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exceed five months. Thus, for example, Johnson's first year ran from 11/22/63–1/19/65; Nixon's last year ran from 1/20/74 through 8/9/74, while Ford's first year was from 8/9/74 through 1/19/75. All other years stretched from January to January. Secondly, the percentage of presidential speeches delivered to each constituency during each presidential year was calculated. This rendered our data more amenable to analysis using the assumptions necessary for parametric statistics, since we now have interval data. However, the author will readily concede that he is making these assumptions for exploratory purposes. The series of ANOVAs was used to ascertain whether for different constituencies the differences between presidents, parties, and eras exceeded the differences within presidential years.

19. Neustadt, p. 16.

THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION: HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING

by

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I. Introduction

Electoral mandates are made, not born. What a President does after his election and in his first several months in office sets the tone for his administration and may determine whether or not he is able to deliver on his campaign promises. While President Reagan's transition was marked by some successes and some failures, he took office under a favorable set of circumstances. No major domestic or foreign crises were pending, and the U.S. hostages had been returned from Iran. The nation had elected him in a landslide victory and had presented him with the first Republican Senate in several decades. Although the electorate had spoken emphatically, it had not articulated its preferences very precisely. The analysis of public opinion polls showed that the public did not necessarily support the conservative goals or drastic budget cuts the Reagan administration had promised, though it did want increased defense spending, reduced taxes and overall reductions in spending.[1]

But in an important sense electoral mandates are made in office, not born in the election. President Reagan pursued his policy priorities in his early months in office and received positive approval ratings in opinion polls. The electoral "mandate" was an opportunity to lead the country in the direction he wanted to go, and he took that opportunity to accomplish much of what he had set out to do in his first eight months in office.

The goals of any presidential transition are to take over the government in order to direct national policy toward the priorities of the new President. This article will focus on the transition of governmental power rather than on the many other roles and functions a President performs. In order to achieve his policy goals a President must first gain control of his major tools of power: legislation, the budget, personnel, and administration.

This article will analyze the early experience of the Reagan administration in its attempts to gain control of the government in these four crucial areas. It will conclude that in achieving its legislative and budget goals the administration's careful planning and consummate political skills can serve as a model for future transitions. This is not to assert that it gained these goals with no costs to other priorities. Early personnel choices by the administration put a heavy emphasis on personal loyalty to Ronald Reagan. This was done at the cost of professional experience and the ability of many chief executives to choose their own management teams. The personnel process involved a series of clearances that helped assure that all bases were touched, but this was done at the cost of time. Subcabinet personnel appointments dragged on into the summer of 1981 at the cost of administrative leadership and managerial direction. This extended the period of bureaucratic drift that is involved in any change in top leadership. This article will also examine the view from the bottom up, that is, what happens in the bureaucracy during a period of presidential transition.

II. The Lame-Duck Eleven Weeks

Policy direction and control can come to a presidential administration only after the inauguration on January 20th. But the groundwork for the takeover of power must begin well before November, and be under way in earnest immediately after the election. The foundation for the transition is laid during the lame-duck eleven weeks between election and inauguration. As the outgoing administration ties up loose ends, the President-Elect scrambles to put together a governing team, and the bureaucracy slips into neutral gear while it awaits its new bosses.

The Outgoing Administration

After the election new policy initiatives stop as agencies become reluctant to make agreements that may become moot on January 20. The outgoing administration is usually sensitive to the need to give the incoming President as clean a slate as possible. On the other hand, there is a flurry to complete those policy decisions well underway so that they cannot be easily reversed by the new people. One example of this was the litigation over the Professional and Administrative Career Examination (PACE), the professional level entry examination that had been challenged in court as discriminatory. The Justice Department and the Office of Personnel Management were handling the case, and in the final days of the Carter administration, negotiated a consent decree that committed OPM to develop Civil Service entrance examinations that did not have a discriminatory impact on minority groups.[2] While the outgoing Carter officials felt they were minimizing the cost to the government and still upholding the spirit of non-discrimination, the Reagan people felt they made an eleventh hour deal that committed the government to a form of reverse discrimination.

A major concern of all newly elected administrations is that the outgoing administration will attempt to seed the bureaucracy with its own people, either to save their jobs or to leave behind people sympathetic to the old and hostile to the new administration's goals. One way this can be done is to have people who entered the government as political appointees converted to career status in the Civil Service or to career Senior Executive Service appointments.

In the past this could be done wholesale and was called "blanketing in." It occurred when a President staffed a new agency with officials from his own party, and then issued an executive order that put the personnel of the new agency under the jurisdiction of the merit system and under Civil Service rules. The next administration thus could not throw out the political appointees upon taking office, and could remove them only for cause through cumbersome Civil Service procedures. Most presidents since the Pendleton Act was passed in 1883 to World War II engaged in this practice to a greater or lesser extent.

This option is no longer readily available to presidents, but individual political appointees can try to immunize themselves from being ousted by the next administration by getting for themselves "career status" with all the attendant procedural protections of the Civil Service. This maneuver is called "burrowing in." On January 4, 1980 OPM sent out FPM (Federal Personnel Manual) Bulletin 273-18 to remind agencies that during election years they ought to "carefully review all personnel actions to be certain they meet all civil service rules and regulations and also that these actions are free of any stigma of impropriety." The bulletin urged agency personnel directors to review carefully any actions that would place incumbents of positions in the excepted service in the competitive service.[3] In a follow-up Operations Letter to OPM officials on September 17, 1980 it was reiterated that "before any competitive staffing action is initiated involving a conversion of an excepted service employee" it should be ascertained that there is a "bonafide vacancy" and that, "In no instance should vacancies be announced solely to convert an excepted service employee to a position in the competitive service."[4]

Despite OPM policy there were some attempted conversions of political appointees to the career service. OPM investigated 43 conversions in three agencies during the transition period and concluded that 13 were improper. Conversions are legitimate if there is a genuine competitive selection process or if the employee had a prior competitive service appointment. Not all conversions are attempts to "burrow in." The General Accounting Office did an investigation of conversion cases during the transition period that covered four additional agencies. While it found no improper conversions, it found that some attempts were made but stopped by OPM or the agency's personnel monitoring system. The GAO report suggested that a more comprehensive monitoring system be instituted for future presidential transitions.[5] While the problem of potential conversions from political to career status is a serious one, the number of such attempts during the Carter-Reagan transition was small, and the OPM monitoring system seemed to pick up most improper actions.

President Carter named Jack Watson his deputy for the transition. On November 10 Watson sent a memo to cabinet and agency heads reminding them that the purpose of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 was to provide for "the orderly transfer of the executive power." He admonished those preparing materials for the incoming transition teams not to innundate them with excessive detail or unsolicited advice. "Our guideline is simply to be helpful and forthcoming in every way possible, without burying the new people under mountains of briefing books and paper."[6] Thus the official presidential line was to be as helpful as possible to the incoming administration. There were, however, some undercurrents advocating the minimum of help and cooperation. These probably reflected attitudes of individuals who still felt bitter about the campaign or who received less than full cooperation in the transition from the outgoing Ford administration four years earlier.[7]

On November 12, 1980 Watson sent out another memo reminding heads of departments and agencies that the President wanted to give the new administration "appropriate latitude" in filling career SES vacancies or making transfers. Since the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act prohibits new agency heads from transferring career Senior Executives until 120 days after taking office, the memo instructed that "the President expects all department and agency heads personally and carefully to review all recommendations for new SES appointments and transfers of career SES employees between now and January 20, 1981."[8] In addition to this the director of OPM had been carefully monitoring all new SES appointments for the last several months of the Carter Presidency to avoid even the appearance of improper political appointments to the career ranks. In this period some entirely legitimate personnel actions were held up or cancelled in order to eliminate any hint of partisan personnel actions.

On December 10 a Watson memo requested letters of resignation from presidential appointees who expected to leave the government by January 20, although it pointed out that resignations were not technically required until requested by the new administration. It also asked for draft letters of appreciation from the President to the appointees and for the names of the officials who would be acting in positions the presidential appointees left.[9] Some of the final acts of the Carter administration were to decide which political appointees were to get what type of gift as a token of appreciation for service in the Carter administration.

The Reagan Transition Bureaucracy

The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 provides that in order "to promote the orderly transfer of the executive power in connection with the expiration of the term of the office of a President and the inauguration of a new President" that the Administrator of General Services (GSA) provide office space wherever the President-Elect wants as well as staff, travel, communication and printing expenses. The Act, as amended in 1976, provides $2 million for incoming administrations and $1 million for the departing President.[10] While in 1976 President Carter returned $300,000 of his allotment to the treasury, the Reagan administration used the full $2 million plus another million in private funds. When asked about the amount spent by an administration advocating lower government spending, deputy director for transition administration, Verne Orr, replied "The dollar just doesn't buy what it did four years ago."[11]

While President-Elect Nixon chose to run his transition from the Pierre Hotel in

New York City and Carter did much of his work from his home in Plains, Ronald Reagan chose a large government office building at 1726 M Street, several blocks from the White House.[12] Reagan appointed Edwin Meese III to direct transition operations in Washington while his "kitchen cabinet" of business executives met on the west coast to recommend cabinet and other high level appointments. The main divisions under Meese were personnel, headed by Pendleton James; executive branch and Congressional relations, headed by William E. Timmons; and policy issue groups in the foreign, budget, and domestic areas, headed by Richard Allen, Caspar Weinberger, and Martin Anderson, respectively.[13]

Timmons was in charge of about 100 transition teams sent into most federal agencies. They were organized into five issue clusters: economic affairs, national security, human services, resources and development, and legal-administrative. The function of the teams was to set up shop in each agency (which some did the day after the election), examine ongoing operations and issues, report to the transition headquarters the status of agency operations, and recommend changes and cutbacks. Other major functions of the transition teams were to test people for possible appointments in the new administration and to reward loyal campaign workers who would not be kept on.

While the agencies and departments scrambled to prepare briefing books to acquaint the new teams with their functions and operations, the team members were keeping tight lipped about their recommendations. The teams had full access to budget and operation files, though not to individual personnel files. Members of the career service in general were very responsive to the transition teams, since any member might become a new boss or colleague. Some team members ended up heading the agency to which they were assigned, while some teams were dismissed when the new boss was named (e.g. State and Defense).

There were so many people working on the t[illegible]on that the operation soon developed into a bureaucracy in itself. Transition press secretary James Brady said there were 588 listings in the telephone directory, but if people in agency teams were included there could be twice as many people.[14] The Carter transition had 312 people on the payroll.[15] One of the problems with a staff of such size is trying to determine who speaks for the new administration. Even though transition teams had no policy authority, and public statements were supposed to be funneled through the transition hierarchy; there were a number of embarrassing leaks as representatives of various interests began to push their own policy preferences.

Early in the transition period members of the OPM transition team, Donald Devine and R. T. McNamar, met with agency personnel directors. The purpose of the meeting was to assure the career Civil Service that the Reagan administration would respect the integrity of the career personnel system and promise there would be no "sweeping changes." They said they understood that career SES positions were not frozen but they expected that any appointments would be carefully scrutinized and filled only if absolutely necessary. They said they supported the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and promised its continued implementation.[16] They asked for advice on how to make the transition a smooth one, but no useful comments were forthcoming from the group. Such advice usually got to the new administration via other channels; usually a high level person with credibility in both administrations was asked to relay by hand any advice or suggestions from the departing administration.

III. Taking Over the Government

Legislative Control

President Reagan's early successes with the Congress have been considered comparable to those of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson. He benefitted from the sense of economic crisis felt by the public and from his land-slide victory. And he was able to overcome the fragmenting tendencies that frustrated his three immediate predecessors in their efforts with the Congress. But his success was qualified by the fact that he focussed his legislative efforts on his economic program to the virtual exclusion of other Republican priorities. This section will examine the basis of the impressive, early legislative victories of the Reagan Administration in its courting of Congress, legislative liaison, and legislative strategy and tactics.

Ronald Reagan began the careful courting of Congress long before he became President-Elect. In 1977 he helped set up a political action committee, Citizens for the Republic, that funneled campaign money to Republican candidates. The payoff came when 62 of those he helped were victorious and could be expected to be grateful for his help and coattails.[17] After his nomination his aides made early contacts with members of Congress and set up a network of advisory committees for the Reagan campaign that included 160 members of Congress.[18] He made a symbolic gesture to the importance of Congress during his campaign by staging on the steps of the Capitol a show of unity on his future legislative agenda. While not specific in substance, it was intended to be an important gesture. Of more substantive importance was Reagan's inclusion of Senator Paul Laxalt and Congressman Thomas B. Evans, Jr. in weekly campaign strategy sessions at his headquarters in Arlington, VA.

After the election Congress continued to be a major transition priority. The President-Elect held a series of dinners to which he invited members of Congress. With the realization that Democratic votes would be necessary for his legislative agenda he announced that he would retain ex-Senator Mike Mansfield as ambassador to Japan. He took particular care to court House Majority Leader Tip O'Neill who had chafed at perceived slights from the Carter White House. He and his wife were invited to a private dinner at the White House, and he was also invited to the President's small 70th birthday party. Republican members of Congress were invited to advise the transition teams in the departments. And the President-Elect sought the advice of Senators Robert Dole, John Tower, and Strom Thurmond in making his cabinet choices.

The choice of Max Friedersdorf was an important decision in the new President's legislative strategy. Friedersdorf had been President Ford's chief lobbyist and had worked in legislative liaison for President Nixon. He was widely respected on the Hill and selected his lobbying staff from those with strong professional experience with Congress. The intention was to show a sharp contrast with President Carter's choice of Frank Moore who recruited a less experienced lobbying staff. In his dealings with Congress Reagan consciously deemphasized his being an outsider to Washington. His advisors felt that the "outsider" concept had been one of the reasons for President Carter's lack of early success with the Congress.

The main elements of the Reagan legislative strategy were speed and focus. Old Washington hands and academics alike had warned that the scope of budgetary changes sought by the new administration would be virtually impossible to get through the Congress, particularly the Democratic House. The Reagan strategists realized that if it was to be done at all it had to be done quickly, both to take advantage of public confidence and the election "mandate" and to move before opposition could coalesce. During the first months of 1981 the Democrats were in shock from the Republican electoral victory and were unable to unite on any coherent opposition to the Reagan economic program.

The second element of the strategy, focus, was intended to avoid what they felt was the Carter mistake of sending Congress too much, too soon. Thus the Reagan strategy systematically neglected other Republican priorities, particularly "social issues," such as bussing, abortion, school prayer, and crime. Since he could count on the Republican Senate for support, the keystone of his legislative strategy was his ability to carry the block of conservative Democrats known as the "Boll Weevils." They were a vulnerable target both because they were conservatives and would likely be somewhat sympathetic to his program, and also because

Reagan had carried many of their districts in the election.

The winning of the votes of the Boll Weevils (and of other House members) covered the gamut of legislative tactics from softsell to hardball. To garner votes for his economic package the President systematically and personally dealt with wavering members. He called them repeatedly; he invited them to the White House and Camp David and gave them small favors such as cuff links or tickets to the Presidential box at the Kennedy Center. The President's personal approach was understated and soft pedaled. He dealt with general issues and did not get involved with the details of legislative horse trading. His aides would follow up with specific promises and threats.[19]

In addition to small favors and courtesies the administration made policy compromises to get votes, such as the "rental" of Democrat John Breaux's vote in exchange for a pledge on sugar price supports or a compromise on peanut price supports.[20] When the carrots of favors and compromises did not do the job, the sticks of political hardball were brought out. One of the main tactics was going directly to the voters. It is ironic that President Carter was criticized so severely on the Hill for *threatening* to go over the heads of Congress to the people if legislators would not give him what he wanted. President Reagan did not threaten, he just did it. He put pressure on Congress by a series of televised speeches to the nation as well as personal appeals to groups around the country by himself and members of his administration. In the battle for the administration's tax bill, the President in a televised speech asked people to call their Representatives and demand support for his bill. With the help of donated corporate phone banks the volume of calls at the Capitol switchboard doubled.[21]

The "Southern Blitz" masterminded by Lyn Nofziger sent high administration officials into the districts of 45 southern Representatives in late April 1981 to pressure them to vote with the administration on the first concurrent resolution. Conservative groups were organized, the media were blanketed with paid and voluntary messages, and even campaign contributors of the Representatives were mobilized.

One of the most potent tactics was the use of electoral leverage. There was the threat that big political action money would be used against those who opposed the President's program.[22] There was also the promise that conservative organizations, such as the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress and the Fund for the Conservative Majority, would not campaign against Democrats voting the right way.[23] There was even a presidential promise not to campaign against southern Democrats who consistently supported his budget program.[24] Some have argued that these short term political victories were purchased at the price of long term Republican renewal in the south.[25]

Thus by skillful courting of Congress, a coherent legislative strategy, and shrewd use of a wide range of lobbying tactics did President Reagan accomplish most of the legislative objectives he set in his first eight months in office. He even enjoyed greater party discipline in Congress than had his Republican predecessors Eisenhower, Nixon, or Ford. While his early success with Congress was comparable to those of Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson; the range of his legislative goals was narrower. President Carter threw a plethora of difficult issues to the Congress and lost on many of them in his early months (though his overall success rate was not exceptionally low). President Reagan limited his legislative agenda to a few important, though difficult, issues; then with the virtuosity of an old pro he rolled through Congress with a battery of carrots and sticks. In order to concentrate on the economic plan, tough issues were put off until later. One of the few setbacks in this early period of the Reagan administration was the failure to coordinate with Congress the Schweiker-Stockman proposal for Social Security reform, leading to its repudiation in the Senate.[26] The payoff of all the efforts that went into the Reagan legislative program came in its budget victories, which are the subject of the next section.

Budget Control

Most previous incoming administrations asserted their budget priorities by making marginal changes in the proposed budget of the outgoing President. It used to be considered impossible to do much to a budget proposal that had been a year in the making because of the complexity of the document and because of all of the political bargains that had been struck in arriving at the totals for each program. Yet by March 10, only 49 days after taking office, President Reagan submitted to Congress a complete revision of President Carter's FY1982 budget, including large defense increases, large tax cuts, unprecedented reductions in domestic programs, and even reductions in the then current FY1981 budget. Even more impressive, within six months he had achieved virtually all of his budgetary, if not economic, goals.[27] The sharp reversal of political and budgetary priorities was no accident. It was the product of a carefully laid out plan that put political and governmental machinery into high gear immediately upon President Reagan's taking office. In the budgetary arena the administration did indeed "hit the ground running," much more so than with respect to personnel or management.

The Reagan budget victories of 1981 were the result of advance planning, singleness of purpose, and speed of execution. Much of the groundwork for the specific budget cuts that the new administration would make was done by David Stockman during his two terms in the House as a Representative from Michigan. Immediately after Reagan's victory he, along with Congressman Jack Kemp, wrote an economic plan entitled "Avoiding a GOP Economic Dunkirk" that became known as the "Stockman Manifesto."[28] Stockman impressed President-Elect Reagan so much that he selected him to be his Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the youngest person to hold Cabinet rank in 150 years.[29] Stockman's intimate knowledge of the budgetary process, his command of budget figures, and his lobbying abilities with the Congress were crucial to the early Reagan budget victories.

The new administration decided to revise completely the Carter budget proposals for Fiscal Year 1982 and submit its own budget to the Congress. Before the inauguration, plans for budget cuts were made by Reagan transition teams that were assigned to each federal agency and had access to internal budget and planning documents. After January 20 Stockman was in charge of the entire OMB machinery which he put to work overtime tearing apart the budget they had just put together for President Carter. The overall strategy was to achieve most of the victories quickly in order to cow the opposition and stampede as many members of Congress as possible on the winning band wagon.[30]

Immediately upon taking office the administration took actions to implement its budget plans in the executive branch. OMB sent out bulletins to heads of executive departments and agencies freezing civilian hiring,[31] reducing travel expenditures,[32] making reductions in consulting and related services,[33] and placing a moratorium on the procurement of certain equipment.[34] On February 11 President Reagan sent out a memorandum stressing the short time that was available to revise the entire Carter budget and stated that any disagreements with the OMB budget plans or personnel limits had to be conveyed to the OMB director within 48 hours of the agency's receipt of the budget revisions, a process that normally takes weeks.[35]

A series of televised presidential speeches and official documents began the administration's political budget campaign for Fiscal Year 1982. On February 5 in a TV address the President warned of an "economic calamity of tremendous proportions" if his program were not passed. On February 18 in a speech to a joint session of Congress he presented his

"Program for Economic Recovery" along with an inch-thick document explaining his approach to fiscal and monetary policy. This was followed on March 10 by another address to Congress and the release of *Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions*, the Reagan budget proposal for Fiscal Year 1982, prepared by the Office of Management and Budget. The following month OMB released *Additional Details on Budget Savings*, a document that specified budget projections for each program being cut along with the rationale for the proposed cuts. During the same time members of the Cabinet and Council of Economic Advisers were actively seeking appearances on TV and before various political, governmental, and interest groups in order to promote the administration's budget plans.

One source of potential opposition to the proposed cuts in domestic programs was the executive branch bureaucracies that were being cut. The administration used several approaches to neutralize this potential opposition: it delayed executive appointments and carefully orchestrated cabinet level acceptance of budget cuts. While some argue that the career service, the permanent bureaucrats, are a potent force in opposition to cuts; they were a negligible factor in this set of circumstances. They might have been able to argue convincingly against program cuts, but no one in the administration would listen to them, whereas the administration would have to at least listen to a Reagan appointee. In addition, career executives because of their role perceptions and career interests, tend to be very responsive to new political appointees and their priorities.[36]

During the first few weeks of the administration, before the newly appointed secretaries were fully able or willing to defend their organizations, small meetings were held with Stockman, the President, and several White House aides present, along with the cabinet secretary. The new appointee was confronted with Stockman's proposed cuts and given a chance to argue against them, but that was difficult because "they're in the position of having to argue against the group line. And the group line is cut, cut, cut."[37] Although the new cabinet strongly supported the Reagan economic program in general and probably some cuts to their programs in particular, they may have felt railroaded to go along with decisions made by others before they were ready to take an active role in the process. Stockman admitted "That's a very awkward position for them, and you make them resentful very fast. . . . I have a little nervousness about the heavy-handedness with which I am being forced to act."[38] But the cabinet was a small problem of bringing along the home team compared with the political challenge that faced the administration in Congress.

After President Reagan sent his detailed budget revision proposals to the Congress on March 10, the Congress had to take the first major step in the congressional budget process by passing a first concurrent budget resolution, setting spending, revenue, and deficit targets for Fiscal Year 1982. The crucial strategic decision had been made in February by the administration to use the reconciliation process in conjunction with the first concurrent resolution. Reconciliation was set up in the 1974 Budget Act to enable the House or Senate to require committees to change reported legislation in order to conform with the second concurrent resolution.

The Reagan plan was ambitious; it called for budget cuts—$48.6 billion initially—to be made by changes in the laws authorizing programs and extended the cuts over Fiscal Years 1983 and 1984. The usual budget procedure would call for a first concurrent resolution to set spending targets and then a second resolution in September to make the ceilings final. In the interim, the appropriations committee would pass spending bills within the targets of the first resolution, and if any individual bill violated the final totals of the second resolution, a reconciliation bill could instruct the committees to report out a revised bill to conform with the second resolution. The Republicans, however, felt that the only way to get Congress to go along with the largest budget cuts in U.S. history was to put them all in one bill and pass it as soon as possible.

The crucial votes came in the House on May 7, when it passed the first concurrent resolution and on June 26 when it passed the reconciliation package, including changes in existing legislation. In April the House Budget Committee reported out a Democrat backed budget resolution calling for more spending but a smaller deficit than the administration proposal. After several weeks of intense lobbying, however, sixty-three Democrats defected and passed the administration backed package known as "Gramm-Latta" by 253-176 on May 7. This vote was crucial because it showed that President Reagan could control the Democratic House and get his unprecedented budget changes through the Congress. On May 14 the House and Senate conference committee agreed to the first concurrent resolution including reconciliation instructions requiring authorizing committees to come up with the changes in law that would provide the $36 billion in budget cuts wanted by President Reagan.

Over the next few weeks authorizing committees in both houses struggled to make the cuts required of them in the reconciliation instructions. As each committee made its changes the separate bills were referred back to the budget committees to compile them in a package and bring them to the floor for a vote. In mid-June each Budget Committee reported out the budget cut packages. As in the May vote on the first concurrent resolution, the crucial test came in the House. The House Budget Committee reported a bill compiled from the recommendations of 15 Committees that provided $37.7 billion in savings and claimed the bill included 85% of the cuts wanted by Reagan. Republicans and conservative Democrats, however, claimed that entitlements were not cut enough and not enough programs were put into block grants.[39] They proposed a substitute called "Gramm-Latta II" that conformed very closely with what the administration wanted.

The administration again pulled out its heavy guns in lobbying for the Gramm-Latta substitute. The President himself telephoned or telegraphed each of the 63 Democrats who had voted with the administration on the first budget resolution.[40] Compromises and concessions in the final package were made in order to win votes, some of them departures from the administration's earlier proposals. For example, David Stockman promised that the administration would not oppose the revival of sugar subsidies. He later said: "In economic principle, it's kind of a rotten idea," but "they don't care, over in the White House, they want to win."[41]

The deciding vote came when the House defeated (210–217) a motion that would have allowed the Democrats to force votes on the separate pieces of the reconciliation substitute package rather than yes or no on the whole package as the Republicans wanted. The Gramm-Latta reconciliation substitute itself passed 232–193 on June 26. The Senate had already passed a very similar bill on June 25 by a vote of 80–15. The omnibus reconciliation package cut a total of $35.1 billion from the baseline established by CBO for FY1982 for a total savings of $130.6 billion for Fiscal Years 1982–1984.[42]

The FY1982 reconciliation bill was historic in that it was a major reversal of the spending priorities of the past several decades. House Budget Committee Chair James Jones called it "clearly the most monumental and historic turnaround in fiscal policy that has ever occurred." It provided the largest spending cut in U.S. history, affecting hundreds of programs and made some of the greatest changes ever made in a single bill by the Congress.

Personnel Control

Each incoming administration has the authority to appoint a number of officials who are responsible for the formulation, direction, and advancing of administration policies, or who serve in a confidential relationship to policy makers. These appointees are members of the "excepted service" since they serve at the pleasure of the President and are not subject to the merit system requirements of the Civil Service. The top cabinet and subcabinet positions, numbering about 500, are ranked in the Executive Schedule levels I–III: cabinet, under, deputy, and associate secretaries. Executive Schedule Levels IV and V, as well as General Schedule levels 16–18 are now included in the Senior Executive Service. Ten percent, about 700 of 7000 (8500 are authorized) of these are non-career members, that is, political appointees. The option is also available to appoint a number of "limited term" or "limited emergency" Senior Executives. Finally, there are Schedule C positions, about 1800 in number, at the GS 15 level and below. Schedule C duties include policy-determining responsibilities or a confidential relationship to key officials.[43]

Each election year the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service publishes *Policy and Supporting Positions*, the "Plum Book." It lists by agency each administration incumbent by name, position, and salary. During every transition there is a scramble for this committee print because it identifies those specific positions that a new administration can fill and the names of the political appointees who must leave.[44]

In order to fill the top five hundred executive positions as well as hundreds of other positions on regulatory commissions, advisory boards, etc., recent presidential candidates have had personnel operations going well before the election. Candidate Carter set up a "Talent Inventory Program" before his election.[45] In April 1980 Edwin Meese asked Pendleton James, who headed a Los Angeles "head hunting" firm, to set up a personnel operation for the Reagan administration. James assembled a staff and organized the "Reagan-Bush Planning Task Force" located in Alexandria, Virginia in August 1980.[46] It was funded and run entirely separately from the campaign, and therein were planted the seeds of future discord in the Republican Party. Such conflict may be inevitable in any modern presidential administration. Governing is not the same as campaigning, and a presidential candidate must have people planning future administration policy and personnel decisions in addition to campaign workers who are otherwise occupied.

