1
MARIA DE LOURDES BACHA
REALISM AND TRUTH – PEIRCE´S THEMES
Discussion paper
mlbacha@gmail.com
2014
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To Ana and Júlio
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I would like to thank my friends, who have helped with suggestions,
ideas, and hard work: Jorgina Santos, Ligia Feitosa;
my colleagues from Peirce Edition Project, Professors Nathan
Houser, Andre DeTienne, Cornelis de Waal
for the kidness with which they welcomed me;
Professor Lúcia Santaella, PhD, for supporting the post doctoral
project;
my friend Júlio Lamounier, for providing financial support to publish
this book.
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Summary
Introduction ............................................................................................. 005
Part I In defense of Scientific Realism .................................................. 008
1. Realism and antirealism ........................................................................ 009
2. Peircean realism ................................................................................... 023
Part II Would the Truth be the best goal for scientific inquiry? .......... 051
1. Categorization of theories of truth ......................................................... 052
2. Peirce and the theory of truth: correspondence or convergence?......... 060
2.1 Truth and method .......................................................................... 079
2.2 Truth and pragmatismo ................................................................. 090
Final considerations ............................................................................... 098
References ............................................................................................... 100
List of Tables
Table 1 New Realism and Idealism ....................................................................... 022
Table 2 Categorization of theories of truth ............................................................ 057
List of figures
Figure 1 Theories of Truth ..................................................................................... 059
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INTRODUCTION
This work may be regarded as the continuation of two previous
papers that have been published: the first named C. S. Peirce´s Theory of
Inquiry and the second The Induction from Aristotle to Peirce.
In C. S. Peirce´s Theory of Inquiry, we aimed at showing that for
Peirce the inquiry starts from an uncomfortable state of doubt, which blocks
the flow of usual actions and makes it difficult to choose among alternative
courses of action. This is a real, genuine doubt, and not just a
methodological doubt, a make-believe. Thus, the scientific inquiry
constitutes an effort to put an end to the doubt and reestablish a state of
belief in which the truth would then be a belief unshakeable by the doubt.
The Theory of Inquiry can also be called The Theory of Scientific Method.
According to Peirce, only the scientific method can lead us to the
truth, in the long run, in a long way, which constitutes the dynamics process
of inquiry. This process is subject to both error and chance, but it can be
self-corrected. Agreement of opinions is the sole objective of the inquiry
process, which comprises three stages: abduction, deduction, and induction.
The Theory of Inquiry is grounded in this distinction, which formalizes a
cycle: abduction, deduction, induction, new abduction. Due to the
researches on the theory of inquiry, our attention has been drawn to
induction, resulting in the second publication: The Induction from Aristotle
to Peirce, which aims at analyzing the role of realism in the formulation of
his theory of induction, reminding that, in Peirce, the validity of induction
derives from the realistic environment of his philosophy. In Peirce, the
foundation of induction is the realism of the continua or the doctrine of
synechism in contrast with the normalistic, deterministic and necessitarian
view of other authors, especially Mill. Therefore, the approach to this topic
escapes from the purely logical focus, using Peirce´s theory of reality as
ground for the inductive argument.
In view of the interest in Peirce´s work and as a result of the postdoctoral research, the paper Realism and Truth – Peirce´s themes is now
being presented. It aims at analyzing these two key topics for understanding
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his work, mainly his methodeutic. This book focuses on the discussion about
Charles Sanders Peirce´s realistic conception of truth.
Charles Sanders Peirce was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in
1839. Son of a famous Harvard mathematician, he graduated in Science
and received his PhD in Chemistry. He taught Logic at John Hopkins
University and worked as a scientist at the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey
until 1891. He died in 1914, in Arisbe, at the age of 75. He had cancer, and
died poor and isolated, working on his manuscripts and virtually unknown.
Peirce has carried out scientific researches that contain many
important contributions not only to mathematical logic, but also astronomy,
photometry, geodesy, psychophysics, and philology. His work with
pendulums was internationally recognized, and this work with
measurements together with studies on the theory of probable error had
great influence on the growth of some aspects of his philosophy, especially
his doctrine of chance and continuity. Being both an accurate thinker and
familiar with the actual process our knowledge on the laws of nature is built,
Peirce was against the claim that experience would lead to absolute
evidence, because one cannot disregard discrepancies due to errors of
observation.
His philosophy seeks harmonious answers to a number of questions,
such as the status of cosmos, the matter of temporality, the matter of
knowledge, the matter of belief and doubt, the matter of inwardness and
outwardness, the subject-object dichotomy, the possible conditions of
thought, real, and imaginary.
As a figure of the 19th century, it is no surprise that some issues such
as indeterminism, uncertainty or complexity are part of his work. Peirce has
brought the spirit of scientific inquiry to Philosophy, assuming that
philosophical subjects are or may become scientific issues. For this reason,
with proper adaptations, he has proposed applying to Philosophy the
observation methods, hypothesis and experiments used by science. For
Peirce, the path to Philosophy should be pursued through the logic of
science. Therefore, as a scientist, he was primarily interested in the logic of
science, and understanding the logic of science meant understanding
reasoning methods. Taking into account that there is no thought or
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reasoning without signs, Semiotics, as the study of all possible kinds of
signs, emerged as a natural consequence of Peircean discoveries about
Logic.
Even though Peirce considered each and every human production,
achievement and expression a semiotic issue, Semiotics or Logic is just part
of his philosophical set, which, in turn, is also part of a larger system, which
can be perceived by analyzing the classification of sciences chart. According
to Peirce, Logic is the science of what must be and what should be true
representation; to sum up, it is the philosophy of representation. Thus, the
theme Truth is associated with Logic, Reasoning, and especially scientific
method, and cannot be detached from Realism, which is a metaphysical
hypothesis, but Metaphysics as the science of reality.
Part I is entitled In defense of Scientific Realism and aims at
analyzing the debate on scientific realism at the end of 20th century and early
21st century. At first, it is presented a literature review on the realismantirealism debate, and then the text presents a discussion on the
assumptions of Peirce's realism.
Regarding Part II, entitled Would the Truth be the best goal for
scientific inquiry?, it starts with an overview of several projects on the
theories of truth aiming at contextualizing Peirce´s theory of truth.
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PARTE I
IN DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM
This doctrine is as follows:—Everything in the
world belongs to some natural class or real
kind. The difference between an artificial
class and a natural class or real kind lies in
this: that the things which belong to an
artificial class have but a few points of
resemblance, whereas the things that
compose a natural class resemble one
another in innumerable respects. […] Horse
is a natural class; red horse is not. Yet the
members of the latter class resemble each
other in one more respect than do the
members of the former class. The true
difference seems to be this: Red horses
have nothing whatever in common except
what all horses have in common together
with what all red things have in common;
whereas it would be impossible so to define
horses, that the definition itself should imply
all that horses have in common (W1:417) .
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1. REALISM AND ANTIREALISM
The conflict between realism and anti-realism is a conflict
about the kind of meaning possessed by statements of the
disputed class. For the anti-realist, an understanding of such
a statement consists in knowing what counts as evidence
adequate for the assertion of the statement, and the truth of
the statement can consist only in the existence of such
evidence. For the realist, the notion of truth plays a more
crucial role in the manner of determining the meaning of the
statement (Dummett, 1978 155.)
The questions [ ] whether there is any form of realism or antirealism that would call for a particular theory of truth, and
whether there is any conception of truth with distinctive
implications in the realism debate? And the answer to both
questions has turned out to be no. (Horwich, 1996:197)
This topic aims at analyzing the debate on scientific realism at the
end of 20th century and early 21st century. At first, it is presented a literature
review on the realism and antirealism debate, and then the text presents a
discussion on the assumptions of Peirce's realism.
The review of literature shows that researches on the nature and the
conditions and extent of human knowledge are some of the most persistent
and intriguing problems of philosophy and epistemology. These problems
derive from a reflection on the world around us, generating controversies
over skepticism, rationalism, externalism, foundationalism.
Some skeptics defend the argument that we have no justified beliefs
about certain classes of propositions, and thus, would not have reasons to
believe propositions about the physical world. Thus, regarding Descartes’
question (what do I really know about the external world?), skeptics’
answers are pessimistic.
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Since our knowledge of the external world comes from our senses,
how can we know anything about the world without first prove that our
senses are reliable? Or, how can we gain knowledge using a source of
beliefs without first showing that it is reliable? Or, has the debate run out of
steam? In discussions on scientific realism, what is striking is the absence of
consensus on the principles that constitute a realistic view of the natural
sciences, mainly because scientific advances have transformed the way of
thinking about the world:
Nature is no longer taken to be as our senses
indicate it to be. Entities and mechanisms invisible to
the naked eye, such as electromagnetic waves,
electrons, proctons, neutrinos and DNA molecules –
to mention but a few-are said to populate the world
and cause the observable phenomena (PSILLOS,
1999: xvii).
Thus, there are other questions: why should we consider scientific
theories true or approximately true, or why should we believe that these
entities postulated by our best theories are real? Why not consider such
theories nothing more than instruments for systematization? (PSILLOS,
1999: xvii).
On one hand, what about the theoretical entities (T-entities)? On the
other hand, can we consider the relations shown in mathematics real?
According to Peirce´s arguments, mathematics builds its objects in the form
of hypotheses, and from them draws the necessary conclusions, without
dealing with matters of fact:
Mathematics is engaged solely in tracing out the
consequences of hypotheses, and never considers
whether or not anything be existentially true, or not.
(CP 1.247) The necessary reasoning of mathematics
is performed by means of observation and
experiment (CP 3.560)
But the mathematician observes nothing but the
diagrams he himself constructs; and no occult
compulsion governs his hypotheses except one from
the depths of mind itself. Thus the distinguishing
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characteristic of mathematics is that it is the scientific
study of hypotheses which it first frames and then
traces to their consequences (NEM IV:268).
According to Rorty (1967: 2), the discussion shifted from the question
whether the material reality is mind-dependent to one about what kind of
true assertions are there in the representational relations to non-linguistic
items? For the author, a discussion on realism would only center on whether
assertions of physics can match the "facts of the matter", or if the assertions
of mathematics and ethics can also have this possibility.
The Philosophers [..] seem fated to end the Century
discussing the same topic –realism- which they were
discussing in 1900. In that year the opposite of
realism was still idealism. But now language has
replaced mind as that which, supposedly, stands
over “reeality” […] Nowadays the opposite of realism
is called simply “antirealism” (Rorty, 1967:2).
Psillos (2001:xx), on “Scientific Realism – How science tracks truth”,
argues that there is an endless battlefield of controversies regarding realism,
including the following:
• whether science can possibly describe a mind-independent world?
• whether science can go beyond whatever can be observed by the
naked eye and reveal truths about unobservable causes of the
phenomena?
• how exactly scientific theories should be understood?
• whether one needs to accept the truth of scientific theories in order to
account for the success of science and for salient features of its
practice?
Also according to Psillos (1999), the debate on scientific realism
evolved from the discussion on linguistic terms, that is, about the meaning of
scientific discourse or about whether scientific terms denote something to
the argument over the power of scientific theories to explain unobservable
entities.
Fine (1991: 261) declared:
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Realism is dead. Its death was announced by the
neopositivists who realized that they could accept all
the results of science, including all the members of
the scientific zoo […] Recent philosophical argument
in support of realism tries to move from the success
of the scientific enterprise to the necessity for a
realist account of its practice (Fine, 1991: 261).
Boyd (1991) argued:
The positive evidence for scientific realism thus rests
primarily on features of scientific practice which
would be discernible even if one limited one's
examination to very recent science. According to the
realist, realism provides the only acceptable
explanation for the current instrumental reliability of
scientific methodology in mature sciences. Realism
does however entail interesting conclusions about
historical development within mature sciences – that
is, within those sciences in which theorethical
considerations contribute significantly to a high level
of instrumental reliability of method (Boyd,
1991:221).
What could constitute a realistic view of science? To Plastino (1995:
14), the following statements could clarify this issue:
• he existence and nature of the facts of the world do not depend on
theories or methods that science uses.
• All scientific assertion, when literally interpreted, is either true or false.
• The truth-value of a scientific assertion is determined by the world. An
assertion is true when it maintains a corresponding relationship with the
world.
• Science seeks theories that make a true (or approximately true)
description of the world.
• The theoretical terms remain the same during scientific changes. New
scientific findings absorb the core of preceding ones.
• The progress of science consists of a convergent process of
approaching a complete and true scientific theory.
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•
In mature sciences, theories are approximately true and their core terms
refer to objects of the world.
It can be argued that there are several ways of approaching scientific
realism. Some of them consist of metaphysical assumptions (ontological) on
the existence and independence of the outer physical world others focus on
epistemological aspects of scientific research of the world or semantic
aspects of the interpretation of scientific theories. However, in most cases,
scientific realism is described as a hybrid, integrated set of philosophical
theses concerning different aspects and dimensions of science.
The metaphysical stance asserts that the world has
a definite and mind-independent natural-kind
structure; the semantic stance takes scientific
theories at face-value, seeing them as truthconditioned descriptions of their intended domain,
both observable or unobservable […]. The epistemic
stance regards mature and predictively successful
scientific theories as well-confirmed and
approximately true of the world. So, the entities
posited by them, or at any rate, entities very similar
to those posited, do inhabit the world (Psillos, 1999:
xix).
For Horwich (1996: 187-198), realism is common-sense. For realists
there are facts of physics, mathematics, psychology, history, and so on.
These facts typically do not owe their existence to our awareness of them-or
even to the possibility of our becoming aware of them and we are, as it
happens, able to acquire considerable knowledge in these domains.
Thus the debate between realism and anti-realism is
a dispute between business-as-usual and the
philosophical revision of established belief and
practice […]. The scientific anti-realist is someone
who thinks that this combination of common-sense
views is incoherent and untenable. He cannot see
how it is possible for there to be theoretical facts
that, on the one hand, are within the reach of our
methods of conceptualization and investigation but,
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on the other hand, exists independently of them.
Thus, for a scientific anti-realist, the paradigm of
knowledge is of observed facts, which are regarded
as dependent upon human capacities (Horwich,
1996: 188-189).
Bensusan (1994:37) presents three realistic theses. The first is the
literalness thesis, that is, that the language of science deals with entities,
either observable or not. This language consists of expressions that are
mostly genuine statements and should be interpreted according to a
theoretical model that involves entities other than mere human feelings and
just ordinary observable entities.
The second realistic thesis is unity, according to which theories that
prevail over competing ones take into account justified and non-pragmatic
criteria, they are the most suitable among the competing theories available.
The third corresponds to ontological realism, which implies the
principle that what exists does not depend on theories and representation. If
accepted, these three theses can be connected with the idea of truth by
correspondence, "which seems to be naturally suggested”.
Putnam & Putnan (1990) discuss four types of realism: naive realism,
metaphysical realism, internal realism and realism of common sense, which
oppose each other. Naive realism cannot be confused with the realism of
common sense because it boils down to the belief that the subject has to be
in an absolute relationship with the world and that the real world consists of
appearances that this subject can grasp. When it comes to metaphysical
realism and external perspective, Putnam rejects there main points: that the
world is a fixed totality of mind-independent objects, there is a single
coherent and true description of the world and that truth implies some sort of
correspondence. For internal realism, reference and truth do not depend on
any mysterious relationship of correspondence, but they are both internal to
the theories.
For Putnam & Putnan (1990), any assumption that there are mindindependent entities does not make any sense. He proposes the
abandonment of the traditional dichotomy between the world itself and the
concepts we use to think and talk about it, and the truth. The reference of
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our linguistic expressions is related to the conceptual scheme, that is, they
are internal to the perspective adopted.
Some orthodox formulations on scientific realism that have support in
the theses described below:
•
there is a definite outer world (consisting of entities with properties
and relations) that is largely independent of our knowledge or experience;
•
science seeks substantial and accurate information of the aspects
of the world, that is, presenting true theories that represent the elements and
the structure of the world; and
•
epistemic access to the world is possible and it is expected that the
progressive development of science will improve our ability to obtain
knowledge (at least approximately) of the world.
Realism gives meaning to science through the postulation of the
objective existence of the world (which does not depend on our cognitive
capacity) and a conception of truth by correspondence. A scientific
proposition is seen as true or false due to the way things are, regardless of
our ability to access the world. In the realist view, the world is what the true
proposition says it is, providing an external standard to which scientific
theories must conform, because interactions are built from the interactions
with the world. The legitimacy of scientific statements therefore rests in
external relations maintained with their object of study, that is, in agreement
(approximately) with some parts of reality.
For Rorty (1980), scientific theories should be a mirror that reflects
the structure of nature. In general, realists understand that the scientific
enterprise aims at knowing the truth about the outer world and that the use
of scientific methods and procedures may gradually lead to the discovery of
truth and, as a consequence, to consensus of opinions. Regarding some
specific true assertions, Rorty (1967: 2) claims that the term antirealism is
ambiguous because it is the standard word that refers to the statement that
there is no real issue these assertions could represent.
In turn, Dummett (1978, 72) states that:
Realism I characterize as the belief that statements
of the disputed class possess an objective truth-
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value, independently of our means of knowing it;
they are true of false in virtue of a reality existing
independently of us. n contrast: The anti-realist
opposes to this the view that statements of the
disputed class are tied directly to what we count as
evidence for them, in such a way that a statement of
this disputed class, if true at all, can be true only in
virtue of something of which we could know and
which we should count as evidence for its truth
(DUMMETT, 1978 146).
From the point of view of antirealism, Bensusan (1994:46) discusses
three theses: Van Fraasen´s constructive empiricism, which defends the
underdetermination of every theory, the instrumentalism which can be
divided into pragmatic (each theory can be replaced by endless others) and
epistemic (the theory may be a privileged and most suitable instrument to
handle a specific field).
Plastino (1995) argues that antirealists believe that scientific realism
put an end to an unsustainable tension among their main thesis, that is, the
conflict between "the metaphysical autonomy of the world (its independence
from us) and its epistemic accessibility (our ability to learn something about
it)".
