Índice
Editorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Katarzyna Krzywicka
9
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
Coordinado por Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga y Katarzyna Krzywicka
Brasil: entre la democracia y el autoritarismo. Presentación. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga, Katarzyna Krzywicka
13
Democracias incompletas: El caso de Brasil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga, Gustavo Muller, Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
19
Necropsia de la democracia brasileña . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guilherme Simões Reis
43
Ação política do Partido Militar no Brasil sob Bolsonaro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira, Suzeley Kalil
63
Indicadores de comportamiento autoritario de líderes políticos:
el caso Bolsonaro (2019-2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
83
La búsqueda de estatus: el activismo de Brasil en el Consejo de Derechos
Humanos de la ONU 2006-2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monika Sawicka
99
Artículos y ensayos
Modelo de reducción de daños en la política de drogas de México . . . . . . . . 131
Aleksandra Jargiełło
La vigencia del pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi en el contexto
latinoamericano: el rol del empresario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
5
Índice
Reseñas e informes
Pablo Piccato, Historia nacional de la infamia: Crimen, verdad y justicia
en México, CIDE-Grano de Sal, México 2020, pp. 414,
ISBN: 978-607-8508-73-0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Mario Pavel Díaz Román
Anna Clayfield, El legado guerrillero de la Revolución cubana, University
of Florida Press, Gainesville 2019, pp. 218, ISBN 9781683400899 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Marcos Antonio da Silva
Marta Osuchowska. Rozwój pozycji prawnej Kościoła katolickiego
w Argentynie (La evolución de la posición jurídica de la Iglesia católica
en Argentina). Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT - Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo
Oświatowe, Wrocław 2019, pp. 270, ISBN 978-83-7977-413-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Andrzej Pietrzak
Información para los autores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Guidelines for authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Informação para autores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6
Contents
Editorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Katarzyna Krzywicka
9
Dossier
Latin America: Brazil
Coordinated by Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga and Katarzyna Krzywicka
Brazil: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism. Presentation . . . . . . . . . .
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga, Katarzyna Krzywicka
13
Incomplete Democracies: The Brazilian Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga, Gustavo Muller, Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
19
Necropsy on Brazilian Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guilherme Simões Reis
43
Political Action of the Military Party in Brazil under Bolsonaro . . . . . . . . . .
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira, Suzeley Kalil
63
Indicators of Authoritarian Behavior of Political Leaders.
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
83
The Quest for Status: Brazil’s Activism in the UN Human Rights
Council 2006–2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monika Sawicka
99
Articles and essays
Harm Reduction Model in Mexico’s Drug Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Aleksandra Jargiełło
The Validity of the Thought of Juan Bautista Alberdi in the Latin
American Context. The Role of the Businessman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
7
Contents
Reviews and reports
Pablo Piccato, National History of Infamy: Crime, Truth and Justice
in Mexico, CIDE-Grano de Sal, México 2020, pp. 414,
ISBN: 978-607-8508-73-0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Mario Pavel Díaz Román
Anna Clayfield, The Guerrilla Legacy of the Cuban Revolution, University
of Florida Press, Gainesville 2019, pp. 218, ISBN 9781683400899 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Marcos Antonio da Silva
Marta Osuchowska. Rozwój pozycji prawnej Kościoła katolickiego
w Argentynie (The Development of the Legal Position of the Catholic Church
in Argentina). Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT – Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo
Oświatowe, Wrocław 2019, pp. 270, ISBN 978-83-7977-413-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Andrzej Pietrzak
Información para los autores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Guidelines for authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Informação para autores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8
Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
p. 9
Editorial
DOI: 10.17951/al.2021.11.9
En el undécimo volumen de la revista Anuario Latinoamericano – Ciencias
Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales, les recomendamos leer el contenido del
Dossier titulado “Brasil: entre la democracia y el autoritarismo” y coordinado
por Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga y Katarzyna Krzywicka. La inestable situación política, económica y social, así como las negligencias y amenazas en
el campo de la seguridad sanitaria en el país, atraen la atención de la opinión
pública, periodistas, científicos y analistas. Los problemas internos de Brasil
tienen una dimensión internacional y son de particular importancia en el contexto de las elecciones que se celebrarán en 2022. Los autores de los artículos
publicados en el Dossier hacen una valiosa e importante contribución a la
discusión actual sobre el estado de la democracia brasileña.
Tradicionalmente les recomendamos que presten atención a la sección
“Artículos y ensayos”, así como los alentamos a leer reseñas de libros en la
sección “Reseñas e informes”.
Deseándoles una buena lectura, les invitamos a enviar artículos y reseñas
de libros para los próximos volúmenes de Anuario Latinoamericano. Las informaciones sobre los temas del Dossier de los volúmenes previstos para la
publicación y los plazos para el envío de contribuciones están disponibles en
el sitio web de nuestra revista.
Katarzyna Krzywicka
Lublin, 18 de julio de 2021
9
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
Coordinado por Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
y Katarzyna Krzywicka
Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 13–18
Brasil: entre la democracia y el autoritarismo.
Presentación
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.13-18
Brazil: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism.
Presentation
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga*
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES
UNIVERSIDAD FEDERAL DE SAN CARLOS
BRASIL
msbraga@ufscar.br
https://orcid .org/0000-0003-2141-9778
Katarzyna Krzywicka**
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y PERIODISMO
UNIVERSIDAD MARIA CURIE-SKŁODOWSKA
LUBLIN, POLONIA
katarzyna .krzywicka@umcs .edu .pl
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5623-5384
Brasil es un sujeto relevante e influyente de las relaciones internacionales
por su ubicación geopolítica e importante potencial económico y demográfico. El Estado ha llegado al siglo XXI como la cuarta democracia electoral
más grande del mundo, con 182 millones de habitantes y 125,9 millones de
votantes, pero marcado por nuevos y viejos desafíos. Desde una perspectiva
procedimental, los indicadores muestran que el país se encuentra entre las
democracias relativamente estables en cuanto a los procedimientos que regulan la competencia política, la alternancia de partidos políticos en el poder,
la configuración de un sistema de partidos inclusivo y la expansión de la participación ciudadana electoral. Cabe destacar que, desde 1985, no ha habido
intentos de intervención militar en la política, como ocurrió en otros períodos
* Politóloga, Doctora en Ciencia Política, Profesora en la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Invesigadora asociada del Programa de Postgrado en Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad Federal
de San Carlos en Brasilia, Brasil.
** Politóloga, Doctora en Humanidades por la Universidad Maria Curie-Skłodowska
(UMCS) en Lublin, Polonia. Doctora habilitada en Ciencias Sociales por la Universidad de
Wrocław, Polonia. Profesora, docente e investigadora del Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales de la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Periodismo de la UMCS en Lublin, Polonia.
13
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
de la historia del país. Sin embargo, considerando la esencia de la democracia,
Brasil sigue presentado déficit de representatividad de los grupos sociales minoritarios. Además, Brasil no ha podido avanzar lo suficiente para democratizar el acceso de la mayoría de la sociedad a las políticas de bienestar social,
profundizando así la desigualdad en la distribución del ingreso, el acceso a la
educación y la atención médica adecuada, lo cual acrecienta la brecha social.
Aunque se observa que la sociedad brasileña es cada vez más compleja,
la vieja cultura populista, la invasión de lo público por lo privado, la segregación social, una cultura religiosa conservadora en costumbres y valores y la
falta de un proyecto de país de la élite económica conviven simultáneamente1
(Krzywicka, 2020). Sigue existiendo un sistema de exclusiones en la administración de la ley y los recursos, el rezago educativo y tecnológico con tan solo
escasas excepciones en el desarrollo de la investigación científica, así como
un cierto avance en el campo jurídico y administrativo en algunas empresas,
organismos e instituciones públicas.
La asimetría existente en el funcionamiento de varios elementos del sistema democrático brasileño ha generado muchas contradicciones en su desempeño, afectando así el grado y la amplitud de su legitimidad. Sin embargo,
los gobiernos de las coaliciones gubernamentales más perdurables del último
periodo democrático –de 1995 a 2002, con la centroderecha encabezada por
el Partido de la Socialdemocracia Brasileña (PSDB), y de 2003 a 2015, con la
centroizquierda, bajo el liderazgo del Partido de los Trabajadores (PT)– efectuaron cambios importantes y significativos en Brasil. En el campo de la economía, por ejemplo, los gobiernos del PSDB lograron controlar la hiperinflación, aprobando una enmienda constitucional para reorganizar las finanzas
públicas. Cabe destacar que, con relación a la condición social de la población,
en los gobiernos del PT, entre 2002 y 2012, la desigualdad disminuyó sistemáticamente como el resultado de las políticas de distribución del ingreso y el
aumento real del salario mínimo (Arretche, 2015). Sin embargo, las políticas
más sustantivas que atacaban los problemas estructurales de la desigualdad
brasileña, como el sistema tributario regresivo o la concentración de la tierra,
fueron relegadas por los gobiernos del PSDB y del PT.
La composición del PT como el partido gobernante, con sectores de la
sociedad no siempre alineados con los ideales progresistas, redujo significativamente la efectividad de su gobierno, a pesar de la implementación de
políticas paradigmáticas, como la Bolsa Familia y el Proceso de Aceleración
del Crecimiento (PAC)2, el uso de mecanismos de mercado en la formulación
1
Caio Prado Jr. ([1942] 1970) parece haber sido profético cuando habló del significado de
la colonización brasileña y su carácter de colonia de exploración. Fernando Henrique Cardoso
(1964) también compartió la idea de que no había burguesía nacional. La burguesía existe, pero
no es nacional. Por lo tanto, puede ser hábil para administrar un negocio, pero no para liderar
un proyecto nacional.
2
El Programa de Aceleración del Crecimiento (PAC) se lanzó a principios de 2007. Era un
programa que abarcaba un conjunto de políticas económicas previstas para los cuatro años si-
14
de las políticas, como el PROUNI (Programa Universidade para Todos) y el
FIES (Fundo de Financiamento Estudantil), y la eminencia de un proyecto de
«desmarginalización» a través del consumo, con crédito de nómina. Aunque
el balance general es positivo en términos de inclusión social, la reforma de las
pensiones en 2003 y los recortes sociales de 2015 revelaron la resignación de
la construcción de un Estado de bienestar.
La estabilización y profundización de la democracia brasileña comienza
a colapsar en 2014 cuando, por un lado, el resultado de las elecciones presidenciales –la reelección del PT para el cuarto mandato– no fue aceptado por
el mayor partido de oposición, el PSDB; y, por otro lado, se puso en marcha la
operación Lava Jato, para combatir la corrupción, llegando a políticos de casi
todos los partidos de la base del gobierno del PT y de la oposición. Luego, en
2016, el proyecto de poder hegemónico en el país sufre un golpe con la destitución de la presidenta Dilma Rousseff, como resultado del procedimiento de
impeachment. En el siguiente gobierno, formado por Michel Temer del Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), comenzó el regreso de personal militar a posiciones clave del Estado brasileño. Finalmente, un síntoma más del
colapso de la democracia brasileña fue el ascenso al poder tras las elecciones
de 2018 del populista autoritario de derecha3, excapitán del Ejército y congresista, Jair Messias Bolsonaro4, acompañado por el general de reserva Hamilton
Mourão. La combinación de fuerzas civiles, militares y de seguridad pública
aseguró la realización de los intereses de estos grupos. Esto se debe a que, por
un lado, la agrupación Bolsonaro necesitaba unirse a segmentos que le proporcionaran el capital político y simbólico suficiente para tener el voto nacional. Por otro lado, los militares y la policía civil vieron una oportunidad para
volver a controlar el Estado brasileño en medio de un creciente descontento
y resentimiento hacia las corporaciones. La mayoría del electorado nacional
embarcó en su narrativa con un fuerte énfasis en la mentalidad militar, movilizando temas como la antipolítica, el anti-establishment, el anticomunismo, la
Brasil: entre la democracia
y el autoritarismo.
Presentación
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Katarzyna Krzywicka
guientes y que tenía como objetivo acelerar el crecimiento de Brasil. Previó inversiones totales de
R$ 503,9 mil millones para 2010, siendo una de sus prioridades la inversión en infraestructura,
en áreas como saneamiento, vivienda, transporte, energía y recursos hídricos, entre otros.
3
Se define aquí populismo autoritario como un estilo retórico que puede ser movilizado
por los líderes autoritarios de derecha e izquierda, cuyas estrategias discursivas buscan deslegitimar a los intelectuales, enfatizan la seguridad colectiva en detrimento del cambio social. Además, el populismo defiende la preservación de la tradición y el modo de vida, la obediencia a los
líderes del grupo, que tiende a resultar en políticas públicas contrarias a la ciencia, basadas en
"nosotros" contra "ellos" y que busca deslegitimar las instituciones políticas de la democracia
liberal. Bolsonaro se alinea con la ola de populismo autoritario de derechas que dio prominencia
a Nigel Farage durante la campaña del Brexit, que eligió a Donald Trump en los Estados Unidos
y Viktor Orban en Hungría, entre otros (Norris & Inglehart, 2018).
4
Con una carrera parlamentaria iniciada desde la redemocratización, cuando fue elegido
concejal, en 1988, en 1990 fue elegido diputado federal por el PDC por primera vez, reeligiéndose siete veces por varios partidos (PPR/PPB, PTB, PFL, PSC).
15
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
seguridad pública, el armamento de la población y la lucha contra la corrupción (Braga & Casalecchi, 2019).
En los últimos tres años, Brasil, bajo el gobierno de Jair Bolsonaro, ha retrocedido en todas las áreas. Según el Informe Variaciones en la Democracia
(V-Dem)5, Brasil es el cuarto país que más se alejó de la democracia en 2020
en un ranking de 202 países en casi todos los indicadores analizados. En la
economía, los indicadores eran negativos incluso antes de la pandemia. En
2019, el retiro en dólares americanos de la economía brasileña superó la entrada por 44,7 mil millones, el peor resultado desde 1982. En el mismo año,
el crecimiento del PIB fue del 1,1 %, por debajo de las expectativas del mercado y por debajo de los dos años anteriores. Ese año la tasa de desempleo
también decepcionó con un nivel del 11,9 %, ligeramente inferior al 12,3 % de
2018, pero con una informalidad récord de un 41,1 % de la población ocupada o 38,4 millones de personas (Agência Brasil, 2020; Estado de Minas, 2020;
Nery, 2020). Además, la deuda pública federal, que incluye el endeudamiento
interno y externo de Brasil, cerró 2020 en R$ 5,01 billones. El valor representó
un aumento del 17,9 % en comparación con 2019, cuando la deuda fue de R$
4,249 billones6. Así, en 2021, incluso con la aprobación de la controvertida Enmienda Constitucional de “Teto de Gastos”, la deuda alcanzó, por primera vez,
el 90 % del PIB. El aumento del gasto público propuesto por el gobierno para
mitigar los efectos de la pandemia de coronavirus no ha contribuido a mejorar
su imagen ante los ciudadanos.
Al análisis de la actual situación interna de Brasil, cabe agregar una observación sobre la actividad internacional de este país. Entre los años 1995 y 2015, Brasil pareció emerger como el líder regional y la potencia mundial. Desde 2017, la
política del gobierno de Jair Bolsonaro en el campo de relaciones internacionales
indica que Brasil tiende a aislarse de alguna manera, renunciando a participar en
los foros políticos regionales, como la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) o la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC). Así
5
Según este informe, el mundo está experimentando una ola de expansión de la autocracia
iniciada en 1994. Esta sería la tercera ola desde 1900 (las dos primeras tuvieron lugar entre las décadas de 1920 y 1940 y entre principios de la década de 1960 y finales de la década de 1970). Si en
2010 el 48 % de la población mundial vivía bajo regímenes considerados antidemocráticos, en 2020
este porcentaje aumentó al 68 % y volvió al nivel observado a principios de la década de 1990. En el
grupo G-20 -que suma las economías más grandes del mundo– además de Brasil y Turquía, India
también mostró una caída en los parámetros democráticos tan significativa que ya no se consideraba la democracia más grande del mundo y llegó a ser clasificada, por V-Dem, como autocracia
con elecciones. Según los investigadores, los procesos de India, Turquía, Polonia y Brasil, a pesar de
estar en diferentes etapas, siguen el mismo guion. En primer lugar, atacan a los medios de comunicación y a la sociedad civil. Luego, fomentan la polarización de la sociedad, faltan el respeto a los
oponentes y difunden información falsa, y después socavan las instituciones formales.
6
Mas información en la Secretaría del Tesoro Nacional, del Ministerio de Economía. Máximo, W. (27.01.2021). Dívida pública fecha 2020 acima de R$ 5 trilhões. Agência Brasil. Recuperado el 22 de septiembre de 2021, de https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2021-01/
divida-publica-fecha-2020-acima-de-r-5-trilhoes
16
renuncia a su aspiración de liderazgo regional y contribuye a la desintegración
de los Estados latinoamericanos. Los cambios en la política exterior del gobierno
de Bolsonaro llevaron a una redefinición de la narrativa de la política exterior de
Brasil y roles internacionales del Estado (Sawicka, 2020).
Los autores de los artículos del Dossier dedicado a estudiar el caso de Brasil se comprometieron a explicar los complejos problemas de la democracia
brasileña, como también dilemas y amenazas contemporáneos del funcionamiento del Estado. Las consideraciones y análisis presentados por los autores
se centran en explicar las condiciones, la especificidad y los efectos del gobierno de Jair Bolsonaro en términos de la política interna y funcionamiento del
sistema político brasileño y además la política externa de Brasil.
Brasil: entre la democracia
y el autoritarismo.
Presentación
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Katarzyna Krzywicka
Referencias bibliográficas
Agência Brasil (08.01.2020). Banco Central revela que US$ 44,7 bilhões saíram do Brasil em
2019. Recuperado el 22 de junio de 2021, de https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/
noticia/2020-01/banco-central-revela-que-us-447-bilhoes-sairam-do-brasil-em-2019.
Alizada, N., Cole, R., Gastaldi, L. et al. (2021). Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy
Report 2021. University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute.
Arretche, M. (org.) (2015). Trayectorias de desigualdades. Cómo ha cambiado Brasil en los
últimos cincuenta años. São Paulo: Editorial UNESP.
Braga, M., & Casalecchi, G. (2019). Legitimidad y compromiso democrático. Impases
contemporáneos en América Latina. Anuario Latinoamericano – Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales, vol. 7, pp. 213–230. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/
al.2019.7.213-230
Cardoso, F. H. (1964). Empresario Industrial y Desarrollo Económico en Brasil. São Paulo:
Cuerpo y Alma.
Estado de Minas (04.03.2020). PIB cresce 1,1% em 2019, diz IBGE; crescimento fica abaixo
das expectativas. Recuperado el 22 de junio de 2021, de https://www.em.com.br/app/
noticia/economia/2020/03/04/internas_economia,1126044/pib-cresce-1-1-em-2019-dizibge-crescimento-fica-abaixo-das-expecta.shtml
Krzywicka, K. (2020). La formación de la cultura política latinoamericana: entre la
herencia y la modernidad. Latitud SUR, no 15 (En Línea), ISSN 2683-9326, (15), pp. 7–17.
Recuperado a partir de https://ojs.econ.uba.ar/index.php/LATSUR/article/view/1983
Nery, C. (31.01.2020). Desemprego cai para 11,9% na média de 2019; informalidade é
a maior em 4 anos. Agência IBGE Notícias. Recuperado el 22 de junio de 2021, de https://
agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-noticias/2012-agencia-de-noticias/noticias/26741desemprego-cai-para-11-9-na-media-de-2019-informalidade-e-a-maior-em-4-anos
Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019). The Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and AuthoritarianpPopulism. Cambridge University Press.
Máximo, W. (27.01.2021). Dívida pública fecha 2020 acima de R$ 5 trilhões. Agência
Brasil. Recuperado el 22 de junio de 2021, de https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/
noticia/2021-01/divida-publica-fecha-2020-acima-de-r-5-trilhoes
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Prado Jr., C. (1970). Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo. São Paulo: Brasiliense.
Sawicka, M. (2020). Quemando puentes y defendiendo la fe: la relación turbulenta entre
Brasil y China en la era Bolsonaro. Anuario Latinoamericano – Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones
Internacionales, vol. 10, pp. 121-146. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/al.2020.10.121-146
V-Dem, (2021). Variations in Democracy Report, Institute of Democracy, University of
Gothenburg.
18
Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 19–41
Incomplete Democracies: The Brazilian Case
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.19-41
Democracias incompletas: El caso de Brasil
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga*
FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF SÃO CARLOS, BRAZIL
msbraga@ufscar.br
https://orcid .org/0000-0003-2141-9778
Gustavo Muller**
FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF SANTA MARIA, BRAZIL
gustavomuller2014@uol .com .br
https://orcid .org/0000-0002-1711-013X
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues***
FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF SÃO CARLOS, BRAZIL
marcuslcr@yahoo.com.br
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8494-0264
ABSTRACT
The article aims to analyze whether, after 30 years of current Brazilian democracy,
political institutions will be resilient enough to deal with the consequences of an
authoritarian government elected in the middle of a deep representation crisis.
In other words, would this be a turn to an illiberal democracy? From an analysis of the
situation, we traced a chronology of circumstances – transition from the authoritarian
regime, popular dissatisfaction, critical elections of 2018 as a time of exhaustion for
the New Republic, dynamics of the party dispute – that converged to the rise of ultraright forces, elected through a democratic regime. Data referring to public perception
concerning institutions, electoral results, and performance of traditional parties in
recent electoral cycles (general election of 2018 and municipal election of 2020) are
analyzed. We conclude that the growth of center-right parties in the 2020 municipal
elections indicate that – despite the analytical correctness of the literature on the
possibility of internal corrosion of democracies by nationalist neopopulism – the thesis
regarding incidental rulers has strong evidence visible in Brazil.
* Professor and researcher in the Department of Social Sciences and the Post-graduate
Program of Political Science at the Federal University of São Carlos, Brazil.
** Professor and researcher in the Department of Social Sciences at the Federal University
of Santa Maria, Brazil.
*** PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Federal University of São Carlos,
Brazil.
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América Latina: Brasil
KEYWORDS: Brazilian democracy, Bolsonaro government, party system, democratic
backlash, electoral realignment, critical election.
RESUMEN
El artículo pretende analizar si, tras 30 años de la actual democracia brasileña, las
instituciones políticas serán lo suficientemente resistentes como para afrontar las
consecuencias de un gobierno autoritario elegido en medio de una profunda crisis
de representación. En otras palabras, ¿se trataría de un giro hacia una democracia
antiliberal? A partir de un análisis de coyuntura, trazamos una cronología de
circunstancias –transición del régimen autoritario, insatisfacción popular, elecciones
críticas de 2018 como momento de agotamiento de la Nueva República, dinámica
de la disputa partidaria– que confluyeron al ascenso de fuerzas de ultraderecha,
elegidas en el marco de un régimen democrático. Se analizan los datos referidos a la
percepción pública sobre las instituciones, los resultados electorales y el desempeño
de los partidos tradicionales en los últimos ciclos electorales (elecciones generales
de 2018 y municipales de 2020). Concluimos que el crecimiento de los partidos
de centroderecha en las elecciones municipales de 2020 indica que – a pesar de la
corrección analítica de la literatura sobre la posibilidad de corrosión interna de las
democracias por el neopopulismo nacionalista – la tesis relativa a los gobernantes
incidentales tiene fuertes indicios de mostrarse en Brasil.
PALABRAS CLAVE: democracia brasileña, gobierno de Bolsonaro, sistema de
partidos, retroceso democrático, reajuste electoral, elección crítica.
Introduction1
The results of the 2018 elections, with the victory of Jair Bolsonaro as president
of the Republic, questioned the future of democracy in Brazil, which had begun
to consolidate itself around the 80s through a transition that gave rise to an institutional arrangement denominated as the “New Republic”. Although the “antiPT-ism” exercised had an important role in the behavior of electors who did not
identify themselves with PT, the work of Jairo Nicolau points to a generalized
dissatisfaction of the population in all levels of income, age, and education. Even
though Nicolau’s work provides, as a backdrop, a discussion about political culture, this work will concentrate its focus on institutional dynamics, having been
seen that, as warns Przeworski, despite the fact that democracies need democrats, the relationship of cause and effect between questions and answers related
to belief in the democracy gives rise to controversies (Przeworski, 2019, p. 129).
In other words, the question is if Brazilian democratic institutions will be
resilient enough to face the consequences of an authoritarian government,
This paper is fruit of research funded by the National Council of Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) through a Productivity Grant.
1
20
elected amid a representative crisis, or if it is a turn in the direction of a lowquality democracy – or illiberal democracy, a term adopted in recent literature. Such questioning necessarily goes through the debate and analysis of
party disputes, which is par excellence a form of the expression of “general
will”. Nevertheless, the analysis of an electoral dispute does not exempt the
analysts from the task of contextualizing the elections with a theoretical and
historical backdrop that sets the stage of the dispute and puts it in a broader
perspective, placing it – using the term coined by Huntington – in a wave that
brings with it a demonstration effect.2
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the 2018 election, which broke
the polarization between the two main parties, PT and PSDB, caused the divorce between society and the political system. Its peak were the protests of
2013, accentuated by the investigations of Car Wash Operation, and it was
consummated by the questioning of the 2014 electoral result. To measure the
disruptive depth of 2018, we will confront the performance of the main parties elected to Congress, along with the results for mayoral and city halls and
city council elections in twenty-seven capitals. Therefore, if there is proof of
a steep decline in the number of traditional parties in 2020, we can affirm that
the rise of Bolsonarism was a movement of tectonic plates towards a regime of
different nature than a competitive democracy. If the return of traditional parties in 2020 is verified, we can classify Bolsonarism – at least the most extreme
form of it – as what Sérgio Abranches conceptualized as “incidental rulers”
(Abranches, 2020).
For the author, incidental governments are products of popular uprisings
against the established parties that lose their connection with society and fall
short of the expectations, mainly, of those who are in a less favorable position
in a market economy system. Such incidental governments are supported by
unstable majorities in parliament, in the case of parliamentarism, or around
a leadership that gains popularity in a critical election. Being “incidental”, the
rulers generally are not elected to a second term and, therefore, an authoritarian regime does not come to fruition. However, their time in power tends to
leave a legacy of discreditation of democracy (Abranches, 2020, pp. 77–96).
From controversial congressman belonging to the lower clergy to president
of the Republic, Jair Bolsonaro was notable for his aggressive, prejudiced and
far-right speech. Always emphasizing obscure passages of the military regime,
throughout his terms, now in the exercise of the presidency of the Republic,
Bolsonaro approaches a kind of “antigeisel”, trying to promote a slow, gradual,
but not always safe closure. However, given the thickening of the political and
health crisis, the chances of Bolsonaro becoming an incidental elected official
in a critical election are great.
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
2
The first wave of democratization was in the period between the end of the 19th century
and the beginning of World War 1. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: The Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. São Paulo: Attica. 1994.
21
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We divided this discussion into five sections. After the introduction, in the
second section, we delimited the historical and theoretical debate to discuss
the principal approaches regarding the risks of the current democracy in the
context of Bolsonaro’s election. In the third section, we laid out a panorama
of the public perception of institutions and the implications for the dynamics
of political polarization. In the fourth part, we seek to empirically test our hypothesis taking into consideration the results of the 2018 and 2020 elections.
Finally, in the fifth section, we present our final considerations.
From transition to instability: the background
of an authoritarian electoral option
22
Many authors have faced the challenge of conceptualizing the diverse regimes
that, in one way or another, mix authoritarian components with a democratic
façade. This challenge intensified with the election of Trump and Bolsonaro,
and that, according to Przeworski, left us a warning that the democratic institutions may not offer the necessary safeguards to prevent their rules from
being subverted by the duly elected rulers. (Przeworski, 2019, p. 19).
Among the attempts to conceptualize the current regimes that distance
themselves from what is considered a prerequisite for free and complete democracies, perhaps the most fruitful endeavor was undertaken in the 1990s
by Fred Zakaria when he coined the term “illiberal” to characterize regimes of
peripheral countries that had, as their modus operandi, the systematic violations of civil liberties, freedom of speech, corruption, and fraudulent elections
(Zakaria, 1997). The idea that democracy can erode from within resounds
in the work of Levitsky and Zibblatt (2018), in their analysis of the election
of Donald Trump, and Albertus Menaldo (2018) in regard to democracies in
consolidation.
Levitsky and Ziblatt formulate a series of indicators seeking to measure
what characterizes as a contemporary demagogue. Among these indicators
are the disdain for the “rules of the game”, the attempt to delegitimize the opponent, the tolerance for, or encouraging of, violence and restrictions on the
exercise of civil liberties. According to the authors, this would be the authoritarianism that would install itself in the United States and that would parallel
the ascension of Mussolini and Hitler. All exaggerations aside – principally
concerning the American democracy – it is necessary to recognize the successful finding that the military coups or great revolutions belong, at least for
the moment, to the past. On the other hand, it seems irrefutable that the institutional antibodies developed by democracies are the result of the distinct
historical processes of institutional enrooting, and therefore, each democracy
will produce a different reaction.
In the same line of reasoning, Albertus and Menaldo (2018), with a broader comparative scope point out, like Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), the silent
establishment of authoritarian regimes, but they also emphasize the role of the
political elite. According to them, such institutions are designed to safeguard
the members of the authoritarian regime. This reasoning leads Albertus and
Menaldo to counterpose an elite-based democracy and a popular democracy.
A democracy based on the elite is one whose institutions and legal framework
limit the distributive responsibilities and, in some way, restrict competition.
On the other hand, a popular democracy would ensure a more efficient democratization process in which the “authoritarian rubble” is nullified.
On the other hand, the concept of national populism, as expressed by Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin (2020), offers a less catastrophic perspective
for democracy. For the authors, national populism is an answer to the wariness of what is considered “traditional” politics (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2020,
p. 130). The origin of national populism is in the distrust caused by the elitist
nature of liberal democracy, the insecurity caused by the migratory waves, the
sense of deprivation brought on by the neoliberal globalized economy and by
the misalignment between traditional parties and society (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2020, pp. 20–22).
In the Brazilian case, we have a transition initiated “from the top” with
the indirect election of General Geisel in 1974. A member of the moderate
line, Geisel, along with Golbery, noticed the erosion of the legitimacy of the
authoritarian regime, even though the economy was growing at an accelerated
rate. Nevertheless, according to Chirio (2012), the transition initiated by Geisel was not aimed exactly at democratization, but at “distension” to neutralize
the arbitrariness committed by the hard-liners and the institutionalization of
a hybrid regime, in which the representative practice did not threaten the political limits granted on the basis of an authoritarian ideal.
In order to put an end to the distension, Geisel had to maintain the electoral calendar and, on another front, face the regime’s hard-liners. The legislative elections of 1974 and 1978 were moments of great uncertainty regarding
the continuity of the process of opening of the authoritarian regime, since the
victory of the opposition in the most developed regions of Brazil threatened
the government’s majority in the National Congress. In the case of a controlled
opening, the elections became the main institutionalized channel for contesting the regime, and, for this very reason, a constant source of rule changes so
that the opposition would not obtain an overwhelming victory in the legislative elections.
On the other hand, even if the hotspots of guerilla movements had been
done away with in the Costa e Silva and Médici governments, hardline sectors
(sectors that the current President Jair Bolsonaro is sympathetic to) continuously expressed their dissatisfaction with the opening of the dictatorship, first
with the murder of the journalist Wladimir Herzog and a worker named Manoel Fiel Filho in 1975, then with several bomb attacks during the Figueiredo
government, the latter chosen by Geisel to be his successor and carry out the
transition.
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
23
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
The New Republic arises from this tension within the military regime and
from a transition that preserved the institutional foundations of the political
regime and that allowed the majority of the political elite from the previous
regime to remain at the head of the public administration. It is in line with the
Albertus and Menaldo’s thesis about the influence of elites from the previous
regime on the institutionalization of the new democracy. According to Souza
(1988) and Diniz (1997), skepticism regarding the prospects of a democratic
consolidation was justified by the characteristics of institutional continuity
and little social representativity of political parties.
Although several academic papers, produced during the second half of
the 1990s and early 2000s, have verified, based on solid statistical models, the
strengthening of rules and intra-institutional mechanisms3, the carelessness
with historical and social processes did not allow due attention to be given
to the fact that the short period of political stability experienced in the New
Republic was achieved thanks to the ability to manage large coalitions during the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luís
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010). The first stabilized the economy – while still
Minister of Finance of Itamar Franco – and began to build the foundations
of a regulatory state, and the latter – benefited from the stabilization of the
economy – expanded income distribution and social inclusion.
The sixteen years of political and economic stability (Cardoso / Lula period) were preceded and followed by two impeachments of presidents who
failed to manage coalitions (Collor, 1992 and Rousseff, 2016), a high degree
of party/parliament fragmentation, unemployment, recession, and corruption
scandals that reveal the persistence of promiscuous relationships between parties, the state, and the private sector.
The polarization of the presidential elections, from 1994 to 2014 between
PT and PSDB, did not minimize the spread of acronyms present in the general
elections. The same strategy of “dividing oppositions to govern”, devised by
Golbery do Couto e Silva, when he put an end to bipartisanship in 1979, was
used by Rousseff aiming at the destabilization of the PMDB, which, since the
re-democratization, had been the center of governance and, therefore, essential in coalitions.
The strategy, which had not worked out in the authoritarian period, was
even worse under the democratic regime. The attempt to use the governmental machine to stimulate the creation of new parties increased the price of negotiations between the executive and the legislature precisely at the time when
the expansion of government spending had reached its limit, which made it
3
The studies produced under the aegis of neo-institutionalism began by focusing on the internal dynamics of the House of Congress (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999) passing through the connections between the offices of ministers and electoral performance – suggesting the existence of
a vicious cycle (Meneguello, 1998; Santos, 2003), and lastly sought to understand the dynamics of
the changing of parties and coalitions (among others see Melo, 2004; Krause et al., 2017).
24
impossible to maintain public policies aimed at social inclusion and caused an
intense economic recession.
The rupture of society with the channels of political representation occurred in 2013, with large popular demonstrations mobilized by social networks in the style of the “Arab Spring” and, as observed in the rest of the
world, showed the decline of institutionalized channels of political representation. However, notwithstanding other exogenous factors, in 2013 the inability of the Brazilian political system to consolidate accountability mechanisms
that allow for a minimum level of accountability between government and
governed was an endogenic factor. What followed was the implosion of the
political parties’ funding mechanisms, the protagonism of players who did not
have elective mandates, such as prosecutors and magistrates, and the desperate attempt to maintain a political system that no longer even looked at the
electorate.
It is in this context that the 2018 election takes place, with a weakening
participation of the center parties and the confrontation between the left and
the extreme right, each highly ideological, in Przeworski’s words, each side
believing that the other is the enemy to be destroyed at any cost (Przeworski,
2020, p. 45).
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
Political discontent: a brief overview of public
perception of institutions
Trust in the political system is directly linked to its capacity to respond to the
needs and expectations of society. Thus, the recognition of its democratic legitimacy, on the part of society, depends on the performance of its institutions.
In other words, institutions only exist inasmuch as people believe in their legitimacy.4 But trust in governments and satisfaction with the democratic regime are not the only sources of legitimacy in the political system, – there is
also a need for free, periodic, and competitive elections (Dahl, 1997; Schumpeter, 1961). In any case, citizens’ assessment of the institutions’ performance
is key to understanding the support for democratic norms in the country.
In this section, we assess the Brazilian population’s perception of the functioning of the democratic regime and political institutions through survey
from the Brazilian Electoral Study5 (ESEB). More specifically, the degree of
public satisfaction with democracy and the evaluation of Brazilians regarding
4
In general terms, the legitimacy of democratic institutions can be considered as “the belief
that the political institutions in place, despite their defects and flaws, are better than others that
may be established and, therefore, can demand obedience” (Linz, 1978, p. 16).
5
The ESEB is a post-election survey of academic nature associated with the Comparative
Study of Electoral Systems project of the University of Michigan, coordinated by the political
scientist Rachel Meneguello (CESOP/Unicamp).
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América Latina: Brasil
the performance of political institutions for the period between 2010 and 2018
will be assessed. Table 1 shows citizens’ satisfaction with the functioning of
Brazilian democracy based on ESEB three-wave data.
2010 (%)
Table 1.
Satisfaction with
the functioning
of democracy (%)
Very satisfied / satisfied
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
2014 (%)
2018 (%)
48
38.1
12.3
17.5
20.8
4.8
A little satisfied/ not at all satisfied
30
35.9
80.2
DK / NR
4.5
5.2
2.7
Source: ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018.
In fact, Brazilian democracy does not live its best moments. According to
the data, there is a decline in citizens’ satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and a significant increase among those who declare themselves dissatisfied. Only 12% of respondents affirmed they were satisfied with the performance of democracy in 2018, a drop of 36 percentage points compared to
the survey carried out in 2010, while 80% of respondents declared themselves
dissatisfied in the 2018 survey, which represents an increase of 50% compared
to 2010. Although satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is shaken,
in general, most citizens do not endorse authoritarian regimes, as shown in
Table 2.
Table 2.
Preference
for democracy (%)
2010 (%)
2014 (%)
2018 (%)
Democracy is always better than any other
form of government
78.4
62.1
68.7
In some situations, a dictatorship is better
than a democracy
8.2
10.3
15.2
It does not matter
5.3
8.6
5.3
DK / NR
8.1
19.0
10.8
Source: ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018.
Despite the high preference for democracy, in almost a decade, there was
a decrease of ten percentage points in the rate of those who prefer a democratic regime to an authoritarian alternative. The number of those who express
preferences for authoritarian regimes has also increased, although it is still
only a small part of the population. In contrast to the high levels of preference
for democracy, the high dissatisfaction with it is complemented by the negative evaluations regarding the performance of political institutions, which represents widespread rejection. In the figures below, we present how the Brazil26
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
Source: elaborated on the basis of ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018. The question of the survey:
“How do you evaluate the performance of (...)?”. In the values, those who answered excellent
and good were added; average positive and negative regular; bad and very bad; and did not
know and did not respond.
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América Latina: Brasil
ians evaluated the performance of the following institutions: political parties,
National Congress, presidency, judiciary, and armed forces.
As the figures show, there is an increasing tendency in the rejection of representative institutions over the years. Political parties and the National Congress are the institutions whose performance is the most poorly evaluated. The
percentage of those who think the performance is bad/very bad continues to
grow over time and exceeds 60% in 2018, while the rate of those who consider
it excellent/good does not reach 20% for both. The performance of the federal
government, on the other hand, shows lower levels of rejection than those
observed for parties and Congress, although the rate of those who find the
federal government bad/very bad has been increasing over time, exceeding
40% in 2018. The judiciary, in the year 2018, presented a positive rating (43%)
close to the rejection rating (35%), but what calls the attention is that during
the historical series there is a decrease in the frequency of those who consider
their performance to be average and an increase in the evaluations of opposite
poles – great/good versus bad/very bad. On the other hand, the armed forces
are the institution that traditionally receives the highest positive evaluation,
increasing from 42% in 2010 to 62% in 2018, the percentage of individuals
who evaluate their performance as excellent/good.
Negative evaluations regarding the performance of institutions contribute
to dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the country. That is
what the opinions in relation to the representative arenas indicate, in particular, the political parties, for which discontent is widely noticed. In the three
waves of the ESEB, similar questions were asked about party identification,
more precisely asking whether citizens like and feel represented by any political party. The results of these opinions can be seen in the following Table 3.
LIKE
2010 (%)
Table 3.
Representation and party
preference (%)
REPRESENT
2014 (%)
2018 (%)
2010 (%)
2014 (%)
2018 (%)
Yes
47.7
31.6
15.8
39.2
25.4
27.6
No
51.7
64.5
83.3
57.9
67.8
68.8
0.6
3.9
0.9
2.9
6.8
3.6
DK / NR
Source: ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018. Questions: “Is there a political party that you like?”
(2010 and 2014); “Do you consider yourself close to any political party?” (2018); “Is there
a political party that represents the way you think?”
The data reinforce negative evaluations of the parties. It is noteworthy that
there is an increase among those who declared that they did not like any party.
In the survey carried out in 2010, approximately 50% stated that they did not
like any party, while in 2018, this share rose to 83% of respondents. On the
other hand, there was a sharp decline of around 30% in the percentage of those
28
who declared that they liked a party in 2018, compared to 2010. Among those
who declared that they did not feel represented by any party, there was an
increase of 11 percentage points, in the 2018 round, compared to 2010, with
approximately 70% of respondents declaring that they did not feel represented
by any party.
In the survey carried out by ESEB in 2018, questions were also included regarding citizens’ trust in the country’s political institutions. Once again, mistrust in relation to the parties prevails, with 84.4%, reaching the highest levels
of distrust, followed by the National Congress with 81.2% and the presidency
with 70.1%.6
In general, the data show that in the public perception there is a prevalent
feeling of discreditation and distrust of representative institutions, which increased considerably in the last election analyzed. In the next section, we seek
to identify how this context of widespread citizen discontent was reflected in
the last general elections of 2018.
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
From social to electoral polarization
Never before in its political history had Brazil experienced such a long period
of democratic institutionality, that is, stability in political competition patterns. However, in a society with little democratic experience and frequently
used anti-republican practices, as is the case in Brazil, there was an increasing
skepticism towards parties and government institutions.
The intersection of these elements culminated in the growth of radicalism
and the intensification of political polarization in society, changing the pattern
of competition that had prevailed in the previous six presidential elections
(1994–2014) structured around the dispute between the Workers’ Party (PT)
versus the Party of Social Brazilian Democracy (PSDB) (Braga, 2010; Limongi
& Cortez, 2010; Carreirão, 2014), and gave rise to the ascension of the extreme
right-wing populist candidates like that of Bolsonaro.
