Functional peace? The first wave of nuclear-weapon-free zones proposals in the Cold War

Valeria Puga Alvarez

Two Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in populated areas were established during the Cold War: The Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ in 1967 and the South Pacific NWFZ in 1985. Before the signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, many other countries in regions such as Central Europe (1957), the Balkans (1957) and Scandinavia (1963) also embraced the idea of constituting NWFZs, but they didn’t prosper. How did the bipolar dynamics of the Cold War determine these results? The following article explains the reasons behind the success and failure of the “first wave” of NWFZs proposals (1956 – 1968) by employing qualitative and quantitative methods. The study concludes that a relative disengagement from the superpower confrontation and a reduced number of security threats increased the likelihood of constituting a NWFZ. Additionally, this research outlines two patterns of negotiation, one for the cases that didn’t attain an agreement, and other, for the established NWFZ highlighting the differences and similarities between them.

Functional peace? The “first wave” of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones proposals in the Cold War Valeria Puga Alvarez Introduction Although the idea of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone has changed along history and it has been institutionalized at different degrees across regions, three pillars can be identified at its core: the total absence of nuclear weapons in a delimited zone; the implementation of regional denuclearization measures under a verification and control system of an international organization (in this case the International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA); and the assurance from the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) of not perpetrating any nuclear attack against the members of a certain NWFZ, this understood as the negative security assurance principle. Above these pillars, five Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in populated areas have been established since 1967 when the Treaty of Tlatelolco or Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC-NWFZ) was opened for signature, namely, the South Pacific NWFZ (1985)1, the Southeast Asian NWFZ (1995)2, the African NWFZ (1996)3, and the Central Asian NWFZ (2006)4. While NWFZs are internationally recognized as important regional instruments to tackle the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation, their effectiveness has not been prolifically studied yet. NWFZs promise some benefits for State-members such as the above mentioned negative security assurance, but the price is not to develop nuclear programs with military objectives or even, to renounce to the possession of nuclear weapons, which -in certain contexts- can be undesirable for their national interests. Most of the NWFZs proposals during the Cold War dealt with this predicament when the arms race skyrocketed between the superpowers, and some States carried out their first nuclear tests.5 The LAC-NWFZ was for many decades the only established zone, but many proposals for setting NWFZs elsewhere emerged even before the signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the approval of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, such projects aimed to establish NWFZs in Central Europe (1957), in the Balkans (1957) and in Scandinavia (1963)6. 1 The South Pacific NWFZ was created in 1985 after the signature of the Treaty of Rarotonga. It entered into force at the end of 1986. It has 13 full members including Australia and New Zealand. France and the United Kingdom have ratified the three protocols, China and Russia only the II and III and the United Stated has ratified none. 2 In 1995, the Treaty of Bangkok established the Southeast Asia NWFZ. It entered into force in 1997, but NWSs have not signed the protocols yet. Ten countries are full members. 3 Although the Treaty of Pelindaba, which constituted the African NWFZ, was opened for signature in 1996, it entered into force thirteen years after in 2009. 39 States are full members, ten states have not ratified the Treaty, and South-Sudan is a non-signatory State. All the protocols have been ratified by the NWS except the II protocol, which must be ratified by the United States. 4 The Treaty of Semipalatinsk created the Central Asian Zone in 2006. The five States members of the Zone ratified it in 2009. The Protocol has been ratified by all the NWS except for the United States. 5 Nuclear Tests 1950 – 1960: The United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), China (1964). 6 Declarations towards the creation of NWFZs: 1.- Africa.- In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in its Sixteenth Session -recalling the French nuclear tests in Sahara- had been called upon States “to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone”. (Resolution 1652). The Organization of African Unity (OUA) had also declared Africa as a denuclearized zone since 1964, but this statement was still far 1 After the NPT signature, there was a “Second Wave” and another four NWFZs proposals were undertaken for including: the Middle East, South Asia, the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean in the nuclear-free group. At the end of the Cold War, only the South Pacific NWFZ was constituted with the signature of the Treaty of Rarotonga. In a comparative perspective, not much has been told about the reasons behind the approval or rejection of NWFZs proposals, but there are some analyses -from qualitative and quantitative approaches- in reference to the five NWFZs in populated areas (Goldblat, 1997; Thakur, 1998; Mukai, 2005; Tago, 2006; Moorthy, 2006; Furhman and Li, 2008; Shaker, 2008; Hamel-Green, 2009; Rosas, 2017), including, some reports under the UN auspices (Committee on Disarmament UN, 1976; Hamel-Green, 2005; Vignard and McRae, 2011). A greater number of research works has been carried out on a case-study basis. Regarding the bibliography available on the “first wave” of NWFZs, some short historical and analytical studies exist (Moorthy, 2006; Heurlin, 1966; Epstein, 1975; Delcoigne, 1981; Guilhaudis, 1981; Lodgaard, 1983; Multan, 1985). In that direction, this research aims to compare the “First Wave” of NWFZs proposals, which encompasses Central Europe, the Balkans, Scandinavia and, Latin America and the Caribbean as the target regions. The objective is to identify the variables, which explain better the creation or abortion of a NWFZ in the Cold War period. According to the specialised literature, the conflict-cooperation dynamics, and the geographic position during the Cold War were decisive factors for the signature of a NWFZ Treaty. The underlying question is why did the Latin American project succeed and the other contemporary projects fail? To what extent the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union for controlling their spheres of influence determined the results? In order to answer these questions, the current inquiry will combine quantitative and qualitative methods. On the one hand, the descriptive statistics will allow taking into account a wide range of observable variables, which could have determined the success or the failure of a certain proposal for creating a NWFZ, and on the other hand, this data will be complemented with an analysis of unobservable variables, such as, some historical facts or details that will improve the expected explanation. First, a short historical context analysis will be included, providing a temporary division on the “waves” of the NWFZs proposals. Second, some hypothesis for explaining the signature or abandonment of a NWFZ project will be sketched out. Third, the research design will be detailed thoroughly, including the hypotheses and the variables to be analysed. Fourth, the results will be provided and analysed by contrasting them with the initial hypothesis. Finally, the results will be explained and interpreted by merging the quantitative and qualitative data, included along this article. While, the present research will be focused on the analysis of the NWFZ’s proposals during the Cold War, some useful conclusions could be inferred in order to assess the possibilities for establishing new NWFZs in the Middle East or in Northeast Asia. The “first wave” of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone proposals and the Cold War Bertel Heurlin in the 60s classified NWFZ proposals in two groups: the “continent zones” and the “tension zones”, standing this latter for the zones “in the first rank comprise countries which are located exactly where the opposition between the Eastern and Western powers is most pronounced” (1966). According to this classification: the LAC-NWFZ would be considered as a “continent zone” and Scandinavia, the Balkans and chiefly Central Europe from being a full-fledged proposal. 2.- Asia and the Middle East.