


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3/O/STY/R41-68
16 February 1968
DIST: O/UT
SEA SIGSUM 41

SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

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3/O/STY/R41-68
16 Feb 68 2054Z
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 16 February 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY

Preparations for attacks on Allied forces continue to be discussed by the probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front Authority and the probable PAVN 1st Division element in western Pleiku Province of South Vietnam's Military Region (MR) 5. The identification of a terminal in northern Quang Duc Province as Hq, PAVN 33rd Regiment and reflections of Allied activity in communications serving PAVN 2nd Division elements in Quang Nam Province were also noted. To the south, Hq, Viet Cong (VC) 5th Light Infantry Division and its subordinate VC 274th and possible 275th Regiments are currently located to the east and north-east of Bien Hoa Airbase in MR 1.

In western Quang Tri Province, PAVN communications reflected Communist interest in aircraft activity at the Khe Sanh Airfield and indicated that any aircraft landing there would be fired upon. The reference to a 14th Battalion in tactical communications suggests a AAA capability in the proximity of the airfield. Also reflected in communications was PAVN concern for a probable Allied chemical warhead being used in this area.

In eastern Quang Tri Province elements of the PAVN 803rd and 812th Regiments have indicated a possible attack on Allied forces in the Quang Tri city area. Tactical activity of the 27th Independent Battalion indicated that a detachment of the 5th company was to have planted mines, probably along Route 9.

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


The South Vietnamese Deputy Ambassador, NGO TON DAT, reportedly has expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the lack of any clear-cut foreign policy on the part of the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister and, according to SIGINT on 14 February, has submitted his resignation.

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN HIGHLANDS



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I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIAA. MILITARY1. Vietnamese Communist Communications-South VietnamMilitary Region Tri-Thien-Hue

On 15 February, a message passed by the probable Hq, PAVN 6th Regiment, active in the Hue city area, indicated that two regimental transport companies would bring down ammunition during the night. The companies were to drop off 50 to 100 82-mm mortars when passing La Chu (16-29N 107-32E, YD 693243), the possible location of an unidentified 8th Battalion.

Military Region 5

In the western highlands, PAVN B3 Front elements operating in the western Pleiku Province area continue to discuss plans for attacks against Allied forces.

On 15 February the probable Hq, PAVN B3 Front Authority--located on that day near 14-05N 107-22E (YA 550584) in the Kontum Province-Cambodia border area--instructed the probable Hq, PAVN 1st Division element--located on 15 February near 13-52N 107-34E (YA 789357) in western Pleiku Province--that "You must hold discussions to strengthen your determination to bring the mortars in to fire at the two large buildings to the southeast of Tam Dao [unidentified and unlocated] which are at a range of 5.6 km. This task will be led by a ... cadre. Comrade VU, Comrade LUOC, or Comrade MUON would be satisfactory to go with Comrade CHUONG and the artillery men to insure that the orders of the upper echelon are carried out precisely Once you have entered Area A fire at the enemy artillery position. (B val Mortar whichever location seems best to you, L/T [possibly Le Thanh at 13-50N 107-40E, YA 8930] or the southeast.) Comrade NGHIA's detachment is to do its utmost to ambush vehicles coming from above down to Lang Beng Village [13-53N 107-38E, YA 8436]

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or else it is to fire at aircraft in the areas of Tam Dao, Area K and Area B. If this is done with spirit of determination it will succeed." The message went on to state "If the wild beasts approach, strike immediately. Do not worry if we draw out all of the enemy, so much the better. The more of them there are, the bigger our attack will be Search for every means to strike the enemy. Do not discuss withdrawal as did the old C-4 [C is a generic designator for company].

In an apparent reply to the above message the probable Hq, 1st Division element reported "the wild beasts are active during the day in Areas K, B and Tam Dao, and Mountain Range 500. Ambushes were set up. Today VU went to NGHIA's position to organize the deployment against the vehicle road and the fire against aircraft. At the same time he gave XUAN's team the mission of continuing to reconnoiter Tam Dao. [VU] returned at 1500 [Golf] and received the message to prepare the Tet artillery. There was a meeting . . . Tet artillery in to the area of the long building south-southeast of Tam Dao is VU. CHUONG will go when preparations are completed. Reported with zealous spirit and complete respect."


