Jackson 2008 Comparison of Ancient Near Eastern Law

A Comparison of Ancient Near
Eastern Law Collections Prior to the

First Millennium BC
Gorgias Dissertations
35
Near Eastern Studies 10
A Comparison of Ancient Near
Eastern Law Collections Prior to the
First Millennium BC
Samuel A. Jackson
Gorgias Press
2008
First Gorgias Press Edition, 2008
Copyright © 2008 by Gorgias Press LLC
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ISSN 1935 6870
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Jackson, Samuel A.
A comparison of ancient Near Eastern law collections prior to the first millen-
nium B.C. / Samuel Jackson. -- 1st Gorgias Press ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Law--Middle East. 2. Law, Ancient. 3. Law--Middle East--History. I. Title.
KL147.J33 2008
340.5’394--dc22
2008018317
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the
American National Standards.
Printed in the United States of America

For Maya
&
Josiah, Elijah and Layla
Thank you for your patience
v
CONTENTS
Contents..................................................................................................................vii
Preface......................................................................................................................ix
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................xi
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction..............................................................................................1
1.2 The Historiography of Ancient Near Eastern Law ............................9
1.3 The Comparative Method ....................................................................19
2 Comparisons .................................................................................................37
2.1 Sources.....................................................................................................37
2.1.1 Overview ..............................................................................................37
2.1.2 Form .....................................................................................................44
2.1.3 Framing.................................................................................................54
2.1.4 Nature, Function and Purpose .........................................................69
2.2 Role of Judge and King.......................................................................113
2.3 Marriage and Divorce..........................................................................115
2.4 Property and Inheritance ....................................................................118
2.4.1 Real Estate..........................................................................................118
2.4.2 Inheritance .........................................................................................119
2.4.3 Adoption ............................................................................................122
2.5 Contract .................................................................................................124
2.5.1 Loans...................................................................................................124
2.5.2 Distraint..............................................................................................125
2.5.3 Deposit and Safekeeping .................................................................125
2.5.4 Breach of Contract ...........................................................................127
2.6 Crime and Delict ..................................................................................127
2.6.1 Theft....................................................................................................127
2.6.2 Kidnap ................................................................................................153
2.6.3 Sex Laws.............................................................................................154
2.6.4 False Accusation ...............................................................................174
2.6.5 Sorcery ................................................................................................179
2.6.6 Murder ................................................................................................180
vii
viii A COMPARISON OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW COLLECTIONS
2.6.7 Personal Injury ..................................................................................188

2.6.8 Negligence Causing Loss of or Damage to Property..................213
2.6.9 Non-Negligent Damage to Property .............................................219
2.7 Penalties.................................................................................................220
2.7.1 Corporal..............................................................................................220
2.7.2 Capital .................................................................................................224
2.7.3 Talionic, Vicarious, and Equivalent ...............................................227
2.7.4 Diachronic Analysis of HL..............................................................232
3 Conclusion...................................................................................................243
3.1 Was there a Common Legal Culture and/or Widespread
Borrowing? .........................................................................................243
3.2 Systematic Differences and their Explanation ................................247
3.3 Reflections on the Nature, Function and Purpose of the
Collections ..........................................................................................252
3.4 Implications for Further Research ....................................................253
Bibliography .........................................................................................................257
Index of References ............................................................................................277
PREFACE
This work grew out of an interest in the application of the comparative

method to the Old Testament and some points of disagreement with
Malul’s and Westbrook’s works regarding the comparison of ancient Near
Eastern and biblical law. Eventually I decided to remove the Old Testament
material from view. The enormity of the secondary literature on biblical law,
the myriad issues regarding dating and the relationship between different
collections would have taken so long to discuss there would have been little
space in the work for comparison. Some virtues did come out of this neces-
sity as the exclusion of the biblical material has enabled the opportunity to
test a comparative method without the enormous influence past inclusion
of the biblical texts has had on comparative studies. The study of the bibli-
cal texts tends to heighten the likelihood of ideological influence and au-
thorial agenda. I hope that the conclusions reached here about comparison,
borrowing and culture without such influence may be a useful guide and
balance to future attempts at comparison which do include the biblical
texts.
Scholars’ notions about the Laws of Hammurabi have also had an
enormous impact upon the treatment of other law collections, partly due to
the greater amount of material available to study this collection. Scholars
often prefer to go from the known to the unknown and apply what are
supposedly firm conclusions about the Laws of Hammurabi to other collec-
tions. In this work there is an attempt to question some of the generally
accepted theories about the nature and function of the Laws of Hammurabi
and to assert the possibility that the other collections may differ from it.
Setting out to correct or critique is always a dangerous exercise, espe-
cially in a doctoral thesis. This one aimed primarily at highlighting and ex-
plaining consistent differences in both the framing and content of the vari-
ous law collections. This was carried out in order to complement the works
of Malul and Westbrook, amongst others, as much as to argue against some
of their conclusions regarding similarities. It is hoped that this work will
provide an alternative to reading the law collections of the ancient Near
East as part of a uniform legal culture which was a step towards that of the
ix
x A COMPARISON OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW COLLECTIONS
far superior Greeks and Romans. That is not to say that I do not think there
are similarities amongst the law collections of the ancient Near East prior to
the first-millennium B.C., nor do I deny that changes took place in legal
culture over time. This work was merely designed to fill out the discussion
so that the possibility of consistent cultural differences may be reconsid-
ered.
I believe the work is successful in highlighting these consistent differ-
ences within the law collections and in correlating them with differences in
other areas of culture or literature e.g. religion, treaties and historiography.
For example, Mesopotamian law collections do not explicitly acknowledge
changes, correlating with the notion in Mesopotamia that the correct ways
of doing things were handed down from the gods to men in the beginning.
In contrast the Hittite law collection does explicitly acknowledge change,
correlating with the Hittite tendency to do so in their history writing in or-
der to teach lessons, or in their treaties in order to motivate obedience. The
explanations given to account for such differences and their correlations
remain speculative and very much open to critique and the proposal of al-
ternatives. It is hoped that the tenuous nature of some of the explanations
which are tentatively suggested does not lead the reader or critic to dismiss
the firmly founded demonstration that the ancient Near East did not con-
tain a uniform culture. The oft stated “truism” that the various collections
freely borrowed material from each other is effectively called into question
here. While there is much congruity in terms of the topics covered across
the collections (especially amongst those from within southern Mesopota-
mia), the thesis demonstrates that there is little compelling evidence for
specific instances of more substantial literary borrowing within the laws
themselves, though it acknowledges some possible cases.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr Noel Weeks, without whom this book

would never have come to fruition. I have enjoyed the benefits of years of
his teaching on ancient Near Eastern history, historiography, religion and
languages, as well as his enormously helpful supervision of this thesis. The
concise and thoughtful manner in which he could inspire a path of inquiry,
crystallize a series of thoughts, or rip to shreds an unfounded argument has
been appreciated by and been of benefit to all of his students and this one
in particular. My thanks also go to the library staff at the University of Syd-
ney for their hard work in bringing many books out of storage (having to
electronically barcode many of them for the first time) and in tracking down
and providing me with my many interlibrary loans. Steve Wiggins’, Katie
Stott’s and George Kiraz’ aid and advice with regards to the editing of this
work for publication has been much appreciated as has Gorgias’ initiative in
creating an avenue for the publication of dissertations such as this through
the DNES series. Last of all my heartfelt thanks go to my family: to my par-
ents for instilling in me a love of things Old Testament and Near Eastern,
and to my wife and children, to whom this book is dedicated, for support-
ing and patiently putting up with me through the entire process.
xi
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Much of the literature on ancient Near Eastern law has attempted to wrestle
with issues such as the applicability and purpose of the collections. The is-
sues surrounding the nature, origin and purpose of the ancient Near East-
ern law collections are manifold and complex. Though an attempt will be
made to tackle them in the course of this study, they will not be the focus
of the work. There is a sense where they pose unanswerable questions at
times. We simply do not have enough evidence, or at least not the right type
of evidence, to be able to answer them for all Near Eastern law collections
(perhaps not for any). It will be asserted, however, that to ignore the stated
intent of the collections themselves would be a methodological travesty.
What this study will focus on is perhaps more controversial: a com-
parative look at ancient Near Eastern law collections pre-first millennium
B.C. 1 This will inevitably involve some discussion of comparative method, a
much maligned and vexed topic. The existence of a number of ill-founded
(or un-founded) assumptions which influence research in this area make the
project worthwhile, as does the reluctance of most to take up such an en-
deavor. The publication of the encyclopedic A History of Ancient Near Eastern
Law 2 and Roth’s easily accessible English translation of the Near Eastern
law collections 3 has made this task somewhat more feasible, though still
quite enormous. The lack of systematic comparison in general is a disturb-
ing trend. With comparison being done on an increasingly smaller scale or
as part of a co-operative (or unco-operative as the case may be) venture
(collections of articles by multiple authors etc.); more room is left for old (or
new) assumptions to be left untested (or for selection of those cases where
said assumption seems justified). 4 It is quite true that systematic comparison
1 All dates referred to hereafter are B.C. unless otherwise stated.

2 Raymond Westbrook, ed., A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (2 vols; Hand-
book of Oriental Studies 72/1; Leiden: Brill, 2003).
3 Martha Tobias Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (with a
contribution by Harry Anger Hoffner, Jr.; Society of Biblical Literature Writings
from the Ancient World 6; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1995).
4 e.g. the heavy focus on the laws concerning the goring ox when tackling com-
1
2 A COMPARISON OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW COLLECTIONS
carries its own set of problems, but this does not make it less worthwhile.
All historical research is problematic to a degree.
Much of the avoidance of large scale comparison can be attributed to
particularly Eurocentric and anachronistic portrayals of the ancient Near
East in the past (unable to think in the abstract etc.), the abuses of pan-
Babylonism, the controversial issues surrounding comparison with ancient
Israel and the development of cultural relativism. Much of it is also due to
an ever increasing specialization within the field. Again, one could argue this
makes the taking up of this topic all the more worthwhile. The methodo-
logical inadequacies of the comparative works contained within collections
such as Frankfort’s Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man 5 may also have scared
some off. The recent resurgence of developmental theories, 6 a renewed in-
parative issues, especially from the field of Biblical Studies: Jacob Joel Finkelstein,
“The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrong-
ful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty,” Temple Law Quarterly 46 (1973):
169–290; “The Ox That Gored,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 71
(1981): 1–89; Bernard S. Jackson, Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal History (Lei-
den: Brill, 1975), ch. 5; Meir Malul, The Comparative Method in Ancient Near Eastern
and Biblical Legal Studies (Alter Orient und Altes Testament 227; Kevelaer: Butzon &
Bercker, 1990), ch. 7; A. van Selms, “The Goring Ox in Babylonian and Biblical
Law,” Archiv Orientalni 18 (1950): 321–30; Reuven Yaron, “The Goring Ox in Near
Eastern Laws,” Israel Law Review 1 (1996): 396–406.
5 The articles by Henri Frankfort, H. A. Frankfort, John A. Wilson, Thorkild
Jacobsen, and W. A. Irwin in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An Essay on
Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1946).
See also Henri Frankfort’s Kingship and the Gods: A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Relig-
ion as the Integration of Society and Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1948). The
abuses of the Myth and Ritual school have also contributed to this problem e.g.
James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Comparative Religion (2 vols.; London:
Macmillan, 1890), S. H. Hooke, ed., Myth and Ritual: Essays on the Myth and Ritual of
the Hebrews in Relation to the Culture Pattern of the Ancient East (London: Oxford Uni-
versity, 1933), The Labyrinth: Further Essays in the Relation between Myth and Ritual in the
Ancient World (London: Macmillan, 1935) and Myth, Ritual, and Kingship: Essays on the
Theory and Practice of Kingship in the Ancient Near East and in Israel (Oxford: Clarendon,
1958).
6 Jean Bottéro, “The ‘Code’ of Hammurabi,” in Mesopotamia: Writing, Reasoning
and the Gods (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), 156–84; translated by Z. Bah-
rani, and Marc van de Mieroop from “Le ‘code’ de Hammurapi,” Annali della Scuola
Normale Superiore di Pisa 12 (1982): 409–44; Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law Codes and
the Origins of Legislation,” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 79 (1989): 201–22, and the Axial
Age theory which Westbrook refers to e.g. the papers in The Origins and Diversity of
Axial Age Civilizations (ed. Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt; Albany: State University of
INTRODUCTION 3
terest in comparative method 7 and the lingering notion of a common an-

cient Near Eastern culture 8 also give this work some current relevance.
Much of this study owes its assumptions and methodology to the work
and teaching of Dr Noel Weeks. To an extent this project comes from the
seed of an idea sowed in his course on historiography in the ancient Near
East and furthered by the recent publication of his work on ancient Near
Eastern treaties and covenants. 9
What this thesis will attempt to do is compare the law collections of
pre-first millennium B.C. ancient Near Eastern societies. In doing this we
will be looking for consistent differences between cultures, which may give
us an insight into how that culture operates or what lies behind aspects of
its society. Within the study an eye will be kept on the interaction of differ-
ent aspects of society with its religious outlook or worldview and political
makeup in producing certain ways of doing things (particularly in the field
of law). This writer expects to find some consistent distinctions between
societies, especially in regard to mode and severity of punishment. There are
obviously many theoretical problems raised by such an endeavor. The prob-
lem of the applicability of the law collections, their nature, origin and pur-
pose will certainly have to be discussed to some extent. The question of the
place of the law collections in scribal curriculum and issues of cultural
transmission/borrowing in general will also arise. This inevitably will in-
volve some discussion of form and genre criticism. It will be argued that
generally parallels or borrowings are in the eye of the beholder. Such an
argument may leave this study open to the charge that the pinpointing of
cultural differences is also in the eye of the beholder, let alone their explana-
tion. The collecting of parallels will continue unabated. It is only fitting that
an attempt at the description and explanation of cultural differences in the
New York, 1986). See also now, Axial Civilizations and World History (ed. Johann P.
Arnasen, Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, and B. Wittrock; Jerusalem Studies in Religion
and Culture 4; Leiden: Brill, 2005).
7 See for example John Baines and Norman Yoffee, “Order, Legitimacy, and
Wealth in Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia,” in Archaic States (ed. G. M. Feinman
and J. Marcus; Santa Fe, Mex.: School of American Research, 1998), 199–260 or
the papers in the collected volume Order, Legitimacy and Wealth in Ancient States (ed. J.
Richards and M. van Buren; New Directions in Archaeology; Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University, 2000).
8 Westbrook, see notes 12–13 below.
9 Noel K. Weeks, Admonition and Curse: The Ancient Near Eastern Treaty/Covenant
Form as a Problem in Inter-Cultural Relationships (Journal for the Study of the Old Tes-
tament Supplement 407; London: T&T Clark, 2004).
ancient Near East (particularly in the area of law collections) is given an

airing as a counterpoint. The claim, put forward by many, that borrowing
was so prevalent that there are numerous examples of verbatim copying or
translation of laws will be put to the test. 10 The more difficult issues sur-
rounding the pinpointing of stimulus diffusion as opposed to independent
invention in a similar society will be avoided due to limitations of space.
This work will not focus on contesting the possibility of such stimulus dif-
fusion (which may explain things such as the similarities between law collec-
tions in terms of the topics chosen to treat, or even how they are used), but
will aim at undercutting the claims of more direct and wholesale borrowing.
In some sense we can see the present study as a balance to the work of
those who postulate a common culture within the ancient Near East. While
it cannot be denied there are many similarities between societies within the
ancient Near East it does scholarship little good if it focuses only on these
aspects and ignores the differences. In speaking of all the legal systems re-
ferred to in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law 11 Westbrook is able to
state, “it is impossible to say of any legal system from any place or in any
period within the parameters set by this history, that its laws come from a
conceptual world alien to the others.” 12 Earlier he phrases it thus, “I would
argue that all the ancient Near Eastern systems belonged in varying degrees
to a common legal culture . . . they shared a legal ontology: a way of looking
at the law that reflected their view of the world and determined the horizon
of the lawmaker.” 13 Westbrook spends a good portion of his introduction
outlining what he sees as the elements common within this legal culture.
The work set out here is partially aimed at complementing such an ap-
proach, but will inevitably contradict it also.
10 e.g. Westbrook, “Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes,” Revue Biblique 92

(1985): 248, 252, 256; Norman Yoffee, “Context and Authority in Early Mesopo-
tamian Law,” in State Formation and Political Legitimacy (ed. R. Cohen, and J. D. To-
land; New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 102; Nicholas Postgate, Early
Mesopotamia: Society and Economy at the Dawn of History (London: Routledge, 1992), ch.
15 “Laws and the Law,” 289.
11 Which covers the law of the third to the first millennium B.C. within all of
Mesopotamia (including Assyria), Hatti, Israel, Egypt and smaller entities such as
Ugarit, Nuzi, Alalakh and Emar.
12 Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in A
History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (ed. Raymond Westbrook; vol. 1; Handbook of
Oriental Studies 72/1; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 24.
13 Ibid., 4. To be fair he does recognize some degree of difference within these
systems (especially Egypt).

INTRODUCTION 5
With this stated purpose in mind this writer is sure any tenuous argu-
ments and explanations put forward here will be criticized by opponents of
such an approach. This is to be welcomed, as forced arguments do one’s
purpose no favors. This being said, an attempt will be made to remain open
to cultural parallels, borrowings and literary conventions. To deny these
exist at all would be nonsensical. To think one can come up with a defini-
tive methodology with which to pinpoint and explain parallels or differ-
ences is equally naïve 14 so the method to be used here will be set out as
briefly as possible.
First, an attempt to define the topic to be treated. The term “law col-
lections” here shall be applied loosely. It is not to be taken as a generic
identifier of a common Near Eastern text type so much as a useful term for
any text from our region and period which contains a collection of legal
provisions. This is not to say that each type of text will be treated in the
same way; quite the opposite. This writer believes that such a loose defini-
tion will help to avoid lulling one into the mindset that what we are dealing
with is a uniform type of text and will intensify the readiness to identify in-
dividual differences and nuances. To treat a text such as the Sumerian
Handbook of Law Forms (SLHF) or ana ittišu in the same way as the edict
of Ammiṣaduqa (AE) or the Laws of Hammurabi (LH) would be method-
ologically poor. To deny that these are texts capable of comparison would
also be a poor approach. This loose definition is helpful in a number of
other ways, not the least of which is that it enables Egypt to become part of
the discussion. 15 It gives us a wider base of texts on which to test theories
of cultural or textual specificity. Due to the size of the project and the prob-
lematic assumptions that would be involved, this study is not necessarily a
comparison of the substantive law 16 of these different societies. The large
number of legal sources that would have to be covered in such a topic is
immense. Even in an encyclopedic work such as A History of Ancient Near
Eastern Law, each topic is only covered briefly, and this in a volume with
many contributors. A comparison of the substantive law would also open
up discussion of a number of cultures for whom we do not have law collec-
tions as such e.g. Ugarit, Nuzi, Alalakh, Emar etc. Limitations of space and
time have excluded this. Though this severely limits some of the questions
14 confer Malul, The Comparative Method, chs. 5–6 e.g. “There exist objective ways
to explain similarities and differences,” 83–84.
15 Through texts such as the Edict of Horemheb, the Nauri Decree, Elephan-
tine Decree etc.
16 By this is meant independently valid, current, and applicable law.
which can be answered (e.g. with regard to the relationship between the col-
lections and actual practice) it does allow the time to pursue the main goal
of this work.
Again, for the purpose of limitation, ancient Israelite or Old Testa-
ment law has been left out of the discussion for the time being. 17 The con-
troversy that would be sparked by the inclusion of Israel in such a work
would mean an enormous amount of time would have to be spent covering
the secondary literature. The many issues that would be raised, such as dat-
ing, the nature of the sources (multiple author, purpose, composition, text
history etc.) and the agendas involved in the various sides of the arguments
would mean much time would be spent dealing with introductory issues
rather than the comparison which is the goal of this work. One of the issues
thus postponed is the question of whether the Israelite law collections are
best compared to other ancient Near Eastern law collections or other cove-
nants and treaties. 18 There are some happy benefits that come from this
(along with the disappointments and shortfalls of not including Israel in the
work). One of the benefits of this omission is that the agendas and biases
concerning comparison of ancient Near Eastern societies with Israel will
play less of a role in this work. In this way it is hoped that perhaps a model
will be set up with which to do such studies in the future. Another benefit is
that methods of comparison with Israel can be indirectly put to the test by
comparison within the ancient Near East itself. This work will involve some
criticism of the approach that treats the entire ancient Near East as a mono-
lithic cultural unit. This will have implications both for those who see the
Near East as a monolithic unit in contrast with Israel 19 and for those who
see Israel as merely part of said monolithic unit. 20
One of the many methodological problems raised by this work hinges
on the definition of the terms ‘culture’ and ‘society’. This is especially so for
Mesopotamia. When one approaches a comparison of ancient Near Eastern
law does one treat Mesopotamia as a cultural unit or look for smaller units
within that entity? Is this an unnecessary dichotomy i.e. are both possible
17 It is hoped that this work can be used as the basis for a follow up volume
comparing Old Testament law with the other ancient Near Eastern law collections.
18 See Weeks, Admonition and Curse. The present writer thinks that comparison
with both is a viable possibility.

19 e.g. Moshe Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” in Essen-
tial Papers on Israel and the Ancient Near East (ed. F. E. Greenspahn; New York: New
York University, 1991), 333–52; repr. from Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion: Yehez-
kel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume (ed. Menahem Haran; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1960), 5–28.
20 e.g. Westbrook, see notes 12–13 above.
INTRODUCTION 7
and if so how? It is hoped that this study will show that though there are
similarities within all Mesopotamian societies and cultures, there are also
significant differences. The comparison of the Middle Assyrian law collec-
tions should demonstrate this amply. So, again, it seems a loose definition
of the terms ‘society’ and ‘culture’ will be employed. This should enable this
writer to notice both similarities and differences on a number of different
levels. It would also be naïve to deny the possibility of cultural development
or change over such a long period. Though in most cases the lack of
sources enables us to bypass such an issue, it is something we intend to
keep in mind.
Perhaps the next issue that should be raised is that of what to compare
within these collections. There is debate in many fields as to the benefits
and pitfalls of emic vs etic classification. 21 Within the ancient Near Eastern
law collections that is less of an issue in practice for we have very few texts
which specifically elaborate any classification within the law collections.
Regarding emic classification, there are three manuscripts of LH with sub-
ject headings. 22 No two of these texts have the same heading in the same
place so this writer does not feel the need to be restricted by them as they
were not even authoritative within their own context. This is not to say
there was no emic classification. Much ink has been spilled over the internal
structure of the law collections in arranging the various laws into topics. 23
This is perhaps something we should consider, especially when assessing
claims of borrowing. It is generally thought that the laws were not arranged
solely on the basis of legal topics as we would think of them. This writer
does not feel such emic classifications should limit what we treat as compa-
rable subject matter, though we must keep an eye on the effects of lumping
21 e.g. Tremper Longman III, “Form Criticism, Recent Developments in Genre

Theory, and the Evangelical,” Westminster Theological Journal 47 (1985), esp. 55–56.
22 See Roth, Law Collections, 75–76. For bibliographical information regarding
editions of these texts see the listings for sources S, r and t on pages 252–53 in the
same work.
23 Barry L. Eichler, “Literary Structure in the Laws of Eshnunna,” in Language,
Literature, and History: Philological and Historical Studies Presented to Erica Reiner (ed.
Francisca Rochberg-Halton; American Oriental Series 67; New Haven: American
Oriental Society, 1987), 71–84; Herbert Petschow, “Zur Systematik und Gesetz-
technik im Codex Hammurabi,” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 57 (1965): 146–72; “Zur
‘Systematik’ in den Gesetzen von Eschnunna,” in Symbolae Iuridicae et Historicae
Martino David Dedicatae (ed. J. A. Ankum, R. Feenstra, and W. F. Leemans; vol. 2;
Studia Documenta ad Iura Orientis Antiqui Pertinentia 2; Leiden: Brill, 1968), 131–
43. See also the discussions within the various editions of the law collections.
the laws into modern or Roman legal categories. 24 An attempt to under-

stand each law within its collection and society will be made before com-
parison. The law collections generally follow a seeming train-of-thought
structure (elsewhere termed “association”). 25 It is not unknown for laws we
would consider to be within the same area of law, or at least to demonstrate
similar legal principles, to be found nowhere near each other within a col-
lection, and certainly in different places across collections. 26 With this in
mind, this writer feels at liberty to construct his own topical classifications
to compare across collections and will leave it to the reader to judge
whether they are useful. 27
The lack of sources at our disposal and the gaps within those sources
throw up some very serious problems for our work. A classic example is the
seemingly disproportionate emphasis the Middle Assyrian law collections
have on laws to do with women. If one were comparing the importance of
various areas of law across the collections some skewed conclusions could
be made. The focus of the first tablet of the Middle Assyrian laws on the
topic of women, the accident of discovery that that tablet is the best pre-
served, combined with the fact our other law collection for the Middle As-
syrian period is a group of Harem decrees may explain the apparent over-
emphasis on women in the Assyrian sources. It is very important to con-
sider the possible gaps in the evidence before making any hasty conclusions.
Perhaps a more important example is the lack of a law collection in Egypt
on the scale of such collections as we find in Mesopotamia and Asia Minor.
Is this due to our lack of sources 28 (particularly acute in Egypt at the best of
times) or a difference of outlook within Egypt? 29 These things will need to
24 See already the comment of Reuven Yaron, The Laws of Eshnunna (2nd ed.; Je-
rusalem: Magnes, 1988), 158, n. 94.
25 e.g. by similar terms or subject matter such as Tablet A of MAL which deals
with laws to do with women. For discussion of this phenomenon see the articles by
Petschow in note 23, or more briefly in the following: Johannes Renger, “Noch
einmal: Was war der ‘Kodex’ Hammurapi-ein erlassenes Gesetz oder ein
Rechtsbuch?,” in Rechtskodifizierung und soziale Normen im interkulturellen Vergleich (ed.
Hans-Joachim Gehrke; Script Oralia 66; Series A: Altertumwissentschaftliche
Reiche vol. 15; Tubingen: Gunter Narr, 1994), 38; Roth, Law Collections, 3–4.
26 e.g. the sex laws of MAL which are bunched together between A 12–24 and
then two more are found at A 55–56.
27 They are vaguely related to Westbrook’s distinct areas of law as set out in
History.
28 Westbrook, “Character,” 5.
29 John A. Wilson, “Authority and Law in Ancient Egypt,” Supplement to Journal
INTRODUCTION 9
be considered during comparisons. It will be best then to attempt to keep

comparisons between cultures to topics at least two cultures cover in their
collections.
This work shall begin with an introduction to the issues and debates
within the study of ancient Near Eastern law and how they have developed
and changed. This will also discuss the issue of comparative method more
thoroughly before continuing. It will then compare individual topics across
cultures e.g. punishment, structure of the collections, generic identification
and separate legal topics such as theft, murder, rape, adultery etc. This will
be concluded with the findings of these comparisons, including an attempt
to define consistent aspects of each society’s (including Mesopotamia as a
whole and as smaller units) law collections and possible influences on it e.g.
political makeup, religious outlook, worldview etc., and the implications for
further research both comparatively and in the field of ancient Near Eastern
law.
1.2 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW

The study of ancient Near Eastern law has gone through a number of trans-
formations since the discovery of the stele containing the law collection of
Hammurabi in 1901. Many of the older assumptions still have a lingering
influence on the field. Before LH was available to modern scholars, the
study of ancient Near Eastern law was focused on Egypt and the Old Tes-
tament. 30 The tales told by Herodotus and Diodorus of the Egyptian erudi-
tion in legal matters and the Egyptian origin of classical law were the sum of
our non-biblical information. This focus on Egypt fitted in quite nicely with
late 18th and early 19th century Egyptomania on the heels of Napoleon’s
Mission de Egypte. With the discovery of LH the focus shifted to Mesopota-
mia for the study of the origin of law giving. This was a general shift that
was happening with the rise of Assyriology in the mid to late 19th century. 31
Immediately treated as a source from which to obtain the substantive
law of ancient Babylonia, what Roth has termed the “Hammurabi’s Gesetz”
approach took off. 32 Scholars (and others) wished to know what the Baby-
lonian law was on certain subjects and sought to find out through an analy-
of the American Oriental Society, 17 (1954): 1–33.

30 Including the study of the Talmud, Mishnah etc.
31 See below on pan-Babylonism.
32 Martha Tobias Roth, “Reading Mesopotamian Law Cases: PBS 5 100: A
Question of Filiation,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 44 (2001):
243.
sis of the law collection and the documents from practice. 33 Many other
assumptions played a role in this early stage of the study of ancient Near
Eastern law. Evolutionary theories as to the development of human society
(and more specifically law) could now be tested to some extent. 34 They did
not fare too well, but other developmental theories took their place. 35 Dif-
fusion was also popular, with pan-Babylonism developing during this pe-
riod. 36 The immediate interest in Hammurabi’s laws for scholars of Old
Testament law was also immense. 37 Many of these shared an approach
based on pan-Babylonism which has greatly influenced the field ever since.
Due to a European bias and the assumption that Hammurabi’s stele repre-
sented substantive law, those interested in comparative law or the history of
law often read into Hammurabi’s collection models or concepts from Ro-
man or modern law. 38 This again, is a practice not without modern adher-
ents. 39 Form critical arguments also began to play a role in assessing the
origin and purpose of the law collection. 40
33 Most famously seen in the multi-volume Hammurabi’s Gesetz project. J. Kohler

and F. E. Peiser, Hammurabi’s Gesetz (vol. 1; Leipzig: Pfeifer, 1904); J. Kohler and A.
Ungnad, Hammurabi’s Gesetz (vol. 2; Leipzig: Pfeifer, 1909); Hammurabi’s Gesetz (vol.
3; Leipzig: Pfeifer, 1909); Hammurabi’s Gesetz (vol. 4; Leipzig: Pfeifer, 1910); Ham-
murabi’s Gesetz (vol. 5; Leipzig: Pfeifer, 1911); Paulo Koschaker and A. Ungnad,
Hammurabi’s Gesetz (vol. 6; Leipzig: Pfeifer, 1923).
34 e.g. that of Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law (London: John Murray, 1864;
repr., Tucson: University of Arizona, 1986).
35 See the discussion of Raymond Westbrook, “Character,” 71–74.
36 The seminal works of scholars involved in the Babel-Bibel controversy were
written in the first decade of the 20th century.
37 e.g. D. H. Müller, Die Gesetze Hammurabis und ihr Verhältnis zur mosaischen Ge-
setzgebung sowie zu den XII Tafeln (Vienna: Hölder, 1903) even translated it into He-
brew and placed it parallel to the Old Testament laws.
38 e.g. Hammurabi’s Gesetz’ rendering of LH into modern legal form and its divi-
sion of the documents from practice into modern legal areas, and Müller’s, Die Ge-
setze Hammurabis, setting out of the laws next to the Roman Twelve Tables.
39 e.g. Russ VerSteeg, Early Mesopotamian Law (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Aca-
demic, 2000)
and to a lesser extent Westbrook (see bibliography for some of his works).
40 e.g. Paulo Koschaker in Rechtsvergleichende Studien zur Gesetzgebung Hammurapis
Konigs von Babylon (Leipzig: von Veit, 1917). See comment by Roth, “The Law Col-
lection of King Hammurabi: Toward an Understanding of Codification and Text,”
in La Codification Des Lois Dans L’Antiquité: Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg 27–29 no-
vembre 1997 (ed. Edmond Lévy; Université Marc Bloch de Strasbourg: travaux du
centre de recherche sur le Proche-Orient et la Grèce antiques 16; Paris: De Boc-
INTRODUCTION 11
After some decades scholars began to realize that Hammurabi’s collec-

tion of laws did not regularly match up with the documents from practice 41
and that they did not cite his collection as an authoritative source for the
decision of their case. 42 Some began to question the substantive nature of
his document. With the discovery of more law collections from Mesopota-
mia pan-Babylonism asserted itself again. The discovery of Sumerian law
collections such as that of Lipit-Ishtar or Ur-Nammu fuelled the argument
for original Sumerian (non-Semitic) civilizational development. The exis-
tence of a propagandistic prologue (and epilogue for Lipit-Ishtar) furthered
the argument that the purpose of the law collections was not substantive
law but royal propaganda. 43 For others the existence of copies of these texts
in scribal schools created another line of argument, namely that these were
works of Mesopotamian legal science not a code of comprehensive laws
directly applicable in the law courts of the society. 44 Still Form Criticism and
now Genre Criticism became popular tools to use in assessing background
and purpose for the law collections.
A closer look at the development of the historiography of ancient
Near Eastern law is warranted at this point. It is worth noting the historical
background to some of the changes within the field, the prominent position
of LH in the discussion, the influence this has on the treatment of other
collections, and the influence of methods from Biblical studies and Roman
and modern legal studies on approaches and methodology. The next section
will focus on the comparative method itself more specifically.
It has been pointed out by scholars that the early treatment of LH was
conditioned by historical context. 45 Scheil gave the title “Les Lois de code
Hammurabi” 46 to the collection of laws contained on the Louvre stele. This
card, 2000), 17.

41 W. Eilers, Die Gesetzesstele Chammurabis. Gesetze um die Wende des 3. vorchristlichen
Jahrtausends (Der Alte Orient 31: 3/4; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1932).
42 Benno Landsberger, “Die babylonischen Termini für Gesetz und Recht,” in
Symbolae Paulo Koschaker Dedicatae (ed. Johannes Friedrich, J. G. Lautner, and John
C. Miles; Studia Documenta ad Iura Orientis Antiqui Pertinentia 2; Leiden: Brill,
1939), 219–34.
43 Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict and the Babylonian ‘Law Codes’,” Journal
of Cuneiform Studies 15 (1961): 91–104.
44 F. R. Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem des altmesopotamischen Rechtes: Was
ist der Codex Hammurapi?,” Genava 8 (1960): 283–96; Bottéro, “‘Code’”.

45 Renger, “Noch einmal,” esp. 27–30.
46 V. Scheil, Textes élamites-sémitiques: deuxième série (Mémoires de la Délégation en
Perse 4; Paris: Libraire Ernest LeRoux, 1902).

clearly echoed the ‘Code Napoleon’ for the scholar of his day. Initially most
scholars treated the collection as a law code, a document with statutory
force which collected together the laws of ancient Babylonia. Even after 70
years of scholarship questioning the legal status of the document and asser-
tions that the label ‘Code’ is anachronistic and inapplicable in the case of
LH, there are still many who refer to it with this appellation. In the context
of the early twentieth century it was understandable. Apart from the ‘Code
Napoleon’ issued in France in 1804, there were also codes issued in Austria
in 1811, 47 Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Portugal also in the 19th century and
then Germany in 1900. 48 With the background of these European civil
codes emerging at the same time as nationalism and imperialism it is no
wonder LH was treated as it was initially. The unification of the various
nation states, the rise of imperialism in the 19th century and the connection
of this context with the setting forth of law codes suggested a framework
for understanding Hammurabi’s proclamation of laws. The idea was soon
hatched that the ‘Code Hammurabi’ was set forth as an attempt to unify the
law of Babylonia after his expansionary military achievements and adminis-
trative reforms. 49 This is an idea that still has many adherents 50 though their
number is dwindling.
It is interesting that the three main early critics of LH’s legal status
were all German speaking. 51 Perhaps it was a European conception of
‘Code’ that led them to decide LH was not substantive law. 52 Coming from
a continental European background with a civil law tradition may have lim-
ited some scholar’s conceptions of the roles of LH. A civil law 53 tradition,
stated simply, involves applying stated principles and interpreting authorita-
tive works on law. This was clearly seen as contrary to Hammurabi’s tradi-
tion given the casuistic 54 framing of his laws and the lack of citation of
47 Allgemeines Burgerliches Gestezbuch

48 Burgerliches Gesetzbuch für das deutsches Reich. The criminal law code had been
completed almost simultaneously with unification in 1871.
49 e.g. C. Edwards, The Oldest Laws in the World (London: Watts, 1906), 12.
50 See Renger’s discussion of this issue, “Noch einmal,” 32–34.
51 Eilers, Landsberger, and Kraus.
52 It is also interesting to note Bottéro, “‘Code’” who furthered Kraus’ position
also comes from continental Europe.

53 As opposed to common law.
54 i.e. conditional (if) clauses in the protasis followed by a conclu-
sion/judgment/verdict in the apodosis e.g. If a man does x, then y.

INTRODUCTION 13
them in the documents from practice. 55 It is interesting that John Miles, an

English legal historian, is able to still treat LH as a real piece of legislation in
analogy with the Anglo-Saxon common law system. 56 Common law tradi-
tions, as opposed to civil law, are based upon the study of precedents, or
exemplary cases rather than codified statutes. Common law traditions are
seen in most countries colonized by England and in all English speaking
countries such as the USA. Though it is not always the case, this writer be-
lieves the various national backgrounds and historical contexts of scholars
working on ancient Near Eastern law may have affected their works.
A case in point may be Sophie Lafont’s theory of subsidiarity in Meso-
potamian law. 57 Her theory is that regional customary law may have existed
and that the local standards were left to function when thought sufficient. It
was only in cases where the local standard was deemed insufficient that it
was thought necessary for the highest level of power to intervene. She sees
this reflected in the enforcement of Mesopotamian law collections. It is in-
teresting that the issue of subsidiarity has been raised in connection with
law as the European Union attempts to develop a theory of law that will
accompany national differences within a unified entity. 58
Earlier we mentioned some of the internal reasons for the questioning
of the legal status of LH. These were perceived discrepancies between the
laws and the documents from practice, and the lack of citation of the laws
in the same documents. Other internal factors which have fuelled this skep-
tical stance have been: the absence of any specific address to judges in the
laws themselves 59 and their non-comprehensive nature. 60 The discovery of a
55 And the lack of legislative influence reflected in the documents.

56 Godfrey Rolles Driver and John C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws (vol. 1; Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1952), 48.
He makes a similar comparison with MAL. See Godfrey Rolles Driver and John
C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws (Oxford: Clarendon, 1935), 14.
57 Sophie Lafont, “Codification et Subsidiarité dans les Droits du Proche-Orient
Ancien,” in La Codification Des Lois Dans L’Antiquité: Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg
27–29 novembre 1997 (ed. Edmond Lévy; Université Marc Bloch de Strasbourg: tra-
vaux du centre de recherche sur le Proche-Orient et la Grèce antiques 16; Paris: De
Boccard, 2000), 49–64.
58 The links to Hammurabi’s imperial context are again not hard to see. I owe
the observed correlation between Lafont’s theory and the modern context of the
EU to Roth, “Hammurabi’s Wronged Man,” Journal of the American Oriental Society
122 (2002): 39, n. 7.
59 Landsberger, “Babylonischen Termini,” 221.
60 See Renger, “Noch einmal,” 35, n. 40.
number of other law collections from the ancient Near East with a similar
form and the existence of copies of LH for over a millennium suggested an
alternative context for LH. This was the e2.dub.ba, or scribal school. It is an
interesting phenomenon in scholarship that when scholars write about an-
cient scholars they often portray them as they would like to see them-
selves. 61 This writer cannot help but think that perhaps it was partly due to
this desire that the great law collection of Hammurabi was placed squarely
within this context. Gone were the days when ‘great men’ occupied our
history books, the law collection of Hammurabi was the collective effort of
a group of scholars and belonged to Mesopotamian legal science. Inciden-
tally, it was also seen to be composed, at least in part, with respect to the
proper international literature (the earlier law collections of Mesopotamia). 62
The next development in the scholarly portrayal of LH came with
Finkelstein’s 1961 article on Ammiṣaduqa’s edict. 63 Again one can postulate
internal developments within the field of ancient Near Eastern law and an
external context which may have led to the thesis presented. With the dis-
covery of the Old Babylonian mišarum decrees, there was another reason to
question the legal nature and purpose of the law collections. The mišarum
decrees were not only framed differently, they were both cited and followed
in the documents from practice. 64 If this was the case for the mišarum de-
crees, 65 why not for the law collections? The answer for Finkelstein lay in
the purpose of the law collections. They were not meant to be legislation.
To look for promulgated law in ancient Mesopotamia was an anachro-
nism. 66 For the most part the mišarum decrees were temporally specific and
retrospective. What then was the purpose of the law collections? The exis-
tence of the prologue/epilogue form suggested another alternative. Most of
61 This can perhaps be seen best in many works about Old Testament wisdom
literature. Often ideals of modern scholars are imported/highlighted in the ancient
wisdom literature: the international, co-operative nature of scholarship, the non-
partisan nature of the scholars, their healthy scepticism and humanist inquiry.
Those aspiring to a so-called ‘ethical monotheism’ set on a pedestal in the 19th cen-
tury have been particularly guilty of this.
62 Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem,” 293–95.
63 Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict”.
64 At least to some extent. Both Kraus and Finkelstein did question the applica-
bility and legal force of the mišarum document also. See Kraus, Ein Edikt des Königs
Ammi-s[aduqa von Babylon (Studia et Documenta ad Iura Orientis Pertinentia 5; Lei-
den: Brill, 1958).
65 At least part of them. Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 100–1.
66 Ibid., 103.
INTRODUCTION 15
these sections were spent glorifying the achievements of the king. Obvi-
ously this was the purpose of the law collections. They were royal propa-
ganda. The collection of laws themselves served to justify the king’s claims
to be a just king and thereby a rightful ruler. All of this was of course ar-
gued on the basis of the sources and the general background of Mesopota-
mian kingship and law. This writer finds it unlikely to be a coincidence that
the suspicion that all was smoke and mirrors and that rather than serving
any useful function, the law collections were merely propaganda first found
its expression in the 1960s. The background of the beginnings of the social
movements, a rise in Marxism’s popularity (and in particular Gramsci’s no-
tion of hegemony), the arrival of the post-colonial era and a growing dis-
trust of government in the post-McCarthy era all set themselves up as likely
suspects for this change in approach, though it would be a braver man than
I to single out any one in particular in Finkelstein’s case. 67 It is similarly in-
teresting to see the influence of Kuhn and Foucault in Roth’s dealings with
the same questions in more recent times. 68
Another set of influences shaping the discussion of the ancient Near
Eastern law collections has been the various emphases of the different dis-
ciplines weighing into the debate. Those who have written about ancient
Near Eastern law collections generally come from three different fields:
legal history, Biblical studies and Assyriology. Within the first there are
those who bring with them ideas from modern law and those who have cut
their teeth on Roman law. The interest of this subject to all is quite obvious
though each brings with them a different perspective and set of methodo-
logical tools. These fields are by no means exclusive. One could hardly ex-
clude scholars such as Yaron or Westbrook from any of the three. This said
there are some general tendencies and influences typical to those from each
field. The most general observation, already made by Renger, is that those
from a legal background are more likely to treat the various law collections
as some form of legislation, or at least a closer reflection of legal realities, 69
whereas those from Assyriology tend to be more skeptical. 70 The reason for
this is open to debate. 71 The influence of Roman legal history can be seen
67 One would assume this was not a cynically conscious decision made by
Finkelstein or those who followed him, but the subtle unconscious influence of a
change in cultural mood towards such things.
68 Especially “Reading Law”.
69 See those listed by Renger, “Noch einmal,” 28.
70 Eilers, Landsberger, Kraus, Bottéro, Finkelstein, and Roth to name but a few.
71 Though we suspect a nagging sceptical empiricism (in terms of the need for
throughout the various debates. The notion of code versus precedent and
civil versus common law can be seen as part of the debate over the distinc-
tion of ius and lex (later Recht und Gesetz). The terminology used in this sort
of debate is borrowed from Roman legal history. Inevitably we try to un-
derstand the unfamiliar with reference to the familiar. Many of those who
have worked on the ancient Near Eastern law collections have done so out
of a prior interest in ancient (read classical) law. As an example Koschaker’s
higher critical approach to LH, rather than coming from a Biblical studies
background, may well have come from his work in Roman law. The Roman
law collections such as the Twelve Tables and Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis are
from various earlier sources which have been put together. 72 The assump-
tion that LH and the other Near Eastern law collections would be the same
has influenced much of the work in the field. For many this assumption has
come from a Biblical studies background also. 73 Perhaps someone from a
Romanist background will attempt to put to rest the debate over LH’s
scholarly or legal function by reminding us of the Digest of Justinian which
was given the honor of having both at the same time. The influence of
comparative legal historians has also been felt in the tendency for some to
postulate universals within the area of law whether they be linear develop-
ments, 74 or deep structures. 75
external verification in the documents for the purpose of the collections) and the
influence of Gramsci (and later Liverani-in terms of the default position being one
of royal propaganda).
72 The difference between the two fields of course being that at least some Ro-
man law collections name their sources, e.g. Digest of Justinian.
73 e.g. Eckart Otto e.g. “Aspects of Legal Reforms and Reformulations in An-
cient Cuneiform and Israelite Law,” in Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform
Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development (ed. Bernard M. Levinson; Journal for the
Study of the Old Testament Supplement 181; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994),
160–96 or “Kodifizierung und Kanonisierung von Rechtssatzen in Keilschriftlichen
und Biblischen Rechtssammlungen,” in La Codification Des Lois Dans L’Antiquité:
Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg 27–29 novembre 1997 (ed. Edmond Lévy; Université
Marc Bloch de Strasbourg: travaux du centre de recherche sur le Proche-Orient et
la Grèce antiques 16; Paris: De Boccard, 2000), 77–124; Reuven Yaron, The Laws of
Eshnunna. It must be said that these two are more form critics.
74 Bottéro, “‘Code’”. Westbrook e.g. “Character,” 23 where he “cheerfully ad-
mits to being a developmentalist”.
75 Bernard S. Jackson’s unique approach. See it spelled out in “History, Dog-
matics and Halakhah,” in Jewish Law in Legal History and the Modern World (ed. Ber-
nard S. Jackson; The Jewish Law Annual Supplement 2; Leiden: Brill, 1980), 1–26.
INTRODUCTION 17
The weight of Biblical studies has been felt most in the influx of the
tools of criticism imported from that field be it form, literary-historical, re-
daction, 76 or genre criticism or the study of literary structure. Controverisal
tools which are regularly criticized within their own field 77 they have some-
how managed to exert an influence in our own. For the scholar of Old Tes-
tament law, the law collections of the ancient Near East are fodder for ex-
planatory parallels be they of form, genre, social development, mentalité etc.
The bulk of this work is done in an attempt to situate the Old Testament
laws within their broader Near Eastern setting and to import the Near
Eastern models in order to interpret the Old Testament-but more will be
said on the comparative method in a moment. Whatever the downside of
these influences each field brings with it its own insights, questions and ap-
proaches which enable the work of critical scholarship to go on debating
both new issues and old ones from new perspectives. It is hoped that the
application of this author’s context, background and motivations will also
add to the field. It is also hoped that said writer will be aware of these
things and not allow them to unduly influence the arguments and conclu-
sions presented. One of the most encouraging movements within the field
is an interest in finding out what the law collections were to the people in-
volved with them themselves i.e. their authors, audience (intended and oth-
erwise) and anyone else affected by them. 78 Ideally this work will also help
us to understand the ancient Near Eastern law collections in their own set-
tings, both historical and cultural.
Before proceeding to discussion of the comparative method, we would
like to discuss another phenomenon in this field: that of the undue promi-
nence of LH. Most of the ink spilt over the issues of the nature, purpose,
origin etc. of the ancient Near Eastern law collections has focused on this
text in particular and assumed that the findings were generally applicable for
the other collections 79 (or at least for the other tripartite structured collec-
tions such as LL and LU). Though it is possible in theory that we may well
find this to be the case, this is hardly something that is safe to assume.
There is a general tendency within Assyriology for the first text of its kind
76 e.g. Eckart Otto uses all three.

