CROATIAN
JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
Symposium on Themes from Work of Ilhan Inan
Curiosity and Ignorance
ILHAN INAN
Inan on Objectual and Propositional Ignorance
ERHAN DEMİRCİOGLU
Comments on Inan’s Notions of Objectual
and Propositional Curiosity
MIRELA FUŠ
Curiosity about Curiosity
DANILO ŠUSTER
Stop and Smell the Roses: Inostensible Propositional
Knowledge and Raising the Standard of Knowing
SAFIYE YIĞIT
The Concept of Curiosity
in the Practice of Philosophy for Children
İREM GÜNHAN ALTIPARMAK
Semantics through Reference to the Unknown
ARAN ARSLAN
Epistemic Value-Curiosity, Knowledge and Response-Dependence
NENAD MIŠČEVIĆ
Afterthoughts on Critiques to The Philosophy of Curiosity
ILHAN INAN
Article
Apraxia, Appearances, and Beliefs: The Pyrrhonists’ Way Out
FILIP GRGIĆ
Book Reviews
Vol. XVI · No. 48 · 2016
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
1333-1108 (Print)
1847-6139 (Online)
Editor:
Nenad Miščević (University of Maribor)
Advisory Editor:
Dunja Jutronić (University of Maribor)
Managing Editor:
Tvrtko Jolić (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb)
Editorial board:
Stipe Kutleša (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb),
Davor Pećnjak (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb)
Joško Žanić (University of Zadar)
Advisory Board:
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Boran Berčić (Rijeka), István M. Bodnár (Budapest),
Vanda Božičević (New York), Sergio Cremaschi (Vercelli),
Michael Devitt (New York), Peter Gärdenfors (Lund),
János Kis (Budapest), Friderik Klampfer (Maribor),
Željko Loparić (Sao Paolo), Miomir Matulović (Rijeka),
Snježana Prijić-Samaržija (Rijeka), Igor Primorac (Melbourne), Howard Robinson (Budapest), Nenad Smokrović
(Rijeka), Danilo Šuster (Maribor)
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© Copyright by “Kruzak d.o.o.” 2002 unless otherwise stated
CROATIAN
JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. XVI · No. 48 · 2016
Symposium on Themes from
Work of Ilhan Inan
Curiosity and Ignorance
ILHAN INAN
285
Inan on Objectual and Propositional Ignorance
ERHAN DEMİRCİOGLU
305
Comments on Inan’s Notions of Objectual
and Propositional Curiosity
MIRELA FUŠ
313
Curiosity about Curiosity
DANILO ŠUSTER
327
Stop and Smell the Roses: Inostensible Propositional
Knowledge and Raising the Standard of Knowing
SAFIYE YIĞIT
341
The Concept of Curiosity
in the Practice of Philosophy for Children
İREM GÜNHAN ALTIPARMAK
361
Semantics through Reference to the Unknown
ARAN ARSLAN
381
Epistemic Value-Curiosity, Knowledge
and Response-Dependence
NENAD MIŠČEVIĆ
393
Afterthoughts on Critiques
to The Philosophy of Curiosity
ILHAN INAN
419
Article
Apraxia, Appearances, and Beliefs:
The Pyrrhonists’ Way Out
FILIP GRGIĆ
441
Book Reviews
Katherin A. Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation:
Anselmian Libertarianism
DAVOR PEĆNJAK
459
Andrea Borghini, A Critical Introduction
to the Metaphysics of Modality
ADAM TAMAS TUBOLY
463
Table of Contents of Vol. 16
467
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XVI, No. 48, 2016
Stop and Smell the Roses:
Inostensible Propositional Knowledge
and Raising the Standard of Knowing
SAFIYE YIĞIT
Department of Philosophy, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey
Ilhan Inan’s book The Philosophy of Curiosity is an exploration of understanding human curiosity and its relation to the use of language. He
introduces the notion of inostensible reference (or reference to the unknown) that renders an interesting question possible. He claims that our
aptitude for this kind of reference is what enables us to become aware
of our ignorance and be curious. For him, there are two ways in which
a proposition could be inostensible to a subject: one possibility is when
the whole sentence’s truth value is unknown to the subject, the other
possibility is when the subject knows the proposition to be true but does
not know the fact that makes the proposition true, which he later calls
inostensible knowledge. The former case requires an awareness of ignorance to generate curiosity, and the latter case requires an awareness
of inostensibility of one’s knowledge to be conducive to curiosity. In this
paper, what I would like to do is mainly to draw attention to the often
neglected awareness of inostensible knowledge and explore its relation to
curiosity. I also claim that, contrary to Inan’s idea that the only way of
having inostensible knowledge is when there is at least one inostensible
concept in the proposition, there is another possibility of inostensible
knowledge, which would correspond to a case in which all the terms are
ostensible to the speaker and the proposition is known to be true, but the
proposition as a whole is still inostensible. I would like to argue that
such an awareness of inostensibility of knowledge is a key step in evaluating one’s epistemic contact with reality and accordingly determining
the degree of one’s knowledge on the epistemic scale. I believe this awareness will implicitly raise the standard of knowledge and hopefully foster
curiosity, in its broader meaning of caring to know. I will further suggest
that the acquisition of ostensible knowledge, which is a form of objectual
knowledge of a fact, could also enable the corresponding proposition to
be known better by the subject. This claim of mine might be thought of
as an attempt to argue for the gradability of propositional knowledge,
which has been a controversial issue in epistemology.