To the north in Kontum Province, on 15 February the probable forward element of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS), 1st Division queried a subordinate--located on 15 February in the Dak To area near 14-34N 107-41E (YB 899125)--regarding the results of recent artillery fire. The subordinate was instructed to pick up 30 rounds of ammunition and "rice for the rest of the month." On 16 February the probable forward element reported that it had 39 rounds of ammunition, "five days of rice," and no other provisions.

Meanwhile, between 27 January and 15 February a subordinate of the MIS moved about 23 km eastward, from Cambodia to a position near 14-39N 107-42E (YB 921229), less than 10 km west of Dak To.

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE



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A radio terminal previously identified as the possible 3rd Battalion, PAVN 33rd Regiment, and last located on 14 February near 12-33N 107-53E (ZU 132697) in northern Quang Duc Province, has been identified as probably serving Hq, PAVN 33rd Regiment, PAVN B3 Front. This radio station presently maintains communications with Hq, B3 Front, Kontum Province; with an unidentified B3 Front-associated terminal last located near 12-32N 108-33E (BP 334870) on 29 October; and since at least 8 February, with an unlocated terminal identified as the probable 101st Battalion, B3 Front. The 33rd Regiment is also suspected to communicate with a deployed element of Hq, B3 Front that was last located near the Quang Duc-Darlac Province border at 12-33N 107-58E (ZU 217898) on 11 February; however, these communications have not yet been isolated.

During last September 1967, messages exchanged on communications facilities associated with the 33rd Regiment indicated that the regiment was probably comprised of only the 1st and 3rd Battalions. First indications that the 101st Battalion had been added as a subordinate were contained in a message of 9 February sent from the probable Hq, 33rd Regiment to "K101." A radio terminal previously identified as the possible 101st Battalion was last observed during late October 1967 when it communicated with the probable Hq, PAVN 95B Regiment.

To the north in the Quang Nam Province, Hq, PAVN 2nd Division indicated on 15 February that it was in a difficult situation, under attack. This headquarters was last located on 14 February near 15-39N 108-02E (AT 825310) in southeastern Quang Nam Province, approximately 34 km south-southwest of its 10 February location. Meanwhile, the 2nd Division Provincial Unit Control, last located on 13 February near 15-44N 108-07E (AT 933411), indicated on 15 February that it was about to move. On the same day, an unidentified entity, last located on 17 January near 15-47N 107-56E (ZC 149482), indicated that it too was about to move.

Finally, in east-central Quang Ngai Province the suspected VC 38th Local Force Battalion was located on 14 February near

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14-57N 108-55E (BS 766521) about 11 km south of its 10 February location and approximately 22 km south-southeast of Quang Ngai city.

(2/G12/VCM/R486-68, 160300Z; R485-68, 160120Z; R483-68, 151335Z; R478-68, 150810Z; R470-68, 141720Z; T381-68, 151340Z; T382-68, 151529Z; T384-68, 151915Z; T305-68, 151930Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 1

SIGINT continues to reflect the repositioning of units and the revision of communications structures in the region.


A radio station, which has been active in communications since early February and which is associated with the possible Front Headquarters in Binh Long Province was located for the first time on 15 February in southern Binh Duong Province at 10-58N 106-37E (XT 755128), approximately 90 km southeast of the 9 February position of the possible Front Headquarters in western Binh Long Province near the Cambodian border. The possible Front headquarters has not been observed in communications with any other units or headquarters since late January, when it was active with the possible Hq, MR 10 and Hq, B3 Front.