The conflict arises after the electoral victory when those who ran the campaign feel they ought be have priority in running the government. In the Carter administration this conflict erupted in the battle for White House turf between Hamilton Jordan, who ran the campaign, and Jack Watson, who ran the transition operation. In the Reagan administration the conflict surfaced shortly after the inauguration when the right wing of the Republican Party began to complain that loyal Reagan campaigners were not getting their fair share of appointments.

This conflict was not salient in President Reagan's selection of his Cabinet and immediate White House staff. Each President clearly must make these selections personally. The immediate staff must be tuned in to the President's personality and style and possess the complete confidence of the President.[47] The criteria for cabinet positions are different and include important political and symbolic considerations. President Reagan made his selections with the help of his "kitchen cabinet" that met on the west coast. John Ehrlichman has observed that Presidents begin their administrations with strong cabinets and weak White House staffs and end them with strong staffs and weak cabinets.[48]

While President-Elect Reagan promised to re-institute "cabinet government," as Carter had in 1976, the President's advisors took extraordinary measures to assure that new cabinet appointees were in tune with the White House. In the first few weeks of the administration, frequent cabinet meetings were held to set out the "party line." Budget cutting, as described above, was done from the White House with little participation from newly appointed cabinet officers or their staffs. The White House also decided to keep tight control over subcabinet appointments rather than let cabinet members pick their own people, as President Carter had. Whatever President Reagan meant by "cabinet government," it did not include the delegation of budget or personnel authority.

The struggle over subcabinet positions created the greatest internal controversies in the early Reagan administration. Two main dilemmas dominate subcabinet personnel selection in any administration: will selections be made primarily by the White House or by department and agency heads and, what is the proper balance between political loyalty and administrative competence. Most executives naturally want the discretion to put together their own teams; Robert McNamara said choosing his own subordinates was the most important request he had made of John Kennedy.[49] President Nixon, immediately after giving his new cabinet authority over appointees, said to an aide, "I just made a big mistake."[50] President Carter, as part of his approach to cabinet government, gave the primary discretion for personnel selection to his cabinet secretaries.[51]

The Reagan administration, in conscious contrast, made it clear from the beginning that subcabinet selection would be controlled from the White House. Meese, as Chief of Staff of the Reagan transition team, was favorably impressed with a study on organizing and staffing prepared by the Center for the Study of the Presidency. It pointed up the trials of the Carter administration in subcabinet appointments. "Nixon, like Carter, lost the appointments process," according to Penn James.[52] This time it would be different: "When the cabinet secretaries were selected, Meese made it clear, 'Now look, this is how the appointment process is going to be run.' And they were fully aware as to how the White House was going to handle the appointment process before they were appointed. That was the package that they bought.'"[53]

The intent was not to make all of the selections in the White House, but to assure that all selections made were fully acceptable to the White House. The President's kitchen cabinet also played a role in the selection: "our most crucial concern was to assure that conservative ideology was properly represented. The three criteria we followed were, one, was he a Reagan man? Two, a Republican? And three, a conservative?'"[54] The influence of the kitchen cabinet diminished, however, when it lost its offices in the Old Executive Office Building in March 1981.

It was inevitable that such an approach would cause some conflicts. In general, those cabinet secretaries that were strongest had the best chance to win the disputed cases. Alexander Haig (with the exception of his deputy, William Clark) got his choices through the White House personnel process, if not through the Senate, with dispatch. Defense Secretary Weinberger is reported to have prompted the resignation of a White House personnel staffer by saying "I will not accept any more recommendations from the White House, so don't bother sending them."[55] Other cabinet members, however, did not have the political or personal clout with the White House to be able to insist on their choices when they disagreed over appointments.

The question of who selected appointees was closely intertwined with the other major dilemma of loyalty versus competence. At the beginning of administrations, new Presidents tend to have two fears: that "the bureaucrats" will undermine their policies and that their appointees will "go native" and become coopted by the departments they head. Thus personal loyalty is a centripetal force that helps counter the centrifugal forces that draw presidential appointees to the programs and colleagues in the agencies in which they work. The problem is that in order to have programmatic and management control you need more than just "your guy" in the position. The person must also have a blend of substantive knowledge and administrative skill in order to do effectively the President's bidding in the very complex and competitive bureaucratic world.

One indicator of knowledge and skill is previous administrative experience in business or government. Pendleton James, as head of the White House recruitment effort, sought out executives with proven track records who would be loyal to the President. "We had five criteria all along—compatibility with the President's philosophy, integrity, toughness, competence, and being a team player."[56] James, who had worked in the personnel operations of the Nixon and Ford administrations, naturally found many competent people among those who had served in previous Republican administrations. The problem with them, from the perspective of the Republican right wing, was that some of them had not supported Ronald Reagan soon enough.

In late January and February 1981 conservative right wing supporters of Reagan's candidacy began to complain vociferously that Reagan campaigners were being systematically excluded from the personnel selection process. John Lofton in the February issue of the *Conservative Digest* claimed that the Reagan administration was being filled with "retreads" from the Ford and Nixon administrations and called for James to be fired. He declared, "There will be no Reaganism without Reaganites."[57]

The person carrying the conservative banner on the inside was Lyn Nofziger, who ran White House political operations from his office in the Old EOB. He met regularly with conservative groups, and in March 1981 told the President that conservatives were being frozen out of his administration. His criteria for administration personnel differed significantly from those of James. He felt the personnel process should root out not only Democrats but Republicans who in the past had supported other candidates than Reagan. "I have problems with them. This, damn it, is a Reagan Administration."[58] Nofziger's conception of competence also differed somewhat from that of James: "We have told members of the Cabinet we expect them to help us place people who are competent. . . . As far as I'm concerned, anyone who supported Reagan is competent."[59]

Due to Nofziger's efforts and pressure from conservative groups, after the first two months the appointment process took a turn to the right, at least enough to mollify right wing critics.[60] James' deputy was replaced by John S. Herrington, who was more acceptable to the right wing interest groups. James denied that any policy shift took place, saying that loyalty was always a primary criterion in hiring and that the recent conservative appointees were already in the personnel pipeline rather than the result of any policy shift.

To keep things in perspective, not all administrative positions were the focus of pitched battles between Nofziger and the moderates, and the right wing did not always win. Caspar Weinberger was successful in getting Frank Carlucci, a distinguished career public servant to be his deputy, though Alexander Haig was not successful in preventing the appointment of William Clark as his deputy. Clark, a justice on the California Supreme Court, had virtually no experience in foreign affairs. Ironically, he was later to be appointed as President Reagan's national security advisor and was to be instrumental in Haig's resignation.

The overall result of the personnel selection process was an administration staffed with officials selected more systematically for their personal loyalty to the President than any other recent administration. Not incidentally, it was an administration with relatively little prior government experience, at least at the subcabinet level. As of June 26, 1981, of those appointees confirmed by the Senate, 76 of 112 (59%) of those in the subcabinet, 18 of 23 (78%) in independent agencies, and 7 of 7 in independent regulatory agencies had no prior government experience.[61]

This reflected Ronald Reagan's antigovernment campaign and his promise to change "business as usual." "There's an awful lot of brains and talent in people who haven't learned all the things you can't do."[62] This should have made Senator Jesse Helms happy. One of his staff complained about the early Reagan appointments to the *Wall Street Journal:* "All these people are the experts of the mistakes of the past. Why can't he at least get some new people who could have a chance to make some different mistakes?"[63] The Reagan administration also made some unusual appointments in naming to positions people who were hostile to, or at least highly critical of, the traditional missions of the agencies they were to head, for example James Watt at Interior and Anne Gorsuch at the Environmental Protection Agency.

In addition to disputes over whom to appoint to which position, there were also complaints about the slowness of the process itself. In the spring of 1981 there was a widespread perception that appointments were not coming as fast as they ought to.[64] There were complaints from the Hill that officials who should have been available to testify on administration programs were not yet appointed. There were complaints from the administration that the few top officials on board were spending all of their time testifying on the Hill. And there were complaints from the bureaucracy that essential program leadership was missing, resulting in policy drift and inefficiency. Pendleton James continued to deny that the pace of appointments was particularly slow and maintained that quality of personnel was more important than speed.

Some of the delays were caused by financial disclosure requirements and conflict of interest regulations that resulted from what James called "post-Watergate hysteria."[65] Some delay was inevitable, due to the range of clearances built into the personnel process. Each nomination had to run a formidable gauntlet running from the cabinet secretary and the personnel office to Nofziger to White House counsel Fred Fielding, to either Martin Anderson (domestic) or Richard Allen (national security) to the triad (James Baker, Michael Deaver, Edwin Meese) to the congressional liaison office, and finally to the President, himself.[66] Sometimes names of candidates would make it most of the way through the process only to be vetoed at the last minute by the political affairs office or the kitchen cabinet.[67] Once through the White House personnel process, international affairs nominations requiring Senate approval were often held up by Senator Helms who thought State Department nominees were not conservative enough.[68]

Despite administration claims that it was making major appointments faster than Presidents Carter and Kennedy,[69] *The National Journal* reported that after ten weeks Reagan had submitted to the Senate 95, as opposed to Carter's 142 nominations.[70] *Time* magazine calculated that, as of the first week in May, of the top 400 officials, only 55% had been announced, 36% formally nominated, and 21% actually confirmed.[71]

In January 1977 the Civil Service Commission approved a rule allowing agencies to create another set of Schedule C positions identical to those already authorized for 120 days "in order to facilitate the orderly transition of duties as a consequence of a change in Presidential Administration."[72] Thus during a transition each department and agency can have twice as many Schedule C appointments as usual for its first 120 days. On June 16, 1981 OPM Director Donald Devine authorized the extension of the period for another 120 days "since a number of key political officials have not yet been appointed to federal agencies, thereby continuing the transition period for the new Administration."[73]

Although the slow pace of appointments was disruptive in many ways, some administration officials saw the silver lining, or found virtue in necessity. They argued that the lack of appointees made it very difficult for agencies to resist the severe budget cuts that the White House was advocating.[74] While the slowness of appointments may have helped the President's budget program, it did little to facilitate the transition in the administration of the executive branch.

Administrative Control

Most modern Presidents come to office with an abiding distrust of the bureaucracy. They are convinced that their policy initiatives will be delayed, ignored, or even sabotoged. After two decades of Democratic rule President Eisenhower felt the need for his own people at the operational levels, not merely the top of the government. Schedule C positions were created for this purpose.[75]

John Kennedy felt that the career bureaucracy was too stolid for his new initiatives and drew domestic policy making into his White House staff. In one analysis his administrative strategy amounted to guerilla warfare with numerous "back channels" and special task forces usurping the powers of the career bureaucracy.[76] Richard Nixon's distrust of the bureaucracy was legendary. When his Congressional initiatives failed to fructify, he decided to "*take over* the bureaucracy and *take on* the Congress" with tactics such as impounding funds and his responsiveness program.[77] Jimmy Carter came to Washington as a self-proclaimed outsider promising to reduce the number of federal agencies from 1900 to 200. While this promise was quickly forgotten, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 did create several important tools of administrative control that the White House could use, particularly the SES provisions.

Ronald Reagan also came to office as an outsider, claiming that government was the problem with U.S. society, not the solution. Aside from the administration's budget campaign and personnel strategies, there did not seem to be a separate administrative strategy. The administration, however, did make a series of tactical moves aimed at establishing immediate and unambiguous control over the executive branch. A freeze was imposed on civilian hiring and lowered personnel ceilings led to the firing of thousands of Civil Service employees. The President also fired the striking air traffic controllers as well as the newly created inspectors general who had supposedly non-partisan roles. Finally, he "zeroed out" the Community Services Administration, which had taken over the functions of President Johnson's Office of Economic Opportunity. While each of these actions had important immediate consequences, the larger purpose was the symbolic statement that the Reagan administration was in charge and there would be no more "business as usual."

In his first official act after being inaugurated, President Reagan signed a memorandum imposing a "strict freeze on the hiring of Federal civilian employees to be applied across the board in the executive branch." The purpose of the freeze was "controlling the size of government and stopping the drain on the economy by the public sector."[78] An accompanying White House press release said that compensation and benefits for Federal civilian workers comprised a "major" part of the Federal budget.[79] The administration saw the freeze as a means to show the bureaucracy who was in charge, show the public it would fulfill its promises, and begin a series of broader cutbacks aimed at domestic spending and personnel.

A memo of January 24, 1981 made it clear that the administration intended the freeze to be retroactive, when it included in the freeze all those who had not been formally hired by election day, November 5, 1980. Thus many (some estimate up to 20,000) were caught in the freeze who had duly authorized letters offering them jobs, but who did not yet have formally signed Standard Form 50's (Notification of Personnel Action). Several cases were brought in court challenging the retroactivity of the freeze as a breach of contract with those who had good faith offers of employment, though not a signed SF50. They also charged that many prospective employees underwent extensive personal hardship in giving up their old jobs and traveling to Washington in order to accept jobs that were then retracted by the administration. The petitioners, however, lost on February 25 when U.S. District Court Judge Charles B. Richey ruled that the freeze was "not only constitutional and legally permissable but . . . essential to the well being and general welfare of the American people at this time."[80]

OMB Director Stockman explained that the freeze was made necessary by "a situation demanding sacrifices to help in bringing under control immediately the size and cost of government."[81] While this provided little comfort to those who gave up jobs on the basis of letters promising them positions, Director Stockman said cases of "severe hardship" would be considered for exceptions to the freeze. A memo on January 29, 1981 specified that potential exemptions had to demonstrate "severe and irreparable financial loss" and at the same time had to show the person "was prudent in his or her actions (for example, in terms of timing of severing other employment; or taking on new financial commitments in anticipation of a new job)."[82] This catch-22 type condition, in addition to other restrictions, made exceptions to the freeze few and far between.

The freeze was successful in showing the public and the bureaucracy that the administration was serious about cutbacks. It was criticized by others for causing more disruption than it was worth in terms of saving money or reducing personnel. W. Bowman Cutter, who was Executive Associate Director for Budget in the Carter administration, wrote that the freeze was "fake, gimmicky symbolism."[83] He argued that in his experience of running three freezes for the Carter administration, he found that exceptions were always necessary (for example, in the Defense Department which employs half of the government's civilians) and that vacancies occur randomly, rather than in positions management wants to cut. The General Accounting Office in a series of reports has argued that the best way to manage reductions in government is through work force planning and budget control, rather than through the imposition of personnel ceilings and hiring freezes. In this way the managers closest to operations can decide how best to cut back activities without disrupting essential services.[84] GAO contended that the Carter and Reagan freezes were not successful in substantially reducing employment and that it was not clear whether any money was saved.[85]

In the late spring and summer of 1981 the hiring freeze was selectively lifted in agencies for which there were established personnel ceilings. For most domestic agencies these ceilings were well below those on board at the time. This necessarily involved the reduction of employees by natural attrition (not replacing employees who leave voluntarily) or formal reduction in force (RIF). Both of these procedures are costly and disruptive, though the administration felt that overall reductions were more important than the efficiency or smooth functioning of individual agencies.[86]

The Reagan administration also sought to assert its control over the government by firing all of the inspectors general whose positions were created by statute in 1976 and 1978. The purposes of the positions were to centralize audit functions in major agencies and have the IG's report to Congress on their efforts to uncover fraud, waste and abuse. The IG positions were intended to be apolitical, though the President could remove an incumbent if he communicated the reasons to Congress.

Some Democrats in Congress saw Reagan's firing of all the incumbent IG's as an attempt to politicize the auditing function by appointing his own people who could then suppress any embarrassments to the administration.[87] The White House replied that it was a conscious attempt to establish the precedent that each President could name his own IG's. After making the precedent-setting point, President Reagan reappointed some of the same IG's he had just fired.

Later, in the summer of 1981, the President again asserted his administrative control by firing air traffic controllers who had voted to go on strike. His action established the principle that strikes would not be tolerated and effectively broke the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association (PATCO).

Finally, the administration established its direction by "zeroing out," i.e. abolishing, the Community Services Administration. There was a marked contrast with Richard Nixon's earlier efforts to do away with the Office of Economic Opportunity by impounding its funds. Nixon's efforts directly confronted a united Congress and were defeated in Federal court decisions.[88] President Reagan was able to persuade the Congress to go along with his proposals and thus avoided any question of the constitutionality of the administration's appointment or spending decisions.

On March 18 OMB Director Stockman sent a "Dear Mr. Director" letter to CSA, even though there was no appointed, or even acting, director. The letter stated:

"we will not seek to renew the authorization of the Community Services Administration," and that CSA plans "should provide for the separation of all personnel by the end of Fiscal Year 1981."[89] CSA functions were to be included in state administered block grants proposed by the administration. Although there was much gallows humor at CSA in the last half of FY1981, under the leadership of the veteran Dwight Ink, agency managers ran the shutdown professionally, and CSA closed its doors on September 30, 1981.[90]

While the above actions, despite their drawbacks, were successful from the administration's viewpoint, one big hole in its approach to administrative control was the slowness in getting new appointees into subcabinet positions. This was due to clearance procedures and the conflicts over particular appointees described above. This helped the administration's budget strategy by eliminating potential advocates for agency budgets, but it did little to give the administration programmatic control of the government.

One of the major drawbacks in any presidential transition is that bureaucratic agencies and programs tend to go into neutral gear until new leadership provides policy direction. This tendency toward policy drift is extended by delays in appointments. Career executives do not want to move too far in any direction for fear that the new boss will not approve. A consideration of this syndrome from the bureaucratic perspective is provided in subsequent sections.

In one lesson it learned from the Carter and Nixon experiences, the new Reagan administration did not dissipate its energies pushing any grand scale reorganization of the government. Carter had promised to reduce the number of federal agencies from 1900 to 200. Nixon had tried to consolidate twelve cabinet departments into eight, but Congress would not go along. Reagan promised to abolish the Departments of Energy and Education but he did not squander his political resources on these projects in his first two years.

The general strategy of trying to reduce the span of control of the President by bunching similar agencies with similar functions together under one umbrella agency has the advantage of settling some turf battles before they get to the President's desk. Major policy disputes, however, cannot be swept under an organizational rug. The agency itself, its clientele groups, and Congressional committees will continue to dominate the action, and the President still will have to decide if he wants to throw his weight one way or another. Thus major reorganizations are usually more trouble than they are worth, both in the Congress and in the executive branch.

This does not mean that no reorganizations took place, only that they were implemented at the micro-level, i.e. within departments and agencies, where they count. While large scale reorganization is often touted as a panacea, small scale reorganizations are often effective tools of good management. They engender uncertainty and thus inefficiency in agencies when they are implemented, so they should be used with sensitivity and only when necessary. But in certain circumstances they are useful in gaining control of an agency and can accomplish purposes that personnel rules and regulations make difficult. In 1981 Budget cuts provided useful justifications for agency heads to reorganize their organizations for their own purposes.[91]

IV. The View From the Bureaucracy

To career employees in the executive branch, the transition period is a time of uncertainty. The last few months before an election the bureaucratic machine begins to slow until the election of a new President, at which time it is in neutral gear. In sharp contrast, internal maneuvering increases to a high speed. The result is a machine operating at a high level of r.p.m.'s but with little direction to convert all of the energy to useful productivity.

During periods of presidential transition the upper levels of the bureaucracy are marked by active maneuvering; careers can be made or broken. Attitudes at lower levels are marked by cynicism and the feeling that there will be arbitrary

changes of policy and organization. Each set of attitudes results from the intense uncertainty. This condition does not usually preclude the carrying out of routine functions or the accomplishment of well established agency goals. The inefficiency comes at the cutting edge of policy formulation and program innovation.

The uncertainty at the top results from a lack of leadership and direction. Senior executives do not want to stick their necks out too far in any one policy direction for fear that the new boss will come in and reverse directions. Those who had come to occupy positions of trust and power over the four years of the out-going administration are fearful that they will be identified as partisans of the previous discredited and rejected administration. The reluctance to take any initiatives, even those that seem to make good political and organizational sense and that would be in the best interests of any new incumbent, is reinforced by uncertainty about who will be appointed to run the agency.

Every career executive has seen a range of quality in presidential appointments, from the highly professional expert with a wealth of experience in government or business, to the complete neophyte who is also a political hack. The probable future actions of the former can be calculated much more easily than those of the latter. But people whose career depend on it tend to minimize their maximum losses rather than to pursue the high risk strategy of backing an initiative that may be repudiated by the new boss. Senior executives want to jump on the band wagon of the new boss, but they do not yet know in what direction it is heading.

The period of uncertainty can lead to opportunities to enhance one's career or settle old scores. Old animosities can reemerge, and colleagues can be seen as rivals. Areas of disputed turf can be again opened to challenge. There may be opportunities to reorganize one's bureaucratic enemies out of existence. The focus of all this maneuvering is, of course, the new agency head who will have the power to make or break policies and careers. The speculation about who the new President will appoint is intense, and at the first hint of a rumor people scurry off the telephone to contact their "inside sources" or to *Who's Who* to get a fix on the new boss.

The people on the new administration's transition team are in an ambiguous position because it is never clear if they were assigned to pay off a campaign debt or if they will be appointed the new leaders of the agency. The obvious bureaucratic strategy here is to act as if they had already been appointed and impress them with your responsiveness. One impresses the new (potential) boss with a positive and "can do" attitude. One must also appear professional and not overly obsequious. The usual tack in briefing new appointees is to present one's own operation as efficient and essential to the operation of the agency. In a high risk gambit one might offer up program or personnel cuts to show that one is not the stereotypical empire building bureaucrat.

The executive branch bureaucracy is often portrayed as a unified, monolithic leviathan with the sole goals of survival and expansion. This leads to the expectation that a new political appointee will be faced with a united front. Political appointees who believe this will be at a disadvantage, because the bureaucracy suffers from the same vulnerabilities as a cartel. One small leak can easily become a flood and break the whole edifice. In any agency there are enough senior managers who hold varying political, policy, and professional values that new appointees with any sense of character judgement will not have to face a unified opposition to their policy preferences, whatever they are. This includes the anti-government and anti-welfare policy preferences of the Reagan administration.

In fact, the opposite is likely to be the situation. Senior executives can be expected to render professional and positive support to new political appointees for professional as well as self-interest reasons. Career professionals accept the democratic and constitutional legitimacy of the incoming administration. They also see their own roles as neutral with respect to political party, if not always with respect to programs or institutions. Self interest also provides a strong incentive to be responsive to the new leadership. Senior executives are ambitious and want to be members of the management team. They will only be included if they actively and effectively support the administration's policies.

For these reasons the typical fears of new administrations that "the bureaucrats" will try to undermine their policies are usually exaggerated. There will probably be some dissidents, some personality conflicts, and some differences of opinion; but there is little likelihood of bureaucratic guerilla warfare waged by senior executives against an administration's policies.[92] There will undoubtedly be bureaucratic warfare, but the cleavages will flow along program, policy, and institutional lines with political appointees as well as careerists on both sides of the barricades.

The Reagan administration is the first to come to office enjoying the new flexibilities provided in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Primary among the new management prerogatives are the SES provisions. These allow agency heads to transfer senior executives from position to position much more easily than in the past. Rank in person rather than position provides some security to the executive while allowing the agency head to match the executive to the appropriate position without being bound by the rank of the usual incumbent of that position.

One of the restrictions, however, is that career senior executives cannot be moved involuntarily until 120 days after the new agency head is appointed. The purpose is to ensure that senior executives will have a chance to prove their competence and loyalty to the new administration. During spring in 1981, due to the Civil Service reforms, there was more than the usual amount of paranoia among senior executives. There were newspaper reports in the *Washington Post* and *Star* that the White House was planning "mass transfers" of senior executives at the end of the 120 day waiting period. These fears proved to be groundless, and there is no evidence that the Reagan administration abused its powers over the SES during the transition.[93] Thus a strong precedent has been set for avoiding the politicization of the SES, particularly since the Reagan campaign promised to end "business as usual," and had sharply contrasting policy preferences to the preceding several administrations. In fact, one of the major themes of the transition teams was to reassure the career service that the new administration, despite its campaign rhetoric, valued, and would preserve, the integrity of the merit system.

The new Reagan administration did, however, make systematic efforts to renew and enforce the split between politics and administration that the public administration community found so attractive in the earlier decades of the 20th century.[94] Often the newly appointed administration members of an agency would meet to make policy decisions without any input from career executives, bringing them in to implement decisions only after all important decisions had been made. This approach was due to the typical distrust of the bureaucracy felt by most new administrations.

This did little to enhance the quality of management decision making. For reasons stated above, there is little to fear from most career executives. But more importantly, the administration deprived itself of valuable advice as well as support by excluding career executives from the early stages of policy formulation. In most cases career executives are experienced experts in their areas and have many good ideas for beneficial changes. Such potentially valuable input might be stifled if they are systematically excluded from consultation. In addition, career executives often have shrewd political judgement as well as valuable contacts in other agencies and on the Hill. Ignoring these resources at their disposal can make the job of political appointees much more difficult. No amount of consultation, however, can relieve members of the administration of the authority or the duty to make final decisions.[95] Each new administration goes through a cycle. Gradually, as the abilities and drawbacks of career executives become known and as trust begins to develop with the experience of working together, the artificial barriers of the politics/administration dichotomy break down. The sooner this happens, the sooner any administration will be able to mobilize fully the political and substantive expertise of the career service to achieve its policy goals.

Reassurances about the integrity of the merit system and the absence of abuse of the SES, however, were of little comfort to those at lower levels in the bureaucracy who were facing the uncertainty of reductions in force. The Reagan campaign promises to cut back federal agencies and personnel were always clear and were forcefully reiterated with the immediate hiring freeze. The new reduced personnel ceilings and the budget cuts established by OMB in March and April 1981 made it clear that personnel reductions would be necessary in most domestic agencies, either through natural attrition or formal reductions in force (RIF's). Either method would place government workers in jeopardy of losing their jobs or of being reduced in rank or position.[96] The uncertainty, needless to say, resulted in severe morale problems.

Those who were not fired were nevertheless threatened because the programs they worked in were vulnerable to being eliminated, either by outright termination, or by the slow deletion of functions and authority. One of the problems here is that employees, particularly at mid and lower levels, perceive that the fate of their careers or their programs has nothing to do with their performance. This lack of a sense of efficacy can easily lead to cynicism in which arbitrary "politics" seems to control everything. With this attitude, why should one work hard if one's own performance cannot control one's fate?

