Anthropocentric Bias in Anthropology: Re-Examining Culture/Conservation Conflict Dr. Helen Kopnina Abstract This article examines environmental ethics theories focused on the division between anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to the environment in regard to three value bases for environmental concern: self-interest, humanistic altruism and biospheric altruism. While the first two values are anthropocentric in assigning instrumental value to nature, biospheric altruism, what the author terms the Lorax complex, recognizes intrinsic value of environment or species outside of human interests. Studies of anthropocentric and ecocentric attitudes have indicated that people with ecocentric orientation are much more likely to act upon their values, attitudes and beliefs to protect the environment than those with anthropocentric orientations. The key concern is that because the values underlying anthropocentric support of the environment are utilitarian, governments, corporate elites and individuals are less likely to act to protect the environment if other human-centered values such as welfare and wealth are involved. While environmental concern may be shared in different cultures, anthropological accounts seem to indicate that in the age of rapid industrial growth and the development rhetoric most of it is dictated by utilitarian or instrumental view of environment. Keywords: anthropocentrism, applied anthropology, constructivism, ecocentrism, environmental anthropology, environmental ethics, environmental values, development, conservation/culture conflict Introduction It hurt him deeply when someone plucked flowers from a tree. And he totally understood that this feeling was meaningless to anyone else… His worst troubles arouse when the grass cutter came to cut the grass, because he had watched countless wonders in the grass; small creepers; nameless violet and yellow flowers, tiny in size; here and there a nightshade, whose flue flowers have a little golden dot at the center; medicinal plants near the fence, a kalmegh here and an anantamul there; neem seeds left by birds, sprouting into plants, spreading beautiful leaves. All those were cleared with a heartless weeding tool. None of them were prized trees of the garden, there was no one to listen to their protests. 1 ‘Balai’ From Selected Short Stories of Rabindranath Tagore (Tagore [1928] 2009:256-257). Based on a large number of opinion polls, it appears that concern for the environment is on the rise and may even be universal, rather than based on postmaterial values of post-industrial societies (Dunlap and York 2008). Yet, it is also clear that there is a large discrepancy between what people claim to care about and what they actually do (or don‘t do) in terms of actualizing their beliefs. As Booth postulates: Most people in modern industrial societies agree there is a moral need to conserve nature. Many see it as a social priority. Yet burgeoning lists of threatened species and ongoing habitat destruction show that these so-called values are failing to motivate sufficient political and social pressure for conservation reform. U.S. society, with its excesses of consumption, global exploitation of nature, and massive greenhouse gas emissions, is probably the most nature-destructive in human history. Australians are similarly destructive and apathetic despite pro-conservation sentiments. The chasm between values rhetoric and lifestyle and political focus reeks of hypocrisy. (Booth 2009) Booth further addresses this discrepancy by asking a number of questions and hypothetical explanations: ―Do people lie, or merely parrot what they consider socially acceptable beliefs? Are they self-deceived about their real values? Or do competing values undermine a conservation focus? Do people lack the capacity to conform with moral beliefs, having few resources or time to commit to conservation? Do they feel powerless, or lack knowledge about what they can do?‖ Booth answers these questions with the recognition that all of these questions are probably contributing factors. She concludes that in modern industrial societies, where many are affluent, well educated, sympathetic to conservation and have many ways to contribute, a primary diagnosis must be that people are insufficiently motivated by their beliefs and sympathies to act. Aside from motivation, there are many theories to explain the widespread rhetoricbehaviors gap between what seems to be desired by general public (environmental protection) and what is actually happening (continuous destruction of natural habitat, increasing consumption, etc.). Some are based on the division between anthropocentric and ecocentric values and are encored in research on values, beliefs, attitudes, or motivation (Kortenkamp and Moore 2001). Yet, there is no consistent theory or consensus within the fields of environmental ethics, environmental psychology or environmental social science, partially due to the complexity of the issue. More significantly, little empirical evidence consistently links any of the above-mentioned factors, conditions and predispositions to significant 2 environmental behavior. Environmental psychology and ethics theories do not explain why certain individuals, who, for example, grew up in the same village next to the forest and witnessed its destruction, will gladly agree to work for the logging company clearing the remaining trees, while others will embrace ―tree hugging.