Regarding the polarization of society, the ESEB survey asked about the
ideological self-positioning of voters on a scale from zero to ten, where zero
represents more to the left and ten more to the right. In 2018, the vast majority, 43%, positioned themselves between seven and ten on the right scale, an
increase of 16 percentage points in relation to the 2014 survey. On the other
hand, 20% positioned themselves in the center (between four and six on the
scale) and approximately 15% positioned themselves between zero and three
on the scale in the 2018 survey. These results indicate a turn to the right of
society which was reflected in the elections.
6
These results included the answers little/no trust. The question in the ESEB survey was:
“Regarding these institutions, what level of trust do you have in them?”.
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América Latina: Brasil
In the context of an increase in political polarization of the population, the
traditional center-right parties (mainly MDB and PSDB) had a setback in the
2018 elections, opening space for “new” competitive political parties – such
as REDE, Novo and PSL itself –, increasing party fragmentation7. From a systemic point of view, the dynamics of a polarized pluralism, as Sartori (1982)
defines, with centrifugal tendencies of party competition and high propensity
to institutional instability, ends up taking over. Under this political context,
the center loses its capacity to structure electoral preferences, increasing ideological distances.
At the same time, we observed an increase in electoral uncertainty, caused
by the Brazilian (economic and political) crisis, but also by an increase in
the supply of candidates in the 2018 presidential race. Figure 6 below shows
the evolution of the number of candidates in the presidential elections and
the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) coefficients for presidential disputes
throughout the post-88 democratic period.
Figure 6.
Number of Candidates
and Effective Number of
Candidates in Presidential
Elections
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
In the 2018 presidential race, PT, to a certain extent, remained as the uniting pole of the left (rivaling PDT). The novelty was the emergence of Bolsonarism, which managed to attract a large part of the votes of the center-right and
7
In the Congress elected in 2018, Brazil broke its own record of fragmentation, electing
congressmen from 30 different parties compared to 28 in 2014. In the Senate, there were 15 different parties in 2015 and it turned into 21 different ones in 2019. Currently there are 33 registered
parties in the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE).
30
right-wing electorate, as well as of those segments of the center-left that were
unhappy with the PT government, increasing anti-PT-ism. Nevertheless, the
ENP of effective candidates for the presidential election has remained stable.
What gained strength in this election was the ideological polarization, which
took a turn to the extremes.
The high degree of uncertainty that marked the 2018 general elections in
Brazil translated into a strong polarization around the presidential dispute.
For the first time, a government with representatives of the armed forces –
president and vice president – was democratically elected in Brazil. The analysis of the results of the first round of the presidential dispute, under the right/
left axis, presented in Table 4, shows the high concentration of voting at the extremes of the ideological spectrum (92%), in detriment to center candidates.
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Left
Table 4.
Distribution on the left/right
axis of the valid votes in the
presidential elections (2018)
Center
Right
PT; PDT; PSOL; PSTU; PPL; REDE PSDB; MDB; PODE
PSL; PATRI; DC; NOVO
43.41% valid votes
49.83% valid votes
6.76% valid votes
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
Source: TSE. Proportion of votes by party in presidential elections: PSL: 46.03; PT: 29.28;
PDT: 12.47; PSDB 4.76; NOVO: 2.5; PATRI: 1.26; MDB: 1.2; REDE: 1; PODE: 0.8; PSOL:
0.58; PSTU: 0.05; DC: 0.04; PPL: 0.03.
The influence of Jair Bolsonaro’s candidacy generated a coattail effect on
other electoral disputes, to the point that many candidates linked their campaign to that of Bolsonaro, in detriment to candidates from the same party.
As an emblematic example, this phenomenon occurred with the campaign
of the governor of São Paulo still in the first round. The ex-mayor João Doria
(PSDB), with “BolsoDoria”, linked his campaign to that of Bolsonaro, then
leader in voter intentions for the presidential dispute8.
According to the information in Table 5, in the elections for federal congressmen, in large part, this trend was also replicated, with a concentration of
votes for the right-wing parties. The coattail effect of the presidential election
was also felt in the voting of the small party Partido Social Liberal – Social
Liberal Party – (PSL) for which the then presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro
ran, becoming the party with the highest number of votes in the 2018 elections
and also the one that most increased its seats compared to the previous legislature, skyrocketing from 1 elected congressman in 2014 to 52.
The 2018 election is an example of what in political science is often called
a “critical election”, that is, one in which there are significant transformations
8
Other elected candidates, getting a ride on the Bolsonaro wave were Wilson Witzel, a judge and political novice, elected to the Rio de Janeiro government by the Christian Social Party,
and Romeu Zema, businessman and also a novice in elections, elected as governor of Minas
Gerais by Partido Novo.
31
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América Latina: Brasil
in the patterns of party competition in effect until then. Caught in the wake
of a prolonged crisis (starting with the popular demonstrations of 2013 and
aggravated by the complaints of corruption revealed by Lava Jato from 2014
onwards), the 2018 election had an overwhelming impact on the electoral performance of traditional parties by breaking the center of the party system and
pushing the electorate to extremes in the political spectrum. Meanwhile, the
right grew electorally. Led by Bolsonaro, it left behind the stain of the “shamed
right wing”, once associated with the political and economic burden of the
Parties
Table 5.
Distribution on the left/
right axis* of valid votes and
seats in the 2014 and 2018
elections for the House of
Congress, by party (%)
Votes (%)
2014
Seats (%)
2018
2014
2018
Right
38.4
59.2
41.4
58.6
Center
31.9
15.6
30
15.7
Left
29.7
25.2
28.6
25.7
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
* Note: Parties in the left field: PT, PSB, PDT, PSOL, PC do B, PCB, PMN, PPL PSTU, PCO,
PV, REDE Center: PSDB, MDB, PTB, PMB, PROS, PPS, SD. Right: DEM, PATRI, PHS, PP,
PR, PRB, PRP, PSC, PSD, DC, PRN, PRTB, PSL, PT do B / AVANTE, PTC, PTN / PODE,
NOVO.
military regime (1964–1985), and assumed the liberal-conservative agendas,
which found fertile ground in the 2018 elections, electing the most conservative Congress in the post-re-democratization period. This right-wing wave
that has taken over the country is not limited to just a monolithic group but
finds support in different sectors of society.
In an insightful article, Timothy Power and Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira
(2019) distinguish four sectors of the Brazilian right. The first, known as political/clientelist right, is formed by parties and politicians with office-seeking
motivations, who prioritize participation in government coalitions aimed at
accessing state resources, regardless of ideologies. This category includes parties with no program commitments, and they are recognized as “Centrão” (Big
Center), made up of office-seeking parties (PMDB), “parties for rent” from
right-center (PTB, PR e PP), and tiny parties, usually co-opted by the governments in office.
The other three sectors of the right show greater programmatic adherence
and are identified as the economic right, committed to an agenda of pro-market reforms and shrinking of the state; the religious right, identified with evangelical and neo-Pentecostal segments, committed to defending conservative
moral agendas, such as opposition to abortion and homosexuality; and the
authoritarian right, which combines a radical defense of law and order with
a nostalgia for the military regime (Power & Rodrigues-Silveira, 2019, p. 264).
32
In the 2018 elections, Bolsonaro got himself elected uniting the last three
rights – economic, religious, and authoritarian – and explicitly campaigning
against the political right, reinforcing the “outsider” aspect of his candidacy.
Paradoxically, while presenting himself with an anti-establishment rhetoric, contrary to conventional party politics, Bolsonaro made use of a long
tradition of parties with weak programmatic commitments, which work as
personal vehicles, and he was elected by a small party – which he joined
a few months before the elections. Before that, he had already been in seven
right-wing parties.
Once elected, Bolsonaro composed his ministerial cabinet mainly with
former members from the three right-wing sectors that occupy important
positions, but mainly with military personnel, and refused to negotiate the
formation of a government coalition and adopt practices associated with what
he called “traditional politics” or “old politics”. Such modus operandi caused
numerous problems of political articulation and increased the protagonism of
Congress in the relationship with the Executive power, which had a low success rate in the approval of executive orders sent to Congress and also a high
proportion of presidential vetoes overturned, which earned him the nickname
“queen of England”.
Instead of appointing technical members, as he had promised, he formed
his cabinet of members of the ideological wing given over to radicalism
(formed by his sons and the astrologer Olavo de Carvalho) and turned to the
military (retired and active), who began to act as “co-signers” of the government that opted for a minority strategy – unprecedented in the Brazilian coalition presidentialism – in the negotiation with Congress. Without a supporting
coalition, he runs the risk of becoming politically isolated and transforming
himself into a “lame duck” president. The fact is that not only the absence
of a coalition with parliament creates a perception that Bolsonaro is a weak
president. Other examples can be seen in the breaking away from his former
party, PSL, which occurred when he failed to take command of the party and
in the plan to found a new party (Alliance for Brazil), which seems more and
more distant. At the end of his second year in office, worn down by his disastrous performance in the health crisis, in a context of increasing unpopularity,
he turned to acting strategically with parties attracted by the benefits of public
power, forming a government coalition with greater room for maneuver in the
Legislative branch.
To do so, Bolsonaro gets closer to the political right (the so-called “Big
Center”) and negotiates the nomination of positions in companies and state
agencies in exchange for support in Congress, in order to ensure his own survival and prevent a potential impeachment process. However, this approximation with the parties of the so-called “Big Center” should not occur without
raising tensions in other sectors of the right and the Bolsonaro’s bases, since
Bolsonaro himself was elected – and continued after being elected – with
a discourse critical of the “Big Center”, whom he associated with “old politics”.
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
33
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
At the same time that the series of crises contributed to the weakening of
the president in relation to the other powers, it has also incited tension between the government branches, with Bolsonaro threating to adopt illiberal
practices. It should not be underestimated, given that he keeps at the center
of his government the authoritarian right wing – which is not necessarily the
military –, openly hostile to institutions and opposition forces.
Finally, another question that is worth highlighting is the high rate of electoral alienation (sum of blank, null or abstention votes), which, in the first round
of voting of the 2018 presidential elections, reached almost 30% of the electorate,
i.e., almost one third of eligible voters abstained from choosing of the president.
These results indicate that, besides the two blocks of polarization in the dispute,
there is still another “third electoral force’’, composed of those voters who do not
feel represented by any of the candidates. The figure below shows the evolution
of voter apathy for first rounds in post-redemocratization presidential races:
Figure 7.
Evolution of blank, null
and abstention votes in the
first rounds of presidential
elections (1989–2018)
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
Figure 7 shows that from 2006 on, electoral alienation rates increased gradually over the years, even though voting is mandatory. A probable explanation for
this phenomenon is the dissatisfaction with the political scenario, which faces
a serious crisis of representation caused, inter alia, by the recurrent involvement
of the political class in corruption scandals. In this context, it is noteworthy that,
in a very polarized election like the one in 2018, about one-third of the total
electorate opted out of choosing the President of the Republic, practically the
same number of votes that the president-elect received. In view of all this, the
high rate of electoral alienation seems to have the source in the discontentment
toward representative institutions seen in the nation’s public opinion.
34
Performance of traditional parties
in the 2018 and 2020 elections
Finally in this section, we verify in which direction the Brazilian political regime is going with the ascension of Bolsonarism to power in 2018. Therefore,
if there is proof of a decline of traditional parties in 2020, we will be able to affirm that Bolsonarism was a shift of tectonic plates toward a regime of another
nature than that of a competitive democracy. If the return of traditional parties in 2020 is seen, we could classify Bolsonarism – at least in its most radical
form – as what Sérgio Abranches conceptualized as “incidental governments”
(Abranches, 2020). To this end, we have prepared tables 6 and 7 which compare the performance of traditional parties in the 2018 general elections with
that achieved by the same political agents in the 2020 municipal elections.
Traditional parties are those affiliations that have been in the country’s party
system since the political opening process in the late 1970s.
The 2018 elections marked changes in relation to previous ones, with
a strong shift to the right and the collapse of traditional parties that lost
space in the Senate and Congress (PP, MDB, PSDB, PT, and PTB) and the
rise of parties that until then had little representation (PSL) and newcomers
in elections (REDE and NOVO). This effect was repeated, at least in part, in
the 2020 municipal elections, in which, with the exception of DEM and PP,
which registered an increase in the number of mayors elected and seats in
the city councils, all other traditional parties decreased the number of cities
governed and seats occupied in the city councils, compared to 2016.
The 2020 elections were held in an atypical scenario of health restrictions and social isolation resulting from the coronavirus pandemic. The
best performances were attributed to the right-wing and center-right parties of the ideological spectrum, such as PP and DEM, which significantly
increased the number of municipalities won in 2020. On the other hand,
PSDB and MDB were the biggest losers of the executive offices in municipalities. In absolute numbers, PSDB (–277) and MDB (–260) were the
parties that lost the largest number of municipalities compared to 2016.
Among the parties that are part of the left-wing political spectrum, PT suffered a strong shrinkage since 2016 and, following this downward trend,
shrunk even more in municipalities and did not elect a mayor in any of the
country’s capitals.
Although traditional parties have lost seats in Congress and significantly
decreased the number of elected mayors, parties such as PSDB, MDB, and
PT are far from becoming irrelevant. As can be seen, in the 2020 elections,
PSDB and MDB partially recover from the strong electoral setback suffered
in the 2018 elections, with the MDB being the party that continues to have
the largest number of elected mayors in Brazil, governing 784 municipalities
in all. The PSDB, on the other hand, although it lost the largest number of
municipalities, remained the party that manages cities with the most inhabit-
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
35
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
Table 6.
Performance of traditional
parties in the general
elections of 2018 (Brazil)
Table 7.
Performance of traditional
parties in municipal elections
of 2020 (Brazil)
ants, in total, about 34 million Brazilians live in municipalities governed by
the “Toucans”9.
Moreover, the results of the 2020 municipal elections represented important defeats for candidates supported by President Bolsonaro, as in the case of
Celso Russomano (Republicans), who was eliminated from the second round
of the race for mayor in São Paulo, and Marcello Crivella (Republicans), who
suffered a crushing defeat in the second round of the race for mayor in Rio
de Janeiro. The poor performance of the candidates who were linked to Bolsonaro and associated with the erratic conduct of the president in dealing with
the health crisis, contributed to the weakening of Bolsonarism and the loss of
the president’s prestige. The following tables present the performance of the
traditional parties in the 2018 national and 2020 municipal elections.
Votes and Seats
PP DEM MDB PSDB PT PDT PTB Blank/Null
Percentage
of votes in
the House of
Representatives
5.6
4.6
5.5
5.9
Number of
governors elected
1
2
3
3
4
1
0
Number of Senate
seats
6
6
12
8
6
4
3
81
Number of
seats in the
Federal House of
Representativ-es
38
29
34
29
54
28
10
513
10.3 4.7
18.712.260 98.398.564
21.749.078
27
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
Votes and seats
PP
DEM MDB PSDB PT PDT PTB Blank/Null
Percentage of
votes for mayor
7.5
8.3
10.7
10.5
6.8
5.2
2.6 10.969.405 100.879.416
Number of
elected mayors
685
466
784
522
183
314
216
Percentage of
votes for city
councilmen in
the city council
7.4
6.6
8.5
6.6
5.6
5.4
3.8 10.138.845 1 02.802.066
Number of
seats in the city 6172 4187
council
7109
4270 2575 3326 2375
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
9
36
2.1
Total
The figure of a toucan is the symbol/mascot of PSDB.
Total
5.568
58.114
The first important observation from these results is that from one election
to the next there was relative continuity in electoral support for the parties.
When we bear in mind the total number of valid votes, there was even an increase in the electorate that opted for a political party when casting their ballots. Although voting continues to be mandatory in our context, the choice of
a party is one way of expressing society’s electoral preferences. But even with
all the process of erosion and disorganization experienced in recent years,
Brazilian political parties maintain a significant margin of allegiance by the
national electorate.
A second important aspect to note is that, among the older parties, those
on right of the ideological political spectrum, DEM and PP, and center-right,
PSDB and MDB, increased their electoral political power considerably in the
2020 election. While the parties on the left, PT and PDT, decreased the margin
of electoral support and, consequently, control of political positions. There was,
therefore, a return of conservative forces to political control of the country.
It is important to emphasize that the Brazilian right-wing segment concentrates the oldest parties, under different names, but long standing in national
politics. It is the political family that has persisted from the Imperial Age to the
Sixth Republic (1985 onwards). Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power (2000)
show that the success of the conservative parties in maintaining political power in much of this period is related to the strategy of conciliation with civilian
and military groups at the head of the government coalition at the national
level, to the extent that they will remain in power even if in alliance with the
forces that were politically opposed to them. Specifically concerning the last
democratic transition process, Hagopian (1996), O’Donnel (1996) and Souza
(1989) point out that the absence of a rupture between the 1964–1985 authoritarian regime and the so-called New Republic resulted in the continuity
of the conservative political elites in charge of the reorganization of the new
democratic order.
As was the case in the electoral results in the United States with the victory
of Democrat Joe Biden, the growth of right-wing and center-right parties in
the 2020 Brazilian municipal elections are indicative that, despite the analytical merit of the mentioned literature on the possibility of internal corrosion of
democracies, the thesis regarding incidental rulers was evident in the United
States and has strong indications that the same evidence will be seen in Brazil.
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
Final considerations
In the face of the critical election of 2018, the traditional right parties, associated with the political establishment, displayed resilience and were victorious
in the 2020 municipal elections. Even though municipal elections do not have
a decisive impact on the national one, past trends can pave the way for the
path to future disputes. However, the risks to democracy posed by an authori37
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
tarian government, elected in 2018 to command the fourth largest democracy
in the world, raise an alert about the need to maintain constant vigilance.
The 2018 elections consecrated an extreme right-wing candidate as president of the world’s fourth largest democracy. If, on the one hand, his victory,
legitimized at the polls, is proof of the consolidation of the democratic system
in the country, on the other hand, it has sparked fear of a democratic regression.
This fear is justified when we consider that Bolsonaro has met all four
requirements proposed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) to identify potential
authoritarian rulers: rejection of or weak commitment to the rules of the democratic game; denial of the legitimacy of opponents; tolerance and encouragement of violence; willingness to restrict the civil liberties of opponents,
including the media. In his 28 years as a congressman, Bolsonaro has become
notable for his extreme positions and authoritarian bias, with controversial
statements not rarely associated with hate speech, disparaging “minorities”
(women, LGBT, blacks, and indigenous people) and apology to military dictatorship and torture (Sponholz, Christofoletti, 2019; Smith, 2020). As noted
above, the divisive ethos, widely exploited during his campaign, has lasted during the government, which has always been prone to crises and always finds
itself in a constant tug-of-war against the Legislative and Judiciary branches.
In the midst of the crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic, Bolsonaro
continued to instigate the polarization of society, encouraging participation
in pro-government demonstrations and against other branches, ignoring the
recommendations of health authorities. Hostility against political institutions
and irresponsibility are characteristic of populist-authoritarian politicians,
both from the right and the left.
Therefore, a dilemma the democratic process faces is that free and fair
elections can elect extremist demagogues who are not committed to institutional limits. This dilemma was emphasized by Fareed Zakaria, in an article
written in 1997, in which he coined the term “illiberal democracy” to refer
to countries – especially Latin American and Eastern European countries
– whose transition to democracy retains traces of the authoritarian period.
In the author’s words:
Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or
reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits
on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.
(Zakaria, 1997, p. 22)
This phenomenon is extremely challenging since it is the democratic
mechanisms of popular elections that allow leaders with authoritarian profiles
to come to power (Zakaria, 1997; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). When elected,
such leaders subvert the laws for their own benefit, raising the liberal deficit
and undermining the system of checks and balances, putting the regime at risk
of going down the path of illiberal democracies.
38
For the first time since the re-democratization, Brazil elected an ultrarightist as president of the Republic. In this sense, it has come closer to countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, which have elected extreme rightwing populist rulers. As if all the extremist outbursts of President Bolsonaro
were not enough, the large number of amendments – and repeals – of decrees
and provisional measures have deleterious effects, as they allow the Executive
to legislate without the participation of the Legislative branch. In fact, democracy has never been his north. As president, he has further intensified the
polarization present in society – as if he were in a permanent campaign – and
has been testing institutions and contributing to the corrosion of accountability mechanisms. But unlike his far-right counterparts in European countries
– such as Polish President Andrzej Duda and, especially, Hungarian Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán – Bolsonaro does not have the popular and congress
support necessary to transform the country into an “illiberal democracy”.
According to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), for the preservation of democracy, in addition to official rules, political agents must commit to respecting
the informal rules of “mutual toleration”, which means recognizing political rivals as legitimate, and of “institutional forbearance”, which refers to the
need for parsimony in the use of legal attributions that, at their extremes, may
undermine democratic principles. In this case, challenges to electoral results
and impeachment proceedings reveal fragile institutional forbearance. The
opposite of institutional forbearance is to play the politics of “constitutional
hardball”, when institutions are tested to the limit, generating deep animosity
among party adversaries. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) assign political parties
the responsibility of preventing the emergence of extremist leaders and selecting candidates who respect democratic rules. On this point, the authors are
adamant: “political parties are democracy’s gatekeepers”.
With regard to the Brazilian case, the situation of the party system, disorganized by the 2018 elections and still integrated by a large number of parties
that have little representation and limited agendas, is quite challenging. Add to
this the incentives for candidates to run for ad hoc parties, which function as
mere vehicles for promoting their personal careers. One can see the president
of the Republic without a party. In turn, these practices are endemic to party
institutionalization, because they cause candidates to place themselves above
the parties, seeking legitimacy outside the organizations, which generates incentives for individualism and the proliferation of new parties.
We have long known that populist autocrats use political polarization and
partisan intolerance to weaken democracy. As a response to this scenario, Brazilian parties have an essential role not only in promoting tolerance and institutional forbearance, but especially in democratizing social, racial, and gender
issues if they truly desire to continue managing social conflicts. After all, Brazil
reached the 21st century with a relatively stable democracy in terms of the procedures that regulate political competition, the change of political groups in the
control of political power at the municipal, state, and national levels, the con-
Incomplete Democracies:
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
39
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
figuration of a multi-party system, and the expansion of the electoral civil duty.
But, at the same time, it presents deficits of representativity of major population
segments, such as women, who represent more than 52% of the national electorate, but currently occupy only 15% of the seats in the House of Representatives
and 16% in the Senate. With regard to social requirements, the country has not
advanced enough to democratize the access of the majority of the population to
social welfare policies, deepening inequality in the distribution of income, education, and health, thus increasing the barriers between social classes.
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41
Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 43–61
Necropsy on Brazilian Democracy
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.43-61
Necropsia de la democracia brasileña
Guilherme Simões Reis*
FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO
BRAZIL
guilherme.s.reis@unirio.br
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7031-7167
ABSTRACT
This article explains by what means ongoing democratic backsliding takes place in
Brazil, after the pinnacle of its democratic experience. Unlike mainstream concerns
about the death of democracies and the quality of democracy, it started neither
by the action of outsiders nor through Executive aggrandizement. Institutions
regarded as protectors against abuse of power, such as media, the judiciary, public
prosecution, and parliament, led to the disruption of democracy. Consequences were
militarization, party system deterioration and undemocratic elections, favoring farright extremist Bolsonaro.
KEYWORDS: democracy, coup, lawfare, military, elections, Brazil.
RESUMEN
Este artículo explica como ocurre el retroceso democrático en curso en Brasil,
tras el apogeo de su experiencia democrática. A diferencia de las preocupaciones
tradicionales acerca de la muerte de las democracias o de su calidad, este retroceso no
empezó ni por la acción desde fuera ni a través del engrandecimiento del Ejecutivo.
Instituciones consideradas protectoras contra el autoritarismo, como los medios
de comunicación, el poder judicial, la fiscalía pública y el parlamento, llevaron
a la ruptura de la democracia. Las consecuencias fueron la militarización, el
deterioro del sistema de partidos y las elecciones no democráticas, que favorecieron
a Bolsonaro.
PALABRAS CLAVE: democracia, golpe, guerra jurídica, militares, elecciones, Brasil.
* Professor at the School of Political Science at UNIRIO, PhD in Political Science from
IESP-UERJ, coordinator of CAIPORA.
43
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
Introduction
Despite not being free of problems, the end of military rule in 1985 led to the
most stable and deeply democratic age in Brazilian history. Indeed, Brazilian
hegemonic Political Science used to believe that democratic resiliency in the
country was safe, as the institutionalization of the party system, free elections
and Executive-Legislative relations seemed to be far advanced (Figueiredo &
Limongi, 1999; Palermo, 2000; Limongi, 2006).
However, the Brazilian case is an example of how democratic backsliding
may be much faster than the progressive advancement of democracy. We may
consider that Brazil’s democratization process reached a pinnacle with the acceptance of electoral defeat by Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) in 2002 and the alternation of power, followed
by 13 years in which left-wing Workers’ Party (PT) governed, winning four
fully democratic elections in a row, with presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma
Rousseff being elected. The dramatic end of that age leads to a fast democratic
backsliding, as will be explained in this text.
Brazilian polity is also a useful example to discuss how some usual assumptions in political science may be misleading, as I will do in this article.
The death of democracy happened in a way that diverges from mainstream
diagnostics according to Levitsky’s or Runciman’s models (Levitsky & Ziblatt,
2018; Runciman, 2018). Indeed, some upcoming reasons were already indicated in a previous text of mine with a similar title: “How democracy dies”
(Reis, 2015). By ignoring some core elements, it is not possible to understand
Jair Bolsonaro’s phenomenon: he is not a cause of democratic breakdown, but
rather its consequence and enhancement. Also, as I will discuss later, those
authors emphasize a pernicious role of outsiders and support barriers as a solution. However, those very barriers may be undemocratic; they are supporting a specific market-oriented policy and not properly democracy. According
to Webster’s Dictionary, autopsy (or necropsy) may be defined as “a post-mortem examination to determine the cause of death”. Of course, you may identify
precisely the defunct. Authors are discussing the death of democracy but looking to a wrong corpse. I will address this problem in “The downfall” section.
The improvements and disruption of Brazilian democracy may be graphically noticed as measured by V-Dem indices for different conceptions of
democracy (Coppedge et al., 2017): Electoral, Deliberative, Liberal, Participatory, and Egalitarian (Figure 1). There was a sharp improvement in re-democratization in 1985 and the new Constitution in 1988, a slighter one in the
election of Lula in 2002, and a dramatic slump since the 2015 economic crisis
and 2016 coup.
This text aims to make a necropsy on Brazilian democracy, exploring how
it died. It will be organized this way: in the following section, I will make a brief
overview of Brazilian undemocratic history and explain why those 13 years
should be considered the most democratic ever. After that, the analysis will
44
Necropsy on Brazilian
Democracy
Guilherme Simões Reis
Figure 1.
Indices for different
conceptions of democracy
Source: V-Dem (Electoral Democracy Index; Deliberative Democracy Index; Liberal
Democracy Index; Participatory Democracy Index; Egalitarian Democracy Index).
move to the de-democratization process that began when Rousseff was ousted
from the presidency, divided into three more sections besides the conclusion.
Undemocratic chain
Brazilian history is mostly not a democratic one. Independence from Portugal
in 1822 was followed by the introduction of an Empire in which the king had
substantial powers, always having the last word due to what was euphemistically called the Moderator Power, not being analogous to current parliamentary
monarchies. The proclamation of the republic in 1889 was a military coup,
with the introduction of the so-called Sword Republic not leading to more
civil liberties than the previous regime. Five years later, it was succeeded by
the Old Republic, in which election frauds were the rule, and most of the time
rural oligarchies from the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais took turns
holding the presidency. Besides that, merely 5% of people voted for president
in that First Republic. That undemocratic electoral regime ceased with the Getúlio Vargas coup, known as the Revolution of 1930, which led to the forging
of many important institutions, state-owned companies, and social welfare in
Brazil. In 1937, that dictatorship centralized its power even more, starting the
so-called New State.
Brazil would know a polyarchic regime (Dahl, 1971) only after the end
of the New State, in 1945. However, the very first election was disputed by
military candidates and, only three years afterward, the recently legalized and
electorally strong Communist Party was made illegal again. Elections were
not characterized by easy acceptance of the ballot results, and among the most
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46
turbulent events, we may highlight the failed assassination attempt of uncompromising opposition leader Carlos Lacerda in August 1954 and the Vargas
suicide in the very same month, not to mention coup attempts (Santos, 2017).
The left-wing Brazilian Labour Party was growing from election to election (Soares, 2001) and indeed had a vice president, João Goulart, who became president after conservative Jânio Quadros resigned from office. However,
the Armed Forces only accepted Goulart’s presidency after a change in the
system of government, from presidential to parliamentary since presidents in
the latter usually have much less power than in the former. Goulart accepted
those terms, but the regime returned to presidentialism after the people’s decision in a referendum in 1963. Once more, most of the Armed Forces did not
tolerate this and a coup d’état in 1964 ousted the president and led to 21 years
of violent military dictatorship.
Although considered by Alvarez et al. (1996) as democratic, the first presidential election in 1985 was indirect, just like the ones held under dictatorship.
Additionally, as the winner Tancredo Neves died before the beginning of his
term, Vice President José Sarney took office. I must also mention that illiterate
people were not allowed to vote throughout Brazilian republican history until
the enactment of the 1988 Federal Constitution. The very first free election, in
1989, with biased participation of the press (Goulart, 2008), was followed in
1992 by the impeachment of Fernando Collor, accused of corruption.
In any event, stability endured ever since. Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
elected in 1994, had a majority coalition and could make neo-liberal state reforms with strong parliamentary support (Palermo, 2000). On the one hand,
the government coalition schemed to change the rules to allow Cardoso to
be re-elected in 1998 (Rodrigues, 2014). On the other hand, he did accept his
party’s candidate’s electoral defeat in 2002 and Brazil saw a democratic alternation of power, with left-wing Lula da Silva as the new president.
During their three and a half presidential terms, PT’s governments strengthened predictable enforcement. The autonomy of the Federal Police and Public Prosecutor’s Office has been considerably increased compared to previous
governments, which closely controlled investigations themselves. However,
the public’s perception of corruption increased, due to the media and the Judiciary “criminalization of politics” (Santos, 2017; Marona & Barbosa, 2018;
Feres Júnior & Sassara, 2018; Veiga et al., 2019), reaching its worst level one
year before the 2016 coup, according to Transparency International’s Global
Corruption Barometer, and worsening again in 2017 as inducted president
Michel Temer reversed policies against corruption (see Figure 2).
Other measures taken by the PT strengthened checks on the Executive.
For the head of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic (and also the
heads of the federal universities), the president of the Republic could choose
any candidate from a “triple list” (a list comprised of three names, the first of
which received the most votes from her or his colleagues); although, different
from previous officeholders, Lula and Rousseff always chose the first name on
Necropsy on Brazilian
Democracy
Guilherme Simões Reis
Figure 2.
Corruption Perceptions
Index 2017
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: Transparency International / Global Corruption Barometer.
2017
the list, the most voted one. In addition to this, Rousseff enacted a law that
stated that only policemen at the top of their career with the Federal Police
could be chosen as the Director-General of that bureau. Lula and Rousseff
could also indicate most of the justices of the Supreme Court but made no
partisan choice.
Additionally, Lula created or re-created national conferences and councils
to spread the people’s participation in public policies, such as those for the
Promotion of Racial Equality, for Women’s Rights, for Fighting Discrimination, for Disabled People’s Rights, for Elderly People’s Rights, for the Youth,
and Cities, as well as the National Commission of Indigenous Policy (Pogrebinschi, 2010).
The downfall
Great waves of massive, heterogeneous popular protests in 2013 (Bringel,
2013; Reis & Soares, 2017) began a change in the mood of Brazilian politics,
with less acceptance of the rules of the game, great dissatisfaction with political parties, and less control by traditional organized social movements. This
article will focus, hereafter, on the eight-year period until the beginning of
2021, in a declining democratic trend.
The media narrative that PT’s corruption broke the Brazilian economy
(Azevedo, 2017, for example) boosted the anti-PT and anti-politics feelings
and desire for a political change, be it democratic or not, and without a clear
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Figure 3.
GDP Growth in Brazil
direction, favoring someone not identified with political class (Reis & Soares,
2017). The bad economic moment also impacted people’s perceptions, and
GDP growth in Brazil was almost null in 2014 and fell again in 2015, keeping
the same negative outcome in 2016, as Figure 3 shows. The economic crisis
was considerably caused by the way corruption investigations in Operation
Car Wash were held by judge Sérgio Moro and Federal Police, affecting state
oil company Petrobras, engineering and construction companies, and investments (Belluzzo, 2018).
Source: Tinoco & Giambiagi (2018, p. 9).
Cardoso’s party PSDB lost the runoff against the PT for the fourth time in
2014, but its candidate, Aécio Neves, did not accept the result, differently from
the previous three defeats. The second term of Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, would suffer undemocratic pressures until its premature end (Santos, 2017).
Rousseff ’s impeachment process, distinctly from Collor’s, had no relation
to corruption. The accusation of manipulating the federal budget dealt with
measures which happened in previous and subsequent national and local governments, being neither serious enough (Carvalho, 2018, pp. 105–115) nor
enough of a felony to be considered what is known in Brazil as a “crime of
responsibility”, the type of crime necessary for an impeachment to take place.
Only two days after the impeachment was concluded, the same maneuver of
which Rousseff was accused was fully legalized in a bill. Indeed, majority opposition sought an excuse to oust an undesired president (Löwy, 2016; Semer,
2016; Reis, 2017). It means that elections in Brazil ought not to be considered
democratic any longer, as they are not decisive (O’Donnell, 1999) and do not
follow the rule of the ex-post irreversibility (Alvarez et al., 1996).
The impeachment was transformed into a vote of no confidence, like the
one that exists under parliamentary systems, what is obviously illegal and ignores the popular sovereign decision in a previous direct election for a limited
and fixed presidential term. Therefore, it has been called a “coupeachment”
(Klein, 2016) or an institutional, constitutional, or parliamentary coup (Löwy,
48
2016; Santos, 2017; Pereira da Silva, 2018). By stretching the rules, the opposition disrespected core elements of democracy, with the practical consequence
of making any left-wing government unfeasible. This was made clear by the
speech of the opposition leader in the lower house, PSDB Congressman Miguel Haddad, during the impeachment process:
Necropsy on Brazilian
Democracy
Guilherme Simões Reis
Today, we are no longer judging only the nature of the many crimes committed by President Dilma Rousseff which are shown daily in the newspaper headlines. What we are deciding today with our vote in the Chamber of
Deputies and afterwards in the Senate is the future of a country destroyed
by a president of the Republic who, with arrogance, 1) humiliated the parliament; 2) ruled with her back to the people, who expected from her leadership
better days and a better life but received deception and systematic lies; and
whose loyalty is not to the nation nor to Brazilian people but to her narrowminded ideology.
Additionally, other than the intention of a policy switch (Stokes, 2001;
Reis, 2016), a reason for the coup seems to be stopping corruption investigations (Fernandes, 2016), as a famous leaked telephone statement from Senator
and future Minister of Planning Romero Jucá shows: “It is necessary to change
the government to stop this ‘bleeding’ [… in a great national agreement] with
the Supreme Court and everything else.”. Traditional pro-coup parties such
as PSDB and Temer’s Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB)
were also associated with corruption by voters, having a much worse electoral
performance than the PT in 2018, as Figure 4 shows. The situation favored
outsiders and back-benchers, such as far-right extremist Jair Bolsonaro (Reis
& Soares, 2017), whose Social Liberal Party (PSL), tiny before his candidacy,
became the second largest one in the lower house.1
There is a wave of political science best-sellers concerned about the democracy crisis in the world and the advancement of extremism, often presenting
it as the death of democracy. Although agreeing with this general trend, I shall
caution about core problems in the definition of the concept of democracy.
Consequently, its autopsy is recurrently misdirected: while some democratic
elements are perceived as risks, there are undemocratic ones that are presented as a remedy or as minor mischiefs.
Przeworski’s (2019) assumptions share Schumpeter’s idea that “the democratic method never works at its best when nations are much divided on fundamental questions of social structure” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 298). Indeed,
Przeworski (2019, p. 20) considers that: “When political parties are highly
ideological, when they believe that essential issues or values are at stake, they
see their opponents as enemies who must be prevented from coming to office
1
By the end of 2019, Jair Bolsonaro withdrew from PSL, having no party ever since. Only
one of his sons remained as a PSL member, congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro.
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Figure 4.
Number of seats in Lower
Chamber (selected parties)
Source: Author (using data from G1, 08 October 2018).
by any means.”. According to him (Przeworski, 2019, pp. 18–19), the stability of democracy depended on a specific agreement: working-class parties
accepted capitalism, unions moderated their demands, and “bourgeois parties
and organizations accepted some redistribution of income”, with governments
organizing that compromise. The difficulty for preserving that arrangement
came from the loss of class roots and ideology by political parties, and from
the fact that “unions lost much of their capacity to organize and discipline
workers”. Those very changes would have as an effect higher income inequality
with a reduced slice of the pie for workers. It would make voters susceptible to
“populist” speech on the left as well as on the right.
Mainstream political science often shares that perception and expects that
responsible governance lies in moderating demands and accepting that status
quo, not “expecting too much from democracy”. Just like what happens among
most of the old established political parties while holding office in Western
Europe. According to that approach, changes should be the least dramatic
possible, taking place only when they are almost consensual, in the Burkean
way (Burke, 1790). However, all outsiders, either anti-neoliberal left-wing or
far-right extremists, are equally labeled as “populists”. Any challenge to that
political-economic consensus is viewed as radicalization and as a danger to
democracy. Political science often follows the Schumpeterian idea that the value of democracy lies in stability and that no bond between popular preferences and implemented policies may be a serious concern.
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) consider as democratic, even quoting Madison, a polity ruled by an establishment that makes all efforts to avoid any volatility or renewal, by building entrance barriers. That establishment, grounded in pre-existent political parties, is compromised with both endogenous
tolerance and free-market policy. According to these authors, outsiders, either
50
anti-neoliberal left-wing or far-right extremists (they mention a wide variety
of politicians from different times and places), were expected to increasingly use demagogic speech (which is, at once, anti-elite and authoritarian) and
erode democracy from inside. Therefore, even hard means to take out those
outsiders may be acceptable or at least understandable2:
Necropsy on Brazilian
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Guilherme Simões Reis
[…] demagogue’s initial rise to power tends to polarize society, creating a climate of panic, hostility, and mutual distrust. The new leader’s threatening words
often have a boomerang effect. […] the opposition may conclude that, for the
good of the country, the government must be removed via extreme measures –
impeachment, mass protest, even a coup. (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 76)
Legislatures may also overindulge their constitutional prerogatives. Take
the 2012 impeachment of President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay. Lugo, a leftist ex-priest, was elected in 2008, ending the Colorado Party’s sixty-one-year
run in power. An outsider with few friends in congress, Lugo faced impeachment attempts throughout his presidency. [...] According to one observer,
the trial was an “obvious farce…. Lugo’s impeachment barely even rose to
the level of show trial.” Strictly speaking, however, it was legal. (Levitsky &
Ziblatt, 2018, p. 110)
Runciman (2018) is also concerned about “right and left populists” and
so does he see a crisis in a modern democracy. Attacks on representative government that are not led by militaries, but by businessmen and bankers, are
viewed in a variety of ways throughout the book: as conspiratorial theories,
as metaphors of coups, as disguised coups, or as distortions on democracy.
Runciman emphasizes more the difficulty to undoubtedly identify a subtler
coup than gives answers. In any event, he is also not very concerned about
a connection between preferences and policies, in two main ways: 1) like Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), he does not see economic elites biasing outcomes
as a major problem, and 2) similarly to Przeworski (2019), he considers that
democracy is going to end just because of increasing popular demands for
solutions (“supercharged solutionism”) and claims for personal recognition
(“supercharged expressionism”), the very elements he pointed out as what
makes democracy worth (respect and long-term benefits). According to him,
they would be increasingly not possible together anymore.
2
Authors do say that those actions are “constitutional hardballs”, which violate “norms of
toleration and restraint”, but the examples they use throughout the book show more indulgence
towards establishment players than when it comes to outsiders. A good example is how they discuss George W. Bush’s role. They imply that his USA Patriot Act was “authoritarian”, or an “abuse
of power” (p. 93) and they affirm that during his government there was a “decline in forbearance”; however, they also say that only since Trump’s candidacy “the window was now also open
to true outsiders” (p. 53). Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) many given examples of establishment
players overturning democracy do not lead them not to relate intolerance to outsiders.
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The debates on democratic backsliding in world politics are often directed towards the issue of Executive aggrandizement. It is a historical concern
in liberal and republican roots of political thought (Locke, Burke, Montesquieu, and Constant, for instance). The need for “horizontal accountability”
(O’Donnell, 1998; Diamond & Morlino, 2005) has been expressed mainly because of this. Therefore, some variables on which literature focuses the most
are media integrity, judicial independence, and effective parliament.
According to International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Indices, all
three had been quite stable in Brazil since the enactment of the new Constitution in 1988, until suffering a sharp decrease since the 2015 economic crisis
(see Figure 5). However, the democratic breakdown in 2016 was caused by
a cartel agreement between those very actors: the media, Judiciary and Parliament majority (Perissinotto, 2016; Reis, 2017; Santos, 2017; Chalhoub &
Lima, 2018; Engelmann, 2018; Feres Júnior & Sassara, 2018; Marona & Barbosa, 2018), backed by then-Vice President Michel Temer.
Figure 5.
Media Integrity, Judicial
Independence, and Effective
Parliament
Source: GSoD Indices 2019.
There is a new and subtler kind of coup that is becoming more common in Latin America than old-style military ones (Coelho, 2016; Löwy,
2016; Santos, 2017; Pereira da Silva, 2018). Those who control the Judiciary
and do not suffer opposition from the Armed Forces, whether in the Executive or not, may be able to oust the opposite side if there is no tolerance
and the conflicts are not de facto regulated by institutionalized rules – like
well- known distinctions between “antagonism” and “agonism”, and between
“adversaries” and “enemies”, according to the concepts developed by Mouffe
(2000, 2005). Protests both in favor of and against the coup happened, but
violent police repression victimized those who tried to avoid a democratic
breakdown.