Thus the cutbacks of the Reagan administration in 1981 had the unfortunate effect of seriously undermining morale in many domestic agencies. While morale is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, it is an important factor in any organization.[97] When it drops, people become detached from their jobs and do not see any need to work toward organizational goals. They become worried about their personal careers and look for opportunities in other organizations. It is difficult to recruit bright, young managers to organizations that seem to be in decline. This was probably the major administrative challenge the Reagan administration faced in its early years.[98]

All transitions cause some uncertainty and disruption, but within departments and agencies they can be handled with more or less grace. The incoming agency head can choose to handle appointees of the outgoing administration and career executives who will be replaced with professional respect and can make their exits as smooth as possible. Giving them chances to find new positions and using selective options for early retirement are ways to do this. The agency head can choose the least painful way to reorganize the agency or separate personnel. On the other hand, the new agency head can come with six-guns blazing and demand resignations of all holdovers by close of business that day. He can have their offices locked and their desks cleared out. He can put heavy handed pressure on careerists to leave quickly, and can reassign them to undesirable geographic locations on the 121st day after his appointment.

It probably takes an executive who is confident in himself and his position in the administration to take the low-key, gracious route. There is, after all, no question of who is running the agency, and there is plenty of legal power to back it up. Those who are insecure in themselves or their positions may feel the need to assert their authority through heavy handed actions and abrupt firings. They will inspire fear in their subordinates rather than respect. While the Machiavellian approach to control through fear may enhance personal power, it will not lead to the sort of teamwork necessary to run an organization in the complex and sometimes treacherous milieu of Washington. More importantly, it will be a disservice to the administration of which the appointee is a member.

V. Conclusion

The overwhelming fact about presidential transitions from a management perspective is that they are extremely costly in terms of productivity sacrificed and momentum lost. Important changes in policy direction mean writing off sunk costs. Changes in top management entail policy drift and turf battles at the agency level. The benefits of a representative government, however, are well worth the cost of the disruptions involved in presidential transitions.

While presidential transitions are necessarily inefficient, they can be accomplished more or less quickly and effectively and can be conducted with more or less grace. From this perspective, what can future presidents-elect learn from the Carter/Reagan experience? First of all, the transition must begin before the election and be professionally staffed. The development of policy issues and the search for personnel cannot be left until after the election. It must be kept in mind, however, that the governmental transition staff and the political campaign staff will battle over who will run the government. The President-Elect must expect such conflict and make his choices clear.

Watson and Meese both performed ably in the transition. Both are lawyers with good minds and experience. The Reagan administration must be given very high marks for the execution of its legislative and budget programs. (Whether or not these programs were successful in reviving the U.S. economy is another question.") The political personnel process gets a mixed review. It selected loyal administrators but sacrificed professionalism and time. Administrative leadership and managerial direction were sacrificed to budget, personnel, and cutback priorities. Many agencies were so disrupted by the process that their operations were seriously affected in the short run, and long term management recruitment may have been hurt. It is probable, however, that this was not an unintended consequence, as seen by the administration, but viewed as a necessary tradeoff.

What can future administrations learn from the Reagan experience in the areas of legislation, budget, personnel and administration. One lesson is that Congress will still pass a President's legislative package. Some had concluded that since Lyndon Johnson the fragmenting pressures in Congress—structural reforms, high turnover, single interest pressure groups—had marked the end of the President's role as legislative leader. President Reagan proved that White House control of legislation was possible in spite of unpopular budget cuts and a Democratic House. But it took most of President Reagan's political resources during his first six months in office to win the budget battle on the Hill. These victories, however, did not accomplish the economic turnaround that supply-siders had predicted, and his budget policies led to the largest deficits in U.S. history. Not until the end of the second year of the Reagan administration did the economic recovery begin, although the stock market proved an earlier harbinger.

What did the elaborate presidential personnel system accomplish? The White House kept closer control over subcabinet appointments than any other recent administration. Thus many Reagan loyalists were appointed, but at the cost of administrative experience and letting cabinet members choose their own management teams. While the Carter and Nixon personnel systems may have been too lax in this regard, the Reagan system may have been too strict. The delay in appointments that was caused in major part by the administration's political clearance procedures took a toll in departmental leadership and program development. However, the Reagan administration was spared the severe stress of staff vs. Cabinet which characterized the Carter administration. Further, the Meese originated cabinet councils provided an effective system of relating Cabinet and staff in policy development.

The larger question to be addressed is whether the above described actions amount to administrative, policy, and programatic control of the government. The Reagan transition period did provide significant budgetary cutbacks for domestic agencies, and the personnel system ensured personal loyalty to the President from the subcabinet. But there did not seem to be much positive policy direction to set the tone for the Reagan administration. Even in defense, the early budget actions seemed to be the addition of more money to the previous administration's priorities rather than a carefully targetted redirection of defense policy.[100]

Setting a positive policy direction is difficult for an administration whose avowed goals are essentially negative. If government is part of the problem, then doing less is better. Major changes in domestic policy were made at EPA and the Department of Interior, but these were accomplished primarily through cutbacks and the decision to modify enforcement of regulations. In cutback situations where government is seen as part of the problem, positive leadership is, at best, inherently difficult. Having "hit the ground running," this was the challenge confronting the Reagan administration.

Notes

1. See Austin Ranney, *The American Elections of 1980* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), Gerald Pomper, et al., *The Election of 1980: Reports and Interpretations* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1981), Ellis Sandoz and Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *A Tide of Discontent: The 1980 Elections and Their Meaning* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), and Royce Crocker, "Federal Government Spending and Public Opinion," Public Budgeting and Finance (Autumn 1981), Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 25–35.
2. See Luevano v. Campbell, Civil Action No. 79-0271.
3. FPM Bulletin 273-18, January 4, 1980.
4. OPM Operations Letter No. 332-246, September 17, 1980 signed by Richard B. Post.
5. GAO Report FPCD-81-51 (B-202713) May 27, 1981 signed Clifford I. Gould. The OPM investigation covered the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the Department of Education, and the EEOC. The GAO investigation covered the FTC, SBA, USDA, and DOT.
6. Memorandum for Cabinet and Agency Heads, Subject: "An Orderly Transition of the Presidency," November 10, 1980, signed "Jack" Watson.
7. See Richard E. Neustadt, "The Reagan Transition," *Presidency Research Group Newsletter* (April 1981), p. 2.
8. The White House, "Memorandum for Cabinet and Agency Heads," November 12, 1981, signed "Jack" Watson.
9. Memorandum for Department and Agency Heads, Subject: "Resignation Policy," December 10, 1980, signed "Jack" Watson.
10. Public Law 88-277, 78 Stat. 153.
11. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, December 27, 1980, p. 3657.
12. For a treatment of transitions from Kennedy through Carter see Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley, 1980), Chapter 11: "Hazards of Transition," pp. 208–243. For a study of transitions from Wilson through Eisenhower see Laurin L. Henry, *Presidential Transitions* (Washington: Brookings, 1960). For an inside view of a transition see Richard E. Neustadt, Memorandum on "Staffing the President-Elect," October 30, 1960, available in the Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.
13. *Washington Post*, November 16, 1980, p. A9.
14. *Washington Post*, December 15, 1980.
15. *Congressional Quarterly*, December 27, 1980, p. 3656.
16. See "Minutes of IAG Meeting on the Transition," Office of Personnel Management, November 14, 1980. The author was present at this meeting.
17. *Congressional Quarterly*, October 4, 1980, p. 2920.
18. Ibid.
19. Hendrick Smith, "Taking Charge of Congress," *New York Times*, August 9, 1981.
20. Ibid.
21. *Congressional Quarterly*, August 1, 1981, p. 1372.
22. Smith, "Taking Charge of Congress," *New York Times*, August 9, 1981.
23. See *Washington Post*, April 26, 1981, p. A10, *Congressional Quarterly*, July 25, 1981, p. 1325.
24. *Congressional Quarterly*, June 13, 1981, p. 1025.
25. James MacGregor Burns has made this argument. See the *Los Angeles Times*, January 19, 1982, Part IV, p. 1.
26. See William Greider, "The Education of David Stockman," *The Atlantic* (December 1981).
27. For a more complete analysis of the Reagan administration's budget strategy and tactics, see: James P. Pfiffner, "The Reagan Budget Juggernaut: The Fiscal 1982 Budget Campaign," paper presented at the 1982 Convention of the American Society for Public Administration, Honolulu, Hawaii.
28. See *Washington Post*, Sec. C, p. 1, December 14, 1980.
29. Walter Shapiro, "The Stockman Express," *Washington Post Magazine*, February 8, 1981, p. 8.
30. Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter in Washington," *The New Yorker* (June 8, 1981), p. 138.
31. OMB Bulletin No. 81-6 (January 24, 1981).
32. OMB Bulletin No. 81-7 (January 24, 1981).
33. OMB Bulletin No. 81-8 (January 24, 1981).
34. OMB Bulletin No. 81-9 (January 30, 1981), see also OMB Bulletin 81-11 (February 11, 1981).
35. Memorandum for Heads of Non-Cabinet Agencies, "Revisions of the 1982 Budget," (February 7, 1981), signed by President Reagan.
36. See James P. Pfiffner, "The Challenge of Federal Management in the 1980s," *Public Administration Quarterly* (forthcoming).

37. Stockman quoted in *The Atlantic*, p. 33.
38. Ibid.
39. *Congressional Quarterly*, July 4, 1981, p. 1167.
40. *Congressional Quarterly*, June 27, 1981, p. 1127.
41. Greider, *The Atlantic*, p. 50.
42. *Congressional Quarterly*, August 1, 1981, p. 1377.
43. See James P. Pfiffner, "Presidential Personnel Policy," *Presidency Research Group Newsletter* (Spring 1982) Vol. IV No. 2, p. 5.
44. The Plum Book also lists those in Schedule A positions (about 100,000) and Schedule B (about 17,000). These are part of the excepted service because it is not practical to hold examinations for the positions; they include attorneys, chaplains, National Bank examiners, and students in cooperative education programs. Schedules A and B do not turn over with each incoming administration.
45. See Bruce Adams and Kathryn Kavanagh-Baran, *Promise and Performance: Carter Builds a New Administration* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1979).
46. See *Dun's Review*, "Staffing the Reagan Administration," (May 1981), p. 91.
47. For an excellent analysis of the roles of the White House staff and the cabinet, see: Brad Patterson, *The President's Cabinet: Issues and Questions* (Washington: American Society for Public Administration, 1976), see also "Comments Presented at the Panel on White House Staff/Cabinet Relationships," American Political Science Association Convention, September 1981, New York City. See also Bradley D. Nash, with Milton S. Eisenhower, R. Gordon Hoxie, and William C. Spragens, *Organizing and Staffing the Presidency* (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1980).
48. Comments made at panel on the Presidency, American Political Science Association Convention, September 1981, New York City. See also *Witness to Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), Chapter 7.
49. See Joseph Califano, *Governing America* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1981), pp. 16–17. For an insightful and thorough treatment of presidential personnel recruitment operations and the role of the Senate in confirmations, see Calvin MacKenzie, *The Politics of Presidential Appointments* (New York: The Free Press, 1981).
50. Richard P. Nathan, *The Plot That Failed* (New York: Wiley, 1975), p. 50.
51. See Dick Kirschten, "Wanted: 275 Reagan Team Players; Empire Builders Need Not Apply," *National Journal* (December 6, 1980), pp. 2077–79. See Hoxie, "Staffing the Ford and Carter Presidencies," in Nash, *Organizing and Staffing*, pp. 72–75.
52. Pendleton James quoted by Lou Cannon, "Appointments by White House Take Right Turn," *Washington Post* (June 18, 1981), pp. 1, 12, 13. The Center for the Study of the Presidency study is noted in footnotes 47 and 51 above.
53. Quoted in Calvin MacKenzie, "Cabinet and Subcabinet Personnel Selection in Reagan's First Year," paper presented at the 1981 American Political Science Association Convention, New York City, p. 24.
54. Henry Salvatori quoted ibid.
55. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Cleaning Out the Kitchen," *Washington Post* (March 20, 1981).
56. Pendleton James quoted by Hedrick Smith, "Conservatives Cite Gains in Top Posts," *New York Times* (March 8, 1981), p. 24.
57. Dom Bonafede, "The New Right Preaches a New Religion, and Ronald Reagan is its Prophet," *National Journal* (May 2, 1981), p. 779. See also Evans and Novak, "Reaganism Without Reaganites," *Washington Post* (January 23, 1981).
58. Quoted by Howell Raines, "Nofziger Thrives on Tough Reputation," *New York Times* (June 25, 1981), p. B12.
59. Quoted by Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at Large," *The New Yorker* (March 16, 1981), pp. 91–92.
60. See MacKenzie, "Cabinet and Subcabinet Personnel Selection in Reagan's First Year," pp. 16, 20. See also Lou Cannon, "Appointments by White House Take Right Turn," *Washington Post* (June 18, 1981), pp. 1, 12, 13; Hedrick Smith, "Conservatives Cite Gains in Top Posts," *New York Times* (March 8, 1981), p. 24; and Howell Raines, "White House Headhunter Feels the Heat," *New York Times* (May 3, 1981), p. E3.
61. See MacKenzie, "Cabinet and Subcabinet Personnel Selection," p. 19.
62. Quoted by James Reston, "Reagan's Recruiting Philosophy," *New York Times* (November 12, 1980).
63. Quoted by James M. Perry, "Top Jobs Still Vacant in Federal Agencies As Nominations Lag," *Wall Street Journal* (March 13, 1981).
64. See Lou Cannon, "Reagan's Appointments 'Mess' Decried," *Washington Post* (March 1, 1981); Philip Geyelin, "One-Man Wrecking Crew," *Washington Post* (April 14, 1981); Dick Kirschten, "You Say You Want a Sub-Cabinet Post? Clear it with Marty, Dick, Lyn and Fred," *National Journal* (April 4, 1981), p. 564; James M. Perry, "Top Jobs Still Vacant in Federal Agencies As Nominations Lag," *Wall Street Journal* (April 13, 1981); Howell Raines, "White House Headhunter Feels the Heat," *New York Times* (May 3, 1981); *Time Magazine* "Molasses Pace on Appointments," (May 11, 1981), p. 19.
65. Quoted in James M. Perry, "Top Jobs Still Vacant," *Wall Street Journal* (April 13, 1981); but cf. J. Jackson Walker, "The Ethics in Government Act, Conflict of Interest Laws and Presidential Recruiting," *Public Administrative Review* (November/December 1981), pp. 659–665.

66. See diagram in MacKenzie, "Cabinet and Subcabinet Personnel Selection," 1981 APSA paper; Kirschten, "You Say You Want a Sub-Cabinet Post?," *National Journal* (April 4, 1981), pp. 564–567; and *Dun's Review*, "Staffing the Reagan Administration," (May 1981), p. 91.
67. See Raines, "White House Headhunter Feels the Heat," *New York Times* (May 3, 1981); see also Christopher T. Cross, "If the White House Calls to Offer a Top Job, Hang Up," *Washington Post* (late February or early March, 1981).
68. See Perry, "Top Jobs Still Vacant," *Wall Street Journal* (April 13, 1981).
69. Lou Cannon, "Reagan's Appointments 'Mess' Decried," *Washington Post* (March 1, 1981), p. 1.
70. Kirschten, "You Say You Want a Sub-Cabinet Post?," *National Journal* (April 4, 1981), pp. 564–567.
71. *Time*, "Molasses Pace on Appointments," (May 11, 1981), p. 19.
72. 5 CFR Part 213.
73. *Federal Register*, Vol. 46 No. 115 (June 16, 1981), p. 31405.
74. William Safire, "Of Meese and Men," *New York Times* (February 2, 1981).
75. Richard E. Neustadt, "Do *What* to the Bureaucracy," *Washington Post* (November 10, 1980).
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77. Richard Nathan, *The Plot That Failed* (New York: Wiley, 1975), p. 8, see also pp. 82–84.
78. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Hiring Freeze, The White House, (January 20, 1981), signed "Ronald Reagan." Federal civilian employment had decreased from 2.94 million in 1970 to 2.82 million in 1980. As a percentage of total employment it dropped from a high of 3.8 percent in 1968 to 2.8 percent in 1981 and relative to the U.S. population it dropped from 16.3 federal employees per 1000 in 1952 to 12.7 per 1000 in 1980. (OMB, *U.S. Budget: Special Analyses FY1982*, pp. 286–288.)
79. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Hiring Freeze," (January 20, 1981). Total compensation and benefits compromise about $57 billion of a total budget of about $700 billion.
80. Quoted by Laura A. Kiernan, "Job Freeze by Reagan Is Upheld," *Washington Post* (February 26, 1981).
81. Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Federal Civilian Hiring Freeze (January 29, 1981).
82. Ibid., parentheses in original.
83. "When a Good Symbol Is a Bad Policy," *Washington Star* (January 27, 1981).
84. For a bibliography of GAO reports on freezes, ceilings and personnel reductions, see: "Federal Work Force Planning: Time for Renewed Emphasis," FPCD-81-4, (December 30, 1980), pp. 46–49.
85. "Recent Government-Wide Hiring Freezes Prove Ineffective in Managing Federal Employment," FPCD-82-21 (March 10, 1982).
86. For an analysis of the tradeoffs involved in choosing between these two methods of personnel reductions, see: James P. Pfiffner, "Inflexible Budgets, Fiscal Stress, and the Tax Revolt," in *The Municipal Money Chase* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).
87. *Congressional Quarterly* (February 21, 1981), p. 342.
88. See James P. Pfiffner, *The President, the Budget, and Congress* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 116–117.
89. OMB letter (March 18, 1981), signed "David A. Stockman."
90. See Dwight Ink, "Agency Shutdown: The Ultimate Challenge," *PA Times* (December 15, 1981), p. 3.
91. For a more complete statement of this argument, see James P. Pfiffner, "The Challenge of Federal Management in the 1980s," *Public Administration Quarterly* (forthcoming).
92. For a discussion of professionalism in very trying circumstances, see: Dwight Ink, "Agency Shutdown," *PA Times* (December 15, 1981), p. 3.
93. See GAO, "Effects of the Presidential Transition On the Senior Executive Service," FPCD-82-29 (March 23, 1982); see also Merit Service Protection Board, "An MSPB Special Study on the SES," (April 2, 1981).
94. For a more complete discussion of this issue see: Pfiffner, "The Challenge of Federal Management in the 1980s," *Public Administration Quarterly* (forthcoming).
95. For a classic treatment of the relationship between political appointees and career executives, see: Hugh Heclo, *A Government of Strangers* (Washington: Brookings, 1977).
96. See Pfiffner, "Inflexible Budgets, Fiscal Stress, and the Tax Revolt," in *Managing Municipal Money*, edited by Alberta Sbragia (Boulder: Westview, forthcoming).
97. Ibid.
98. See Pfiffner, "The Challenge of Federal Management in the 1980s," *Public Administration Quarterly* (forthcoming).
99. See James P. Pfiffner, editor, *The President and Economic Policy* (Philadelphia: ISHI Publications, forthcoming).
100. See Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter in Washington," *The New Yorker* (June 8, 1981), p. 141; see also Joseph Pechman, et al. *Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget* (Washington: Brookings, 1981).

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Strategies for Governance: Transition and Domestic Policymaking in the Reagan Administration*

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Nothing has appeared more preposterous than Ronald Reagan's claim of kinship with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. While dismantling the New Deal, President Reagan has continued to venerate its author. Each of Roosevelt's successors has known that if he did not walk in FDR's footsteps, he ran the risk of having it said he was not a Roosevelt but a Hoover.[1] The Roosevelt precedent of effectiveness has conditioned expectations among the opinions of Washingtonians and the public alike.

With today's complex and fragmented political environment, FDR's one-hundred day legislative legend—fifteen messages sent to Congress, fifteen major laws enacted, ten speeches delivered, biweekly press conferences and cabinet meetings held—cannot be duplicated.[2] Current administrations must confront many more budget and foreign policy decisions with significantly less time to organize than Roosevelt who was inaugurated in March, not January.[3] Consequently, decision-making and advice-giving mechanisms must be developed, refined and adjusted to the President-elect's own style and sense of purpose in order to extend the hundred days into a full Congressional session or more precisely, into an administration. Furthermore, the promissory expectation of the hundred days analogy creates within itself seeds for its own demise. The proliferation of campaign promises will have resulted in public expectations which far exceed a President's capacity to carry them through. Yet, in spite of all these modern political handicaps of the impossible Presidency,[4] the Reagan Administration on the whole succeeded in creating the impression of direction, action and accomplishment during the 97th Congress.

This paper is an attempt to explore Reagan's early effectiveness and to offer some generalizations for subsequent Administrations, whether Republican or Democratic. It is based on four propositions:

First: The Reagan transition was the most carefully planned and effective in American political history.

Second: The transition process was a crucial precursor for Reagan's legislative and budget successes during the presidential honeymoon.

Third: In spite of legislative blunders and a weak economy the Reagan administration extended the traditional "honeymoon" period further than any President since Franklin Roosevelt.

Fourth: Reagan's use of the Cabinet council process has been a most imaginative endeavor, a process which extended the transition and promoted implementation of the Reagan program.

In order to defend these propositions an overall framework of the transition process will be discussed. Each of these propositions will then be examined. The focus here is on the *strategies* used by the Reagan Administration in domestic policymaking and implementation. Our conclusions are that these strategies were of whole cloth; that they fit together in a coherent fabric which provided Reagan spectacular early successes. Subsequent legislative victories were then spun out from these early successes until the Administration could no long control the agenda.

Thus the argument here is that one can best understand domestic policymaking in the first two years of a president's term as evolving out of the transition process. That process sets the loom out of which the fabric of programmatic success or failure is woven. Some presidents have been able to pile success upon success, thereby extending their "honeymoon" with the Congress and the press. In fact the length of the honeymoon period is an important indicator of presidential effectiveness. Effectiveness is assessed in the president's own terms. That is has he been able to achieve his priority goals in government and has he positioned himself and his party or coalition for success in the next presidential election?

The Extended Transition Framework

By tradition and now by statutory authority the presidential transition can be narrowly defined as that eleven-week period between the election and the inaugural.[5] Presumably during this time period, a campaign organization must transform itself into an administration. Key staff, Cabinet and sub-Cabinet appointments must be made, working relationships must be ironed out, and an innovative legislative program[6] as well as a coherent foreign policy must be freed from the trappings of campaign rhetoric and set into programmatic strategies. All of these tasks must be initiated while often inexperienced and zealous campaigners are learning to govern from the very incumbents whose policies were attacked during the campaign.

Eleven weeks seem woefully inadequate for the tasks at hand and fortunately not descriptive of the modern or extended transition process.[7] The modern or extended transition actually begins several months prior to the election and extends through the entire first session of Congress and perhaps into the midterm of the second. Most importantly, it coincides with the presidential honeymoon. The honeymoon is a period after the election in which mass approval and elite acceptance permit the president to achieve his goals for government. During this period the president can dominate policymaking because elites, cognizant of high mass support, have no reason to doubt his skill as sufficient to promote their preferred policies or, if of another ideological pursuasion, to defeat their predelictions.

"To give the benefit of doubt" is the one phrase which best describes the honeymoon period in government. During this period Congress and the bureaucracy anticipate that the president will use his ability and will make use of his bargaining advantages. This quadrennial atmosphere in government maximizes uncertainties for presidential opponents and minimizes the insecurities of his supporters. Obviously, the larger the electoral margin, the longer the Congressional coattails, and the clearer the campaign issues, the more leeway or benefit of doubt will be created in government. To extend this honeymoon advantage a president must protect this leeway in government. Nothing confirms this leeway more than quick legislative victories and rigorous implementation. On the other hand, legislative defeats or inaction, both of which lower public expectations, would hearten Washington resistance and end the honeymoon. Certainly the termination of the honeymoon is a subjective measurement but it is also remarkable that the media appears to know when it has passed. Clear signals exist: a drop in popularity, an upsurge in supporter criticism, the disappearance of the term "mandate," and the shift of attention toward Congressional initiatives.

Continuity of the federal government and responsiveness to the new political leadership are hallmark objectives of the traditional transition process. While incorporating these objectives, the extended transition process has been refined to perform the functions of policy making, advice-giving and personnel selection simultaneously. The new administration must concentrate upon policy programs that are immediately relevant to show effectiveness on and immediately following January 20. Consequently, only two or three policy programs can realistically be initiated with any real vigor. Thus a selective list must be carefully winnowed from numerous campaign promises. Establishing presidential priorities in policy areas is a necessary function, but not a sufficient condition for effectiveness. Programmatic strategies to exploit and perhaps extend the honeymoon period of opportunity must be formulated to ensure eventual policy adoption by Congress. President Johnson reminisced:

> You've got to give it all you can that first year. Doesn't matter what kind of majority you come in with. You've got just one year when they treat you right, and before they start worrying about themselves. The third year, you lose votes . . . The fourth year's all politics. You can't put anything through when half of the Congress is thinking how to beat you. So you've got one year. That's why I tried. Well, we gave it a hell of a lick, didn't we?[8]

The function of advice-giving to the president-elect during the transition eventually develops into the administration's decision-making process. Advice-giving is usually in disarray during transitions until decision channels are defined and a president's decision-making style emerges. Adhocracy tends to triumph. Confusing signals and miscues proliferate as task forces, transition teams, campaign staffs, think tanks and the staffs of the Executive Office of the President jockey for power and positions.[9]

Personnel decisions are always in the media forefront during any transition, but there is no operating reason why this function needs to be given priority immediately after the election. With task forces, transition teams and key staff aides already appointed, a president does not need Cabinet officers, agency heads and sub-Cabinet officials designated to get proposals for policies and programs prepared for introduction to Congress. The only imperative is for a president to know his appointee before he makes the nomination. Transition teams and policy task forces not only provide rewards for the battle-scarred veterans of the campaign observed Harrison Wellford, veteran of the Carter and Reagan transitions, but the process "gives you a chance to try out a lot of people."[10]

As outlined here, the functions are by no means distinct, separate entities. In fact a goal common to all three functions, policy, advice, and personnel, is a negative one—to avoid blunders which would close the honeymoon window of opportunity. The missing legislative program of 1953 (Policy), the Bay of Pigs (Advice) and the Bert Lance affair (Personnel) are all decisive examples of the hazards of transition which have rapidly stalled previous administrations.[11]

Operating concurrently with these transition functions are two policy cycles described by Paul Light. The first cycle, the cycle of decreasing influence, is the opportunity curve described by President Johnson above and illustrated in Figure 1 below. Since all presidents have experienced decline in their public approval ratings over the term of office and since all presidents since Roosevelt in 1934 have suffered midterm losses of party seats in Congress, presidents have been advised to act in the first years of their term and as early as possible within each year. If a president fails to move early, Congress will fill the domestic agenda with its own intiatives. In short, since a president's resources of congressional support, public approval, electoral margins and patronage are at a maximum early in the first year, he must push his domestic proposals as soon as he enters office. Consequently, this puts tremendous pressures on the transition team prior to the inaugural to make decisions on the substance, timing, publicity and priority of legislative proposals to Congress.[12]

The second cycle, the cycle of increasing effectiveness, rests on the premise that presidents and staffs learn over time. Except for President Johnson's unelected year in the office (1964), a job training program for Presidents simply does not exist. Mechanisms to gain timely information, program expertise, and staffs to provide congressional liaison and publicity take time to mature. Thus the cycle of increasing effectiveness and the cycle of declining influence are incompatible. The cycle of declining

FIGURE 1
Learning and Opportunity Curves



influence encourages the president to move his domestic agenda quickly; the cycle of increasing effectiveness encourages caution to avoid the hazards of inexperience and miscalculation. Simply put, the president's key strategic choice in the first year is to learn or to move legislation. Washington and the public expect the latter. If a president could temper unrealistic expectations, the first moments of the second year would provide the best blend of the two cycles. After all, it was early in 1954, not 1953, that President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented to Congress some 65 proposals for new legislation, representing his judgments in every major facet of federal action.[13]

The presidential life cycle aggregates these two policy cycles. The historical rhythm of the modern presidency is said to find its crucial test during the third year. John Kessel notes that after a period of learning which takes about eighteen months, the president must face Congress without the glow of an electoral mandate.[14] The third year provides the re-election material for the fourth year. It is a time when a president either reaffirms old policies or takes new initiatives for which history will remember him.[15] Yet as Steven Hess has concluded, the president during the third year seems to devote more time to foreign policy initiatives, a policy area on which he has the most authority. For domestic policy, the first two years are deterministic. Thus the extended transition is critical, if not decisive for domestic policy.