‖ An even more pressing question is: Why, despite the multidisciplinary academic efforts to discover the theory, explanation or mechanism of environmental behavior, do realworld events testify to the dominance of socio-economic (particularly corporate and government elite) anthropocentric interests over environmental protection? The author proposes a simple and perhaps common-sense explanation: referring to the grand old theory of human nature, we may postulate that the majority of people is simply anthropocentric. Political representation of those with ecocentric orientation is limited to (proportionally) few convinced conservationists. Ecocentrics‘ political representation (with a few cases of the most prominent environmental ongovernmental organizations, or ENGO‘s) is subordinate to the interests of the more powerful government and corporate elites whose orientation is largely anthropocentric. In the context of advanced industrial societies (whose materialistic appeal seems to be universal), while environmental concern may be shared by the general public, most of it is dictated by utilitarian or instrumental view of environment. Studies of anthropocentric and ecocentric attitudes have indicated that people with ecocentric orientation are much more likely to actually act upon their values, attitudes, and beliefs, in order to protect the environment than those with anthropocentric orientations (Gagnon Thompson and Barton 1994; Kortenkamp and Moore 2001). The key concern is that because it appears that the values underlying anthropocentrics‘ support of the environment are basically utilitarian or instrumental, ―they will be less likely to act to protect the environment if other human-centered values such as material quality of life or the accumulation of wealth interfere‖ (Gagnon Thompson and Barton 1994: 150). It may be argued that based on the common-sense empirical evidence of the continuous destruction of environment, despite the calls of conservation organizations and individuals to protect it, the marginality of an ecocentric view, or its subordination to those expressing selfinterest and/or anthropocentric altruist values, is obvious. While historically the anthropocentric position of individuals in power did not threaten bio-diversity due to lower population density and a non-industrial system of production, the present-day anthropocentrism has salient implications for the wellbeing and even very survival of non-human species. Modern world changes affect both the animals that humans depend on and those that live in the wild. On the level of national politics, domestic animals‘ welfare is largely ignored, while conditions of these species deteriorate due to the modern-day intensive food production strategies (such as battery chickens or cattle that are kept and forcefully fed inside cramped spaces until slaughter). While some green political parties in Europe (such as the 3 Party for the Animals in The Netherlands) exercise some form of political influence over animal welfare, such influence is proportionally very small and subordinated to other political interests. Also, most green political parties are only interested in the welfare of animals that humans consume or keep as pets and not in wild animals outside of human instrumental or esthetic interest. First, the author will examine a number of environmental ethics and environmental psychology theories, particularly in regard to anthropocentric versus eco- or biocentric perspectives. The author will then examine the insights from a number of disciplines, including environmental ethics, psychology and anthropology. Finally, the author will touch upon the notion of political representation in the case of environment and examine environmental implications of the involvement of the ecocentric individuals in the political arena. Environmental Ethics and Environmental Psychology Environmental ethics literature poses the question about the extent to which only loss in human life and welfare should be the basis of political action, and whether human progress should also take into account the consequences for non-human species. Critical anthropological thinkers criticized the Western idea of material and technological ‗progress‘ at the expense of other underlying human values and environment (Bodley 2008). Human welfare ecology offers one perspective from which to examine the ecocentric position: the objective of human emancipation and fulfillment in an ecologically sustainable society (Routley 1973; O‘Riordan 1976). Ecocentric theorists postulate that the current ecological crisis stems from the ―arrogance of humanism‖(Ehrenfeld 1978). O‘Riordan (1976) reflects that even the weaker forms of anthropocentrism such as conservationism and human welfare ecology are not sustainable since, in the presence of human crisis, they would be sacrificed for the more humanist perspectives. Indeed, it is ever more crucial in the context of the recent rhetoric about the importance of addressing climate change, environmental considerations continue to be subordinated to economic ones‖ (Stevenson 2006: 280). Another position in environmental ethics acknowledges the same objective of sustaining human emancipation but with recognition of the rights of nonhuman species. As noted by Dunlap and Catton (1978), the primary point of departure between the two views is the position of humans in the biosphere. Within the theory that humans are part of the biosphere and not exempt from ecological constraints, there is an ethical debate of whether non-human species should have intrinsic value or only instrumental value (Singer 1975; Regan 1984; Taylor 1986; Ferry 1995; DesJardins 2005). Environmental psychology provides a number of theories explaining individual predisposition to environmental empathy. Hungerford and Volk (1990) distinguish 4 between entry-level variables, predisposing people to take an interest in the environment; ownership variables, such as a personal investment in certain environmental issues; and empowerment variables, including skill in using environmental action strategies and the belief that one can be successful. Building on this theory is the value-belief-norm theory, which indicates that people assigning intrinsic value to the environment outside humans or perceiving environmental value in utilitarian terms (valuing ―natural resources‖ as they benefit human society) serve as entry-level variables (Stern and Dietz 1994). These models base their theories‘ meta-analyses on hundreds of empirical studies, few of which hypothesized the factors predisposing some people toward the perception of intrinsic value of environment in the first place. The utilitarian attitude to nature seems almost common-sense, as human survival and economic growth are dependent on energy and material resources that are extracted from natural ecosystems (Rees 1992). The so-called ―altruistic‖ eco-orientation (even if it means being somewhat anti-ownspecies) was found to be much more