52
As a matter of fact, Rousseff had already enacted a criticized Anti-Terrorism
Bill which could be used against activists, and indeed it became an obstacle to
those who attempted to defend the president herself against the coup. Before
“coupeachment” there was also a process of expansion of Military Justice responsibilities, with consequences such as lack of checks on law enforcement misconduct by officers, particularly with the increasing use of the National Public
Security Force in major police operations (Lessing, 2018; Del Río & Gomes,
2018; Del Río & Rodrigues, 2018). This situation, however, would worsen with
the new government, as will be explained in the following section.
Necropsy on Brazilian
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Guilherme Simões Reis
Militarization
Quite unpopular, Temer assured his survival in office not only by bargaining
with Parliament, the Judiciary, and businessmen but also through militarization of his regime. Temer recreated the Cabinet for Institutional Security,
to be led by General Sérgio Etchegoyen, a fierce critic of the National Truth
Commission and a relative of key repressive agents of the previous military
dictatorship (Reis, 2016). Temer also chose a military officer for Minister of
Defense, which had not happened in Brazil since the end of Cardoso’s first
term as president, in 1999 (Arias, 2018). However, the most radical decision
by Temer towards militarization was perhaps the unprecedented authorization of federal military intervention in public security in the state of Rio de
Janeiro. In practice, this put the head of that operation above the state governor himself with regards to law enforcement, being different from the aforementioned operations by the National Public Security Force (Lessing, 2018).
Before the presidential election, Presiding Supreme Court Judge Dias
Toffoli invited General Fernando Azevedo e Silva, a member of the military
close to Bolsonaro3, to be his personal advisor (Brigido & Sassine, 2018).
Toffoli also said that the putsch of 1964 should not be called a coup, but a “movement”, adding that people “chose to blame the military” but the left was also
responsible for that situation. Bolsonaro began his political career after retiring as a military officer and always defended not only conservative views but
also narrow military interests, including refusing any criticism or punishment
for the military dictatorship.
As a presidential candidate, Bolsonaro chose General Hamilton Mourão
to be his vice president. A strong supporter of Bolsonaro’s candidacy, General
Augusto Heleno Pereira has been chosen to be one of his closest advisors, as
the head of the Institutional Security Cabinet (Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, GSI). Additionally, Bolsonaro appointed members of the military
3
Eventually, Azevedo was appointed as minister of Defense by Bolsonaro. However, their
relationship worsened due to disagreements concerning pandemic and, in March 2021, he was
fired, in a decision with unpredictable consequences.
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for an unparalleled number of offices and the management of the largest slice
of budgetary pie since the end of military dictatorship. That includes stateowned firms and many positions in the cabinet, including Civil House (chief
of staff) and even Health during COVID-19 pandemic (Vianna, 2021).
In a public demonstration of authoritarian far-right agenda, GSI head
General Heleno informed that the Brazilian Intelligence Agency was spying
on Brazilian cardinals because of the meetings with Pope Francis about the
Synod of Bishops for the Pan-Amazon region. According to him, those were
“alarming” meetings towards a “progressive agenda” and opposition to the government which needed to be “neutralized”. By “progressive agenda” he meant
the discussion on climatic changes and the lives of indigenous peoples and
quilombolas (traditional black communities that descend from former slaves).
More recently, referring to an investigation on charges against Bolsonaro, Heleno said that “it is inconceivable and even unbelievable”, and then threatened by stating that “it may lead to unpredictable consequences to national
stability”.
Not only an authoritarian and violent faction of the Armed Forces is important inside Bolsonaro’s government, but also there are clues of connections
with mafia-like paramilitary groups called “militias” (Paiva & Do Sul, 2019;
Calixto, 2019).4 Following Bolsonaro’s path, there was also an increase in the
number of military candidates and voting winners in the elections for many
offices.
According to Cheibub (2006, p. 18), “the military, once activated into politics, are hard to control”, and that is the reason why authoritarian legacies
may lead to shorter-life democracies, particularly if they follow military dictatorships. Indeed, as General Eduardo Villas Bôas admitted, the Army High
Command planned together a message published by him on Twitter inducing
the Supreme Court to deny Lula’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Together
with other stages of Lula’s judicial process, it biased presidential elections, an
issue I will address in the following section.
Undemocratic election
Far-right personalistic extremism represented by new president Bolsonaro has
been boosted by the undemocratic disruptive behavior of institutions that are
supposed to put checks on government. Therefore, more attention should be
directed to the private media and the Judiciary, not to be taken for granted as
neutral actors.
Favorite to win the 2018 presidential election, former president Lula has
been condemned and lost his political rights in a politicized judicial process
(Weisbrot, 2018; Marona & Barbosa, 2018) in which his constitutional right to
4
54
In order to read more about how militias work, see Phillips (2018) and Manso (2020).
due process was disrespected. Plea bargaining (delação premiada) “Snitching
Rewards” were adopted in Brazil in a biased way, disrespecting due process
and transferring the burden of proof to the accused (Avritzer, 2018). Sérgio
Moro, the same judge who condemned Lula with no material evidence to prove the corruption charges against him in the Car Wash Operation in a lawfare case (National Coordination of the Homeless Workers Movement, 2018;
Marona & Barbosa, 2018), was rewarded by being chosen as the Minister of
Justice and Public Security by then president-elect Bolsonaro.5
Public prosecutors involved in the Car Wash Operation and judge Moro
schemed together in order to have support in the media and to impact elections, concerned about not allowing PT’s success. It became clear when some
private chats between them in the Telegram application were leaked (Duarte,
2020; Estrada, 2021). Brazilian Public Prosecution, following Thatcher and
Sweet’s (2003) discussion on delegation, is a non-majoritarian institution, that
is, it is not accountable to people’s democratic vote. Considering the authors’
model, it is a non-majoritarian institution with a broad and eventually enlarged ex-ante agency and exposed to very little ex-post control, enjoying a substantial “zone of discretion”. Therefore, we ought to acknowledge that its misuse of power is no less harmful to democracy than the issue of Executive
aggrandizement.
Lula led all the polls, and his interdiction predictably changed the election
result (see Figure 6). Although the PT’s alternative for the presidential race,
Fernando Haddad, grew in the polls and reached the runoff, he was far from
Lula as a favorite against Bolsonaro, who was already in the lead in the polls
when Lula’s candidacy was not considered as an option. Then, a biased judicial
process determined the result of the 2018 Brazilian presidential election (Londoño & Casado, 2019), which must not be considered fair.
However, other serious problems also happened in this electoral process.
Bolsonaro, in both his 28-year career as Congressman and in his presidential
campaign, manifested intolerance against the left, support for the violation of
human rights and the military dictatorship, and offended minorities and vulnerable groups, such as women, blacks, indigenous peoples, and homosexuals
(Forrest, 2018). While running for president, he stated that PT politicians and
supporters should be shot by a firing squad and that they would be sent to
Ponta da Praia, an execution site during the military dictatorship. Unsurprisingly, widespread violence accompanied his campaign, at levels unparalleled
with previous national elections. Bolsonaro himself has been stabbed, in not
yet fully known circumstances.
Besides his hate speech, some illegal elements may have helped in
Bolsonaro’s triumph. The extremist contender’s businessmen supporters allegedly paid for sending voters massive fake news against PT candidate Fernan-
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Guilherme Simões Reis
5
It was such a powerful new Ministry, controlling most of the law enforcement institutions,
that it has been called a “Super-Ministry” by the press.
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Figure 6.
Presidential polls – 12 April
2016–18 September 2018
Source: Datafolha and Ibope presidential polls – 12 April 2016–18 September 2018.
do Haddad through the messaging application WhatsApp (Tardáguila et al.,
2018). If these accusations are true, different kinds of electoral crimes have
been committed: 1) electoral financing by firms is illegal in Brazil; 2) spreading fake news is obviously not permitted; 3) paying for flooding messages in
WhatsApp during political campaigns is not allowed either.
Conclusion
As discussed in the present text, literature on democracy backsliding is often
misleading. Executive aggrandizement or direct military intervention are often seen as the main (or unique) causes of democratic breakdown. Though,
there are other monsters besides Leviathan killing democracy. Institutions
responsible for checking may wreck democratic order in an “antagonist” way
(contrary to an “agonic” behavior), such as the Judiciary. While searching
for “populists”, political science may neglect subtler coups and undemocratic
schemes caused by the establishment.
Indeed, the very presidents accountable for the deepening of check instruments on Executive in Brazil were punished by them. Rousseff suffered
a “coupeachment”, and Lula became a political prisoner, unable to run in the
election in which he led the polls. Besides the intended policy switch to the
right, other side effects may be noticed in Brazilian politics since democracy ceased to be a commitment, returning to its undemocratic chain. First of
all, the party system has been harmed, and the main parties that opposed PT
shrank while backbenchers became more influential. Secondly, militarization
grew both inside the government and on elections, what may lead to a rougher
56
democratic breakdown in a near future if they behave as veto players or simply
do not accept to leave. Thirdly, Brazilian society is not only divided, but violent values became more mainstream and openly sustained. As elections are
no more the only game in town, and when they happen, there is no ex-post
irreversibility, polity also became less predictable, with a broader range of variables to impact.
The Car Wash Operation ended in February 2021. In March, the Supreme Court cancelled Lula’s conviction and also considered former judge Sergio
Moro as suspect of bias. Lula became eligible again. Perhaps the road back to
democracy began to be traveled. Alternatively, maybe the road is still too long,
and militaries will be blocking the passage.
Necropsy on Brazilian
Democracy
Guilherme Simões Reis
Bibliographical references
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Alvarez, M. et al. (1996). Classifying Political Regimes. Studies in Comparative International
Development, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 3–36. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02719326
Arias, J. (2018, February 27). Por que tantos mimos de Temer aos militares? El País.
Retrieved on 23 March 2021, from https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2018/02/27/
opinion/1519689207_346590.html
Avritzer, L. (2018). Inovando na Direção Errada: Supremo Tribunal Federal e Ministério
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Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 63–82
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
DOI: 10.17951/al.2021.11.63-82
Political Action of the Military Party
in Brazil under Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira*
UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL PAULISTA
SÃO PAULO, BRASIL
ana.penido@unesp.br
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0110-4840
Suzeley Kalil**
UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL PAULISTA
SÃO PAULO, BRASIL
suzeley.kalil@unesp.br
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0354-9675
RESUMO
Discute-se aqui a adequação do termo Partido Militar para avaliar a presença
castrense no governo Bolsonaro. Para este fim, resgata-se tanto a literatura sobre
partidos políticos em geral quanto aquela que conceitua Partido Militar no Brasil.
Em seguida, analisa-se a participação dos seus quadros atualmente no Executivo
federal. A metodologia empregada combina releitura bibliográfica com a análise
quantitativa dos militares que ocupam cargos comissionados no núcleo do governo
Bolsonaro. Conclui-se que o Partido Militar guarda características dos partidos de
quadros e dos partidos de massas, conformando um híbrido que é hoje o principal
partido de sustentação do governo brasileiro.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Partido Militar, partidos políticos, forças armadas, militari-
zação, bolsonarismo.
* Bolsista Capes de pós-doutorado do Programa San Tiago Dantas (UNESP - Unicamp Puc-SP; pesquisadora do Grupo de Estudos em Defesa e Segurança Internacional (GEDES) e do
Instituto Tricontinental de Pesquisa Social.
** Professora do Programa de Pós-Graduação Interinstitucional ‘San Tiago Dantas’ e da
FCHS-UNESP, campus de Franca; bolsista Pq-2, CNPq e pesquisadora do Grupo de Estudos em
Defesa e Segurança Internacional (GEDES).
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ABSTRACT
The paper discusses the accuracy of the term “Military Party” to understand the
current military presence in the Bolsonaro administration. We argue that “Military
Party” has the characteristics of both cadre and mass parties, being a hybrid that
is currently the main support party of the Brazilian government. The article starts
by reviewing previous studies that conceptualized the “Military Party” in Brazil as
well as the literature on political parties in general. Then, we present an empirical
evaluation of military officers presently working in the Federal Government. The
methodology combines a literature review with the quantitative analysis of the
military occupying high commissioned positions at the core of Bolsonaro government.
KEYWORDS: Armed Forces, Bolsonarism, Military Party, militarization, political
parties.
Introdução
A participação das forças armadas (FA) na política, bastante comum ao longo
do século XX em toda a América Latina, parecia ter se modificado nos últimos
trinta anos, uma fase que os estudiosos das relações civis-militares chamavam
de “retorno aos quartéis”. Os acontecimentos políticos do último lustro, especialmente no Brasil, apontam que as portas da caserna nunca estiveram fechadas.
Há várias formas de ação dos militares na política, aqui distingue-se pelos
menos três: a institucional – quando a participação se realiza em nome da
instituição “Forças Armadas”; a corporativa – quando ocorre pela atuação de
lobbies ou de representações políticas e sindicais, sejam essas militares ou não;
e a pessoal – quando militares, comissionados ou reformados, exercem um papel constitucionalmente reservado aos civis, seja por mandato atribuído pelo
poder político, seja por ascensão ao poder pelo voto no Legislativo ou Executivo (Saint-Pierre, 2004, p. 123). Neste texto, compreende-se a ação política do
Partido Militar (ParM) como uma combinação das três possibilidades aqui
indicadas, predominando a ação corporativa.
Muitos pensam a participação política dos militares, entre estes: Janowitz
(1964), Perlmutter (1969), Finer (1975), Moskos e Wood (1988) e Huntington (1996); e para o Brasil: Stepan (1975), Coelho (1976/2000), Quartim de
Moraes (1987), Rouquié (1990), Ferreira (1988; 2000) e Carvalho (2005). Em
toda essa literatura, a presença dos militares na política é a regra, e não a exceção. Os golpes militares são apenas os momentos mais espetaculares dessa
participação.
O efeito negativo desta participação sobre as democracias liberais é elemento comum aos autores mencionados, enquanto a quem cabe maior responsabilidade – se aos próprios militares, aos civis, ou ao sistema político – é o que os faz
divergir. Baseando-se nesse leito, é possível afirmar que, analisando a atual presença castrense no cenário brasileiro, os militares voltaram para ficar. Por isso,
64
neste artigo debruça-se sobre uma possibilidade de análise dessa participação:
a constituição de um instrumento de natureza partidária.
Segundo Janowitz (1985, p.131), embora os militares se interessem por política, eles nutrem grande antipatia por políticos e pelos partidos, considerados
incompetentes e corruptos, não compreendendo seu papel criador no processo
político. “É a política de querer estar acima da política”. Assim, mesmo
empregando um termo que, em geral, militares não gostam de ver associado
a eles, pretende-se avaliar sua validade explicativa para a situação atual brasileira.
Para alcançar os objetivos elencados, dividiu-se o texto em três seções.
Na primeira, resgata-se brevemente a noção de partidos políticos para, na sequência, retomar o esforço de outros sobre o termo partido militar. Depois,
é oferecida uma formulação teórica atualizada de ParM. Já na terceira parte,
a formulação teórica é confrontada com a análise da ocupação dos cargos comissionados no núcleo do governo Bolsonaro pelo ParM. Assim, pretende-se
verificar como as características elencadas na discussão teórica se manifestam
atualmente. Estas são completadas por algumas considerações finais.
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
Suzeley Kalil
Partido político: resgate conceitual necessário
Segundo a definição de Weber (1999, p. 75), partido político é uma “associação que visa a um fim deliberado”, seja este fim a realização de um plano
com intuitos materiais ou ideais (a exemplo de um projeto nacional); “pessoal”,
isto é, destinado a obter benefícios, poder e, consequentemente, glória para os
chefes do partido e seu séquito; ou ainda os dois conjuntamente. Para Oppo
(1998, p. 890), essa definição coloca em relevo três questões. A primeira, o caráter associativo voluntário dos partidos; a segunda, a natureza das ações partidárias orientada à conquista do poder político de determinada comunidade;
e a terceira a multiplicidade de motivações que levam à ação política. Trata-se
de definição bastante ampla, que compreende desde associações formadas por
vínculos pessoais até as complexas organizações burocráticas dos partidos de
massa, que têm em comum seu locus de atuação: a esfera do poder político.
Ainda para Oppo (1998, p. 899), é a ampliação da cidadania que exige o desenvolvimento dos partidos políticos, como representantes de partes organizadas
do povo no sistema político. A crescente demanda por participação exigiu também a expansão da função dos partidos, que passaram a ser vistos não apenas
como representantes de segmentos, mas também como responsáveis por educar
e organizar as classes subalternas para a política, formando novos quadros.
Os primeiros partidos, porque representavam e formavam interesses bastante específicos, hoje chamam-se partidos de quadros. Para tal classificação,
pesou bastante a organização leninista do partido comunista que, segundo
Hobsbawn (1995, p. 66), era “extraordinária”, pois impunha aos seus membros
“disciplina militar” e “obtinha dos seus membros uma grande dose de entrega
e sacrifício”.
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Independentemente do número de filiados, nesses partidos de quadros,
todas as posições internas ou de atuação na sociedade eram eletivas, e os escolhidos eram subordinados às regras e decisões do partido. A tarefa de representação institucional (nos parlamentos) era considerada secundária, devendo subordinar-se à ação de massas. Assim, não havia a predominância dos
parlamentares eleitos.
Com a expansão do sufrágio, a maioria dos diferentes segmentos sociais
caminhou para a conformação de partidos eleitorais de massa. Diferente do
primeiro, esse tipo de partido não se dirige a estratos sociais específicos, mas
sim à sociedade em geral, apresentando plataformas amplas e flexíveis cujo
objetivo é cativar grandes segmentos de eleitores.
Nesse modelo, os eleitos, e não os eleitores, ganham maior proeminência,
resgatando a ideia dos partidos de notáveis, agora associada à popularidade
ou a capacidade de financiar as eleições. Por isso, esses partidos são chamados
de catch all (pega tudo) ou partido ônibus (Mainwaring, 1991). Por pretender
representar um espectro amplo do eleitorado, o verdadeiro partido de massas
invariavelmente caminharia para um discurso não polarizado, intermediário
e mais ou menos vazio, o que caracteriza o centro político (entre a esquerda
e a direita) (Dows, 1999).
No partido de massas, a disciplina partidária é bastante frouxa, sendo mais comum a organização em torno dos eleitos. Para autores como Schumpeter (1984),
esses partidos são veículos criados por empresários políticos e destinados a objetivos pessoais, pois os espaços de representação são secundarizados em privilégio
de ações para a sua clientela de origem, sejam estas empregos ou recursos.
Duverger (1987) é quem melhor sintetiza as características dos tipos de
partidos políticos, organizando o partido de quadros e de massas em dois
polos. No entanto, ele informa que o sistema partidário incorpora distintas
combinações desses dois polos, já que o surgimento desses tipos de partido
não pode ser entendido de forma evolutiva, como se o nascimento de um tipo
extinguisse o anterior: diferentes tipos de partido coexistem no sistema partidário (Oppo, 1988, p. 902).
O rápido resgate da literatura sobre partidos políticos emoldura o que aqui
é chamado de partido militar (ParM), cuja caracterização e forma de ação política é o objetivo deste ensaio. Não se trata de classificar o ParM como partido
de massas ou de quadros, mas informar que, embora este não esteja disponível
à representação da cidadania nacional, comporta-se como um partido e influencia a organização do sistema partidário.
Partido Militar como partido político
Avaliar as ações políticas do setor militar não implica em escamotear as especificidades das instituições armadas bem pontuadas por Finer (1975), como
o monopólio da força das armas, a organização corporativa pautada pela hie66
rarquia e disciplina, e o sentimento de pertença a um coletivo maior que si
mesmo, o “espírito de corpo”. A isso cabe agregar uma característica fundamental: “o princípio constitutivo” das FA é a honra (categoria moral), o que é
contrário àquele que organiza a política estatal, que é a Lei (categoria penal).
“(...) Lei e Honra são princípios constitutivos que modelam a adesão das consciências individuais aos valores que cada um desses princípios traz implícito
(...)” (Ferreira, 2007, pp. 53–54).
A escolha da expressão ParM para pensar a situação atual deve-se, além
da sua capacidade explicativa, à sua efetividade pedagógica, uma vez que ajuda os setores da sociedade distantes da temática militar a associar a atuação
política de membros das FA com outras práticas adotadas por distintos segmentos sociais na arena política. Assim, o termo ajuda a mostrar como uma
determinada fração organizada das FA ganha funções elementares dos partidos políticos, como articulação política, representação de interesses, coesão
e organização de vontades individuais.
O termo ParM foi anteriormente utilizado por Ferreira (2000) e Rouquié
(1990) para analisar a ação política das FA no Brasil. Outros autores, como
Quartim (1985), também o empregaram como metáfora. Eles não discutem
propriamente o conceito de partido. Essas diferenças no emprego de um mesmo termo foram uma das motivações para este texto, apresentadas a seguir.
Ferreira (1988; 2000; 2007) argumenta que no Brasil, dada a falta de organicidade das classes sociais – ou seja, “não tem projeto específico enquanto
classe” (2007, p. 89), somada à organização do sistema eleitoral – onde a forma
majoritária para o Executivo faz com que, aos olhos do eleitor, este aparente
ter maior legitimidade que o Legislativo, eleito proporcionalmente –, faz com
que as FA apresentem-se como única classe organizada que, para atuarem na
política, conformam uma organização semelhante a um partido político. Elas
o fazem porque tem quadros preparados, a força das armas e considerável
coesão interna (1988).
Ferreira (2000) assinala que o partido fardado1 não é algo formal para
a disputa de eleições, mas uma organização temporária, que só se evidencia
em momentos de tensão interna nas FA ou de desencontro entre a instituição
e o governo, precisando, portanto, de uma situação social favorável à politização
militar. Nessas situações, tal partido revela-se um centro aglutinador no qual
as discussões processam-se de modo a construir um discurso coletivo, numa
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
Suzeley Kalil
1
Ferreira não utiliza o termo Partido Militar, mas sim “Partido Fardado” ou “Partido da
Ordem” – aqui avaliando que a evolução política no Brasil está marcada pelo embate entre “ordem” (patrimonial) e “revolução” (burguesa) – ou ainda “Ponto”, neste caso sublinhando a característica burocrática da instituição militar, especialmente quando contrasta seu papel frente à
“Banca”, que representaria os interesses das classes dominantes. Segundo o autor, os momentos
de maior presença do partido fardado na política brasileira acontecem quando há uma espécie
de “empate” entre os interesses das classes no assalto ao Estado, ou quando os interesses da “classe militar” divergem dos da classe dominante – o que aconteceu apenas uma vez, na abolição da
escravatura. Consulte-se os capítulos iniciais de Ferreira (2007).
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lógica mais semelhante aos partidos proletários. Ferreira ainda pontua que
esse centro aglutinador não tem autoridade sobre o conjunto militar “que
tende a se dissolver passado o momento agitado em que as FA se movem para
efetuar mudanças na sociedade ou em si mesmas” (Ferreira, 2000, pp. 43–44).
Perspectiva diversa é apresentada na coletânea Os Partidos Militares no
Brasil. O emprego no plural do termo antecipa visão distinta do fenômeno
relativamente àquela acima resumida. Usa-se o termo para questionar o lugar-comum de que as FA são um ator monolítico, enfatizando como a política penetra no aparelho militar e vice-versa. Os autores apontam que existe
uma tensão permanente entre as tendências políticas organizadas no seio do
Exército e a própria instituição. Mas essas tendências internas podem ou não
coincidir com correntes da opinião civil, o que impacta na capacidade de massificação dos projetos do ParM no conjunto da sociedade.
Para Rouquié (1990, pp. 9–21), o Exército brasileiro é um espelho deformador das tensões da sociedade, ou seja, os problemas nacionais são refratados internamente pelo prisma institucional. Como grande exemplar dessa conversão,
o autor aponta o estudo de Domingos Neto, presente na mesma coletânea (pp.
43–61), que mostra como preocupações que inicialmente eram de natureza profissional, transformam-se em questões político-partidárias. Acrescenta-se que
o espelho de Rouquié é um espelho côncavo, pois a lente institucional concentra
as informações filtradas do exterior, tornando-as mais agudas.
A questão do momento político é importante para pensar a atuação explícita do ParM (Ferreira, 2000). Todavia, a partir do entendimento de que
partidos são partes organizadas do povo no sistema político, nada indica que
militares não desejassem ter seus representantes, mesmo que esse sentimento esteja latente e não se expresse diretamente na arena pública. Nesse sentido, Finer (1975) e Coelho (2000) convergem ao apontar que não há nada de
normal na não participação dos militares na política. Assim, considerando
o grau de comprometimento de segmentos castrenses com o governo Bolsonaro e suas candidaturas ao Legislativo, pode-se dizer com relativa segurança
que os militares voltaram para ficar na arena política. Por isso, pretende-se
entender como este segmento armado se organiza e atua.
É possível perceber um grau de associativismo entre os militares que
foram para a política, daí apontar-se para a organização partidária. Mesmo
que isso não ocorra formalmente, a socialização totalizante das FA nas escolas
militares e na carreira gera o que Ferreira (2000) chamou de “nação dentro da
nação”, de maneira que cada militar considera que críticas dirigidas às FA, ou
a cada força singular, atingem-no individualmente, e vice-versa. Em outros
termos, em virtude da sua forma de socialização particular, mesmo quando
na reserva, militares não tendem a atuar na política como meros indivíduos,
e sim como grupo.
Perceber que os militares se organizam para atuar na esfera política, mantendo e ampliando seu poder político, não implica afirmar que essa organização
tomará a forma de um partido. Também não quer dizer que o partido buscará
oficializar-se por meio da definição de uma legenda registrada no Tribunal
Eleitoral.2 Por isso, concorda-se com a afirmação de Ferreira (2000): a finalidade do ParM não é a eleição dos seus, mesmo que essa questão seja considerada
relevante.
Quanto à estrutura, o ParM reproduz as características do mundo castrense, quais sejam, a hierarquia e a disciplina. Portanto, ele não se organiza ao
redor de notáveis eleitos, e sim ao redor de totens ou o mais próximo disso possível. Mesmo com as reformas castelistas3, totens continuam existindo
(Ferreira, 2000, p. 59): o sucesso de tais reformas está em que a posição de
totem é ocupada pelos generais de Exército, que comandam as FA e o ParM.
Embora possam existir pressões vindas de baixo, apenas com a autorização
do Alto Comando algumas atividades podem ocorrer, portanto, os caciques
políticos desse partido precisam ocupar (ou já ocuparam) posições hierarquicamente superiores na Instituição militar.
A estrutura do partido é piramidal, como nos partidos socialistas, mas no
lugar de organizações locais – regionais – nacionais, as instâncias decisórias
seguem a estrutura das FA, partindo dos oficiais generais até as praças. Combinada às características do mundo militar, a tendência oligárquica apontada
por Michels (1982) se aprofunda, pois, as bases de fundação do partido – autoridade e disciplina, são as mesmas da Instituição militar. Assim, os membros
do ParM são fortemente disciplinados, mas não faz sentido uma discussão
sobre a democracia interna ao partido para a tomada de decisões.
Por outro lado, há que não se desconsiderar as relações horizontais no processo de recrutamento. No interior das FA existem subgrupos que se desenvolvem como equipes da mesma idade, que estudam juntos, têm a mesma patente, servem no mesmo lugar, compartilham histórias e até mesmo relações
familiares. Em geral, dois oficiais de uma mesma turma (definida pela entrada
em uma das academias militares, equivalente ao curso superior civil) se mantêm em contato e se apoiam mutuamente, não importa o motivo ou o lugar
em que estejam servindo. Assim, as relações políticas no campo militar ocorrem também de forma horizontal. É dessa maneira que se transmitem ideias,
análises e posições políticas. Assim, o ParM atua em diálogo com a “família
militar”, misturando aspectos públicos e privados.
O ParM tem uma organização estável, com um corpo de funcionários
pagos para desenvolver atividade política e um programa político sistemáti-
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
Suzeley Kalil
2
Existe movimentação antiga nesse sentido, partindo de um conjunto de policiais militares
que tenta, sem sucesso, registrar formalmente um partido com o nome de Partido Militar Brasileiro https://aopm.com.br/partido-militar-brasileiro-contagem-regressiva/
3
Reformas produzidas pelo Marechal Castelo Branco quando no exercício da presidência
da República (1964–1967). Além de dotar o país de uma nova Constituição, ele reformulou todo
o estatuto militar, os regimentos e regulamentos das FA com o fito de modernizá-las. O objetivo
primordial de tais modificações era o de impedir a formação de lideranças (o que Ferreira chama
de totens) transversais à hierarquia. O principal mecanismo para tal foi o estabelecimento de
regras rígidas de promoção e tempo certo de permanência em cada posto militar.
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co. Para resolver o problema do financiamento, se aproveitam de estruturas
tais como associações – a mais importante são as ADESG, Associação dos
Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra – e clubes militares espalhados
pelos estados, para promover espaços de discussão dos problemas políticos
nacionais.
Por outro lado, o ParM tem uma desvantagem diante dos partidos civis,
que é a liberdade de movimentação dos seus quadros articuladores, particularmente quando estão na ativa. Por isso, uma vez que estes não estão sujeitos
às mesmas amarras do Estatuto Militar, os militares da reserva, bem como
a “família militar”, assumem o protagonismo na articulação do Partido. Segundo a Lei 7524/86, o militar inativo pode “opinar livremente sobre assunto
político, e externar pensamento e conceito ideológico, filosófico ou relativo à
matéria pertinente ao interesse público”. Isso não implica que estes sejam os
comandantes do partido, pois quem está na ativa tem o poder de abrir ou não
as portas da Instituição para os militantes do partido.
Registre-se que o ParM evoluiu junto com o processo político brasileiro.
Parafraseando conhecida expressão de Góis Monteiro, as FA deixaram de fazer
a “política no Exército”, praticada no início do século XX, para fazer a “política
do Exército”, cujo ponto culminante foi realizado ao longo do regime burocrático-autoritário (1964–1985) (O’Donnell, 1990) quando facções internas do
ParM levaram a cabo seus projetos políticos, como exemplifica o “Programa
de Metas e Bases para a Ação do Governo”, apresentado em 1970 pelo general-presidente Médici (1969–1974), e o II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento
(1974–1979), desenvolvido por Geisel (1974–1979).
Diferentemente do ParM que atuou sob o Regime Autoritário, que se assemelhava aos partidos socialistas, cuja principal meta de poder é realizar um
programa, o ParM que hoje se conhece aproxima-se muito mais do partido
catch all, sem conteúdo programático (embora com sólida formação ideológica), com alto proselitismo e com objetivos claros de ocupação e manutenção
de cargos na burocracia estatal. Nesse sentido, é uma organização muito mais
corporativa do que de representação institucional ou pessoal.
O poder partidário não advém do número de cargos que ocupa no Estado,
mas essa é uma questão relevante. As FA sempre administraram a área da defesa, mesmo após a criação do Ministério da Defesa e nomeação de ministros
civis, independente do grupo político à frente do Executivo. Também por isso
sabem como funciona a máquina pública, sendo capazes de identificar posições estratégicas nos ministérios.
Diferente de Rouquié (1990), não se percebe atualmente a existência de
vários partidos militares no interior das FA. Isso não significa que o ParM seja
homogêneo e monolítico. O ParM comporta tendências internas, mas estas
estão em forte coesão ao redor da unidade da corporação e da ‘família militar’;
do sentimento de superioridade diante do mundo político-jurídico do sistema
partidário; e da sua maneira de ver a ação política, pautada pela ideia de amigos e inimigos, sejam eles reais ou imaginários.
Retomando as variáveis do quadro proposto por Duverger (1987), quanto
à origem, o ParM surge do centro aglutinador e depois se espalha por diretórios. Quanto à morfologia, são altamente centralizados e hierárquicos, assim como as FA. Têm um alto constitucionalismo partidário, mesmo que esse
ocorra por canais informais como encontros de turmas, datas comemorativas
e a intrincada rede de atividades sociais das FA. Têm uma estrutura simples,
e baixa burocratização, pois estes já são cumpridos pela Instituição militar.
Quanto às características fisiológicas, o ParM não necessariamente apresenta seus próprios membros às eleições, mas se preocupa com a vitória eleitoral,
pois disso depende a ocupação de cargos governamentais e a conquista de políticas públicas para as suas bases. Porém, ao contrário dos partidos políticos tradicionais, o PartM não precisa atentar-se à formação de seus quadros, uma vez
que a tarefa de educação política já é cumprida pela própria Instituição, desde as
escolas militares até a ESG. A ideologia ocupa uma função preponderante, e os
interesses doutrinários e da própria corporação tem mais espaço nos debates
que os interesses pessoais. Em função da hierarquia e disciplina que existem nas
FA, a disciplina partidária é alta e os processos decisórios são simples.
Em resumo, o ParM une as diferentes vontades individuais em um discurso
coletivo partidário fortemente ideológico e, para isso, cuida da educação política dos seus quadros. Não é monolítico, ou homogêneo, mas é bastante coeso.
O partido representa os interesses corporativos, priorizando políticas públicas
e a ocupação de cargos pela sua própria base, mas também participa, direta ou
indiretamente, de eleições e interpreta a Constituição segundo seus interesses,
desejando massificar na sociedade seus entendimentos sobre o país. Seu núcleo
duro é permanente, e não ocasional ou reflexo de regimes políticos, sendo responsável por estabelecer alianças e fazer articulações políticas que, em algum
momento, aumentam seu poder. Seus aliados principais, e a ele subordinados,
são aqueles oriundos das forças de segurança (policiais, bombeiros, militares
reformados, ex-funcionários de empresas de segurança privada etc.) filiados
a distintos partidos políticos, especialmente aqueles classificados à direita no
espectro político. A estrutura organizativa do ParM repete a das FA, baseada
na hierarquia e disciplina, e se aproveita de estruturas estatais para o seu funcionamento. Por isso, é um partido com alta disciplina partidária e processos
decisórios simples e hierarquizados, comandado por generais de Exército que
transmitem suas opiniões políticas ou ocupam estruturas partidárias de cima
para baixo, numa lógica piramidal. Generais da reserva desfrutam de especial
protagonismo por deterem maior liberdade de ação. O ParM transfere para
a política raciocínios de guerra e paz, amigo e inimigo, o que impacta profundamente o sistema político. Por fim, diferente de qualquer outro partido político,
o ParM mantém relações diretas com a força das armas.
Mesmo enfraquecida ao fim do regime burocrático-autoritário, a Instituição militar foi exitosa em fazer uma transição “transada” (Share e Mainwaring, 1986) e construir uma memória positiva sobre o regime dos generais.
Por outro lado, o ParM se enfraqueceu em virtude da saída do governo e da
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
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“crise de identidade” que se instalou nas FA após a Guerra Fria (Coelho, 2000).
Mas o ParM não se dissolveu, e sim voltou-se para dentro, em um período de
hibernação, cuidando da sua autopreservação (inclusive geracional), e repensando sua atuação organizativa nas fileiras das FA e fora delas.
Sob o aparente retorno aos quartéis em um processo de construção do
controle civil da defesa e das FA, foi-se reformulando as bases para o retorno
do ParM à cena política. O primeiro momento fundamental desse processo foi
o da Constituinte (1987–1988), quando, por meio de um bem montado lobby
e contando com assessorias fardadas em vários gabinetes, os militares garantiram para si prerrogativas que nenhum outro grupo social, organizado ou não,
foi capaz de construir (Oliveira, 1994, pp. 127–130). Garantida sua autonomia
e manutenção da exclusividade na condução da defesa nacional – o Ministério
da Defesa viria a ser criado apenas em 1999 –, os militares voltaram para seu
estado de hibernação, assim permanecendo, com alguns poucos episódios de
ação pública avaliados como irrelevantes pela opinião pública nacional.
Assim, embora emerjam na cena pública com Temer, o ParM vinha se
reorganizando desde o fim dos anos 1990, tendo crescido a partir de duas
atividades: os megaeventos esportivos – Copa do Mundo e Olimpíadas, que
possibilitaram a reconstrução/ampliação de redes com as elites civis, fragilizadas após o fim do regime militar; e a missão da ONU no Haiti4, que promoveu a atuação das FA como organizadores do Estado no sentido amplo (indo
muito além da segurança pública, especialmente após o furacão que destruiu
o país em 2010), reavivando a já histórica prática em segurança interna e fortalecendo laços com oficiais de outros países, particularmente dos EUA. Retornam dessas funções ansiosos por reconhecimento político. Na falta desse
reconhecimento nas proporções e moldes esperados, criou-se uma questão
militar a ser resolvida5.
Se essas atividades permitiram a reorganização do ParM, a eleição de Bolsonaro possibilitou que o Partido chegasse ao poder, e são muitos os sinais que
deseja ali permanecer.
O Partido Militar no governo Bolsonaro
Desde o início do governo Bolsonaro, muitos militares ocuparam cargos chave
em diversas estruturas de governo e reivindicaram assuntos do seu interesse,
como o controle da Amazônia. A relação entre o ParM e Bolsonaro já passou
4
Essa reorganização está claramente documentada na série de entrevistas dos force commanders da Minustah concedidas a Celso Castro de Adriana Marques (2019).
5
Há quem defenda que foi a “questão militar” (1883–1887), motivada, segundo os militares, pelo sentimento de orfandade que animou a tropa vitoriosa no Paraguai, que levou à participação fundamental das FA no movimento republicano – foram elas que proclamaram a República (Cf. Ferreira, 2007). As contradições da atual “questão militar” podem ser percebidas pela
leitura de Castro e Marques (2019).
72
por diferentes momentos, trazendo reflexos para a Instituição FA. Todavia,
essa relação não é objeto deste texto. Repetindo, o objetivo aqui é seguir na
identificação das características desenhadas para o ParM. Para isso, passouse à análise quantitativa dos militares que ocupam cargos comissionados no
governo Bolsonaro à luz da discussão apresentada6.
A fonte utilizada para a análise é a resposta dada pela Casa Civil da Presidência da República ao Requerimento de Informações n. 660/20207, de autoria dos deputados Patrus Ananias, Ivan Valente, Helder Salomão, Nilto Tatto,
João Daniel e Valmir Assunção; e o requerimento 647, do deputado Danilo
Cabral, ambos solicitando informações sobre os militares nomeados em cargos comissionados no Executivo Federal.
A Casa Civil enviou os dados de toda a estrutura da Presidência da República, defendendo que apenas pode responder a informações de sua própria
responsabilidade, e não de toda a administração federal. Assim as informações
são relativas: Casa Civil, Secretaria de Governo, Secretaria Geral, Gabinete de
Segurança Institucional, Gabinete Pessoal do Presidente da República e Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos. Embora não abranjam toda a administração
pública, o que seria necessário para uma discussão sobre a militarização do
Estado, os dados oferecidos são uma amostra suficiente para o objetivo desse
texto, pois permitem identificar o perfil dos quadros destacados pelo ParM
e seu modus operandi no núcleo central do governo. O universo total da amostra são 341 pessoas.
É possível que essa amostra não abranja todos os militares nas pastas,
pois ela se restringe àqueles que ocupam cargos de chefia, assessoramento ou
direção. Diferente da investidura em cargos provenientes de concursos públicos,
as nomeações para tais cargos são de livre nomeação e exoneração, portanto,
discricionárias da cúpula do governo. Ressalte-se que dada a dinâmica de
nomeações e exonerações, a amostra se refere ao extrato de pessoal na data de
resposta ao requerimento: 6 de julho de 2020.
Existem diversas modalidades de funções comissionadas, mas neste texto,
interessam particularmente os cargos de Direção e Assessoramento Superiores (DAS) e as Funções Gratificadas pelo Exercício de Cargo de Confiança
Devidas a Militares (RMP). Essa segunda modalidade só pode ser atribuída
a servidores de carreira ocupantes de cargo efetivo em casos, condições e percentuais mínimos previstos em lei, sob a lógica de formação de uma burocracia profissional. Esclarecendo: um ministro não pode preencher todos os
cargos comissionados sob sua responsabilidade apenas com recrutamento
externo. Por lei, ele necessita atribuir parte dessas funções aos servidores pú-
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
Suzeley Kalil
6
Sublinhe-se que a regra constitucional vigente (art. 142, III) permite que militares da ativa
continuem ligados às FA caso tomem posse em cargo, emprego ou função pública civil temporária e não eletiva.
7
Quando for necessária a menção a esta fonte, ela será anotada como “Resposta CC”.
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blicos concursados e em exercício da carreira pública. Por isso, uma parte dos
militares ocupando cargos em comissão necessariamente precisa ser da ativa.
Os DAS e os RPM estão sujeitos ao teto salarial do serviço público8, hoje
definido em R$39.200,00. No caso dos servidores efetivos nomeados (militares da ativa), a remuneração é regulamentada pelas Leis 11.526/2007
e 12.094/2009. O valor da remuneração dos RMP, em dados de 20199, é baixo,
variando entre R$1.077,15 e R$ 1.734,92. As comissões em formato de DAS,
por sua vez, variam entre R$2.701,46 e R$ 17.327,65. Aquelas mais cobiçadas
são as DAS 4, 5 e 6, e aquelas consideradas de natureza especial, todas correspondendo às remunerações acima de 10 mil reais.
Pelo decreto 9.732, de 15 de março de 2019, o governo definiu alguns critérios gerais e específicos mínimos a serem atendidos para as nomeações de
comissionados conforme cada cargo. Gerais são, por exemplo, idoneidade
moral, reputação ilibada e perfil profissional ou formação acadêmica compatível com o cargo para o qual foi designado. Para as mais altas funções exige-se
também experiência profissional de 5 anos de atividades em áreas relacionadas; ter ocupado cargo ou função equivalente a DAS-3 ou superior na administração pública direta ou indireta por no mínimo 3 anos; ou ser mestre ou
doutor em área correlata àquela do cargo ou função.
Se tais regras apontam para profissionalização do serviço público, o próprio decreto indica que o responsável pela nomeação pode dispensar esses
critérios, desde que justifique a medida. Assim, a decisão final, reconhecida
pela Lei, é ato discricionário da autoridade responsável pela nomeação. Ou
seja, a escolha é, em última instância, política.