For antirealists, however, it is not possible to reconcile several
ontological, semantic and epistemological assumptions that often make up
scientific realism. Based on internal (and external) criticism, antirealists
conclude that it is necessary to deeply change the traditional realistic image
of science (Horwich, 1996:57). In order to do so, antirealists have many
options:
•
•
Some reject the assumption that certain types of objects exist, for
example, one can deny the existence of unobservable objects
(instrumentalism), so that it is not legitimate to literally believe in
theories that approach them, or things in themselves independent of the
mind or language (conceptual relativism).
Others prefer to show that certain types of objects are reducible to
others that seem to have epistemological priority (phenomenalism).
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•
•
Others question our ability to know objects inaccessible to observation
(constructive empiricism), although they do not deny the existence of
unobservable entities.
Besides, there are antirealists who propose other conceptions of truth
and reference which eliminate the alleged internal conflict of scientific
realism (Plastino, 1995: 15).
However, taking into account an antirealist and instrumentalist view
of science, the realistic principles are generally relegated or criticized,
because the meaning of science is not the result of an attempt to represent
a reality that exists independently of us, but "rather the pragmatic virtues of
theories (such as their instrumental reliability)".
[...] to argue for realism we must employ methods
more stringent than those in ordinary scientific
practice. In particular one must not beg the question
as to the significance of explanatory hypotheses by
assuming that they carry truth as well as explanatory
efficacy (Fine, 1991: 263).
The raison d'être of science would be in how it allows us to guide our
actions and thoughts, and the main goal of scientific research is to build
theories that, "to some extent, are appropriate to the phenomena of our
observation and for extracting new and successful future consequences of
events that we can perceive and investigate". Thus, a scientific theory is
accepted provided that it works satisfactorily. Somehow, scientific practice is
understood as an outward projection of us, our interests, habits and
capabilities (Fine, 1991).
For instrumentalists, it is within the scientific practice itself that the
merits of scientific findings are recognized and appreciated, and therefore it
is necessary that the strategies adopted by the scientific community are
seen as able to perform or progressively lead to the expected results.
In this context, the truth, as correspondence or agreement between
theory and reality, should not be regarded as a goal of scientific research,
because in general we do not know how to determine whether a given
scientific hypothesis or theory has the property of being true or closer to the
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truth than another. Although the truth may be rigorously defined and an
attainable principle, there is no operational criteria ensuring that a statement
or set of statements of empirical science may be true or asymptotically close
to the truth (in realistic terms).
Consequently, even in the face of a scientific truth, we would not
identify or recognize it as such, and the best we can and should expect of
scientific theories is agreement with our views, accuracy and simplicity (in
many ways), power to predict and explain, ability to unify and systematize
empirical laws, the scope of the field, effectiveness in solving theoretical
problems, practical application, consistency with other well-established
beliefs. (Plastino, 1995)
[…] the realistic notion of truth (as correspondence)
transcends our knowledge in a way that there is no
implication for the effective practice of the agents of
scientific research (and, moreover, opens the doors
to skepticism) (Plastino, 1995:16).
The instrumentalist conception of science believes that the practical
success of science does not allow the current belief in (literally interpreted)
scientific theories or the existence of theoretical entities (unobservable) they
postulate, and pragmatic considerations in favor of a scientific theory only
seem to indicate that it is a useful tool. In this context, the so-called
theoretical entities of science are regarded as fictions, mental constructs or
simple and convenient idealizations to the purposes of science.
For instrumentalists, the arguments used to justify the acceptance of
scientific results are not basis for assuming that science is a source of
reliable information about the "underlying structure" to observable natural
phenomena. The contemporary debate realism versus instrumentalism
focuses primarily on the epistemological question of whether the explanatory
and predictive power of a scientific theory justifies the belief in the truth (or
approximate truth) of this theory (Plastino, 1995).
However, according to Plastino (1995:10), a historical analysis of the
evolution of science also shows the inadequacy of realism based on its
explanation for scientific success, because many scientific theories that had
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considerable success in the past postulated theoretical entities whose
existence today is denied (such as phlogiston, caloric fluid or vital forces).
Without an explanation for the instrumental success of science, it
would be necessary to recognize this success as the result of a "miracle" or
perhaps a mysterious "cosmic coincidence" and realism could be presented
as the idea that offers the best explanation for the experimental success of
science. But, as Fine points out (1991), there would be a "manifest circularity
in this attempt to justify the realist view" and one should expect that the
reasoning of scientific realism would involve "methods more rigorous than
those used in ordinary scientific practice". Thus, realists are not able to show
(without begging the question) that the explanatory power of realism ensures
the belief in the truth (approximately) of theory or the existence of theoretical
entities it postulates.
This deficiency in the miracle argument is rightly recognized by
realists like Boyd (1990), to whom the acceptance of a realistic explanation
as a scientific theory does not imply accepting scientific realism, because a
realistic explanation can be interpreted in a non-realistic way.
Thus, in order to avoid circularity, scientific realism should be
included in a larger philosophical package of epistemological, metaphysical
and semantic theses, including the naturalized version of knowledge and
reference, in which philosophical considerations and scientific discoveries
are closely related. The argumentative strategy to be used will be to show
the superiority of this realistic package before any other rival philosophical
package (Boyd, 1991).
Plastino (1995) explains that in order to accept a realist´s
explanation, without compromising with the truth of realistic theses, an
instrumentalist should only admit its effectiveness to satisfactorily explain
certain types of phenomena. Thus, the instrumentalist proposes that the
realist conception of truth is replaced by a pragmatist conception in which
truth is analyzed in terms of instrumental reliability (or Dewey´s "guaranteed
assertability").
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But the defense of realism must take into account the existence of
entities that are considered unnecessary by some antirealist positions such
as phenomenalism, or nominalism (as abstract ideas or mathematical
objects), and that many are willing to remove with
A scientific man must be
an Ockham´s razor.
For Bensusan (1994:37), realism must
reject an instrumentalist view of theories and
argue that science deals with entities and
properties of these entities, whether observable or
not, and its language seems to not only treat
these entities and their properties.
single-minded
and
sincere with himself.
Otherwise, his love of
truth will melt away, at
once. He can, therefore,
hardly be otherwise than
an honest , fair-minded
man. True, a few
naturalists have been
accused of purloining
specimens; and some
men have been far from
judicial in advocating
their theories. Both of
these faults must be
exceedingly deleterious
to their scientific ability.
But on the whole,
scientific men have been
the best of men. It is
quite natural, therefore,
that a young man who
might develope into a
scientific man should be
a well-conducted person
(CP 1.49).
However, for those who defend "language
games", "ontological relativism," "extreme
translation" and "views of the world" as
Wittgenstein, Quine and Goodman, knowledge is
not an immediate mirroring of external things, but
the
construction
of
"narratives"
and
"interpretations", which are, in turn, systems of
symbols ordering and categorizing experience. In
this context, the linguistic-pragmatic-hermeneutic
turn
"would
dissolve
foundationalism,
representationalism and transcendentalism" and
the place of epistemology and metaphysics could
be taken by "a world without substances or
essences" or "truth without correspondence to
reality". For foundationalists, beliefs about "sense
data" and the present experience are infallible,
then they can play the role assigned to them in this form of empiricism;
beliefs about our sensory states are infallible and can be justified when
resorting to that foundation.
Some philosophies presuppose a metaphysical or epistemological
realism and share the idea that there is something objective enough to serve
as a foundation to ensure the rational argument or possible conclusions
about the most intelligible perspectives on the experience or the world.
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Others refute the idea of a "broader perspective", a "metavocabulary",
"common space", "neutral scheme" or "god's eye-view".
Opposition to the metaphysical tradition may take a number of forms.
For philosophers like Rorty, Davidson and Putnam, the core issue of
philosophy - external reality - can be resolved neither by antirealism nor by
phenomenalism. Rorty (1989: xiii-xiv) claims that traditional philosophical
guidelines assume a neutral and comprehensive view of reality, which can
be based on criteria of truth and appropriateness.
Davidson (1990:309) sees no reason to suppose that realism and
antirealism, understood in terms of radical non-epistemic or epistemic
character or truth, are the only ways of giving substance to a theory of truth
or meaning.
From another perspective, Hildebrand (2003:10) considers two
movements which succeeded to realism: at the turn of the 20th century,
some philosophers (like Moore, Mach, Peirce, James and Dewey) rose
against idealism, amazed by advances in biology, mathematics and logic.
These realists emphasized the independence of objects and their
relationships. Later on, Perry and Montague became well-known as
representatives of New Realism. The New Realism had a great impact and
the rebellion against idealism not only ensured the relative independence of
the object, but also involved a redefinition of the mind itself. However, the
New Realism has been unable to assess awareness and the problem of
error, being replaced by a movement called Critical Realism, which argued
that the knowing mind needed to be mediated by some kind of non-physical
interface. The epistemological distinction between object and vehicle of
knowledge becomes crucial for Critical Realists. Critical Realism would have
opened a gap between New Realism and Pragmatism. The chart below
summarizes these considerations:
22
Table 1 - New realists and Idealists
Issue
“Mind” includes or
characterizes
New Realists
nothing intrinsecally its
own’, mind is a relation
between nonmental
contents (contra
Descartes’ mind-as
container model).
Mind’s powers vis-a-vis
are nil; mind observes
its objetct
but does not alter its
objetcts
Knower-known
knowledge is na external
relationship
relation; the beinf of
objetcts does not
depend on the subject
Mind’s essence
mind is relational, not
substantive; mental
states does not depend
on the subject
Mind’s ontological status
mind does not exist
apart from things, events
or entities in relation;
they however, do not
depend upon mind
Source: Hildebrand (2003, p.12)
Idealists
all reality
are criative and
constitutive
object cannot be causally
severed from knowing
subjetc
mind is a systematic
unity, a self-evolving
universal
mind exists independently
of objects though it may
be influenced by them
23
2. PEIRCEAN REALISM
The successes of modern science ought to convince
us that induction is the only capable imperator of
truth-seeking. Now pragmaticism is simply the
doctrine that the inductive method is the only
essential to the ascertainment of the intellectual
purport of any symbol (CP 8.209,1905).
Taking into account a Peircean perspective, the following pages are
an attempt to respond to the claims that metaphysical statements about
reality, extralinguistic objects, or even systematic speculations are possible,
and do not constitute meaningless, futile or out of fashion issues, as some of
the opponents say about scientific realism.
From an epistemological view, Peirce was aware of the need to
provide both a justification for the belief in the existence of an external world
and a criterion for determining which objects of our experience belong to the
class of external objects. And Peirce asks: "How do I know they are real?"
The answer lies in the following considerations:
•
•
•
•
“If investigation cannot be regarded as proving that there are Real
things, it at least does not lead to a contrary conclusion; but the method
and the conception on which it is based remain ever in harmony. No
doubts of the method, therefore, necessarily arise from its practice, as is
the case with all the others.
The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a
dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions. But here already is a
vague concession that there is some one thing which a proposition
should represent. Nobody, therefore, can really doubt that there are
Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The
hypothesis, therefore, is one which every mind admits. So that the
social impulse does not cause men to doubt it.
Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and
only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it.
Experience of the method has not led us to doubt it, but, on the
contrary, scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in
24
the way of settling opinion. These afford the explanation of my not
doubting the method or the hypothesis which it supposes; and not
having any doubt, nor believing that anybody else whom I could
influence has, it would be the merest babble for me to say more about
it. If there be anybody with a living doubt upon the subject, let him
consider it” (CP 5.384, 1877).
But if there was not an object, if there was not a real object, there
would not be truth and for Peirce we can only say that there is such a thing
as the truth because otherwise the reasoning and thinking would not be
valuable.
What do you mean by there being such a thing as
Truth? You mean that something is SO—is correct,
or just—whether you, or I, or anybody thinks it is so
or not. Most persons, no doubt, opine that for every
question susceptible of being answered by yes or
no, one of these answers is true and the other false.
(CP 2.135, 1902)
For Peirce, the problem of knowledge of reality is based on the field
of metaphysics. Then there would be at least two alternative positions: a
priori and the empiricist or naturalist. The Kantian a priori position assumes
that metaphysics is a science of pure reason, whose knowledge derives
exclusively from concepts that are not influenced by any experience. The
empiricist assumes that "this question is a question of fact, and experience
alone can settle it" (CP 2.137, 1902).
In 1887, in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", when formulating and
defending rules of clarity about content, hypothesis and concepts, Peirce
reaffirms realism, claiming that there is a real that will imposed itself even if
we make mistakes and have totally misleading collective beliefs, because it
does not matter what we think of it or the representations we make of it;
continuous and independent, “reality does not necessarily depend on
thinking in general, but only on what you or a definite number of people think
about it" (CP 5.408, 1877).
Real establishes beliefs and therefore the representation we make of
it is not arbitrary, hence deriving the concept of truth and "the opinion which
25
is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by
the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real” (CP 5.407,
1877).
The inquiry that reinforces this belief has a telos, which Peirce calls
fate, which is an activity of thinking "by which we are carried, not where we
wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the operation of destiny ". There is
no way to escape the predestined opinion, no change in the point of view, no
choice of other facts to be studied, not even a natural tendency of the spirit,
this great hope is present in the concepts of truth and reality (CP 5.407,
1897) . But, by fate, one can also understand the consolidation of
researchers’ opinion which is bound to meet the real.
Peirce emphasizes the role of experience, that is, the experience is
that belief or cognition imposed on someone through the course of his life.
But how exactly does experience happen? Through a number of surprises
(CP 5:51, 1905). One can lie about this, but no one can escape the fact that
some things are forced upon their cognition (CP 2.138, 1902):
Experience is that determination of belief and
cognition generally which the course of life has
forced upon a man. One may lie about it; but one
cannot escape the fact that some things are forced
upon his cognition. There is the element of brute
force, existing whether you opine it exists or not.
Somebody may object that if he did not think so, he
would not be forced to think so; so that it is not an
instance in point. But this is a double confusion of
ideas. For in the first place, that something is, even if
you think otherwise, is not disproved but
demonstrated if you cannot think otherwise; and in
the next place, what experience forces a man to
think, of course he must think. But he is not therein
forced to think that it is force that makes him think
so. The very opinion entertained by those who deny
that there is any Truth, in the sense defined, is that it
is not force, but their inward freedom which
determines their experiential cognition. But this
26
opinion is flatly contradicted by their own experience.
(CP 2.138, 1902).
Even though some people insist on closing their eyes to the element
of compulsion, they experience it directly. But the fact that it can be denied
confirms the idea that it does not depend on the opinion one can have about
it. The key hypothesis about the method of science is that there are reals,
whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them.
According to Peirce, the above arguments show that science not only
legitimately admits the existence of an independent world but also needs to
create it, in case it wants to keep the current, objective view of science. The
hypothesis of Reality is the only evidence of the research method, "scientific
investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling
opinion” (CP 5.384, 1877).
At any moment we are in possession of certain
information, that is, of cognitions which have been
logically derived by induction and hypothesis from
previous cognitions which are less general, less
distinct, and of which we have a less lively
consciousness. These in their turn have been
derived from others still less general, less distinct,
and less vivid; and so on back to the ideal first,
which is quite singular, and quite out of
consciousness.
This ideal first is the particular thing -in -itself. It does
not exist as such. That is, there is nothing which is in
-itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind,
though things which are relative to the mind
doubtless are, apart from that relation.
That is, there is no thing which is in-itself in the
sense of not being relative to the mind, though things
which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart
from that relation. The cognitions which thus reach
us by this infinite series of inductions and
hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante
logice, is yet as one continuous process not without
27
a beginning in time) are of two kinds, the true and
the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are real and
those whose objects are unreal (CP 5.311, 1868).
Thus, there are two types of cognitions that are found in this endless
series of inductions and hypotheses - true or false, or cognitions whose
objects are real and those whose objects are not real. The real is defined in
the following passage:
The real, then, is that which, sooner or later,
information and reasoning would finally result in, and
which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me
and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of
reality shows that this conception essentially
involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without
definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of
knowledge. And so those two series of cognition —
the real and the unreal — consist of those which, at
a time sufficiently future, the community will always
continue to re-affirm; and of those which, under the
same conditions, will ever after be denied (CP 5.311,
1868).
On the other hand, the existence of the real is followed by a final
response to every question. Thus, all these arguments show a well-built
defense of what is meant by true regarding the objectivity of knowledge
about external reality.
The real is not, therefore, per se an immediate object
of thought, even though my thought may happen to
coincide with it. Yet the real must influence thought
or I could not by following any rules of reasoning
arrive at any truth (W3:60).
The fact that “the real is that which is not whatever we happen to
think it, but is unaffected by what we may think of it” (CP 8.12, 1871); the
fact that “there is an external reality independent of how you or I think” (CP
5.405,1877); the fact that “scientists may at first obtain different results, but,
as each perfects his method and his processes, the results are found to
move steadily together toward a destined centre. So with all scientific
28
research. Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but
the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves
to one and the same conclusion” (CP 5 407, 1877), three ideas emerge:
• reality does not depend on what is being thought and represented.
• reality is essencially related to thinking and ideas.
• the idea of reality is the end result of inquiry.
In this context, Peirce assumes that:
Suppose our opinion with reference to a given
question to be quite settled, so that inquiry, no
matter how far pushed, has no surprises for us on
this point. Then we may be said to have attained
perfect knowledge about that question.
True, it is conceivable that somebody else should
attain to a like "perfect knowledge," which should
conflict with ours. He might know something to be
white, which we should know was black. This is
conceivable; but it is not possible, considering the
social nature of man, if we two are ever to compare
notes; and if we never do compare notes, and no
third party talks with both and makes the
comparison, it is difficult to see what meaning there
is in saying we disagree.