difficult to explain. Developmental studies of people‘s environmental behaviors and attitudes toward the environment have shed some light upon this altruistic predisposition to nature. The retrospective research on the ―significant life experiences‖ of adults and youth who have demonstrated commitment to environmental protection explain differences in environmental attitudes by distinct experiences of the natural world acquired in early childhood (for example, see Korhonen and Lappalainen 2004 and Wells & Lekies 2006). This research involves intercultural studies that indicate that despite differences in nationality and profession, people exhibit similar environmental values coinciding with the childhood experiences that distinguish environmentally active respondents from those who show less commitment (Wells & Lekies 2006). The hypothesis that early childhood encounters with nature are crucial for development of positive environmental values is supported by retrospective reports of environmentalists, which are replete with stories of early and memorable encounters with pristine nature, such as free play, hiking, camping, fishing and berry picking (Kahn & Kellert 2002). Other formative experiences include participation in organizations like the scouts or environmental groups, witnessing the destruction or pollution of a valued place, and reading books about nature and the environment (Chawla and Cushing 2007:440). However, there are no reliable and consistent empirical studies that indicate that children who grew up near forests are less proenvironmental than those who grew up in cities. For example, Western children might be more concerned about destruction of Indonesian rainforest than the Indonesian children who grow up in the loggers‘ families. In line with Louv‘s reflective book, Last Child in The Woods (2005), we may speculate that children from industrialized countries grow up with a very different kind of environmentalism, based on distant knowledge, rather than experience. Western environmentalists are then worried about distant problems rather than their own. Anthropocentric Versus Ecocentric Values 5 The opposition between anthropocentric and ecocentric or bio-centric approaches captures much of the contemporary environmental ethics and environmental psychology discourse on the relationships between humans and nature. These approaches are often linked to effective states (emotions), norms, beliefs, attitudes, motivation and values related to human relationship with nature. Nature can promote the satisfaction of human wants in two main ways: material (how can we use it) and aesthetic (how nice it is to be in it and enjoy it) (Mathews 1994; Fox, 1995). The value bases for environmental concern address a number of basic assumptions about the intrinsic value assigned to humans only or also to non-human entities, as well as belief in human progress and ability to (technologically) solve (environmental) problems. The most widely debated ethical issue is of whether non-human entities should have intrinsic value or only instrumental value. In anthropocentric thought, human beings are seen as separated from nature, unique in their ability to reason, use language, etc. and generally more worthy than members of other species. At least three value bases for environmental concern can be distinguished: selfinterest, humanistic altruism and biospheric altruism (Stern et al, Merchant, Dietz et al 2005). The self-interest basis of environmental concern originates from the rational actor model of individuals operating in the risk society (Giddens 2009). Selfinterested individuals care about environmental protection due to their perception of risks or threats posed by environmental destruction (fear of industrial disasters or natural catastrophes, concerns about human health associated with water, air and soil pollution). According to Eckersley (1992), anthropocentrism not only entails human moral superiority vis-à-vis other species, but also ethical consideration exclusively confined to human beings. This can be illustrated by the case of human rights versus animal rights – for the anthropocentric thinkers, animal rights is at best subservient to human rights and can be thought about when human rights are fully addressed, or at worst a non-issue. In this view, our acts toward nature are judged on the basis of how they affect human being only and not on how they affect other species (Vincent 1992). For anthropocentric thinkers, the values associated with nature are instrumental, as can be illustrated by the use of the term natural resources. The second set of values promoting environmental protection is social or humanistic altruism, which is similar to the first set of concerns but which extends from one‘s self and family to a larger human community. Socially altruistic individuals would care about poor people in their own neighborhood or perhaps about entire developing nations. Their concern for the environment affecting these ―disadvantaged‖ groups or communities is likely associated with averting immediate environmental threats and with a concern for other humans‘ welfare, social justice, distribution of wealth, development (according to Western standards), etc. The Charity Paradox Theory postulates that socially altruistic individuals are unlikely to protect environment for its own sake, and that efforts to assist the poor by increasing exploitation of natural 6 resources and increasing industrial and agricultural production at the cost of clearing pristine lands may be, in fact, counter-productive to conservation efforts (Kopnina and Keune 2010). The third basis for environmental concern is biospheric altruism directed toward other species or entire ecosystems independent of the utility of nature. Anthropocentric and social altruism assign only instrumental values to other species or the environment, while biospheric altruism is an extension of concern beyond the human boundary. Biospheric altruism, on the other hand, acknowledges intrinsic value, whereas self-interest and humanistic altruism do not (Dietz et al 2005:344). Environmental values largely correspond to what environmental ethics writers have termed technocentrism and ecocentrism, or