- In 1958 China proposed the creation of a NWFZ in Asia and a year later the Soviet Union (URSS) urged to Iran to declare the Middle East as a NWFZ, but as the African case, they were only statements without concrete steps, for that reason they have not been included in the present article. 2 would be in the group of “tension zones”. In fact, after two World Wars, the Yalta - Potsdam order drew Europe again as the most important theatre of operations, reducing thus, its possibility of establishing NWFZs in its territories. The Cold War framed a new “security regime” between the United States and the URSS (Nye, 1987), which after the Yalta – Potsdam conferences, limited the political competition in Europe in order to control it, in contrast, in the rest of the world the inexistence of limits and rules opened the door for a variety of measures to control and to enlarge their respective spheres of influence, including direct military interventions. Regarding the zones here studied, Central Europe was mostly under the Soviet sphere of influence7 – except for Austria and the German Federal Republic (GFR)-, meanwhile, Latin America and the Caribbean –except Cuba after 1959- was part of the American sphere of influence. In the case of the Balkans and Scandinavia, their “political boundaries” were more blurred. In the Balkans, the three existent trends converged: a non-aligned position, a pro-Eastern stance, and a proWestern position; while Scandinavia swung between neutrality and a more pro-Western standpoint. Nevertheless, what settled this division in political and military terms was the institutionalization of two defence alliances. The Western side established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1949)8 and the Eastern bloc signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance or Warsaw Pact (1955)9. Between the 50’s and 60’s both superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union shared the purpose of halting the spread of nuclear weapons and maintaining the nuclear status quo, but they disagreed in their emphases and means to accomplish it. The United States underlined holding the nuclear monopoly,10 and the Soviet Union, instead, was more focused on avoiding the nuclearization of its threats. The Yalta-Potsdam conferences enjoined to disarm and demilitarise Germany in order to assure the future peace and security in the world. For the Soviet Union this issue was an overriding concern and in 1956 proposed the “Creation in Europe of a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments”11 which insisted on the prohibition of stationing and locating atomic devices in the “territory of both parts of Germany and of States adjacent to them”. This topdown proposal didn’t prosper but since then, the idea remained as a plausible option for denuclearization, accepted, after decades even by the United States. The concept of NWFZ has proved to be flexible, “liquid” and versatile so far. Central Europe (1957) The re-militarization of West Germany, the keen position of the United States to deploy tactical nuclear weapons 12 on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Soviet occupation in Hungary (1956), motivated the Poles to call upon the creation of a NWFZ in 7 From a theoretical point of view, the debate on the concept of sphere of influence has been surprisingly ignored in International Relations. Susana Hast has written, “Spheres of influence in International Relations, History, Theory and Politics” (2014), an attempt to conceptualise this phenomenon based on some English School’s assumptions. Lloyd Gardner explains also this term in his book: “Spheres of influence, the great powers partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta” (1993). 8 NATO state members during Cold War: (1949) US, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal and UK;(1952) Greece and Turkey; (1955) FGR; (1982) Spain. 9 Warsaw Pact members: URSS, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Albania (until 1968). 10 See the Baruch Plan (1946) available on http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml and the McCloy-Zorin proposal of 1961, available on http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclearweapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/mccloy-zorin-accords_1961-09-20.htm 11 UNGA, Soviet Proposal Introduced in the Disarmament is Subcommittee: Draft Agreement on the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces, March 27, 1956. 12 A tactical nuclear weapon is “sometimes characterized as weapon planned for detonation” (Lodgaard, 1983: 213). 3 Central Europe as a manoeuvre of disengagement from any possible nuclear confrontation. The minister of foreign affairs of Poland, Adam Rapacki authored this first attempt to create such zone covering West Germany, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Since the very beginning, the proposal aimed to get a pledge from Nuclear Weapons countries of not attacking their territories. A first declaration on that was expressed at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1957, and Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) decided to support it. This proposal added the prohibition to produce, process or acquire nuclear weapons or to let them stationing on their territories. According to the Polish Government, the establishment of that zone would bring about broader talks on disarmament as a spill over effect. The Soviet Union also deemed it convenient. For the Soviets, West Germany was a salient threat to its security; therefore, this mechanism would be a significant step to contain it. For the Western allies, the Rapacki Plan was widely interpreted as a strategy for undermining the military power of West Germany and their allies (Laboor, 1993; CIA, 1984). The formal observation by the Western side was that a NWFZ in Central Europe could disturb the “balance of conventional forces which would ensue for NATO from the ‘de-atomising’ of its shield forces” (NATO, 1958). The USA, the NATO and the FRG concluded that creating a NWFZ would not be strategic, and on the contrary, it would be absolutely pointless (Maruzsa, 2008). Nevertheless, Norway, Sweden, the British Labour Party in UK, the German Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Italian socialists and communist parties backed the idea. Rapacki worked intensively and after, the first draft he presented two further texts (1958, 1963) without success. The last version was even supported by the president of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, during a Rapacki’s visit to his country. His role as a proactive diplomat was well recognized internationally but it was not enough to make the project come true. Later on, in 1964 the first Polish secretary, Wladyslaw Gomulka tried to revive the proposal by presenting a new Plan, which was less radical and promised the freezing of the nuclear status quo. The FGR and the Netherlands rejected the proposal thoughtlessly, meanwhile, the US and UK remained sceptical. In the upcoming years the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty gained ground in multilateral arenas and the initiative lost momentum. 13 Paradoxically, whether a Central European NWFZ wasn’t finally created, the Rapacki Plan “model” survived and inspired other NWFZs proposals.14 The Balkans (1957) The Balkan region is often portrayed as the “powder keg” of Europe. Its strategic location between the Middle East and Europe has converted it along history in a recurrent battlefield. During the Cold War, none superpower was the absolute ruler in the region. On the one hand, the longstanding rivals Greece and Turkey were part of the NATO since 1952; on the other hand, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania15 were founder members of the Warsaw Pact (1955), and, Yugoslavia was the founder of the Non-Aligned Movement. A Central European NWFZ was not again formulated in the same terms than in the 50’s or 60’s. In the 80’s the Palme Commission Report on Disarmament and Security urged to establish a NWFZ in the battlefield between the East and West in Germany, which potentially could be extended to the Baltics and the Balkans. However, it didn’t prosper either. In the 90’s Ukraine and Belarus retook the idea of a NWFZ in Central Europe, but central European countries were not interested in, due to most of them were already part of the NATO. 14 Other short-lived proposals were the Aiken Plan (Ireland) and the Undén Plan (Sweden). Those proposals were rather declarations than detailed projects (Vesa, 1975). 15 Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968. See Kristina Mihallari (2014). “Albania in the Warsaw Treaty”, The Public Administration and Social Policies Review VI, 1(12) / June, pp. 5 – 11; Laurien Crump (2015). The Warsaw Pact reconsidered, International relations in Eastern Europe 1955 – 1969. London: Routledge. 