When we come to study the principle of continuity
we shall gain a more ontological conception of
knowledge and of reality; but even that will not shake
the definition we now give. (CP 4.62, 1843)
For Peirce, reality cannot be separated from its representations, that
is, mental phenomena. Logic or semiotics is the only way not to fall into
Locke´s “mentalism”, because our mental products are all signs and we
cannot think without signs. This idea of reality is discussed in the following
passage:
There are Real things, whose characters are entirely
independent of our opinions about them; those Reals
affect our senses according to regular laws, and,
29
though our sensations are as different as are our
relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of
the laws of perception, we can ascertain by
reasoning how things really and truly are; and any
man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason
enough about it, will be led to the one True
conclusion. The new conception here involved is that
of Reality. It may be asked how I know that there are
any Reals. If this hypothesis is the sole support of
my method of inquiry, my method of inquiry must not
be used to support my hypothesis (CP 5.384, 1877).
•
•
•
•
The reality of things is subject to the following properties:
It does not depend on desire or opinion of individuals or groups of
people;
Consensus will be reached among people who have enough experience
and carry out researches in the correct way;
In fact, this consensus is not restricted to a specific community, but it
may include any reasonable agent;
Consensus results from the action of external reality on our senses and
opinions.
For Peirce, the idea of reality presents two important aspects:
otherness, which represents the element that reacts (associated with
Secondness, category of existence) and the insistence of brute force, that by
maintaining certain regularity, enables knowledge (associated with
Thirdness, that is the general category, the law), or in the words of Peirce:
Although in all direct experience of reaction, an ego,
a something within, is one member of the pair, yet
we attribute reactions to objects outside of us. When
we say that a thing exists, what we mean is that it
reacts upon other things. That we are transferring to
it our direct experience of reaction is shown by our
saying that one thing acts upon another. It is our
hypothesis to explain the phenomena, — a
hypothesis, which like the working hypothesis of a
scientific inquiry, we may not believe to be altogether
30
true, but which is useful in enabling us to conceive of
what takes place (CP 7.534 s.d.).
This study also emphasizes Peirce's view of Secondness category,
showing that the compulsiveness of our perceptual experience ensures the
externality of the object we perceive. Secondness is an experience that
results from the reaction between ego and non-ego.
The practical exigencies of life render Secondness
the most prominent of the three. This is not a
conception, nor is it a peculiar quality. It is an
experience. It comes out most fully in the shock of
reaction between ego and non-ego. It is there the
double consciousness of effort and resistance. That
is something which cannot properly be conceived.
For to conceive it is to generalize it; and to
generalize it is to miss altogether the hereness and
nowness which is its essence. According to me, the
idea of a reaction is not the idea of two plus
forcefulness. On the contrary to think of two dots as
two is to have a little experience of reaction and then
to tell ourselves that that is to be taken only in a
Pickwickian sense, as a mere reaction within the
world of ideas, the experience of reaction itself at
once leading us to think of a world of seconds or
existences and a world of mere tame ideas; the one
resistant, the other subject to our wills. We also find
ourselves thinking of the things without us, as acting
on one another, as really connected. Now it is your
business as a psychologist to say how that comes
about, not mine. I merely look at the phenomenon,
and say that all idea of real relation, or connection,
has in it that same element of irrational reaction. All
the actual character of consciousness is merely the
sense of the shock of the non-ego upon us (CP
8.266, 1903).
Despite all his interest in signs, it was only in 1907 (PC 5461-496)
that Peirce established the importance of semiotics to pragmatism, and the
statement that all thoughts are signs becomes a realistic position. How can
31
an object internal to cognition represent an object external to our cognition?
To resolve this issue it is necessary to analyze both Phenomenology and
Peirce´s theory of perception.
Starting with the Phenomenology, what does Peirce mean by
phenomenon? How can we know that what presents itself to cognition is
also a representation of a real object that is out of cognition. Peirce
responds to this with the definition of the phenomenon: “I use the word
phaneron to mean all that is present to the mind in any sense or in any way
whatsoever, regardless of whether it be fact or figment” (CP 8.213).
Experience is a cognitive process of signs, which corresponds to the
category of Thirdness, but the most prominent element of this Thirdness
process is its referential relations as well as Secondness’, which are
expressed in the experience of dual reaction in our cognitive mind, and in
this duality the objects represented are recognized. For science, facts
cannot be seen in an atomic and unrelated way, they should be amenable to
generalization, should be seen within a system, related and grouped
according to general laws, because a true continuum cannot be exhausted
by any multitude of individuals. True generality is in fact continuity.
Or if the force of experience were mere blind
compulsion, and we were utter foreigners in the
world, then again we might as well think to please
ourselves; because we then never could make our
thoughts conform to that mere Secondness.
But the saving truth is that there is a Thirdness in
experience, an element of Reasonableness to which
we can train our own reason to conform more and
more. If this were not the case, there could be no
such thing as logical goodness or badness; and
therefore we need not wait until it is proved that
there is a reason operative in experience to which
our own can approximate. We should at once hope
that it is so, since in that hope lies the only possibility
of any knowledge (CP 5.160, 1903).
However, realism is not just about the reality of the external world, it
32
can also be summed up in a question asked by Peirce in "Logic of 1873",
that is, are there realities, “which are not only independent of my thought,
your thought and anybody else´s thought, but in fact independent of thought
altogether?”. And the answer to this question lies within the idea of final
opinion:
The objective final opinion is independent of the
thoughts of any particular men, but is not
independent of thought in general. That is to say, if
there were no thought, there would be no opinion,
and therefore, no final opinion (CP 7.336, 1873).
At the heart of this question there is another one: whether generality,
rationality, the being of laws or Thirdness are real.If they are not real, the
world does not show any intelligible structure, the universe will not be
revealed in the course of scientific research, but rather, it will present itself
like a puzzle to which we will give orders. But if they are real, then there is a
possibility of discovering the order and rationality of the universe, "a
fragment of divine thought," knowing the intentions of the "divine geometer".
Taking into account many aspects, for Peirce, the nominalist position
is inconsistent. The first aspect claims that qualities are not real, unless they
are really perceived. But what is quality? A quality is a mere abstract
potentiality. For nominalists, what is potential or possible is nothing except
what the present does, but for Peirce “quality only exists when it actually
inheres in a body”, or “quality is the monadic element of the world” (CP
1.422–26, 1896), meaning that the idea of quality comprises suchness, unity
and the reality of Firstness.
The second aspect to be considered is related to the fact that
percepts are subject to certain laws. For Peirce, if percepts were not a
matter of law, our ideas would be a matter for indifference. It may be
appropriate to think and act according to the law, but a set of rules would
properly be superior to another.
Whether all this be true or not, it must at any rate be
admitted by every candid man that he does believe
firmly and without doubt that to some extent
phenomena are regular, that is, are governed by
33
general ideas; and so far as they are so, they are
capable of prediction by reasoning. (CP 2.149,
1902).
The third aspect concerns the reality of the possible. For nominalists,
a possible is simply a function of our ignorance when making assumptions,
but for Peirce it is not a matter of ignorance since nothing is involved except
pure hypothesis. Nominalists consider Aristotle´s future contingent events a
completely absurd, a particular event that will happen or not.
There is nothing now in existence to constitute the
truth of its being about to happen, or of its being
about not to happen, unless it be certain
circumstances to which only a law or uniformity can
lend efficacy. But that law or uniformity, the
nominalists say, has no real being; it is only a mental
representation. If so, neither the being about to
happen nor the being about not to happen has any
reality at present; and the most that we can say is
that the disjunction is true, but neither of the
alternatives. If, however, we admit that the law has a
real being, not of the mode of being of an individual,
but even more real, then the future necessary
consequent of a present state of things is as real and
true as that present state of things itself (CP 6.367368, 1898).
There is a fourth aspect: for nominalists, there is no connection
between individual things. A nominalist defines action as a notion of law or
uniformity in contrast to what Peirce argues: “a law of nature left to itself
would be quite analogous to a court without a sheriff." Suppose a law of
nature, such as the law of gravity, remains mere uniformity, a mere formula
establishing a relationship between terms - what in the world would induce a
stone, which is neither a term nor a concept, but just a plain thing, to act in
accordance with such uniformity? All the other stones may have done so
and this stone too on other occasions, and it would break the uniformity for it
not to do so now. But what to do? And there is no use talking to a stone,
which is deaf and has no reason.
34
It is the same with the operations of nature. With
overwhelming uniformity, in our past experience,
direct and indirect, stones left free to fall have fallen.
Thereupon two hypotheses only are open to us.
Either 1. the uniformity with which those stones have
fallen has been due to mere chance and affords no
ground whatever, not the slightest for any
expectation that the next stone that shall be let go
will fall; or 2. the uniformity with which stones have
fallen has been due to some active general principle,
in which case it would be a strange coincidence that
it should cease to act at the moment my prediction
was based upon it. That position, gentlemen, will
sustain criticism. It is irrefragable.
Of course, every sane man will adopt the latter
hypothesis. If he could doubt it in the case of the
stone — which he can't — and I may as well drop
the stone once for all — I told you so! — if anybody
doubts this still, a thousand other such inductive
predictions are getting verified every day, and he will
have to suppose every one of them to be merely
fortuitous in order reasonably to escape the
conclusion that general principles are really
operative in nature. That is the doctrine of scholastic
realism. (CP 100-101).
The nominalist would say that laws are merely general, formulas
relating to mere terms. If realist, a law of nature will be regarded as a type of
this in futuro, which has a present reality that consists on the fact that events
will take place in accordance with the formulation of that law.
I should ask the objector whether he was a
nominalist or a scholastic realist. If he is a
nominalist, he holds that laws are mere generals,
that is, formulae relating to mere terms; and ordinary
good sense ought to force him to acknowledge that
there are real connections between individual things
regardless of mere formulae. Now any real
connection whatsoever between individual things
35
involves a reaction between them in the sense of this
category. The objector may, however, take
somewhat stronger ground by confessing himself to
be a scholastic realist, holding that generals may be
real. A law of nature, then, will be regarded by him
as having a sort of esse in futuro. That is to say they
will have a present reality which consists in the fact
that events will happen according to the formulation
of those laws. It would seem futile for me to attempt
to reply that when, for example, I make a great effort
to lift a heavy weight and perhaps am unable to stir it
from the ground, there really is a struggle on this
occasion regardless of what happens on other
occasions; because the objector would simply admit
that on such an occasion I have a quality of feeling
which I call a feeling of effort, but he would urge that
the only thing which makes this designation
appropriate to the feeling is the regularity of
connection between this feeling and certain motions
of matter (CP 5.48, 1903).
We have performed experiments with all three categories of
cognition, but the elements of Secondness have more intensity and are the
most vivid, because the practical demands of life render Secondness the
most prominent. Secondness is neither a concept, nor a unique quality; it is
an experience that manifests itself. The simplest characteristic, common to
the second category, is the element of struggle. For Peirce, regarding the
element of struggle, there is no difference between the agent and the
patient. The result decides (CP 5.45, 1903). Secondness is what we
experience when our will meets resistance, or when something imposes
itself on our senses.
Action and reaction are equal. If you find that the
door is pushed open in spite of you, you will say that
it was the person on the other side that acted and
you that resisted, while if you succeed in pushing the
door to, you will say that it was you who acted and
the other person that resisted. In general, we call the
one that succeeds by means of his effort the agent
36
and the one that fails the patient. But as far as the
element of Struggle is concerned, there is no
difference between being an agent and being a
patient. It is the result that decides; but what it is that
is deemed to be the result for the purpose of this
distinction is a detail into which we need not enter
(CP 5.45, 1903).
Peirce also argues that
[…] the main distinction between the Inner and the
Outer Worlds is that inner objects promptly take any
modifications we wish, while outer objects are hard
facts that no man can make to be other than they
are. Yet tremendous as this distinction is, it is after
all only relative. Inner objects do offer a certain
degree of resistance and outer objects are
susceptible of being modified in some measure by
sufficient exertion intelligently directed (CP 5.45,
1903).
Every sane person lives in a double world, the outer and the inner
world, the world of percepts and the world of fantasy. And Peirce asks: “how
exactly does the experience work?”
It takes place by a series of surprises. There is no
need of going into details. At one time a ship is
sailing along in the trades over a smooth sea, the
navigator having no more positive expectation than
that of the usual monotony of such a voyage, when
suddenly she strikes upon a rock. The majority of
discoveries, however, have been the result of
experimentation. Now no man makes an experiment
without being more or less inclined to think that an
interesting result will ensue; for experiments are
much too costly of physical and psychical energy to
be undertaken at random and aimlessly. And
naturally nothing can possibly be learned from an
experiment that turns out just as was anticipated. It
is by surprises that experience teaches all she
deigns to teach us (CP 5.51, 1903).
37
The experience is connected with and assimilated to the knowledge
we already have, and receives an interpretation, or theory. Interpretation is
linked to experience and experience is learning. Peirce wanted to show that
the experience of duality of action and reaction is direct, but independent of
our decision, and cannot be critically inferred from our previous cognitions,
and to show it, Peirce had to prove that perceptual experience is not under
our control. Through the perceptual experience of duality between our
expectations and the objects, we get to know the indirect relationship
between men and external objects.
The phenomenon of surprise in itself is highly
instructive in reference to this category because of
the emphasis it puts upon a mode of consciousness
which can be detected in all perception, namely, a
double consciousness at once of an ego and a nonego, directly acting upon each other. Understand me
well. My appeal is to observation — observation that
each of you must make for himself (CP 5.52, 1903).
Thus, existence as an element of Secondness is the mode of being
of what is external and independent of thought. The reaction experienced by
consciousness, which is a direct reaction, proves that there is an external
reality. The experience of Secondness is immediate and specific, but in case
it appears as a field of uniform response, it can be understood as a sign.
Including the generality of Thirdness, the notion of reality is complete,
because it is a way of thinking about individuals. In the dialogic view of
representation, Peirce stated his realistic position when argued that if
knowledge is general, it is due to the fact that reality, as we know it, is also
general.
At this point, attention will be drawn to the theory of perception. For
Peirce, there is no thought without perception. At some point, every thought
comes from perception and is constantly transformed by it.
The thought-sign theory implies continuity, semiosis, Thirdness,
because every thought or cognitive representation is a sign. Every reasoning
and every thought is expressed by signs, and the Peircean sign is a complex
triad relationship involving the sign, the object, and the interpreter.
38
In a way, the sign needs to be noticed before working as a sign and
being merged with a pre-existing idea, concept or tendency to action,
whoever the interpreter is. According to Peirce, only perception can change
our habits. We just think through the signs and the signs are received by
perception. Thus, taking into account that the sign is something that
represents something else to somebody, an interpreter is necessary
because otherwise the sign would not create another sign.
For Peirce, there are three elements of perception: percept,
percipuum and perceptual judgment. Peirce´s theory of perception is a triad
theory and therefore it constitutes an attempt to break the dichotomy of the
perceiving subject and the object that is perceived. Even though perception
follows a triadic logic, it is under the control of Secondness, given the
relationship between perception and action. When it comes to perception,
the subject is passive; however, when it comes to action, it is active. When
we perceive something we are aware of a duality in which there is
something that turns against us, because the act of perceiving is external to
the perceiver.
Rosenthal (2001) summarizes the relationship among percept,
percipuum and perceptual judgment as it follows: the present percept,
interpreted in light of the ponecipuum, is the percipuum in its narrow sense.
This percipuum is the result of the perceptual judgment in its narrow sense
and ensures the “repeatable content", which serves to activate the habit,
though, as an analytical stopping point, it provides no anticipation of future
experience. The perceptual judgment in its narrow sense is the primitive
abductive hypothesis of a present repetition of past experiential content, and
the content in fact becomes a repetition of previously experienced contents
only as the perceptual judgment assimilates it to those contents in the
abductive process of recognition. Or, the percipuum is a recognition of the
character of what is past.
Haack (1994: 10) argues that Peirce´s theory is a very successful
attempt “to escape from the limits of false dichotomy and understand the
midfield’. Thus, the dichotomy between typical realism and inferentialism is
overcome by Peirce's distinction between the perceptual judgment, the belief
39
that accompanies a perceptual experience, and the percept, the
phenomenal, interactive aspect of a perceptual experience.
Perception is a process through which we experience the action of
the percept that is what presents itself to the subject´s perception. According
to Peirce, only perception can change our habits. In 1885, Peirce claimed:
The capital error of Hegel which permeates his
whole system in every part of it is that he almost
altogether ignores the Outward Clash.†9 Besides the
lower consciousness of feeling and the higher
consciousness of nutrition, this direct consciousness
of hitting and of getting hit enters into all cognition
and serves to make it mean something real. It is
formal logic which teaches us this; not that of a
Whateley or a Jevons, but formal logic in its new
development, drawing nutriment from physiology and
from history without leaving the solid ground of
logical forms (CP 8.41, 1885).
For Peirce, knowledge begins with perception, that is, the work of the
mind in the face of the outer world, and the external shock as a form of
Secondness would be our way of accessing reality; thus, real, which is the
object of our research, can only be found through perception (HOOKWAY,
1985: 151).
Knowledge takes its rise from the percept, which is
the object perceived in a single act of perceiving. Is
is impossível to report from self-observation what it
is that takes place in the act of perception […] so
rapid a succession of throes of perception, that the
effect upon my distinct consciousness (which is
limited to so much of my feeling as I can almost
control) is that of a continuous flow (HP: 809).
Knowledge, however, is not limited to perception, because it focuses
on the future, it aims to anticipate the characteristics of future experience
and the cognitive process that follows aims at establishing a rule or habit.
But the continuity of thought is interrupted by the percept. With experience,
the percept assaults our senses breaking the habitual state.
40
Suddenly, at an instant characterized by a sotong
sense of newness, in which I seem to detect
something corresponding to an indivisibility and an
isolation of this now, (though this may be illusory), I
experience a constraining force (implying a sense of
resistance thereto) and a change of my habits of
feeling brought instantly about with a present image
of extraordinary detail and positiveness. (HP: 810)
Percepts are not knowledge, but its starting point in a process in
which many percepts and possible percepts are elaborated in propositions.