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S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
Keywords: Curiosity, inostensible knowledge, gradability of knowl-
edge
Introduction
It is no surprise to hear that curiosity propels discoveries, but one may
also reasonably entertain the idea that discoveries could ignite curiosity. That would be a kind of curiosity not about the existence of the discovered phenomenon, nor a curiosity regarding the truth value of the
proposition that the discovery spells out. It would be a kind of curiosity
about the fact, the piece of reality itself. For instance, “Alpha Centauri
A is the star that is closest to our sun” is a piece of knowledge I might
learn from a reliable astronomy book. Now, I can claim that I know
that Alpha Centauri A is the star that is closest to our sun. Just after
uttering this, it might sound peculiar when I say that I am curious to
know that Alpha Centauri A is the star that is closest to our sun. Isn’t
that sufficient for me to claim that I know the fact of Alpha Centauri A
being the closest star to our sun? I already know it, don’t I?1 I know the
fact exists, but there is more to knowledge and it usually takes more
to satisfy curiosity. Suppose that it is the first time I hear the name of
this star and the only thing I know of it is that it exists somewhere in
space and is the closest one to our sun; in other words, I merely have
knowledge of the truth of the aforementioned proposition. On the other
hand, an astronomer possessing ample knowledge about the fact that
makes this proposition true might know the same sentence. It seems
there is a big difference between the epistemic state of the astronomer
and that of mine concerning the knowledge of the proposition. We both
“know that p” expressed by the sentence, yet, the two knowledge claims
are not on a par. Propositional knowledge attributions do not discriminate between these two kinds of knowledge. This is the distinction Inan
makes between “knowing that p” by merely knowing that there is a fact
that makes the proposition true, what he calls inostensible knowledge,
and “knowing that p” by knowing the fact, what he calls ostensible
knowledge (Inan 2012: 52–53). In a theory of curiosity, this distinction
becomes significant as sometimes curiosity is more than a search for
certainty. One may know a proposition, be certain that this proposition
refers to a fact but one may still be curious to know the fact that makes
it true. In such cases, rather than knowing that the sentence expressing it refers to a fact, the subject might be after increasing “the degree
of ostensibility”, which is a notion that could be roughly described as
how the curious subject is epistemically related to an object under a
concept (Inan 2014).
1
Later, this will be characterized as a case of inostensible knowledge.
S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
343
1. Inostensible Knowledge
In order to make sense of these claims, it is crucial to understand the
central concepts of ostensibility and inostensibility, which points to a
novel distinction specified by Inan. In spite of the fact that offering a
complete account of the centrality of these terms in a theory of curiosity is difficult and it probably demands a rigorous study of Inan’s book,
here it should suffice to offer a basic understanding of these concepts.
Inostensibility is a term that first appeared in Inan’s dissertation to
single out a kind of reference in philosophy of language. He uses “inostensible reference” almost as interchangeable with reference to the
unknown, and in his book he argues that our aptitude for this kind of
reference enables us to become aware of our ignorance and be curious.
The following quote roughly defines what he has in mind while using
this terminology:
The speaker may know what a term may refer to, in the sense that he knows
that a certain object as being the referent of the term, and in the second case
one may lack such knowledge. Let us call the first kind of term relative to a
speaker an “ostensible” term (for that speaker) and the latter an “inostensible” term (for that speaker). (Inan 2012: 33)
To illustrate, suppose I want to inquire into the longest lived of men
and since I do not know of any individual as being the longest lived of
men, this makes the definite description “the longest lived of men” inostensible to me. Yet, once I learn the referent of this term, it becomes
ostensible, even though it could have a very low degree of ostensibility
at the onset. By getting more acquainted with the object, the ostensibility will increase. After introducing these concepts, Inan asserts that
inostensible terms are always used in asking questions, and argues
that every question asked out of curiosity involves the use of an inostensible term.
As one would expect, ostensibility is a relational concept; so, whether a term is ostensible or inostensible for a person depends on that
person’s epistemic link to the referent of that term. In other words, it
is relative to the person and the same term may be ostensible for one
and inostensible for another, and even for the same person a term that
used to be inostensible in the past may later become ostensible upon
gaining the required kind of knowledge. Then, what makes a proposition inostensible to someone? For Inan, there are two ways in which a
true propostion can be inostensible for a subject, in the first case the
subject does not know whether the proposition is true, and in the other
case the subject knows that the proposition is true, i.e., it refers to a
fact, but the subject does not know the fact which makes the proposition true. This latter case gives rise to “inostensible knowledge”, in
which the subject merely knows that there is a fact, but does not have
sufficient experience of the fact so as to make it ostensible. On the other
hand, one’s knowledge could be deemed “ostensible knowledge” if all
the terms that are contained in the given proposition are ostensible to
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S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
the speaker; that is, if the speaker knows the referent of the terms in
the proposition. Conversely, in inostensible knowledge cases, for Inan,
there is at least one term in the sentence that is inostensible to the
subject. He even claims that “the degree of ostensibility of a whole declarative sentence is also a function of the degree of ostensibility of its
constituent terms” (Inan 2014: 13), which comes to mean that if all
the terms in a sentence are ostensible to a subject, the sentence is also
ostensible. However, I would like to allow for another possible way of
having inostensible knowledge, which is perhaps the least noticed one
in inostensible knowledge cases. In this second case, one knows that
the proposition expressed by the sentence is true, and one has ostensible knowledge of all the terms in a sentence, but the proposition as a
whole is still inostensible to the subject. In other words, one knows that
“a is F”, and both a and F are ostensible to the subject, but the knowledge of the proposition as a whole is still inostensible.
Interestingly, the inostensibility of knowledge, especially if it is of
the latter kind, mostly goes unnoticed. Contrary to the quite recognizable awareness of inostensibility we have while asking a question as in
“how many people shared the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize?”, by which we
are attempting to transform our inostensible term “the number of the
2014 Nobel Peace Prize winners” to an ostensible one by uttering this
question, the inostensibility of propositional knowledge often escapes
our notice. To illustrate, whenever I get the answer “two” to the question “How many people shared the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize?”, I now can
claim that I know “the number of the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize winners
is two” even though I may not know anything about the winners. Suppose someone else also utters the same sentence “the number of the
2014 Nobel Peace Prize winners is two” while publishing an interview
she conducted face-to-face with the winners. Here, whereas the first
subject merely has inostensible knowledge, the interviewer has ostensible knowledge of this proposition. Semantically, there is nothing to
reveal this difference. This was a case of inostensible knowledge due to
the inostensibility of the subject term for the speaker. Yet, for the cases
in which the lack of ostensibility is regarding the knowledge of the fact
the proposition as a whole refers to, it is even harder to recognize. That
is to say, if it is a kind of inostensible knowledge in which all the terms
are ostensible to the subject, and the subject further knows that the
sentence is true, but the proposition as a whole still lacks ostensibility,
this often goes unnoticed, and hence, it often fails to generate curiosity. For instance, one may think that the sentence “war is painful” is
ostensible to a subject since both the concepts ‘war’ and ‘painful’ are ostensible for the subject and he or she knows the proposition to be true.
