ISLAMIC GOVERNMENTALITY WITHIN SHIA IDEOLOGY:

HOW DOES GOVERNMENTALITY WORK IN IRAN-HEZBOLLAH RELATIONSHIP?

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Abstract

This study contributes to the ongoing debates in the field of international relations on applying the Foucault's governmentality theory to a non-neoliberal context. This research tries to examine the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah by employing governmentality theory as an analytical tool. By doing so, it is envisioned to answer three questions: How does the governmentality theory explain the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah? How does Iran governmentalize Hezbollah and Shia population in Lebanon? What are the differences and similarities between Iran's model of governmentality and a neoliberal governmentality? Furthermore, this study investigates the concepts that constitute Iran's governmental rationality and explains the techniques and practices that are produced by this rationality. Finally, it is asserted that governmentality theory functions well in explaining the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah and provides a useful channel for a deeper understanding of this rapport.

Keywords: *Governmentality, Foucault, Iran, Hezbollah, Shia ideology, Middle East*

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Introduction

The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah has been perceived as a strong social, political, economic, and strategic tie between two Shia entities by public discourse both in the Middle East and the West.[1] The multi-layered and multifaceted characteristic of this relationship makes it a fascinating and exceptional case in the field of international relations. Since its inception in the early 80s, Hezbollah has been acting in accordance with Iranian political discourse and the Islamic republic's vision of regional and global affairs. The alluring feature of this relationship comes both from the unique and exceptional nature of Hezbollah and Iranian revolutionary regime's approach to politics; an approach that is called by Foucault as: "spiritual politics".[2] Acknowledging the controversy of the term, I leave the task of scrutinizing the accuracy of labelling the Iranian revolution as such, aside in this study. However, I choose to use this term to allude to specific religious character and values peculiar to Iranian revolution.

The main contribution of this study is in applying Foucault's governmentality theory in analysis of the Iran – Hezbollah rapport. The aim of this approach is to enrich the existent political and strategic debates by arguing that Iran – Hezbollah relationship goes along with governmentality's lines and fits best within its paradigm, comparing to soft and hard power theories, or Foucault's theory on discipline as a mechanism of power.[3] Although it is alleged that Foucault introduced governmentality theory for a neoliberal context, in this study I try to show how governmentality

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[1] See, Rola El Husseini, "Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria," *Third World Quarterly* 31, no. 5 (July 1, 2010): 803–15 ; Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance* (Columbia University Press, 1997).
[2] "Revisiting Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, by Kevin Anderson and Janet Afary, New Politics," accessed May 28, 2015, http://newpol.org/content/revisiting-foucault-and-iranian-revolution.
[3] Due to lack of space here, I cannot go into details in support of my argument. It needs another study to show how this relationship cannot be explained solely by the abovementioned theories or other theories on power.

theory can function in non-neoliberal settings, such as the case of Iran and Hezbollah carrying all Islamic, authoritarian, and transnational qualities at the same time.

To develop my claim, I explain the governmentality theory and different elements of it in the first chapter. Later in the same chapter, I conclude how, based on other works that have applied governmentality theory in non-neoliberal contexts, I presume that it is feasible to use this theory to the case of Iran – Hezbollah relationship. The second chapter deals with the background of the case. The first part is devoted to the history of political Shia, the political ideology of Shia tradition, and Shias' socio-political situation throughout the history. In the second part, I depict a general picture of Iranian revolution and its basic ideological tenets that will be used further in the analytical part in order to apply the governmentality theory. In the last part of this chapter, I explain the political rationality of Iranian regime that is used in governmentalization of Hezbollah.

The third chapter is devoted to application of governmentality theory to the case of Iran – Hezbollah relationship in a threefold manner. First, I briefly go through the history of Hezbollah and highlight the factors useful for the purpose of this study. Second, I seek to point out the techniques of governance based on Iran's political rationality and to provide an answer to the question of the functionality of these techniques in Hezbollah case. Third, I try to show why governmentality theory could explain the case of Iran – Hezbollah as well as its special context. Finally, I discuss the similarities and differences between using governmentality theory in a neoliberal and non-neoliberal context. I conclude that governmentality theory can be applied in a non-neoliberal context where the distinct political rationality produces new forms of governmentality techniques and subjectifies a non-neoliberal population.

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Methodology

Research for this thesis relies on qualitative method. My field work in Beirut was based on semi-structured interviews and personal discussions with university students and ordinary people. The particular choice of conducting semi-structured interviews and having personal discussions with students and ordinary people was to get a more precise vision on micro power dynamics regarding the impacts that governmentality would constitute in the society, and attain a wider insight into inner working of governance in social context of Lebanon.

Semi structured interviews are "designed to be sufficiently open that the subsequent questions of the interviewer cannot be planned in advanced but must be improvised in a careful and theorized way."[4] This type of interviewing is useful for investigating complex opinions[5] and going through the different layers of a topic in interviewees mind. In my research, I chose the method of semi structured interviews because it allows me to change the direction of interview based on the interviewees' knowledge and approach to the topic.

In addition, by having informal and personal discussions with students and ordinary people mostly regarding the same or similar topics, I sought to compare the view of these two groups towards the role of Hezbollah in the country as well as their opinion on Iran's model of Shiism. Although these discussions cannot be categorized under academic discussions, but they provided me with a general picture of Lebanese society as well as people's standpoint on the roles of both Hezbollah and Iran in the country. Through these unstructured interviews I had the chance to

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[4] Tom Wengraf, *Qualitative Research Interviewing: Biographic Narrative and Semi-Structured Methods* (SAGE, 2001), 5.

[5] Nicholas Clifford, Shaun French, and Gill Valentine, *Key Methods in Geography* (SAGE, 2010), 112.

treat my discussants as "an active subject, and not merely a reporter of facts or experiences."[6] My goal was to conduct a personal and intimate interview in order to achieve some kind of deep disclosure on the context of my case study.[7]

I have chosen Iran − Hezbollah relationship as the case study, because of its compatibility to governmentality theory that makes it an interesting case for me. In this study, I use governmentality theory as a tool to analyse a relationship between a state and an organization with an Islamic, non-western context by taking different angles to look at the objected case. Governmentality theory helps me to explain this phenomenon and understand its dynamics.

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[6] "Unstructured Interviews," accessed May 28, 2015, http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/teaching-resources/interview/unstructured.aspx.

[7] J.M Johnson, "In Depth Interviewing," in *Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Methods*, ed. J Gubrium and Holstein (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2001).

Chapter One: Foucault's governmentality theory

In his lectures in 1978 and 1979 at the Collège de France, Michael Foucault introduced the concept of "governmentality" as part of his work on "The history of systems of thought".[8] The framework of these lectures was set in a way to make the lecturer follow certain rules. For example, professors were obliged to present an original research for each academic year in the college.[9] Following this rule, Foucault gave a lecture on two new topics in his lecture series in 1978 and 1979. The titles of these series were, respectively, "security, territory, population" and "the birth of biopolitics."[10] These lectures are the only first-hand and genuine available source for the topic of governmentality. In the course of these two years, Foucault developed the notion of governmentality and there is no other published material on this topic from Foucault himself. His work on governmentality was under construction during this lecture series, thus the concept carries a significant degree of ambiguity as an unfinished project.[11] As Foucault himself admits, "[a]ll of these reflections on governmentality, … should not be taken as gospel truth. This is not finished work, it is not even work that's been done; it is work in progress, with all that this involves in the way of inaccuracies and hypotheses—in short, it amounts to possible tracks for you, if you wish, and maybe for myself, to follow."[12]

1.1. What is (neoliberal) governmentality?

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[8] Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, 1 edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1991).

[9] Michel Foucault et al., *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977--1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell, 1 edition (New York: Picador, 2009), 10.

[10] Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, *The Foucault Effect*, 1.

[11] Milja Kurki, "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies," *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 4 (December 2011): 349–66.

[12] Foucault et al., *Security, Territory, Population*, 186.

The concept of governmentality, as Jonathan Joseph[13] explains it, generally "brings together the practice of governing and the necessary rationality of government that makes governing possible." Foucault's reading of the term government takes both a broad form and a narrow one.[14] In a broad sense, governmentality can be defined as the "conduct of conduct", in order to govern the individuals.[15] Collin Gordon[16] explains this term as follow, "a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons." Here, 'some person or persons' can be translated to individuals and groups of people, or as Foucault categorizes, it contains 'children, souls, communities, families and the sick'.[17]

As he discusses further, Gordon defines act of government as something that could refer to the "relation between self and self, private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty."[18] Foucault[19] explains this relationship, as a form of power, in everyday life of individuals, as follow: "This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects."

Right after giving this explanation, Foucault tries to briefly elaborate on the term "subject" in his discussion on the topic of 'subject and power'. He considers two meanings for this term; the first

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[13] Jonathan Joseph, "The Limits of Governmentality: Social Theory and the International," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 223–46.

[14] Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, *The Foucault Effect*.

[15] Ibid., 2.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Michel Foucault, *Power (The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 3)*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley, 1 edition (New York: The New Press, 2001), 341.

[18] *The Foucault Effect*, 3.

[19] Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Routledge, 2014), 212.

meaning refers to subjectifying someone else by "control and dependence"; and in second one, the subject is "tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge."[20] These two meanings of the term 'subject' clarify the two distinct dimensions of governance: subjectifying the population and self-control of the individuals; and also make a distinction between technologies of domination and technologies of the self. All in all, what Foucault attempts to do is to show how the modern state and modern individuals cooperate to determine each other's emergence and reproduce and reinforce each other's *modus operandi*.

Thus, the act of governing happens when techniques of the self, interact with and integrate to the techniques of government for domination.[21] As Foucault defines it, "Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself."[22] Thus government refers to a continuous spectrum that starts from political government and its technologies, to forms of self-regulation and technologies of the self.[23] In fact, governmentality is dependant to the functioning of the elements in this spectrum.

For the purpose of studying governmentalities, Foucault starts from ancient Greece and continues his discussion in chronological order to modern time and the neo-liberal ideology of governance.[24] Going through this timeline and embracing different historical episodes, he touches upon the concept of "governmental rationality" and transitions in governmentalities,

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[20] Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (July 1, 1982): 781.

[21] Michel Foucault, "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth," ed. Mark Blasius and Thomas Keenan, *Political Theory* 21, no. 2 (May 1, 1993): 198–227.

[22] Ibid., 203–4.

[23] Thomas Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique," *Rethinking Marxism* 14, no. 3 (September 1, 2002): 61.