77 The study of literary structure perhaps being the exception.
78 Expressed for example in Kraus’ groundbreaking article “Ein zentrales Prob-
lem,” 284.
79 e.g. see Westbrook’s statement “Cuneiform Law,” 201–2 that “the debate . . .
has centered mainly around Codex Hammurabi, but its conclusions are assumed to
apply to the codes in general.”
or subject matter to forever retain the most important position in scholar-

ship. We have seen this with Enuma Eliš. Being the first discovered creation
story from Mesopotamia, it came to prominence at the same time as pan-
Babylonism and has held its place ever since. LH has shared a similar fate.
Immediately hailed as the oldest code of laws in the world, 80 one suspects it
has been the subject of more monographs and articles than the rest of the
ancient Near Eastern law collections combined. This is due partly to the
primacy of its discovery, partly to the publicity afforded it during the Babel-
Bibel controversies, and partly to its more complete state of preservation,
its greater length and the more impressive monument upon which it was
found. None of these things necessarily should lead one to conclude it was
more important in its own context than the other law collections. Perhaps it
is just the nature of research that we spend more time studying that for
which we have better sources. 81 It should be emphasized, however, that the
fact that we have more sources with which to study LH and its context does
not necessarily mean that we should import those conclusions into the
study of other Near Eastern law collections. The same can be said for
Enuma Eliš in regards to Babylonian religion. There are many who would
see this work not as ‘The Babylonian Creation Story’ as it has been hailed,
but as a particularly unique (perhaps aberrant) creation story from Babylon
with a very particular context. 82 Vigilance is needed to avoid being caught in
such traps. Though there may be obvious similarities between LH and other
collections, we must recognize the possibility that LH was atypical or at
least special or unique amongst the ancient Near Eastern law collections. 83
To be fair to those who have worked in this field, this writer does not mean
to imply that scholars have been completely blind to the differences be-
tween collections before. The year after the discovery of MAL in 1920,
Koschaker recognized a great difference between it and LH and designated
it as a private Gesetzbuch of a judge rather than a code of laws. 84 This said,
80 e.g. C. Edwards, Oldest Laws. A position LH still holds for some, though erro-
neously.
81 As well as LH being the best attested ancient Near Eastern law collection in
terms of preservation and number of copies, the Old Babylonian period is particu-
larly rich in other legal material with which to compare it
82 e.g. W. G. Lambert, “The Reign of Nebuchadnezzar I: A Turning Point in the
History of Ancient Mesopotamian Religion,” in The Seed of Wisdom: Essays in Honor
of T. J. Meek (ed. W. S. McCullough; Toronto: University of Toronto, 1964), 3–13.
Followed by Baines and Yoffee, “Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth,” 250.
83 Done already by Kraus all those years ago in “Ein zentrales Problem,” 293.
84 Paulo Koschaker, Quellenkritische Untersuchungen zu den “altassyrischen Gesetzen”
INTRODUCTION 19
the imbalance of sources, skewed as they are towards the Old Babylonian
period, makes it hard to test the theories about LH anywhere else, 85 or to
come up with alternative theories. With this in mind it is extremely impor-
tant we watch for the influence of theories imported from studies of LH
when dealing with other sources.
1.3 THE COMPARATIVE METHOD

Though we have briefly discussed the aim and method of our study earlier,
this writer thinks it important to situate it more clearly amongst the various
approaches to the comparative method. There are three main approaches to
the comparison of cultures. Simply these are: 1) looking for similarities, 2)
looking for differences, and 3) approaches which tend to study the particu-
lar, some of which see comparison as violating a society’s “Eigenbegrifflich-
keit”. 86 Within the first approach there are various explanations of similari-
ties from parallel development/evolution to historical con-
tact/diffusion/migration, natural laws/universals/human nature etc., com-
mon cultural/societal/sociological/environmental setting or racial type and
so on. 87 Within the second, differences tend to be explained through differ-
ences in the stages of evolution/development or a difference of cul-
tural/societal/sociological/environmental setting or racial type etc. There
are other explanations including those of chance and coincidence, often
used to explain away similarities or differences which contradict one’s as-
sumptions. Obviously most scholars would not ascribe to only one ap-
proach and explanation though there have been tendencies to favor certain
approaches and explanations in different fields and in different periods. 88
(Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft 26/3; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich,

1921), 79–84.
85 For extreme examples take the lack of discovery of a law collection pre-first
millennium in Egypt, or the almost total absence of legal practice documents from
the Hittite empire.
86 “conceptual autonomy” e.g. Benno Landsberger in his famous article. For an
English translation see Benno Landsberger, “The Conceptual Autonomy of the
Babylonian World,” in Monographs of the Ancient Near East (vol. 1, fasc. 4; Malibu:
Undena, 1976), 5–15; trans. Thorkild Jacobson, Benjamin Foster, and H. von
Siebenthal from “Die Eigenbegrifflichkeit der Babylonischen Welt,” Islamica 2
(1926): 355–72.
87 Malul, The Comparative Method, ch. 1 classified these explanations broadly into
“historical” and “typological” ones.
88 For a discussion of some of these see William Y. Adams, Dennis P. Van
Gerven, and Richard S. Levy, “The Retreat from Migrationism,” Annual Review of
Often comparative studies have become an excuse for parallel hunting

and have resulted in what some have termed “parallelomania”. 89 Those who
criticize comparative studies of this type have some fuel for their fire. It is
quite likely that an understanding of a culture coming only from study of
the aspects of it which have parallels elsewhere will be deficient. There have
been a number of attempts at a comparative method which takes into ac-
count both similarities and differences and attempts to place these within
their cultural context. 90 This is one of the goals of this study.
The comparative method in ancient Near Eastern studies has been
overshadowed by the study of the Hebrew Bible. Most scholars interested
in comparative studies within the ancient Near East want to compare other
societies with that reflected in the Hebrew Bible. This has often determined
what has been considered worth studying and has heavily influenced which
“parallels” would be the focus of scholars’ attention. 91 Attitudes towards
the Old Testament have often shaped their comparative studies to a signifi-
cant degree. Some have reacted against this by disavowing comparative
studies and calling for the autonomy of Assyriology, Egyptology etc. as dis-
ciplines separate from the study of the Hebrew Bible. 92 More recently there
has been a resurgence of calls in the opposite direction, stressing the impor-
tance of studying Israel in its Near Eastern context. 93 It is useful to look at
the context in which these debates have raged and situate this work
amongst them before proceeding to embark on a comparative study of the
ancient Near East.
Perhaps most important for the comparative study of ancient Near
Eastern law is the context within which LH was discovered. Though ap-
proaches change over time, the initial semblance of ideas at the time of a
discovery often have a lingering effect on its later study. 94 Some of these
Anthropology 7 (1978): 483–532.

89 See Samuel Sandmel’s discussion of the term in “Parallelomania,” Journal of
Biblical Literature 81 (1962): 1.
90 e.g. Weeks, Admonition and Curse.
91 e.g. the goring ox. See note 4 above.
92 e.g. Landsberger, “Conceptual Autonomy”.
93 e.g. William W. Hallo, “Ancient Near Eastern Texts and their Relevance for
Biblical Exegesis,” in Canonical Compositions from the Biblical World (ed. William W.
Hallo; vol. 1 of The Context of Scripture; Leiden: Brill, 1997), xxiii–xxviii.
94 An example from Egyptology could be the initial rediscovery of Egypt within
the context of late 18th, early 19th century anti-clericalism and the lingering influence
of the “wicked priest” theories still so prevalent in reconstructions of the political
and religious history of ancient Egypt. Another example from Assyriology would
INTRODUCTION 21
ideas were mentioned briefly in the last section. Those most relevant to this
section are pan-Babylonism and the Babel-Bibel debate.
Though discovered slightly too late to be utilized in Delitzsch’s first
lecture, 95 LH is used in his second. 96 He attempts, through comparison of
LH and the laws in the Pentateuch to show which were Israelite, proto-
Semitic or borrowed from Babylonia. As is to be expected within De-
litzsch’s work, he concluded that much was borrowed from Babylonia and
that Babylonian law was superior to that of ancient Israel. 97 He stressed the
superiority of Babylonian civilization and its non-Semitic (Sumerian) ori-
gins. 98 He denied the uniqueness of ancient Israel and searched for depend-
ency. He did all this from the vantage point of anti-Semitism, going as far as
claiming that Jesus was not a Jew, but Aryan. 99 After World War I he joined
many others in blaming the “Jews” for Germany’s poor condition. 100 Un-
surprisingly, his approach to LH brought a reaction from those with a more
conservative view of the Old Testament. They tended to emphasize differ-
ences between Old Testament law and LH, and when they compromised to
admit borrowing, they pointed out that what was taken over was still
changed and improved. They held, contrary to Delitzsch, that a comparative
analysis in proper perspective would “underscore the uniqueness and supe-
riority of the biblical message”. 101 They also used LH to argue for the his-
toricity of the Pentateuch, showing that it falsified earlier claims that the
period of Moses was too early in history for law to be formulated, 102 and
be the rediscovery of ancient Mesopotamia and other Semitic peoples amidst the
context of linguistic theories of history in the mid-nineteenth century which por-
trayed the Semites as originally nomadic peoples (analogous to Arab Bedouin)
pouring out of the Arabian desert.
95 Though he does mention Hammurabi and the highly developed state of an-
cient Babylonian law in Friedrich Delitzsch, Babel and Bible: Two Lectures (ed. with
intr. C. W. H. Johns; London: Williams & Norgate, 1903), 35.
96 Ibid., 184–92, 199–202.
97 Especially in regards to the position of women. Ibid., 202.
98 Ibid., passim. See Mogens Trolle Larsen’s comments in “The ‘Babel/Bible’
Controversy and its Aftermath,” in Civilizations of the Ancient Near East (ed. Jack M.
Sasson; vol. 1; New York: Hendrickson, 1995), e.g. p. 99.
99 In Die grosse Täuschung as related by Larsen, “Babel/Bible,” 105.
100 See Larsen, “Babel/Bible,” 105.
101 William Rainey Harper, as quoted in Larsen, “Babel/Bible,” 103.
102 See the discussion of König’s position in Klaus Johanning, Der Bibel-Babel-
Streit: Eine forschungsgeschichtliche Studie (European University Studies Series 13:
Theology vol. 343; Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1988), 294. See Johanning’s Excursus II
claiming Hammurabi as the Amraphel of Genesis 14. 103 Seeing the same
evidence in different hands used for such differing purposes, many within
Assyriology reacted by no longer wanting to be a “handmaiden to Old Tes-
tament studies”. 104 The seminal article to this end was published in 1926. 105
Landsberger’s call to respect the “cultural autonomy” of the Babylo-
nian world has had an enormous influence on Assyriology ever since. There
are many, wanting to follow Landsberger’s principle, who have steered As-
syriology as far from Old Testament studies as possible. Given the contin-
ued popular interest in the Old Testament, this has had some unwanted side
effects on the funding of the subject and its status in society. Landsberger
himself did not shy away from all forms of comparison. In this same article
he talks of his empathetic, heuristic method with which he unravels the
conceptual world of the Babylonians from within itself. 106 He proceeds to
use it to contrast Sumerian and Akkadian thinking. 107 For him, language, or
even “Sprachgeist”, was the key to understanding the conceptual world of a
civilization. 108 Interestingly, one of Landsberger’s indirect effects on the
field was to kill off most comparison and to encourage an increasing spe-
cialization within the study of the ancient Near East. Despite this, there
were some (perhaps those closer to him) who followed up his heuristic or
intuitive method and continued comparative studies. Those involved in
Frankfort’s Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man were some of the most influ-
ential.
Interestingly, the later edition of this study, entitled Before Philosophy, 109
did not include a chapter on the speculative thought of the Hebrews. This
was included in the original version, possibly due to popular interest rather
than the convictions of the authors. There was no way to keep everyone
from comparative studies, and no way to abate the popular interest (so im-
portant to publishers) in the Old Testament. So while some buried them-
in this work for a more thorough description of LH’s place within the Babel-Bibel
debate.
103 See Ibid., 291.
104 Thorkild Jacobson’s comment in the introduction to the translation of
Landsberger’s “Eigenbegrifflichkeit,” 4. See note 86 for bibl. details.
105 Landsberger, “Eigenbegrifflichkeit”. Again see note 86.
106 Ibid., 6.
107 Ibid., 12–13.
108 Ibid., 12–15.
109 Henri Frankfort, H. A. Frankfort, John A. Wilson, and Thorkild Jacobsen,
Before Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1949).

INTRODUCTION 23
selves deeper into specialization, these others (Frankfort et al.) picked up

Landsberger’s intuitive method and applied it to a comparative study of the
world views of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and Israel. The work, however,
did reflect the increased specialization of the field in that it was a multi-
authored co-operative venture rather than the work of one man. It also dis-
played Landsberger’s conviction that one could use intuition to contrast the
cultures of different peoples. On the whole, this work was a reaction to the
“Myth and Ritual” school, in particular its form of universalism.
The Myth and Ritual school developed from its evolutionary origins
with Frazer and his The Golden Bough 110 in the late nineteenth century to a
more diffusionist model with Hooke 111 in the early twentieth. 112 Its method
was built on assuming similarity and then going about finding it. Frankfort’s
project was to counter this by contrasting the differences between Mesopo-
tamia and Egypt in particular. One suspects his allegiance to Judaism was a
motivating factor in part. Unfortunately, due to his method, based more on
intuitive personal insights than sources, this work has not helped the cause
of comparative studies and has been seen as an example of its abuse. 113 His
geographic determinism also caused him to deny historical change over
time within the one society. The geography did not change, so the world
view of the society should not either. The application of this assumption led
to some of the criticisms that were leveled.114
One quickly realizes that the development and application of the com-
parative method in ancient Near Eastern studies is based very much on
scholars’ assumptions, particularly their assumptions about the Old Testa-
ment, and their assumptions about human nature and civilization. The de-
bate then rages over the extent of the similarity of human nature versus the
differences between cultures and those found in developments over time
(whether part of a common evolutionary scheme or some idiomatic internal
development). On a larger scale this debate is part of the philosophical
question of the one and the many. On a smaller scale it is about explaining
similarities and differences between the law collections of pre-first millen-
nium B.C. ancient Near Eastern societies. This work will focus on the
110 Frazer, Golden Bough.

111 Hooke, see footnote 5 above.
112 This was a general trend in many fields, anthropology in particular.
113 See the criticisms of Samuel Noah Kramer in his review of Intellectual Adven-
ture in Journal of Cuneiform Studies 2 (1948): 39–70 and those of M. I. Finley in his
review of Kingship and the Gods in Political Science Quarterly 63 (1948): 275–81.
114 Finley’s review above.
smaller scale comparison at hand. There are some unresolved tensions in

the comparative method that should at least be discussed further, if not
solved, before proceeding. In order to explore these we will look at the ap-
proaches of Talmon, Hallo, Tigay and Baines and Yoffee for the compara-
tive method in general, Greenberg and Jackson for the area of ancient Near
Eastern law, and Malul, who writes on both the comparative method in
general and ancient Near Eastern law in particular.
As mentioned earlier, most people interested in the comparative
method in ancient Near Eastern studies are primarily interested in compar-
ing other societies to ancient Israel. 115 It will be interesting in this study to
see whether the systems of comparison set up for this situation work just as
well when applied to the Near Eastern civilizations themselves. One of the
seminal articles on the comparative method was written by Talmon in
1977. 116 One of the main trends he argues against is that of comparative
studies which “deal preponderantly with particular cases of parallels found
or assumed to be present in other cultural complexes.” 117 He saw the many
possible abuses that comparison of this type could perpetrate, and how easy
it would be to assert similarity through such an “atomistic approach . . .
without reference to the general structure and profile of the overall scale of
values and beliefs of the societies involved”. 118 He proposed a comparative
method which would take account of differences and similarities between
societies 119 within the same “historic stream”. 120 Distancing himself both
from “the comparative approach on the grand scale”, 121 and from the atom-
istic parallel hunting 122 of others, he encourages a “holistic method”. 123 In
doing so he sides with Landsberger’s call to respect the “Eigenbegrifflichkeit”
115 Or at least the Hebrew Bible.

116 Shemaryahu Talmon, “The ‘Comparative Method’ in Biblical Interpretation-
Principles and Problems,” Vetus Testamentum Supplement 29 (1977): 320–56.
117 Ibid., 321.
118 Ibid., 324.
119 Ibid., 345, 355.
120 See his explanation of this term in Ibid., 326. He saw it as including “aspects
of historical and geographical proximity as well as those of cultural affinity.” In
encouraging comparison within the historic stream he is similar to Malul, Compara-
tive Method, who encourages historical rather than typological comparison, ch. 1.
121 Talmon, “Comparative Method,” 328 i.e. evolutionary or diffusionist models
or those comparing cultures far removed from each other in an attempt to discover
the “fundamental unity of the human spirit”. See also pp. 322–24, 356.
122 Ibid., 343, 356.
123 Ibid., 328, 356.
INTRODUCTION 25
of different cultures and the approach of those like Frankfort, Wilson and
Jacobsen who attempt to explain individual cultures from the inside with
Landsberger’s empathetic method rather than those who look for similar-
ity. 124 He emphasizes that there may be similarities between cultures within
the same historic stream, but that with this method, by looking at the simi-
larity within the whole cultural complex, one is able to emphasize the “indi-
viduality and dissimilarity conferred upon these identified components”. 125
As the title suggested, Talmon’s method was set up to be applicable
for “biblical interpretation”. In siding with Frankfort’s statement that “the
borrowed features in Hebrew culture, and those which have foreign analo-
gies, are least significant”, 126 in asserting the uniqueness of biblical civiliza-
tion over against the rest of the ancient Near East 127 and in discussing only
the use of his method with reference to comparison with the Hebrew Bible,
he opened himself to criticisms of double-dealings, 128 of applying his
method only to Israel. This writer finds many points of agreement with
Talmon’s method, but asserts that, to be valid, it should be applied to every
society, not just Israel. 129 In the same spirit we have here included the Hit-
tite law collections for study. Too many comparative studies in the ancient
Near East make sweeping statements based on comparison with only Egypt
and/or Mesopotamia. 130 There are other points within Talmon’s method
which raise questions and some which have been challenged.
One issue of comparison which we have avoided by the choice of our
subject matter is that of the priority of date versus geographical proximity
when comparing parallel data. 131 Due to the limitation of our sources to
124 Ibid., 328.

125 Ibid., 328.
126 Ibid., 342.
127 Ibid., 355.
128 Such as that of Malul, Comparative Method, 51, 157 who thinks Talmon is in-
terested only in understanding phenomena in the wider cultural context for Israel,
not the other Near Eastern cultures. If this were the case Talmon’s approach could
lead to a situation where one respects only the cultural autonomy of Israel while
still treating the rest of the ancient Near East as a monolithic block.
129 This is not to say that I agree that Talmon is guilty of double-dealing.
130 e.g. Before Philosophy and Baines and Yoffee, “Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth”.
See Jackson’s criticisms of Greenberg for leaving out the Hittites whom he sees as
more closely related to Israel, Essays, 41.
131 Talmon, “Comparative Method,” 325 espouses the priority of date while
Malul criticises Talmon as though his method implies what he sees as the “invalid
assumption that the biblical corpus is a monolithic and unified work . . . so that one
pre-first millennium B.C. we hope to not have to deal with this question.
Leaving out the law in the Hebrew Bible also enables us to dodge this issue
for now, as for many, the dating of the legal parts of the Hebrew Bible de-
termines the material with which they are compared. 132 In this way we have
also managed to lessen the need to allow for change over time within the
one culture. 133
One of the main challenges to Talmon’s holistic method has come
from diffusionists or parallel hunters. Those who are interested in determin-
ing whether a society borrowed from another only in specific instances are,
consciously or unconsciously, fighting against the idea that each aspect of a
civilization needs to be understood as part of the whole before it is com-
pared to other civilizations. For example, Malul’s work on The Comparative
Method in Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical Legal Studies, though well aware of
Talmon’s arguments, and criticizing those who focus only on similarities or
differences, implies that the prime task of the comparative historian of an-
cient law is to ascertain whether or not there is an historical connection be-
tween biblical law and that of other Near Eastern societies. 134 The fact that
his work, after chapters of theorizing in order to gain a “clear and objective
scientific criteria” 135 with which to carry out comparison, uses the fall-back
example of the goring ox as its test case, tells us much about his method.
may freely resort to any biblical evidence from any genre or period for the elucida-
tion of problems existing in other genres and periods” in Comparative Method, 46. A
hotbed of debate which we are happy to avoid for now.
132 i.e. if seen as second millennium they could be compared with LH etc.,
whereas if they are seen as first millennium or even Persian period, they are com-
pared with first millennium collections e.g. Morton Smith, “East Mediterranean Law
Codes of the Early Iron Age,” Eretz Israel 14 (1978): 38–43. For extreme examples
see Thomas M. Bolin, “History, Historiography, and the Use of the Past in the
Hebrew Bible,” in The Limits of Historiography: Genre and Narrative in Ancient Historical
Texts (ed. C. S. Kraus; Mnemosyne: Bibliotheca Classica Batava Supplementum
191; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 113–40 and John Van Seters, In Search of History: Historiog-
raphy in the Ancient World and the Origins of Biblical History (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity, 1983) who compare biblical historiography with classical antiquarianism.
133 As mentioned earlier this is a problem with Frankfort’s work due to his geo-
graphical determinism. The dialectic approach to the law of the Hebrew Bible can
be left to a later work also, see discussion in Bernard M. Levinson, ed., Theory and
Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development (Journal for
the Study of the Old Testament Supplement 181; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic,
1994).
134 Malul, Comparative Method, 124.
135 Ibid., 155.
INTRODUCTION 27
His use of the “safe” case of the goring ox, which most accept as being a
borrowing into biblical law, to prove his method works, may help a naïve
belief in an objective comparative method, but even with such “safe” cases,
there are those who disagree. 136 To assert, as Malul seems to do, that it is
only those with some sort of “apologetic” or “pseudorthodox tenden-
cies” 137 who are not objective in this debate is a little ridiculous. 138
One must admit that it is to some extent an assumption to say that it is
to the culture as a whole that one should look for explanation of a phe-
nomenon within a society. There are others who see culture differently.
Leach mentions those who see culture “as an assemblage of traits which can
be separately compared” in contrast to those who see societies “as systems
which can be compared only as wholes”. 139 Though this writer sees neither
as necessarily true, he leans to the second option. Unfortunately, given the
massive amount of detail that would need to be covered in the case of
comparison of whole societies it is hardly likely that any one person will
ever be able to undertake such a comparison of the cultures of the ancient
Near East. Perhaps comparing one aspect of a society may be a working
compromise between ideal and pragmatism, so here the written law collec-
tions of the ancient Near Eastern societies will be compared. Rather than
enter the debate over the usefulness of cultural background in comparative
studies in all its details, which could not be done in this work, this model
will be offered and it will be left to others to judge its usefulness. It is a mi-
nority who would consciously oppose such an undertaking. This writer be-
lieves that most merely shy away from such an undertaking themselves due
to the risks involved. 140
To say one will be comparing the law collections of the ancient Near
East in their cultural contexts does raise a number of questions. The first
has to do with the difficulty of defining these contexts. For example, does
one look at LH in the context of Mesopotamia, Babylon, the Old Babylo-
136 See the discussion of Jeffrey H. Tigay, “On Evaluating Claims of Borrow-
ing,” in The Tablet and the Scroll: Near Eastern Studies in Honor of William W. Hallo (ed.
Mark E. Cohen, Daniel C. Snell, and David B. Weisberg; Bethesda, Md.: CDL,
1993), 250–55 who mentions scholars who do not see borrowings of Near Eastern
material into biblical even in such “safe” cases as Genesis’ borrowing of material
from Enuma Elish, or Ecclesiastes’ borrowing of material from Gilgamesh.
138 The fact that Malul focuses his criticisms on those who defend the Old Tes-
tament is perhaps testimony to this fact.
139 As quoted in Talmon, “Comparative Method,” 336.
140 See discussion in the introduction.
nian period or just Hammurabi’s reign? Where does Assyria fit within
Mesopotamia? Does one treat the Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (LL) as “Sumerian”
law because that is the language it is written in, or does one class it with
Babylonian law due to its origins in the dynasty of Isin? 141 What of the rela-
tion of the Laws of Eshnunna (LE) to LH? 142 Do we, like many compara-
tive theorists, postulate that the “literary culture” is the most important? 143
Does this mean we lump all the collections together under the rubric of
“cuneiform law”, 144 or do we still need to understand how a common liter-
ary culture was individualized in each society? 145 Should we perhaps look at
the general ancient Near Eastern cultural context as determinative and
amend differences to become similarities? 146 This writer thinks it is perhaps
141 The issue of the relationship of Sumerian culture to that of Mesopotamia

more generally or Babylon and Akkad more particularly has been discussed in the
various articles collected in E. Sollberger, ed., “Aspects du Contact Suméro-
Akkadien,” Genava 8 (1960): 241–314. See especially Kraus’ famous article “Ein
zentrales Problem,” and the comments made in conclusion pp. 294–96. Similar
problems are mentioned by Tigay, “On Evaluating,” 253.
142 For differing opinions see Jackson, Essays, 40 and Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna.
143 e.g. Tigay, “On Evaluating”, and William W. Hallo, “Biblical History in its
Near Eastern Setting: The Contextual Approach,” in Scripture in Context: Essays on
the Comparative Method (ed. C. D. Evans, William W. Hallo, and J. B. White; Pitts-
burgh Theological Monograph Series 34; Pittsburgh: Pickwick, 1980), 1–26. See
esp. p. 2.
144 As with many before us e.g. Paulo Koschaker, “Keilschriftrecht,” Zeitschrift
für Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft 89 (1935): 1–39 and “Cuneiform Law,” in
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (ed. E. R. A. Seligman; vol. 9; New York:
Macmillan, 1959), 211–9, 263–4; Victor Korošec, “Keilschriftrecht,” in Orientalisches
Recht (ed. B. Spuler; Handbuch der Orientalistik 3; Leiden: Brill, 1964), 49–219; E.
A. Speiser, “Cuneiform Law and the History of Civilization,” Proceedings of the Ameri-
can Philosophical Society 107 (1963): 536–41. Westbrook is even more general, speak-
ing of ancient Near Eastern law as a unit. See notes 12–13 above.
145 To which most at least pay lip service e.g. Malul, Comparative Method, 150–51;
Tigay, “On Evaluating,” 252, 255; Hallo, “Contextual Approach,” 8; Talmon,
“Comparative Method,” esp. 342; John H. Walton, Ancient Israelite Literature in its
Cultural Context: A Survey of Parallels Between Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern Texts
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1989), 74–75, 90–91. It should be noted here
that some emphasise this in order to emphasise the uniqueness of Israel while oth-
ers do so in order to continue parallel hunting (and thus emphasise similarity or
dependence) despite the differences.
146 Following Westbrook! See especially his work regarding the difference be-
tween laws recording punishments such as death or talio versus those recording
INTRODUCTION 29
best to leave final conclusions on these matters to a discussion a posteriori

rather than decide the issue beforehand in an attempt to define an objective
a priori method. Let it be said that such issues will be kept in mind as com-
parisons are made and that an eye will be kept on each possible cultural
background.
The issue of putting these sources within their cultural context raises
an old debate that was heightened within the field of ancient Near Eastern
law by the publication of Greenberg’s article “Some Postulates of Biblical
Criminal Law”. 147 In essence, Greenberg’s argument was that the apparent
differences between criminal law in the Hebrew Bible and that in Mesopo-
tamia were caused by the different ideological principles underlying the dif-
ferent societies. The potential apologetic use of this argument drew criti-
cism from a number of angles. 148 One of the arguments that has arisen is
that one cannot draw out underlying societal principles from the law collec-
tions due to their casuistic framing. 149 The argument is basically that unless
the principles are spelled out by the society themselves, we have no busi-
ness trying to figure them out. 150 While this writer agrees that it is a difficult
task to draw out principles or ideals which are not clearly spelled out, 151 he
compensation. Rather than explain the differences culturally or developmentally, he

argues that both existed side by side in all cultures, thus erasing any apparent dis-
similarity. See for example Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law (Cahiers de la Revue
Biblique 26; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1988), ch. 2. For a critique see Malul’s review Orien-
talia 59 (1990): 85–91.
147 Greenberg, “Postulates”. See note 19. For an interesting approach to the
more general question of Israelite distinctiveness see Machinist, “The Question of

Distinctiveness in Ancient Israel: An Essay,” in Ah, Assyria . . . Studies in Assyrian
History and Ancient Near Eastern Historiography Presented to Hayim Tadmor (ed. M. Co-
gan and I. Eph`al; Scripta Hierosolymitana 33; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1991), 196–212.
148 Some were similar to the protests of Finkelstein, “Bible and Babel: A Com-
parative Study of the Hebrew and Babylonian Religious Spirit,” Commentary 26
(1958): 436–38 that this sort of comparison violated a true understanding of ancient
Mesopotamian culture. See that of Jackson, Essays, 30–41. Malul, Comparative
Method, recognises the usefulness of Greenberg’s approach to an extent, see p. 40,
n. 6 and p. 46, n. 21, but sees its allegiance to the contrastive method and its apolo-
getic usage as an abuse, e.g. pp. 50–51. See also S. Loewenstamm’s critique of
Greenberg, “The Law of Adultery and the Law of Murder in Biblical Law and
Mesopotamian Law,” Beth Mikra 13 (1962): 55–59.
149 Primarily argued by Jackson, Essays, 32–36, 63, 74, 165.
150 Jackson, Essays, 63 and in more detail in “History, Dogmatics,” 11–12.
151 For example, how does one enter the mind of a civilisation that sentences to
death people who sleep with cows, sheep, pigs or dogs, but no punishment for
does not agree with the proposition that it is a fruitless exercise. The fact
that the main proponent of the ideal that we should not attempt this is in-
consistent in his application 152 and bases his theory on an idiomatic version
of Chomskian structuralism 153 enables us to rest easily in our lack of sub-
scription to his theory. One suspects the argument is aimed primarily
against those like Greenberg whose arguments have an apologetic use. 154 It
is not safe to assume that an apologetic use necessarily equals falsity of
method or conclusion. Most who discuss the casuistic nature of the law
collections quite freely admit that they are able to be used to extract some
form of underlying ideal. 155 The fact that the present study does not include
Israel should help alleviate some of the criticisms of its method also. By
testing certain methods of comparison used in reference to biblical material
solely on other ancient Near Eastern material it is also hoped that this study
will help to implement Kitchen’s dictum that “methods or principles which
are demonstrably false when applied to first-hand ancient Near Eastern data
should not be imposed on Old Testament data”. 156
The following discussion will focus on the trend towards comparison
solely on the basis of literary context. When LH was first discovered and
comparative studies were undertaken, the interest was to compare the actual
law of Babylonian society with that of others. Through the many changes
those who sleep with horses or mules- HL 187–88, 199–200? For some attempts
see Harry Angier Hoffner, The Laws of the Hittites: A Critical Edition, (Documenta et
Monumenta Orientis Antiqui 23; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 224, 227 or Richard Haase,
“The Hittite Kingdom,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (ed. Raymond
Westbrook; vol. 1; Handbook of Oriental Studies 72/1; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 649
who thinks the key to the difference is that the former are used in rituals while the
latter are not.
152 Using underlying societal principles to amend texts even, Essays, 98–101.
153 Jackson, “History, Dogmatics,” esp. p. 14 where he cites Chomsky’s idea of
universals. See also his more complete application of this method in Studies in the
Semiotics of Biblical Law (Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement
314; Sheffield: Sheffield, 2000).
154 See Jackson’s criticism of Greenberg, Essays, 30–41.
155 See Roth’s statement in, Law Collections, 7 that the various collections of law
“are all products of the cultural assumptions and values of their drafters and copy-
ists”. See also her, “Reading Law,” where she argues for the law cases as paradigm
exemplars used to teach such “standards”. Compare Jackson’s explicit denial of this
in Essays, 165.
156 Kenneth Kitchen, Ancient Orient and Old Testament (London: Tyndale, 1966),
28.
INTRODUCTION 31
that have taken place in the field since, most comparisons are now done in
an attempt to underscore the literary culture and intertextuality behind the
drafting of the written law collections or to define the “genre” so as to have
a key to understanding the purpose of the text. This literary emphasis has
become so ingrained that few complain when an article on comparative
method espousing a “contextual approach” is speaking only of the literary
context while excluding any sociological context. 157 This writer is not argu-
ing here that one should not place a written text within its literary context;
rather, that this is not enough. The text should be understood first from
within itself and secondly within the broader cultural context along with any
literary comparison that is attempted. The ideas that the “individual is inef-
fable” 158 or that “genre is the key to the understanding of the text” 159 are
not ones to which this writer subscribes. If the first claim is true one won-
ders how the first texts were ever written. It is the contention of this writer
that the individual literary clues within a text and the actual content of it are
what help make meaning rather than the text’s relationship to a genre. 160
Therefore we will not concern ourselves overly much with whether or not
we are comparing texts of the same genre. 161 Similarly we distance ourselves
from Form Criticism and therefore Talmon’s well intentioned notion that
one should only compare texts which have the same Form and Sitz im Le-
ben. 162 Form Criticism’s shaky foundations in the Romanticist idea of the
purity of the original and the simplicity of original form combined with the
fact that very few, if any, actual texts seem to fit this ideal 163 makes one
wonder about the usefulness of such a tool. The hypothetical reconstruc-
157 Hallo, “Contextual Method,” 2. But do see Malul’s comments, Comparative

Method, 87–88, about the fact that people do still compare actual life and culture
and literary context even though both are accessed mainly through written docu-
ments. His call to be clear about which one is comparing should perhaps be
heeded. This writer attempts to do both to some extent. While not necessarily deal-
ing with the actual law of the various cultures, it is best attempt to place the literary
texts within a cultural context.
158 See discussion of this idea in Longman, “Form Criticism,” 50–51.
159 Ibid., 51, 53, 61–63.
160 Longman’s approach of mutual elucidation from both the content and genre
is similar but this writer believes he places too much emphasis on the role of genre
for elucidation. See Ibid., 59.
161 As Hallo, “Contextual Approach,” 3 advocates.
162 Talmon, “Comparative Method,” 351–52.
163 i.e. each text is seen to be a conglomeration of mixed forms from different
places in life.
tion of the prehistory of a text as the key to its interpretation based on such
a flimsy presupposition will form no part of this work. One wonders at the
continuance of this method. 164 Genre criticism has arisen on the back of
structuralist literary criticism and the focus on the whole text rather than its
individual parts. This is to be welcomed to some extent, but there are prob-
lems with an undue emphasis on genre.
The idea that one should only compare texts of the same genre (or
form) assumes an unnecessary a priori, namely, that the framing of legal ma-
terial in different “genre” could not reflect cultural differences. 165 To what
authority does one appeal to decide genre is most important when compar-
ing two texts? This seems especially problematic as most admit that to bor-
row genre/form is not necessarily to borrow the ideals or framework of
another civilization. Why is it that so many think that form/genre is more
likely to be borrowed than content? 166 Is this less offensive to the “Eigenbe-
grifflichkeit” of the borrowing society? Perhaps it is, but the emphasis on
comparing texts of the same genre can lead to scholars forcing texts into a
generic mould so that they can be compared. 167 Is it not more important to
pay attention to what the text actually says while keeping an eye on how it is
framed and watching for possible links to other texts? In this sense the
shape, function and content of the law collections of the ancient Near East
will here be compared. Attention will be paid to the cultural context which
the text stems from, not just the literary context. The move from treating
LH as substantive law to treating it as a propagandistic text has gone along
with the influence of literary interpretation on the field of history and the
emphasis on treating written evidence as a “text”. Though this has had
some fruitful consequences one must not shy too far from treating the texts
as some reflection of reality. This said, to some extent this debate is avoided
164 Eckart Otto and Reuven Yaron are perhaps the main scholars working on
ancient Near Eastern law who focus on such a method.
165 e.g. Israel’s framing of parts of its law within a covenantal framework. But
see the discussion of Longman, “Form Criticism,” 53–54 who mentions that “a
culture-free genre system does not exist”.
166 e.g. Jackson, Essays, 23 or R. A. F. Mackenzie, “The Formal Aspects of An-
cient Near Eastern Law,” in The Seed of Wisdom: Essays in Honour of T.J. Meek (ed. W.
S. McCullogh; Toronto: University of Toronto, 1964), 32 where he states that the
“family resemblance which they do show concerns more their form than their sub-
stance.”
167 e.g. the assumption that most of the law collections were “monumental” in-
scriptions even though we do not have evidence of this and the forcing of some of
the law collections into the tripartite structure of LH.
INTRODUCTION 33
by focusing on the law collections themselves rather than the actual “law of
practice” of the various cultures. As mentioned earlier, this is more to do
with the number of sources that would need to be covered (for some col-
lections and the total lack of them in others) in such an exercise rather than
a firm position that the law collections do not reflect reality. 168
Perhaps the next problem which should be addressed is that of identi-
fying a parallel and explaining its significance. This is a problem that plagues
comparativists of all kinds. All agree that this is a very difficult task. It is
certainly one that is open to the subjective mind of the scholar. 169 Talmon
has described the phenomenon thus: “personal inspiration often takes the
place of systematic investigation, and impressionistic déjà vu insights substi-
tute for the required procedural principles”. 170 Even Malul, with his “scien-
tific” criteria for picking a parallel, admits that determining the “direction,
nature or type” 171 of it is a more subjective matter. Weeks poses the prob-
lems more pertinently: “Does X look similar enough to Y to exclude acci-
dental resemblance and prove historical connection? Whether we ask the
question for a literary form or an artistic style we confront the same diffi-
culty. Convincing similarity is in the eye of the beholder.” 172 With Weeks,
this writer also affirms that the discussion is still worthwhile. An attempt
will be made to pick similarities as well as differences and to offer an expla-
nation though, as mentioned earlier, no attempt will be made to identify
stimulus diffusion. Though it is quite possible that this form of borrowing
lies behind some of the similarities amongst the law collections, there is not
room in this work to explore the methodological issues surrounding how
one distinguishes stimulus diffusion from independent invention in similar
circumstances. This is, of course, a subject worth investigating more fully in
the future.
As mentioned earlier we will be comparing the shape, function and
content of the law collections. In the conclusion this will be briefly related
168 The function of the law collections will be discussed in the next chapter.
The difference can be seen between Malul and others who look for literary borrow-
ings (see Comparative Method, 93–94, n. 1), versus those like Smith, “Law Codes,”
who presume an actual legal tradition behind the collections and therefore compare
this. Otto is of this latter mould also. Being a form critic, he is certain that a similar-
ity of form must also mean a common background or Sitz im Leben as its basis.
169 Again, see Tigay’s discussion of differing interpretation of parallels, “On
Evaluating”.
170 Talmon, “Comparative Method,” 344.
172 Weeks, Admonition and Curse, 3.
to a comparison of the world views and cultural makeup of the various so-
cieties behind these collections in an attempt to explain the similarities and
differences. It should be noted at this point that a cultural determinist point
of view is not held by the present author. 173 This would be far too simplis-
tic, as the geographically 174 or racially deterministic 175 comparisons of the
past have been. Though points of similarity exist between the approach out-
lined here and Baines and Yoffee’s method spelled out in “Order, Legiti-
macy and Wealth”, 176 this project will not restrict itself to these categories.
An attempt will be made to stay open to a range of possible reasons for
similarity or difference, ascribing to the possibility of a multi-causal ap-
proach. 177 It is expected that this study will show that such deterministic
methods are inherently flawed and miss the obvious fact that usually life is
more complex. 178 It is also hoped that this complexity will “not blind us to
general tendencies”. 179
From at least the time of Aristotle onwards, it has been recognized
that History, as a discipline, tends toward the study of the particular. Aris-
totle saw this as a weakness for history as it could thus not deal very well
with the general, the big questions, and was therefore of less use than phi-
losophy or poetry. 180 This said, from Roman times onwards general history
has also been written, often in an attempt to give answers to large questions
of a philosophical or practical nature. This tension between the accuracy of
the particular and the usefulness of the general is one that has been felt
173 This approach is criticised, from an anthropological point of view by A. Ku-

per, Culture: the Anthropologists’ Account (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University,
1999).
174 Frankfort.
175 Delitzsch.
176 Baines and Yoffee, “Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth”. This writer finds
points of contact with their emphasis on the importance of kingship and ideology
as areas of comparison to help understand the cultures of Mesopotamia and Egypt
and in their subscription to the idea of cultural differences within the ancient Near
East but is less sympathetic to their treatment of all texts as propaganda addressed
to the divine or the elite, their emphasis on the concept of order in both societies
and their priest vs state dichotomy.
177 Discussed by Adams, Gerven, and Levy, “Retreat,” in reaction to migration-
ism, diffusionism, materialism , evolutionism etc. within their own field.
178 Weeks, Admonition and Curse, 8–9, 175.
179 Ibid., 176.
180 Aristotle, “The Poetics,” in Richard P. McKeon, ed. The Basic Works of Aris-
totle. (New York: Random House; 1941), section 9.