But it might turn out that the fact the proposition as a unity refers to
is not actually ostensible to the subject.
S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
345
2. Significance of Awareneness
of Inostensibile Knowledge
Now, I would like to focus on the significance of the awareness of inostensible propositional knowledge, and try to draw attention to how such
an awareness might propel curiosity. I will begin by elaborating more
on the neglect of the distinction between ostensible/inostensible knowledge in epistemology and allude to one of the shortcomings in epistemology that Inan draws our attention; namely, the indeterminacy of
“to know”. Despite its significant consequences, this important distinction seems to be insufficiently addressed in philosophy literature. Inan
says “knowing that a sentence refers to a fact does not imply that one
thereby knows that fact; and if not, one may still be curious about it”.
He argues that to satisfy our curiosity sometimes we need more than
a proposition that we know to be true. Inan discusses this in his book
making use of several intuitive examples and makes one wonder how
such a significant distinction could be overlooked in epistemology. One
would expect it to be emphasized more and even be established as a
central distinction; in other words, one would expect that we should
be able to distinguish between having merely the knowledge of truth
of the proposition versus having knowledge of the fact itself. These two
epistemic states, i.e., having inostensible propositional knowledge versus ostensible propositional knowledge, point to an important distinction that reveals significant epistemic intuitions.
Consider the following cases:
i. S knows that the scent of the rose in the vase is pleasant.
ii. S knows that the scent of Cosmos atrosanguineus is pleasant.
In the first case, the subject smells the rose and knows that the scent of
the rose is pleasant. In the second case, given that cosmos atrosanguineus is an extinct flower that used to have a lovely fragrance, S can acquire that knowledge from a reliable source and can claim to know this
fact. Nonetheless, even though the two subjects both claim the same
epistemic standing, i.e., “to know”, there is a striking difference between the two states. In case (i), S knows the fact that makes the proposition true, whereas in case (ii), S merely knows that this proposition
is —or used to be— true. This latter case is an instance of inostensible
knowledge since the subject term of the sentence “the scent of Cosmos
atrosanguineus” is inostensible to S. It is important to be aware of what
S lacks in (ii), even if S can use the same verb “to know” in both cases.
This nuance is generally neglected by epistemology literature and the
lack of this awareness might display itself by a loss of curiosity on the
part of the knower, as the subject might consider himself as “knowing”
the fact the sentence refers to. In this particular case, it is practically
impossible for S to know the proposition ostensibly as he cannot know
the scent to which it actually refers. In other cases, it could be possible
to gain more ostensibility regarding a fact. Yet, I think merely pos-
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S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
sessing an awareness of the inostensibility of propositional knowledge
attributions could be quite significant, and even help us look at the
world differently. Knowing that war is painful is true and knowing
the fact that makes this proposition true are quite different epistemic
standings, and the latter is definitely more profound. Unfortunately,
epistemology literature has been mostly insensitive to that subtlety.
Although one of the most original and important contributions of
Inan’s book is the claim that there is “inostensible propositional knowledge”, awareness of inostensibility of propositional knowledge, which
is so ubiquitous in the book, is not mentioned at all. I think drawing
attention to this awareness is significant and plays quite an important
role in a theory of curiosity, since a considerable part of our curiosities
linger even if we have propositional knowledge, and knowing the truth
or falsity of a proposition may not be what a curious person aims for in
the end.
As normative a claim as it might be, this distinction of ostensibility and inostensibility, coupled with the awareness of such a distinction lets us appreciate there is more to knowledge; in a sense, it is an
awareness that to know is deeper than knowing the truth of a proposition. This kind of awareness will be related to the value of knowledge
that transcends certainty or truth. In a sense, it is about knowledge of
“something” other than truth. Knowledge can get deeper, get better or
get enriched without necessarily having anything to do with knowing
more about its truth or having a stronger justification, this could happen due to experiencing, internalizing the piece of knowledge and making it one’s own. Take the proposition “Love is beautiful”, one can grasp
this proposition and may merely know that this proposition is true,
one can understand what this proposition might come to mean through
reading a touching romance; one can also further experience love, get
acquainted with the fact and come to know that the proposition “love is
beautiful” means something much deeper than one originally thought.
In the first case, the subject merely knows that this proposition is true
but does not really know the fact the it refers to, in the second case, the
subject has somewhat better knowledge, yet experiencing the beauty
of love can enable one to know the proposition “love is beautiful” even
much better. However, this still would not be the last step in the epistemic journey, for one could experience love once more in one’s life and
might realize that if this experience is love the former was indeed less
than love.
Peculiar as it might sound, one suggestion could be to adopt the use
of “testify” rather than “know” whenever one merely has inostensible
propositional knowledge. In other words, at the entrance of the stairway to knowledge, one should perhaps be aware that one is not entitled
to say one “knows” the proposition yet, or else one could at least realize
that “to know” is gradable and it is possible to increase the quality of
his knowledge. So, the use of “testify” should be seen as an attempt to
S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
347
raise the standard of knowledge rather than a vain effort to change
language. Accordingly, if I were lucky enough to have ostensible knowledge of the beauty of love, this would stipulate me to say “I know that
love is beautiful”; however, being lucky enough not to have experienced
the painfulness of war in my life so far, I should perhaps say that “I
testify that war is painful” rather than “I know that war is painful”.
Restricting the use of “to know” might seem as a fine grained issue that has little significance as long as we can communicate what
we mean. But I have worries about the possibility of losing a sense
of wonder and curiosity due to the pretense of “knowledge that we do
not yet deserve”. In philosophical terms, having de dicto satisfaction2
of our curiosity sometimes stops us from inquiring further, and inostensible propositional knowledge passes as knowledge, in spite of the
fact that it is just the entrance to the stairway to knowledge. Having
ostensible knowledge—although it is not always possible practically or
metaphysically—should perhaps be the ideal to strive for. This could be
achieved through the act of distancing ourselves from the proposition
and sincerely asking if we know what it really means —or might come
to mean. By fostering the awareness of inostensibility of propositional
knowledge, one would also nurture curiosity in one’s life, as this awareness will manifest itself in inquiring more into what we thought we
knew, and in a sense what we certainly, yet inostensibly, knew.