Figure 2 illustrates the extended transition process by identifying four components over the first two years of an administration. The first component is that action-forcing mechanism called the inaugural address. The second is labeled "studies and planning" where the functions of policy, advice and personnel are largely performed. The third is identified as "external response" and signifies the end of the presidential honeymoon. The fourth component is the adoption and implementation of policy programs. This paper discusses these components in the following sections.

The inaugural, especially if it is a "memorable" one, announces the new president's policies for the first time. It sets his agenda. It is not the promises of a candidate,

FIGURE 2
The Extended Transition—First Two Years of the Presidential Life Cycle



but a formal set of priorities which defines his electoral mandate. In order to prepare for the inaugural, to re-work the first budget, and to refine campaign promises into successful legislative programs, study and planning groups must begin prior to the election and normally extend far into the honeymoon period. If a policy proposal is set in the inaugural agenda and specific legislation is refined to include a strategy for adoption before the termination of the honeymoon period, the proposal would stand a high probability of passage. Not only would a victory be achieved, but the honeymoon would actually be extended to allow for more opportunities. "People pay attention to [presidential] results. Talk does not impress them much."[16]

Thus one strategy for a president is to time the legislative modification and adoption sequences early during the cycle of decreasing influence, the honeymoon period. Unfortunately for presidents, this is not usually possible. Often campaign rhetoric and promises conflict with complex realities. Simplified campaign issues butt against unforeseen problems. Now real people with official responsibility have to produce policies which can be implemented. Congress expects bargaining and compromise. Bureaucrats are found to have expertise and experience which must be considered. Groups outside government demand to be heard. It often becomes impossible to compress the policy formation process to take advantage of the president's honeymoon. Thus the opportunity for innovative policy making can pass. Incremental decision-making, characterized by congressional committee and bureaucratic pulling and hauling becomes the norm. Without results, only talk, critics of the left and right of the administration begin to charge ineptness. "Is the President waffling?" "Is the President straying from the campaign path?" Public opinion polls begin to reflect mass dissatisfaction with presidential performance. Politics as usual, end of the honeymoon.[17]

Many have charged that Jimmy Carter's performance was sluggish, at best. How then was Reagan able to "hit the ground running?"[18]

The Reagan Transition: Planning as a Precursor for Success

Experience at managing transitions has produced a considerable institutionalization of the mechanics—tasks to be accomplished, deadlines to be met, security and diplomatic negotiations to be reviewed, budget and administrative procedures to be followed. The focus here will not be on mechanics, something others have already done extremely well.[19] Rather, the focus will be more strategic—how Reagan consolidated his victory, how a foundation was laid for the post-inaugural initiatives, and how Reagan managed to implement his conservative philosophy. The Reagan strategy was not always a well designed blueprint. Often events and decisions became strategy fortuitously. Regardless, the Reagan transition became the most carefully planned and effective one in American history. The elements for the success of the Reagan transition were: (1) organization; (2) early strategic planning and advice; (3) the appointment process; and (4) the transition team employment.

The Transition Organization. At first blush the organizational design of the Reagan transition team appeared complex and overloaded with unclear lines of authority. With numerous volunteers, the size of the organization ranged from 1,000 to 1,200 of which perhaps 450 were on the payroll. The $2 million in federal funds available under the

1963 Transition Act had to be supplemented by private funds through a Presidential Trust Fund. Yet the organization makes sense when one recalls Reagan's disposition to delegate details while preserving the major decisions to himself.

Most obviously the transition structure maintained the campaign's command hierarchy with William J. Casey, Edwin Meese III and Anne L. Armstrong holding similar positions as they had held throughout the campaign. By keeping his campaign team intact Reagan reduced potential hostility engendered during the Carter transition when staffers openly competed for senior positions. Also the Reagan team included key deputies from the campaign as well as several old hands from the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Finally, the Reagan team contained a Congressional Advisory Committee headed by Senator Paul Laxalt whose mission was to open the channels of communciation with Capitol Hill, something Carter never achieved.[20]

Another strategic implication can be gleaned from the transition organization. While broad authority and coordinating responsibility were given to Richard Allen in foreign affairs, Martin Anderson in domestic policy and Caspar Weinberger in budget matters, a major role was delegated to the directors of five working groups designated as issue clusters. These working groups were to assess policy initiatives, budgetary questions, personnel needs, current legislative agendas and possible executive orders. In essence these were the forerunners to the Cabinet councils which were designed by Meese and Baker to provide a forum for "collegial" advice on a broad span of issues.[21]

Strategic Planning. Preparation for the Reagan transition began some years before the Administration took office. Intellectual spade work on the proper themes and issues to be pursued by a conservative Republican Administration were generated by such think tanks as the Hoover Institute, Center for the Study of the Presidency, the Heritage Foundation and the Institute for Contemporary Studies, and by various scholars at the American Enterprise Institute and the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. For example, the Heritage Foundation's *Mandate for Leadership*, a 20-volume, 3,000 page work setting out specific policy suggestions, received a tribute from Reagan personally. So also Meese singled out Center for the Study of the Presidency for high praise for its volume *Organizing and Staffing the Presidency*.[22]

Planning began in earnest in the Spring of 1980. As early as April 18, 1980 candidate Reagan asked an assembled group of foreign policy advisors, headed by Richard Allen, "to develop specific policy and budget recommendations for use in the first 100 days of his Administration."[23] In the realm of domestic and economic policy, Martin Anderson, assisted by Darrell Trent, developed a network of 17 advisory groups in domestic affairs and 6 advisory groups in budgetary matters. Also, Caspar Weinberger encouraged Robert Freer to develop a network of former political appointees. They prepared a series of papers summarizing agency issues, problems and opportunities.[24]

What significance can we draw from this pre-election planning? Any administration runs off stored-up intellectual capital. The pace of events and the press of time almost precludes learning while in the White House; as one White House staffer noted, it is "life in the fast lane." The sources of ideas for an agenda are normally from policy analysts in Institutes, the campaign, Congress and its committees, agency and department staffs and the transition teams. "The whole issue of running the Presidency in the modern age is control of the agenda," commented Richard Beal. "We deal with what ought to be the building of things six to nine months out. It's a process question."[25] In other words, make it your honeymoon, not theirs. Thus by early planning, the agenda was practically set in concrete by the election and more importantly it was set by loyal conservative thinkers and Reagan campaigners *alone*. Reagan had defined his mandate. Consequently, after November 4, efforts could be focused on how to get things done politically in Washington and not what policy issues should be stressed during the Inaugural Address.

The ability to join policy and politics systematically in a realistic time frame has been called the *strategic presidency*.[26] A strategic approach means to set a limited number of "first-order" priorities, to force action, to integrate the political considerations and to be master of the process. From November 4, 1980 to February 18, 1981, the Reagan team worked on this strategic approach to governance.

The Reagan first order of business was to put some kind of tourniquet on government spending. By mid-November, following the David Stockman memorandum entitled "Avoiding a GOP Economic Dunkirk," the method to control government was to be "supply-side economics"—a combination of non-defense spending reductions, tax cuts, control over the money supply and deregulation all meant to stimulate the economy and lead to a balanced budget. It was an act of conservative political theory to find big government as the chief cause of a malfunctioning government. But since supply-side economics offered something for everyone, (monetarists, deregulators, and supply-siders) there was a considerable disagreement about the priorities. Thus, by January the Reagan advisors made a strategic decision by designing an action-forcing mechanism. They made a commitment to force a program by announcing a target date of February 3, 1981, for the unveiling of the Reagan economic program, a date which eventually slipped to the 18th when President Reagan delivered his economic message before a joint session of Congress.[27]

The Reagan economic program became the only game in town. Other Republican issues such as school prayer, crime and abortion were neglected to avoid the Carter mistake of sending Congress too much too soon and usually to the same overworked committees. But if the program was to be passed, it had to be done quickly to take advantage of the presidential honeymoon and before the opposition could coalesce. To co-opt the opposition Reagan, met with some 60 Senators and Congressmen, in the first three weeks of his Administration.[28]

Reagan forged his domestic program primarily through executive orders and the budget process. On January 28, 1981, Executive Order 12287 removed federal controls on oil production. On February 5, Reagan reported to the nation that he had already placed a freeze on hiring government replacements. But most importantly under OMB Director David Stockman's guidance, the Reagan Administration employed the first budget reconciliation process to set binding budget figures, a process which required both authorizing and appropriations committees to make significant spending cuts. The resulting committee recommendations were compiled into a single bill, the Omnibus Reconciliation Bill. Thus each member of Congress was confronted with the decision "Are you for him or against him?" *during* Reagan's presidential honeymoon. Obviously Stockman and the Reagan team understood the budget process better than their congressional counterparts.

The Appointment Process. Once it became clear that Reagan had the Republican nomination, Edwin Meese called in Pendleton James and asked him to begin planning to fill positions in the administration. Thereafter Reagan and his advisors paid very careful attention to the selection process and Reagan personally reviewed and agreed on every significant appointee.[29] He has also met and posed for pictures with each of his sub-Cabinet officers. The system was designed for thoroughness, not speed; for loyalty, not expertise; and for appointees with hostility toward government programs, not issue advocates. According to Calvin MacKenzie the appointment process "ended up with an administration quite like the one it set out to build, an administration, that is, composed primarily of people who seemed to share the President's political philosophy and to possess a commitment to its rapid implementation."[30]

While the President received high marks for his quick hitting economic package he also drew fire for his slow process of staffing the government.[31] Clearance procedures were part of the problem. They included FBI background checks, financial disclosures, and several layers of White House political and loyalty tests. Additionally, the Senate confirmation proceedings extended the process to an average of three months for many sub-Cabinet officials. Yet the outcome of this slow process in naming officials was strategically fortuitous from the standpoint of competing agendas and of getting an agreement on budget cuts. Cabinet officers did not have time to develop competing department agendas before the announcement of the President's program. Thus they did not have the opportunity to "go native" as early as in previous administration. Furthermore, without the support from hand-picked assistant secretaries, Cabinet officers were ill-equipped to understand the full implications of Stockman's cutbacks.[32]

Transition Team Employment. Transition teams[33] were used in a new precedent-setting fashion. The transition teams were not the primary source for appointments, but a system to reward campaigners and to gather information. They also were not the tool to percolate new agenda ideas, but a mechanism ultimately used to freeze developing agency programs. Finally, the teams served not as instruments to evaluate agency performance, but as devices to promote better government relations with industry and to confirm Reagan's pledge to free enterprise.

The Administration solved an enduring problem faced by all winning presidents: what to do with those who were of service in the campaign but not deemed beneficial for positions in the administration. Reagan solved this by giving them a place on various transition teams, encouraging them to gather information and to write reports. The control mechanism employed was a series of deadlines. Each team was to submit a "first look" report by November 24, followed by an interim report two weeks later and by December 22, their final work in the form of a final brief was to be completed. There was so much pressure to meet deadlines for written reports that the "substance amounted to little more than preconceived notions they came in with. The stuff could have been copied verbatim out of the Heritage Foundation report," commented an assistant secretary from the Carter regime.[34]

The teams were not universally loved by the new Cabinet members. Caspar Weinberger, angered by the public posturing of members of the Defense Department team, sent that team packing after one meeting. This happened all over town. Secretary-designate Haig dismissed his after 30 minutes. Secretary-designate Edwards summarily dismissed his as well. In a few instances, Cabinet members with limited Washington experience made good use of the transition teams departmental knowledge; however, most followed the pattern set by Haig and Weinberger.[35]

A primary function of departmental teams according to Darrell Trent, director of the Office of Policy Coordination, was to "freeze developing programs that would not be in accord with Reagan priorities."[36] For example, Edward Noble, head of the transition team studying the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, came to a very strong conclusion that "the fledgling organization was an ill-conceived affront to free enterprise and was embarked on a dubious mission."[37] Although other examples can be given to support Trent's assertion, it may be an exaggeration to label it as an explicitly designed function of the transition teams. Most transition teams produced reports which could serve as agendas for subsequent initiatives. But by allowing incoming Cabinet officers the flexibility to dismiss them, Reagan let them take the heat and protected his policy agenda.

Free enterprise was definitely in accordance with Reagan priorities. For example, transition team chiefs Michael Halbouty (DOE), Ben Plymate (DOD), and Richard Lyng (DOA) were all recruited from the ranks of industry and were all hostile to the current agency programs. Their message was clear—in Washington, industry wasn't going to be the enemy anymore.[38]

Perhaps the best recapitulation of the Reagan transition was provided by Dick Kirschten:

> Remember that "bloated and inefficient" Reagan transition in office? You know, the folks who kept extending their deadlines for announcing Cabinet and sub-Cabinet appointments; the over-populated outfit that had to raise money privately because $2 million in federal funds wasn't enough to cover its bills.
>
> Those memories have quickly faded in the backwash of Von Reagan's Express—the rapidly assembled economic package and promotional campaign unleashed just 30 days after the President took office. At the start of any Administration, the time is ripe for bold initiatives, but the Reagan forces have taken unprecedented advantage of the drama of the moment. They have riveted public attention on a single issue—the economy—and have presented their policy agenda while citizen interest is at a peak.[39]

Thus the transition effort predicted later success. The transition organization also prophesied Reagan's scheme for using people in his Administration. The many teams and task forces he employed reflected his disposition to "due process governance." That is, all his supporters and appointees were to have their say in an organized way, but Reagan alone would be free to make the final decision.

The Long Honeymoon: Of "Short Lists" and Luck

The preceding section focused on the statutory transition period in which planning for Reagan's domestic program was the dominant concern. This section concerns itself with the extension of that transition to include the important honeymoon period. Reagan was able to time the legislative adoption of his economic programs during the honeymoon period. Although luck was involved, his timing was no accident. Early planning allowed early action. Constant attention to a limited number of priorities conserved presidential power which improved Reagan's prospects of influence when he needed it most. Reagan's ability to deflect criticism, to dissipate heat, extended his honeymoon advantages. Finally, his budget victories led to expectations of additional victories. In terms of the model, the Reagan strategies for governance involved the shifting of the second (Studies & Planning) and fourth (Policy Adoption) components to the right and the third (External Response) to the left. Such a shift requires a management team dedicated to the success of the presidency.

President Reagan extended his honeymoon period of opportunity from the usual six months to an unprecedented post-Roosevelt duration of almost fourteen months. By February 1982, Reagan's popularity had nose dived from a peak job approval rating of 68% to 46%. One major reason for this dive was quite simple—the numbers in his budget and revenue projections didn't add up in a complex economic environment. In retrospect, other factors may have been almost as significant. An agenda buildup in the second year to include voting rights, Urban Enterprise Zones, crime, clean air and social issues all promised different congressional alignments from his first year budget and tax reduction victories. Furthermore, the Administration wasted valuable political resources on a poorly conceived and managed endeavor entitled New Federalism.

The demise of the Reagan honeymoon was forecast several months earlier when critics from the New Right charged that Reagan was straying from the campaign path.[40] Following the departure of Richard Allen and political advisor Lyn Nofziger, the conservative grassroots leaders led by Richard Viguerie charged that the Administration was being pushed toward the political center by the "Bush factions"—Chief of Staff Baker and his assistant, Richard Darman. Viguerie complained that the White House staff strategy was "to make Reagan into an Eisenhower instead of a Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the Right."[41] The problem of course was that to "Let Reagan Be Reagan" meant that the White House advisors would have tremendous obstacles in trying to steer Mr. Reagan toward conciliation with Congress on the FY 1983 budget. The pragmatism and strategic governing concepts of the transition which allowed GOP "Gypsy Moths" and southern Democratic "Boll Weevils" to unite with the mainstream Republican delegations would be in a state of paralysis with uncompromising presidential rhetoric and unprecedented deficits. For the matter of academic record, the honeymoon officially ended on February 11 when GOP congressional leaders met in the White House and asked Reagan to give them the running room to develop budget alternatives. The helm controlling the agenda was being seized from the White House.[42]

Looking back on the first few years of the Reagan Administration, four distinct, legislative periods can be identified. As illustrated in Figure 3, the period from the



FIGURE 3
Reagan's First Two Years

Inaugural to the August reconciliation roundup represented Reagan's successful attempt to "hit the ground running." The second period's rhetorical beginnings can be traced to the President's September 24 televised address to the nation advocating a firm, steady, economic course and pointing the way to carry his mandate into the second year. It has been labeled a "breather period" in that policy planning for the domestic agenda was to be the major activity. But since the President plays every "role" at once, there was little room to breathe with national strategic issues such as the AWACs sale and nuclear freeze movements demanding immediate attention.

Preparation for and delivery of the 1982 State of the Union Address marked the beginning of the third period. The Address was intended to control the agenda and to uphold the mandate as his Inaugural did previously. As Chief of Staff James Baker explained: "This State of the Union address represents the fifth installment on the President's mandate. Last year, he cut spending, he cut taxes, he cut regulations and he strengthened defense. The fifth thing he wanted to do was return power to the states."[43] Thus New Federalism became identified as part of the Reagan mandate, but also became hostage to the FY 1983 budget paralysis and consequently received virtually no congressional attention.

The June 10, 1982 budget resolution marked the beginning of the fourth period. By squeezing the deficit below $100 billion and maintaining party discipline, the Republican alternative to the Reagan FY 1983 budget eked out a 220-207 victory. This also marked the beginning of the appropriation squeeze and the midterm recess rush. This period was filled with election year maneuvering. Social issues such as abortion and school prayer were finding their way into the congested agenda in the unlikely form of amendments to a debt limit resolution. On September 10, the Senate smacked President Reagan with his first veto override on the "budget buster bill." Of the eleven Republican senators up for reelection, seven voted against Reagan and two abstained. Finally, in an attempt to control the political damage and to affix deficit irresponsibility squarely on the Democratic controlled House, President Reagan drummed up support for a Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment. Throughout this period, President Reagan demonstrated an ideological consistency during the 1982 congressional campaigns in an attempt to get Americans to "stay the course." In summary the first two year life cycle of the Reagan Presidency had an extended window of opportunity which rapidly diminished after the 1982 State of the Union Message and a window of vulnerability which foreclosed any possibility of the adoption of a second year domestic agenda.

Period One: The First Four Installments. Soon after the election, Communications Director David Gergen assembled a thick volume entitled "The First 100 Days" which drew three conclusions. "One, the first 100 days is the time during which the President establishes his Presidential persona. Two, the general character of the Administration is established and lasts at least the first term. And three, the President is vulnerable to making a big mistake." With these conclusions at hand both Wirthlin and Gergen advised President Reagan, "to keep a simple focus and go strong on the economy. Don't come up with other mischiefs."[44]

Similar advice was given by Arnold Meltsner, In order to govern in the 1980s, Meltsner advised a president to: develop a short list—three or four objectives he wants to accomplish; focus the White House staff on these objectives; consult extensively with congressional leaders, interest group representatives and bureaucratic experts to help adopt and implement these objectives; and shape public expectations by being rhetorically consistent and by blaming failures on inherited conditions. This blueprint was adopted by the Reagan Administration.[45]

The economy became the first, second, and third objective and Reagan staked his reputation on it. By choosing the economy, he added simplicity to both policymaking and the policy process. All social and domestic issues were discussed not in terms of need, equity, or values, but in budget recommendations—how much can be cut back without causing an uproar. According to Hugh Heclo, "Defined in this way the program of the Reagan Administration possessed several substantial advantages for creating unified political management. Much of it was budget oriented, thereby tying programmatic actions to the one powerful, action-forcing process that exists on a government-wide basis."[46]

Adding to the concept of a short list and policy and process simplification was the development of Reagan's legislative strategy team, a group charged with "working the Hill." Legislative strategy meetings were held almost daily during the first year in James Baker's office to marshal presidential resources for negotiating with Congress. Attendance at those meetings included Baker, Edwin Meese and Michael Deaver; Richard Darman, the group's coordinator; Ken Duberstein, the liasion to Capitol Hill; Craig Fuller, the liaison to the Cabinet and budget director David Stockman and Treasury Secretary Donald Regan. In spite of being enmeshed in day-to-day tactics, they maintained two clear priorities. First, keep contentious social issues on the back burner and second, base all discussions of the domestic agenda on the premise that spending cuts were needed to bring about economic recovery.[47]

Chief of Staff Baker and others felt that Reagan should muster his energies around the major economic issues that demanded his close attention, rather than being diverted in several policy congested areas and "mischiefs." New Right causes were to be avoided. As Baker observed, "There are some issues that are political losers. Abortion cuts both ways hard. If you come down one way or the other, you lose some people. Most of the social issues are polarizing. No President can govern effectively who can't build consensus."[48] In short, consensus was to be achieved by focusing on the economy alone.

When El Salvador began to demand more attention than the 1981 economic plan, luck intervened. The assassination attempt did a lot to endear the President to the people and thus extend his honeymoon. Widespread sympathy and admiration for the courage, calmness and humor of the wounded President made it politically more difficult for Democrats to obstruct the economic program. Additionally, aside from some rough moments by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the daily routine of the Executive Office continued as usual. The White House organization was being tested not by Congress and the bureaucracy, where experience gained means battle scars received, but by the President hospitalized just five blocks from the White House. Finally, it was no accident that President Reagan's first major public appearance after his hospitalization was a speech on the economy before a joint session of Congress. The hero who "forgot to duck" went to the rescue of Reaganomics.[49]

Period Two: The Extension of the Honeymoon. The extensive planning before and after the November election, the employment of Meltsner's "short list," White House organization and luck all contributed to President Reagan's successful honeymoon. But most honeymoons end quickly and usually as a result of a blunder, which Reagan managed to avoid. His effectiveness can be explained by the three factors discussed below: publicized political pressure, the willingness to market legislative victories and the ability to dissipate heat generated from mistakes.

The function of "Communicator-in-Chief" has seen an unprecedented development in the Reagan presidency. Television has become a major organizing tool for the presidency. Every presidential effort must be planned around opportunities for TV coverage to assure a constant flow of positive visuals from the White House. As Steven Weisman concluded: "It is no longer enough for a President to have a vision of national purpose; he must be willing to spend most of his time selling it."[50]

As the archtypical modern grassroots president, Reagan's political success was built upon polling techniques. In essence polls provided Reagan with the script of what the people wanted to hear and the President then mobilized them through television appearances. Since modern technology is also available to special interest groups, it was not uncommon for a Congressman to receive 75 to 100 calls from businessmen of his district within 24 hours after a Presidential television appeal for support.

Commenting on the limited attention span of the electorate, Walter Lippmann observed: "The public will arrive in the middle of the third act and will leave before the last curtain, having stayed just long enough perhaps to decide who is the hero and who the villain of the piece."[51] If the public arrives in the third act the president must have arrived during the end of the second. Rarely do presidents shape their own political context or environment. Thus, for a president to be effective within the confines of Lippmann's play, he must point to a consistent if not repetitious direction to ensure audience retention, must portray optimisim to be identified as the hero who will restore public confidence and must explain why previous conditions or acts are the cause for existing problems. This has been the formula of Reagan's successful publicized political pressure. Without question, he has been rhetorically consistent throughout his 20 years as a political figure. Reagan's optimism is legendary.

Whatever the rhetoric, without accomplishment Washington would begin to resist Presidential initiatives. The signing of the Reconciliation Bill in August, 1981, represented the Administration's first major accomplishment and signalled a major change in policy direction. But just as important, Reagan was able to pile success upon success, thereby extending his honeymoon with Congress and the press. Following on the heels of the budget and tax cut victories, key votes were won on AWACs as well as military assistance, the B-1 and MX appropriations. After the AWACs victory, the President seemed invincible and his press office was eagerly marketing that image. In tribute *Time* magazine called him the "Great Persuader." The theme, "Reagan Does It Again!" became headline news in all media markets. Consequently, Reagan protected his public prestige thus guarding his prospective leeway in government.

President Reagan has been such a master at dissipating heat, at putting distance between himself and the mistakes and controversies of his Administration, that he has been called the "Teflon President."[52] Such alchemy reflects an exaggeration of his failures and an underestimation of his effectiveness. President Reagan can walk away from mistakes and never look back, because he can delegate authority and can conduct tactical retreats.

Like President Eisenhower, Reagan was willing to make broad delegations after enunciating general guidelines.[53] By avoiding details and specifics, any identification of controversial issues went to department heads not the President. Thus the President was free to make mid-course corrections if necessary. A striking example of this was offered by a White House official in late 1981:

> The President feels that he ought not to be answering questions about the B-1 bomber or anything else that specific. His job is to announce broad policy. Let Cap Weinberger take the heat on the B-1 or let Ted Bell take the heat for cuts in school aid. We believe in the delegation of authority.[54]

This lightning-rod effect of delegation, which allows subordinates to take responsibility of unpopular administrative decisions, extended Reagan's public support and reinforced his scheme of Cabinet government.

If the situation precluded Cabinet member responsibility for errors, Reagan knew how to conduct a tactical retreat. The most egregious mistake of his new Administration was the proposed cutbacks in Social Security. On May 19, 1981, the Republican Senate rejected the proposal by a vote of 96-0. In an act of damage control the President acknowledged "that members of Congress on both sides of the aisle have alternative answers" and sent Secretary Schweicker to meet with congressional leaders to launch a bipartisan effort. The President explained to the nation in a televised address that he had appointed a bipartisan commission to study the needs of the Social Security system. The deadline for the commission to report was after the 1982 congressional elections, a proven tactic in retreats.[55] Reagan's final episode in Social Security occurred in July, 1984. During a nationally televised news conference, the President proposed that Social Security recipients be guaranteed a cost-of-living increase even though the wage-earner price index was below 3%. But moreover, the Reagan Administration then claimed a "savings" of more than $3 billion because its fiscal year budget had assumed a 4.7% cost-of-living increase![56]

If a president can point the country in a direction and convince the electorate that it is the right one, if he can display optimism, decisiveness and grace under pressure, and if he can get reasonably competent people to figure out the details and take the heat if necessary, then there is a good possibility that a president can build on victories and extend his honeymoon. The Reagan margin prevailed until February, 1982. The failure of the fifth installment was due in part to the high risks of economic promises, a poor choice of domestic programs, improper planning, and an overwhelmed agenda.

Period Three: The Honeymoon Ends. As the numbers were being calculated in 1982, the enthusiasm for supply-side economics waned. Of the five key economic indicators listed in Table 1 only the inflation rate was a major success story dropping to 3.9% from 12.4% during the last year of the Carter Administration. Production and growth were down, while unemployment and deficits skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. Supply-side economics was a high risk strategy whose premises could be checked by monthly indicators aired on the network news. As talk of another depression circulated, the President's popularity plummeted. By March 1982, more people disapproved of how President Reagan was doing his job than approved.

