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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Khrushchev, in a speech on 25 April at Baku, provided a preview of his negotiating position on the major summit issues. Predicting that the favorable trend in international affairs would continue after the summit, he assigned top priority to disarmament, to be followed by a discussion of Germany and Berlin. Nuclear test ban negotiations and the general category of East-West relations were also included as subjects for summit consideration.

The speech was another example of the Soviet strategy of combining pressure and inducement to extract concessions from the West. After Moscow used a Pravda article in mid-April to encourage speculation on the possibility of an interim solution on Berlin, Khrushchev sought to sharpen the alternatives open to the West by spelling out in some detail the consequences of the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He elaborated on the standard claim that such action would end all Western rights of occupation, specifically including the right of access to Berlin by land, water, and air.

By discussing the question in the general context of the May meeting, Khrushchev again implied, without, however, specifically committing the USSR to such timing, that Moscow would take prompt unilateral action if the Western leaders reject the Soviet peace treaty proposal. He reinforced the separate treaty threat with a warning that if "hotheads" should invoke the use of force, they would be met with force.

Khrushchev's apparent objective in reverting to a strong-

er definition of the consequences of a separate treaty is to increase the incentive for the West to negotiate an interim Berlin agreement as an alternative to unilateral Soviet action.

Foreign Minister Gromyko hinted that such a solution was still negotiable, after repeating the standard demand for a peace treaty with both German states and the creation of a free city in Berlin.

Timed for maximum impact on the talks between Presidents Eisenhower and De Gaulle, Khrushchev's speech was probably intended as a reply to De Gaulle's statement that no solution could be reached on Berlin or Germany. The Soviet premier sharply criticized "some statesmen" who intend to conduct a noncommittal exchange of opinions at the summit and avoid reaching "concrete" decisions.

Khrushchev adhered closely to the position taken by the Soviet delegation in the disarmament negotiations in criticizing the West for insisting on substituting control for disarmament. Gromyko's private remarks that Khrushchev will be seeking a "concrete" decision on disarmament provide further evidence that Moscow will press for a joint statement endorsing the main principles of a treaty for complete and general disarmament which the Soviet delegation could represent as a directive to proceed with the Soviet plan.

The Soviet leader also made it clear that he anticipates hard bargaining at the summit on the

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question of a nuclear test ban treaty. Breaking a long silence on the Eisenhower-Macmillan communiqué proposing a voluntary moratorium on small underground tests, Khrushchev portrayed this as accepting in principle the Soviet proposal and thereby raising hopes for conclusion of a treaty "in the near future." He singled out the duration of the moratorium as the key issue, and claimed that the Soviet suggestion of four or five years was based on American estimates of the period necessary to work out improved detection techniques. He implied, however, that this duration could be shortened.

Gromyko privately also struck an optimistic note on a test ban treaty, contrasting it with the "disappointing" Western position in the disarmament negotiations.

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

KHRUSHCHEV'S ROAD TO THE SUMMIT

Two weeks after agreement was reached last December on the date and place for the forthcoming summit meeting, Khrushchev proudly informed the Supreme Soviet on 14 January that his campaign for top-level East-West talks launched in November 1957 had been crowned with success.

In a speech at the 40th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik revolution, in 1957, Khrushchev had called for a "high-level meeting of representatives of capitalist and socialist countries" to reach agreement to exclude war as a means of settling international disputes, to end the cold war and the armaments race, to establish coexistence as the basis of international relations, and to settle ideological issues by peaceful competition, not by force. This speech was followed by formal notes to the Western powers proposing an early conference of heads of government to discuss measures for easing tension and ending the cold war.

With these pronouncements Moscow initiated what has developed into its most ambitious and far-reaching foreign policy operation since the death of Stalin. The ultimate objectives are to extract from the Western powers a definitive recognition of the political and territorial gains scored by the USSR during and after World War II and to bring about the most favorable international conditions for achieving the USSR's domestic goals as set forth in the Seven-Year Plan.

This diplomatic offensive was conceived against a backdrop of the military and technological achievements in the

late summer of 1957--the successful ICBM test and the launching of the first sputniks--which the Soviet leaders hailed as marking a major shift in the world balance of power. They displayed great confidence that the trend of world events was running heavily in their favor and that they could translate these technological advances into political gains.

While Soviet tactics over the past two and one-half years have fluctuated widely, the principal objectives of the summit campaign have remained remarkably constant. Khrushchev's overriding aim is to overcome the West's unwillingness to accept the permanence of the Sovietization of Eastern Europe and the partition of Germany.