3. A Threefold Awareness Regarding Inostensibility
An important insight that emerges from recognizing this distinction between ostensible and inostensible knowledge in propositional
knowledge attributions is that it makes possible to talk about degrees
on a scale of epistemic strength/intensity. On the condition that the
epistemic scale is thought like a stairway, inostensible propositional
knowledge (IPK) will be taken as merely the entrance to the stairway to
knowledge, which will open the door for the individual to be aware of
the lack of ostensibility of his knowledge and this awareness will pave
the way for further curiosity.
At this point, I would like to sketch out three possible cases of awareness of inostensibility regarding a proposition and how they could become conducive to curiosity:
In case (a), S does not know whether the proposition expressed
by the sentence is true,
in case (b), S does not ostensibly know one of the terms in a sentence that he thinks he knows,
and in case (c), the proposition expressed by the sentence is inostensibile for S even if S knows the proposition to be true and all
the terms are ostensible to S.
2
See Inan (2012, especially Chapters 5 and 9) for the distinction between de re
versus de dicto satisfaction of curiosity.
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S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
In fact, pondering on the status of a proposition with respect to its epistemic link to the knower reveals some interesting intuitions, the most
neglected of which is the awareness of inostensibility characterized in
(c). Now, I will try to demonstrate what I call a threefold awareness
regarding inostensibility; to do this, I will make use of three different
cases of epistemic connection to propositions and each corresponding
sentence will be used to elaborate more on the type of awareness.
Example for the case (a) S: There are extraterrestrial beings in
outer space.
Example for the case (b) S: The roses in my friend’s garden
smell good.
Example for the case (c) S: War is painful.
In the example for case (a), S does not know whether the proposition is
true and this is an opportunity to gain awareness of ignorance.
This sentence is inostensible to S because the truth value of the
whole sentence is unknown to S, as S is not acquainted with the fact
that makes this proposition either true or false. In the first sentence,
the proposition, whether or not there are extraterrestrial beings in outer space, is so inostensible to S that S does not even know if it refers to
a fact, let alone ostensibly know anything about the fact itself, and S is
aware that he is still in the dark about it. This darkness often causes
one to realize one's lack of epistemic contact with the fact and thereby
one demands enlightenment. Since awareness of lacking knowledge,
given that we are interested enough in the subject, usually causes curiosity, it is expected that the subject will get curious. Hence, there is
a natural and easily detectable link between awareness of ignorance
and curiosity.
In the example for the case (b), S knows the sentence to be true, but
lacks ostensible knowledge of the subject term in the sentence, this is
an opportunity S to gain awareness of inostensibility of his knowledge
due to the inostensibility of the subject term.
Suppose S talks to a friend about gardening and wants to plant fragrant roses on his front porch. His friend tells him that the roses in his
garden smell good and he might consider planting that type, which is
called Francis Meilland. S believes his friend and now he can say that
he knows the roses in his friend’s garden, i.e. Francis Meilland roses,
smell good. This is a case of inostensible knowledge because he has not
seen the roses in his friend’s garden nor has he experienced the smell.
He merely knows that this proposition refers to a fact without knowing
the fact to which it refers. He must stop and smell the roses to make
his knowledge ostensible.
In the example for the case (c), S knows the proposition to be true,
both terms are ostensible to him, but S lacks inostensibility of the
proposition as a whole, and this is an opportunity to gain awareness of
inostensibility of his knowledge of the proposition as a unity.
S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
349
This awareness draws attention to a mostly unrecognized yet important distinction that afflicts many of our knowledge claims. Since all
the terms in the sentence “war is painful” are ostensible to S, and the
truth value of the proposition is not a mystery, and in a sense is too obvious, S might confidently, yet mistakenly, think that he is already at
top of the epistemic scale regarding his knowledge of the given proposition. However, pondering on the ostensible/inostensible distinction will
enable S to question the status of the proposition for him as a unity;
and this might motivate him to deepen his knowledge. This could be
thought as a call for increasing the degree of ostensibility of the proposition as a whole. Let us suppose S is a history professor and he knows
a lot about wars in the human history and this concept is ostensible
to him, he also knows very well that “war is painful” is true. Further
suppose that he is familiar with pain due to his having lost a loved
one recently, so he sadly knows what painful refers to. Even though
the terms war and painful are ostensible to him, there is a sense in
which he does not have ostensible knowledge of the proposition “war is
painful”. Conversely, a person who has experienced war and has gone
through the painfulness of it would have ostensible knowledge of this
fact and would know the proposition better. Yet, this should not be understood as requiring one to experience the painfulness of war, or any
such experience, to know the propositions ostensibly. For instance, if
one has not experienced humiliation before, it would not be logical to
advise that person to be humiliated to understand the proposition “being humiliated is bad”. There are other ways to make one’s knowledge
more ostensible, such as through empathy, getting more acquainted
with the fact by observing others who experience it, as well as through
other possible ways of gaining partial ostensibility. Regardless of the
attainability of ostensibility or of possible means to attain it, I would
like to make a more philosophically salient point here, which is a call
for distancing oneself from the proposition and the concepts involved in
the proposition and sincerely ask oneself if he really knows the fact the
proposition refers to, and aim to imagine to what the fact might actually refer. Only then, can one determine how ostensible the knowledge
at hand is for oneself. This awareness will be vital in acknowledging
how deeply/fully/well one knows, or possibly utterly fails to know the
proposition. Hopefully, it could also enable one to get curious to know
the inostensible propositions more deeply. But, what kind of deeper
knowledge would that be? It would not be about the truth of the proposition, as propositional knowledge already provides this to the subject.
It has to be about something other than truth; it could perhaps be a
transformative epistemic leap through experience, which causes one to
gain better insight into the fact.
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S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
4. Knowing a Proposition Better
Through Having Better Ostensibility of a Fact
Idiosyncratic though it may seem considering the mainstream epistemology literature, I would like to argue that it is possible to know more
about a proposition without having anything more to do with knowing
about its truth. In other words, it is possible to know more about a fact
regarding something other than its truth. It is especially the case whenever the piece of knowledge at hand is of something to be experienced.