[24] Foucault et al., *Security, Territory, Population*, 67.

which begins with the role of prince as a ruler who protects the territory; to the idea of government in early Christianity as "pastoral power"; to early modern Europe and doctrines of raison d'etat and the police state; and lastly to the modern neo-liberal interpretation of government and rethinking the political rationality of government in the western hemisphere.[25] The underlying rationale of governance appeared to be different from sixteenth and eighteenth Europe when it changed in two aspects: from the focus on interests of the prince or the divine ruler to a politically oriented attitude towards population as the target of governance; and from strengthening the power of the ruler by protecting and expanding the territories to empowering the state by "enhancing the productivity and docility of population."[26]

Analysing the structure of the government and the process of governing requires a connection or a link between power and population. Foucault claims that governmentality provides the means to understand the relation of the government and population through examining the power system. In doing so, he suggests to pay a special attention to the rationality of government. In other words, governmental rationality, or in a wider sense political rationality, as Thomas Lemke calls it, is the cornerstone of analysing the power. Governmentality, in fact, is the link between political rationality of the state, and the population as the subject of governing.[27] As Lemke put it, "Foucault uses [governmentality] exactly to analyse the connections between what he called technologies of the self and technologies of domination, the constitution of the subject and the

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[25] Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, *The Foucault Effect*.

[26] Michael Merlingen, "Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 35, no. 1 (December 1, 2006): 183.

[27] Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique."

formation of the state."[28] In fact, Foucault adopts the notion of government in order to connect forms of power to the process of subjectifying individuals.[29]

Foucault takes the term "governmental rationality" or "rationality of government" as an equivalence of "arts of government" in his discussion on government.[30] The arts of government indicate the nature of the government for practicing and exercising its power over the population and individuals. Thus political rationality, basically, deals with different forms of government and answers questions like, who the governer is, what governing means for the existing government, how the government exercises its power and through which means it does so, and who the subject of governance is. Hence, Lemke[31] tends to emphasize political rationality in analysing the connection between power and the subject of power and takes it as the main pillar in the study of technologies of power based on the fact that there is a semantic link between "governing ("gouverner") and modes of thought ("mentalité")."

Foucault does not use governmental rationality to investigate if the practices and operations are in line with certain rationality. In other words, governmental rationality does not seek to make the link between practices and rationalities; does not try to examine the application of ideas and their conformity with the main rationality; and it also does not want to detect the deviations in the practices from the main mandate of the rationality that they aligned to. In fact, governmental rationality attempts to discover what kind of rationality is in use for different practices.[32] As Lemke put it, "[t]he analytics of government not only concentrates on the mechanisms of the legitimisation of domination or the masking of violence, beyond that it focuses on the knowledge

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[28] Ibid., 50.
[29] Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique."
[30] Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, *The Foucault Effect*.
[31] Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique," 51.
[32] Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 1st Edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1991a).

that is part of the practices, the systematisation and 'rationalisation' of a pragmatics of guidance."[33] Foucault clarifies this concept as follows: "One isn't assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they play within them, because it's true that 'practices' don't exist without a certain regime of rationality."[34] Hence, it is necessary to bear in mind that different rationalities cause different practices.

Although the theory of governmentality has been used in many different disciplines since it was introduced by Foucault,[35] only in recent years, this theory has entered the field of international relations (IR) and has "gone global."[36] A growing number of researchers and analysts, who mainly come from a critically oriented circle in IR, have started to work on and study the application of governmentality theory to IR and use this theory to explain power relations at the global level.[37] In fact, the application of governmentality theory to IR can be understood as an attempt to use this theory in a wider "social ontology".[38] Indeed, by using governmental

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[33] Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique," 55.

[34] Michel Foucault, "Questions of Method," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1991b), 79.

[35] For example see, "Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America," *Cambridge University Press*, n.d.; Kristie McClure, "Taking Liberties in Foucault's Triangle: Sovereignty, Discipline, Governmentality, and the Subject of Rights," in *Identities, Politics, and Rights*, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R Kearns (University of Michigan Press, 1997).

[36] Michael Merlingen, "From Governance to Governmentality in CSDP: Towards a Foucauldian Research Agenda," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 151.

[37] Wendy Larner and William Walters, eds., *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces*, 1 edition (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2004); Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 89–115; Tore Fougner, "Neoliberal Governance of States: The Role of Competitiveness Indexing and Country Benchmarking," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (December 1, 2008): 303–26; Michael Merlingen, "Governmentality Towards a Foucauldian Framework for the Study of IGOs," *Cooperation and Conflict* 38, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 361–84; Halit Mustafa Tagma, Elif Kalaycioglu, and Emel Akcali, "'Taming' Arab Social Movements: Exporting Neoliberal Governmentality," *Security Dialogue* 44, no. October-December (2013): 375–92.

[38] Joseph, "The Limits of Governmentality," 229.

rationalities and technologies of government, as well as technologies of the self, "global governmentality" allows IR to approach global governance with a new perspective and also "reconfigure the relations between states and other actors,"[39] as well as between states themselves, as Merlingen calls it the "conduct of the conduct of countries."[40]

Critical theorists in IR use global governmentality to criticize the practices and instruments of the global governance that are mostly based on the mainstream theories of the field.[41] For instance, global governmentality scholars argue that the main goal of international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) is not to improve the well-being of the target population of their programs and project, but rather by implementing their policies they aim to control and regulate the behaviour of the host states and their governments through a series of governmental technologies such as "competitive indexing" and "country benchmarking."[42] As another example, Tagma, Kalacioglu and Akcali[43] look at the EU's democracy promotion initiative in the Middle East and North Africa from a global governmentality standpoint and argue that these projects and programs are not just virtuous efforts to benefit the target population of these countries and bring them peace and democracy based on EU's set of norms and ideas, but rather they are a form of governmental technologies which aim to subjectify the societies in this region to comply with the EU's own benefits and interests at the regional, as well as global level.

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[39] Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, *Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 16.

[40] Merlingen, "Governmentality Towards a Foucauldian Framework for the Study of IGOs," 367.

[41] Ali Diskaya, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": The Israeli Nuclear Taboo and the Limits of Global Governmentality," in *Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Emel Akcali (NewYork: Palgrave, forthcoming).

[42] Fougner, "Neoliberal Governance of States"; Merlingen, "Governmentality Towards a Foucauldian Framework for the Study of IGOs."

[43] "'Taming' Arab Social Movements."

However, there are a number of scholars who criticize the application of governmentality in IR. For example, Joseph warns the governmentality theorists that using governmentality theory in IR would raise the risk of creating "a catch-all category that can be applied too generally."[44] Joseph argues that "problems immediately arise when applying governmentality to IR because the international, if we follow the argument of uneven and combined development, is a complex combination of different social contexts."[45] He contends that since the "international system is not uniformly liberal" and as a consequence does not possess the same socio-political conditions, as in Foucault's take on governmentality in a predominantly liberal society where individuals practice self-control as free subjects, that are prerequisites for applying governmentality in a society, it is impossible to talk of global governmentality at a global level.[46]

As another example of critics to using governmentality theory in IR, Thomas[47] asserts that, "when the practices and projects of governmentality, or the scholarly diagnoses of power based on governmentality, are applied outside the bounds of Foucault's original empirical work where facilitating conditions differ, these projects and analyses will fail." The critics believe that this failure is inevitable in other parts of the world, such as developing countries in the so called global south or failed states, because it is these 'facilitating conditions' in a liberal society that provide the situation for the individual to create free and self-regulated subjects. Consequently, in non-liberal societies, they argue, the application of governmentality theory degenerates to "something more basic, or else is closer to what Foucauldians would call 'disciplinary power'

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[44] Joseph, "The Limits of Governmentality," 226.
[45] Ibid., 243.
[46] Ibid., 230.
[47] "Foucaultian Dispositifs as Methodology: The Case of Anonymous Exclusions by Unique Identification in India," *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 164–81.

rather than fully fledged liberal governmentality."[48] Nevertheless, there is a trend of scholarship[49] in IR that tries to apply Foucault's governmentality theory to non-liberal context and open a new channel in studying different phenomena by using this theory.

1.2.Governmentality without a neoliberal dress code

The aim of this study is to apply the Foucault's governmentality theory in a context other than a liberal/neoliberal paradigm. Indeed, a handful of scholars in IR have used governmentality theory in their empirical studies in various places all around the world, such as Volha Piotukh's work on Afghanistan and Belarus,[50] Salwa Ismail's research on Cairo,[51] Natalie Koch's work on the governmentality's impacts on qualitative method,[52] and Gary Sigley's study on Chinese governmentalities,[53] and Ali Diskaya's research on governmentality in Israel.[54] On this account and in line with aforementioned works, I contend that governmentality, both as an analytical framework and a socio-political practice to "conduct the conduct", is not confined to a neoliberal framework of governmentality. If we take Foucault's definition of governmentality into account as arts of government and techniques that regulate the conduct of individuals, we do not need to

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[48] Joseph, "The Limits of Governmentality," 225.

[49] Emel Akcali, "Urban Transformations in Istanbul and Budapest: Neoliberal Governmentality in the EU's Semi-Periphery and Its Limits," *Political Geography* 46 (2015): 76–88; Helle Malmvig, "Free Us from Power: Governmentality, Counter-Conduct, and Simulation in European Democracy and Reform Promotion in the Arab World," *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 293–310; Tagma, Kalaycioglu, and Akcali, "'Taming' Arab Social Movements."

[50] Volha Piotukh, *Biopolitics, Governmentality and Humanitarianism: "Caring" for the Population in Afghanistan and Belarus*, 1 edition (Hoboken: Routledge, 2015).

[51] Salwa Ismail, *Political Life in Cairo's New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State*, 1 edition (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2006).

[52] Natalie Koch, "Technologising the Opinion: Focus Groups, Performance and Free Speech," *Area* 45, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 411–18.

[53] Gary Sigley, "Chinese Governmentalities: Government, Governance and the Socialist Market Economy," *Economy and Society* 35, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 487–508.

[54] Diskaya, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": The Israeli Nuclear Taboo and the Limits of Global Governmentality."

necessarily limit ourselves to neoliberal governmentality.[55] As abovementioned researchers have already claimed, I argue that it is well possible to leave the neoliberal dress code aside in order to go around to other regions of the world and find other contexts in which to apply Foucault's governmentality theory.

To support this work of scholarships, Walters,[56] for instance, argues that governmentality should be considered as a "research program" rather than as a "depiction of discrete systems of power", and in the same vein, as Death[57] exemplifies, "even authoritarian regimes seek to conduct their subjects through propaganda, religion, and economic incentives, rather than pure or total coercion." In general, these scholars and theorists alike suggest that governmentality theory can be used in different contexts with different governmental rationalities, with different governmental technologies, with varied individuals who exercise different ways of self-regulation and technologies of the self, and producing different ways of subjectification of different populations.