INTRODUCTION 35
within historiography throughout the ages. Even the man hailed by many as
the founder of history’s empirical method, Leopold von Ranke, felt this
tension and in his old age attempted a “Universal History”. 181 This writer
also feels this tension in the present study and is wary of the dangers that
come with a more general work. As argued earlier, the possible usefulness
of such a work, and the myriad of scholars who are capable of correcting
errors of detail within it, make it a worthwhile exercise. Due to limitations
within our sources, many conclusions must be only tentative. This may limit
the usefulness of the study somewhat, and though we generally concur with
Boulding that, “It will be a sad day for man when nobody is allowed to ask
questions that do not have any answers”, 182 it is hoped that the answers
offered here will be of some use.
At the end of this introduction the reader can probably tell that this
writer has less sympathy with Elton’s suggestion that, “a philosophic con-
cern with such problems as the reality of historical knowledge or the nature
of historical thought only hinders the practice of history” 183 and more with
Butterfield’s that, “It matters very much how we start upon our labours”. 184
181 While holding to positions such as the following: “strict presentation of

facts, no matter how conditional and unattractive they might be, is undoubtedly the
supreme law”, he attempted to mesh them with an eye for the universal e.g. “It is
necessary that the historian keep his eyes open for the general”, an historian “will
not have preconceived ideas as does the philosopher, but rather while he observes
the particular, the course which the development of the world in general has taken
will be revealed to him”, “It was impossible to remain content with the history of
individual nations. A collection of national histories . . . is not what we mean by
Universal History”, “I have not devoted much space to less significant events; but
this has enabled me to pay the greater attention to those of world historical impor-
tance”, “historians are also mistaken who consider history simply an immense ag-
gregate of particular facts”. See the selection from Ranke’s works in Fritz Stern, The
Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present (2nd ed., Cleveland: Macmillan, 1970),
54–62.
182 Quoted in Adams, Gerven, and Levy, “Retreat,” 505.
183 Geoffrey Elton, The Practice of History (2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), vii.
184 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London: G. Bell, 1931),
27.
2 COMPARISONS
2.1 SOURCES
2.1.1 Overview
The documents we will be comparing under the rubric of “law collections”
are the following:
Reforms of Uru-Inimgina (RU)
Laws of Ur-Nammu (LU)
Laws of X (LX)
Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (LL)
Laws of Rented Oxen (LOx)
Sumerian Laws Exercise Tablet (SLEx)
Sumerian Laws Handbook of Forms (SLHF)
Laws of Eshnunna (LE)
Laws of Hammurabi (LH)
Ammiṣaduqa’s Edict (AE)
Middle Assyrian Laws (MAL)
Middle Assyrian Palace Decrees (MAPD)
Hittite Laws (HL)
Edict of Telepinu (ETel.)
Edict of Tudhaliya IV (ETud.)
Edict of Haremhab (EH)
Nauri Decree (ND)
Elephantine Decree (ED)
As one can see we are not too worried about looking at material only
from one generic classification. We are interested in comparing works about
law from the different cultures of the ancient Near East before the first-
millennium B.C. Below is some information regarding these sources.
Reforms of Uru-Inimgina (RU)
Author/Date: Uru-inimgina, last ruler of First dynasty of Lagash.
Ruled 2351–2342 B.C.
37
Texts/Copies: 1 Six copies. Five on clay nails/cones, one on an oval

clay plaque. There are supposedly three different versions. 2
Language: Sumerian.
Laws of Ur-Nammu (LU)
Author/Date: Most likely Ur-Nammu, founder of Third dynasty of
Ur, r. 2112–2095 B.C. Some have argued that his son Šulgi was the author
due to the mention of military conquests that cannot be firmly ascribed to
Ur-Nammu’s reign. 3 It is likely the text was written late in the reign of Ur-
Nammu. This would go some way to accounting for the lack of reference to
these military activities. 4
Text: 5 Three manuscripts from Nippur, Ur and perhaps Sippar. There
is no evidence that this was set up as a stele 6 apart from the reference to the
future ruler who effaces the inscription in LX, which may be the conclusion
of LU. Wilcke assigns LL a–g (of Roth’s edition) to LU also. 7 For ease of
reference Roth’s edition will be followed here.
1 For English translations and bibliographical information regarding the cunei-

form see “Reforms of Uru-inimgina,” trans. William W. Hallo (COS 2.152:407–8)
and Jerrold S. Cooper, Presargonic Inscriptions (Sumerian and Akkadian Royal Inscrip-
tions 1; New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1986), La. 9.1–9.3, 70–78.
Cooper’s translations have been followed in this work unless specified otherwise.
2 See Claus Wilcke, “Early Dynastic and Sargonic Periods,” in A History of An-
cient Near Eastern Law (ed. Raymond Westbrook; vol. 1; Handbook of Oriental
Studies 72/1; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 142, n. 6 and Cooper, loc. cit.
3 See discussions of Samuel Noah Kramer, “The Ur-Nammu Law Code: Who
Was Its Author?” Orientalia 52 (1983): 453–56 and Piotr Steinkeller, “The Adminis-
trative and Economic Organization of the Ur III State: The Core and the Periph-
ery,” in The Organization of Power: Aspects of Bureaucracy in the Ancient Near East (ed.
McGuire Gibson, and Robert D. Biggs; 2nd ed.; Studies in Ancient Oriental Civiliza-
tions 46; Chicago: Oriental Institute, 1991), 15–33.
4 Of course, there remains the possibility that these conquests have been exag-
gerated.
5 For English translation of this text, LX, LL, LOx, SLEx, SLHF, LE, LH,
MAL, and MAPD see Roth, Law Collections. For bibliographic information regard-
ing the cuneiform texts, other translations and treatments see pp. 249–54. Roth’s
translation has been followed in this work for the above collections unless other-
wise specified.
6 Though Bertrand Lafont and Westbrook assume this to be the case. See
“Neo-Sumerian Period (Ur III),” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (ed. Ray-
mond Westbrook; vol. 1; Handbook of Oriental Studies 72/1; Leiden: Brill, 2003),
183.
7 Claus Wilcke, “Der Kodex Urnamma (CU): Versuch einer Rekonstruktion,”
COMPARISONS 39
Language: Sumerian.
Laws of X 8
Author/Date: Name of ruler not preserved. This text is possibly the
end of LU. Roth dates it to 2050–1800.
Text: Fragmentary text from Sippar.
Language: Sumerian.
Laws of Lipit-Ishtar
Author/Date: Lipit-Ishtar, fifth king of the First dynasty of Isin, r.
1934–1924 B.C. Late in his reign while Larsa is coming into ascendancy.
Text: Most sources from Nippur, R from Kish, N from Sippar. There
are more than fifteen mss. a–g perhaps not part of LL. 9 The text is only
preserved on tablets 10 though the epilogue refers to the erection of a stele
(na4), and Roth asserts that some stone fragments of LL have been identi-
fied. 11
Language: Sumerian
Other: There is possibly a year name recording the setting up of this
stele. 12
Laws of Rented Oxen (LOx)
Date: c. 1800 B.C.
Text: There are nine laws but it is unclear if laws eight and nine are
part of the composition. It is witnessed by six supposed student exercise
tablets from Nippur.
Sumerian Laws Exercise Tablet (SLEx)
Date: c. 1800 B.C.
Text: Provenance unknown. The tablet has the name of the student
Bel-šunu and the number of lines recorded on it, and includes a number of
mistakes. On this basis it has been judged a student exercise/copy tablet.
in Riches Hidden in Secret Places: Ancient Near Eastern Studies in Memory of Thorkild
Jacobsen (ed. Tsvi Abusch; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisebrauns, 2002), 291–333.
8 For an alternative treatment to Roth’s, see Piotr Michalowski and C. B. F.
Walker, “A New Sumerian ‘Law Code’,” in DUMU.E2.DUB.BA.A: Studies in Honor
of Åke W. Sjöberg (ed. Hermann Behrens, Darlene Loding and Martha Tobias Roth;
Occasional Publications of the Samuel Noah Kramer Fund 11; Philadephia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Museum, 1989), 383–96.
9 See note 7 above concerning Wilcke’s reconstruction of LU.
10 Westbrook refers to them as exercise tablets, “Old Babylonian Period,” in
History, 361.
11 Roth’s comments before her translation of “The Laws of Lipit-Ishtar,” in
COS 2.154: 411.
12 Roth, Law Collections, 23.
The obverse is badly damaged, while there are ten laws legible on the re-
verse.
Sumerian Laws Handbook of Forms (SLHF)
Date: c. 1700 B.C. Prism.
Text: Provenance unknown. It consists of a mixture of phrases, con-
tractual clauses and laws similar to those of formal collections. It is suppos-
edly written by an accomplished scribe.
Laws of Eshnunna (LE)
Author/Date: Dadusha of Eshnunna. Roth claims a tentative date of
c. 1770 B.C. due to the Sumerian date formula which begins the text. Other
dates and rulers have been offered. 13
Text: 14 There are two large tablets which are almost complete, and a
third which looks like a student exercise tablet with extracts from the laws.
Language: The text begins with fragmentary date for-
mula/superscription in Sumerian. The rest is in Akkadian. There is no evi-
dence that this collection was set up on a stele. 15
Laws of Hammurabi (LH)
Author/Date: Towards the end of the reign of Hammurabi, sixth ruler
of First dynasty of Babylon, r. 1792–1750 B.C. This is deduced from the list
of military achievements in the prologue to the laws and its correlation with
other historical evidence such as the Mari letters and year names.
Text: 16 The collection was found on a black diorite stele in Elam. The
epilogue mentions that the laws were put on the stele for public display and
set up before a statue of Hammurabi, “king of justice” in Babylon within
the Esagil temple. Roth claims that fragments from two other stele of LH
were also found in Susa. 17 The script and presentation of the stele is archaic.
There are dozens of duplicates and extracts of the laws (over 50), including
commentaries, references in catalogues, bilingual Sumerian-Akkadian ver-
sions, three late OB mss with headings, some copies of only pro-
logue/epilogue etc. which range over 1000 years.
Language: Akkadian
13 See the discussion of this and the relevant references in Reuven Yaron, Laws
of Eshnunna, 20–21.
14 For an alternative English translation see Ibid.
15 Though this is assumed by Westbrook, in “Old Babylonian Period,” 361.
16 There are an enormous number of translations of this collection into English
and many other languages. As mentioned earlier, Roth’s translation in Law Collec-
tions will be followed here unless otherwise specified.
COMPARISONS 41
Ammiṣaduqa’s Edict (AE)

Author/Date: Ammiṣaduqa’s version of this edict dates from c. 1640
B.C.
Text: 18 AE is the best preserved of the Old Babylonian edicts and
shares so many similarities with the other two main texts that this study will
not treat them separately. AE has a preamble and 22 paragraphs preserved
whereas the Edict of Samsu-iluna (c. 1740 B.C.) has only the date and 3
paragraphs, and that of another Babylonian king 19 is fragmentary, with only
6 paragraphs.
Language: Akkadian, with Sumerian date formula superscribed.
Middle Assyrian Laws (MAL)
Author/Date: The tablets date to the eleventh century during the reign
of Tiglath-pileser I, r. 1114–1076. Many scholars see them as copies from c.
fourteenth century originals. This would date them to the beginning of As-
syria’s new found power under Aššur-uballit I. r. 1363–1328.
Text: There are a number of tablets dealing with thematic collections
of laws, all of which were found in Aššur. It is not necessarily a single sys-
tematic composition e.g. there is some duplication of provisions in tablets B
and O. The best preserved tablet (A) deals with women and other depend-
ants. There is one duplicate copy of Tablet A from Nineveh which dates to
the Neo-Assyrian period.
Language: Akkadian, in the Middle Assyrian dialect.
Middle Assyrian Palace Decrees (MAPD)
Author/Date: This text includes decrees issued by nine-kings. The text
was assembled in the time of Tiglath-pileser I. The decrees start with orders
from Aššur-uballit I and ends with those of Tiglath-pileser I.
Text: There are nine fragmentary sources from Aššur.
Other: Overlapping laws are not harmonized, just listed in their sepa-
rate decrees.
Hittite Laws (HL)
Author/Date: The author is unknown. There is some good evidence
connecting this text to the early Old Kingdom. 20
18 For an English translation “The Edicts of Samsu-iluna and his Successors,”

trans. William W. Hallo, (COS 2.134: 362–64). Hallo’s translation has been followed
in this work unless specified otherwise. For a critical edition and discussion of the
texts see F.R. Kraus, Königliche Verfugungen in altbabylonischer Zeit (Studia et Docu-
menta ad Iura Orientis Pertinentia 11; Leiden: Brill, 1984).
19 Possibly Ammi-ditana. r. 1683–1647 B.C.. See Hallo’s comments in COS
2.134: 362 and Kraus, Königliche, 293.
20 A number of scholars however prefer to date it to the reign of Telepinu,
Text: 21 From Hattusa, at site of royal court of justice. Two tablets: “If
a man” and “If a vine”. Probably a third tablet, also “If a man”, not pre-
served. Modified parallel text to first tablet: KBo VI 4. Four copies of laws
in Old Hittite (1650–1500), rest are Middle Hittite or Neo-Hittite (1500–
1180).
Language: Hittite
Other: Has been reworked over time e.g. “Formerly . . . now”, and the
late Parallel Text (PT).
Edict of Telepinu (ETel.)
Author/Date: The Hittite king Telepinu who ruled part way through
the Old Kingdom period. This text dates to c. 1500.
Text: 22 There are at least seven thirteenth century copies of the Old
Hittite text and two manuscripts of an Akkadian translation.
Language: Hittite.
Edict of Tudhaliya IV (ETud.)
Author/Date: The Hittite king Tudhaliya IV who ruled 1265–1240,
during the New Kingdom period.
Text: 23 The Edict is witnessed in one New Kingdom copy.
Language: Hittite.
Edict of Haremhab (EH)
based on little more than the fact this king is known to have instituted other re-
forms. See the discussion of this issue in Itamar Singer’s review of Hoffner’s critical
edition in Journal of Near Eastern Studies 60 (2001): 288–89. For the view held here
see Singer’s review, Alfonso Archi, “Sulla formazione del testo delle leggi ittite,”
Studi micenei ed egeo-anatolici 7 (1968): 54–89 and Franca Pecchioli Daddi, “Il re, il
padre del re, il nonno del re,” Orientis Antiqui Miscellanea 1 (1994): 75–91.
21 Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites.
22 The English translation followed here is “The Proclamation of Telipinu,”
trans. Th. P. J. van den Hout (COS 1.76: 194–98). For a critical edition see Inge
Hoffmann, Der Erlaβ Telipinus (Texte der Hethiter 11; Heidelberg: Carl Winter,
1984).
23 An English translation (with transliteration) is given by Westbrook and Roger
D. Woodard, “The Edict of Tudhaliya IV,” in Journal of the American Oriental Society
110 (1990): 641–59. As will be mentioned, this translation is skewed towards a par-
ticular reading of this text. The earlier critical treatment of this text should also be
consulted, E. von Schuler, “Hethitische Königserlässe als Quellen der
Rechtsfindung und ihr Verhältnis zum kodifizierten Recht,” in Festschrift Johannes
Friedrich (ed. R. von Kienle, A. Moortgart, Heinrich Otten, E. von Schuler, and W.
Zaumsell; Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959), 435–72.
COMPARISONS 43
Author/Date: Haremhab, last ruler of the eighteenth or first of the

nineteenth dynasty, r. 1323–1295.
Text: 24 Set up on pylon at Karnak.
Language: Similar to the Amarna dialect with its tendencies towards
Late Egyptian.
Nauri Decree (ND)
Author/Date: Issued by Seti I, r. 1294–1279.
Text: 25 Set up on stone in Nubia, concerning an estate in Nubia be-
longing to temple of Osiris at Abydos.
Elephantine Decree of Ramesses III (ED)
Author/Date: Possibly dated to the reign of Ramesses III. 26
Text: 27 Inscription on a temple block which is part of the quay wall in
Elephantine. The text safeguards the temple of Khnum.
Already we can see some differences in the way these various cultures
presented legal material. Of course we need to be cautious in playing too
much on these differences at this point. There are many problems with our
evidence. It is hard to know whether some of the differences we see are
accidents of discovery rather than reflections of an actual difference in the
place of law within a society’s worldview. The most extreme example of this
is perhaps the vexed question of the existence of an Egyptian collection of
laws comparable to those of Mesopotamia and Hatti. 28 Is our lack of such a
document due to the difficulties surrounding the preservation of papyrus or
the system of justification around Egyptian kingship? 29 There is also a diffi-
24 For English translation see William J. Murnane, Texts from the Amarna Period in
Egypt (Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Ancient World 5; Atlanta,
Ga.: Scholars, 1995), text 108, pp. 235–39. This is based on Jean-Marie Kruchten’s
critical edition, Le Decret d’Horemheb:Traduction, commentaire épigraphique, philologique et
instutionnel (Brussels: University of Brussels Press, 1981). For an earlier English
translation see Kurt Pflüger, “The Edict of Haremhab,” Journal of Near Eastern Stud-
ies 5 (1946): 260–76. Murnane’s translation has been followed here.
25 For an English translation see William F. Edgerton, “The Nauri Decree of
Seti I: A translation and analysis of the legal portion,” in Journal of Near Eastern Stud-
ies 6 (1947): 219–30. This translation does not include the long prologue and epi-
logue for which see the earlier edition of F. Lt. Griffith, “The Abydos Decree of
Seti I at Nauri,” in Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 13 (1927): 193–208.
26 We may have an epilogue to this decree which mentions the name of
Ramesses III. See Griffith, “Abydos Decree,” 207.
27 For an English translation see Griffith, “Abydos Decree,” 207–8.
28 e.g. LH, LE, LU (and LX), LL, MAL, HL.
29 This is a question we will return to later on.
culty in that the one culture can present law in various forms. This is espe-
cially the case if we treat Mesopotamia as a whole. There we have law
within the more formal law collections connected to rulers, in decrees, aca-
demic treatises, historical inscriptions mentioning reforms, palace decrees,
and whatever MAL are! This raises the possibility that we could make too
much of the presence or absence of any one of these forms within a culture.
Even if we divide Mesopotamia into smaller units we would run into similar
problems. There is also the problem of arguments from silence. It is highly
unlikely one can have positive evidence of the lack of something. To be
able to discuss the lack of something in one culture versus its presence in
another, one must resort to arguments from silence. This is always done
with hesitation, but is unavoidable to some extent. We can but proceed with
these cautions in mind. Perhaps there is much we can still make of the (at
least apparent) differences. Our method will be to compare on the basis of
the evidence we have at our disposal, not to read in what is expected, and
certainly not to alter what we have so it fits expectations. 30 The comparison
will focus on the larger, more formal law collections 31 but will include the
others in the belief that this will help the study avoid any oversimplification
of issues. 32 We shall also test the theory that there is widespread verbatim
copying or translation amongst these collections, 33 and Westbrook’s theory
that: “a large number of the same cases recur in different codes. They are
not necessarily presented in the same language, nor do they always have the
same solution.” 34
2.1.2 Form
There are a number of issues which are raised through a discussion of the
forms 35 within the ancient Near Eastern law collections. Claims are regu-
larly made that it is the form more than the content which is similar in these
30 Our suspicion that the enforcement of a uniform common law of the ancient
Near East upon the evidence does it some injustice lies behind this.
31 LH, LE, LU (and LX), LL, MAL and HL.
32 See discussion in the introduction, p. 5.
33 e.g. Norman Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 102; Nicholas Postgate, Early
Mesopotamia, 289.
35 Form here is distinguished from structure. Issues related to the tripartite
structure of some law collections and the role of prologue, epilogue, superscription
etc. will follow shortly. This present section aims to cover merely the significance of
casuistic, relative, apodictic forms etc. within the law collections.
COMPARISONS 45
collections. 36 For some the similarities in form are seen as part of the spread
of “cuneiform culture”, 37 while others see the similarities as natural ones. 38
There are those who see the differences in form as reflecting a different
worldview with regards to the morality of law, 39 some who see the differ-
ences as part of developmental change, 40 and those for whom these differ-
ences are seen as trivial. 41 Through Form Criticism many issues are raised as
to the original source material for the law collections and their Sitz im Le-
ben. 42 The origins of the different forms also raise the question of the nature
and purpose of the law collections. This aspect of the debate about forms
will be left until a later section. 43 The present section will attempt to assess
the similarity of forms in these texts and discuss the significance of both
general similarities and the differences which do occur.
A description of the forms in the various law collections will be a help-
ful place to begin. Much of the scholarship regarding forms is based on a
distinction between three main forms: conditional (if), relative (any who),
and apodictic (do/do not). It is argued here that the distinction between the
first two is not always firm, and that it is the influence of the study of Ro-
man law which has led to scholars’ attempts to keep such a distinction. A
more general distinction between casuistic and apodictic is more feasible
36 e.g. Mackenzie, “Formal Aspects,” 32 where he states that the “family resem-
blance which they do show concerns more their form than their substance.” See
also Bernard S. Jackson, Essays, 23.
37 Mackenzie, “Formal Aspects,” 32; E. A. Speiser, “Cuneiform Law and the
History of Civilization,” 536–39; Westbrook, “Codification and Canonization,” in
La Codification des lois dans l’antiquité: Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg, 27–29 Novembre
1997 (ed. Edmond Levy; Travaux du centre de recherche sur le Proche-Orient et la
Grèce antiques 16; Paris: De Boccard, 2000), 35.
38 See the discussion by Herbert Petschow, “Zu den Stillformen antiker Gesetze
und Rechtssammlungen,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 82 (1965):
36–38; Reuven Yaron, “Forms in the Laws of Eshnunna,” Revue Internationale des
droits de l’antiquité 9 (1962): 150.
39 Mackenzie, “Formal Aspect”; Walton, Ancient Israelite Literature, 80–83, 90–91.
40 This theory is heavily influenced by Daube’s theories regarding the develop-
ment of Roman legal forms in Forms of Roman Legislation (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1956). This model is applied to the ancient Near Eastern collections by
Petschow, “Stillformen,” and Yaron, “Forms,” e.g. 150.
41 Westbrook, “Character,” 17: “the approach is always the same.”
42 See the works of Yaron and Eckart Otto in particular for modern proponents
of this approach.
43 Section 2.1.4
though its usefulness can be questioned, especially through an analysis of

EH.
The section of RU covering Uru-inimgina’s legal reforms is not cast in
the casuistic form which is to become common later on. After an account
of the abuses which were being perpetrated before his rule, he lists his re-
forms as past action in the third person.
Each of the provisions in LU begins with the Sumerian tukum-bi, “its
case”. This is certainly a casuistic form. Though this term is usually trans-
lated as “if”, one could hardly argue that it introduces a conditional clause.
The same is the case for LL and all but one of the laws contained in LX. 44
Provision j 45 of LX is cast in the Sumerian equivalent of a relative clause, 46
“A female-weaver who…”. It is worth noting that this provision involves
the listing of a price. Provision k may be cast similarly but is broken.
The provisions of LOx also all begin with tukum-bi as do those of
SLEx. 47 The legal clauses and provisions collected in SLHF are diverse in
their form. Some are simple statements of past action, possibly recording an
action from a case. 48 Others are statements about future action 49 or the pre-
sent state of affairs. Some are in the more regular casuistic form beginning a
protasis with tukum-bi describing a possible offence followed by an apodosis
making a statement about the consequent action to be taken/punishment to
be carried out. Some have a protasis-apodosis form without a relative clause
or an initial tukum-bi. 50 There are other forms also which look as though
they are phrases from contracts or di-til-la records. 51
There are a number of forms in LE. The casuistic form beginning with
šumma is by far the most common. The term šumma is universally translated
as “if”. In Akkadian the distinction between a conditional and a relative
clause would then be distinguishable linguistically, but this writer doubts
44 Which, as we have mentioned earlier, is seen by some as the end of LU.

45 For the sake of consistency and ease of reference we will follow Roth’s num-
bering where possible.
46 Formed by the addition of the nominalising particle ‘a’ after the verbal root.
47 Provision 5 seems to be a continuation of provision 4 rather than a com-
pletely new paragraph. This may explain the lack of the term at the beginning of
this provision.
48 Be it swearing, validating documents, sounding a horn, having someone killed
etc.
49 Whether in the future tense or the desiderative mood.
50 e.g. iv 31–34 which looks like part of a split-protasis or iv 12–14 which merely
states a past action and its consequence, “He despised her. He shall . . .”.
51 e.g. viii 11–15, vii 34–36, v 45, ii 26–31 etc.
COMPARISONS 47
that there are significant conceptual differences between these two casuistic
forms. There is also some evidence to suggest that the term began as a form
of the demonstrative rather than a conditional particle. 52 There are a num-
ber of variations of the šumma clause. 53 There are four apodictic com-
mands, 54 three of which are negatively formulated, “x shall not…”, 55 and
one positively, “x shall…”. 56 The collection also contains three provisions
with the relative construction awilum ša, “A man who…”. 57 Eleven provi-
sions in LE concern the regulation of price and hire or rates of exchange or
interest which are not framed in a casuistic style.
LH is almost completely casuistic in its framing (each clause beginning
with šumma); even the regulations about price, hire and wage are put into
this mould. There are, however, several laws concerning real estate 58 and
one about adoption 59 which are framed as third person apodictic com-
mands.
The edict of Ammiṣaduqa has a smattering of all three forms. Six are
apodictic, 60 11 are relative clauses, and 5 are conditional. Within this mix-
ture there is also the combining of the various forms within the one law e.g.
§3 starts as a relative clause and ends with the apodictic statement, “he may
not collect barley…”; §4 begins with a šumma clause and ends with a relative
clause; §6 begins with an apodictic statement and ends with a conditional
clause, “If he duns, he dies.”
The Middle Assyrian Laws are almost completely conditional in their
form. Three laws are apodictic 61 and one is relative. 62 There is one law
framed conditionally which contains a relative clause, 63 and there is the in-
teresting case of law A 40 which begins as an apodictic statement, but then
52 See the discussion of Mackenzie, “Formal Aspect,” 34 and note 8.

53 The “split-protasis” forms mentioned by Yaron, “Forms,” 141–45. We will
treat them merely as variant casuistic forms.
54 LE 15–16, 51–52 (apart from the provisions concerning price and hire).
55 LE 15–16, 51
56 LE 52
57 LE 12, 13, 19
58 LH 36, 38–40
59 LH 187
60 Almost all of these concern the remittance of debt.
61 A 57–59
62 F 2
63 e.g. A 41
goes on to a relative clause followed by a conditional one. Many of the laws

not from tablet A are too fragmentary to speculate as to their framing.
Mainly conditional again are the Middle Assyrian Palace Decrees. Of-
ten, given the fragmentary nature of some of the laws, we are unable to tell
if a conditional or relative form was used. 64 There are a number of laws
where a mixture of forms may occur. 65 There are some laws which defi-
nitely contain relative constructions. 66 Several laws begin with temporal
clauses 67 and some contain apodictic statements. 68
Casuistic framing is most typical throughout the Hittite Laws which
generally begin with takku. Though most translate this as “if” and treat it as
though it introduces a conditional clause, it has been argued that it was in
fact a temporal conjunction. 69 Laws 50–52 are relative clauses and 54 and
56 seem to be apodictic. These laws concern rendering of services, as does
55 which records the apodictic declaration of the king within a brief histori-
cal narrative. The price laws of 178–185 are framed apodictically (i.e. the
price of x is y), while that of 186 is a series of relative clauses. Interestingly,
while law 48 does not begin with the typical takku, its parallel version (PT)
does. 70
The legal and administrative measures set out at the end of the Edict
of Telepinu are a mixture of casuistic forms using takku, “if” or kuiš,
“someone, whoever”, and apodictic commands of the king. 71 Most provi-
sions include more than one form. 72 The Edict of Tudhaliya IV generally
uses the conditional particle man or takku, though it also employs the rela-
tive kuiš.
64 e.g. § 3
65 e.g. § 1, that of Ashur-uballit I, may contain all three forms. See Roth’s recon-
struction, Law Collections, 197. Also see § 5 which begins with an apodictic statement
and ends with several casuistic or relative clauses.
66 e.g. § 7, § 10, part of § 20 (mixed with casuistic clauses also), part of § 21, part
of § 23
67 e.g. § 7 ištu, “after”, § 6 ki, “when” or “if” (the latter would make the clause
conditional/casuistic rather than temporal, § 8 ina um, “on the day when . . .”.
68 § 5
69 See the discussion of Mackenzie, “Formal Aspect,” 34–35 and note 9.
70 A Neo-Hittite version of the laws which has revised them at points.
71 e.g. § 29 which is framed as a second person prohibitive.
72 e.g. § 28 begins with a command and then a series of conditions introduced
by takku; § 29 begins with a relative clause introduced by kuiš and is followed by a
series of commands.
COMPARISONS 49
The Edict of Haremhab is traditionally divided into two legal sections:

a latter section dealing with administrative reforms and an earlier section
dealing with law more properly. 73 In the legal section a conditional framing
is more typical while there are also many relative clauses. 74 The supposed
conditional form of those clauses introduced by ir is not absolute. This par-
ticle can also mean “as to” or “concerning” which, while still casuistic, is
not necessarily conditional. 75 In the administrative section there are several
apodictic declarations, a few relative clauses and a number of sections of
historical narrative. The generally casuistic nature of this collection is inter-
esting given its framing as the direct speech/commands of the king. 76
The section of the Nauri Decree recording the decree of the king to
the court has four smaller sections which begin with a list of wrongs to be
prevented and are followed by a series of relative clauses which outline the
penalties to be meted out for any offenders.
What is the significance of all this? Is it possible to sort through all
these texts and forms and come to solid conclusions? The most obvious
similarity between all these texts is the preponderance of casuistic forms. A
number of the above mentioned texts are almost completely casuistic. For
all but EH, ND, RU, EA, ETel. and SLHF, 77 a form argued to be condi-
tional is most common amongst the legal provisions of the collections.
What does this show? That a conditional form is a natural way to express a
law? 78 Or, given its less frequent use in our two Egyptian texts, do we put it
down to the spread of “cuneiform law”? 79 Given its widespread use in
Greek, Roman and later law, and its appearance within EH, the former
seems more likely. Why then do some texts use only that form, some mix it
with others, and some avoid it all together? 80 Does this reflect Daube’s
model of development from the concrete conditional cases which reflected
folk-law to the more general and systematic relative forms, more reflective
73 See Pflüger’s translation, “Haremhab”.

74 There are also some where the text is fragmentary and it is hard to tell.
75 See Raymond O. Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian (Oxford:
Griffith Institute, 1999), 24, 145 (ir can be the full form of the preposition r).
76 Mackenzie tries to avoid this problem with his statements regarding the ad-
ministrative rather than legislative function of the Egyptian material and its lack of
set juridical modes of expression, “Formal Aspect,” 39.
77 5 of the 15 collections
78 Even form critics like Yaron acknowledge this as very likely, “Forms”.
79 See note 37 above.
80 e.g. the later Neo-Babylonian laws which are all relative in form.
of a legal system, and then finally to the apodictic form which comes close
to the expression of underlying principles? 81 This model has been argued to
hold up in regards to Keilschriftrechten by Petschow. 82 The argument rests on
shaky grounds. Some argue that the earliest law collections consist almost
exclusively of conditional forms, those of the Old to Middle Babylonian
period display some sort of mixture of forms, and then the Neo-Babylonian
laws consist solely of relative clauses. This is problematic and rests on the
determination of tukum-bi as a particle introducing a conditional clause.
While this writer happily acknowledges tukum-bi as one of the many parti-
cles introducing casuistically framed laws, he cannot accept it as a condi-
tional form. The fact that our earliest collections are in Sumerian and do
tend to have only casuistic forms, 83 says very little. That LH has a prepon-
derance of conditional clauses, though written after LE, which mixes condi-
tional and relative, also argues against this conclusion. There is only one
first-millennium B.C. cuneiform law collection available to us, hardly
enough to generalize as to developmental principles. 84 Perhaps the snap-
shot of collections from the second-millennium B.C., displaying various
mixtures of all forms should be taken on its own terms, not forced into a
developmental mould. Given the fact that most available collections come
from this period, one should be wary in declaring this situation to be ab-
normal. If there were other collections in the first-millennium B.C., perhaps
they would also reflect this diversity. This writer argues that one should fol-
low Roth’s conclusion that both the supposed conditional and relative
clauses are merely variations of a casuistic clause anyway 85 and admit that it
is somewhat forced to read a developmental difference into these collec-
tions on such a basis. This is especially true when one considers the difficul-
ties involved in defining certain particles as conditional. If collections out-
side of southern Mesopotamia are included, it is even more difficult to pos-
tulate a pattern of development; what we see instead is the plurality of
forms available for the structuring of laws.
A similarity amongst the collections is that it is not uncommon for
regulations concerning prices, wages, hire etc. and/or those concerning the
81 Daube, Forms of Roman Legislation.

82 Petschow, “Stillformen”.
83 Except SLHF.
84 For our purposes the dating of the law collections in the Hebrew Bible will
not be considered here.
85 Roth, Law Collections, 3: “A variation of this casuistic formulation is the rela-
tive construction”.
COMPARISONS 51
ownership of state land and the services to be rendered in return, to be

framed differently from the rest of a collection. 86 This said, there is not a
uniform way to frame laws concerning prices etc. nor those concerning state
land. All three forms 87 are used for such laws, there even being diversity
within the one collection. 88 Some have suggested that there are different
forms for laws concerning economic or administrative matters versus those
of a more legal nature, but this does not seem to be borne out by the evi-
dence, especially when one considers that in LH, even these topics were
able to be framed in šumma clauses. 89
Theories which postulate a particular Sitz im Leben for each form run
into the difficulty that most collections contain a mixture of forms. To ask
people to assume that each original section of a text was made up of solely
one form is to ask them to ignore the evidence to the contrary and instills in
them the need to fabricate hypothetical texts. 90 Only four of the texts under
consideration here, all Sumerian, live up to such an ideal, LU, LL, LOx and
SLEx. 91 One may agree with Yaron that a priori: “There is no reason to as-
sume that any one legislator would express his rules in very different
ways”. 92 Given the evidence that this was what legislators 93 had a tendency
to do, the onus should be on those whose assumption goes against the evi-
dence. 94 Perhaps there is no reason to assume that any one legislator would
86 e.g. the prices within LX (one relative clause), LE (various forms, but not
casuistic), Hittite Laws (mostly apodictic, some relative). The prices within LH
however are all forced into the casuistic style that dominates the collection. The
laws concerning the ownership of state land and services to be rendered in return
are framed differently to the rest of the collection in LH (apodictic) and HL (apo-
dictic and relative).
87 i.e. supposedly conditional, apodictic and relative
88 e.g. the variously framed laws concerning prices, wage, hire in LE, or the real
estate laws in HL which use all three forms.

89 Even Yaron, “Forms,” admits that the forms used for prices cannot be used
to argue for a different origin, 139–40.
90 See the works of Eckart Otto who, on the basis of his belief in Form Criti-
cism, postulates original texts which all follow the same form and structure.
91 If LX is the end of LU then this number is further reduced.
92 Yaron, “Forms,” 138.
93 This term is here used for the sake of contrast, not to imply that these law
collections were “legislation” in the modern sense.
94 i.e. though the a priori assumption seems reasonable it is proven incorrect a
posteriori and should thus be abandoned. To force it upon the evidence to the con-
trary just because it seems reasonable and sensible is the wrong approach according
necessarily want to restrict himself to expressing his rules in only one way,
let alone the scribe who actually wrote them up. 95 The fact that the same
material can be framed differently across collections, e.g. the conditional
prices in LH, should make one hesitate to postulate a difference in content
as the cause for a difference in form. 96 It is inconsistent to argue that a dif-
ference of form in a collection such as LE shows that it is made up of a
variety of sources while the uniformity of form within LH shows that the
author responsible covered up the variety of sources he used. 97 The as-
sumption that these collections should be made up of a combination of
sources which are reflected in different forms is obviously playing a greater
role than the evidence in the construction of such a position. As was argued
earlier, it is the influence of both the study of sources in Roman law and
source critical approaches to the Old Testament which lead to such an ap-
proach to ancient Near Eastern law collections.
The idea that offences framed apodictically reflect a moral concern
whereas those framed casuistically or in a relative construction reflect only
an economic or other amoral concern does not seem to fit the evidence
either. 98 This idea has been used as an argument to elevate the Israelite con-
ception of morality onto a higher plane than that of the cultures around
them. 99 The argument is that a law which is framed apodictically is forbid-
den, disobedience is not envisaged whereas a casuistic or relatively formu-
lated law is not forbidden, there are just consequences if one breaks it.
While one may agree that an apodictic statement more clearly enunciates
moral principles and perhaps states them more forcefully one hesitates to
argue that this is always the case. Take the real estate laws of LH and HL as
to this writer.
95 There has been more and more recognition of diversity within scribal prac-
tice. One need not assume different scribes each time a word is written differently
or a different formula or form is used. Perhaps scribes got bored of uniformity,
perhaps they wanted to display their diverse talents, who knows? This writer’s the-
ory of best practice is to deal with the text available rather than trying to recon-
struct hypothetical originals based on unnecessary and inconsistently applied as-
sumptions.
96 See also Roth’s comments regarding the similarity of content between the
Neo-Babylonian Laws and LH despite the difference of form, “The Law Collection
of King Hammurabi,” 28.
97 See Yaron, “Forms,” 137.
98 See e.g Mackenzie, “Formal Aspect” and Walton, Ancient Israelite Literature.
99 Especially through a focus on the Ten Commandments/Words and their
apodictic framing.
COMPARISONS 53
an example. Many of these are framed as apodictic commands. They merely

regulate what land can be sold and who has to pay duties or service in re-
turn. These are hardly higher moral principles than those concerning rape
and adultery in the same collections. 100 Though we rarely have apodictic
commands with a second person address in law collections outside of Is-
rael, 101 one also wonders what is to be done with the majority of Israelite
laws which are not framed in an apodictic manner. Are these of a lower
order of morality? 102
The idea that Egypt’s law was framed apodictically versus the Mesopo-
tamian casuistic framing 103 is difficult to discuss given our lack of a more
formal law collection in Egypt. The tendency towards smaller collections
contained in edicts or decrees may well explain the perception of a relative
preponderance of apodictic commands in Egypt versus those in Mesopo-
tamia. It should be remembered, however, that, though there is a greater
sense that the Egyptian material is apodictic due to its framing as the direct
commands of the Pharaoh, there were many casuistic forms contained
within it. It may be the case that this emphasis on framing law as pharaonic
commands is not just the result of the accidents of discovery, but reflects a
difference in the Egyptian worldview. This writer does not think it reflects a
higher level of morality, rather, a different conception of kingship. Neither
EH nor ND are dominated by apodictic forms so the difference is more
likely to be found in the framing than the forms used.
What then can be said about the similarities and differences of forms
used within the law collections? Little so far, but perhaps more can be said
when we discuss the relationship of these forms to the function of the vari-
ous collections. Thus far the discussion has warned scholars from making
much of the forms used in order to reconstruct borrowing channels, 104
original texts, patterns of development or cultural differences. This position
100 One might also look to the regulations concerning prices etc. which often
tend to be in an apodictic form.
101 Perhaps this is of more significance, though it is important to consider the
second person addresses within Hittite treaties and ETel. 29.
102 See the many studies on the structure of laws in Exodus and Deuteronomy
which see them grouping laws concerning the same commandment (from the Ten
Commandments) together e.g. Stephen A. Kaufman, “The Structure of the Deuter-
onomic Law,” Maarav 1 (1978–1979): 105–58 and A. E. Guilding, “Notes on the
Hebrew Law Codes,” Journal of Theological Studies 49–50 (1948–1949): 43–53. Per-
haps this can be taken to imply that these laws are in some sense subsidiary.
103 Mackenzie, “Formal Aspect,” 39.
104 e.g. the spread of cuneiform law.
is supported by Westbrook who, acknowledging the formal differences

within the texts, sees them as unimportant, remarking: “the approach is al-
ways the same.” 105 This writer does not think the variety of forms disproves
Westbrook’s central contention concerning the unity of ancient Near East-
ern law. Let us move on to another topic then.
2.1.3 Framing
The term ‘framing’ does not refer so much to the literary structure here as
to the more general framework affecting the way the laws are presented. A
list of the aspects of the collections to be examined will help elucidate what
is meant: acknowledgement of change/reform within the laws; the existence
of explanations within the laws e.g. motive/because clauses or historical in-
formation; explicit connection to a ruler; existence and content of a pro-
logue/epilogue (colophon, superscription etc.). Basically, this section will
attempt to detect anything within the framing of the law collections which
may point to a worldview concerning the area of law. 106 Some preliminary
observations will be made here. They will be brought together into a more
coherent picture in the concluding chapter. This section will only deal with
issues of structure where they are seen to bear on the framework in which
the laws are put. 107 Issues relating to the nature or purpose of the collec-
tions will be dealt with in the next section.
It is a well-known fact that the Hittite law collections, out of all the law
collections we possess from the ancient Near East, are the only ones to
clearly acknowledge the reform of previous laws, especially HL. Many have
105 “Character,” 17.

106 Therefore excluding differences of penalty, use of oath, ceremony, or ordeal,
what is seen as an offence etc. The former and latter will be dealt with in later sec-
tions regarding the laws themselves rather than their framing.
107 For some works focusing on the structure of the laws themselves see H.
Sauren, “Aufbau und Anordnung der babylonischen Kodizes,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 106 (1989): 1–55; Petschow, “Zur Systematik und
Gesetztechnik im Codex Hammurabi,” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 57 (1965): 146–72
and “Zur ‘Systematik’ in den Gesetzen von Eschnunna,” in Symbolae Iuridicae et
Historicae Martino David Dedicatae (ed. J. A. Ankum, R. Feenstra, and W. F. Leemans;
Studia Documenta ad Iura Orientis Antiqui Pertinentia 2; Leiden: Brill, 1968), 131–
43; Barry L. Eichler, “Literary Structure in the Laws of Eshnunna,” 71–84; B.
Hruška, “Die innere Struktur der Reformtexte Urukaginas von Lagash,” Archiv
Orientalni 41 (1973): 4–13, 104–32; Korošec, “Sistematika prve hettitske pravne
zbirke (KBoVI 3),” Zbornik znanstvenih razpraw 7 (1930): 2–12.
COMPARISONS 55
seen some of the other law collections as reforming documents. 108 Some
have even postulated that they can detect a change in law by comparing
laws on the one topic within the one collection. 109 A number of scholars
have taken this difference in HL to imply a closer connection between its
laws and the laws of practice than other ancient Near Eastern law collec-
tions. 110 This is done on the presumption that the changes in the collection
must arise as reflections or enactments of changes in the law of practice.
Though the latter may well be the case, there is another possible explana-
tion for the difference between the Hittite Laws and the other collections
which do not acknowledge legal change in the same manner. It will be ar-
gued that RU, atypical for a Mesopotamian collection, also acknowledges
change to some extent.
Before these things are discussed, some clarification is needed. While
pointing out the difference between HL and the other collections, it is not
necessarily implied that the other law collections are not reforming or do
not change previously existing laws. This is a possibility, though a contested
one. In some of the other collections there is even acknowledgement of a
situation where laws were not previously kept. 111 In EH there may even be
an indication that some of the laws set forth are new. 112 It is, however, pos-
sible that the references in EH imply the re-establishment of old norms
which may have fallen out of favor during the Amarna period. 113 No other
108 e.g. Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, vol. 1, 45 regarding LH; the title at-
tributed to Uru-inimgina’s document (RU) also implies such a purpose; J.
Fleishman on “Legal Continuation and Reform in Codex Hammurabi Paragraphs
168–169,” Zeitschrift für altorientalische und biblische Rechtgeschichte 5 (1999): 54–65;
Hallo on the purpose of AE in COS 2.134: 362; Eckart Otto, “Aspects of Legal
Reforms and Reformulations,” 160–96.
109 e.g. Guillame Cardascia, “La réparation des dommages agricoles dans le Code
de Hammurabi,” Revue d’Assyriologie 79 (1985): 169–80.
110 e.g. Haase, “The Hittite Kingdom,” 620.
111 e.g. RU and EH.
112 See Pflüger, “Haremhab,” 267: “commands which My Majesty has newly is-
sued”, and, 263: “starting from today, the law shall be applied against him”. For the
same two phrases Murnane, Amarna Period, has similarly (though perhaps implying
renewal): “decrees which my Person has made anew”, 240 and, in contrast: “. . . still
appropriates hides [until] today, let the law be applied against him”, 237.
113 This said, the disruptive and chaotic nature of the Amarna period has been
increasingly questioned e.g. Mario Liverani, Three Amarna Essays (intr. and trans.
Matthew L. Jaffe; Monographs on the Ancient Near East vol. 1, fasc. 5; Malibu,
Ca.: Undena, 1979).
collection is as explicit as HL in its acknowledgement that an old law has

been changed. The existence of such acknowledgements in HL and their
absence elsewhere does not necessarily imply that the other collections are
therefore less likely to be related to the law of actual practice than HL. It
will be argued here that this difference reflects a more general cultural dif-
ference between the Hittites, Egypt and Mesopotamia.
This difference is reflected in the historiography and treaty forms of
these different civilizations also. 114 Within their royal historical texts, the
Hittites, unlike their Egyptian or Mesopotamian counterparts, have a ten-
dency to speak of abuses by previous rulers and the negative consequences
which ensued. 115 The Edict of Telepinu is a case in point. Telepinu recounts
the bloody and violent squabbles of the past surrounding the throne. He
explains that it is these past abuses which have led him to change the suc-
cession laws of the Hittite throne. 116 Here we have explicit recognition that
the laws of the past were mistaken and have been changed. The Hittite abil-
ity to acknowledge past abuses in rulership should perhaps be understood
to be connected to their ability to acknowledge a change in law. This writer
thinks, with Weeks, that all of this is connected with the Hittite use of his-
tory and their system of rule. This will be discussed in the concluding chap-
ter.
Within Mesopotamian historiography it is uncommon to speak of the
mistakes of a previous ruler, 117 to acknowledge a defeat 118 or to use history
to teach lessons. 119 Atypically, the historiography of Lagash does the latter
114 For the latter see Weeks, Admonition and Curse.