From the observation, the effect of the outer world predominates, action and
reaction. When action is suspended, an "imaginative habit" remains, but
although the percept is a singular event, here and now, the memory seems
to embody the characteristics of percepts. But the knowledge we are obliged
to admit is that knowledge that is directly forced upon us. The percept
consists of a unique event. But according to Peirce, even considering the
perceptual facts, or immediate judgments we make concerning our unique
percepts, the percept is the reality, but it is not in a propositional way. The
most immediately judgment concerning it is abstract, which, however, is
different from reality, although it must be accepted as true for this reality. Its
truth is the fact that it is impossible to fix it, and the fact that it only claims to
consider an aspect of the percept (CP 5568.1901).
A percept contains only two types of elements: the ones belonging to
both Firstness and Secondness (CP 7630, 1903). The immediate object of
all knowledge and all thought is, ultimately, the percept, that knocks on the
door of perception, blind, raw, insistent. The percept is a unique event that
happens here and now. The percept may not be generalized without losing
its essential character. It is a real battle between the ego and non-ego (CP
2.246, 1903).
It is very insistent, for all its silence.
It is a forceful thing. Yet it offers no reason, defence,
nor excuse for its presence. It does not pretend to
any right to be there. It silently forces itself upon me.
41
Such is the percept. Now what is its logical bearing
upon knowledge and belief. This may be summed up
in three items, as follows: 1st, it contributes
something positive. (Thus, the chair has its four legs,
seat, and back, its yellow color, its green cushion,
etc. To learn this is a contribution to knowledge.)
2nd, it compels the perceiver to acknowledge it. 3rd,
it neither offers any reason for such acknowledgment
nor makes any pretension to reasonableness. This
last point distinguishes the percept from an axiom.
[…] The percept, on the contrary, is absolutely
dumb. It acts upon us, it forces itself upon us; but it
does not address the reason, nor appeal to anything
for support (CP 7.620-622, 1903)
Therefore, percepts are raw, compulsive experiences made up of
feelings, but Peirce expects to connect the character of irrational brute force
of Secondness to the double consciousness involved in perception, in the
perceptual experience as other than the subject. The percept is presented to
the senses. Through perception we acquire information about the
environment around us and the judgments we make are the result of a
sensory contact with these objects, so a theory of perception must explain
this connection: the sensory confrontation and the conceptual interpretation
of what is perceived.
It can be said that the process of knowledge begins with the percept
breaking habits of feeling and giving way to images that, combined, can
refer to a possible experience, involving the same event that gave rise to
those percepts.
The way the mind grasps the phenomenon is related to the theory of
perception. In triadic logic of perception, the first is the sensory-motor
apparatus. The percipuum, which is how the percept is translated by the
sensory apparatus, is equivalent to the immediate object, without which the
percept would not be noticed.
The survival of human beings depends on this sensory-motor
apparatus and the percipuum is how the sensory-motor apparatus will
translate the percept. The judgment of perception is instantaneous because
42
the percipuum is immediately absorbed in our brain schemes, a continuum
that Peirce names perceptual judgment.
The percipuum is a recognition of the character of
what is past, the percept which we think we
remember. The interpretation is forced upon us; but
no reason for it can be given.
But just so when we experience a long series of
systematically connected phenomena, suddenly the
idea of the mode of connection, of the system,
springs up in our minds, is forced upon us, and there
is no warrant for it and no apparent explanation of
how we were led so to view it. You may say that we
put this and that together; but what brought those
ideas out of the depths of consciousness? On this
idea, which springs out upon experience of part of
the system we immediately build expectations of
what is to come and assume the attitude of watching
for them.
It is in this way that science is built up; and science
would be impossible if man did not possess a
tendency to conjecture rightly (CP 7.677-79, 1903).
Percept is the second, because it plays the role of a dynamic object,
and the perceptual judgement would be the third, equivalent to a proposition
(interpreter).
Perceptual judgments contain general elements, so
that universal propositions are deducible from them
in the manner in which the logic of relations shows
that particular propositions usually, not to say
invariably, allow universal propositions to be
necessarily inferred from them (CP 5.541, 1902).
What kind of judgment is the perceptual judgment? Peirce compares
perceptual judgment to abductive inferences, that is, a reasoning method by
which new hypotheses are suggested. Perceptual judgments are imposed to
and accepted by us through a process we are unable to control and
therefore criticize (CP 5.157, 1903). For Peirce, perceptual judgments are
43
the result of a process not sufficiently conscious to be controlled, or rather,
not controllable and therefore not fully conscious. Both perceptual judgment
and abduction are equally fallible, although the perceptual judgment cannot
be doubted. There is something persistent and compulsive about perceptual
judgment that makes us recognize it; on the other hand, abduction appears
at those relaxing and playful moments when we do not know anything for
sure.
Peirce even says “but I will venture so far as to assert that every
general form of putting concepts together is, in its elements, given in
perception” (CP 5.186, 1903), because perceptual judgment is automated,
usual perception that allows us to survive, “despite its apparent primitive
features, every percept is the product of mental processes” (CP 7.624,
1903). But perceptual judgement is completely different from the percept:
The percept is not the only thing that we ordinarily
say we "perceive"; and when I professed to believe
only what I perceived, of course I did not mean
percepts, since percepts are not subjects of belief or
disbelief. I meant perceptual judgments. Given a
percept, this percept does not describe itself; for
description involves analysis, while the percept is
whole and undivided. But once having a percept, I
may contemplate it, and say to myself, 'That appears
to be a yellow chair'; and our usual language is that
we "perceive" it to be a yellow chair, although this is
not a percept, but a judgment about a present
percept (CP 7.626, 1903).
Or,
I promised to show that a perceptual judgment is
entirely unlike a percept. If it be true, as my analysis
makes it to be, that a percept contains only two kinds
of elements, those of firstness and those of
secondness, then the great overshadowing point of
difference is that the perceptual judgment professes
to represent something, and thereby does represent
something, whether truly or falsely. This is a very
important difference, since the idea of representation
44
is essentially what may be termed an element of
"Thirdness," that is, involves the idea of determining
one thing to refer to another. The element of
secondness in the percept consists in one part being
relative to another. But the percept presents itself
ready made, and contains no idea of any state of
things being brought about. There is a rigid
mathematical demonstration (which I cannot give
here) that the idea of Firstness, or that of a positive
suchness, and the idea of Secondness, or that of
one thing's referring to another, can in no way be
combined so as to produce the idea of one thing A,
referring to a second, B, in the very act of referring to
a third, C. This is the element of Thirdness, or
mediation, which the conception of the
representation of something to somebody obviously
involves. In a perceptual judgment the mind
professes to tell the mind's future self what the
character of the present percept is. The percept, on
the contrary, stands on its own legs and makes no
professions of any kind (CP 7.630ff, 1903).
Peirce´s theory of perception shows its realistic trend, giving priority
to existing things over thought. Therefore, there are two types of effects: one
of Firstness, when the percept reaches us in moments of perceptual
availability and the mind is not full, and another of Secondness, of surprise
or shock, when the mind is filled with expectation.
“No cognition and no Sign is absolutely precise, not even a Percept”
(CP 4.543, 1905), because every sign has a certain indetermination
regarding the represented object, maintains a certain vagueness concerning
the evolution of thought, yet it represents essential qualities of the object.
Perception may fail, but can also be corrected if there are multiple types of
access to the object, and what we perceive is the percept, which, according
to Santaella (1993: 90), would be the greatest proof that Peirce presented in
favor of realism.
Based on his theory of perception, Peirce can solve some problems
related to real as the perceptual source of our knowledge, the structure of
45
perception is linked to the origin of truth in Peirce´s theory. Understanding
the theory of the object in Peirce's philosophy is crucial to the ontological
and epistemological discussions of sign universe. For Peirce, the object
determines the unity of the sign and the realistic philosophy provides
justifications for the belief in the existence of a real world that is independent
of what we may think or fantasize about it. Peirce suggests that by
confrontation with the external objects the cognitive signs gain truth or
falsity.
So, then, a sign, in order to fulfill its office, to
actualize its potency, must be compelled by its
object. This is evidently the reason of the dichotomy
of the true and the false. For it takes two to make a
quarrel, and a compulsion involves as large a dose
of quarrel as is requisite to make it quite impossible
that there should be compulsion without resistance
(CP 5.554, 1905).
Peirce clearly distinguishes the thing in itself unknowable from the
idea of knowable external reality independent of the representative function
of the mind, which separates him from some pragmatists or coherentists
such as Davidson (1986: 312) for whom there is no way of knowing what is
causing the internal events of which we are aware:
On the other hand, the instinctive truth of perceptual judgment is due
to the correlation or coherence of the dynamic interpreter with the perceptual
and emotional interpreter, and this coherent structure is both transparent
and embedded in the perceptual judgment. This process is beyond our
reasonable control, which we cannot decide if the result is true or false.
Peirce suggests some tests that could be performed:
The percepts, could I make sure what they were,
constitute experience proper, that which I am forced
to accept. But whether they are experience of the
real world, or only experience of a dream, is a
question which I have no means of answering with
absolute certainty. I have, however, three tests
which, though none of them is infallible, answer very
well in ordinary cases (CP 2.142, 1902)
46
The first test consists in trying to dismiss the percepts:
The first test consists in trying to dismiss the
percepts. A fancy, or day-dream, can commonly be
dismissed by a direct effort of will. If I find that the
flow of percepts persists consistently in spite of my
will, I am usually satisfied (CP 2.142, 1902).
Still, it may be a hallucination, if there is reason to suspect that it is
so, the second test can be applied.
[the second test] consists in asking some other
person whether he sees or hears the same thing. If
he does, and if several people do, that will ordinarily
be taken as conclusive. Yet it is an established fact
that some hallucinations and illusions affect whole
companies of people (CP 2.142, 1902)
There remains a third test that can be applied, it is the safest of them:
Namely, I may make use of my knowledge of the
laws of nature (very fallible knowledge, confessedly)
to predict that if my percept has its cause in the real
world, a certain experiment must have a certain
result—a result which in the absence of that cause
would be not a little surprising. I apply this test of
experiment. If the result does not occur my percept
is illusory; if it does, it receives strong confirmation
(CP 2.142, 1902).
We can test and thus confirm or refute the perceptual judgment itself,
not in the same process in which it is developed, but through a more
controlled elaboration of the observation of the same object. Therefore,
through the development of our knowledge and scientific research, we can
distinguish the false from the true (CP 2141.1902), we can specially
distinguish illusions or confirmed representations (CP 2.142, 1902).
Although these tests may confirm the insistence on the real world, its
existence is not provided by the immediate experience, but by our
inferences derived from perceptual facts:
47
All these tests, however, depend upon inference.
The data from which inference sets out and upon
which all reasoning depends are the perceptual
facts, which are the intellect's fallible record of the
percepts, or "evidence of the senses." It is these
percepts alone upon which we can absolutely rely,
and that not as representative of any underlying
reality other than themselves (CP 2.14, 1902).
Since the 1860s, Peirce has always supported the theory that
knowledge is derived from the outer world. Even the conclusions about our
emotional and affective state are consequences of inferences from the outer
world. But the impossibility of controlling and criticizing this almost inferential
instinctual process (which is incorrigible) is not an absolute foundation of our
knowledge. How then, in the cognitive process, is it possible to control it? In
Peirce´s view, certainly not before the percept is formed.
The machinery of the mind can only transform
knowledge, but never originate it, unless it be fed
with facts of observation (CP 5.392, 1903).
This analysis can explain Peirce´s position against foundationalists,
who accept the "given" as the foundation of knowledge. According to
Rosenthal (2001), what is provided is not the absolute certainty of
fundamentalist claims, but pragmatic certainty. The perception of an
appearance is beyond conceivable doubt, because doubt it in the sense that
it can actually be proved wrong is, literally, nonsense.
In this discussion, Peirce highlights the crucial problems of the theory
of knowledge and the knowledge of the external world that concern
philosophy today. The naturalist idea of the evolution of knowledge and the
method of discovering the truth through the trio of logical operations, the
fallibility of human knowledge, hold for any knowledge, for everyday
experience and for science or for philosophy. This is the rational method to
make our ideas clear.
The evidence of our negative knowledge of something external can
be achieved by the analysis of Peirce´s epistemology. In 1904, the author
48
stated that “the highest grade of reality is only reached by signs” (CP 8.327,
1904). It worth emphasizing Peirce´s conception of reasoning:
Reasoning, therefore, begins with premisses which
are adopted as representing percepts, or
generalizations of such percepts. All the reasoner's
conclusions ought to refer solely to the percepts, or
rather to propositions expressing facts of perception
(CP 2.773, 1901).
Peirce´s realism1 implies not only the consideration of a real object,
independent of the outer world, but the recognition of the reality of
universals. To nominalism, the continuum is only a matter of language. For
nominalists, universals are just signs created to describe the quality of
particular things.
Nominalists refuse an objective correspondence of our concepts with
the laws of nature, so the issue of nominalism and realism implies whether
the truth of the laws or our logical inferences are objective or subjective, “the
nominalists conceived the general element of cognition to be merely a
convenience for understanding this and that fact. However, the realists
looked upon the general, not only as the end and aim of knowledge, but also
as the most important element of being” (CP 4.1, 1898).
One of the prime doctrines of these men, for
instance, a doctrine inherited from the pre-scientific
ages, is that all generalization is a mere matter of
convenience. The scientific man, on the other hand,
without theorizing about generals, implicitly holds
that laws are really operative in nature, and that the
classification he is so painfully trying to find out is
expressive of real facts. (N-58, 1894)
1
Peirce´s journey from Nominalism to Realism is discussed by Fisch (1986: 184-199) in five
steps: “nominalist” (1867-1868), first step towards realism (1868), second step towards
realism (1871), Pre-Monist period (1871-1890), and Monist period (1891-1914). See Bacha
(1998).
49
Nature is in accordance with general laws, which actually determine
how future events will occur, and these "formulas" are closely related to the
characteristics of human reason, or
[…] that every scientific explanation of a natural
phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something
in nature to which the human reason is analogous;
and that it really is so all the successes of science in
its applications to human convenience are witnesses
(CP 1.316, 1903).
In addition to this, nature was created a long time ago, but the
process of becoming more and more to human reason still continues.
A law is under Thirdness, it is mediation, a law can be seen as
generalization of a particular case because for a law to be true all the
possible facts should obey this rule. Realism is not a hypothesis about the
past, but about science as a "socio-historical" process that allows
predictions about the future:
[…] to my notions there can be no mystery in the
universe, in the sense of a real fact to which no
approach to knowledge can ever be gained. For a
reality is an idea that insists upon proclaiming itself,
whether we like it or not. There may be a question
that no amount of research can ever answer. If so,
there is a lacuna in the completeness of reality. But
these things usually called mysteries are simply
cases in which questions cannot be answered for the
reason that no definite meaning can be attached to
them (CP 8.156, 1901).
In the context of Peirce's philosophy, scientific research is an activity
focused on an end that is the discovery of truth and in the realistic view,
science progresses by convergence toward truth in the sense of
correspondence with reality.
This is an important element, because the very validity of induction is
related to predictions, not as a basis for action, but as validity of the scientific
method, as a way to uncover the truth. If a theory explains the facts
50
submitted to it, it can be considered true, and a theory is true because it
predicts the course of future events very well. Peirce´s continuum theory
intends to demonstrate that nature has continuity from the past to the future,
which is the very legitimacy of the laws of nature and induction, because
otherwise there would be no representation. It is the regularity, generality,
continuity that allow the representation.
But if, on the other hand, it be conceivable that the
secret should be disclosed to human intelligence, it
will be something that thought can compass. Now
thought is of the nature of a sign. In that case, then,
if we can find out the right method of thinking and
can follow it out — the right method of transforming
signs — then truth can be nothing more nor less
than the last result to which the following out of this
method would ultimately carry us. In that case, that
to which the representation should conform, is itself
something in the nature of a representation, or sign
— something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable,
and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself (CP 5.553, 1905).
51
PART II
WOULD THE TRUTH BE THE BEST GOAL FOR
SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY?
The man of science has received a deep impression of the
majesty of truth, as that to which, sooner or later, every
knee must bow. He has further found that his own mind is
sufficiently akin to that truth, to enable him, on condition of
submissive observation, to interpret it in some measure.
As he gradually becomes better and better acquainted
with the character of cosmical truth, and learns that
human reason is its issue and can be brought step by step
into accord with it, he conceives a passion for its fuller
revelation. He is keenly aware of his own ignorance, and
knows that personally he can make but small steps in
discovery (CP 8.136).
But the question is, whether, granting that there be such a
thing as truth , which can be ascertained at all, such a way
of adding conclusion to premiss, as that under
examination, would lead to the ascertainment of the truth
by the speediest path, or not. The whole logical inquiry
relates to the truth; now the very idea of truth is that it is
quite independent of what you or I may think it to be. How
we think, therefore, is utterly irrelevant to logical inquiry
(CP 2.55).
52
1. CATEGORIZATION OF THEORIES OF TRUTH
Truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a
philosophically interesting theory about (Rorty, 1995).
“What is truth”? we sometimes ask – but the question tends
to be rethorical conveying the somewhat defeatist idea that a
good answer, if indeed there is such a thing, will be subtle,
so profound and so hard to find, that to look for one would
surely be a waste of time (Horwich, 1999: 1).
When a man desires ardently to know the truth, his first effort
will be to imagine what that truth can be. He cannot
prosecute his pursuit long without finding that imagination
unbridled is sure to carry him off the track (CP 1.46, 1896).
But if a man occupies himself with investigating the truth of
some question for some ulterior purpose, such as to make
money, or to amend his life, or to benefit his fellows, he may
be ever so much better than a scientific man, if you will — to
discuss that would be aside from the question — but he is
not a scientific man (CP 1.45, 1896).
This chapter presents a brief overview of many projects on theories
of truth establishing the context of Peirce´s theory.
According to Rorty (1967:35):
In our culture, the notions of “science”, “racionality”,
“objetivity”, and “truth” are bound up with one
another. Science is thought of as offering a solid
“hard” and “objetive” truth; truth as correspondence
to reality, the only sort of truth worthy of the name
(Rorty, 1967:35).