13 4 In spite of this complex political tangle, between the 50s and 60’s at least six “proposals” for establishing a NWFZ in the Balkans (or including the Balkans) would have been put forth (Mircea Pașcu, 1983). Romania essayed two proposals for promoting a Balkan Peace Zone, first in 1957 and after in 1959. Those proposals didn’t limit themselves in their scope to security or nuclear issues, but rather they included political, cultural, economic and social dimensions. These blueprints addressed to increase the interdependence among the Balkan countries by strengthening their cooperation and security ties. The Soviet Union decided to support the proposal of 1959. The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in Albania expressed his concern and disapproval regarding the deployment of US Thor and Jupiter missiles in Greece and Italy. He warned Greece that if they accepted the missiles, the Soviets would establish a base in Albania, to prevent this problem, Khrushchev said that he preferred underpinning the construction of a Balkan NWFZ including the Adriatic (Klick, 1987). The proposal did not succeed. The United States alleged that the Balkans as long as they were within the range of Soviet missiles, there was no consistence with that offer and their interests. They stated also that the proposal had overlooked details about stockpiling, producing and processing nuclear weapons; as well as the lineaments on verification and inspection. In 1961, the US deployed the Jupiter nuclear missiles to Turkey and Italy, and in 1963, the Hercules batteries were on the Greek territory. These moves left no practical room for a NWFZ in the Balkans, such endeavour was at odds with the deterrence16 principle that guided the mind-set of statesmen during the Cold War. In 1965 Greece signed the “Multilateral Agreement” for using the NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) at Crete in the Mediterranean region, this event provoked the revival of the proposal for a NWFZ in the Balkans. The NATO rejected it again. “Subsequent proposals were made in 1968 by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and in 1971 by Romania at the United Nation's Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.” (Klick, 1987:113). In 1981, although Greece and Romania decided to revive the initiative, it didn’t have the support of Turkey, a sine qua non actor for the creation of a NWFZ.17 Similar to the Central European case, the idea of constituting a NWFZ was propelled by an imminent change in the regional military stability, such as the deployment of nuclear missiles. In both cases, the proponents were Warsaw Pact members, and they counted with the Soviet Union’s support. This endorsement deepened the mistrust of the Western side towards these proposals and it turned out in a rejection of all the initiatives. The United States and the NATO were convinced that a NWFZ would erode the balance of power in Europe favouring the Soviets. Despite of the Balkan countries didn’t have capabilities to start a nuclear program on their own; they were important locations for the storage and transit of nuclear weapons (Andrikos, 1985). Scandinavia (1963) Scandinavia was considered at the end of the 50’s a de facto NWFZ (Lindahl, 1988). On the one hand, Norway and Denmark, founders of the NATO, had declared their unwillingness to receive nuclear weapons in their territories; and on the other hand, Sweden had decided to postpone its nuclear program. Additionally, Finland’s position was characterised but its 16 Deterrence means to be ready for attack, but never attack. Nuclear weapons possession, therefore, is the most important factor to dissuade any possible attack. Deterrence has been considered as a core strategy that prevented a new world war. See John Mearsheimer (1985) “Prospects for conventional deterrence in Europe”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August, pp. 158 – 162. 17 In 1981 Andreas Papandreou (Panhellenic Socialist Movement – PASOK-) came to power as prime minister of Greece. This victory altered the correlation of forces in the region. He called for “the abrogation of the US- Greek military basing agreement”, which smooth the Greek stance in favour of a Balkan NWFZ. 5 pragmatic neutrality. 18 Since 1959, the Soviet Union had proposed the denuclearization of Scandinavia. In 1961, the Swedish minister of Foreign Affairs, Östen Undén, a staunch opponent of nuclear weapons, drew a conclusion of creating a “nuclear-free club” with the support of the United Nations (UN). The representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland during the 16th UN General Assembly considered the Undén Plan similar to the Rapacki Plan, and although they initially criticised it, they decided to support it. Despite the opposition of the NATO, two-thirds of the UN members backed the idea of a “non-nuclear club”. In front of the critics of Norway, Denmark and some groups in Sweden, Undén argued that a NWFZ should not give an advantage to any group of States or defence alliance in order to preserve the military balance. In spite of these first steps, the proposal didn’t plan a timetable or follow-up meetings. Consequently, the Undén Plan didn’t flourish. At the end of 1964, Undén accepted that the initiative was not feasible at that time. Although the difficulties of the first failed project, Finland, which fully supported the Undén Plan, took over the initiative in 1963 under the mandate of the president Urho Kekkonen. Finland characterised by its neutral but pragmatic foreign policy, called on Nordic countries to formalize their regional non-nuclear status by establishing a NWFZ. The Missile Crisis occurred in 1962 had put the nuclear issue in the forefront again, and this fact, somehow, triggered several reactions around the world redefining the security regime, including the revival of the NWFZs idea. The so-called Kekkonen Plan was the first concrete NWFZ proposal targeting Scandinavia strictly 19 . Sweden supported again the idea, but the Norwegian and Danish governments –regardless their “political colour”- opposed it along a decade. Norway and Denmark were afraid that an agreement on a Nordic NWFZ could affect the deterrence policy within the NATO, and even further, this could virtually exclude them from the NATO to some extent. Although the Kekkonen Plan was more precise in its geographical limit, it didn’t contemplate clear demands on the nuclear powers, which is an essential pillar of a NWFZ. “Problems regarding guarantees, control and verification were also left out” (Lindhal, 1988: 81). Despite these shortcomings, the Kekkonen Plan enjoyed great support from Soviets, which were worried about the re-militarization of West Germany, and its cooperation ties with Nordic countries. Norway was the main opponent of the Kekkonen Plan because they estimated that it jeopardized the security balance20. Denmark, instead, insisted on portraying the NWFZ in a comprehensive European scheme. The Danish side also criticized the superficiality of the Plan. The Swedish government fairly shared the Danish criterion on constituting a NWFZ but in a broader geographical scope. Specifically, Sweden suggested including as much as countries possible from Central and Northern Europe in the estimated area. The increasing debate over an international nuclear ban treaty finally added more reasons for the fading of the Kekkonen Plan. The foreign policy implemented by president Urho Kekkonen, the so-called “Kekkonen doctrine was well known in those years due to its pragmatism in dealing with its powerful neighbour, the Soviet Union. It basically consisted in providing the Soviets with a permanent assurance that Finland would never become an anti-Soviet actor neither it would be used by an anti-Soviet alliance, thus Finland would keep its independence, neutrality and democratic system. The Western side considered this position virtually yielded in favour of the Soviet hegemony. After, came the term “Finlandization” to describe a possible transformation of Western Europe’ foreign policy characterised by its support to the United States- into a weak neutral policy, functional to Soviet interests. Fred Singleton published in 1981 a critical assessment on this topic under the title “The Myth of 'Finlandisation'”. 19 That’s the reason why this analysis will take into account this initiative rather the “Undén Plan” whose scope was rather international. 20 In a meeting of Nordic Ministers of Foreign affairs in September 1963, Norway vetoed the inclusion of any mention to the Kekkonen Plan in the final statement. 