The performance of the economy was an important, though not a decisive factor in ending in the Reagan honeymoon. Policy did have to change to confront the economic realities of the growing deficit and unemployment in 1982. Strategic management was imperative. Such management meant that the Reagan presidency consciously maneuvered to meet its opponents under favorable conditions while maintaining the appearance of the consistent theme—retrench government to revive the economy. Action on the FY 1983 budget and the highway jobs bill during the lame duck session of Congress followed this typical script:

TABLE 1
Economic and Public Opinion Indicators

	Unemployment[1]	GNP[2]	Consumer[3] Price Index	Federal[4] Deficit	Capacity[5] Utilization	Approval/ Disapproval[6] Rating
1980	7.1	1,474.0	12.4	59.6	79.1	
1981	7.6	1,502.6	8.9	57.9	78.5	
Jan	7.5		0.8			51/13
Feb	7.4		1.0			55/18
Mar	7.3	1,507.8	0.7		79.9	60/24
Apr	7.2		0.6			67/19
May	7.5		0.8			68/21
Jun	7.4	1,502.2	0.9		79.8	59/29
Jul	7.2		1.1			60/29
Aug	7.4		0.8			60/29
Sep	7.6	1,510.4	1.0		79.3	52/37
Oct	6.0		0.2			56/35
Nov	8.3		0.3			54/37
Dec	8.6	1,490.1	0.3		74.8	49/41
1982	9.7	1,475.5	3.9	110.6	69.8	
Jan	8.6		0.4			49/40
Feb	8.8		0.3			47/43
Mar	9.0	1,470.7	−0.1		71.8	46/45
Apr	9.3		0.4			45/46
May	9.4		1.0			45/44
Jun	9.5	1,478.4	1.2		70.3	45/45
Jul	9.8		0.6			42/46
Aug	9.9		0.2			41/49
Sep	10.2	1,481.1	0.2		69.7	42/46
Oct	10.5		0.3			42/48
Nov	10.7		−0.2			43/47
Dec	10.8	1,471.7	−0.4		67.8	41/50

NOTES: 1 All civilian workers
2 Billions of 1972 dollars
3 Based on unadjusted indexes, both yearly change and changes from preceding month
4 In billions of current dollars
5 Percent quarterly data, seasonally adjusted
6 Gallop polls

Source: Economic Report of the President, February 1983

1. The President would enunciate a simple conservative principle such as "stay the course."
2. Reports would be issued that the President was resisting counterpressure with great stubbornness.
3. Trial balloons such as "revenue enhancement" would signal compromise but always in a tentative manner and never attributed to the President.
4. A compromise would be eventually worked out by the staff and Republican Senate without the President himself appearing to engage in any political bargaining.
5. The White House would claim another victory and revert to its familiar anti-tax and budget cutting themes.[57]

Thus, the White House in 1982 made economic policy reversals without ever explicitly denying the merits of its original program. Presidential success and rhetorical consistency were valued more highly than any school of economic theory.

Reagan's effectiveness as a communicator and the efforts of his staff to make the Reagan presidency a successful one mitigated some of the unfavorable effects of the economic news. Opportunity existed for Reagan to push forward a domestic agenda in early 1982 before the appropriation squeeze and congressional recess for the November elections. He was unable to do so because of a poor choice of policy proposals, improper political ground work and a congested agenda.

In his January, 1982 State of the Union Address, President Reagan unveiled his New Federalism proposal which involved the federal government assuming full responsibility for medicare and the states taking over Aid for Dependent Children and Food Stamps. It also provided for block grants to the states in lieu of several grants-in-aid programs. Thus, new Federalism was a means to achieve budget reductions as well as to reduce federal government interference. It also posed a host of new questions about federal-state relationships.

The injection of federalism onto the 1982 political agenda presented a number of problems for the President. First, although opinion poll data indicated strong support for the idea of shifting cumbersome programs to the states, few respondents understood the term "federalism" or knew what President Reagan's position on federalism was.[58] Thus, unless a massive education program was launched to build grassroots support, and at the expense of the FY 1983 budget, the popular pressure necessary to obtain acquiescence from Congress and state and local officials would be missing. Second, unlike the first year budget plans, New Federalism meant a major effort in intergovernmental relations, a task beyond the capacity of the White House Intergovernmental Affairs Office.[59] Consequently the Big Seven public interest groups which represent state and local interests were largely by-passed by the Administration during the initial formulation of New Federalism. In fact it was not until September 30, 1982, after the Administration's proposals had floundered that the President met with representatives of these groups.[60] Finally, with budget deficits soaring, OMB Director David Stockman seized New Federalism as a means to achieve budget reductions. The face of the issue was being perceived by Congress and local officials as a method to pass on the deficits to the states and not as a method to transfer authority. Congress was able to criticize the Administration's every move without fear of losing public support, because the people neither understood nor cared about the outcome.[61]

The 1982 State of the Union Address contained other domestic agenda items as noted in Table 2. Of particular note were the Urban Enterprise Zones, Voting Rights and the Clean Air Act. All three of these issues involved different congressional coalitions and thereby diffused White House efforts. Only one, Voting Rights, passed through Congress and that was not a Reagan victory. After seeking to weaken key enforcement provisions of the Voting Rights Act, Reagan reluctantly signed the legislation following Democratic Party charges of insensitivity.

Unlike the transition period before the Inaugural address, the "breather" period before the State of the Union Address did not allow sufficient time to plan in detail and choose priorities wisely. The hopes and euphoria of the first year victories did not automatically carry over to the second year agenda. Most of the Administration's domestic proposals were never put into legislation. Those pursued became stalled by the FY 1983 budget process and had little grassroots support.

Reagan Cabinet Government: Collegialty and Co-optation

To be effective a president needs advice and a decision-making mechanism to exploit his honeymoon advantages. Early in a transition adhocracy triumphs. If continued, confusing signals, miscues, and bickering would proliferate and tarnish the president's reputation. In the United States, Cabinet government has not been the solution but neither has it been an illusion. Under the Reagan Administration

TABLE 2
The Second Year Domestic Agenda From the State of the Union Address

Issue	*Outcome*
1. Dismantle Department of Energy	— Approved by Cabinet Council 12/15/81 No Action by Congress
2. Dismantle Department of Education	— Approved by Cabinet Council 11/13/81 No Action by Congress
3. New Federalism	— No Legislative Proposal Transmitted to Congress
4. Urban Enterprise Zones	— Approved by Cabinet Council 12/22/81 — Presidential Message 3/23/82 — Deadlocked in Committee
5. Crime Legislation	— Cleared Congress 12/20/82 — Vetoed 1/14/83
6. Clean Air Act Reauthorization	— Approved by Senate Environment and Public Works Committee 8/19/82 — Deadlocked in House Energy and Commerce Committee
7. Voting Rights Extension	— Cleared Congress 6/23/82 — Signed by President
8. Economic Policy—Stay the Course	— Reagan Budget FY 83 rejected; Budget Resolution passed 6/23/82 — Reconciliation Bill PL 97-253 cut spending by 13.3 billion — Tax Increase Bill PL 97-248 raised taxes $98.3 billion over 3 years

Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1982 and Chester A. Newland, "The Reagan Presidency: Limited Government and Political Administration," *Public Administration Review* (January/February 1983) pp. 1–21.

it has provided strong surrogates to take the heat while simultaneously has had high payoffs in promoting consonance between policy implementation and Reagan's conservative philosophy. Reagan's commitment to rapid implementation of his political philosophy was first recognized during his thorough appointment process. Increasingly, Cabinet relations has become politics of implementation writ large. Implementation, the last component of the extended transition framework has often been overlooked by previous administrations. Yet in the current Administration, when Reagan issues an order no one seems to ask, "Is anybody listening"?[62]

Cabinet officers and Administration officials when speaking behind the anonymity of "not for attribution" readily acknowledge that many of the Reagan decisions, like those of this predecessors, are made in private consultation of trusted advisors and not in the Chairman of the Board style before his Cabinet. The Cabinet is a communication not a decision-making device. It carries information to and from the President and is useful for maintaining espirit de corps and unity.[63]

The fabric and administrative machinery of Reagan's Cabinet government rested on the premise that no man could rule alone. At the same time no purpose could be fulfilled by forcing busy Cabinet secretaries to waste time in meetings on issues which were tangential to their department concerns. From this perspective, Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese divided the Cabinet initially into five and later seven councils in order to sort out and refine issues that involved multiple departments without wasting the time of disinterested department heads.[64] The second dominant concern was the operational ability of President Reagan to translate policies and themes as defined by his mandate into actions without having the bickering and tensions between "loyal" White House staff and "native" department officials.

The process itself entailed Cabinet secretariats for each of the councils and working groups of assistant secretaries convened on an ad hoc basis to address a specific issue. Once the working group developed a report, the secretariat distributed that report along with an agenda in advance of each council meeting. The meetings themselves were usually attended by Cabinet members and senior White House assistants. Reagan sat in on about one-half of these meetings.

Such meetings were essentially planned and rehearsed encounters between the President and his Cabinet. Normally the Cabinet officers debated their point of view before Reagan, who then went off to consider his decision. Seldom did a Cabinet officer discuss issues one-on-one with Reagan outside the Cabinet council system. Instead, the President insisted on a point of view from each Cabinet member during a Cabinet council meeting.[65] Thus Cabinet government was a flexible, policy advising network *for* the President and not necessarily a vehicle to serve the individual Cabinet member.

Although proponents of Reagan Cabinet government have maintained that all issues come up through the Cabinet council system while the legislative strategy team handles how to sell, market and get adoption, this is surely for public consumption. Both Social Security and New Federalism proposals were developed by ad hoc groups and not through the three tiers of the Cabinet council structure.[66] Obviously such issues decided outside the framework of the Cabinet denied the White House political advice on the probable reaction from Congress and the public. But since most fundamental Reagan initiatives—priority shifting budget bills, income tax reduction, deregulation and defense policy—were decided and planned by the transition organization, one should expect similar budget high priority issues to be communicated to the Cabinet not decided and developed by the Cabinet.

The implications that follow from Reagan's Cabinet government are a better integrated effort between department and White House staffs, and increased prestige for Cabinet officials. Quantitative evidence generated by John Kessel indicated that White House involvement with the seven Cabinet councils has broadened communications among the President's staff. The high participation rate of Cabinet and White House officials in a multiple advocacy format in which issues are sorted, sifted and then resolved means that decisions become more legitimate.[67] "There is some real advising that goes on from those who implement the decisions, particularly on issues where the President may not previously have focused."[68] The process also serves as an "action-forcing event," in that it can cause departments to reconcile or moderate their disagreements, knowing that continued disagreements will go to the President for resolution.

By keeping Cabinet officers and agency heads in a collegial process close to the President, the Reagan Cabinet system inhibits what many presidents have complained about—what one might call the iron law of departmental capture in which presidential appointees "go native" by becoming part of the department instead of the president's emmissary to it. But ensuring that the Cabinet officer operates with a presidential perspective in daily implementation decisions assumes that the officer has a clear conception of what is in the president's interest. Thus the President must articulate consistent and clear goals, reaffirm political themes and hold his appointees accountable to them. By being the great communicator to his appointees through the Cabinet system, Ronald Reagan allows his Cabinet officers to be great communicators to the bureaucracy. By keeping them closer, Reagan serves his needs as well as those of his department heads. That is he serves his needs by providing a process for his White House staffers to proselytize the Cabinet and to monitor implementation.[69]

But the Cabinet council system also serves the needs of the Cabinet officers too. They need to be seen coming and going from the White House, to appear to have the ear of the President. Such appearances are important in Washington, because they confer legitimacy. That is, they promote the Cabinet officer to his department, to the Congress and the public at large. Appearances thereby give Cabinet officers credibility and respect, both of which they desparately need to carry out their far-flung responsibilities.

Drawbacks exist to the Reagan Cabinet system. The Cabinet council system, especially the first two tiers, removes the President further away from the raw materials of decision. By not being involved closely with the flow of policy debate in the early stages, the President risks not being informed on the issues and controversies within his Administration. On the other side of the spectrum, by giving Cabinet members greater responsibility and visibility, the White House may have difficulty in controlling headstrong Cabinet officials. If White House staffers lack political clout to challenge ideologically-charged Cabinet members and their aides, embarrassment to the administration may follow.[70]

Thus the cabinet council system extended the transition by insuring more orderly implementation and a more coherent understanding by the Cabinet of the President's preferences. Collegial government became the answer for the Reagan Administration. In such a government, all have a chance to present their views; all become part of the process and are therefore co-opted. Structure and process have become policy.

Speculations on Future Extended Transitions

Domestic policy success demands that presidents move quickly in their first few months in office. To give it all you can in the first year requires a carefully planned transition. Thus great benefits will be given to that candidate who secures his party's nomination early in the Spring. A close race for the nomination followed by a tough general election simply puts additional constraints of time and resources on the extended transition process, a process already incompatible with the cycles of declining influence and increasing effectiveness. Consequently, that action-forcing mechanism, the Inaugural Address, may signal a call for planning and not action. Based on the extended transition thesis, calls for planning can destroy opportunities for action.

As a case study, the Reagan extended transition provides four strategic imperatives for future presidents, regardless of party affiliation.

1. Concentrate on being effective immediately following January 20.
2. Make it your honeymoon, not one for outsiders. This means presidents must key on a few issues.
3. Extend your honeymoon by shaping public expectations, by marketing your legislative victories and by deflecting political heat. But guard against arrogance and ill-conceived programs.
4. Consider Cabinet relations as the politics of implementation writ large.

While presidential style, ideology, election returns, political skills and political environment will vary among future presidents, to a large degree a President's political reputation among Washingtonians and the public at large will be based on his early choices and actions.

The goal for any new administration is to extend the window of opportunity for new policies and programs. The recurrent dilemmas faced by all new administrations in achieving this goal are a combination of inexperience and arrogance within the White House, and excessive public expectations and claims on the president's agenda. Thus, if a new administration wants to exploit, not forclose, its honeymoon, it must plan and operate as a team early, must develop strategies to clear the congested campaign agenda and must focus on one or at most two issue clusters. Early legislative victories can extend opportunities, assuming the absence of egregious mistakes or unfavorable and uncontrollable events in the international system. But legislative victories alone do not guarantee follow-through by the bureaucracy, nor alleviate the need to manage external criticism from political opponents and supporters alike. Cabinet organization is needed to achieve those ends.

We should expect future presidents to begin programmatic planning prior to their election, to attempt to control the agenda by forcing action on a limited number of priorities, to freeze other agenda items for as long as possible and to take renewed interest in the appointment process as an insurance policy for effective implementation. By selecting a limited number of issues, a future president can define the terms in which his public will initially judge him. Selectivity will reduce the occasions when he goes on record with specific proposals which are likely to be refuted by events beyond his control. Selectivity requires detailed programmatic planning and coalition building along with damage control contingencies in the event of failure. Selectivity assumes that a president can deflect hot political issues which upset his sense of timing. Finally, selectivity cannot last. If successful, expectations will rise and supporters and other institutions will press for action based on their claims of the president.

Greater reliance on strategic planning by the transition organization, an ad hoc affair by definition, means a lesser role for Cabinet advice at the start of any administration. Cabinet government will be increasingly seen as a mechanism to insure a coordinated and ideologically consistent effort in implementation.

As to Cabinet councils, one must conclude that institutionalization of structure is impossible to ask of presidents. Their personalities, styles, aspirations, and staffs differ too much. Furthermore, the problems modern presidents must face and the demands placed upon them are too slippery to expect consistency in structure. However, the diversity of these problems and demands, when combined with the inconsistent nature of public expectations for the modern presidency, seem to assure that presidential dependence on the Cabinet will persist. "There is," as Gordon Hoxie observed, "need both for strong White House staffing, with experienced senior aides, and a revitalized Cabinet which can be the crux of the Presidency."[71] As Aaron Wildavsky so accurately predicted in 1976:

> The Cabinet will undergo a visible revival because Presidents will trade a little power for a lot of protection. The more prominent a President's Cabinet, the less of a target he becomes. When Presidents wanted to keep the credit, they kept their Cabinets quiet; but they will welcome Cabinet notoriety now that they want to spread the blame.[72]

* *The views contained herein do not necessarily represent those of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.*

This paper was adapted from one presented at the Southern Political Science Association in Savannah, Georgia on November 2, 1984. We are indebted to George Edwards, John Kessel, and Steve Shull for their useful comments at that Conference. We would also like to thank those who anonymously discussed this topic with us as well as Richard E. Neustadt who first asked in strategic terms: how to be on top in fact as well as in name.

Notes

1. W. Leuchtenburg, *In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 244.
2. A. Schlesinger, Jr. *The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), pp. 20–21.

3. R.E. Neustadt, *Memorandum on Organizing the Transition* September 15, 1960, pp. 1–5. Selections available in the Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
4. For example see H. Barger, *The Impossible Presidency* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1984) and F. Kessler, *The Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership: of Caretakers and Kings* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982).
5. The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 provides office space and funds for the president-elect prior to his inaugural.
6. Nelson Polsby in *Political Innovation for America* argues that innovation is now becoming routine in American politics due to the proliferations of policy entrepreneurs and politicians in search of new ideas. For a contrary assessment see John Herbers, "Assessing the Presidency: The Yardstick Is Changed" in *The New York Times*, November 13, 1977, in which he maintains that, "Government and policy innovations do not come in geysers in this decade, they well up slowly if at all."
7. As reported in *The New York Times*, April 25, 1984, Senators Claiborne Pell (D-RI) and Charles Mathias (R-MD) urged the adoption of a resolution calling for a constitutional amendment to move the inauguration of a new President from Jan 20 to Nov 20. Such a move, if adopted, would put tremendous pressure on the new administration and would assuredly weaken presidential government.
8. Quoted from Steven Hess, *Organizing the Presidency* (Washington The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 22. This is somewhat contrary to the findings of Steven Shull, *Domestic Policy Formation—Presidential Congressional Partnership?* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1983), pp. 164–5. Presidents make fewer legislative requests during first years and most during their last years in office. Presidents also obtain little support during first years in office. This is rather surprising evidence but it is not weighted according to the president's priorities and effort.
9. D. Haider, "Presidential Transitions: Critical, If Not Decisive" in *Public Administration Review*, March/April 1981, p. 210.
10. Harrison Wellford quoted in "Presidential Transition Offers Insights into Character" in *Congressional Quarterly*, (December 27, 1980), p. 3655.
11. For a good discussion on the Bay of Pigs and Bert Lance affairs see Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership From FDR to Carter* (New York: John Wiley, 1980), Chapter 11, "The Hazards of Transition," pp. 208–243.
12. P. Light, *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), Chapter 2, pp. 35–61.
13. R. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: Planning and the President's Program" in the *American Political Science Review*, vol. 49 (1955), p. 981.
14. See J. Kessel, *The Domestic Presidency: Decision-Making in the White House* (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1975), pp. 9–11 and Hess, op. cit., pp. 20–24.
15. H. Smith, "Reagan's Crucial Year" in *New York Times Magazine* (October 16, 1983), p. 48.
16. R. Brody and B.I. Page, "The Impact of Events on Presidential Popularity" in Wildavsky (ed.) *Perspectives on the Presidency* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1975). pp. 136–147.
17. L. Bloomfield, "From Ideology to Program to Policy: Tracking the Carter Human Rights Policy" in the *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1982), p. 10. An excellent case study which identifies the risk of setting off to a late start in the movement from ideas to program when a president has only a limited time to set the agenda.
18. J. Wooten "Mr. Carter's Domestic Performance Is Sluggish, At Best," *New York Times*, October 16, 1977, section 4. For the best comparison of the Carter and Reagan transitions to include an analytical framework for evaluation see James Pfiffner, "The Carter-Reagan Transition: Hitting the Ground Running" in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Volume XIII, Fall 1983.
19. However one area where there was distinctly less cooperation between outgoing and incoming groups during the Reagan transition was in the budget. Carter officials of the Office of Management and Budget held the Reagan representatives at arms length until the budget was essentially completed. See Laurin L. Henry, "The Transition: From Nomination to Inauguration" in David

and Everson (eds.) *The Presidential Election and Transion 1980–81* (Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), pp. 195–218.

During the 1976 and 1980 elections, the Kennedy School of Government provided the major candidates with a detailed checklist and time schedule for significant actions during the transition. See also L. Henry, *Presidential Transitions* (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1960).

20. D. Kirschten, "The Reagan Team Comes to Washington, Ready to Get Off to a Running Start," *National Journal* (November 15, 1980), p. 1924.
21. Evidence provided by Chief of Staff James Baker III in D. Kirschten, "Reagan and the Federal Machine—If It Doesn't Work, Then Fix It," *National Journal* (January 17, 1981), pp. 89–90.
22. D. Bonafede, "Issue-Oriented Heritage Foundation Hitches its Wagon to Reagan's Star," *National Journal* (March 20, 1982), p. 502. Edwin Meese III in 12th Annual Student Symposium (1981) Center for the Study of the Presidency.
23. D. Kirschten, "The Reagan Team Comes to Washington, Ready to Get Off to a Running Start, *National Journal* (November 11, 1980), p. 1925.
24. Henry, op. cit., p. 198–199. Part of what explains Reagan's success is that the transition team had a clear idea of what policies were in effect vs. the policies espoused. They knew what they didn't like.
25. S. Blumenthal, "Marketing the President," *The New York Times Magazine*, September 13, 1982, p. 42. Translation campaign themes, not creating new issues, is the safe route. Of course this assumes that the Reagan team know what they were about when they were in the campaigning phase.
26. B. Heineman, Jr., and C. Hessler, *Memorandum for the President* (New York: Random House, 1980), Preface and Chapter 1. Heineman and Hessler argue that the president's plan of governing must be the central organizing concern of his administration.
27. H. Heclo and R. Penner, "Fiscal and Political Strategy in the Reagan Administration" in F. Greenstein (ed.) *The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 28.
28. D. Kirschten, "Reagan: 'No More Business as Usual,' " *National Journal* (February 21, 1981), p. 303.
29. See D. Kirschten, "Wanted: 275 Reagan Team Players; Empire Builders Need Not Apply," *National Journal* (December 6, 1980), pp. 2077–2079.
30. The Reagan administration was aware of the difficulties in unifying political executives in government which stem initially from the selection process itself. See H. Heclo, *A Government of Strangers* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977) especially chapter 3. Several tactics have been used by the Reagan administration to make political executives less of a stranger to the White House. See R. Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), chapter 6 and Calvin Mackenzie, *Cabinet and Subcabinet Personnel Selection in Reagan's First Year: New Variations on Some Not-So-Old Themes* in a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the APSA in New York, September 2–5, 1981.
31. Following the trend of naming Cabinet choices progressively later, Reagan finished on December 23 while Eisenhower had completed the task on December 1.
32. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 12 and Kirschten, "No More Business as Usual," op. cit., p. 302. See also *Time*, "Molasses Pace on Appointments," (May 11, 1981), p. 19.
33. Walker worked with the transition team at the Department of Energy. The team was headed by oil wildcatter, Michael Halbouty, and energy Lawyer, Jim Adkins. They were a low keyed group, very courteous but secretive. Almost none of them were selected to serve in the new Administration.
34. Kirschten, "Von Reagan's Express," *National Journal* (February 21, 1981), p. 323.
35. Interview #7.
36. *Congressional Quarterly* (December 27, 1980), p. 3657.
37. R. Hershey, "Synfuels Chief Under Fire: Edward E. Noble," *New York Times*, June 17, 1984, section F, p. 6.

38. C. Madison, "In Washington, the Energy Industry Isn't Going to Be the Enemy Anymore," *National Journal* (December 16, 1980), pp. 2072–2076.
39. Kirschten, "Von Reagan's Express," op. cit. p. 323.
40. See the conservative publications such as *Human Events* and *Conservative Digest* during the Winter, 1981
41. D. Kirschten, "After a Year, the Reagan White House May Be Beginning to Feel the Strain," *National Journal* (January 23, 1982), p. 143.
42. H. Raines, "Aides See Reagan Straying From Campaign Path," *New York Times*, March 25, 1982. See also *Congressional Quarterly*, (February 13, 1982), pp. 223–4.
43. B. Ingold and T.O. Windt, Jr., "Trying to 'Stay the Course': President Reagan's Rhetoric During the 1982 Election," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Volume XIV, Winter 1984, p. 88–89.
44. Blumenthal, op. cit., p. 17.
45. A.J. Meltsner, "Memorandum to President Reagan" in Meltsner eds. *Politics and the Oval Office* (San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981), pp. 3–9.
46. H. Heclo, "One Executive Branch or Many?" in Anthony King (ed.) *Both Ends of the Avenue* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), p. 44.
47. D. Kirschten, "Reagan's Legislative Strategy Team Keeps His Record of Victories Intact," *National Journal* (June 26, 1982), pp. 1127–1129.
48. Blumenthal, op. cit., p. 116.
49. D. Kirschten, "Reagan Sends a Message—In Spite of the Bullet, He's Still in Charge," *National Journal* (April 4, 1981), pp. 562–3. See also L. Cannon, *Reagan* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1982), p. 411, for the role of heroes.
50. S. Weisman, "Can the Magic Prevail?" *The New York Times Magazine*, April 29, 1984, p. 42.
51. Weismann, op. cit., p. 52.
52. For example see Hugh Sidey, "Why the Criticisms Don't Stick," *Time*, May 21, 1984, p. 53 and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Making Reagan Accountable," *Wall Street Journal*, April 20, 1984, p. 22.
53. F. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 237.
54. S. Weisman, "Reagan Dissipates Heat by Delegating Authority," *New York Times*, October 11, 1981, p. 4E.
55. Nathan, op. cit., pp. 61–63.
56. A. Murray and J. Birnbaum, "Reagan's Inexpensive Vote-Getter," *Wall Street Journal*, July 26, 1984, p. 54.
57. Heclo, "Fiscal and Political Strategy in the Reagan Administration," op. cit., p. 35–41.
58. R. Beal, "Polling and the Democratic Consensus," *The Annuals*, Volume 472, March 1984, pp. 72–84.
59. For a quick account of Reagan's Congressional liaison operations see Stephen Wayne, "Congressional Liaison in the Reagan White House" in Norman Ornstein's (ed.) *President and Congress: Assessing Reagan's First Year* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1982), pp. 44–65. See also Eric L. Davis, "Congressional Liaison: The People and the Institutions" in *Both Ends of the Avenue*, op. cit.
60. C. Newland, "The Reagan Presidency: Limited Government and Political Administration," *Public Administration Review*, January/February 1983, pp. 12–13. The Big Seven are: Council of State Governments; International City Management Association; National Association of Counties; National Conference of State Legislatures; National Governor's Association; National League of Cities; and U.S. Conference of Mayors.
61. Beal, op. cit., p. 78.
62. A president can never escape from management duties. To do so would result in bureaucratic inertia and delays in the implementation of the President's program. For a good case study see "Carter Issues an Order, But is Anybody Listening?" in *National Journal* (7/14/79) pp. 1156–1158.
63. Heclo, "The Changing Presidential Office" in Meltsner (ed.), *Politics and the Oval Office*, op. cit., pp. 180–181.