shallow and deep ecology, respectively. Timothy O‘Riordan‘s division of environmentalism into the categories of technocentrism and ecocentrism somewhat corresponds to the humanistic and biospheric value bases of environmental concern. Technocentrism can be summarized as the belief in human superiority over other species and their (technological) ingenuity to solve all problems. William Catton and Riley Dunlap wrote a series of articles defining environmental sociology postulating that Western society shares a variety of background assumptions termed the Dominant Western Worldview (DWW) (Catton and Dunlap 1978; 1980; Dunlap and Catton 1979; 1983). Traditional sociology emerged out of this tradition and, hence, shared a set of related background assumptions: the Human Exceptionalism Paridigm (HEP), based upon a shared anthropocentrism that led sociologists to treat modern societies as ―exempt‖ from ecological constraints and to share belief in human (technical) ingenuity and ability to solve environmental or social problems. Anthropocentrism breathes optimism in the sense that humans are largely in control of the surrounding world and that problems arising from modern living can be taken care of, primarily through technological development (Lundmarck 2007:331). The distinction between deep and shallow ecology was pioneered by Næss and his colleagues Sigmund Kvaløy and Nils Faarlund. The shallow ecology movement, as Næss (1973) calls it, is the ―fight against pollution and resource depletion,‖ the central objective of which is ―the health and affluence of people in the developed countries.‖ The deep ecology movement, in contrast, endorses biospheric egalitarianism, the view that all living things are alike in having intrinsic value, independent of their utilitarian usefulness to humans. The deep ecology also endorses the ―relational, total-field image,‖ understanding organisms (including humans) as interrelated knots in the biospherical net. The identification of the human ego with nature can enlarge the boundaries of the self by extending the person beyond the boundaries of individualism. The ecological self in this view does not only connect humans with the wider environment but also provides the source of deep contentment and fulfills deeper needs (Brennan and Lo 2002). Within the complex webs of ecological interdependence, ―humans and the rest of Nature (sic) are truly 7 and deeply interconnected and interrelated in terms of their mutual long-term interests and welfare‖ (Sessions 1992, p. 104). When environmental ethics emerged as a new sub-discipline of philosophy in the early 1970s, it did so by posing a challenge to traditional anthropocentrism. In the first place, it questioned the assumed moral superiority of human beings over other species. In the second place, it investigated the possibility of rational arguments for the intrinsic value of the natural environment and its nonhuman contents (Brennan and Lo 2002). Aldo Leopold (1887 – 1948), an American ecologist and environmentalist and one of the founders of environmental ethics who is best known for his book A Sand Country Almanac, developed the concept of land ethic. Leopold stated: ―A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise‖ (Leopold 1987:224). In this view, humans should protect the biotic community by eschewing self-interest and acting for the good of other species. Reflection on Leopold‘s land ethic by environmental sociologists and environmental psychologists such as Catton and Dunlap (1978) and Stern and Dietz (1994) introduced the idea of nonanthropocentric (biospheric or ecocentric) altruism into environmental concern. Along with anthropocentric self-interest and social altruism (concern for other people), biospheric altruism refers to concern about environment independent of human interest. The Lorax Complex We are left with the following question – why do some individuals, who have the same formative experiences as their peers or even siblings, exhibit more proenvironmental behavior than others? One of the rarest attitudes – the conscious rejection of anthropocentrism in favor of altruistic ecocentrism – cannot be explained by the environmental psychology alone. Environmental psychology and ethics theories do not explain why certain individuals, who, for example, grew up in the same village next to the forest and witnessed its destruction, will gladly accept the job for the logging company clearing the remaining trees, while others will embrace tree hugging. The theory that the author wants to put forth may be termed the Lorax Complex1: non-anthropocentric attitudes and altruistic ―love of nature‖ is something that, at least today, is becoming increasingly rare. In combination with the condition of industrial capitalism, current power relations and development, the rarity of a Lorax complex – for whatever political, economic or biological reasons – means that the task of protecting non-human species rests on The Lorax is a creation of the children‟s writer Theodor Seuss Geisel (1904-1991), an American writer and cartoonist better known by his pen name, Dr. Seuss. He wrote a children‟s book about the Lorax, the prototype environmentalist fighting against the capitalist, the Once-ler. The Lorax stands up for the “Traffula Trees” which are being turned into „thneeds‟ that “everybody needs”. Addressing the Once-ler, the Lorax says: "I am the Lorax, I speak for the trees I speak for the trees, for the trees have no tongues…” 1 8 the shoulders of a few, perhaps even extreme environmentalists. Whether these environmentalists are Westerners or indigenous peoples, their defense of nonhuman species is often overshadowed by other economic, political and social interests of both powerful elites and common citizens, as witnessed by the constant failures of biodiversity protection programs in recent decades. Returning to Rabindranath Tagore‘s story of Balai, the Indian boy‘s pain at seeing the weeds, in all their beauty and diversity being removed from the garden: Balai had long begun to realize that some of the pains he experienced were his alone. They were not felt by anyone around him. This boy really belonged to the age, millions of years ago, when the earth‘s would-be forests cried at birth among the marshlands newly sprung from the ocean‘s depth… The plant, vanguard of all living things on the road of time, had raised its joint hands to the sun and said, ―I want to stay here, I want to live. I am an eternal traveler. Rain or sun, night or day, I shall keep travelling through death after death, towards the pilgrim‘s goal of endless life.