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Rethinking the Concept of Ottomanization: The Yishuv in the Aftermath of the
Young Turk Revolution of 1908
Yuval Ben-Bassat
Online Publication Date: 01 May 2009
To cite this Article Ben-Bassat, Yuval(2009)'Rethinking the Concept of Ottomanization: The Yishuv in the Aftermath of the Young Turk
Revolution of 1908',Middle Eastern Studies,45:3,461 — 475
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Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. 45, No. 3, 461–475, May 2009
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Rethinking the Concept of
Ottomanization: The Yishuv in the
Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution
of 1908
YUVAL BEN-BASSAT
An examination of the discourse on Ottomanization in the sectarian Hebrew press in
Palestine in the aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 shows that
contrary to frequent scholarly claims, the pursuit of Jewish nationalism within the
Ottoman framework was largely accepted among wide segments of the yishuv.
Although the proponents varied considerably in their understanding of Ottomanism,
level of support and motivation, overall it came to be viewed as their common
denominator. The major bone of contention between the yishuv’s various segments
revolved around the question of who would lead the community in the future and
shape its policies and character, a fact well testified by their ongoing harsh mutual
ideological attacks on the front pages of the Hebrew press.
Thus, Ottomanization, despite its disadvantages and the genuine fears it elicited
among many, was considered the best way to preserve the interests of the Jewish
community and further pursue the national project in light of the rapid political
changes taking place in the Empire. This support for Ottomanization in the Hebrew
press, I argue, represented a genuine feeling which prevailed in the yishuv at the time,
and was a far cry from being merely a tactical stance or an effort to temporarily
conceal the true aims of Zionism in order to appease the Ottoman government. In
this regard, the Revolution of 1908 constitutes a clear watershed in the yishuv’s
position vis-à-vis the Empire compared to the policies pursued during the reign of
Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909).
The discourse on Ottomanization and integration in the Empire that developed in
the yishuv following the Revolution of 1908 can serve as an especially instructive case
study. It shows that at the time the national awakening of minorities in the Ottoman
Empire in the aftermath of the Revolution was more than a simple expression of
irredentist aspirations. Some minorities sought to pursue their national goals within
the structure of the Empire, for reasons which mainly had to do with realpolitik, the
expectations that the Empire would be revived, and their evaluation of their relative
power and status within the Empire. The yishuv’s diverse nature and fragmentation
into several subgroups, as well as the fact that it was very small in size and did not
have a demographic majority in any given region, make such a study particularly
ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/09/030461-15 ª 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/00263200902853488
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462
Y. Ben-Bassat
intriguing. A great deal can be learned about the dilemmas confronting minorities in
the Empire after 1908 by examining the case of the yishuv, its vision for national
activity within the framework of the Empire, the way in which it dealt with possible
contradictions that this vision entailed, and its preferred arrangements for resolving
the relationships between the central Ottoman government and the Empire’s
provinces. Above all, however, it highlights the complexity of the ill-defined term
Ottomanism and demonstrates how its interpretation by different groups in the
Empire varied.
It is hard to imagine any other event in the late history of the Ottoman Empire
that created such high expectations for change and triggered so many political and
social processes as did the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The reinstitution of
the 1876 Constitution, after the long despotic reign of Abdülhamid II, was
especially welcomed by the ethnic and religious minorities in the Empire. When the
strict censorship of the media and the ban on political activity were lifted
nominally for the first time, members of all the minority groups in the Empire
became equal citizens entitled to elect their own representatives to the Ottoman
parliament and free to express their political opinions. The fact that the new rulers
were more secular and modernist and less committed to Abdülhamid II’s panIslamic policies raised expectations even more, especially among the Empire’s nonMuslim subjects.
However, by allowing greater freedom of expression and easing the restrictions on
political activity, the Revolution unintentionally encouraged national awakening
throughout the Empire, and created new challenges for both the Empire and the
religious and ethnic minorities remaining within its shrinking borders. As Kayali
writes, ‘the introduction of mass politics, a liberal press, and greater educational
opportunities enhanced ethnic communal consciousness among certain groups,
whereas they were promoted by the government with the purpose of achieving
greater societal integration and administrative amalgamation’.1 Faced with the
secession of several provinces in the Balkans, the new regime opposed any
manifestation of national awakening among the Empire’s minorities, fearing it
would further threaten its political and territorial integrity.
Unlike several other ethnic and religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire, Jews
were traditionally considered devoid of irredentist aspirations. The fact that they
were not geographically concentrated in one area contributed to their image as loyal
subjects. Nonetheless, the gradual emergence of a nationally motivated Jewish
community in Palestine at the end of the nineteen century, whose members came
predominantly from countries hostile to the Ottoman Empire, considerably altered
this situation. This became an especially acute problem in the aftermath of the
Revolution, due to the rapid national awakening throughout the Empire, including
in the Arab provinces where first signs of national awareness burgeoned among
certain educated circles.
Following the Revolution, the yishuv, perhaps more than any other minority in the
Empire, faced a crucial dilemma. At the time, Jews constituted only a small
percentage of the population in the districts which later became known as
Mandatory Palestine and were divided along several lines.2 Given Palestine’s
demography under the newly established parliamentary regime, the yishuv’s
representation at both the municipal and national levels was expected to be
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Rethinking the Concept of Ottomanization
463
negligible. This problem was further exacerbated by the fact that most of the Jews
residing in Palestine were not Ottoman citizens. Thus, at this critical historical
juncture the yishuv’s ability to influence Ottoman policy in Palestine was likely to
diminish, especially with regard to issues close to its heart such as immigration and
the purchase of land.
The wide support in the yishuv for Ottomanization and the pursuit of Jewish
national activity within the framework of the Empire needs to be understood against
this backdrop. The Revolution constituted a watershed in the attitude of the
mainstream yishuv towards the Ottoman Empire. The constitutional parliamentary
regime re-established there after 1908 led many to support the Empire out of a belief
that it would be revived, a situation which persisted well into the First World War.