64. The first accounts of the Cabinet Council system were given by D. Kirschten, "Circles within Circles," *National Journal* (March 7, 1981), p. 399 and "Reagan's Cabinet Councils May Have Less Influence Than Meets the Eye," *National Journal* (July 11, 1981), pp. 1242–1247.
65. Some of the material here is based on Walker's experience as a staff member in the White House Office of Policy Development and his attendance at these meetings. Also Interview #1.
66. See D. Kirschten, "Reagan's Cabinet Councils May Have Less Influence Than Meets the Eye," op. cit., p. 1246 and Cannon, "The Inner Circle Decides and the Outer Circle Ratifies," *Washington Post*. Reagan and his Cabinet heard the proposed Stockman-Schweiker Social Security proposals at a Cabinet council meeting one day prior to scheduled congressional testimony. Edwin Meese in a classic understatement commented, "There was not a lot of time for pre-explanations and you had a volatile topic on which almost anything you say is going to produce adverse reaction." Regarding New Federalism, the plan was debated for many months in councils after the State of the Union address. The chief effect was probably to delay the proposal.
67. Heineman argues that "Most of the time, the debates between Cabinet officers and your top personal staff are over what is good for you." There is a remarkable consensus on issue positions in the Reagan White House as compared to the Carter White House. See John H. Kessel, *The Structures of the Reagan White House*, paper delivered at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1–4, 1983, pp. 4–7. See also Edwin Meese III, "The Institutional Presidency: A View from the White House," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XIII, 2, Spring 1983, pp. 191–197.
68. Interview #3.
69. Interview #5.
70. This point was raised in a recent appraisal of the NSC. See D. Igantius, "Foreign-Policy Laws Make McFarlane's Job Unusually Tough One," *Wall Street Journal*, August 10, 1984, p. 1.
71. R. Gordon Hoxie, "The Cabinet in the American Presidency, 1789–1984," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XIV, 2, Spring 1984, p. 228.
72. A. Wildavsky, "The Past and Future Presidency," *The Public Interest*, no. 41 (Fall 1975), pp. 56–76; quotation, p. 73.

"A Conversation-Interview on The American Presidency" with Louis W. Koenig

Conducted by Associate Editor
THOMAS E. CRONIN

Interviewer's Note

Professor Louis W. Koenig retired in June 1986 from New York University where he had taught for thirty-six years. After earning his A.B. from Bard College and his Ph.D. from Columbia University Koenig worked during the war years in the Executive Office of the President. He later taught at Bard before joining NYU. Author and editor of several major books, students of the presidency are especially familiar with his classic text, *The Chief Executive.* He has served as a member of the Editorial Board of *Presidential Studies Quarterly* since its founding and since 1978 as Chairman. A mentor for scores of students of the presidency the *Quarterly* honors him with this conversation/interview on the occasion of his retirement and wishes him well in his future research projects and his Visiting Distinguished Professorship at Long Island University. This interview was conducted at Professor Koenig's office at N.Y.U. in late February, 1986. Interestingly, his L.I.U. office will be in Hoxie Hall, named for this *Quarterly*'s founder.

Question: Can you talk about some of the early influences that shaped your interest in the American presidency?

Koenig: A major influence was my going to Bard College. The College went through a number of exciting changes and there were a lot of seminars and specialized tutorials. There was a spirit of educational innovation there that paralleled the New Deal spirit and atmosphere.

Franklin Roosevelt was from nearby Hyde Park, and I had the opportunity to see him on several occasions, for example, right after he was elected in 1933, he passed through Poughkeepsie. I was with my father, as I recall, and I shook Roosevelt's hand and wished him good luck. Later, while in College, I saw him again.

My family was a Republican family. And I went to Bard College with a Republican frame of mind. But that changed. It was probably a combination of the Depression and the severe poverty as well as some of our faculty and their views and the vivid impression and ties of FDR to our region—all these deeply affected me. These plus the innovative and experimental climate at Bard College all helped to change me.

One other thought about FDR. My family knew the head caretaker over at the Roosevelt home in Hyde Park. And while I was in high school I sometimes drove

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Filling the White House's 'Empty Nest'

Carter Ex-Aide Wants a Secretariat to Greet Incoming President

By Judith Havemann
Washington Post Staff Writer

When Stuart E. Eizenstat walked into the White House with newly elected President Jimmy Carter in 1977, he found it denuded: no secretaries, no files, no civil servants and no institutional memory of what had gone before.

"No corporate CEO would tolerate it," he said. "Issues tend to be repetitive," and no business executive would want every one of his top-level managers to be green and all records to be awaiting cataloguing for the next presidential library.

In a discussion of presidential transition issues conducted yesterday by The Center for Excellence in Government, Eizenstat called for a White House secretariat.

His proposed secretariat would include perhaps 10 longtime civil servants who would have responsibility for an archival record system, who would be part of the loop of memos to the president and who would lay out precedents before a president made major decisions.

The last two presidents, Eizenstat noted, had to deal with Iran and they made similar mistakes. "Issues are very much alike from one president to the next."

According to Eizenstat, who worked in the White House as Carter's domestic policy adviser, it took a leap of faith to accept the idea. It began, Eizenstat said, as he talked to the secretary to then-British prime minister James Callaghan and found he had held the same post under Edward Heath.

Callaghan's secretary said that his job was to keep the current prime minister away from the political and policy land mines other prime ministers had already stepped on, Eizenstat said.

Although Eizenstat remains strongly committed to his idea, it has failed to catch on at Capitol Hill, which would have to approve it. But the secretariat is only one management improvement that could be usefully handed to the incoming president, he said.

The nonprofit center is writing a "Prune Book"—descriptions of the government's top 130 jobs and the qualifications necessary to hold them—and "we hope that this will have an influence on who is appointed," said center Chairman William A. Morrill.

The name is a takeoff on the "Plum Book"—the list of top political jobs available at the beginning of each administration. "A prune is a plum with experience," said John H. Trattner, author of the forthcoming volume.

In an effort to draw attention to the importance of governing, the center, one of many organizations hoping to play a role in framing how the next presidential transition is conducted, expects to put a list of questions to the 1988 candidates in the coming months.

Eizenstat said he thought it significant that none of the presidential candidates is running anti-Washington, antigovernment campaigns. "If it were politically popular, at least a couple of them would be doing it," he said.

Yesterday's discussion participants agreed that candidates' management qualifications are tough to judge in advance. Eizenstat said that Herbert Hoover went to the presidency with a strong business and management record, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency was characterized by overlapping responsibilities and duplicative assignments, yet Roosevelt is judged as by far the more successful president.

"We are not electing a chief manager," said Eizenstat, "we're electing a leader who will choose competent people, reward them for good performance, and use the bureaucracy as an important corporate resource."

"Obviously, it is difficult to motivate and cheerlead when you're cutting back," said Alan K. (Scotty) Campbell, former director of the Office of Personnel Management, "but the business world is going through that very same thing, and they spend a lot of time thinking about motivating those who stay to work very hard and and maintain the system.

"The signals have to come out of the White House."

QUESTIONS FOR GOVERNANCE

Excerpts from a questionnaire for 1988 presidential candidates prepared by The Center for Excellence in Government:

- Public opinion polls indicate that the public is looking for competent performance rather than flashy policy initiatives from their government officials. What do you think this means? How would it affect your administration if you win?
- Recent studies have found that political appointees to high-level federal positions serve for very short periods (an average of about 2 years), are quite young, and seldom have extensive experience in managing large organizations . . . . If elected, you will have to make over 3,000 appointments. How will you find the talent to fill these positions . . . ?
- Transitions between presidents—even of the same party—traditionally have been chaotic, frenzied, and a short 10 weeks. It is an anxious time as well for career civil servants, sometimes prolonged by misunderstanding and distrust on all sides. Do you regard this as an inevitable part of our system . . . . What changes would you make?
- Government, in general, and specific federal agencies of all kinds have been under siege for some time; yet these agencies are expected to perform critical functions or deliver important services. If you become president, what are the most important steps you will take so that you can leave these agencies at the end of your term better off than you found them?

FEDERAL PAGE

. ALAN CRANSTON
e's no deal for this year"

/ the White House over t 15-year certificates as a oviding rental assistance ople.

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to Reagan

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The Day After Election Day

Harvard Project Aims at Easing the Transition Between Presidencies

By Gwen Ifill
Washington Post Staff Writer

The field of candidates remains unsettled, and the men who would be president are too busy jockeying among themselves to pay attention but, in one quarter at least, serious planning has begun for the post-Reagan presidential transition.

Reasoning that an early start is the best way to avoid confusion later, a group of former government officials based at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government has devised a solution to "the quiet crisis of public service."

Members of Harvard's Public/Private Careers Project said yesterday that Congress should approve higher executive salaries as a lure for government professionals and increase by one-third the $2 million budget alloted for transition activities. Transition teams, they said, should engage in more intensive apolitical recruiting to fill top spots in an incoming administration.

The best way to attract qualified and competent individuals to public service, project chief Carl M. Brauer said, is to employ a favorite private-sector tactic—head hunting.

"Head hunting has become an accepted practice in the private sector," said Henry H. Fowler, a member of the committee and a former secretary of the Treasury. "I don't see why the federal government should be barred" from using the same methods.

But the most important elements, Brauer is convinced, are timing and money.

"You can't get people appointed ahead of time, but at least you can find out if they're interested," he said.

Of those interested, Brauer noted that in the past only 20 percent of new officials received orientation training. Also, he said, one-third of those selected for the roughly 3,000 positions that the president fills stay on the job only about 18 months.

None of this bodes well for a

swift start on an agenda that many new presidents find is often virtually in place well before Inauguration Day.

"On Jan. 20, many of the problems that existed on Jan. 19 are already crying for attention," Brauer said.

Brauer and other members of his

> *"You can't get people appointed ahead of time, but at least you can find out if they're interested."*
>
> —Carl M. Brauer, project chief

group, however, concede that the main elements of their proposal could fall victim to the politics of money and patronage.

The money process begins when Congress allocates $2 million for the president-elect's transition needs.

In 1980, the Reagan team spent $1.7 million of the congressional appropriation and raised at least another $1 million from the private sector. In 1976, Jimmy Carter's transition organization returned $300,000 of the congressional allocation.

In order to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest arising from potential appointees making cash payments to an incoming administration, the Harvard group is suggesting that more money be made available and allocated to the major parties' nominees prior to the election.

In addition, salaries for the new appointees, the committee said, should be fattened—to $150,000 annually for some jobs that are now paid considerably less—in order to attract older, more experienced people to government service.

"You do have to look [at public service] as a public duty," Fowler said.

"On the other hand, you have to temper that with realism that people in their late 30s, 40s or even 50s are going to have certain minimum requirements, such as [paying] for children going to college . . . ," he added.

In 1980, the conservative Heritage Foundation gave the incoming Reagan administration a 3,000-page report on the transition that urged Reagan to select the administration's 400 top aides by Jan. 5, well before his swearing-in.

That transition effort, headed by Edwin Meese III, later came under scrutiny when it was disclosed in 1984 that lump-sum payments had been made out of transition funds to several top officials.

Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) is sponsoring legislation that would also increase the amount of money spent on transition planning, in part so that future presidents would be unlikely to require private money to support a public function.

"Politically it's never an easy sell," said Brauer of proposals to spend more money on planning and staff. "But we've reached the point where even academics are turning down appointments."

Members of the project acknowledged that political realities that give the victor the right to award the spoils of patronage could impede any implementation of their suggestions.

As project member Stanford Ross, a lawyer with Arnold & Porter and former commissioner of the Social Security Administration, put it, "Politics ultimately will work its will."

E

Shifting Authority: The Transition Begins

His six-day post-election vacation on St. Simons Island, Ga., ended, Jimmy Carter flew home to Plains, Ga., Nov. 11 and began preparations for assuming the presidency. "I'm tired of vacation," he said. "I'm ready to go to work."

He had mixed work with play during his respite with his family at the 1,300-acre estate on the Atlantic Ocean coastal island, reading through an 18-inch stack of reports by his transition team.

He had flown to the island on an executive jet provided by the government. It was the first and most obvious evidence of his victory. He flew home on a commercial aircraft.

Awaiting him there was less ostentatious but more important evidence of his new power: a communications center built by the Army Signal Corps. Along with the communications center came the start of daily intelligence briefings by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to be preceded by a meeting with CIA Director George Bush.

Also planned, at dates yet to be announced, were meetings with President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

The President-elect will divide his time between Plains and Washington during the period before his inauguration Jan. 20. The Carter family has been offered the use of a restored, federal-style brownstone house on Lafayette Square, across Pennsylvania Ave. from the White House.

Much of the transitional work will be handled by a staff that will move into a suite of offices at the Health, Education and Welfare building in Washington Nov. 17. Jack H. Watson, coordinator of the transition team, and Hamilton Jordan, Carter's campaign director, were scheduled to meet with Carter in Plains Nov. 15.

Watson and Jordan had been considered rivals for power in what one report described as a "bloodless duel." Watson emerged from the maneuvering with most of the responsibilities for the transition.

He is a 38-year-old lawyer from Atlanta who has been in charge of Carter's transition planning staff since July. Jordan, a 32-year-old Georgian, has been close to Carter for six years and was the architect of his successful presidential campaign.

Jack H. Watson Jr.

Frank Moore

Carter's Transition Chief, Hill Liaison Man

During the interregnum between administrations, Watson has oversight over Carter's Cabinet appointments, government reorganization, congressional liaison, budget analysis and personnel recruitment. Jordan is in charge of setting up a White House staff.

Jody Powell, Carter's press secretary, said Nov. 10 that neither man would have a specific title. In announcing the staff of the transition team, Powell said it had been chosen by Watson without being approved by Carter. It would be logical to assume, he told reporters, that the staff members would be given jobs in the new administration. "But I don't believe there have been any commitments made to people," he added.

Continuing as Carter's liaison man with Capitol Hill is Frank Moore, 40, of Dahlonega, Ga. But Powell said that Vice President-elect Walter F. Mondale and his staff would play an important role in Hill liaison during the transition. Moore, Carter's legislative lobbyist when Carter was governor of Georgia from 1971 to 1975, was his liaison with congressional Democrats during the presidential campaign.

Besides Moore, Powell announced Watson's selection of 11 other transition staff members:

- Barbara Blum, 37, deputy director of the Carter presidential campaign and former vice president of the Restaurant Association of Georgia—director of the Washington transition office.
- W. Bowman Cutter, 34, former assistant to the president of the Washington Post Co.—coordinator of the transition staff's budget analysis group.
- Harrison Wellford, 36, former legislative assistant to Sen. Philip A. Hart (D Mich.)—government organization and regulatory reform.
- Landon Butler, Matt Coffey and Dick Flemming—recruiters for administration appointments under the "talent inventory program." Butler, 35, was political director of the Carter campaign. Coffey, 35, is a former president of the Association of Public Radio Stations and a former staffer in the Johnson White House. Flemming is an urban development specialist.
- Alfred Stern, Bruce Kirschenbaum and Curtis Hessler—policy development and liaison with federal agencies. Stern, deputy director of Carter's campaign issues staff, is a professor at Wayne State University in Detroit. Kirschenbaum, 36, is a former Washington representative for New York City. Hessler, 33, is a Los Angeles lawyer.
- Lawrence Bailey and Jule Sugarman—transition planning staff. Bailey, 35, is an assistant director of the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Sugarman, 49, is a chief administrative officer for the city of Atlanta.

Watson Nov. 11 named four leaders of Carter's transition team in foreign policy: Anthony Lake, 36, a former Kissinger aide; Richard C. Steadman, 44, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense; David Aaron, 38, a former foreign service officer and Mondale aide; and Fred Bergsten, 35, a former State Department official. ■

Ford-Carter Shift: On the Right Track

"Whatever the prerogatives of the executive power may be, the period which immediately precedes an election and the moment of its duration must always be considered as a national crisis, which is perilous in proportion to the internal embarrassments and the external dangers of the country."

—Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*

The word in Washington these days is transition. For the 38th time in the nation's 200-year history, a new administration is preparing to replace an old one.

The most obvious sign of change is on Capitol Hill, where workmen are erecting the mammoth platform on which Democrat Jimmy Carter will be sworn in as the 39th President next Jan. 20. Soon, the bleachers for the quadrennial inauguration parade will make their appearance along Pennsylvania Avenue near the White House.

For-sale signs will sprout in suburbia as several thousand Republican appointees return home, their government jobs filled by Democratic appointees.

It is the 18th time in history that one party's President is replacing another's. It is the seventh such overturn in the 20th century.

Eleven other presidential elections have produced continuations of the same party. The last was in 1928, when Republican Herbert Hoover succeeded Republican Calvin Coolidge.

The other nine presidencies, the latest of which is that of Republican Gerald R. Ford, have been filled by the accession of Vice Presidents.

Of the three types of change, the party overturn is the most dramatic. But since de Tocqueville made his observation nearly 150 years ago, numerous steps have been taken to reduce the threat of crisis during the interregnums between administrations.

Carter: Unprecedented Readiness

No one has seen anything that compares with the way Carter and his staff have approached the coming transition. Never before have preparations been so thorough.

Ford

Carter

A Strong Spirit of Cooperation

The preparations began in July with the formation of an unpublicized transition staff under the direction of Atlanta lawyer Jack H. Watson Jr. The staff of about 15 persons compiled a thick sheaf of background material with which Carter was able to start familiarizing himself as soon as he was elected.

Watson met in Washington with designated representatives of the Ford administration's executive branch the week after the Nov. 2 election. The 38-year-old attorney appointed 11 persons to key transition staff positions immediately. Dozens more from the transition team started pouring into the capital the next week; the official opening date of the transition office in the Health, Education and Welfare building was Nov. 17. *(Weekly Report p. 3187)*

Beyond the readiness of the Carter staff, however, there was a spirit of cooperation from Ford that was unusual, if not unique, in the long history of hostile transitions. *(Box p. 3196)*

In his congratulatory telegram to Carter the day after the election, Ford set the tone. "Although there will continue to be disagreements over the best means to use in pursuing our goals, I want to assure you that you have my complete and wholehearted support as you take the oath of office this January," he said. "I also pledge to you that I and all members of my administration will do all that we can to assure that you begin your term as smoothly and as effectively as possible."

Carter responded in kind, saying that Ford's "characteristically gracious statement" would make his job easier. "I am particularly grateful for his offer of close cooperation during this transition period," said Carter, "and during the next administration Sen. Mondale and I will take full advantage of that offer."

It was Carter's first mention, as President-elect, of the role he envisioned for Minnesota Sen. Walter F. Mondale, his running mate. He referred to Mondale again on Nov. 4 at a press conference in his hometown of Plains, Ga., saying that he expected his Vice President "to play a larger role in the next administration than any other previous Vice President has ever played." *(Text, Weekly Report p. 3188)*

Mondale underscored the point on Nov. 12 as he finished a week of post-election vacation. He said he would advise Carter on appointments to some executive jobs and on some budgetary decisions. "I intend to be working closely with congressional leadership, with governors, mayors, state legislators and the rest and with party leadership around the country and with a wide range of people in getting their advice and counsel on behalf of the President-elect," said Mondale at a press conference.

Carter said at his first press conference after the election that he would not start naming his Cabinet until December. But he has in hand a list, prepared by his staff, of names from which to choose. His selections will be made, he said, in the same manner he used in selecting Mondale: publicized interviews of those under consideration. The appointments will therefore not be surprises, said his staff leaders.

Latter-Day Civility

Cooperation has only lately become a characteristic of the transitions between incoming and outgoing administrations. Before the 20th century, when issues were simpler and pressures fewer, attitudes of the rivals toward each other tended to be frigid if not downright hostile.

This was true of both Adamses, for example. When father John, a Federalist, turned over the presidency to Democrat-Republican Thomas Jefferson in 1801, Adams refused to cooperate. He would not even attend the inauguration ceremony for his successor and former friend.

John Quincy Adams, a National Republican, adopted his father's attitude 28 years later, when he shunned cooperation with the incoming Democrat, Andrew Jackson. John Quincy, too, stayed home on Inauguration Day.

An exception to the arm's-length rule occurred in 1853. The departing Whig, Millard Fillmore, hit it off quite well with his Democratic successor, Franklin Pierce. He invited his replacement to a lecture by British writer William Makepeace Thackeray on Inauguration Day in that calmer time.

Within a few years, however, calmness was on the wane as the union headed toward dissolution. Republican Abraham Lincoln and his predecessor, Democrat James Buchanan, differed diametrically in their approaches to the worsening crisis. After his election in 1860, Lincoln did not communicate with Buchanan. He kept in touch with developments through Gen. Winfield Scott, commander of the Army.

Lincoln's successor, Andrew Johnson, was the Vice President who acceded after Lincoln's assassination. But he had little to say to Ulysses S. Grant, the Republican who was elected to replace him. On the morning of Grant's inauguration in 1869, Johnson defiantly held a Cabinet meeting in the White House.

Woodrow Wilson devised the most radical plan of all for the transition that did not occur in 1917. Democrat Wilson was certain he would lose the 1916 contest to Republican Charles Evans Hughes. His plan was to appoint Hughes Secretary of State immediately after the election, and then to resign along with his Vice President, Thomas R. Marshall.

Under the rules of presidential succession then in effect, Hughes would have become President immediately. The interregnum period, so important to Presidents for planning their succession, would have been eliminated. Wilson's unanticipated election to a second term eliminated a potentially dangerous precedent that has not arisen since.

Not until the 1932 election was a formal precedent established for cooperation between Cabinet-level appointees of the old and new administrations. Relations between Republican Herbert Hoover and Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt were far from cordial. Roosevelt rebuffed Hoover's repeated pleas to endorse a program at odds with Roosevelt's New Deal concepts.

The two rode to the Capitol together in near-silence on Inauguration Day. Despite their personal differences, however, their advisers had worked together on transition planning.

Including Cabinet officers, Carter has about 75 major administration appointments to fill personally. For these positions, he said, he seeks advice from knowledgeable people around the country. He added that he will "try to achieve some geographical and other balance in the total Cabinet and the public servants there. I would guess that this would be a very careful, very slow, very methodical process."

Also to be filled by political appointment, although probably not considered personally by Carter in some cases, are more than 2,000 lesser but still important federal executive jobs.

Apart from the jobs are the programs that demand immediate attention from Carter and his staff: taxes, welfare, energy, foreign policy, jobs, housing, inflation. And Carter and his advisers are already at work on the budget for fiscal year 1978. Ford will present his budget to Congress in January, but Carter will offer modifications that will leave his imprint on it, probably by mid-February.

Price Tag: $2-million

The cost of Carter's transition into office will be paid from a $2-million appropriation. The appropriation for Ford's departure is $1-million. That is five times more than the $200,000 Congress appropriated for Ford's disgraced predecessor, Richard M. Nixon, when he left office in 1974.

No budget has yet been set for the inaugural ceremonies, many of which will be paid for with private contributions. But if all goes as planned, the differences between 1977 and 1973, when Nixon was sworn in for a second term, will be stark.

Custom and protocol determine much of what happens at an inauguration. But the incoming President does much to set the style. Nixon's inauguration cost some $4-million and was among the most elaborate on record.

The cochairmen of the Carter inaugural, Washington lawyer Bardyl Tirana and Vicki Rogers, a longtime Carter supporter from South Carolina, promise a far less lavish—and less expensive—event. Carter has opted for a business suit, not a morning coat, for his swearing-in. His wife, Rosalynn, says she may wear to the inaugural ball the same gown she wore to her husband's inaugural ball when he became governor of Georgia in 1971.

But the most striking feature of the Carter inauguration may be the hordes of people who descend on Washington Jan. 20. Between 300,000 and 400,000 campaign workers will be invited personally to the ceremonies. The aim of this approach is to give the celebration the sort of touch that set apart the "people's" inauguration of Andrew Jackson in 1829.

Learning from the Past

One of the nation's leading students of presidential change is Laurin L. Henry, a professor of government and public administration at the University of Virginia. As a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, Henry wrote a book, *Presidential Transitions*, in 1960, and he since has written articles about the later transitions.

Henry gives high marks to the early preparations of Carter and his staff. "He's doing all the things I would have suggested and some of the things I wouldn't have thought of," he said in a telephone interview with Congressional Quarterly Nov. 15.

Among the factors Henry singled out for praise were the large size of Carter's transition planning staff, its separation from the campaign operation and its ability to move quickly after the election. The initial Ford and Carter statements, he said, were "letter-perfect in setting the tone for transition."

Henry expressed interest but no surprise in reports of tension between Watson and Hamilton Jordan, Carter's campaign director. (The reports were denied by both men.) A President-elect, Henry observed, makes a mistake if he does not realize that the kinds of people who run his campaign are not necessarily the kinds of people he wants to run his administration. One of Henry's concerns, he said, is whether, in the long run, "they can really achieve an amalgamation."

Although Carter ran an anti-Washington campaign, he concluded it on a conciliatory note toward the career civil service in a speech at Alexandria, Va., a few days before the election. Henry said Carter's comments were well-advised, because his administration will need help from the career employees who keep their jobs regardless of administration.

Johnson-Nixon

Over the years, presidential transition has been a frequently slapdash process. Only in 1964, for example, with enactment of the Presidential Transition Act (PL 88-277), have federal funds been authorized to pay for the shifts of power. The 1964 act authorized $900,000.

The law was first put to use during the 1968-69 interregnum between the administrations of the retiring Lyndon B. Johnson and Nixon. Despite a few friction points, the changeover went quite smoothly. The departing Democrat and the incoming Republican achieved a solid working relationship, agreeing to consult one another during the interim and taking a realistic approach to the gap between Johnson's legal authority and Nixon's actual power.

Nixon was aided by Johnson's role as a retiree rather than a defeated incumbent. "It's easier to be a good loser than a good winner," said Henry. "It's easier for the guy going out to take a cooperative line than for the guy coming in to take advantage of it."

The Vietnam War also helped bring the two men together. The war, and Johnson's failure to end it, had driven him from office. Nixon had supported Johnson's efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement. Johnson reciprocated by doing all he could to ensure a smooth transition.


Truman


Eisenhower

At the Inauguration, Homburgs, Not Top Hats


Johnson


Nixon

Cooperation in Return for Policy Support

Truman-Eisenhower

The fairly cordial relationship between Nixon and Johnson was in marked contrast to the one between Democrat Harry S Truman and Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952-53. Then the war was in Korea. Truman, his popularity at a low ebb, had announced early in 1952 that he would not seek a second full term.

But the campaign was bitter, not conciliatory. Truman attacked Eisenhower, who took the attacks as assaults on his personal integrity. The Republicans attacked Truman and the Democrats as the forces of "communism, corruption and Korea." The hapless Democratic nominee, Adlai E. Stevenson, was swamped by the popular former war hero. The people liked Ike.

Eisenhower had promised, as part of his campaign, to visit Korea if elected. Truman was prompted to write Eisenhower one of his famous hand-written letters when the general refused to meet with him to discuss foreign policy. "Partisan politics," Truman wrote, "should stop at the boundaries of the United States. I'm extremely sorry that you have allowed a bunch of screwballs to come between us."

Despite their differences, Truman tried earnestly to smooth out the shift of power. He ordered his Cabinet officers and department heads to cooperate fully with Eisenhower's transition staff.

Coolness persisted to the end. The Trumans felt snubbed when the Eisenhowers did not come into the White House when they arrived for the ride to the Capitol. Truman favored the traditional silk top hats for the swearing-in; Eisenhower preferred homburgs. They wore homburgs.

