: the Cartesian notion of the isolated, unrelated substance; the Lockean static substance, the inert substratum needed to support accidents but unknowable in itself; and the separable substance of Hume, which, if it existed, would have to be empirically observable as separated from all its accidents. These versions of substance from classical modern philosophy, tending to be the only ones available, have led 81 modern and contemporary thinkers such as Bergson, Collingwood, Whitehead, Dewey, Heidegger, phenomenologists in general and others, to reject substance as a viable mode of being. Viewed this way, person is in danger of being reduced to nothing but a relation or set of relations. This creates the difficulty then, that if the substance, or in-itself pole of being, is dropped, the person has no inner self to share403. Clearly this view would impact adversely on how one views God as person and hence God’s personal immutability. As Norris Clarke states there is no need for this either/or dichotomy between substance and relation, once the notion of substance as centre of activity and receptivity has been retrieved. To be is to be substance-in-relation. This opens the way to a more adequate understanding of God as personal being, source of activity and receptivity, and thereby contextualizes the notion of God’s immutability. To be fully is to be personally In fleshing out the notion of substance in relation, it should be acknowledged that for Aquinas, when being is allowed to be fully itself as active presence, it becomes selfpresence, self-awareness, self-consciousness, the primary attribute of person. To be fully is to be personally. A significant implication follows. Being is active presence. To be a person is to be a being that tends by nature to pour into active, conscious selfmanifestation and self-communication to others, through intellect and will, working together. To be a person is to be a bi-polar being that is both present in itself, actively possessing itself by its self-consciousness, this is its substantial pole and actively oriented towards others, toward active loving self-communication to others, this is its relational pole.404 Following this understanding then, God as perfect personal being must be substance-in-relation, must be both present in God’s self, actively possessing God’s self by God’s self-consciousness and actively oriented towards others, toward active loving self-communication to others. Anticipated objections We take a moment at this point, to observe how Norris Clarke sees fit to deal with an anticipated objection to his proposal.405 The objection would run thus: if being is intrinsically self-communicative and relational at all levels, including the divine, then it would follow that either God must necessarily, rather than freely, communicate God’s self in creation, which Aquinas as a Christian thinker does not subscribe to, for such a proposal would seem to deny the absolute freedom of God in creation; or 2] God’s own inner being must be intrinsically relational, thus affording a philosophical deduction of the doctrine of the Trinity of distinct Persons, whereas the doctrine is held by Christian tradition to be inaccessible to any arguments of natural or purely philosophical reason, being known only by divine revelation. In answer to the objection concerning freedom of creation, Norris Clarke believes that Aquinas has exercised over-caution, failing to follow through consistently on his own principles.406 In his philosophical expositions, Aquinas habitually puts forward the strong interpretation of the self-diffusiveness of being.407 Norris Clarke offers two ways Aquinas could have handled this objection.408 First, if, as Christian Revelation declares, 82 God carries out a self-communication within God’s own being among the three Persons, then further self-communication to finite beings can be purely gratuitous. Second, the creation of any particular finite world by an infinite cause must be free. There can be no necessary connection between a source of infinite power and any finite effect, only a contingent one. Norris Clarke takes a step further however, contending that the selfdiffusiveness of the divine goodness does necessarily have to manifest itself in some finite universe, albeit with qualifications. Given an infinitely good and loving personal being, one can say it is inevitable, as opposed to necessary, that it will pour over in some way to share its goodness outside itself. This inevitability is the very logic, the special logic, of a loving nature. In the case of God, as Hegel and others have said, in a certain sense freedom and necessity come together in a transcendent synthesis, proper only to the nature of love. In answer to the objection concerning deduction of the Trinity occurring from natural reason, a deduction of the need for some kind of interpersonal relationship on the divine level, Norris Clarke does not think we are forced into an either/or confrontation between faith and reason. In the twelfth century Richard of St Victor proposed a kind of deduction of a suasive argument from natural reason showing why, if God is personal at all, God must have some other person to relate to in love.409 Richard tried also to show that the plurality had to be precisely three. Norris Clarke contends that this latter point remains open, and as such, deduction from reason as to the precise Triune God has not occurred.410 We can say further, that any natural reasoning regarding relatedness being a necessary implication of what it means to say that God is personal, in no way anticipates the precise revelation of the nature of the Trinity. Norris Clarke at the cutting Edge Substance as centre of activity and receptivity. Norris Clarke seeks to develop further this notion of bi-polar being in an effort to find the best way to understand being as substance-in-relation. Specifically, there is an effort to do justice to the notion of substance as centre of activity and receptivity. In so doing we can better understand God’s relatedness to humankind and hence the nature of God’s immutability. Receptivity as perfection To complete his creative retrieval of Aquinas’ metaphysics Norris Clarke turns to the Swiss theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar411, whom he finds profound and daringly speculative in his deliberation of receptivity as a perfection of being and person. Receptivity has been regarded too long in Classical theology as passivity, associated with the inferior status of potentiality, and completed by actuality as the perfecting principle. John Cobb, following on from Charles Hartshorne, seeks objection to this longstanding notion. The counter proposal is that welcoming, active receptivity is a mode of actuality and perfection, not of potentiality and imperfection, as seen clearly in the intra-Trinitarian life of God, an eternal, ever-actualized process. 