Nevertheless, the concept of Ottomanism, as the yishuv’s various segments
interpreted it, was at odds with the way in which the government understood and
promoted this concept in the aftermath of 1908. For the government it constituted a
new type of identity, a form of a hybrid nationalism that would replace existing
national identities among the Empire’s minorities. The yishuv members, however,
largely perceived Ottomanism as a federal umbrella under which each minority
would be free to run its own affairs with a considerable degree of autonomy.
To what extent did the Hebrew press in Palestine represent Jewish public opinion?
From its onset in 1863, the Hebrew press was political-polemic in nature and served
as the mouthpiece of various segments within the fragmented yishuv.3 The publishers
of the Hebrew newspapers were motivated by ideological rather than economic
considerations, a fact well testified by the newspapers’ lengthy lifetimes despite
limited readership and low demand for advertising space.4 To a large extent, the
dissemination of these newspapers was the life-project of a few individuals from
various sectors in the yishuv who were willing to invest heavily both personally and
financially to promote their sector’s agenda.5
Compared to the press of other minorities in the Empire, in particular the Arab
sector, the Hebrew press enjoyed considerable freedom even prior to the
Revolution.6 The Ottoman authorities were apparently much more concerned with
developments affecting the Arab population than with the tiny yishuv and thus
allowed it greater autonomy and political freedom, from which the press benefited
greatly. In addition, the local authorities in Palestine may have encountered technical
problems censoring the Hebrew press, and had to rely on the services of someone
within the Jewish community itself to translate the content of the newspapers.7 As a
result, they only intervened rarely in the activity of the Hebrew newspapers. This
usually occurred when the content of a given newspaper seemed inappropriate to
them,8 or when someone from the Jewish community itself complained about their
co-religionists for expressing disloyalty to the Empire.9 Nevertheless, the Revolution
still provided the Hebrew press with many new opportunities, as the exponential
increase in the publication of newspapers after 1908 indicates.10 This increased
freedom also found its expression in the content, which became more diverse and
polemical. The press expressed explicit criticism of some of the government’s policies
and decisions, up to the point of declaring that the Empire would cease to exist if it
failed to implement certain policies.11
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Y. Ben-Bassat
The four newspapers examined in this study are the most important and widely
read to be published at the time, representing the yishuv’s four major sectors.
Havatselet first appeared in 1863 for a brief period as part of the internal rivalry
within the Ashkenazi ‘old yishuv’ in Jerusalem.12 In the late 1870s and early 1880s,
Havatselet expressed support for the establishment of the Jewish colonies, but from
the end of the 1880s it focused again on the ‘old yishuv’s’ internal affairs, while
criticizing the activities of the national circles. As the rivalry within the Ashkenazi
‘old yishuv’ diminished, Havatselet became the mouthpiece of the entire Ashkenazi
community. At the time of the Revolution it expressed more sympathetic positions
toward the ‘new yishuv’ and once again became the mouthpiece of the young
generation within the Ashkenazi ‘old yishuv’, a generation that was exposed to the
ideas of the Jewish national movement and partially supported them.13
Ha-Tsvi was published in Jerusalem between 1884 and 1911 by Eliezer BenYehudah, who saw it as a tool for promoting the revival of the Jewish people in
Eretz-Yisrael and developing a modern and secular Hebrew speaking society. Its
readers were mainly from the circles of the first ‘aliyah colonizers and their
supporters, but ha-Tsvi constantly attempted to make inroads into the Sephardic
community, which Ben-Yehudah sought to bring closer to the national movement.14
Ha-Tsvi went through several transformations over the years and had different
names, such as Hashqafah and ha-’Or, although they all pursued a similar agenda.15
Ben-Yehudah maintained a bitter rivalry with members of the Ashkenazi ‘old yishuv’
in Jerusalem and was involved in severe ideological debates with ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir.
Ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir started 1907 and served as the mouthpiece of the second ‘aliyah
party ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir. Its publication was motivated by discontent over ha-Tsvi,
which many second ‘aliyah circles considered sensational and lacking intellectual
depth and sensitivity to Hebrew workers.16
Ha-Herut was published between 1909 and 1917 by the young generation of the
Sephardic intelligentsia in Jerusalem.17 It supported the Jewish national revival in
Eretz-Yisrael and sought to incorporate the Sephardic community in this project by
transforming its traditional character from within.18
These four newspapers provide a rather accurate reflection of public opinion in the
yishuv at the time regarding the effects of the Revolution on the Jewish community in
Palestine and the character of its national activity within the framework of the
Empire. However, this type of inquiry entails a certain number of limitations. One
can plausibly assume that particularly delicate issues were debated behind closed
doors and did not find their way into the press. In this regard, researchers on the
Ottoman Empire are well aware of the gap which often existed among the Empire’s
minorities between expressions made in the public sphere and those that remained
private. In addition, despite being critical of the Ottoman regime to an
unprecedented level after 1908, the Hebrew newspapers still took care not to cross
the fine line that would have drawn a vehement reaction from the authorities, such as
openly questioning the right of the Empire to exist or calling for its demise. These
limitations notwithstanding, the nature of the discussion in the press and the
arguments raised, as will be discussed below, provide significant evidence for the
broad support of Ottomanization in the yishuv at the time, as the best available
framework to preserve its interests and continue pursuing the Jewish national
project. The question which remains is how different sectors within the yishuv
Rethinking the Concept of Ottomanization
465
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interpreted the concept of Ottomanization, and how it differed from the Empire’s
‘official’ perception of this term.