I agree that it is not intuitive to think I may know the proposition
“the age of my physics professor is 43” better or more deeply. This is a
simple factual knowledge and when I hear that this proposition is true,
it automatically becomes ostensible to me assuming that I am familiar
with my physics professor and what it is to be 43, which simply means
having lived in this world for 43 years.
However, for propositions that allow for better understanding it is
possible to have partial ostensibility, which would be usually the case
in experiential knowledge. In fact, it may even be the case that a full ostensibility is sometimes unattainable for some propositions, as “better
knowledge” of them always remains possible. In light of this, I will argue that gaining partial ostensibility of the fact in cases of experiential
knowledge enables one to know the proposition better. To illustrate, experiencing the beauty of love through watching a well-made romantic
movie may give partial ostensibility of the fact of “the beauty of love”,
but experiencing it in one’s own life might make one know the fact better and accordingly make one know the proposition that “love is beautiful” better. Similarly, experiencing the joy of being a mother makes one
know the proposition that “becoming a mother is joyous” better. Yet,
someone might get close to having better knowledge of this proposition
by watching the joy of her best friend becoming a mother. Furthermore,
I also would like to allow for the possibility of gaining partial ostensibility regarding an experiential knowledge not through direct experience
but via other means such as fostering emphatic abilities in general.
I may get better knowledge that “war is painful” not because I feel
pain (get acquainted with pain) or experience war (get acquainted with
war), but because I gain better emphatic abilities (due to becoming a
mother/father, or reading about empathy in general) and so know that
“war is painful” more fully. Even watching a movie or a documentary
might help me make the fact of “war’s being painful” more ostensible
to me. So, I might claim that I know the proposition better now since I
ostensibly know what it might refer to as a fact.
With reference to all that has been said above, I would like to claim
that by gaining ostensible knowledge of the fact, one also gains better
knowledge of the proposition itself. In other words, knowing the referent—or if I may say, knowing ostensibly—enables one to know the
proposition better, in the sense of increasing one’s acquaintance with
the proposition. This could be thought as a claim for the possibility of
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the gradability of propositional knowledge, and indirectly as a call for
raising the standard of knowledge.
Yet, one might oppose this intuition and claim that rather than being a case of having better propositional knowledge, the above example
would be better interpreted as a case arising out of increasing one’s objectual knowledge. In other words, the opponent may claim that the inostensibility of the proposition is due to the lack of objectual knowledge
of war and/or painfulness, and the more one attains objectual knowledge of those, the more ostensible the proposition will be. However, my
claim is somewhat bolder than that, and extends to knowing better the
proposition as a whole. I want to claim that what the subject lacks is
not an objectual knowledge of war or painfulness, but the ostensible
knowledge of the fact of “war’s being painful”. Since this is a kind of
knowledge that can only be fully known through experience, there is
something seriously missing in S’s knowledge claim, even though S has
non-experiential propositional knowledge. To put it slightly differently,
one who has experienced the painfulness of war can be said to know
“war is painful” better than S does.
Such an understanding of knowledge as something gradable is less
controversial in cases of objectual knowledge, but gradability is almost
never applied to propositional knowledge cases in mainstream epistemology literature. Yet, I think “knowing better” does not necessarily
have to be “of an object”, it could as well be “of a proposition”. It would
be overambitious to try to establish this view here, but I just want to
note that this intuitive view is hinted at by a scant number of epistemologists.3 One of the most outspoken proponents, Stephen Hetherington, attacks what he thinks are two “dogmas” of epistemology. One of
them he calls “epistemic absolutism” which amounts to the claim that
knowledge is absolute: you can be with or without it, but once you have
it, it is not possible to have more or less. Sharing perhaps a similar
intuition, Bac holds that empirical knowledge is a matter of degree
(Bac 1999), and revisiting a similar characterization of knowledge, in a
recent article, Bac and Irmak argue that we should rethink about what
and how we know in general and whether knowledge is really an on/off
switch which has no gradation or nuance (Bac 2011: 319). Some others
such as Lawrance BonJour find that without allowing for such gradation, knowledge talk becomes useless and he even resorts to discarding
the concept of knowledge: “The concept of knowledge is… a seriously
problematic concept… So much so that it is… best avoided as far as
possible in sober epistemological discussion.” (BonJour 2010).
Related to this, recent epistemological discussions have seen a surge
of interest in the notion of understanding as opposed to knowledge, and
there have been attempts to shift the epistemological focus from knowl3
Stephen Hetherington is one such epistemologist who offers a sophisticated
theory of (empirical) knowledge by allowing for fine-grained evaluations of competing
knowledge-claims (see Hetherington 2001, 2005).
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edge to understanding. This has been mainly due to the problems encountered when searching for an intrinsic or distinctive value that can
be attributed to knowledge (see especially Kvanvig 1998, 2003, Depaul
1989, Zagzebski 1996, 2003, Boylu 2010, Jones 2003 and Riggs 2002).
Understanding, which is a concept that allows for gradability, has been
appealing for virtue epistemologists who has concerns about reflecting
the true nature of our knowledge claims. In her article, Boylu reasonably claims that “there is always a minimal understanding required by
knowledge but one can understand better what one already knows.”
(Boylu 2010: 598). Hence, the idea of gradation is perhaps inevitable
in knowledge talk.
For me, increasing the ostensibility of one’s knowledge of a fact
through experience makes the knowledge a better one compared to the
non-experiential—albeit perhaps certain—knowledge one had before,
and it adds further value to the knowledge at hand. Perhaps the idea
that the value of experiential knowledge exceeds that of non-experiential knowledge is one of the insights that goes as far back as Plato’s
Meno. Knowing the way to Larissa is possibly a case of experiential
knowledge, and having only factual knowledge rather than having
experiential knowledge puts one on a comparatively worse epistemic
standing. As Socrates says, “if a man knew the way to Larissa, or any
other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not
give right and good guidance?” For Plato, he definitely would. Analogously, one who has experiential knowledge of a proposition would definitely be in a better epistemic standing.
To make sense of this distinctive value of experiential knowledge,
it is perhaps useful to reflect on cases which can only be fully known
through experience. Let us consider the following propositions:
War is painful.
A day spent in Disneyland is fun.