18 6 The proposal has given room to puzzling interpretations. For example, Ingemar Lindhal, who wrote an entire volume on the Nordic NWFZ proposal, has understood the Kekkonen Plan as a confidence-building measure aimed to improve the Finnish-Soviet relations at that time (1988:81). It must be recalled that more than a decade before the “Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance”, had been signed by Finland and the Soviet Union and this was the basis for their relations from 1948 until 1992. Henceforth, the explanation of Lindhal met coherence in the frame of this agreement, altogether with the explicit disengagement policy implemented by Kekkonen. Latin America and the Caribbean (1967) Before the onset of the Cold War, the United States conceived Latin America as part of its zone of influence21. During the Cold War, although the region was not the most important theatre of military operations, it experienced the American direct interventionism under the argument of eliminating the communist threat. Therefore, the approval of the Treaty of Tlatelolco amidst the years of the “National Security Doctrine” is still far from being uncontroversial. For the first time, in a meeting at the Organization of the American Stated (OAS) Council in 1958, Costa Rica proposed a Latin American nuclear arms control arrangement, fundamentally, to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons and their acquisition from the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). Nevertheless, it didn’t get enough support. After the Missile Crisis in 1962, at the seventeenth regular session of the UN General Assembly, the Brazilian ambassador to the UN, Afonso Arinos proposed the disatomization of Latin America –and Africa-. This initiative was supported by Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador, but it met staunch opposition from Cuba, which argued that Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone should be contemplated in the proposal, as well as the foreign military bases, mainly, the Guantanamo Naval Base. Surprisingly, Brazil had expressed in a Telegram to the UN that the Cuban Missile Crisis had not motivated its initiative; but rather it intended to “generalize international inspection of nuclear arms”22. Brazil insisted on its proposal after in the OAS, but it failed again. But if Brazil said that the Missile Crisis was not the main motivation of its proposal, it did for many Latin American countries, which for the first time witnessed closely the worst brinkmanship of the Cold War. Thus, five Latin American Presidents23 at the initiative of the President of Mexico, Adolfo López Mateos, made public a Joint Declaration on April 29, 1963 expressing the purpose of protecting the region from all the nuclear threats. The majority of this group of presidents shared a nationalist-progressive political orientation so they framed this proposal also as an attempt to gain autonomy and independence from the bipolar confrontation. In the same year, the political landscape changed dramatically over the region and the “National Security Doctrine” started to being applied.24 The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 can be summarized in the phrase: “American for the Americans” established Latin America and the Caribbean as part of the American sphere of influence. As the American historian, Harry Watson summarizes: “On the surface, Monroe’s declaration supported the independence of fellow republics, but it subtly implied that the United States should dominate Latin America itself. It thus became the rationale for future American interventions.” (2018: 397). 22 This information is recently available. See “Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 7 p.m., Monday,” November 12, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, “Secret Anex— 600.(24h)—Situação politica—Cuba—Novembro à Dezembro de 1962/,” Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115378 23 They were: Víctor Paz Estenssoro from Bolivia; João Goulart from Brazil; Jorge Alessandri from Chile; and Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy from Ecuador. 24 This Doctrine implied: the systematic annihilation of political “internal enemies” under the rule of military governments directly or indirectly backed by the US. For example, three presidents of the initial group which 21 7 Table 1. The “waves” of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones proposals 1956 – 200625 Year26 1957, 1964 1957 1959 1963 1967 COLD WAR PERIOD First Wave of NWFZs 1956 – 1968 Zones Central Europe I and II Balkans I Antarctic Treaty Scandinavia I Latin America and C. Outer Space Approved No No Yes No Yes Yes Type Subregional Subregional Non-populated area Subregional Regional Non-populated area Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968 -1970 SECOND WAVE OF NWFZS 1972 – 1985 1972 1974 1975 1981 1982 1985 Seabed Treaty Middle East Scandinavia II Balkans II Special Zone between EastWest battlefield27 South Pacific Non-populated area Subregional Subregional Subregional Special Zone Yes No No No No Regional Yes POST-COLD WAR PERIOD Third Wave of NWFZs proposals 1995 – 2006 1995 1996 1999 2000 2006 Southeast Asia Africa Austria Mongolia Central Asia Subregional Regional (partially) Single-State NWFZ28 Single-State NWFZ Subregional Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Elaborated by the author promoted the denuclearization of Latin America were toppled by US-backed military coups, those were the cases of João Goulart in Brazil, Victor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia and Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy in Ecuador. 25 Part of this division is based on the article: “The revival of proposals for Nuclear-Free Zones” written by Vesa, Unto (1975). Instant Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. 5, Nº 1, The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 42-51. 26 In the case of the NWFZ created, the years indicated in Table 1 refer to the date of signature, not to the date of ratification. 27 The Palme Commission Report on Disarmament and Security suggested a zone 300 km wide (150 km on each side of the borderline between the GDR and the GFR) including parts of Czechoslovakia. The URSS supported this initiative, meanwhile, the US opposed. See Barry Blechman and Mark R. Moore (1983). “A NuclearWeapon-Free-Zone in Europe”. Scientific American, April, Volume 248, Nº 4, pp. 37 – 43. 28 Since 1976, the UNGA allowed a new category: Single-State Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SS-NWFZ). The Philippines declared in its Constitution of 1987 its Nuclear-Free status, but it has not been included in Table 1 because it’s a member of the Southeast Asian NWFZ. New Zealand, State Member of the South Pacific NWFZ, also declared its Nuclear Free Status in 1987 in the Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act. It has not been included in Table 1 either for the same reasons. The FRG and the GDR in the article 3 and 5 (3) of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” they reaffirmed “their renunciation of the manufacture and possession of and control over nuclear biological and chemical weapons”; it included also the GDR’s prohibition to have stationed or deployed Soviet nuclear weapons in its territory. It’s not a NWFZ strictly speaking, but it was a remarkable achievement. September 12, 1990. At a local level, there are 2003 nuclear-free zone communities in 16 States including in the United States and the United Kingdom. See more in Chadwick F. Alger (2014). “Chapter 7: Searching for democratic potential in emerging global governance: What are the Implications of Regional and Global Involvements of Local Governments?” In The UN System and Cities in Global Governance, Springer Publishing Company, Nueva York. A good analysis of the case of the United States, from a legal perspective, can be read in Lori A. Martin (1988). “The legality of Nuclear Free Zones”, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Summer), pp. 965-1009. 8 Nevertheless, the initiative was not abandoned. This continuity can be attributed to some factors. First: there was no a polarizing understanding on this issue in most countries of the continent, and with the pro-American dictatorships in power, a “bandwagoner” foreign policy29 depended in greater extent on the superpower criteria, so if the US was agree with the initiative it had more probabilities to survive; second: the impact of the Missile crisis and its consequences dissuaded any State from pursuing a nuclear program and pushed them towards a nuclear-free path; third, the weak structural conditions of the majority of States made improbable to them to embark upon a pro-nuclear undertaking -with the exception of Brazil30 and Argentina31-, and fourth: both superpowers had somehow favourable stances. The General Assembly of the UN issued the (1911) XVIII Resolution on the Denuclearization of Latin America, which stated its support to this endeavour. In November 1964, the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America (Reupral for its acronym in Spanish), in which seventeen Latin America countries participated, established the Preparatory Commission for Latin American Denuclearisation (Copredal) in order to draft a preliminary version of the Treaty. Although the Treaty had a robust support from regional and extra-regional actors, there were some important obstacles to overcome, such as the domestic polities of Cuba, Brazil and Argentina. The expulsion of Cuba in 1962 from the OAS, its relative isolation after the military coup d’état in Brazil (1964)32, the measures taken by the United States to harm the Cuban economy and its diplomatic ties with Latin American countries, and the presence of the US in the military base of Guantanamo made improbable an adhesion of this country. Table 2. Sessions of the Preparatory Commission for Latin American Denuclearisation (Copredal). First period of sessions Second period of sessions Third period of sessions Fourth period of sessions Part I Fourth period of sessions Part II August 23 - September 2, 1965 March 15 – 22, 1965 April 19 - May 4, 1965 August 30, 1966 January 31 - February 14, 1967 Elaborated by the author See Octavio Amorim and Andrés Malamud (2015) “What Determines Foreign Policy in Latin America? Systemic versus Domestic Factors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 1946–2008”. Latin American Politics and Society, 57 (4), 1-27. 