To apply it in a useful way, scholars suggest using governmentality as a "toolbox" which helps the user to adapt to different situations and various conditions while simultaneously taking Foucault's governmentality theory as the centre of the argument. In this case, analytically speaking, governmentality theory concerns four points:[58] (1) the thinking, problematization, justification, and calculation embedded in governmental practices (governmental rationalities); (2) the ways and manners employed to direct conduct (governmental technologies); (3) the modes of subjectivation involved in these rationalities and technologies; and (4) the ways in

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[55] Thomas, "Foucaultian Dispositifs as Methodology," 167.

[56] *Governmentality: Critical Encounters* (Routledge, 2012), 40.

[57] "Governmentality at the Limits of the International: African Politics and Foucauldian Theory," *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 03 (July 2013): 773.

[58] Death, "Governmentality at the Limits of the International"; Malmvig, "Free Us from Power"; Merlingen, "From Governance to Governmentality in CSDP."

which governing technologies and rationalities are countered, reversed, and resisted (counter-conducts).[59]

In this study, as a contribution to the current trend in IR field of using governmentality theory in contexts other than a neo-liberal context, I want to travel with governmentality theory to the Middle East and apply it to the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, as a Shia organisation in Lebanon. In this study, I will use governmentality as a toolkit to analyse the relationship between Hezbollah as the subject of Iran's governmentality and examine how Iran governmentalizes Hezbollah, what the technologies are and what kind of governmental rationalities Iran uses to rationalize and justify his moves and techniques.

For the purpose of this study, I focus mostly on political rationality and techniques of governmentality. Furthermore, I try to understand to what extent and based on what justifications we can claim, if we can at all, that Iran has, partly or completely, been successful in governmentalizing Hezbollah and the Shia population in Lebanon. In the next chapter, I give a very brief review on historical background of political Shia in the Middle East. In the second step, I go through the Iranian revolution and its main supporting ideologies and doctrines. I close the chapter by discussing the political rationalities of Iran's government which have been the brace for its techniques of governmentality regarding Hezbollah.

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[59] This study does not concern with the concept of counter-conduct in governmentality theory. For this reason, I did not talk about it in this chapter as part of governmentality theory.

Chapter Two: Iranian revolution and its governmental rationality

In this chapter, I give a general picture of the historical background of political Shia in the Middle East. This requires, for the purpose of this study, going back to Iran's contemporary history and the Islamic republic's political goals and ambitions. In order to do so, I first elaborate on Shia's political history in the Middle East, which followed by two sections on Iranian revolution and political rationality of it. I show how Iranian regime's political rationality have been formed based on Shia's ideology, as well as tradition, and what role Khomeini, as the architect of Iranian revolution, played in shaping the revolution's ideological paradigm.

2.1. Political Shia in the Middle East

Two events are considered as the most important turning points in the contemporary history of political Shia in 20th century: Iranian revolution in 1979 and the 2006 Iraqi election following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the former, the revolution led to the creation of an absolute Shia-dominated Islamic republic in Iran, and in the latter, Iraqi Shias could take power after more than half a century of being marginalized and carrying a minority status in their own country. For the purpose of this study, my focus will be only on Islamic revolution of Iran. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the Islamic revolution, I will briefly review the historical background of Shia community and political Shia in the Middle East.

Throughout the history, since the death of Prophet Mohammad, Shias have always been the subordinated branch of Islam. Being an absolute minority in comparison to Sunnis, who shape 87-90% of the Muslim population in the world,[60] has made Shias the marginalized religious sect

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[60] PEW Research Center, "Mapping the Global Muslim Population," *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project*, accessed May 7, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/.

who always seeks a better position in the world of Islam. Shias form 10-13% of the Muslim population in the world. Most Shias (between 68% and 80%) live in four countries; Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq. Iran hosts about 66 Million Shia, while Iraq, Pakistan and India each are home for around 16 million Shia.[61]

Shia was born initially as a legitimist movement out of a conflict between some family members of Prophet Mohammad over his succession as the leader of the Muslim community in the seventh century.[62] Shia believes that Prophet Mohammad explicitly introduced his cousin Ali, who was the husband of his daughter *Fateme* as well, as the legitimate successor of himself and the first Imam of Muslims.[63] On the contrary to Shias, Sunnis accept the solution suggested by a tribal council to choose *Abu Bakr as-Siddiq* as the successor of Mohammad and *Khalifat Rasul-al-Allah* (representative of the messenger of God).[64] The same tribal council chose *Umar ibn al-Khattab* as *Abu bakr*'s successor, and after him *Uthman ibn Affan* was selected as the leader of the Muslim community. *Ali ibn Abi taleb* was the last one who was selected by the same committee. The followers of this line of succession after Prophet Mohammad form an overwhelming majority in Muslim world since the death of the Prophet.

Nevertheless, Shias believed that the leadership of the Muslim community was not something that the tribal council would have the right to decide upon.[65] They referred to an incident called *Ghadir Khom* that Prophet Mohammad officially pronounced Ali as his rightful successor. Shias believe that even *Abu bakr*, *Umar* and *Uthman* congratulated Ali for his position as the leader of

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[61] Ibid.

[62] Laurence Louër, *Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008), 5.

[63] Hamid Dabashi, *Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2011).

[64] Ibid., 59.

[65] Ibid.

Muslims after Mohammad, after the event of *Ghadir Khom*.[66] In contrast to Sunnis who believe that religious-political succession of Prophet Mohammad ends with Ali, in Shia tradition *Hassan ibn Ali* and *Husayn ibn Ali*, Ali's sons, succeeded Ali as the rightful successors of Prophet Mohammad, and subsequently Ali. Different offshoots of Shia believe in different narratives of *imamat* (imamhood, Shia's doctrine for leadership of Muslim society) as the "Twelve Imams" are the most important branch of Shia with most followers.[67] However, all these branches of Shia believe in the doctrine of *imamat* as one of the basic tenets of Shia Islam.

The division between Shias and Sunnis became wider and wider through the history of Islam following the death of Prophet Mohammad. Until sixteenth century, when *Safavids* took over Iran and established a Shia-oriented monarchy in the country, Sunnis were the absolute dominant power of the Muslim world and Iran.[68] The commencement of *Safavid* dynasty in Iran altered the prolonged story of Sunni's political dominancy in the Muslim world. *Safavids* tried to change Iran to a Shia land and by doing so they became the main rival for Ottoman Empire in a competition over domination of the heartland of Islamic world.[69] Hence, establishment of *Safavids* dynasty in Iran balanced the Shia/Sunni political power to some extent. Nevertheless, Shias were still in minority and disadvantaged, while Sunnis enjoyed their demographical superiority and socio-cultural pre-eminence in the Muslim world.

Safavids not only tried to make Iran a Shia country, but also endeavoured to build a new learning centre for Shias. In order to do so, they brought Shia clerics from *Jabal Amel* Mountains in Lebanon, and Bahrain and constructed many Shia seminaries and religious schools in the

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[66] Ibid., 60.

[67] Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future*, Reprint edition (New York, NY ;London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007).

[68] Ibid.

[69] Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam, Volume 3: The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1977).

country.[70] *Ulama*, scholars, philosophers and theologians, who were patronized by *Safavids* to spread and entrench Shiism in Iran and in the region, produced tremendous number of literature on Shia Islam and turned Iran to the centre of Shia scholarship giving it a new intellectual vibrancy.[71] As a result, *ulama* and *faqihs* or *mujtahids* (legal experts of Islam) became "functional replacements for the authority of imams".[72] This spiritual status for *ulama* of Shia as the successors of the twelfth imam[73] has given them a special and favourable position among the Shia Muslim societies that their Sunni counterparts have never possessed and achieved.[74] This position strengthens *ulama*'s authoritative power in the Muslim community and offers them an influential tribune to convey their thoughts and ideas to the followers.

For Shias, the *ulama* fulfil the political as well as social need of the society. They play the role of the religious lawyers and the main source of information regarding the religious issues for Shias. Because of the faith in *ulama* amongst Shias, *Safavids*, and consequently the country of Iran, acquired a powerful position in the Shia world – to a high degree because of all these *ulama* and ayatollahs[75] who lived in Iran and taught Islamic lesson in Islamic schools (*Hawzah*) in the city of *Qom*.

The *Safavids*, in fact, created a safe haven for Shias to prosper and flourish their religion, spread their culture as well as traditions, establish Shia law in a country, and have their seminaries and

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[70] Rula Jurdi Abisaab, *Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).

[71] Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, 66.

[72] Ibid., 66–67.

[73] Twelfth imam refers to the last imam of Twelve imams offshoot of Shia. The followers of this branch of Shia believe that the last imam of Shias or the twelfth imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi, lives in a miraculous state of occultation. It is believed that during his occultation, *mujtahids* and *ulama* shouldering the task of leading the Muslim community. In the same vein as Christianity or Judaism, the Shia believe that the twelfth imam will return for the day of judgment. For further information see: *Islamic Messianism: the idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism*, Abdulaziz A. Sachedina (Albany: SUNY Press, 1981)

[74] Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, 68.

[75] Ayatollah is the Shia religious leader in Iran.

Islamic schools to produce Islamic knowledge. *Ulama* supported *Safavids* and Shia monarchy in Iran as long as the shahs protected them.[76] This unwritten contract between Shia *ulama* and monarchies in Iran lasted until the 1979 revolution that brought a Shia-dominated political regime to the power.[77] In the next section, I will discuss this revolution and its impacts on Shiism and Shia status in the Middle East.

2.2.Islamic revolution of Iran

In 16th January 1979, *Etelaat* newspaper in Iran was published with a historical headline on the front page: The Shah is gone (*Shah raft*). This day was the beginning of the end of about 2500 years of monarchy in Iran. In less than a month a revolution swept up the country and overthrew the Pahlavi regime and Mohammad Reza Shah's monarchy as the last king of Iran. The revolution supposed to exchange an absolutist-monarchical semi-secular dictatorship with an Islamic regime which its nature was not clear for anyone.[78] Although, the term Islamic republic was spreading around during the demonstration's period prior to revolution and made its way to slogans and placards next to Khomeini's name in rallies, but many of the protestors and opposition groups did not bother themselves to discuss the structure and nature of the so called "Islamic republic" that supposed to take the current regimes' place as the ruling system of the country.[79]

Khomeini, as the leader of the Islamic movement before the revolution, played a vital role in leading the revolutionaries' moves and orchestrated the direction of the revolution to a Shia-oriented Islamic regime. Khomeini emerged as a serious anti-regime cleric for the first time in

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[76] Abisaab, *Converting Persia*.

[77] Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (Oxford University Press, 1988).

[78] Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11, no. 3 (May 1, 1982): 265–83.