115 See especially the “Plague Prayers of Muršili II,” trans. Gary Beckman (COS
1.60: 156–60).
116 He also enacts a number of other reforms, also due to the lessons learned
from past mistakes/abuses e.g. those regarding the treatment of fortified cities
(where rebellion had stemmed from in the past), COS 1.76: 198, section 35.
117 See Esarhaddon’s cloaked remarks about Sennacherib’s Babylonian policy.
This is perhaps as close as they come. English translation available in Daniel David
Luckenbill, Historical Records of Assyria: from Sargon to the End (vol. 2 of Ancient Records
of Assyria and Babylonia; New York: Greenwood, 1927), 242–264.
118 But see the Babylonian chronicles which acknowledge Babylonian defeat in
contrast with the Assyrian chronicles which never acknowledge Assyrian defeat.
For English translations see Jean-Jacques Glassner, Mesopotamian Chronicles (Society
of Biblical Literature Writings from the Ancient World 19; Atlanta, Ga.: Society of
Biblical Literature, 2004) or Albert Kirk Grayson, Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles
(Locust Valley, NY: J.J. Augustin, 1975).
119 The exception is of course the treaties of Aššur-banipal and the Tukulti-
COMPARISONS 57
two. 120 This is connected to its ability to acknowledge legal change, as evi-
denced in RU. It is here argued that the Mesopotamian conception of insti-
tutions and modes of doing things being passed down from the gods to
man in the beginning may lie behind their typical unwillingness to acknowl-
edge change, especially in the area of law. If the precepts for law are con-
ceived as having come from the gods in the beginning, 121 then it does the
ruler no favors if he claims to change them. Given the Mesopotamian rul-
ers’ tendency to shy away from criticism of previous rulers, they are unlikely
to mention a situation where the wrong laws were in place. Unlike the
Egyptians, they do not even seem to contemplate offering new laws. From
what can be gathered from the framing of the Mesopotamian laws in our
possession, they conceive of their laws as being applications of the princi-
ples of kittum u mišarum handed down from the gods to man. In all of the
Mesopotamian collections, except RU, there is no acknowledgement that
laws have changed. There is some difficulty in discerning exactly what Uru-
inimgina is claiming regarding the situation in the past and the relation of
his reforms to it. 122 Hallo’s translation 123 would seem to fit the more com-
mon Mesopotamian practice as it implies that there have been abuses from
time immemorial and that Uru-inimgina merely “(re)established the norms
Ninurta Epic. See the discussion of Weeks, Admonition and Curse, 41–54. References
to these texts can also be found there.
120 See Cooper, Presargonic Inscriptions, 9.4 for a historical account of defeat by
Uru-inimgina and see Weeks, Admonition and Curse, 17–19 for a discussion of the
Lagash treaties.
121 See the Sumerian King List: Thorkild Jacobsen, The Sumerian King List (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) or the translation of A. Leo Oppenheim
(ANET, 265–66).
122 The literature discussing (and demonstrating) the difficulties of interpreting
what is being referred to in RU (let alone its relation to actuality) is immense e.g.
Maurice Lambert, “Les ‘réformes’ d’Urukagina,” Revue d’Assyriologie 50 (1956): 169–
184; Benjamin Foster, “Social Reform in Ancient Mesopotamia,” in Social Justice in
the Ancient World (ed. K. Irani and M. Silver; Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1995),
165–77; I. M. Diakonoff, “Some Remarks on the Reforms of Urukagina,” Revue
d’Assyriologie 52 (1958): 1–15; Dietz Otto Edzard, “‘Soziale Reformen’ im Zweis-
tromland bis ca. 1600 v. Chr.: Realitat oder literarischer Topos?” Acta Antiqua Aca-
demiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 22 (1974): 145–56; Claus Wilcke, Early Ancient Near
Eastern Law. A History of its Beginnings: The Early Dynastic and Sargonic Periods
(Sitzungberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 2003/2; Munich:
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2003).
123 COS 2.152: 407–8.
of old”, 124 i.e. the way things were supposed to have been done as handed
down in the beginning, in order to check these abuses. Hallo’s translation
runs into problems as a contradiction is implied: the “standards of old” are
the problem but the re-establishment of the “norms of old” is the solution.
Cooper’s translation 125 fits what one would expect from Lagash given its
atypical historiography and treaty formulation. He sees the solution to the
abusive “conventions of former times” which had been around “since time
immemorial” as coming because of Uru-inimgina having “replaced the cus-
toms of former times”. 126 Though both translations are possible from the
Sumerian, Cooper’s makes sense of what Uru-inimgina is claiming and links
well with the atypical practice of Lagash.
For the Egyptians it is perhaps their conception of kingship which
leads to the restraint exercised in regard to criticism of previous practice.
The Egyptians generally present their history as unchanging. Though they
may at times introduce some new practice, they will never acknowledge that
they did away with an old one. 127 The perception of the pharaoh as divine
may explain this tendency. If one pharaoh were to question the actions of a
previous divine ruler, he may in effect be bringing the whole system of justi-
fication into disrepute i.e. “If a past divine ruler made a mistake why should
we trust this one?” or, “If a past ruler claiming to be divine could make
such an error perhaps he was not divine, perhaps the current pharaoh is not
either!” Because law is an activity closely associated with the pharaoh, it
would possibly be damaging to claim to have reformed or changed a previ-
ously existing law. Perhaps the Egyptian conception of Ma‘at also plays a
role.
For now, what is quite likely is that the Hittite ability to acknowledge
wrong practice in the past and change from it in the present may explain the
existence of the acknowledgement of change within the Hittite Laws as
against the practices of Mesopotamia (with the exception of RU) and Egypt.
In the concluding chapter it will be argued that this is connected to the
various conceptions of kingship and the mode of rule in these societies.
This may have implications for an assessment of the function of the law
collections in the next section. It does seem to imply a cultural difference in
the framing of the laws of the ancient Near East.
124 Ibid., 407.

125 Cooper, Presargonic Inscriptions, 9.1–9.3.
126 Ibid., 71.
127 e.g. the move from pyramid building to Sun-temples etc.
COMPARISONS 59
The existence of motive clauses in Old Testament law has been used
to argue for the distinctiveness of ancient Israel’s conception of law. 128
Within ancient Near Eastern law there is no parallel within legal material. 129
There is a vaguely related clause within Old Babylonian law; the aššum or
“because clause”. 130 As Roth has observed, this clause is used to repeat the
most pertinent section of the case. Her contention, one with which this
writer concurs, is that this clause represents some form of punishment ra-
tionalization i.e. a way to highlight the main factor used to decide the pen-
alty. This type of clause is far removed from those of the Old Testament
whose purpose is to motivate obedience. The “because clause” does per-
haps indicate a level of reflective legal reasoning not expressed everywhere
within ancient Near Eastern law collections. Its restriction to Old Babylo-
nian law collections highlights the fact that law could be framed differently
across the cultures and periods of the ancient Near East. In contradiction to
the claims of Yaron, the clause does not just reflect the verbose nature of
LH in its appropriation of LE, 131 it reflects a wider Old Babylonian conven-
tion reflected not only in LH but also in the mišarum edicts from the period
(e.g. AE) and in the documents from practice. It is not only an Old Babylo-
nian convention, however. It is also reflected in documents from practice in
Lower Mesopotamia e.g. the Ur III period. 132
Somewhat paralleling their more prevalent use of history to teach les-
sons, there are some Hittite laws which incorporate some form of explana-
128 e.g. Rifat Sonsino, Motive Clauses in the Old Testament and the Ancient Near East:
Biblical Forms and Near Eastern Parallels (SBL Dissertations Series 45; Chico, Ca.:
Scholars Press, 1980) and B. Gemser, “The Importance of the Motive Clause in
Old Testament Law,” in Supplement to Vetus Testamentum 1 (1953): 50–66.
129 But see Hittite treaties and internal loyalty oaths. For a recent English trans-
lation of some of these texts see Gary Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts (2nd ed.;
Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Ancient World 7; Atlanta, Ga.: So-
ciety of Biblical Literature, 1999).
130 See Roth, “The Because Clause: Punishment Rationalization in Mesopota-
mian Laws,” in Veenhof Anniversary Volume: Studies Presented to Klaas R. Veenhof on the
Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday (ed. W. H. van Soldt, J. G. Dercksen, N. J. C.
Kouwenberg and Th. J. H. Krispijn; Publications de l’Institut historique-
archéologique néerlandais de Stamboul 89; Leiden: Nederlands Institut voor het
Nabije Oosten, 2001), 407–12.
131 Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna, 89–91.
132 See Nicholas Postgate, Early Mesopotamia, 289. Perhaps LE is far enough
north to be less influenced by the culture of Lower Mesopotamia. This must be
tempered by the fact that MAL A 36 also includes a because clause.
tion or historical detail. HL 49 includes an explanation as to the motivation

behind the formulating of the law i.e. otherwise the hipparaš would do x.
This is not, however, simple motivation towards obedience as found in the
Hebrew Bible. The inclusion of historical details leading up to the giving of
a law is typically Hittite. This is most obvious in ETel. which outlines the
past abuses which have led to the need for Telepinu’s reforms and uses
them as motivation to keep them. HL 55 and ETud. each describe the
process leading up to the giving of laws, detailing subjects of the king com-
ing to him as a delegation, and then the king’s decision. This very much
contrasts with EH’s description of Haremhab consulting with himself to
give his laws, and neatly parallels the lack of any specific attribution of HL
to a king (in that it perhaps demonstrates a less centralized role for the king
with regards to law at Hatti).
By far the majority of the law collections dealt with here are explicitly
acknowledged as the work of a king. 133 Within Egypt both EH and ND are
specifically linked to a king, as is the more fragmentary Elephantine decree.
Within Mesopotamia it is only the supposed school exercises LOx, SLEx
and SLHF along with MAL which are not specifically connected to a ruler.
The HL are also not explicitly connected to a ruler. What significance does
this have? One is tempted to see in HL’s lack of connection a link to their
less centralized form of rule as opposed to that of Mesopotamia and Egypt
and thus to postulate a lesser role for the Hittite king in regards to the es-
tablishment of law in society. The main obstacle to such a contention is
obviously a similar lack of connection in MAL. 134
It is possible that this obstacle could be removed if it were found that
MAL were closer in function to the so called “scribal exercises” 135 from
Mesopotamia which also had no explicit royal authorship. 136 The mention
133 Though in some instances we do not know which particular king e.g. the de-
bate surrounding the authorship of LE and LU and the question about whether LX
belongs to LU or is a separate collection. See Kramer, “Ur-Nammu”. There is also
uncertainty as to whether the Elephantine Decree was issued by Ramesses III. All
four texts have clear indication that they were nevertheless connected with a spe-
cific ruler.
134 The only section of the collection external to the laws themselves is the ap-
pearance of a colophon with a year name at the end of Tablet A. The existence of
colophons etc. at the end of other tablets of MAL is a possibility due to breaks at
the end of each tablet (except perhaps M and O).
135 i.e. LOx, SLHF and SLEx.
136 See our discussion of this issue in the next section. Westbrook, “Character,”
18 sees all collections as associated with rulers as well as having a place in the
COMPARISONS 61
of reforms within the Hittite Laws could be used as an argument not to

treat them as a scribal exercise or private collection of laws. Earlier it was
posited that the lack of explicit mention of reform in Mesopotamian texts
possibly reflected cultural rather than functional differences. If this is the
case one could not rule out a similar function for MAL to that of HL on the
basis of such omission. The existence of explicit royal attribution within
MAPD may be due to a difference between the nature and content of this
text and MAL. MAPD’s context within the royal household and therefore
its more immediate connection to the ruler could explain this difference.
Another possibility arises which is mere speculation. It is possible that MAL
were originally collected in a period before Assyrian imperialism and in-
creased centralization had affected the framing of the law collection. This
contention may not be well supported by the evidence given the superscrip-
tion of tablet A placing our copy in a year during the reign of Tiglath-pileser
I (1114–1076). It is a general scholarly consensus that our copies are “elev-
enth century B.C.E copies of fourteenth-century originals”. 137 Though As-
syrian society was less centralized and its foreign policy less imperial at this
stage 138 it would be somewhat of a stretch to argue that it reflected the Old
Assyrian system of rule (and the important role of the council) more closely
than the later centralization of the Neo-Assyrian Empire. For now we are
left with the possibility that the existence (or lack thereof) of an explicit
connection to a king within the law collections may also be related to a cul-
tural difference between the Hittites and Egypt and Mesopotamia. This dif-
ference would revolve around the conception of the role of the king with
regards to the law. 139 The problematic nature of MAL, without an explicit
attribution to a king, may be due to the nature of the copies found or its
original production in the fourteenth century, during or before the gradual
development of new conceptions of Assyrian kingship. The lack of an ex-
plicit attribution does not necessarily imply that the laws were not of royal
origin. Of course such an approach would leave this writer open to the
charge of basing an argument on the evidence of absence in the case of HL
in contrast to ignoring it with regards to MAL.
scribal curriculum.
137 Roth, Law Collections, 154 and Sophie Lafont, “Middle Assyrian Period,” in A
History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (ed. Raymond Westbrook; vol. 1; Handbook of
Oriental Studies 72/1; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 521.
138 Especially before the reign of Ashur-uballit I (1363–1328).
139 The following discussion of the nature and function of the law collections
will help elucidate whether this is a likely possibility. The discussion of the laws
which mention the king in a later section will also be relevant.
The final aspect of the framing of the laws to be discussed here con-
cerns the prologue and epilogue attached to some of the collections. There
is a correlation between the collections which have some form of text at-
tached before or after the legal section of the document and those which
attribute its production to a royal source. 140 Again, it is the texts with the
supposed school origins which do not have any form of introduction, con-
clusion, heading, colophon etc. i.e. SLEx, SLHF and LOx, nor do MAL 141
and HL. This is of course more than a coincidence as it is these non-legal
sections of the collections which tend to mention royal involvement in the
production of the text. It is then a question of whether the absence of such
a section is merely a difference of structure or whether it reflects a broader
worldview concerning the role of the king with regard to the production of
law. It is difficult to decide given the fact one must proceed from an argu-
ment from silence to argue in this way. There is no evidence to suggest that
all collections originally did have a prologue and epilogue. The only ways to
argue for a uniform structure for ancient Near Eastern law collections are
to severely restrict the collections being looked at 142 or to speculate as to
some hypothetical original text with uniform structure as the source mate-
rial for the diverse collections we have. 143 Neither option attempts to ex-
plain the diversity actually extant in the texts available for study. That said
there are some obvious similarities among some texts.
It has long been noted that among the ancient Near Eastern law col-
lections, LH, LL and LU share many similarities. One of the most obvious
similarities is the form and structure of these collections. The existence of a
prologue and epilogue surrounding a collection of casuistically framed laws
has led many to see these three collections as belonging to the same tradi-
tion of Babylonian legal science. There is certainly much to be said for this
idea when one compares the prologues and epilogues of these works. A
brief perusal of the three prologues shows many similarities both in themes
and phrasing. All three have an opening mention of the granting of kingship
140 It must be said that mention of the king in the title of AE is reconstructed
but highly probable.
141 Though there is a colophon of sorts with a date at the end of Tablet A.
142 e.g. only LL, LH and LU (if one accepts the identification of LX as its epi-
logue)
143 e.g. Eckart Otto’s approach. See bibliography for a list of his works. Even
then his definition of a law collection must be restricted to the classic collections:
LU, LL, LE, LH, MAL and HL, of which only MAL Tablet A and LOx fit the de-
scription of the structure of the original text without doctoring.
COMPARISONS 63
by Anu and Enlil to their city deity 144 who then appoints them as king. Each
of the prologues mentions the king: establishing justice; eliminating injus-
tice; providing well-being for their people; establishing freedom from ene-
mies or oppression; being loyal to his city; protecting the weak from the
strong; 145 doing service to the gods through offerings or temple building.
Each of the prologues also ends with the phrase: “At that time”, before
giving the casuistically formulated laws. 146 The most obvious difference
within these prologues is the length of that in LH. Much of this extra space
is filled with epithets of Hammurabi developing the above themes in more
detail. He spends much time listing his pious acts e.g. re/building of temples
or the city. These are themes we find in the prologues of both LU and LL
also. One theme that is far more highly developed within the prologue of
LH, however, is his military prowess. There is not even the hint of claims to
be: “the onslaught of the four regions of the world” in LU or LL. Though
LU does mention the liberation of cities from Anshan, and LL the libera-
tion of Nippur, Ur and Isin, this is not a major theme in their prologues. 147
For Hammurabi, however, the praise of his military prowess is as promi-
nent as the mention of his pious deeds or good rule. One need not look
further than his political context, with him as head of a very large empire
won by military conquest, to explain the difference. This military focus is
also found in his inscriptions, 148 and is reflected in the heavy emphasis on
the curses in his treaty negotiations. 149
144 Anu’s name is broken in LL’s prologue but its reconstruction is highly prob-
able.
145 This theme is not well developed in LL’s prologue, but this may be due to
the loss of two columns.
146 Again, this is reconstructed in the break for LL so it is possibly absent.
Given the mass of other similar features it is perhaps most likely that this phrase
was present originally.
147 The liberation in LL is possibly akin to the economic liberation of the miša-
rum decrees rather than any military activity.
148 See RIME 4 and specifically those referred to by Marc Van De Mieroop,
King Hammurabi of Babylon: A Biography (Malden, Ma.: Blackwell, 2005), 124–127.
149 See Van De Mieroop’s description, Hammurabi, 21 and Weeks’, Admonition
and Curse, 23–26.
The epilogues of these three collections 150 have only one feature
common to all. That is the existence of a curse for any who efface the in-
scription. This section is again greatly expanded in LH. The epilogue of LL
shares some other similarities with LH. Like LH, LL also includes a blessing
for him who does not damage the stele he has set up. The epilogues of both
also begin with a section declaring the accomplishments of the rulers in
accordance with their command from the sun-god to establish justice, set
up fair judicial procedure, and to bring well-being to the people. LL again
repeats the claim to have gotten rid of injustice, whereas LH mentions how
he has put an end to war by annihilating enemies. Again we have a military
focus in Hammurabi that is lacking elsewhere. Why do we have this military
focus in the prologue and epilogue to a collection of laws? It is possible to
relate the giving of the law collection to claims of piety given its relation to
a command of a god and its role in exercising good rule over the people of
the city. It is more difficult to understand why military conquests make up
such a focus. Even though this ought to be admitted, the intimate connec-
tion of the actual laws with many sections of the prologue and epilogue of
LH, so amply demonstrated by Hurowitz, 151 should make one hesitate be-
fore ascribing a lesser role to the laws in the purpose of the text. More
about this later. What of the other collections with attachments at their be-
ginning and/or end?
RU does not have a formal prologue, laws, epilogue distinction but
there are many similarities to LU, LL and LH in the framing of the reforms
it recounts. Uru-inimgina recounts his building works for Nin-Girsu then
goes on to describe a situation where injustice was rife. This is followed by
the mention of his divine selection for kingship and his establishment of
justice at the command of the god. The account of the abuses which were
in existence and then rectified share many similarities to those mentioned in
the prologue to LU e.g. the control of the sea-captains and the misappro-
priation of sheep. The claims to have established freedom and to have pro-
tected the weak also have clear resonance in the prologues of the three col-
150 Assuming LX as LU’s epilogue. See discussion above in 2.1.1. For a very
different theory as to the epilogue contained in LX see S. J. Lieberman, “Nippur:
City of Decisions,” in Nippur at the Centennial (ed. Maria de Jong Ellis; Rencontre
Assyriologique Internationale 35; Philadelphia: Occasional Publication of the Sam-
uel Noah Kramer Fund, 1992), 127–36.
151 Victor Hurowitz, Inu Anum S9irum: Literary Studies in the Non-Juridical Section of
Codex Hammurabi (Philadelphia: Occasional Publications of the Samuel Noah
Kramer Fund, 1994).
COMPARISONS 65
lections mentioned earlier (especially to the phrasing of LU). RU ends with

the mention of the building of a canal.
The framing of these four collections all reflect a very similar world-
view concerning the king’s place in regard to the giving of law. They also
share some more general aspects of what may be a particularly southern
Mesopotamian view of kingship. The laws in each case seem to be given by
the king at the behest of the gods. The similarities in the framing of these
laws lead this writer to postulate an internal development within southern
Mesopotamia regarding how laws were presented. Uru-inimgina makes use
of a typical building inscription to recount his judicial activities. Picking up
on this idea, the succeeding royal authors of southern Mesopotamian law
collections frame their collections within the structure of a building inscrip-
tion, developing themes both from RU and other building inscriptions re-
garding kingship and law. If one compares these collections with the build-
ing inscriptions of the time there are some interesting similarities. For ex-
ample, compare the inscriptions of Hammurabi. 152 After a beginning state-
ment concerning the gods granting him kingship we see the phrase, “at that
time” as in LH. 153 In the other inscriptions this is used to introduce a narra-
tive of building activities. In LH, the phrase instead introduces
Hammruabi’s dinat mišarim. A similar development seems to lead to the in-
clusion of military conquests in building inscriptions which later develops
into the annal form. Whatever the details of the internal development, it
would be a brave scholar who would deny the probability that these texts
(RU, LU, LL and LH) were influenced by their predecessors, reflect very
similar conceptions about kingship and the law and possibly display an in-
ternal development in the structuring of the presentation of the legal
achievements of a king. What of the other collections?
LE has a Sumerian superscription at its beginning which, while very
different in structure to the prologues of the three collections just men-
tioned, shares some themes. There is mention of ascension to kingship and
the role of the gods Enlil and Ninazu. 154 As with LH, there is also mention
of military conquests before the listing of the laws. There is little room on
152 e.g. those translated by Douglas R. Frayne in COS 2.107: 256–58. More com-
prehensively see Douglas R. Frayne, Old Babylonian Period: 2003–1595 B.C. (The
Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Early Period 4; Toronto: University of To-
ronto, 1990).
153 See the use of this phrase in Samsu-iluna’s inscriptions also, e.g. as translated
by Frayne in COS 2.108: 258 or RIME 4.
154 Unfortunately the text is a little fragmentary at this point so definite state-
ments as to the significance of this section cannot be made.

the tablet for the king of Eshnunna to have boasted of his piety or role in
the establishment of justice in the land. Interestingly, as LU mentions the
standardization of weights and measures in its prologue, the superscription
of LE is followed by standardized exchange rates for commodities. There is
no epilogue for LE though in one copy there is a blank of 6–8 lines where a
scribe may have placed a colophon as in MAPD, MAL A or SLEx.
The Old Babylonian edicts also begin with a Sumerian superscription.
This merely states that the text is the document of when the king estab-
lished equity for the land.
The Middle Assyrian Palace Decrees have a specific introduction for
each decree (or set of them). This introduction merely mentions the name
of the king, his title (e.g. overseer or king) and his father’s name and title,
followed by the statement that he “issued a decree for the/his palace”.
Though these certainly give us helpful information as to the origin and pur-
pose of the original decrees, these are very different to the prologues of the
laws mentioned earlier. There is possibly a colophon at the end of the col-
lection which refers to the whole collection of decrees. It outlines that vio-
lating the decrees is a punishable offence and seems to demand the regular
proclamation of the decrees. 155 It is possible that, rather than being a colo-
phon, this is a final decree of Tiglath-pileser I. The existence of such a de-
mand within biblical law and Hittite treaties does not help us to decide
whether the request to have the decrees read out refers only to Tiglath-
pileser’s decrees or whether it refers to the whole document. The latter does
seem preferable. An eponym year is attached at the bottom of the tablet,
dating the text to the reign of Tiglath-pileser I.
The Egyptian texts at our disposal are uniquely framed in that they
portray the legal sections of their texts as the direct command of the phar-
aoh. Though one clearly pictures other decrees as coming from the mouth
of the king, none of them explicitly state as much. EH portrays itself as a
transcription of the direct speech of the king. 156 It is written in first person
as are the prologues and epilogues of RU, LU, LL and LH. These latter
texts, however, do not refer to the legal sections as “commands”, nor do
they address a particular audience as does ND and the Elephantine decree
which have a list of officials addressed. ND and the Elephantine decree
both contain this brief address, stating that the decree was issued in the
155 Though the text is broken at this point.

156 Face principale, line 13.
COMPARISONS 67
royal court to the various officials. This is followed by a statement that “the
decree says: His Majesty has commanded . . .”. 157
There are a number of similarities between these texts and those of
southern Mesopotamia with the full prologue and epilogue. EH has two
introductory sections before the legal and administrative sections. There is
also an epilogue of sorts at the end. In the first introductory section
Haremhab boasts of having had the throne bestowed upon him, of doing
good for the land, bringing it righteousness, 158 expelling injustice and op-
pression. These are all themes we have seen in the southern Mesopotamian
collections we discussed initially. Again, we have a significant difference in
this Egyptian text. Whereas in Mesopotamia the king sets forth the laws at
the behest of a god, 159 here we are told that Haremhab “took counsel in his
heart”. 160 It would seem Egyptian law is conceived as coming from the
pharaoh in a more direct fashion than in Mesopotamia. Haremhab boasts of
traveling through the land, appointing judges of good character and setting
forth the laws (hpw) for them. 161 The epilogue of EH concludes with an
exhortation to heed his commands so as to set the land in order and get rid
of the oppression which he has taken to heart. It is self-glorifying. He even
wishes himself a long life.
The Nauri decree contains a long prologue and ends with an epilogue
of sorts outlining the reason Seti has put forth this decree. He states that he
did so as an act of piety towards Osiris so that people will praise the god
and in return the god will grant Seti a long life and rule. Similar to the pro-
logues of LU, LL and LH, the long prologue details Seti’s appointment to
the throne by the gods, praise of them and the listing of pious deeds for
them. 162 The Elephantine decree is broken at the end. There is some evi-
dence that its conclusion contained the name of Ramesses III but we know
little more than that about it.
Other than these additions to the laws themselves we have a few colo-
phons identifying the scribe who wrote/copied the text e.g. SLEx, MAL
157 Slightly reconstructed for the Elephantine decree on the basis of ND.
158 Ma‘at.
159 Whether the god is understood to provide the laws or just to guard the prin-
ciples behind them is unclear.
160 Obverse, line 10.
161 Left side (Pflüger, “Haremhab,” names this the left side, whereas Kruchten,
Horemheb, sees it as “face latérale droite”), column 4.
162 As mentioned earlier, this long introductory section of ND is not found in
Edgerton’s edition, but is found in Griffith’s, “Abydos Decree”.

tablet A, and perhaps MAPD in the break. 163 This tells us very little about
the framing of the original text. It just shows us that the collection was
thought worthy to be copied for a variety of possible reasons whether aca-
demic or practical. It may well reflect a scholarly or school origin of some
sort for some texts, but this must be decided on some other basis.
In the framing of these laws then there are a number of features which
may be explained as cultural specificities. These range from the Old Baby-
lonian (and lower Mesopotamian) use of the “because clause” to differences
which may reflect a different worldview with regards to conceptions of
kingship; more specifically the king’s role in the production and/or promul-
gation of law. This may be reflected in things such as the existence and con-
tent of additional text before or after the laws themselves, 164 the related
question of whether the collection is specifically connected to a ruler; the
presence or absence of historical details and perhaps most significantly, the
existence of explicit acknowledgement of change within the law collection.
To be able to make firmer conclusions about such things it is important to
take into account, as far as is possible, the nature and purpose of these vari-
ous collections. For example, the contention that the Hittite acknowledge-
ment of change within their laws is a reflection of a broader cultural con-
ception would be made less likely if it were found that this feature demon-
strated instead that HL were a closer reflection of the law of practice than
the collections which did not display such a feature. In a similar vein, the
nature of MAL influences the interpretation of the brutality within it.
Though it must be said that even if the collection were of a private nature,
the laws themselves may well reflect royal rulings of some form. They
would thus be connected to kingship, rather than Assyrian culture more
generally. This study will now turn to this vexed topic and see what can be
made of the data available.
163 Roth, Law Collections, 56 thinks that LE may have also had something similar
at the end. Numerous copies of LH (Late Old Babylonian and after) also display
such a colophon see e.g. that in Finkelstein, “A Late Old Babylonian Copy of the
Laws of Hammurapi,” Journal of Cuneiform Studies 21 (1967): 48, as do some copies
of the Hittite Laws (all Neo-Hittite or later), see Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 98 and
160.
164 Variously termed prologues, epilogues, introductions, conclusions, super-
scriptions, preambles, colophons etc.

COMPARISONS 69
2.1.4 Nature, Function and Purpose
2.1.4.1 Introduction
This section aims to assess, as far as is possible, the nature, function and
purpose of the various texts under discussion. It was mentioned in the in-
troduction that there has been much literature written on this topic. The
law collections dealt with here are generally lumped into three groups.
Firstly, there are the more formal law collections (sometimes referred to as
codes for ease of reference and distinction from the other texts), 165 then the
edicts or decrees 166 and then the texts which are seen to be scholarly exer-
cises or school texts. 167 Most of the discussion as to the nature and function
of these texts has focused on LH and assumed or implied that the findings
were legitimate for the other formal ancient Near Eastern law collections. 168
This is not a necessary assumption. In our discussion we will attempt to
analyze both the traditional classification of these texts and the legitimacy of
importing ideas about LH to understand the other formal collections or
“codes”. It is hoped that this will help to clarify how it is possible to distin-
guish the different text types and their functions and perhaps also question
the simplistic way this has sometimes been presented in the past.
Since the discovery of LH some hundred years ago there have been
numerous theories as to the nature and purpose of this text. Theories have
been offered which range from seeing LH as: a prescriptive code of laws; 169
a law collection binding on the courts which were given to unify the em-
pire; 170 at once codification and reform; 171 a series of amendments 172 and
165 i.e. LU (and LX), LL, LE, LH, MAL, HL as distinguished from the decrees,
edicts and others.
166 AE, MAPD, EH and ND. RU is sometimes included in this list, e.g. by
Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 214; Westbrook and Woodard, “Tudhaliya IV,”
641, n. 3.
167 LOx, SLEx and SLHF.
168 e.g. Westbrook’s statement “Cuneiform Law,” 201–2 that “the debate . . . has
centered mainly around Codex Hammurabi, but its conclusions are assumed to
apply to the codes in general.”
169 Scheil, Textes élamites.
170 Joseph Klíma, “La perspective historique des lois Hammourabiennes,”
Compte rendus de l’Académie des Inscription et belles lettres (1973): 306–7; Edwards, Oldest
Laws, 12; A. Leo Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization (rev.
ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 231.
171 Koschaker, Rechtsvergleichende, 2.
172 E. A. Speiser, “Early Law and Civilization,” Canadian Bar Review 31 (1953):
restatements of common law; 173 a reflection of common law with no statu-

tory force; 174 a guide to courts’ decisions without having statutory force e.g.
a private lawbook; 175 an expression of rules for judges rather than individu-
als; 176 representation of law but not legal reality; 177 a scholarly text/part of
Mesopotamian scientific literature; 178 royal apologia 179 or political propa-
ganda; 180 a monumental commemoration of Hammurabi’s achievements; 181
originally a training manual for judges appropriated for a political pur-
pose; 182 a collection of the legal decisions of Hammurabi from his role as
judge; 183 legislation for new circumstances due to change in society; 184 a
866.
173 Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, vol. 1, 45 hold to LH as both amendment
and restatement, as does Yaron, “The Nature of the Early Mesopotamian Collec-
tions of Laws: Another Approach,” in La Codification des lois dans l’antiquité: Actes du
Colloque de Strasbourg, 27–29 Novembre 1997 (ed. Edmond Levy; Travaux du centre
de recherche sur le Proche-Orient et la Grèce antiques 16; Paris: De Boccard,
2000), 65–76, Postgate, Early Mesopotamia, 289, and Shalom M. Paul, Studies in the
Book of the Covenant in the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law (Vetus Testamentum
Supplement 18; Leiden: Brill, 1970), 24–25.
174 Westbrook, (see any number of his works e.g. “Character”) though he blends
this with other functions e.g. he sees LH as a model of good judging and as having
its origins in Mesopotamian scientific literature.
175 Marian San Nicolò, Die Schlussklauseln der altbabylonsichen Kauf und
Tauschverträge (2nd ed. New introduction and notes by Herbert Petschow; Munich:
C. H. Beck, 1974 [1922]), 9–10.
176 Mackenzie, “Formal Aspect,” 36–37.
177 Eilers, Gesetzesstele Chammurabis, 8.
178 Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem,” 293–95; Bottéro, “Code”; Westbrook, e.g.
“Character,” 17–18, or “Codification and Canonization,” 15–36.
179 Finkelstein, “Ammis[aduqa’s Edict,” 103.
180 e.g. Norman Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 107.
181 Renger, “Noch einmal,” 51 and “Hammurapis Stele ‘Konig der
Gerichtigkeit’: Zur Frage von Recht und Gesetz in der altbabylonischen Zeit,” Die
Welt des Orients 8 (1976): 228.
182 Otto, “Aspects of Legal Reforms,” 160–63.
183 W. F. Leemans, “King Hammurabi as Judge,” in Symbolae Iuridicae et Historicae
Martino David Dedicatae (ed. J. A. Ankum, R. Feenstra, and W. F. Leemans; Studia
Documenta ad Iura Orientis Antiqui Pertinentia 2; Leiden: Brill, 1968), 107–29.
Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem,” acknowledges this possibility to some extent.
184 Wilfried G. Lambert, “Morals in Ancient Mesopotamia,” Jaarbericht Ex Ori-
ente Lux 15 (1958): 187 as followed by Walton, Israelite Literature, 87.

COMPARISONS 71
means to preserve law as a living tradition 185 etc. Some blend a number of
these functions, 186 some have given up hope of ever figuring out the nature,
function and purpose of LH and the other formal collections in general, 187
while others are so sick of the discussion they have called for scholars to
drop it and talk about something else. 188
The development of some of these ideas was discussed in the intro-
ductory chapter. Rather than retrace this development in more detail, what
we aim to do here is assess the various arguments in relation to the evi-
dence. Though an analysis of the nature and function of LH has been done
before we wish to bring it all together and hopefully add something new to
the discussion. Despite the numerous discussions about the function of LH,
none of them have been done in the context of comparing the nature and
function of law collections across the ancient Near East. 189 Far less discus-
sion has centered on the nature and function of the other law collections.
The conclusions drawn from the study of LH seem to hold sway over such
discussions. In dealing with each collection this writer hopes to highlight
what it is that enables us to judge the nature and function of ancient Near
Eastern law collections.
2.1.4.2 Evidence used regarding LH

To begin it may be helpful to outline what kinds of evidence have been
brought to bear on this discussion. There are many angles from which
scholars have come at the questions surrounding the nature, function and
purpose of LH. Within these, arguments have focused on issues such as:
the relation of LH to the documents of legal practice (and/or letters of the
king regarding juridical matters) from the Old Babylonian period; the form
and structure of LH; the existence and content of the prologue and epi-
logue (including the issue of intended audience and perhaps the relation of
these sections to the contents of the laws themselves); the laws’ function as
185 Donald J. Wiseman, “The Laws of Hammurabi Again,” Journal of Semitic Stud-
ies 7 (1962):166.
186 Westbrook.
187 Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions and the Laws of Hammurabi,” Chi-
cago-Kent Law Review 70 (1995): 13.

188 e.g. Paul Eugene Dion, review of E. Levy (ed.), La Codification des lois dans l’an-
tiquité, Journal of the American Oriental Society 121 (2001): 315.
189 Except perhaps in some collaborative works, multi-authored volumes or
proceedings of conferences e.g. Westbrook (ed.), A History, and Levy (ed.), La codifi-
cation.
a monumental inscription (including its find place and original setting/s);

the existence of copies of LH; the relationship of LH to previous Mesopo-
tamian law collections or other sources; problems in applying the
laws/problems of logical consistency within them; the non-comprehensive
nature of the laws; the historical context for the giving of the law collection.
A study of the nature and function of LH raises most of the issues 190 re-
garding the nature and function of the other collections. Despite this the
present writer feels it is best to start this discussion with an analysis of the
edicts/decrees as they compare to LH and the “monumental” law collec-
tions. 191 This will enable a questioning of the usefulness of some of the ar-
guments put forward to decide upon the nature, function and purpose of
LH. This in turn will stop this writer from importing conclusions made
about LH from such faulty argumentation in order to interpret the nature,
function and purpose of other collections. The study will then proceed to
analyze some of the other evidence used to decide upon LH’s nature, func-
tion and purpose, followed by an analysis of the other formal law collec-
tions and the scholarly texts.
2.1.4.3 Westbrook’s definition of edicts/decrees

Westbrook sees a number of distinctive factors within the group of texts
which he sees as edicts or decrees. 192 What he sees as the characteristic fea-
tures of decrees is that they have an actual effect on legal relations, 193 their
content is restricted to matters such as debt-release, and economic and ad-
ministrative reform, 194 and they tend to mention past abuses and the king’s
correction of them. 195 He contrasts this to the formal law collections which
he does not see as having any effect on legal relations and which cover a
broader range of topics. Though there is much to commend this theory,
there are a number of points of contention. His inclusion of RU within the
190 The Hittite Laws do raise another issue concerning the recognition of legal
change within their collection that some have used to argue for a closer relationship
between HL and legal practice than the other ancient Near Eastern law collections.
191 LU, LL, LX. RU will also be discussed.
192 RU, AE, EH, Edict of Telepinu and Edict of Tudhaliya IV, to which we will
add in this discussion ND, ED and MAPD.
193 Westbrook and Woodard, “Edict of Tudhaliya IV,” 641 and Westbrook,
“Cuneiform Law,” 214–217.

194 Westbrook and Woodard, “Edict of Tudhaliya IV,” 641 and Westbrook,
“Character,” 15–16 where “constitutional law” is added.
195 Westbrook and Woodard, “Edict of Tudhaliya IV,” 641 and n. 4.
COMPARISONS 73
genre of decrees is not accepted by all. There is a fervent debate over the
purpose and legal effects of RU. 196 There are many scholars who see this
text as royal propaganda in analogy with Finkelstein’s Lower Mesopotamian
“law codes”. 197 Another problem with Westbrook’s arguments regarding
decrees is that he has read conclusions from the study of AE and the effect
of the mišarum edicts into the other sources. If one were to try and treat this
group of collections as a literary genre there would be even more difficul-
ties, especially given the length of the non-legal sections in texts other than
AE.
2.1.4.4 Past abuses as reason for reform?

Let us begin with the point Westbrook makes least of. Though he claims it
is “typical” for edicts and decrees to list past abuses or reasons reform is
needed, a number of texts in this group do not do so e.g. AE and MAPD, or
can be interpreted otherwise e.g. ND and ED which state that they are set
up in order to prevent certain things happening. 198 The monumental law
collections also claim to eradicate enmity, violence, injustice etc, 199 and are
thus not to be distinguished on this basis.
2.1.4.5 Subject matter of edicts and collections fixedly different?

The claim that edicts cover the limited range of topics enumerated above in
contrast to the law collections is also questionable. For example, should we
accept the claim that because the legal sections of the Egyptian decrees
might possibly deal only with offences committed by officials or people in
positions of authority that it reflects only an administrative reform? We are
not even sure that all the legal clauses of these documents are restricted to
abuses of this kind. 200 Given the fact that the law collections also cover
similar abuses, what are we to make of such a distinction anyway? 201 While
it is true that AE deals solely with measures related to the issuing of a miša-
rum or debt-release decree, ND and ED are addressed to officials and relate
to their actions towards a particular estate with links to the royal administra-
196 See the references supplied above in note 122.

197 e.g. Edzard, “Soziale Reformen” and Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 99.
198 This does not necessarily imply that these were current abuses, though that
is possible.
199 See the later discussion of the non-legal sections of the law collections.
200 Though it does seem fairly likely.
201 e.g. LH 33–34. To be fair, Westbrook does admit that the formal collections
can include the subject matter of the edicts and decrees, “Cuneiform Law,” 217.
tion, RU seems to cover economic and administrative reforms, the Hittite

texts do not fit so neatly. In both the Edict of Telepinu and of Tudhaliya IV
there are sections not relating to economic or administrative matters. For
example, the Edict of Telepinu contains provisions for punishments in the
case of homicide or sorcery. 202 While the law dealing with sorcery speaks
specifically of offenders within the royal family and the law of murder could
be linked to Telepinu’s recounting of royal assassinations and usurpations
surrounding positioning for the throne and his succession reforms, this law
is framed as generally applicable. When we come to the Edict of Tudhaliya
IV the issue is complicated. Originally there were sections of this text which
were seen as similar to those covered by formal law collections. For exam-
ple, von Schuler treated the text as a law collection parallel to HL which was
intended as legislation. 203 This was on the basis of a number of provisions
which dealt with topics such as theft and murder. Westbrook will have none
of this and has published an alternative translation which squashes these
provisions back into the purview of an edict, e.g. he forces the law regarding
murder and blood-payment into a provision concerning debt-release. 204
2.1.4.6 Edicts applicable in contrast to collections?

Westbrook’s claim that the edicts (in contrast to the formal law collections)
had an effect on legal reality is based on the external evidence available that
the Old Babylonian mišarum decrees had such an effect. For none of these
other edicts/decrees do we possess evidence which confirms their applica-
bility in the same way. 205 This similarity has been assumed on the basis of
the other similarities between these texts (such as the content). Interestingly,
Finkelstein and Kraus argue that AE was not the actual text of the mišarum
edict but only a guide for officials in its execution. 206 Kraus went even fur-
202 Hoffner is so convinced of their similarity with the formal law collections
that he adds these two provisions at the end of his translation of HL in Roth, Law
Collections, 237–38.
203 Schuler, “Hethitische Königserlässe,” 445.
204 Westbrook and Woodard, “Edict of Tudhaliya IV,” 643.
205 Though there is of course the evidence of Hittite succession practices after
Telepinu and the economic and administrative documents from Lagash. The latter
are extremely difficult to use to assess the effect of RU, especially given the difficul-
ties in translation of RU. See the discussion of Foster, “Social Reform”. He does
raise the possibility that one of Uru-inimgina’s reforms can be traced in the sources,
238.
206 See Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 92 and Kraus, Ein Edikt and see
also Königliche.
COMPARISONS 75
ther pointing out that there was little correlation between the kinds of con-
tracts covered by the edicts and those found in actual documents. 207 Finkel-
stein argued that the more general pronouncements contained in the texts
of the mišarum act were “for the most part pious hopes and moral resolve
rather than effective law”, and he was happy to see such regulations as be-
ing incorporated into law collections. 208 It would seem that discerning the
applicability of edicts, even the mišarum ones, is as problematic as the case
of LH. Perhaps it is better to discuss any evidence within the texts them-
selves as to their intended purpose. It is pertinent at this point to discuss
the usefulness of arguments put forward about LH’s nature, purpose and
function from the basis of its relation to the documents of practice.
As mentioned, one of the reasons LH’s legal function has been ques-
tioned is the relationship of the legal provisions within it as compared to
the documents of practice. Thus far no documents from Old Babylonian
legal practice have been found which cite LH as an authority for the deci-
sion in their case. Much was made of this by Landsberger in assessing the
function of LH. 209 Some have argued for citation of LH in letters. 210 Some
have argued for specific references to LH, other decrees or the decisions
within other letters on the basis of references to “the words of the stele” 211
or ṣimdat šarrim. 212 Veenhof uses such an argument to create numerous Old
Babylonian decrees for which we have no other evidence. 213 Given the fact
207 Kraus, Ein Edikt . See discussion of Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 94.
208 Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 102.
209 Landsberger, “Die babylonischen Termini,” 221. This observation has been
repeated ad infinitum in the literature e.g. Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem”; Horst
Klengel, König Hammurabi und der alltag Babylons (2nd ed.; Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992), 184–264; Otto, “Aspects of Legal
Reforms”; Renger, “Noch einmal,” 35; Niels Peter Lemche, “Justice in Western
Asia in Antiquity, or: Why No Laws Were Needed!” Chicago-Kent Law Review 70
(1995): 1698.
210 E. Szlechter, “La “loi” dans la Mesopotamie ancienne,” Revue Internationale des
droits de l’antiquité 12 (1965): 55–77; W. F. Preiser, “Zur rechtlichen Natur der
altorientalischen ‘Gesetze’,” in Festschrift für Karl Englisch (ed. P. Bockelmann, A.
Kaufmann, and U. Klugg; Frankfurt: Main, 1969), 17–36; Leemans, “King
Hammurabi as Judge”.
211 Hurowitz, Inu Anum S9irum, 13 mentions the existence of at least 4 such ref-
erences. They do not seem to match up well with LH.