‖ That ancient chant of the plants reverberates to this day, in the woods and forests, hills and meadows, and the life of the mother earth declares through the leaves and braches, ―I want to stay, I want to stay.‖ The plant, speechless foster mother of life on earth, has drawn nourishment from the heavens since time immemorial to feed her progeny; has gathered the sap, the vigour, the savour of life for the earth‘s immortal store; and raised to the sky the message of beleaguered life, ―I want to stay.‖ Balai could here that eternal message of life in a special way in his bloodstream. We used to laugh at this a good deal. (Tagore [1928] 2009:257) The fact that people in general – with a few exceptions – are anthropocentric, is perhaps not surprising as one may argue that every species is mostly concerned with themselves. However, at the time of rapid industrial growth, population growth and the unprecedented threat to biodiversity, and rapid extinction of plant and animal species, this anthropocentrism becomes particularly salient. Whether anthropocentrism is universal or culturally conditioned (by the condition of advanced industrialism, or neo-liberal and corporate power structures of the modern world, for example) may be best examined from the anthropological perspective. In the following section, we shall examine what the anthropologists position is in regard to cross-cultural human-environment studies. Generally, many socio-economic and political theories point to power imbalances and imply that the politically and economically weaker communities do not stand a chance against the dominant ideology of capitalism. Indeed, there is some evidence that the economically disadvantaged nations and communities do not have the luxury to afford the ―post-materialist‖ values, such as presumably Western environmentalists possess (Stevenson 2006). There is accumulation of evidence of a universal concern for the environment independent of national GDP or culture (for 9 a critique of the theory of post-material values by Ingelhart that views environmentalism as a post-material luxury, see Dunlap and York, 2008). Perhaps, explanations for anthropocentric, rather than ecocentric, behavior need to be included in theories exploring individual, rather than cultural or national, behaviors. We shall now address the question of exactly how universal ecocentric concern for the environment is. In order to do so, we shall examine the cases of mainstream anthropologists and their subjects. Case Study 1: Applied or Development Anthropologists In her book Loving Nature, environmental anthropologist Kay Milton (2002) analyzes the relationship between emotion and learning and identifies sentimental commitment to conservation as a personal understanding of nature, rooted in direct experiences of the non-human world and biophilia (Anderson 1996). Milton pointed out that anthropologists may be very helpful in answering questions like ―Why isn't everyone an environmentalist?‖ and ―Why do some people care more about the future of natural world then others do?‖ as these questions go to the heart of cultural diversity debate (Milton 2002:1). Traditional anthropological focus on the indigenous, local and minority groups coupled with support for human rights in the context of ―traditional way of life‖ (such as hunting or slash-and-burn agriculture) is often pitched against conservation efforts to institute limits to cultural practices that negatively affect non-human species. Many anthropologists hold the view that conservation organizations attempt to limit the access of the dispossessed to the spoils of modern industrial societies, including the use of natural resources, wage labor and development, and deny indigenous people of the opportunity to use natural resources. In some cases, conservationists are viewed as Western ethnocentric imperialists, imposing their dominant ideology on politically and economically disadvantaged people. Many applied and development anthropologists have accused conservationists of eco-imperialism and of the imposition of their own vision of environmental values (see, for example, publications of Alcorn, the president of the Anthropology and Environment section of the American Association of Anthropology (AAA), who equates the work of conservationists in developing countries to "ecofascism"). The work of conservation agencies is demonized and conservational activists are blamed for extreme atrocities against humanity. According to Alcorn: Human rights abuse allegations associated with conservation activities include violation of due process, massive forcible resettlements, extrajudicial killings, destruction of property and farms, torture, and other violations of social, cultural, political and economic rights. Indigenous Peoples are 10 particularly vulnerable to having their prior territorial rights violated by conservation programs…. Conservation agencies and their supporters deny, mask or defend their behavior, trotting out isolated examples. They hijack the discussion from human rights to economics, claiming the "real agenda" of "savages" is to end capitalism. Or they use technospeak to shift the discussion of human rights to one of "conservation trade-offs." (Alcorn, 2008:2) Applied anthropologists‘ ethnographies often reflect that the empirical reality of conservation or development governance warrants more anthropological advocacy and moral engagement. Conservation/culture conflict in the work of applied and development anthropologists outlines a number of countercurrents of grassroots efforts to achieve conservation with social justice. Anthropologists blame environmental organizations for being neo-colonialist in their efforts to protect non-human-species‘ interests and rights. For example, the anthropological discussion group Just Conservation on Facebook serves ―To air grievances, concerns or experiences of conservation-related human rights abuses.