The terms used in the Hebrew press to describe the Revolution emphasize the
yishuv’s high expectations. ‘Never was the Messiah so close, so dependent on our
deeds, as he is today’, wrote Eliezer Ben-Yehudah in ha-Tsvi, while clarifying that he
referred to the Messiah in the national rather than the religious sense.19 In
celebrations that took place in honour of the Revolution in the major towns of
Palestine, Muslims, Christians, and Jews (from all the sectors in the yishuv), as well
as Ottoman officials, came together to celebrate the new era. Speeches were made in
Turkish, Arabic, and Hebrew, expressing the hope that the Revolution would bring
equality and freedom to all the Empire’s inhabitants.20 Interestingly, during these
celebrations, which some researchers identify as the first signs of the development of
a civil society in Palestine, encompassing Muslims, Christians, and Jews,21 the Star
of David flag, a clear Jewish national symbol, was raised by several of the celebrators
and the national anthem, the Tikvah, was sung, reflecting the enthusiasm and high
expectations from the Revolution prevalent among the yishuv’s national circles. Up
until then, it should be noted, Jews in Palestine refrained from all public
manifestations of Jewish nationalism to avoid friction with the Ottoman government
or accusations of sedition.22
In Jaffa, some Jews took advantage of this new spirit of fraternity to celebrate
together with the town’s non-Jewish inhabitants Tu be-’Av, a biblical holiday which
was revived during the first ‘aliyah and given nationalist overtones.23 The latter
perceived these celebrations as the Jewish way of commemorating the Revolution,
while playing down, or being unaware of, its importance for the Jews as a national
festival. These celebrations were a symbolic indication that for many circles in the
yishuv, integration into Ottoman society side by side with support for Jewish
nationalism was seen as possible and feasible.
Nonetheless, once the celebrations were over and a new parliamentary
representative regime was established, no one from the yishuv was elected to the
Ottoman parliament in the first elections.24 This event clearly demonstrates the
yishuv’s inability to unite behind agreed-upon candidates, which resulted in the loss
of many votes in a race that had only a slim chance of success in any case. As a
result, heated public debate developed in the yishuv concerning the way it should
protect and promote its interests in light of the rapidly changing political
environment in the Empire.
The issue of Ottomanization, the acceptance of Ottoman citizenship with its
broader social and political implications, was the crux of public debate and was one
of the most frequently discussed topics in the Hebrew press at that time. Some
believed that the refusal to become Ottoman citizens was one of the major reasons
behind the yishuv’s failure in the first elections. Part of the press perceived the
collective acceptance of Ottoman citizenship as an effective political tool to change
the Empire’s policy regarding Palestine from within, by increasing the Jews’ electoral
power in Palestine. Others, however, considered Ottomanization more in terms of
the process of social and cultural integration in the Empire, which in their eyes was
no less important for the yishuv’s future and its development.
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Y. Ben-Bassat
The most vehement supporter of Ottomanization was ha-Tsvi, which repeatedly
called on the Jews in Palestine to become Ottoman citizens.25 The fact that this
newspaper, a clear representative of the ‘new yishuv’, called for Ottomanization best
contradicts the dichotomy often described in the literature between the national
circles and the other sectors in the yishuv. In fact, ha-Tsvi, by running its vigorous
campaign in favour of Ottomanization, set the tone for the debate on this topic in the
Hebrew press, eliciting responses from the other newspapers.26 Its main argument
was that only mass Ottomanization would convince the government that the
members of the yishuv were loyal citizens, and allow them to take an active part in
political processes in the Empire, influence the future of Palestine, and freely pursue
their national project. Otherwise, a growing number of Jews without Ottoman
citizenship in Palestine might lead the Ottoman authorities to impose restrictions on
Jewish immigration and settlement activity.
Ben-Yehudah, thus, clearly perceived the multi-ethnic, multi-confessional nature
of the Empire as a suitable framework for pursuing the Jewish national goals, and
saw no contradiction between supporting Jewish nationalism and remaining loyal
to the Empire. He argued that Jews could live in Palestine under Ottoman rule in
the same way they did in America as equally loyal Americans, and categorically
rejected claims that Ottomanization was similar to the assimilation of Jews in
Europe:27
The call to accept Ottoman citizenship does not mean assimilation, to become
Turkish citizens of the religion of Moses. It does not resemble the call of the
assimilated Jews in Europe to be French, Polish, German: What is the meaning
of the term Ottoman? It is not the name for a nationality, a race, or a nation in
the natural sense of the word. Ottoman is not a synonym for Turk. No! God
forbid! It is a political term, no more . . . the call: Jews, be Ottoman! does not
mean Jews be Turk! Jews be Arab! It is not an appeal like that of the enlightened
Jews in the Diaspora: Jews, be French! Jews, be German! Jews, be Russian! Be
Polish! Its meaning in Hebrew is Jews, be the subjects of the state in which you
live! Jews, enjoy the political rights of the country of freedom in which you
reside and in which you want to live a national, Hebrew life, without giving up
any part of your nationality! Jews, be Ottoman! be the subjects of the Ottoman
Empire, so you can be Hebrew in the land of your forefathers.
Hence, although he referred to the American model, Ben-Yehudah in fact
envisioned the Ottoman Empire as a mosaic of nations within which Jewish
nationalism would be revived in the Jews’ ancient homeland. In this setting, each
nation would be able to keep its own specific character and identity without
jeopardizing the Ottoman nature of the Empire. Ben-Yehudah even argued that this
structure would help revive the Empire, enhance its strength and prestige, and create
a common source of identification for all its citizens. To support his claim he used a
questionable historical precedent of Jewish life in Eretz-Yisrael during the Persian
Kingdom, as an example for Jewish autonomous life under imperial rule.28
Even though Ben-Yehudah did not refer to the Austro-Hungarian Empire as one
of the models that influenced his position, it is more than likely that his vision was
based on this model, more so than on the American one. The Austro-Hungarian
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Rethinking the Concept of Ottomanization
467
Empire comprised several small nations, each running its own affairs with a high
degree of autonomy, while preserving its unique identity within the general
framework of the Empire. Ben-Yehudah’s arguments demonstrate that he believed
such a model could be implemented in the Ottoman Empire following the
Revolution; hence his vision for the future relationships between the yishuv and
the Empire.