Assuming that the sentences above are true, I want to claim that it
is possible to know these propositions better, more fully or ostensibly
by coming to know what facts they actually —or possibly— refer to.
In addition, knowing the facts more ostensibly enables one to have
better propositional knowledge of such experiential knowledge cases.
Thus, this allows me, contra Stanley (2005: 40), to argue that the following would be uncontroversial examples involving scales of epistemic
strength or depth.
(a)
A Syrian boy knows that war is painful better than a Swiss boy
does.
(b)
A Syrian boy knows that war is painful better than he knows
that a day spent in Disneyland is fun.
Unlike the common assumption of lack of gradability for propositional
knowledge, propositional knowledge cases that require experience to
be fully known seems to be gradable. That is, the knowledge of some
facts may become more ostensible, hence known better, by gaining
S. Yiğit, Stop and Smell the Roses
353
deeper knowledge of the facts they refer to. One might merely grasp
the proposition “war is painful” and might know that proposition refers
to a fact, which would merely be a case of inostensible knowledge. On
the other hand, another person who gains ostensible knowledge of this
proposition through experience may be said to know the proposition
better. Just as better knowledge could be due to better acquaintance
with the objects in the proposition, it is also possible through getting
acquainted with the proposition as a whole. That is to say, getting more
acquainted with war or pain or Disneyland or having fun might help
you know the proposition better. This would be an attempt to make
sense of this betterment of knowledge by appealing to increasing objectual knowledge of things while keeping propositional knowledge as
it is, sans gradation. Yet, what I wish to claim is beyond that; I would
like to entertain the idea that knowing a proposition more deeply could
also be possible, which results from knowing the fact more ostensibly.
My reasoning will possibly become more obvious, once we get rid of
the “know that p” formulation. I suppose it would be permissible to form
the sentence “I know that war is painful” with this different formulation without losing the meaning: “I know war’s being painful”. This
particular sentential form, which is the standard form used in Turkish
for propositional knowledge attributions, perhaps reveals more accurate intuitions. To make it more explicit, let us consider Turkish language and the sentential form for propositional knowledge cases. The
standard form of propositional knowledge in the Turkish language can
be formulated word by word as “war’s painfulness I know”.4 It is also
possible to use the formulation “I know that war is painful” in Turkish,5
but even though grammatically correct, it is rarely used, and when it
is used, it usually adds a poetic touch to the statement. That is to say,
in Turkish language, instead of the “S knows that x is y” structure, a
sentence almost always has the form “S knows x’s being y”. The latter
sentential form, which is the way Turkish people say that they know a
particular proposition to be true, has a structure similar to that of objectual knowledge attributions. It seems that gradability becomes less
problematic when the proposition to be known is formed as such; in
other words, just as one could know an object better, it would be less
controversial to claim that one could know “war’s being painful” better.
Granted that gradability is possible for propositional knowledge,
one may meaningfully say, “I know that war is painful better now” after experiencing the painfulness of war. So, my claim is that by making
a fact more ostensible, one also comes to know the proposition better.
Since, as argued above, it seems possible to get acquainted with propositional content just as it is possible to get acquainted with an object, it
could be claimed that better knowledge is not restricted to things but is
also applicable to propositions.
4
5
In Turkish, the sentence would be “Savaşın acı olduğunu biliyorum”.
In Turkish, the sentence would be “Biliyorum ki savaş acıdır”.
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5. Degrees of Ostensibility
and Degrees of Propositional Knowledge
After making this claim, I want to relate all these insights to my main
endeavor, which could be thought of as an attempt to motivate curiosity by fostering an awareness of possible degrees of ostensibility regarding our propositional knowledge claims. Acknowledging the fact that
propositional knowledge admits of gradability makes one understand
that having inostensible propositional knowledge—knowing the truth
of a fact without knowing the fact itself—is not the end but perhaps
the beginning of our epistemic journey. The destination would be full
ostensibility, which is an ideal a curious mind should strive for. It is an
ideal because precious things are as difficult as they are rare:6
Inostensible knowledge is abundant, but ostensible knowledge is scarce.
This usually gets unnoticed. If knowledge is valuable, then surely ostensible
knowledge should be taken to be more valuable than inostensible knowledge. There are many things people claim to know, and perhaps mostly they
are right about it; but we forget the fact that in most cases when someone
is said to know something that is of some significance, they have very little
experience of the subject matter of whatever it is that they know… (Inan,
Forthcoming)
The awareness that in most cases our knowledge is in fact inostensible proves to be significant, because whenever we realize that our
knowledge attributions fall short of being ostensible, it propels us to
strive to deepen our knowledge. This awareness could also enable one
to appreciate the value of ostensible knowledge, which far exceeds the
value of knowledge of truths. Taking ostensibility out of the picture,
there remains almost nothing but knowledge of truths. Furthermore,
when this passes as knowledge, this causes knowledge to be underrated, while knowledge of truths become overrated. My hope is that the
awareness of inostensibility of propositional knowledge, and the possibility of knowing something more fully, deeply, completely, if I may
say, ostensibly, would be valued more as a result of such an awareness.
Only then can one meaningfully utter sentences like:
I know that love is beautiful but I can know it more deeply.
I know that love is beautiful but there is more to experience to
know it fully.
I know that love is beautiful but some truths allow for deeper
understanding.
I know that love is beautiful but it is not all that can be known
about p.
I know that love is beautiful, but it is inostensible propositional
knowledge, and I can make it more ostensible.
Notice that, the first parts of the sentences above, which could be formulated as “I know that p” are so strong and perhaps possess an un6
Alluding to Spinoza’s famous saying.
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355
deserved epistemic standing with which we credit ourselves. It easily
misleads us into being dogmatic if we are not aware of our fallibility
and not attentive to the inostensibility of our knowledge. It is interesting that knowing the truth of a proposition, which we express with “I
know that p” is like knowing the name of a thing; it gives us the illusion
of knowing the fact.
6. To Name or Not to Name: The Guise of Ostensibility
Lastly, I would like to elaborate on the guise of knowing associated with
giving standard names to things. This is addressed in Inan’s book but
while his treatment is mainly about proper names and general terms, I
will extend this problem to apply to knowing the name of feeling terms
and the truth value of propositions (Inan 2012: 145). Inan thinks that
“many proper names we use daily, of great figures, cities, or planets,
are in fact inostensible for us, which we tend to forget” (Inan 2012: 63).
