RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: COULD QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING BE THE WAY FORWARD? Marta Guzmán , Diana Montan é, Hakan Yapar. REVIS TA UC3M Nº1 January 2021 Enero 2021/1 SUMMARY The EU's voting system has been questioned in recent years. Two voting regimes have been contraposed: unanimity and qualified majority voting. While the first one is declining its importance since several member states refuse to remove it, the second one is gaining popularity as European powers grow thanks to this system. This article aims to prove the effectiveness of the Qualified Majority Voting faced to the pros of the unanimity system and the possible solutions as the progressive implementation in concrete fields as sanctions, human rights and civil missions. KEYWORDS: European Union, European Council, Unanimity, QMV, Voting system, Debate MARTA GUZMÁN martaguz.g97@gmail.com DIANA MONTANÉ HAKAN YAPAR dianamonmarin@gmail.com hakancihanyapar@gmail.com Ronda de Toledo, 1 28005, Madrid Tel: 638 55 71 75 www.uc3m.es University's magazine is focused on discussing geopolitical strategic points. All manuscripts are reviewed by professors. The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors. 4 INTRODUCTION UNANIMITY SYSTEM IN THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: WHAT UNANIMITY HAS TO OFFER? 8 TRANSITION TO QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING IN EU FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: MAKING THE MOST OF ITS POSSIBILITIES 14 16 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING INTRODUCTION The world is in constant evolution; however, the current times are the testimony of history's most significant transformation. Politics rule the countries that constitute the global order. The main political currents are basculating between right and left, and new tendencies have burst recently, as transnationalism. Once Donald Trump was elected as the USA President, some points of this concept have been included on the international scale and used in foreign matters. 1 Multipolarism has also been raised, and it permits the existence of international structures that can be regulated by a combination of collective hegemony and cooperative multilateralism. 2 European Union has integrated into the liberal order, and this integration has served economic intentions, security policies, power, global governance, and national obligations. The EU is meant to assume the role of a “normative power” in academic circles. However, the concept of “normative power” is a specification of the EU’s selfimage, which is expected to take over a particular responsibility for the spreading of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the principles of multilateralism and rulesbased global order. 3 Yet the votation system does not respond to these noble aspirations for some of the members. The European Council, depending on the subject of voting, takes the decisions by three different systems: the simple majority (vote in favor by 14 member states), the qualified majority (it requires the vote in favor of the 55% of the member states that represents at least 65% of EU's population) and the Unanimous vote (all votes in favor).4 This report´s primary purpose is to reconsider the unanimity system in EU foreign policymaking and to analyse if it is the best system to keep the EU integrated into the 1 Bashirov, G. Yilmaz.I, (2019) The rise of transactionalism in international relations: evidence from Turkey’s relations with the European Union, Australian journal of international affairs, pp.1- 19. 2 Añorve, D.; Cid, I.; Gutiérrez, A.T. (2012) Los BRICS entre la multipolaridad y la unipolaridad en el siglo XXI, México: Universidad de Guanajuato, págs.17-53. 3 Bakardjieva,A, Michalski, A, Oxelheim,L (2018) The European union in a changing world order, Executive summary of Europaperspektiv, Sweden: Santerus Förlag, pp 4-16. 4 European Council (2020) How does the Council Vote? available in https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/ 3 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING international system. The debate has been opened. The majority system already serves to vote the most significant part of social policies. However, a limited number of matters still request unanimity, especially for the Commission set’s legislative procedures. 5 To answer the problematic question raised, the subject is going to be divided into two different parts. To understand the debate, it is essential to face both sides and deepen into the possibilities. Two systems of voting are going to be analysed by qualitative and quantitative methods: unanimity and qualified majority. The final answer relies on the member states since they decide the European Union´s power dynamics. It is complicated to theorize about a topic that divides the opinion of the political spheres. Even the states members have not arrived yet at a conclusion, and the ball is on their court. UNANIMITY SYSTEM IN THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: WHAT UNANIMITY HAS TO OFFER? The voting system of the Council of the European Union was set by article 16 of the TEU and amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, shifting from unanimity to qualified majority voting in many cases. There are only few processes in which the Council of the European Union (EU) must act by unanimity, being this system reserved for matters are in fact