212 Postgate, Early Mesopotamia, 291. See discussion of Renger, “Konig der
Gerichtigkeit,” 230.
213 Klaas R. Veenhof, “The Relation between Royal Decrees and ‘Law Codes’
ṣimdatum can mean “regulation”, “decree”, 214 “enactment”, “laws”, 215 or

perhaps even just “decision”, 216 we should be cautious in our interpretation
of what is being referred to. A possible interpretation seems to be that what
are being referred to are the other decisions of the king within letters he has
sent. 217 That said, we cannot rule out that LH could be referred to by some
of these references. Though Hammurabi never refers to his collection as a
ṣimdatum, LH is referred to as ṣimdat H}ammurabi in a colophon of a late Old
Babylonian manuscript. 218
At least one Old Babylonian letter refers to wages recorded on a stele.
The wages referred to are three times that outlined in LH. Some have con-
cluded therefore that LH does not reflect legal reality at the time. 219 Roth
has questioned this conclusion, mentioning that LH may have set out
minimum wages rather than maximum. 220 Whatever the correct interpreta-
tion, we do have evidence that laws set up on a stele could be appealed to in
the daily exercise of law. 221 Despite this possibility, some have argued that
the reason we do not have citation of LH in the documents of practice was
that it was not the practice of the day to cite such collections. 222 If so, one
would think the lack of citation could not be used to argue against the legal
validity (or at least the reflection of legal actuality) of LH. This has not been
of the Old Babylonian Period,” Jaarbericht Ex Oriente Lux 35/36 (1997–2000): 49–
83.
214 Jeremy Black, Andrew George and Nicholas Postgate, eds., A Concise Dic-
tionary of Akkadian (SANTAG 5; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000), 338.
215 Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” 21, n. 13.
216 Bottéro, “Code,” 180.
217 A possibility raised by Veenhof himself, “Royal Decrees,” 58. This does not
exclude other possibilities. For further discussion of this term see Yaron, Laws of
Eshnunna, 1988, 121–26 and references there.
218 Finkelstein, “A Late Old Babylonian Copy of the Laws of Hammurapi,” 42–
44. Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” 21, n. 13. We cannot tell whether this
should be construed as a singular or plural i.e. “edict”, “fiat” or “decisions”, “laws”
etc.
219 R. F. G. Sweet, “On Prices, Moneys, and Money Uses in the Old Babylonian
Period” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1958), 104–11 as cited by Roth, Law
Collections, 6, n. 1.
220 cf. Roth, Law Collections, 5–7.
221 See the comments of Roth, Law Collections, 7 and Postgate, Early Mesopotamia,
291.
222 e.g. Klima, “La perspective,” 308 and S. Demare, “La valeur de la loi dans les
droits cuneiforms,” Archives de Philosophie de Droit 32 (1987): 344.

COMPARISONS 77
the case. Much has been made of the fact that the documents from practice
(contracts) do tend to cite mišarum acts. 223 Though Westbrook argues that
lack of citation regarding LH does not reflect a difference between it and
the actual practice of law, but the absence of legalism (i.e. self-conscious
reflection on the reasoning behind a decision and the citation of authority
for it), 224 he uses the fact that the mišarum acts are cited, in contrast to LH,
to bolster the argument that LH was not binding on the courts. 225
In reality, what can this lack of citation tell us about the function of
LH? 226 It is not impossible that the lack of citation reflects a Mesopotamian
modus operandi with regard to their legal system i.e. the law collections were
not directly referred to in court. This does not necessarily imply that they
played no role in the goings on. Its absence may even be due to a concern
to keep legal documents brief. We cannot rule out the possibility that the
legal cases presented in collections such as LH were discussed in the court-
room or at least influenced the reasoning of the judges in making their deci-
sion. It may just be that this reasoning process has not been recorded.
Whatever the situation was, it would be unwise to make too many conclu-
223 e.g. Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 215; Renger, “Noch einmal,” 49; Finkel-
stein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 101 argues as much while being careful to distinguish
the mišarum act itself from the Old Babylonian edicts such as AE which record such
an event. H. Olivier, “The Effectiveness of the Old Babylonian Mesharum De-
cree,” Journal of North-West Semitic Studies 12 (1984): 108, n. 9 notes that Kraus, Ein
Edikt, had collected 61 references to mišarum enactments to which Edzard had
added.
224 Westbrook, “Codification and Canonization,” 40.
225 Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 216 and “Character,” 19. It should be said
that Westbrook does not see the citation of the mišarum acts as a reflection of legal-
ism either. He asserts that the references are to the existence, not the content of
such acts. See “Character,” 19.
226 We have not mentioned Veenhof’s supposed examples of citation of the
prologue and epilogue of LH in two letters, “Royal Decrees”, 81–82, due to the
dubious nature of such a citation. Veenhof argues that the mention of a concern
not to let the strong oppress the weak in one letter and the expression of the idea
that Marduk had appointed the king to provide justice in another is evidence that
LH could have been cited. He uses this to argue that the reason the laws of LH
were not cited was that they were not intended for legal usage. It is quite possible
that these two letters are merely appealing to two well known ideological aspects of
Babylonian kingship rather than directly quoting LH. The two letters in question do
not frame their statements as quotes nor do they directly refer to LH. This writer
struggles to see the logic of the argument presented.
sions based on the lack of citation of LH. 227 The economic nature of the
mišarum acts (perhaps combined with the skewing of our Mesopotamian
evidence towards economic and administrative documents and contracts)
may also explain the perceived differences in citation practice between LH
and mišarum decrees. Another possible explanation is that the lack of cita-
tion does reflect the lack of influence of LH on practice. This implies very
little about the intended purpose of the collection. 228
There has been an even more fervent debate surrounding the question
of whether LH reflects actual legal practice. In an attempt to present Baby-
lonian law on different subjects, the Hammurabi’s Gesetz project collected the
Old Babylonian legal documents from practice and organized them into
modern legal topics, as well as presenting a translation of LH. It did not
take too long before some questioned how well these two sets of evidence
matched up. Eilers in particular argued that LH was at odds with the legal
realities of the time and often differed in many respects with the records of
actual legal cases. 229 Many scholars since have also analyzed the relationship
of LH to these records. A number of different conclusions have been of-
fered. Some see no great distinction between the two sets of evidence. An
example is Petschow who argues that LH matches up with these docu-
ments. 230 If LH matches up with these documents what would that tell us?
Is it merely a reflection of the legal realities? 231 Has it had an effect on legal
practice e.g. as either reform or prescription of law? 232 Some have attempted
to answer this question by comparing documents from before Hammu-
rabi’s time to those afterwards. In general it has been found that where LH
matches up with the documents of practice, it does so for the periods both
before and after its publication. The most famous example is Harris’ and
others’ studies regarding the naditu laws. 233 Many have concluded then that
227 See the comments of Renger, “Noch einmal,” 35.

228 See the comments of Lemche, “Justice in Western Asia,” 1698.
229 Eilers, Gesetzesstele Chammurabis.
230 Petschow, “Die §§ 45 und 46 des Codex Hammurapi. Ein Beitrag zum
altbabylonischen Bodenpachtrecht und zum Problem: Was ist der Codex
Hammurapi?” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 74 (1984): 181–212.
231 Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 204–5.
232 See Postgate, Early Mesopotamia, 291 who finds it difficult to imagine that the
codes were simply ignored and did not affect practice.
233 Rivkah Harris, “The naditu Laws of the Code of Hammurapi in Praxis,” Ori-
entalia 30 (1961): 163–9 or C. Janssen, “Samsu-iluna and the Hungry naditums,”
Northern Akkad Project Reports 5 (1991): 3–40.
COMPARISONS 79
LH was never intended as an influence on the legal realities of Babylonia. 234

Some, however, have argued that they can trace the influence of LH on the
legal realities of the day. 235 Petschow’s 236 and Yoffee’s 237 contrasting posi-
tions in regards to LH’s relationship to legal practice show that the conclu-
sions based on such studies are not universally accepted. To this we must
add several other problems.
Westbrook, who sees LH as reflecting legal reality, but not having a
legislative function of any kind, argues that one must not base one’s posi-
tion regarding LH’s function on its relationship to the legal documents of
the time. 238 With this we agree. There are many problems in the use and
interpretation of this evidence to decide upon the purpose of LH. Though
the documents may be able to give us some idea of the effects of LH, they
do not necessarily give us an insight into the intended purpose of it. An
analogy has been offered by Weeks who asks: “Would you be able to dis-
cern the driving laws of a country by watching people drive?” 239 If it was
found that the laws of Hammurabi’s collection were not put into practice, it
does not imply that he did not want them to be. 240 It may only record his
failure to have his intentions realized. This could be explained a number of
ways: opposition to reform based on traditional legal practice; the late date
of his collection’s publication and the dissolving of his empire not long af-
ter his death, the extraordinary or rare nature of many of the cases within
his collection etc. The fact is, we do not know why the collection was not
put into practice and we must look elsewhere again to help us decide upon
the nature and purpose of the collection. Roth puts it more forcefully: “Ul-
timately such questions as Is there any concord between the formal law col-
lections and the transactional contracts? or Is the daily operation of the law
234 e.g. Finkelstein, “Law in the Ancient Near East,” Encyclopedia Miqra’it 5
(1968): 588–614, who argues that where LH matches up with the documents of
practice it must be seen as a reflection of that practice not an influence on it. Fol-
lowed by Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 103.
235 See Postgate’s discussion regarding the influence of LH on shepherding con-
tracts, Early Mesopotamia, 291.
236 LH matches with practice. See note 230.
237 Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 103 following Finkelstein, “Law in the
Ancient Near East” where the supposed contradictions lead him to conclude that
“Hammurabi never intended that his rules be accorded the status of practical law.”
238 Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 204.
239 A question asked in his lecture on Hammurabi in the first-year course
“Power and Persuasion in the Ancient Near East” at the University of Sydney.
240 Compare the conclusions of Yoffee and Finkelstein above, note 234.
constrained by the rules of the formal law collections? are not really an-
swerable and, moreover, miss the intimate connections between law and
society.” 241
She asserts the “independence as well as the independent value of the
law collections and the law cases.” 242 This said, the fact that the sections,
which do seem to match up with legal practice, do so for the period before
Hammurabi as well as afterwards may fit well with an explanation based on
opposition because of adherence to a traditional legal practice i.e. the parts
of LH which were reforming were generally ignored.
If such evidence is not able to determine LH’s function, we must be
careful not to read the conclusions based on this evidence into discussion
regarding other collections, especially when such evidence is not available
for them. Even in attempting to contrast LH to the Old Babylonian mišarum
decrees, it has been found that the evidence of documents from practice
has limited usefulness.
2.1.4.7 How does one decide the purposes of decrees or monumental

law collections? What can the non-legal sections reveal regarding
the nature, purpose and function of these texts?
Some scholars make much of the monumental nature of some of the
Mesopotamian law collections and the existence of non-legal sections
speaking of the actions of the king is used to argue for a propagandistic
purpose for these texts as opposed to a legal one. 243 When we turn to the
decrees and edicts, there are a number which were also monumental and
contained similar non-legal sections. However, these factors are rarely used
to argue against the legal intentions of these texts (except in the case of
RU). While it may be wise to recognize that the monumental nature of texts
such as ND, ED, EH, RU may have given these texts a similar function to
other monumental texts, 244 this does not imply that they could not have
also served a legal function. Perhaps a warning against the interpretation
that a propagandistic or memorializing purpose was specific to monumental
inscriptions should be seen in the fact that there is no overt evidence that
RU, argued most commonly by scholars to have been mere rhetoric, 245 was
ever set up on a stele. 246

242 Roth, “Reading Law,” 250.
243 e.g. Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict”.
244 e.g. celebration and memorialising of royal accomplishments.
245 e.g. Diakonoff, “The Rise of the Despotic State in Ancient Mesopotamia,” in
COMPARISONS 81
Within the non-legal sections of EH there are a number of themes

similar to those found in the non-legal sections of the Mesopotamian mate-
rial e.g. the claim to have set forth justice in the land, 247 to have prospered
the people, 248 and the concluding wish that people will listen to the laws so
that the land will be set in order. 249 He even mentions that the effect of his
laws was that people praised his goodness. 250 Despite all these similarities
with the monumental laws of Mesopotamia, including its being set up on a
stele within a temple, the legal import of EH is rarely questioned. Some
have argued that the laws put forth may have had propagandistic value and
were aimed at popularizing Haremhab’s rule, but they did not question that
these laws were meant to be applied. 251
The Nauri Decree has a very long introductory section full of epithets,
the recounting of the divine election of the king, praise of the gods, re-
counting of pious deeds towards them, and the announcement that he has
set a decree to look after the workers of the House of Osiris. He then ad-
dresses the decree to the Egyptian royal officials who may have some con-
tact with the estate of Osiris in Cush (Nubia). He lists the offences he is
preventing and then lists the laws. The epilogue tells us specifically that the
decree was issued as an act of piety towards Osiris so that the god would
look after the king. 252 The purposes are clearly stated, protection of the
workers of a particular estate of Osiris and a religious purpose seen to give
benefits to the king here and now. The Elephantine decree is similar in all
extant sections so one would presume a similarity of purpose, though, of
course, this may prove unfounded.
The Middle Assyrian Palace Decrees also seem to have a clear cut pur-
pose. Each set of provisions begins with an introduction mentioning the
name of the king, his father’s name, their title/s and then the statement that
the king “issued a decree”. Sometimes the decree mentions a specific audi-
Ancient Mesopotamia (ed. I. M. Diakonoff; Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 173–203. Edzard

“Soziale Reformen,” 147. Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 99.
246 The copies we have consist of 5 on clay nails, cones and one on an oval clay
plaque. See Wilcke, “Early Dynastic and Sargonic Periods,” 142, n. 6. It certainly
was an inscription of some sort rather than an internal memo of course.
247 In the prologue to the administrative section in Pflüger’s edition.
248 End of section II in admin. sect., in Pflüger’s edition.
249 Compare the precatives in LH.
250 End of section II in admin. sect. cf. the epilogue of LH and the injunction to
the awilum h}ablum to praise Hammurabi.
251 e.g. Pfluger, “Haremhab,” 268.
252 Griffiths, “Abydos Decree,” 205.
ence such as “the palace personnel”, “the court attendants”, “his (the
king’s) palace”, or, in the case of Tiglath-pileser I, “the palace commander
of the Inner City, the palace herald, the chief of the water-sprinklers of the
Processional Residence, the physician of the Inner Quarters, and the admin-
istrator of all the palaces of the entire extent of the country”. Both this ad-
dress and the content of the laws themselves lend weight to the idea these
are specific decrees from these kings concerning the internal running of the
royal palace/s. The possibility that the colophon of the collection decreed
that the rulings should be read out regularly supports the likelihood of their
applicability, 253 though the cumulative nature of the rulings from various
kings including repetition and overlap may temper this conclusion some-
what. 254
Through literary analysis of LH, including its structure, solid links have
been made between it and contemporary royal inscriptions. 255 This may
have implications for its function. Hurowitz’ study does seem to imply that
LH is unique, though there are certainly still similarities with other texts,
especially LL and LU. These results question the idea that the genre of law
collection included a tripartite structure. 256 Does this similarity to royal in-
scriptions imply a similarity of purpose? Is this purpose propagandistic?
Some have used the monumental nature of LH, along with its links to con-
temporary inscriptions, to argue for various purposes for the text. It should
be noted here that there is no unanimous agreement among scholars as to
the purpose of such monumental inscriptions. Some of the purposes that
are thus attributed to LH include: the memorializing of his accomplish-
ments so he is remembered in the future; 257 propaganda for the subject
peoples of his empire; 258 propaganda for his own people showing him to be
the just king; 259 a self-representation to the gods of his fulfillment of his
function as the just king. 260
253 See Roth, Law Collections, 208. See also the end of the Nuzi edict presented in
the same work, p. 196.
254 Ibid., 196.
255 e.g. Hurowitz, Inu Anum S9irum, 4, 15.
256 For this opinion see Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 11–42.
257 Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” 17; Renger, “Noch einmal,” 50–53;
Hurowitz, Inu Anum S9irum, 103.
258 Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” passim, esp. 18, 24.
259 Bottéro, “Code,” and Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem”.
260 Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 103, Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Tradi-
tions,” 17, Hurowitz, Inu Anum S9irum, 30, 61

COMPARISONS 83
The relationship between LH and previous law collections has also

been used to argue certain things regarding its nature and function. The
similarities between the non-legal sections of LH, LL, LU (and LX) and RU
have been used to stress the non-legal function of LH and to see it as part
of a literary stream or genre or self-aggrandizing royal inscriptions. 261 The
similarity of the content of the various law collections has been seen to rep-
resent the fact that such texts are examples of legal science (in contrast to
legislation) and that various traditional legal problems are dealt with in an
academic fashion from culture to culture. 262
The question has been asked whether the literary context of the scribal
school or the monumental inscription determines the function of the law
collections, and LH in particular. 263 Our answer is somewhat circumspect in
that we think to decide on such questions one should pay closer attention
to the content of the laws, specifically their prologue and epilogue, than to
its form or structure. Let us now turn to this. What does Hammurabi claim
as the purpose for his own collection?
It has long been recognized that Hammurabi’s list of epithets in the
prologue and achievements in the epilogue refer to his reign in the broadest
sense and not merely to his legal achievements, let alone only those accom-
plished by the setting up of his stele. There are other sections which do di-
rectly comment on Hammurabi’s role as provider of justice or to the role of
the stele itself. It is to these we will look for statements about the purpose
of LH. The prologue does not refer specifically to the stele itself, rather it
outlines Hammurabi’s commission at the behest of the gods. The epilogue
then recounts that the commission has been fulfilled in the setting up of the
stele (or is at least witnessed by such an act). In the prologue we are told
that Hammurabi was named to: make justice in the land; abolish the wicked
and evil; to ensure the strong did not oppress the weak; to enhance the
well-being of the people; and to illuminate the land. In the last paragraph of
the prologue we are also told that Marduk commanded him to provide just
ways for the people of the land for appropriate behavior. The statement
that Hammurabi established truth and justice and enhanced the well-being
of the people follows this command. The laws themselves follow this
statement. Surely we are to understand the laws as the fulfillment of this
command and the commission Hammurabi was given. The epilogue makes
this understanding inescapable.
261 Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 98.

262 Westbrook, “Codification and Canonization,” 43, “Character,” 17.
The first line of the epilogue tells the reader that these are the just de-
cisions that Hammurabi established which have directed the land along the
course of truth and the correct way of life. After a long list of achievements
we are told that Hammurabi inscribed his precious words on the stele and
set it up: in order that the mighty not wrong the weak; to provide just ways
for the waif and widow; to give the verdicts of the land; and to provide just
ways for the wronged. This is followed by a wish in the precative that
Hammurabi’s justice would prevail in the land by the command of Marduk.
All of this seems to point towards Hammurabi seeing himself as setting up
the model for good judgment in Babylonia. There is no escaping this stated
purpose. The flow of LH could be summed up thus: Hammurabi was
commissioned by the gods to establish justice etc., the laws and their setting
up on the stele have achieved fulfillment of that commission, may they con-
tinue to do so. It is in this context that the addresses to the awilum h}ablum
and the future ruler are to be understood.
The significance of the section of the epilogue addressing the awilum
h}ablum is highly debated. There are some who, taking the text at face value,
see in this section evidence that LH was to be applied in the law courts of
Babylonia at the time. The wronged man is to have the stele read out to him
so that he can find the relevant provision and have his lawsuit revealed.
Some have seen in this an implied address to the judges that they were to
look to LH for the verdicts of their cases. 264 Others have made much of the
further instruction that the wronged man is then to praise Hammurabi with
the formulaic blessing set out on the stele to argue that the praise of Ham-
murabi is the real purpose in contrast to any legislative function. 265 To this
end Martha Roth has even published an article arguing that the wronged
man is not someone who has been mistreated or oppressed and has come
to the stele looking for legal remedy but someone who has already lost their
case, perhaps unfairly, who comes to the stele to be comforted by the fact
Hammurabi tried to establish justice. 266 This last argument is very hard for
this writer to swallow. Her argument, based on the occurrence of the term
h}ablum in contemporary records and in two of LH’s provisions, is a little
264 Petschow, “Beiträge zum Codex Hammurapi,” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 76
(1986): 22 and H. Sauren, “Aufbau und Anordnung,” 1–55.

265 e.g. Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” 17; “Codification and Text,”
41; Renger, “Noch einmal,” 31–32; Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 203; Yoffee,
“Context and Authority,” 103.
266 Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” 17; “Codification and Text,” 41;
“Hammurabi’s Wronged Man,” 38, 41, 45.

COMPARISONS 85
forced. She attempts to limit the wrong being done to: 1) abuse by a person
in authority over an underling or, 2) a defendant or plaintiff involved in a
case where the undergoing of an ordeal gives the wrong result. 267 This
writer would think it highly unlikely that the latter possibility was allowed an
airing in Babylonian thought given its connections to the justice of the
gods. Roth uses a literary text in which one who has been wronged appeals
to the gods as judge and two Old Babylonian letters to argue for the second
meaning for “wronged”. We certainly agree with Roth that someone who
loses a case unfairly can be described as an awilum h}ablum. The two cases she
presents seem to show this. The problem we have is the attempt to limit the
meaning of h}abalum to the two mentioned above. The list of terms given by
Roth 268 which can be associated with the verb or its derivatives seem to
imply the opposite of her case for such a limited semantic range. She lists
terms for murder, villainy, desertion, injustice, affliction, cries for justice etc.
These terms seem to fit well with a very general meaning for the term
h}abalum. CDA gives the translation, “to wrong, oppress”. 269 This is how
Roth has translated the term also. 270 Despite Roth’s arguments for a limited
semantic range for the term in this context, it seems the wrong that an
awilum h}ablum could have suffered could be extremely varied in nature. The
examples Roth gives in order to limit the range of the term merely demon-
strate that a context is needed to define the wrong more specifically. 271 In-
terestingly the two letters cited also order that action be taken to correct
what has taken place. The addressee is not told to console the victim by
taking him to Hammurabi’s stele in order to comfort them in the knowl-
edge Hammurabi tried. It is unlikely Hammurabi would think such a
wronged man would bless him in such a situation. It is therefore unwise to
conclude that the awilum h}ablum of LH’s epilogue must be a man who has
been let down by the justice system, either because of a wrong done to him
from above or because he has unfairly lost a case. These two are certainly
possibilities given the wide semantic range of the term, but we cannot rule
out that the wrong committed against him could have been one of the
267 Roth, “Hammurabi’s Wronged Man”.

268 Ibid., 41.
269 CDA, 98.
270 Law Collections, 133–34.
271 See Veenhof’s comments regarding LH’s scribes’ infrequent usage of this
term: “they prefer rulings on specific cases over formulating general principles,” in
“Royal Decrees”, 62.
many abuses covered by the laws e.g. perhaps he could have had his tooth
knocked out, or his slave gored by an ox.
Those who would see the wronged man being urged to find the ver-
dict for his case in LH do run into the problem that he is then told, not to
take his case before the judges and refer to the judgment of LH, but to calm
his heart and to praise Hammurabi with the formulaic blessing on the stele.
This has fed arguments that LH was set up to be self-aggrandizing and
propagandistic rather than legislative. 272 Perhaps this is an unnecessary and
somewhat anachronistic contrast. We do not question that the Assyrian
annals record history of some form or another merely because they involve
praise of the king’s actions. Of course our interpretations of such history
should be aware of such an alternative motive, but we do not throw the
whole annals out as ahistorical because they are colored by other motives.
Why then should we do so with LH? Is it not possible for LH to be self-
aggrandizing and legislative at the same time? 273 Here a once popular anach-
ronistic comparison would seem to confirm such a possibility. Did not the
Code Napoléon play such a dual function (though perhaps more subtly)? Is it
really necessary to portray LH as either self-aggrandizing or legislative in pur-
pose? This said we do not mean to imply that this is legislation in the mod-
ern sense of the term. The statements of Hammurabi in his prologue and
epilogue do seem to imply that the laws he was setting forth were to have
some sort of effect on the running of the judicial system in Babylonia, and
that they had in the past.
The address to the future ruler raises similar problems. Hammurabi
expresses concern both that the ruler, if he be wise and want to rule his
people well, will put Hammurabi’s laws into practice and also, that he not
deface the inscription in any way or claim Hammurabi’s achievements as his
own. Hammurabi wishes that the stele will reveal to such a king the tradi-
tion/path (kibsum), right conduct/way (ridum), the judgments and deci-
sions/verdicts of the land (din/purusse matim) so that the future king can
provide just ways, render judgments, give verdicts, eradicate evil and en-
hance the well-being of the people. For such a king he wishes a long rule in
which they will shepherd the people with justice. The fact that Hammurabi
also expresses the concern common to monumental inscriptions that his
name and image not be erased, does not mean we should ignore his other
272 e.g. Roth, “Codification and Text” and “Hammurabi’s Wronged Man,” 39.
273 See Driver and Miles’ interpretation, Babylonian Laws, vol. 1, 41. They saw
the purpose of the awilum h}ablum passage with this dual purpose in mind i.e. learn
the law applicable and praise Hammurabi.
COMPARISONS 87
stated intentions. Of course this may imply that Hammurabi had ulterior
motives for setting up this stele which may have included a desire for glory
and the immortality that comes from being remembered. It should not lead
us to exclude all other motives. The fact that the future ruler may have been
expected to follow the words on the stele only because they were evidence
of wise judgments rather than autonomous law, 274 need not lead us to con-
clude that Hammurabi did not intend for these laws to be followed both in
his own day and in the future.
Though much of the prologue and epilogue speak of the uses of LH
with regard to the legal life of Babylonia, we are left with the problem that
the text itself addresses only the awilum h}ablum and the future king specifi-
cally. Surely it is the judges who should be addressed if LH were some form
of legislation? 275 This is an understandable objection to LH’s legislative
purpose. Perhaps at this point we should raise a similar problem for those
who would read this text as propaganda or as self-representation to the
gods. There is no direct address to either Hammurabi’s subjects (apart from
the awilum h}ablum), whether native or foreign, or to the gods anywhere in his
composition. If we are to rule out any judicial function based on the ab-
sence of address to the judges, should we not be consistent and rule out a
propagandistic purpose based on similar absences? Perhaps such purposes
cannot be ruled out. Returning to our question, how are we to reconcile the
absence of any address to the judges with the fact that LH sees itself as de-
claring the relevant case for an awilum h}ablum and serving as guide for the
legal activities of future rulers? If LH were not binding on the judges what
use would it be for the awilum h}ablum to approach the court having figured
out the relevant case from LH? We cannot really answer this question as
there is little evidence to help us do so. There are a number of possibilities.
Perhaps the rulings of LH were passed on to judges through some other
channel. In the Babylonian judicial system it seems the onus was on the
plaintiff to collect witnesses, evidence etc. Given this role, perhaps it was
expected that the plaintiff, perhaps the awilum h}ablum, knew the relevant
provision for their case. Again, this is mere speculation. It is unlikely that
the legal system in Babylonia worked on the basis of such law collections
most of the time. Perhaps it was the knowledge that the legal system would
carry on according to tradition that led Hammurabi to not bother address-
ing the judges. His letters to his administrators do show that he had the

275 A point made long ago by Landsberger, “Die babylonischen Termini,” 221–
222.
power to make rulings in specific cases and we presume the administrators

were to follow such orders in their role as judges so perhaps this explana-
tion does not hold up. That they did not necessarily cite Hammurabi’s let-
ters when they did so may give us an interesting check on theories arguing
against the applicability of LH due to its lack of citation. Perhaps the ques-
tion could be resolved if we postulate that the person reading the provision
to the awilum h}ablum would be a member of the ruling administration. It is
possible that it was the judge of the case who would be the most likely per-
son to read out the relevant case. Whatever the situation regarding the ap-
plicability of LH for the judges of Babylonia, it seems that if the awilum
h}ablum were to expect to have his case dealt with as LH set out, it would
have to be applicable for the judges as well as for him. As this is the sim-
plest reading of LH we presume it is also the most likely. The fact that the
judges did not tend to follow LH or at least did not cite it for their decisions
does not tell us very much about the purpose of LH. It may tell us some-
thing about the temporary nature of law put forth by a king in Mesopota-
mia.
Another set of issues arises if we attempt to take seriously LH’s claim
that the case of the awilum h}ablum should be found on the stele. Is Hammu-
rabi claiming that LH is comprehensive? Many commentators have pointed
out that it is far from being so. For many this has been one of the key ar-
guments against defining LH as a “code”. With this we must agree. LH is
certainly not comprehensive in that it does not cover every conceivable case
of every conceivable abuse. One could well postulate a situation where an
awilum h}ablum could come to LH, have it read out and not find his case at
all. 276 What significance does this have when considering the nature and
function of LH? If it was not comprehensive and did not aim to be it may
enable us to stop using the term “code” and perhaps replace it with terms
like “restatement”, “reform”, “law collection”, but does it really tell us very
much about its purpose? One can see the attraction in doing away with
Hammurabi’s claim to be putting forth actual law. If one does away with
that claim there is no longer a problem regarding the lack of citation of LH,
nor with the fact that documents from legal practice may not regularly
match up with the provisions in LH, nor with the situation here envisaged
that the awilum h}ablum may not find the relevant case. The problem is, that
to hold such a position one needs to ignore the claims that LH itself makes
276Thus Westbrook, “Codification and Canonization,” 35–36 and Yoffee,

“Context and Authority,” 103.
COMPARISONS 89
whereas surely this should be where we start when looking for the purpose
of the collection.
Michalowski has argued against the idea that texts like LH reflect a
genre used for Mesopotamian scientific texts. 277 Though he does see them
as “scholastic compositions”, 278 he sees the monumental origin of LH
(along with LL and LU) as setting them apart from the other legal texts
found as part of the Mesopotamian scribal curriculum. The relationship of
the formal collections to the scholarly compositions will be discussed later.
Finkelstein’s position has become perhaps the majority stance in regards to
the formal law collections with prologue and/or epilogue. 279 He terms these
collections “Lower Mesopotamian “law codes”” and asserts that they were
“royal inscriptions of the apologia genre” whose purposes were “decidedly
not legislative”. 280 His argument is based on the fact that the non-legal sec-
tions of these texts recount the glorious achievements of the king and his
concern for justice within the framework of his divine election and mandate
to carry out justice.
Unlike LH, in LU and LL we do not possess a specific address to any-
one apart from those in the future who may be in a position to damage the
stele. This makes it more difficult to assess the purpose of these collections.
Should we attribute the same purpose as in LH to these collections? In LH
we had a specific address to the future ruler and the awilum h}ablum which
seemed to imply that Hammurabi intended the laws within his collection to
affect legal practice. In the case of LU and LL, there are broken sections in
the epilogue, 281 but these appear within the curse formula so are unlikely to
have contained such an address. If LX be the epilogue of LU, all it seems to
have contained is the series of curses for him who effaces the inscription.
LL and LU do not contain the purpose and wish clauses of LH which gave
us an insight into his intentions in setting up his stele. 282
277 Michalowski and Walker, “A New Sumerian ‘Law Code’”.

278 Ibid., 384.
279 LU, LL, LH. He was unaware of LX at the time.
280 Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 103.
281 For the sake of argument, we are here assuming that LX represents the epi-
logue of LU. See Michalowski and Walker, “A New Sumerian ‘Law Code’” for dis-
cussion. Lieberman’s arguments that LX does not represent a royal law collection
are unfounded, “Nippur: City of Decisions”. See Roth’s brief discussion, Law Collec-
tions, 39, nn. 1–2.
282 e.g. xlvii 59–78 which Roth, Law Collections, 133 translates as “In order that
the mighty not wrong the weak, to provide just ways for the waif and widow, I
have inscribed my precious pronouncements” or the precative forms in the address
All three collections display similarities. The section of LU’s prologue

where we might expect his divine commission to appear is broken. 283 Like
LL, he records part of his fulfillment of such a commission within his pro-
logue, whereas LH leaves this until the epilogue. 284 Both LL and LU, as
with LH, claim to have established freedom and justice in the land, 285 LU
and LH claim to have stopped the strong oppressing the weak and to have
looked after the widow and the orphan. 286 That LL does not claim to have
achieved the last two objectives may only be due to the accidents of discov-
ery as over two columns of the prologue are lost. All three collections end
with the curse formulae typical of monumental inscriptions. 287 All have a
generally casuistic framing. 288 All were probably set up on a stele. 289 All
were copied to some extent. Is this enough for us to ascribe a similar pur-
pose to these collections as that claimed for LH? It is certainly enough to
make links between the purpose of these collections and the purpose of
monumental stele with their concern for posterity. What of the legal import
of these collections? LH claims an intention to influence legal practice
which most scholars today deny. If these collections do not even claim to
have a legal function, should we attribute one to them?
There are some hints in the prologue of LL that his collection may
have functioned in a manner similar to LH. The fact that he recounts in the
opening section of his epilogue that he has made Sumer and Akkad hold
fair judicial procedure, eradicated enmity and violence and made right and
to the awilum h}ablum and the future ruler. See also the first lines of the epilogue
where he states that his dinat mišarim have caused the land to seize ussam kinam u
ridam damqam.
283 A i 43–74
284 But do see the last line of LH’s prologue.
285 LU A iii 114–124, C ii 40–51. LL ii 1–15, xxi 5–17, 36–38. LH v 14–24, xlvii
9–58.
286 LU A iv 162–168, C ii 30–39. LH xlvii 59–64.
287 Again, presuming LX to have been the epilogue of LU.
288 If one accepts our earlier broad definition of casuistic as regarding specific
cases rather than a definition which would contrast conditional and relative forms.
Sumerian tukum-bi, “its case” is hardly a conditional particle (in meaning, though of
course it may function as such).
289 There is obviously good evidence for this with LH. LL refers to its being set
up as a stele and it is possible some stone fragments have been identified (see Roth
in COS 2.154: 411). The only evidence that LU was set up on a stele comes from
the likelihood that it had an epilogue such as LX which contained the monumental
curse formula.
COMPARISONS 91
truth shine forth, should perhaps lead one to the conclusion that the laws
just enumerated are, at the least, evidence that he has done so. This argu-
ment differs in no way from that of those who see the purpose of these
collections as royal apologia designed to portray the king’s fulfillment of his
role as just king. What we are asking is whether this was the only purpose
for these collections. With LH we had evidence to the contrary; here we
must say we do not. For these texts it seems as though the question of their
intended applicability will continue to be decided on the basis of one’s pre-
suppositions e.g. Otto’s ascription to form-criticism and the Sitz im Leben of
the judge’s training causes him to see composite texts, originally arranged by
legal topic, which have been taken over for the purpose of royal propa-
ganda. 290 This writer does not feel it necessary to have a form of the laws
divorced from their prologue and epilogue for them to have been intended
to play a role in the legal life of Mesopotamia. We are cautious in ascribing
such an intention given the lack of its expression in the texts themselves,
though we would not necessarily deny it.
It has been found that there is a great degree of similarity in the non-
legal parts of LH and the other Lower Mesopotamian “monumental” law
collections. However, there is also a degree of similarity to the non-legal
sections of the Egyptian decrees. Though these sections may add the func-
tion of a “monumental inscription” to these works, this does not necessarily
deny the possibility that they also played a legal function. This denial is
more prevalent in Assyriology than Egyptology when it comes to an analy-
sis of the function of the respective law collections. These non-legal sec-
tions, especially in the case of LH, EH, ND and MAPD are most useful to
decide upon the purpose of the collections, especially when such a purpose
is clearly stated. It would be dangerous to assume a similarity of purpose in
LL, LU and LX when it is not stated in such a manner. The content of AE
seems to be the best evidence for its purpose. What follows is a discussion
of the usefulness of some of the other evidence brought to bear to decide
upon the purpose of LH, and other texts.
2.1.4.8 The usefulness of form and the links to Mesopotamian “sci-

ence"
The contrasting of LH’s form to that of the mišarum edicts has been used by
some to argue for a different function for LH and the other more formal
law collections. This argument, to a large extent, depends upon one defin-
290 Otto, e.g. “Aspects of Legal Reforms”; “Auf dem Wege zu einer
altorientalischen Rechtgeschichte,” Bibliotheca Orientalis 48 (1991): 5–13.
ing conditional form as contrastive to relative forms. This is based on the

distinction in Roman law between conditional and relative clauses. This
distinction does not stand up very well in ancient Near Eastern law (one
suspects it is probably unhelpful within Roman law also) as there are few, if
any, purely conditional forms. Though one can use the term casuistic with
good conscience given the specific case based nature of most legal provi-
sions, one is hard pressed to make a firm distinction between the variously
formulated casuistic forms e.g. tukum-bi, “its case is…”, šumma,
“if/when…”, takku, a combination of the clause conjunction ta, “and then”
and the –aku ending, “whether/or/if”. Though a translation of all these
terms with the English word “if” does little damage to their sense, it does
give the false impression that the various terms are part of the same gram-
matical structure. It is worth noting here that none of the edicts or mišarum
decrees have been found in a school setting as yet. 291
A number of scholars have seen LH as a collection of the legal judg-
ments of LH in his role as judge. 292 This argument is often based on the
evidence of Hammurabi’s legal role as reflected in his letters. 293 The specific
or casuistic nature of the provisions in LH is used to bolster such an argu-
ment. 294 It is seen to reflect the specific cases dealt with by the king in his
role as judge while leaving room for some invention of cases also. 295 The
use of casuistic forms (whether conditional, relative or otherwise) almost
across the board in ancient Near Eastern law collections, including those
which are not specifically linked to a king, should perhaps make one hesi-
tate before using this form to argue for the provisions reflecting the legal
activity of the king. There are some specific cases where an argument can
be made for the process from a specific judgment of Hammurabi in a letter
291 See Michalowski and Walker, “A New Sumerian ‘Law Code’,” 384.
292 Leemans, “King Hammurabi as Judge” and to a lesser extent Kraus, “Ein
zentrales Problem”.
293 e.g. Kraus’ collection of the letters to and from Shamash-Hazir, Briefe aus dem
Archive des Shamah-Hazir (Altbabylonische Briefe 4; Leiden: Brill, 1968).
294 Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna, 107–8. His position here is somewhat more cir-
cumspect than his first edition. See The Laws of Eshnunna (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1969),
66.
295 The invented nature of at least some cases has become a generally accepted
position from the time of Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem” onwards. See the com-
ments of Roth, “Reading Law,” 48; Postgate, Early Mesopotamia, 289; Renger,
“Noch einmal,” 38–39; Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 218–219 and “Character,”
18.
COMPARISONS 93
to a provision in his law collection. 296 As pointed out by Leemans, the pos-
sibility that LH may reflect Hammurabi’s actions as a judge does not rule
out the conclusion reached by Kraus and others that it is “learned litera-
ture”, Mesopotamian science, or in the service of propaganda. 297
The casuistic nature of LH has been used by many to argue for a link
between it and Mesopotamian scientific literature in general e.g. omen lists,
medical texts etc. 298 Scholars researching the intellectual history of Mesopo-
tamia have often made much of the concrete nature of such texts with their
lists of individual cases. 299 A large number of such scholars have taken this
concretization in the presentation of Mesopotamian texts to reflect an in-
ability on the part of the Mesopotamian people to think in the abstract. 300
This idea has been questioned in more recent times. Roth has done so in
the area of law by pointing out the usefulness of teaching through concrete
examples. She links this approach to Kuhn’s notion of paradigm exemplars
in order to highlight the ability of concrete cases to teach abstract notions
or principles (especially through the arrangement of contrasting examples
e.g. LH 133–136). 301 If we accept this as the case, then the form of the laws
does not rule out a legislative function, though, of course, one different to
the civil law of modern times with its declaration of statutes and princi-
ples. 302 This will be of relevance when one comes to the problem of the
applicability and internal consistency of the laws. For example, some have
argued that, as the laws are so specific, there would be enormous trouble
applying them in cases where some detail was missing. A famous example is
LH 230 where the law states that a builder who builds a wall which col-
296 See Veenhof, “Royal Decrees,” 69–72 and Leemans, “King Hammurabi as
Judge” for possibilities. See also Westbrook, “Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes,”
260 and Bottéro, “Code,” 421.
297 Leemans, “King Hammurabi as Judge,” 129, n. 1.
298 Landsberger, “Die babylonischen Termini”; Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem”;
Bottéro, “Code”; Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict”; Westbrook, “Cuneiform

Law,” 251–53.
299 This includes the lexical lists and grammatical texts which teach through lists
of individual examples, rather than abstract rules.
300 e.g. Bottéro, “Code,” 177–78; Westbrook, “Codification and Canonization,”
35–36.
301 Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” 35. The idea that such individual
cases can be used to teach more general principles is accepted to some extent by
Westbrook, “Character,” 18.
302 e.g. Postgate, Early Mesopotamia, 289 who sees the ability of such individual
cases to portray general principles as an argument for their prescriptive nature.

lapses and kills a man’s son will have his son killed. Commentators have
ruminated about the problems of applying this law if the builder had no
son. 303 Perhaps this is the wrong approach to these collections. Westbrook
has postulated “that some of the punishments reflect the scribal compiler’s
concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic
experience of the law courts.” 304 It is unlikely that ancient Mesopotamian
law applied these collections in the way we picture statutes being applied
these days i.e. according to the letter of the law. This does not mean that
this law may not have been taken into consideration when its exact details
did not apply. At the least, one could imagine it being considered as a model
of good judgment in a similar case and therefore having some precedential
value. 305 This fits with the claims Hammurabi makes for his collection in its
prologue and epilogue.
The casuistic nature and the structure of LH and other collections and
their supposed link to other Mesopotamian texts set out in a similar fashion
has been used to assess the nature and function of the legal collections.
Most commonly the link is made between LH and the omen texts which are
seen to be a mixture of historical omens and invented ones which pad out
other possibilities. 306 A similar process is then read into LH which is seen to
consist of some cases from Hammurabi’s role as a judge and some which
are invented in order to provide contrasting cases and fill gaps. 307 If this was
the case, then we can see the laws within LH as some sort of teaching tool
or merely as an intellectual exercise. The function is not decided by such
evidence as many possibilities are left open e.g. this process was used by
Hammurabi to convey most effectively the laws he wanted to be imple-
mented in the land, or at least the model of judging he wanted to be fol-
lowed; what is presented comes from legal scholars of some sort who stud-
ied the problems of the law purely as an intellectual exercise; 308 what was
collected was originally the training manual for judges which taught them
303 e.g. Finkelstein, “Ox that Gored,” 33–35. There are similar problems apply-
ing LH 210 if the offender has no daughter or LH 25 if the fire had gone out.
305 The collection’s role as some kind of model for good judgement is generally
accepted, even by Bottéro, “Code,” 167.
306 Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem,” 289–90; Bottéro, “Code,” 169–77;
Westbrook, “Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes,” 253–64.

307 See previous note.
308 Often other scholars’ summary of the position of Kraus and Bottéro e.g.
Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 201.

COMPARISONS 95
how to decide difficult cases by teaching them the principles they should
apply through these sets of contrasting cases. 309 All these theories involve a
degree of speculation from such evidence. If LH’s origins are within Meso-
potamian legal science then are we to distinguish it from collections such as
LOx, SLHF or SLEx? Has Hammurabi merely appropriated one such col-
lection and given it a new function by adding a prologue and epilogue?
Once we start to divide our texts into sections and hypothesize about origi-
nals and original functions for which we have little or no evidence our con-
clusions must be taken with more than a grain of salt.
The Edict of Haremhab raises many problems for those who would
use the existence of forms to decide upon the nature, function or purpose
of a collection. EH frames itself as direct commands from the king, even
though many of the rulings are in a casuistic form. 310 This makes a mockery
of the arguments presented above on the basis of the forms within other
collections, especially the idea that such a form cannot come from the Sitz
im Leben of a royal order, but must come from legal science.
Westbrook claims that the structure of LH “made no pretence of be-
ing anything but an academic treatise”. 311 Perhaps the question we need to
ask is whether the structure really tells us very much about the purpose of
the collection. The structuring of LH according to the principles of associa-
tion and extrapolation 312 does not necessarily tell us the function of the text,
even though these structural principles may be found in other Mesopota-
mian texts. Given that scholars seem to give the omen lists and medical
texts a practical function it seems a little strange that LH’s similarity of form
and structure is used to argue that the opposite is the case. 313 Westbrook
originally questioned the purely scientific character of the laws based on this
similarity with the omen texts which had a practical function. 314 Interest-
309 Thus Otto, “Kodifizierung und Kanonisierung,” 77–124.