Rorty (1967) and Searle (1993) point out that the relationship
between reality and thought have a long history in the Western tradition, and
involves a particular conception of truth, reason, reality, rationality, logic,
knowledge, justification and demonstration, which are so important that
53
somehow would define this tradition. For Searle, the simplest definition of
science would aim to formulate a set of true sentences in the form of
theories, which are true because they approximately correspond to a reality
independent of thought. Thus, for the concept of Western metaphysics
underlying the concept of Western science, the foundational principle would
be realism, according to which reality exists independently of human
representations. Searle also argues that there are many theories of truth, but
the correspondence theory of truth is the most important to the Western
tradition.
The idea of truth as something to be pursued for its
own sake, not because it will be good for oneself, or
one´s real or imaginary community, is the central
theme of this tradition (Western) (Rorty, 1987:21).
Goodman (2001) argues that the truth has been widely attacked and
when philosophers meet to discuss ways of knowledge or belief, some treat
the word truth as something shameful. Others consider dogmatic or fascist
those who believe that there really is a truth to be known, and that this truth
can be of any kind.
Thus, it is not surprising that a review of literature brings a widely
variety of divergent concepts and theories, especially when considering
areas such as semantics, logic, epistemology or ontology. One of the most
profound differences is about whether the notion of truth would be epistemic,
ontological, linguistic, pragmatic, or whether the notion of truth would be
substantial or deflationary. It is worth mentioning that this study does not
intend to answer questions like: what are the philosophical issues of truth?
or what questions should a theory of truth answer?
In fact the truth predicate exists solely for the sake of
a certain logical need (Horwich, 1998:2).
The concept of truth has a dual, interesting and exciting nature,
because on one hand it is a clear and simple idea, but on closer
examination, the apparent clarity and simplicity may lead to logical
contradictions and insoluble problems.
54
According to Chauí (1994: 98-99), our common concepts of truth
depend greatly on meanings that emerge from linguistic differences. In
Greek, truth is aletheia, with reference to what is not hidden or concealed.
Aletheia is the opposite of pseudos, which is exactly what is hidden or
concealed. When aletheia predominates, truth is in things themselves, or in
reality itself, and the mark of true knowledge is the evidence.
On the other hand, still according to Chauí (1994: 98-99), the Latin
word for truth is veritas, and it refers to the accuracy of a description, or the
level of accuracy of a story. Truth here is not about the quality of things, but
how accurate, exact and detailed a narrative is. When veritas prevails, it is
considered that truth depends on precision and accuracy in creating and
using language rules. Besides, it is important to keep in mind that the
Hebrew word for truth (emunah) refers to what was agreed upon for the
present or the future, and has to do with the expectation that something that
was arranged or agreed will happen for sure. When emunah predominates,
truth depends on a reliance agreement or a pact of trust among researchers.
Gadamer (2002: 46) draws attention to the privileged relationship
between truth and science. For him, it is clear that science "has created the
Western civilization, especially its unique mode of being and uniqueness,"
and aletheia properly means "unblinding", that is, truth is "unblinding".
Carrilho (1990, p.31) explains that the problem of truth is presented
according to two approaches, genealogical and epistemological, which
correspond to two ways of thinking about the relationship knowledge / truth.
In the first case, the emphasis is not only on justifying the knowledge, but
also using the scientific knowledge as a model; and in the other, the
importance and meaning of this same model is questioned.
Blackburn & Simmons (1999: 1) argue that truth “characterizes only
some of the things we might say or believe”. Truth is abstract in that it can
apply to propositions of any kind, on any subject matter. But what do true
propositions share, or what do the false ones lack?
Suppose we call the things we might say or believe,
propositions (there are some choices about that, but
for the moment we ignore them) then truth is
55
similarly abstract in that it can apply to propositions
of any kind, on any subject matter (Blackburn &
Simmons, 1999:1).
Musgrave (1999:247) claims that the philosophical problem of truth
would be Pilate's question. It refers to two issues: 1. What is truth? That is,
what does it mean to say of something that is true? And 2. What is true?
That is, what is the truth about the matter in which we are interested
(whatever it is). And how do we find out the truth of the matter?
According to the author, the second question is more important than
the first, but until we know what the word true means (the first), we cannot
set investigating the second.
Da Costa (1997: 22) explains that knowledge finds itself correlated
with truth. Both knowledge and logic "find themselves intertwined with each
other," because they depend on the truth. Also, from the epistemological
point of view, truth and justification are two concepts that are connected. As
for Kirkham (1997: 49), the justification must be defended or discussed with
reference to the truth, or as it is usually said, the concept of justification
presupposes the truth.
However, there are authors who disagree with this point of view,
such as Rorty (1979: 280), for whom theories about truth and meaning are
unnecessary. According to him, the thesis of justification / truth is often
defended only as input to other doctrines and would just be a way to express
the hypothesis that there is really no philosophical program in which the truth
can play its role. Thus, we would not need any theory of truth distinct from
the theory of justification. Also for Rorty, the thesis of justification would be a
metaphor for the thesis that the truth is related to a conceptual scheme or a
way of denying that the truth has any epistemological value.
Some authors (such as Strawson, 1950 or Putnan, 1971) argue that it
is inappropriate or even nonsense to say that the statements are true. Thus,
to admit what sentences are, one can explore the grammatical structure in
the definition of truth, as in some versions of the correspondence theory,
especially Tarski's semantic theory. Although the sentences clearly have
grammatical structure, utterances and propositions do not, because they are
56
extralinguistic. Thus, the plausibility of Tarski's theory could be a reason to
consider sentences as the bearers of truth.
Even though there are several categories of theories of truth,
Kirkham´s theory (1995: 20) seems to be the most complete and appropriate
for the scope of this study, as shown in the table below, although in the
course of this chapter we mention other categories such as Blackburn &
Simmons (1999) and Musgrave (1999).
Kirkham (1995: 20) proposes three main categories for theories of
truth: the metaphysical project, the justification project and the speech-act
project. The metaphysical project would aim to identify what the truth is, or,
what a true proposition would be. This project has three branches, which are
the extensional, naturalistic and essence. Also according to Kirkham, the
answers to the level of the metaphysical project can be divided into two
broad categories: realistic and unrealistic theories. Realist theories include
those historically named theories of correspondence and the unrealistic
ones include semantics, coherence and redundancy.
Regarding the justification project, some philosophers have sought to
discover what kind of evidence can be used to determine whether a given
proposition is likely to be true or not. What counts as relevant evidence
varies according to each kind of proposition, whether it is related to physical
or abstract objects. Theories of justification answer questions such as: for a
given proposition (belief or statement), when and how it is possible to justify
that it is true.
As for the speech-act project, it aims to describe locutionary and
illocutionary purposes that use expressions that seem to ascribe the quality
of truth to any proposition. They can be classified into illocutionary, assertion
or attribution. Table 2 summarizes this categorization.
57
Table 2 - Categorization of theories of truth
1. The metaphysical Project
A. The extensional project
Philosopher
Alfred Tarski
Saul Kripke
B. The naturalistic Project
C. The essence project
Philosopher
C.S.Peirce
William James
Bertrand Russel
J. L. Austin
Brand Blanshard
Paul Horwich
2. The justification Project
Philosopher
F.H.Bradley
William James
Brand Blanshard
(many others)
3. The speech-act Project
A. The ilocutionary act project
Philosopher
P.F.Strawson
Huw Price
B. The assertion Project
The assertion project
The ordinary (naive?) person
The deep structure Project
Philosopher
F.P. Ramsey
Alan White
C.J.F. Williams
Grover, Camp and Belnap
Theoretical school
Semantic theory
Semantic theory
Theoretical school
Pragmaticism
Instrumentalism
Correspondence theory
Correspondence theory
Coherence theory
Minimal theory
Theoretical school
Coherence theory
Instrumentalism
Coherence theory
Foundationalism
Theoretical school
Performantive theory
Darwinian theory
Theoretical school
Redundance theory
Appraisal theory
Redundancy theory
“Prossentential” theory
Fonte: Kirkham (1995:37).2
2
According to Kirkham (1999), Field, Davidson and Dummet have been excluded from this
list for not having a theory of truth, and supporting other kinds of projects.
58
Musgrave (1999: 149) classifies the truth in objective and subjective;
so if one defines truth not as the relationship between beliefs and the
external world but as “some internal quality of beliefs” and assuming that the
“believer” may know if this belief is true, then the “believer” may also know
the truth what Musgrave calls subjective truth. According to this classification
and regarding the first type, the general formulations are:
•
•
•
To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to
say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true;
A statement is true if and only if what it states to be the case really is
the case;
A statement is true if and only it corresponds to the facts.
And regarding the second type, the subjective theories, the general
formulations are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The self-evidence theory: a belief is true if and only if it is self-evident to
me;
The indubitability theory: a belief is true if and only if I cannot doubt it;
The clear and distinct perception theory: a belief is true if and only if I
perceive (conceive) it clearly and distinctly;
The coherence theory: a belief is true if and only if it coheres with the
rest of my beliefs;
The pragmatist theory: a belief is true if and only if I find useful to have
it;
The verifiability theory: a belief is true if and only if it is confirmed by my
experience;
The consensus theory: a belief is true if and only if my intellectual
community agrees that it is.
But according to Musgrave (1999), an objection made to subjective
theories is that they can lead to relativism, that is, a proposition can be true
or coherent, or confirmed by experience to an individual and not to another.
59
Subjetivism about truth entails relativism, and that
flies in the face of two laws of truth, the law of
excluded middle and the law of contradition
(Musgrave, 1999:254).
Blackburn & Simmons (1999: 1-29) classify the theories of truth into
two types: traditional theories of truth and minimalist theories. Traditional
theories of truth are basically four: the correspondence theory, the
coherence theory, the pragmatist theory and the theory of optimal
verification. The minimalist theories belong to the semantic field, and the
main theories are the deflationary theory, Ramsey´s redundancy theory, and
Davidson´s semantic theory.
Picture 1 Theories of Truth
Source: Haack (2006:87)
60
2. PEIRCE AND THE THEORY OF TRUTH: correspondence or
convergence?
Peirce, however conceived of himself as an architectonic
philosopher and so in order to get a grip on what he thought
about truth, one must make serious excursions into
pragmatism, theory of signs, fallibilism, critical commonsensism, logic, categories and scholastic realism (Myzak,
1991: Preface)
Correspondence theory: a statement is true if and only if it
corresponds with facts. Coherence theory: a statement is
true if and only if coheres with some specific set of other
statements we hold (Blackburn & Simon, 1999: 781)
The correspondence theory of truth comes from Aristotle's
definition, that is, for a proposition to be true it must correspond to the facts.
This Aristotelian explanation introduces a distinction between being as
something real and being itself comprising a multiplicity of ways of being. So
"X is true if X corresponds to a fact."
Blackburn & Simon (1999) claim that the correspondence theory of
truth "is a commonplace that no one denies". But the difficulties begin when
we try to dissect the notions involved. The definition of truth, according to the
theory of correspondence, leads to a discussion about what a fact is. What
kind of thing is a fact? What kind of correspondence is in question? And for
that matter what kind of thing is a proposition? For some authors, the
definition of fact (as something that actually happens, or as something that is
true, or how something corresponds to the truth) falls into a vicious circle.
Some have taken propositions to be creatures of the mind
[...] others take propositions to be abstract structures…[…]
still others hope to dispense with propositions in favour of
sentences…(Blackburn & Simon, 1999 2).
61
According to Haack (2006: 26), both Russell and Wittgenstein,
during the period of "logical atomism", defined truth as the correspondence
of a proposition with a fact, for they aspired to device a unique, ideally
language in which logical form would be perfectly exhibited.
Blackburn & Simon (1999: 2) argue that some philosophers are
pessimistic about our ability to answer these questions, they think the
answers traditionally given generate insuperable problems. There would be
two alternatives. On one hand, the authors try to find something more than
just correspondence with facts to find out what the truth is; this is the
direction taken by Bradley, Joachim, giving rise to the coherentist theory of
truth, or James and the utility, giving rise to the pragmatist theory of truth .
Some think that people trying to describe a
correspondence relation make a category mistake,
by turning facts into complexes of things, which they
are not .[…] Some think that the theory requires a
separation between the mind, as the domain of facts
(Blackburn& Simon, 1999:2).
Bradley (1999:36) claims that “the end of truth is to be and to
possess reality in an ideal form”. For Joachim (1999: 46-52):
Truth, we said, was the systematic coherence which
characterized a significant whole. And as we
proceed to identify a significant whole with “an
organized individual experience, self-fulfilling and
sel-fulfilled” […] Hence the truth, which our sketch
describe, is – from the point of view of human
intelligence – an Ideal and an Ideal which can never
as such, or in its completeness, be actual as human
experience (Joachim, 1999:46-52).
James (1907) says that “truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a
property of certain o four ideas. It means agreement, as falsity means
disagreement, with reality.”
In the second alternative, the authors deny that there actually is a
real project to discover what the truth is; this is the position of those who
oppose the correspondence theory of truth (Blackburn & Simon, 1999). In
62
this context, Haack (2006: 95) notices a persistent difficulty with the
correspondence theory has been “the difficulty of supplying a precise
amount of ‘corresponds’” although a similar problem occurs with the
coherence theory because it “needs to be specified exactly what the
appropriate relations between beliefs must be them to be coherent in the
required sense”.
Davidson (1990) criticizes realism and the correspondence theory of
truth. For him, the truth would not be the aim of the investigation. The
correspondence theory of truth would aim to find substantial evidence for our
beliefs, and there is nothing more we can do than trying to stabilize our
convictions. The truth is not a norm that can be added to norm (norms) of
justifications. Thus:
Even if we are persuaded that the concept of truth
cannot be defined, the intuition or hope remains tat
we can characterize truth using some fairly simple
formula (Davidson, 1999: 310).
Davidson (1999) claims that “truth as correspondence with reality
may be an idea we are better off without...”, especially when the words truth
and reality are capitalized. For Davidson, "the formulation is not as wrong as
empty, but it has the merit of suggesting that something should not be true
just because it is believed, even if each and every person believes in it”. The
problem of truth by correspondence rests on the assertion that the formula
has an explanatory power; however, there would be good reasons to
skepticism regarding the importance of the theory of truth by
correspondence:
Truth is, as G.E.Moore, Bertrrand Russel, and
Gottlob Frege mantained, and Alfred Tarski proved,
an indefinable concept. This does not mean we can
say notinhing revealing about it: we can, by realting it
to other concepts like belief, desire, cause and
action. Nor does the indefinability of truth imply that
the concept is mysterious, ambigouous, or
untrustworthy (Davidson, 1999: 309).
63
According to Putnam (1997: 169), for both Peirce and James, the
opinion of those who investigate is ultimately the one they “tend to consider”
to be the truth. This would be the constitutive explanation for the truth.
Da Costa (1997: 114), however, argues that in physics there are
concepts such as probability wave, quarks or phase space, which make it
difficult to accept that they actually correspond to traces of real, resembling
more the categories created by man. The empirical sciences use theories or
laws that "are known not to reproduce reality", for example, Maxwell's
electromagnetic theory or Lavoisier´s law, "although they are not strictly
true."
In this context, Souza (2000) believes that today it is accepted that
the various theories formulated by the scientist, in the fields of both natural
and human sciences, are destined to be in the near or distant future
overcome by the discovery of phenomena that distort them. Therefore, no
researcher can simply accept that his theories are true (in the sense of the
theory by correspondence).
For Haack (2006: 88), it is common to make a distinction between
definitions of truth and criteria of truth, and it is necessary to carefully deal
with this issue. However, one cannot simply refrain from using this
distinction, even if it is "problematic", because of its importance to the rivalry
between the theory of correspondence3 and the theory of coherence:
[...]the idea is, roughly, that whereas a definition
gives the meaning the word “true”, a criterion gives
a test by means of o tell whether a sentence (or
whatever) is true or false [...] (Haack, 2006: 88)
The categorization of theory of truth is a controversial issue among
scholars of Peirce. For some, Peirce chose a correspondence theory of truth
and thereby true propositions are simply the result of the final opinion of the
3
Coherence theories take truth to consist in relations of coherence among a set of beliefs.
Correspondence theories take the truth of a proposition to consist, not in its relations to
other propositions, but in relation to the world, its correspondence to the facts. Peirce,
James and Dewey offer characteristically pragmatic accounts of truth which combine
coherence and correspondence elements (Haack, 2006: 86).
64
scientific community (Thompson, 1952, Scheffer 1994, Rescher, 2000, and
Haack, 1978).
Do you think, reader, that it is a positive fact that
"Truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again," or do you
think that this, being poetry, is only a pretty fiction?
Do you think that, notwithstanding the horrible
wickedness of every mortal wight, the idea of right
and wrong is nevertheless the greatest power on this
earth, to which every knee must sooner or later bow
or be broken down; or do you think that this is
another notion at which common sense should
smile? (CP 1.217 de 1902).
All positive reasoning is of the nature of judging the
proportion of something in a whole collection by the
proportion found in a sample. Accordingly, there are
three things to which we can never hope to attain by
reasoning, namely, absolute certainty, absolute
exactitude, absolute universality (CP 1.141 de 1897).
For others, the correspondence theory of truth would be an ideal limit
to scientific progress (Levi, 1980, Quine4, 1960). To them, science is a body
of well-justified beliefs in the pursuit of truth, which will not be affected even
if its progress continues forever. There is a third group that argues that for
Peirce true propositions are a matter of correspondence between language
and the world, so some true propositions correspond to what the scientific
community endorses as a final conclusion in case the research continues
(Thompson, 1953, Hilpinen, 1982). In this view, truth is not a regulative
concept and will never be discovered unless asymptotically.
Also, there are scholars who consider Peirce's theory of truth a
theory of coherence. For them, there is no relationship between the opinion
of the scientific community and the extra linguistic world. Altshuler (1982: 43)
notes that, in 1867, in his review of Venn´s "The Logic of Chance", Peirce
4
Like Quine, Peirce insisted that there is no knowledge in philosophy other than empirical
science and that logic is methodologically compatible with natural science, telling
something about things are.