Eisenhower-Kennedy

Eisenhower was the first President limited to two terms by the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution. At the end of his eight years in office, he greeted Democrat John F. Kennedy at the White House with military bands and an honor guard.

The transition was a smooth one. Kennedy made a point of starting his term on a rancor-free note by paying a courtesy call on the defeated Nixon immediately after the election.

While the campaign was in progress, a Brookings Institution study was under way, leading to the 1964 law that removed transition costs from the pocketbooks of influential contributors and placed the responsibility on the federal Treasury. —*By Mercer Cross and David Speights*

The Reagan Team Comes to Washington, Ready to Get Off to a Running Start

Where Jimmy Carter kept his transition and campaign staffs separate, the leaders of Ronald Reagan's well-organized transition staff were part of the campaign.

BY DICK KIRSCHTEN

The making of the Reagan presidency is proceeding apace under tight discipline and careful planning that would be the envy of any efficiency-minded corporate manager.

Now that the election is over and the spoils of victory—government positions of power and prestige—are near at hand, one might expect friction and fractiousness to surface among the ambitious and not necessarily like-minded supporters of the President-elect.

Competition for Ronald Reagan's favor among both seekers of jobs and sellers of ideas is, to be sure, running at fever pitch, as always when there is a new Administration to be put together. But the architects of the winning Republican's transition to the White House have so far clamped a tight lid on outward signs of clamor or disorder.

The decisions of the next few weeks, with respect to both personnel and policy initiatives will be crucial to the success of Reagan's expressed desire to change the government's course sharply to the philosophical right. When he takes office on Jan. 20, he will be riding the crest of a broad electoral mandate that also put in power the most conservative Congress elected in many years.

A key goal of the Reagan transition period will be to prepare a direct assault on the spending plans for this year and next that he will inherit from the Carter Administration. The incoming Republicans hope to move quickly to demonstrate their determination to reduce government spending in the aggregate, yet at the same time add funds for "quick fixes" in what they see as the nation's lagging national security posture.

These goals require that some very tough budgetary decisions be made in a relatively short period. Accordingly, Reagan has said he will waste little time in filling key Administration positions and hopes to have completed his Cabinet selections by Dec. 1 if not sooner.

In making the judgments of the transition period, Reagan will follow a path that contrasts sharply in several respects with that followed by Jimmy Carter four years ago.

Both Reagan and Carter began to draft plans for their Administrations long before their victories were assured and, once elected, both qualified for $2 million in federal funds to cover transition costs—the first two Presidents-elect to receive such aid. There, however, the similarities end.

Reagan's pre-election planning for the transition was carried out under the control and management of advisers who clearly were part of the campaign's command hierarchy. In 1976, Carter established separate campaign and transition staffs, and the members of both groups fell into open rivalry and ill feeling when the time came to vie for choice jobs in the incoming Administration.

Another contrast between 1976 and 1980: partly by design and partly because the Democrats had been out of power for eight years, Carter, who gloried in campaigning as an "outsider," managed to insulate himself almost totally from advisers who knew what the inside of the White House looked like, much less what it was like to work there. Not so with Reagan, whose transition team includes an ample supply of veterans of the Nixon and Ford Administrations.

Finally, one of the most immediate results of the 1976 Carter transition was an early and violent collision with congressional sensibilities, especially in the new President's sudden attempt to yank the funds out from under a group of major water projects. A conspicuous feature in the 1980 Reagan transition structure is a congressional advisory group charged with opening channels of communication with Capitol Hill to avoid the rude shocks that Carter generated during his first months in office.

TRANSITION HIERARCHY

At first blush, the organizational structure of the Reagan team appears needlessly complex and overloaded. In addition to a director and three senior transition advisers—one each for budget, domestic issues and foreign policy—it includes a half-dozen deputy directors and, at the top of the pyramid, a transition executive committee.

Yet, in the light of the Carter transition's unclear lines of authority and Reagan's reputed penchant for delegating authority for all but the most important decisions, the complicated transition hierarchy begins to make sense. It also deals with some of the tensions and potential problems within the Reagan advisory family itself.

Most obviously, the transition structure maintains the chain of command that was established, after some early disorder, in the Reagan campaign organization. On the surface, at least, if offers no cause for any noses to be out of joint.

Campaign director William J. Casey remains at the top of the organizational heap in his new role as chairman of the transition executive committee. Campaign co-chairwoman Anne L. Armstrong holds the same title on the new executive group.

Reagan's close friend, Sen. Paul Laxalt, R-Nev., who served as campaign chairman, was a natural to fill the role of chairman of the transition's congressional advisory group. Edwin Meese III, who was Reagan's chief of staff in the California State Capitol and is likely to play that same role in the White House, has the main responsibility for running the transition operation. Meese was in charge of issues and research during the campaign and has now taken over as transition director.

Three senior transition advisers are to exercise broad oversight and coordinating responsibility: Richard V. Allen for foreign affairs and national security, Martin Anderson for domestic and economic issues and Caspar W. Weinberger for budget and management. All three served in the Nixon Administration, and Weinberger was California's finance director during Reagan's governorship.

Keeping his campaign team intact, Reagan has named seven deputy directors of the transition. They are James A. Baker, Michael K. Deaver, Drew Lewis, Franklyn (Lyn) Nofziger, Verne Orr, William E. Timmons and Richard B. Wirthlin. Nofziger, who will accompany the President-elect during the transition, will remain the chief press spokesman during that period. James S. Brady will head the press office at the transition headquarters in Washington.

Wirthlin, the top polling expert in the Reagan campaign, reportedly is drafting a "black book" on the strategy of governing for use of the transition staff. He was the author of a similar strategy document used in the campaign.

As a group, the transition leaders bridge the gap between Reagan's core of conservative support, which includes national security hardliners such as Allen and the more moderate Republicans, such as Timmons and Baker, who have close ties to Ford. The inclusion of Baker, who earlier in the year headed the Bush for President Committee, also provides a show of solidarity between Reagan and Vice President-elect George Bush.

The decision to retain Allen in a prominent transition role was a sensitive call. Reagan declared that the security adviser has a clean bill of health with respect to recent charges of improprieties in his dealings as a private representative of foreign interests. Rumors persist, however, that Reagan was simply buying time and that Allen may not be given a post in the new Administration.

Reagan has also retained E. Pendleton James, an executive talent scout from Los Angeles, to help recruit and screen candidates for the roughly 2,500 political job slots throughout the federal bureaucracy that the new President will get to fill.

With assistance from Helene Von Damm, Reagan's longtime executive secretary, James has been at work for a month preparing for the onslaught of resumes and job applications that already have begun to pour in.

A major transition role will be played by Timmons, who heads an office of executive branch management. Reporting to him will be the directors of five working groups, designated by "issue clusters," that will field small teams of analysts who will be located in each of the federal agencies. These teams will assess and report on policy initiatives, budgetary questions, personnel needs, current legislative agendas and possible executive orders.

The five group directors are David M. Abshire (national security), Stanton D. Anderson (economic affairs), Elizabeth H. Dole (human services), Richard Fairbanks (resources and development) and Loren A. Smith (legal and administrative agencies).

Anderson, an international lawyer, was a special assistant to Nixon and later a deputy assistant secretary of State. Abshire, chairman of Georgetown University's center for Strategic and International Studies, was assistant secretary of State from 1970-73. Dole, a former member of the Federal Trade Commission, served in the Nixon Administration as a consumer affairs adviser. She is the wife of Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kan.

Fairbanks, a Washington attorney, was associate director of the Domestic Council for natural resources, energy and environment during the Ford Administration. Smith, an associate professor of constitutional law at Widener University, served as counsel to the Reagan campaign committee.

Timmons's staff will include Frank A. Whetstone (senior adviser), Stanley Ebner (coordinator) and John M. Nugent (assistant). Whetstone is a businessman and GOP activist from Cut Bank, Mont. Ebner is a corporate vice president of Northrop Corp. and former general counsel of the Office of Management and Budget during the Nixon Administration. Nugent is a business associate of Timmons.

EARLY PLANNING

Reagan decided a long time ago that he wanted to hit the ground running when he entered the White House. He said as much on April 18, even before he had the GOP nomination sewn up, when he met in Washington with a group of almost 70 defense and foreign policy advisers.

A participant in that meeting, William R. Graham, an engineer with a California defense consulting firm, said Reagan asked the advisers to develop specific policy and budget recommendations for use in the first 100 days of his Administration. "He said he didn't want a six-month period of trying to get organized," Graham recalled.

Under Allen's coordination, the advisers, eventually numbering 132, were divided into 25 working groups. University of Southern California international relations professor William R. Van Cleave headed up the national security study panels with assistance from retired

The Higher-Ups on Reagan's Transition Team

As director of President-elect Reagan's transition team, Edwin Meese III (far right) will work through three senior advisers. They are (from left) Richard V. Allen, Martin Anderson and Caspar W. Weinberger.

Lt. Gen. Edward Rowny, who had resigned from the Carter Administration's strategic arms limitation negotiating team to protest concessions to the Soviets. Reagan's foreign policy advisers worked under the direction of Fred C. Ikle, whom Nixon had chosen to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

After the Republican convention in July, a similar planning effort was launched in the area of economic and domestic issues. Anderson, a former special assistant in the Nixon White House who pushed for the concept of the all-volunteer Army, played a leading role in bringing together 329 prominent advisers to serve on 23 task forces. He was assisted by Darrell M. Trent, a colleague on the staff of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University.

Roughly a month before the election, the Reagan forces established a separate corporation for transition purposes that was eligible under the federal election law to receive contributions that would not be counted as campaign gifts. In 1976, Carter used campaign funds to finance his pre-election transition planning operation in Atlanta.

The new Reagan corporation, the Presidential Transition Trust, opened shop in Alexandria, Va., in quarters formerly occupied by the Bush presidential campaign. James and Von Damm operated out of this location, getting a head start on the development of procedures for handling the expected task of doling out federal patronage jobs.

In the meantime, Meese had called upon a Washington attorney, Peter McPherson, to find office space in the capital for 250 or more transition employees expected to move into action after the election. McPherson obtained seven floors of a downtown office building, and on Nov. 4, as the voters were going to the polls, the telephone company had already begun installing phones for the confident Republicans.

Carter moved quickly on Nov. 5 to designate White House chief of staff Jack H. Watson Jr. as liaison to the incoming Reagan forces. Watson, who had been Carter's transition director four years ago, has asked each federal agency to name a top-level official to work with the counterparts who are to be designated within the Republican transition team.

ADVISORY NETWORKS

The magnitude of Reagan's electoral mandate and his party's unexpected capture of the Senate suggests that the climate is ripe for testing the theories of political scholars who believe that the Democratic liberalism of the New Deal era has run its course. Not surprisingly, a great many Reagan advisers have been recruited from centers of conservative scholarship.

Reagan met last April with his defense and foreign policy advisers at Washington's plush International Club, which is located in the same building as the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, a fertile source of advice for the Reagan camp. A spokesman for the Georgetown center listed a half-dozen associates who have, on their own time, assisted the Reagan effort to address important issues that will face the new Administration.

Similarly by happenstance, the Reagan transition staff is being housed in a building next door to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, another center of conservative scholarship and source of Reagan advisers.

On the West Coast, the Hoover Institution is a leading source of Reagan advisory talent. Besides Anderson and Trent, the institution has supplied assistance from its director, W. Glenn Campbell, and its associate director, Richard T. Burress.

Another rich source of information and proposals for action is the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank located on Capitol Hill that has strong ties to Republican Members of Congress and their staffs. The foundation has undertaken an extensive study of steps that might be taken by a conservative Administration. This work was carried out independently of the Reagan advisory apparatus but made available to the new Republican transition team.

The aerospace and defense industries also have provided a network of advisers for the Reagan team. In many instances, industry engineers and scientists also have Defense Department backgrounds. *(See this issue, pp. 1950-51.)*

No matter how carefully it is put together, the Reagan transition team faces a monumental task as it prepares to deal with the issues that the new President will face.

LOOKING TOWARD JAN. 20

No matter how carefully it is put together, the Reagan transition team faces a monumental task as it prepares to deal with the issues that the new President will face. As a candidate, Reagan suggested an ambitious agenda of tax cuts, general spending reductions and beefed-up defense spending—along with a firm commitment to balancing the budget.

While the new Congress promises to be relatively sympathetic, the relationship between the White House and Capitol Hill seldom is a smooth one. Reagan's transition advisers certainly seem sensitive to that. In addition to setting up the congressional liaison group during the transition, Reagan also included two Democratic and two Republican Senators on the interim foreign policy advisory committee that he formed to track international developments between the election and the inauguration: Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, who is likely to be Majority Leader next year; John Tower, R-Texas, slated to be chairman of the Armed Services Committee; Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., and Richard (Dick) Stone, D-Fla., who was defeated for reelection in his state's primary.

The bipartisan makeup of the interim group has been taken by some as a signal that Reagan may seek to include at least a few Democrats in key spots in his Administration. The selection of a Cabinet, as well as a team of top White House aides, is the first order of business for the transition officials.

Once the Cabinet is named, there comes the delicate task of selecting the top echelon of sub-Cabinet officials. This clearly must be done in consultation with the designated Cabinet officers, but as the Carter Administration found out the hard way, the President-elect must also have a strong hand in those selections. The Carter White House discovered to its regret that it did not know some of its key sub-Cabinet officers very well in the early days of the Administration.

If Reagan is to charge off to the fast start that he has promised, with legislative proposals to amend the 1981 budget and to second-guess Carter's 1982 budget, he will need to have a well-coordinated and finely tuned team working for him. The transition period is only 11 weeks long, and there is much to be done, including the preparation of Reagan's inaugural speech. Some advisers have hinted that Reagan might also wish to deliver his own State of the Union speech in late January—following the one that Carter delivers.

Ed Meese and his associates have a formidable task to perform. But they are riding the crest of a formidable mandate. □

The Other Side of the Transition—Leaving Office Isn't As Much Fun

The Carter Administration seems to be doing its best to prepare President-elect Reagan's transition advisers for the day when they will be running the government.

BY DOM BONAFEDE

With the change in Administrations, all eyes turn to the victors. During the two and a half months of the transition, they dominate the national stage and their every move is perceived as a harbinger. The interregnum serves as both a time for them to design and tool up their Administration and for the country to get to know the people who will manage the government for the next four years.

Almost forgotten is the other side of the transition: the outgoing Administration that tries to complete as much business as possible, assist its successor in settling in and await the judgment of history. The change is immediate, profound and sad: defeat suggests failure. Losing a presidential election may not be like death, but it surely marks the irrevocable end of an Administration with all of its promise.

The transfer of constitutional authority in the United States has only since the end of World War II been recognized as a vital aspect of presidential government. Previously, the reins were exchanged in a catch-as-catch-can fashion, with no formal interaction to help prepare the incoming Administration to take command immediately after the inauguration. But the shocking disclosure that Harry S Truman had not been apprised of the atomic bomb while serving as Vice President underscored the gap in presidential preparation.

President Eisenhower set a precedent by twice inviting John F. Kennedy to the White House to confer with him and offer guidance. Eisenhower further consented to place Kennedy transition aides on the payroll of various departments and agencies.

Recognizing the need for an orderly and educational interlude, Congress now authorizes $3 million for a presidential transition—$2 million for the President-elect and his advisers and $1 million for the outgoing President and Vice President. As a Reagan spokesman facetiously yet aptly observed, "First prize is $2 million; second prize is $1 million."

Following his defeat for reelection, President Carter set the tone for his lame-duck Administration by promising "the best transition that's ever taken place in history." He directed government officials to cooperate to the fullest with Reagan representatives. Noting the response to the President's directive, a sub-Cabinet official recently remarked, "Everybody is behaving like gentlemen. That's the way it should be."

There is little evidence that Carter's wishes aren't being generally followed.

Although he has no formal role in the transition, Hamilton Jordan, Carter's senior adviser and former campaign director, observed, "Everybody has a stake in assisting the new President." Jordan, who was scheduled to hold substantive discussions on White House operations with Edwin Meese III, counselor to the President-elect, and James A. Baker III, incoming White House chief of staff, said, "I intend to be as gracious and helpful to the Reagan people as President Ford's people were to us." *(See this issue, p. 2183.)*

Jack H. Watson Jr., the current White House chief of staff who managed Carter's incoming transition and is now in charge of his outgoing transition, said it is "going well. I have instructed all agencies not to drown the incoming folks with mountains of paper, to give them practical information and insights useful for early decisions they will have to make. I want them to be forthcoming and instructive, to literally 'do unto them as you would have them do unto you.' And I want them to point out the mistakes they have made so perhaps they won't be repeated."

Meanwhile, almost every office in the White House is crowded with boxes jammed with papers, memoranda and official documents, which cannot be removed by presidential aides without Carter's approval. This is the last year that papers generated by the Executive Office of the President are legally considered the President's property. The 1978 Presidential Records Act requires that at the end of the next Administration, White House papers belong to the government.

The President's chief counsel, Lloyd N. Cutler, and his deputy, Michael H. Cardozo, defined the legal options available to Carter. "He made the decisions regarding the removal of the papers and they were outlined in a memo sent to the White House staff," Cardozo said.

THE PERSONAL SIDE

The transition takes place on two levels, one involving the operations of the Executive Office and various departments and agencies, and another dealing with policy and decision-making processes.

Constitutionally, the defeated incumbent remains the President, with all the powers accorded him under law, until Inauguration Day. He is the commander-in-chief and head of the executive bureaucracy. He still has the authority to make appointments, grant reprieves and pardons and meet with foreign delegates. He continues to have the responsibility to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." And in the event of a threat to national security, he is empowered to ask Congress to commit U.S. troops or, if need be, declare war.

But during this interlude, the outgoing President possesses considerably less political clout. He holds the levers of government but wields real power mainly as a contingency. In practice, he is relegated to a paper presidency. And he shares the public spotlight with his successor as the news media, fickle in their choice of heroes, abruptly turn their attention away from him to the President-elect.

In Carter's case, it is even debatable whether he will be the leader of his own party after he leaves office.

These ambiguities in the transfer of presidential power are difficult for some foreign leaders to understand, particularly those of totalitarian regimes. In the view of numerous observers, the fact that the U.S. government appears to be in a state of suspension may have contributed to the Soviet Union's covetous probing into Polish affairs. Accordingly, the White House, President-elect Reagan and Senate Republican leaders have signaled the Soviets that the basic structure, policies and principles of the government remain intact during the shift of Administrations from Democratic to Republican.

Still another hidden side of the transition is the personal element. This is immediately reflected in the ambience within the White House proper. Suddenly, the sense of urgency fades, almost as if the human electricity had been cut off.

There is still presidential work to be done, but while the desire may be there, the spirit and will are lacking. Morale is deflated. Inner rage at the reversal of fate is replaced with attempts at sardonic humor. Remarked a White House official, "Someone the other day was comparing Carter with Millard Fillmore, and I told him that was doing an injustice to Fillmore."

Presidential aides and appointed Administration officials are being forced to endure withdrawal pains. Formerly wooed, courted and sought after, they promptly become the "outs." The invitations stop arriving, the phones ring less often and time, of which there had been so little before, seems to stand still. There is a lot of gazing out of windows and attempts to distill the last few moments of an experience that, for many, will be the highlight of their lives.

Normally, the mental clock of the White House is set for the present. But overnight, members of the President's staff have switched their concerns to yesterday—pondering what went wrong—and to tomorrow—wondering how they will go on professionally and socially. Their sense of loss is exacerbated by its contrast with the euphoria and confidence exuded by their successors, busy with ambitious plans.

Musing on the changes, Harrison Wellford, executive associate director of the Office of Management and Budget, said: "There is a lot of graveyard humor. Your attention span is short and there is a general air of distraction. You find yourself replaying the battles of the last four years as you try to cope with your current work. Thoughts simmer; you start looking to your own future and the future of the party. . . .

"You sense that when you meet with the Reagan people, they are thinking, 'If you're so wise, how come we're replacing you?' At the same time, you feel they have one eye on the rug and the drapes and are planning where they are going to place photographs of their family and how they are going to rearrange the furniture."

Wellford, who maintains a proper lawyer's stolid facade, recalled that "I used to wake up and read *The Washington Post* and my wife would say I'd average four or five 'Oh, my Gods!' Now, I'm interested but don't feel personally involved."

TRANSITION NETWORK

Carter's transition organization resembles a huge web within the federal bureaucracy. At the center is Watson, who has over-all responsibility for the operation. Assisting him are White House staff director Alonzo L. McDonald and his deputy, Michael Rowny; they are transition coordinators for the White House Office and other units of the presidential complex. Wellford is charged with the supervision of transition efforts beyond the Executive Office of the President, covering about 40 departments and agencies.

Other White House transition contacts include Hugh Carter Jr. for administration, Ray Jenkins and Rex Granum for press operations and Richard Moe for the Vice President's office.

All departments and major agencies have officially designated transition officers who have counterparts in the Reagan organization. "There are dozens and dozens of teams spaced far and wide throughout the government," Wellford said. Still others may be appointed as the transition progresses.

The President-elect's representatives have been allocated working space in appropriate federal buildings and provided "modest support services." But the White House's generosity did not extend to agreeing to a request to put Reagan transition officers on the federal payroll as consultants. "The Administration would have had to pay for it out of the general funds," Wellford explained.

Since the bilateral transition network was established on Nov. 12, Watson has periodically met with Meese and Baker and, on at least one occasion, with Richard B. Wirthlin, the California pollster who worked on Reagan's campaign and is expected to serve the new President in a capacity similar to that of Patrick H. Caddell in the Carter Administration, and William J. Casey, Reagan's campaign director who has been named to head the Central Intelligence Agency.

"The meetings basically centered on the organization, staffing and operations of the White House and what we might have done differently in a second term," Watson said. At one session, he gave Meese a briefing book on the Executive Office. The Reagan aides, he said, were also interested in the working relationship between the White House and officials in the departments and agencies.

Watson requires his transition aides

Some Members of the Carter Team Helping Out in the Transition

Senior adviser and political aide Hamilton Jordan: "I intend to be as gracious and helpful to the Reagan people as President Ford's people were to us."

Domestic policy aide David M. Rubenstein drew up a list of actions that will have to be taken by Reagan shortly after he assumes the presidency.

OMB's Harrison Wellford: "We've generally had good experience in dealing with the Reagan people. . . . But there have been some difficulties."

Chief of staff Jack H. Watson Jr., who is in charge of Carter's transition: "I want [the agencies] to be forthcoming and instructive."

to report to him twice each month. "I want to have a reliable chronicle of exactly how the transition is proceeding for historical purposes and be able to assess direct accountability for the President," he said.

For the most part, the initial transition phase involved the transfer of information on logistics and housekeeping matters. Reported David M. Rubenstein, deputy assistant for domestic affairs and policy, "We had to draft a memorandum which included such things as our budget, our physical facilities, the number of slots we have, our individual areas of responsibility, the statutes under which we operate and the office secretaries who are willing to stay on."

Not until well into December were in-depth discussions held between Stuart E. Eizenstat, Carter's assistant for domestic affairs and policy, and Martin Anderson, Reagan's chief domestic policy adviser, or between Zbigniew Brzezinski, assistant for national security affairs, and Richard V. Allen, the President-elect's foreign policy adviser.

There has also been a delay in the press area. A goodwill session between White House press secretary Jody Powell and a few Reagan emissaries and the drafting of an introductory memo represented the only real dialogue as of the middle of December.

"We're available," Granum said. "The holdup is because they haven't appointed a press secretary."

Wellford has set up a "hot-line" arrangement between his quarters in the Old Executive Office Building and the Reagan transition office of William E. Timmons, a Washington political consultant and former White House lobbyist who is in charge of putting together the President-elect's executive branch organization.

"This serves as sort of the control center for the transition," Wellford said. "We've generally had good experience in dealing with the Reagan people. Timmons has been around for a long time and has a feeling for the culture and pace of government. But there have been some difficulties."

For example, he said, "before they send teams in, they are supposed to give an official list to us and to the agency. Sometimes they get behind and fail to notify us as to who is authorized to act for them.

"There have been a number of imposters who have only a faint connection with the Reagan organization. They'll call an agency and request a briefing and sometimes they'll be given one from unsuspecting, lower-ranking officials in the agency. Mostly, these are people who may be on a list of prospective Reagan appointments or who are simply going around posing as potential appointees and want to appear knowledgeable in their field in hopes of getting a job."

From a distance, it appears that like so much at the federal level, the transition has become big, complicated and over-structured. Not including scores of voluntary advisers, Reagan has almost 250 transition workers, compared to 135 for Carter in 1976. Watson conceded, "There is no way I could monitor every single judgment transmitted."

DECISIONS

One of the most important—and delicate—aspects of the transition operation concerns an array of executive and legislative decisions that have to be made at the White House level during and shortly after the interlude. The Carter White House appears to be of two minds on the matter.

Following the announcement of the establishment of the transition groups, Watson said that Carter had agreed to defer action on major policy questions and appointments for the remainder of his term.

But at a meeting with reporters the same day, Carter took a less deferential position: "Obviously, we'll try to accommodate Gov. Reagan as much as we can, but the ultimate judgment about what I do and what I don't do will have to be made by me unilaterally."

On subsequent occasions, Carter made it clear that he is still President until Inauguration Day.

More recently, a presidential aide reported, "efforts are being made to provide the Reagan group with early warning for decisions that have to be taken in the six months after Jan. 20. However, we're not sympathetic to involving them in decisions before Jan. 20. Our rule on that is the government goes on until then. The exceptions cover foreign policy and budgetary matters, which may be reviewed in consultation."

Wellford reported that an agreement

had been worked out to allow the Reagan forces to make supplemental adjustments to the fiscal 1981 budget the week after Christmas. At the same time, they will be given access to data on the 1982 budget. "That is sooner than we got it" in 1976, Wellford said. *(See this issue, p. 2152.)*

As drawn up by Rubenstein, a list of domestic policy actions that will have to be taken by Reagan shortly after he assumes the presidency includes the preparation of responses to reports that will be issued by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, the National Commission on Social Security and the President's Commission on Pension Policy.

The new President must also determine whether to accept or try to short-circuit several regulatory measures due to be released during the early weeks of his Administration. These include proposed Environmental Protection Agency air quality regulations, Transportation Department fuel economy standards and labeling standards devised by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Reagan will also eventually have to make decisions on recommended pay increases for senior officials in the three branches of government. The increases have already been calibrated in the 1982 budget, which means Reagan will have to amend the budget if he is opposed to the salary boost or work for its approval if he supports it. Either way, it could spell trouble for him. *(See this issue, p. 2152.)*

The second involves the military draft registration that is scheduled to come up for renewal on Jan. 5. Carter could simply leave the matter up to Reagan, who said during the campaign that he opposed registration.

All in all, it seems evident that while the Carter Administration is eager to cooperate with Reagan on questions involving the national interest, it is not eager to go out of its way for him on political matters.

Reagan aides, for example, clashed with the Carter Administration on several issues that could make it tougher to cut the budget when they occupy the White House: the recent $2.1 billion settlement with Penn Central Co. creditors and the proposed expenditure of billions of dollars for synthetic fuel projects. "They clearly wanted to make the decisions themselves," Rubenstein said.

APPOINTMENTS

Soon after the Nov. 4 election, reports circulated in Washington that Carter was planning to take advantage of his lame-duck status by appointing political favorites to government jobs and using his leverage to transfer presidential and other political appointees to career positions. Carter spokesmen vigorously deny the allegations.