An unidentified possible tactical control authority and two of its subordinates, both of which are tentatively associated with the PAVN 7th Division, have relocated. The control authority was located on 15 February in eastern Binh Duong near 11-12N 106-44E (XT 899371), approximately 22 km south-southeast of its 10 February location in southeastern Binh Long. One of the suspected 7th Division-associated terminals was located on 15 February in eastern Binh Duong near 11-12N 106-45E (XT 907393), approximately 21 km southeast of its 9 February position near 11-19N 106-36E (XT 742511); the second terminal had moved by 14 February into east-central Binh Duong near 11-09N 106-41E (XT 843324), approximately 70 km southeast of its 13 January location in northeastern Tay Ninh Province near 11-39N 106-17E (XT 402872).

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VC 5th LID ACTIVITY NEAR BIEN HOA AIRBASE



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In other activity Hq, VC 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) and its subordinate 274th and possible 275th Regiments are deployed to the east and northeast of Bien Hoa Air Base, according to the latest available SIGINT information. On 2 February, the division headquarters was located in northern Bien Hoa Province at 11-00N 106-57E (YT 123174), approximately 14 km east of the base. The possible Hq, VC 275th Regiment was located 32 km north-east of the air base near 11-07N 107-03E (YT 243304) while in communications with the Military Affairs Section (MAS) of COSVN on 13 February. The regimental headquarters had resumed communications with the MAS on 11 February for the first time since late October 1966. By 15 February, Hq, VC 274th Regiment had moved 31 km north-northeast of its 8 January location in southern Bien Hoa to a position 28 km due east of the air base, along the Bien Hoa-Long Khanh Province border at 10-58N 107-05E (YT 287144). It is believed that this unit has been located in the general area of its latest position since at least 13 February.

Preliminary information indicates that a subordinate of the probable Hq, C95 Reconnaissance Company of the MIS, Hq, VC 9th LID reappeared in communications as early as 13 February, instead of 14 February as previously reported. On 13 February this subordinate was observed servicing at least 24 messages.

(2/G10/VCM/R94-68, 151349Z; R95-68, Change 1, 160205Z; 2/G10/VCJ/R45-68 151715Z; 2/O/VCM/R89-68, 172040Z; 3/O/STY/R40-68).

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 1/10

The possible Hq, PAVN 7th Division reappeared in radio communications with an unidentified control in northern Phuoc Long Province on 9 and 12 February, marking the first communications activity noted between these two headquarters since 20 December 1967. The control authority in northern Phuoc Long, arbitrarily termed the Phuoc Long control authority, is suspected to be serving a logistics function. ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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Military Region 2

A VC Party broadcast communications group which had previously been used to pass foreknowledge reports of "enemy" activity in Dinh Tuong Province has not been observed since about 1 February. This group consisted of a control, which was colocated with an unidentified subordinate of the My Tho Provincial Committee (MTPC), and four subordinates; however, individual communications links between the control and its subordinates continue to be observed.

Foreknowledge reports were also occasionally noted on a communications link between MTPC and the unidentified subordinate which is colocated with the above control. On 29 January the MTPC relocated from western to central Dinh Tuong to the vicinity of this unidentified subordinate, communications between the two were last noted on 30 January. (3/O/STY/R32-68)

~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

COSVN Communications

Between 3 and 9 February COSVN sent at least 59 and possibly as many as 161 messages to its subordinates in MR 1. An average of 7 to 10 messages per day are normally passed on these communications. ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

Communications between two unidentified PAVN elements believed to be serving a direct support artillery function indicated that the Khe Sanh Airfield "must be dominated" continuously. Requests for exact locations where Allied aircraft land and take off from were noted, as well as orders to prepare to fire on the airfield. On 15 February an unidentified 14th Battalion reported that 74 rounds of unspecified ammunition had been expended; it also reported the possible shoot-down of an aircraft on that day. The "14th Battalion" is the accepted designation

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for the anti-aircraft support battalion assigned to PAVN divisions. However, SIGINT indicates that the 14th Battalions of all PAVN divisions located in the general DMZ area probably remained in North Vietnam and were resubordinated to their respective military region air-defense-command posts. It cannot be determined from SIGINT if the battalion noted above is another generation of any of those remaining in North Vietnam.