[79] Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

1963 when a demonstration in support of Khomeini was lodged to protest against his arrest by the Shah's regime after his speech in Qom.[80] Until 1970, Khomeini had not publicly talked about and discussed the issue of *Velayat-e-Faqih* (guardianship of the jurist).[81] For the first time, in early 1970, he delivered thirteen speeches in Najaf on the theory of *Velayat-e-Faqih* and explained the Islamic government from his perspective.[82] By these lecture series, Khomeini offered a new model for Shia government based on theological doctrine of *Velayat-e-Faqih*. In his theory, Khomeini puts a special emphasise on the guardianship of *fuqaha* (jurists) in a Shia society and he examines the issue of the guardianship from governmental and political standpoints.[83] Khomeini poses that it is necessary to have an Islamic government for a Muslim society and contends that no one knew Islamic law and religion's doctrines better than *fuqaha*.[84] He argues that, "Now we live at the occultation period. On the one hand, Islamic precepts are to be enforced, (and no one is designated by the God Almighty to fulfil this task, and on the other hand, what should we do then? … God Almighty has given the quality which is required for rulership to a great number of religious scholars from the very outset of Islam … This quality is the knowledge about law and justice. A great number of our contemporary scholars (*fuqaha*) possess this quality and they should join hands. They will be able to establish a just government

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[80] Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[81] In his book *Kashf-al-Asrar*, which was allegedly written after Reza Shah's period, Khomeini explains many of his thoughts. But it is really hard to grasp Khomeini's main idea of *Velayat-e-Faqih* in this book. For further information see: *Sargozashthaye Vizheh az Zendegi Imam*, Mostafa Vajdani, Payame Azadi Publication, 2005

[82] Ayatullah Ruhullah Khomeini, *Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist*, trans. Hamid Algar (The institue for compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's works, 2014), 3.

[83] Khomeini, *Islamic Government*.

[84] Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, 125.

in the world."[85] In fact, as the driving thesis of his theory, Khomeini suggests that *ulama* and *fuqaha* should rule to have a Shia society with a well-functioning and proper government.[86]

The theory of *Velayat-e-Faqih* converted the Shia *fuqaha* to a ruling class in Iran with the leadership of Khomeini while he sought to place himself as the leader of all Shias, and then as the next step all Muslims. During the revolution and in the ensuing years, followers of Khomeini used religious and spiritual language to enforce his position as the leader of the Shias and attributed to him the title of imam.[87] The title of 'imam' for Khomeini was partly meant to expand his authoritative circle to all the Shia communities. After all, Khomeini claimed himself as the leader of all Muslims by always referring and addressing to all "Muslims" in his speeches, lectures, and books before and after the revolution.[88]

Khomeini and his revolution rose briskly, achieved its momentum amongst the Shias immediately, and the Shias around the world opened their arms to welcome Iran's revolution. The Iranian revolution, after all, turned to be a supporting base for the Shias and moved them up in the socio-political stage of the region of the Middle East.[89] Hamid Dabashi emphasises on the revolution's prominence position on behalf of Shias, by calling it "the most massive social revolution in modern Shi'i history."[90] The Islamic revolution in Iran aspired Shias and awakened the rebellious propensity of them which was supressed under powerful Sunni domination during their prolonged rule on Muslim societies. As Vali Nasr put it, Shias "became bolder in their

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[85] Khomeini, *Islamic Government*, 5.

[86] Hamid Enayat, "Iran: Khomini's Concept of the 'Guardianship of the Jurisconsult,'"," in *Islam in the Political Process*, ed. James Piscatori (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 160–80.

[87] Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, 134.

[88] Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*.

[89] R. K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East*, Reprint edition (Baltimore u.a: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

[90] Dabashi, *Shi'ism*, 71.

demands for rights and representation, secure in the belief that Khomeini would support them and that they had a model for political activism which would succeed in challenging authority."[91]

For more than three decades after the revolution, Iran continued its concerted attempt to enlarge its circle of hegemony and domination in the region by supporting and strengthening Shia groups and organisations in different countries. However, during this period, Iran went through a war with Iraq, had many internal and international socio-political as well as financial crises and changes, altered its initial perspective of world affairs, and made some changes in its policies and strategies towards Shia groups. In any case, the relationships of Iran with Shia groups all around the Middle East are not a simple relationship between a state and a non-state actor. In this current study I aim to understand different aspects and dimensions of one of these relationships. Hence, as mentioned before, I look through the Iran-Hezbollah rapport to analyse the nature, structure, and mechanism of it by using Foucault's governmentality theory. As the first step, in what follows, I discuss in details the political rationalities of Iran for governmentalizing Hezbollah.

2.3.Iran's political rationality

Iran's political rationality can be defined within both the Islamic revolution's dynamic and Khomeini's interpretation of Shia tradition. They both have social and political dimensions; they both have extreme and intense opinion on a proper model of governance; and they both have unique and remarkable viewpoint of the structure of transnational and international Islamic politics. For a better understanding of Iran's governmental rationality and the modes of subjectifying Hezbollah, it is necessary to combine the abovementioned viewpoints as the basis of our assessment. On this account, I offer three different concepts in Iran's governmental

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[91] Nasr, *The Shia Revival*, 138.

rationality to be discussed based on Islamic revolution's paradigm and Khomeini's perspective to both Shiism and revolution as a socio-political phenomenon, which are both at the cornerstone of the Iranian regime's ideological nature. I elaborate on each of these concepts while using govermentality theory in each case to conceptualize and contextualize them within the framework of this study. These three concepts can be listed as:

1) Exporting the revolution and revolutionary ethos by Iranian revolutionaries in the post 1979 period, and spreading the concept of *velayat-e-faqih* in Khomeini's perspective of Islam.

2) The culture of resistance and martyrdom in Shia narratives.

3) Anti American and anti-Israeli sentiment along with anti-imperialist stance.

I chose these three concepts as the main elements of political rationality of Iran because, as I argue in below for every one of them, they rationalize the practices and pragmatics of Iranian model of governmentalization after the revolution regarding Hezbollah as the subject. However, we have to bear in mind that the political rationality that results from these elements is not necessary applicable for any other model of governmentalization by Iran. As an example, I assume that how Iran governmentalizes his population inside his borders is different from the model that we try to analyse here, and that model of governmentalization might have distinct political rationality and techniques of governance. In any case, in what follows, I go through each of these concepts and use governmentality theory as a tool to frame them for the aim of this study, and furthermore, see what can be explained by this theory regarding the Iran's rapport with Hezbollah.

2.3.1. Exporting the revolution

Like the revolutions before it, Islamic revolution in Iran had (and still have) the zeal to spread its voice, ideology, and passion to other people of the world, particularly Muslims, under the project of, so to speak, 'exporting the revolution'.[92] As this utterance declares, the causes and goals of revolutionaries in Iran were not limited to country's borders. Their craving for spreading the revolution encouraged these revolutionaries to make connections to other movements and their figures in the region during the first years, and even the first months, following the fall of Shah.

The question of prosperity/failure of revolutionaries to accomplish and realize their ambition of exporting the revolution in practice is not the matter of this study. Nevertheless, theoretically speaking, I argue that there were two main reasons that paved the way for the spread of Iranian revolution in that time. First, Iran's role - as the only country that an Islamic revolution had taken place successfully at the time - was indisputable amongst, particularly, Shia Muslim as the prime motivator and designer for Islamic oriented movements in their communities. Shias' then socio-political and economic condition played a vital role in depicting Iranian revolution as an appealing source of emancipation for Shia communities. As Shireen Hunter asserts that, it goes without question that "Iran's revolution has been a source of inspiration and encouragement to Islamic groups."[93] Second, spreading the revolution was one of the main defined agenda for Iranian officials after the revolution. In other words, exporting the revolution was, in fact, part of the state building timetable and long/short-term plan for Iranian revolutionaries. Clerics in Iran advocated the Iranian brand of Islamic revolution and called upon the Shias, and all Muslims, to

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[92] The idea of 'exporting the revolution' has been stated in tremendous amount of occasions, events, speeches, and etc. by many different Iranian officials and *ulama* since 1979. For example see, Maryam Panah, *The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).
[93] Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam," *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (April 1, 1988): 731.

follow the revolution in Iran.[94] These two reasons reinforced and reproduced each other during the years succeeding the revolution and placed the 1979 revolution in the focal point of attention within and without the Muslim world. The Islamic movements hoped to lead their countries and societies to 'independence' and bring about social and political change through an Islamic revolution or movement. In addition, in that time the Iranian revolution, as a successful case, was the only role model for these movements to follow. However, it turned out that these two reasons are not enough to successfully export the revolution.[95]

A few years passed until some followers of Khomeini and Iranian revolutionaries figured that their revolutionary aspirations need to come along with statecraft's necessities. As a result, Iranian regime started to combine the rules and regulations of governance to its revolutionary rhetoric. Contextually speaking, Iran had to mix "requirements of pragmatism" with "demands of ideology" in its domestic and foreign policy.[96] However, this approach has not ever been the dominant opinion in the political scene of the country. The conflict between those who believe in more pragmatic tendency within Iranian leadership and policy making and those who support the revolutionary spirit in decision making is still unresolved. This internal constant conflict within Iranian regime has gone public in many cases such as the Iran-contra scandal,[97] Iran's posture regarding Palestine-Israel conflict,[98] and Iran and west negotiation over Iran's nuclear program.[99]

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[94] Hafizullah Emadi, "Exporting Iran's Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan," *Middle Eastern Studies* 31, no. 1 (January 1, 1995): 2.

[95] Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam," 731.

[96] Ibid., 732.

[97] Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs* (New York: Touchstone, 1992).

[98] "Israel and the Arabs: Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf," *Foreign Affairs*, accessed April 29, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1979-06-01/israel-and-arabs-iran-palestinians-and-gulf.

[99] "A Nuclear Energy Program That Benefits the Iranian People," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, accessed April 29, 2015, http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-energy-program-benefits-iranian-people.

In any case, the pragmatic approach, incrementally, merged to Iran's revolutionary government and shaped a model of governance that became a means in the hand of Iranian regime to govern the country as well as those mostly Shia communities outside of the country who felt attached to the revolution for some reason. Thus, in other words, the political rationality that stemmed from the revolutionary mentality and supporting the idea of exporting the revolution and spreading the words of Islamic republic, found itself binding with modern rationality of statecraft and governance, similar to its western counterparts. In this new situation, revolutionary mentality, which rationalizes some practices of Iranian government per se, began to create new practices and techniques of governance in an inter play with the western model of statecraft which was becoming more salient during the time. The forced marriage between these two different tendencies forms one part of Iran's political rationality to governmentalize an organisation like Hezbollah and create certain practices and techniques.