30 In the decade of the 50’s, Brazil started its nuclear program. Brazil envisioned its nuclear program as a launch pad for development, a “great equalizer” of power at international level, and as a symbol of scientific progress. The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States collaborated with this program in different moments. See more in Adela Cubillos Meza (2012) “O desenvolvimento nuclear do Brasil: revisão histórica ” [Nuclear development in Brazil: a historical review]”. Memorias Revista digital de Historia y Arqueología desde el Caribe colombiano, Year 9, Nº 17, Barranquilla, July- December, pp. 170 – 204. 31 The Argentinian President, Juan Domingo Peron created the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA, for its acronym in Spanish) in the 50’s, under the same objectives as the Brazilian case. The industrial nuclear complex encompassed three atomic centres: Bariloche (1955), Constituyentes (1958) and Ezeiza (1967). See Sandra Colombo, Cristian Guglielminotti and María Nevia Vera (2017). “El desarrollo nuclear de Argentina y el regimen de no proliferación”. [The nuclear development in Argentina and the non-proliferation regime]. Perfiles Latinoamericanos, January, Vol. 25, Nº 49, Flacso Mexico, pp. 119-139. 32 President Joao Goulart had had an independent foreign policy, which was carved out since the Convention of Punta del Este in 1962. He championed the principle of non-intervention and he had had a friendly position towards the Cuban revolution and his leader Fidel Castro. During the 39 General Assembly, the OAS expulsed Cuba from the Organization with 14 favourable votes. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador abstained. The military coup of 1964 against the progressive government of Joao Goulart, imposed a “civilmilitary” dictatorship backed by the United States. The government of Castelo Branco was overtly antiCommunist and consequently anti-Cuban. See Anthony Pereira (2018) “The US role in the 1964 coup in Brazil”, Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 37, Nº 1, pp. 5- 17. 29 9 The positions of Brazil and Argentina were ambiguous and unsteady. Both countries had nuclear aspirations since the 50’s, and they planned to carry them out. Brazil argued that Cuba had to be part of the Treaty, and it was perceived as a pretext to delay the negotiations. In the case of Argentina, the implications of the Treaty regarding its claim over the Malvinas/ Falkland Islands was the main factor to assess its adhesion or not. Additionally, the US wanted a permanent coordination body between the Treaty and the OAS, but the US military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, backfired its request. Notwithstanding, in the last period of sessions, the United States expressed its support to the Treaty. They concluded that the Treaty “would impose no prohibition that restrict the freedom of transit as based on the security needs of the Western Hemisphere” (Serrano, 1992:37). As a result of the last period of sessions, the treaty was opened for signature. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, México, Panamá, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela signed the Treaty immediately. In the same year (1967) only UK had signed both Additional Protocols. The Treaty finally stipulated: to prohibit nuclear tests in the Latin American territory, additionally, “not to manufacture, acquire, store or place directly or indirectly nuclear weapons by any means”. It established also the creation of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Opanal). This agreement didn’t proclaim any prohibition of using atomic energy for peaceful objectives such as the economic development of scientific advances. Cuba joined the Treaty in 1995. In Argentina and Brazil it came into force in 1994, when democratic regimes retake the power. When did a NWFZ proposal survive? In 1957, one of the milestones of the nuclear regime was settled: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but before 1968, there was no comprehensive international nonproliferation instrument, only some regulations and regional initiatives were implemented such as The Antarctic Treaty (1959); the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963); the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967)33 and the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967)34. Notwithstanding, some steps towards a non-proliferation treaty were already underway35. Consequently, the NWFZ proposals can be considered as the pioneers of the international non-proliferation regime. Since the 40’s, but mainly when the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki occurred in 1945, the States began to be aware of the relevance of nuclear weapons for national and international security purposes, and the superpowers, started an arms race. Afterwards, a set of critic events, in which the (no) use of nuclear weapons played a fundamental role, ensued concurrently to the discussions of the NWFZs, namely: the Berlin crisis (1961) and the Missile Crisis in Cuba (1962)36. The United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964) had 33 This is considered as the first NWFZ, but in inhabited area. The first attempt to implement a regulation in atomic issues can be traced back to 1946. David Holloway describes this fact: “In 1946, the United States and the Soviet Union, along with several other countries, began negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations to bring atomic energy under international control.” (2010:378). 35 In this group it can be mentioned: the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960); the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) (1961 – 1968); the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) (1969) and since 1979, the Conference on Disarmament. 36 Before of these crises, the Korean War (1950-1953) marked the onset of the nuclear deterrence US security policy. 34 10 joined the nuclear club too. However, nuclear weapons were not too easy to obtain and they demanded huge financial resources, technical capabilities and political costs, thus, not all the States were able to run a nuclear program. Whether this was the option for obtaining greater security without depending on a third country, and it was appraised as the “great equalizer” in terms of global power, only a few nations could get it. The creation of the NATO (1949) and the conformation of the Warsaw Pact (1955) represented the “institutionalization” of the two opposed ideological blocs, these defence alliances became another option for States to increase their security although their scarce possibilities or intentions to develop an autonomous nuclear program. Regarding Latin America and the Caribbean, 23 countries signed, altogether with the US, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR, for its acronym in Spanish) in 194737. It was based on the principle of collective defence, similar, to the aforementioned coalitions 38 . The TIAR expressed the US hegemony over Latin America, rather than a real security alliance 39 . In general, these alliances demanded a strong and exclusive commitment from States, which often was an obstacle to implement non-proliferation measures. For instance, Sweden although its intention was to endorse the creation of a NWFZ, its status as NATO member pushed it away from this plan. Finally, since 1957 the third option available for States to protect themselves from a nuclear attack was establishing a NWFZ. Nevertheless, this option had not been “tested” until 1967 when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was opened for signature, hence there was a lack of knowledge and too much scepticism over this. Additionally, a NWFZ entailed the commitment of member states of not to develop their own nuclear programs and instead, to be assured by the NWSs of not being a target of a nuclear attack, that implied for future member-states to depend on a third State when the nuclear age was at its peak. Although this fragility, in the short-term, a NWFZ could be the cheapest option to prevent internal nuclear imbalances and conflicts, neutralize a possible military overtaking by a rival alliance or be suitable instruments to have at least some guarantees of protection. Consequently, why did States choose this last option to prevent a nuclear attack in the infancy of the nuclear age? In the following pages, this article will sketch some explanations. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones survived in “disengaged” regions In the Cold War, the geography was a crucial part of the game. Europe was par excellence the disputed space. The Berlin Wall, built since 1961, represented physically and symbolically the borderline between the capitalist West and the communist East. Europe certainly was a highly engaged region in the conflict. According to Kutyaeva, a NWFZ was possible when it were geographically close to the United States or to the Soviet Union (Russia) but far from Europe, as in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean (2013). Nevertheless, this didn’t mean that those zones far from Europe were not involved at all in the superpower’s confrontations; in fact the so-called proxy wars were a very recurrent modus operandi. The geographical factor also determined the inclusion or not in a sphere of influence and in a defence alliance. The Central European and the Balkan proposals were done by two 37 TIAR member states during the Cold War: (1947) US, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela; (1948) Nicaragua; (1949) Ecuador and (1967) Trinidad and Tobago. 38 The principle of collective defence was enshrined in: the article 5 of the NATO Treaty; in the article 3 of TIAR, and in the article 4 of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance or Warsaw Pact. 39 The US – Latin American relation has been an asymmetrical one. Moreover, they chiefly had very different threats and very few common interests. The Soviet Union, for example, hardly could be estimated as a threat to Latin American security, if it would not have been portrayed as the “communist threat” in the National Security Doctrine. 11 Warsaw Pact members as Poland and Romania and those zones aimed to include NATO members, and non –aligned countries –as Yugoslavia- in the case of the Balkans; which finally played havoc with the idea. In the case of the Scandinavian proposal, although the proponent was a neutral country as Finland (often perceived by the Western countries as pro-Soviet) also intended to embrace other three NATO members as Norway, Sweden and Denmark, which complicated its approval. The five proponents of the Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ: Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador although being part of the US sphere of influence and of the TIAR, they expressly declared their unwillingness to be engaged in the superpowers confrontation. The zone projected included Cuba as the only officially pro-URSS country. It’s striking to note that although the proposer countries were mostly members of defence alliances –except Finland- they didn’t discard the possibility of establishing a NWFZ, this means that both responses against a nuclear threat: an alliance and a NWFZ were not asserted as mutually exclusive. This can be explained by the fact that the NWFZs proposals often contained a clause of negative security assurance, which was not explicitly included in the alliance’s pacts. Moreover, due to the strategic importance of Europe as the theatre of operations, the salience of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact falls in high contrast with that of the TIAR, which was invoked fundamentally for settling territorial and political crisis among its members40. Additionally, the United States and Canada were members of the NATO and TIAR, which determined the robustness of the first one in detriment of the second one. In overall terms, the NATO and the Warsaw Pact were active defence alliances meanwhile the TIAR was inactive. Hypothesis I: In a bipolar order the States, which are less engaged in the confrontation, are more likely to constitute a NWFZ. The NWFZs were supported by States with minor security concerns From a realist point of view, to establish a NWFZ in the nuclear age, when more countries tried to proliferate and some were looking for nuclear shelter, was not the most favourable option for a country. In the case of Central Europe, the Balkans and Scandinavia the NWFZs might have supposed the less safe option. Neither the proponents of NWFZs nor their supporters and critics had a clear idea to solve future legal, political and military conundrums provoked by a double status of being members of a military alliance and members of a NWFZ. In fact, this was the first obstacle that faced minister Rapacki, and even when he promised to achieve a NWFZ gradually, his Plan was not convincing enough. Then the risk of a war was still latent in Europe. Furthermore, both superpowers had started to deploy their missiles across the European territory, and across the world including in Latin America and the Caribbean, but in contrast to Europe, Latin America didn’t deal with the shadow of an immediate belligerent past. Notably, the four proposals were presented after some “triggering events”. They usually implied a significative change in the regional security status quo and /or in the military balance favouring one alliance, thus: Poland presented the Central European proposal after the FGR adhesion to the NATO and its rearmament; Romania in the Balkans presented its first blueprint when the announce of the deployment of US Jupiter missiles in Turkey (and Italy) occurred, and in 1965, the proposal was rekindled when Greece signed the “Multilateral Agreement” for using the NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) at Crete; Finland proposed a NWFZ for See Pedro Félix Salas Elgart (1962). “Parte tercera: De los diversos casos de aplicación del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca” [Third part: On the different cases of application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance]. El Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca de Río de Janeiro 1947, Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, pp. 234 – 255. 40 12 Scandinavia during the establishment of the FGR’s storage facilities on Denmark and Norway, and when the creation of the Joint Baltic Command (COMBAL-TAP) was effective; and finally, Mexico and other four Latin American countries launched their initiative largely motivated by the Missile Crisis and its consequences. Central Europe was marked by the permanent rivalry between West Germany and East Germany, including the divided Berlin; in the Balkans, the Turkish – Greek hostile relations were a constant during the Cold War. Conversely, Scandinavia didn’t register significant interstate rivalries, greatly because its stability was based on the so-called “low Northern Balance” in which their commitments with defence alliances were limited (Alison, 1985: 52). In the case of Latin America, inter-state conflicts were not a generalized practice, but it was still present in some countries in Central America and South America. Additionally, Argentina and Brazil had started to develop nuclear programs. At a glance, Central Europe and the Balkans were the most conflictive regions with greater security threats. The Nordic countries although their peaceful identity, due to their geographic position they had to work on preserving their traditional stability. Latin America also tackled considerable security concerns at inter-state level and at intra-state level just when proxy wars loomed over the third world. Hypothesis 2: States with limited security threats are more prone to create a NWFZ Research Design This work is focused on identifying the most important factors that determined the approval of a NWFZ before the signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This period has been called as “the first wave of NWFZ proposals” and goes from 1956 to 1968. The complexity of the Cold War, which entangled national, bi-national, regional and systemic dynamics, invites to avoid any simplistic or univocal approach. The historical analysis and the documental examination of intelligence reports, draft treaties, telegrams, laws compilations, UN studies, UN resolutions, altogether with the revision of specialized bibliography has enabled this study to contextualize and depict the negotiation process of each NWFZ proposal, identifying relations between actors and events. However, the historical analysis harshly can cope with exact data regarding which variable or variables prevailed for an outcome. Therefore, this inquiry complement that with descriptive statistics in order to have a better understanding of the process and its results. Additionally, as it was mentioned before, comparative studies on the NWFZs proposals are still scarce; henceforth the present work can be considered as a novel contribution to the security studies field. For the quantitative part, a state database