Also on 15 February, the description of a possible Allied chemical warhead was noted in communications between two unidentified entities believed to be associated with the PAVN 304th Division. Reportedly, the diameter of the shell was 4.2 inches and it contained a white powder which caused coughing, sneezing and skin irritation when it exploded.

Mentions of landline capabilities were also evidenced in voice communications on 13 and 15 February, when an unidentified entity reported that "Now we can use the telephone system from the sea." A lack of telephones and the bomb damage to a 12-km section of wire were also reported as obstacles to landline communication.

The disposition of prisoners was the topic of an exchange on 8 February between two unidentified elements of the PAVN 304th Division. Reportedly, prisoners were to be dispatched to the vicinity of 16-31N 106-42E (XD 825283) where the "2nd Regiment has a place."

To the east, a probable forward observer of the PAVN 164th Artillery Regiment was ordered on 15 February to watch Camp Carroll counterbattery fire for one hour after rockets were fired between 0600 and 1200 hours (GOLF) on 16 February.

Tactical activity reflected in 27th Independent Battalion communications has sharply declined with generally only resupply and personnel replacement noted. On 15 February communications of the battalion indicated a detachment of the 5th Company would plant mines that night, probably along Route 9 between Cam Lo and Dong Ha. Company 6 was ordered at the same time to provide

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cadre for receiving and guiding recruits down from the 7th company.

In the Quang Tri city area, elements of the PAVN 803rd and 812th Regiments have indicated a possible impending attack on Allied forces in the area. On 16 February, the possible 4th Battalion, 812th Regiment revealed that it was reconnoitering the area of Ngo Xa (16-46N 107-13E, YD 380550 or 16-45N 107-14E, YD 390545) and that if conditions permitted, it would attack. The 1st Battalion, 803rd Regiment reported that it was reconnoitering the Americans closely in the areas of My Khe (16-46N 107-14E, YD 404555) and Trieu Son (unlocated), and if the Americans remained in the areas mentioned, then the 1st Battalion was to organize to strike.

(2/G11/VCM/R317-68, 161300Z; R315-68, 152116Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

DRV Naval Activity

The T-532, which is believed to be an auxiliary vessel, appeared in North Vietnamese Naval communications for the first time on 16 February while being directed to transport batteries to an undisclosed destination.

PAVN High Command

On 14 February seven consecutive circular messages--the type considered unlimited in distribution on the High Command internal network--were sent to Hq, MR 3 North from PAVN High Command. Two of the messages were also sent to Hq, MR Northwest, and two were sent to Hq, MR 3 South. An unusually high precedence of "very urgent" was attached to all seven messages. The reason for this unusual circular message activity is unknown. An increase in the number of high-priority circular messages has been noted since 10 January.

(2/O/VCM/R34-68, 261725Z Jan; 2/O/VCM/R12-68, 162119Z Jan; 3/O/STY/R33-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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PAVN Rear Services

A PAVN Rear Services shipment message of 13 February contained a reference to a type of ammunition, "D-74". The amount of the ammunition was reported as "139 cases containing 139 rounds," at a weight of 10,210 kilograms.

While this type of ammunition has not been observed previously in Rear Services communications, collateral information discloses that "D-74" is a specific type of Soviet 122-mm artillery piece. In the past, 122-mm ammunition has been shipped two rounds per case, and the weight of this shipment tends to indicate that a total of 278 rounds were shipped instead of the indicated 139 rounds. ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

2/G11/VCM/R312-68, 150502Z

Overland Infiltration


On 14 February, the tentative Hq, PAVN 70th Transportation Regiment reappeared in communications with the A Shau Valley Rear Services Headquarters. This is the first noted contact between these two entities since 15 May 1967. This is the initial SIGINT indication that the Hq, 70th Regiment may return to its previous level of communications activity. The tentative Hq, 70th Regiment was located by SIGINT on 15 February in the vicinity of 16-34N 106-13E (XD 302307) and the A Shau Valley Rear Services Headquarters was located on 5 February in the vicinity of 16-18N 107-07E (YD 286045).

(2/O/VCM/R30-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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


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