None of the other Hebrew newspapers dealt with the issue of Ottomanization as
intensively as did ha-Tsvi, but in general they too largely accepted the framework
proposed by Ben-Yehudah. Ha-Herut, for example, supported the Ottoman
framework unequivocally and enthusiastically as the only option that would allow
the yishuv to pursue its national goals. This is not surprising considering the
Ottoman background of its Sephardic publishers, who were well integrated into
Ottoman society. Following the Revolution, the young Sephardic intelligentsia in
Jerusalem responsible for the publication of ha-Herut foresaw many new
opportunities for the Jews in Palestine to promote their national project as part of
the Empire, which they called ‘our homeland’,29 and did not fear the consequences of
Ottomanization, above all the expected enlistment of Jewish youth in the army.30
Similar to ha-Tsvi, ha-Herut also linked the revival of the Empire with the Jewish
nation within it, and did not see any conflicting loyalties.
Compared to the other newspapers, ha-Herut’s view of Ottomanism was focused
more on its cultural and social features rather than its political implications, which
was arguably more instrumental. Hence it emphasized integration within the fabric
of Ottoman society, for instance by discussing at length the rising hostility of
Palestine’s Arab population to the Jewish national project and claiming that the
Sephardic community could serve as a bridge between Jews and Arabs, with whom it
was familiar. Nonetheless, ha-Herut still vehemently called to preserve the unique
religious and cultural Jewish identity of the yishuv within the Ottoman framework, a
call testifying to its perception of Ottomanism.31
The conservative Havatselet did not explicitly call on its readers to accept Ottoman
citizenship, apart from one case in which Jews who wished to immigrate to Palestine
were urged to consider becoming Ottoman.32 Nonetheless, between the lines there
was some support for Ottomanization. For instance, Havatselet reported extensively
about Jewish Ottoman societies, which were established in various cities in Palestine
with the aim of protecting the Jews’ civil and political rights and promoting
Ottomanization, and wrote about the new spirit in the country: ‘A pristine spirit is
blowing in the mountains of Galilee, a spirit of freedom and equality, complete
liberty, a spirit of Ottoman Jews’ unity, whose ideal is dedicated to the honour of our
nation and Torah.’33 Havatselet claimed that under the new regime it was possible to
pursue the Jewish national revival in Eretz-Yisrael and concomitantly preserve the
religious character of the yishuv.34 Moreover, the newspaper feared that the high
profile of the Zionist activity in Palestine would eventually lead the Ottoman
authorities to restrict Jewish immigration to Palestine. Thus, Havatselet, a clear
representative of the ‘old yishuv’ clearly accepted (and even supported) the Jewish
national project, and believed that it was possible to implement it within the new
political reality created in the Empire after the Revolution.
Only ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir expressed reservations about unconditional acceptance of
Ottoman citizenship without first securing the political and individual rights of the
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Y. Ben-Bassat
Jews in Palestine. While criticizing ha-Tsvi, it argued that it was too early to discuss
the issue of Ottomanization with regard to the yishuv. Its main concern was that
Jews’ unequivocal renunciation of their European citizenship would leave them
devoid of the protection of foreign consulates in times of unrest.35 Nonetheless, like
the other newspapers, ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir also realized that in the new set of
circumstances created in the Empire, Ottomanization was necessary in the long run
and could not be avoided. Hence, it called on its readers to prepare for it by
establishing a Jewish federation that would represent all the Jews in Palestine and act
to protect their rights through negotiations with the Ottoman authorities.36 Ha-Po‘el
ha-Tsa‘ir debated the terms for accepting Ottoman citizenship but did not question
actual acceptance itself. This realization apparently stemmed from the assumption
that greater autonomy would be granted to the provinces and that national politics
would take on more significance in the Empire.37 Hence it encouraged the yishuv to
participate in the political process in Palestine, among other things by cooperating
with the local Arab population.38 With respect to the latter, ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir
differed from ha-Tsvi, which focused solely on political negotiations with the
Ottoman authorities, and was closer to ha-Herut’s position. Interestingly, support
for Ottomanization was also expressed during secret meetings of the ha-Po‘el haTsa‘ir party, which ran the newspaper, although it was decided not to publish the
decision.39
Two issues directly connected to the question of Ottomanization, namely the
expected enlistment of Jewish youth and the study of Turkish and Arabic in the
yishuv schools, were widely debated in the Hebrew press at the time. Supporters
of Ottomanization often linked the two, claiming that it was necessary to teach
the Jewish youth both Arabic and Turkish as part of the process of preparing
them for military service. The strongest supporters of enlistment were ha-Tsvi and
ha-Herut, which argued that in the new era enlistment was a fait accompli.
Therefore, they both called on their audiences to make the necessary
arrangements for enlistment, including support for families of those ‘called up
to serve’.40 Ha-Tsvi’s approach, however, was once again more instrumental than
ha-Herut’s. It argued that despite the concerns among certain circles in the yishuv,
in the long run conscription would best serve its interests. Moreover, it perceived
the issue of military service and the learning of Arabic and Turkish as part of a
broader need to become familiarized with Ottoman law, the political system and
the economy, in order to better protect the yishuv’s interests in Ottoman
institutions. Ha-Herut, on the other hand, treated these issues to a greater extent
as a means for the yishuv to socially integrate into the Empire, and as part of the
Jews’ obligation to it as loyal Ottoman citizens.
Interestingly, Havatselet also came out in favour of teaching Arabic and Turkish
in Jewish schools as a way to prepare youth for military service.41 This surprising
stand is intriguing given the fact that most members of the Ashkenazi ‘old yishuv’
were not Ottoman citizens at the time, and thus were not obliged to serve in
the army. It indicates that despite genuine fears of conscription prevalent in the
Ashkenazi ‘old yishuv’, some in this community aspired to have a hand in the
political and social processes taking place in the yishuv and in the Empire. These
segments of the ‘old yishuv’ who supported the national project, especially among the
younger generation, realized that in the long run acceptance of Ottoman citizenship,
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469
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including army service, was unavoidable, especially if the interests of the yishuv were
to be protected. Nevertheless, despite this cautious support, they were not at all
enthusiastic about conscription for obvious reasons.