83 With regard to this, Norris Clarke notes412 von Balthasar’s creative rethinking on God’s immutability. In this von Balthasar not only allows in the Trinity an eternal dynamic process or event of interpersonal communication beyond time and change, but of which change and time in our world are an imperfect image, but he calls also for an adequate notion of the perfection of love wherein receptivity is the necessary complement of active self-communication, a complementarity belonging to the perfection of the love relationship. von Balthasar shows that in God there is an active receptivity which is the original image of passive potency in the created realm. He believes this can be understood as perfection when it is allowed that the omnipotence of God is primarily the absolute power of love, involving the giving and receiving of trinitarian exchange and mutuality in which we participate.413 Norris Clarke’s exploration of the place of receptivity in being as substance-in-relation is furthered too, by the thought of philosopher David Schindler. In a paper, “Norris Clarke on Person, Being, and St Thomas”, Schindler comments on Norris Clarke’s book, “Person and Being”414, an expansion of the latter’s article, “Person, Being and St Thomas”. The comment engenders in turn, a response from Norris Clarke.415 Primordial substantiality and relationality Schindler endeavours to gently push Norris Clarke further down his chosen path, by first questioning Norris Clarke’s way of distinguishing between esse as the source of a being’s presence to itself ,and agere as the source of a being’s opening to the other. Schindler asks how, in this scenario, can relationality be equally primordial as a dimension of being, to substantiality. In response, Norris Clarke416 points out a fundamental misunderstanding of his position with respect to the relationality dimension of any real being.417 He states that the relationality dimension, with its dynamic tendency towards self-communicative action, is rooted in the very substantial act of esse itself; expansive by its very nature as act of existence. Hence he affirms that relationality is equally primordial with substantiality and that it is also necessary for this dynamic tendency to find expression in some actual relation. Being and self-expression in action are so intimately intertwined that the intelligibility of each is incomplete without the other. In this sense the two orders are equally primordial. Substance is first in the order of origin, action is first in the order of self-fulfilment. Relationality as Communicative and Receptive Schindler pushes Norris Clarke still further in commenting secondly, on the latter’s statements that initial relationality of the human person is primarily receptive, with the active, freely initiated, response side then emerging418. Schindler questions whether this discloses ambiguity in Norris Clarke’s affirmation, made elsewhere419, of receptivity being a positive perfection of being.420 Schindler himself turns to the thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar, whose notion of receptivity as a perfection lies in the Trinitarian understanding of God, with humankind’s being-from imaging Christ’s own being-from the First Person. As already noted, von Balthasar is a theologian from whom Norris Clarke himself draws421. Schindler gives consideration as to how von Balthasar’s notion of perfection translates in metaphysical terms. What does von Balthasar’s sense of perfection entail with respect to Norris Clarke’s metaphysics of relation and 84 receptivity?422 If humans image God in God’s trinitarian meaning as revealed in Jesus Christ, then, Schindler maintains, this seems to indicate in metaphysical terms, that both a relation begins in the constitution of the being of the human person, and the relation is primarily receptive in nature. This requires that relation be inscribed in esse and that receptivity signifies the first meaning of relation in the human person. Schindler thus proposes that receptivity be rooted in esse, ontologically prior to communicativity, this being so in the human person. Being-receptive, esse-ab, is the anterior for first possessing being, esse-in; and for being-for-others, esse-ad. Norris Clarke responds positively to this challenge by Schindler to be pushed further down his relationality path, in opening up to an understanding of a deeper level of primordial relationality linked to receptivity, as it belongs to created esse. In terms of the absolute order of things Norris Clarke does agree with Schindler that first comes active self-communication with relations flowing from it and then comes receptivity with corresponding relations. The very meaning of receptivity as gift implies a relation to an active giver as primary in the order of origin. In the Trinity the First Person, the Unoriginated One, must be first in the ultimate order of being itself, from whom the Second Person eternally originates. In the order of the human person the situation reverses. The absolutely primary status of our being, of our substantial esse, is receptivity. It is a gift received from God, our Creator, generating in us an absolutely primordial relation of receptivity and dependence. Thus, first comes receptivity with the primordial relation flowing therefrom, then comes our taking possession of this gift, then our out-pouring of active self-communication of the gift. Norris Clarke concedes thus, that rather than the dyadic structure of being that he formerly proposed, which is being in itself and being turned toward the other, it is more accurate to propose a triadic structure of: being from another, being in oneself, being turned toward the other.423 In this Norris Clarke, with Schindler, is proceeding further into the theological dimension opened by Christian revelation, in suggesting that the very receptivity of our being from God is a positive image of the status of the second Person within the Divine Being itself. The Second Person’s distinctive personality