‖ According to Wenzel (1991), environmentalists in general, and animal rights activists in particular, are ethnocentric cultural imperialists. In the article on environmental anthropology in American Anthropologist Kottak reflects: Analysis of social forms should not be subordinated to approaches that emphasize the environment at the expense of society and culture, and ecology over anthropology. People must come first. Cultural anthropologists need to remember the primacy of society and culture in their analysis and not be dazzled by ecological data. Funding sources that give priority to the hard sciences, fund expensive equipment, and support sophisticated technology should not lead us away from a focus on cultural specificity and social and cultural variables. Ecological anthropologists must put anthropology ahead of ecology. Anthropology's contribution is to place people ahead of plants, animals, and soil. (Kottak 1999:33) In an ethnography of Icelandic minke whalers, Niels Einarsson describes the struggle to earn their living in the face of environmentalists and argues that there is a ―serious need to show respect for the values and interests of local people relating to natural resources‘‘ (Einarsson 1993:82). The reference to natural resources, even if they refer to endangered species, is worth noting. Einarsson also acknowledges the fact that: Most anthropologists will protest if ―their‖ people are subjected to ethnocentric treatment attacking their culture or even threatening their subsistence. Many anthropologists are suffering from ―species compassion fatigue‖ when they 11 see this as threatening to the way of life of people whom they have lived among and learned to appreciate. (Einarsson 1993:80) Preoccupation with environmental justice and socio-economic fairness, which is typical of development discourse, is often much more pronounced in anthropological work than concern for environment. There are many instances of anthropologists taking sides against conservationists in animal-human rights conflicts in the cause of guaranteeing local people their rights. Western aid and development workers, as well as groups that profit from these ―rights‖ the most (such as Japanese pro-whaling protagonists who consciously attempt to connect discourses on ―Western‖ ecoimperialism with their own goals and often find a sympathetic anthropological audience (Blok 2010:21). The view that portrays environmentalists as imposing neoimperialist ideology is ironic considering the fact that the very notion of human rights and development (with accompanying non-traditional practices of, for example, wage labor and consumerism) are also very much Western concepts and impositions. Anthropologists have noted that ecologically important economic activities are those that put people and the environment in immediate proximity, and that this idea is also salient to conservation research – especially development projects that attempt to change the way people interact with their surroundings (Haenn 2011). It must be noted, however, that most conservation/culture conflicts do not include famishing humans, but those who struggle for economic or social advantage. In other words, the issue of non-human survival is normally not equally balanced with the issue of human welfare. Despite efforts to reconcile conservation/culture conflict, many anthropologists seem still very much inclined to favor culture over conservation. Einarsson adds that to most anthropologists, the choice of the human side may seem self-evident, as they live with and learn from the local communities and internalize their values and viewpoints, ―which may be the reason why anthropologists sometimes have difficulty communicating with environmentalists, compared with the relative success they have with the development community‖ (1993: 82). As anthropologists seem generally predisposed to cultural relativism, the idea of ―going native‖ and accepting the indigenous populations‘ values seems logical. There are many examples of how anthropologists demonstrat this moral engagement, particularly by accusing environmentalists of using indigenous populations to achieve their conservationist ends and then ―abandoning the people‖ when their goals have been achieved. However, there is also evidence that while environmentalists have tried to manipulate the indigenous group with whom they worked, in the end, they felt that they themselves had been manipulated, both by local governments and local communities (Brosius, 2006). Leah Horowitz‘s ethnography describes the indigenous group in New Caledonia that fought alongside the environmentalists for six years against a multinational mining project that would 12 have polluted the lagoon where they fish (as well as conduct lots of other environmental damage). The environmentalists needed the group's "indigenous legitimacy" in order to bolster their effect. Finally, without the knowledge of the anthropologists – the indigenous group signed a "pact" with the mining company (Horowitz 2010, in press). Case Study 2. Anthropocentrism in Constructivist View. On the other hand, the anthropologists who espouse constructivism see nature and wilderness as social constructs, a view which implies that environmental problems are only salient in as far as they are interpreted as such by human actors. Yet another source of anthropocentric bias in anthropology is presented by the constructivist stream, within the theory of postmodernism. Many postmodern writers, especially those following a constructionist view, consider the concept of nature as a socially constructed entity, created by the characters themselves and largely a product of language, a dependent construct wholly connected to the human perception of it. Ecology is mostly discussed in symbolic, historical and political terms, overriding the dichotomies that informed and enlivened the debates of the past – nature/culture, idealism/materialism – and is informed by the literature on transnationalist flows and local-global articulations (Biersack 2008), with the physical aspect of ecology conspicuously absent. From this perspective, nature is not only represented