A respeito, sublinhe-se que a utilização dos DAS para compor o governo
com quadros políticos alinhados ideologicamente não é uma inovação desse governo, mas uma prática consolidada, sendo possível conhecer bastante
sobre a base de sustentação política de cada governo, analisando quem são
seus comissionados. Dado que o ParM é o principal partido de sustentação do
governo Bolsonaro, é esperado (embora não positivo para a democracia e para
a Instituição FA) encontrar quadros desse partido nos cargos comissionados
do núcleo do governo.
O governo dispõe de um total de 950 cargos comissionados (DAS) para
as pastas aqui analisadas. Destes, 141 estão ocupadas por militares, ou seja,
quase 15%. Essa informação é relevante para mostrar o peso que os quadros
do ParM têm no conjunto das nomeações do governo, como ilustra a Tabela 1:
8
A Advocacia Geral da União emitiu parecer favorável à solicitação do Ministério da Defesa para que seja possível acumular dois pagamentos de uma mesma fonte pagadora (governo
federal), como é o caso dos militares que estão na reserva (recebendo a aposentadoria) e são
nomeados para altos cargos no governo. O somatório das duas remunerações ultrapassaria o teto
salarial. O tema é atualmente objeto de controvérsias.
9
A lei 13.328 de 2016 estabeleceu um cronograma de reajustes nos valores dos cargos
comissionados.
74
Total DAS
% ocupada por militares
Casa Civil
229
10
GSI
71
N.A *
Gabinete Pessoal
123
19
Secretaria de Governo
157
15
Secretaria Geral
332
17
Secretaria Assuntos Estratégicos (SAE)
38
21
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
Suzeley Kalil
Tabela 1.
Total de cargos DAS por
pasta analisada
*Uma vez que o GSI tem muitos militares nomeados através de RPMs, e não como DAS,
o raciocínio aplicado para os demais não funciona.
Fonte: elaboração própria a partir da “Resposta CC”.
Analisando individualmente, além do GSI, a pasta que possui o maior número proporcional de militares em cargos comissionados é a SAE, com quase
um quarto dos seus nomeados em DAS provenientes das fileiras militares. Por
outro lado, a pasta em que esse índice é menor é a Casa Civil.
Salta aos olhos que, no universo de 341 pessoas, 303 são militares das FA,
ou seja, quase 90% do total. Essa informação reforça que o ParM faz alianças
mais amplas com membros das demais forças de segurança, mas os mantém
subordinados a ele. E mais, acrescenta que na partilha dos cargos comissionados no governo, o ParM mantém para si quase a totalidade deles. Também
a proporção entre as forças singulares mostra que é no Exército que está o núcleo duro do ParM.
Total
Percentual (%) *
Exército
216
71
Marinha
45
15
Aeronáutica
42
14
TOTAL
303
100
Tabela 2.
Origem dos membros das
forças armadas
* Optamos por arredondar as porcentagens para facilitar a leitura e análise dos dados.
Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.
Como indicado, o Exército predomina, com 71% dos indicados. Nesse sentido, tem continuidade a história brasileira em que o Exército sempre se impôs
sobre as demais forças singulares, exercendo o comando em virtude de seu peso
numérico. Entretanto, ao analisar a proporção dos comissionados diante do efetivo total de cada força separadamente, essa predominância deve ser relativizada. Marinha e Aeronáutica mantêm perfis de ocupação mais discretos que o do
Exército, 15% e 14%, enquanto sua proporção poderia ser de 17%.
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Sabe-se que em todo partido há uma hierarquia interna. Todavia, se nos
partidos políticos ela está vinculada à capacidade de angariar votos, no ParM
ela reproduz a origem de formação, a Instituição militar. Os dados abaixo permitem a reflexão sobre como as diversas patentes presentes no ParM estão
distribuídas pelo núcleo do governo.
Classificação
Patente*
Praças
Soldado
0,3
3
1
2o Sargento
19
6,3
23
7,6
2 Tenente
13
4,3
1o Tenente
17
5,6
30
9,9
Subtotal
o
Subtotal
Oficiais Intermediários.
Capitão
64
21
Oficiais Superiores
Major
54
17,8
Tenente Coronel
26
8,5
Coronel
75
24,7
155
51
General de Brigada
8
2,6
General de Divisão
6
2,0
General de Exército
7
2,3
Subtotal
Oficiais generais
Subtotal
Tabela 3. Patente dos
membros das forças armadas
comissionados
1
3 Sargento
o
Oficiais Subalternos
Comissionados Percentual (%)
Não identificado
TOTAL
21
6,9
10
3,3
303
100
* Uma vez que são a maioria, optamos por apresentar a nomenclatura das patentes utilizada
pelo Exército, que possui seus correlatos na Marinha e Aeronáutica.
Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.
A Tabela 3 mostra a quase completa ausência de praças ou oficiais subalternos entre os quadros indicados pelo ParM, o que parece inconsistente
com a forma como Bolsonaro construiu sua carreira política, apresentandose como representante da “família militar”. Na hora da partilha das cadeiras,
contudo, o ParM, comandado pelos oficiais generais, praticamente não contemplou as baixas patentes no núcleo do governo.
Chamam a atenção os 21 oficiais generais, com destaque para os ministros-generais Heleno, Ramos, Braga Netto e Flávio Rocha. Essa predominância indica que é acertada a avaliação de que a organização do ParM mimetiza
àquela das FA. As demais cadeiras são ocupadas por capitães e pelos oficiais
76
superiores. Há um leve predomínio dos coronéis, numa proporção média de 7
oficiais superiores por general.
Sabe-se que a participação feminina nas fileiras militares é ainda muito baixa.
Não é diferente no estudado aqui. Na amostra analisada existem 11 mulheres, 3 delas pertencendo ao Exército, 4 à Marinha e 4 à Aeronáutica. Portanto, uma vez que
reproduz características da Instituição militar, o partido é comandado por homens.
Porém, ao contrário da predominância da força terrestre tanto no governo quanto
na direção do ParM, há maior participação feminina advinda das demais forças.
A maior proporção na Marinha (9%) e na Aeronáutica (9,5%) relativamente ao Exército (1,4%) provavelmente acontece por dois motivos. O primeiro,
por terem aberto suas fileiras a mais tempo para a presença feminina10, elas já
estão em postos mais graduados e são mais conhecidas internamente a ponto
de gozarem de maior legitimidade para as indicações. O segundo, os quadros
de comando do ParM nessas forças são mais abertos à presença de mulheres.
Seria possível também aventar hipóteses como a de que elas têm relações familiares com outros quadros do ParM também destacados para a atuação no
governo, mas os dados disponíveis não permitem esses cruzamentos.
Quanto ao local de atuação, das 11 mulheres, 8 (mais de 70%) estão alojadas na Secretaria Geral da presidência da República, à época comandada
por um membro do que poderia ser chamado partido fardado11 – aquele que
reúne todas as forças de segurança, e possivelmente, com atribuições similares
àquelas em geral atribuídas as mulheres pela sociedade: secretárias e auxiliares
em serviços administrativos.
Relativamente à distribuição dos quadros do ParM pelo núcleo do governo,
a maioria dos quadros ocupados por militares estão no GSI, totalizando 56%. Como
apontado na Tabela 4, este é o espaço mais militarizado do núcleo do governo.
A tabela também permite ver certa simetria no recrutamento de cargos
comissionados militares entre a Casa Civil, o Gabinete Pessoal do Presidente
e a Secretaria de Governo, entretanto, a Casa Civil tem uma estrutura muito
maior que as outras duas pastas, o que indica que, comparativamente, ela é
menos militarizada do que outras, provavelmente também acomodando os
indicados pelos aliados no Congresso.
Já foi apontada forte presença de altos oficiais e de oficiais generais entre os
nomeados. Todavia, a legislação obriga que uma parte dos cargos comissionados seja distribuída entre servidores efetivos. Por isso, é previsível a presença
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
Suzeley Kalil
10
O tema não é objeto deste texto, mas importa registrar que a incorporação feminina na
Marinha se realizou em 1980 para o Corpo Auxiliar, tendo passado para o efetivo de fato e de
direito apenas em 1998; na Aeronáutica aconteceu em 1982 e no Exército em 1992, para o Quadro de Serviço. Em 2012, legalizou-se o ingresso feminino para todas as armas – com exceções
pontuais –, inclusive as combatentes, para as três forças. A respeito do tema na América Latina,
veja trabalho seminal organizado por Mathias (2009).
11
Quando do levantamento dos dados, o ministro-chefe da Secretaria Geral era Jorge Oliveira, policial militar reformado (desde 2013), alçado ao Tribunal de Contas da União em dezembro de 2020.
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Estrutura Administrativa
Indicados
Proporcional (%)
23
7,5
Casa Civil
Gabinete Pessoal do Presidente
23
7,5
169
55,9
Secretaria de Governo
24
8
Secretaria Geral
56
18,5
8
2,6
303
100
Gabinete de Segurança Institucional
Tabela 4.
Lotação dos membros das FA
na Presidência da República
Secretaria Especial de Assuntos
Estratégicos
TOTAL
Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.
Situação Funcional
Tabela 5.
Situação funcional dos
comissionados na Presidência
da República
Ativa
Números Absolutos
208
Percentual (%)
68
Reserva
94
32
TOTAL
303
100
Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.
de cargos comissionados preenchidos por militares da ativa, representando
68%, como apontado abaixo:
Há segmentos militares que argumentam que os comissionados na ativa
estão cumprindo funções de natureza militar, por exemplo no GSI, e que essa
era uma prática comum a outros governos. Para testar esse argumento, optouse por, em primeiro lugar, destacar os cargos comissionados DAS das funções
militares comissionadas, ambos ocupados por militares.
Função
DAS
Tabela 6.
Funções comissionadas
ocupadas por militares
Absolutos
Proporcional
133
44
NE e ministros
8
2,6
Função militar
162
53,4
8
2,6
303
100
Não identificado
TOTAL
Fonte: elaboração própria com base em “Resposta CC”.
Verifica-se, o argumento acima não se sustenta, pois os comissionados que
cumprem funções militares podem ser atribuídos a pouco mais de 50% da
amostra.
78
Para identificar melhor o perfil dos principais quadros do ParM, foi separada uma nova amostra, destacando apenas aqueles nomeados em DAS superior (níveis 4, 5 e 6, remuneração maior que R$10 mil/mês), os ocupantes
de cargos de natureza especial e os ministros. Essa segunda amostra equivale
a 94 pessoas. Segundo a hipótese levantada, esses são os quadros dirigentes do
ParM que foram destacados para o núcleo do governo.
Nessa nova amostra, 72,4% correspondem a militares na reserva ou reformados, o que coaduna com os apontamentos já apresentados, do papel da
reserva na articulação política do ParM, uma vez que tem maior autonomia
de movimentação.
Quanto à distribuição entre as três Forças, a Aeronáutica sofre uma retração e a Marinha se mantém, o que faz com que o Exército chegue a quase
80% do total de ocupação de cargos. Sob esse aspecto, é possível aventar que
a Aeronáutica destacou para o preenchimento dos cargos comissionados militares que efetivamente estão cumprindo funções militares e, por isso, sua
representação é menor nessa segunda amostra, estritamente política.
Relativamente à lotação dos membros das FA nestes estratos, os dados
apontam a absoluta continuidade da predominância do GSI como local para
os quadros do ParM, e a completa militarização dos altos cargos do Gabinete,
quase 90%. Os números da cúpula da SAE também impressionam, com quase
40% de militares.
O cruzamento das variáveis força singular de origem e local de lotação
permitem aventar nova hipótese sobre o funcionamento interno do ParM.
No debate teórico, assinalou-se que o ParM não é homogêneo, mas que suas
tendências internas não derivam de conflitos ideológicos. Cruzando as duas
variáveis, observa-se que entre os 14 militares da Marinha na amostra, 6 estão
na SAE, comandada por um Almirante. Sob a mesma lógica, chama a atenção
o fato de que na Casa Civil, todos os militares nomeados pertencem ao Exército. Por isso, levanta-se a hipótese de que uma questão orientadora que orienta
a organização das tendências internas ao ParM são as afinidades corporativas.
Explorar-se-á esta hipótese em outros trabalhos.
Ainda sobre a ocupação dos estratos DAS superiores, as informações
quanto à patente apontam que existe uma única praça (segundo sargento) entre os nomeados, servindo no gabinete pessoal do presidente. Mesmo os oficiais subalternos somam apenas 8,5%, mantendo a média já apontada. Outro
dado interessante é a ampliação da proporção de oficiais superiores, notadamente de coronéis. Coronéis representam 51% de todos os indicados do ParM
para os altos cargos do governo. Dado que o ParM não é um partido formal,
sendo impossível analisar “fichas de filiação”, fica a hipótese de que, em seus
quadros de direção, predominem os coronéis. Essa presença pode ter relação
com a própria maneira como se organiza a carreira militar, pois os coronéis
normalmente já cumpriram os cursos de Estado-Maior, entretanto, enfrentam
o funil de ascensão ao generalato – a maior parte dos militares segue para
a reserva como coronel, portanto.
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
Suzeley Kalil
79
Dossier
América Latina: Brasil
Os oficiais generais ocupam a segunda posição nos cargos DAS deste estrato (21,3% dos cargos), com 20 generais, entre estes os 4 ministros. Existem
quatro oficiais generais na ativa: um Brigadeiro do Ar e dois Generais de Divisão, os três servindo no Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, e o Almirante
Flávio Rocha como Secretário.
Considerações finais
Neste texto, buscou-se apontar como a nova presença militar no atual governo
encontra guarida no que chamamos de ParM. Por meio de um sobrevoo combinado pela literatura que trata de partidos políticos com a de partido militar,
buscou-se apontar como a expressão “Partido Militar” é representativa da hodierna forma de atuação política das FA.
Ao estudar o ParM, verificou-se que ele guarda muitas semelhanças com
os chamados partidos de quadros, mas destes se afasta no que se refere ao conteúdo programático dos partidos: mais que um programa a dirigir suas ações,
o ParM busca especialmente objetivos corporativos.
Comparando-se a ação política do antigo partido militar (até 1985) com
a do atual, especialmente avaliada pelos dados quantitativos de ocupação de
cargos DAS, verificou-se que a reforma promovida por Castelo Branco foi feliz para impedir a apresentação para o público externo (civil) de lideranças
castrenses do oficialato superior, pois são os oficiais generais que representam
(são porta vozes) não apenas da tropa, mas também do ParM. No entanto,
a reforma não foi suficiente para impedir que os coronéis atuem como correia
de transmissão doutrinária do partido, se constituindo como as lideranças
portadoras da vontade do partido.
Por outro lado, confirmou-se a tradição de predominância do Exército
frente à Marinha e Aeronáutica na distribuição de cargos. É daí que deriva
outra hipótese apontada pelo estudo: tendências internas constituídas pela
afinidade corporativa.
Outra tendência do estudo é a maior presença de militares reformados
enquanto a voz da caserna, ao menos para o exterior. Isso decorre da sua liberdade para fazer proselitismo político – Heleno é o exemplo mais explícito
–, sendo a nomeação para cargos a compensação pelo serviço.
O estudo mostrou ainda que, dos setores do governo analisados, o que
congrega o maior número de cargos comissionados ocupados por militares
está no GSI. Cabe lembrar que o GSI foi extinto pela presidenta Dilma Rousseff (o que por muitos é avaliado como o estopim final da relação entre a expresidenta e os militares) e reorganizado por Sérgio Etchegoyen ainda no governo Temer. Até que ponto esta não é uma maneira de mandar um recado
80
para as forças de oposição? Esta é uma pergunta que só no futuro se poderá
responder.
Ação política do Partido Militar
no Brasil sob Bolsonaro
Ana Amélia Penido Oliveira
Suzeley Kalil
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Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 83–98
Indicators of Authoritarian Behavior
of Political Leaders.
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.83-98
Indicadores de comportamiento autoritario
de líderes políticos: el caso Bolsonaro (2019–2020)
Adriano de Oliveira Othon*
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF LISBON
LISBON, PORTUGAL
adriano_othon@hotmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3834-7002
ABSTRACT
Based on indicators of the authoritarian behavior of political leaders developed by
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), this paper examines the political discourse, stances, and
attitudes of Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil, during his first two years in office.
The research uses a qualitative case study approach centered on literature review,
with emphasis on chapters of books and journal articles, as well as news reports for
an empirical observation of the behavior of the president of Brazil concerning rules
and institutions of democracy. The essentially authoritarian behavior of Bolsonaro
signals a trend toward democratic regression in Brazil; however, it is not technically
correct to affirm that Brazil is already being governed through an authoritarian
regime.
KEYWORDS: democracy, authoritarianism, Brazil, Bolsonaro.
RESUMEN
Basándose en los indicadores del comportamiento autoritario de líderes políticos
desarrollados por Levitsky y Ziblatt (2018), el autor del artículo examina el discurso
político, la postura y las actitudes del presidente de Brasil, Jair Bolsonaro, en los dos
primeros años de ejercicio de su mandato. La investigación utiliza un estudio de caso
con un enfoque cualitativo basado en la revisión bibliográfica, con un énfasis en los
capítulos de libros y artículos científicos, así como los materiales periodísticos, para
* Master’s student in Political Science at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lisbon (ISCSP-ULisboa). Bachelor’s Degree in Law from the Federal University of Rio
Grande do Norte (Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil).
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América Latina: Brasil
permitir una observación empírica de la conducta del presidente brasileño frente a las
instituciones y las normas democráticas. Se observa que Bolsonaro en realidad tiene
un comportamiento autoritario, que señala una tendencia de regresión democrática
en Brasil, aunque técnicamente no es correcto afirmar que el país ya esté bajo un
régimen autoritario.
PALABRAS CLAVE: democracia, autoritarismo, Brasil, Bolsonaro.
Introduction
Based on a set of key indicators of authoritarian behavior of political leaders,
as developed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), this article examines the political
discourse, stances, and attitudes of the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, during his first two years in office, which began in January 2019. This time frame
does not include the period of more than two decades that Bolsonaro spent
as a congressman, nor his campaign-based declarations. Instead, it focuses on
his performance as president to verify whether he can be classified as authoritarian under the adopted model.
This research takes part in the debate about the onset of a new global wave
of authoritarianism, either in countries with an already consolidated tradition
of democracy, or where the democratic process is still gathering momentum.
Brazil, whose re-democratization process took place in the 1980s, after two
decades of military dictatorship, is currently in the second category. Contrary
to what has traditionally taken place in the 20th century in Latin America,
when authoritarian systems generally came to power through violence and
State-based military coups, many contemporary societies have witnessed the
rise of leaders with authoritarian behavior legitimized through popular vote.
Once elected and able to exercise their power, they start to systematically violate the rules of democracy.
This article focuses on the following research question: Is it possible to
formally categorize the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, as a political leader
with authoritarian behavior? In this respect and based on the test for authoritarianism proposed by the aforementioned authors, the general objective of
this article is to critically analyze the period of two years that Jair Bolsonaro
served so far as the president of Brazil. Note that due to the limitations of this
research, it is not possible to proceed to a profound analysis on the entire range of political phenomena usually associated with authoritarianism, such as
populism or democratic regression; however, these topics may still be briefly
addressed throughout this text.
In terms of relevance, this article aims to contribute to the set of observations concerning the current situation and the paths of democracy in Brazil,
which – due to its geographic dimensions and regional economic weight –
levies an additional impact on its Latin American neighbors. This research is
84
further justified by the currency of the core material, enabling an empirical
observation of the behavior of the president of Brazil concerning rules and
institutions of democracy during his first two years in office.
Even though there is academic research in political science that examines the start of the Bolsonaro mandate, the literature review has not found
any previous study using the theoretical framework proposed here. Neto and
Pimenta (2020) analyze the first year of Jair Bolsonaro’s role as president, but
through a comparative approach to two other presidential periods: Jânio Quadros (from January to August 1961) and Fernando Collor (from March 1990
to December 1992). As a result, the authors declare that despite Bolsonaro
having experienced what appears to be a level of conflict similar to that of
the presidents mentioned above during his first year in office, the distinctive characteristics of Bolsonaro’s mandate center on his intimate relationship
with the leaders of the Armed Forces and the solid support of the conservative
evangelical electorate.
Methodologically, this research was carried out employing a case study
delimited on a geographical and chronological basis but focused on understanding a more complex and comprehensive phenomenon: the growth of institutional authoritarian manifestations in democratic systems. A qualitative
approach was adopted based on bibliographical research and through a specific emphasis on the work of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) but also supported
by chapters from other books and journal articles, in addition to using news
reports available on the internet to verify the practical validity of each of the
indicators of authoritarian behavior. This case study has predominantly empirical-descriptive characteristics, focused on assessing the elected case within
its actual context: the first two years of Jair Bolsonaro’s mandate as the president of Brazil.
Indicators of Authoritarian
Behavior of Political Leaders.
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
Democracy and authoritarianism
At a factual level, the analysis undertaken in this research looks at the behavior
of a specific political leader, elected according to the rules of a democratic system but with overtones of supposedly authoritarian conduct. In this scenario,
understanding the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism (in addition
to the hybrid competitive authoritarianism regime) is fundamental for the objectives of this article.
In general terms, this article adopts the concept of representative democracy advocated by the pluralist theoretical model currently prevalent in contemporary political science, which among its principal exponents includes
Robert Dahl, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and Charles Lindblom (Smith,
1997). This theoretical approach is founded on the basis of society with multiple centers of power – not just the exclusive exercising of power by a specific
class or group – in addition to the instruments that ensure the freedom of
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political participation by its citizens in electing their chosen representatives
(Costa, 2007).
Democracy, according to Dahl (1989), is a governing system that meets the
following seven primordial conditions: i) “elected officials”; ii) “free and fair elections”; iii) “inclusive suffrage”; iv) “right to run for office”; v) “freedom of expression”; vi) “alternative information”; and vii) “associational autonomy” (p. 221).
More recently, Levitsky and Way (2010) added another attribute: “the existence of
a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition” (p. 5).
According to Linz (1964), authoritarianism is a political system
with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and
guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in their development); and
in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones. (p. 297)
Somewhere between these two concepts, there is a kind of hybrid authoritarianism that is discussed in the works of Levitsky and Way (2010), which
presents characteristics of democracy and authoritarianism described as competitive authoritarianism. In this system, there are legal and relatively effective channels allowing opposition parties to compete for power, with elections
being held regularly in which opposition parties are not legally prevented
from competing. However, one of the distinctive characteristics of this system, even though democratic institutions are respected enough to enable real
competition, is that they can be violated in such a manner that competition is
often unfair, with opposition parties being impaired from seriously challenging those in power. The authors’ examples concerning the absence of material
equality for competition-based conditions are disparities in financial resources and insufficient access to the media.
Note that the aforementioned concepts do not necessarily signify a claim
to a hermetic and inflexible definition of democracy and authoritarianism, but
instead a perception of its principal characteristic elements. Due to their complex socio-political phenomena, these elements must always be interpreted
by those who take part, their individual circumstances, and the periods over
which they occur.
Through this conceptual framework, it is possible to classify the Brazilian government system as democratic, even though it is not necessarily a fully consolidated democracy. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit
(2021), Brazil is classified as a “flawed democracy,” which is currently positioned in its annual ranking system in 49th place out of a total of 167 countries1.
1
According to the democracy index of The Economist Intelligence Unit (2021), there are
four democratic quality classifications, listed in descending order: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.
86
In turn, the most recent report from the V-Dem Institute (2021) classifies the
Brazilian system as an “electoral democracy”2 but also makes repeated warnings about Brazil being on a democratic decline. According to this document
(p. 19), among the ten countries that have “autocratized” the most over the last
decade, there are once-stable democracies such as Poland (1st), Hungary (2nd),
Turkey (3rd), Brazil (4th), Serbia (5th) and India (7th).
Democracy in Brazil – or any other part of the world – cannot be classified
as an absolutely assured achievement free from setbacks or downturns and, as
such, immune to an authoritarian jolt. The fact that Brazil has not achieved
full democratic consolidation further emphasizes this risk.
The process of slowly and gradually losing democratic quality – especially about “competitive electoral procedures, civil and political liberties, and
accountability” – is characteristic of democratic backsliding (Lust & Waldner, 2015, p. 2). This phenomenon has been the subject of studies by multiple
authors in recent years, with subtle terminological distinctions such as democratic recession or democratic regression (Diamond, 2015, 2021), democratic
decline (Plattner, 2015), democratic decay (Daly, 2019), and de-democratization (Enyedi, 2016). This particular case study is based on this precept, supported by the recent work of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018).
Indicators of Authoritarian
Behavior of Political Leaders.
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
Test for authoritarianism – indicators of authoritarian
behavior applied to the case of President Bolsonaro
Inspired by the studies of Linz (1978), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) developed
the following set of four key indicators of authoritarian behavior by political
leaders that potentially put democracy at risk: “1) rejects, in words or action,
the democratic rules of the game, 2) denies the legitimacy of opponents, 3) tolerates or encourages violence, or 4) indicates a willingness to curtail the civil
liberties of opponents, including the media” (p. 18). Table 1 contains a number
of questions to be considered as a test for authoritarianism.
Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules
of the game
Application of this test for authoritarianism in relation to President Bolsonaro
begins with an affirmative response to question 1.a (Do they reject the Constitution or express a willingness to violate it?).
The Brazilian president has already expressed a willingness to violate
the Brazilian Constitution by endorsing the Armed Forces’ potential inter2
According to the V-Dem Institute (2021), there are four classifications of democratic
quality: liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, and closed autocracies.
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Table 1.
Four key indicators of
authoritarian behavior
1. Rejection of (or
weak commitment
to) democratic rules
of the game
a) Do they reject the Constitution or express a willingness to
violate it?
b) Do they suggest a need for antidemocratic measures,
such as canceling elections, violating or suspending the
Constitution, banning certain organizations, or restricting
basic civil or political rights?
c) Do they seek to use (or endorse the use of)
extraconstitutional means to change the government, such
as military coups, violent insurrections, or mass protests
aimed at forcing a change in the government?
d) Do they attempt to undermine the legitimacy of elections,
for example, by refusing to accept credible electoral results?
2. Denial of the
legitimacy of
political opponents
a) Do they describe their rivals as subversive, or opposed to
the existing constitutional order?
b) Do they claim that their rivals constitute an existential
threat, either to national security or to the prevailing way
of life?
c) Do they baselessly describe their partisan rivals as
criminals, whose supposed violation of the law (or
potential to do so) disqualifies them from full participation
in the political arena?
d) Do they baselessly suggest that their rivals are foreign
agents, in that they are secretly working in alliance with (or
the employ of) a foreign government— usually an enemy
one?
3. Toleration or
encouragement of
violence
a) Do they have any ties to armed gangs, paramilitary forces,
militias, guerrillas, or other organizations that engage in
illicit violence?
b) Have they or their partisan allies sponsored or encouraged
mob attacks on opponents?
c) Have they tacitly endorsed violence by their supporters by
refusing to unambiguously condemn it and punish it?
d) Have they praised (or refused to condemn) other
significant acts of political violence, either in the past or
elsewhere in the world?
4. Readiness to curtail a) Have they supported laws or policies that restrict civil
civil liberties of
liberties, such as expanded libel or defamation laws or laws
opponents, including
restricting protest, criticism of the government, or certain
media
civic or political organizations?
b) Have they threatened to take legal or other punitive action
against critics in rival parties, civil society, or the media?
c) Have they praised repressive measures taken by other
governments, either in the past or elsewhere in the world?
Source: adapted from Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, pp. 18–19).
88
vention in the event of a political dispute between the branches of power,
known among his supporters as “military intervention.” In a ministerial
meeting recorded on video, which subsequently went public, Bolsonaro,
who had been in conflict with the Federal Supreme Court (STF) due to
authorized criminal investigations into his sons, stated that he could trigger Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution3, including the possibility
that the Armed Forces could reestablish order. This is a distorted and unsustainable interpretation of the constitutional provision, which started
with blog posts on the internet and was subsequently rejected by Brazil’s
principal jurists as equivalent to predicting the own constitutional order’s
breakdown (G1, 2020, June 2). In reality, the article deals with the organization and duties of the Armed Forces and not the relationship or the
separation of the government powers.
In terms of question 1.b (Do they suggest a need for antidemocratic measures, such as canceling elections, violating or suspending the Constitution,
banning certain organizations, or restricting basic civil or political rights?),
the response is equally affirmative, specifically concerning the mitigation of
the fundamental rights of expression of thought and the ability to meet in locations open to the general public, as enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution4.
In recent popular pro-democracy and anti-government demonstrations,
Bolsonaro called such demonstrators “addicts,” “thugs” and “terrorists” (Público, 2020, June 5), in addition to threatening to use the National Public Security Force – consisting of police officers subordinate to the Ministry of Justice – against activities that could be identified as anti-fascist (Deutsche Welle,
2020, June 5).
Item 1.c (Do they seek to use [or endorse the use of] extra-constitutional
means to change the government, such as military coups, violent insurrections
or mass protests aimed at forcing a change in the government?), which also
has an affirmative response, illustrates Bolsonaro’s endorsement and admiration to the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964–1985), something recurring
throughout his parliamentary career.
Indicators of Authoritarian
Behavior of Political Leaders.
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
3
Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (CFRB), Article 142, caput: “The Armed
Forces, comprised of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, are permanent and regular national
institutions, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of
the President of the Republic, and are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee
of the constitutional powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order” (Senado
Federal, 2013, p. 85).
4
CFRB, Article 5: “All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever,
Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country being ensured of inviolability of the right to life,
to liberty, to equality, to security and to property, on the following terms: (...) IV – the expression
of thought is free, and anonymity is forbidden; (...) XVI – all persons may hold peaceful meetings, without weapons, in places open to the public, regardless of authorization provided that
they do not frustrate another meeting previously called for the same place, subject only to prior
notice to the competent authority; (...)” (Senado Federal, 2013, p. 13).
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90
In a symptomatic manner, amid popular protests in his support, banners
and posters have been raised exalting Institutional Act No. 5 (AI–5), a decree
from 1968 that inaugurated the darkest and most violent decade of the dictatorship, which repealed mandates served by members of the opposition,
suspended constitutional guarantees, and led to the institutionalized torture
of opponents to the system, plus having other harmful consequences. Such
protests and demonstrations stemmed from tensions between Bolsonaro
and the then President of the House of Representatives, Rodrigo Maia, with
the most prominent of these taking place in front of the Army Headquarters
in Brasilia, with Bolsonaro being present himself in an address to demonstrators (Exame, 2020, April 19). At no moment in time did he rebuke the
praise of AI–5.
Ultimately, the response to question 1.d (Do they attempt to undermine
the legitimacy of elections, for example, by refusing to accept credible electoral
results?) is also affirmative. The Brazilian electoral system, although it could
still be improved, is internationally recognized for its efficiency, safety, and
transparency in the way that it promotes elections and discloses its results.
There are no records of any fraud linked to the use of electronic ballot boxes,
implemented more than two decades ago and having been used on an interrupted basis since then. This was pointed out, for example, by the Electoral
Observation Mission of the Organization of American States (EOM/OAS) during the 2018 presidential elections (OAS, 2018).
Bolsonaro, however, fielded the theory – which was vastly disseminated
across the Brazilian extreme right – that the electronic voting system used
throughout Brazil is not reliable or trustworthy. On that occasion, in a speech
to Brazilian supporters in Miami (USA), he stated that he had proof that electronic ballot boxes were frauded during the 2018 presidential election and that
he apparently would have received enough votes to be elected during the first
round of voting (the election was effectively decided after the second round of
voting) (BBC, 2020, March 10). Despite this serious and hard-hitting declaration, he never presented any form of proof.
It is indeed symptomatic that Bolsonaro remained faithful to the false
allegations of fraud made by Donald Trump during the presidential elections of the United States, having been the last president of the countries that
comprise G20 – the forum that brings together the world’s most important
economies – to congratulate Joe Biden on his election victory. He only did so
a day after the Electoral College endorsed the election result (El País, 2020,
December 15).
Such examples satisfactorily demonstrate Bolsonaro’s lack of compromise to the rules of democracy. This type of public stance has occurred when
being pressured by public opinion or other political actors, which is natural in democratic systems but has resulted in clashes and even institutional
crises, making the Brazilian president’s authoritarian penchants even more
evident.
Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents
At this point, although less frequently, Bolsonaro’s behavioral patterns are
consistent with indicators of authoritarianism.
The affirmative response to item 2.a (Do they describe their rivals as subversive or opposed to the existing constitutional order?) reemphasizes the manner in
which the president of Brazil treats his political rivals, such as the governor of the
State of Maranhão, Flávio Dino, a member the Brazilian Communist Party (PCdoB). During a recent inauguration of federal government infrastructure works in
this state, Bolsonaro, in addition to not inviting the state governor himself – contrary to institutional practice – affirmed during the event that communism would
soon be eradicated from Brazil. That very same week, he had stated to supporters
in Brasilia: “We have to remove the PCdoB from there, man, for God’s sake. It’s
only here in Brazil that communists declare that they are democrats” (Congresso
em Foco, 2020, October 29). This last statement, incidentally, reveals the strategy
of leveling an accusation of being undemocratic on political opponents, a tactic
that he started to use as an attempt to distance himself from the same image.
In terms of question 2.b (Do they claim that their rivals constitute an existential
threat, either to national security or to the prevailing way of life?), the authoritarian behavior of Bolsonaro is emphasized through the use of the National Security
Law (Planalto, 1983) in relation to critical speeches directed at the government.
This type of law dates back to the military dictatorship but remains in force, either
because no other law has expressly revoked it or because the STF has never judged its compliance with the new constitutional order initiated in 1988. Making
the most of the legal nature of this fact, Bolsonaro used this law to threaten exPresident Lula (Deutsche Welle, 2019, November 21), as well as ministers of his
government have been using it as the legal basis to legally sue journalists and even
one of the STF Ministers, Gilmar Mendes (Carta Capital, 2020, July 24).
Indicators of Authoritarian
Behavior of Political Leaders.
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
Toleration or encouragement of violence
Here, as in the previous subsections, the behavior of the Brazilian president
once again fits into the indicators proposed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018).
In terms of item 3.a (Do they have any ties to armed gangs, paramilitary
forces, militias, guerrillas or other organizations that engage in illicit violence?), Bolsonaro and his sons (one of these being a Federal Senator who is under criminal investigation for such a crime), in addition to having intimate
connections with members of armed militias (El País, 2020, June 20), adopts
a form of discourse that actually supports the actions of these criminals5.
5
In terms of the current situation in Brazil, militias are criminal organizations that mostly
consist of members or ex-members of security forces (police, firefighters, and members of the
Armed Forces) that dominate territories in poor communities and also commit assassinations,
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The political scientist Bruno Paes Manso – a scholar on the subject – reveals
glimpses of this ideological connection to Bolsonaro’s rhetoric, which embodies “the concept of breakdown imposed by force, of reinventing politics by
means of an authority that will impose itself and restore traditional values
through violence, even if the law is disregarded during the process” (Deutsche
Welle, 2020, October 7).
In relation to question 1.b (Have they or their partisan allies sponsored or
encouraged mob attacks on opponents?), Bolsonaro, from a context of rhetorical clashes with state governors over the accuracy of the statistics on the sick and
dead caused by COVID-19, encouraged his supporters to enter public hospitals
to physically check the usage of beds (IstoÉ, 2020, June 12). As a result, there
were incidences of invasion and depredation of hospitals that very same day,
even in wards restricted to doctors and patients (Exame, 2020, June 12).
The analysis of the item 1.d (Have they praised [or refused to condemn]
other significant acts of political violence, either in the past or elsewhere in the
world?) once again emphasizes Bolsonaro’s predilection for dictatorial systems
and their methods. In response to criticism from the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, whose father was imprisoned, tortured, and killed at the beginning of the Chilean dictatorship of
Augusto Pinochet (1973 to 1990), the Brazilian president made a post on the
internet declaring that Chile “failed to turn into another Cuba thanks to those
who had the courage to put a stop to the left in 1973, with her father, a brigadier at the time, being one of these communists” (Veja, 2019, September 4).
A month beforehand, Bolsonaro had extolled the deceased colonel Brilhante Ustra, ex-leader of the Detachment of Information Operations – Center
for Internal Defense Operations (DOI-CODI), a political repression organization of the Brazilian military dictatorship, as a “national hero.” According to
the National Truth Commission (2011–2014), Ustra was directly or indirectly
responsible for the torture and murder of dozens of political prisoners when
he was in charge of this organization from 1970 to 1974 (G1, 2019, August 8).
Readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents,
including media
Additionally, mitigation of civil liberties was highly evident during the first
two years of Bolsonaro’s rule, thus responding in the affirmative to the three
questions set out in this subsection.
In line with the rhetoric of the president of Brazil against protests in the
street, there has been a significant increase in bills made by the National Conextortions and carry out other illicit activities under the pretense of helping to combat drug
trafficking or other types of offenses, with concentrated activity in the Brazilian state of Rio de
Janeiro (Congresso em Foco, 2019, December 23).
92
gress aimed at restricting fundamental constitutional rights of expression of
thought and the ability to meet in places open to the public. This fact brings
about question 4.a (Have they supported laws or policies that restrict civil liberties, such as expanded libel or defamation laws or laws restricting protest,
criticism of the government, or certain civic or political organizations?).
One of these legislative proposals, initiated by the Bolsonaro government,
amplifies cases of exclusion of illegality for the potential coming into force
of a decree for the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO), i.e., assignments of
the Armed Forces over a limited period, exclusively determined by express
order of the Presidency of the Republic, in cases where traditional public security forces are insufficient. Under the pretext of curbing violent popular
demonstrations, this bill increases the likelihood that security services (police, firefighters, or military personnel in the Armed Forces) could be exempt
from criminal punishment if their conduct is considered to be in self-defense
(Agência Brasil, 2019, November 25).
Among the other proposals aimed at mitigating popular demonstrations
(it is estimated that of the 70 passed so far through the National Congress,
21 were presented in 2019 alone), the most prominent are as follows: criminalizing the use of masks and the blocking of streets; increasing penalties for
crimes of being in contempt of the police; permission by the police – with
no judicial authorization – to monitor people through genetic mapping and
private messages on social networks, in addition to infiltrating agents and intercepting telephone calls; and, classifying acts of violence based on political
and ideological motivation as crimes of terrorism (Folha de S. Paulo, 2020,
January 10).
Relative to point 4.b (Have they threatened to take legal or other punitive action against critics in rival parties, civil society, or the media?), Bolsonaro has directed numerous threats at the press, with which he has regular
skirmishes.
On more than one occasion, the Brazilian president declared that television broadcasters who convey the news to supposedly destabilize him would
have difficulties when it comes to the renewal process of respective public concessions for broadcasting services for sound and images. One of his preferred
targets is Rede Globo (Globo Network), the leading private television broadcaster in Brazil, to whom Bolsonaro has referred to as the “gutter press, garbage,” and whose concession is required to be renewed in 2022, the final year
of his presidential mandate. Non-renewal of the Globo Network concession is
a banner frequently seen at demonstrations held by the president’s supporters
(Congresso em Foco, 2020, April 30; IstoÉ, 2019, October 29).
Ultimately, in the same way as the two previous passages in this subsection,
the response to item 4.c (Have they praised repressive measures taken by other
governments, either in the past or elsewhere in the world?) is also affirmative.
To provide yet another example of Bolsonaro’s devotion to the Brazilian dictatorship, in his first year in office, the anniversary of the 1964 military coup
Indicators of Authoritarian
Behavior of Political Leaders.
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
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was “commemorated” via a bulk message campaign on WhatsApp through an
electronic account of the Communication Secretariat of the Presidency, consisting of a two-minute-long video in which the presenter recounted his own
version of Brazilian history, where the military saved Brazil from a supposedly
communist dominion. The account from which this information was disseminated is intended to be used for federal government public utility, news, and
service-based messages (UOL, 2019, March 31).
A young democracy facing the authoritarian threat
After the result of the 2018 presidential elections in Brazil, there was hope
among politicians and opposition voters alike that Bolsonaro’s aggressive and
undemocratic attitude would not be put into practice after taking office. As
such, the required liturgy of the role would naturally moderate the future
president’s potential authoritarian outbursts. It can be affirmed that any such
expectation did not come to fruition.
Relying on popular approval that – minus a few exceptions – had oscillated
between 30 and 40 percent (CNI-IBOPE, 2020; Datafolha, 2021), involving
the backing of relevant private initiative sectors (e.g., the financial market),
a strong link with personnel from the Armed Forces, the solid support of conservative evangelicals and a divided and weakened opposition, instead of slackening his authoritarian behavior, Bolsonaro went on to exacerbate it.
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) emphasize in their body of work that a powerful politician’s fulfillment of even one of the indicators discussed above would
be enough to inspire concern over the integrity of democracy. Thus, we can
determine that Bolsonaro’s attitudes are affirmative to nearly all of the tested
items, emphasizing the danger faced by Brazilian democracy under his rule.
In addition to the obvious risks of democratic backsliding through his direct
activities, there is also the collateral effect on other spheres of power, including
an increase in politicians with similar or even greater authoritarian tendencies.
Based on the aforementioned indicators and in response to the original
question of whether the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, can be formally
classified as a political leader with authoritarian behavior, the answer is certainly affirmative. The qualitative approach used in this article makes it difficult to provide a precise estimate of the degree of regression experienced by
Brazilian democracy since the election of Bolsonaro, but it does confirm that
there has been a move in this direction. However, according to the concepts
described in the second section of this article, it cannot be upheld that Brazil
is effectively under an authoritarian regime.
In spite of imperfections, Brazilian democracy retains certain attributes
that underline its resilience. Important sectors of civil society remain organized, the Judiciary branch of power is independent, there is a robust institutional apparatus for the protection of rights – with emphasis on the Public
94
Ministry – and the press retains a good measure of freedom (Daly, 2019). Resilient democratic institutions are pointed out as one of the major defenses
of Western societies against the recently emerging authoritarian forces and
the democratic backsliding (Norris, 2017). The capacity of these multiple elements to successfully operate is decisive for the vitality of the Brazilian democracy in the future.