65
argues that "truth is the agreement of representation with its object" (CP 8.3,
1867).
The fact that Peirce believes that truth consists in the existence of a
fact corresponding to the true proposition (CP 2.652, 1877) and that truth is
the correspondence of representation with its object (CP 5.553, 1905),
scholars such as Rescher (1994, 2000, 2005) and Haack (1978) considered
Peirce fundamentally committed to the correspondence theory of truth.
However, when analyzing what is involved in the correspondence relation,
what is observed is that he rarely talks about combining thought with an
interpreted reality, showing that he might be more concerned with the
correspondence of a given belief with the ultimate ideal. As much as James
and Dewey, Peirce would consider truth as correspondence in terms of the
relationship between cognitive entities (Altshuler, 1982: 43).
According to Altshuler (1982), when Peirce talks about
correspondence, he refers to the topics which we potentially have cognitive
access to. Both James and Dewey argue that truth involves a relation of
correspondence or agreement, but the nature of this relationship can only be
determined by a pragmatic analysis. James’ position was first presented in
1884 in "The Function of Cognition", which presents a point of view that he
later adopted to disseminate the power of Royce´s argument for an absolute
mind as the only possible reference. Briefly, the relationship between an
idea and its object is the function of that idea leading to some unexpected
experiences. The fact that designed experiences are available in appropriate
circumstances, in part constitutes the truth of the representation in question.
The agreement involving the truth is the agreement between ideas.
It is the correspondence between an expected experience and
experience itself that actually happens in relevant circumstances, then the
truth is not a relationship between our ideas and non-human realities, but
between conceptual parts of our experience and sensational parts. Dewey
also specifies the corresponding relation of truth and a connection between
cognitive entities.
66
The relation gets the fulfillment of a purpose, a plan and its execution,
and the result is the verification or the success of the initial belief that certain
actions would lead to certain consequences. It can be seen that Peirce uses
the notion of correspondence in the same way as James and Dewey, and
the truth would not be defended in terms of the relationship between the
representation and the thing itself.
To support these considerations, Altshuler refers to CP 5.5535, 1905,
in which Peirce argues that the nature of the correspondence is not specified
in human terms, then the truth would have no meaning for us. In order to
avoid this, truth is defined as the final result to which we would be taken
when following the method of science. In this case, the representation would
conform to something that is the nature of the representation or sign –
“something nomological, conceivable, and definitely a thing-in-itself".
Hookway (2000: 78) relates the truth in Peirce with convergence,
correspondence and reference. From the point of view of truth by
convergence, the analysis is related to the idea of science as a sociohistorical research process (CP 7:54, 1902), emphasizing science as a way
of life.
Regarding the view of truth by correspondence, Hookway highlights
the passage "truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the
ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific
belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of
the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness" (CP 5.565, 1901). This
conception shows that true propositions provide iconic representations of
reality.
From the point of view of truth by reference, it is important to
emphasize the role of ratings in Peirce's theory, as well as the concepts
related to the theory of perception and the theory of knowledge (CP 5.384,
1877) 6.
5
6
This passage was mentioned on pages 47 and 81
This passage was presented on page 27.
67
According to Rorty (1999: 328), Peirce in his earlier period wanted to
avoid both the revisionary metaphysics of idealism and the promissory notes
of physicalism.
He shared with the idealist and the physicalist the
motive of refuting the sceptic, but he thought it
enough to say that “reality” means somthibng like
“whatever we sall still be asserting the existence of
at the end of inquity”. This definition of reality
briedges the gap the s etic sees between coherence
and correspondence (Rorty, 1999: 328).
On the other hand, in CP 7.187, 1901, Peirce is clear about the
nature of correspondence when he claimed that the scientific truth is “the
agreement with that ultimate proposition that we look forward to, —
agreement with that, whatever it may turn out to be”.
And also:
No modification of the point of view taken, no
selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of
mind even, can enable a man to escape the
predestinate opinion (CP 5.407 de 1897)
Or,
[…] it is the predestined ultimate idea, which is
independent of what you, I, or any number of men
may persist, for however long, in thinking, yet which
remains thought, after all (CP 8.103 de 1900).
The analysis of the passages mentioned suggests a theory of truth by
correspondence, because they ensure that the true proposition is one that
accurately describes a world whose properties are logically and causally
independent of minds7.
7
See CP 5.406, 8.153, 3.129 or 6.495; CP 5.416, 1905 or 5.407, 1893 or 8.126, 1902, or
5.554, 1906 or 2.135, 1902 and 5.384, 1877.
68
But Peirce emphasizes that "beyond the realm of truth and falsity
verification lose their meanings" (Nation, 57, 1893) or a hypothesis is true
when certain predictions based on it have been verified by it (MS 473: 23).
Peirce defines truth in terms of scientific inference to be achieved by the
community, that is, as correspondence and coherence, because in the
context of Peirce's philosophy, scientific research is an activity focused on
one end, which is the discovery of truth. In the realist view, science
progresses by convergence toward truth, in the sense of correspondence
with reality. This is an important element, because the very validity of
induction is related to predictions, not as a basis for action, but as validity of
the scientific method, as a way to uncover the truth.
Savan (1964) and Rescher (1978) argue that Peirce adopts a
correspondence theory of truth along with a criterion of truth by coherence.
One could say that, especially after the 1900s, Peirce's ideas about the truth
are closely related to his strong defense of realism.
According to Rescher's argument (2000: 11), the pragmatic view of
truth in Peirce is understandably coordinated with effective implementation.
But this must be understood considering the background of some
assumptions, because a pragmatic theory of truth is always construed with
reference to a criterion that assess the claims to truth of a factual contention
in terms of the success engendered by its acceptance. But for Peirce this
criterion is neither immediately nor simply the factor of its applicative
success, but, “Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the
ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific
belief…” (CP 5.565, 1901).
On the other hand, there is an instinctive mechanism in human
cognition that allows us to acquire rational knowledge of reality, probably like
other animals that are also confronted with reality, but that only acquire more
practical knowledge. This basic mechanism is called by Peirce the "natural
instinct for truth"8
8
Also see CP 7.220, 1903 or CP 7.77, 1882 or CP 2.176, 1902 or CP 5.212, 1903 or CP
5.554, 1906.
69
In examining the reasonings of those physicists who
gave to modern science the initial propulsion which
has insured its healthful life ever since, we are struck
with the great, though not absolutely decisive, weight
they allowed to instinctive judgments. Galileo
appeals to il lume naturale at the most critical stages
of his reasoning. Kepler, Gilbert, and Harvey — not
to speak of Copernicus — substantially rely upon an
inward power, not sufficient to reach the truth by
itself, but yet supplying an essential factor to the
influences carrying their minds to the truth. (CP 1.80,
1896).
Side by side, then, with the well established
proposition that all knowledge is based on
experience, and that science is only advanced by the
experimental verifications of theories, we have to
place this other equally important truth, that all
human knowledge, up to the highest flights of
science, is but the development of our inborn animal
instincts (CP 2.754, 1883).
For Almeder (1982: 64), Peirce has never distanced himself from his
realistic commitment, and therefore the nature of truth by correspondence
would be incompatible with his fallibilism.
Regarding the contemporary authors, Dummett´s realism involves an
assessment of meaning dependent on truth, but his verificationist theory of
meaning is antirealist. Goodman in turn declares himself a radical relativist,
and the truth would only be relevant to denotational systems. Quine (1999),
though not explicitly antirealist, can also be placed in the perspective of
others because of his rejection of metaphysical realism. For Quine, truth is
related to a theory, in which it is stated the terms of discourse.
Truth hinges on reality, but to object, on this score,
to calling sentences true, is a confusion. Where the
truth predicate has its utility is in just those places,
where, though still concerned with reality, we are
impelled by certain technical complications to
mentions sentences (Quine, 1999: 144).
70
Peirce´s theory of truth was developed in accordance with his realist
theory of knowledge, in which reality and truth are two closely related
concepts. Peirce was always interested in the truth, because he believed it
was the main goal of science, that is, one would reach the truth through the
use of the scientific method.
His first conception of truth was presented in 1868, in an attack on
the Cartesian epistemology. By defining truth as an established opinion at
the end of a scientific research, he sets a standard view that rejects causal
realism as an explanation for knowledge.
To the argument from universal and hypothetical
propositions, the reply is, that though their truth
cannot be cognized with absolute certainty, it may be
probably known by induction (CP 5.258, 1868)
In his criticism of nominalism (in which the role of reasoning is
undermined, since it does not provide established truths about a world
known by the effects of sensations, unless it is granted by God) comes an
understanding of reality as well as an evolutionary concept of truth. As
Peirce develops his view of reality in order to make it equivalent to the truth
itself, and the final theory becomes its own object, reality becomes an ideal
entity due to final causation (telos) of research progress.
Peirce's ideas about the scientific method are particularly connected
to his conception of truth, which in turn can be seen as a type of semiosis9.
In fact, the specific kind of correspondence involved in Peirce´s theory of
truth can be conceived as a kind of semiotic relationship.
In CP 5.311, 1868, Peirce claimed that “those two series of cognition
— the real and the unreal — consist of those which, at a time sufficiently
future, the community will always continue to re-affirm; and of those which,
under the same conditions, will ever after be denied”, which will be later
resumed:
9
Generating or producing another sign is proper to sign action, a process that Peirce calls
semiosis.
71
[...] the ideal limit towards which endless
investigation would tend to bring scientific belief,
which concordance the abstract statement may
possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy
and one-sidedness, and this confession is an
essential ingredient of truth (CP 5.565, 1901).
In 1871, Peirce argues that “all human opinion universally tends in
the long run to a definite form, which is the truth”.
Let any human being have enough information and
exert enough thought upon any question, and the
result will be that he will arrive at a certain definite
conclusion, which is the same that any other mind
will reach under sufficiently favorable circumstances
(CP 8.12, 1871).
In 1873, Peirce claims that “truth is a character which attaches to an
abstract proposition, such as a person might utter. It essentially depends
upon that proposition´s not professing to be exactly true” (CP 5.565, 1901).
In 1878, “truth consists in the existence of a real fact corresponding to the
true proposition”. For Peirce, “the truth of the hypothetical proposition that if
the premises be true the conclusion will also be true” (CP 2.652, 1878).
On the other hand, the decision about the truth or falsity of any belief
is only possible through knowledge, and this decision is not immediate.
Investigating is to inquire and try to get answers, it is to increasingly
reinforce a certain belief. But there is a question that can be asked based on
the first version of the truth: will the reality be represented only at the end of
the investigation, when the final opinion is reached? This issue will only be
settled from the 1900s on, with the use of “would-be´s”.
In “Truth and Reality: Putnan and the Pragmatic Conception of
Truth”, Hookway (n.d.) summarizes the evolutionary path of the notion of
truth in Peirce´s work. The author separates Peirce's views before and after
1880. In 1877-8, the convergence thesis is preponderant. Peirce’s earlier
formulations of the convergence thesis form part of an explanation of the
concept of reality.
72
Peirce’s formulations of the convergence thesis after 1880 qualify this
confidence that we shall always eventually reach a fated convergence. The
passage (CP 4.32) suggests a considerable weakening of the claims from
1877-8. Transforming the commitment to convergence into a hope, a
regulative ideal, is a pervasive feature of his later writings. As Peirce’s
philosophy developed after 1878, he soon came to give his account of truth
a regulative status. After 1900, Peirce challenged the ‘virtual assumption
that what is relative to thought cannot be real’ (CP 5.430, 1905).
According to Hookway (n.d.), Peirce´s first definitions of truth would
be part of the clarification of the concept of reality (reality as the object of
true opinion). They would represent his eagerness to develop metaphysics
from logic, for which he needed a logical analysis of truth in order to identify
a set of true propositions with reference to its destination in the research
process.
In the 1877-8 period, an absolute conception of truth and reality could
be found in Peirce´s writings, especially “How to make our ideas Clear” and
“Fixation of Belief”. It would be a worldview independent of our experience,
disregarding all that refers to a particular perspective and avoiding
dependence on any feature of our cognitive apparatus, a conception mostly
independent of our perspectives and peculiarities:
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and
the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is
the way I would explain reality (CP 5.407, 1877).
After 1880, Peirce would have developed a new way to explain our
thoughts about reality (external things would be directly perceived). The
formulations after 1880 would show confidence that we would always reach
this predestined convergence. But, by fate, one can also understand the
consolidation of researchers´ opinion, a view that is bound to find the real
and truth means something that the research shows. Around 1903, Peirce
would introduce the immediate object of perception.
In “What Pragmatism Is” (1905), Peirce resumes his initial ideas
about truth and reality, explaining that the predestined opinion "controlled by
a rational experimental logic" does not depend on any accidental
73
circumstance, “however the perversity of thought of whole generations may
cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation” (CP 5.430, 1905).
Hausman (1993) reinforces this idea by stating that a general cannot
be thought of without a telos, with respect to being a habit, a third, the
general is what it is due to its influence on its future instances, that is, what
is truly real is necessarily connected to the general idea that it represents.
Peirce´s theory of truth results from the application of the pragmatic
principle to the clarification of concepts, a principle which is advocated as an
appropriate methodological rule for these purposes, based on his theory of
signs. Briefly, Peirce defines genuine sign as a relational process among
three terms (sign, object, interpretant), and the sign action itself generates or
produces another sign, a process called semiosis. In the triadic relation
among sign, object and interpretant, everything has a semiotic nature. This
is not a simple triadic relation, but a complex of triadic relations, which can
be thought of in three different ways, depending on the emphasis that is
placed on each of the correlates. If the sign is emphasized, it is a
relationship of meaning or representation. If the object is put in evidence, it
is a relationship of objectification. And finally, if the interpreter is
emphasized, it is a relationship of interpretation.
Genuine mediation is the character of a Sign. A Sign
is anything which is related to a Second thing, its
Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to
bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to
the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring
a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form,
ad infinitum. If the series is broken off, the Sign, in so
far, falls short of the perfect significant character (CP
2.92, 1902).
In this triadic relationship there is a scheme of continuity that Peirce
calls semiosis, explaining that no interpretant can be seen as absolute or
definitive. The sign is mediation for its object and representation for its
interpretant.
The easiest of those which are of philosophical
interest is the idea of a sign, or representation. A
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sign stands for something to the idea which it
produces, or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying
into the mind something from without. That for which
it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its
meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise, its
interpretant. The object of representation can be
nothing but a representation of which the first
representation is the interpretant. But an endless
series of representations, each representing the one
behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute
object at its limit. The meaning of a representation
can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is
nothing but the representation itself conceived as
stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never
can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for
something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite
regression here (CP 1.339, 1875).
The typical mode of action of the sign is the growth through selfgeneration. By its own constitution, the sign is bound to germinate and grow,
but then comes its inevitably incomplete nature, because the sign is
connected to the object, not in all aspects, otherwise it would be the object
itself. The otherness of the object is the result of the incompleteness of the
sign. The sign can only represent the object and refer to it (CP 2.230, 1910).
In Peircean semiotics, the term semiosis refers primarily to the action
of the sign to produce an interpretant of itself; but since the interpretant is
also a sign with the same sort of productive power, one can speak of the
semiosis processes. It should be noted that during the process of semiosis,
the generation of the interpretant is primarily more the action of the sign
itself than the interpreter (anything that can represent the sign).
The role of an interpreter is primarily perception and interpretation. It
is also implied a rule according to which the sign is responsible for
generating interpretants, that is, an immanent principle that supports the
idea that it is an autonomous and self-generative process.
A sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving
an interpretation, that is, by virtue of its determining
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another sign of the same object. This is as true of
mental judgments as it is of external signs. To say
that a proposition is true is to say that every
interpretation of it is true (CP 5.569, 1901).
The idea is that the sign has three modal aspects: it has a certain
appearance, it is something that occurs or exists, not necessarily in the real
world, but in the universe of discourse, and it has the power of generating
interpretants. But what logically makes it a sign is the third, which means
that we are interested in its power to generate interpretants, that is, a rule
that means something that rules.
On the other hand, “an argument is always understood by its
Interpretant to belong to a general class of analogous arguments, which
class, as a whole, tends toward the truth” (CP 2.266, 1903).
The operation of the sign is actually the operation of the object
through sign (CP 2.277, 1903). The object of the representation is a
representation of the first representation which is the interpretant, but an
endless series of representations, each representing the previous one, can
be conceived as having an absolute object as a limit.
Without considering the mathematical concept of limit for Peirce,
there is certainly a sense in which the dynamic object is in sequence by
virtue of being represented, as long as being the term of a representative
relation, it is "ipso facto" part of the sequence, because “to make a
distinction between the true conception of a thing and the thing itself is, he
will say, only to regard one and the same thing from two different points of
view; for the immediate object of thought in a true judgment is the reality”.
(CP 8.16, CP 3.482).
So, when we realize that Peirce considers thought essentially
temporal, it is clear why he says that the immediate object of thought in a
true judgment is the reality, the thing in itself as it appears. Thus, “in being
real and external, it does not in the least cease to be a purely psychical
product, a generalized percept, like everything of which I can take any sort
of cognizance” (CP 8.144, 1901).
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According to Ransdell (2001), semiosis is an interpretative process
and therefore has the structure of an objective reference. This structure is
implicit and it is not necessarily consciously observed as such. However, to
explain the objectivity, it is necessary to understand semiosis, not merely in
its formal aspect, but also to develop an understanding of semiosis as a
communicative process.
Moreover, Ransdell claims that it is implicit in the concept of the
interpretant as such, that is, talking about objectivity in a methodical sense is
talking about what concerns Peirce in “Fixation of Belief” and "How to make
our ideas clear", which is the nature of the research. Since the interpretant
represents the relationship between the term sign (relate) and the term
object (correlate), it has, by definition, the second intentional function, which
means that the logical point of view constitutes the objective consciousness.
Peirce asks: what represents sign-thought? What designates it?
What is its suppositum?