They maintain that Carter is making only routine appointments, naming members of boards and commissions and promoting career diplomats to ambassadorships, almost all of whom automatically gain Senate confirmation. "If the President wanted to make an appointment which might create a problem, he would first consult with the Senate leadership," Watson said.

"Only appointments that have bipartisan support are being made," Wellford stated. "We've asked that the agency heads give special reviews of the needs of non-career appointees who want to move into career slots, based on individual merit and as long as they meet [Office of Personnel Management] criteria. It's been a fairly difficult hurdle and there has been little movement."

Arnold Miller, director of the Presidential Personnel Office, estimated that Carter has made about 75 appointments to vacancies on advisory boards and commissions since the election, not an unusually high rate.

But Miller was bitter in his condemnation of the purported treatment by the Office of Personnel Management of political appointees. He accused the office of going out of its way to discriminate against people who once had career jobs, then accepted promotions to political posts and now want to go back to civil service status.

"Most of the political appointees want to leave, but others have developed expertise and feel they have something to offer and want to remain," Miller said. "If qualified, they ought to be considered on their merits; if not qualified, they should not be in government. But they should not be discriminated against because they are political appointees."

He said he has seen the office memoranda that discourage the agencies from retaining political appointees.

WEIGHING THE BENEFITS

With all the fanfare, elaborate superstructures and courtly negotiations, it remains uncertain whether the transition is beneficial to incoming Administration officials.

"I listened to what Dick Cheney [President Ford's White House chief of staff and now a Member of the House from Wyoming] had to say, but I wish I had listened harder," remarked Hamilton Jordan.

"It depends on the advice," said John O. Marsh Jr., director of the transition for the Ford Administration in 1976, in an interview. "My own feeling is that advice regarding administration, organization, staffing and operational functions can be helpful. I believe the Carter people benefited from it. But on policy, they pick and choose. I don't fault them for that; each Administration has the right to determine its own issues and priorities."

Referring to the President-elect's transition officials, a Carter aide said: "They really haven't asked us for our advice or what we think of some of their ideas, such as the so-called super Cabinet. There is no reason why they should, I guess."

There is still work to be done at the Carter White House, but while the desire may be there, the spirit and will are lacking. Morale is deflated. Inner rage at the reversal of fate is replaced with sardonic humor. Said a White House official, "Someone the other day was comparing Carter with Millard Fillmore, and I told him he was doing an injustice to Fillmore."

Carter staffers expressed adverse opinions on what one called Reagan's "exotic plans" for redesigning the White House decision-making structure.

"They will find that things are more complicated and not so easily given to facile solutions as they indicated in the campaign," another Carter Administration aide said. "There is a tendency to reinvent the wheel every four years before you discover the fundamental truth of what will work and will not work. Some things you are not going to believe until you experience them yourself."

On the Reagan side, Baker said he was told by a high-ranking Carter adviser that "we'd be crazy if we didn't increase the size of the White House staff." Ironically, it was President Carter who promised to preside over a small White House staff.

If nothing else, the presidential transition tends to reaffirm faith in the U.S. political process. In few other countries of the world is power passed from one hand to another with such mutual assistance, and without physical or spiritual violence. □

Good Marks and Rough Spots:

Presidential Transition Offers Insights Into Character, Style Of Reagan Administration

Presidential transitions may represent "a triumph of hope over experience," in the phrase that Dr. Samuel Johnson, the 18th century British wit, once applied to second marriages.

Expectations run high during the transition and criticism usually is muted while the president-elect and the federal government adjust to the prospect of living together.

Now, more than halfway through the 11 weeks between the election and the Jan. 20 inauguration, President-elect Reagan's transition operation appears to be "doing a lot of things right," according to Stephen Hess, a scholar of the presidency at the Brookings Institution, the liberal Washington think tank. Hess said that the Reagan team's effort to work simultaneously on "policy, process and personnel" is an admirable departure from the job scramble that has dominated past transitions.

There have been rough spots, however. Whether these are inevitable snags in a new and complex undertaking or deep, lasting flaws will become apparent only in retrospect.

Nevertheless, past transitions gave the nation a first taste of presidential style.

For example, President Carter's insistence on mastering details of federal programs was foreshadowed by his deep involvement in his transition. He spent long days poring over briefing books and scoured the country by telephone for candidates for government posts. Reagan, by contrast, appears remote from the operation that sprang up in Washington after his election, though top aides insist he is in full charge of important decisions.

Early Indications

Reagan's first round of Cabinet appointments brought approval from the nation's business community and moderate Republicans. But later choices, such as those of Alexander M. Haig Jr. as secretary of state and James G. Watt as secretary of the interior, promise substantial controversy during the Senate confirmation process. *(Cabinet appointments, p. 3649)*

Other features of the Reagan transition that have drawn critical comments are:

- The contrast between Reagan's objections to massive, expensive government and the fact that his transition is the largest and costliest ever.
- A proliferation of statements by Reagan advisers and groups on important foreign affairs, economic and military issues. The number of people appearing to speak on behalf of the president-elect is far greater than in previous transitions, and their significance is uncertain because transition officials such as Washington press secretary James Brady sometimes disavow their statements.
- A sprinkling of controversial transition appointments, such as Cleveland Teamsters Union official Jackie Presser, who is being sued by the Labor Department for alleged "imprudent use" of Teamster pension and welfare funds.
- Suggestions by Carter administration officials that some Reagan staffers now working in federal departments could have conflicts of interest.
- The questions about how much control Reagan himself exercises over the process of staffing the administration and developing its policies.

Washington veterans warn against making too much of these phenomena. For instance, attorney Clark M. Clifford, adviser to presidents since Harry S Truman, thinks that "what people say" during this period "will be forgotten and gone" as the Reagan administration finds its footing.

Some political scientists believe it takes a year or more for any new administration to become fully functional.

Transition Tasks

Two tasks of any transition are to assure continuity in the federal government while seeking to instill "responsiveness of the government to the new political leadership," according to Laurin L. Henry, author of a respected Brookings Institution study, *Presidential Transitions.*

A third function is "care and feeding for the battle-scarred veterans of the campaign — a way of rewarding people," observes Harrison Wellford, executive associate director for reorganization and management at the Office of Management and Budget.

Wellford, who served in the Carter transition four years ago and is handling "nuts-and-bolts" details of this transition, added that the process also "gives you a chance to try out a lot of people."

The transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy was "quite smooth" and "didn't cost anything" beyond donated time.

—Clark M. Clifford,
Kennedy transition adviser

—By Elizabeth Wehr

The latter two functions partially explain the startling growth of transition activity in recent years, in the view of Hess and others.

Sandwiches and the Cabinet

Formally organized and federally funded transitions are a recent phenomenon. In a simpler time, President-elect Woodrow Wilson spent most of the months before Inauguration Day winding up his term as governor of New Jersey. Wilson picked potential Cabinet members while munching sandwiches with his close friend Col. Edward M. House.

"Much to the disgust of the reporters who badgered him daily," Henry wrote, Wilson refused to disclose his Cabinet until he introduced them at his swearing-in — a customary practice.

Twenty years later, an attempt at improving the process failed. Outgoing President Herbert Hoover sought unsuccessfully to draw President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt into joint action to stem the massive failures of the nation's banks during the four months between the November election and March inauguration. (The 20th Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1933, moved Inauguration Day to Jan. 20.) Roosevelt's resistance had severely strained relations between the two men by the time they rode to the Capitol for the inauguration.

Truman, who had been thrust unprepared into the job by Roosevelt's death, turned over budget and other information to Dwight D. Eisenhower. But the first clearly organized transition was the changeover from Eisenhower to John F. Kennedy in 1960.

The Kennedy Transition

In the summer of 1960, Kennedy asked Clifford to prepare a general memorandum on "fundamentals," as Clifford remembers. On the day after the election, Clifford sent off a 60- or 70-page guide, largely on governmental processes, to Kennedy and his "gang at Hyannisport." There also were a handful of "low-key, very small" groups preparing short issue reports after the election, and Clifford met daily with Eisenhower's White House chief of staff.

Cabinet announcements were handled with dispatch, Clifford said. The press was called to Kennedy's Georgetown house. Kennedy and the nominee would appear on the front step, and "the press would ask some questions. But it was kind of cold in December" so the queries didn't last long.

Clifford recalls that the transition was "quite smooth," and "didn't cost anything" beyond donated time.



In 1932, President Herbert Hoover sought unsuccessfully to draw President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt into joint action to stem massive bank failures. Roosevelt's resistance severely strained relations between the two men by the time they rode to the Capitol for the inauguration.

Cabinet nominees, once cleared by the FBI, were told to immediately "get an office in their department and start meeting with people there," Clifford said.

Several years later, Congress decided that the process should be institutionalized, and the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (PL 88-277) authorized $900,000 for expenses of incoming and outgoing administrations. *(1963 Almanac p. 405)*

In 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson collected the first of such funds — some $72,000, according to a 1977 General Accounting Office (GAO) report. In 1968, Richard M. Nixon's transition spent $450,000 in federal funds and an additional $1 million from private sources. Congressional amendments in 1976 (PL 94-499) raised the ceiling to the current $2 million for incoming administrations and $1 million for expenses of leaving office. *(1976 Almanac p. 519)*

Carter Transition

The increase in transition funding may have set up President Carter for some of his problems in office, according to Harvard Professor Richard E. Neustadt, who advised Truman, Kennedy, Johnson and Carter.

In a 1980 update of his classic study *Presidential Power*, Neustadt writes that the availability of generous transition funds ballooned the transition staff, setting the pattern for a larger White House than Carter had planned. Some 312 people were on that Carter transition payroll for varying periods, according to the 1977 GAO study. And his transition spent about $1.7 million of the $2 million provided by Congress.

In Neustadt's view, Carter underestimated how much the trend to a large White House staff, begun in his transition, would undermine his plan for a decentralized "Cabinet government" where policy would be made largely in the departments.

The 1976 transition also was deeply troubled by an internal power struggle between Jack H. Watson, who had been overseeing planning and policy development for Carter for months before the election, and Carter campaign operatives led by Hamilton Jordan.

Precious time was lost to jockeying for position, and "the inevitable triumph of the tried-and-true campaigners helped dilute the [Watson] planners' emphasis on governance," according to Neustadt. He concluded that "too many transitions like Carter's . . . might indeed make the presidency impossible."

Wellford concedes that the Carter transition was too large and that some of its work was not used. At the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, for example, Secretary Joseph A. Califano Jr. "just said 'thank you very much'" to the transition team and disregarded its recommendations, according to Wellford. But other transition recommendations, on civil service and regulatory reform, became the core of major Carter administration achievements, he said.

President-elect Woodrow Wilson picked potential Cabinet members while munching sandwiches with his close friend, Col. Edward M. House.

Reagan Transition

Reagan has avoided some of these pitfalls, according to Hess. His campaign staff moved smoothly into transition positions.

Another important difference is that Reagan's overall philosophy is clearer than Carter's was, and that has cut the internal power struggles. Carter picked strong-willed advocates from consumer, environmental and other public interest groups for many transition slots and permanent appointments. "These people each had very clear, competing agendas," while Carter was "ambiguous" on many policy questions, so "you had a lot of fighting for the heart and mind of the president," Hess observed.

Edwin Meese III, transition director and White House counselor-designate, has repeatedly said that loyalty to Reagan's philosophy is a first consideration in appointments.

And the transition has created an elaborate structure for sifting through policy recommendations and putting them in some order before moving them on to Reagan. The president-elect apparently sees his job as decision-maker, "not manager of the government, and frankly that's good," Hess said.

Size and Organization

Officially, there are about 450 people working on the Reagan transition. But transition officials believe that perhaps an equal number are working informally on behalf of the president-elect in various advisory roles. About 10 percent of the 450 are salaried. The rest are volunteers or are working on a "dollar-a-year" basis.

The cost of the whole operation has been estimated at $2.3 million to $3 million by Verne Orr, deputy director for administration at the transition.

"The dollar just doesn't buy what it did four years ago," laments Orr. But he noted that the size of the operation was to shrink Dec. 22, the day that final reports were due from some 25 transition teams working in federal departments and agencies.

This process of surveying existing programs and policies, headed by William Timmons, will provide both data and a ready-made staff for incoming Cabinet members, said John Nugent, Timmons' assistant.

The teams are "the nucleus of the staffs" for new department heads, according to Nugent. Transition officials have made no commitments to move the teams onto department payrolls after Inauguration Day, but their expertise and loyalty to Reagan's philosophy make them likely candidates for permanent appointments, Nugent said.

Another function of the teams stationed within the departments, according to transition official Darrell M. Trent, is to "freeze developing programs" that would not be in accord with Reagan's priorities.

Trent heads a new 30-member Office of Policy Coordination that has been receiving issue reports from a second group of 48 transition task forces that began work last summer. The group also is receiving reports from about 20 congressional task forces and a substantial amount of unsolicited advice, including a 20-volume study of the federal government by the very conservative Heritage Foundation.

From these, Trent's group will fashion an "overall program." This group's work will be moved through five general "issue chiefs" to senior policy advisers Martin C. Anderson, Caspar W. Weinberger and Richard V. Allen.

How the GOP platform fits into these deliberations is not clear. Trent called it a statement of "general [Republican] goals and objectives" but not "specifically the document of the standard-bearer of the party."

Trent declined to speculate on how much of the transition policy apparatus would be transferred to the Reagan White House. But these early efforts to process information and set priorities for the new president suggest that Reagan and his top advisers want sources independent of the permanent — and sometimes stubborn — federal bureaucracy.

Past presidents commonly complained of difficulties in impressing major new policies upon the federal apparatus. Truman recalled thinking that Eisenhower would say "'Do this! Do that!' *And nothing will happen.* Poor Ike — it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating," Truman wrote.

Staff

Carter relied largely on public interest groups and congressional staff members for his transition workers, many of whom were inexperienced in department management. Reagan workers within the departments generally are older and more established.

Hess and Wellford see more focus on information gathering and less preoccupation with sparring for jobs. "For this group, there aren't that many great government jobs," because they've already seen the government from the inside and because their present salaries in industry or law practices may be significantly higher, Hess remarked.

Because many of the Reagan people have worked either in or with the departments they are scrutinizing, the quality of information they produce may be more useful than that of the Carter transition, Hess speculates.

"The 'outs' have only been out for four years and now they're back in the departments, knowing how things work and where the bodies are buried," he said.

However, in the opinion of some Carter officials, the background of the Reaganites creates potential conflicts of interest. The volunteers and dollar-a-year workers are typically on the payrolls of companies that may have an interest in inside information on departmental contracts, regulations or lawsuits.

"We would never have sent defense contractors into the Department of Defense," remarked Wellford. By contrast, Ben Plymale, a Boeing Corp. vice president on the Defense transition team, has been a leading proponent of an expensive modernization of the Boeing-made Minuteman intercontinental missile — a project for which the original manufacturer would be the likely contractor. Plymale has been widely mentioned as a candidate for a top Pentagon post.

The Reagan group is "very" sensitive to conflict of interest problems, according to Nugent. Transition counsel Peter McPherson and staff lawyers are informing each transition worker of potential conflicts and telling them not to work on contracts or regulations where those conflicts lie.

Within the departments, however, transition team leaders have had considerable latitude in bringing on occasional consultants, or "helpers from their law offices, Senate staffs, whatever," reports one Carter official. Some of these have not gone through the official screening by the transition counsel's office so have not gotten the conflict of interest instructions.

Policy Pronouncements

When Roosevelt avoided Hoover's efforts to draw him into emergency action before his inauguration, he was acting in a well-established tradition. Wilson was conspicuously uninterested in a Mexican revolution that occurred after his election, even though rioting Mexicans sacked the U.S. Embassy and killed several Americans.

Later, in 1968, President Nixon explicitly stated that Johnson administration officials should be viewed as spokesmen also for the incoming Republicans in the ongoing Paris negotiations over Vietnam.

Reagan, too, has said he would not comment on issues until his inauguration. But his reputation for delegating authority has heightened interest in the opinions of those advising him. His views on various issues in the lame-duck session of Congress, such as the partial embargo on U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union, were solicited and given. Within days of Reagan's election, reports began surfacing on recommendations of various advisory groups on economics, health, environment, defense spending and other issues.

Carter's State Department has criticized "unofficial statements and news leaks" from the Reagan transition on foreign policy, particularly in Latin America. And Patricia M. Derian, assistant secretary of state for human rights, suggested to the Associated Press that certain "imprudent statements" of Reagan advisers had encouraged brutality and may have contributed to the recent murders in El Salvador of four American women, three of them Roman Catholic nuns.

Wellford speculates that these leaks may represent another version of jockeying for position in the new administration.

In 1976, Carter spent long days reading reports and huddled with his transition teams in Washington and Georgia. Wellford recalled that "when you realized that you had access to the president-elect and that he was intensely interested in what you did, you had less recourse to the newspaper."

Reagan has appeared distant from his Washington transition operation. For four days, Dec. 15-18, his California press schedule showed only that he would visit his barber, his tailor and a meat locker and that he would receive a Christmas tree.

But Meese has dismissed suggestions that Reagan is idling in California or uninterested in detail. And Trent says that Reagan's knowledgeable involvement at a major briefing session with his economic advisers in mid-November was typical of the president-elect: "He went through the report line by line. He is always very interested in the details of specific proposals."

New Reagan Advisers Named

President-elect Reagan Dec. 23 gave three of his most trusted campaign teammates top advisory positions on his White House staff. They are:

- Richard V. Allen, 44, assistant for national security affairs. Allen, who runs his own international business consulting firm, is known as a defense hard-liner. He handled foreign policy for President Nixon's 1968 campaign and briefly assisted Henry Kissinger at the National Security Council. The *Wall Street Journal* said earlier this year that he had had private dealings with the Japanese while a federal trade adviser in the 1970s. Allen refuted the charges, but left the Reagan camp for a week.
- Martin C. Anderson, 44, director of domestic policy development. An economist from the conservative Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Anderson is another Nixon White House veteran. He has pressed for a reduced federal role, particularly in welfare programs.
- Lyn Nofziger, 56, assistant to the president for political affairs. He has been part of every Reagan campaign since the first one in 1966. In 1980, he served as press secretary. His new post will include responsibility for keeping the White House in touch with the Republican National Committee and GOP congressional campaign committees.

Earlier, on Dec. 20, Reagan named Elizabeth Hanford Dole as his assistant for public liaison, a job that traditionally centers on women's and minority issues. Dole, a former Federal Trade Commissioner, is married to Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kansas. She was national voter chairman in the Reagan campaign and has been transition director of human services. *(Background, Weekly Report pp. 2913, 3394; Cabinet nominees, p. 3649)*

The Transition: Preparing for Next President

On the night of his landslide 1980 victory over President Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan told exuberant supporters: "There's never been a more humbling moment in my life."

One year from now, after the polls close and the votes are tabulated, a new president-elect will experience the same thrill of victory and the same awesome challenge of putting together a government in the 2½-month transition period before his inauguration.

Almost before the champagne goes flat, the new president must begin to fill roughly 3,000 key government positions and to create a budget that will lay the foundation for domestic and foreign policy during his first term. But his efforts may be hampered by the need to raise funds to cover transition-period costs and by competition with the outgoing president for use of government resources.

Congress twice has tried to ease the burden of transition costs. In 1964, it enacted a law (PL 88-277) giving the president-elect $450,000 in public funding, and in 1976 it raised the funding ceiling to $2 million (PL 94-499). *(Background, 1964 Almanac p. 425; 1976 Almanac p. 519)*

Now, as the nation looks forward to its first new administration in eight years, Congress is again working on transition legislation. But the pending measure would go one step beyond earlier versions: It would try to shield the incoming administration from potential ethical problems.

"We have all sorts of FEC rules, regulations, laws, so on, that are concerned about conflict-of-interest in government," said Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, referring to statutes and Federal Election Commission rules that limit campaign contributions from individuals and political action committees and require a candidate to account for every cent his campaign receives and spends.

"A person can't spend a jillion dollars [on a presidential candidate] and buy their way into favorable treatment in the government or a favorable position in the government," Glenn said. But after the election, "all bets are off."

Glenn, a former presidential aspirant and chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, is currently drafting a bill to increase the public funding available to a president-elect for the transition period and to require public disclosure of private contributions to the transition team.

The measure also may create a repository for information on presidential transitions to help future presidents-elect.

Glenn's committee held hearings on the proposal Sept. 17 and Oct. 14.

"A person can't spend a jillion dollars [on a presidential candidate] and buy their way into favorable treatment in the government...." But after the election, "all bets are off."

—Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio

Trust and Temptations

Proponents of the measure expect easy approval from Congress and no opposition from the Reagan administration. But at the hearings, Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, warned against excessive disclosure demands. The transition period, he said, is a time to trust a new president, not to scrutinize his every move for potential miscreancy.

In an Oct. 26 interview, Glenn said he partially agrees with Stevens but clarified, "I'm not as concerned about the nominee as I am about all the people around the nominee."

The Ohio senator is fond of telling a story about a man who wanted to be the U.S. ambassador to Ireland many years ago but who walked away from the job when an administration representative told him his chances of getting it would be greater if he contributed $30,000 to the party. "That's the kind of thing that can happen during a transition period," Glenn said.

Carter transition adviser Harrison Wellford described the period: "The whole world comes down on top of you.... There is a fantastic bag of goodies to be distributed to the rest of the human race."

If there were less pressure on the president-elect to raise funds as soon as he wins the election, there might be less opportunity for the implicit buying and selling of jobs and influence. "We're trying to prevent coercion of funds from wealthy individuals who have aspirations to a government position," Glenn said Oct. 14.

Hearing witnesses agreed the current public-funding ceiling is too low, virtually forcing transition staffers to seek added funds from private donors.

The $2 million spending ceiling in effect since 1976 is equivalent to $1.2 million in 1987 dollars, according to Glenn. The 1980 Reagan transition staff raised $1.25 million above the public-funding level to cover costs.

Glenn's draft bill would authorize $5 million in public funding for transition costs; the ceiling would be inflation-adjusted in future years.

Up to $500,000 per candidate could be set aside for use during the pre-election period for early planning for the transition period, developing a personnel-screening process and setting up liaisons between each candidate's staff and federal agencies. Glenn is exploring the idea of giving the pre-election funds to the national

—By Macon Morehouse

parties, which could also use them to create a formal record of transition planning for future presidents-elect.

Full Disclosure

During the transition period, private contributions would be allowed, but the transition team would have to record and disclose all contributions and expenditures. A list of transition staffers and volunteers would also have to be made public, along with their major affiliations and who is underwriting their stint in Washington.

The most likely repositories for these records would be the FEC or the General Accounting Office, an audit and investigatory agency for Congress.

Reporting requirements would not prevent the president-elect from accepting large contributions from individuals who may later play an important role in the administration. Nor would they prohibit, for example, the chief executive officer of a major oil company from volunteering to research energy policy issues in the Department of Energy. But Glenn and others believe the disclosure requirement would discourage improprieties.

"Disclosure always makes people behave better," said Comptroller General Charles A. Bowsher, head of the GAO, at the Oct. 14 hearing.

But Stevens, the sole Republican to attend the hearing, opposed tightening the rules around the president-elect. "Don't you think we ought to . . . trust the fellow who has just been elected president of the United States?" he asked. "[The president-elect] ought to be unfettered and allowed to take the best advice he can get. . . . I don't think they ought to be one-armed paper-hangers."

Glenn emphasized that his legislation looks to the future and is not a reflection of ethical problems encountered by the current or past administrations. "I haven't taken the tack on this that there has been criminal activity or anything like that," he said. "Don't know that there has. Also don't know that there hasn't. . . ."

Records, Pay and Appointments

Another problem facing the president-elect is a lack of records from previous transitions that might help him avoid the planning pitfalls and policy mistakes of his predecessors. Records from past transitions have either not been maintained or cannot be found, according to Glenn.

Other issues that arose during hearings probably will not be addressed in the transition bill, in part because they are too controversial.

Several witnesses, for example, complained that low federal salaries and the large number of political appointees in the federal government make it next to impossible to have more than a skeleton administration ready in time for the inauguration.

An estimated 3,000 key government positions are filled by political appointments, many of which must pass through the time-consuming process of Senate confirmation. However, limiting the number of political appointees would not be popular with members of either party in a year when the White House is up for grabs.

Salary levels for federal employees "are a hindrance to attracting top people," GAO's Bowsher says. "You shouldn't have to borrow to stay in Washington." A recent Office of Personnel Management (OPM) study based on information gathered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) found that public-service salaries lag 23 percent behind private-sector ones. But an OPM spokesman said that figure may be misleading, because the BLS survey did not include a proper mix of large and small businesses.

Another witness at the Oct. 14 hearing contradicted Bowsher's arguments. "We don't have any trouble filling the government with appointees of high caliber. The jobs don't go vacant," said J. Jackson Walter, former director of the Office of Government Ethics under both Carter and Reagan.

Budget Conflicts

The budget process during an election year also came under fire at the Senate hearings. The outgoing president spends the final months of his term preparing a budget that essentially is his last hurrah in office, a final look at his policies and where he would have taken the country in the next four years. Meanwhile, the president-elect is creating his own budget to set the country on a new course.

Carter adviser Wellford said this scenario "makes for conflict between the new team that wants to push aside completely the outgoing president's budget" and the incumbent, who is tying up Office of Management and Budget (OMB) resources in the development of his final budget.

During the 1976 transition, Wellford said, President Gerald R. Ford did not wrap up his budget until the end of December, leaving Carter's advisers scrambling to put together a draft budget in time to have some impact on the fiscal 1978 budget.

Under deadlines set by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings anti-deficit law (PL 99-177), the outgoing president must send his budget to Congress on the first Monday after Jan. 3 — a couple of weeks before the new president is sworn in Jan. 20.

While the incoming president is not required to submit his own budget, he usually wants to do so as soon as possible in order to obtain funding for his policy initiatives. Carter submitted his fiscal 1978 budget to Congress Feb. 22, 1977; Reagan submitted his fiscal 1982 budget March 10, 1981.

Under Gramm-Rudman, the first deadline for Congress is Feb. 25, when legislative and appropriations committees must submit their spending estimates to the Budget committees.

Suggestions for alleviating budget strain include pushing deadlines back by as much as a month in a year when a new administration takes over and directing the outgoing president to do a current-services budget, freeing up OMB resources for the new president.

Stevens strongly opposed the latter idea, saying it would have the effect of "taking away from the incumbent president the powers of his office."

Timing, Outlook

Glenn's measure may be ready to be introduced by the end of this session, perhaps simultaneously in the House and Senate, and may reach the floor early in 1988. Senate staffers and those on the House Government Operations Committee are trying to work out some agreement on the bill. The House committee will probably hold its own hearings early next year.

House committee Chairman Jack Brooks, D-Texas, sponsored the 1976 bill revising the original presidential transition act.

Lawmakers on both sides of the Capitol say the time for new transition legislation is ripe. For the first time in 20 years, it is certain that there will be an entirely new administration on Inaugural Day 1989.

In every election since Richard M. Nixon's victory in 1968, a sitting president has been one of the contenders for the White House. Earlier attempts to change the presidential transition law would have risked opposition from incumbents who had little desire to make life easier for a successor.

"Now's the time to do it so we don't get looked at like we're just being political about this," said Glenn. ∎