In an interview on 7 October 1957 he spelled out the implications of the only kind of accommodation with the West he would find acceptable: "One thing only is needed (to ensure peace)--to recognize what has historically taken place," i.e., the existence of the satellite regimes. "There must be no interference in their affairs. We, for our part, proceed from the realistic conditions of the existence of such capitalist states as the United States, Britain, France, and others, and that the social structure of these countries is the domestic affair of their peoples."

The Soviet leaders probably had little expectation that the Western governments could be stampeded into accepting their initial bid for a summit conference in the spring of 1958. They apparently envisaged this as only the opening move in a prolonged period of negotiation, lasting possibly several years, in which the USSR, by a

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combination of pressures and inducements, would gradually bring the Western powers to make a chain of concessions whose cumulative effect would be recognition of the permanence and legitimacy of the status quo in Eastern Europe and East Germany.

By the time the USSR finally accepted the West's proposal for preparatory discussions in Moscow between Foreign Minister Gromyko and the three Western ambassadors beginning in April 1958, Khrushchev and his colleagues evidently had lost much of their optimism about getting a summit meeting on their terms. Gromyko

63 [redacted] clearly reflected Moscow's unwillingness to engage in careful preparations for a summit.

The USSR, in effect, terminated these talks in June by publishing the documents exchanged by the two sides--a violation of the agreed secrecy. This marked the end, for the time being, of the summit drive. Khrushchev concluded that he could not force the West into a summit meeting on Soviet terms without greater pressure.

Background of Berlin Crisis

Khrushchev's determination to bring matters to a head with the Western powers was sharpened by the resolution passed by the West German Bundestag on 25 March 1958 authorizing nuclear weapons and missiles for the West German armed forces. In view of the Soviet leaders' almost pathological suspicion and fear of resurgent German military power, it appears in retrospect that this development played a major role in Khrushchev's decision to precipitate a new Berlin crisis. From Moscow's viewpoint, the prospect of strong West German forces, armed with modern weapons, underscored the urgency of consolidating Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, especially

in East Germany, before the growing power of West Germany could confront the USSR with a serious challenge.

The USSR responded quickly with a move designed primarily to check the implementation of NATO plans to develop a strong nuclear-deterrent capacity centered in West Germany. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 March 1958, Gromyko announced the unilateral cessation of Soviet nuclear weapons tests. About half of his speech was devoted to a severe indictment of the Adenauer government's policies. "It would be sheer folly," he warned, "to underrate the gravity of this step" by the Bonn government.

Moscow's preoccupation with erecting an impregnable barrier against future West German political and military pressure on the satellites was evident in Gromyko's conclusion that Bonn's intention to arm its forces with nuclear weapons "cannot be interpreted otherwise than as a challenge to the European nations and, above all, to those bordering on Germany." To emphasize his point, Gromyko charged that West Germany "is the only European state whose government is seeking to redraw the present frontiers in Europe."

First Deputy Premier Mikoyan arrived in Bonn at the end of April 1958, ostensibly to sign a routine trade agreement, but actually to impress on Chancellor Adenauer the seriousness with which the USSR viewed Bonn's decision on nuclear weapons. [redacted] b2

Mikoyan repeatedly objected to this decision and expressed Soviet fears that National Socialist tendencies would increase in the new German military establishment and would ultimately affect the conduct of the government itself.

[redacted] b3 Mikoyan offered to guarantee West Germany immunity

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against nuclear attack in the event of war, provided West Germany renounced nuclear armaments. He also warned that implementation of measures to equip West German forces with such weapons would create a "new obstacle to German reunification."

Pressure for Summit Meeting

Mikoyan's report to his colleagues in Moscow was followed by a sharp increase in Soviet pressure on the West, particularly on the United States. Moscow seized on the Middle East crisis sparked by the Iraqi revolution in mid-July of 1958 to call for an immediate summit meeting to consider, specifically, the intervention of American troops in Lebanon and British forces in Jordan. But the Soviet leaders dropped this project when they failed to break Western insistence on a forum which they considered unfavorable--a special session of the UN Security Council attended by the heads of member governments but bound by Security Council rules and voting procedures.

Khrushchev certainly regarded the crisis precipitated by the Chinese Communists' bombardment of the offshore Quemoy Islands on 22 and 23 August 1958 as an excellent opportunity to test American readiness to respond to a bloc challenge and to discredit and isolate the United States on an issue where its policy was the subject of widespread disagreement in the free world. He probably considered that if Washington could either be forced to retreat from its position on the offshore islands issue or to act in defiance of world opinion, the upshot would be a serious political defeat for the United States.