Indicators of Authoritarian
Behavior of Political Leaders.
The Bolsonaro Case (2019–2020)
Adriano de Oliveira Othon
Conclusions
This article constitutes an effort to understand the concepts of democracy and
authoritarianism on the basis of the framework of authoritarian behavioral
indicators of political leaders, as established by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018),
having been applied in a clear and systematic manner for the case in question:
the first two years of the rule of Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil.
Taking the core question into account, it has been empirically verified that
the Brazilian president adopts political discourse, stances, and attitudes of an
authoritarian nature, emphasizing a tendency for democratic regression in
Brazil, but it is still not technically accurate to affirm that the situation has
degenerated into an authoritarian regime.
Through a qualitative analysis of the democratic regression observed in
Brazil or through the impacts of the revisionist and obscurantist stance of the
president of Brazil during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is definitely more
room for further in-depth investigations into the central topic of this article,
plus further analysis of the subject matter that surrounds it.
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Exame. (2020, April 19). Bolsonaro discursa para manifestação com faixa “Fora Maia” e
apoio ao AI-5. Retrieved February 3, 2021, from https://exame.com/brasil/bolsonarodiscursa-para-manifestacao-com-faixa-fora-maia-e-apoio-ao-ai-5/
Exame. (2020, June 12). Grupo invade ala da covid-19 em hospital no RJ e exige “checar
leitos”. Retrieved February 16, 2021, from https://exame.com/brasil/grupo-invade-ala-dacovid-19-em-hospital-no-rj-e-exige-checar-leitos/
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Folha de S. Paulo. (2020, January 10). Explode o número de projetos de lei que restringem o direito
a protesto. Retrieved February 17, 2021, from https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2020/01/
explode-numero-de-projetos-de-lei-que-restringem-direito-a-protesto.shtml
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Adriano de Oliveira Othon
G1. (2020, June 2). O que é o artigo 142 da Constituição, que Bolsonaro citou ao pedir
intervenção das Forças Armadas. Retrieved February 2, 2021, from https://g1.globo.com/
politica/noticia/2020/06/02/o-que-e-o-artigo-142-da-constituicao-que-bolsonaro-citouao-pedir-intervencao-das-forcas-armadas.ghtml
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hospitais para checar ocupação. Retrieved February 16, 2021, from https://istoe.com.br/
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Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 99–127
The Quest for Status: Brazil’s Activism in the UN
Human Rights Council 2006–2020
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.99-127
La búsqueda de estatus: el activismo de Brasil en el
Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU 2006–2020
Monika Sawicka*
INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN STUDIES AND POLISH DIASPORA
JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY
CRACOW, POLAND
monika.sawicka@uj.edu.pl
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8889-6061
ABSTRACT
The paper seeks to investigate changes in Brazil’s activism within the UN Human
Rights Council (HRC) between 2006 and 2020 and addresses the modifications of
status-seeking strategies (of social mobility, creativity, and competition) applied by
the state within this international body. My claim is that Brazil under the Bolsonaro
administration chose the role of the defender of the faith advocating for a recreation
of the global human rights protection system over being a good international citizen
committed to the maintenance and development of this system. This role was selected
in conformity with a populist political agenda based on a conservative set of values
that the state’s diplomacy had to promote. The changes, exemplified by Brazil’s
conduct within the HRC since 2019, undermined the state’s prestige and moral
authority that led to status losses.
KEYWORDS: Brazil, Human Rights Council, status-seeking, moral authority.
RESUMEN
El trabajo busca investigar los cambios en el activismo de Brasil dentro del Consejo de
Derechos Humanos (CDH) de la ONU entre 2006 y 2020 y aborda las modificaciones
de las estrategias de búsqueda de estatus (de movilidad, creatividad y competencia
social) aplicadas por el Estado dentro de este organismo internacional. Mi argumento
es que Brasil, bajo el gobierno de Bolsonaro, eligió el papel de defensor de la fe que
aboga por una recreación del sistema global de protección de los derechos humanos en
* M. A. and Ph. D. in Political Science from the Jagiellonian University. Assistant Professor
at the Department of International and Political Studies, Institute of American Studies and Polish Diaspora, Jagiellonian University.
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lugar de ser un buen ciudadano internacional comprometido con el mantenimiento
y desarrollo de este sistema. Este papel fue seleccionado en conformidad con una
agenda política populista basada en un conjunto de valores conservadores que la
diplomacia del Estado debía promover. Los cambios, ejemplificados por la conducta
de Brasil en el CDH desde 2019, socavaron el prestigio y la autoridad moral del
Estado, lo que condujo a pérdidas de estatus.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Brasil, Consejo de Derechos Humanos, búsqueda de estatus,
autoridad moral.
Introduction
While the legacy that Ernesto Araújo left behind after stepping down
from his post of head of the Itamaraty1 will certainly be assessed in the
upcoming months, one point remains already undisputed. As announced
in January 2019, the administration of the ultraconservative Jair
M. Bolsonaro has engaged in the creation of a new and unprecedented
external activism for Brazil. Coined as nationalist and fundamentalist
(Casarões, 2020), conservative (Medeiros, Vilas-Boas and Andrade, 2019,
March 21), anti-globalist (Rodrigues, 2019), submissive (based on an
automatic and unconditional alignment with the state’s core ally) (Fuser,
2019), chaotic (Lima and Albuquerque, 2019) or even messianic (Gabatz &
Angelin, 2021, p. 123), the foreign policy underwent a process of profound
redefinition. Core values and principles which served as guidelines for
Brazilian diplomats since the beginning of the 20th century have been at
best questioned and at worst, refuted. Such was the case of multilateralism:
one of the drivers of the state’s initiatives at international fora ever since
the creation of the Republic, it has been vilified by Ernesto Araújo (2019,
November 21). The redefinition of the guiding principles was followed by
a reformulation of Brazil’s key allies as well as the themes and niches that
the South American actor wanted to shape.
Human rights protection has been identified by academics as one of the
main areas affected by foreign policy reformulations of the current administration (Spektor, 2019). To scrutinize the scope of these changes, this paper
aims to compare Brazil’s standing in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)
since 2019 with the causes promoted by the Lula da Silva (20062–2010),
Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), and Michel Temer (2016–2018) administrations within this international body. Focus is put on a global rather than
As the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is commonly called.
The first three years of Lula da Silva’s first term in office have not been included in the
analysis as the Human Rights Council held its first session in June 2006, substituting the former
Human Rights Commission.
1
2
100
a regional institution as Brazil in the past three decades has been recognized
as a global player using supraregional fora as leverage to gain visibility and
construct its image of a norm entrepreneur and promoter of human rights
(Stolte, 2015; Nogueira, 2017; Carvalho, 2020; Sá e Silva, 2020). Also, the
global forum permits to capture the Brazilian realignment of partnerships
into new coalitions with European, African, and Asian states. The paper is
driven by the following research questions: how did the state’s engagement
within the HRC change (in terms of resolutions and decisions introduced
and/or sponsored, as well as voting patterns)? What were the new coalitions
Brazil engaged in at the HRC? How did these adjustments translate into
shifts in status-seeking strategies? What is the impact of these realignments
on the state’s international status?
My study is aided by the conceptual contributions on the status and
status-seeking strategies (Wohlforth et al. 2018; Hurrell, 2006; Larson &
Shevchenko, 2010; 2014) and recent research on the Brazilian far-right
populist foreign policy (Verbeeck & Zaslove, 2017; Chryssogelos, 2017;
Sá Guimarães & Oliveira e Silva, 2021). My claim is that Brazil under the
Bolsonaro administration neglected the role of a good international citizen
and engaged in performing the role of the defender of the faith. This role
was selected in conformity with the populist political agenda, especially the
conservative set of values that the state’s diplomacy had to promote. The
changes, exemplified by Brazil’s conduct within the HRC since 2019, led to
the abandonment of status enhancement through increasing prestige and
moral authority causing status losses.
The empirical part of the study is based on document analysis which allowed to identify and categorize causes promoted by Brazil and the country’s
positions towards human rights violations in several states addressed at the
HRC. It also discerns between resolutions and decisions introduced by/on behalf of Brazil, (co-)sponsored by the state, and Brazil’s voting patterns, including the actor’s vote on amendments to resolutions. In addition to resolutions
and decisions, the primary sources used in the research include the reports of
45 regular sessions3 and 28 special sessions of the HRC, as well as the Brazilian statements explaining its vote and other comments available on the HRC
Extranet website. To capture discursive practices handling the matter of international human rights promotion the paper also includes data obtained from
content analysis of official speeches made by Brazilian presidents and foreign
affairs ministers.
The article starts from a brief presentation of the understanding of status
and status-seeking strategies. The following section reflects on the notion of
populism as applied to foreign policy research and its applicability to the case
of Brazil’s external activism. The next part briefly elaborates on references to
human rights protection made by Brazilian decision-makers and continues
3
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Rights Council 2006-2020
Monika Sawicka
By the time of writing, the report of the 46th session was not available.
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with an overview of major changes in the state’s activities within the HRC
since 2019. The last part presents concluding remarks.
Status and status seeking
Status is considered as an analytical category appropriate for scrutinizing the
place of states in the international system (Holsti, 1970). The notion of status allows to refer to the location of a state in the global stratified structure.
Frameworks conceptualizing status as a club good also highlight the hierarchical aspect of status (Larson et al., 2014, p. 15). The presence, admission,
or exclusion of the state from groupings such as the club of permanent UN
Security Council, the G7 of the largest advanced economies, and nuclear
powers impacts the country’s international standing. Despite a focus on material capabilities such as military strength and economic performance as
status markers determining an actor’s place in the global hierarchy, the past
decade experienced a surge in research capturing an extended reading of
status (Volgy et al., 2011; Paul et al., 2014; Renshon, 2017; Wohlforth et al.,
2018). This alternative angle does recognize the material aspect of status, yet
it goes beyond such understanding by exploring status as a cognitive category. Such is the approach to research on status proposed by Larson, Paul,
and Wohlforth (2014, p. 7) who define it as “collective beliefs about a ranked
ordering of valued attributes”. This outline acknowledges the hierarchical
nature of status; however, it emphasizes first and foremost that an actor’s
positioning in the international structure is socially constructed and perceptual. Kalevi Holsti, writing in 1970 about states’ roles, linked them with
statuses, which were determined by policymakers’ impressions. According
to him, status identification was determined by the perceptions shared by
decision-makers: “it seems reasonable to assume that those responsible for
making decisions and taking actions for the state are aware of international
status distinctions and that their policies reflect this awareness” (Holsti 1970,
p. 242). Later works coped with the question of whose collective beliefs mattered in assessing the state’s status and discerned between self-attributed
status (by the country’s political and intellectual elites and the rest of the
society) and recognition received by the actor from other members of the
international system (Hurrell, 2006, p. 4). The latter was indicated as crucial
to determine the actor’s positioning on the global stage. Furthermore, this
distinction allowed to capture tensions arising when the status ascribed to
the state by its elites differed from the perceptions held by other countries,
leading to status inconsistencies (Volgy et al., 2011).
Discrepancies in the ways status is assessed are among the factors triggering efforts made by state actors to influence the perceptions of other members
of the international system. Through the declaration and performance of international roles, understood as functions states assume in the international
102
system based on role conceptions4, states strive to align the internal and external understandings of one’s place in the world. These endeavors have been
referred to in the literature as status-seeking. Status-seeking, closely-knit with
the desire for recognition and prestige,5 and fueled by the intrinsic quest to
strengthen ones standing within a hierarchy, relates to the state’s self-esteem
identified among its core needs and foreign policy objectives (Murray, 2019, p.
13). Status enhancement efforts can be identified in the behavior of all sovereign states, including small states (Carvalho & Neumann, 2015), although certain players attract more attention from researchers. Be it due to their high asset levels, significant historical shifts of their international standing or current
increased activism which ensure that their efforts are not going unnoticed,
status-seeking strategies of global players such as Russia, China, India, Turkey,
and Brazil constitute an extensive body of literature focused on state’s international mobility (Deng, 2008; Volgy et al., 2011; Hurrell 2006; Wohlforth, 2009;
Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; Stolte, 2015; Renshon, 2017; Basrur & Estrada,
2017; Esteves et al., 2020; Curanović, 2020).
Researchers, adopting varied approaches, proposed several, partially
overlapping, conceptualizations of status-enhancement strategies, i.a. initiating and engaging in conflicts, arms race, and other hard-balancing options,
soft-balancing, bandwagoning, recognitive discursive and material practices
(such as gaining a great-power voice, increasing military power, and assuring
spheres of influence), and social mobility, competition, and creativity strategies (Hurrell, 2006; Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; 2014; Renshon, 2017; Murray, 2019). It is important to note that, rather than opting for one particular
strategy, states apply a blend of several approaches to gain visibility, recognition, and prestige leading to status increase.
In the case of Brazil, a country that can be considered as an archetypical aspirational power, unsatisfied with its status and committed to increasing
it (Mares & Trinkunas, 2016), hard-balancing strategies are not considered
as options by policymakers. Emphasizing the commitment to principles of
non-intervention and peaceful resolution of conflicts, Brazil gave priority
to soft approaches (Sotero & Armijo, 2007). Faced with limited material capacities, policymakers on numerous occasions turned to ideational resources
such as the promotion of norms, values, and causes as means to acquire status. Endeavors to increase its global standing focused on moral authority –
“proper6 behavior as judged within the specific framework laid down histori-
The Quest for Status: Brazil’s
Activism in the UN Human
Rights Council 2006-2020
Monika Sawicka
4
National role conceptions are defined as “policymakers’ own definitions of the general
kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions, suitable to their state, and of the functions,
if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems” (Holsti, 1970, p. 246).
5
For a definition of prestige, honor and respect see Larson et al. (2014, pp. 7–17) and
Curanović (2020, p. 84).
6
The definition of proper conduct which distinguishes the moral subject is – as the definition suggests – contextual. The social context at the beginning of the 21st century is determined
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cally by the leading powers of the system” (Wohlforth et al., 2018, p. 533) – and
prestige (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014, pp. 49–52; Stolte, 2015; Esteves et al.,
2020). They were to be exposed and further strengthened, ensuring the state
recognition via the existing global organizational setup. The international human rights protection system offered institutional space for smaller states and
middle powers like Brazil to perform the roles of good international citizens
and, therefore, maintain or increase its standing as moral powers. This niche
permitted the state to act as a normative entrepreneur to raise awareness and
contribute to solutions to global problems. What is particularly interesting in
the case of Brazil is that the area of human rights protection exposed the actor’s commitment to normative underpinnings traditionally associated with
Western values and priorities, on one hand, and causes raised by developing
nations, members of the Global South, on the other (Carvalho, 2020, p. 25).
Placing varying emphasis on several values and topics, the administrations of Lula da Silva, Rousseff, Temer, and Bolsonaro all claimed that human
rights protection was a crucial part of Brazil’s foreign policy.7 Applying the
conceptual framework proposed by Larson and Shevchenko (2010; 2014) of
social mobility8, creativity9, and competition10, it is possible to identify a blend
of these strategies applied by Brazilian policymakers to promote Brazil’s image as a moral authority in the endeavor to increase its status through human
rights advocacy. States employing mobility strategies are expected to voice
their commitment to the protection of human rights listed in international
conventions and other normative acts, seek membership in international core
organizations promoting them, and align with actors perceived as exemplary
in protecting these rights to promote commonly acknowledged causes, e.g.,
fundamental political and civil rights. The posture would be followed by declarations coming from the decision-makers about their full commitment to
protecting human rights. Social creativity strategies envisage discursive pracprimarily by norms and values promoted by developed capitalist Western countries under the
leadership of the world hegemon, the U.S. These states identify proper conduct with world system maintenance, respect for international law, peaceful resolution of conflicts, human rights
promotion. Authors referring to the moral authority of the state draw from classic works of
Émile Durkheim (Sociology and Philosophy and Professional Ethics and Civic Morals), see Hall,
1997; Neumann, 2014; Wohlforth et al., 2018.
7
For more details, see section 5.
8
Social mobility assumes behavior emulating higher-ranking powers as the lower-ranked
actor accepts and follows the rules of the international game. Social mobility applies to states that
adhere to international regimes and promote norms and values supported by relevant actors (the
world’s great powers and/or actors with a recognized high position within a particular cooperation area).
9
Social creativity consists of the promotion of new and alternative attributes which give the
status aspiring state competitive advantage over the higher-ranked.
10
Social competition, of a more conflictive nature, takes place when the status aspiring state
identifies areas in which it could outstrip the higher-ranked actors and engages in activities challenging the existing stratifications.
104
tices also emphasizing such obligation, yet indicting gaps and deficiencies
in the institutional setup which need to be overcome. A state using this approach offers to bring in new perspectives into the debate, due to its distinctive
profile and experiences – for instance, affiliation with the developing world
leading to increased interest and authority to promote social and economic
rights. Social competition can be identified as postures defying acknowledged
understandings of fundamental rights and freedoms and opposing them to
alternative sets of values or unconventional interpretations of certain norms
and standards. Such an approach can be manifested by abstaining from voting on resolutions condemning human rights abuses. Criticized by Western
liberal democracies, the posture is frequently adopted by developing countries
and explained by a Southern point of view which places the value of dialogue
maintenance at all costs and non-interference in domestic matters over more
assertive ways of protecting human rights. Contrary to social creativity behavior, social competition entails more confrontational attitudes, at times based
on dichotomist and conflictive assessments of the subject matter in question.
Actors using this strategy perceive the set of human rights norms they defend
as threatened; their promotion becomes a moral imperative. Discursively social competition would be manifested by statements undermining the existing
human rights protection architecture and claims of a deep value crisis which
the status aspirant could handle due to its moral superiority.
Between 2006 and 201811 Brazil applied all three approaches in its conduct
within the HRC, whereas in 2019 and 2020 Brazilian policymakers resorted to
mobility and competition strategies. The differences in Brazil’s activism derive
from distinct roles played by Brazil in both periods, stemming from diverse
identities and objectives. If until the end of 2018 Brazil identified its function
of a good state sustaining a normative order as an appropriate way to manifest
its moral authority, since 2019 the state, as a defender of the faith12, adopted
a confrontational approach. It was based on the claim that the human rights
protection system – corrupted and decaying – required reconstruction. If in
the first decade of the HRC Brazil, within the mobility strategy, introduced
and sponsored documents on topics important to Western liberal democracies, it neglected this approach after 2019, proving its affinity with the West
by a more critical standing towards selected human rights offenders identified
as Brazil’s foes. In regard to the state’s creativity in human rights promotion,
Brazil during the Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff administrations aimed at
raising awareness and supporting initiatives of other members of the Global
South on subjects related to such rights as just access to medicines and the
The Quest for Status: Brazil’s
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Rights Council 2006-2020
Monika Sawicka
11
Although shifts leading to a partial alignment with standings applied since 2019 became
noticeable during the Temer administration and will be highlighted in the fifth section.
12
This role is not limited to strong commitments to religious values, but generally to causes,
norms and ideas deemed crucial by policymakers and “those who espouse the defender of the
faith national role conception presumably undertake special responsibilities to guarantee ideological purity for a group of other states” (Holsti, 1970, p. 264).
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highest healthcare standards as well as the elimination of hunger and poverty. Country delegates also voted in favor of documents introduced by Cuba
and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); a posture mostly
abandoned by the Bolsonaro government. A striking change occurred also in
the way Brazil employed social competition within the HRC: before 2019 tensions between Western states and the Latin American player arose mainly due
to its restraint in votings on human rights abuses in such states as North Korea, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. The Bolsonaro government, persistently asserting
its distinctiveness from liberal democracies, assumed competitive postures by
promoting a conservative normative agenda on such matters as the protection
of the family, women’s rights, and persecution of religions.
Before moving to a more detailed analysis of changing narratives and practices reflecting Brazil’s human rights record within the HRC and for a deeper
understanding of the changes in the state’s participation in the body, a brief
overview of the new features of the Brazilian foreign policy is required.
A populist foreign policy13
The claim that the Bolsonaro administration provides yet another example
of a populist political style should not raise objections. What enabled the
far-right statesman to come to power was a deep national crisis of political
representation and economic performance. Political parties in power for over
two decades have been to varying degrees discredited by a corruption scandal of an unprecedented scale which had dire consequences for the country’s
economic output. Jair Bolsonaro and his supporters used this opportunity to
position the former army captain as a figure rejecting the rules of conventional policymaking, a political steadfast outsider who was not engaged in
corrupt practices (Casarões, 2019). He was thus not a member of the elites
(although these claims can surprise coming from a person who served seven
consecutive terms in the Brazilian Congress) but a true patriot representing
the people, tired of traditional politics. Already in office, the Brazilian head of
state adopted an antagonistic and Manichean discourse starkly juxtaposing
virtuous Brazilian citizens with corrupt elites and bandits (Bolsonaro, 2019,
January 1). Bolsonaro’s most ardent supporters – former foreign affairs minister Ernesto Araújo, federal deputy and member of the commission of foreign
affairs and defense in the lower house of the Brazilian Congress Eduardo Bolsonaro, Filipe Martins, special foreign policy advisor to President Bolsonaro,
and Damares Alves, minister of human rights – constitute the ideological axis
of his administration. Araújo, Bolsonaro, and Martins are admirers and followers of Olavo de Carvalho, a self-proclaimed philosopher and the ideologi13
For a detailed conceptual clarification see Verbeek and Zaslove (2017) and Chryssogelos
(2017).
106
cal mentor of the Bolsonaro family, described as “the intellectual founder of
the Brazilian far-right” (Duarte, 2019, December 28) known for his radicalism
and propensity for conspiracy theories. The conservative values of Damares
Alves reflect the moral and social agenda of evangelical churches, a stakeholder that in the past two decades gained significant influence over Brazil’s political life (Zilla, 2020). Minister Alves, an evangelical pastor herself, represents
therefore the interests of a powerful political actor committed to curtailing
liberal family and lifestyle visions. Olavists and evangelicals are seen by other
segments of the government – the military and neoliberals – as the ideological
fraction as they place a set of identified principles and values over pragmatic
postures focused on the state’s material interests.
If on the domestic level the Bolsonaro administration uses the fear of loss
of one’s material and social status (which millions of Brazilians saw compromised by the economic crisis) – therefore strengthening and exploiting status
anxiety14 – a similar logic underpins the perception of the international system.
Its consequence is a rupture with traditional ways of policymaking not only
internally but also externally. Ernesto Araújo made numerous references to
the exogenous threats the state is facing: globalism, socialism, cultural Marxism, and communism.15 The worldview of the first foreign affairs minister in
the Bolsonaro cabinet was clearly an antagonistic one: Brazil was presented
as a member of a conservative informal avant-garde coalition that needs to
resist rogue globalist forces (Araújo, 2019, January 2; 2019 September 11).
As observed by Sá Guimarães and Oliveira e Silva (2021, p. 350), within this
logic Brazil was morally obliged to engage in a civilizational struggle which
required combating liberal institutionalism, for global institutions constituted
the framework that legitimized international groups of elites against the will of
the people in sovereign states. If criticism of globalism and the architecture of
international institutions along with a strong attachment to sovereignty were
not new in Brazil’s external affairs and can be found in the narratives on the
foreign policy of the Lula da Silva, Rousseff, and Temer administrations, the
radicalism permeating the new policymakers’ discourse was unprecedented.
An explicit classification of states into friends and foes was a novelty and went
against past efforts to promote Brazil as a country able to maintain good relations with all international actors (Interview with Brazil’s President Lula on
his legacy, 2010, September 30). What distinguished the foreign policy discourse of the Bolsonaro administration were references to international conspiracies and complots that could harm Brazil’s interests and values (Casarões,
2020, p. 83).
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Rights Council 2006-2020
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14
This logic was indicated as a hallmark of populist policies already by Seymour M. Lipset
(1955).
15
They can be found in most of his speeches and posts published on his blog Metapolítica
17 (https://www.metapoliticabrasil.com).
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The traditional principles which members of the ideological fraction usually referred to were that of God, homeland, and family. Deus, Pátria, Família
is not a new catchphrase, it reminds us of the slogans of large-scale protests
organized by conservative social movements against the government of João
Goulart in 1964 as well as of the military regime that followed shortly after
(Cordeiro, 2021). Yet, contrary to the administration of Jair Bolsonaro, the
junta’s foreign policy was more restrained in applying these values on the international level, guided by pragmatism (Cervo & Bueno, 2008). What distinguished the administration of Jair Bolsonaro is the fact that far-right populism
as a style of governance was not limited to the domestic sphere, as had been
the case of, for instance, the Getúlio Vargas era, but became ingrained in the
country’s foreign policy (Sá Guimarães & Oliveira e Silva, 2021, p. 352). Therefore, since 2019 and for the first time in the history of Brazilian diplomacy, one
of the driving forces of the Brazilian external engagement was the belief that
the state is morally obliged to defend Christianity and traditional family values, as they were threatened by leftist forces in the global cultural struggle. The
international human rights architecture with the HRC at its center became an
important arena for Brazil’s performance as a defender of the faith.
Human rights in the political discourse
With the adoption of the Constitution in 1988 (Title I, Article 4, Point II) human rights gained explicit recognition as one of the core principles guiding
the country’s foreign policy. Their protection was thus seen as both a moral
obligation for the Brazilian diplomatic corps and a niche enabling the country
to build up prestige and international recognition. Between 2006 and 2020
all Brazilian heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs referred to human
rights protection in speeches addressed to both domestic and international
audiences. Nevertheless, significant changes in the way Brazil’s international
commitment to human rights protection is perceived are discernible in the
last two years.
Presidents Lula da Silva, Dilma Rousseff, and Michel Temer as well as their
heads of diplomacy all emphasized their strong commitment to human rights
protection. They reminded that Brazil was party to international treaties constituting the legal-normative human rights protection framework of binding
nature. The state’s political elites, therefore, acknowledged the fundamental
human rights norms and assured of their obligation to implement them internally, assuming thus a posture that fitted within a social mobility strategy.
Given the institution in question – modern liberal democracies bound by the
rule of law do not contest the human rights principle – such standing was
expected. Signs of Brazil’s efforts to strengthen the normative system can also
be distinguished in declarations about the state’s aspirations to be not only
a norm-taker but also a norm-maker. President Lula da Silva and Minister
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Amorim stressed that Brazil contributed to the institutional setup of the HRC
by promoting the universal periodic review of countries’ mechanisms and
voluntary human rights goals (Amorim, 2009, p. 432). Brazil further aimed
at gaining visibility by advocating for economic, social, and cultural rights.
Among the main promoted causes were the right to development, including
the fight against hunger and poverty, universal access to medication, and the
impact of the global economic crisis on human rights. Another important issue area the country engaged in was the combat of racism. Brazilian policymakers were also using this opportunity to highlight Brazil’s internal successes
to eliminate hunger and poverty, and willingness to engage in technical cooperation projects to share its own success stories with other nations. President Lula da Silva (2007, September 25) was particularly vocal in addressing
the world’s obligation to fight hunger, poverty, and inequalities as well as advertising Brazilian homemade, tried-and-tested solutions to these problems.
A focus on topics exposing Brazilian achievements coupled with an insistence
on the handling global challenges at times overlooked by the most developed
economies can therefore be considered a social creativity strategy.
Despite the administration’s efforts to perform the role of a good international citizen guided by the principle of human rights protection, the state
also attracted attention due to its ambivalent standing towards regimes notorious for human rights abuses, especially between 2006 and 2010. Policymakers faced with accusations of disregard for fundamental human rights
were trying to defend the country’s posture. According to Celso Amorim
(2009, pp. 432–433), Brazil was choosing constructive cooperation and
dialogue over conflict and condemnation, which would only lead to the
isolation of the accused country. The head of the diplomacy expressed his
frustration over criticism faced by Brazil at the 65th session of the UN General Assembly, calling such posture arrogant and criticizing the “moral superiority” which some members of the international community conferred
upon themselves (Amorim, 2010, p. 147). The palpable irritation reflected
a deeper disappointment over the outcomes of Brazil’s efforts to strengthen
its status through social competition. The approach of holding to the nonintervention principle, dear to Brazil as a member of the Global South, did
not bring the expected gains and diverted the international audience’s attention from the state’s successes to controversial postures. Dilma Rousseff,
aware of the critique, decided to introduce adjustments to Brazil’s policy and
made sure to advertise the modification. In an interview for the Washington
Post after her election in 2010, asked about Brazil’s lenient posture towards
women’s rights in Iran, Ms. Rousseff replied that her government would assume a more explicit standing towards the violators within the UN body
(Weymouth, 2010, December 3). She made this also clear when speaking for
the first time at the UN General Assembly in September 2011: “There are
violations in all countries, without exception. Let us recognize this reality
and accept, all of us, the criticism. We should benefit from it and criticize,
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without mincing words, the flagrant cases of violation, wherever they occur”
(Rousseff, 2011, September 21). On the other hand, what stayed unchanged
was the policymakers’ posture of avoiding critical comments about human
rights records in Cuba and Venezuela. Questioned about this matter, Rousseff ’s first foreign affairs minister Antonio Patriota gave answers in line with
the argumentation used by his predecessor – humans rights protection had
to be less selective and politically motivated (Rossi, 2011, January 29). Slight
changes in the way Brazil addressed the issue of human rights violations in
other states were introduced by the Temer government. The main change
referred to the fact that Brazil, mainly through the discourse of minister
Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, voiced criticism of the human rights record of the
Venezuelan regime (Ferreira, 2019, March 7).
Between 2006 and 2018, human rights were depicted as an important
area of Brazilian international activism – the country’s commitment to their
promotion and protection remained an unquestioned guiding principle of
its external activism. The main differences consisted in the postures towards
practices of condemning human rights violators. The changes notable in the
administration’s discourse after January 2019 were of a different nature.
The assessment of the approach adopted by the current government in the
international debate on human rights is complex and controversy prone as
Jair Bolsonaro made over the past twenty years numerous comments depreciating and criticizing the rights of i.a. women, indigenous people, members
of the LGBTQ+ community, victims of the military rule, and the poor. These
statements came again to the limelight during the presidential campaign and
his electoral victory, making international headlines (Londoño & Darlington,
2018, October 28; Phillips, 2018 October 29). The critical approach towards
human rights was maintained after January 2019, although in official declarations this was (compared to past statements) tempered and expressed in
a more moderate manner. In his inaugural speech, President Bolsonaro referred to “the distortion of human rights”. They have been presented as an ideology that “protects the bandits and criminalizes police officers” (Bolsonaro,
2019, January 1). Speaking for the first time as head of state in front of an
international audience, President Bolsonaro (2019, January 22) also referred
to “true human rights” the country would defend. These were clear signals of
a new goal: rather than sustaining the global human rights protection system,
Brazil challenged its normative underpinnings aiming at a reconstruction of
this system. In his first speech at the UN General Assembly, President Bolsonaro assured of Brazil’s “uncompromising commitment to the highest standards in human rights”, yet a focus on family and God along with the obligation
to defend the society from criminals suggested that Brazil had a very narrow
and ultraconservative understanding of human rights. This vision would be
defended in international organizations including the UN bodies as, according to the new administration, “The UN can help defeat the materialistic and
ideological climate that puts in check some of the basic principles of human
dignity” (Bolsonaro 2019, September 24). Similar views were expressed by the
head of Itamaraty. A cause particularly promoted by Araújo at the UN (2019,
September 27) was religious freedom: the diplomat made references to the
increase in persecutions of Christians, which did not resonate with topics promoted by Brazil earlier.
As the Bolsonaro government has been criticized for neglecting or even
violating human rights in Brazil, using this issue area to strengthen the country’s status would not seem plausible. Yet, efforts to use global fora, including
the HRC, to promote conservative values of God, the protection of the family and the “innocence of children” have been indicated by members of the
Brazilian administration as a core element of Brazil’s international positioning. The basis for Brazil’s moral authority was its membership in the club of
a new conservative avant-garde of the West, along with the US (under Donald Trump), Israel, Hungary, and Poland (Araújo, 2019, January 2). Equipped
with such moral authority, making it fit for a renewal of the international system, the state engaged in a cultural crusade to combat “nihilism disguised as
multilateralism”, communism and Marxism, which were destroying humanity
(Araújo, 2019, June 10). Therefore, the Brazilian administration, rather than
promoting the image of Brazil as a good international citizen, conceptualized
Brazil as a defender of the faith. Seen from this angle, the discourse of the
administration can be classified as a somewhat distorted effort of status enhancement through social competition. The next section shows whether and
how political declarations were followed by Brazil’s engagement in the HRC.
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Activism in the UN Human
Rights Council 2006-2020
Monika Sawicka
Brazil in the HRC: constants and variables
To verify the changes in Brazil’s activism within the HRC I analyzed the subject matters of resolutions and decisions introduced by the country (or on
behalf of it), sponsored and co-sponsored by Brazil, the state’s vote on amendments to documents, and on resolutions/decisions which were not adopted
without a vote. Noteworthy shifts between 2006 and 2020 concern the Brazilian vote on resolutions addressing human rights violations in several countries, including the country’s stance towards the regimes in Cuba, Venezuela,
and Nicaragua; the support for initiatives promoted by developing countries;
and several causes traditionally supported by Brazil, in particular religious
freedom, the rights of sexual minorities, the protection of the family as well as
women’ and girls’ rights.
Resolutions on human rights violations
Although Brazil during the Lula da Silva administration was praised for its
efforts to increase human rights protection levels, especially those related to
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social and economic rights (Costa da Silva, 2020; Sá e Silva, 2020), the country also faced criticism because of its resistance to condemn human rights
violations in a number of undemocratic regimes (Ricupero, 2010, August 29).
In 2006 Brazil, along with Cuba and Mexico, voted in favor of a decision addressing the issue of human rights violations in Darfur introduced by African
states, which was considered by European countries as too restrained. Brazil
was the only Latin American country to abstain from voting on the amendments proposed by European states (Cuba voted against, other Latin American states – in favor). In 2009, Brazil abstained from voting on a resolution on
the People’s Republic of Korea, explaining that this way it was giving the Kim
regime a chance to maintain dialogue with the Council. At the 11th special
session, also in 2009, convened to discuss the human rights situation in Sri
Lanka, Brazil co-sponsored a resolution introduced by the Sri Lankan representative and did not support European efforts to amend the text. These
were clear manifestations of a social competition strategy that brought negative outcomes as Brazil was criticized for such postures, as mentioned earlier.
Despite Brazil’s complaints about the selective and political nature of human rights monitoring and protection in the Human Rights Commission,
spotted by state officials also within the HRC (Amorim, 2010, p. 147), Brazil’s
neutrality was also questionable. Between 2006 and 2010 the Latin American
actor voted in favor of resolutions condemning human rights violations in
Palestine. The Council’s focus on abuses committed by Israel, as evidenced by
the number of resolutions addressing the issue adopted in regular as well as
special sessions16, was considered politically motivated as numerous violations
in other parts of the world never received similar attention (Asano & Nader,
2011, p. 128).
During Dilma Rousseff ’s first term in office from 2011 to 2014, Brazil’s
vote on resolutions condemning human rights abuses in specific countries
was less controversial. Brazil supported the resolutions on Iran, Syria, North
Korea, and Sri Lanka. In 2011 Brazil also co-sponsored a resolution on the
human rights situation in Libya, adopted at the 15th special session. The country’s posture changed in March 2015 with the Brazilian abstention in the case
of both Iran and Syria. The Temer administration maintained such a posture
towards Iran. In the case of Syria, Brazil voted in favor of the resolutions, however, country representatives expressed concerns also raised by the previous
government. They referred to the interference of external actors into the conflict, including arms supply, which was aggravating the situation. Further, at
all three sessions in 2018 Brazil supported several amendments submitted by
Russia. The amendments called upon states and non-state actors to render
support to the parties engaged in the Syrian conflict, referred more explicitly
to the engagement of several terrorist groups in the conflict, and criticized
16
Until 2020, out of 28 sessions 7 were held to discuss the situation in Palestine and 1, the
situation in Lebanon.
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“unilateral coercive measures” applied against the Assad regime as leading to
a deterioration of the human rights situation within the war-thorn country.
Such a position once again voiced the concerns of Brazil as a member of the
Global South driven by the non-intervention principle and thus ready to provide competitive standing in the international body.
The main modifications notable in Brazil’s standing towards the debate on
human rights violations since 2019 relate to Israel. For the first time since 2006
Brazil voted against the resolution on human rights in the occupied Syrian
Golan and abstained from voting on the issue of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Explaining such posture, Brazilian representatives pointed to an excessive number of resolutions referring to Israel within
the HRC (Brazil, 2019b) and the selective nature of the draft tackling the situation in the Golan Heights as it omitted abuses in Syria (Brazil, 2019c). The
shift was a consequence of a major recalibration of Brazil’s strategic partnerships. In an effort to align with the position of the United States in international organizations, Brazil followed the direction of its partner, who complained
of the anti-Israeli bias within the HRC. Additionally, as already signaled by
Ernesto Araújo in his inauguration speech, the Latin American state perceived
Israel as a crucial ally. In the diplomat’s view, both countries, bound by the
Judeo-Christian tradition, were members of the coalition of virtuous states in
the global cultural war to save humanity.
Another alteration visible in 2019 referred to the state’s antagonistic posture towards the regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua. In the case of Nicaragua, Brazil was one of the main sponsors of the initiatives in 2019 and 2020. In
the Venezuelan case, the country sponsored in 2019 and introduced in 2020,
at the request of the Trump administration (Sá Guimarães & Oliveira e Silva,
2021, p. 355), a draft proposal condemning human rights abuses committed
by the Maduro regime. This was unprecedented as Brazil’s leftist presidents
firmly avoided referring to this issue, including when explicitly questioned in
interviews (Vivanco, 2015, June 29). The Temer administration in September
2018 voted in favor of a resolution on Venezuela introduced by Peru, although
the country did not sponsor it. Temer’s successor went further, leaving aside
the non-interference principle, which was emphasized since the beginning
of the 20th century in Brazil’s relations with regional partners. These modifications, reflecting an alignment with Western democracies on the matter of
human rights violations, represent a shift from social competition to social
mobility. Yet, this posture was not fully consistent.
A much softer stance was shown by Brazil on the situation in Iran and the
Philippines. The state abstained from voting in both cases. Particularly surprising was the state’s posture towards Iran as it was inconsistent with the current administration’s support for a tough stand on the Islamic Republic.17 The
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Activism in the UN Human
Rights Council 2006-2020
Monika Sawicka
17
Brazil participated in the US-led Middle East conference in Warsaw in February 2019 considered anti-Iranian and even offered to host another similar event (Desideri, 2020, January 8).
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Brazilian delegate in an explanation of the vote expressed the state’s “understanding that Iran will undertake additional measures on the protection and
promotion of human rights” (Brazil, 2019a), which reminded the approach
assumed by Brazil between 2015 and 2018. In the case of the Philippines, the
decision raised criticism as it was perceived as ideologically motivated. President Bolsonaro, oftentimes compared with President Rodrigo Duterte, did not
want to point fingers at another far-right and conservative regime (Brasil se
abstém em votação na ONU sobre violações de direitos humanos nas Filipinas, 2019, July 12; Duchiade, 2019, July 11).
Causes promoted by the Global South
Between 2006 and March 2016, Brazil voted in favor or even co-sponsored
resolutions referring to topics promoted by developing countries, thus expressing its affiliation to the Global South. This affinity was mostly manifested
in a less confrontational manner than was the case of human rights abuses and
it can be classified as an example of a social creativity approach. The promoted causes focused on economic, social, and cultural rights as well as national
sovereignty, such as the right to food; the right to development; international
solidarity; the right to peace; promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights;
the effects of foreign debt on economic, social, and cultural rights; the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.
The initiatives were promoted by Cuba and other members of the NAM –
Venezuela, Egypt, and Iran – on behalf of the group. Adjustments in Brazil’s
vote were made after the impeachment of President Rousseff. The administration of Michel Temer decided to vote against a Cuban-sponsored resolution
on foreign debt and it abstained from supporting documents referring to the
democratic and equitable international order and unilateral coercive measures (the latter sponsored by Venezuela on behalf of NAM). Since 2019 Brazil
voted against the resolution on the impact of unilateral coercive measures on
human rights and the effects of foreign debt on human rights. Also, by abstention, the state no longer supported the resolutions on the democratic international order and the use of mercenaries. The only Cuban-sponsored drafts
still backed by Brazil were resolutions on the promotion of the right to peace
and international solidarity. What stood out making a stark contrast with past
practices was an extremely critical assessment of the Cuban and Venezuelan
regime when explaining its vote on documents introduced by the Caribbean
countries. For instance, at the 42nd session in September 2019 the Brazilian
delegate explained that despite the state’s support for a democratic and equitable international order, principles of self-determination and sovereignty,
Brazil would abstain in the voting as “the Government of Cuba lacks the necessary legitimacy to lead the initiative” (Brazil, 2019f). When commenting
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on a resolution regarding Venezuela, sponsored by Brazil at the same session,
the state’s representative complained about the criticism faced “at the HRC
corridors” by the country due to the initiative. Emphasizing the Venezuelan
humanitarian crisis and the Brazilian support for refugees from the Bolivarian Republic, the representative mentioned twice: “We are not the bad guys.”
(Brazil, 2019e). The statement was another example of Brazil’s black and white
perception of the international system, torn by the clash between forces of
good and evil. Yet, the necessity to remind the UN audience about who the
“good guys” were, albeit undoubtedly sarcastic, can be read as a signal that
Brazil’s moral superiority lacks recognition and representatives of the government are aware of it. The strong inclination towards ideologically motivated
initiatives not only exposed a much more critical posture towards regional
neighbors. The changes, visible since the Temer government and continued in
the last two years, signal changes in the Brazilian commitment to causes close
to members of the Global South, thus questioning the state’s adherence to this
group. In line with the declarations made by Ernesto Araújo who promoted
Brazil’s profile as a member of the Western civilization, Brazil continues to
distance itself from developing countries, a shift clearly noticeable in the HRC.