In addition to revolutionary rhetoric of Iranian regime, one can point out the role of Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e-faqih* in forming Iran's political rationality and the arts of government of this country, particularly in the first years succeeding the revolution. In article 5 of the constitution of Islamic republic of Iran, the role of *faqih* has been asserted:

> During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age (may God hasten his reappearance), the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the just and pious *faqih* who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people. In the event that no *faqih* should be so recognized by the majority, the leader, or the Leadership Council, composed of *fuqaha* possessing the aforementioned qualifications, will assume these responsibilities in accordance with Article 107.[100]

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[100] Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, article 5.

While the theory of *velayat-e-faqih* found its way into the constitution of the country and embedded its position as one of the main pillars of the regime, Khomeini, as the *vali-e-faqih* (supreme leader) of Iran, managed to realize some of his ideas regarding establishing an Islamic republic. Although, after the death of Khomeini his ideas and doctrine, as well as existing revolutionary rhetoric within the regime, started to dissolve gradually, but khomeini's legacy is still the dominant factor in policy making and agenda setting of the Islamic republic of Iran. As a recent example, Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader after Khomeini, in one of his speeches regarding the nuclear talk with west has asserted that, "I am not a diplomat, I am a revolutionary. Because of that I speak direct, tactful, honest and determined. For me, an offer to negotiate is meaningless without good and honest intentions."[101]

As a matter of fact, the idea of exporting the revolution and spreading its ideological composition was attached to the mindset of the Iranian revolutionaries from the outset of forming a government in the country and replacing the old statecraft system to a new one, which supposed to be compatible to Khomeini's interpretation of Islamic tradition and Islamic revolution. One can make the link between Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e-faqih* and spreading the revolution voice and exporting it to other regions based on Khomeini's idea of governance. According to the theory of *velayat-e-faqih*, the existence of an imam is necessary in the occultation time and based on Khomeini's claim on "his"[102] successful revolution, he is in the right state and situation to take the imam's position for all the Shias in the world. Thus, Khomeini was not only the supreme leader of Iran; he was the leader of all Shias, and in a more ambitious approach, the

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[101] Khamenei's speech regarding the nuclear talks with 5+1, 7th February 2013.
[102] I used the quotation mark here to implicitly point out that the revolution, of course, was taken place by all the peoples and groups who participated in it and took a role to make it happen. Nevertheless, since Khomeini was the source of inspiration for a major part of the people in the revolution, he, afterwards, explicitly claimed that the main and only leader of the revolution is him.

leader of all Muslims. On this account, placing Khomeini, and after him Khamenei as the leader

of Shias, and subsequently trying to unite and govern the Shia groups, movements, and

communities in the region evolve into the regional and international policy of Iran over time.

Supporting movements and groups such as Hezbollah and Amal in Lebanon, Syrian state, Shia

groups in Iraq and Syria, Houthis in Yemen, and etc. can be explained by this argument.

Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that it is not a political or religious goal for Iran. Using

Shia Islam to attract, monitor, control, and govern Shia groups around the region is merely a

means for other purposes.

2.3.2. The culture of resistance and martyrdom

> "My dears, do not fear giving martyrs, giving life and property for God,
> Islam, and the Muslim nation. This is the custom of our great prophet and
> his clan. Our blood is no more precious than the blood of the martyrs of
> Karbala . . . You, who have stood up for Islam and devoted your life and
> property [to it], are now in the ranks of the martyrs of Karbala."[103]

The concepts of pain, suffering, and sacrifice together with the culture of martyrdom have

always been in the core of Iranian interpretation of Shia tradition since its emergence in Iran.[104]

All these concepts have been symbolized in Muharram[105] rituals and form the central message of

Karbala for Shias. Many Shias in Iran and other countries celebrate Muharram in

commemoration of the third imam of Shias, imam *Hossein*, and endorsement of the culture of

martyrdom and resistance. The anniversary of the martyrdom of imam *Hossein* is one the most

important events amongst different branches of Shia Islam all over the world. Every year, Shias

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[103] *Sahify-E-Imam [Collected Lectures, Interviews, and Fatwas]*, vol. 4 (Mo'aseseh-yi Tanzim va Chap-i Asar-i Imam Khomeini., n.d.), 155.

[104] Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*, annotated edition edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2005), 38.

[105] Muharram refers to a month in Islamic calendar when imam hossein and his seventy two comrades and companions were murdered by Muslim caliph Yazid ibn Mu'awiyah in a battle that became famous later as the 'battle of Karbala'. For more information see: "Battle of Karbala' | Islamic History," *Encyclopedia Britannica*; or, Kamran Scot Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran (University of Washington Press, 2004).

perform the rituals of Muharram, which in many cases have interwoven with local/cultural traditions, and in doing so, try to keep the memory of Karbala alive in the minds and promote the culture of martyrdom and resistance in Muslim societies. While the twin concepts of *Jihad* (holy war in defending and expanding the faith) and martyrdom appears both in Sunni and Shia traditions, but because of sublime position of Muharram among Shias, the narrative of martyrdom and insurgency against unjust earthy rulers is more pronounced in Shia tradition than Sunni Islam.[106]

The years leading to revolution and in the aftermath of 1979, the Iranian interpretation of Shia tradition transferred to a politicized doctrine and was shifted from a conservative and politically passive religious tradition to a radical driving force for socio-political activities.[107] In the same line, as Abrahamian contends, the central message of Muharram started to be interpreted as "fighting for social justice and political revolution."[108] During the time of demonstrations and protests against the Shah's regime, one of the most effective sets of symbols used in political discourse of oppositions was the Karbala paradigm.[109] Muharram which used to be a mere cultural gathering and religious ritual developed to one of the most provocative political demonstrations against the Shah of Iran with a strong political message to his regime.

The political manifesto of the event of Karbala spread around different groups and communities, who were fighting against the Shah's regime, very fast and opened a new page in socio-political discourse of Iranian politics. The culture of martyrdom and resistance turned into a widespread political motivator for the oppositions of the Shah, from non-religious groups to pious Shia

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[106] Afary and Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, 43.
[107] Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*.
[108] Ibid., 5.
[109] Kamran Scot Aghaie, *The Martyrs Of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran* (University of Washington Press, 2004), 87.

groups, and from leftists and radicals to conservatives.[110] Even the intellectual community and scholars and academicians admired Muharram because of its role in spreading the culture of resistance and martyrdom and insurgency against the unjust ruler. Jalal Al-Ahmad, as one of the most famous Iranian writers and thinkers, admires the culture of martyrdom and emphasizes on it as follows, "the day we gave up the possibility of martyrdom, and limited ourselves to paying homage to the martyrs, we were reduced to the role of the doormen of cemeteries."[111] In another example, Ali Shariati, one of the most influential and well-known Muslim thinkers before the revolution and a university professor, found the culture of martyrdom and resistance very appealing as he was searching for an authentic interpretation of Islam as a lifetime project.[112] One can still find his famous quote on Karbala, "Make Every Month Muharram, Every Day Ashura, and Every Place Karbala,"[113] as a slogan in Muharram celebrations in Iran. Shariati sees the battle of Karbala with an existentialist point of view. In his view, *Hossein* could not fight his rival in Karbala and win over; he neither could remain silent nor accept the rule of an unjust ruler. Thus he chose the third option, to die and open the possibility of an authentic Shia Islam for others in the future.[114]

What happened in Iran in the months preceding the revolution embraces a twofold set of Shia-oriented causes: first, the revival of forbidden rituals of Muharram, and second, a new interpretation of Shia tradition and its emphasis on martyrdom and resistance.[115] Ideas of thinkers like Shariati and Al-Ahmad together with Khomeini's emphasis on martyrdom and resistance left

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[110] Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005).

[111] Jalal Al-Ahmad, *Plagued by the West (Gharbzadegi)*, trans. Paul Sprachman (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1963), 68.

[112] Afary and Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*.

[113] Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 5.

[114] Afary and Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*.

[115] Ibid.

a substantial effect on the Iranian revolution and shaped a major part of its political ideology. The culture of martyrdom and resistance continued to be an influential factor in forming the mentality of the Iranian revolutionaries and had a great impact even on policy making, model of governance, and political rhetoric of Iran after the revolution. Based on Khomeini's call, Shias were expected to cherish and glorify the memory of *Hossein* and the message of Karbala, and be ready to become the martyr of the way of justice, which is defined by Khomeini.[116]

In few months after the revolution, the culture of martyrdom and resistance was already part of the official political rationality of Iranian revolution and the resulted government and political regime. Based on this rationality, Iranian regime was able to rationalize many of its policies in different fields of socio-eco-political issues. As a result, the culture of martyrdom and resistance became one of the main concepts in Iran's governmental rationality to governmentalize both Iranian population and foreign Shia movements and organisations. For example, in its domestic usage, during the war between Iran and Iraq, Iran's propaganda machine investing great amount of money and time to promote the culture of martyrdom among people to receive unconditional loyalty of the population regarding the war.[117] Consequently, Iran and Iraq war became a practical means in the hand of Iran to underpin its practices and techniques of governmentality to conduct the conduct of the subject.

In any case, one can again trace the role of Khomeini in creation of this rationality in the politics of the country. Similar to the first concept in political rationality about spreading the word of the revolution and the theory of *velayat-e-faqih*, Khomeini played a crucial role in creation of the culture of martyrdom and resistance as one of basic tenets of revolutionaries' political rationality.

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[116] Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*.

[117] Mateo Mohammad Farzaneh, "Shi'i Ideology, Iranian Secular Nationalism and the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988)," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 7, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 86–103, doi:10.1111/j.1754-9469.2007.tb00109.x.

2.3.3. Anti-American, anti-Israel, and anti-imperialist sentiments

The Iranian revolutionaries' world view, in addition to the ideas of Khomeini, is highly inspired by Marxism and leftist groups before the revolution. This vision to the global affairs and dynamic divides people and states in the world simply into two distinct camps: "the oppressor and arrogant powers; and the oppressed and downtrodden nations."[118] Khomeini's parlance for calling these two groups, or so to speak, in a narrower context, classes, as *mostazafin* (oppressed) and the *mostakberin* (oppressors), were part of central rhetoric of revolutionary discourse before the revolution among Islamists, leftists and even nationalists. This revolutionary discourse continued to be one of the basic tenets of official foreign policy of Iran after the revolution until the present time. In Khomeini's vision of the world, United States and Soviet Union were the symbol of oppressor states and powers, and on the opposite camp, he placed most of the so called third world countries, particularly Shias who were oppressed both by powerful states and nations as well as their Sunni counterparts.[119] Before the revolution, Khomeini and Marxist groups employed this discourse to denounce Shah's position in the country as a king and blame him for its relationship with United States, Israel, and in general the global imperialist.