Soviet complicity in this operation seems probable, for Khrushchev and Mao must have discussed strategy on this issue

at their meeting in Peiping from 31 July to 3 August 1958. The most striking feature of the USSR's role was the unprecedentedly strong and unequivocal commitment to provide military support for Peiping--in sharp contrast to the cautious Soviet behavior in the strait crisis of 1954-55. In letters to President Eisenhower on 7 and 19 September, Khrushchev cited the USSR's obligations under the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, pledged that Moscow would come to the aid of China in the event of an American "attack," and intimated that there would be retaliation in kind to any nuclear bombardment.

Berlin Crisis

The mood and calculations that governed Khrushchev's aggressive course in the Taiwan Strait affair were reflected in a remark he made at a Kremlin reception on 10 November 1958--the day he invoked an indirect threat of a new and more formidable Berlin blockade by announcing the USSR's intention to turn over its remaining functions in Berlin to the East Germans. Khrushchev told [redacted] in effect, that up to that time he had been begging for peace, but that now he was demanding it with an atomic bomb in his hand.

[redacted] Khrushchev said, "If I go to church to pray for peace, they throw bombs at me, but when I come there bomb in hand to ask for peace, they will listen."

The frustration of his efforts since November 1957 to bring the West to a summit meeting under favorable conditions had convinced Khrushchev that he had to have a sharp crisis, or a threat of one, to make a summit urgent and compel the Western governments to abandon their previous conditions.

Khrushchev's aim in reopening the Berlin question was to confront the Western powers with

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what appeared to be a choice between risking war to maintain their rights in Berlin or making concessions which would erode their position not only in Berlin but on the fundamental question of German reunification.

In addition to using the Berlin threat as a lever for a summit meeting, Khrushchev saw the Berlin issue as a means of wringing concessions from the West which would lead eventually to some form of recognition of the East German regime and to acceptance of the permanence and legitimacy of the status quo in Eastern Europe. Berlin, therefore, was not an end in itself but primarily a means of drawing the West toward an accommodation with long-standing Soviet demands regarding the future shape of Europe.

During Khrushchev's recent visit to France, [REDACTED]

63 [REDACTED] "Berlin is a secondary question. What matters to us is the recognition of the two German states. It is in regard to this that we must have an understanding, if we are to make progress on any other questions whatever."

Khrushchev's line of action in developing the Berlin threat was aimed at making the danger of an imminent military clash appear credible to Western public opinion. He showed confidence, however, that he could control the situation and extract heavy political gains without any serious risk of provoking a Western military reaction.

53 [REDACTED] Khrushchev said it was "unthinkable" that the Western powers would fight over Berlin.

Mikoyan's visit to the United States in January 1959 was intended not only to sound out American official and public opinion on Berlin, but to create

an impression that the two superpowers were taking the first steps toward an accommodation. Soviet agents in Europe circulated reports designed to stimulate fears of a private Soviet-American deal at the expense of the United States' allies.

Mikoyan's report on his visit at the 21st party congress at the end of January sought to convey an impression that the situation was ripe for serious negotiations. He said he found that American leaders were inclined "to recognize the principle of peaceful coexistence" and noted that "in contrast to earlier times, the American statesmen had expressed a readiness to negotiate" and that they no longer talked of a "policy of containing or liberating."

Soviet Negotiating Tactics

Khrushchev's fundamental goal in the period of negotiations which opened with the Geneva foreign ministers' conference in May 1959 was not to drive Western forces out of Berlin in some brief period of time, but to bring about a change in the legal status of the Western presence in the city. This change of status, in Moscow's view, would seriously undermine the Western powers' long-standing insistence that their rights in Berlin, based on the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, obtain until Germany is reunified by four-power agreement. The Western presence in Berlin under the "occupation regime" challenges the permanence of the partition of Germany, on which Moscow's claim to the permanence of the status quo in Eastern Europe is based.

From the beginning of the Berlin threat in November 1958, Moscow has stated that while it is willing to consider amendments to its free-city plan, these must be directed at ending the "occupation regime" in West Berlin. The Soviet notes of 27 November setting forth the free-

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city plan took the position that the West has "lost the right for preserving the occupation regime" by violating the Potsdam Agreement. Mikoyan took pains to clarify Moscow's actual objective in Berlin

63 [redacted] Mikoyan declared that the USSR was not demanding that the Western forces should be withdrawn from West Berlin, but only that the "occupation" be terminated.

Geneva Conference

The three main objectives that guided Gromyko's tactics at the foreign ministers' conference in Geneva in 1959 were: (1) to induce the West to consent to a change in the status of West Berlin which the USSR could interpret as acceptance of the principle that the occupation regime should be ended and that Western forces, as a consequence, should be reduced and ultimately withdrawn; (2) to curtail existing political and economic links between West Berlin and West Germany; and (3) to enhance the international stature and acceptability of the East German regime.