310 So much for the supposed Sitz im Leben of this form cf. Yaron, Laws of Esh-
nunna, 1969, 66–67.
312 See discussions of Sauren, “Aufbau und Anordnung”; Petschow,
“Systematik Hammurabi”; Bottéro, “Code,” 173–77; Renger, “Noch einmal,” 38–
39 etc.
313 Westbrook is aware of this dilemma but offers no solution, merely asserting
that LH did not seem to function in such a manner, “Codification and Canoniza-
tion,” 41. See the next footnote for his earlier position. Bottéro was also aware of
this contradiction, “Code,” 177–79.
314 Westbrook, “Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes,” 253.
ingly, it is only during the reign of two Neo-Assyrian kings 315 that we have
evidence of citation of the omen texts. One presumes they were consulted
in earlier periods also. It has been conjectured that the reason the citation
appears for this brief period is due to an aberrant situation where the ome-
nologists were living away from the palace and had to be consulted via letter
rather than orally. 316
Though there may be a link between LH and the other formal law col-
lections and the concrete nature of other texts such as omens, this evidence
cannot be used to decide upon the nature, function or purpose of these
texts.
2.1.4.9 Comprehensivity
Some have used the non-comprehensive nature of law collections such as
LH to argue that legislation must not have been their purpose. 317 Though
we may agree that “it is clear that none attempts to set out a complete law
of the land,” 318 we must also agree that “it is not clear what conclusions
follow.” 319 The fact that the entire law of the land was not contained within
LH does not necessarily mean he did not mean for the laws he did present
to be followed. 320 Various conclusions have been made around this non-
comprehensive nature of LH. Many have argued that no written laws were
needed and there must have been some sort of unwritten or common law
which guided everyday practice. 321 Some see LH as some sort of confirma-
tion or correction of such a common law and thus keep a legislative func-
tion for it. 322 Renger has aptly pointed out that the expectation of compre-
hensivity is a modern bias and is therefore invalid in determining the func-
tion of such a text. 323
315 Esarhaddon and Aššur-banipal.

317 Finkelstein, “Law in the Ancient Near East”; Westbrook, “Character,” 20;
Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 102.
319 Ibid., 4.
320 However we conceive that.
321e.g. Lemche, “Justice in Western Asia,” 1699.
322 Cardascia, “La coutume dans les droits cuneiformes,” Recueils de la société Jean
Bodin 51 (1990): 61–69; Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, vol. 1, 45; Postgate, Early
Mesopotamia, 289.
323 Renger, “Noch einmal,” 36.
COMPARISONS 97
2.1.4.10 Historical context

The historical context has been used to determine the purpose of EH.
Coming so soon after the Amarna period, many have seen it as a series of
reforms to do away with the abuses of this period, though it is difficult to
prove this. 324
The historical context of the giving of LH has also been called upon to
help decide the purpose and function of the text. Many have seen the crea-
tion of Hammurabi’s empire as creating a need for a unified legal and ad-
ministrative system. They see LH as being set up all over his empire in or-
der to enforce such uniformity. 325 The fact that a number of the promulga-
tors of the more formal law collections were kings who had recently an-
nexed new territories lends weight to such a theory. 326 Though this is a logi-
cal possibility supported by the fact of copies of LH throughout the em-
pire, 327 we do not possess the evidence to be able to decide whether this
was the purpose. Hammurabi never states so much in his text. We do not
have evidence of the impact of LH in subject areas nor do we have enough
evidence to suggest that there was a significant variation in local practice
across his empire. 328 It has even been questioned whether such uniformity
was needed or desirable for Hammurabi’s empire to function. 329 In this
context a letter from Hammurabi is cited (AbB 13 10:10ff) where he in-
structs one of his officials in Emutbalum to treat a case “kima dinim ša
inanna ina Emutbalum iddinnu”, “according to the law/in accordance with the
case/decision they currently apply in Emutbalum”. Unfortunately this letter
does not tell us whether its import is that Hammurabi is happy for his offi-
cials to give verdicts in accord with local practice, or, whether it is remind-
324 Pflüger, “Haremhab,” 267–68 thinks so, though he is reserved as he finds no

direct reference to this in the text.
325 Edwards, Oldest Laws, 12; Klima, “La perspective,” 306–7; George E.
Mendenhall, “Ancient Oriental and Biblical Law,” Biblical Archaeologist 17 (1954): 33.
326 Postgate, Early Mesopotamia, 290.
327 Admitted by Roth, “Codification and Text”, 29.
328 As pointed out by Roth, “Codification and Text”, 29; Westbrook, “Cunei-
form Law,” 204 and Renger, “Noch einmal,” 33–34. The only possibilities admitted
are the distinction between the inheritance rights of firstborn sons in the north and
the south of Mesopotamia, Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 204 and sealing prac-
tices, as shown by Leemans, referred to by Renger, 33.
329 Renger, “Noch einmal,” 33. Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 204.
ing the official to apply the newly enforced royal rulings in contrast to the
local practice. 330
Historical context may raise some possible reasons for the promulga-
tion of a law collection, but cannot be used as evidence by itself.
2.1.4.11 Copies
The fact that the copies of the edicts from Samsu-iluna and Ammiditana
seem to have the same provisions, bar several which may have been added
by Ammiṣaduqa, 331 may point to the applicability of the provisions. It could
then be argued that further provisions were added to deal with the difficul-
ties of enforcement. The updating of the copies of HL are also used to ar-
gue for its applicability. This will be discussed later.
The existence of copies of LH can tell us much about its later use but
perhaps little about its original intention. The many copies of LH show us
that it became a staple of the Babylonian e2-dub-ba. There are over 50 copies
of LH ranging from complete copies to extracts, lexical commentaries and
bilingual versions. Amongst these some copies have subject headings above
the laws, and some copies consist of only the prologue and epilogue. This
multitude of school versions of LH does show us that it came to serve
some sort of scholastic function. The fact that the prologue and epilogue
could be copied separately to the laws may tell us that this section was ap-
preciated for its literary excellence or as a model to follow in writing texts
which praised the king. The lexical commentaries show us that the text was
used to help teach the scribes how to read and write Akkadian. None of this
tells us that the original function of LH could not have been legal in nature.
Kraus’ claim that the copies attest to the literary excellence of LH rather
than its legal applicability is an unnecessary contrast. 332 It is certainly feasi-
ble that part of the reason LH was passed on was its usefulness in training
judges to solve difficult cases, or, perhaps less likely, to teach them the laws
of the land. Wiseman has argued that some of the later copies “could point
to an Achaemenid or later inquiry into Babylonian precedents.” 333 The exis-
330 See discussion of Veenhof, “Royal Decrees”, 78.

331 See comments of Lieberman, “Royal ‘Reforms’ of the Amurrite Dynasty,”
Bibliotheca Orientalis 46 (1989): 255 and Olivier, “Old Babylonian Mesharum De-
cree,” 108–109.
332 Kraus, “Ein zentrales Problem”; Bottéro, “Code,” e.g. 160. See Renger’s
comments, “Noch einmal,” 51.
333 Wiseman, “The Laws of Hammurabi Again,” 162 (and see reference in note
5).
COMPARISONS 99
tence of the copy of LH containing only the non-legal sections should not
be used to confirm the suspicion that LH had no legal purpose. 334 It does
attest to a non-legal use in later days. It should certainly not be used to re-
construct the textual history of the composition. As Roth has pointed out,
we cannot tell whether the distinction between the laws and the non-legal
sections of LH was primary or a secondary development. 335 Hurowitz has
aptly demonstrated the intimate relationship between the two sections in
LH as we have it. 336
2.1.4.12 Some conclusions thus far

For most of the texts classed as decrees or edicts, their purpose does not
seem overly difficult to decide. Perhaps it is this factor, more than anything
else, which has led to scholars grouping them together.
The provisions of AE for example all relate to the application of the
mišarum or debt-release decree. Since at least the time of Bottéro’s important
article on the subject, 337 it has been generally accepted that the mišarum edict
was aimed at increasing stability and getting rid of economic disorder, a
kind of compression valve to prevent the collapse of the economy. It is
now generally accepted that this was done on the basis of perceived need
rather than a fixed periodicity. 338 The need for such a decree of release
within the Old Babylonian economy and the citation of these decrees in
contracts and documents from the time has meant few have questioned the
334 e.g. N. Wasserman, “CT 21, 40–42: A bilingual Report of an Oracle with a
Royal Hymn of Hammurabi,” Revue d’Assyriologie 86 (1992): 1–18.
335 Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” 16.
336 Hurowitz, Inu Anum S9irum, passim. See his comments on page 7 about the
intimate relationship between these two sections and pages 14–15 where he admits
the possibility that LH is a form-critically composite work, but asserts that the final
form is unified and integrated.
337 Bottéro, “Désordre Economique et Annulation des Dettes en Mesopotamia
a l’époque paleo-babylonienne,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 4
(1961): 113–63.
338 Contrast Finkelstein’s earlier position in “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” with that in
“Some New Misharum Material and its Implications,” in Studies in Honor of Benno
Landsberger (ed. Hans G. Guterbock and Thorkild Jacobsen; Assyriological Studies
16; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) e.g. p. 243. See discussion of G.
Komoroczy, “Zur Frage der Periodizitat der altbabylonischen Misharum-Erlasse,”
in Societies and Languages of the Ancient Near East: Studies in Honour of I.M. Diakonoff
(ed. M. Dandamaev and I. M. Diakonoff; Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1982), 196–
205; Lieberman, “Royal Reforms,” 255, n. 56.
applicability of such decrees. The most scholars have done is to question

the importance of the written form of the decree for the carrying out of its
stipulations e.g. Lieberman: “Promulgation of the edicts was one way to let
individuals know about the king’s decisions, but not the only one, and per-
haps not the most important.” 339
In general, there seems to be a double-standard of sorts geared to-
wards a propagandistic rather than legal reading of LH. Despite the lack of
address to any of Hammurabi’s conquered subjects within the laws, numer-
ous scholars have argued for a propagandistic purpose in the context of the
establishment of Hammurabi’s empire. Given the evidence for literacy rates
in the ancient Near East, it is difficult to imagine the content of the inscrip-
tion being of much use as propaganda, except perhaps towards some of the
conquered elite. Despite this, arguments are regularly put forward concern-
ing such a function for LH. For example, Roth reads the first and last laws
of the inscription, referring to false accusation of unlawful death and the
rebellion of slaves from the perspective of the historical context of Ham-
murabi’s order. She sees the first law as code warning against the accusa-
tions being made against Hammurabi for the warfare he has carried out on
the now subject cities and the last law as a warning against any form of re-
bellion from such “enslaved” cities. 340 This is ingenious and in the realm of
the possible but finds no evidential support. Yoffee also understands LH as
propaganda within his imperial context. He sees LH as portraying Hammu-
rabi’s imperial rule as just. 341 The historical context, like so much evidence
bearing on the issue of the nature and function of LH, is not enough to
decide the issue. The fact that we have no evidence that LH affected the
legal practice of his empire does not rule out that this may have been an
intention of his just as the lack of address to any subject peoples does not
mean that the stele could not have played a propagandistic role. It does
seem to be quite a coincidence that most of the law collections were proba-
bly promulgated by imperial rulers. Whether this helps us to understand the
propagandistic element of the collections or the need for legislation is still
open to debate.
Given the uncertain significance of most of the evidence that can be
brought to bear to decide on the issue of LH’s purpose and function it
would seem unnecessary to try and explain away the simplest reading of his
prologue and epilogue and its claims that what is being presented will be of
339 Lieberman, “Royal Reforms,” 258.

340 Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” 18–19.
341 Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 107.
COMPARISONS 101
use to the awilum h}ablum in his case and to the future ruler in deciding the
law of the land. We must hold this purpose in tension with the clear links
between LH and royal monumental inscriptions. Perhaps the address to the
future ruler is here of more importance than the imperial context and our
expectation of propagandistic usage. 342 Hammurabi does intend to memori-
alize his accomplishments. Perhaps this is done through the survival of
Hammurabi’s name due to the existence of the stele and its consultation by
future rulers just as the name of rulers was passed down through their
building inscriptions being replaced when their palace, temple or canal was
rebuilt.
Apart from these two stated purposes we are left with some other pos-
sible functions for LH whether it be as some form of propaganda within his
imperial context, an attempt at unifying the law within his empire, a proof
to the gods that he fulfilled the role for which they elected him, an example
of academic legal reasoning, a collection of Hammurabi’s decisions from his
role as judge with some cases possibly added etc. etc.
Whatever the other functions may have been there are two likelihoods
to keep in mind. The first is that, whether intended to be applied by the
letter of the law (unlikely) or to be used to ascertain the standards or princi-
ples that were to be used when making decisions, or merely to cover par-
ticularly difficult cases, LH is intended to have some sort of role as a model
for successful legal practice and thus to affect its everyday running. This is
true whether this intended desire came to fruition or not. While not being
codification in the modern sense of the term, and it being difficult for us to
decide whether it reflects or attempts to change contemporary practice, LH
was, at the least, a collection of examples of decisions which were to be
emulated. This can be reconciled with the idea that the document itself may
not have become autonomous law. 343 Hammurabi may have been well
aware of the fact that his collection may not carry authority after his death,
that it would not be cited by judges in the documentation of their legal deci-
sions, that it would not be the sole source of law in the land and would be
difficult to enforce throughout the empire. This does not imply that LH
was merely an intellectual exercise with no intended consequences. That it
342 See N. K. Weeks, “Assyrian Imperialism and the Walls of Uruk,” in Gilgameš
and the World of Assyria: Proceedings of the Conference Held at Mandelbaum House, The Uni-
versity of Sydney, 21–23 July 2004 (ed. J. J. Azize and N. K. Weeks; Ancient Near
Eastern Studies Supplement 21; Louvain: Peeters, 2007), 79–90.
343 As argued by Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 220, “Codification and Can-
onization,” 38.
does not look or behave like a modern law collection does not mean its
stated intentions are false. An approach is needed which both accounts for
the difference between law of this period and modern law and takes seri-
ously the claims made by ancient documents about their own purpose.
While we may not exclude some secondary possibilities, we will not elevate
them above the purposes for which we have evidence. It would be wisest
not to try and fill in too many of the details regarding the nature of the
document when we do not have the evidence at our disposal to do so.
Sometimes it is better to say we do not know than to force an argument.
Given the enormous amount of material that can be brought to bear
on the issue of LH’s nature, function and purpose when compared to the
other law collections under study here, the hesitancy of our conclusions
regarding this issue do not bode well for us being able to decide upon the
purpose of the collections not yet treated. That said, we were able to offer a
general thesis in this regard on the basis of the claims made by the text itself
in the case of LH, EH, ND and MAPD, and hope to be able to do so for
these other collections. We found it more difficult to offer a thesis regard-
ing the purpose of the monumental collections due to the lack of a clear
statement of purpose within those collections. We will proceed by analyzing
the rest of the formal law collections, and the supposed scholarly texts.
2.1.4.13 Other formal collections

Our problem is exacerbated when we turn to the other formal law collec-
tions. 344 With these texts we do not have non-legal sections in which to
search for a purpose. The laws are not part of a monumental inscription. 345
We cannot say that an intention is expressly indicated in the texts them-
selves. Nevertheless there is not a scholar who thinks these texts served no
intended purpose at all. There are some clues as to the nature and function
of these texts.
For MAL we are not even sure we are dealing with one composition.
What is generally termed MAL is in fact, a series of tablets, mostly fragmen-
tary, which deal with various topics “rather than a single, systematic, recon-
structed, composition”. 346 There is some evidence which possibly implies
different copyists and/or different dates for the tablets, 347 but it would be
344 LE, MAL, HL.

345 Though Westbrook does see such a function for LE, See “Character,” 9.
346 Roth, Law Collections, 153. This is a generally accepted conclusion. See Driver
and Miles, Assyrian Laws, 12.
347 See Driver and Miles, Assyrian Laws, 7–9.
COMPARISONS 103
unwise to base any theories on orthographic variants within cuneiform. 348

For all but one tablet we have only one copy. 349 The only non-legal section
we have from these tablets is the eponym year inscribed at the end of Tab-
let A. Though this helps us to date the copy of the text, it tells us nothing
about its nature.
Some have tried to use the fact that Tablet A deals with offences by
or against women to speculate as to the nature of the laws. For example,
MAL, along with LOx, are the only collections which approach Otto’s pos-
tulated original Vorlagen. He argued for series of tablets, each dealing with a
separate legal topic, which were put together to form the other law collec-
tions. 350 The tablets of MAL do seem to be arranged to fit a particular topic.
Tablet A deals with laws dealing with women, B and O with fixed property
laws (i.e. real estate, including inheritance laws), C with movable property
laws (including sale and theft), D and E are too fragmentary to tell, both
extant laws of F deal with animal herding, J and K are very fragmentary
also, but J may cover laws pertaining to public works or royal service and K
may deal with credit, L is too fragmentary, M deals with boats (perhaps neg-
ligence more generally) and N with quarrels (perhaps personal injury more
generally). Unfortunately for Otto’s theory, he still feels the need to find
interpolations and a mixture of sources for MAL itself. We think it better to
deal with the text before us, but what can this arrangement by topic tell us
about the sources? Driver and Miles used this arrangement to argue against
the idea the laws were similar to a modern code as they thought this should
be arranged according to specific areas of law, not offences against
women. 351 Both the question of codification and the expectation of certain
arrangement principles are anachronisms in the interpretation of these texts
in general.
What are we left with to help decide upon the nature and function of
these tablets? The casuistic framing, similar to the Lower Mesopotamian
collections, suggested to Driver and Miles that they were “clearly enact-
ments which have either been or are intended to be henceforth in force.” 352
Others may have seen this same framing as implying merely an academic
348 There are some minor grammatical variations also, but again, one should be
cautious not to impose uniformity on a period, or even a scribe.
349 There is a fragmentary Neo-Assyrian copy of Tablet A and some provisions
are duplicated in B and O.
350 See note 290.
351 Driver and Miles, Assyrian Laws, 12.
352 Ibid., 12.
purpose for the collection. As they did with LH, Driver and Miles turn to
their English common law system to explain the nature of MAL and argue
that it “presupposes the pre-existing law and proceeds to alter it”. 353 In con-
trast to this, Cardascia thought the laws were the expression of the unwrit-
ten customary law already in place, 354 while Lafont sees them as similar to
modern “restatements”. 355 The last piece of evidence that has been brought
to bear on this discussion is the findspot for the tablets. It is thought that
the tablets were found in the gate of Shamash, which would be the normal
location for a courthouse. 356 On this basis a number of theories have been
offered. Some have seen the texts as a legal library for judges, 357 perhaps
part of a royal archive. 358 Others still follow Koschaker’s theory that the
tablets represent a collection of laws for personal use. 359 In the end we must
agree with Roth that we remain uncertain whether the copies we have were
collected for royal or private use, 360 and even more uncertain what the
original purpose of the texts was. 361
HL also contain no express statement regarding their purpose. They
are not framed by any type of superscription or prologue. Again, the only
non-legal sections consist of colophons from the scribes who copied the
laws. The colophon on KBo 6.6 has the interesting phrase “Of the father of
353 Ibid., 14.

354 Cardascia, “La formazione del diritto in Assiria,” in La Formazione del Diritto
ne vicino oriente antico (ed. Aristide Theodorides, Carlo Zaccagnini, Guillaume
Cardascia, Alfonso Archi and Reuven Yaron; Rome: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiene,
1988), 55. He contrasts this to the opinion of others that the casuistic nature of the
document shows that it stems from the Sitz im Leben of actual legal cases.
355 Lafont, “Middle Assyrian Period,” 521.
356 See the statements of Westbrook, “Character,” 9–10 and “Biblical and Cu-
neiform Law Codes,” 255; Ernst Weidner, “Das Alter der mittelassyrischen Geset-
zestexte,” Archiv für Orientforschung 12 (1937/9): 46–54; Cardascia, “La formazione
del diritto in Assiria,” 55.
357 Weidner, “Das Alter der mittelassyrischen Gesetzestexte,” 46–54.
358 Westbrook, “Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes,” 255 and “Character,” 9–
10; Weidner, “Die Bibliothek Tiglatpilesers I,” Archiv für Orientforschung 16
(1952/53): 197–215.
359 Koschaker, Rechtsvergleichende, 79–84. His argument is based more on the
form of the document than its findspot. Followed by many, including Lambert,
“Tukulti-Ninurta I and the Assyrian King List,” Iraq 38 (1976): 85–86, n.2.
361 It is generally assumed that these tablets are eleventh century copies of 14th
century originals e.g. Westbrook, “Character,” 10; Roth, Law Collections, 153.
COMPARISONS 105
His Majesty”. 362 Though this may or may not be of use in connecting these
texts with the royal administration, 363 it tells us little else. Again, arguments
have taken place over the significance of the casuistic nature of the laws,
some framing this as evidence of the laws’ origins in precedent cases. 364
Archi argues that HL stem from customary law but have been transformed
by the addition of palace concerns. 365 Most of the discussion around this
collection of laws has centered on the evidence for reform within the texts
themselves. This comes in two forms. One is the karu…kinuna, “for-
merly…now” passages which mention the old ruling and the new one. The
second is evidenced in the New Kingdom text KBo 6.4 (PT) 366 which cov-
ers the same material as the Old Kingdom version of the laws, but has often
changed the ruling in some way. 367 This evidence for the reforming or up-
dating of the Hittite Laws has affected the debate about their nature. For
example, Westbrook states: “Regular changes to keep abreast of develop-
ments in the law would not have been necessary if the text were merely
academic.” 368 While this may possibly be a useful contrast with the later
copying of LH, perhaps showing it was copied due to its literary or aca-
demic excellence rather than its legal import, it does not imply that LH itself
was not originally intended to influence the law of Babylonia. Our earlier
contention that the Mesopotamian scribes’ unwillingness to speak of legal
reforms (changes to royally promulgated law) in contrast to the Hittite
openness to speak of such things should also be taken into consideration
when weighing up the impact of these sections of HL on the debate sur-
rounding the nature and purpose of the ancient Near Eastern law collec-
tions. This said, the fact that HL does tell us that it was updated/reformed
362 Hoffner’s translation, Hittite Laws, 98.

363 E. Neufeld, Hittite Laws (London: Luzac & Co., 1951), 111 discusses the sig-
nificance of this colophon and argues that it may just represent the fact that a king
had this text copied, not necessarily that he instigated its collection. Hoffner’s New
Kingdom dating of this text would support such an idea, Laws of the Hittites, 161.
364 e.g. Hoffner in Roth, Law Collections, 215. Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 110.
365 Alfonso Archi, “La formazione del diritto nell’Anatolia Ittita,” in La
Formazione del Diritto ne vicino oriente antico (ed. Aristide Theodorides, Carlo
Zaccagnini, Guillaume Cardascia, Alfonso Archi and Reuven Yaron; Rome:
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiene, 1988), 61–76.
366 Parallel text. The term and abbreviation given follows Hoffner, in Roth, Law
Collections.
367 There are numerous New Kingdom copies of HL which do not show this
reforming aspect.
etc. does have some implications for its relation to the law of practice. It is
highly unlikely that such a text would be updated or mention reforms if it
was not intended to bear relation to actual law. Unfortunately for us,
though the Hittite Laws themselves are the most copied of the Hittite texts
at our disposal, our evidence for Hittite legal practice is extremely poor and
we cannot assess the relationship between the two in this way. 369
Though we can be certain that within HL the reforming paragraphs
“may show that the Code is linked to the law in practice”, we must concede
with Westbrook that “they do not necessarily mean that the Code is the
source of the reform mentioned.” 370 Though a number of commentators
have taken these reforming paragraphs to mean that the laws were the
source of the reform, 371 HL could just be a description of the law in prac-
tice rather than its prescription or reform. 372 Many have continued to see it
as a law book of sorts whether of a private or royal nature. 373 If the evi-
dence for reform in HL merely shows that it is a reflection of current laws
or legal standards, an attribute ascribed by most commentators to all law
collections to varying degrees, 374 then does this aspect of HL necessarily
distinguish its function from that of any other collections?
It is similarly difficult to ascertain the purpose of LE. Depending on
which evidence one focuses on, this text has been variously linked to 375 or
369 See comments of Haase, “The Hittite Kingdom,” 619.

370 Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 205. See also his discussion of HL 55 in this
regard. It ascribes the reform to the king’s father.
371 e.g. Haase, “The Hittite Kingdom,” 620. Neufeld sees most of HL as a law-
book, but sees the karu…kinuna sections as statute, or the prescription of positive
law, Hittite Laws, 107.
372 One of Westbrook’s main contentions for all the formal law collections of
this period.
373 Marian San Nicolò, “Die Stellung der Keilschrifturkunden in der
vorderasiatischen Rechtsentwicklung,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte
48 (1928): 37 and Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte im Bereiche der keilschriftlichen Rechtsquellen
(Instituttet for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning 13; Oslo: Aschehoug & Co.,
1931), 97; Korošec, “Beiträge zum hethitischen Privatrecht,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 52 (1932): 157. Westbrook, “Biblical and Cuneiform Law
Codes,” 255 sees it as part of the royal archives because of its location.
374 e.g. Westbrook, description not prescription, “Cuneiform Law,” 205. Malul,
review of Westbrook Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 85–90, among others, has
criticised him for assuming this reflection. Roth sees the collections as a reflection
of legal standards of some sort e.g. Law Collections, 1.
375 e.g. Wesbrook, “Character,” 9; Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 100.
COMPARISONS 107
separated from 376 the monumental law collections, linked to mišarum

edicts, 377 seen as a text that stands midway between the two, 378 and could be
linked to the scholarly texts also. 379 Unlike MAL or HL, LE contains a short
superscription at its beginning. Its mention of the kingship of Eshnunna
and military conquests could be seen as a link to the themes of the non-
legal sections of the monumental law collections. We possess no evidence
that LE was set up as a monument. Our two main witnesses to this text are
clay tablets which have sometimes been interpreted as school texts, 380 as
private copies of an official inscription, 381 or extracts of some other real law
of Eshnunna. 382 Our third witness to the collection has been described as
“a student exercise tablet recording extracts from the laws”. 383 It seems it is
only the superscription that would enable us to distinguish this text from
the “scholarly” texts.
In fact, this superscription has been used to link LE to the mišarum and
other Old Babylonian edicts such as AE. 384 AE also begins with a dated
superscription written in Sumerian, in contrast to the rest of the collection
which is in Akkadian. The economic focus of some of LE’s provisions has
also provided material for scholars to make the link between it and these
other edicts e.g. LE’s first provisions deal with prices and rates of exchange.
Its later provisions deal with topics more regularly found in the formal law
collections. 385 Perhaps this is a slightly false distinction given the fact that
376 e.g. Michalowski and Walker, “A New Sumerian ‘Law Code’,” 386.
378 Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 102–3.
379 e.g. all three copies of the text could be interpreted as school copies or exer-
cise texts. See Westbrook, “Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes,” 252 and Roth,
Law Collections, 58. Eichler, “Literary Structure,” 81 links LE to Mesopotamian
scholastic tradition on the basis of its structure and presentation of polar cases.
381 e.g. Yaron, “Context and Authority,” 30.
382 John C. Miles and O. R. Gurney, “The Laws of Eshnunna,” Archiv Orientalni
17 (1949): 174–88.
384 e.g. discussion of Roth, Law Collections, 57; Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s
Edict,” 102–3.
385 But see Yoffee, “Context and Authority,” 100 who sees LE as slightly dif-
ferent to the monumental collections due to subject matter and arrangement,
though he is speaking, at least in part, about the economic measures contained at
the beginning of the provisions and the lack of a prologue and epilogue as in the
other monumental collections.
AE also deals with non-economic topics, and that the other formal law col-
lections deal with prices and economic measures also. 386 Sometimes the
spattering of relative (as opposed to the šumma clauses) clauses are used to
make links to the edicts or to proclamations in general, 387 at other times it is
the apodictic clauses which are used for this purpose. 388 The fact that the
relative formulation also turns up in MAL and is but a variation of a casuis-
tic framing should make one a little hesitant to follow this line of argument.
The fact that AE does contain a number of šumma clauses should have the
same effect or perhaps, may make us question any strict distinction between
the formal collections and edicts/decrees based on form. Perhaps what an
analysis of the nature and function of LE tells us is that such things cannot
and should not be hastily decided on the basis of form or genre.
Again, we have a variety of opinions of the text’s purpose ranging
from those who see the laws as officially promulgated 389 (perhaps linked to
the political context of empire again) 390 to those who see it as some kind of
private text based on actual law. 391 All agree that the text is non-
comprehensive and perhaps has an emphasis on the exceptional. 392
2.1.4.14 School Texts

Let us now turn to the group of texts which are generally classed as “schol-
arly” or “school texts”. 393 Is the distinction between these texts and the
formal law collections a secure one or is the link between these two groups
of texts perhaps so strong that we should postulate a school origin for the
386 e.g. LH 268–277 and the prologue of LU which speaks of the standardisation
of measures, A iii 135–iv 149.
387 e.g. Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna, 1988, 106–113.
388 e.g. Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 102.
389 Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna, 1988, 30; Albrecht Goetze, Laws of Eshnunna (An-
nual of the American School of Oriental Research 31; New Haven: Department of
Antiquities of the Government of Iraq and the American Schools of Oriental Re-
search, 1956), 16. Korošec, “Keilschriftrecht,” 87.
390 e.g. Goetze, “The Laws of Eshnunna Discovered at Tell Harmal,” Sumer 4
(1948): 67 for Bilalama (a claim later abandoned by Goetze, Laws of Eshnunna). This
ruler is no longer seen to be connected to the collection, but a similar imperial con-
text also fits for Dadusha.
391 Miles and Gurney, “Laws of Eshnunna”. Yaron mixes the two, seeing the
original as officially promulgated and the tablets we have as private copies, Laws of
Eshnunna, 30.
392 e.g. Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna, 86.
393 SLEx, SLHF, LOx.
COMPARISONS 109
formal collections also? Levinson has stated that texts such as SLHF are
“important for the ongoing debate about whether the cuneiform legal col-
lections possessed legislative force or represented scribal reflection on ideal
norms.” 394 Given the fact that this text has a mixture of law provisions in a
framing similar to that of the formal law collections 395 and phrases taken
from contractual clauses, perhaps we need to rethink the implications of a
link between “scholarly texts” and law collections. Why is it that on the one
hand one is happy to see the phrases within SLHF as reflecting the scribal
practicing of phrases they may have to write in actual legal contracts,
whereas when they copy provisions that may appear similar to those in law
collections we are to presume that this is merely an academic exercise and
serves no practical purpose? Surely this is no more than an assumption. To
then argue for a similar purpose for the formal law collections based on
similarity with these texts is certainly false methodology.
Within SLHF, the collection of legal phrases next to provisions like
those of the formal law collections need not lead one to the conclusion that
this text was merely a scholarly exercise. Surely this text could be seen in the
way others have seen LE or MAL, as a private collection of some official
for his role in the judicial system. Of course, whether the laws within the
collection reflected the common law, some officially promulgated written
law collection or the academic musings of the legal scholar we cannot tell.
The text named Sumerian Laws Exercise Tablet by Roth (SLEx) does
contain a number of hints that the copy we have comes from a school con-
text. The most solid of this evidence is the fact that the scribe, having writ-
ten tukum-bi mistakenly three times, later writes it out properly three times
in succession. Apart from this there is only the fact that the scribe has left a
colophon listing the number of lines and his name at the bottom of the tab-
let to tell us that this may be a school text rather than a promulgated law
collection. Does this really tell us anything about the original purpose of the
text? LH was copied for over a millennia by scribes who sometimes made
mistakes and who may or may not have left a colophon at the bottom of
the tablet. For MAL and HL we possess similar colophons also. 396 Does
this imply that these texts were also nothing but scribal exercises or does it
394 Bernard M. Levinson, review of M.T. Roth (with a contribution by H.A.

Hoffner), Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, Journal of Near Eastern Stud-
ies 59 (2000): 119.
395 e.g. 15 sections of SLHF begin with šumma.
396 And Roth thinks it possible that there was space for one at the bottom of
LE, Law Collections, 58.

just show us that such texts could be copied whether for legal purposes or
for scribal education? 397 SLEx was originally interpreted as a code of laws
like that of LH, 398 and it must be said that the subject matter of the collec-
tion is quite prevalent in other collections. LOx is quite similar. Like SLEx,
the copy of it appears to have come from a school context and its subject
matter is commonly covered in other law collections. 399 This raises the pos-
sibility that these texts serve a different function to the more formal law
collections that circulated independently of them, “and, with its repetitive
language and limited subject matter, lent itself to student copying and
memorization.” 400 But that is all it does and this remains but a possibility.
We do not have evidence that this text or SLEx were circulated or memo-
rized. It is quite possible that they reflect the study of different topics taken
from other law collections, but it is always possible that they are but copies
of formal law collections. They certainly do not necessarily imply that LH,
or any other formal law collection, was not intended to have any effect.
2.1.4.15 Conclusions
Is the difference between scholarly acceptance of the applicability of ancient
Near Eastern law collections based on an objective difference between de-
crees and law “codes” as Westbrook would have us believe? The evidence is
inconclusive, but the classifications usually given to these texts are a little
too rigid and unconvincing at crucial points. The arguments used to ascer-
tain the nature and purpose of these same documents do not hold up when
looked at from a comparative perspective as we have offered here. The fact
that a document was set up on a stele or some other monument has been
used by some to question the legal import of several law collections while
other scholars do not see a problem with a monumental text having legal
import as well as some other role. 401 The use of external evidence for the
397 Whether in legal thought, literary forms or literacy more generally.

398 by A. T. Clay, Miscellaneous Inscriptions in the Yale Babylonian Collections (Yale
Oriental Series Babylonian Texts 1; New Haven: Yale University Press,1915), 18.
Clay also translated the Sumerian term ti-la as “laws” and rendered lines 2 and 3 of
column vi of the reverse as “laws of Nisaba and Hani”, whereas Roth renders the
same text as part of a dedication of the copy of the text to these deities, Law Collec-
tions, 45.
399 See comments of Roth, Law Collections, 40.
400 Ibid, 40.
401 e.g. Amélie Kuhrt, The Ancient Near East: c. 3000–330 BC (vol. 1; London:
Routledge, 1995), 111–12.

COMPARISONS 111
citation of laws or the correspondence of documents from legal practice

with law collections to decide the import of the latter has been seen to be
problematic. The creation of separate generic categories for these law col-
lections has also been shown to be unhelpful when trying to decide upon
their nature. Arguments regarding the historical context surrounding the
giving of a law collection may offer possibilities as to the reason for a col-
lection’s promulgation, but given the problems in dating many of these
texts 402 and the difficulty in determining the role they were intended to play,
it is difficult to make much use of such arguments. The existence of copies
of these texts has been used to say more than it can. The fact that a docu-
ment may have been copied tells us little about its original purpose. In the
end, what we are left with, rather than a rigid distinction between text types,
each with a similar nature and purpose, is a continuum of different texts
which could cover various topics for various purposes and be formulated
and framed in a number of different ways and be copied for multiple rea-
sons. We are left with a number of possibilities regarding the nature, pur-
pose and function of these texts. Where the texts themselves have claimed a
purpose we have more right to propose one on this basis. Unfortunately,
research regarding one of the few texts which does this, LH, has consisted
of scholars explaining away some of the legal purposes which were claimed.
Our best evidence for the nature of these texts comes from internal clues
within the texts themselves such as Hammurabi’s desires regarding his
stele’s effects on the awilum h}ablum or the future ruler and his land and his
statements about what it shows he has already achieved in the realm of law,
the evidence for reform within HL, the superscription on LE, the non-legal
sections on other collections. Perhaps our best evidence for the purpose of
MAL came from its supposed findspot in the gate of Shamash. Form criti-
cism tells us nothing unless we concoct an extremely complicated prehis-
tory for all our texts so as to not have to explain the texts we have before
us. We found that even after all the evidence that is brought to bear, our
conclusions on such matters are far from certain.
One issue which has not been mentioned in much detail has been the
actual content of the collections. For the mišarum edicts, it is the content of
the provisions which enables us to postulate its purpose for economic re-
lief. For MAPD, the content confirms the evidence from the non-legal sec-
tions that this text is aimed at the regulation of the internal running of the
palace. When we come to discuss other law collections, often the content of
the provisions has been seen as unimportant, perhaps reflecting something
402 e.g. HL, LU, LE, MAL.

resembling the law of practice or some utopian dream of its reform. For the
monumental texts especially, many seem to treat the content as mere win-
dow dressing to show that the king was just. Perhaps there is more to it
than this and an analysis of the content may be able to tell us a little more
about the purpose of the collection. At the least, the content should make
one suspect, as the first editors of these texts did, that texts containing col-
lections of legal rulings were most likely intended to effect the practice of
law to some extent, whether that be through legislation, the collection of
exemplary decisions, or decisions on extreme or difficult cases, past com-
mands or decisions of use to judges etc. Perhaps an attempt to reconstruct
the society which would be created by the application of the laws within
collections would be a helpful step towards understanding their intended
purposes. Unfortunately the limitations of space mean that such an under-
taking must wait. An analysis of the relation of the content of the provi-
sions of LH to Hammurabi’s context in Old Babylonian economy, society
and politics and to the non-legal sections of his collection would be useful.
This writer suspects that these provisions reflect the society Hammurabi
wished to create, or had attempted to create. If this was found to be the
case, it may go someway towards explaining the lack of citation of LH and
perhaps even its perceived lack of correspondence to the documents from
practice. It is possible that the end of his empire, his short lived dynasty and
the nature of Mesopotamian law, were the reasons his laws were not put
into practice. If one were to find that the effect of putting these provisions
into practice would have been the accomplishment of the purposes set out
in the non-legal sections of the collection, this may lend weight to the idea
that these were intended to be put into practice in some form or another.
The comparisons to this point have dealt with various non-legal as-
pects of the law collections. The following sections will be comparing the
legal material itself. This will focus on the similarity or lack thereof between
the laws in topics for which there is comparative material. This will involve
analysis of the similarity of the situation or offence outlined, the phraseol-
ogy and vocabulary employed, as well as the proposed outcome of the case.
To some extent a comparison will be made regarding the various penalties
for each offence. For the most part this will be left until section 2.7 where a
comparative analysis of the penalties across collections will be made. A dif-
ference of penalty within laws across collections does not rule out the pos-
sibility of borrowing though it can demonstrate the lack of a uniform or
common law in the ancient Near East. This writer is attempting to deter-
mine whether the parallels are quite general, only involving a surface simi-
larity in terms of the topic treated, or are so close that borrowing is likely.
COMPARISONS 113
This is a somewhat subjective exercise as discussed in the first chapter, but

worthwhile nonetheless. It is hoped that this more comprehensive compari-
son will help to discern a more accurate view regarding borrowing than that
which comes about through selection only of examples where it is consid-
ered highly likely.
2.2 ROLE OF JUDGE AND KING

Amongst the laws which mention the roles of judges and kings there is very
little of interest from a comparative perspective. There is some very general
evidence which enables some insight into the various roles of judges: inves-
tigating claims, hearing/seeing evidence, issuing required documents, grant-
ing or withholding permission for certain actions, not allowed to change his
judgment as well as some sanctions against dishonesty and penalties against
those who do not follow his judgment. Possibly of significance with regards
to the nature and purpose of MAL is the fact that this collection makes
more mention of judges than any other. This supports the scholarly suspi-
cion that MAL was intended as some kind of judge’s private law book,
though it hardly proves the point. In keeping with the nature of LH in gen-
eral (in terms of its size), there is more information in this collection about
the activity of judges.
There are two issues which are of interest. The first relates to West-
brook’s contention that there is a distinction between the collections he
terms edicts or decrees and the more formal law collections with regards to
their contents, with the former supposedly dealing mainly with administra-
tive and economic matters. It is interesting to note that within the collec-
tions Westbrook terms edicts/decrees, EH is alone in its mention of
judges. 403 The second relates to another of Westbrook’s contentions,
namely, that LE 48 is applicable across the entire ancient Near East i.e. that
judges decide lesser cases and the king decides capital ones. 404
LE 48 And for a case involving a penalty of silver in amounts ranging
from 20 shekels to 60 shekels, the judges shall determine the case
against him; however, a capital case is only for the king.
It must be said that there is some evidence supporting the notion that
decisions could be passed up the line from judges to the king e.g. MAL C 8,
403 To be fair, the Hittite “Instructions to Commanders of Border Garrisons,”

trans. Gregory McMahon (COS 1.84: 221–25) does contain mention of their role as
judges e.g. section 36.
HL 102 and Hittite Instruction for Border Officials sect. 36. 405 In none of these
cases is there the notion that it is only capital cases that go to the king. HL
102, for instance, states that the theft of 3 talents of wood becomes a case
for the king’s court. Nowhere else in HL is a theft offence punished by
death. 406 Given the fact that the theft of two talents of wood only attracts a
six shekel penalty it is quite unlikely that this was a capital case. In the Hit-
tite Instructions to Commanders of Border Garrisons, as in Exodus 18, the deci-
sions are passed up the line due to their difficulty rather than their gravity.
That the king played a role in judging non-capital cases in Assyria is quite
clear from other laws such as MAL B 3 and C 10, and it is possible that the
laws regarding sorcery in HL 44b and 111, and that regarding a bull outside
its corral in HL 176a were not necessarily capital cases. 407 The abundant
evidence of the involvement of Old Babylonian kings in mundane, everyday
judgments, as witnessed in the numerous letters between the kings and their
officials is also testimony to this. 408 Sorcery is also a case for the king in
MAL A 47 (which was possibly a capital case) and in ETel. 50. There is evi-
dence that the king had involvement in capital cases in LH 129, LE 58, and
the Hittite sex laws e.g. 187–88, 198–200a.
There are two laws which possibly cast some doubt on the idea that
capital cases were only for the king. The first is ETel. 49. The law deals with
a case of murder. In the context of the document as a whole, it probably
relates to murder within the intrigues and political maneuverings around the
throne. It is stated that the heir of the murdered man can decide whether
the offender is killed or makes compensation. The last line contains a
statement about the king which Hoffner translates as: “The king shall have
no role in the decision.” 409 This would seem to imply that the king was to
have no role in a decision regarding a capital case. Van den Hout, staying
closer to the original, translates the phrase differently: “For the king (there
will be) nothing, however.” 410 The import of this last line seems to be that
405 Compare also Exodus 18.