is Subsistent Receptivity and Gratitude, a purely positive perfection of being itself.424 Being then is primordially substantial and relational, the latter involving both communicativity and receptivity. In God, all subsist as positive perfection of being. God’s relation to humankind is rooted in this perfection of being. God’s immutability is the expression of this perfection 85 CONCLUSION We can affirm God’s immutability and hence the nature of God’s relationship to humankind, as able to be interpreted and understood in the following terms: God is Unchanging Love, Perfection of Personal Being, Substance in Relation, Pure Act of Existing in Existential Relation, Active Self-Communication and Receptivity Unchanging in Intrinsic, Abiding, Perfection of Nature. Thus is accommodated on the one hand, personal religious experience supported by Scriptural witness, of God’s loving relationship with humankind, a relationship both communicative and receptive, and on the other hand, the affirmation by the tradition of the unchangeableness of God. We conclude with the affirmation of William Norris Clarke that it should be unambiguously stated that God is truly, really, personally related to the world by relations of knowledge and mutual love and affected in consciousness, but not in abiding intrinsic perfection of nature, by what happens in the world. 86 ENDNOTES 1 Christopher Rowland, "Change and the God of the Bible", New Blackfriars, 68, no. 805, May 1987. 2 Metzger B. [Ed.], The New Oxford Annotated Bible. Oxford, New York, 1989; O.T, footnote,72. 3 This is held by H. Gunkel, L. Schmidt, and others. See Claus Westerman, Genesis 12-36: a Commentary, Tr. John J. Scullion, Augsburg, Minneapolis, 1981; 286. 4 Rowland, "Change and the God of the Bible", 213-4. 5 Westerman, Genesis 12-36, 286-7. 6 Brian Davies, "God, Time and Change", New Blackfriars, 68, no. 805, May 1987, 7. 7 Leslie C. Allen, Word Biblical Commentary: Psalms 101-150, 21, Word, Waco, Texas, 1983; 115. 8 Marvine E. Tate, Word Biblical Commentary: Psalms 51-100, 20, Word, Dallas, Texas, 1990, 429,430. 9 Peter C. Craigie, Word Biblical Commentary: Psalms 1-50, Word, Waco, Texas, 1983, 40. 10 Gerald F. Hawthorne,”, Word Biblical Commentary: Philippians, 43, Waco, Texas, 1993, 95. 11 Rowland, “Change and the God of the Bible”, 216. 12 See Gen. 6:6, Ps. 78:41; Isa 63:10; Hos. 11:8f; Jer. 31:20; Mk 3:5, 6:34; Lk 19:41. 13 Metzger B. [Ed] New Oxford, footnote, 1159O. 14 Peter T. O’Brien, New International Greek Testament Commentary: Commentary on Philippians, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1991, 216. 15 Luke T. Johnson, Sacra Pagina: The Gospel of Luke, 3, Liturgical, Collegeville, Minnesota, 1991, 179. 16 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Anchor Bible: The Gospel according to Luke x-xxiv, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1985, 910. 17 Johnson, Gospel of Luke, 273. 18 Fitzmyer, Gospel according to Luke, 1177. 19 W.D. Davies, D C. Allison, The International Critical commentary The Gospel according to Saint Matthew, 1, T.& T. Clarke, Edinburgh, 1988, 679. 20 Donald A. Hagner, Word Biblical Commentary, Matthew 1-13, 33A, Word, Dallas, Texas, 1993, 173, 175. 21 William L. Lane, Word Biblical Commentary: Hebrews 9-13, 47B, Word, Dallas, Texas, 528,529. 22 J.P.M. Sweet, Revelation, Westminster, Philadelphia, 1979, 60-61. 23 All Church Document references and commentary sources: J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, The Christian Faith, Harper, Collins, 1990. 24 Neuner & Dupuis, Christian Faith, 165 25 Ibid, 177-78. 26 Neuner & Dupuis, Christian Faith, 14. 27 Ibid, 17-18. 28 Ibid, 117-19. 29 Ibid, 133. 30 Ibid, 119-20. 31 W. Maas, Die Undveranderlichkeit Gottes. Zum Verhaltnis von griechisch-philosphischer und christlicher Gotteslehre, Paderborner theologische Studien 1, Munster, Paderborn, Vienna, 1974, 87 quoted in Gerard O’Hanlon, The Immutability of God in the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 178, note 3. 32 “International Theological Commission: Theology, Christology, Anthropology”, International Theological Quarterly, 49, 1982, 285. 33 W. Maas, Die Undveranderlichkeit Gottes, 125ff, in Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, Tr Matthew J. O’Connell, SCM, London, 1984, 358, note 108. 34 35 Kasper, Ibid, 190, and 358, note 109. Ignatius of Antioch, Ad Polycarpum 3, 2, Patres Apostolici, Ed. Funk-Diekamp, 2, 188 ff, in Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 358. 36 See Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1V, 20, 4, Sources chretiennes [SC]100/2, Paris 1941 ff, 634-7; Melito of Sardis, In Pascha 3, SC 123, 60-2, Tertullian, De carne Christi, 5, 4 , Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina [CCL]2, Turnholt, 1953ff, 881; Tertullian Adv. Marcionem II, 16,3, CCL, 493; ibid, II, 27, 7, CCL 1, 507, in Kasper, Ibid. 37 See Augustine, De civitate Dei, V111, 17, CCL 47, 234f, in Kasper, Ibid. 38 Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 191. 39 Origen, De principiis 11, 4, 4, SC 252, 288f; Homiliae in Ezechielem 6, 6, Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, [GCS], Leipzig, 1897ff, Orig. 8, 383 ff, in Kasper, Ibid, 358. 40 The following is based in part on Santiago Sia, “The Doctrine of God's Immutability: Introducing the modern debate”, God and Change, New Blackfriars, 27.7.87. 41 O’Hanlon, Immutability of God in theology of Balthasar, 134-35. 42 Ibid, 1-2. 43 Ibid, 2. 44 For some works pertaining to most names mentioned see Sia "Doctrine of God's Immutability". 45 William Norris Clarke "Person, Being and St Thomas", Communio, 19, Spring, 1992; Person and Being, Marquette, 1993; David L. Schindler "Norris Clarke on Person, Being, and St Thomas", Communio, 20, 3, Fall, 1993. 46 Michael Vertin, “Is God in Process?”, Religion and Culture Essays in Honour of Bernard Lonergan, Ed. Timothy P. Fallon and Phillip B. Riley, State University of New York Press, Albany 1987. 47 International Theological Commission, “Theology, Christology, Anthropology”, Irish Theological Quarterly, 49, 299. 48 Works of Philo Judaeus, Tr. C.D. Younge; George Bell & Sons, 1890. 49 Santiago Sia, "The Doctrine of God's Immutability", New Blackfriars, 68, no. 805, May 1987, 221. 50 St. Augustine, Confessions, Tr. E.B. Pusey; E.P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1907, 261. 51 Sia, "Doctrine of God's Immutability", 222. 52 Ibid, 222,223. 