Yet, a deepening cleavage between Brazil and other developing nations was
not the only novelty, as it was followed by several unprecedented decisions
which distanced Brazil also from Western democracies.
The Quest for Status: Brazil’s
Activism in the UN Human
Rights Council 2006-2020
Monika Sawicka
Topics introduced and supported by Brazil
Despite criticism faced by Brazil on several occasions due to abstentions in
votings on human rights violations in several countries, the state also managed to gain recognition and prestige as a promoter of human rights causes.
Brazilian diplomats proudly emphasized the state’s efforts to raise awareness
on the incompatibility between democracy and racism, access to medication
for developing countries, the rights of people with HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, rights of people struggling with mental illnesses, older persons,
and journalists. At the initiative of Brazil, the HRC held special sessions to
discuss the impact of the global economic crisis on human rights in 2009 and
the situation in Haiti in 2010. Celso Amorim in 2009 stressed that although
Brazil led in sponsoring documents referring to economic, social, and cultural rights – initiatives developed within the social creativity strategy through
which Brazil was gaining visibility as a member of the Global South, able to
provide innovative solutions and raise awareness on causes particularly important for the South – the state also paid attention to political and civic rights
traditionally promoted by members of the North. By giving the example of the
incompatibility between democracy and racism, a cause first introduced by
Brazil in 2006 at the 2nd HRC session, the diplomat reassured that Brazil was
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cies, thus, willing to take on mobility strategies.18 In addition, Brazil advocated
for the adoption of human rights voluntary goals as well as resolutions on the
enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity building in the field of
human rights. Another topic raised by Brazil regarded human rights and the
Internet as well as the right to privacy in the digital age.
Many of these initiatives were continued by the administrations of Michel
Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. Access to medication and the right to physical
and mental health continues to be a cause the Brazilian delegation in Geneva
advocates for. Other issues include the rights of older persons, the safety of
journalists19, the negative impact of corruption on human rights, technical cooperation in the field of human rights, and the right to privacy in the digital
age. In 2016 and 2017 Brazil also introduced documents aimed at addressing
the issue of racial discrimination, however, the attention given to this topic
decreased after January 2019 as the state did not introduce any draft referring
to this issue since then.
Other causes which Brazil supported between 2006 and 2018, most commonly by co-sponsoring them, were i.a. the rights of indigenous peoples, migrants, freedom of religion, prevention of genocide, human trafficking, the
question of the death penalty, enforced voluntary disappearances, the right to
peaceful protests, and combating torture. After 2019 Brazil showed signs of
continuity, backing many of these initiatives as a co-sponsor. Causes that were
no longer supported by the Latin American state included the rights of indigenous people and migrants.20 A novelty since 2019 was the state’s increased
commitment to combat discrimination based on religion. On numerous occasions leading members of the Brazilian administration, including President
Bolsonaro, ministers Araújo and Alves raised the issue of persecuted Christians. Brazil along with Poland and Iraq organized an event to discuss the
matter of religious persecutions at the 41st HRC session in 2019. During the
event, the Brazilian representative claimed that Christians were the most persecuted religious group in the world (Chade, 2019, July 9). What gained even
more attention, however, was Brazil’s unprecedented standing on women’s
rights and gender identity. These initiatives were clear manifestations of social
18
At later sessions Brazil also introduced resolutions on education as a tool to eliminate
racism (in 2013), addressing the impact of racism on women’s rights (in 2016) and advocated for
the elaboration of a declaration promoting the rights of African descendants (in 2017). Brazil’s
commitment to combating racism was also expressed by co-sponsoring resolutions urging to
eliminate racism, other forms of racial discrimination and xenophobia, an initiative promoted
by African states.
19
President Bolsonaro was accused of inciting violence against journalists (Medeiros, 2010,
January 16).
20
In January 2019, the Bolsonaro administration decided to withdraw from the UN Global
Compact for Migration initiative despite the state’s engagement in negotiating the international
non-binding deal in 2018.
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competition, through which Brazil was to exert and further increase its moral
authority.
Brazil was the first country to introduce a resolution proposal on the topic
of sexual orientation and gender identity at a UN human rights protection
body in 2003 (Nogueira, 2017, p. 550). After several attempts and adjustments
of its content, finally, in 2011 the document passed and was reintroduced in
2014 and 201621 granting Brazil visibility as a promoter of a progressive human rights agenda. Although in 2019 the country together with Argentina introduced a document on the mandate of the independent expert on protection
against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity, its standing on the rights of sexual minorities underwent a significant
change. At the 41st session in July 2019, the Brazilian representative emphasized that the term “gender” lacked a clear definition in HRC documents and
therefore explained that for the Brazilian delegation it was synonymous with
“sex”, understood as a biological category (Brazil, 2019d). This new caveat to
the term “gender” came in line with the instruction received by the Brazilian diplomats from Ernesto Araújo to exclude the term “gender” from their
vocabulary and use solely the word “sex” (Valadares, 2019, August 7). It also
stood in stark contrast with previous practices as Brazil actively supported
documents using this expression. For instance, in September 2017, Brazil introduced a resolution addressing the importance of “mainstreaming a gender
perspective” into the human rights protection system.22
Efforts to present Brazil as a country engaged in the protection of sexual
minorities were also limited since 2019. In 2020 at the 44th session, a debate
was held after the presentation of a report on the global practice of “conversion therapies” for members of the LGBT community. The report stated that
such practices were taking place in Brazil, provided by religious institutions,
and pointed out that national legislation prohibiting them did not address the
problem of “therapies” by “religious interventions”. The Brazilian delegate in
response after the presentation (Brazil, 2020) tried to clarify the state’s official position towards these “therapies”. Although it was emphasized that such
practices were illegal, the influence of religious groups on the rights of sexual
minorities was not addressed.
Jair Bolsonaro and Ernesto Araújo on numerous occasions emphasized
the strong commitment to defending the value of the family, making references to the traditional understanding of the family as based on the bond between
a man and a woman (Bolsonaro, 2019, August 10; Araújo, 2019, October 22).
These statements contrasted with Brazil’s position on the matter before 2019,
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Rights Council 2006-2020
Monika Sawicka
21
In 2016 Chile introduced the proposal on behalf of Brazil who was not a member of the
Council at the 32nd session.
22
Resolution 36/8 The full enjoyment of human rights by all women and girls and the systematic mainstreaming of a gender perspective into the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development.
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118
also expressed within the HRC. At the 21st session in September 2012, when
human rights protection in Brazil was under scrutiny within the universal periodic review mechanism, Brazil refuted a recommendation made by the Holy
See to protect the “natural family”. The state’s delegate reminded the audience
that Brazilian institutions “recognized other family arrangements as also being eligible for protection” (HRC, 2015, November 11, p. 169). In 2014, 2015,
and 2017 Brazil abstained from voting on resolutions on the protection of the
family sponsored by African and Arab states. The country did not support
the proposal as amendments extending the definition of the family (by adding that “various forms of the family exist”), introduced in 2014 by Uruguay
and in 2015 by Brazil, were refuted. Although in 2019 and 2020 the topic was
not raised within the HRC, it is highly improbable that Brazil would back an
extended understanding of the family including same-sex couples.
Another area that witnessed unparalleled adjustments referred to women’s
rights. Since 2009 Brazil sponsored resolutions on women’s rights (on accelerating the efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women – a Canadian initiative – and on the elimination of discrimination against women,
promoted by Mexico and Colombia) and voted against amendments proposed
to these documents by Arab states and Russia. This was the case still in 2018
when Brazil was against amendment proposals aiming at deleting references
to the right to evidence-based comprehensive sexual education as well as the
acknowledgement of violence caused by intimate partners. In the same year at
the September session, Brazil also rejected an amendment sponsored by Egypt
and Russia to the resolution on preventable maternal mortality and morbidity in humanitarian settlements. The changes once again aimed at deleting
references to the right to sexual education. One year later, at the 41st session in
June, Brazil not only ceased to sponsor drafts introduced by Canada, Mexico,
and Colombia but also voted in favor of amendments intended to erase references to the right to sexual education. Brazil was the only Latin American
country that backed the Pakistani and Russian proposals, joining the club of
such countries as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, China, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Bangladesh. The Brazilian neighbors, along with European states, were against
the amendments. At the same session, Brazil voted in a similar vein on the
European resolution addressing the consequences of child, early, and forced
marriage. The Latin American state supported a controversial amendment introduced by Bahrain. The proposal suggested binding the right to a comprehensive education for women and girls aimed at gender equality and women
empowerment with “appropriate direction and guidance from parents and legal guardians”, thus introducing a reference to the girl’s family’s consent. Brazil’s new alignment with states associated with ultraconservative postures and
poor human rights records came as a surprise to Brazil’s partners within the
HRC as well as the domestic audience. Latin American diplomats, for years
coordinating initiatives with their Brazilian counterparts, were stunned by the
drastic shift and new Brazilian vocabulary, questioning established human
rights protection standards (Chade, 2019, June 20). The topic was also thrust
into the national spotlight: main news outlets decried Brazil’s new controversial alliances within the HRC (Duchiade, 2019, July 11; Queiroz, 2019, July 29;
Senra, 2019, July 17; Chade, 2020, July 3; Maneo, 2020, July 7). In 2020 at the
44th session, Brazil tried to take a less controversial stand by abstaining from
the vote on five amendments sponsored by Russia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia,
yet it did not sponsor the Mexican resolution (on the elimination of all forms
of discrimination against women and girls).
It remains highly questionable whether under the Bolsonaro administration Brazil will manage to overcome associations with a group of countries
opposed to strengthening human rights. It remains also an open question if
the state’s decision-makers are interested in overcoming such associations.
For the past two years, Brazil within the HRC presented an ultraconservative
posture in the debate over the protection of sexual minorities, the family, the
rights of women and girls, and by advocating for the protection of persecuted
Christians rather than focusing on such challenges as discrimination based
on gender identity and domestic violence that Brazil itself is also facing. The
state’s decision-makers preferred alignments with countries criticized for human rights abuses such as Saudi Arabia and Russia over alliances with Western democracies. The described changes can be classified as a move to challenge the existing agenda on human rights protection and promote alternative
understandings of rights, within the civilizational war over morality in which
Brazil is supposedly “the good guy”. If this move is an effort to purge the international system by bringing back fundamental values through competing
with positions defending their established understandings, it is a failed one.
For Brazil instead of recognition as a member of the global avant-garde gained
visibility as a state that is losing its credentials as a human rights promoter and
responsible member of the international community.
The Quest for Status: Brazil’s
Activism in the UN Human
Rights Council 2006-2020
Monika Sawicka
Conclusion
Perhaps the most surprising declaration made by a foreign affairs minister
of a country traditionally recognized for its strive for greatness, the desire of
grandeza, was the affirmation of Ernesto Araújo in October 2020 that Brazil
preferred to be an international pariah rather than a “guest at the banquet
of self-interested cynicism of the globalists”. For the head of Brazilian diplomacy, being a pariah was a virtue (Araújo, 2020, October 22). These assertions
starkly contrasted with past moments when Brazil was in the spotlight as an
example in the fight against inequality and poverty, a credible actor able to
convince the international community of its willingness to assume increased
responsibility for world affairs.
Human rights protection is not an area associated with great power politics, contrary to mediation in high profile conflicts, acquisition of nuclear
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120
power, and other increases in strategic material capabilities. States seeking
status without resorting to hard measures select other areas and non-material
resources which could increase their standing. International human rights
promotion is one of them. Actors who aim at proving their international responsibility and commitment adhere to a set of rules and standards acknowledged by the dominant powers: the United States and, in the niche of human
rights protection, Western modern liberal democracies having uncompromised human rights standards. Yet, for states with a long tradition of allegiance to human rights as a fundamental principle orienting foreign policy,
this niche of international cooperation remains even more indispensable. Brazil did not procure a strengthened global standing through increases in hard
power but, since the 20th century, remained committed to the notion of constructing prestige through other means. Mediation and diplomatic dialogue,
peaceful resolution of conflicts, respect for national sovereignty as well as the
promotion of human rights, were typical instruments used by Brazilian diplomats until recently. If advocating for human rights solely cannot be considered
a sufficient condition for status enhancement, in the case of soft powers, it is
a necessary one as moral authority becomes an important way to gain visibility and recognition. The commitment to human rights protection is a baseline
which must be fulfilled for the country to be taken seriously and considered as
a responsible global player.
The paper presented two alternative ways of Brazilian status-seeking focused on the state’s moral authority which brought differing results. Between
2006 and 2018 Brazil, expressing its profile as both Western liberal democracy
and a member of the Global South (the latter identity promoted less vigorously by the Temer administration), identified opportunities for status gains
by engaging in efforts to sustain and develop the international human rights
system. Performing the role of a good international citizen, the state applied
a blend of social mobility, creativity, and competition strategies. Although the
last approach, manifested in reticence towards condemning human rights
abuses within the HRC, cost Brazil image losses, applying social mobility and
creativity strategies brought positive outcomes. Brazil was recognized as an
actor contributing both to causes supported by Western liberal states as well
as topics important for developing countries.
The changes palpable within the HRC since 2019 resonated with major
policy shifts and ideological convictions of key figures responsible for the
foreign policy design. The populist foreign policy adopted by the government was a nod towards President Bolsonaro’s most radical followers and
evangelicals, the religious community whose representatives were increasing
their influence over political life in Brazil. The state since 2019 was no longer
interested in sustaining the human rights protection system. As a defender
of the faith and endowed with moral superiority, Brazil wished for its thorough redefinition. As frequently repeated by President Bolsonaro and Ernesto
Araújo in an obvious reference to Evangelist John, it was necessary to bring
“the truth back in[to]” the international system. To this end, Brazil engaged in
a range of activities adopting approaches of social mobility and competition.
Country representatives aligned their votes with Western states on matters of
human rights abuses in Venezuela and changed the state’s position on some
resolutions regarding Israel. Yet, the determination to raise awareness over
the situation in Cuba and Venezuela seemed to be first and foremost triggered
by a Manichean vision of the global reality in which those countries, due to
their ideological affiliations, were classified as foes. This also explains the reticent posture towards Duterte’s rule in the Philippines. The most visible shift
in the past two years refers to Brazil’s posture on matters of religious freedom,
the protection of the family, sexual minorities, and women. Putting itself in
the same row alongside countries such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, known
for their ultraconservative normative agenda and compromised human rights
protection standards, took a heavy toll on Brazil’s prestige and authority as
a human rights promoter.
The international alignments of Brazil were clearly exposed in January
2019, when the head of the Brazilian diplomacy stressed the country’s admiration for the U.S., Israel, and Hungary. Nevertheless, entitlement to moral
authority requires recognition from a broader number of states, including
members of the clubs recognized for high human rights protection standards.
Should policymakers stop seeking such recognition, Brazil might fail not only
to prove who “the good guys” are but also face accusations of “not being a serious state”.23
The Quest for Status: Brazil’s
Activism in the UN Human
Rights Council 2006-2020
Monika Sawicka
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Zilla, C. (2020). Evangelicals and Politics in Brazil. The Relevance of Religious Change in
Latin America. SWP Research Paper, 2020/RP 01, January. Retrieved May 7, 2021, from:
https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020RP01/
The Quest for Status: Brazil’s
Activism in the UN Human
Rights Council 2006-2020
Websites:
Monika Sawicka
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/pages/sessions.aspx – official website of the
Human Rights Council containing reports of regular and special sessions as well as links
to full text documents.
https://hrcmeetings.ohchr.org/Pages/default.aspx - Extranet of the Human Rights Council
containing transcripts of oral statements made by country representatives at regular and
special sessions.
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Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 131–145
Harm Reduction Model in Mexico’s Drug Policy
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.131-145
Modelo de reducción de daños en la política
de drogas de México
Aleksandra Jargiełło*
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND JOURNALISM
MARIA CURIE-SKŁODOWSKA UNIVERSITY
LUBLIN, POLAND
aleksandra.jargiello@poczta.umcs.lublin.pl
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3776-4050
ABSTRACT
Harm reduction is an approach in drug policy based on health issues and human rights.
The aim of this article is to present the essence of the harm reduction model, as well as
its implementation in Mexico after the year 2006. The study is an attempt to answer the
following research questions: firstly, what is the scale of psychoactive drugs consumption
in Mexico – and what goes with it – its negative health implications; secondly, to what
extent does the Mexican drug policy takes account of aspects related to public health? This
analysis proves that Mexico lacks a comprehensive harm reduction strategy and the main
role in implementing this model is played by civil society organizations.
KEYWORDS: harm reduction, drug policy, Mexico, drugs, public health.
RESUMEN
La reducción de daños es un enfoque de la política de drogas basado en cuestiones de
salud y derechos humanos. El objetivo de este artículo es presentar la idea principal
del modelo de reducción de daños, así como su implementación en México a partir del
año 2006. El estudio intenta responder a las siguientes preguntas de investigación: en
primer lugar, cuál es la magnitud del consumo de drogas psicoactivas en México y sus
implicaciones negativas para la salud; en segundo lugar, en qué medida la política
de drogas de México tiene en cuenta los aspectos relacionados con la salud pública.
Este análisis demuestra que México carece de una estrategia integral de reducción
de daños y que el papel principal en la aplicación de este modelo lo desempeñan las
organizaciones de la sociedad civil.
* Ph.D. student in Political Science at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University (UMCS), Lublin,
Poland. Graduate of International Relations and Logistics from UMCS. Research interests: drug
policy, organized crime, security in Latin America.
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PALABRAS CLAVE: reducción de daños, política de drogas, México, drogas, salud
pública.
Introduction
Psychoactive drugs1 represent a social construct meaning that in various time
periods they were defined and valuated differently by sundry social groups.
Over the years, influenced by the Age of Discovery and the development of
science, they have been desacralized, i.e., drugs have been moved from the
sacrum sphere, in which access to them was restricted and controlled by certain social groups, to the profanum realm, where drugs are used for the socalled recreational purposes (Motyka & Marcinkowski, 2014). Greater drugs
availability on the market, the emergence of new psychoactive substances
and the lack of proper legal regulations pertaining to them caused health and
social issues to mount. Most countries all over the world implemented the
policy of drug prohibition as a response to these problems. Internationally,
this policy is realised within international drug control regime. Nevertheless,
global war on drugs has not yielded the expected results, it has not reduced
demand and supply for psychoactive drugs. This fact is testified by the data
from the report compiled in 2020 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime which says that over the last twenty years there has been an increase in
drugs consumption, as well as their number and types on the market. In 2018,
269 million people took psychoactive drugs, which constitutes a 30% growth
in comparison to 2009. Approximately 35.6 million people suffer from disorders resulting from drug-taking and only 1 in 8 people in need receives medical treatment, while among 11 million people taking psychoactive drugs by
injection, 50% are reported to be suffering from type C hepatitis (HCV) and
1.4 million are carriers of HIV (UN, 2020, p. 1). Therefore, experts point out
that the presence of drugs in culture and social space is inevitable and, therefore, more measures and resources need to be committed to the elimination
of negative health and social impacts connected with their consumption, such
as: addictions, overdose, the spread of contagious diseases, or marginalisation and discrimination towards people taking drugs. Schemes aiming to curb
such processes are realised within the so-called harm reduction2.
The main objective of this article is to present the essence of harm reduction model and to outline its implementation in Mexico after the year 2006. In
the global drug market, Mexico performs the functions of psychoactive drugs
1
For the purposes of this article, expressions „drugs”, „psychoactive drugs”, “psychoactive
substances” will be used interchangeably. These expressions denote illegal substances.
2
Harm reduction may also concern alcohol abuse issues.
132
producer3 and a transit country for drugs smuggling4, which is reflected in the
organised crime groups activity, who profit by distributing and selling drugs
(Nieto, 2018), thus generating violence which raises a serious issue for the
country’s security. It needs to be noted that since 2006 Mexico’s drug policy
has been mainly directed towards the militarisation in combating drug cartels
(Jargiełło, 2018). Taking all the above issues into account, this article is an attempt to answer the following questions: firstly, what is the scale of psychoactive drug consumption and its negative health impacts?; secondly, to what extent does the Mexican drug policy allow for aspects related to public health?
The following hypothesis has been put forward in this paper – Mexico lacks
appropriate harm reduction strategy. To verify this claim, various methods
and techniques of research have been used, for instance: institutional and legal
analysis, analysis of literature and research, analysis of statistical data.
Harm Reduction Model in
Mexico’s Drug Policy
Aleksandra Jargiełło
The essence of harm reduction model
Drug policy is one of the public policies pursued by a government or its representatives providing for a system of laws, regulations, courses of action, as
well as budget priorities regarding psychoactive drugs. It encompasses a range
of strategies involving issues such as: education, treatment, drug legislation, the
police activities and control of borders5. Since the scope of drug policy is rather
broad, three basic models may be distinguished. This article primarily centres
around the harm reduction model, however, to fully understand its core, one
must scratch beneath the surface and take a closer look at the other two.
The most common approach is supply reduction with its underlying
conviction that drugs are bad, and drug-taking affects health and societies
in a negative way, thus the need to curb the amount of drugs on the market
and hinder access to them, which can be achieved by inhibiting illegal production of drugs and their distribution (Zamecka, 2018, pp. 112–115). The
production may also be constrained by crop eradication or by implementing
the alternative development programmes. Moreover, this policy also entails
the liquidation of illegal laboratories and controlling the chemical precursors.
In addition, drug distribution is hindered by both police and border guards’
activities, for example – drug seizure (UN ODCCP, 2000, p. 69) Supply reduction involves legal control which makes use of harsh penalties or repressive
measures. This essentially constitutes the policy of combating criminality by
penal measures oriented on drug control and fighting drug crime. The model
in question may take extreme forms such as: prohibition, capital punishment
3
4
5
Heroine, marijuana, methamphetamine.
Cocaine.
Author’s own definition based on: EMCDDA, 2017, p. 3; UN ODCCP, 2000, p. 23.
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for drug-related offences or the militarisation of activities against drug crime,
which is often figuratively called war on drugs.
Demand reduction model constitutes a crucial component of drug policy in many countries. It refers to policies and schemes orientated on limiting psychoactive drugs consumption. Contrary to the former model, one of
the assumptions of demand reduction model is the fact that the existence of
a drug-free society is an unreal concept. Yet, the risk of reaching out for drugs
needs to be reduced by taking preventative and therapeutic measures6. This
model involves strategies regarding prevention and education i.e., raising social awareness and compounding knowledge of threats related to drug consumption, especially among adolescents. The key factor seems to be enabling
easy access to high quality services falling within therapy and treatment of
people addicted to psychoactive drugs, however the mandatory requirement
to receive such help is to stop using drugs and stay sober (Zamecka, 2018, pp.
115–117).
The model which addresses the drug issue in the most humanitarian and
health-promoting way is harm reduction. According to the definition provided by a non-governmental organization Harm Reduction International:
Harm reduction refers to policies, programmes and practises that aim to
minimise negative health, social and legal impacts associated with drug use,
drug policies and drug laws. Harm reduction is grounded in justice and human rights. It focuses on positive change and on working with people without
judgement, coercion, discrimination (…). (Harm Reduction International,
2021)
It does not stigmatise drug users, claiming that drug consumption and
addiction stems from various factors: social, environmental, cultural, and personal. As in the case of demand reduction, drug-addicted people should be
treated as people suffering from an illness who ought to be offered treatment.
Contrary to the previous model, it is not mandatory for a person to stop using
psychoactive substances and keep drug-abstinence. At the bottom of this model lies the concern for the well-being of a person who takes and is addicted
to psychoactive drugs and the concern for public health which manifests itself
in hindering the “harm” resulting from taking drugs such as, for example, the
spread of HIV across the population or other diseases or viruses, which may
be the result of some “risky behaviour” – for instance – taking drugs by injection, using non-sterile injection equipment which had been used before.
6
This model mainly involves using the social policy measures. It must be borne in mind
that the demand might also be curbed using criminal law. The so-called “deterrence mechanism”
is supposed to prevent people from drug consumption in the fear for penal responsibility (Krajewski, 2001, pp. 69–70).
134
Harm reduction entails a comprehensive set of services recommended by
the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS
(UNAIDS) (UNAIDS, 2019, p. 17).
These activities include:
1. Needle and syringes exchange programmes7.
2. Drug dependence treatment, including opioid substitution therapy8.
3. Testing for HIV services.
4. Anti-retrovirus therapy9.
5. Prevention and treatment of sexually transmissible diseases.
6. Condom distribution programmes for people injecting drugs and their sexual partners.
7. Directed information, education, and communication.
8. Prevention, vaccination, diagnostics and treatment of type B and C
hepatitis.
9. Prophylaxis, diagnostics, and treatment of tuberculosis.
10. Distribution of naloxone10.
Apart from the above-mentioned components, harm reduction might also
involve such aspects as: the existence of the so-called consumption rooms, in
which drugs may be taken under the supervision of qualified staff and in hygienic conditions; giving out dressings and disinfection materials; housing initiatives for the addicted homeless; psychosocial support and providing information about drugs and their safe use (Harm Reduction International, 2021).
Despite the obvious differences between the above-mentioned models,
they should be treated complementarily, which means that they can co-exist
and complement one another. In effect, however, most countries base their
drug policy on supply reduction, which is expensive, and often does not yield
the desired results. Therefore, research-based attitude change towards drug issue is necessary. According to UNAIDS report from 2019, implementing com-
Harm Reduction Model in
Mexico’s Drug Policy
Aleksandra Jargiełło
7
The exchange involves giving out sterile materials to people taking drugs by injection with
the intention to lower the risk of them getting infected with HIV and HCV and to collect used
equipment from them which is intended to prevent random people from being exposed to it
(Michalewski, 2021, p. 26).
8
It involves giving people addicted to heroin and other opiates its synthetic equivalent –
mainly methadone. This action aims to combat withdrawal syndrome and to prevent the rejection effect thanks to which a patient will be able to function in a society. Methadone therapy
leads to a decrease in or a complete withdrawal from drug-taking (Michalewski, 2021, p. 26).
9
It involves treating people infected with HIV aiming to improve their health condition,
restore their immune system, lower the risk of AIDS progression and the risk of other people
getting infected.
10
Distribution of naloxone is recommended by WHO. Naloxone is a substance which
blocks opiates. If given at the right moment to a person who overdosed drugs, it will prevent
death and save the person’s life. Typically, other addicted people are witnesses to overdose, that is
why, it is recommended that they have naloxone so that they could react in time (Michalewski,
2021, p. 27).
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prehensive harm reduction services reduces “the incidence of blood-borne infections, problem drug use, overdose deaths and other harms. Countries that
have successfully scaled up harm reduction have experienced steep declines in
HIV infections among people who inject drugs” (UNAIDS, 2019, p. 2). Harm
reduction arouses some controversy, but it appears to be of the most humanitarian, pragmatic and health-promoting nature. Its main goal is to improve the
quality of life of people taking drugs without imposing abstinence upon them.
This, though, should not be associated with promoting the use of psychoactive
substances, but rather the care for an individual and the whole society.
Drug use in Mexico and its negative health implications
The key study on the tendencies of psychoactive drugs use is National Trends
in Alcohol, Tobacco and Drugs Consumption in 2016–2017 (Encuesta Nacional de Consumo de Drogas, Alcohol y Tabaco, ENCODAT 2016–2017), which
was conducted in 2016 when 56,877 people were interviewed, 12,440 of whom
were adolescents aged 12–17 and the other 44,437 were adults aged 18–65.
According to this research, there has been an increase in consumption of “any
drug”11 taken by a person at a certain stage of their lives. In 2011, 7.8% of interviewees admitted to having used such drugs, while in 2016 the number rose to
10.3%. Between 2011–2016 the consumption of illegal drugs used at a certain
stage of a person’s life rose from 7.2% to 9.9% with cannabis being the most
popular drug (used by 8.6% of people surveyed) followed by cocaine with
3.5% of people admitting to its consumption. Moreover, 0.6% of people who
took part in this study exhibited a possible consumption dependency on drug
use in the last year and 20.3% of them signed on for treatment. Interestingly,
in recent years the average age of people who start using drugs decreased from
20.6 in 2002, 18.7 in 2008, 18.8 in 2011 to 17.8 in 2016 (Encuesta Nacional…,
2017; CONADIC, 2017, pp. 50, 56, 115).
In Mexico, a staggering 164,157 people take drugs by injection, and bearing in mind the whole population of the country, it is the highest number
in Latin America. For comparison, in Argentina the number of people who
inject drugs amounts to 8,144, in Colombia to 14,893. Harm Reduction International report from 2020 provides a percentage number of HIV, type C
(anti-HCV) and type B (anti-HBsAg) carriers among people who inject drugs.
The prevalence rate of HIV looks the following: in Mexico 4.4% of people,
in Argentina 3.5% and in Colombia 5.5%. Nevertheless, the most worrying
11
The expression “any drug” refers to the use of medical substances (opioids, sedatives,
barbiturates, or amphetamine) without prescription or their consumption exceeding a doctor’s
recommendation over a longer period of time or the use of illegal drugs such as: marijuana,
cocaine, cocaine paste, crack, hallucinogens, intoxicative inhalants, heroine, and stimulants of
methamphetamine type and other substances such as ketamine or GHB etc.
136
data concern the prevalence of type C hepatitis. In Mexico, 96% people who
use injected drugs are carriers of this disease, which constitutes the highest
number in the region, and one of the highest in the world. As a comparison,
in Argentina this rate comes to 4.8% and in Columbia it totals 31.6%, whereas
in the case of hepatitis B, this rate only amounts to 0.2% in Mexico, 1.6% in
Argentina and there are no data available for Colombia (Harm Reduction International, 2020, p. 100).
Territorial data show that it is in the northern areas of the country that
the issue of drug consumption and addictions is most apparent. This fact is
reflected in the research conducted in 2017–2018 by the National Institute of
Psychiatry Ramón de la Fuente Muñiz (Instituto Nacional de Psiquiatría Ramón de la Fuente Muñiz, INPRM) in association with the Ministry of Health
and with the participation of three non-governmental organisations12. This
study concerns the use of heroin in three major, cross-border cities in Mexico,
namely: Tijuana (Lower California), San Luis Rio Colorado (Sonora) and Ciudad Juarez (Chihuahua), and it was conducted in addiction treatment centres
on a group of 600 people and at consumption sites on a group of 391 people.
Based on the results, it has been concluded that in the population of people
taking heroin, the majority were male, migrants who tried to cross the border
and/or were deported from the USA. These individuals also had had experimentation phases with other psychoactive drugs – as many as 96.5% had used
marijuana at least once in their lifetime, and 91.3% used cocaine. In addition,
the research indicates that 66.8% of surveyed people experienced overdose at
some point in their lives, which represents a total of 401 cases. The data regarding risky practices connected with taking drugs also need to be taken into
consideration. As many as 75.1% of interviewees admitted having lent a used
syringe to other people, while 69.8% admitted having used a syringe which
had been used before. Thereupon, a high rate of reactive hepatitis C cases has
been reported in treatment centres. It amounts to 76.9%, which represents 455
cases. In the context of negative social implications such as discrimination or
marginalisation, as many as 58.6% of the population surveyed claimed to have
been treated with contempt and to have been rejected or offended by a family
member, while 49.5% have been rejected by potential employers during the
job-seeking process (Fleiz-Bautista & Domínguez-García …, 2019, pp. 61, 68,
90, 93, 162).
The problem of drug consumption and the number of addictions surge in
northern states stems from the specific character of these areas, namely, the
fact that they border the southern states of the USA. These are territories of
both geographical and goods and services mobility, where people cross the
border both for touristic and earning purposes. Moreover, these are key points
of smuggling drugs into the USA. For these reasons, in some parts of the cities drug trafficking and consumption, prostitution and crime have simmered.
12
Harm Reduction Model in
Mexico’s Drug Policy
Aleksandra Jargiełło
Prevencasa, Integración Social Verter and Programa Compañeros.
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Increasing the number of border patrols, combined with the endeavours to
seal the border, resulted in people – who did not manage to cross the border
or have been deported from the USA – having to settle in cross-border cities.
Consequently, no prospects and source of income made them resort to psychoactive drugs. It must be stated that due to the opioid crisis13 in the USA, in
northern Mexican states an increase in heroin and fentanyl consumption, resulting from the change in drug demand, and thus, the heroin price reduction,
has been noted. Additionally, as a result of security police operations, a share
of drugs produced in Mexico does not make it across the border and reach
its American consumers. Therefore, to make up for the financial loss, drug
cartels try to stimulate and meet the local drug demand (Bonello, November
1, 2019), which results in the increase in psychoactive drug consumption in
the country.
The implementation of harm reduction model in Mexico
In the context of public health, Mexican drug policy is regulated by several
legal acts. The fourth article of the Political Constitution of the United States
of Mexico (Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos) states that
every person has the right to health (Diario Oficial de la Federación, May 28,
2021). The control and supervision over particular psychoactive drugs have
been defined in the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), which provides a definition of the so-called “therapeutic values” of psychotropic substances14, and determines whether they pose a threat to public health (Diario
Oficial de la Federación, August 20, 2009). Another important piece of legislation concerning drugs which took effect on 21st of August 2009 is the decree
known as Small-Scale Drug Law (Ley de narcomenudeo) which decriminalises
psychoactive drugs and determines the maximum number of dosages allowed
for personal and direct use without facing criminal charges15. Any individual
taking more drugs than stated in statutory law, caught by the police for the
third time, will have to attend compulsory rehab treatment. Moreover, the law
determines the kinds of crime committed against health in the context of drug
dealing, and more importantly, designates the following terms: “user”, “addicted person” and “retailer” (Hernández, 2010).
13
By the term “opioid crisis” we refer to the epidemic of prescribed opioid medication addiction (mainly fentanyl) which goes back to 1990s. Since 2017 a steep increase in opioid addictions and overdose deaths has been observed. See: National Institute…, March 11, 2021.
14
The term “psychotropic substances” refers to substances affecting central nervous system.
It is synonymous to “psychoactive drugs” frequently used in legal parlance.
15
The 2009 reform eliminates legal sanctions for the possession of the following drugs: 0.5
g of cocaine, 50 mg of heroin, 0.015 mg of LSD, 40 mg of methamphetamine, 5 g of marijuana
(Mackey & Werb…, 2014).
138
The most important legal instrument regulating issues regarding drug
use in terms of health is the Official Mexican Standard 028 (Norma Oficial
Mexicana, NOM-028-SSA2-2009) which pertains to the prevention, treatment, and control of addictions. The standard provides a definition of harm
reduction which, in a nutshell, says that it is a complex of activities aiming
to avoid completely or limit the risk and curb harms caused by psychoactive
drugs consumption. Thus, it is imperative to provide treatment and prophylaxis. This does not necessarily mean abstinence. In the case of HIV/AIDS, it
is a strategy which involves providing information about HIV/AIDS to drug
users; instructing them how to properly clean syringes and how to use sterile
needles and syringes; distributing condoms, chlorine, gauze bandages, as well
as giving medical advice, conducting HIV tests; community service for people
who inject drugs, creating interdisciplinary advice groups regarding drug consumption. Such activities are the safest and most effective method of limiting
the HIV transmission among individuals who inject drugs (CNDH, 2009).
This definition corresponds to the UN-promoted definitions, nongovernmental organisations, and academic centres.
There are two methods of treating people addicted to psychoactive substances available in Mexico, namely: ambulatory and stationary. The former is
represented by 341 governmental Primary Health Care Centres for Addictions
(Centros de Atención Primaria en Adicciones, CAPA), 104 external consulting
units of the Centres for Youth Integration (Centros de Integración Juvenil) and
medical services provided by an unspecified number of private clinics. As far
as the stationary care goes, it consists of 11 hospital wards of the Centres for
Youth Integration, the so-called public housing units (45) and 2,108 private
care facilities for the addicted, many of which were set up over a dozen years
ago. All this constitutes the civil society’s response to the fact that such facilities are extremely scarce in the country. Almost half of these facilities are
registered, and 348 entities are officially approved, which means that medical
services provided there comply with the rules of law (CONADIC, 2019, p. 44).
Within the framework of harm reduction, needle exchange schemes
(NSP) are realised. However, according to the data obtained from the Harm
Reduction International report from 2020, less than 5% of people injecting drugs have access to such programmes. Heroin addicts may use opioid agonist therapy (OAT), which primarily involves methadone therapy.
Nonetheless, neither NSP nor OAT are accessible for the inmates. In Mexico,
naloxone is distributed with the intention to prevent deaths resulting from
opioids16 overdose. People who take drugs do not have the possibility to use
the so-called drug consumption rooms (DCR), with only the city of Mexicali
having this type of facility available. Yet, this place is not officially supervised
Harm Reduction Model in
Mexico’s Drug Policy
Aleksandra Jargiełło
16
Opioids are a group of substances including opiates (among others opium, morphine, and
heroin) and synthetic opioids (for instance fentanyl) and pharmaceutical opioids (prescribed
medicine).
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140
by the public service administration organs (Harm Reduction International,
2020, p. 100).
Detailed data showing precise information regarding the realisation and
financing of harm reduction schemes are missing. It is known that in the
last 10 years public health expenditure fluctuated between 2.5% and 2.9%
of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (Méndez, 2020). It needs to be
stressed that during the presidential term of Felipe Calderón (2006–2012),
who declared a “war on drug cartels”, as much as 97.07% (790 billion pesos) of overall drug policy expenditure was channelled to law enforcement
activities, and as little as 2.91% (23 billion pesos) was used for prophylaxis
and treatment including human rights programmes (Zedillo Ponce de León,
Pérez Correa González…, 2019, p. 42). The public institution coordinating
and financing harm reduction is the National Centre for the Prevention and
Control of HIV and AIDS (Centro Nacional para la Prevención y el Control
del VIH y el Sida, CENSIDA). It subsidises projects realised by private sector – only to a small extent, though. Between 2011–2017 CENSIDA financed
31 social and research programmes, 19 of which were realised in conjunction
with nongovernmental organisations. A 23 million pesos investment went
directly to 44,444 and indirectly to 22,468 participants (Magis-Rodríguez
& García-Sánchez…, 2018, p. 155). Nongovernmental organisation Global
Fund was an important entity financing harm reduction operations. From
January 2011 until December 2013, it aided the HIV struggle in Mexico appropriating 34,680,258 US dollars (Global Fund, 2021) for the cause. However, due to the country’s increasing GDP, financial support was terminated,
which translated to the limitation of harm reduction services by decreasing
the number of civil society organisations which, at the time, did not receive
enough funding from the Mexican government.
Essentially, it is the civil society organisations that play a major role in
implementing harm reduction. This funding has been in effect since 1988 with
the support of international organisations and academic centres (Ospina-Escobar, September 23, 2019). Thanks to their interventions, people with a drug
abuse problem living in extreme poverty on the fringes of society may gain
access to health services. These organisations centre around Mexican Harm
Reduction Network (Red Mexicana de Reducción de Daños, REDUMEX),
whose members include people taking drugs, former drug users, activists, and
scientists. According to the CENSIDA data, in 2014 there existed 38 registered organisations in the north of the country. However, by 2017 this number had dropped to 8. The number of facilities offering replacement therapy
also decreased significantly. In 2013, CENSIDA recorded 21 such facilities nationwide, but in 2017 there were just 10. These facilities were shut down also
because of the medication deficit. The depletion of financial backing also resulted in the reduction of syringes distribution to people who inject drugs. The
biggest number of syringes was given out during the realisation of the Global
Fund programme in 2013 when the number of syringes per person amounted
to 19.7 while in 2017 it dropped by 30% and came to 6.2 syringes per person
annually (Ospina-Escobar, June 11, 2019). Considering WHO recommendations, these numbers were low17.
Although civil society organisations are the key entity providing harm reduction services, in 2019, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador announced
that they would not be subsidised by the state. This decision was legitimised by
the government’s fight against corruption, financial abuse, and fraud. According to Angélica Ospina Escobar from REDUMEX, the lack of governmental
support is going to hit smaller organisations, which do not have international
backing and are more of a communal nature, the hardest, meaning that frequently they are the only service provider in terms of harm reduction among
local communities (Ospina-Escobar, June 11, 2019). It must be borne in mind
that the lack of funds is going to hinder the process of helping people in need.
Consequently, it may increase the chances of HIV epidemic occurring in the
future. The data regarding the efficiency of harm reduction schemes in terms
of reducing the number of infections were published in 2019 in Salud Mental
scientific journal. It has been calculated that in Mexico, between 2015–2018,
among 66,973 people who inject drugs, 869 HIV infections were successfully
prevented. The total CENSIDA’s investment spent on harm reduction came to
13,206,323.20 pesos, which meant that the average cost of preventing 1 HIV
infection amounted to 15,197 pesos, whereas an annual anti-retrovirus treatment of an infected person came to 31,344 pesos (Valenzuela-Lara, PonceRamos et al., 2019, pp. 160–161). It may be concluded that prevention is more
cost-effective than treatment since the cost of preventing a single infection is
50% lower than an annual treatment cost of an infected person whose survival
rate may reach 20 years.
Presidential decree concerning funding restrictions for civil society organisations proves that the government continues their predecessors’ drug
policy which, above all, relies on supply reduction, with little regard given to the issue of public health. Even though The National Development
Programme for years 2019–2024 (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019–2024)
(Diario Oficial de la Federación, July 12, 2019) highlighted the necessity to
reformulate drug policy, put an end to drug war and adopt the prevention
strategy treatment of addictions, in effect, the government did not devise
any strategy in this respect. Mexico lacks the proper system which would be
able to monitor the efficacy of such programmes, and the one which would
include data coming both from state institutions and private entities, which
in turn, would make it possible to coordinate activities in a better way and
to provide more effective health care for patients, thus curbing drug-related
social and health harms.
17
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Mexico’s Drug Policy
Aleksandra Jargiełło
WHO recommends distributing 200 syringes per person annually.
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Conclusions
Mexico is among the states most severely affected by the negative impacts of
drug prohibition related to combating organised crime groups. What is more,
in recent years the use and abuse of psychoactive drugs has posed a serious
health and social issue in the country – the fact which is related to the increase
in HIV and HCV infections, as well as the marginalisation and discrimination
of drug addicts. It can be noticed that drug problem affects different parts of
the country to a varying degree, which is mainly caused by an array of socioeconomic factors and the proximity of the USA.