The outward thing, undoubtedly, when a real
outward thing is thought of. But still, as the thought is
determined by a previous thought of the same
object, it only refers to the thing through denoting
this previous thought (CP 5.285, 1868).
What Peirce describes here as what was previously thought is the
immediate object, while the dynamic object is the thing itself regarded as
what is "thought of." The theory of interpretants comprises one of the pillars
of Peirce's epistemology. The interpretants can be categorized into
immediate, dynamic and final.
The immediate interpretant is the effect the sign is able to produce.
The dynamic interpretant is the effect that the sign actually produces in the
interpreter´s mind, it is that what happens in the process of semiosis.
The concept of the final interpretant is of utmost importance for the
purpose of this work, because Peirce connects it with the truth, “because it is
that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if
consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were
reached” (CP 8.184 n.d.). The final interpretant is the effect that the sign
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would produce in any mind, a semiosis carried out in the long run, the one
that would represent a definitive opinion. The final interpretant is what will
appear when we know everything about the object at the end of the
investigation, it is the final belief which tends to the evolution of our
investigation, the belief that will not be removed.
The idea of final interpretant is part of Peirce's cosmology. In the
evolutionary process, the final representation would coincide with the object
itself, and the final interpretant would coincide with the object itself because
the structure of the object would be completely unveiled and the object
would not object anymore. If it were possible, in the development of
semiosis, to fully reveal the dynamic object that is the real, to the point of
fully revealing the dynamic object, then the final interpretant would
correspond to the truth. But as the sign produces its interpretants, the
dynamic object becomes increasingly complex and the final interpretant (or
truth) ends up being continuously postponed.
On the other hand, the meaning of an intellectual concept can only
be assigned by the study of interpretants, or proper meaning of signs. The
first effect is a feeling (emotional interpretant), the second effect is an effort
(energetic interpretant), and a third effect is a thought (logical interpretant)
(CP 5.475, 1907).
From the point of view of logic, the rational meaning of an intellectual
concept lies only in the ultimate logical interpretant (habit change), because
a sign is interpreted in a subsequent sign, and so ad infinitum (CP 5.492,
1907). “The Truth, the fact that is not abstract but complete, is the ultimate
interpretant of every sign”. (NEM IV: 240).
In CP 5.56, Peirce claims that truth is in accordance with something
that is independent of human thought or opinion (CP 5.211, 1903):
That truth is the correspondence of a
representation with its object is, as Kant says,
merely the nominal definition of it. Truth belongs
exclusively to propositions. A proposition has a
subject (or set of subjects) and a predicate. The
subject is a sign, the predicate is a sign; and the
proposition is a sign that the predicate is a sign
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of that of which the subject is a sign. If it be so, it
is true (CP 5.553, 1903).
Or,
[…] In that case, that to which the representation
should conform, is itself something in the nature
of a representation, or sign — something
noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly
unlike a thing-in-itself (CP 5.553, 1903).
This passage shows how it is not possible to separate Peirce´s
theory of truth from the notions of sign, perception, reality. Truth belongs
exclusively to propositions, because in order to make it real it is necessary
the action of the object over the sign. Two propositions are equivalent when
one of them has been the interpretant of the other, but the interpretant of a
proposition and any inference derived from a proposition is an interpretant of
it. So when we talk about truth and falsity we refer to the possibility of
refuting a proposition:
Truth and falsity are characters confined to
propositions […] Thus, a false proposition is a
proposition of which some interpretant represents
that, on an occasion which it indicates, a percept will
have a certain character, while the immediate
perceptual judgment on that occasion is that the
percept has not that character. A true proposition is
a proposition belief in which would never lead to
such disappointment so long as the proposition is
not understood otherwise than it was intended (CP
5.569, 1901).
But what does this correspondence or reference of the sign, to its
object, consist in? Both the object and the interpretant are integral parts of
the sign, as the generation process, which can only be defined in relation to
the object and the interpretant. Truth and falsity are properties of
representation and contents of representation are vague, indefinite. In order
to take over its role as a sign, that is, a sign can only function as a sign if it
can be interpreted and this interpretation should be made as another sign
(CP 5.553).
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Your problems would be greatly simplified, if, instead
of saying that you want to know the "Truth," you
were simply to say that you want to attain a state of
belief unassailable by doubt (CP 5.416, 1905).
If your terms "truth" and "falsity" are taken in such
senses as to be definable in terms of doubt and
belief and the course of experience (as for example
they would be, if you were to define the "truth" as
that to a belief in which belief would tend if it were to
tend indefinitely toward absolute fixity), well and
good: in that case, you are only talking about doubt
and belief (CP 5.416, 1905).
2.1 Truth and Method
Logic teaches that Chance, Law and Continuity must be
great elements of the explanation of the universe (NEM
IV:376).
Logic requires us, with reference to each question we
have in hand, to hope some defineit answer to it may be
true (MS140, NEM IV: xiii).
In order to analyze the relationship between truth and method in
Peirce's philosophy, it is initially worth emphasizing that Peirce proposes a
definition of science as "a mode of life", based on his own experience as a
scientist and his knowledge of science history:
Science should be a mode of life to us, whose only
purpose is to find the truth [...] It does not matter how
imperfect the knowledge of a man can be, how
subject to error and prejudice, from the moment he
engages in an investigation with the spirit described,
science is what matters the most (CP 7.54-55 1902).
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Peirce extends this definition to all sciences. In Peirce´s perspective,
when it comes to science in general or in particular, it is understood a
community of researchers in a given period of time, with a purpose and a
method in common, which makes the result more than a simple sum of
individual results. In this context, the socio-historical meaning of a research
is clear, which is shown in the following passage:
If we are to define science, not in the sense of
stuffing it into an artificial pigeon-hole where it may
be found again by some insignificant mark, but in the
sense of characterizing it as a living historic entity,
we must conceive it as that about which such men
as I have described busy themselves (CP 1.44 de
1892).
So, if a man is thirsty to learn and compare his ideas with
experimental results in order to fix these ideas, that man will be recognized
by scientists as such, no matter how little his knowledge may be (CP 1.44 de
1892).
In Peirce´s research model, presented in his text "Fixation of Belief",
research is the struggle for stabilization of belief. The research begins with a
doubt, but not Descartes’ doubt, which is a methodological doubt, but a
genuine and specific doubt that generates a state of discomfort. From this
state of uncomfortable doubt, a scientist, a researcher or even a common
person in his everyday life struggles to establish a new belief, which Peirce
calls research.
We cannot be quite sure that the community ever will
settle down to an unalterable conclusion upon any
given question. Even if they do so for the most part,
we have no reason to think the unanimity will be
quite complete, nor can we rationally presume any
overwhelming consensus of opinion will be reached
upon every question (CP 6.610 de 1891).
Therefore, in the method of science, later called pragmatic, our
beliefs are determined by something external, independent of our fantasies,
and the results we got must meet the reality and also be subjected to the
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criticism of others. But how does a wide variety of observations and
processes can lead to a conclusion that is accepted by all those who
understand it? For Peirce, when different researchers agree on a final result,
it would not simply be a brute fact; on the contrary, there is convergence of
opinions, observations, ideas and viewpoints. The explanation for this is in
his theory of reality as the final outcome of the investigation. Reality is not
only something that corresponds with the world, but what is represented in
the final opinion of the research (CP 1.420, 2.5661, 4.580, 5.453, 5.467,
5.528, 6.327).
Rorty (1990: 7) is suspicious of the expression “final opinion”,
because he doubts whether this expression can clarify the notions of
"absolute truth" and "absolute reality"; he doubts that there is a single project
called research that is intended to reach a specific end.
Therefore, according to Peirce, research consists of a logical
framework and its goal is the knowledge of the real. On the other hand, the
belief tends to be gradually set by the influence of the research, that is, in
the long run the process of inquiry tends to converge towards the edge and
stabilization of belief. Therefore, in Peirce´s writings, there is a conception of
truth connected with the establishment or fixation of belief at the end of the
research and the scientific method is in the center of this issue.
The idea of science as an activity in which a community of
researchers is engaged and the conception of reality as a final opinion
obtained in the inquiry process can be analyzed as reciprocal. Or, according
to Peirce:
There is no escaping the admission that the ultimate
end of inquiry — the essential, not ulterior end — the
mould to which we endeavor to shape our opinions,
cannot itself be of the nature of an opinion. Could it
be realized, it would rather be like an insistent
image, not referring to anything else, and in that
sense concrete (CP 8.104, 1900).
For Peirce, methods are adopted to minimize surprises and reduce
erros (CP 2.173, 6.413). Peirce asks: “Why should one study logic?”
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In the first place, you would not wish to study logic
unless you intended to reason; and you doubtless
hold the purpose of reasoning to be the
ascertainment of the truth. So it appears that you
belong to the sect that maintains that there is such a
thing as truth. Ought you not, then, to settle with
yourself what that opinion of yours precisely
amounts to, and further, what reason there is for
entertaining it?
In the second place, you not only seem to fancy that
there is such a thing as truth, but also that it can be
found out and known, in some measure. What
reason is there for that?
In the third place, you seem to think not only that
some knowledge can be attained, but that it can be
attained by reasoning.
In the fourth place, you seem to think that not only
may reasoning lead to the truth, but that a man may
be deceived by reasoning badly. This conception
seems to demand scrutiny (CP 2.125-128, 1902).
Peirce explores the relation between logic and psychology, the nature
of truth and reasoning.
Peirce describes logic as the art of developing research methods (CP
7:59, 1882), methods that would lead to the truth, because when certain
modes of reasoning are persistently met, they should lead us to the truth
(CP 1.608, 1903). Scientific research is justified because it is self-correction,
which means that on the long run it eliminates errors, because:
Thus it is that inquiry of every type, fully carried out,
has the vital power of self-correction and of growth.
This is a property so deeply saturating its inmost
nature that it may truly be said that there is but one
thing needful for learning the truth, and that is a
hearty and active desire to learn what is true. If you
really want to learn the truth, you will, by however
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devious a path, be surely led into the way of truth, at
last. No matter how erroneous your ideas of the
method may be at first, you will be forced at length to
correct them so long as your activity is moved by
that sincere desire. Nay, no matter if you only half
desire it, at first, that desire would at length conquer
all others, could experience continue long enough.
But the more veraciously truth is described at the
outset, the shorter by centuries will the road to it be
(CP 5.582, 1898).
The issue of self-correctiveness is a very controversial topic among
scholars Peirce. The argument of self-correctiveness, its relationship with
the truth as convergence and the growth of knowledge are addressed by
Rescher (1978), Delaney (1993), Hausman (1993) and Misak (1991).
To Goudge (1950), the self-correcting tendency is due to the fact that
induction is based on samples randomly taken and each sample is free to
bring the same frequency, and hence the objective constitution of what is
being studied is finally revealed.
According to Ransdell (1999), scientific researchers report and
respond to each other in accordance with a shared framework of critical
expectations, and it is their adherence to ethical standards that makes the
process of self-correcting research.
In “Scientific Inquiry as a Self-Correcting Process", Foster (n. d.)
argues that, when it comes to fixation of beliefs, self-correctiveness of the
scientific method would not be only a matter of faith, but it would be at the
very superiority of the method over others.
The logic of research is seen as a cycle abduction / deduction /
induction / new abduction... When surprising events are observed, or
differences between predictions and results demand either reformulation or
abandonment of the original hypothesis, or the formulation of entirely new
hypotheses, then the cycle restarts as new abduction. After proving the
validity of abduction, deduction and induction, Peirce shows that together
they constitute a method that is self-corrective. The notion of self-
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correctiveness of science cannot be treated separately from the concept of
induction.
Forster (n. d.) allocate criticism to self-correctiveness into two groups:
the first group comprises those authors who think that Peirce failed to find a
successful criterion to defend the scientific method; and the second group
comprises those scholars who challenge the adequacy Peirce´s criterion.
According to Rescher (1978: 3), Peirce's attempt to justify induction by selfcorrectiveness has been one of the most criticized topics of his philosophy.
This self-correcting character, which Peirce calls "wonderful property of
Reason", will also be reassured in 1898, in a passage of the Conference
"The First Rule of Logic":
That Induction tends to correct itself, is obvious
enough [...] Now the operation of inferring a law in a
succession of observed numbers is, broadly
speaking, inductive; and therefore we see that a
properly conducted Inductive research corrects its
own premises (CP 5.576 or RLT :167, 1898).
In the article “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined” (CP 6.50-65,
1892), Peirce develops more fully the defense of the self-correcting
character of induction. The self-correction of induction means that in the long
run the induction will eventually be successful, and inferences arising from
sampling procedures are considered provisional and experiential. Induction
is a kind of inference that through continued work will necessarily lead to the
truth at the end (CP 2.757, 1905).
The self-correctiveness is related to two conditions: sample
randomness and pre-selected characters. These two inductive rules
generate logical basis for the validity of induction, but they have often been
violated (CP 1.95, 1896):
The truth is that induction is reasoning from a
sample taken at random to the whole lot sampled. A
sample is a random one, provided it is drawn by
such machinery, artificial or physiological, that in the
long run any one individual of the whole lot would get
taken as often as any other.
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Therefore, judging of the statistical composition of a
whole lot from a sample is judging by a method
which will be right on the average in the long run,
and, by the reasoning of the doctrine of chances, will
be nearly right oftener than it will be far from right
(CP 1.93-94, 1896).
For Skagestad (1981:199), there are five things that favor the notion
of self-correctiveness:
•
•
•
•
•
the autonomy of pure research, because science is extremely radical,
leading us to question accepted theories or doctrines in order to submit
them to the test of experience. In this context, Peirce´s conception of
truth is crucial, such as the agreement of opinions in the long run;
the fallibility of science in the short run. Peirce opposed to positivist
ideas, while reinforcing the idea that the validity of induction is based on
the calculation of probabilities, which justifies our belief in selfcorrectiveness of induction; Peirce also shows that we cannot trust the
results of inductive conclusions;
the legitimacy of statistical explanation, based on sample randomness
and pre-selected characters;
the rejection of Laplace´s theory of probability, that Peirce eventually
reduces to absurdity.
anthropocentrism of science: this is an important point and is connected
to the issue of instinct and the natural tendency of man to formulate
correct hypotheses.
In “Definitions of Truth” (CP 5.565-573, 1901), Peirce presents many
definitions of truth, distinguishing scientific truth from mathematical truth.
The pure mathematician deals exclusively with hypotheses, whether or not
there is any corresponding real thing is not what we should be concerned
with, because hypotheses are created by the imagination.
The logical truth is a feature that is linked to an abstract proposition,
in the same way that a person can enunciate, it depends essentially that
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propositions are not expressed as being completely true (CP 5.565, 1901).
The truths of mathematics are truths about ideas merely (NEM IV: xv).
Peirce also argues that logical truth is a sentence used in three ways:
•
•
•
The harmony of a thought with itself. Most usually so defined, but
seldom so employed. So far as this definition is distinct, it makes logical
truth a synonym for logical possibility; but, no doubt, more is intended.
The conformity of a thought to the laws of logic; in particular, in a
concept, consistency; in an inference, validity; in a proposition,
agreement with assumptions. This would better be called mathematical
truth, since mathematics is the only science which aims at nothing
more.
More properly, the conformity of a proposition with the reality, so far as
the proposition asserts anything about the reality. Opposed, on the one
hand, to metaphysical truth, which is an affection of the ens, and, on the
other hand, to ethical truth, which is telling what a witness believes to be
true. (CP 2.541, 1901).
But what would Peirce´s criterion of truth be? Apparently, it would be
the scientific method itself, because it works when correctly applied. But
what is the nature of truth? In the works on logic, from 1873, Peirce begins
by asking how a variety of observations and thought processes can lead to a
consensual conclusion that is accepted by all the researchers (CP 7331336). The answer would be in the relation truth / reality, in the review of the
book "The works of George Berkeley", edited by Fraser (CP 8.7-31 1871).
According to Peirce´s realism, real is an object of true opinion. Truth
is not an individual matter. The truth has a collective sense and the
individual may even lose sight of it, but “it remains that there is a definite
opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run,
tending” (CP 8.12, 1871). Truth can only be reached in the long run, by the
ongoing use of the scientific method and by a scientific community, because
there is an outer reality working as a force external to the scientific research,
as confirmed in the following passages:
A certain writer has suggested that reality, the fact
that there is such a thing as a true answer to a
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question, consists in this: that human inquiries, —
human reasoning and observation, — tend toward
the settlement of disputes and ultimate agreement in
definite conclusions which are independent of the
particular stand-points from which the different
inquirers may have set out; so that the real is that
which any man would believe in, and be ready to act
upon, if his investigations were to be pushed
sufficiently far (CP 8.41, 1885).
It is important to note that it is not a simple idea or a single simple
procedure regarding abduction, or deduction, or induction that can achieve
correspondence of an idea to reality. Only the full cognitive process, using
the correct method of transforming signs, is what makes the truth nothing
more or less than the ultimate result we would achieve in case the method
had been followed. But even assuming a fallacy may have emerged, we
must admit that the only method of reaching the truth is repeating this triad
of operations: conjecture (abduction), deduction of predictions from
conjecture and test of predictions by experiment (induction) (CP 7.762,
1903).
For Peirce, a research is composed of three stages: abduction,
deduction and induction, so that it can neither be reduced to any of its parts
nor to the hypothetico-deductive method. The scientific method would then
be self-corrective as a product of the human mind, which is self-corrective.
Thus, the scientific method is itself the criterion of truth, but only in the long
term one can tell if the proposition is true.
Marostica, (1989: 20-23) examines the development of the
scientific method in Peirce´s work, dividing it into three phases. The first
phase covers the year 1868 (the anti-Cartesian texts) when Peirce begins to
associate the three types of reasoning – deduction, induction and
hypothesis- to the scientific method. The second phase corresponds to the
period from 1871 to 1878. The scientific method is presented as an effort to
calm down the doubt. In "Illustrations of the logic of science", truth is related
to method, and probability, to induction. The investigation process can
always be restarted and the scientific activity should not be exclusive to a
single individual.