Then, he goes on to say that:
I know that the closest star to our sun is Alpha Centurie, but that’s about
all that I know about this star. If someone were to ask me what the closest
star to our sun is, I would normally answer by “Alpha Centurie”; the reason
for this is that normally I would take the question to be asking for a name,
although the interrogative used does not really ask for a name but a star.
If the name “Alpha Centurie” is in fact inostensible for me, given my lack
of knowledge of it, then I really should have said that I do not know the
answer to the question.
It is evident that knowing the name of a thing (also applicable to knowing the truth of a proposition) gives us the impression that we know
the answer. This impression, in turn, causes us to stop inquiring further/deeper into the phenomenon. Perhaps the person in the example
above had better replied “it is a star called Alpha Centauri” rather than
claiming to know which star it is. In the case of general terms, Inan
holds that we also feel a “false sense of acquaintance” even if we do not
exactly know what we refer to. In turn, this causes a lack of awareness
of our unfamiliarity with these terms.
We use general terms in everyday speech having extremely little knowledge
of their referents. We talk about different kinds of animals, herbs, atomic
parts, or what have you, not really knowing them. Given that such knowledge is available and in our reach, we feel at home. The more frequently
such terms are used, the more a false sense of acquaintance with their referents emerges. Just because someone uses the term “rye” in his everyday affairs regularly, to buy bread for instance, it does not follow that this person
knows the kind of cereal it refers to. (Inan 2012: 145)
I would like to extend such a sense of false acquaintance to terms we
use in language that we have not experienced as a fact but roughly
know what they refer to. If one reflects on his epistemic status regarding his understanding of such terms like painfulness of war, joy of being a mother, losing a loved one, beauty of love, etc. one might come
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to the realization that he is not acquainted with them since these are
not fully known prior to experience. Furthermore, knowing a proposition that could only be known fully through experience to be true also
causes one to misinterpret one’s epistemic relation to the given proposition. For instance, knowing that “losing a loved one is bad” to be true
might cause one to take this piece of knowledge for granted if one is not
reflective enough on the epistemic status of this proposition in relation
to oneself.
Now, to appreciate the role of experience in knowledge attributuions, let us consider two cases:
The sky is blue. (Mary in the black-and-white room)7
War is painful. (Someone who has not experienced war)
Or, assuming that speakers have never experienced war or the color
blue, these two sentences would be better formed as:
The sky is said to be blue.
War is said to be painful.
In the first case, Jackson’s Mary has no qualms whatsoever about the
truth of this piece of knowledge. She in fact knows this—inostensibly
though—better than many other people as she is taught quite a great
deal about color science including how and where they are reflected on
earth. Yet, there is a sense in which she lacks knowledge of sky’s being
blue. She only knows that the sky is said to be blue. She does not know
what blue is like. Not getting out of her black and white room all her
life, she has not experienced the color blue and there is a lack of ostensibility in her knowledge claim. She does not have all there is to know
the fact that “the sky is blue” and whenever she is allowed to leave the
room and look up at the sky, can she be said to know the proposition
that “the sky is blue” ostensibly. Likewise, in the second case, a person
who has not experienced war would not know what feeling corresponds
to “war’s being painful”, even if these terms are ostensible to him. Since
this wording might arouse a sense of false familiarity, let us come up
with a new concept such as ‘awefullypainful’8 and let us assume it is
a concept used only to refer to the feeling one has experiencing war.
Let us also suppose that it is an easily graspable concept for speakers
of English. Then, I may, without contradicting myself, say that I do
not fully know war’s being awefullypainful. I just know that “war is
awefullypainful” is said to be true. Only if we take knowledge as saying
nothing more than knowledge of truth of a proposition, then can I say
that I know that war is awefullypainful.9 Prior to knowing it ostensibly,
7
The thought experiment was originally proposed by Jackson (1982, 1986).
I made up that word from the word pain and ‘awe’ which etymologically
comes from the Greek word ‘achos’ meaning grief, pain, woe. Also alluding to the
connotations of fear, terror, and dread. Notice that it is purposefully written as
“awefullypainful”, rather than “awfullypainful”.
9
Perhaps it will be helpful to draw an analogy to Mary uttering the sentence ‘I
know that the sky is blue’ prior to her experience of the blue sky.
8
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if one asks me what feeling is awefullypainful, the only thing I could
say is that it is the feeling one experiences in war. Similarly, suppose
Mary goes outside and looks up at the blue sky, now she knows sky’s
being blue. Does she know the proposition better now? If we admit that
ostensibly knowing is better, she seems to know the proposition “the
sky is blue” better now. Yet, if we think of knowing a proposition as
merely expressing a justified true belief of the subject, then nothing
has changed for Mary, the proposition is still as true and as justified
as it was prior to the experience. But there is a sense in which Mary
knows “the sky is blue better after she sees the blue sky. This is a
better knowledge of something other than truth, a kind of knowledge
which requires experience, and the standard definition of propositional
knowledge is inattentive to this.
Similarly, only after I experience war, can I be said to know how
awefullypainful war is. A person who has experienced the painfulness
of war might say, for instance, “I know how one feels in war, but I forgot
what it is called”, or perhaps there is no separate word for it in her language—just as the English language has none—and since naming is not
knowing, it should not be about what it is called.10 In the same manner,
Mary may forget the name of the color, i.e. blue, after she sees the sky,
but then she will still surely know the blueness of the sky itself. And
just like Mary can say “I know the color of the sky but I forgot its name”
without contradicting herself, another person can say “I know how war
feels but I forgot what it is called”. It is clear that to know a colour does
not require one to know its standard name. Similarly, “awefullypainful”
is still ostensible for one, even one she forgets or has never learned that
it is called awefullypainful. This could be captured by the distinction
between knowing a concept versus knowing the name of a concept; a
similar distinction could be made between knowing a fact versus knowing the truth of a proposition, that is, whether or not the proposition
refers to a fact. Ostensibly knowing that war is awefullypainful and
inostensibly knowing that war is awefullypainful would be examples of
the latter distinction above, respectively.