Mexico lacks an integrated approach to drug policy which would rely on
harm reduction to a greater extent and whose purpose would be to contain
the negative health, social and economic implications of taking drugs. Despite the existing legal mechanisms regulating this model, in effect, they do
not translate into any particular strategy. There is no public institution being
solely responsible for the coordination of harm reduction programmes. These
activities rest with CENSIDA, whose goal is to prevent the spread of HIV and
AIDS or HCV across society. However, it must be borne in mind that harm
reduction should also encompass other aspects aiming to improve the general
well-being and quality of life of people taking psychoactive drugs. In Mexico,
it primarily concerns the needle and syringe exchange scheme and substitutional programmes. These activities are essentially performed by the civil society
organisations, which are not sufficiently subsidised by the government.
In recent years, in Mexico there has been the liberalisation of drug law18.
Still, there are no projects aiming to protect public health which would observe human rights, while experts emphasise the fact that positive effects of
decriminalisation or legalisation of psychoactive substances depend on the
degree to which the harm reduction model or preventative schemes have been
implemented. Ensuring the appropriate harm reduction services for people
taking drugs is crucial, especially now, during COVID-19 pandemic, when access to health is restricted – the consequences of which most deeply affect the
addicted living in extreme poverty. It needs to be stressed that by signing The
Sustainable Development Goals, Mexico declared that AIDS epidemic should
be contained by 2030. In 2020, the Ministry of Health announced the launch
of the national programme whose purpose is to eliminate type C hepatitis,
viewed as a public health issue, by 2030. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned
goals will not be realised without implementing a proper harm reduction stra18
Since 2017, medical use of marijuana has been legal in Mexico. In 2018, the Supreme
Court pronounced that the ban on possessing and cultivating marijuana is non-constitutional
and it ordered that the appropriate law be changed in that respect. According to the stand ready
legislative bill, adults will be allowed to possess up to 28 grams of marijuana for personal use and
cultivate up to 6 plants. The bill is meant to regulate issues concerning the rules of the operation
of commercial market and the system of granting licenses (Lopez, July 14, 2021).
142
tegy which should allow for the diversity of the society including aspects, such
as: sex, LGBT+ or the indigenous people.
Harm Reduction Model in
Mexico’s Drug Policy
Aleksandra Jargiełło
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Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 147–164
La vigencia del pensamiento de Juan Bautista
Alberdi en el contexto latinoamericano:
el rol del empresario1
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.147-164
The Validity of the Thought of Juan Bautista Alberdi in the
Latin American Context. The Role of the Businessman2
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez*
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS
UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA
Sumadesarrollo2030@gmail .com
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4702-7393
RESUMEN
El objetivo de este artículo es presentar, en el actual contexto latinoamericano, la
vigencia del pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi (JBA) respecto de las condiciones
necesarias para superar el estado de pobreza, así como revelar las condiciones
institucionales y el rol de los emprendedores sobre las dinámicas de generación de
valor. La metodología utilizada se basa en el análisis documental de la obra y de
fuentes secundarias relevantes al estudio de su pensamiento. Presentar el pensamiento
de Alberdi da cuenta de la relevancia de sus diagnósticos sobre la pobreza y las
limitaciones de oportunidades del conjunto de países latinoamericanos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Juan Bautista Alberdi, emprendedor, valor, pobreza, crisis,
instituciones.
ABSTRACT
The objective of this article is to present, in the current Latin American context,
the validity of the thought of Juan Bautista Alberdi (JBA) regarding the necessary
conditions to overcome the state of poverty as well as to reveal the institutional
conditions and the role of entrepreneurs over the dynamics of value generation. The
methodology used is based on the documentary analysis of his work and secondary
* Doctorando en Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Profesor Adjunto regular e investigador con dedicación exclusiva de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la
Universidad de Buenos Aires.
1
El presente documento revela parte de las conclusiones de investigación enmarcadas en la
realización doctoral en Ciencias Económicas en la Universidad de Buenos Aires por parte del autor.
2
This document reveals part of the research conclusions of the author’s doctoral studies in
Economic Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires.
147
Artículos y ensayos
sources relevant to the study of his thought. The presentation of Alberdi’s thought
shows the relevance of his diagnoses on poverty and the limitations of opportunities
in all Latin American countries.
KEYWORDS: Juan Bautista Alberdi, entrepreneur, value, poverty, crisis, institutions.
Introducción
El objetivo de este articulo es presentar el análisis de la relación entre las condiciones institucionales, el rol de los emprendedores y las crisis sobre las dinámicas de generación de valor en la Argentina del siglo XIX en el pensamiento
de Juan Bautista Alberdi (JBA). Se presentan aquí parcialmente los resultados
de la investigación doctoral respecto del pensamiento de Alberdi para dar
cuenta de la relevancia de sus diagnósticos sobre la pobreza y las limitaciones
de oportunidades del conjunto de países latinoamericanos.
La investigación se planteó contrastar el aporte del pensamiento de Juan
Bautista Alberdi a las ciencias económicas identificando los condicionantes
del crecimiento basado en las características institucionales, el rol de los empresarios/emprendedores y la estructura productiva de la Argentina del siglo
XIX. Su pensamiento representa la base del estudio de las condiciones institucionales necesarias para lograr incentivos favorables a la organización del
trabajo productivo como articulador social.
El estudio pormenorizado del pensamiento de Alberdi desde las ciencias
económicas es una tarea pendiente.3 Por lo tanto, llevar a cabo el estudio del
sistema institucional que Alberdi considera necesario para superar la condición de pobreza que caracteriza a la economía argentina será un aporte novedoso para el estudio del pensamiento de las ciencias económicas. El análisis de
las crisis económicas como expresión de las condiciones de pobreza depende
del orden institucional y del papel de la iniciativa privada en la organización
social (North, 2014).
El pensamiento de Alberdi está influenciado por su formación en la literatura económica clásica (Adam Smith, David Ricardo y Jean-Baptiste Say) y por
la filosofía política liberal romántica (Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier,
Friedrich Karl von Savigny y Pierre Leroux, principalmente) (Tarcus, 2016, p.
119). Estas dos influencias caracterizaron sus propuestas en temas económicoinstitucionales de una forma particular. Sus aportes se inscriben en la matriz de
3
La contribución de Juan Bautista Alberdi a la teoría de las crisis es un capítulo indebidamente omitido en la historia del pensamiento económico. La causa de tal omisión reside en que Alberdi no hizo nunca una exposición compacta y coherente de sus ideas sobre las crisis. Los elementos esenciales de lo que (sin exageración) puede llamarse la teoría alberdiana de las crisis se hallan
dispersos en forma desordenada a lo largo de sus reflexiones acerca de este asunto. Se requiere un
trabajo de análisis para identificar esos elementos y para amalgamarlos en una estructura teórica
apropiada. (Olivera, 1977, p. 76)
148
la Modernidad, entendida como una época caracterizada por la racionalidad
científica como medio de transformación social, por un cambio epistémico que
transita de la religión a la ciencia, de la fe a la razón, desde el conocimiento revelado al conocimiento empírico y objetivo y al dominio de la naturaleza. Este
abordaje moderno y liberal será el mismo que impulse el estudio de la eficiencia
productiva como espacio científico de las ciencias económicas.
Este movimiento moderno se concibe liberal y universal como proceso;
no obstante, la particularidad en Alberdi es que está presente la influencia
romántica (Tarcus, 2016). Así, su característica diferencial como pensador de
las ciencias económicas alimenta un imaginario político secularizado y teleológico que inventa la historia como progreso y que tiene como utopía final una
república soberana, idealizada y feliz (Halperín Donghi, 2007).
La pregunta de investigación en la que se basa el presente trabajo se refiere
a identificar ¿Cuál es la relación entre las “crisis de empobrecimiento”, el rol de
los “empresarios/emprendedores” y las “instituciones” en el pensamiento de
Juan Bautista Alberdi?
La vigencia del pensamiento
de Juan Bautista Alberdi
en el contexto latinoamericano:
el rol del empresario
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
Metodología utilizada
La metodología cualitativa fue utilizada en el presente artículo: técnicas de
análisis documental, revisión bibliográfica y entrevistas abiertas en profundidad (análisis del discurso) a especialistas en la obra de Alberdi, historiadores,
licenciados en Administración y economistas.
La historia de las ciencias económicas presenta algunas características particulares que la describen y diferencian tanto de la ciencia económica como de
la historia. Entre sus principales especificidades se encuentra la de deber remitirse a un número mayor de variables de análisis de los procesos bajo estudio.
En la ciencia económica, el estudio se encuentra enfocado en la prospectiva de
los resultados, mientras que en la historia los objetivos están en la descripción
de los hechos. En la historia económica, el foco está en la descripción de los
procesos con un número mayor de datos, variables y procesos.
Este es el foco de la presente investigación: el pensamiento de JBA en materia
económico-administrativa y en cuanto al rol de los empresarios/emprendedores
en los procesos de generación de valor y distribución del ingreso. Su estudio nos
remitirá a indagar en las influencias, las lecturas y finalmente las formulaciones
que haya realizado Alberdi a lo largo de su producción intelectual.
Resultados alcanzados
A lo largo del presente artículo hemos recuperado el análisis del pensamiento de
Juan Bautista Alberdi respecto de las condiciones necesarias para consolidar la
independencia argentina. El empresario/emprendedor será el actor representati149
Artículos y ensayos
vo de este proceso mediante las decisiones de ahorro e inversión. Los emprendedores/empresarios realizan su progreso material, potenciado por y dependiente
de las condiciones institucionales de paz, seguridad, estabilidad y propiedad. Las
instituciones representan el resultado de este proceso y se constituyen como los
instrumentos de cambio (medios) que JBA articuló en su teoría del valor.
JBA planteó una reforma de las instituciones heredadas de la Colonia, que
basaban su esquema de distribución de la renta en estructuras económicas de
alta concentración, donde los monopolios eran una de las estrategias de control y de apropiación del excedente (el puerto único en Buenos Aires). También centró sus propuestas en la necesidad de lograr un régimen institucional
estable que redujera el nivel de conflicto y garantizara seguridad y previsión,
para establecer procesos de largo plazo de inversión y trabajo que produjeran
un crecimiento económico estable y continuo.
La escasez de recursos, la pobre dinámica de acumulación y crecimiento
y el alto nivel de violencia (guerra civil) imperante en la sociedad llevaron
a JBA a concentrar sus críticas sobre el uso de recursos públicos en gastos
militares, el endeudamiento, la pérdida del valor de la moneda y la falta de un
federalismo representativo efectivo.
Los aportes analizados desde la economía institucional nos invitan a reflexionar sobre el pensamiento de Alberdi respecto de la necesidad de establecer mecanismos de regulación que impulsen instituciones inclusivas (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Mediante estrategias de desarrollo en que los
sectores dinámicos de acumulación sean generadores de conocimiento y permitan la diversificación productiva necesaria, se logrará un nuevo sistema de
valores para alcanzar la independencia.
El aporte de este artículo cuenta con un límite temporal, dado que analiza
el pensamiento de un intelectual que integró y correlacionó conocimientos
de diversos campos para indagar en las condiciones necesarias, desde la regulación de la vida social y económica, para construir un país próspero y una
sociedad libre. El momento histórico, que coincide con el nacimiento de la
ciencia de la administración (comienzos del siglo XX), representa nuevos desafíos institucionales y asociativos de un mercado en crecimiento y en el uso
especializado de los factores de producción.
Las instituciones y el rol del “empresario/emprendedor”
Los incentivos son estímulos que despiertan nuestra motivación y, consecuentemente, nos mueven a alcanzar nuestros objetivos. Alberdi adhiere a una
aproximación a este fenómeno desde un enfoque individual: “No es por la
benevolencia del carnicero, del cervecero y del panadero que podemos contar
con nuestra cena, sino por su propio interés” (Smith, 2011, p. 25).
El análisis de la relación entre incentivos e instituciones republicanas ha
llevado al estudio de comportamientos regulatorios basados en la maximiza150
ción política. James Buchanan, premio nobel de Economía en 1989, analiza,
mediante la teoría de la elección pública, como los dirigentes intentan maximizar la posibilidad de ser reelegidos.
Podría argumentarse que los ciudadanos han llegado a esperar pan y circo de sus políticos. Si sus políticos no ofrecen tales cosas, elegirán a otros políticos en su lugar. En vista de estas perspectivas, hay pocos políticos dispuestos
a negarse a ofrecer pan y circo. Después de todo, ¿no es más agradable cumplir que rechazar los deseos de su electorado? (Buchanan et al., 2000)
La vigencia del pensamiento
de Juan Bautista Alberdi
en el contexto latinoamericano:
el rol del empresario
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
Alberdi condiciona el comportamiento del actor individual al ordenamiento institucional vigente. En este sentido, la herencia colonial de instituciones que no centraban los incentivos en el uso intensivo de los factores de
producción en la búsqueda de incrementar la generación de valor y el producto (PBI) representa una limitación al progreso. La visión de JBA del emprendedor/empresario se manifiesta en el siguiente fragmento.
Con nociones menos españolas y más exactas sobre la naturaleza verdadera de la riqueza, se daría a la tierra en Sud-América otro valor. No
menos que su valor real, sino su verdadero valor. La América antes española
no perdería en ello, porque realmente ocupa la tierra más capaz de ser rica,
con otro orden de cosas que el actual, en que no es sino mero instrumento de
riqueza, pero instrumento sin instrumentista.
Ese instrumentista, es decir, el trabajador inteligente, activo, enérgico,
económico y juicioso, bien entendido; en una palabra, el trabajador de la
Europa actual, inmigrado y establecido en el suelo americano. (Alberdi,
1895b, p. 72)
Es relevante la comparación del enfoque de Alberdi respecto de las condiciones necesarias para el incremento de la riqueza en el territorio, en relación
con las motivaciones o incentivos que determinaron las instituciones coloniales. La extracción de valor de los territorios y la limitación de la generación
de capacidades locales representó la base del modelo de extracción que heredaron nuestras instituciones de la colonia (Gutiérrez, 2019) . En este sentido,
para Alberdi, los perfiles de los actores de la conquista americana expresan,
al igual que para Acemoğlu y Robinson (2014), la búsqueda de rentas y la
formación de instituciones políticas y económicas que limitan el desarrollo de
capacidades e independencia de los territorios.
La riqueza fácil, ya formada, descubierta, que se obtiene sin la doble
pena del trabajo y el ahorro, es la riqueza apetecida por el aventurero, por el
noble, por el soldado, por el soberano…
La riqueza, así nacida, no era hija de las virtudes del trabajo y el ahorro.
Como la riqueza griega y romana primitiva, era hija de la fuerza y de la
151
Artículos y ensayos
injusticia: un robo hecho al suelo por un trabajo robado al hombre. (Alberdi,
1895b, p. 107)
Este argumento se analiza en el trabajo de Graeber (2012) en relación con
estudio de la evolución de las instituciones. En los períodos históricos de inestabilidad institucional (guerra) se incrementa el uso del dinero-mercancía con
relación a los períodos de paz. En tiempos de estabilidad y previsibilidad el
dinero adquiere una conformación de convención (de cooperación en el tiempo) y los intercambios se fortalecen en relaciones de largo plazo ancladas en el
trabajo y la confianza.
El inmigrado europeo pudo arrancar a la tierra sus metales preciosos por
el trabajo del esclavo, pero no fue libre de ejercer su propio trabajo, para hacerle producir el cáñamo, la uva, la morera, el algodón, el trigo, el azúcar, el
índigo; ni trabajar estas materias primas, para producir vinos, tejidos, muebles, comestibles ni otro objeto esencial a la vida social.
Prohibido el trabajo, no había producción ni riqueza. Faltando la producción, no había comercio. Es lo que necesitaba España para asegurar sus
colonias. En su idea, el comercio era un peligro en emancipación, tanto de
América consigo misma como con el extranjero.
Desde que la producción industrial estaba prohibida por la ley, el comercio no tenía razón de ser, ni podía existir.
El poblamiento de tales países debía ser lento. Como España misma no
abundaba de población, la emigración para América estaba restringida.
La España, pueblo militar y religioso, colonizando el nuevo mundo, no
cedió a mira alguna económica, ni comercial, ni industrial. (Alberdi, 1895b,
p. 108)
Esta caracterización expone el tipo de instituciones heredadas de la Colonia y los esquemas de incentivos presentes en el territorio de la independencia. Por eso señala Alberdi la necesidad de transformación de las condiciones
institucionales para gobernar las condiciones económicas. Para avanzar en la
transformación de las instituciones, su aporte más conocido es evidentemente
su propuesta de Constitución. Es mediante el avance de las transformaciones
regulatorias que se modificarán los incentivos, las preferencias adaptativas de
los agentes y, en último lugar, sus comportamientos.
Se trata únicamente de hacer de la Constitución una verdad de hecho, en
los cuatro o seis artículos que forman toda su originalidad de Constitución
Argentina, es decir, de la ley que responde a las cuatro necesidades que ese
país tiene, y son: un gobierno estable, población, capital, riqueza, seguridad.
Todo lo demás vendrá a su vez, como derivación lógica de esas causas.
Estabilidad significa paz.
Seguridad significa libertad.
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Población significa trabajo.
Trabajo y capital significan riqueza, bienestar, poder o independencia,
progreso y civilización. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 434)
Estos hechos son para Alberdi el punto de mira hacia la construcción de
un futuro de libertad, en que las capacidades se sustenten en el hacer, en el
trabajo humano orientado al mercado. Este futuro imaginado contrasta con
los tres siglos del pasado colonial, en que el despotismo era la base de la organización institucional, en que el mercado no existía en libertad; en suma, un
orden institucional organizado para eliminar la libertad y la iniciativa privada
de todo tipo (Acemoğlu y Robinson, 2012). Estudiar, rezar y legislar eran las
acciones más honorables del período anterior, carentes de valor de progreso
y de promoción de las riquezas de los bienes necesarios para un país civilizado.
En este contexto, el desarrollo de la institución “mercado” depende del
fortalecimiento del Estado. Sin él, no es posible concebir los mercados competitivos modernos a los que Alberdi hace referencia.
La vigencia del pensamiento
de Juan Bautista Alberdi
en el contexto latinoamericano:
el rol del empresario
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
De hecho, el Estado y sus poderes coercitivos fueron los que tuvieron que
ver con la creación de lo que ahora conocemos como “el mercado”, ya que se
basa en instituciones como la propiedad privada, las monedas nacionales, los
contratos legales, los mercados de crédito. Todo tuvo que ser creado y mantenido por políticas gubernamentales. El mercado fue una creación del gobierno
y así ha permanecido siempre. Si reflexionamos sobre los presupuestos de los
economistas respecto del comportamiento humano, veremos que tiene sentido
que fuera así: después de todo, el principio de maximización da por sentado
que la gente intentará extraer todo lo que pueda de aquellos con quienes está
tratando, sin considerar en absoluto los intereses de los otros; pero al mismo
tiempo supone que jamás, bajo ninguna circunstancia, recurrirá a ninguno
de los modos más obvios de extraer riqueza de aquellos cuyo destino le resulta
indiferente, tal como tomar la riqueza por la fuerza. El “comportamiento de
mercado” sería imposible sin policía. (Graeber, 2018, p. 49)
Son las instituciones las que viabilizan las posibilidades de funcionamiento
de los mercados como espacios de producción y realización del valor. Este
sistema institucional de incentivos inclusivo promueve las posibilidades de
desarrollar capacidades individuales y los incentivos necesarios para fomentar procesos de ahorro e inversión (procesos de generación de capital). Esto
depende de las instituciones, en sentido amplio, como esquema de regulación
social y económico.
La necesidad de crear instituciones tiene una clara conexión con el papel
de los códigos de conducta, ya que las instituciones basadas en mecanismos
interpersonales y entendimientos compartidos funcionan a partir de pautas
de conducta comunes, de la confianza mutua y de la confianza en la ética
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del otro. La utilización de reglas de conducta normalmente está implícita
más que explícita; de hecho, tan implícita que su importancia puede pasarse
por alto con facilidad en las situaciones en las que esa confianza no plantea
problemas. Pero siempre que plantea problemas, puede ser desastroso pasar
por alto la necesidad de que exista confianza. (Sen, 2000, p. 318)
No obstante lo anterior, es relevante señalar el rol del Estado en la nueva configuración del mercado y de las relaciones mercantiles y sociales. Estas
nuevas funciones y regulaciones son compartidas por Alberdi como condiciones necesarias para establecer incentivos correctos que promuevan la toma
de decisiones relativas al ahorro y la inversión. Este cambio institucional del
rol del Estado se consolida con la revolución liberal de fines del siglo XVIII,
expresada en la Revolución francesa.
Pues es un error elemental (y no compartido por los lógicos protagonistas
del capitalismo, los “filósofos radicales” benthamitas) el de creer que el liberalismo era hostil a la burocracia. Era hostil solamente a la burocracia ineficaz, a la
intromisión pública en cuestiones que debían dejarse a la iniciativa privada,
y a las contribuciones excesivas. El vulgar tópico liberal de un Estado reducido
a las atrofiadas funciones de un vigilante nocturno oscurece el hecho de que el
Estado libre de sus funciones ineficaces e inadecuadas era un Estado mucho
más poderoso y ambicioso que antes. (Hobsbawm, 2015, p. 185)
Esta nueva organización institucional representa una necesaria disponibilidad de recursos y una modernización del Estado y de sus sistemas de control,
recaudación y servicios. El Estado liberal comprende nuevas funciones relativas a garantizar las condiciones para el desarrollo del sistema de intercambios
por precios: promueve funciones relativas a la estabilidad de un sistema monetario y de recaudación de impuestos que valide sus funciones y su soberanía
(en presencia y prestación de funciones).
De esta forma, el Estado, en el conjunto institucional del siglo XIX, incrementa sus capacidades, funciones y complejidad. Esta reflexión también está
presente en Alberdi respecto de los desafíos necesarios para superar el estado
de pobreza natural del territorio argentino. Las instituciones deben superar
sus funciones extractivas y proveer garantías de seguridad, propiedad, estabilidad y paz de largo plazo que promuevan el marco regulatorio necesario para
el desarrollo del mercado.
La riqueza depende del emprendedor
El estudio del trabajo, el ahorro y la inversión como características morales
que describen a las sociedades civilizadas en el pensamiento de Alberdi corresponde al análisis del valor y la riqueza, relevante para esta investigación.
154
Analizaremos a continuación las características de estas categorías en el pensamiento de Alberdi y la articulación entre los diferentes procesos que describen la generación de valor y el progreso social en su visión. Así pues, en el
análisis del emprendedor/empresario como agente de transformación social,
nos centraremos en las condiciones necesarias y suficientes para la generación
de valor, para la generación de ciclos de riqueza y para la transformación de
los incentivos
La vigencia del pensamiento
de Juan Bautista Alberdi
en el contexto latinoamericano:
el rol del empresario
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
El trabajo sud-americano carece todavía de las condiciones que hacen del
trabajo europeo una verdadera fuente de riqueza. El ahorro es desconocido.
Dada esta situación en el suelo más capaz de ser un instrumento poderoso de producción, en manos de un trabajo inteligente y capaz, todo el problema de su transformación económica se reduce a buscar el medio de poner
ese suelo en manos del trabajo y del trabajador de la Europa más adelantada,
haciéndolo inmigrar en grande escala en el suelo que le reclama, sin perjuicio del mantenimiento íntegro de su nacionalismo y de su independencia.
(Alberdi, 1895a, p. 715)
Alberdi analiza la teoría smithiana referida a la formación de capital como
proceso de generación de riqueza. En Smith, los factores de los que depende la
formación de capital —y en consecuencia el crecimiento— se encuentran en
la extensión del mercado y en la proporción de la fuerza de trabajo productiva
en relación con la fuerza de trabajo improductiva (2011, p. 52). La riqueza de
una nación depende en última instancia de la acumulación de capital, y es esta
visión la que adopta Alberdi.
Los factores estructurales del crecimiento económico están para Alberdi
en la proporción de trabajadores productivos (no en la importación de capital) y en las condiciones institucionales (regulación). Estos dos elementos
determinan la tendencia del crecimiento económico en el largo plazo. El trabajo productivo, por su parte, será el que establezca las posibilidades de acumulación de capital de largo plazo y transforme las acciones (incentivos) de
los emprendedores mediante un incremento del ahorro. La importancia está
centrada en la capacidad de los emprendedores de establecer procesos de generación de capital basados en el trabajo productivo y local (Alberdi, 1895a).
Las condiciones institucionales serán centrales para establecer incentivos de ahorro e inversión de largo plazo. Las características heredadas
de la Colonia atentan contra este proceso, ya que limitan las oportunidades de inversión. La transformación de esta regulación requiere modificar las estrategias de apropiación de valor. Las continuas disputas territoriales y la consecuente inestabilidad en la gestión monetaria, impositiva
y de endeudamiento condicionan las oportunidades de inversión y ahorro
(Alberdi, 2008).
Respecto a las características cíclicas de los procesos de crecimiento, Alberdi centró su propuesta en la necesidad de estimular el crecimiento y la ve155
Artículos y ensayos
locidad de las acciones como forma de contrarrestar las “crisis de pobreza”.
JBA adhiere a la teoría de ventajas absolutas como estrategia de crecimiento.
Lo que constituye la grande industria en Europa es el resultado de la evolución natural, porque pasa el poder productor de las sociedades civilizadas,
a medida que su desarrollo toca sus más grandes consecuencias […].
Tal desarrollo supone siglos de acumulación gradual de capitales y fuerzas y trabajo productor. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 125)
Así, el trabajo productivo determina las posibilidades de generación de
valor, el cual mediante el ahorro y la inversión produce capital. Este capital,
a lo largo del tiempo y gracias a la especialización del uso de los factores productivos, genera condiciones de competitividad relativa al territorio.
La crisis de pobreza se relaciona con la falta de capital suficiente y la consolidación de procesos de bajo valor y competitividad. La escasez de trabajo
productivo es la causa de la condición natural de pobreza de la Argentina del
siglo XIX, en un contexto institucional inestable (revoluciones), con una política de crédito y emisión que empobrece y limita las posibilidades de planificar
ahorro e inversión.
El trabajo debe contener características que representen su posibilidad de
materializar procesos de ahorro e inversión, como parte de lo que Alberdi
define como trabajo inteligente.
Pero el trabajo mismo no es causa de riqueza sino cuando reúne estas
condiciones morales, a que debe su poder productivo:
1. Debe ser constante y persistente, es decir, un hábito, una educación.
2. Deber ser estudioso de su objeto y no meramente rutinario.
3. Debe ser libre y estar exento de toda traba colonial o restrictiva
y monopolista.
4. Debe estar armado de capitales, de vías de comunicación y transporte, de
telégrafos, puertos, muelles, postas.
5. Seguro en sus funciones, establecimientos y resultados.
6. Ha de ser desempeñado con gusto, con amor del estado u oficio o profesión o carrera.
7. Ennoblecido y glorificado, si es posible, como el primer título de recomendación al aprecio y consideración del país.
8. Hacer de él la virtud democrática y republicana por excelencia y el arma
predilecta de la libertad del hombre, como causa de riqueza, es decir, de
poder, es decir, de autoridad y de independencia personal.
9. Debe tener el rango y honor que en las monarquías y aristocracias se da
a la sociedad elegante y dispendiosa.
10. Habituado a la amistad inseparable e indispensable del agente que le da
valor y honor, quiero hablar del hábito del ahorro, del juicio y del buen
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gusto, simple en los gastos, sin lo cual el trabajo es una vana y estéril tarea. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 625)
Encontramos aquí una clara relación entre las características institucionales, la construcción moral de valores sociales y la relación con el mercado
competitivo de las actividades del trabajo. Son las regulaciones de las relaciones sociales las que determinan el conjunto de condiciones que Alberdi
expresa como necesarias para que el trabajo se convierta en valor (trabajo productivo) (Smith, 2011). Las expresiones verdaderas y últimas de este proceso
son el ahorro y la inversión, mediante los cuales el trabajo adquiere la forma
del emprendimiento. El emprendedor es el actor social de transformación en
la teoría de Alberdi del crecimiento.
Para concluir el análisis del tipo de trabajo productivo que genera valor,
es necesario definir el ahorro en el pensamiento de Alberdi para entender su
vínculo con la inversión como causa y origen del valor. Son el ahorro y su
consecuente inversión —y no el ahorro como atesoramiento— las expresiones
del ahorro productivo.
La vigencia del pensamiento
de Juan Bautista Alberdi
en el contexto latinoamericano:
el rol del empresario
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
Lejos de confundirse con los vicios de la avaricia y de la codicia, el ahorro
es una virtud moral, la más bella cualidad de un hombre de buena educación y de buen gusto. Es una virtud que se compone de muchas otras: de previsión, de moderación, de dominio de sí mismo, de sobriedad, de orden. Es
imposible llegar a la riqueza, sin la posesión de estas cualidades morales […].
No hay más que ver cómo gasta un hombre su fortuna, para saber cuál es
su educación, su moral, su inteligencia.
En una palabra, saber gastar es saber enriquecer sin empobrecer a nadie.
(Alberdi, 1895b, p. 628)
En este esquema ideal, el emprendedor/empresario es el actor de transformación y de resultado de los procesos de regulación institucional. El emprendedor adquiere las virtudes del hombre liberal en la igualdad, la libertad y la
simpatía. El proceso de competencia y de mercado promueve las iniciativas
de ahorro e inversión que potencian la riqueza territorial y el desarrollo de
capacidades. El emprendedor, mediante sus capacidades de previsión, de gestión y de perseverancia, promueve la transformación de los valores morales
y transforma las relaciones sociales hacia una comunidad con mayor libertad
y capacidades.
El emprendedor como agente de transformación
Es probable que JBA haya tomado la categoría de emprendedor que estableció
Jean-Baptiste Say: la figura de un tomador de riesgos en la búsqueda de ganancias: “The entrepreneur shifts economic resources out of an area of lower and
157
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into an area of higher productivity and greater yield” [El empresario traslada
los recursos económicos de una zona de menor productividad a otra de mayor
productividad y rendimiento.] (Hindle, 2008, p. 77). Esta figura del emprendedor como un gestor del riesgo y la innovación, acuñada por Say a comienzos
del siglo XIX en su Tratado de economía política (Say, 2001), es fundamental
para la teoría económica y de la administración: la expresión de un individuo
libre que representa las posibilidades de transformación social por medio de
la innovación.
El desarrollo de la empresa, la innovación, la propensión a la toma de
riesgos, la constancia en el trabajo y la búsqueda de riqueza son los valores
necesarios para la transformación de la cultura argentina heredada. Estos se
expresan en la figura de William Wheelwright, quien participó en el desarrollo de diversos proyectos y empresas en América del Sur durante el siglo XIX,
y quien representaba para Alberdi el modelo de inmigrante necesario para la
prosperidad regional.
La seguridad, la libertad y la igualdad son necesarias para el crecimiento
del sector mercantil y de la burguesía nacional como clase. La transformación
cultural depende en primera instancia de la reforma institucional que garanticen las libertades negativas como medios para el desarrollo de incentivos mercantiles. El crecimiento de la clase empresarial precisa los incentivos adecuados, y estos, las garantías institucionales de propiedad privada, paz y libertad.
Si bien Alberdi vivió en un período previo al desarrollo de la ciencia de
la administración, comparte con ella preocupaciones teóricas en cuanto al
objetivo final. Tanto JBA como los padres de la ciencia de la administración
(Taylor, Fayol, Mayo) estudian mejoras en los métodos para el incremento de
la riqueza.
Se puede ubicar el desarrollo de la ciencia de la administración en un momento del desarrollo del mercado en que el uso de los factores de producción
necesita ser más intensivo y homogéneo para la estandarización de los procesos. Este objetivo de reducción de costos representa la profesionalización de la
actividad empresarial: el emprendedor incorpora investigación sobre los procesos y sobre la organización como medio de estudio del negocio, y da paso
al surgimiento de la administración como disciplina de estudio en sí misma.
Como resultado de los esfuerzos pragmáticos de la administración científica y el razonamiento administrativo, cambió el enfoque de “siempre-lo-hemos-hecho-de-esta-manera” al enfoque de “cuál-es-la-mejor-manera-de-hacerlo”. Debemos enfatizar que estos administradores rompieron con la toma
de decisiones tradicional, abogando por un enfoque administrativo basado
en hechos y en el razonamiento científico. (George et al., 2005, p. 118)
Para Frederick Winslow Taylor, “el objetivo principal de la administración
ha de ser asegurar la máxima prosperidad para el patrón, junto con la máxima
prosperidad para cada uno de los empleados” (Taylor, 1969, p. 19). El impacto
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económico de la ineficiencia humana a nivel macro es el objetivo principal
del estudio de la administración; el remedio para la ineficiencia se origina en
una cuestión administrativa, y no en habilidades extraordinarias que deberían
tener los hombres (Taylor, 1969, pp. 16-17).
Henri Fayol realizará, para la misma época, un análisis de los problemas
relacionados con la dirección, por lo que centrará su estudio en los niveles
medios y gerenciales de la empresa. Fayol considera a la planificación como
la principal capacidad, dada su complejidad e influencia para el éxito de la
organización en el tiempo. “La previsión, la organización, la coordinación y el
control forman parte, sin lugar a dudas, de la administración, de acuerdo con
el concepto corriente de este término” (Fayol & Taylor, 1994, p. 9).
JBA, por su parte, centró su interés en las condiciones institucionales necesarias para fomentar los incentivos al ahorro y a la inversión con fines comerciales. Producir es crear riqueza, y esta será parte de un proceso que requiere
ciertos contextos “ambientales”. Los valores liberales configuran las capacidades empresariales —la constancia (tolerancia a la frustración), la toma de
riesgos y la búsqueda de beneficios— como una condición necesaria para la
existencia de este proceso (Alberdi, 1887). Estas capacidades, relativas a la gestión administrativa, tienen en Alberdi una expresión cultural y moral, en que
los comportamientos del pasado condicionan las preferencias adaptativas y las
expectativas de los actores.
Alberdi comparte la idea de superar la tradición (antiguo régimen) como
una necesidad, y demuestra su preocupación por la mejora en las condiciones
y el desarrollo del mercado como espacio de realización social. Los incentivos
liberales empresariales están en formación en Argentina durante este período,
a partir de estructuras mixtas. Madurar como país es para Alberdi recorrer un
camino hacia el liberalismo mediante estrategias institucionales que tomen en
cuenta las características locales (territoriales).
En suma, el emprendedor representa la figura del agente de transformación de los valores morales y de las capacidades locales. Las posibilidades de
consolidación de una burguesía argentina dependen para Alberdi de las regulaciones institucionales de las libertades negativas. El mercado es el espacio
natural de regulación de las relaciones sociales para una sociedad liberal y,
según Alberdi, es la expresión del progreso como institución.
Esta es la expresión que caracteriza el análisis de Alberdi sobre la necesidad de limitar las acciones del Estado como actor de consumos improductivos
basados principalmente en gastos militares y de patronazgo. La función central del Estado es garantizar, como proveedor de bienes públicos, los principios liberales –el desarrollo de las iniciativas privadas de libertad social y crecimiento de mercado– que permiten que el mercado exista como institución.
La acción del emprendedor/empresario es resultado de este proceso, así
como el medio para la consolidación del empresariado como actor político de
representación. JBA reconoce a este actor de transformación en los productores agropecuarios y en los comerciantes, por ser los sectores dinámicos de
La vigencia del pensamiento
de Juan Bautista Alberdi
en el contexto latinoamericano:
el rol del empresario
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
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crecimiento en la estructura productiva argentina. Garantizar el crecimiento
económico basado en la especialización primaria es la estrategia que Alberdi
adopta (ventajas comparativas) como medio de integración internacional. Las
características particulares del territorio son las condiciones universales de
producción de mercancías, de gestión de los procesos productivos y de administración empresarial (Ricardo, 2007).
William Wheelwright: El modelo de empresario
de Alberdi
El monumento de William Wheelwright que se encuentra en Valparaíso es
en parte un homenaje al pensamiento de Alberdi respecto de la necesidad
de reemplazar las figuras heroicas de la independencia, vinculadas a valores
relativos al honor, la gloria y la guerra, por un modelo nuevo de hombre, ligado a las condiciones necesarias para el logro genuino de la libertad (Alberdi,
1887, pp. 316-317). Estos valores modernos y liberales, vinculados al trabajo,
la propiedad y la libertad, están emparentados, en el ideario alberdiano, a las
posibilidades de alcanzar un estado de independencia efectivo (material).
Alberdi considera que es imprescindible que haya un cambio de actitud
hacia el rol del empresario, quien debía ser visto como un héroe promotor
del progreso. El nuevo paradigma debía ser el emprendedor que desarrolle
industrias, abra nuevos mercados y comunique regiones que hasta ese momento permanecían improductivas con todo su potencial desaprovechado.
(Newland & Gómez, 2013, p. 32)
Los empresarios desarrollan capacidades que les permiten asumir tres
tipos específicos de comportamiento: en primer lugar, aceptar los costos de
cometer más errores y de mayor magnitud que los que cometerían si continuaran de la manera habitual; segundo, el comportamiento peculiar del hombre
de negocios, la disposición a hacer las cosas de una forma diferente, a enfrentar las dificultades en las primeras etapas de su emprendimiento; y tercero, la
superación al rechazo social, que se manifiesta en contra de quienes impulsan nuevos métodos de actuar (Schumpeter & Backhaus, 2003, pp. 85-87).
Estas características particulares del hacer colocan a los empresarios como
promotores de un cambio posible en los valores relativos a la construcción de
las relaciones sociales. Esta transformación se da mediante la realización de
las actividades comerciales, que en la magnitud de los proyectos propuestos
por Wheelwright transformarían el sistema productivo, las relaciones sociales
y hasta el paisaje.
160
Los derechos individuales estaban muy protegidos en la Constitución
de 1853. Para Alberdi, el motor primario del crecimiento económico era el
hombre. No solo era el hombre la base del trabajo, sino que la acumulación
de capital, producto del trabajo previo, era imposible sin él. La tierra era improductiva si faltaba el hombre o el capital. Por lo tanto, pensaba Alberdi, la
organización política debía extender la protección a las actividades económicas de todos los hombres en la Argentina —y aun ampliar sus privilegios—.
(Brown, 1993, p. 70)
La vigencia del pensamiento
de Juan Bautista Alberdi
en el contexto latinoamericano:
el rol del empresario
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
Esta transformación silenciosa tiene una base moral en la evolución de los
valores: desde la gloria, el honor y la guerra, hacia la libertad, el trabajo y la
paz. Expresa la importancia de la actividad productiva, científica, rutinaria,
sistematizada, como consolidación de la independencia de un territorio que se
vuelve capaz de bastarse a sí mismo por medio de su trabajo productivo e integración al mercado internacional. Es a través de la organización productiva
y el uso intensivo de los factores de producción que la libertad será un hecho
en la Argentina del siglo XIX.
La nueva política debe tender a glorificar los triunfos industriales, a ennoblecer el trabajo, a rodear de honor las empresas de colonización, de navegación y de industria, a reemplazar en las costumbres del pueblo, como
estímulo moral, la vanagloria militar por el honor del trabajo, el entusiasmo
guerrero por el entusiasmo industrial que distingue a los países libres de la
raza inglesa, el patriotismo belicoso por el patriotismo de las empresas industriales que cambian la faz estéril de nuestros desiertos en lugares poblados
y animados. (Alberdi, 1887, p. 535)
Alberdi se encuentra entre los intelectuales que considera a los empresarios agentes estratégicos y fundamentales para la evolución social. Solo mediante su trabajo será posible avanzar en un proceso de acumulación genuino
y contar con un aumento sistemático y continuo de la riqueza. En este sentido,
el uso intensivo de los factores de producción es lo que hizo posible desde el
siglo XVIII la revolución de las innovaciones y un crecimiento económico
constante como nunca en la historia (Huntington et al., 2014).
Es importante señalar el interés intelectual de Alberdi por el estudio de los
factores que promueven el crecimiento económico, sin avanzar en el análisis
de la distribución del ingreso. Tal como señala Tulio Halperín Donghi (2007,
p. 32), JBA se interesó en la creación de los beneficios materiales.
…los capitales extranjeros, atraídos y establecidos por el estímulo de una
legislación de libertad, son el medio previsto por la Constitución para fomento de las empresas de ferrocarriles, de colonización, de líneas de vapores,
bancos de circulación, seguros, etc. Pero los capitales no tienen el poder de
llevar a cabo esas grandes empresas, sino por medio de la asociación. Los
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ferrocarriles, los canales, los bancos, las líneas de vapores, en ningún país del
mundo son empresas que se acometan por un solo capitalista. Así, pues, la
omnipotencia del capital, las maravillas de transformación y progreso que la
América desierta espera de ese agente soberano de producción, residen y dependen de la asociación o compañía, que es la unión industrial de muchos
para obtener un beneficio común. Este medio de acción del capital es igualmente aplicable a la producción agrícola, fabril y comercial. En todos los
terrenos de la industria, la asociación es la fuerza que da al capital el poder
de obrar resultados en grande escala. (Alberdi, 1853, p. 240)
Es necesario garantizar la paz, la estabilidad y la seguridad para brindar
incentivos de inversión. Sin embargo, estas condiciones de base no aseguran
por sí solas la acumulación de capital, para la cual se requieren incentivos económicos de mercado. Las condiciones particulares condicionan los incentivos
para la generación de valor; el trabajo, el ahorro y la inversión son los procesos
por los cuales se alcanzan la riqueza y la prosperidad efectivas del territorio.
Garantizando un proceso de crecimiento sostenido en incentivos de mercado de largo plazo se superan las “crisis de pobreza” en la Argentina del siglo
XIX. Este conjunto de condiciones universales (sobre las características de los
procesos de generación de valor) y particulares (sistema productivo e institucional heredado) configura los límites y las oportunidades de crecimiento
según JBA (Alberdi, 1853). La relación entre endeudamiento, guerra y crisis
conforma un sistema correlacionado de causas que Alberdi señala como procesos constitutivos de crisis.