The election of a unified leadership for the yishuv constituted another theme that was
extensively debated in the Hebrew press in the aftermath of the Revolution. The new
era in the Empire soon led members of the yishuv to realize that in order to protect
their interests and have a say in the Empire’s new representative institutions they had
to unite politically, at least when operating vis-à-vis the Ottoman authorities. Indeed,
the long process that eventually led to the political unification of the entire yishuv
under the leadership of the ‘new yishuv’ after the First World War can be said to
have started immediately after the Revolution.42 The Hebrew press gives us a
thorough assessment of the re-evaluation and reconfiguration processes that took
place in the yishuv at the time and highlights the Revolution’s crucial role in their
initiation.
All four newspapers emphasized the need to unite politically and stressed that the
internal schisms within the yishuv were detrimental to the Jewish cause, especially at
a time when precedents were being established in the new political system and the
first signs of national awakening had emerged in the Arab provinces. Despite the call
to unite, all the newspapers heavily criticized their counterparts, and each of them
appealed to their readerships to implement its own agenda by electing a leadership
that would reflect its ideals.
Havatselet, for instance, believed the elders of the community, the Rabbis, should
lead the yishuv. They were obliged to:
Get down to the people’s level and clarify their needs to them, what their future
existence and success depend on in the present, so that the people will willingly
follow the wise and prominent people who seek their good . . . they should
gather the people together, teach them the way of public leadership, which is
accepted by all enlightened people, they should make it clear what issues are
shared by us all and for all the people residing in Eretz-Yisrael, and what
matters are unique to us, and how we should treat our gentile neighbours.43
Havatselet stressed the need to maintain the religious nature of the yishuv and
warned against the influence of foreign ideas that did not suit the Jewish community
in Palestine, ideas that would hinder the implementation of the Jewish national
project.44 It specifically referred to certain second ‘aliyah circles it considered radical
and secular.
Ha-Herut also made fervent calls to preserve the yishuv’s Jewish identity and
establish an Ottoman-Jewish committee that would represent all the segments of
the yishuv under the auspices of the Empire’s Chief Rabbi in Istanbul (the
haham başı).45 This stance was consistent with the traditional behaviour of the
Sephardic community, given the fact that it was officially recognized by the
Empire as a millet. At the same time it clearly demonstrates the belief among some
Sephardic circles in the possibility of preserving the yishuv’s uniqueness and
promoting its development, while integrating into Ottoman society, both culturally
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Y. Ben-Bassat
and socially. This approach clearly distinguishes it from the other newspapers
discussed here.
Ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir which, as noted, called for the establishment of a Jewish
federation that would protect the yishuv’s interests vis-à-vis the Ottoman authorities,
emphasized the leading role that the Hebrew workers would play in the historical
task of restoring the Jewish people in their ancient homeland. Hence it called upon
the workers to take an active part in leading the yishuv.46 Similarly, ha-Tsvi, as part
of its perception of Ottomanization as a panacea for all the yishuv’s problems, called
for the establishment of a Hebrew federation (histadrut) which would represent all
the Jews in Palestine in dealings with the authorities as part of the Ottoman political
system, protect their civil and political rights, and negotiate their special needs.47
Gradually, upon realizing their inability to overcome internal differences and
bridge their deep ideological divides, a consensus emerged among the various
segments of the yishuv that they should present, at least externally, a united front. In
this regard, the debate over political unification and the need to protect the common
interests of the Jews in Palestine reveals the breadth of the common denominator
among the yishuv’s various segments and the ways in which the rapid changes taking
place in the Empire in the aftermath of the Revolution contributed to bringing them
together. The acceptance of Ottoman citizenship constituted a major part of this
shared vision. Despite the different perceptions of Ottomanization by the yishuv’s
various sectors, it was considered by all as a means for unifying the yishuv under one
framework, and as the best way to ensure the continuation of the Jewish national
project, given the changes in the Empire’s political system. The Ottoman framework
hence served as the point of reference for all the future activities planned by the
yishuv’s various sectors.
An examination of the ways in which the Hebrew press perceived the nature of the
new regime in the Empire demonstrates how the yishuv, as a tiny minority,
negotiated the gap between its vision, its assessment of its own ability and strength,
and the government’s policies. Similar to the reactions of other minorities in the
Empire, when the initial euphoria over the Revolution had dissipated, the Hebrew
press began expressing disappointment with the outcomes. It claimed that no major
alteration had taken place in the status of the Jews in Palestine and that the
limitations on Jewish immigration had not been lifted.48 Moreover, it complained
that the new regime had begun limiting freedom of speech and political activity in the
Empire, and was acting dictatorially to Turkify the Empire, while abandoning its
former policy of Ottomanization.49 This development was perceived as a great threat
to the yishuv’s interests, one that would not allow the Jewish community to preserve
its distinct identity and further pursue its goals within the framework of the Empire.
The Hebrew press expressed the hope that the new regime would adhere to the
original aims of the Revolution, guarantee rights of equal citizenship to all the
inhabitants of the Empire under the House of Osman, and grant the minorities a
high degree of autonomy by allowing them to run their own affairs.
In this context, the position of the Hebrew press as regards the renewed limitations
on freedom of speech and political activity after the attempted counterrevolution of
April 1909, especially with respect to the circles that opposed the Committee of
Union and Progress (CUP) such as the Decentralization Party of Prince al-Sabah, is
especially instructive. It sheds light on the way in which concomitant adherence to
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471
Jewish nationalism and loyalty to the Empire was resolved in the yishuv, as well as its
interpretation of the term Ottomanism. Varying degrees of support for the
proclaimed principles of the Decentralization Party, which aspired to govern the
Empire as a loose federation of provinces under the house of Osman, can be found in
three of the four newspapers discussed here.50 Only Havatselet did not refer to this
issue at all. The yishuv, hence, favoured a decentralized regime, which would enable
the provinces to run their own affairs, while remaining loyal to the Empire as an
umbrella organization.