One important aspect to consider here would be the role of experience in making these distinctions. In Mary case, it is clear that to know
blue and to know the name of the color blue are two different things.
One is knowing the color itself, the other is just knowing the correct
reference. ‘Blue’ is a word, but blue is a color, something to experience;
‘awefullypainful’ is a concept but awefullypainful is the feeling which
is not fully knowable prior to experience. It would also be not wrong
to claim that if one is satisfied by the name ‘blue’ when one inquiries
into the color of the sky, then, instead of “what is the colour of sky?”
one actually wants to ask “what is the name of the colour of the sky?”
10
This point is made in Inan’s book to establish the idea that “knowing the
standard name of an object is neither necessary nor sufficient to come to know that
object” (Inan 2012: 139).
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In the same manner, if one is satisfied by the answer “war is awefullypainful”, in other words, by the knowledge of truth of the fact that
war is awefullypainful, then, instead of asking what does war feel like,
in other words, knowing about the awefullypainfulness of war, one perhaps wants to ask “what is the name of the feeling you get in war?”
One is a superficial thing compared to the other. Naming things is a
habit that has many pragmatic advantages but it also deceives us into
thinking that we have knowledge when we have only the knowledge of
the name of a concept or only the knowledge of truth of the proposition.
Inan shares his worry as such:
There is nothing in the semantic content of the sentence that reveals this
difference though. So the distinction between ostensible and inostensible
knowledge cannot be cashed out in terms of the kind of proposition that
is known. Contemporary epistemology, which predominantly focuses on
propositional knowledge, is unable to mark this important difference. (Inan
2012: 68)
But why should we care about this distinction?
First, it is about raising the standard of knowing. An awareness
of the inostensibility of knowledge will allow people to demand more,
and aim at ostensibility. Through aiming at ostensible knowledge, one
also aims at better knowledge, hence it becomes possible and meaningful to talk about better/deeper knowledge. Then, no one in their right
mind would claim that they know things so effortlessly. Of course, they
would know the truth of the fact, but that would be it. As noted earlier,
for cases in which we find ourselves quite far from ostensibility, rather
than saying “I know that x is F”, I would rather we said, “I testify that
x is F”. For, “to know” is deeper.
We may perhaps liken “naming” to creating an epistemic mental file
of things—a mental file that needs to be rich enough for some, while
others may be happy with merely naming the file. But whenever people
become aware of the scantiness of their files—that is, become aware
of the inostensibility of their knowledge—this will make them realize
that they do not have the right to claim they know it fully and this
awareness will hopefully propel them to demand more and be curious.
It is important to note that, the person longing for ostensibility will
not be after complete certainty (as the naming of the file is correct),
but perhaps after complete understanding. There is a certain epistemic
humility about the fact that he may come to know that “x is F” better
through experiencing, internalizing, or reflecting on the proposition at
hand. It is a desire for enriching the file through seeing, tasting, smelling, feeling, experiencing, etc. the fact the proposition refers to. Melodramatic as it may sound, it could be summarized as a call for people
“to stop and smell the roses” before saying that they know that roses do
smell. Put more prosaically, the point is that ostensible knowledge, unlike mere knowledge of truths, grants one internalized knowledge that
is not easily lost, and it is this property that accounts for the distinctive
value of ostensible knowledge over inostensible knowledge.
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Another important question is: no matter how we define knowledge
and no matter what our stance is on the gradability of knowledge, does
knowledge of truths— that is, having IPK— satisfy curiosity? Should it
be enough to satisfy curiosity? I think not. That would be like stopping
at the entrance of the stairway to knowledge. That would be a cessation
of curiosity way too early.
Secondly, I believe having ostensible knowledge of things might
change the world for the better. Ostensibility is like ascending a stairway that is perhaps never-ending, and one had better aim as high
as possible. This stairway starts with knowledge of truth (IPK) and
it may gradually become less inostensible, but still more knowable.
To illustrate with a few examples, romantic though it may seem, if
people ostensibly knew or were aware of the lack of ostensibility of
their knowledge that war is painful, they would be a lot more concerned
about wars, what it really means to commence a war, and perhaps be
more cautious to refrain from attitudes and acts that might give rise
to war. Likewise, provided that people ostensibly knew what hunger
is, then there would probably be less suffering from hunger. Deeper or
better knowledge of propositions like “War is painful” or “This family
is hungry” could possibly change the world; and even if having better knowledge of those propositions may not be practically possible, at
least being aware of the inostensibility of our knowledge is significant.
It helps us to empathize with people going through situations we have
not experienced yet, and it enables one to care to know deeply. When
one hears the sentence “hunger is bad”, that sentence will produce an
effect depending on the experience one has had of that fact in one’s life.
It is possible that there could be separate names for degrees of hunger;
one word for being hungry for eight hours (which we normally take it
to be), being hungry for a day, two days, a week, etc., then we would
not so hastily claim that we know that “hunger is bad”. We would question and care to know how others experience it. And this is not possible
through a search for certainty that “hunger is bad”, but is possibly attained by trying to increase the degree of ostensibility about the knowledge that “hunger is bad”. One might state that “I know that hunger
is bad”, but it could be just knowledge of its truth, that is, inostensible
knowledge, supposing that one is medically not allowed to feel hunger
and is instructed to eat every two hours due to a case of severe hypoglycemia. Another could know it more ostensibly, but to a lesser degree
compared to someone who stays hungry for a day. So, it is possible to
know better what a person means when one hears another utter the
sentence “My family is hungry”.
I knew of an author once who never sated her hunger fully and did
not turn on the heater in winter just to understand her fictional characters better. Perhaps, we could do better to understand non-fictional
characters, and perhaps, at least hope to recognize that ostensible
knowledge requires one to move further along in the transformational
epistemic journey. And no matter where one finds oneself situated on
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the stairway to knowledge, I believe wisdom resides somewhere in the
vicinity of awareness of inostensibility.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Aran Arslan, Ayca Boylu, Murat Bac for reading
drafts of this paper and I owe special gratitude to Ilhan Inan for long
hours of discussion and his valuable comments on the paper. I also
would like to thank Nenad Miscevic for giving me this opportunity to
contribute to this issue.
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