406 The exception to this is found in HL 126, relating to the theft of a spear
from the palace. See the later discussion of this law in the section comparing theft
laws where it is argued that the unique severity of this law is probably related to the
possible use of such an implement for an assassination attempt.
407 See later discussion of laws regarding sorcery and the goring ox.
408 e.g. letters to Shamash-Hazir in Kraus, Briefe Shamash-Hazir.
409 Hoffner in Roth, Law Collections, 237.
410 “The Proclamation of Telipinu” (COS 1.76: 198).
COMPARISONS 115
the king will not benefit financially from whatever compensation is paid, 411
rather than that he plays no role in the decision (though this also seems to
be true). There are numerous examples of capital cases within these law
collections which do not mention the role of the king in the deciding of the
case. MAL A 15 specifically mentions that a capital case, involving accusa-
tion of adultery, can be brought to either a judge or a king. Though there is
good evidence that cases could be passed up the chain of authority, and that
kings often did play a role in deciding capital cases, LE 48 does not seem to
have been a uniform rule throughout the ancient Near East.
It is worth noting that the Hittite Laws mention the king’s role in judg-
ing far more than any other collection. It is possible that this is due to a
different role for the Hittite king with regards to the legal system at Hatti as
compared to Mesopotamia and Egypt. HL 55 displays an interesting feature
unique to the Hittites amongst the collections being compared here i.e. a
narrative description of events leading up to a legal decision. 412
2.3 MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

There are certainly some similarities amongst the laws treating marriage and
divorce in the ancient Near Eastern collections, though there are also dif-
ferences. One area where there is not uniformity is that regarding the re-
quirement of some form of written contract for a marriage to be legitimate.
This is seen as a necessary requirement in LH 128, LE 27–28 and LU 11.
Each of these laws, however, treats a slightly different situation: LH treats
marriage in general; LE treats a similar situation but also the implications
such an act has for adulterous offences; LU 11 specifically speaks of wid-
ows. MAL A 34 also treats marriage to widows, but contains a ruling very
different from the others:
MAL A 34 If a man should marry a widow without her formal binding
agreement and she resides in his house for two years, she is a wife; she
shall not leave.
It seems unlikely that there was any literary borrowing among these
given their very different framing and slightly different subject matter. The
411 Perhaps compare the reduction of fines in HL due to the waiving of the pal-
ace share. See the later discussion of this in section 2.7.
412 See the earlier discussion of this feature in 2.1.3 where it was compared to
ETel. and RU and contrasted to the rest of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian collec-
tions.
law in MAL also shows that this law was not treated in uniform fashion
throughout the ancient Near East. Compare:
LH 128 If a man marries a wife but does not draw up a formal contract
for her, she is not a wife.
An area where there is more agreement concerns the breaking of mar-
riage negotiations. Prior to the full consummation of marriage, at least
within the societies for whom we have cuneiform law collections, there was
some form of payment from the groom to his prospective father-in-law.
Once this was paid the law treated the couple as married as regards outsid-
ers, but the marriage could still be called off by either party. This situation,
the breaking of marriage negotiations after the bridewealth had been paid, is
dealt with in a fairly uniform way in the extant collections. The most com-
mon law amongst the collections concerns the breaking of the deal by the
father-in-law. If this happens, he is to return the brideprice double cf. LH
160–161; LE 25; LU 15; LL 29; HL 29. It would be difficult to argue for
substantial literary borrowing amongst these laws given the many differ-
ences in framing. These laws mention the involvement of a third party. LH
161 and LL 29 forbid the marriage of the betrothed woman to any third
party to whom her parents may want to give her, whereas LE 25 and LU 15
do not. HL 28 envisages another situation where another man has run off
with the betrothed woman. In this case the man who elopes with the
woman is to compensate the groom-to-be. If the father and mother gave
the woman to another man, they are responsible for the compensation.
There is no hint here that the woman cannot run off with another man, or
that the parents cannot give the woman to another man, just that this would
be an expensive exercise. Interesting in the Hittite collection is the mention
of the father and mother rather than just the father, and also the possibility
of the bride-to-be running off with someone else and thus herself abrogat-
ing the agreement. LH 159 and HL 30 also cover the situation where the
groom-to-be abrogates the agreement. In both cases he forfeits the bride-
price. The other collections do not treat this situation. Only the two Sumer-
ian collections mention the son-in-law entering the house of his father-in-
law as an action occurring at the time of the payment of the brideprice.
Compare this to LE 25 where the husband comes to claim the bride from
the house of his father-in-law after the payment has been made.
The situation where one member of the married couple dies before
they have children is dealt with in several collections. Both LH 163–164 and
LE 17–18 determine that both the bridewealth and the dowry should return
COMPARISONS 117
to their original households, though they phrase this very differently. 413
MAL A 30–31 deal with this situation slightly differently. MAL A 30 speci-
fies that a woman’s father can cancel marriage proceedings in the case
where the prospective groom is put in a situation where he has to carry out
levirate marriage (i.e. an older brother has died leaving a childless widow). If
the pending marriage is cancelled by the girl’s father the prospective
groom’s father is able to take back the non-consumable portion of the bri-
dal gift and marriage prestation. MAL A 31 allows a man who has presented
the bridal gift to his father-in-law to choose whether he will marry a differ-
ent daughter or take back non-edibles in the case that his prospective bride
dies. HL 193 also specifies levirate marriage in the case of a deceased older
brother. HL 27 treats the death of a man’s wife quite differently to else-
where. Her personal possessions are to be burnt and her husband is to keep
the dowry if there are no children rather than returning it to his father-in-
law.
Divorce of a woman by a man seems to be dealt with differently across
the collections. LH 138–139 treats the divorce of a woman who had not
borne a man children. If there was bridewealth he is to give her silver to its
value and return her dowry to her; if not, he pays her 60 shekels. LE 59
treats the divorce of a woman who had borne a man children. Unfortu-
nately the provision is broken. The man seems to be expelled from the
house of his second wife. LU 9, similar to LH 139 sets a price of 60 shekels
for divorcing a first-ranking wife, LU 10, 30 shekels in the case of the di-
vorce of a widow. SLHF iv 12–14 also implies that divorce involves some
kind of payment. MAL A 37, however, declares that a man who wants to
divorce his wife can choose whether or not he wants to give her anything.
MAL A 38 states that, if his wife was still living in her father’s house, the
woman gets to keep the bridewealth and the husband can take back any
other valuables he gave her. These laws are difficult to compare, but it
seems that the woman gets a tougher deal in MAL than elsewhere. Divorce
at the behest of the woman is treated in LH and HL. In LH 141 a woman
who wants to leave but appropriates goods, squanders possessions or dis-
parages her husband can be divorced by her husband without receiving any
payment, or can be made to reside in her husband’s house as a slave
woman. LH 142–143 possibly treat a case where a woman wants a divorce.
Her case is to be investigated. If she passes the tests then she can take her
413 For discussion about the difficulties involved in LE 18 see Roth, Law Collec-
tions, 69, nn. 5–6; Westbrook, “A Death in the Family: Codex Eshnunna 17–18
Revisited,” Israel Law Review 29 (1995): 32–42; Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna, 54–55.
dowry and leave; if not she is drowned. The only other mention of divorce
at the behest of the wife comes in LH 149. In the case that a woman suffers
from disease and her husband has married another, she has the right to ei-
ther stay and be supported or take her dowry and leave for her father’s
house. HL 26 by contrast, seems to envisage divorce at the behest of the
woman as less problematic. The woman takes some sort of payment for
bearing children and the man keeps the land and children.
2.4 PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE
2.4.1 Real Estate

Though there is an abundance of laws treating real estate matters within
LH, there are only two topics which have comparable material elsewhere:
boundary violations and state land. MAL and SLHF also both treat the
topic of common property and its upkeep.
There are laws treating boundary violations in LH d, MAL B 8–10,
12–15, 19–20, HL 168–69 and LU 30. Both LH d and LU 30 deal with the
unlawful cultivation of another’s uncultivated or neglected field. Unfortu-
nately, much of LH d is broken so they are difficult to compare. The laws in
MAL on this topic treat a range of offences from the unlawful incorpora-
tion of another’s land to the building of structures on it, to the unlawful use
of it for cultivation or brick making. None of these laws treat exactly the
same topic as LH d or LU 30. MAL B 8 treats the unlawful incorporation
of a large area of another’s land into one’s own border severely, punishing
this offence with the removal of a finger. This Assyrian prevalence towards
corporal punishments will be further demonstrated in the later discussion of
topics related to criminal law. Displaying another cultural peculiarity, the
Hittite Laws treating this topic involve some kind of sacrifice and reconse-
cration of the field. There is many other pieces of evidence demonstrating
the peculiarly Hittite focus on ritual and purity aspects of law within their
law collections. There is nothing in this material upon which one could base
and argument for literary borrowing or a common background of cunei-
form legal science.
The same is the case within the laws of LH and HL treating the distri-
bution, upkeep and services due from state land. The most that can be said
is that both societies utilized a system similar to the medieval feudal system
in the distribution of parcels of state-owned land. The system is better un-
derstood for LH and the Old Babylonian period, but the Hittite material is
clearly not merely a literary borrowing but reflects the peculiarities of the
Hittite administration of such land. The relevant laws in LH deal with sol-
COMPARISONS 119
diers and fishermen who are given land in return for various ser-
vices/payments. This land cannot be sold or transferred. Within the Hittite
laws there is a similarity in that state land is being given to certain people in
return for payments/services, but it does not seem to be for the same rea-
sons as in LH. This practice is fairly common throughout the historical re-
cords, there being parallels in Egypt and medieval Europe. There are many
differences between each system of course, as there is here between LH and
HL, but the explication of these differences is not the concern of this work.
It is enough to state that the similarities in LH 27–41 and HL 39–42, 46–56
are unlikely to be due to literary borrowing, common legal science or any
common ancient Near Eastern culture. That the two systems are not identi-
cal and that the drafters of the law collections did not have the same topics
in mind is demonstrated by a comparison of LH 26 and 33 with HL 42. LH
punishes with death any soldier who hires a substitute to go on a royal
campaign in his stead whereas HL 42 is concerned only that a person hired
to go on military campaign was paid before they went.
The laws treating the upkeep of common property in MAL B 17–18,
O 5 and SLHF iii 18–19 share little in common. The Assyrian laws treat the
upkeep of irrigation canals whereas SLHF merely refers to shared responsi-
bility for a common wall.
2.4.2 Inheritance
The inheritance of the dowry after a woman’s death is a topic treated in a
number of collections. In LH, 414 LL 415 and MAL, 416 the dowry goes to the
woman’s children. If there are no children, it goes back to her father’s
household (in LH 163 anyway). In MAL, there is the additional possibility
that the husband can “take control of her” and give the dowry to one or
more of his sons at his discretion. In HL 27, the dowry is not specifically
said to be for the children. If the woman dies in her husband’s house, her
husband keeps the dowry; if in her father’s house, her father seems to keep
it. Perhaps there is a distinction here between Mesopotamian and Hittite
practice.
There are a number of other laws treating the topic of inheritance in
the case of the death of the father/head of the household, including those
treating the topic of the upkeep of widows. In LH, unless her dead husband
414 LH 162–64, 167, 172–74.

415 LL 24.
416 MAL A 29.
has willed her a portion of his estate, 417 the widow has the choice of re-
maining in her husband’s property and having use of it until she dies 418 or,
if her children are still young, she can remarry. 419 The laws in MAL on this
topic are more detailed, including situations where the widow is residing in
her father’s house. 420 MAL A 46 basically sets out the same provisions as
those in LH, but does so quite differently and adds a number of possibilities
e.g. marriage to one of her husband’s sons. Though the topic and conclu-
sions are similar, borrowing is hardly proven here.
LH 172–74, 177 deal with the topic of a widow’s remarriage and the
inheritance issues arising regarding the dowry and the estates of her two
husbands. MAL A 28 contains a provision differently formulated from that
in LH 177. LH 177 describes the remarriage of a widow with young chil-
dren and stipulates that the later husband will be entrusted with the estate
of her former husband but that it will be inventoried and all of it will pass
on to the children of the former husband. MAL A 28 specifies the remar-
riage of a widow who marries with her former husband’s child in her
womb. The child can either be adopted into the new household or merely
take an inheritance share from his father’s estate. Though the two rulings
amount to a similar thing, they are approached from different angles and
formulated very differently, making substantial borrowing unlikely.
Laws discussing inheritance issues relating to a man’s second marriage
appear in LH, LL and MAL. LH 167 treats the remarriage of a man after his
wife’s death. This topic is not treated anywhere else. There are a number of
laws which specifically treat a secondary marriage to a slave woman: LH
170–172 and LL 25–26. LH deals with the inheritance of the children from
a secondary marriage to a slave which occurs while the first-ranking wife is
still alive. If the father declares the children of the slave woman to be “My
children”, then they divide the estate with the children of the first ranking
wife, with the preferential share going to a son of the latter. If the father
doesn’t declare such a status, the release of the slave woman and her chil-
dren is secured but they do not inherit. The ruling of LL 25 seems to paral-
lel the second situation outlined above (i.e. the children of a slave woman
and the slave woman are released from slavery but do not inherit), as set out
in LH 171, but does not specify any declaration by the father. LL 26 treats a
slightly different situation, namely, a secondary marriage to a slave woman
417 LH 150.
418 LH 171–72.
419 LH 177.
420 MAL A 25–26 and 33.
COMPARISONS 121
after the death of the first ranking wife. In this case, the ruling parallels that
of LH 170, including the stipulation that a child of the first ranking wife will
be the primary heir. It is possible that the drafter of LH knew of these laws
and used them in some kind of reformation of inheritance law but this is
speculative. Though the rulings of LL 25–26 parallel those of LH 170–71,
the situations described in each case are not the same.
The marriage of a male slave to a free woman is best dealt with in this
section due to the fact that the main concern of the drafters of the laws on
this topic was with the division of property amongst slave, spouse and mas-
ter. LH 175 states that the children resultant from the marriage of a slave to
a free woman will not be claimed as slaves by the slave’s owner. LU 5, how-
ever, states that such a marriage requires one male child to be placed at the
service of the slave’s owner.
The Hittite Laws also contain a number of laws treating the marriage
of slaves, both to other slaves and to either male or female free persons.
None of these parallel the laws treating the marriage of slaves in LH or LU
e.g. whereas LH 176 and HL 32 treat the division of property in the case of
the marriage of a male slave to a free woman, LH does so in the case of the
death of one’s partner, whereas HL does so in the case of divorce.
Both LH 166 and LL 32 concern the provision of bridewealth for an
unmarried son upon the death of his father. Unfortunately, LL 32 is too
broken to compare fruitfully. Interestingly, LL 23 also contains a law re-
garding the provision of a dowry for an unmarried daughter. Again, LH 165
and LL 31 both enable a father to give a special gift to a favored son. It is
worth noting that these two sets of parallel laws are placed next to each
other, in the same order in both collections. It is not impossible that the
drafter of LH had knowledge of LL 31–32, nor is it proven that he did.
There is a possible parallel between LH 180 and LL 22 regarding the
inheritance of naditu. Both laws specify that a naditu will divide the estate as
an equal heir. LL 22 connects this to an ugbabtu or qadištu also, while LH
180 connects it to only cloistered naditu or a sekretu. LH also specifies that
the daughter only has the use of the property which still legally belongs to
her brothers, whereas LL makes no such statement. This is likely to be an
actual difference rather than a more detailed statement in LH as compared
to LL. This author is inclined to this conclusion partly due to the unique
statement in LL b that unmarried daughters can inherit their father’s estate
if there is no male heir. It seems there is a slightly different attitude to fe-
male inheritance within this collection, at least as compared to LH.
There is very little to compare again concerning disinheritance. LH
mentions disinheritance in three places: LH 158, 168–69. The first law pre-
scribes disinheritance for the son who sleeps with his father’s principal wife
after his father’s death, the latter two describe the process of disinheritance
which must be overseen and investigated by judges. HL 171 merely de-
scribes the ritual used for disinheritance or reinstatement.
There has been some debate surrounding the existence of a double
share for the eldest son in Mesopotamia, some arguing that this was a
northern, rather than southern practice. 421 As far as the law collections can
bear on this issue, LH 170 prescribes a preferential share and LL 26 deter-
mines a primary heir, while MAL B 1 specifically mentions a double share
for the eldest son. This material does not seem to decide the issue.
2.4.3 Adoption
There are a number of laws within the topic of adoption which relate to
inheritance matters, others to contractual ones, hence its location in be-
tween these two topics. The relevant laws on this topic are found in LH
185–94, LE 32–35, LL 20, SLEx 4'–6', MAL A 28 and HL 200b. There are
difficulties in comparing these laws given the possibility that a child could
be taken for rearing without adoption. 422 At times it is difficult to know
which arrangement is in view. For example, contrast LH 185 and LE 32:
LH 185 If a man takes in adoption a young child at birth and then rears
him, that rearling will not be reclaimed.
LE 32 If a man gives his child for suckling and for rearing but does not
give the food, oil, and clothing rations (to the caregiver) for 3 years, he
shall weigh and deliver 10 shekels of silver for the cost of the rearing of
his child, and he shall take away his child.
Is this a contrast or two laws for different situations both protecting
the adopter (i.e. the child stays with them and payment for services is as-
sured)? This hinges on how the last sentence of LE 32 is read. Is the “he”
who takes away the child the father or the caregiver? If the caregiver, then it
correlates with LH, if the father, then it is in direct contradiction to it. It is
possible these laws are dealing with two different situations also i.e. LH
treats adoption, LE rearing.
A form of adoption was also employed whereby a young child was
taken by a craftsman to learn a trade. This appears to have been done dif-
ferently in Mesopotamia than in Hatti:
421See Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 204 and note 14 for references.

422 At least within the Ur III period. See Lafont and Westbrook, “Neo-
Sumerian Period,” 205.
COMPARISONS 123
LH 188 If a craftsman takes a young child to rear and then teaches him
his craft, he will not be reclaimed.
LH 189 If he should not teach him his craft, that rearling shall return to
his father’s house.
LL 20b If a man does not raise the son whom he contracted to raise in
an apprenticeship, and it is confirmed before the judges, he (the child)
shall be returned to his birth mother.
HL 200b If anyone gives his son for training either as a carpenter or a
smith, a weaver or a leatherworker or a fuller, he shall pay 6 shekels of
silver as the fee for the training. If the teacher makes him an expert, the
student shall give to his teacher one person.
In LH and LL, a child taken by a craftsman to learn a trade is only re-
claimed if the craftsman breaks the contract, by failing to teach the trade to
the child in LH 189, or failing to raise him in LL 20b. HL 200b, however,
seems to set up this training via the payment of fees and a replacement per-
son rather than through an adoption process and seems to imply that the
student can go free after such payments. This arrangement is somewhat
similar to that in LE 32 above regarding the payments required for the rear-
ing of a child. This material is quite difficult to compare given the uncer-
tainties regarding the arrangements in view, though there are certainly some
similarities.
Much of the material regarding adoption finds no parallel in other col-
lections. LH 190–193, treating the abrogation of the adoption contract, do
find parallels in SLEx 4'–6'. LH 192–93 employ a technique common to LH
and prescribe vicious penalties which are framed to fit the crime. A child
reared by a courtier or a sekretu will have his tongue cut out if he declares his
adoptive parents not to be his father or mother, or his eye plucked out if he
decides to return to his biological father’s house. In SLEx 4', an adopted
child who declares his adoptive parents not to be his parents forfeits his
possessions and is sold into slavery. The phrasing of SLEx 4' is close to that
of LH 192 though the situation is not identical, and the punishment quite
different. If any borrowing has occurred it has had little restriction on the
formulation of the law. SLEx 5'–6' are quite different to LH 190–191. In
the former laws, adoptive parents who attempt to disinherit their adopted
son seem to forfeit their estate. 423 In the latter, if an adoptive father does
not deem the adopted son as able to inherit an equal portion of his estate,
the child is merely to return to his father’s house. If he did deem the
423 These laws are not well preserved.

adopted son as able to inherit his estate and then changed his mind after
having children of his own, the adoptive father is to give him a one third
share of the estate (in movables, not property).
2.5 CONTRACT
2.5.1 Loans
One commonality amongst some of these collections with regards to loans
is the interest rate. In LH t, LE 18A and LX m–n it is stated that a loan in
grain attracts an interest rate of thirty-three and a third percent, while a loan
in silver twenty percent. No other collections mention interest rates. This
similarity is most easily explained by the common background of these ac-
tual interest rates in practice in southern Mesopotamia rather than some
kind of literary borrowing or common legal science.
There are two other parallel sets of laws on the topic of loans in LH
and LE. LH 49–50 and LE 19 both state, in different ways, that the man
who lends grain will not have to do any work to recover it with its interest.
LH declares that the owner will take the grain and give it to the merchant,
while LE states that the lender will collect his payment at the threshing
floor (i.e. after the work of harvest is finished). The other similarity is found
in LH u and LE 20–21 which, again, both state the same legal principle in
different ways i.e. that the interest rate on a loan is set according to the
commodity borrowed (i.e. grain or silver), not by the commodity of repay-
ment. The dissimilarity in the phrasing of these laws argues against substan-
tial literary borrowing. Common practice is the most likely explanation for
the similar principle behind these different laws, though, of course, minor
literary influence is not ruled out with regards to the selection of subject
matter.
A better case for borrowing is found between LX l and LH 111.
Roth’s translation follows:
LH 111 If a woman innkeeper gives one vat of beer as a loan(?), she
shall take 50 silas of grain at the harvest.
LX l If a woman innkeeper gives one of her vats (of beer on credit) to a
man, [she shall receive] 50 silas of grain at the harvest.
There is a great degree of similarity between these two laws, so much
so that LH 111 is almost a verbatim translation of LX l. A number of the
same ideograms appear in both laws.
On the whole there is little parallel material regarding loans, though
there follows some concerning pledges and distraint. The most striking fea-
COMPARISONS 125
ture when one compares the laws to do with merchants, loans and trade
across collections is the inordinate focus on these topics within LH and AE
as compared to other collections.
2.5.2 Distraint
There are a number of similarities between the laws of distraint in LH 114–
116 and LE 22–24, but no two laws treat exactly the same situation. LH 114
and LE 22 are similar in that they both treat unlawful distraint; however,
LH 114 envisages distraint of a household member while LE 22, of a slave
woman. LH 115–116 and LE 23–24 are similar in that they treat the death
of a distrainee; however, there are a number of differences. LH distin-
guishes between a distrainee, lawfully distrained, who dies a natural death
(for which there is no penalty) and a distrainee, lawfully distrained, who dies
from abuse (in which case talion is implemented if it is the son of a man, or
a fine of 20 shekels if it is a slave). LE, however, treats two situations of
unlawful distraint where the distrainee dies at the hand of the distrainer. If
the distrainee was a slave woman, the offender replaces her with two slave
women. If the distrainee was the wife or child of a muškenum it is a capital
offence. SLHF viii 3–10 also contains a law treating the death of a dis-
trainee. In this law there is no specific mention of fault on the part of the
distrainer and the distrainee’s death is also linked to her disappearance, es-
cape or illness. The distrainer merely has to compensate for her work quota.
It would seem this law presumes the distrainee to be a female slave and is
only interested in the economics of her unavailability. The law seems to
assume lawful distraint. It is worth noting the use of talion in LH in con-
trast to its absence in LE, but there is little here to suggest more than a
common topic within a similar society. The material regarding distraint in
MAL and HL does not parallel material elsewhere. MAL is mainly con-
cerned with the illegal sale of a distrainee though it is worth noting the hor-
rifyingly brutal law A 44 with its list of acceptable abuses which can be
meted upon a distrainee.
2.5.3 Deposit and Safekeeping

This topic is dealt with in LH, LE and MAL. There are two pairs of laws in
LH and LE which are somewhat parallel:
LH 120 If a man stores his grain in another man’s house, and a loss oc-
curs in the storage bin or the householder opens the granary and takes
the grain or he completely denies receiving the grain that was stored in
his house-the owner of the grain shall establish his grain before the god,
and the householder shall give to the owner of the grain twofold the
grain that he took (in storage).
LE 36 If a man gives his goods to a napṭaru for safekeeping, and he (the
napṭaru) then allows the goods which he gave to him for safekeeping to
become lost-even without evidence that the house has been broken into,
the doorjamb scraped, the window forced-he shall replace his goods for
him.
LH 125 If a man gives his property for safekeeping and his property to-
gether with the householder’s property is lost either by (theft achieved
through) a breach or by scaling over a wall, the householder who was
careless shall make restitution and shall restore to the owner of the
property that which was given to him for safekeeping and which he al-
lowed to be lost; the householder shall continue to search for his own
lost property, and he shall take it from the one who stole it from him.
LE 37 If the man’s house has been burglarized, and the owner of the
house incurs a loss along with the goods which the depositor gave to
him, the owner of the house shall swear an oath to satisfy him at the
gate of (the temple of) the god Tishpak: “My goods have been lost along
with your goods; I have not committed a fraud or misdeed”; thus shall
he swear an oath to satisfy him and he will have no claim against him.
These laws cover situations where property which had been given to
another for safekeeping has been lost. The second pair of laws both treat
the situation where both the depositor’s and the safe keeper’s goods have
been lost. LH 125 treats this as carelessness on the part of the safe keeper
who is to replace the goods to the depositor whereas LE 37 states that such
a case has no claim. It is possible that LH here envisages some form of neg-
ligence on the part of the safe keeper and thus orders the replacement of
goods. It is also possible that the drafter of this law had LH 23 in mind
which states that stolen property will be replaced by the city to the victim
who was unable to recover his goods from the thief. The mention of the
safe keeper’s duty to pursue the thief combined with the subject matter of
LH 126 (a false claim of stolen property to the city) makes the latter quite
possible. This would explain LH’s harsher treatment i.e. the safe keeper can
afford to replace the goods to the depositor as he will either recover them
from the thief or have them restored by the city authorities. This would also
explain the difference in penalty in the first pair of laws. The material in
MAL treating deposit and safekeeping is concerned with who is allowed to
be responsible for the depositing of household goods with a third party and
with the falsification of documents relating to such storage. It does not par-
allel the material here. It is worth noting LH’s unique emphasis on the need
COMPARISONS 127
for witnesses or written contracts for the depositing of property e.g. LH

122–124. 424
2.5.4 Breach of Contract

This is another topic where there is very little parallel material. In three col-
lections there are laws treating the failure of workers to properly cultivate
land entrusted to their care. The relevant laws are LH 41–48, 52, 61–65, LU
32 and LL 8. LH is obviously far more detailed in its description of the
various situations and the methods of compensation. 425 LU 32 is similar to
LH 44 in that both treat the failure of a man to cultivate uncultivated land
and both order a fixed compensation based on land area. LL 8 is different
to LH 62–63 in that the man who has been given fallow land in which to
plant an orchard and fails to do so is merely required to give it to somebody
else whereas in LH compensation is required. The only other laws treating
breach of contract either involve damage to property or adoption and are
treated in their relevant sections.
2.6 CRIME AND DELICT
2.6.1 THEFT 426

There are an enormous number of laws concerning theft amongst the col-
lections under discussion here. Laws relating to this topic are by far the
most frequent. This makes comparison a difficult task, though it also en-
ables some confidence in any findings given the amount of material with
which to test any hypotheses. There are some fairly solid distinctions to be
found between the penalties given for theft-related offences in these collec-
tions. In general, the death penalty is most common in LH and AE, corpo-
ral punishments in MAL and the Egyptian material, and multiple payments
in kind in HL. There are certainly exceptions to these rules, as will be
shown presently, but they do stand up as broad generalizations. Each col-
lection also reflects its different nature/purpose in the selection of offences
424 This seems to reflect a development in legal practice during the Old Babylo-
nian period. See Renger, “Noch einmal,” 4.1.2.
425 Note that these laws, along with the laws treating damage to agricultural
property have sparked a debate in regards to the origin of the various compensa-
tion methods and their consistency within LH. This is discussed to some extent in
the later section on damage to property.
426 This term is used here in its broadest sense, including offences such as mis-
appropriation, fraud, robbery, brigandage, looting etc.

dealt with, e.g. the focus of MAL A on offences involving women and EH
on offences by officials. There are a number of topics or tropes which are
dealt with in different collections e.g. the thief who is caught before the act.
Whether this is mere coincidence due to the similarity of the societies re-
flected in the collections (e.g. the prevalence of laws dealing with the theft of
ploughs, slaves, oxen etc.) or whether it reflects a background of some sort
of common legal science or literary culture will be explored.
Problems arise in the comparison of this area of law, beginning with
an apparent lack of consistency in the punishments meted out in LH. Some
of the penalties in LH involve death, some payment, corporal punishment
or servitude. 427 There have been a number of approaches to this problem.
Some have argued that the differences reflect historical development or a
difference between geographic or ethnic systems. 428 These arguments are
merely based on the application of various assumptions in an attempt to
explain the differences. Westbrook has applied a different set of assump-
tions to the same data in an effort to harmonize the theft laws of LH.
Though this author would also lean towards an attempt to understand this
text which presumes consistency (at least within the text) rather than the
mindless compilation of conflicting approaches to theft (whether based on
different Sitze im Leben, historical periods or geographic/ethnic traditions),
he believes that Westbrook’s attempts at harmonization go against the most
obvious reading of the text at times. Given Westbrook’s larger program of
demonstrating the essential sameness of ancient Near Eastern law one is
suspicious of his arguments here. His arguments go further than merely
attempting to identify relevant differences between the laws which may
have led to the difference in penalty; 429 he also often explains away the
death penalty when it is present and reads in the possibility of other penal-
ties. It is this author’s suspicion that the theft laws of LH are harmonizable,
at times in the way Westbrook has suggested, but that the more forced ar-
guments of Westbrook come about as he attempts to harmonize the theft
laws of LH not merely with each other, but with the theft laws of other an-
cient Near Eastern collections.
Irreconcilable differences within the theft laws of LH would present
problems for the suspicions of this author that one can identify differences
427According to Westbrook, “Old Babylonian Period,” 419–20.

428See discussion Ibid., 419.
429 Though he does do this e.g. see our discussion of the contradiction between
LH 6 and 8 below.
COMPARISONS 129
of attitude towards such offences between cultures. 430 If LH has different

penalties for the same offence, the task of substantiating this suspicion is
made more difficult. These apparent contradictions also feed the arguments
that LH could not possibly have been intended to be referred to by judges
when deciding cases and the concomitant argument that its real purpose
was more propagandistic, the legal paragraphs merely being window dress-
ing to demonstrate the justice of the king. One must ask whether such
propaganda would have been positive if the king presented a confused ap-
proach to different legal areas. Some may argue that the analysis of a legal
area such as “theft” is a totally modern concept and the ancients may not
have seen the contradictions we see when comparing these different laws
within LH. The contradictory nature of these laws may also be used to ar-
gue that they reflect an origin as past decisions in legal cases, which do not
necessarily need to be harmonized. One can see the importance then of an
analysis of the theft laws of LH itself before we proceed to a comparison of
them with those of other law collections.
2.6.1.1 Theft laws of LH

Many of the laws in LH regarding theft in its various forms prescribe some
kind of death penalty. 431 One law which offers the possibility of another
form of punishment is LH 8. At first sight it seems to be in direct contrast
to LH 6:
LH 6: šumma awilum makkur ilim u ekallim išriq awilum šu iddak u ša šurqam
ina qatišu imh}uru iddak- If a man steals valuables belonging to the god or
to the palace, that man shall be killed, and also he who received the sto-
len goods from him shall be killed.
LH 8: šumma awilum lu alpum lu immeram lu imeram lu šah}am u lu elippam
išriq šumma ša ekallim adi 30-šu inaddin šumma ša muškenim adi 10-šu iriab
šumma šarraqanum ša nadanim la išu iddak-If a man steals an ox, a sheep, a
donkey, a pig, or a boat-if it belongs either to the god or to the palace,
he shall give thirtyfold; if it belongs to a commoner, he shall replace it
tenfold; if the thief does not have anything to give, he shall be killed.
What is the relationship between these two laws? Both mention the
theft of goods belonging to a temple or palace. LH 6 states simply that the
430 Jean Bottéro, “Code,” 162–63 sees the theft laws of Hammurabi as contra-
dictory and uses this to argue against its applicability. Bernard S. Jackson, Essays, ch.
3 argues similarly to deter scholars from looking for underlying principles.
431 LH 6, 7, part of 8, 9, 10, 11, probably 13, 14 (really dealing with kidnap), 15,
16, 19, 21, 22, 25, 227.

thief and the receiver of stolen goods will be killed. LH 8 is different in a

number of respects. One possible solution to this contrast lies in the dis-
tinction between the laws regarding the objects that are stolen. However,
one would be hard pressed to argue that the list of objects in LH 8 could
not be included under the rubric of makkuru in LH 6 which simply means
“possession” or “property”. 432 It does remain possible that LH 8 provides a
list of exclusions from the law in LH 6 i.e. when put together the import of
the two laws is that the theft of the objects listed in LH 8 from a temple or
palace requires a thirtyfold payment whereas the theft of any other (more
valuable?) object requires the death penalty. The additional mention of the
muškenum in LH 8 and its separation from LH 6 leads this writer to question
whether LH 8 was intended as a comment on LH 6, though this possibility
cannot be ruled out, especially given the fact that muškenum does not always
refer to a class distinct from an awilum. 433
Another possibility is that LH 8 is a more general elucidation of LH 6.
This argument would see LH 8 explicating more fully the process that
would lead to the death penalty in LH i.e. some form of payment in kind
was possible with the death penalty only being enforced when the thief was
unable to pay. Westbrook attempts a different harmonization hypothesizing
that LH 8 covers the situation where the thief was unaware the property
belonged to a temple or palace. 434 This would make some sense of the addi-
tional mention of the penalty if the property belonged to a muškenum. This
approach, however, is nothing more than an educated speculation. It finds
no real support in the text. There is another harmonization which finds
some support in the text. In contrast to LH 8, LH 6 specifies a penalty for
the receiver (who is not mentioned in LH 8) as well as the thief. Perhaps
LH 6 envisages an organized theft with a view to disposal whereas LH 8 is
simple theft for personal use.
Though the attempts at harmonization outlined above remain possi-
bilities, one cannot rule out another, namely that the two laws are in fact
different. Whether this reflects the compilation of two different past cases
which are lumped together here, whether one is an updating of the other, or
they reflect two different traditions to do with this offence cannot be dem-
onstrated. It seems more likely to this writer that there is some substantial
difference between the two offences which explains the difference of pen-
432 CDA, 192.

433 See the discussion of Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna, 1988, 132–45 and references
to the debate between Kraus, Speiser and Finkelstein.
434 Westbrook, “Old Babylonian Period,” 420.
COMPARISONS 131
alty, the distinction between organized theft and simple personal theft being
the most cogent. One may object that this approach is not based on the
evidence but on an unnecessary assumption i.e. that the compiler of such a
text (with its stated purpose) would be unlikely to preserve two contradic-
tory laws next to each other. In response to such an objection it is worth
examining the other theft-related offences in LH, including those which do
not require the death penalty. It will be demonstrated that a lesser offence is
in view for these laws than those which do attract capital punishment, or
that a particular group is being protected. Given the application of such a
principle elsewhere in LH, this writer feels somewhat justified in expecting
it here also.
Let us first look at the laws which do require the death penalty. LH 6
and 8 have already been mentioned. There are many other laws within LH
which require the death penalty. LH 7 prescribes death for a man who pur-
chases or accepts for safekeeping anything from a man’s son or slave with-
out witnesses or a contract. Such a man is labeled a thief (šarraqum). The
mention of the son or slave seems to imply either that the man is dealing
with someone ignorant about the processes of sale whom he can take ad-
vantage of, or someone who does not have the authority of the head of
household to be selling the goods and thus the transaction amounts to a
form of theft from the head of household.
LH 9–13 give an extensive treatment regarding the possession of sto-
len property. It has already been mentioned in LH 6 that one who receives
stolen goods is also considered a thief and is to be killed. Laws 9–13 envis-
age three possible perpetrators in the case where someone claims to identify
his lost property in another’s possession. The guilty party is detected by the
ability to produce witnesses to: identify the stolen property and/or attest to
the possessor’s purchase of said goods from a third party (the seller). If the
owner cannot produce witnesses to attest that the property in question was
his he is to be killed for false accusation in a capital case. 435 If the possessor
of the goods cannot produce witnesses to confirm his purchase of the
goods from a third party he is to be killed for theft and the owner takes his
property. If both parties can produce witnesses then the seller is regarded as
the thief and is to be killed. The owner of the stolen property takes his lost
property and the buyer will recover what he paid for the goods.
LH 12 interrupts the neat flow of this series of laws. It states: “If the
seller should die, the buyer shall take fivefold the claim for that case from
the estate of the seller.” This law, however, does not cover the case that the
435 LH 11. See our later discussion regarding false accusation laws.
seller was found guilty and put to death. It seems to deal with the situation
where the seller was the culprit, was not able to be killed for his crime but
died a natural death before the court proceedings. This then would explain
the fivefold penalty taken by the buyer from the seller’s estate. It may be to
compensate for the fact he did not have the satisfaction of having the seller
put to death. Commentators have pointed out a problem with this interpre-
tation of LH 12. They ask why the owner of the stolen property is not also
entitled to receive this fivefold claim. 436 This writer does struggle to find an
answer to this objection but perhaps the satisfaction of having the seller
killed is of more importance to the buyer as it was the seller who put him in
a position where his life may have been taken for being in possession of
stolen goods, whereas the owner of the stolen property just had his stuff
stolen. 437
Westbrook has a radically different interpretation of these laws in gen-
eral. He argues that the innocent receiver of goods (the buyer) was only
liable for a multiple payment of the goods (the multiple being lower than
that for theft) and that it was up to him to “recoup his outlay” from the
seller. 438 This contradicts what is set forth in LH 10 which prescribes death
for the buyer if he can not produce witnesses, and a whole range of laws in
LH which prescribe death rather than multiple payment for simple theft.
Westbrook cites LH 12 in this context in support of the idea that the buyer
has to chase the seller to recoup his outlay. This situation is already covered
in LH 9. It is unlikely that LH 12 would merely repeat the same situation
with a contradictory ruling. It makes most sense if a separate offence is here
in view that hinges on the fact that the seller has “gone to his fate”. Hence
the approach taken to this law above.
LH 13 has been seen as notoriously difficult to interpret. This writer
does not see the problem with reading it as a continuation of the situation
in LH 12. The import would most likely be that in the case where the buyer
attempted to claim his fivefold penalty and could not produce witnesses he
was to bear the penalty of the case (i.e. he will pay a fivefold penalty to the
deceased seller’s estate/heirs). This interpretation seems more likely than
one which would see this as a general comment that all parties have six
months to bring their witnesses (though of course that principle could be
inferred reasoning per analogiam) given the framing of the penalty. In con-
trast to LH 11 where the case would result in the buyer or seller being killed
436 Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, vol. 1, 100–1.

437 For a discussion of different interpretations of this law see Ibid., 98–105.
438 Westbrook, “Old Babylonian Period,” 422.
COMPARISONS 133
due to the malicious charges of the supposed owner of the stolen property,
here the case would merely result in the heirs of the deceased seller having
to pay a monetary penalty. In LH 11 the penalty for the false charge is
death; in LH 13 it is stated: aran dinim šuati ittanašši: “he will continue to bear
the penalty of that case.” Another difference in the framing of these two
laws which confirms our suspicion is found in the respective terms used to
describe the offender and his action. In both cases the offender is called a
liar (sar); in the more serious case in LH 11 the offender is said to have
tuššamma iddi: “spread malicious charges”. 439 Whatever the case, in these
laws there is no indication that payment was acceptable instead of the death
penalty. To read this into these laws, one must infer it from elsewhere. To
infer it from practice is to assume that LH must reflect the documents from
practice and to rule out the possibility that it tried to change practice but
was not followed. To infer it from other collections requires the assumption
of essential sameness and goes against the methodology of this thesis. Nei-
ther of these are secure or necessary assumptions. 440
Other theft laws in LH which state the death penalty for the offence
include aiding the escape of, 441 harboring 442 or detaining a slave. 443 Rob-
bery, 444 burglary 445 and looting 446 also receive the death penalty. LH 25 con-
tains a somewhat humorous literary framing. The situation envisaged is that
a man who has come to help put out a fire at a neighbor’s house and ends
up stealing his household possessions, will be thrown into that very fire.
Many commentators have wasted precious pages trying to figure out what
would happen to the man if the fire had gone out before they managed to
capture him etc. One suspects that is not how the laws were meant to work;
merely being intended to display an equitable judgment in that situation.
Reasoning from this law to a situation where the fire had gone out would
439 So Roth, Law Collections, 84. Another possible rendering that may not sup-
port our case quite as well would be “he has thrown (accused of) might-have-
beens”. See CDA, 411 under tuša/tušam(a)/tuššamma.
440 There has been much work pointing out the differences between LH and
the documents of practice in the Old Babylonian period (see the earlier discussions
in the introduction and 2.1.4.). Though many question the results of this research,
one cannot ignore it completely.
441 LH 15
442 LH 16
443 LH 19
444 LH 22
445 LH 21
446 LH 25
not be rocket science. Old Babylonian law was not viewed in the way mod-
ern lawyers view statute. A situation would not have arisen where the ac-
cused was able to argue the letter of the law and thus avoid punishment
because the fire had gone out. This is a completely modern and, one might
argue, aberrant approach to law. The lack of comprehensivity in the law
collections under view certainly undercuts any remaining idea that the an-
cients would have had a problem if they could not find a written law that
dealt with the specifics of a case. 447 This was not the function of these law
collections. This is not to say that the laws which were written down were
not intended to have any application. That is a non sequitur.
There are four other laws in LH related to theft which prescribe the
death penalty. LH m and n mention something about a merchant and a son
of a man and a slave respectively. The provisions are too broken to recon-
struct but one wonders whether these laws parallel LH 7, this time specifi-
cally for the merchant who would deal with a son or slave instead of the
head of the household. LH bb is in a worse state of preservation than these
last two. The only part of the provision remaining is the death penalty, id-
dak. The only reason it is mentioned here is that some of the nearby laws
treat the fraudulent dealings of merchants or traders. The last law in LH
that orders the death penalty for theft-related offences is LH 108. The ale-
wife/woman innkeeper (sabitum) who refuses to accept grain for the price
of beer and defrauds her customer with incorrect weights is to be thrown
into the water i.e. drowned. This penalty is quite different from that in LH
x. LH x supposedly states that a merchant who gives an interest-bearing
loan and either hands out or collects the grain or silver with incorrect
weights will only forfeit his loan. The text is fairly broken at this point but
the final penalty does not seem to be death. 448 The offence of the sabitum is
possibly compounded by her refusal to accept payment in grain but it is
unlikely this is the reason for the difference in punishment. One wonders
whether merchants were protected somewhat in LH given the important
447 Joseph J. Azize has argued against such an approach to law in Mesopotamia,
“Assumptions of the Criminal Justice System: Euthanasia and Aboriginal Opposi-
tion” (paper presented at the conference Law’s Empire, Harrison, B.C., Canada, 26
June 2005).
448 On A. Poebel’s copy, Historical and Grammatical Texts (Publications of the
Babylonian Section, University of Pennsylvania Museum 5; Philadelphia: University

Museum, 1914), col ii, ln 21 of the final verb we have only the ‘i’. This would fit the
proposed itelli, but would not fit iddak which would be written id-da-ak. Line 20 is
similarly broken with only i-na mi- preserved. Driver and Miles’ transliteration does
not reflect this uncertainty, Babylonian Laws, vol. 2, 41, § P.
COMPARISONS 135
financial role they played in the Old Babylonian economy. 449 LH y also or-
ders an offending merchant to forfeit what he loaned. LH w prescribes a
twofold penalty for a merchant who does not acknowledge the receipt of
loan repayments. In another context, this time to do with partnerships be-
tween merchants and trading agents, the merchant is to pay a sixfold pen-
alty to the trading agent if he denies the return of the silver he lent to him.
In LH 106 the trading agent is only asked to pay a threefold penalty if he
denies that the merchant lent him silver. It would seem that the merchant is
here fined more heavily as he is the greater of the two parties, fitting in
nicely with Hammurabi’s claim in the prologue that he set up the stele dan-
num enšam la h}abalim: “so that the strong may not oppress the weak”. The
progression from LH 106 through to 108 may be of significance here. The
trading agent pays a threefold penalty, the merchant sixfold and the sabitum
is drowned. Does this just show the haphazard nature of this collection or
is this a progression of penalties according to Hammurabi’s program of
protecting the weak? If the latter is so, can it be reconciled with Hammu-
rabi’s seeming protection of the merchant and trading agent from the death
penalty for offences which seem very similar to the theft laws which receive
the death penalty elsewhere in LH? Another example of this is found in LH
112 where the trading agent only receives a fivefold penalty if he misappro-
priates any goods consigned to him on his journey. LH 120 and 124 also
only prescribe multiple payment for fraudulent behavior. They cover the
situation where goods are deposited for safekeeping and are either lost or
their receipt is denied. In each case the one storing the goods for the other
man only pays a twofold penalty. The distinction in severity in LH cannot
be one between the theft of movables and fraudulent economic transactions
as will be seen presently.
Another group of people who seem to be protected from the death
penalty for theft-related offences are hired workers. It is difficult to discern
consistency amongst the laws in LH 253–256. LH 253 orders that a hired
man who steals the seed for plowing or the fodder for the cattle will have
his hand cut off. For stealing some of the stored grain (again seemingly
food for the cattle) he is only ordered to make a twofold restitution in LH
254. In LH 255 the provision states that a hired man who hires out the
owner’s cattle or who steals the seeds so that there is no crop, will pay 18
000 silas per iku of land. Both LH 254 and 255 seem to directly contradict
449 i.e. Their role as a middle-man who could turn taxes in kind into silver for
the palace etc. See Yoffee, The Economic Role of the Crown in the Old Babylonian Period
(Bibliotheca Mesopotamica 5; Malibu: Undena, 1977); Postgate, Early Mesopotamia.
LH 253. There are differences between the various laws which may explain
the appearance of different penalties. In LH 253 the hired man misappro-
priates fodder (ukullum) whereas in LH 254 it is the stored grain (aldum). 450
LH 253 begins “If a man hires another man to care for his field, that is, he
entrusts to him the stored grain (aldum), hands over to him the care of the
cattle, and contracts with him for the cultivation of the field”. The hired
man has three areas of responsibility: the stored grain, the cattle and cultiva-
tion. LH 254–255 cover offences which show a lack of care for these re-
sponsibilities. If he is caught in flagrante delicto stealing (šaraqum) seed or cattle
fodder, his hand is cut off (LH 253). In LH 254 the man is not said to have
stolen the grain but to have taken it (ilqema). Is there some difference of
offence implied here? Does it just cover a situation where he was not
caught red-handed? LH 255 may cover a more serious offence where so
much seed has been misappropriated that there are no crops. The monetary
penalty is extremely high for a hired worker and LH 256 would be applied,
i.e. death. The wording of this law seems to imply that debt slavery was not
an option here. 451
LH 255 seems oddly formulated given the penalty, on first reading,
covers the offence of hiring out the owner’s cattle. Why would this offence
result in the payment of grain by area of land? This penalty certainly seems
suited to the offence of stealing the seed resulting in a lack of crops to be
harvested, but not hiring out cattle. 452 The last law in this series, LH 256,
has a different punishment again. If the hired worker (of LH 255) is not
able to pay he is to be dragged through that field by the cattle. This law,
combined with LH 8, is used by Westbrook to argue that payment was al-
ways the first option regarding the punishment of theft; it was only in the
case the thief could not pay that he was put to death. This argument, as
pointed out before, goes against the reading of most of the theft laws of LH
which prescribe the death penalty. It must be admitted that we are left with
some seeming inconsistencies in not forcing this harmonization upon the
evidence.
There are several more laws which also seem to confirm that theft-
related offences by hired workers were treated more leniently. LH 259 and
260 prescribe the miniscule punishment of 5 and 3 shekels for the theft of a
450 This term seems to be in apposition with the seed in LH 253.