53 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, Tr. M. Friedlander, Trubner & Co., 1907, 261. 54 Sia, "Doctrine of God's Immutability", 223. 88 55 The following is drawn from Michael J. Dodds, The Unchanging God of Love, Editions Universitaires , Fribourg, Switzerland, 1986, II B. All references for Aquinas are as quoted in Dodds. See abbreviations page for interpretation and full reference title, including in first instance. 56 Principium biblicum 1, Mandonnet, 483; ITOO: line 77c. 57 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 158. 58 Reference to Malachi 3:6 is made in the following works: Sent. I, 8, 3, 1, sc.1; SCG I, c.14, nr.4 [119]; III, c.96, nr.13 [270]; ST I, 9, 1, sc; ST III, Q.16, a.6, obj. 2; Q.57, 1, ad.1; Epis. ad bernardum, [line 93]; Principium biblicum I, [Mandonnet, p.483; ITOO: line 77c.]; In de div. nom IX, lect.1 [800], Super ad rom. I, lect.2 [37]; lect.7 [129]; Super ev. joh. I, lect. 7 [166]; Super ad hebr. I, lect.5 [77]. 59 Reference is made to Num. 23: 19 in the following works: SCG I, c.14, nr.4 [119]; III, c.96, nr.13 [2720]; c.98, nr.5 [2745]; ST I, 19, 7, sc; Comp. II, c.2; Principium biblicum I, [Mandonnet, p.483; ITOO: line 77c.]; Super iob II, vs.3, line 54c; Super is. I, vs.20 [line 688c.]; VIII, vs.11 [line 346c]; XXXI, vs.2, [line 16c]; In jer. [ITOO]: XVIII, lect.2, line 3c; Super ev. joh. VII, lect.2 [1025]; VIII, lect.1 [1134]. 60 Reference is made to Ps.101:28 in the following works: Sent. I, 8, 3, 2, sc.1; SCG I, c.15, nr.7 [126]; De pot. Q.3, 17, obj.6; In de div. nom 22. IX, lect.1 [800]; lect.2 [815]; X, lect.3 [874]; Super is. LX, vs.20 [line 202c.]; Super ev. joh. XX, lect.1 [2483]; Super ad hebr. XIII, lect.1 [739]. This same verse as referred to in Heb.1:11-12, is cited by St Thomas in In de div. nom. II, lect. I, [119], and Super ad hebr. I, lect.5 [77]. 61 Reference is made to Jas.1:17 in the following works: Sent. I, 3, 2, 1, obj.2; d.4, 1,1, obj.1; d.8, 3, 1, sc.1; II, 3, 3, 4, obj.1; d.15, 3, 2, obj.1; SCG I, c.14, nr.4 [119]; c.55, nr.10 [464]; ST I, 14, 15, sc; III, 61, 4, obj.3; De ver. Q.2, 13, sc.1; Super decretalem I, line 211; Super ad hebr 22. I, lect.5 [73 and 77]. 62 See In psalmos XLIII, nr.2 63 See Super ev. joh., prologus [4] 64 In de div. nom. IX, lect.1 [800]; lect.4 [837]; cf: Super ev. Joh., prologus [4], Super is. [Leonine] I, vs.20, line 688 c.; Super ev. matt. IV, lect.2 [364]; Super ad hebr. I, lect.2, [42]; ST I, 3, 1, ad.4. 65 ST I, 9, 1, obj.3; Q.19, 7, obj.2; SCG I, c.91, nr.16 [766]; III, c.96, nr.11 [2718]; nr.15 [2722]; IV, c.23, nr.7 [3597]; nr.9 [3599]; In psalmos XXVI, nr.9 66 ST I, 9, 1, obj.2; Sent. I, 8, 3, 1, obj.1; Super de trin. Q.5, 4, obj.2; In de div. nom. IX, lect. 1 [800]; In psalmos XVII, nr.8. 67 ST I, 9, 1, ad.2 and ad.3; cf. SCG III, c.96, nr.11-13 [2718-2720]. 68 ST II-II, 11, 2, ad.3; Super ev. matt. IV, 2 [349]; Quodl. IX, a.1 [16]. 69 For Jerome see Epist. XV, 4 [PL 22, 357], in text of Peter Lombard and referred to in Sent. I, 8, 1, 1, co. For Gregory see Moral XVI, 10 [PL 75, 1127], cited in ST I, 19, 7, ad.2. For John of Damascus see De fide orth. I, 3 [PG 94, 795], cited in Sent. I, 5, 2, 2, sc.2; d.8, 3, 2, sc.2; II, 23, 1, 1, obj.3 De fide orth. II, 3, [PG 94, 868], cited in ST I, 9, 2, co. 70 De ver. Q.14, 10, ad,11. 71 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 167. 89 72 Dionysius, Cael. Hier. I, 1 [PG 3, 120]; De div. nom. V, 9- 10; IX, I, 3, 8-10 [PG 3: 325, 909, 912, 916917]. In de div. nom. IX, lect.4 [840]; Sent. I, 8, 3, 1, ad.1; ST I, 9, 1, ad.2; Super de trin. Q.5, 4, ad.2. 73 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 168. 74 Dionysius, De div. nom IX, 9 [PG 916]. In de div. nom. IX, lect.4 [842]. 75 Etienne Gilson The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, Tr. L. Shook, New York, Random House, 1956, 136; Being and some Philosophers, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952, 39-40. 76 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 170. 77 References to Augustine establishing the immutability of God include the following: Contra Max. Haeret. II, 12 [PL 42, 768], cited in Sent I, d.8 [text of P. Lombard]; I, 8, 2, 1, ad.2; ST I, 50, 5, ad.1. De Civ. Dei VIII, 6 [PL 41: 231], cited in Sent. I, d.3 [text of P. Lombard]; I, 3, 1, 1, div. text. Ibid. XII, 15 [PL 41, 364], cited in De aeter. mundi, line 282 [Leonine]. De Gen. Ad Lit. VIII, 14 [PL 34, 384],cited in ST III, 57, 1, ad.1. Ibid. VIII, 23 [PL 34, 389], cited in De aeter. mundi, line 293 [Leonine]. De Natura Boni cap.1 [PL 42, 551], cited in Sent. I, 19, 5, 3, sc.1; ST I, 9, 2, sc.; III, 57, 1, ad.1; Super de trin. Q.5, 2, obj.7. De Trin. I, 1 [PL 42, 821], cited in Sent. I, d.8 [text of P. V, 2 [PL 42, 912], cited in Sent I, d.8 [text of P. Lombard]. 78 St Augustine, Sermo. VII, 7 [PL 38, 66]. Tr. E. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 134. 79 ST I, 13, 11, co. cf: I, 3, 4; Super ev. joh. VIII, lect.3 [1179]. 80 E. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 93. 81 see Walter Stokes, "Whitehead's challenge to Theistic Realism", New Scholasticism 38, 1964, 7. 82 Marie D. Chenu, Towards Understanding St Thomas. Tr. A. Landry and D. Hughes. Chicago, Regnery, 1964, 321. Also Etienne Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy, New York, Mentor, 1963, 58. 83 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 174-5, 181. ST I, 9, 1. 84 L.B. Geiger "Saint Thomas et la metaphysique d'Aristote," in Aristotle et saint Thomas d'Aquin. P. Moraux, et. al. Louvain: Universite de Louvain, 1957, 175-220; in Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 182. 85 Gerald B. Phelan, Selected Papers, 77, in Armand Maurer, "Introduction", in St Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1968, 19. 86 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 186. 87 ST I, 13, 11, co. 88 This overview follows Michael Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, Ch. 2. 89 Super iob. IV, vs.18, lines 420-430. 90 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 110-11, 112-13. 91 Super ad hebr. I, lect.5, [72-73, 77]. 92 Super I ad tim. VI, lect. 3, [268]. 93 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 114-115. 94 Super ev. joh. Prologus S. Thomae [4] 95 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 117, 118-19. 96 In psalmos. XLIII, nr.2. 90 97 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 119, 120. 98 In phys. VII, lect.2, nr.1 [891]; VIII, lect.9, nr.12, [1049], lect.11, nr.7, [1068], lect.12, nr.8, [1076], lect.23, nr.3, [1166]. 