The strongest advocates of decentralization were ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir and ha-Tsvi,
which, as mentioned, differed considerably in the level of support they expressed for
Ottomanization. Both predicted an Empire in which national politics would gain
greater importance, and argued that a federative regime was the most suitable
arrangement for such a situation. Ha-Herut, not surprisingly given the way it
interpreted the term Ottomanism, was less enthusiastic about a federative regime,
but nevertheless supported it. This support for decentralization, it should be stressed,
is surprising given Palestine’s demography at that time, which under a parliamentary
regime was expected to constitute a major disadvantage for the yishuv at both the
municipal and national levels, as proved by the first elections held after the
Revolution. Moreover, a federative regime would not solve the problems
confronting the yishuv or increase its representation and provide it with more
opportunities to pursue its own agenda.
Members of the yishuv who supported decentralization were well aware of this
problem. In a series of interviews conducted by the Hebrew press, as well as in
translated articles from foreign newspapers it published, prominent leaders of the CUP
clearly stated that Palestine’s demography would find its expression in the new
representative elected institutions.51 Ben-Yehudah himself openly declared that in the
new era that had begun in the Empire, policies would be determined by the number of
votes.52 Similarly, ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir expressed its fear that under the new regime the
yishuv’s members would no longer be able to buy their way, as they did in the past
under the corrupt monarchy, by methods such as bribing Ottoman officials.53
There are two possibly interconnected explanations that can reconcile these
seemingly contradictory stands held by members of the yishuv: support for
decentralization and Palestine’s demographic composition at the time. First, some
in the yishuv truly believed in the possibility of somehow carving out a Jewish
autonomous area in Palestine, in a small territory within the greater sphere of Arab
provinces under Ottoman rule.54 Second, many expected the Jewish population to
grow substantially and rapidly through massive immigration. They believed the
Empire would reconsider its policies vis-à-vis the yishuv and open its doors to Jewish
immigration and settlement once it realized what it could gain from the revival of the
Jewish people in their ancient homeland. This scenario was a recurrent theme in the
Hebrew press, which often linked up the idea of the revival of the Empire and that of
the Jewish people in Palestine. Ha-Tsvi, for example, wrote:
Of all the nations in this Empire, the Jews were the natural allies of the Turks,
the larger their number, the higher the Turks’ status . . . The Jews will never
have a reason to obviate the Ottoman nature of this Empire. The Jews, as a
nation in Eretz-Yisrael, will always be one of the most important powers that
472
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can tilt the balance in favour of the Ottoman unity of this Empire. The Jewish
nation in Eretz-Yisrael will always be one of the powers preserving the Ottoman
Empire. A Jewish nation in Eretz-Yisrael is perhaps a necessary condition for
the existence of the Ottoman Empire.55
In short, an examination of the Hebrew press published in Palestine after the Young
Turk Revolution of 1908 provides a particularly instructive case study for learning
about the complex ways in which this important event influenced one of the Empire’s
minority groups. It sheds light on the dilemmas confronting the Jewish community
in Palestine, and reveals the internal processes triggered by the Revolution and their
impact on the formation of a common platform for the yishuv’s subgroups. Most
importantly, however, it teaches us about the different ways in which the concept of
Ottomanization was interpreted and dealt with by the various sectors in the Jewish
community, and how it differed from the official interpretation of this term by the
state, as a kind of hybrid Ottoman nationalism, whose aim was to replace existing
particularistic loyalties.
Pursuing Jewish nationalism while at the same time remaining loyal to the
Ottoman Empire became the dominant trend within the yishuv after the Revolution,
although its sectors differed considerably in their level of support, motivation, and
interpretation of the idea of Ottomanization. Ottomanization was supported not
only by national circles within the ‘new yishuv’, such as the readers of ha-Tsvi, but
also by some Sephardic circles, such as the readers of ha-Herut, and to a certain
extent even by members of the Ashkenazi ‘old yishuv’, such as the readers of
Havatselet. Even ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir, which represented some of the second ‘aliyah
workers, eventually accepted this framework after realizing its importance for the
Jewish national cause, despite its genuine fear that support for Ottoman nationalism
in the yishuv would come at the expense of the Jewish national movement. In this
regard, however, it is important to recall that around the time of the Revolution the
newspapers examined in this study primarily represented the younger generation in
the yishuv, a generation which was in general more enthusiastic about promoting the
Jewish national project than the older generation, particularly in the Ashkenazi ‘old
yishuv’ and among the Sephardic community in Jerusalem. Many in the latter’s older
generation did not support the Jewish national cause, and some even explicitly
opposed it.
The clearest manifestation for the decision to operate within the Ottoman
framework was support for the idea of Ottomanization, and the acceptance of
Ottoman citizenship. Due to realpolitik, many in the yishuv perceived Ottomanization, with all its disadvantages and the challenges it posed, as the most suitable
framework for pursuing its development, while maintaining its unique character.
Other options for running the Empire, such as Turkism and pan-Turkism, which the
regime may have contemplated were considered detrimental to the Jewish national
project. Thus, when at a certain stage after the Revolution members of the yishuv
believed that the preferred policy of the government had become Turkism rather
than Ottomanism, general opposition arose and arguments were made that the new
policy was in stark contradiction to the proclaimed aims of the Revolution.
The yishuv’s perception of Ottomanization teaches us a great deal about the
complexity of this concept. Many perceived it as a political and instrumental issue
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473
(ha-Tsvi), whereas others also envisaged the idea of social and cultural integration
into the Empire (ha-Herut). Both groups, however, wished to preserve the distinct
character of the Jewish community in Palestine and believed it was possible to do so
under the new regime. The meaning of Ottomanization as it was perceived by
members of the yishuv was largely consistent with their vision of an Empire as a
federative entity under the House of Osman, in which each province would be free to
run its own affairs with considerable autonomy. Nevertheless, this view, best
articulated by Ben-Yehudah, did not really address Palestine’s demographic reality
at the time, a problem which, from the Jewish point of view, remained unresolved
until the end of Ottoman rule in Palestine. The Empire’s new regime, obviously, had
a very different interpretation of Ottomanism. It viewed this term as a kind of new
hybrid nationalism which would replace the distinct national identities of the
Empire’s minorities.