the most sensitive in nature, in which several times it is included the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).6 Even if qualified majority voting (QMV) is possible in most cases, the Council of the EU is often willing to adopt policies by unanimous consensus. However, there has been an increasing debate in the last decade, within the Community institutions and mostly within intergovernmental conferences concerned with the amendment of the EU's treaties, about the extension of QMV. The trend (Figure 1) shows a pattern where several states, mostly driven by Hungary and Poland, insist on retaining the unanimity rule while others, such as France, Germany and Belgium, promote a further 5 European Commision (2019) Commision launches debate on more efficient decision-makign in EU social policy, Strasbourg: European Commission. 6 Voting System of the Council of EU, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/votingsystem/unanimity/ 4 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING extension of qualified majority voting, forming two blocks which are well differentiated by ideological terms.7 Figure 1: Position of the member states on the use of QMV in EU Foreign Policy (Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by Hertie School) In general, there are several scholars that address the inherent spirit of consensus, cooperation and dialogue that has shaped the European Union since its creation. In this line, unanimity is seen as the path that has enabled member states to find a middle ground for developing a balanced, secure, integrated, and strong union.8 Unanimity based on consensus has several fundamental advantages for enhancing interstate relations and maximizing the benefits of multilateral cooperation. Historically, there are multiple evidence on how the most successful reforms and plans have come through consensus, from the protection of European citizens to the sanctions and restrictive measures imposed on certain countries. Contrary to the popular belief, unanimity does not mean single thought or ideological conformism. While single thought can create the illusion of a non-existing unanimity based on coercion and/or group pressure, consensus is the essential process of having an open mind and enforce dialogue to look for collective 7 Häge, F. (2012). Coalition-Building and Consensus in the Council of the European Union. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340351099 8 Mattia, M. and Lane, J. (2001). Why Unanimity in the Council? A Roll Call Analysis of Council Voting. SAGE Publications. European Union Politics, Vol 2 (1), 31-52. DOI: 10.14650/11652000102015394 5 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING decisions9, which is the basic rule of diplomatic relations and therefore a consistent way to approach any matter concerning CFSP. A worth mentioning trend is the formation of coalition voting patterns and blocks, which are a current reality within the European Union. Whether acting from geographical (northsouth or west-east), ideological (conservatives-progressives) or economic approaches, the fact is that states are often divided according to their positions on certain matters. Even if this pattern is allegedly turning decision-making into a nightmare for European leaders, it is to be said that the inefficiency of achieving agreements is not so much due to the unanimity rule that governs several processes of the Council. It could be relying on the inability of political leaders to negotiate and present plausible proposals. Paraphrasing Martin Luther King Jr., a genuine leader is not a consensus searcher but a molder of consensus, and this task needs a stronger compromise from European Union institutions. In addition, there is to be said that several studies have stated that decisions made by consensus have greater efficiency regarding the application of measures related to those decisions.10Following this opinion, a decision taken by consensus in the Council would imply that all members of the group agree with that decision and therefore will support its application. This differs from decisions made according to the majority system, which usually is accused of creating a minority in disagreement and therefore discrimination of that minority who is opposing to the measures derived from the decision.11Moreover, a decision cannot be qualified as better or more just only because it is taken by majority. Therefore, applying unanimity to matters of CFSP is seen by many as the triumph of the consensual option once all the scenarios have been considered. After all, the strategic autonomy of the EU is still under debate, and the position of the member states on the importance of it for its own national defense and security is diverse (Figure 2), for which most of the states that contest the strategic autonomy of the EU are the ones that are pushing against QMV. 9 Miller, C. (1985). Group Decision Making Under Majority and Unanimity Decision Rules. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48(1), 51-61. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3033781 10 Kevin L. Sager & John Gastil (2006) The Origins and Consequences of Consensus Decision Making: A Test of the Social Consensus Model, Southern Communication Journal, 71:1, 1-24, DOI: 10.1080/10417940500503464 11 Häge, F. (2012). Coalition-Building and Consensus in the Council of the European Union. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340351099 6 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING Figure 2: Opinion of the EU members states on the importance of CFSP autonomy (Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by ECFR) Through the unanimity system, the Council plays a crucial role in facilitating the negotiation process by sounding out positions and offering compromise proposals and the positions of member states tend to become more moderate during the course of negotiations. The coalition formation process would be one of the most relevant factors for explaining consensus decision making, with member states adapting their positions over time to form larger and larger groups and therefore ensure negotiation and through compromise ensure unanimous support of decisions that would affect all. 12 In any case, if the Council was to transition to a system based on qualitative majority voting on matters such as CFSP, there would be further intrusion on matters of sovereignty 13 and therefore less support for implementing reforms from certain member states. 12 Mattia, M. and Lane, J. (2001). Why Unanimity in the Council? A Roll Call Analysis of Council Voting. SAGE Publications. European Union Politics, Vol 2 (1), 31-52. DOI: 10.14650/11652000102015394 13 Häge, F. (2012). Coalition-Building and Consensus in the Council of the European Union. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340351099 7 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING TRANSITION TO QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING IN EU FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: MAKING THE MOST OF ITS POSSIBILITIES Before starting to discuss advantages of transition towards qualified majority voting in more policy areas under the auspices of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it is important to note that this transition requires certain preconditions as follows: Legally, all member states in advance need to unanimously agree on which further policy areas will be allowed for qualified majority voting (QMV)14. Practically and most importantly, there must be to a certain extent common strategic culture15 emerged out of convergent economic, security and strategic interests which is far from being the case now and in the foreseeable future. Bearing them in mind will help better frame the debate and explore advantages of such a transition. Firstly, it would act as a driver for member states that most tend to block the proposals to actively engage in shaping the policies instead of simply exploiting veto power with comfort and complete disregard to EU's strategic posturing as a whole. Hence, it would put an end to paralysis and standstill that often emerge from one country leveraging veto power for the sake of a matter of disagreement in another unrelated issue or as a result of 3rd party pressure. Eliminating unanimity will enable unlinking unrelated issues on the one hand and serve as a "shield"16against rivals' attempts to paralyze EU unity through abusing mostly economic vulnerabilities of some member states on the other. For instance, many EU actions were diluted since unanimity principle is instrumentalized against the EU by Russian and Chinese influence on some member states.17 Furthermore, as more than %90 percent of EU's current decision-making rests on qualified majority voting18, its effectiveness has already been proven in such areas as 14 LEGISLATIVE TRAIN SCHEDULE: EUROPE AS A STRONGER GLOBAL ACTOR. (2020, December 18). Retrieved from European Parliament: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-europeas-a-stronger-global-actor/file-more-efficient-decision-making-in-cfsp 15 Borrel, J. (2020, October 2). When member states are divided, how do we ensure Europe is able to act? Retrieved from European Union External Action Service: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/86276/when-member-states-are-dividedhow-do-we-ensure-europe-able-act_en 16 Schuette, L. (2019). Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting? Center For European Reform. Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf 17 Schuette, L. (2019). Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting? Center For European Reform. Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf 18 Schuette, L. (2019). Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting? Center For European Reform. Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf 8 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING single market, climate and migration where stakes for individual member states are as important as in foreign policy. 19 Having replaced unanimity with QMV doesn't necessarily mean that every decision will be taken by QMV. Instead, the EU's spirit of consensus making will be de facto out there as has been so far 20and there will be more incentives added to compromise. In relation to the first point, an EU foreign policy capable of acting swiftly will have more credibility vis-à-vis partners and rivals alike in the global stage. Today and in the near future, ability to quickly respond in an ever increasingly ailing international environment is a crucial asset to stand up as a global actor. Nevertheless, who respects an actor acting and reacting only belatedly? The EU's faltering foreign policy because of unanimity obsession has obviously ended up with muddling vis-à-vis Russia, Turkey and China. [See Figures 3,4 and 5]. Would Russian annexation of Crimea and interference to eastern Ukraine be possible if the EU had been able to stand up against the earlier signals of Russian aggression on time? Would Turkey dare ridiculing the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean by bringing her drilling ships back each time before EU Council meetings and forth just after the Council meetings had the EU been able to take decisions by QMV? Would China treat the EU with self-aggrandizement had human rights violations of China not gone with impunity but with credibly agile EU response? 