Based on this ideology and socio-eco-political account, salvation and emancipation of oppressed societies and peoples dominated the central narrative of Iran's view on its foreign relations and model of policy making beyond the country's borders. As a result, Iran chose to take the side of oppressed nations in the world's politics – at least in rhetorical level - against power blocs. Based on this approach, Iran initiated to make extensive cooperation links with Shia communities and movements, notably Islamic movements. Taking Iran's dominant Shia discourse into account, it

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[118] Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam," 734.
[119] Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*.

was predictable to see Iran supporting the Shia communities in the world. These connections and links were supposed to allow Iran to challenge the big powers more effectively and form a block of resistance on his side. It is also in line with Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e-faqih* and his leadership on all Shias in the world. Iran sought uniting all the Shias in the first place, and makes an Islamic government for all Muslims in the second stage, to rebel against the western and eastern powers. In fact, creation of Hezbollah, Iran's support for Palestinians, anti-Israel rhetoric, and a handful of other policies, strategies, and discourses can be justified on this ground.

However, as one of the consequences of visualizing the world's politics and dynamics in this way, Iran had to take a twofold political strategy: state-to-state and people-to-people.[120] The state-to-state approach has two sides per se. On the one hand, Iran has maintained its diplomatic relationship with other countries and showed its commitment to international rules and norms. On the other hand, Iran has followed its anti-imperialist standpoint and tried to make a resistance bloc with other states and governments against the international norms that are mostly settled by these alleged 'arrogant powers'.[121] At the same time, Iran has tried to maintain its links with various Islamic movements and organizations around the world through official and semi-official practices.

2.3.4. Iran's political rationality: A summary

As Foucault explains in his article for *Le Nouvel Observateur*, he believes that Islamic movements are a form of political will rather than an ideology with political structure.[122] What impressed Foucault more than other things about the Iranian revolution was a "spiritual

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[120] Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam," 736.

[121] Mariano V Ospina and David H Gray, "Syria, Iran, and Hizballah: A Strategic Alliance" 5, no. 1 (January 2014): 27–36.

[122] Michel Foucault, "What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, October 16.

dimension of politics."[123] All the factors that mentioned above as political rationality of Iran's revolutionary government are, more or less, along the line of spirituality in politics, in a way that Foucault would perceive it. Even the position of Khomeini as the twelfth imam's deputy for Shias has a certain degree of spirituality in it, despite its practical materialistic political dimension. However, we have to bear in mind that although there was an obvious indication of influence of spirituality in the political rhetoric of Iranian revolutionaries, particularly in the last years before the revolution and the first decade following the revolution, but in many cases this spirituality found itself confined in rhetorical level could not be translated and transferred to empirical level. While the political rationality of Islamic republic's governmentality stem from a certain ground of spirituality, at the same time it has distanced itself from this spiritual dimension of politics over time in the last decades of Iran's political life. *Ahmadi Nejad*, Iran's president from 2005 to 2013, made an effort to bring back the spirituality to political scene of the country, but faced formidable obstacles.

Nevertheless, for Iranian revolutionaries the issue of exporting the revolution, Khomeini's *imamat* and leadership on Muslims based on his *velayat-e-faqih* theory and special interpretation of Shia Islam, the culture of martyrdom and resistance, and uprising against the global arrogant powers, are all along the same line of rationality and form the political rationality of Iranian government in governmentalizing an organisation like Hezbollah. One can rationalise, analyse, and explain majority of Iran's policies and moves regarding its foreign policy during Islamic republic's lifetime, particularly in the first decade after the revolution, based on one of these political rationalities or any sort of combination of them.[124] In any case, we have to take into

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[123] Afary and Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*.
[124] In last two decades, started from the end of war between Iran and Iraq, and enhanced during Khatami's period in office as the president, Iran has partly adopted a selective narrative of worldly-accepted political rationality in

account that the main purpose of the Islamic regime is not to protect the ideology of Islam or its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, but the central concern lies on protecting the Islamic principality as a political regime in the world.[125] And it is exactly the point that the confusion arises. While the basic objective of the Iranian regime can be defined by, in Foucault's language, a spiritual dimension of politics and spiritualizing the political affairs, protecting the Islamic principality and Islamic regime of Iran requires a certain level of 'non-spiritual' approach to political rationality. This paradoxical situation has bothered and hurt the socio-political cohesion of Islamic republic since 1979. However, Hezbollah and Shias in Lebanon can be considered as one the most evident and conspicuous attempts of Iran to governmentalize Shia groups, movements, and organisations, beyond its borders based on the aforementioned political rationality. In the next chapter, I introduce some of the governmental technologies and practices that have been created and employed by Iran based on the above mentioned concepts, in order to governmentalize Hezbollah. At the end, I will assess whether Iran's attempt to governmentalize Hezbollah has been a successful case.

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his foreign policy and has tried to conform more than before to the international norms and rules. Nevertheless, the trace of abovementioned elements of rationality is still very bold and visible in his policy making process and approach to international relations. The recent (this dissertation is being written in spring of 2015) nuclear negotiations between Iran and six current world powers is a good example of the intense struggle between these old and deep rooted political rationality and more western-friendly approach to politics inside Iran's higher levels of political sphere.

[125] Refers to Khomeini's famous quote on the importance of protection of the *Nezam* (Islamic regime) as the first priority in the country (paraphrased). Quoted in *Sahify-E-Imam [Collected Lectures, Interviews, and Fatwas]*, vol. 15 (Mo'aseseh-yi Tanzim va Chap-i Asar-i Imam Khomeini., n.d.), 221.

Chapter Three: Iran, Hezbollah and governmentality in a different context

In the previous chapter, I introduced the political rationality of Iran for governmentalizing Hezbollah. In this chapter, I analyse Iran-Hezbollah rapport based on Foucault's governmentality theory. I try to understand how Iran attempts to governmentalize Hezbollah, and endeavour to see how we can make sense of Iran's different practices and techniques based on his political rationality. In other words, I investigate and study the process of governmentalization and subjectification of Hezbollah by Iran in their relationship. In order to do so, first, in reviewing Hezbollah's history, I simultaneously try to show how the context of the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is different from a neoliberal setting. In the rest of this chapter, I demonstrate how this theory can work in this certain case and how governmentality theory can explain this relationship.

3.1. Iran and Hezbollah rapport: A non-neoliberal context

In this section, by reviewing different features and characteristics of the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, I show that the rationality that represents this relationship and functions as the "politics of truth" in the relationship's context, is based on the new form of knowledge that is produced by Iran's governmental rationality. As Lemke put it, what governmentality theory does is to bridge the dualisms that critiques to neoliberalism produce such as knowledge and power, state and economy, and subject and power.[126] The critiques to neoliberalism stem from three lines of approaches and pinpoint three alleged characteristics of it: first, "[n]eo-liberalism as a manipulative 'wrong knowledge' of society and economy," second, "neo-liberalism the

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[126] Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique," 55.

extension of economy into the domain of politics," third, "destructive effects of neo-liberalism on individuals."[127] In this study, based on what comes in follow about the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, I argue that the Iran-Hezbollah relationship is peculiar per se. In any case, for the sake of more clarity, first, I give an overall picture on Hezbollah history and development.

Hezbollah was formed in 1982. Within few months following the Israeli's invasion of Lebanon in 1982,[128] nine young revolutionaries founded Hezbollah with writing an internal treatise, which contains the goals, causes, and dimensions of Hezbollah's structure and work as a resistance movement.[129] While 1982 has been mentioned as the inception year of Hezbollah by its members and other resources,[130] it took almost two years for this organisation to shape its structure and function as a coherent entity.[131] Hezbollah was initially created under the supervision of Iranian regime to support Palestine liberation organisation (PLO) against Israel.[132] In fact, Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon furnished the ground for Iranian revolutionaries and gave them a self-convincing and self-persuasive excuse, as well as motivation, to despatch their forces to Lebanon to fight against Israel and train the locals in military, logistical, and ideological affairs. As Louër put it, Hezbollah, in the outset of its creation, was meant to be a "proxy of Iran in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and therefore a means to enhance Iran's credential in the Arab world,… [and] the main vehicle of Iranian influence among Lebanese Shias."[133]

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[127] Ibid.
[128] Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton University Press, 2014).
[129] Joseph Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program* (Leiden: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).
[130] Ibid.
[131] Augustus Richard Norton, "The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics," *The International Spectator* 42, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 475–91.
[132] Louër. Laurence, 2008, Transnational Shia Politics.
[133] Ibid,. 205.

Hezbollah ideological background could be traced back to both Najaf and Iran. *Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi*,[134] who was one of the founders of Hezbollah, came back from Najaf in 1978 and brought with himself the ideology of *al-Da'wa* party and Khomeini's thoughts on Islamic governance.[135] On the other hand, *Ali Akbar Muhtashami*, who was one of the followers of Khomeini and assumed as the mastermind of Hezbollah, went to Lebanon in the same year.[136] The role of these two clergies on emergence of Hezbollah and its structure indicates and explains the ideological background of this organisation to some extent. As a matter of fact, most of the founding members of Hezbollah in 1982 were ideologically affiliated to either *al-Da'wa* party in Iraq or Khomeini's ideas on Islamic government and Islamic revolution in Iran.[137] On the other hand, *al-Da'wa* party also had borrowed a lot from Khomeini's theories in religion and politics. As a result, it is viable to claim that Khomeini and his theories were the main source of inspiration for Hezbollah's ideological framework.

Joseph Alagha divides the development of Hezbollah since its inception until cedar revolution[138] into three phases.[139] The first phase starts from the arrival of *al-Musawi* to Lebanon until mid-80s when the organisation was formed completely. This period can be associated to ideology and agenda making for the organisation and the process of shaping the organisation in institutional level. The second phase is from 1985-6 until early 90s after the civil war finished. In this period Hezbollah's main focus was on forming its political ideology and political agenda setting. While

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[134] Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi studied in Najaf was a student of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was one of the leading members of Da'wa of Iraq at the time.

[135] Marius Deeb, "Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with Iran and Syria," *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (April 1, 1988): 683–98.

[136] Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology*, 32.

[137] Nader El-bizri, Iran and Hezbollah: How does Iran governmentalize Shia groups in the Middle East, interview by Payman Shamsian, 04 2015.

[138] Cedar revolution refers to the events after assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2015 that a chain of demonstrations and protests led to withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

[139] Joseph Alagha, Lebanon: Hizbullah, a progressive Islamic party?, interview by Olivier Moos, May 17, 2007, http://religion.info/english/interviews/article_317.shtml#.VVTZqpNQ625.

religious ideology formed a vital part of Hezbollah's action, political ideology of the organisation had the upper hand in decision making process and the agenda setting of the movement during these years. During this period, as Alagha put it, Hezbollah "integrate[d] itself into the Lebanese political system and public sphere."[140] In third phase, which is from early 90s until the cedar revolution, Hezbollah followed its policies in the second phase to integrate itself more and more to the Lebanese political sphere when some of its leaders "made a conscious effort to transform the militia to Lebanese political party."[141] While there was an intense debate among the cadres of Hezbollah over the issue of integration of this organisation into Lebanese official political system, at the end the proponents of Lebanonization of Hezbollah could get more support among Hezbollah's members. Consequently, Hezbollah started to give a different picture of itself to Lebanese and self-depict the organisation as a political party rather than a militia revolutionary group in Lebanon.