Finally, the methodology and analytic approach used in this study can be applied
to other minorities in the Ottoman Empire for a more comprehensive grasp of the
influence of the Revolution and the resulting concept of Ottomanization. The case of
the yishuv demonstrates that the process of national awakening among the Empire’s
minorities was not necessarily expressed in terms of irredentist aspirations. For
various reasons which were surveyed in this article, the yishuv did not seek to
separate itself from the Empire, but rather to develop its national character within its
framework.
Notes
1. H. Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908–
1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p.13.
2. Israel Kolatt rightly noted that the Jews in Palestine, particularly in the ‘old yishuv’, ‘were
divided according to their ethnic background, the languages they spoke (Yiddish or Ladino), their
rabbinic courts, and the form of their prayers.’ See I. Kolatt, ‘The Organization of the Jewish
Population of Palestine and the Development of its Political Consciousness before World War I’,
in M. Ma‘oz (ed.), Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975),
p.213.
3. U. Elyada, ‘The Sensationalist Press in Eretz Yisrael in the Early Twentieth Century’, Kesher, Vol.11
(1992), pp.70–71.
4. Ibid.; I. Bartal, ‘The Jewish Press as a Conduit for Modernization’, Cathedra, Vol.71 (1994), p.164.
5. Elyada, ‘The Sensationalist Press in Eretz Yisrael’.
6. On the Arab press after the Revolution see R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of
Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.53–9, 120–21.
According to Khalidi, in the first year after the Revolution, 35 new Arab newspapers appeared in bilad
al-Sham and dozens more afterwards, whereas before the Revolution most of the Arab press operated
from abroad, either from Egypt or from Europe.
7. G. Frumkin, Derekh Shofet bi-Yrushalayim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1954), pp.120–21; see also I. Ben-Avi, ‘Im
Shahar ‘Atzma’utenu: Memoirs of the First Hebrew Child (Tel Aviv: ha-Va‘ad ha-Tsiburi le-Hotsa’at
Kitvei Ittamar Ben-Avi, 1961), p.220.
8. For several illuminating examples of intervention by the authorities following the publication of
articles in the Hebrew press and the guiding lines regarding the censorship of the Hebrew newspapers
see Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, DH. MKT, 1310/N/23 [April 10, 1893] (investigation against
Havatselet which published on 24 February 1893 an article accusing the government of preventing
Jews from buying land and property. Following the incident, the Mutasarrıf of Jerusalem was ordered
to scrutinize the newspaper more closely); DH. MKT, 122/3, 1311/S/15 [August 28, 1893]
(investigation following the publication of an article in Havatselet on 12 August 1893 accusing the
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9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Y. Ben-Bassat
authorities of bringing a Jew suspected of stealing to court in Hebron on Saturday. The Mutasarrıf of
Jerusalem was ordered not to let Havatselet publish similar articles); DH. MKT, 2217/48, 1317/S/22
[July 2, 1899] (request by the Ministry of Interior from the Mutasarrıf of Jerusalem to update him
about the censorship methods of a new newspaper which a Jewish woman named Hemdah BenYehudah, the wife of Eliezer Ben-Yehudah, sought to publish); DH. MKT, 2128/6, 1316/C/20
[November 5, 1898] (correspondence between the Ministry of Interior and the Mutasarrıf of Jerusalem
regarding a Jew who applied to open a printing house in Jerusalem. Among the things he was asked to
do in order to get the license was to sign a statement saying that he will not criticize the sultan and will
publish in accordance with the law and the will of the sultan.
For example, Eliezer Ben-Yehudah was arrested in 1891 and his newspaper ha-Tsvi was shut down
following a quarrel with several Jerusalemite rabbis from the Ashkenazi old yishuv who complained
about the alleged inflammatory content of his newspaper which criticized the government. Only
following foreign intervention, was Ben-Yehudah released from jail and his license restored to him.
See A.M. Luntz, Luach Eretz Yisrael 1910–11 (Jerusalem: A.M. Luntz, 1911), pp.121–3; see also
Y. Kaniel, Ben-Yehudah in Prison, 1893: A Selection of Contemporary Correspondence (Jerusalem: Yad
Ben-Zvi, 1983), pp.11–23; Frumkin, Derekh Shofet bi-Yrushalayim, pp.121–2; Ben-Avi, ‘Im Shahar
‘Atzma’utenu, pp.69–72.
For instance in the period following the Revolution newspapers such as ha-Herut, ha-Ahdut, Moriah,
ha-Pardes began to be printed.
For instance see ha-Tsevi, 25/135, 23 March 1909, pp.1–2 (the newspaper claimed that if the Empire
would stick to the policy of Turkification and would not give equal rights to all the nations comprising
it, it would cease to exist).
G. Jardeni, The Hebrew Press in Eretz-Israel, 1863–1904 (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1969),
pp.18–19, 30; Havatselet was the mouthpiece of the minority group within the Prushim (the
Lithuanian segment in the Ashkenazi ‘old yishuv’) and served as a response to ha-Levanon, the organ
of the majority. In addition, it also represented the Hassidim within the Ashkenazi old yishuv and
certain segments within the Sephardic community.
G. Kressel, Toldot ha-‘Itonut ha-‘Ivrit be-Eretz-Yisrael (Jerusalem: The Zionist Library, 1964), p.111;
see also Frumkin, Derekh Shofet, pp.130–43.
N. Efrati, The Sephardic Community in Jerusalem during the Years 1840–1917 (Jerusalem: Bialik
Institute, 1999), pp.73–4.
For the various transformations in Ben-Yehudah’s newspapers see Luntz, Luach Eretz Yisrael 1910–
11, pp.121–6.
Kressel, Toldot ha-‘Itonut, pp.100–104.