19 Borrel, J. (2020, October 2). When member states are divided, how do we ensure Europe is able to act? Retrieved from European Union External Action Service: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/86276/when-member-states-are-divided-h ow-do-we-ensure-europe-able-act_en 20 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL. (2018, September 12). Retrieved from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-efficient-decisionmaking-cfsp-communication-647_en.pdf 9 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING Figure 3: EU´s impact in Chinese Media (Source Google Big Query) Figure 4: EU’s impact in Russia’s Media (Source Google Big Query) Figure5: EU’s impact in Turkish Media (Source Google Big Query) 10 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING Secondly, it would contribute to the Transatlantic Alliance with the EU capable of shouldering more responsibility on its own. Considering Trump's unkindly urge for Europe to be more active is now shared by many in the US regardless of their parties 21and the centre of gravity in world politics is increasingly pivoting to Asia, neither EU can keep on offshoring its security to US, nor US can afford going with its traditional approach of keeping Europe in check as a passive actor instead of a "genuine partner".22As this will be in the interest of the US, it might be expected that the US would be better off from a fairer burden-sharing in the Transatlantic Alliance. As such, the US could actively engage in convincing those member states, particularly Baltic, Central and Eastern European countries that may have concerns of their special security concerns downplayed in this new setting, that Transatlantic security could be better served with a bolder and effective EU foreign policy.23 In fact, contrary to the common belief that QMV could only serve the interests of larger countries, it might well be the case that those smaller countries opposing the idea can benefit from it. It simply does not come up with one-wins-all terms if it is decided to be binding for all member states and to all cases. As such, it will unblock the inaction status of the EU foreign policy that might in some cases favor positions of those smaller member states like Cyprus. For instance, had there been QMV in CFSP, Cyprus would never have had to express her frustration over a la carte24 practice in EU foreign policy. Recently, Cyprus blocked the EU sanctions proposal against Belarus unless the EU imposes bold sanctions against Turkey over Turkey's illegal drilling activities in Eastern Mediterranean in breach of Cyprus sovereignty. For more than three months, the EU could not act in unity. However, sanctions against Turkey have, not only in this recent example but for quite a long time, been resisted by several countries led by Germany. In case QMV is 21 Bergmann, M., & Brattberg, E. (2020, October 15). WASHINGTON SHOULD PUSH FOR A STRONGER E.U. FOREIGN POLICY. Retrieved from War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/washington-should-push-for-a-stronger-e-u-foreign-policy/ 22 Bergmann, M., & Brattberg, E. (2020, October 15). WASHINGTON SHOULD PUSH FOR A STRONGER E.U. FOREIGN POLICY. Retrieved from War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/washington-should-push-for-a-stronger-e-u-foreign-policy/ 23 Bergmann, M., & Brattberg, E. (2020, October 15). WASHINGTON SHOULD PUSH FOR A STRONGER E.U. FOREIGN POLICY. Retrieved from War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/washington-should-push-for-a-stronger-e-u-foreign-policy/ 24 Erlanger, S. (2020, September 24). E.U. Failure to Impose Sanctions on Belarus Lays Bare Its Weakness. Retrieved from New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/world/europe/europesanctions-belarus-cyprus.html 11 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING applied uniformly, Cyprus supported by Greece and France could mobilize the EU to impose sanctions on Turkey that Germany barely afford to oppose. On the other hand, it is also important to note that switching from unanimity voting to QMV does not necessarily mean that there might be cases where a member state's core national security interests be damaged, since they are protected under the Treaty on European Union (TEU) with certain clauses acting as "emergency brakes"25 whenever needed. Beyond that, it is important to remember that European integration emerged out of the fact that, as Alan Milward stressed, European states had to transfer some of national sovereignty to pre-empt future threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.26 Now time has come again that they should recognize the severity of the global situation (See Figure 6) to reconsider the importance of more effective common foreign policy making. Figure 6: Worldwide Deteriorating Tone and Increasing Coverage of Verbal and Material Conflicts in the Last Decade (Source: Google Big Query) Thirdly, QMV in CFSP will strengthen EU's united actorness since it will foster EU framework in member states' foreign affairs and de-accelerate emerging trends of resorting to non-EU frameworks as can be seen in cases of the coalitions of willing and State of the Union 2018: Making the EU a stronger global actor – European Commission proposes more efficient decision-making in CFSP. (2018, September 12). Retrieved from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5683 25 Matthijs, M. (2020, May/June). The Right Way to Fix the EU. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-0413/right-way-fix-eu 26 12 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING differentiated integration. Unanimity principle cannot be said to be well-functioning. It increasingly paves the way for the use of non-EU frameworks and hence, diminishes the role of the EU27. Although the use of such coalitions of willing like E3 and Normandy Format would appear to be useful at the first glance, they cannot be a real substitute for a united EU front forged effectively and promptly in the EU framework thanks to QMV.28 Furthermore, it will also enable more ambitious decisions to be taken since the lowest common denominator will no longer be imposed by unanimity obsession. For instance, contrary to arguments in favor of unanimity that EU managed to slap sanctions on Russia under unanimity voting, there would have been stronger sanctions and stance under QMV.29 This can also apply to many cases including Turkey where positions established upon lowest common denominator has fallen far from being deterrent. With respect to critiques over sovereignty and legitimacy of such a transition, it has already been mentioned that there are emergency brakes to ensure core national interests of member states and QMV in CFSP would be no more consequential than in other areas where QMV has successfully been applied for long time.30As it proactively opens up new opportunities for smaller countries through fostering the role of Brussels instead of Berlin-Paris axis in foreign policy geometry31, it can be said that QMV in CFSP would be more legitimate and inclusive. In addition, some proposed that a role for European Parliament might be established to exert an oversight not before but after the decisions taken to foster democratic legitimacy.32 27 Nadibaidze, A. (2020, October 23). Will the EU move to Qualified Majority Voting in Foreign Policy? Retrieved from Vocal Europe: https://usercontent.one/wp/www.vocaleurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/Willthe-EU-move-to-Qualified-Majority-Voting-in-Foreign-Policy.pdf 28 Bergmann, M., & Brattberg, E. (2020, October 15). WASHINGTON SHOULD PUSH FOR A STRONGER E.U. FOREIGN POLICY. Retrieved from War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/washington-should-push-for-a-stronger-e-u-foreign-policy/ 29 Schuette, L. (2019). Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting? Center For European Reform. Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf 30 Schuette, L. (2019). Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting? Center For European Reform. Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf 31 Bergmann, M., & Brattberg, E. (2020, October 15). WASHINGTON SHOULD PUSH FOR A STRONGER E.U. FOREIGN POLICY. Retrieved from War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/washington-should-push-for-a-stronger-e-u-foreign-policy/ 32 Schuette, L. (2019). Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting? Center For European Reform. Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf 13 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING From a point of view, unanimity principle itself contradicts with the rights of member states to exert collective sovereignty at the EU level. For instance, EU Foreign Policy Chief Joseph Borrel slammed the obstruction of Operation Irini aiming to monitor arms embargo on Libya by a member state that is even not to be involved in the conduct of operation.33How legitimate is it then? Besides, how legitimate is it that some member states define their national interests in contradiction to EU values like refugee rights as seen in the case of refugee relocation mechanism debates? Lastly, there is a public consensus for bolder EU CFSP across member states including in those countries staunchly opposing QMV in CFSP.34 Overall, it will be a valuable step forward for the EU to be able to pursue more ambitious and credible foreign policy through overcoming some structural defaults of common foreign policy making in the interests of the whole Union and Transatlantic partnership. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS It is urgent to adopt QMV in larger segments of decisions, even if it is used in the biggest majority of European matters (90%). The extension of this system will benefit the EU faced by other world powers such as Russia, Turkey, and China. As a matter of fact, it would contribute to enhance EU projections and the union could assume more responsibilities. The QMV system would not only serve the interest of the larger countries as it is believed. It would not threaten any of the members' core security interests, but instead, will strengthen EU actorness in the international order. Furthermore, unanimity is not wellfunctioning and has decreased the EU's role. Yet, the unanimity system is used in a limited number of processes; however, there is a debate still going. Member states such as France, Germany, and Belgium are pressing for this transition since unanimity and veto bring chaos in most cases. 