Como el poblador por excelencia es el capital, como no hay agente de inmigración de trabajadores igual al capital, que paga salarios atractivos y estimulantes al trabajo importando, es evidente que disminuir el capital del país,
arruinarlo, exponerlo, es despoblar al país de su población más fecunda, que
es la población obrera. Pues bien, acometer empresas de guerra o de mejoramiento material, superiores a los medios pecuniarios e inteligentes del país,
es exponer el capital, disminuirlo, arruinarlo, perderlo y producir la crisis,
que no es otra cosa que una gran destrucción de capital, es decir, un grande
empobrecimiento general del país. (Alberdi, 1895b, p. 541; con énfasis en el
original)
En síntesis, las garantías particulares sobre el sistema institucional hacen
posible, según Alberdi, un proceso de crecimiento sostenido de acumulación
de capital, donde las crisis pasan a ser de riqueza. La construcción de este
proceso de crecimiento depende del emprendedor/empresario como agente
de transformación económico y social (Gutiérrez, 2019). Las características
institucionales heredadas del período colonial representan de este modo una
limitación para el conjunto de países de América Latina. La organización extractiva de la producción sumada al escaso desarrollo del mecanismo de com-
162
petencia de mercado limitó los incentivos de los emprendedores. Así pues,
este sistema institucional promueve actividades rentísticas, reduciendo las dinámicas de crecimiento en la región. Superar el estado natural de pobreza en
los territorios latinoamericanos depende entonces de refundar el orden institucional para establecer incentivos basados en la paz, el orden y los mecanismos de mercado como principal proceso de generación de valor.
La vigencia del pensamiento
de Juan Bautista Alberdi
en el contexto latinoamericano:
el rol del empresario
Miguel Francisco Gutiérrez
Referencias bibliográficas
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. (2012). ¿Por qué fracasan los países? Los orígenes del poder, la
prosperidad y la riqueza. (1a ed.). Ariel.
Alberdi, J. B. (1853). Sistema económico y rentístico de la Confederación Argentina según su
Constitución de 1853. Vaccaro.
Alberdi, J. B. (1887). La vida y los trabajos industriales de William Wheelwright en América
del Sud. En Obras completas de J. B. Alberdi, tomo VIII. La Tribuna Nacional.
Alberdi, J. B. (1895a). El crimen de la guerra. En Escritos póstumos, Tomo X (p. 322).
Imprenta Europea, Moreno y Defensa.
Alberdi, J. B. (1895b). Estudios económicos. Tomo VIII. En Escritos póstumos. Imprenta
Europea, Moreno y Defensa.
Alberdi, J. B. (2008). Notas para servir al estudio de las crisis. En Escritos Póstumos Vol.
1-XII, (pp. 705-735). Editorial Docencia.
Brown, J. C. (1993). Juan Bautista Alberdi y la doctrina del capitalismoliberal en la
Argentina. Ciclos, no. 3(4), pp. 61-74.
Buchanan, J. M. & Wagner, R. E. (2000). Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord
Keynes. Liberty Fund.
Fayol, H. & Taylor, F. W. (1994). Administración industrial y general coordinación, control,
revisión, organización, mando [16ª ed.]. El Ateneo.
George, C. S., Alvarez Medina, M. de L. & Maldonado Santa Cruz, G. (2005). Historia del
pensamiento administrativo. Pearson Educación de México.
Graeber, D. (2018). Hacia una teoría antropológica del valor: La moneda falsa de nuestros
sueños. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Gutiérrez, M. F. (2019). El pensamiento de Juan Bautista Alberdi desde las ciencias
económicas. En E. Pandís Pavlakis, D. L. Drosos, M. de Monserrat Llairó, V. Kritikou, E.
Paraskevá (Eds.), ESTUDIOS Y HOMENAJES HISPANOAMERICANOS VI. Ediciones del
Orto.
Halperín Donghi, T. (Ed.). (2007). Proyecto y construcción de una nación: 1846-1880, (1ª
ed.). Emecé Editores.
Hobsbawm, E. J. E. (2015). La era de la revolución (1789-1848), La era del capital (18481875), La era del imperio (1875-1914). (1a ed.). Critica.
Huntington, S. P., Fukuyama, F. & Oszlak, O. (2014). El orden político en las sociedades en
cambio. Paidos.
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Newland, C. & Gómez, A. (2013). Alberdi, sobre héroes y empresarios. Revista Cultura
Económica, no. 31(86).
North, D. C. (2014). Instituciones, cambio institucional y desempeño económico. Fondo de
Cultura Económica.
Olivera, J. H. G. (1977). Economia Clasica Actual. Ediciones Macchi.
Ricardo, D. (2007). Principios de economía política y tributación. Editorial Claridad.
Say, J. B. (2001). Tratado de economía política. Fondo de Cultura Economica.
Schumpeter, J. A., Stiglitz, J. E., Díaz García, J., & Limeres, A. (2015). Capitalismo, socialismo
y democracia. Página Indómita.
Schumpeter, J. & Backhaus, U. (2003). The Theory of Economic Development. En J. Backhaus
(Ed.), Joseph Alois Schumpeter (Vol. 1, pp. 61-116). Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://
doi.org/10.1007/0-306-48082-4_3
Smith, A. (2011). La riqueza de las naciones. Alianza Editorial SA.
Tarcus, H. (2016). El socialismo romántico en el Río de la Plata (1837-1852) (Primera
edición). Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Taylor, F. W. (1969). Principios de la Administración Cientifica (11o). Herrero Hnos. S.A.
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Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 167–171
Pablo Piccato (2020). Historia nacional de la
infamia: Crimen, verdad y justicia en México,
México: CIDE-Grano de Sal, pp. 414,
ISBN: 978-607-8508-73-0
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.167-171
Pablo Piccato (2020). National History of Infamy: Crime,
Truth and Justice in Mexico, México: CIDE-Grano de Sal,
pp. 414, ISBN: 978-607-8508-73-0
Recientemente, el Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE),
de la mano con la editorial Grano de Sal, han editado, para el público
hispanohablante, Historia nacional de la infamia: Crimen, verdad y justicia
en México, investigación del Doctor Pablo Picatto, publicada en 2017 por la
Universidad de California. Hasta ahora, que la barrera del idioma ha sido
solventada gracias a la traducción de Claudia Itzkowich, su consulta había
estado circunscrita al público angloparlante; hecho lamentable ya que este
libro, al suscribirse en el marco de la realidad mexicana, particularmente
en el siglo XX, resulta sumamente atrayente para todo aquel interesado en
comprender las expresiones criminales en el país suscitadas durante el siglo
pasado, las cuales dan forma a manifestaciones presentes hasta hoy.
Violencia y delincuencia están cada vez más presentes en la vida contemporánea, especialmente en América Latina, la cual se ha convertido
en la región más violenta del mundo. México no es una excepción, pues
en el país se manifiestan de altos índices delictivos. Ante tal escenario,
ha surgido la necesidad de analizar y dar respuesta a la problemática criminal, al mismo tiempo que la búsqueda de verdad y justicia ha sido una
de las principales demandas de la sociedad mexicana durante los últimos
años. No obstante, estas falencias en el sistema judicial y la desvinculación entre crimen, verdad y justicia no son una novedad en el panorama
político mexicano. Como historiador, Piccato escudriña las raíces de esta
problemática, actual, hacia la primera mitad del siglo XX, particularmente
después de la reconfiguración política y social que devino posterior a la
Revolución Mexicana.
Así pues, en Historia nacional de la infamia, Pablo Piccato registra estas
prácticas de impunidad y explora cómo la sociedad dio respuesta a la frágil
relación entre crimen, verdad y justicia. En este estudio, el autor analiza las
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instituciones, como los juicios con jurado (abolidos en 1929), la policía y los
detectives; la prensa, con la importancia social y política que representó la
nota roja y sus narrativas en México; la literatura, con la novela negra y policiaca y las prácticas sociales en torno a la criminalidad, la verdad y justicia,
tanto de perpetuadores como de la sociedad que coexistía con dichas prácticas. Elementos, todos, interrelacionados entre sí, que dan un paisaje de la
sociedad mexicana de la primera mitad del siglo pasado.
Un elemento importante en la construcción narrativa del libro es la relación que tiene el autor con la literatura. Más allá de los apartados dedicados
exclusivamente a la novela negra y la comedia policiaca, el libro está plagado
de intertextualidades, sobre todo referencias literarias que se anuncian desde
el título mismo, el cual es un guiño a Jorge Luis Borges, en específico al libro de
relatos Historia universal de la infamia del escritor argentino; así como el epígrafe que le da entrada al texto de Piccato, el cual proviene de La Universidad
Desconocida, último poemario de Roberto Bolaño, publicado póstumamente,
y constantes referencias a la vida literaria mexicana, desde Federico Gamboa,
pasando por Max Aub1, Jorge Ibargüengoitia, hasta el premio nobel, Octavio
Paz, exhibiendo la erudición que supera el área de especialización académica
del autor.
Otra cuestión por subrayar es la construcción conceptual que Piccato
hace de lo que denomina “alfabetismo criminal”; es decir, una serie de conocimientos que la sociedad mexicana adquirió acerca del mundo del crimen
y el derecho penal, que le fue útil al afrontar el desgastado vínculo entre los
hechos y la procuración de justicia. Este alfabetismo fue adquirido de manera histórica, social, mediante los diversos elementos que pertenecían a asuntos relacionados con el crimen, y se manifiesta en todos los apartados que
conforman el libro, desde las instancias institucionales, como el juicio con
jurado (y con público que los presenciaba casi como una puesta en escena)
que aglutinaba a la sociedad mexicana, de toda clase social, en los recintos
donde los juicios se llevaban a cabo; en especial en aquellos que ponían en
tela de juicio el sistema legal, las instituciones, la moral y los valores con
los cuales se erigía el Estado mexicano. También, el alfabetismo criminal se
adquiría a través de las publicaciones periódicas de la nota roja, con producciones radiofónicas de la época, con la efervescencia de la novela policiaca;
situación que de alguna manera ha tenido continuidad y se manifiesta hoy
en día con el consumo masivo y cotidiano de noticias relacionadas con crímenes atroces exhibidos y disertados por la colectividad en charlas de sobre
mesa, como si de alguna manera la sociedad mexicana, sobreexpuesta a situaciones violentas, desenvolviera en su interior la narrativa que la versión
oficial e institucional calla.
1
En particular, se menciona Crímenes Ejemplares, libro de micro relatos, una especie de
aforismos del crimen, que coquetean con los encabezados de la nota roja y la parodia.
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En ese sentido, cabe destacar la historicidad que el autor realiza de los
periódicos de nota roja, los de mayor tiraje y consumo, los cuales jugaron
una suerte de crítica política a las instituciones creadas por el régimen, con
sus versiones oficiales que fueron replicadas por los medios que comulgaban
con él. En su momento, esas publicaciones periódicas eran las que ponían
en entredicho el actuar de las instituciones y revelaban una forma social de
concebir actos delictivos, muchas veces justificados por la misma sociedad
que reclamaba justicia. Una de las publicaciones de nota roja que hacían
frente a la versión oficial, más allá de enunciar la corrupción policiaca, fue
la revista Por Qué?, de Mario Méndez Rodríguez, la única en poner en sus
portadas los hechos del 2 de octubre de 1968 y denunciar la masacre de
estudiantes acontecida en Tlatelolco, ejecutada por el Ejército mexicano. El
papel que desempeñan hoy en día las publicaciones de nota roja se encuentra lejos de ser una crítica al Estado, sirviendo incluso como distractor de
los asuntos políticos del país, con sus encabezados que más bien parecen un
chiste oscuro del humor más negro de la sociedad. Precisamente esa transformación es la que se muestra en las páginas de Historia universal de la infamia. Resulta más que interesante ver cómo las publicaciones de nota roja,
siendo un elemento presente en la realidad mexicana, fueron cooptadas por
los mecanismos que responden más a una idea de mercado que de ejercicio
periodístico.
En Historia universal de la infamia es posible advertir incluso la evolución de la criminología en México, desde una perspectiva positivista de tesis
biológicas de la antropología criminal, cuya influencia se tornaría hegemónica hacia finales del siglo XIX, hasta una concepción posrevolucionaria,
la cual, en vez de buscar el fenotipo criminal en concepciones cargadas de
racismo y clasismo, “recuperaba las ideas clásicas acerca del crimen como
un acto voluntario y del castigo en proporción con la gravedad del delito”
(p. 159), siendo el acto criminal la expresión más auténtica de la individualidad. Así, a través de un estudio que guiña a los estudios culturales, se manifiesta la construcción jurídica, política, criminológica y social del México
que surgió después de la revuelta civil de 1910 y da forma a lo que es el país
hoy en día.
En cuanto a su estructura interna, el libro está organizado en tres partes: Espacios, Actores y Ficciones. En la primera parte, Piccato estudia los
juicios con jurado en la Ciudad de México, como escenarios ejemplares
donde se desarrollaron públicamente debates, que construían el mencionado alfabetismo criminal, sobre actos delictivos y la impartición de justicia. En este apartado se destaca el papel de las mujeres en la conformación
del sistema judicial y de las trasformaciones políticas y sociales en el país.
Sin embargo, aquellos procesos judiciales que se libraron un siglo atrás
no formaron parte de un empoderamiento de la mujer o de cuestiones
relacionadas con la igualdad de género, discusión presente hoy en día cada
vez con mayor potencia, sino que fueron casos excepcionales que sirvie-
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ron de ejemplo moral que cuestionaron el poder del Estado y sus instituciones, pero que, al final, sirvieron para sedimentar el orden masculino
que excluía a las mujeres, que superara las barreras de una parábola moral
de la corrupción del sistema, dentro del sistema penal, político y judicial.
Asimismo, esta primera sección, en su segundo capítulo, estudia los antes
mencionados casos paradigmáticos de la nota roja.
El segundo apartado, capítulos 3, 4 y 5, se orienta a la presentación
de los actores que personificaron en su ser las discusiones cardinales en
torno a la criminalidad. En esta sección vemos, por un lado, a detectives
y policías: por el otro, a los propios perpetradores de crímenes, e incluso al
arquetipo del pistolero, que ayudaron a configurar el alfabetismo criminal
y encarnaron la forma en que fue concebida la violencia y la delincuencia.
También, se manifiesta la idea de verdad y justicia, que muchas veces no
era representada en quienes se suponía que la debían representar (instituciones y/o policías), sino que se exteriorizaba en situaciones ajenas a lo
institucional. Ejemplo de ello es la ley fuga, entendida como la aplicación
justa del castigo correspondiente al crimen cometido; que, en otras instancias oficiales, como la corte o la misma cárcel, no resultaba suficiente
ante el delito cometido, y que se suscitaba de manera extraoficial por los
elementos encargados de hacer valer el Estado de derecho. Otro ejemplo es
el uso de la fuerza, de la violencia, ante hechos que no habían sido castigados por la justicia mexicana y se resolvían con la ejecución o linchamiento,
también de forma extraoficial.
La tercera y última parte, titulada Ficciones, se enfoca en los textos criminales de corte ficcional para destacar el papel que jugó la narrativa en la
alfabetización criminal, donde los autores construyeron una versión más
precisa y detallada de la realidad que las instituciones y los propios periodistas de la época. Si bien todos los capítulos del libro se basan en casos
concretos, actores materiales de crímenes específicos o autores literarios,
y sus obras, en particular, no son un corpus de anecdotarios, sino que sirven de ejemplos prístinos para dar un panorama general de la historia nacional de la infamia, donde la relación entre verdad y justicia se encuentra
fracturada y donde el alfabetismo criminal de la sociedad jugó un papel
importante para darle respuesta.
Una reseña crítica debería omitir, en la medida de lo posible, adjetivos
que mancillen o alaben a la obra referida; sin embargo, rompiendo los
códigos que el formato demanda, se puede decir que esta obra es una joya
que dialoga tanto con expertos en la materia, criminólogos, sociólogos,
historiadores y literatos, como con el público no especializado, pero que,
de una manera intuitiva o empírica, conoce la infamia nacional y tiene
opiniones críticas hacia el Estado, su sistema judicial y su impartición de
justicia. Es brillante en su exposición y relevante en su contenido. Da nota
de la contemporaneidad, haciendo un estudio del pasado. El uso de fuentes
es múltiple y experimentado, cumpliendo las exigencias de un estudio aca-
démico, y, al mismo tiempo, resulta atrayente para el lector ajeno a la academia. Es una lectura imprescindible para comprender el México actual
y conocer lo que le dio forma, la relación entre impunidad y modernidad
del Estado mexicano.
Mario Pavel Díaz Román*
Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Ciudad de México, México
mpdiaz@colmex.mx
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0820-9469
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DOI:10.17951/al.2021.167-171
* Especialista en violencia y delincuencia. Doctor por El Colegio de México en Ciencias Sociales. Profesor de posgrado en la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México.
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pp. 173–176
Anna Clayfield, The Guerrilla Legacy of the
Cuban Revolution, University of Florida Press,
2019, Gainesville, pp. 218, ISBN 9781683400899
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.173-176
Anna Clayfield, El legado guerrillero de la Revolución
cubana, University of Florida Press, 2019, Gainesville,
pp. 218, ISBN 9781683400899
Más allá de la Sierra: la guerrilla y la construcción del
ethos revolucionario cubano en “The Guerrilla Legacy
of the Cuban Revolution”
La imagen del guerrillero marcó el imaginario político latinoamericano contemporáneo y su aura, mítica o heroica, se asocia a valores como el sacrificio,
el deber y el honor movilizados a favor de la transformación social o la revolución, retomando la imagen de luchadores sociales o anticoloniales, del periodo colonial, o de los justicieros que vivieron entre el siglo XIX y principios del
XX en toda América Latina.
Aunque presente en toda la región, el epicentro de este imaginario fue la
Revolución cubana y su narrativa histórica, que, convirtiéndose en el horizonte normativo y modelo de los procesos revolucionarios en los países del
tercer mundo, elevó la guerrilla y el guerrillero a una condición heroica, al
servicio de las transformaciones sociales, y encontró en el Che Guevara, tanto
por su obra como por su sacrificio, la personificación ejemplar de un Quijote
contemporáneo, capaz de fomentar la dedicación incondicional a las luchas
y proyectos revolucionarios en todo el planeta.
En el caso de Cuba, ese proyecto revolucionario tiene una dinámica compleja y sugerente, asociada al contexto internacional, marcada por numerosas
acciones e iniciativas, nacionales o internacionales, que se han ido ajustando
a las condiciones y desafíos enfrentados a lo largo de los años hasta la actualidad. En este sentido, es posible observar que, desde fines del siglo pasado,
el colapso del bloque soviético y el endurecimiento del embargo comercial
estadounidense han llevado a Cuba a su más grave crisis económica y social
(el periodo especial), con efectos que persisten hasta el día de hoy, afectando la
economía y la vida cotidiana de los cubanos, y llevó el proyecto revolucionario
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a una serie de transformaciones y reformas (la actualización del modelo) que,
hoy, se combinan con una transición política, de un corte generacional, lo que
afecta su continuidad y futuro.
Entonces, ¿cómo entender la legitimidad y resiliencia (y adecuación) de
este proyecto y la concreción de transformaciones estructurales, ante los enormes desafíos y en condiciones tan adversas, en diferentes momentos de la historia cubana contemporánea?
Si bien la respuesta es compleja y tiene muchos factores, la lectura de este
libro permite un indicio instigador que indica que el ethos y el legado guerrillero, que atraviesa toda la sociedad cubana de forma multidimensional,
pueden ser considerados un elemento fundamental para la comprensión de la
historia y de la política cubana contemporánea, principalmente de su adaptabilidad y capacidad de cambios estructurales, en diferentes contextos y orientaciones, y del apoyo y legitimidad del régimen cubano y su liderazgo.
Así, este trabajo, elaborado por Anna Clayfield, de la Universidad de
Chester (Inglaterra), nos presenta como la guerrilla y sus legados (con valores y prácticas asociados al honor, sacrificio, luchas, obediencia, etc.) son
fundamentales para la comprensión de la Revolución cubana y su dinámica
contemporánea y, a partir de ella, demuestra cómo el legado guerrillero permitió la construcción de una narrativa y su convergencia con el pasado (como
continuación de las luchas independentistas) y el futuro del país (como proyecto revolucionario), a través de la construcción del ethos revolucionario que
sirve como referente fundamental de la cultura política y de la sociedad cubana contemporánea, aportando legitimidad y capacidad de adaptación a este
proyecto y su liderazgo.
De esta manera, el trabajo busca comprender cómo se construyó tal legado
a partir del análisis del lenguaje verbal y visual presente en innumerables medios y fuentes cubanas como los escritos y discursos de la dirección revolucionaria (Fidel Castro y Che Guevara, especialmente), las consignas e imágenes
de libros, periódicos, revistas y manuales revolucionarios sobre la guerrilla
o utilizados por las fuerzas armadas cubanas que sirvieron para dar forma a la
cultura política del país asociándola con el legado de guerrillas y guerrillero,
haciendo uso de una investigación profunda y bien fundada.
Para ello, la obra se organiza en seis capítulos que acompañan la construcción y reproducción de dicho legado de forma cronológica, siguiendo su
dinámica reciente y los principales hechos que marcaron la Revolución y la
historia cubana contemporánea.
El primer capítulo (‘Perpetuar un espíritu de lucha: la guerra de guerrillas
y el guerrillero en Cuba’) presenta un panorama de toda la lucha armada (desde el ataque al cuartel Moncada hasta la victoria de la Revolución, pasando por
acción guerrillera) y un análisis, a partir de la teorización de la guerra de guerrillas de Che Guevara (teoría del enfoque, condiciones subjetivas, sacrificio,
etc.), los orígenes y grandes rasgos del mito guerrillero, su vinculación con las
luchas independentistas y su legado en Cuba.
En el siguiente capítulo (‘Consolidando la Revolución, 1959-1968’) busca
-a partir de Foucault y otros estudiosos del análisis del discurso y su comprensión de cómo se produce la verdad- analizar cómo el lenguaje y la imagen
oficial fueron incorporando, en la década de 1960, los temas y valores de la
guerrilla, promoviendo una nueva cultura política asociada a la concepción e
intereses de la Revolución y de su visión de la historia cubana.
El tercer capítulo (‘La vanguardia será el movimiento guerrillero, 19681979’) analiza cómo, a pesar de la expansión de la presencia soviética y sus
efectos en toda la sociedad cubana (sovietización), el ethos guerrillero continuó siendo promovido, incluso como reacción a burocratización, analizando
publicaciones como la Revista Verde Olivo, Moncada y otras publicaciones de
las FAR o de órganos oficiales y como siguieron exaltando a la guerrilla y su
ethos.
En el siguiente capítulo (‘Guerrillerismo en las sombras, 1980-1989’), ofrece un cuadro más complejo de la década de 1980 en el país, con la tensión
entre las reformas y la reanudación de los valores fundamentales de la Revolución (el proceso de “rectificación de errores”), en buena parte asociados
a la guerrilla, en el que se destaca una revalorización del Che Guevara (vida
y obra) y los ideales de lucha, servicio y sacrificio, que se acentuarán en las
próximas décadas.
El quinto capítulo (‘Sobreviviendo al Periodo Especial: Aprendiendo lecciones del pasado, 1989-2003’), busca presentar cómo, en el periodo especial,
el ethos guerrillero fue fundamental para superar la crisis económica y los desafíos que el país enfrentó y guiaron tácticas o iniciativas típicas de una guerrilla, como la conocida como “Batalla de las ideas” en un escenario de profunda
crisis económica y social.
Finalmente, en el último capítulo (‘La revolución bajo Raúl: La vieja guardia en un nuevo siglo, 2006-2018’) analiza el periodo de Raúl Castro y sus iniciativas para actualizar el modelo cubano, indicando cómo el legado guerrillero estuvo presente en su actuación política, más pragmática, y en los cambios
que lideró, presentando las reformas que ha desarrollado en diversos campos,
como una forma de actualizar los ideales de la Revolución y mantener sus
logros.
Esto da como resultado un trabajo bien fundado, con una extensa investigación en diversos medios cubanos, que brinda una visión integral y multidimensional del legado guerrillero y su importancia fundamental, como un
“arsenal simbólico” como se refiere la conclusión, para la supervivencia, adaptaciones y transformaciones de la Revolución cubana, además de contribuir
a la comprensión de su singularidad en relación al socialismo soviético y superar los estereotipos relacionados con el debate sobre el papel del militarismo
en la sociedad cubana, aportando elementos importantes para un análisis más
equilibrado de su naturaleza y papel efectivo en la isla caribeña.
En suma, si bien nos permite entender cómo se legitimó y llevó a cabo este
revolucionario proyecto, permitiendo comprender cómo se consolidó el apo-
Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 173–176
DOI:10.17951/al.2021.11.173-176
175
Reseñas e informes
yo fundamental al régimen en las últimas décadas, el trabajo demuestra que
este proyecto se enfrenta hoy a su mayor desafío relacionado con la necesidad
de reformas y de una transición política, de un corte generacional, que derivó
en una nueva dirección que, por no haber participado en la lucha guerrillera,
debe demostrar ser capaz de mantener el ethos y el legado guerrillero, garantizando la legitimidad y la continuidad de reformas que puedan reconciliar
los ideales de la Revolución cubana con la nueva realidad contemporánea y el
nuevo orden global.
Marcos Antonio da Silva*
Universidade Federal da Grande Dourados
Brasil
marcossilva@ufgd.edu.br
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1196-2814
* Doctor en Estudios sobre la Integración LatinoAmericana (PROLAM/USP). Profesor
del Programa de Posgrado en Sociologia y de la carrera de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad
Federal da Grande Dourados (UFGD). Fue miembro del Laboratorio Interdisciplinario de
Estudios sobre la América Latina.
176
Anuario Latinoamericano
Ciencias Políticas
y Relaciones Internacionales
vol. 11, 2021
pp. 177–178
Marta Osuchowska, Rozwój pozycji prawnej
Kościoła katolickiego w Argentynie
(The Development of the Legal Position
of the Catholic Church in Argentina). Oficyna
Wydawnicza ATUT – Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo
Oświatowe, Wrocław 2019, pp. 270,
ISBN 978-83-7977-413-5
DOI: 10.17951/al.2021.11.177-178
Marta Osuchowska, La evolución de la posición jurídica de
la Iglesia católica en Argentina. Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT
- Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe, Wrocław 2019,
pp. 270, ISBN 978-83-7977-413-5
Professor Marta Osuchowska is a recognized representative of the young
generation of Latin Americanists in Poland. In 2007, she received a master’s
degree in law and canon law, and in 2013, she was awarded a doctoral degree
based on her dissertation entitled “Legal Protection of Religious Freedom in
Colombia” (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw). In 2011, she
completed her postgraduate studies on Latin America at the Centre for LatinAmerican Studies at the University of Warsaw. Since 2008, she has worked as
an academic teacher and researcher at Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University.
Her main area of interest is religious law in Latin America.
The book (habilitation thesis), which was the basis for awarding the
postdoctoral degree, concerns the development of legal norms relating to
the Catholic Church in Argentina. This development is traced from the May
Revolution of 1810 to the present day. The book consists of four chapters. The
first chapter “Relations between the state and the Catholic Church since the
May Revolution of 1810 until the termination of the Constitutional Congress
provisions in 1827” deals with the issue of religion in constitutional bills, the
right of patronage, relations with the Holy See, the Church reform by Marina
Rodriguez, and the treaty with Great Britain. Chapter II “The Argentine
Confederation and the Catholic Church” examines the document Memorial
Ajustado, attempts to form the national church in Argentina, attitudes of
conservatives and liberals to religion, religious issues addressed during
Congreso Constituyente in 1853, the Constitution of 1853, and the reform of
177
Reseñas e informes
patronage. In Chapter III entitled “Towards a dialogue with the Holy See”, the
Author focuses on the attempts to reach an agreement between the state and
Church authorities, the place of religion in the Argentinian law and society,
confrontation between fuerza politica and the Catholic tradition, and the
concordat. The last chapter entitled “The principle of cooperation in religious
freedom” deals with international agreements in the Argentinian legal system,
the reform of Art. 2 of the Constitution and other confessional norms, sostener
of the Catholic culture, the legal status of the Church and changing relations
between the state and the Church.
The book is a scholarly work and as such, it complies with all the
requirements for academic publications. The research problem is well-defined,
and the methods, sources and subject literature are appropriately selected. The
Author presents the research results in a thoughtful and competent manner,
meeting all the standards of scientific thinking. She provides a comprehensive
and clear analysis of a variety of issues, taking into account the complexity
of religious law in Argentina, not only in relation to the legal position of
the Catholic Church, but also of other denominations and religions in this
country. The analysis is in-depth and detailed, written in logical and coherent
language that shows the Author’s originality and autonomy of thinking. The
book is richly documented, containing 350 bibliographic references (mainly
to Argentinian sources) and 789 footnotes. Osuchowska focuses on the legal
acts of the Federation and Province of Buenos Aires, as they play a key role in
the legal system and international relations of Argentina.
I recommend the book to all those interested in law and the history of law,
religious law, political science, and the role of religion in the life of individuals
and societies. This is an erudite, competent, and critical synthesis of the history
of religious law in Argentina. It offers an innovative approach of looking at the
relations between the state and the Church, which overcomes the binary and
often mutually exclusive concepts of the secular state and religious state.
Andrzej Pietrzak
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
Poland
apietrzak@kul .pl
https://orcid .org/0000-0001-6793-0681
178
INFORMACIÓN PARA LOS AUTORES
De acuerdo con la política editorial de Anuario Latinoamericano – Ciencias
Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales, en la revista se publicarán artículos científicos en español, portugués e inglés.
La aceptación de los textos para su publicación depende de la positiva evaluación por dos expertos externos según el sistema de doble anonimato.
Los autores que deseen colaborar en nuestra revista deben ceñirse a los siguientes requisitos formales y editoriales:
1 . El formato *.docx, *.doc o *.rtf.; la extensión máxima del texto de 40 000
caracteres, junto con notas a pie de página y referencias bibliográficas; las
reseñas de libros no deben exceder 10 000 caracteres; fuente tipo Times
New Roman, 12 puntos en el cuerpo del texto y 10 puntos en las notas de
pie de página y referencias bibliográficas; interlineado 1.5.
2 . El artículo debe ser dividido en secciones, incluida la introducción y las
conclusiones. Los títulos de las secciones del texto se alinearán a la izquierda, sin numeración ni tabulado. La introducción del artículo debe proveer al lector de los siguientes datos: importancia del tema, antecedentes
conceptuales o históricos del tema, definición del problema, objetivos que
deben estar en sintonía con la pregunta de investigación. En las siguientes
secciones se exponen: métodos, resultados y conclusiones.
3 . El título del artículo en el idioma del artículo y en inglés, el nombre y el
apellido del autor, la afiliación institucional y su dirección postal, la dirección del correo electrónico institucional, una breve información sobre el
autor, el número de identificación del autor ORCID.
4 . El resumen (de 600 caracteres máximo) en el idioma del artículo y otro en
inglés, o en español (en caso del artículo escrito en inglés); palabras clave
(3–6) en el idioma correspondiente, separadas por comas. El resumen debe
expresar claramente el objetivo principal del estudio y la hipótesis planteada, exponer todos los aspectos esenciales de la metodología y materiales
usados para la investigación, describir los principales resultados, indicar
con precisión las conclusiones.
5 . Las referencias bibliográficas deben atenerse a las normas de publicación
de la APA y serán listadas en el orden alfabético. La descripción debe incluir: el apellido y el inicial del nombre del autor/los autores; el año de
publicación entre paréntesis; el título de la obra en cursiva; el lugar de edición; el nombre del editor; el número del volumen y el número DOI en el
caso de las publicaciones que lo poseen.
179
Información para los autores
Ejemplos:
Libros:
Mainwaring, S. & Pérez-Liñán, A. (2013). Democracies and Dictatorships in
Latin America. Emergence, Survival, and Fall. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Capítulos de libros:
Alcántara Sáez, M. & Tagina, M. L. (2011). Las elecciones del bicentenario:
un análisis comparado. En M. Alcántara Sáez, M. L. Tagina (Eds.), América
Latina: política y elecciones del bicentenario (2009–2010) (pp. 1–30). Madrid:
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Artículos en revistas:
Altman, D. (2005). Democracia directa en el continente americano: ¿Autolegitimación gubernamental o censura ciudadana?. Política y Gobierno, vol. XII,
no. 2, pp. 203–232.
Documentos electrónicos:
Shifter, M. (19 de agosto de 2011). Liderazgo político y gobernabilidad democrática en América Latina y Colombia. Los desafíos de la democracia en América
Latina. Inter-American Dialogue. Recuperado el 15 de mayo de 2015, de http://
www.thedialogue .org/page .cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2080&mode=print
6 . Las notas de carácter explicativo o polémico deben situarse al pie de página; las referencias bibliográficas en el cuerpo del texto deben colocarse entre paréntesis e incluir el apellido del autor, el año de publicación e indicar
la página (Altman, 2005, p. 203) / las páginas (Altman, 2005, pp. 203–232).
7 . Las citas textuales que tienen menos de 40 palabras se escriben inmersas
en el texto y entre comillas, sin cursiva. Las citas que tienen más de 40 palabras se escriben aparte del texto, con sangría izquierda aplicada al párrafo
y sin comillas ni cursivas en letra Times New Roman 11.
8 . Los gráficos y las tablas (en blanco y negro) deben ser editables y preparados en el formato MS Windows.
Los artículos deben ser enviados a la dirección electrónica de la Editora en Jefe:
Profa. Dra. Katarzyna Krzywicka
katarzyna .krzywicka@umcs .edu .pl o anuario .latinoamericano@umcs .pl
La oficina de la Redacción se ubica en:
Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Periodismo, Universidad Maria Curie-Skłodowska
Ul. Głęboka 45, oficina A.5.61
20-612 Lublin, Polonia
180
AUTHOR GUIDELINES
In accordance with the editorial policy, the scientific journal Anuario
Latinoamericano – Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales will publish
scholarly papers in Spanish, Portuguese, and English.
The submitted texts will be approved for publication after the positive review
by two external experts through the double-blind peer review process.
The articles should fulfil the following formal and editorial requirements:
1. The text should be in *.docx, *.doc or *.rtf. format; the length of the article
should not exceed 40 000 characters, including footnotes and bibliographic
references; in case of book reviews the size should be of up to 10 000 characters; font: Times New Roman, size of the body of the text 12 points, size
of the footnotes and bibliographic references 10 points; 1.5 line spacing.
2. The article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and
conclusions. The titles of the sections of the text will be aligned to the left,
without numbering or tabulation. The introduction of the article should
provide the reader with the following information: importance of the
topic, conceptual or historical background of the topic, definition of the
problem, objectives that should be in tune with the research question. The
following sections explain methods, results, and conclusions.
3. The title of the article in the language of the article and in English; the
name and surname of the author; the institutional affiliation with postal
address and institutional e-mail address; brief information on the author;
the author identification number ORCID.
4. The abstract (of up to 600 characters) should be written in the language
of the article and in English (in Spanish, if the article is in English); keywords (3-6) in the respective language, separated by commas. The abstract
should clearly express the main objective of the study and the hypothesis
proposed. It should also state all the essential aspects of the methodology
used for the investigation as well as describe the main results and indicate
the conclusions accurately.
5. The bibliographical references must follow the rules of APA format and
must be listed in alphabetical order; each entry should include: surname
and first name initial of the author/authors; year of publication given in parentheses; title of the work in italics; place of publication; name of the editor; volume number as well as DOI number in case of publications which
have it allocated.
181
Author guidelines
Examples:
Books:
Mainwaring, S. & Pérez-Liñán, A. (2013). Democracies and Dictatorships in
Latin America. Emergence, Survival, and Fall. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Chapters in books:
Alcántara Sáez, M. & Tagina, M. L. (2011). Las elecciones del bicentenario:
un análisis comparado. In M. Alcántara Sáez, M. L. Tagina (Eds.), América
Latina: política y elecciones del bicentenario (2009–2010) (pp. 1–30). Madrid:
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Articles in journals:
Altman, D. (2005). Democracia directa en el continente americano: ¿Autolegitimación gubernamental o censura ciudadana?. Política y Gobierno, vol. XII,
no. 2, pp. 203–232.
Electronic documents:
Shifter, M. (August 19, 2011). Liderazgo político y gobernabilidad democrática en América Latina y Colombia. Los desafíos de la democracia en América
Latina. Inter-American Dialogue. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.
thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2080&mode=print
6. The footnotes of explicative or discursive character should be written at
the bottom of the page; the biographical references inserted into the text
should be given in parentheses and must contain the name of the author,
year of publication and page number (Altman, 2005, p. 203) / pages number (Altman, 2005, pp. 203-232).
7. Textual quotations which have less than 40 words, are written immersed
in the text and enclosed in double quotation marks, without italics. Quotes
that have more than 40 words are written apart from the text, with left indentation applied to the paragraph and without quotation marks or italics
in Times New Roman 11.
8. Diagrams and tables (in black and white only) should be editable and prepared in the format compatible with MS Windows.
The materials should be sent to the e-mail address of the Editor-in-Chief:
Prof. Dr. Katarzyna Krzywicka
katarzyna.krzywicka@umcs.edu.pl or anuario.latinoamericano@umcs.pl
The Editorial Office is located in:
Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University
Ul. Głęboka 45, 20-612 Lublin, Poland, room A.5.61
182
INFORMAÇÃO PARA AUTORES
Em conformidade com a política editorial do Anuario Latinoamericano –
Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales, na revista se vão publicar artigos científicos em língua espanhola, portuguesa e inglesa.
A aceitação dos textos para sua publicação depende de uma avaliação positiva
por dois peritos externos em regime de duplo anonimato.
Os artigos devem cingir-se aos seguintes requisitos formais e editoriais:
1. O formato *.docx, *.doc o *.rtf.; extensão máxima do texto de 40.000 caracteres, juntamente com as notas de rodapé e referências bibliográficas; resenhas de livros não devem exceder 10.000 caracteres; tipo de fonte Times
New Roman, 12 pontos no corpo do texto e 10 pontos nas notas de rodapé
e referências bibliográficas; espaçamento 1.5.
2. O artigo deve ser dividido em seções, incluindo a introdução e as conclusões. Os títulos das seções do texto serão alinhados à esquerda, sem
numeração ou tabulação. A introdução do artigo deve fornecer ao leitor os
seguintes dados: importância do tópico, antecedentes conceituais ou históricos do tópico, definição do problema, objetivos que devem estar em sintonia com a pergunta da pesquisa. As seções a seguir explicam: métodos,
resultados e conclusões.
3. O título do artigo na língua do artigo e em inglês; o nome e sobrenome do
autor; a afiliação institucional e seu endereço postal; o endereço do correio
eletrónico institucional; uma breve informação sobre o autor; o número de
identificação do autor ORCID.
4. O resumo (de 600 caracteres no máximo) na língua do artigo e outro em
inglês, ou em espanhol (em caso do artigo escrito em inglês); palavraschave (3-6) na língua utilizada no artigo, separadas por vírgulas. O resumo
deve expressar claramente o objetivo principal do estudo e a hipótese proposta, declarar todos os aspetos essenciais da metodologia e dos materiais
utilizados na investigação, descrever os principais resultados, indicar as
conclusões com precisão.
5. As referências bibliográficas deverão respeitar as regras de publicação da
APA e ser listadas em ordem alfabética. A descrição deve incluir: o sobrenome e a inicial do nome do autor/dos autores; o ano da publicação entre
parênteses; o título do trabalho em itálico; o local da edição; o nome do
editor; o número do volume e o número DOI no caso de publicações que
o possuem.
183
Informacão para autores
Exemplos:
Livros:
Mainwaring, S. & Pérez-Liñán, A. (2013). Democracies and Dictatorships in
Latin America. Emergence, Survival, and Fall. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Capítulos de livros:
Alcántara Sáez, M. & Tagina, M. L. (2011). Las elecciones del bicentenario:
un análisis comparado. Em M. Alcántara Sáez, M. L. Tagina (Eds.), América
Latina: política y elecciones del bicentenario (2009-2010) (pp. 1-30). Madrid:
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
Artigos em revistas:
Altman, D. (2005). Democracia directa en el continente americano: ¿Autolegitimación gubernamental o censura ciudadana?. Política y Gobierno, vol. XII,
no. 2, pp. 203-232.
Documentos eletrônicos:
Shifter, M. (19 de agosto de 2011). Liderazgo político y gobernabilidad democrática en América Latina y Colombia. Los desafíos de la democracia en América Latina. Inter-American Dialogue. Recuperado em 15 de maio de 2015, de
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2080&mode=print
6. As notas de carácter explicativo ou polémico devem aparecer ao pé da página;
as referências bibliográficas no corpo do texto devem ser colocadas entre
parênteses e incluir o sobrenome do autor, o ano de publicação e indicar
a página (Altman, 2005, p. 203) /as páginas (Altman, 2005, pp. 203–232).
7. As citações textuais de menos de 40 palavras serão escritas imersas no texto
e entre aspas, sem itálico. As citações com mais de 40 palavras são escritas separadamente do texto, com recuo à esquerda aplicado ao parágrafo
e sem aspas ou itálico no Times New Roman 11.
8. Os gráficos y tabelas (em preto e branco) devem ser editáveis e preparados
em formato MS Windows.
Os artigos deverão ser enviados via internet pelo seguinte endereço eletrônico
da Editora-Chefe:
Profa. Dra. Katarzyna Krzywicka
katarzyna.krzywicka@umcs.edu.pl ou anuario.latinoamericano@umcs.pl
O escritório da revista se localiza em:
Faculdade de Ciências Políticas e Jornalismo
Universidade Maria Curie-Skłodowska
Ul. Głęboka 45, gabinete A.5.61.
20-612 Lublin, Polônia
184