The Soviet delegation succeeded in getting the two German delegations seated at separate tables, although only adjacent to the main conference table. Khrushchev, speaking on 19 June, declared that their participation showed "not only de facto but also de jure recognition of the existence of the two German states."

Gromyko lost no time in moving the negotiations toward the question of an interim agreement on Berlin. He made hints in this direction in the second week of the conference, and on 9 and 10 June he introduced a proposal which would have permitted the West to "retain certain occupation rights" for one year--later extended to 18 months. However, Gromyko ada-

manly refused to endorse the "perpetuation" of these rights. His basic objection to all Western proposals for an interim solution was that they were based on an indefinite prolongation of the occupation regime.

The Western ministers repeatedly attempted to elicit an unequivocal response as to whether the USSR would agree that Western rights would be maintained after the proposed time limit on an interim agreement expired, but Gromyko would not be pinned down. Khrushchev vigorously supported his foreign minister on this point with a statement on 6 June that the USSR "cannot under any pressure accept an agreement which perpetuates the occupation regime." This statement was a reply to President Eisenhower's call on 3 June for a clear Soviet commitment reaffirming Western rights in Berlin.

In forcing the deadlock on this key issue of Western rights, the Soviet leaders were confident that the West would have no alternative but to proceed to a summit meeting without any of the previous progress toward a solution on which it had previously insisted. On the day the foreign ministers' conference opened, Khrushchev publicly expressed confidence that a summit would be held regardless of the outcome of the Geneva meeting and hinted that he favored a series of summit meetings. When the first half of the conference ended in stalemate, he predicted on 19 June that a summit meeting "will take place, if not today, then at some later date, because the people of the world demand it."

Khrushchev's Visit to US

The Soviet leaders clearly regarded President Eisenhower's invitation to Khrushchev as a direct result of their power play on Berlin. Soviet officials [redacted] asserted that from the Soviet standpoint, the foreign

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ministers' conference had been a great success, since it had led to the long-sought invitation for Khrushchev to visit the United States and hold talks with the President. They expressed the belief that the invitation signified a basic change in American policy and greater receptivity to an accommodation based on the "global status quo."

Apart from the understanding reached with the President that future negotiations on Berlin should not have any time limit but should not be protracted indefinitely, Khrushchev did not introduce substantive changes in his position on Berlin and Germany. His goal of bringing the West to recognize the status quo in Europe and the "existence of two systems" throughout the world was implicit in his repeated calls for "peaceful coexistence" and an "end to the cold war."

Khrushchev made this point particularly clear in a talk with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In words that closely parallel his statement in October 1957, he said recognition of the status quo is "the main thing." "There is no other problem, and if that is recognized, we should be able to secure a firm and lasting peace."

Khrushchev's visit ushered in a new phase in Soviet policy. In contrast to the assertiveness and pressure tactics that characterized Soviet behavior from the fall of 1957 through the first half of 1959, Moscow shifted to a conciliatory posture toward the West. Soviet spokesmen hailed the "Camp David spirit" as auguring a new era in East-West relations.

Khrushchev's appraisal of the visit, however, made it clear that peaceful coexistence

is neither an end in itself nor a sign of a basic turn in Soviet policy toward a genuine long-term accommodation with the West. Peaceful coexistence, in Khrushchev's view, is primarily designed to inhibit and limit Western reaction to growing bloc military power and to provide a framework for obtaining unilateral Western concessions through negotiations in the face of this power.

In his speech in Moscow on 28 September summing up his trip, Khrushchev repeated the standard Soviet contention that bloc strength was the main ingredient in the present trend toward "peace." In Peiping on 30 September he assessed Western policy as a reaction to growing bloc strength. "The leaders of many capitalist states," he said, "are being forced more and more to take account of realities and recast their international relations."

Conclusion

Khrushchev has deeply committed his personal prestige and authority in a difficult and extremely delicate diplomatic operation which he clearly believes has already yielded substantial results. He assured the Chinese Communists that it "will gain new victories in the future, too."

If he is to attain the ultimate goals he has set himself, Khrushchev must have a free hand to maneuver and temporize. He must avoid applying excessive pressure on the West which could upset his whole design, and to this end he needs the understanding and support of his satellites, his Chinese allies, and his own subordinates. It would seem that much will turn on his success or failure in winning Peiping's agreement to refrain from any premature testing by force of the stability of the capitalist system.