by language, but it is also created by it and ultimately becomes little more than an offshoot of social reality (Kidner 2000:264). This makes it impossible to judge one attitude toward nature as better or worse, more beneficial or more harmful; according to this logic, there is no nature outside the human perception of it (ibid). Nature as ―an artifact, understood and interacted with by people via culturally specific symbolic systems‖ (Kang 2003: 335) implies that there is no ―nature‖ outside of human perception of it. Ethnographies of human-animal interactions, such as those with dingoes (Healy, 2007), crocodiles (McGregor 2005), elephants (Thompson 2002; Barua 2010), whales (Einarsson 1993; Anders 2010; Blok 2010) to name just a few, tend to emphasize the socio-cultural and political complexity and interdependency of (human) actors‘ networks, a systems approach, action network theories, etc. rather than the unequal and often extractive nature of this interaction (hunting, fishing, etc.). Particularly in the case of endangered species, a constructivist view of The Other implies that the very concept of danger or risk is manufactured or socially produced. Obviously, conservation work or work of any human-animal conflict mediators can not be understood without realization of the complexity of human agency and power, yet the remarkable omission in these discussions is the implications for the existence of non-human actors (Zerner 2000). However, the author calls for a radical departure 13 from the mainstream postmodern preoccupation with the social construction of nature (among other things) (Escobar 1996) or wilderness (Cronon 1996; Neumann 1998; Whatmore and Thorne 1998) and, by implication environmental problems. Conservation anthropology brings forth the conscious realization that extinction of species is not just socially constructed but needs to be ethically addressed, much in the same way the more traditional anthropological subjects – the local, the indigenous, the minority, the poor – have been addressed. Conservation anthropology is a conscious, ethical, political and practical call to include the rights of non-human actors in the discussion of environmental justice. While it is not the purpose of this article to seek evidence to support or refute anthropological accusations, the author argues that the view of environmentalists as imposing neo-imperialists is ironic in light of the fact that the very notion of human rights and development are also very much Western concepts and impositions. Stripped of ideological and ethical underpinnings, the argument of anti-environmental academics in favor of defending human rather than environmental rights is equally subjective, whether or not people are traditionally pro-environmental. The fact that both development and constructivist anthropological positions are essentially anthropocentric is perhaps not surprising since the discipline of anthropology is per definition anthropocentric. The fact cannot be denied that in some cases anthropologists play a significant role in undermining the work of conservationists, be they Western or local. What‘s more worrying is that anthropologists seem to adapt the very dominant view of the industrial elites that they profess to criticize in the quest for development. Case Study 3. Indigenous Communities One school of thought in anthropology views the ―natives‖ within traditional and increasingly transitional societies as ―noble savages‖ living in harmony with nature. In this view, it is (Western) political and economic elites who are largely responsible for the environmental problems. Caldwell (1990) and Chokor (1993), for example, suggest that indigenous, non-industrialized societies tend to believe in the profound connection between humanity and nature. They find compatibility between natural balance and the needs of humans in using natural resources. Environmental knowledge or education in such societies then implies transmission of the deeply embedded ecological values, in spite of the encroachment of materialistic, capitalist, external (often Western) colonizers, popularized in the Western imagination through films such as Pocahontas (1995) and Avatar (2009). However, most ethnographic studies challenge this depiction of tribal peoples who live in harmony with nature. Instead, critics of such idealized representation assert that indigenous peoples have ―human vices just as we do‖ (Wagley 1976:302), view animals and plants as something not worth protecting (Allendorf et al. 2006; Infield 1988), and are capable of overuse and poor decision-making (Netting 1993). They 14 consider that the majority of traits that perhaps once enabled traditional societies to live in greater harmony with the environment than more industrialized groups are slowly diminishing (Brosius 1999). As Turner argued: The strong claims that all indigenous people are by nature conservationists can easily be attacked by counterexamples—species extinctions due to human hunting in the prehistoric past and indigenous peoples who grant large timber cutting or mining concessions on their lands. (1993: 526) Utilitarian approach to plants and animals can be illustrated by Grundy‘s account of Lesotho boy‘s approach to ecology: Once when I expressed to a student my delight at having located a nest of an endangered bird, the bald ibis, on the mountain where we lived, I found myself having to explain the concept of an "endangered species" to him. When Tsepo understood that this particular species of bird might no longer exist in a few years, his first question was, "Are they useful?" If no one needs bald ibises for anything, Tsepo reasoned, why bother to preserve them? (Grundy 1995: 7) In her paper on factors influencing local attitudes toward protected areas, Teressa Trusty (2011) notes that in Asia and Africa, local people frequently view wildlife from protected areas as pests (Infield 1988, Newmark et al., 1993, Infield and Namara 2001, Allendorf et al. 2006), something to be feared (Infield 1988, Allendorf 2007) or as valued by the government more than they value the local people that the government values over themselves (Brockington 2002, Igoe 2004). Kottak (1999) reflects that in Madagascar, many