Ibid., p.109; M.D. Gaon, ‘ha-Herut’, in D. Yudelovitch (ed.), Kovetz Ma’amarim le-Divre Yeme ha‘Itonut be-Eretz-Yisrael, Vol.II (Tel Aviv: Salomon Publishers, 1936), pp.140–41.
Efrati, The Sephardic Community, pp.67–9.
Ha-Tsvi, 25/3, 2 Oct. 1908, p. 1.
See for example Hashqafah, 9/93, 10 Aug. 1908, pp.2–3; Havatselet, 38/73, 7 Aug. 1908, p.440.
M.U. Campos, ‘Between ‘‘Beloved Ottomania’’ and ‘‘The Land of Israel’’’, International Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.37, No.4 (2005), p.464.
For example, when such symbols were displayed in a celebration in the colony of Nes-Zionah in
1890 by some of the celebrators, many in the yishuv were opposed claiming that it would pose
a threat to its relationships with the Ottoman authorities. See Havatselet, 21/14, 8 Jan. 1891,
p.106.
Havatselet, 38/77, 17 Aug. 1908, p.463. This holiday, which takes place on the fifteenth day of the
Hebrew month of Av (August), is a biblical holiday commemorating the grape harvest.
On the results of these elections see H. Weiner, ‘ha-Medinyut ha-Tsiyonit be-Turkiah ‘ad 1914’, in I.
Kollat (ed.), The History of the Jewish Community in Eretz-Yisrael since 1882, Part 1 (Jerusalem: Bialik
Institute, 1989), pp.273–5.
Ha-Tsvi, 25/3, 1 Oct. 1908, p.1; 25/80, 15 Jan. 1909, pp.1–2; 25/85, 21 Jan. 1909, p.2.
For instance see ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir, 2/7, Dec. 1908–Jan. 1909, p.12 (the Hebrew month of Tevet).
Ha-Tsvi, 25/85, 21 Jan. 1909, p.2.
Hashqafah, 9/96, 21 Aug. 1908, p.2.
Ha-Herut, 1/39, 27 Dec. 1909, p.1.
Ibid., 1/2, 14 May 1909, p.3.
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31. Ibid. Arguably, this perception was influenced by the behavior of other groups in the Empire,
following the Revolution, which all strove to protect their own interests within the changing political
climate. See Campos, ‘Between ‘‘Beloved Ottomania’’ and ‘‘The Land of Israel’’’, p.479.
32. Havatselet, 39/44, 15 Jan. 1909, pp.229–30.
33. Ibid., 39/64, 3 Aug. 1908, p.340; 24 Aug. 1908, p.479; 38/85, 4 Sept. 1908, pp.503–4.
34. Ibid., 38/76, 14 Aug. 1908, pp.458–9 (a quote from a speech by Rabbi Kook, the Rabbi of Jaffa and
the colonies in its vicinity).
35. Ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir, 2/7; 2/14, May–June 1909 (The Hebrew month of Sivan).
36. Ibid., 2/7.
37. Ibid., and also 2/1, Sept. 1908, p.14 (the Hebrew month of Tishre).
38. Ibid., 2/3, Oct.–Nov. 1908, p.10 (the Hebrew month of Heshvan).
39. For more about the tension between these two newspapers see Gaon, ‘ha-Herut’, pp.181–2;
Y. Shapirah, Ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir: Ha-Ra’ayon veha-Ma’aseh (Tel Aviv: ‘Ayanot, 1967), pp.107–8.
40. Ha-Tsvi, 25/80, 15 Jan. 1909, pp.1–2; ha-Herut, 1/2, 14 April 1909, p.3.
41. Havatselet, 38/80, 24 Aug. 1908, p.479; 38/85, 4 Sept. 1908, pp.503–4; 39/64, 3 March 1909, p.340.
42. Kolatt, ‘The Organization’, p.212.
43. Havatselet, 33/44, 15 Jan. 1909, pp.229–30.
44. Ibid., 38/76.
45. Ha-Herut, 1/2, 14 May 1909, p.3.
46. Ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir, 2/6, Dec. 1908–Jan. 1909, p.6 (the Hebrew month of Tevet).
47. Ha-Tsvi, 25/90, 28 Jan. 1909, pp.1–2.
48. ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir, 2/14, p.11; ha-Tsvi, 25/122, 23 Feb. 1909, pp.2–3; ha-Herut, 2/17, 5 Nov. 1909, p.1.
49. For instance, see ha-Tsvi, 25/135, 23 March 1909, pp.1–2.
50. ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir openly supported decentralization of the Empire as was suggested by the party of
Prince al-Sabah, see ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir, 2/1; ha-Tsvi, argued that the only way to save the Empire was
to give equal rights to all its citizens under the house of Osman and expressed its hope that the Young
Turks would allow each of the Empire’s people (umot) to express their unique character. See ha-Tsvi,
25/135 and 25/3, 1 Oct. 1908, p.1; Ha-Herut expressed strong opposition to Prince Sabah’s arrest after
the failure of the counterrevolution. The rebels, it stressed, should be punished, but the idea of
freedom is to allow political opposition to operate freely. See ha-Herut, 2/17.
51. For instance, see Hashqafah, 9/100, 4 Sept. 1908, p.1 (an interview with one of the leaders of the
Young Turks in Paris, quoted from the newspaper Hed ha-Zman).
52. Ha-Tsvi, 25/127, 12 March 1909, p.2.
53. Ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir, 2/2, Oct. 1908 (the Hebrew month of Heshvan); 2/3.
54. In line with this logic, ha-Tsvi wrote that each nation within the Empire would run its own affairs in
the area where it constituted the majority. See ha-Tsvi, 25/3, 10 Jan. 1908, p.1; see also ha-Po‘el haTsa‘ir, 2/2, pp.3–4.
55. Ha-Tsvi, 25/124, 8 March 1909, pp.1–2 and 25/239, 8 Aug. 1909, p.1; ha-Herut, 2/39, 27 Dec. 1909,
p.1; ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir, 3/18, 6 July 1910, p.3.