99 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 89-90,91-2. 100 Ibid, 97,98,99-100,101-2. 101 In meta. XII, lect.2, [2424, 2426], lect. 6, [2517]. 102 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 104,106-7,108. 103 In de caelo. I, lect.21, nr. 7-8, 12-13. 104 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 110. 105 Sent. I, 3, 1, a.1 106 Dionysius, De div. nom. VII, 3 [PG 3, 870]. In de div. nom. V11, lect. 4; Sent. I,3,1,1, div. text. 107 Aquinas indicates that these three ways are grounded in humankind having its being from another. The way of causality indicates the Being which is the source of humankind, but the imperfection characteristic of humankind must be removed, the way of remotion, when speaking of this Being, and the perfections found in humankind may be predicated, the way of eminence, in a surpassing way of this Being. Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 68. 108 Augustine, De civ. Dei VIII, 6 [PL 41, 231]. Dodds, Ibid, 68, and 353. 109 Sent. I, 8, 3, 1. 110 St Hilary, De trin. VII, 11 [PL 33, 208].Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 69, 353. 111 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 69,70,71. 112 Ibid, 71, 72, 74. 113 Super decretalem. I, lines 178-187, 208-212. 114 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 79,80. 115 In de div. nom. IX, lect.2 [813,815,817-9, 823-4, 827]. and lect.4. 116 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 82-85. 117 In de div. nom. IX, lect.4 [835, 837-41] 118 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 86-9. 119 SCG I,c.13,nr.3,10,20-21,28,32,[83,90,100-101,108,112]. c.14,nr.4,[119] 120 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 126-27. 121 ST I, 2, 3, co. 122 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 138, 139, 140. 123 ST I, 9, 1. 124 Michael J. Dodds, "St Thomas Aquinas and the Motion of the Motionless God", New Blackfriars, 68, no. 805, May, 1987, 236. 125 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, Tr. Bede Rose, Herder, London, 1954, 268. 126 Sia, "Doctrine of God's Immutability", 224. 127 ST I, 3, 1, co. 128 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 146-7. 129 Ibid, 147. ST I, 3, 7. 91 130 Dodds, "St Thomas Aquinas", 237. 131 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 147-8. 132 Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, 271. 133 See ST I, 27, 1-4; 42,5. 134 See ST I, 27, 4, co. 135 Dodds, "St Thomas Aquinas", 239. 136 Dodds, Unchanging God Love, 151. 137 Dodds, "St Thomas Aquinas", 240. 138 Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 152-3. 139 ST, 26,1. 140 Sia, "Doctrine of God's Immutability", 224. 141 SCG II, c.9, nr. 4. 142 ST I, 19, 4, ad.1,2. 143 Super de causis Prop. 6 [Saffrey, 47, lines 8-12]. Tr. A. Pegis, "Penitus manet ignotum," Med. Std 27 [1965], 224. 144 De pot. Q.7, 10, co. cf. Sent. I, 30, 1, 3, ad.3. 145 ST I, 45, 3, co. 146 ST I, 45, 3, ad.1 cf. De pot. Q.3, 3, co.; ad.2; Q.7, 9; Sent. I, 30, 1, 3, co. 147 William Hill, Knowing the Unknown God, New York Philosophical Library, 1971, 177-78. 148 De pot. Q.3, 5, co. cf. SCG II. c.15; c.21; ST I, 45, 5. 149 De pot. Q.7, 8, co. cf. SCG I, c.11-12; De ver. Q.4, 5, co. 150 In de div. nom. V, lect.3 [672]; ST I, 20, 2, ad.1 where Aquinas is quoting Dionysius, De div. nom. IV, 13, [PG 3, 712]. 151 Sia, "Doctrine of God's Immutability", 224-5. 152 John Chryssavgis, "Essence and Energies", Human Beings and Nature, Sydney College of Divinity Philosophical Association, Dec. 1992, 28. 153 John Meyendorff, "Introduction", in John Meyendorff [Ed], Gregory Palamas: The Triads, [from now on referred to as The Triads], Tr. Nicholas Gendle, SPCK, London, 1983, 20. In this Palamas references [The Triads] are sourced from Palamas’ Triads in Defence of the Holy Hesychasts, and Meyendorff’s critical edition Gregoire Palamas, Defense des saints hesychasts, 2nd ed., Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, etudes et documents, fascicules 30, 31, Louvain 1973. Palamas references here follow Meyendorff, The Triads, until otherwise stated. 154 David Coffey, "The Palamite Doctrine of God: a New Perspective", St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly, 32, No. 4, 1988. 155 Palamas, The Triads, III, 2, 5, in The Triads, 93. 156 Meyendorff, "Introduction" 21, and Palamas, The Triads III, ii, 12, and Meyendorff [Ed.], note 37, 149, in The Triads. 157 Meyendorff, "Introduction", in The Triads, 21. 92 158 The following section is drawn mainly from John. Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas, [from now on referred to as Study of Palamas], Tr. G. Lawrence, The Faith Press, London, 1964, Part 2 chapter 5. In this Palamas references [The Triads] are sourced from Migne, Patrologia graeca, Vols. CL and CLI and Meyendorff’s, Gregoir Palamas- Les Triades pour la defense des saints hesychastes, Louvain, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, vol 29-30, Louvain, 1959. All Palamas references follow Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, from now on, until further stated 159 V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, Trs. Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, Clarke, London, 1957, 28-9. 160 Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 203-4. 161 Catherine La Cugna, God for Us, Harper, San Francisco, 1973, 184 162 Palamas, Triads, I, 3, 17, in Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 207. 163 Palamas, Apology, Coisl. 99, fol. 2, in Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 209. 164 Palamas, Triads, I, 3, 23; II, 3, 8; Palamas, Theophanes, 937 A, in Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 210. 165 Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 213. 166 Chryssavgis "Essence and Energies", 31,33. 167 Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 213. 168 La Cugna, God for Us, 183, 184. 169 Palamas Triads, II, 2, 7; cf. Triads III, 3, 6, in Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 214. 170 Palamas, On Participation to God, Coisl. 99, fol. 22; cf. Palamas, Letter to Damian, Coisl. 98, fol. 202. in Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 214. 171 Palamas, Against Akindynos, V, 13, Coisl. 98, fol. 254 in Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 215. 172 Palamas, Apology, Coisl. 99, fol. 6v, 8, in Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 215. 173 Palamas, On union and distinction, Coisl. 