intellectuals and officials are bothered that foreigners seem more concerned about lemurs and other endangered species than about Madagascar's people. As one of his colleague there remarked, "The next time you come to Madagascar, there'll be no more Malagasy. All the people will have starved to death, and a lemur will have to meet you at the airport." Most Malagasy perceive human poverty as a more pressing problem than animal and plant survival (Kottak 1999:33). A group of anthropologists adhering to the Actor Network Theory (ANT) derived from studies of the social construction of science and technology by Callon (1986), Latour (1988), and Law (1986) postulate that society and nature are not divisible into easily identifiable compartments, but rather into different kinds of material forms (material heterogeneity), such as humans, machines, devices and other living organisms. Coconstitutive relationships between people and non-humans embody the form, character and content of human activities and the world which are intimately interdependent – resonating with Latour's ―experimental metaphysics,‖ which is intended to achieve the ―progressive composition‖ of people and their worlds (Healy 15 2007). In drawing on ANT, the analysis of kangaroo products trade by Lorraine Thorne reveals the connections between spaces of calculation and spaces of killing often overlooked and dismissed as unconnected with human lives. A number of noteworthy non-anthropocentric ethnographies emerged out of ANT tradition. The contemporary international trade in kangaroo products is an historically specific, complex set of (attenuated) relationships between hidden spaces, sites and actors. Spatial metaphors help legitimize the kangaroo industry; in particular, deployment of spatial imaginaries has tangible, material impact on the animals' lives. The taxonomy of abundance fuels public acceptance of kangaroo slaughter, underpinned by widespread popular images of kangaroo hordes bounding across a flat, virtual landscape. Ultimately, by casting kangaroos as large, abundant pests now repackaged to serve the lucrative caused celèbre of biodiversity, the kangaroo trading network profoundly delimits the options for agency of the commercially targeted species. Kangaroo slaughter is thus rendered justifiable – a non-issue (Thorne, 1998:168). In their ethnography of otter preservation efforts, Goedeke and Rikoon (2008) use scientific controversy emerging from a river otter restoration project in Missouri to explore the role of nonhuman actors in the dynamism of networks forming to establish the ideals and outcomes of ecological restoration. The authors demonstrated how an epistemic controversy, sparked by the failure of authoritative spokespersons (such as scientists) to enroll river otters, fish, and waterways, opened the door for a more diverse group of spokespersons who, in turn, enrolled more actors to settle the controversy and emphasize the need to recognize the role of nonhumans as catalysts and actors because of their potential to challenge and change networks. In Kohn‘s article, the author considers the challenges involved in knowing and interacting with other species and the implications this has for the practice of anthropology (Kohn 2007). He argues for the development of an anthropology that is not just confined to the human but is concerned with the effects of our entanglements (Raffles 2002) with other kinds of living selves. In Tim Ingold‘s words, ―despite human attempts to hard surface this world, and to block the intermingling of substance and medium that is essential to growth and habitation, the creeping entanglements of life will always and eventually gain the upper hand‖ (Ingold, 2008: 1796). Ethnographies exploring emotional connection with nature (Sobel, 1996; Milton, 2002) and continuing the work in human geography that has been termed more-than-human, posthuman and relational (Whatmore 2002; Castree 2003; Braun 2008) may provide a way forward from the anthropocentric paradigm in which many anthropologists are caught. Furthermore, there‘s a need for developing an environmentally conscious, non-anthropocentric anthropology – a distinct anthropology of ecology and conservation. 16 Conclusion. In this article we have discussed the differences between anthropocentric and ecocentric perspectives. Anthropocentrism only grants intrinsic value and, in prolongation, rights and interests to human beings, while ecocentrism‘s proponents assert the intrinsic value of each individual living organism, including humans, plant and animal species, and ecosystems. This extended view on who is the holder of intrinsic value is used to justify respect across species boundaries, in the sense that consideration for humans and non-humans encompass both present and future generations (Eckersley, 1992). As the fictional characters of the Lorax (who speak for the trees, ―for the trees have no tongues‖) or Balai (who was deeply hurt ―when someone plucked flowers from a tree‖) conservationists are often met with hostility of the communities, governments and anthropologists. As long as the subjects have no voice of their own, those who speak for them may be hailed as traitors to their own species. Also, as the author has argued in the case of development, it is not always possible to satisfy the interests of both the economically disadvantaged and those who are being distributed or consumed as part of the expanding economic pie. If interests of the structurally weak and underrepresented – those of other species – are to be taken into consideration, one will need to make hard moral choices, and anthropological arbitration can help. Anthropological engagement and arbitration in the case of nonhuman species would mean working together and not against conservationists. If successful, conservation anthropologists‘ contribution to the survival – and wellbeing – of all creatures on this planet can be great. As long as ecocentrics‘ political representation is limited to a few large and active ENGO‘s, ecocentrism is still subordinate to the interests of the immensely more powerful anthropocentrically oriented government and corporate elites. 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