and a regional database have been developed. They include data from 1957 when the Rapacki Plan was proposed until 1968 when the NPT Treaty was approved, and in some cases, certain variables register information since 1947. This temporary choice will be explained after in further details. This research incorporates reliable sources such as the Correlates of War databases. The descriptive statistical process will intend to characterise, organize and compare the concerned regions according to the variables that will test the mentioned hypotheses. It must be noticed that in a first phase the data gathering was at State-level and after at regional-level, this latter presented in this article. The combination of these data with qualitative information will allow underpinning a more sound explanation and, outlining a possible pattern among them. It must be warned that there are significative differences between the universes of each zone/region. The Central European case is made up by 4 countries; the Balkans has a total of 6 13 cases; Scandinavia is represented by 4 cases, and Latin America and the Caribbean is composed of 33 countries. It’s notable that this latter has the largest number of countries and this might rend the result tricky for interpreting. For example: a variable A (a security threat) can be present in the four members of region A, where four countries are the total universe of the region, then if the same variable A is observed in region D, it turns out that it’s present in 10 cases from a total universe of 33 States. Although the variable A is larger in D, is not present in other 23 countries, which is a relevant number for continuing a negotiation; but if A is present in the whole region A it would paralyze any approach. Therefore, in some cases, the values of the State-data have been transformed in percentage in order to make the regional-data more coherent. Table 3. Regions as the unit of analysis Regions Central Europe Balkans Scandinavia Latin American and Caribbean Universe/ Countries 4 6 4 33 Number of proposals 3 6 2 3 Outcome Rejection Rejection Rejection Treaty signed Elaborated by the author This study includes seven independent variables. For testing the hypothesis I -regarding the level of engagement in Cold War-, three variables have been built-in: the geographical location which stands for two values: European and non-European countries. The reason is that the main theatre of operations at that time was Europe, therefore this condition increases automatically the level of engagement of a region in the Cold War. The second variable is the membership in a belligerent defence alliance. Here, the cases of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact are considered as belligerent alliances, meanwhile, the TIAR will be discarded as belligerent due to the aforementioned reasons. In this case, the values: belligerent and nonbelligerent are coded. For regions, the prevailing type of alliance has been included. The third variable is the number of crisis associated with the Cold War since 1948 until 1968. It has been estimated suitable to include a cumulative figure to have a comprehensive understanding of region’s involvement in the conflict. The chronologies available on the webpage of Cold War History Research Center41 have been used as a source to complete the information of this variable. For testing the hypothesis II about “security threats”, the first variable is enduring 42 rivalry . For the State-database there are two values: presence or absence of enduring rivalries, then to obtain the regional data these figures were calculated in percentage values also. All the data for this variable was obtained from the list of Enduring rivalries, 1816 – 1992 of Diehl and Goertz (2000: 145 - 146) and from the classification made by Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2008:105). The second variable is protracted conflict presence43. Similarly to the previous variable, this has two values: presence or absence. For the regional comparison, it has been also converted in percentages. The information for this variable is consistent with the table of “Protracted conflicts in the twentieth century” of Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2008:105). It should be pointed out that, these two variables before explained have incorporated data since 1948, due to “security threats” are generated by cognitive process deeply based on previous experiences. 41 Cold War History Research Center Budapest (2016). Chronologies. Retrieved on March 6, 2018, from http://www.coldwar.hu/ 42 Diehl and Goertz define enduring rivalry as a “repeated conflict between the same pairs of states” (2000:60). 43 Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson define a protracted conflict as a conflict, which embodies intense and violent conflict over important issues persisting for long periods of time. 14 The last two variables are strictly related to nuclear threats. The third variable pertains to States with nuclear programs. The given values represent the number of country-programs per region. Bibliographic sources, documents and the NATO website44 have been consulted for this part. The fourth variable is States hosting Nuclear Weapons, which is calculated too. In this case, it’s supposed that the presence of one of them discourages a State to join to a NWFZ. Finally, for comparing the signature status or not signature this research incorporates the data available on the official web of Opanal45. For the rest of cases, it uses bibliographic and documentary sources. Results, patterns and interpretations The prominent scholar Joseph Nye stated “The agreements less central to U.S.-Soviet competition may be more durable and better insulated from the vagaries of the overall relationship. These include the regimes for non-proliferation, for avoiding accidental nuclear war, and for neutralizing certain areas and countries” (Nye, 1987: 401). This is the case of the Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ. After analysing the data obtained for testing the Hypothesis 1, the relative “disengagement” of this region from the conflict proved to be relevant for its constitution as a NWFZ. The military and geographical attachment of the other regions to one of the belligerent blocs decreased substantially any possible advance towards a NWFZ. Additionally, both defence alliances had members in the three European regions – except the Warsaw Pact in Scandinavia-, rending impossible to attain an agreement. Neutral and non-aligned members such as Finland and Yugoslavia respectively were also keen on a NWFZ creation, demonstrating again that the level of “engagement” might determine the likelihood of creation of a NWFZ. Central Europe and the Balkans were the most “engaged” regions. In both regions, the proponents of a NWFZ were Warsaw Pact members and they had the auspices of the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev who campaigned diplomatically for their approval mostly in bilateral meetings. This red support was seen with suspicion by Western allies who argued that those projects intended to reduce their power in Europe and consequently, they affected the regional security balance. A similar argument outlined by the Soviets when the NATO started to gain ground in Europe. However, it should be recalled that Khrushchev had already started a process of de-Stalinization, which in foreign policy was translated into the so-called “peaceful coexistence”, henceforth; the NWFZ initiatives might be consistent with this turning point. Graph. 1: Number of crises related to the Cold War 1948 - 1968 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 44 Number of crisis NATO: https://www.nato.int/ Website of the NATO Missile Firing Installation: http://www.namfi.gr/ Status of the Treaty of Tlatelolco available http://www.opanal.org/en/status-of-the-treaty-of-tlatelolco/ 45 15 The Scandinavian Zone was also a Soviet suggestion, though Sweden was the first country to promote non-proliferation initiatives even if it was a NATO member. Nevertheless, Sweden was coherent with that previous step and supported the Finnish NWFZ proposal presented by president Kekkonen. From this “first wave” and after, the Latin American NWFZ, the Nordic zone was appraised as highly probable until the 80s -as the CIA itself once recognized it in a report (1983). Although Latin America and the Caribbean didn’t register a membership in one of the belligerent alliances, it’s striking the number of crisis related to Cold War in this zone. Even Cuba was not an official member of the Warsaw Pact 46 and it was deeply involved in the conflict. This showcases how the superpower confrontation started to be deployed continentally and internationally since the very beginning of the Cold War. Notably, the most important event was the Missile Crisis occurred in Cuba in 1962 after the Bay of Pigs invasion. Regarding the second hypothesis about states with limited security threats and their likelihood to create a