98, fol. 24v, in Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 226. 174 Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 215, 216, 217, 218. 175 Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 220. 176 Chryssavgis, “Essence and Energies”, 31. 177 Coffey, “The Palamite Doctrine of God”, 357. 178 Rowan D. Williams, “The Philosophical Structures of Palamism”, Eastern Churches Review, 9, no.1-2, 1977. Palamas references from now on as quoted in Williams. 179 See Eric L. Mascall, The Openness of Being: a natural theology today, Darton, Longman, & Todd, London, 1971, appendix iii, 217-50; Illtyd Trethowan, “Lossky on Mystical Theology”, The Downside Review, 309, Oct 1974, 239-47. 180 Williams, “Philosophical Structures”, 29 ff. 181 Ibid, 32. 182 Palamas, Cap, 135, [1216B], in Williams, “Philosophical Structures”, 29,32. 183 Gertrude E.M. Anscombe and Peter Geach, Three Philosophers, B. Blackwell, Oxford, 1961, 34-35. 184 Meyendorff, Study of Palamas, 218 ff. 185 L.H. Grondijs, “The Patristic Origins of Gregory Palamas’ Doctrine of God”, Studia Patristica V, part iii, 323-28. 93 186 Williams, “Philosophical Structures”, 34. 187 Palamas, Cap 136,[1216D], in Williams, “Philosophical Structures”, note 45, 34. 188 Palamas, Cap, 109 [1196A], in Williams, “Philosophical Structures”, 34. 189 Williams, “Philosophical Structures”, 35. 190 Williams, “Philosophical Structures”, 38. 191 Ibid, 40-41. 192 Ibid, 41-42. 193 Noel D. O’Donoghue, “Creation and Participation”, Creation, Christ, and Culture, Ed. R.W.A. McKinney, Edinburgh, 1976, 135-48, suggests a way forward here. 194 Polycarp Sherwood, “Debate on Palamism: Reflections on reading Lossky’s The vision Of God”, St Vladimir’s Seminary Quarterly, 10, no 4, 1966, 196-97, argues that the ousia-energeia distinction in the Cappadocians can be said to have some ontological or metaphysical content. 195 196 Williams, “Philosophical Structures”, 44. Others who have dealt critically with God's immutability as traditionally formulated are: Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, W. Pannenberg, J. Macquarrie, Karl Rahner and Jean Galot. 197 John O'Donnell, "God's Historicity: Trinitarian Perspectives", Word & Spirit 8: Process Theology and the Christian Doctrine of God, 1986, 65. 198 David A. Pailin, God and the Processes of Reality, Routledge, London & New York, 1989, 28. 199 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Macmillan, New York, 1933; rev. ed., 1967; Free Press, 1969, 521. 200 Norman Pittenger, Catholic Faith in a Process Perspective, Orbis, New York, 1981, 26-7. 201 John Cobb & David Griffin, Process Theology, Westminster, Philadelphia, 1976, 14. 202 John O'Donnell, "God's Historicity", 65. 203 Ibid, 59. 204 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, Macmillan, 1933, 357. 205 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, Macmillan, 1938, 53. 206 Cobb, Process, 62. 207 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making, Macmillan, London, 1926, 148-9, 151, 152. 208 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Macmillan, London, 1929, 524, 532. 209 Cobb, Process, 62. 210 Pittenger, Catholic Faith, 27. 211 Whitehead, Process, 1929, 524, 530. 212 Cobb, Process, 48. 213 Ibid, 47. 214 Santiago Sia, "The Doctrine of God's Immutability", New Blackfriars, 68, no. 805, May 1987, 226, 227. 215 Sia, "Doctrine of God's Immutability", 228. 216 Based on David A. Pailin, "The Utterly Absolute and the Totally Related", New Blackfriars, 68, no. 805, May 1987, 244. 94 217 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Ed. D. Griffin & D. Sherburne, Free Press, New York, 1978, 343. 218 Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, SCM, London, 1970, 24. 219 Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-1970, Lincoln & London, University of Nebraska, 1972, 162. 220 Pailin, "Utterly Absolute", 246. 221 Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and other essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1962, 38. 222 Charles Hartshorne & William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1953, 16. 223 Pailin, "Utterly Absolute", 248, 249. 224 Pailin, Processes of Reality, 101. 225 The following discussion on unchangeability is drawn from Pailin, Processes of Reality, 102-4. 226 The following discussion on pure actuality is drawn from Ibid, 104-6. 227 Sia, "Doctrine of God's Immutability", 229. 228 Charles Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery: A Re-examination of the Ontological Proof for God's Existence, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1965, xf, 38f. 229 Pailin, "Utterly Absolute", 250-251. 230 Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism, Archon, Connecticut, 1964, 251 ff. 231 Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis, 227 ff. 232 Pailin, "Utterly Absolute", 252,253. 233 Ibid,253. 234 Michael Vertin, “Is God in Process?”, Religion and Culture Essays in Honour of Bernard Lonergan, Eds. Timothy P. Fallon and Phillip B. Riley, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1987, 45. 235 Ibid 45-58. 236 Cobb, Process, 52-3 237 Ibid, 61-2. 238 This feminist section is drawn from Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is, Crossroad, New York, 1992. This definition from p 13. 239 ST, I, 3;4. 240 Johnson, She, 236 241 Ibid, 237. 242 Catherine LaCugna, "The Relational God: Aquinas and Beyond", Theological Studies, 46, 1985. 243 Linell Cady, "Relational Love: A Feminist Christian Vision", Embodied Love: Sensuality and Relationship as Feminist Values, Eds. Paula M. Cooey, Sharon A. Farmer, Mary E. Ross, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1987, 135-49. 244 Scriptural references to female Wisdom are: Prov 1; 3; 4; 8; 9; Sir 24; 51; Wis 7; 8; 9; 10; Bar 3; 41; 245 Johnson, She, 91. 95 246 James Dunn, "Was Christianity a Monotheistic Faith from the Beginning?", Scottish Journal of Theology, 35, no. 4, 1982, 319-20. 247 Johnson, She, 147. 248 Ibid, 247. For a thorough argument for this position see Richard Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 1986. 249 This section drawn from Johnson, She, 247, 251-252, 253, 224-6. 250 Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, Tr. Matthew J. O’Connell, SCM, London, 1984. 251 Ibid, 189. 252 Augustine, “Sermon”, 4,5, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Turnholt, 1953, 41, 21f, in Kasper, 358. 253 Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 189-90. 254 O’Donnell, “God’s Historicity”, 70, 71. 