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The third phase corresponds to the development of logic as the
method of the methods:
The scientific specialists — pendulum swingers and
the like — are doing a great and useful work; each
one very little, but altogether something vast. But the
higher places in science in the coming years are for
those who succeed in adapting the methods of one
science to the investigation of another. That is what
the greatest progress of the passing generation has
consisted in. Darwin adapted to biology the methods
of Malthus and the economists; Maxwell adapted to
the theory of gases the methods of the doctrine of
chances, and to electricity the methods of
hydrodynamics. Wundt adapts to psychology the
methods of physiology; Galton adapts to the same
study the methods of the theory of errors; Morgan
adapted to history a method from biology; Cournot
adapted to political economy the calculus of
variations. The philologists have adapted to their
science the methods of the decipherers of
dispatches. The astronomers have learned the
methods of chemistry; radiant heat is investigated
with an ear trumpet; the mental temperament is read
off on a vernier (CP 7.66, 1898).
Mizak (1991: 130-131) relates the objectivity of Peirce's theory with
two different explanations of reality. The first is linked to the argument of
Fraser's review: "real is that which is not what we eventually think of it, but is
not affected by what we might think of it" (CP 8.12, 1871). The second refers
to a pragmatic view related to reality that would be this final opinion which is
not independent of thought in general, but is independent of all that is
arbitrary and individual in thought, that is totally independent of what any
number of people may think. Therefore, all you think there is in the final
opinion is real, and there is nothing besides that. The idea of truth itself is
that it is completely independent of what you or I may think of it.
Science is perceived as the best way of knowing the outer world and
the induction itself, being ampliative, has a crucial role in the research
89
process, which is to provide the approximate value of an opinion. This was
not a viewpoint developed by Peirce later on, because in 1873, he already
said:
All that we directly experience is our thought — what
passes through our minds; and that only, at the
moment at which it is passing through. We here see
thoughts determining and causing other thoughts,
and a chain of reasoning or of association is
produced. But the beginning and the end of this
chain, are not distinctly perceived. A current is
another image under which thought is often spoken
of, and perhaps more suitably. We have particularly
drawn attention to the point to which thought flows,
and that it finally reaches: a certain level, as it were
— a certain basin, where reality becomes
unchanging. It has reached its destination, and that
permanency, that fixed reality, which every thought
strives to represent and image, we have placed in
this objective point, towards which the current of
thought flows (CP 7.337, 1873).
However, from 1980 on, Peirce starts to insist that truth would be
what the scientific community would find if it carried out an ongoing
research, introducing the would-be´s.
But above all things it is the searching thoroughness
of the schoolmen which affiliates them with men of
science and separates them, world-wide, from
modern so-called philosophers. The thoroughness I
allude to consists in this, that in adopting any theory,
they go about everywhere, they devote their whole
energies and lives in putting it to tests bona fide —
not such as shall merely add a new spangle to the
glitter of their proofs but such as shall really go
toward satisfying their restless insatiable impulse to
put their opinions to the test. Having a theory, they
must apply it to every subject and to every branch of
every subject to see whether it produces a result in
accordance with the only criteria they were able to
90
apply — the truth of the Catholic faith and the
teaching of the Prince of Philosophers (CP 1.33,
1869).
This paragraph highlights that people seek science driven by an
interest in achieving true knowledge of things. They are attracted by the truth
as one of the aspects of summum bonum. And the lure of the truth over the
scientific community is one aspect of agapism that attracts everything in the
evolutionary process, because a scientist must be particularly honest with
himself, “otherwise, his love of truth will melt away, at once” (CP 1.49, 1896).
Thus, assuming that the truth is something that thought can reach,
and that thought is in the nature of the sign, then if we can figure out a
correct way of thinking – the correct method of transforming signs - then
truth cannot be nothing less than the ultimate result we would be taken to
when following this method (CP 5553, 1902).
Peirce highlights the temporary feature of scientific truths:
Nothing is vital for science; nothing can be. Its
accepted propositions, therefore, are but opinions at
most; and the whole list is provisional. The scientific
man is not in the least wedded to his conclusions.
He risks nothing upon them. He stands ready to
abandon one or all as soon as experience opposes
them (CP 1.635-36, 1898).
2.2 Truth and Pragmatism
Supposing such a thing to be true, what is the kind of proof
which I ought to demand to satisfy me of its truth? (CP
2.112)
Peirce has always wanted to rid philosophy of metaphysics
tautology to bring it as close as possible to the methods of the natural
sciences (CP 5.423 or CP 5.2, 1901). His interest in finding a maxim that
was clear and easy to understand led him to formulate pragmatism, which
91
has always been described as a reflection method whose only purpose is to
bring clarity to ideas.
The increasing popularity of pragmatism led Peirce to produce
“evidence”, that is, to show that pragmaticism is "probable, it is not only a
maxim" (CP 5.415, 1904) and this "evidence" would distinguish his version
of pragmatism from other versions. According to Peirce, what distinguishes
his pragmatism from others is “first, its retention of a purified philosophy;
secondly, its full acceptance of the main body of our instinctive beliefs; and
thirdly, its strenuous insistence upon the truth of scholastic realism” (CP
5.423 de 1905).
Hookway (2003) argues that Peirce considered his version of
pragmatism different from the others because it could be proved. He made
his first attempt in 1898, but the search for this evidence would become the
center of his work after 1900.
In the evolution of Peirce's thought, the interrelationship of normative
sciences is made clear from 1905 on. Also, from this period on, Peirce
begins to use the conditional would be in the new versions of the pragmatic
maxims, which makes pragmatism the right method of transforming signs,
with the goal of achieving the ultimate result, the truth.
In 1905, Peirce states that “it is the right time to explain what
pragmatism is.” Pragmatism is “in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no
attempt to determine any truth of things. “It is merely a method of
ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts” (CP
5.464, 1905).
Peirce claims that pragmatism is a “method to confirm meaning”, but
not all ideas, “only of what I call ‘intellectual concepts’, that is to say, of
those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective fact may
hinge”.
Pragmatism becomes a linking point of many aspects that were
partially disconnected in Peirce's philosophy, including the theory of signs,
the theory of investigation and pragmatism itself. Thus, in the context of
pragmatism, Peirce will revise his theory of belief, centered on the concept
of habit, and will resume the theory of signs with special emphasis on the
92
interpretants. Also, the works that Peirce produced between 1901 and 1903
should be considered, including a proposal developed for Carnegie
Institution, in which Peirce asked for financial support for his projects on
logic, namely Minute Logic, which would show his main discoveries in
continuity and modality. The development of a new theory of perception on
the basis of phenomenology and the examination of the interrelationship of
normative sciences will lead Peirce to reformulate pragmatism as a doctrine
in which the concepts are not related to the action, but the ultimate goal, the
summum bonum. The ultimate goal of action deliberately adopted, that is,
reasonably adopted, "must be an admirable ideal" (CP 5.130, 1903).
I also want to say that after all pragmatism solves no
real problem. It only shows that supposed problems
are not real problems. But when one comes to such
questions as immortality, the nature of the
connection of mind and matter (further than that
mind acts on matter not like a cause but like a law)
we are left completely in the dark. The effect of
pragmatism here is simply to open our minds to
receiving any evidence, not to furnish evidence. (CP
8.259, 1902).
Pragmatism is a step in the general procedure of synechism,
because the correct formulation of hypotheses presupposes a correct
understanding of the concepts employed as well, but both synechism and
pragmatism are built from realism, because everything rests on the
assumption that there are general reals (CP 5.503, 1905). It is worth noting
that assuming a satisfactory attitude towards the element of Thirdness is
what later would be the pragmatic criterion (CP 5.206, 1903). Pragmatism,
therefore, reinforces the general character of realism through the would-be's
because “Pragmaticism consists in holding that the purport of any concept is
its conceived bearing upon our conduct” (CP 5.460, 1905), that is, the reality
of generals is the reality of would-be’s.
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical
judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative
mood is a confused form of thought whose only
meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce
93
a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a
conditional sentence having its apodosis in the
imperative mood (CP 5.18).
The applicability of the criterion of truth demands the criterion of
meaning, which is pragmatism itself. From the notion of reality and research,
Pragmatism emerges as a method of verification of our general conceptions:
Pragmatism is the key method to know and determine the meaning of
these persistent realities that force themselves upon our recognition. That
which has no such persistence is just a dream, and reality is persistent, it is
regular (CP 1.175, 1897). Pragmatism is equivalent to the basic procedures
of the laboratory sciences, but can be employed in any field of knowledge,
because for Peirce Pragmatism is the method of methods, the method of the
other methods, a method of acquiring and developing knowledge of
universal scope.
Its triple framework can be defined as problem identification
(problems are those turbulent experiences or misunderstanding of reality,
that is, those moments when our core beliefs do not correspond to reality,
which demand of us the understanding that our knowledge is fallible and
subject to error), elaboration of explanatory hypotheses and hypotheses test
for later disposal of those that have no explanatory power. The remaining
hypotheses will be inductively tested, in order to provide likely and reliable
results. The elimination of a hypothesis means that this hypothesis or its
predictive explanation is inconsistent or contradictory in relation to what it
was supposed to explain. On the other hand, realism, one of the main topics
supported by Peirce, is fundamental to our understanding, so that any
problem that needs to be solved presents two major issues:
•
•
whether the initial theory or set of beliefs remains the same at the time
of testing
if the hypothetical solution explains our problem or not
It is important to observe that each exercise of pragmatic
experimentation, however simple or sophisticated, implies that there was a
certain basic sense of reality, a certain theory about what the world is made
of and how it behaves, a set of beliefs about what we think and how we
94
know. We can improve or increase our knowledge through appropriate
information, correct reasoning and creative approach. However, the reality
does not change, we cannot fix it, because real remains indifferent to our
wanderings or selfishness (CP 5.111, 1903).
Abduction, deduction and induction are closely involved with the
pragmatic experimental process of acquisition and development of
knowledge, considering the connections between the structure of our initial
problem of formulating and testing hypotheses and Peirce´s architecture and
logic. If induction and probability describe knowledge as a movement
towards the future, deduction and logic need guide us through the process
of eliminating failed hypotheses, abduction can be considered a form of
reasoning that leads us to recognize the problem. In Peirce, what primarily
matters in order to support a claim based on the inductive method is not just
a successful prediction of facts, but also that they can be classified as
typical, that is, they are random specimens of all predictions that could be
based on the hypothesis and constitute the axis of truth.
Pragmatism was originally conceived not to abandon concepts such
as true or right, but clarify and elucidate them. Rorty (1982: xiv) argues that
pragmatism suggests that we do not ask questions about the nature of truth
or goodness, so from this point of view, pragmatism does not constitute a
philosophical doctrine, but a position that recommends the abandonment of
philosophy in search for something else. If we adopt Rorty´s view, one of the
key issues of philosophy, which refers to those considerations that support
our beliefs and choices, should be abandoned.
Rescher (2000: xii) believes that pragmatism is not anti-skepticism
but a rational approach to solve theoretical problems, considering our
practical and cognitive obligations. In the hands of its founder, Peirce,
pragmatism had two main components, one concerning the meaning and
another related to the truth.
For Peirce, the crucial point of pragmatism is something conditional,
that is, there is an established research methodology - the scientific method
- that, when used with persistence, in an ongoing community of rational
researchers, must produce the truth in the end.
95
Murphy (1990: 39-55) points out nine fundamental principles of
Peirce´s pragmatism, namely:
•
Beliefs are identical if and only if they give rise to the same habit of
action
•
Beliefs give rise to the same habit of action only if they appease the
same doubt by producing the same rule of action
•
The meaning of a thought is the belief it produces
•
Beliefs produce the same rule of action if they lead us to act in the same
sensible situations
•
There is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a
possible difference in what is tangible and conceivably practical
•
Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects
•
Considering what effects might conceivably have practical bearings, we
conceive what the object of our conception has. Then our conception of
these effects is our whole conception of the object
•
A true belief is one which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate scientifically
•
Any object represented in a true opinion is real
On the other hand, pragmatism is usually associated with the idea of
truth. William James himself defined his pragmatism as a theory of truth.
According to Rescher (2000:13), pragmatism has three forms:
semantic pragmatism: the meaning of terms consists on their use, epistemic
pragmatism: the successful implementation of beliefs is the proper criterion
for their truth, and ontological pragmatism (or metaphysical): in the human
realm, praxis has primacy over theory because all understanding must itself
be the product of a doing.
In Rescher´s view (2000), Peirce supported all three doctrines, but
the latter would become particularly "portentuous" for him, because all
human activity can always be refined, extended, and improved, which
96
means that our knowledge of the truth is always experimental and imperfect,
and it was this line of thought that led Peirce to fallibilism. Only in an
idealized long term, our pragmatically validated knowledge can be
considered the truth as such.
Peirce related the truth with what an intelligent community of scientific
researchers actually thinks about the issue, not here and now, but in the
distant, indefinite future, the theoretical long term. The problem is that the
natural course of observation never reaches this idealized long term, no
matter how it is understood, it is beyond our cognitive reach (Rescher,
2000).
Truth is the conformity of a representation to its object, but what is
the object used to define truth? It is reality, whose nature is so independent
of its representations that, by taking any single sign or any individual
collection of signs, there is a character to which the thing belongs (CP 1.578,
1902).
Therefore, for Peirce, truth is objective, because there is such a thing
as truth, because otherwise reasoning and thought would not have a
purpose. Peirce asks: What do you mean by such a thing as truth?
For Peirce, the essence of truth lies in its resistance to being ignored
(CP 2.139, 1902), because we deceive ourselves, but we all have had some
experience of reacting against something,
Besides, say those who object to this method, all
reasoning and inquiry expects that there is such a
thing as the truth concerning whatever question may
be under examination. Now, it is of the very essence
of this "truth," the meaning of the expectation, that
the "truth" in no wise depends upon what any man to
whom direct appeal can be made may opine about
that question. (CP 2.209, 1901).
Truth is public, truth is truth, whether it is opposed to the interests of
society to admit it or not (CP 8.143, 1901). Even though researchers seek a
position of stable belief, there is no guarantee that this position will be
achieved and that it is not threatened by new facts that raise questions that
97
need to be explained and lead to new investigations. But in the long run we
could reach a state of belief unassailable by doubt, which Peirce called truth.
Pragmatism is a method of determining the meaning of intellectual concepts,
so pragmatism is the right method of transforming signs whose objective is
to obtain the logical good, and consequently the truth.
The pragmatic characterization of truth joins truth and research, and
consequently method. It is therefore the pragmatic method that generates
this version of the truth, which according to Misak (1991: 160) has three
advantages: first, it provides a rational context for the research to be
conducted; second, the pursuit of truth becomes the goal of research
practice; and third, Peirce´s theory of truth provides and justifies a
methodology that uses the scientific method of abduction, deduction and
induction, and applies the pragmatic criterion of legitimacy of hypotheses.
Truth then becomes something we aim to investigate.
It can be said that in the logic of scientific research, reality would be
constituted through signs, because "we can only indicate the real universe; if
we are asked to describe it, we can only say that it includes whatever there
might be in what it really is". This is universal, not individual (CP 8.208). The
concept of truth can be analyzed from the point of view of interpretants and
research. The concept of truth that comes from that fixed belief in the
hypothetical end of the investigation depends on the realism of the
conditionals (would- be's) and these conditionals need the collaboration of
interpretants, especially the definition of the ultimate logical interpretant.
We have indexes of the outer world. These indexes bring in
themselves the generality of reality, because they derive from general
principles operating in nature, that is, through logical consequences of signs,
and pragmatism is the right method of transforming signs with the purpose
of reaching the ultimate result, truth, which is the view that will be
established and settled after enough research (MS 300, 1905).
98
Final Considerations
Throughout this paper, we aimed to present two themes of Peirce, his
realism and his theory of truth. In Part I, we tried to show some aspects of
the realism-antirealism debate in order to describe the assumptions of
Peirce's realism.
Peirce supports the objectivity of knowledge, according to which the
possibility of an ultimate answer to every question derives from the
existence of real. The fact that the real is not affected by what we think, that
the real is independent of what one may think of it, and that a community of
researchers, using a correct method, will reach an opinion with which all
agree with, emerge his theory of reality, his theory of knowledge, which will
be the pillars of the scientific method, which bring in its core the realism and
the theory of truth. For Peirce, the notion of reality has two important
aspects: the otherness that characterizes the element that reacts
(associated with Secondness, category of existence), and the insistence of
brute force, which enables knowledge by maintaining certain regularity
(associated with Thirdness, what is the category of generality, the law).
Peirce´s realism can be classified as one of three categories, by
acceptance of reality as Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, realism by
accepting the reality of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, through
awareness that human rationality is a continuum of rationality of the
universe, as part of the doctrine of synechism, but subject to the action of
chance (tychism), seeking an ideal in its development, from the interrelationship of the normative sciences, according to which pragmatism
becomes a doctrine in which the concepts are not related to the action, but
to the summum bonum, or admirable.
Peirce´s realism implies not only a consideration of a real object,
independent of the outer world, but a recognition of the reality of universals
in contrast to nominalism, to which the continuum is only a matter of
language. For nominalists, universals are just signs created to designate the
quality of particular things. Nominalists refuse an objective correspondence
of our concepts with the laws of nature, so realism implies objectivity of the
laws of nature.
99
In Part II, it was initially presented a contextualization of the main
theories of truth as a background for the analysis of Peirce's theory of truth.
For Peirce, the truth is public and anyone that carried out a research and
used the correct method would come to it. Truth and reality are related
concepts. Peirce supports scientific research as a path to the truth.
This work was developed based on the triadic semiotic relationship
among sign, object and interpretant. From the relationship between the sign
and its object, in which Secondness, opposition, otherness, and
determination prevails, results one the aspects of his realism. From the
relationship between the sign and the interpretant, as mediation or
interpretation, we can understand the action of the sign as semiosis, such as
continuity, but that is subject to indeterminacy, fate, freedom. Thus, it will be
through the convergence of interpretants that the research community will
come to the truth in the long run, if this process is guided by a purpose, the
summum bonum.
100
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