After the cedar revolution, Hezbollah experienced many ups and downs in his status in the Lebanese politics. Although it could finally settle its position down as the only force inside Lebanon who can secure the borders and defend the country in case of external military attacks, its popularity among Lebanese from different sects and communities changes over time.[142] During this period, Hezbollah could also entrench its position in the political scene of the country. After the cedar revolution, Hezbollah has become even more influential on the socio-political stage of Lebanon through making its way to the parliament in the national elections, expanding its charity program in the country, and broadening its military presence in different regions.

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[140] Ibid.

[141] Husseini, "Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal," 807.

[142] Mehrdad Farahmand, Iran and Shia groups in the region, interview by Payman Shamsian, April 25, 2015.

All in all, taking the specific qualities of both Iranian politics and the environment that Hezbollah as developed into account, one can point out the differences and similarities of the neoliberal context and the setting of Iran – Hezbollah relationship. On this account, one can argue that how the relationship between knowledge and power is different in Iran-Hezbollah context while at the same time it has a manipulative character like neoliberalism; furthermore, I also claim that the role that economy plays in neoliberal context is being played by "spirituality" that makes the Iranian politics a "spiritual politics"; at the same time, I show that while the Iran's rationality in Iran-Hezbollah relationship emphasises on collective action and unity, it has a strong effect on individuals, like neoliberalism context.

3.2.Iran and Hezbollah rapport: Iran's attempt to governmentalize Hezbollah

In this section, I discuss the techniques of governance that have been employed by Iran regarding the subjectification of the Shias in Lebanon through the means of Hezbollah as well as Hezbollah itself as an organisation. In order to do so, I have to consider the historical disposition of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Due to ambivalent position of Hezbollah as both a movement and a political party in Lebanon, governmentalizing of Hezbollah contains two distinct elements. On the one hand, Iran uses techniques of governance to conduct the conduct of Hezbollah as a political entity that plays a role in local, national, and regional political arena. On the other hand, I consider Hezbollah as an Islamic movement in Lebanon that initially emerged to support PLO against Israel and protect the Shia community in south of Lebanon.[143] In this case, Iran uses Hezbollah as a means to conduct the conduct of the people, mostly Shias, in Lebanon. So in this case, Hezbollah turns into a technique of governmentality per se. In the former case, the

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[143] Alagha, Lebanon: Hizbullah, a progressive Islamic party?; and Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology*.

relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is a modern state-based relationship, and in the latter one, the relationship tends to be a revolutionary Shia-based relationship. To put it differently, in the first case, Hezbollah, itself, as a political organisation is the target of subjectification by Iran's governmentality, and in the second case, Hezbollah is a means in the hand of Iran to subjectify the Lebanese population, in which the main focus is the Shias, and make them the target of governance. Although I discuss both cases in this study, but the main focus is on Hezbollah as a political organisation that is subjected by Iran's governmentality. First, I briefly explain how Iran tries to subjectify Hezbollah and what the functionality and dynamics of governmental techniques are.

3.2.1. How does Iran try to subjectify Hezbollah as a political entity?

The process of governmentalizing Hezbollah was started by exercising two distinct, very evident main techniques: 1) through training camps and religious ideological influence, 2) through anti-Israel rhetoric since the dawn of the revolution in Iran. These techniques did not target the Shia population of Lebanon directly, but the main aim was to make an organisation that follows the Iranian agenda in its policy making without requiring any top-down direct control or constant supervision. By lodging these two techniques, Iranian revolutionary regime started to conduct the conduct of Hezbollah in both practical as well as ideological level.

In 1978, a group of Iranian clergies and military officers went to Lebanon to establish several religious and military training centres in order to train social activists based on substantial material and ideological brace of Iranian revolution and Khomeini's ideology.[144] These training camps played the role of making the ideology of Hezbollah, monitoring the process of

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[144] Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology*, 33.

construction of Hezbollah's organisation, and evaluating the structure and dynamics of the movement/organisation from the beginning.

As an outcome of these training camps, many Lebanese youth went to religious seminaries in the city of *Qom* in Iran, and also *Najaf* in Iraq, to take religious studies; among them were many of the Hezbollah's cadres.[145] In these seminaries, particularly in *Qom*, they were exposed mostly by Khomeini's interpretation of Islam and Shiism, due to high influence of Khomeini's ideas on the whole academic environment of the seminaries in *Qom*. On the other hand, the trainers in the training camps promoted the revolutionary ideas of Iranian revolution as well as Khomeini's theories on Islam through various cultural and ideological programs. As a result, the Hezbollah cadres developed their religious and political identities based on Iranian revolution's doctrine. As *Saad Ghorayeb* explains, some founders of Hezbollah identify themselves with "Committee Supportive of the Islamic Revolution, a cultural organization founded in 1979 in the run-up to the revolution in Iran. Since the committee is considered by Hizbu'llah as its 'prospective nucleus', party members emphasize the fact that its birth preceded the [victory of the] Islamic Revolution."[146] In addition, this committee staged a mass demonstration in support of the revolution in Iran before its triumph, which can be referred as a proof to ideological bind between Hezbollah's members to Iranian revolution.[147]

On this account, we can expect to trace three elements of Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e-faqih*, culture of martyrdom and resistance, and Khomeini's idea about the division between oppressors the oppressed in the world, in Hezbollah's identity. The first element is explainable with

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[145] Ibid.
[146] Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, "Factors Conducive to the Politicization of the Lebanese Shī'a and the Emergence of Hizbu'llĀh," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 14, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 303.
[147] Saad-Ghorayeb, "Factors Conducive to the Politicization of the Lebanese Shī'a and the Emergence of Hizbu'llĀh."

Hezbollah's strong faith to Khomeini, and his successor Khamenei, as the imam of Shias during the lifetime of this organisation until now.[148] For example, in the rallies and demonstrations that are held by Hezbollah, the pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei can be found everywhere in the hands demonstrators. This practice makes people to remember the Iran's position for Hezbollah, and subsequently, in Lebanese socio-political scene. For the second element, we can detect the culture of martyrdom and resistance on the many of the Hezbollah's moves and operations since its emergence. As an example, most of Hezbollah rhetoric on the resistance against Israel emanates from this culture of martyrdom and resistance. On the other hand, for the third element, Hezbollah has localized the oppressors/oppressed duality and has shifted it to invader/oppressed duality.[149]

As mentioned before, Hezbollah emerged in the wake of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the beginning of 80s as a resistance movement against Israel. The prolonged conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has constructed the rebellion character of Hezbollah and has been turned to the main pillar of Hezbollah as a resistance movement. In the similar vein as of Iranian revolution, which made an analogy between the event of Karbala and the situation of revolutionaries against Shah before, and against United States and Israel after, the revolution, Hezbollah borrowed the political narrative of Muharram from Iran's revolution and Khomeini's rhetorical statements about the event of Karbala and put Israel in the position of the oppressor (invader) of the time. As a result, Hezbollah used the Karbala paradigm to symbolize its resistance movement against oppressor/occupier rather than as an uprising against the unjust ruler.[150] It is mentioned in

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[148] See, Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology*; Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History: A Short History* (Princeton University Press, 2014); and also cited in: Nader El-bizri, Iran and Hezbullah: How does Iran governmentalize Shia groups in the Middle East, interview by Payman Shamsian, 04 2015.
[149] Husseini, "Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal."
[150] Ibid., 805.

Hezbollah manifesto, which was published in February 1985 as an open letter, that, "America, its Atlantic Pact allies, and the Zionist entity in the holy land of Palestine, attacked us and continue to do so without respite . . . This is why we are, more and more, in a state of permanent alert in order to repel aggression and defend our religion, our existence, our dignity."[151]

To reinforce it position, Hezbollah never let its picture as the protector of Lebanese against Israel vanishes from the people's memory. Even after 2000, Hezbollah has tried to keep the tension between Lebanon and Israel in a certain heated level. For example, the Shebaa farms' conflict can be read with this approach. In a similar vein, based on data that has been collected from Hezbollah's TV channel, *Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah*, Hezbollah's current leader who was a student of Khomeini, refers to the threat of Israel and United States in almost every speech that he holds.[152] On the other hand, Israel's aggressive and hawkish attitude towards Palestinians, Iran, and Lebanon helps Hezbollah to give a persuasive image of itself as the protector of Lebanon against Israel's threat.[153]

Hence, one can conclude that the invasion of Lebanon by Israel paved the way for Iran to governmentalize Hezbollah based on its anti-American, anti-Israel and anti-imperialist concept of its political rationality. As former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak believes, there was no Hezbollah before Israel's invasion of Lebanon: "When we entered Lebanon . . . [w]e were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah."[154]

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[151] "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program," *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed May 27, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah-program/p30967.

[152] For more details and information, see Hezbollah's TV channel's, al-Manar, website: http://www.alnour.com.lb/, and other newspapers such as al-akhbar, Dailystar Lebanon.

[153] El-bizri, Iran and Hezbollah: How does Iran governmentalize Shia groups in the Middle East.

[154] Norton, *Hezbollah*, 33.

In sum, over time the Iranian revolutionary's doctrine has become the "political truth" for Hezbollah's members and also its structural dynamics. Because of this overarching influence of Iran in creation of Hezbollah and making the ideological ground of the organisation, Hezbollah has remained Iran's revolutionary offshoot in Lebanon until present as part of the project of exporting the revolution. Although we should not forget the role of vehement financial support of Iran for Hezbollah in agenda setting of this organisation, but we have to consider Hezbollah as an independent entity with independent board of decision makers who make the policies of Hezbollah without direct supervision of Iran.[155]

3.2.2. How does Iran try to subjectify the Shia population by using Hezbollah as a means?

In the previous section, I explained that how Hezbollah was subjectified and became the target of Iran's governmentalization as a political entity and military organisation. In this section, I try to breakdown another aspect of Iran's governmentality practice in Lebanon. I want to look at Hezbollah as a means in the hand of Iran to governmentalize the population in Lebanon based on the three elements of Iran's political rationality.