255 Jürgen Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom of God, SCM, London, 1981, 105. 256 Ibid, 107. 257 O’Donnell, “God’s Historicity”, 69-70. 258 Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 195. 259 Ibid 260 Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 196-97. 261 O’Donnell, “God’s Historicity”, 70. 262 Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 197. 263 Eberhard Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity God’s Being is in Becoming, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh and London, 1976. 264 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, T.& T. Clarke, Edinburgh, 1983. 265 Jüngel, God’s Being is in Becoming, 106. 266 Jüngel, God as Mystery, 369. 267 Jüngel, God’s Being is in Becoming, 101, note 152. 268 Barry L. Whitney, "Divine Immutability in Process Philosophy and contemporary Thomism", Horizons, 7, no. 1, Spring 1980, 49. 269 Bernard J. Lonergan, Philosophy of God, and Theology, St Michael's Lectures, Gonzaga University, Spokane, Darton, Longman, and Todd, London, 1973, 64-5. 270 Ibid, 65. 271 David B. Burrell, "Does Process Theology Rest on a Mistake", Theological Studies, 43, 1982, 125-134. 272 William Norris Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 1979. 273 William Hill, "Two Gods of Love: Aquinas and Whitehead", Listening 14, 1976, 249-64. 274 John H. Wright, "Method of Process Theology: An Evaluation," Communio, 6, 1979, 48. 275 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Humanities New York, 1929, 161. 276 Aquinas' language for introducing the God in whom Christians believe and for which he offers a theological elucidation. ST 1, .2, Intro. 277 Burrell, "Does Process theology", 131. 96 278 William Hill, "Does the World make a Difference to God?", The Thomist, 38, no.1, Jan, 1974, 149. 279 Hill, "Does the world", 150. 280 Greg Moses, "Thinking about God in Process Thought and Classical Theism", Unpublished article, 1993, 14. 281 James Felt, "Invitation to a Philosophic Revolution", New Scholasticism, 45, 1971, 96, 102, 104, 109. 282 Piet Schoonenberg, "Process or History in God?", Louvain Studies, 4, no.4, Fall, 1973, 303. 283 Ibid, 306-7, 14. 284 Wright, “Method of Process theology”, 1979. 285 Ibid, 51, 52. 286 Ibid, 52-3. 287 Ibid, 304-5. 288 Schoonenberg, "Process or History", 316, 317, 318. 289 Piet Schoonenberg, Man and Sin, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1965, 50. 290 J. Norman King and Barry. L. Whitney, "Rahner and Hartshorne on Divine Immutability", International Philosophical Quarterly, 22, No.3, Issue No. 87, Fordham University, New York, Sept. 1982, 199,200. 291 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, Seabury Press, New York, 1976, 212, 220-22. 292 Karl Rahner, Ibid, 219; "On the Theology of the Incarnation", Theological Investigations, IV, Seabury Press, New York, 1974, 111. 293 Ibid, Foundations, 219-20; “Incarnation”, 113. 294 Ibid, Foundations, 220-21; “Incarnation”, 113-14. 295 Ibid, Foundations, 221-22; “Incarnation”, 114-15. 296 King and Whitney, “Rahner and Hartshorne”, 208, 209. 297 Joseph Donceel, "Second Thoughts on the Nature of God", Thought, 46, no. 182, 347, 348. 298 Ibid, 360, 361. 299 Ibid, 363-4. 300 Ibid, 365. 301 Ibid. 302 Hans Kung, Menschwerd ung Gottes, [The Incarnation of God] Subtitled: Introduction to the theological thought of Hegel as Prolegomena to a future Christology, Herder, Freiburg, 1970, 551. 303 Anthony J. Kelly, "God: How near a Relation?" The Thomist, 34, no. 2, April, 1970,193, 198. 304 Ibid, 191, 192. 305 Schubert Ogden, The Reality of God and other essays, SCM, London, 1967. 306 especially Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1948; Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953. 307 Kelly, “God: How near a Relation”, 193. 308 Ogden, “Reality of God”, 58 ff, 48 ff. 309 Ibid, 57, 58, 59, 60. 97 310 Kelly, “God: How near a Relation”, 205. 311 Ibid, 205. 312 Ibid, 216-17. 313 Ibid, 218, 219, 220. 314 Whitney, “Divine Immutability”, 58. 315 ST I, 8, 1. 316 Kelly, “God: How near a Relation”, 223, 227. 317 Hill, "Does the world”,146. 318 Hill, “Does the world”, 151; William Hill, "Does God know the future", Theological Studies, 36, 1975,13; ST 1, 3, 4, ad 2m; cf. 1, 14,1 & 2. 319 Johannes B. Metz, "The Theological world and the Metaphysical World", Philosophy Today, 10, no.4, 1966, 259. 320 Hill, “Does the world”, 152, 163. 321 Hill, “Does God know the future”, 14-15. 322 Kelly, “Does the world”, 163. 323 Schubert Ogden, "The Temporality of God", The Reality of God, Harper and Row, New York, 1963, 144 - 163. 324 Heidegger, Being and Time, SCM, London, New York, 1962, 499, note 13. 325 William Hill, “Historicity of God”, Theological Studies, 45, no. 2, June, 1984, 321, 327. 326 ST. 1, 3, 3; 9; 10. 327 Hill, “Historicity of God”, 328-9. 328 ST 1, q.4, a.1, ad 3; De veritate, 2, 3 329 Hill, “Historicity of God”, 331-33. 330 Walter E. Stokes, "Is God Really Related to the world?", Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, 39, 1965. 331 J. Metz, Christliche Anthropozentrik, Munich, 1962, in Stokes, 147. 332 Stokes, “Is God really related?”, 147-8. 333 Ibid, 149, 150. 334 Ibid, 151, 152. 335 Martin D'Arcy, "The Immutability of God", Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 41, 1967, 19, 20, 21. 336 William Norris Clarke, “Theism and Process Thought”, New Catholic Encyclopedia 17, 646-647. 337 Ibid, 648. 338 Ibid 339 Ibid 648-9. 340 Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, ed.2 Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, Canada, 1952, 182-183. 341 Ibid, 183. 342 Ibid, 184. 98 343 Ibid, 184-185. 344 See SCG, I, 10; I, 13; II, 15. 345 See William Norris Clarke, “A New Look at the Immutability of God”, God Knowable and Unknowable, Ed. Robert J. Roth, Fordham University, 1973, and “Christian Theism and Whiteheadian Process Philosophy: Are they Compatible?”, The Philosophical Approach to God. A Neo-Thomistic Perspective. [Fordham University] Ed. W.E. Ray , Wake Forest University, North Carolina, 1979; see in particular note 1, 105, “The present lecture is a follow up to my previous essay and taking into account some recent developments in process philosophy”; and p89, “What I shall say is a follow-up of my previous paper , 1973, continued reflection and discussion with process thinkers have led me to a significant rethinking of some of my positions there and a notable emendation of one of them in particular- namely, the real relatedness of God to the world.” 