NWFZ, the study demonstrates that this set of variables may determine the possibility of establishing a zone. The presence of security threats is higher in European regions -in relation with its proportion- than in Latin America and the Caribbean, especially those related to “enduring rivalries” which were intertwined with the Cold War. Thus, in Central Europe, West Germany vs. East Germany was the most salient enduring rivalry, 47 followed by Czechoslovakia which registered a rivalry with an extra-regional actor: the United States48. In the Balkans, the four cases out of 6 were identified, where the Greek – Turkish rivalry was the most substantial situation. In Scandinavia, Sweden and Norway had rivalries with the URSS since 1943 until 1964 and from 1956 to 1987, respectively. In Latin America were observed 13 cases. Cuba showed the most significant rivalry vs. the United States since the Revolution of 1959. On the “protracted conflict” variable, its presence was less frequent in all the zones. For the Central European region appeared the dyadics Poland vs. Lithuania and Poland vs. the Soviet Union (1920 – 1981). In the Balkans, the confrontation between Turkey and Greece due to the Cypriot issue was aggregated in the evidence. In Scandinavia, the tension between Finland and Russia was included (until 1961), and in Latin America, the dyadics related to territorial disputes, namely Costa Rica – Nicaragua (1918 – 1955); Ecuador – Peru (1935 – 1995) and Honduras – Nicaragua (1937 – 2007) completed the evidence for this variable. In terms of nuclear threats, Central Europe and the Balkans were the “hottest zones” hosting nuclear weapons and in a lesser extent, developing indigenous programs. Latin America instead, registered two cases of indigenous programs (Brazil and Argentina), and one temporal event of hosting nuclear weapons (Cuba). Finally, the Swedish nuclear program is included in the Scandinavian bloc. Table 4. Results Hypothesis II “Security threats” Regions Variables Enduring rivalries Protracted conflicts Nuclear programs States hosting NWs Central Europe 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 1 2 Balkans Scandinavia 4 (67%) 2 (33%) 1 2 2 (75%) 1 (25%) 1 0 Latin America and the Caribbean 13 (39%) 6 (18%) 2 1 Elaborated by the author 46 Since 1947, Cuba, formally, was a member of the TIAR. Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson classified this pair as a Strategic rivalry (1949 – 1973) and as an Enduring rivalry II (1961 – 1971). 48 The period of the rivalry was between 1953 and 1961. This rivalry was triggered by the Air battle over Merklin. 47 16 The evidence has demonstrated that each case had its own peculiarities in terms of engagement with the superpowers confrontation and in terms of security threats, which influenced the likelihood to establish a NWFZ. Clearly, the geographical distance played an important role. As a consequence of the influence of these variables, superpowers decided to endorse or reject a proposal. In the case of all the three European proposals, the positions of the US and the URSS were very polarized, meanwhile in the case of Latin America both positions were moderated which contributed to the approval of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Additionally, international organizations such as the UN and the OAS played also an important role as socialization arenas in a moment when regional organizations were still a few, and the multilateralism began to be built. The bipolar confrontation pervaded these structures as well. In the case of the European NWFZs proposals, the UN was less eager to issue any statement supporting an initiative in part due to the lack of agreement between the member-States and because of the external pressure from one of the superpowers. In Graph 2, these differences and similarities between the analysed areas are outlined. Graph 2. Patterns of negotiation of the “first wave of NWFZs proposals” Elaborated by the author Conclusion The political dimension of the NWFZs has often been ignored or reduced to an idealistic discourse that emphasizes their contribution to denuclearize and to improve the international security from a regional perspective. However, there is no report or evaluation on the already created NWFZs that inform on their performance, compliance and impact at regional and international level. Therefore, it is difficult to leave the political debate about their constitution aside. The four cases presented here have attempted to expose the historical and political factors that intervened in the negotiation processes and determined their abandonment or signature. This historical review shows that although these initiatives were generally motivated by an intention of disengagement from the bipolar confrontation and above all from the nuclear risks, they were also subtly functional to the interests of both superpowers. Thus, in the case of 17 the European proposals, the Soviet Union intended to use them for containing the military advance of the West. In the Latin American case, instead, the Treaty of Tlatelolco gave to the United States a breath of peace for three reasons: first, it assured the USA that a second missile crisis was impossible; second, it generated a permanent disincentive for those countries with nuclear intentions and third, the Treaty of Tlatelolco preserved the military subordination of Latin America to the United States, reaffirmed after, by the implementation of the National Security Doctrine. Relatively recent studies on the approval of the five NWFZs, done by Atsushi Tago (2006) and Furhman and Li (2008) have demonstrated that states with moderate security threats are more prone to create a NWFZ, and that is consistent with the results shown in this research. Comparatively, in spite of the fact that the proposed European zones had greater threats and risks of direct confrontation between the belligerent powers, in Latin America there was also a considerable picture of external threats that didn’t dissuade the negotiating countries from signing the treaty with the exception of Brazil, Argentina and Cuba, whose motivations in the case of the first two, had more to do with the development of their own nuclear programs. The failure of the NWFZs proposals in Europe also revealed that the lack of regional political cohesion was decisive. The fact that countries with different military alliances and political orientations coexisted in each region made impossible for them to reach an agreement. The state activism of the Soviet Union in supporting the proposals of Poland and Romania backfired them, and the proposals were not perceived as autonomous endeavours. However, Khrushchev himself reckoned once that “even if the establishment of nuclear-free zones would constitute an important step forward, it would not solve the main problem, namely, the realisation of general and total disarmament.” (Lindhal, 1988: 69). Joseph Nye has underlined that “learning may lead to the creation of regimes. In turn, regimes may promote further learning” (1987:398). In this aspect, it can not be dismissed that Tlatelolco represented the first example of a NWFZ and as such it become a baseline for future negotiations of other NWFZs treaties and it represented a normative referent to the construction of the non-proliferation international regime. For example, its flexibility regarding the date of signature, the creation of a permanent body, namely the Opanal, can be remarked. What remains unclear is if this Treaty influenced or not the denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina in the 90’s. Although the political landscape nowadays it’s different to that of the 50’s and 60’s, and even the number of nuclear warheads have diminished considerably since the end of the Cold War, the arms competition between the United States and Russia persists, and the risk that terrorists groups can possess nuclear weapons has emerged as a new threat for the international security. In this context, the idea of creating NWFZs in regions such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia has been rekindled with insignificant progress. The history has proved that top-down proposals in regions with considerable threats are condemned to fail, and that is the situation of the two mentioned zones. Ramesh Thakur has pointed out that “a NWFZ must satisfy the principle of undiminished security for all countries in the region as well as for the global powers” (1998:13). Even if the scenarios have changed, after more than a half-century the core of the nuclear regime has continued almost unaltered. Furthermore, the main international players have not renounced to their weapons and the deterrence principle has persisted. This is then, the occasion to argue that many findings of this study harshly can be considered outdated. 18 Bibliography Acharya, Amitav (2014). “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds, a new agenda for International Studies”. 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