As discussed before, one of the main aims of Islamic republic was, as it is claimed by the Iranian revolutionaries in the onset of the revolution in many occasions and official speeches, to export the revolution and, consequently, unite the Muslim world, particularly Shias, to make a powerful bloc against the arrogant imperialist powers of the world. However, this rhetoric has lost its dominant position in political scene of the country over time. For example, as an indicator, according to the official website of Iran's supreme leader, while the term "exporting the

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[155] Nevertheless, in controversial cases, the board consults with the supreme leader of Iran to make the proper decisions on various issues. For further information see: N Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, London: Saqi Press, 2005, p 191.

revolution" was used by the supreme leader 2022 times in 1989, he only used this term 356 times in 2010.[156]

In any case, Lebanon, due to its demographical characteristics and special historical as well as political background, was one of the first destinations for Iran to export his revolution. Creation of Hezbollah facilitated and expedited the process of governmentalization of the population in Lebanon. In fact, one of the techniques of governmentality for Iran to regulate the Shia population in Lebanon is the Hezbollah itself. It is the exemplary of the conduct of the conduct of the state through subjectifying the state itself. Increasing political power of Hezbollah in Lebanon expanded Iran's circle of control to governmentalize the population.

Particularly after 2000, Hezbollah has turned from a mere military organisation to a social and political and even economic organisation in Lebanon.[157] People in Lebanon consider Hezbollah as a charity organisation, a political party, an army who fight for Lebanon and protect the country and secure the borders, and a religious organisation that holds religious events and promote Shiism in the country.[158] Therefore, Hezbollah is present in every aspect of people's life with a certain socio-political and religious identity which is peculiar to this organisation. For example, its checkpoints in every corner of the city of Beirut, is a way for this organisation to monitor every act of the citizens in certain neighbourhoods. Subsequently, Iran can monitor and control the population in these neighbourhoods in Beirut. At the same time, these checkpoints keep Hezbollah in people's mind and play a vital role in the self-regulation of the people. On the other hand, the airport of Beirut is under Hezbollah's control. In this case, they can control and

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[156] "'Exporting the Revolution' in Khamenei's Speeches," *Http://www.khamenei.ir/*, n.d., http://farsi.khamenei.ir/keyword-content?id=1647.
[157] Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology*.
[158] Farahmand, Iran and Shia groups in the region.

monitor all the transfers through this airport.[159] As a result, Iran uses this overarching presence of Hezbollah in the society to governmentalize the population. Similar to the city check points, the practice of checking passenger in the airport is a key factor in self-regulation of the population.

As another example, during the Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Hezbollah identified itself as a resistance movement and military organisation against Israel's hawkish attitude towards Lebanon. As Richard Norton asserts, "Hezbollah … positioned itself as a force resisting the actions of Israel and the superpowers, which have led to subjugation and oppression throughout the Third World."[160] At the same time, Iran was engaged in a war against Iraq. According to Iranian regime's claim, the war was not just between Iran and Iraq, but Iran was fighting against the whole bloc of imperialism and global oppressors who were supporting Saddam's regime in the war.[161] Making these dualities of Hezbollah/Israel and Iran/global-imperialism was one of the essential factors in governmentalizing the Shia population in Lebanon. The Shias who had been oppressed throughout the history and had developed the notion of victimhood among themselves, sympathised with Hezbollah resistance movement, thus subsequently, found Iran as a saviour or emancipator. In fact, Iran propagated his stance against "imperialism" through Hezbollah in Lebanon. To put it differently, Iran managed to make an ideological link with Shia population in Lebanon through Hezbollah by depicting itself as the only source of hope for Shias to turn the page and change the situation. The Shias in Lebanon see Iran as the main buttress to fulfil their demands and wants. But what was the role of Hezbollah in this connection? The answer lies on the anti-imperialist rhetoric of Iran and anti-Israel sentiments among the Shias in Lebanon.

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[159] Ibid.

[160] Norton, *Hezbollah*, 38.

[161] Farhang Rajaee, *Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War* (University Press of Florida, 1997).

The Israel's annexation of Lebanon was a tangible issue for Lebanese, specially the Shias in the south of Lebanon. When Hezbollah started its operation as a resistance movement against Israel, it managed to make the 'resistance against Israel' as part of its identity. Everyday presence of both Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon pushed the population to believe in this identification and the picture that was painted for them. At the same time, Hezbollah's image in Lebanon was attached to Iran's revolution and Iranian regime.[162] Thus, for Shia population in Lebanon, the Hezbollah's fight against Israel was a resemblance of Iran's fight against Saddam's regime, or as it is claimed, the imperialism. Hence, Iran tried to infiltrate his anti-American and anti-imperialism ideology to Shia communities in Lebanon, and eventually, to the rest of the population in the country.

In another example, the culture of martyrdom and resistance has had a great impact on governmentalizing the population in Lebanon. For Iran, Hezbollah played the role of a propaganda machine to promote the culture of martyrdom and resistance among Shias. Holding Muharram rituals in Shia communities and emphasizing on the culture of martyrdom and resistance in the battle of Karbala, admiring and praising the martyrs of the war against Israel in different occasions, portraying the martyrs of the war between Iran and Iraq as highly respected liberators of Islam and Shia tradition, and depicting Iran's revolutions as a successful revolution that gained its triumph through the revolutionaries' faith in martyrdom and resistance, are only a few techniques that used by Hezbollah to permeate this culture amongst the people.[163] On the other hand, the war against Israel was (and still is) an influential driving force to flourish the culture of martyrdom and resistance in Lebanon.

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[162] El-bizri, Iran and Hezbollah: How does Iran governmentalize Shia groups in the Middle East.
[163] Ibid.

In sum, Iran's governmental power over Shia as well as non-Shia populations in Lebanon has become effective and successful with the help of Hezbollah. On the other hand, since both Hezbollah and Shia population in Lebanon are the subject of Iran's governmentalization, exercising the governmental power over the population through Hezbollah enhance the effectiveness of Iran's governmentalization over Hezbollah itself. In this case, Hezbollah is both the subject of governmentalization and a technique of government. Thus, Hezbollah exercise a reinforced self-regulation technique on itself by being a technique of governance for Iran's governmentality. In this case, Iran can establish and entrench its ideology and rationality as the only valid and true political knowledge in Hezbollah and some parts of the Lebanese society.

3.3. Neoliberal governmentality vs. Iran's governmentality: Similarities and differences in a wider scope

So far in this chapter, I discussed different aspects of Iran's governmentality power on Hezbollah and Lebanese populations. Reviewing Iran's political rationality and his practices that are associated to this rationality reveals the similarities and differences between neoliberal governmentality and Iran's governmentality regarding Hezbollah and Lebanese populations. At the first glance, the issue of individualism can be considered as the point where neoliberal governmentality splits from Iran's governmentality. As discussed before, the idea of martyrdom and resistance is highly associated to 'sacrifice for the sake of community' so that an individual sacrifices him/herself for his/her society's triumph. While in the neoliberal society freedom of individuals is one of the main pillars, in a Shia society, freedom of individuals is not the priority, but the whole community should be free of any unjust earthy ruler. Iran has positioned oppressors and global imperialists as 'unjust earthy ruler' in his political rationality. Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that in both governmentalities, the body of the human is

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the target of docility practice. Iran's governmentality, based on Shia tradition, makes a docile body by praising the concept of martyrdom and making the individuals to believe that one of the ways of individual freedom is martyrdom. As a result, the subjectified individuals see the martyrdom as an emancipation quality and, so to speak, the road to freedom.

On the other hand, Iran's governmental rationality is based on the notion of "spirituality", as a political dimension of a political knowledge that is made in Iran. While in neoliberal governmentality economy is completely interwoven in politics and there is no politics or economy that functions separately from the other one. Similarly, in Shia-based Iran's governmental rationality, spirituality plays the same role as the role that economy plays in neoliberalism. Thus, in Iran's rationality we face the concept of spiritual politics which is the counter part of political economy. In other words, spirituality – or ideology, which represents a broader scope – is bind to and interwoven with politics.

As a conclusion, although there are some differences between Iran's governmentality and neoliberal governmentality, but one can claim that the governmentality can work in the context of Iran – Hezbollah relationship. Nonetheless, we have to bear in mind that the political rationality of Iran' governmentality is totally different from neoliberal rationality and produces different techniques and subjects. And it is the most interesting point in this study. As Foucault states that, "I don't believe one can speak of an intrinsic notion of 'rationalization' without on the one hand positing an absolute value inherent in reason, and on the other taking the risk of applying the term empirically in a completely arbitrary way,"[164]

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[164] Foucault, "Questions of Method," 79.

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Conclusion

As the main goal of this study, I tried to explain the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah through Foucault's governmentality theory. In order to do so, first of all, I introduced three elements for Iran's political rationality: 1) Exporting the revolution and revolutionary ethos by Iranian revolutionaries in the post 1979 period, and spreading the concept of *velayat-e-faqih* from Khomeini's perspective of Islam, 2) The culture of resistance and martyrdom in Shia tradition, 3) Anti American and anti-Israeli sentiment along with anti-imperialist stance. For each of them, I explained how they emerged in the politics and statehood of Iran and how they function to produce the political rationality of Iranian regime. Furthermore, I discussed how governmentality theory can work in the case of Iran and Hezbollah through explaining the Iran's political rationality and the governmental techniques that are employed by Iran in accordance to different elements of this rationality. In the last step, I tried to define the context of the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. Afterwards, I analysed the similarities that it shares with and differences that make it distinctive from a neoliberal context.

In this study I showed why governmentality theory is applicable in the case of Iran – Hezbollah relationship, and explained how it works in this specific case. As a result, I contend that not only the defined political rationality for Iran functions very well within the governmentality framework, but also that it produces very interesting techniques, practices, and modes of subjectification suitable to this theory.

Although Iran has exercised his governmental power on various Shia groups, movements, and organisations in the Middle East – with Hezbollah being only one of these groups and organisations – it is not accurate to claim that Iran seeks to create a Shia empire in the region

through governmentalizing these groups as his regional policy. Especially after the recent nuclear talks between Iran and western countries, there are some scholars and thinkers who claim that Iran is seeking to regain its imperial power, but this time a Shia model of it.[165] On the contrary, I believe that Iran only uses Shia Islam to expand his circle of influence in the region and reinforce his regional power. Hence, Iran's relationship with Hezbollah can be justified as one of these attempts to increase his power, and not making a regional Shia empire.

However, there is a need for further research based on governmentality theory in order to understand Iran's relationship with various groups in the region, particularly in today's Iraq and Syria. Governmentality theory can be very helpful to comprehend the situation in countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen where Iran plays a key role in their socio-political affairs through various movements and organisations. As a result, extending this research to other disciplines of international relations such as security studies, and different topics such as conflict studies, immigration issues, terrorism, and etc. can be a valuable contribution to the scholarship.

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[165] For more information in this debate see, Ralph Peters, "The Iranian Dream of a Reborn Persian Empire," *New York Post*, February 1, 2015, http://nypost.com/2015/02/01/the-iranian-dream-of-a-reborn-persian-empire/.; And Hamid Dabashi's piece on Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/05/persian-empire-iran-isil-150522062050503.html.

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