346 Clarke, “A New Look”, 45. 347 Clarke, “Christian Theism”, 89. 348 Clarke, “A New Look”, 45-6. 349 Clarke, “Christian Theism”, 90; the following discourse of these two orders is Norris Clarke’s own summation of his previous article “A New Look at the Immutability of God”, 1973, as expounded in his follow-up article “Christian Theism and Whiteheadian Process Philosophy: Are They Compatible?”, 1979, 90. 350 Ibid, 90-104 351 Ibid, 91. 352 Ibid. 353 See Anthony Kelly, “God: How Near a Relation?”, Thomist, 34, no. 2, April, 1970, 191-229; William Hill, “Does the world make a difference to God?”, Thomist, 38, no. 1, Jan, 1974, 148-164, “Does God know the Future? Aquinas and some modern Theologians”, Theological Studies, 36, 1975, 3-18; and John Wright, “Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom: The God who Dialogues,” Theological Studies, 38, 1977, 450-477. 354 Lewis Ford, “The Immutable God and Fr. Clarke”, New Scholasticism, 49, 1975, 194. 355 Clarke, “Christian Theism”, note 41, 108. 356 Ibid, 92. 357 Ibid, 93. 358 Ibid, 97. 359 See Merold Westphal, “Temporality and Finitude in Hartshorne’s Theism”, Review of Metaphysics, 19, 1966, 550-64; and discussion on it in David Brown, Richard James, and Gene Reeves, Eds Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1971, 44-46. 360 Clarke, “Christian Theism”, 93-94. 361 See John Wright, “Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom”. 362 Clarke, “Christian Theism”, 95. 363 Heribert Mühlen, Die Veranderlichkeit Gottes als Horizont einer zukunftigen Christologie, Aschendorff, Munster, 1969 in Clarke, Ibid, 108.. 99 364 Clarke, “Christian Theism”, 97-98. 365 Ford, “Immutable God”, 193 ff. 366 Clarke, “Christian Theism”, 99-100. 367 Ibid, 100-102. 368 Ibid, 104. 369 Robert A. Connor, “Relational Esse and the Person”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly annual ACPA Proceedings, 65, 1991, 253-267. 370 Ibid, 253. 371 Ibid 372 Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, Herder & Herder, New York, 1970, 131-132. 373 Connor notes, “Relational Esse”, 264, note 4, that Gregory of Nyssa complained against Eunomius, the Arian, because “he suppresses the names of “Father, Son, and Holy Ghost”, and speaks of a “Supreme and Absolute Being” instead of the Father of ; and of “another existing through it, but after it”, instead of the Son; and of a “third ranking with neither of these two”, instead of the Holy Ghost”. He complains that this substitution robbed the revelation of the Trinity of its constitutive relational dimension. Gregory of Nyssa, “Against Eunomius”, Bk I, par.14, from A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ed. P. Schaff and H. Wace, Eerdmans, Michigan, 1892, 51-52, 132. 374 William J Hill, “The Historicity of God”, Theological Studies, 45, no.2, June 1984, 333. 375 Ibid, 331-32. 376 Walter Kasper, “Postmodern Dogmatics”, Communio, 17, Summer 1990, 189-90. 377 Connor, “Relational Esse”, 254. 378 Gerald B. Phelan, “Being, Order and Knowledge”, Selected Papers, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1967, 127. 379 Hill, “The Historicity of God”, 331. 380 Connor, “Relational Esse”, 255. 381 Ibid, 256. 382 Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1949, 184-186. 383 Connor, “Relational Esse”, 259. 384 Phelan, “Being, Order, and Knowledge”, 126. 385 Connor, “Relational Esse”, 260. 386 J. de Finance, Tr. R. Connor, Etre et Agir Dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas, Librarie Editrice de l’Universite Gregorienne, Roma, 1060, 248-249, in Connor, 266. 387 William Carlo, The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence in Existential Metaphysics, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966, 1003-1004. also, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophic Association, 1957, 127-128, in Connor, 266. 388 William Norris Clarke, “The Role of Essence within St Thomas’ Essence-Existence Doctrine: Positive or Negative Principle? A Dispute within Thomism” Atti del Congresso Internazionale, no. 6: “L’Essere”, in Connor, 266. 100 389 Ibid, 112. 390 Connor, “Relational Esse”, 260-261. 391 Ibid, 261. 392 Josef Pieper, Living the Truth, Ignatius, San Francisco, 1989, 81. 393 Connor, “Relational Esse”, 261. 394 Ibid, 263-264. 395 William. Norris Clarke, “Person, Being and St. Thomas”, Communio, 19, spring 1992 396 ST, 1, 29, 3 397 SCG, 111, ch. 113. 398 Clarke, “Person, Being”, 603. 399 Gilson, “Being”, 184. 400 Gerald B. Phelan, “The Existentialism of St Thomas”, Selected Papers, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1967, 77. 401 Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent, Doubleday, Garden City, 1957, 90. 402 Clarke, “Person, Being”, 606-7. 403 Ibid, 608. 404 Ibid, 609, 610. 405 Ibid, 614-617. 406 Ibid, 615. 407 See De Ver, 21, 1, 4. 408 Clarke, “Person, Being”, 615-617. 409 Ewert Cousins, “A Theology of Interpersonal Relations”, Thought, 45, 1970, 56-82. 410 Clarke, “Person, Being”, 617. 411 Gerard O’Hanlon, The Immutability of God in the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cambridge University, 1990. 412 Clarke, “Person, Being,”, 612, 613. 413 von Balthasar, Homo creatus, 138-40, in O’Hanlon, 124, note 41, 204. 414 William Norris Clarke, Person and Being, Marquette University Press, 1993. 415 David L. Schindler, “Norris Clarke on Person, Being and St Thomas”, Communio, 20, no.3, fall, 1993, 580-591. and William. Norris Clarke, “Response to David Schindler’s Comments”, Communio, 592-598. 416 Clarke “Response to”, 593-596. 417 Ibid, 593-595. 418 Clarke, Person and Being, 72,73. 419 Ibid, 82ff and “Person, Being, ”, 612 420 Schindler, “Norris Clarke “ 582. 421 Clarke, “Person, Being”, 86; Person and Being, 612. 422 Schindler, 583, 584. 423 Ibid, 593-594. 424 Ibid, 594. 101 BIBLIOGRAPHY Allen, Leslie C. Word Biblical Commentary: Psalms 101-150, 21, Word, Waco, Texas, 1983. Anscombe, Gertrude E.M. & Geach, Peter T. Three Philosophers, B. Blackwell, Oxford, 1961. Aquinas, Thomas, St. see list under abbreviations for Aquinas from Dodds, Michael J. The Unchanging God of Love, Editions Universitaires , Fribourg, Switzerland, 1986. Augustine, St. Confessions, tr. E.B. Pusey; E.P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1907. Brown, David., James, R., and Reeves,. G., eds., Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianopolis, 1971. Burrell, David B. 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