33 Borrel, J. (2020, October 2). When member states are divided, how do we ensure Europe is able to act? Retrieved from European Union External Action Service: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/86276/when-member-states-are-dividedhow-do-we-ensure-europe-able-act_en 34 Schuette, L. (2019). Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting? Center For European Reform. Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf 14 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING Even if unanimity smashes the principles of cooperation, dialogue, and concession, it still has advantages as enhancing interstate relations and maximizes the benefits of multilateral cooperation. There is a trend going on that sets the patterns of the formation of a coalition. Different criteria are followed as geographical, ideological, and economical. Decisions taken by consensus are known as more effective since all members agree, and therefore, they support the application of the decision. Following Martin Luther King's words, it would be necessary to create an ambiance of consensus that would allow the transition to the Qualified Majority Voting. The QMV extension could be progressive, implementing different fields as sanctions, human rights, and civilian missions. It would be useful and would not affect the EU treaties. It would be interesting to demonstrate that QMV system does not benefit only the most powerful countries, but it is a method which can improve the whole Union and then enhance the possibilities of every country member. To inform about all the decisions that have already been taken with the Qualifies Majority system and show the benefits could be an option to convince the most sceptical members. Thus, implementing this system would be milestone of European cooperation that has been an example worldwide since the end of Second War World. The future is progressively closer and the QMV is the key for it. 15 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING BIBLIOGRAPHY Añorve, D.; Cid, I.; Gutiérrez, A.T. (2012) Los BRICS entre la multipolaridad y la unipolaridad en el siglo XXI, México: Universidad de Guanajuato, págs.17-53. Bakardjieva,A, Michalski, A, Oxelheim,L (2018) The European union in a changing world order, Executive summary of Europaperspektiv, Sweden: Santerus Förlag, pp 416. Bashirov, G. Yilmaz.I, (2019) The rise of transactionalism in international relations: eidence from Turkey’s relations with the European Union, Australian journal of international affairs, pp.1- 19 Bergmann, M., & Brattberg, E. (2020, October 15). WASHINGTON SHOULD PUSH FOR A STRONGER E.U. FOREIGN POLICY. Retrieved from War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/washington-should-push-for-a-stronger-e-u-foreignpolicy/ Borrel, J. (2020, October 2). When member states are divided, how do we ensure Europe is able to act? Retrieved from European Union External Action Service: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/86276/when-memberstates-are-divided-h ow-do-we-ensure-europe-able-act_en COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL. (2018, September 12). Retrieved from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/soteu2018-efficient-decision-making-cfsp-communication-647_en.pdf Erlanger, S. (2020, September 24). E.U. Failure to Impose Sanctions on Belarus Lays Bare Its Weakness. Retrieved from New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/world/europe/europe-sanctions-belarus-cyprus. European Commission (2019) Commission launches debate on more efficient decisionmaking in EU social policy, Strasbourg: European Commission. 16 RECONSIDERING UNANIMITY IN EU POLICY MAKING European Council (2020) How does the Council Vote? available in https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/ Häge, F. (2012). Coalition-Building and Consensus in the Council of the European Union. Cambridge University Retrieved Press. from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340351099 Kevin L. Sager & John Gastil (2006) The Origins and Consequences of Consensus Decision Making: A Test of the Social Consensus Model, Southern Communication Journal, 71:1, 1-24, DOI: 10.1080/10417940500503464 Matthijs, M. (2020, May/June). The Right Way to Fix the EU. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-04-13/right-way-fixeu Miller, C. (1985). Group Decision Making Under Majority and Unanimity Decision Rules. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48(1), 51-61. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3033781 Nadibaidze, A. (2020, October 23). Will the EU move to Qualified Majority Voting in Foreign Retrieved Policy? from Vocal Europe: https://usercontent.one/wp/www.vocaleurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/Will-the-EUmove-to-Qualified-Majority-Voting-in-Foreign-Policy.pdf Schuette, L. (2019). Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting? Center For European Reform. Retrieved from https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf State of the Union 2018: Making the EU a stronger global actor – European Commission proposes more efficient decision-making in CFSP. (2018, September 12). Retrieved from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5683 Voting System of the Council of EU, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/councileu/voting-system/unanimity/ 17