451 On this we may be mistaken.
452 Perhaps they are beasts of burden given that the penalty in LH 256 involves
the offender being dragged through the field by the cattle. It is also possible that
they were used for treading in broadcast grain.
COMPARISONS 137
plough or a clod-breaking plough from the common irrigated area. Perhaps

it is the position of the plough that lessens the offence and its status as
communal property rather than the likelihood it would have been stolen by
a hired worker in this case. LH 265, however, does seem to confirm our
suspicion. A shepherd who alters the brands and sells the sheep and/or
goats under his care is only required to make tenfold restitution. One does
wonder whether a hired shepherd would be in any position to pay such a
large fine and whether LH 256 would apply here also, again raising the
more general question of which options we can or should read into the
various laws.
The final theft-related offence which is penalized merely by a multiple
payment is found in LH 126. This law should be read in conjunction with
LH 23. Taken together what is implied is that a man who fraudulently
claims his belongings have been stolen and that he could not track down
the thief, who has had his supposedly stolen property replaced by his city-
quarter, will pay it back twofold. This seems a little odd. Why would theft
from the city-quarter be treated as a lesser offence? Is Hammurabi again
applying his principle of protecting the weak rather than the strong? Is it
because the city-quarter is more able to pay? Given the harsh penalty in LH
6 regarding theft from the palace or temple, 453 this law is somewhat surpris-
ing in its leniency.
There are two more laws which both prescribe corporal punishment of
some kind. LH 226 orders the cutting off of the hand of a barber who
shaves off a slave’s slave-hairlock without the owner’s approval. This is not
tantamount to theft in that the barber does not keep the slave but it does
cause loss to the owner. LH 194 may not be strictly relevant here and deals
with fraudulent conduct rather than theft.
It is quite obvious that there are some difficulties in pinning down a
precise attitude towards theft in LH. Amongst the various laws punish-
ments have ranged from twofold to thirtyfold restitution, from two shekels
of silver to 18 000 silas of grain per iku, from the cutting off of a hand to
death in its various forms e.g. drowning and being dragged through a field
by cattle. In general we were able to suggest explanations for the variations
in these laws and do not feel the need to secede to the arguments of those
who argue that it is impossible to discern principles behind the laws of
Hammurabi. 454
453 Of course, somewhat mitigated by LH 8.

454 e.g. Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa’s Edict,” 98–99 argued against the idea that
there was any logical consistency within collections such as LH.
2.6.1.2 Comparison of theft laws
2.6.1.2.1 Penalties
The paragraphs dealing with theft-related offences in Ammiṣaduqa’s Edict
parallel those in LH very well. The offences in AE are not strictly “theft”
but economic misappropriation, including falsifying documents, and not
following the mišarum edict’s regulations for financial gain. The most com-
monly stated penalty, as in LH, is death. 455 AE 4 prescribes the death pen-
alty for any creditor who does not return a wrongly collected loan repay-
ment. AE 6 orders the same penalty for a creditor who seizes the property
of an Akkadian or Amorite to whom he has extended credit (as the debt has
been cancelled). AE 18 has the death penalty for a sabitu or a merchant who
uses a false seal for some kind of economic transaction. In AE 5, a creditor
who misappropriates interest by writing up the loan in a falsified form 456
merely has the loan document voided and forfeits what he lent. This is very
similar to LH x and y.
AE 7 is similar to LH 8 and 256 in that the death penalty is only pre-
scribed in the case where the offender cannot pay. The law covers a situa-
tion similar to AE 5. A creditor has had a loan document drawn up and
then claims to have given the loan for some other purpose in order to col-
lect more money. The debtor is to bring witnesses and declare an oath that
the document has been changed. The creditor is to pay six-fold. If he can’t
pay, he dies. This law parallels the penalty in LH 107 for the merchant who
does not acknowledge loan payments, though there it is in the context of a
loan to a trading agent which is specifically ruled out here. It is difficult to
see a real difference between AE 5 and 7. The studies regarding the differ-
ent versions of the Old Babylonian edicts tend to conclude that when new
provisions were added, the old ones were kept. Unfortunately the version
from Samsu-iluna’s time breaks off before § 5 or § 7 so we cannot tell
whether one was added as an update or both co-existed. AE shows that the
death penalty could be applied to creditors/merchants in the Old Babylo-
nian period. Does AE 7, like LH 8, imply after all that payment was a pos-
sibility, at least at times, rather than the death penalty? Whatever the case,
there is still a surface similarity between AE and LH in that the death pen-
alty is that most often stated for theft-related offences. As in LH, in AE
there are cases where merchants can give a multiple payment or forfeit their
455 AE 4, 6, 7, 18.
456 i.e. turns the loan into one of the loan types in AE 8 which are not remitted
e.g. money lent for a trading expedition.
COMPARISONS 139
loan (as in LH x) rather than receiving the death penalty. Though there are
some difficulties in explaining this, this writer does see a link between these
two texts as opposed to the other collections regarding the attitude towards
theft-related offences.
The penalty for theft at Eshnunna is difficult to determine. There are
several laws which prescribe a fixed payment or replacement of goods. 457
None of these deal with simple theft. For theft-related offences the death
penalty is only in view for the thief who is caught in the field or house of a
muškenum at night, 458 or the guard who allows a burglar to break into the
house he is watching. 459 There are two other laws which state “it is he who
is a thief” 460 or “the palace shall bring a charge of theft against him”. 461 The
problem is we do not know what penalty this would mean at Eshnunna.
Presumably those who were to read LE would have known what the pen-
alty was but there is no sure way to determine this. LE 50 deals with the
theft of property from the palace or a muškenum by an official. This law has
clear parallels to LH 8, but also to LH 6. One hesitates to read the provi-
sions of LH into LE, however. The differences between the laws would
make this a very difficult task anyway. For example, LH 8 has two distinct
penalties for whether the property stolen was the property of the palace or
of a muškenum whereas LE 50 merely states that in either case the palace
shall charge the offender with theft. It is not impossible that different pen-
alties could still be given as LE 50 does not state any particular penalty but
this seems unlikely. Do we assume a more general similarity between LH
and LE and argue that LE also provided the death penalty for simple theft?
This would give this law a parallel in LH 6. Given the uncertainty regarding
these two laws it would be unwise to use them to compare the penalty for
theft.
LU is generally thought not to treat the offence of theft. There is a
possible reference to a theft-related offence in LU 2, however. Roth trans-
lates the law as follows: “If a man acts lawlessly (?), they shall kill him.” 462
The Sumerian term she translates as “lawlessly” is not well attested in its
form, but its root is. The term is sa-gaz-še. Sa-gaz is a well attested term that
457 LE 6, 36, 49 and the first halves of LE 12–13.

458 LE 12–13
459 LE 60-the guard is to be buried without a grave at the point where the thief
entered the house.
460 LE 40
461 LE 50
462 Roth Law Collections, 17.
often seems to refer to the infamous H}apiru. The term also turns up in a
lexical list as an equivalent for Akkadian h}abbatum, “plunderer, bandit”, or
perhaps more simply, “robber”. 463 The ending šè can follow the adverbial
ending eš, 464 or can be some sort of terminative ending. Halloran gives “to
rob” 465 or “to commit murder” for the phrase we have here, sa-gaz . . .
aka. 466 Given that the previous law treated murder, and the root’s more
common connection to robbery, it is most likely that this is what is in view
here. If that is the case, here we have another example of the death penalty
for robbery. This is possibly not simple theft, however, but probably im-
plies some kind of assault also, hence the possible extension of meaning to
“murder”. In LL 5 and SLHF iv 42–v 11the term does seem to mean theft
more generally, being applied to someone who has misappropriated a boat.
There is very little material in the Sumerian collections dealing with
theft-related offences. LL 9 deals with the case of a man seized in the or-
chard on his way to steal something, which attracts a 10 shekel penalty and
12–13 deal with the harboring of a fugitive slave which is penalized with the
return of an additional slave or a payment of 15 shekels. The only other
Sumerian material is found in SLHF iii 10–15 where it is stated that the
theft of a boat or pig is penalized by a twofold payment.
The material from MAL A focuses on offences committed by women
here as elsewhere. Other tablets treat theft involving different persons.
MAL A 1 prescribes that a woman who steals something from a temple
shall be punished as the deity instructs. MAL A 3–4 deal with situations
involving theft of a wife from her husband’s household. A 3 prescribes the
death penalty for a woman who steals from her husband’s house when he is
sick or dead and for the receiver of the stolen goods. In the case where the
husband was healthy a lesser punishment is in view. The punishment is at
the husband’s discretion and will be the same for both his wife and the re-
ceiver of the goods. 467 A 4 specifies further that if the receiver of stolen
goods was a slave, they shall have their nose and ears cut off and restore the
463 CDA, 99, from the verbal root h}abatum, “to rob, plunder”. For the use of the
logogram SA.GAZ for h}abbatum, see CAD 6, 13–14.
464 e.g. John A. Halloran, “Sumerian Lexicon,” (version 3.0): 158 [cited 13 Janu-
ary 2005]. Online: http://www. sumerian.org/sumerlex.htm.
465 With a dative infix. There is not one here.
466 Halloran, “Sumerian Lexicon,” 133. The text reads: tukum-bi lú-ù sa-gaz-šè in-
ak in-gaz-e: “If a man does sa-gaz-šè, they will kill him.” This is how Westbrook and
Lafont treat the term also, “Neo-Sumerian Period,” 220.
467 Compare MAL A 14–15, 22–23 dealing with adultery.
COMPARISONS 141
stolen goods and the husband shall cut off his wife’s ears. Added to this is a
provision in case the husband does not cut off his wife’s ears. If such is the
case, they will not cut off the nose and ears of the slave, nor will the slave
restore the stolen goods. A 5 deals with a man’s wife stealing goods worth
over 300 shekels from the household of another man. If the owner of the
stolen goods swears that he did not incite the woman to steal the goods the
husband can hand over the stolen goods thus ransoming his wife and then
cut off her ears. If he refuses to ransom his wife the owner of the stolen
goods keeps her and cuts off her nose. A 6 treats a case where a man’s wife
has placed goods for safekeeping. It is stated that the receiver of the goods
shall bear liability for stolen property. This penalty is not abundantly clear
but may signify that MAL A 3 is applicable in such a case, implying that the
wife and the receiver are in cahoots. MAL C 9 seems to repeat the general
substance of this law and the ruling. An extra clause is inserted in that the
receiver of the goods for depositing is said to have failed to notify the
owner of the goods of their deposit by a lesser household member. 468
All of the other theft-related offences in MAL are somewhat broken
and thus not always completely understood. In general these other laws in-
volve some sort of payment or return of goods combined with a number of
blows and performance of the king’s service for a fixed period of time.
MAL C 2–3 fit this pattern. C 2 treats a situation where a creditor sells his
debtor’s son or daughter who was living in his house as a pledge. The credi-
tor forfeits the loan, gives something 469 to the debtor, is struck an un-
known 470 number of blows and performs the king’s service for 20 days. In
C 3, if the creditor sold the son or daughter into a foreign land the penalty
is increased, at least for the king’s service which rises to 40 days. If the per-
son whom he sold into a foreign land dies he is to make full payment for a
life. 471
468 The beginning of this law is broken. A slave is certainly mentioned but
which other household member is mentioned is unclear. Roth puts wife, son or
daughter as possibilities, Law Collections, 185. Roth’s translations of the two laws
falsely imply the use of different terminology. In A 6 she translates ina kide taltakan
as “place goods for safekeeping” whereas in C 9 she translates ina kide šaknat as “as
trust […] it is deposited”. The final statement in both laws that the receiver šurqa
inašši is translated as “bear liability for stolen property” in A 6 and “be liable for
theft” in C 9. Though in each case the translations are fitting, the inconsistency is
perhaps unhelpful.
469 Text broken
470 Text broken
471 It is most likely that this refers to some kind of fixed monetary value (cf. the
C 4 treats the same situation as C 2, but this time the pledge sold is an
animal. The creditor is to replace the animal and the loan stands. If he does
not replace the animal the loan is forfeited, the debtor seizes his animal and
the person from whom he seized the animal recovers his silver from the
person who sold it to him. 472 C 5 treats the theft of animals and their sale to
a third party. Unfortunately much of the apodosis of this law is broken off.
At the least the offender is to restore the stolen goods. C 6 a–b are too bro-
ken to discuss here. C 8 seems to cover a similar situation to C 5, namely
the theft of animals. Here the offender is to repay the stolen goods, is
struck 50 blows and performs the king’s service for an unknown number of
days. There is an extra clause in this law in case the theft exceeded a certain
value of goods. If it did the offender was to return the goods and the king
was to determine his punishment, perhaps implying that capital punishment
was a possibility. 473 C 10 is too broken for certain reconstruction but seems
to refer to a creditor exaggerating the value of his partner’s loan. The credi-
tor is declared a thief and the punishment is again determined by the
king. 474 C 11 seems to cover a very similar situation, though a partner
(tappa’u) is not mentioned, and the additional act of recording the inflated
figure is. Most of the penalty is broken but it does include an unknown
number of blows.
From Tablet F there are two laws dealing with theft. Though F 1 is a
little broken it seems to cover a situation where a man changes the brand of
his friend’s sheep and steals them. He is assessed 100 blows, has his hair
torn out, performs the king’s service for a month and returns the value of
the sheep. 475 F 2 treats a hired horse herder who sells off the horses under
his care without the owner’s knowledge. Most of the penalty is broken, but
some form of laceration is in view. O 6 briefly mentions theft in a very bro-
ken context. Payment in silver and/or lead forms some part of the penalty.
Within MAL then, many punishments contain some combination of
corporal punishment, return of goods, and performance of king’s service. 476
60 shekels in LH 24 and 198). See the discussion of Driver and Miles, Assyrian
Laws, 491–92.
472 The text breaks off at this point; presumably this last person is the creditor
himself.
473 Compare section 2.2 on laws mentioning the king.
474 Perhaps, though not necessarily implying that capital punishment is a possi-
bility cf. MAL A 15.
475 Or the sheep themselves.
476 C 2, 3, 8, 11, F 1.
COMPARISONS 143
Those from tablet A, treating offences by women, envisage a number of

different punishments 477 though most involve mutilation. 478 Death is only
mentioned specifically in one law, A 3, though it may possibly be one of the
punishments the deity, king, or husband may have decided upon in A 1, 3,
C 8 and 10. It is unclear what penalty is implied by the statement šurqa inašši
in A 6 and C 9, though it is likely to have been at the discretion of the head
of household as in A 3. Some form of corporal punishment, be it blows or
mutilation, is present in almost all the theft-related laws of MAL. None of-
fer multiple payments.
The theft laws of HL are extremely numerous and will not all be enu-
merated here for sake of space. Almost every law concerning theft within
HL prescribes a penalty of a fixed payment in silver, grain or in kind (often
in multiples). It is difficult to explain why some cases of theft require pay-
ment in silver while others demand payment in kind but there are some
possibilities. All the theft laws which demand payment in kind 479 occur to-
gether from HL 57–70 and each deals with the theft of a farm animal.
There are, however, some laws treating the theft of different farm animals
that require payment in silver, for example HL 81–85 dealing with the theft
of pigs or HL 91–92 regarding bees. One law, HL 102, states that theft of
over 3 talents of wood becomes a case for the king’s court and one, HL
95, 480 prescribes mutilation for burglary committed by slaves. Not all theft
offences by slaves are treated this way, with some merely requiring a pay-
ment less than that if the offence were committed by a free man e.g. HL
93. 481 The offence where mutilation is in view is more serious than the oth-
ers, involving burglary of a house rather than simple theft. There is only one
law within HL where theft requires the death penalty. HL 126 demands the
death penalty if someone steals a bronze spear in the gate of the palace.
Given that the theft of other objects belonging to the palace in the same
law only require minimal payments in silver, one imagines this provision
may be aimed against assassination attempts rather than the act of theft it-
self. 482 Supporting this suspicion is the care urged in The Hittite Instruction for
477 Death and that decided by the deity in A 1.

478 A 3–5
479 At least in their formulation.
480 Compare HL 99.
481 Compare HL 97.
482 Hoffner expresses amazement and confusion at this ruling, Laws of the Hit-
tites, 204. Haase thinks that perhaps the spear was somehow sacred and cites a fu-
nerary ritual in which it is used, “Überlegungen zur erlaubten Tötung eines Men-
the Royal Bodyguard regarding the spears of the guards 483 and the evidence in
ETel. that such guards could be involved in assassinations. 484 The harsh
penalty in this law stands out quite remarkably from the other theft laws of
HL. The threat of assassination would explain this relative severity.
Several of the Hittite laws record a reduction in the penalty for the
relevant theft given in the formula karu . . . kinuna, “formerly . . . now”. HL
57–59 reduce the fine from 30 cattle/horses/sheep to 15; 63 from 15 cattle
to 10; 81, 94, 119 and 129 from 40 shekels to 12. In addition HL 92, 101
and 121 also reduce a corporal/capital punishment to a fine. There are also
two cases, similar to those seen in LE and MAL, where the HL simply
states that a man will be considered a thief. HL 45 treats a man who does
not return implements he finds to their owner. In PT XXXV, the penalty
implied by this is spelt out as three-fold compensation. HL 86 deals with
the failure of a man to return a pig carcass after killing it to protect his food
supplies. The penalty of HL 82 may apply. There is also one law which
seems to contradict the ruling of others. HL 70 states that the theft of an
ox, horse, mule or ass will result in the owner taking it back and the thief
giving another two. This contrasts to other laws dealing with the theft of
these animals which prescribe 10–15 fold replacement. 485 These phenom-
ena will be discussed more fully in the next section of this work. The Hittite
Laws are the only ones to distinguish penalties with regard to whether the
theft was committed by a slave or a freeman.
ETud. makes mention of the payment of a field as compensation
(šarnik-) for theft by a free person, 486 blinding (of the slave) or forfeiture if
the theft was carried out by a slave. 487 Blinding is forbidden as a punish-
ment for theft by a free man. 488
The Edict of Horemhab covers offences by officials in general. Many
of these include provisions against theft and misappropriation of goods.
schen in der hethitischen Rechtssammlung,” Die Welt des Orients 27 (1996): 37. Nei-
ther Hoffner nor this writer are convinced by this speculation.
483 See especially §§ 2, 10, 42, 53 and 58–59 (concerning a bronze spear). Hans
G. Güterbock and Theo P. J. van den Hout, The Hittite Instruction for the Royal Body-
guard (Assyriological Studies 24; Chicago: Oriental Institute, 1991) or “Instructions
to the Royal Guard (MEŠEDI PROTOCOL),” trans. Gregory McMahon (COS
1.85: 225–30).
484 See especially §§21, 31–33.
485 HL 58, 63–64.
486 Col. i, lines 9–10.
487 Col. i, lines 11–15.
488 Col. i, lines 16–19.
COMPARISONS 145
Various penalties including corporal punishment, exile and forced labor are
in view. The relevant laws can be summarized as follows: anyone who takes
away the craft of a military man or any other person attempting to deliver
dues for the breweries or abattoirs of Pharaoh will have his nose cut off and
be sent to Sile; the same punishment applies for anyone interfering with the
supply of goods to the harem or of offerings to the gods; the same again
applies for officials who requisition kt-plants and/or privately owned slaves
to help them do so; same again for the uncontrolled looting of hides from
peasants, involving their beating and being left poor; a military man who
commits a similar offence will be struck one hundred blows, receive five
open wounds and will have the stolen hides taken from him.
There are also some clauses stating that a particular offence will now
be prosecuted or prevented though a penalty is not always given (e.g. VI,
VIII), some laws protecting commoners who have had dues stolen, and
some provisions whose penalty is unknown due to a break in the text (VII
sm-herbs). All laws within EH regarding theft-related offences that record a
penalty involve some form of corporal punishment. None of them require
payment or the death penalty. It must be remembered that these laws are
addressing offences by officials rather than the general population.
The theft laws in ND combine corporal punishments, whether beat-
ings, making pierced wounds or the cutting of off ears and nose or multiple
payments in kind, with forced labor (including being made into servants of
the protected foundation) for various misappropriation offences by offi-
cials. For the offence of offering dedicated sacrifices to another deity, im-
palement is prescribed. 489
2.6.1.2.2 Other theft comparisons

Apart from being able to compare the different penalties for theft in gen-
eral, there are a number of similarities within more specific aspects of the
theft laws from these collections which enable closer comparison. This fol-
lows presently and should enable an assessment, to some extent, of the like-
lihood of borrowing amongst these laws.
There are many laws across these collections which deal with the theft
of the same object. Despite this they are often difficult to compare, perhaps
implying a lack of borrowing. There are three collections which treat the
theft of a boat. LH 8 specifically deals with the theft of a boat 490 from the
palace or a muškenum. The penalty is thirty fold replacement if from the pal-
489 Section II.3.b.

490 Among other items.
ace, ten fold if from the muškenum, and death if the thief cannot afford ei-
ther payment. The specification of the boat’s owner along with the list of
other objects contained within LH 8 distinguishes it significantly from the
other two laws treating boat theft. LE 6 states that a man who steals some-
one else’s boat through deception shall pay 10 shekels of silver. 491 SLHF iii
10–12 puts it more simply again: “If he steals a boat, he shall double (its
value) as compensation.” 492 Though the penalties of the last two laws may
be similar, one could hardly argue that borrowing had necessarily occurred.
The theft (from the palace or muškenum again) of a pig, ox, sheep or
donkey is also mentioned in LH 8. 493 Each of these items is mentioned in
other collections in different contexts. SLHF iii 13–15 again demands a two
fold payment for such a theft. Within HL there are a number of laws treat-
ing the theft of different kinds of pigs: HL 81, a fattened pig-12 shekels of
silver; HL 82, a pig of the courtyard-6 shekels; HL 83, a pregnant sow-6
shekels plus 50 liters of barley for every 2 piglets inside her; HL 85, a piglet
stolen from within its mother-100 liters of barley. In HL 86, a man who
kills a pig that had trespassed onto a part of his property where it may have
damaged food supplies and does not return it to the owner is said to be
“considered a thief”. Presumably he would pay the 6 shekels outlined in HL
82. Whatever the case, there is little evidence for any borrowing between
these laws either. The laws treating the theft of sheep, 494 oxen, 495 don-
keys/mules, 496 and horses 497 display many differences also and are not
worth outlining in detail here. Amongst the laws the penalties are different
in amount and type, the animals mentioned together in the same law are
different in each collection as is the order in which they are mentioned, no
two collections mention exactly the same combination of animals etc. Very
different situations are often in view across the collections e.g. selling ani-
mals held in pledge, stealing from a palace, misappropriating a trespassing
or stray animal, the sale of such a stolen animal etc. There is not even a case
where laws from two different collections that treat the theft of the same
animal do so within the same situation e.g. simple theft of the animal from
another. The only similarity is that the same animal may be mentioned in
491 Presumably he also returns the boat.

492 Thus Roth Law Collections, 49.
493 With the same penalty as above.
494 LH 8, 265; MAL F 1; HL 59, 69.
495 LH 8; LE 50; MAL C 5; HL 63, 70.
496 LH 8; LE 50; MAL C 4; HL 70–71
497 MAL C 4–5; HL 58, 64, 70; PT XXXV.
COMPARISONS 147
more than one collection. This is hardly resounding evidence for borrow-
ing. This minor similarity of content is hardly surprising given the agricul-
tural nature of the societies within which these laws were produced.
Yaron’s argument 498 that LH 8 derives from a combination of SLHF
iii 10–15 is unconvincing in the extreme. Especially given the fact LH 8 lists
many more objects than the two listed in this section of SLHF.
The theft of a plough is treated in both LH and HL. LH 259 demands
a payment of 5 shekels for a plough stolen from the common irrigated area
and LH 260, 3 shekels if it is a clod breaking plough. HL 121 demands a
similar penalty for the theft of a plough, 6 shekels if the thief is a free man,
3 if he is a slave. There is no mention of a common irrigated area in HL
which may be significant. The usual penalty for theft in LH is death. The
punishment here in LH is very miniscule and it is difficult to understand
why this is the case unless the location within the common area somehow
lessens the offence. 499 Interestingly, in contrast, this may be one of the few
Hittite Laws which mentions a death penalty (as part of the karu . . . kinuna
clause). 500
Bricks are another item mentioned in two collections with a similar
penalty, but again, there are a number of differences. MAL B 14 treats a
situation where a man makes bricks from someone else’s plot. The man is
to give triple the plot, has his bricks confiscated, is struck a number of
blows and performs the king’s service. 501 HL 128 prescribes that the theft
of bricks shall result in their two fold return. Along with this the theft of
foundation stones and the stele is mentioned. The former is paid back five
fold and the latter requires a 2 shekel payment. There are many obvious
differences between the two laws that seem to question the significance of
the surface similarity of the mention of bricks. Though the penalty is simi-
lar, in MAL B 14 the whole “plot” is tripled, whereas in HL 128, it is the
bricks that are doubled. As usual, MAL includes blows and king’s service as
part of the penalty.
Another topic dealt with across collections is theft from the palace.
Again there is little support for the notion of a common ancient Near East-
ern law on this topic, nor for borrowing across the collections. Within LH
498 Yaron, “Early Mesopotamian Collections,” 69–70. This writer does agree
with his notion that LH contains stiffer sanctions for theft-related offences.
499 More like misappropriation than theft.
500 The penalty is quite broken and is usually reconstructed on the basis of HL
166. See Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 203.
501 MAL B 15 treats a similar offence but is too broken to mention in any detail.
there are four laws which treat this topic. LH 6 and 8 have been mentioned
in detail above, 6 prescribing the death penalty for the theft of objects from
the palace or temple, and 8 specifying a number of objects which require
thirty fold repayment if stolen from the temple or palace, ten fold if from a
muškenum. LH 15–16 seems to uphold LH 6 in that the harboring of a slave
of the palace or a muškenum or aiding their escape is punished with death.
Unfortunately for our purposes LE 50 simply states that anyone in a posi-
tion of authority who seizes a fugitive slave or a stray animal belonging to
the palace or a muškenum and does not return it within a month will be
charged with theft. Not knowing what the penalty for such a charge would
be at Eshnunna makes comparison difficult. Though it is possible that the
penalties may have been the same, there is no support for this idea in the
texts themselves. The one obvious similarity between these laws is the con-
nection of the muškenum with the palace. This is most safely explained by
postulating a similar role for the muškenu at Eshnunna as in Babylonia. 502
HL 126 also deals with the theft of a number of objects from the gate of
the palace. The first item mentioned is some form of wooden object 503 for
which the penalty is 6 shekels. The theft of a bronze spear from the palace
gate requires the death penalty. The theft of a pin/stylus, 504 requiring pay-
ment of 25 liters of barley and then the theft of threads from a bolt of
cloth, requiring a replacement bolt of cloth are mentioned within this law
also. The theft of these two items is not specifically said to have occurred at
the gate of the palace. It is interesting that within this law there is the death
penalty, and payments in silver, grain and kind. The essence of the provi-
sions in this law is certainly not that theft from the palace deserved death. It
may be significant that the exception here occurs for an object which may
have been used to harm the person of the king i.e. the spear. 505
The theft of slaves is treated in all but two of the collections which
contain laws dealing with theft-related offences. 506 In LH, the penalty for
detaining a fugitive slave, 507 for aiding the escape of the slave of the palace
502 See Kraus, Vom mesopotamischen Menschen der altbabylonischen Zeit und seiner Welt
(Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1973) for an in-depth analysis of this term.
503 Perhaps a chair or throne. See Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 203.
504 Ibid., 203.
505 See our earlier proposition that some form of treachery or assassination may
have been in mind.
506 All but three if LU 2 is not accepted as referring to theft.
507 LH 19
COMPARISONS 149
or a muškenum, 508 harboring such a fugitive slave even at the herald’s proc-
lamation, 509 or misinforming a barber so that he inadvertently removes the
slave-hairlock of another’s slave, 510 all receive the death penalty. If a barber
removes the slave-hairlock without the owner’s permission his hand is cut
off. 511 LE 40 and 50 which both deal with the theft of slaves, merely state
that the offender is a thief. LE 40 treats a man who buys a slave and cannot
identify the seller while LE 50 treats the detaining of a fugitive slave of the
palace or a muškenum by someone in authority for over a month. It is possi-
ble that the punishment was death, but LE 49 makes this unlikely: “If a man
should be seized with a stolen slave or a stolen slave woman, a slave shall
lead a slave, a slave woman shall lead a slave woman.” What seems to be
implied is that the slave will be returned and another will be given in re-
turn. 512 This law is very similar to LL 12, which also shares similarity with
LE 50. LL 12 states that a man who detains a fugitive slave for over a
month must give another slave in return. The ruling and situation are the
same as LE 49 and the time period which the detainer has to return the
slave is identical to that in LE 50. It is possible that LL lay before the
drafter of LE and was used in this case. It is also possible, given the loca-
tion of both within Mesopotamia, that each reflects a practice that was
common in Mesopotamia. 513 LL 13 adds an extra stipulation that a payment
of 15 shekels can be delivered if the offender had no slave to give.
The Hittite Laws regarding this offence also contain some suggestive
similarities with LE and LL. HL 20 penalizes the abduction of the male
slave of a Hittite, stolen from the land of Luwiya and taken to Hatti, with a
12 shekel payment (very similar to the amount of silver in LL 13). HL 21
covers a situation less offensive to the Hittites, namely the stealing of the
male slave of a Luwian. For this latter offence the owner merely takes his
slave back and receives no compensation. This law is peculiar to the Hittite
laws and their focus on international relations regarding kidnapping in gen-
eral. 514 Covering a situation more akin to those in LL and LE, HL 24 states
that 12 shekels will be paid by “the one at whose hearth the slave-owner”
finds their runaway male slave, 6 shekels if the runaway slave was female.
508 LH 15
509 LH 16
510 LH 227
511 LH 226
512 See Roth Law Collections, 70, n. 26.
513 Perhaps excluding Assyria here.
514 See the next section, 2.6.2.
This unique distinction is qualified by the statement that the offender is

paying one month’s wages, with the male slave earning more. There is a
similarity in penalty here and in LL 13, but it seems the similarity arises for
different reasons. In LL 13 the 15 shekels is given in place of giving a slave,
not necessarily as the equivalent of a month’s wages. The mention of the
one month time period again at first seems to suggest common practice or
borrowing, but it is slightly different here. In HL 24 there is no mention of
how long the slave has dwelt in the house, just that the penalty is equivalent
to one month’s wages. Interestingly, the version of this law supposedly
dated to the Neo-Hittite period, demands the payment of one year’s wages:
100 shekels if a male slave, 50 if a female. Though one could argue the
closer proximity of date between the Old Hittite version of HL and LL and
LE, it seems the amounts are similar for different, unrelated reasons, and
the common mention of the one month period is merely coincidental. The
link between LL and LE here may, however, be more substantial.
Robbery and/or burglary are punished by death in LH 21–22 and pos-
sibly in LU 2. 515 MAL A 3 also prescribes death for theft from a house, but
a very specific situation is mentioned. The law deals with theft by a man’s
wife from his house while he is ill or dead. It is only in this situation that the
thieving wife and the receiver of the goods are to be put to death. If the
husband is healthy, the punishment is at his discretion. If the wife gave the
goods to a slave mutilation of ears and/or nose are in view (MAL A 4). If
the man’s wife steals from another house the woman also has ears or nose
mutilated and may be claimed by the owner of the house if not ransomed
by her husband. In contrast to the severity of these laws, HL 94 has a sim-
ple fine of 12 shekels for burglary of a house by a freeman, 516 to which
seems to be added some other monetary compensation dependent on how
much is taken. HL 95 has a lesser monetary penalty of 6 shekels if the of-
fence is committed by a slave, to which is added mutilation of nose and
ears. The owner of the slave is to pay some form of compensation depend-
ent on the amount stolen or he forfeits the slave. A simple comparison of
LH and HL highlights a general trend, namely the harsh nature of LH in
contrast to that of HL. Given the uncertain import of the offence listed in
LU 2 it would be unwise to make too much of the similar penalty to LH
21–22. 517 The death penalty in MAL is for a very specific situation that is
515 See our earlier discussion of the phrase sa-gaz-šè in-ak.

516 Down from 40 shekels formerly.
517 Especially given the possibility that the phrase can mean “to murder”. See
earlier discussion.
COMPARISONS 151
not technically robbery or burglary. The series of laws in MAL A treating

theft from houses generally involve mutilation of some form. This mutila-
tion of nose and/or ears is paralleled in the treatment of slaves in HL 95
and also in some of the penalties for theft-related offences in ND. This
does not seem to be a common law regarding robbery or theft-related of-
fences that crosses cultures, nor a borrowing. That mutilation happens to
those particular body parts is a phenomenon that transcends the ancient
Near East. The occurrences of mutilation in legal penalties in the Near East
will be discussed more generally in a following section.
One topic that has been seen as a borrowing or part of a common le-
gal culture is that regarding the thief caught before the act. The attention
given to this topic, as is the case with the goring ox, stems partly from its
existence in biblical law. 518 This topic is taken up in three different Near
Eastern collections: LE 12–13, LL 9 and HL 93. Similar in each law is the
capture of a man before he has committed an offence. Similar also is the
mention of a penalty of either 10 or 12 shekels in each case. It is also a rea-
sonable deduction that each law envisages the man as preparing to commit
theft. This is clearly stated in LL 9 and is obvious in the case of HL 93 from
the content of the two laws which follow it. LE 12–13, however, are sur-
rounded by laws which treat rates of hire. There are a number of significant
differences amongst these laws. It is only LE which distinguishes penalties
dependent on whether the offender is seized during daylight or night-
time. 519 If seized in the daylight the offender is penalized 10 shekels, if at
night the law states “he shall die, he will not live”. 520 It is unclear what role
self-help is to play here. LL 9 simply prescribes a 10 shekel payment and
HL 93 12 shekels if the man caught is free or 6 if he is a slave. There is no
518 Ex. 22:2–3 (22:1–2 in LXX and MT/HB): “If a thief is caught breaking in
and is struck so that he dies, the defender is not guilty of bloodshed; but if it hap-
pens after sunrise, he is guilty of bloodshed. A thief must certainly make restitution,
but if he has nothing, he must be sold to pay for his theft.” Note here that the law
is set among a number of laws which deal with murder rather than theft. The focus
is on whether the householder is guilty of murder if he kills an intruder rather than
on the penalty to be paid by the thief (though this is also covered).
519 This being one of the points used to argue a parallel with Ex. 22:2–3. Inter-
estingly the Hebrew in this passage allows the interpretation that what is ruled out
is not so much killing a burglar who entered during daylight hours, but going after a
night-time burglar to kill him the next morning. The meaning hinges on one’s in-
terpretation of the phrase wyl'Þ[' vm,V²h, ; hx'îr>z"-~ai lit. “If the sun has risen upon him”.
520 imat ul iballuṭ. Note that the law does not state that the householder is al-
lowed to kill the intruder, but that the intruder will be punished with death.
indication in these laws that they were only applicable during daylight hours.
It is quite possible that the drafter of LE used LL 9 here and embellished it.
There are some other differences also. The provision in LE 12 is for a man
seized in the field (eqlum) of a muškenum, LE 13, in the house of a muškenum.
LL 9 parallels LE 12 in that the thief is seized outside, but is different in
that he is seized in the orchard (kiri6) of a man (lu2). HL 93 parallels LE 13
in its mention of the house as that which is in the offender’s sights. Again
there are significant differences. In HL 93 the thief is seized before entering
the house, whereas in LE 13 the offender is seized inside it. As Tigay 521 has
pointed out, borrowing does not necessarily lead to word for word transla-
tion or adoption but can include significant differences. If this is accepted
then borrowing is a possibility here also. It is possible that the drafter of LE
was familiar with LL, adapted it and expanded upon it, as it is possible that
the drafter of HL 93 was familiar with LE and adapted and shortened it.
This, however, is mere speculation, as is any attempt to hypothesize other
unwitnessed sources that the drafters may have relied upon. There remains
the possibility that such a situation did make up part of the legal training of
the drafters of these collections. That its existence at Isin, Eshnunna and
Hatti was due to a common legal training across the entire Near East seems
unlikely given the many differences amongst the collections regarding other
topics and the differences outlined here. That the drafters of these three
collections 522 all thought this topic worth consideration is not enough to
demand its diffusion in any form, let alone to be able to specify it. 523
The last topic amongst the theft-related offences that is treated in a
number of collections is that of the seller/purchaser of stolen goods. LH 9–
13 treat this topic extensively. There is a clear parallel between LH 10 and
LE 40. In both cases, if a person in possession of stolen goods cannot es-
tablish the identity of the person whom they claim sold them the stolen
goods, they are considered the thief. In LH 10 this means they are killed.
The penalty is not specified in LE 40. It is possible that LE 40 was stimulus
material for the drafter of LH who greatly expanded on the topic. The im-
plication of LE 40, spelled out in LH 9, is that the seller would be consid-
ered the thief if identified. This is the case in MAL C 4–6. In C 4 the of-
fender wrongly sells off an animal taken in pledge, in C 5 the offender may
521 Tigay, “On Evaluating”.

522 As well as that of Exodus 22:2–3.
523 Nor are the differences here outlined and the general differences between
these collections outlined elsewhere enough to comprehensively disprove it in this
case.
COMPARISONS 153
have stolen the goods 524 and C 6 is too broken to reconstruct the situation.
The laws certainly treat a topic similar to LH 9 but do so in a very different
framing. Again, earlier material in LE and LH may have been a stimulus but
this is difficult to argue. The fact that three different societies have decided
someone who sells property that is not theirs is a thief and someone who
unknowingly buys such property is not does not demand a diffusionist ex-
planation. 525
2.6.2 Kidnap
In contrast to the theft laws, there is very little material to compare con-
cerning kidnap. No two of the ancient Near Eastern laws on this topic seem
to cover exactly the same situation. LH 14 prescribes death for a man who
kidnaps someone’s young child. LU 3 prescribes imprisonment and the
payment of 15 shekels of silver for a man who either detains, kidnaps or
falsely imprisons. 526 The object of this offence does not seem to be men-
tioned specifically. It is tempting to see LH as prescribing a much harsher
penalty as was often the case in the theft laws. It would be unwise to be too
dogmatic in this case given the uncertain meaning of LU 3. It may even be
possible that what is being described is some form of illegal distraint. It is
quite possible that LU 3 describes a lesser offence than that of LH 14 rather
than highlighting the harsher penalties of LH. The specific mention in LH
14 that the offence is committed against the child of an awilum may support
this possibility though the term mar awilim could refer to any member of the
awilu class.
The Hittite laws regarding kidnap cover slightly different situations
and seem more interested in relations with their Luwian neighbors than the
offence of kidnap itself. 527 As a result these are difficult to compare to LH
14. The Hittite laws cover the abduction of a free Hittite person from Hatti
to Luwiya by a Luwian, which is punished with forfeiture of the offender’s
estate, 528 to the abduction of a Luwian slave from Luwiya to Hatti by a Hit-
524 The text is broken at this point.

525 The modern situation where the purchaser of stolen goods is considered li-
able for an offence presumes a society where sale is carried out in a different man-
ner.
526 Note the uncertainty of the translation: Roth has “detains”, Law Collections,
17 while Wilcke has imprisonment, as cited by Lafont and Westbrook, “Neo-

Sumerian Period,” 221.
527 HL 19–21.
528 Literally “house”.
tite which involves no penalty, just the return of the stolen slave. In keeping
with the Hittite theft laws, some form of pecuniary penalty is prescribed in
contrast to the harsher penalty of LH.
The Egyptian material which, on a surface reading, seems to regard
kidnap, is really concerned with the misappropriation of labor from temple
estates. 529
2.6.3 Sex Laws

The similarities in the sex laws of the ancient Near Eastern law collec-
tions 530 have been used to confirm the existence of a canon of scholarly
scientific problems that supposedly spread with cuneiform writing and to
confirm the essential sameness of ancient Near Eastern law. 531 Within this
model, the differences between the laws are seen as minimal and due to
nothing more than the different literary styles of the individual collec-
tions. 532 Though there certainly are many similarities between these laws,
the differences are not as slight as claimed. The idea that the similarities can
be explained via the common legal background of “cuneiform law” and its
canonical legal problems, though a possibility, is hardly demonstrable. The
assertion that such a canon was so well known that a collection could men-
tion one or two examples from a given topic and assume knowledge in the
reader of the others is a forced argument from an unnecessary assumption,
as is any attempt to read the provisions of one collection’s laws into an-
other’s. 533 Other possible explanations will be given for the similarities and
the differences will be allowed to speak. Without manipulation of the evi-
dence uniformity is more difficult to find.
2.6.3.1 Offences Involving Married Women 534

Many parallels can be found amongst the laws treating adultery in the an-
cient Near East. These include the mention of certain details such as the
seizure of adulterers in flagrante delicto, the location of the offence, the coer-
cion or lack thereof of the woman, the case of the absentee husband; the
general focus on married women; the treatment of adultery as an offence
529 e.g. EH and ND.

530 At least those regarding adultery and rape.
531 Westbrook, “Adultery in Ancient Near Eastern Law,” Revue Biblique 97
(1990): 548.
532 Ibid., 542.
533 Ibid., 571.
534 Including those betrothed or holding status as inchoate wives.
COMPARISONS 155
against the husband only and the lack of treatment of a husband’s marital
indiscretions (unless with a married woman); similarities in the description
of the penalty for adultery offences including the principle that the para-
mour is to be treated as the husband treats his wife and the general possibil-
ity of the death penalty for the offence. All of this seems to support West-
brook’s model of different collections treating common canonical legal top-
ics. Let us analyze these laws in a little more detail.
A number of laws state that the death penalty is in view for both a
man’s wife and her paramour involved in adultery. This is specifically men-
tioned in LH 129, MAL A 13, 15, HL 197–198, and is implied in MAL A
14, 16, 22 and 23. A number of laws mention the death penalty for only one
or the other person involved in the adulterous offence: LH 130, 133, LU 6–
7, MAL A 12, 14 (implied), 16 (implied), 23, LE 26, 28, HL 197. Often this
is due to factors such as lack of knowledge of the woman’s marital status or
the use of force. There are also several laws which mention the possibility
of lesser (or no) penalties whether at the discretion of the husband (LH
129, MAL A 14–16, 22–23, HL 198) and/or the king or judges (LH 129,
MAL A 15, HL 198).
Westbrook uses all this material and the several laws which mention
the seizure of the couple in flagrante delicto (LH 129, MAL A 15, HL 197 and
LE 28) to reconstruct the law of adultery in the ancient Near East. When all
details are taken into account this is not an easy task, nor, according to this
writer, one that should be undertaken. Generally the laws which speak of
the possibility of death for both wife and paramour seem to envisage a mu-
tual sexual encounter without the involvement of force and probably as-
sume the paramour’s knowledge of the woman’s marital status. LH 129
does not mention the possibility of force nor of the paramour’s cognizance
that the woman was married but states that, if seized in the act, they shall be
thrown into the water. 535 MAL A 13 comes after an example where a man’s
wife was raped, implying that this is not the case here, and specifically men-
tions that the paramour knew that the woman was married. The penalty is
death. MAL A 15 shares more parallels with LH 129 in that neither aspect is
mentioned, merely the seizure of the couple in the act. The husband is able
to kill both parties. 536 HL 197, after detailing two situations where only one
party is said to die, dependent on the location (i.e. in the mountains or in the
535 There is also the following clause dealing with the situation where the hus-
band pardons his wife. This will be treated later.
536 As in LH 129 more follows which will be treated later.
woman’s house) of the sexual encounter, 537 merely states that the woman’s
husband, if he catches them in the act, may kill both of them. There is no
repeated detailing of the location or any other factor such as the use of
force or the paramour’s knowledge. Perhaps it is implied that the second
situation was envisaged i.e. the husband caught his wife and her paramour in
his house. MAL A 14 specifies both location (which may have led to the
paramour’s confusion regarding the woman’s marital status) 538 and whether
or not the paramour knew the woman was married. If he knew, he is pun-
ished as the husband punishes his wife.
MAL A 16 is difficult to reconcile with the other sex laws of this col-
lection and is thus not treated by Westbrook. The opening protasis of the
law is somewhat damaged, and leaves the reader somewhat perplexed as to
the situation envisaged. The second protasis, however, is completely pre-
served and its apodosis prescribes punishment for the paramour identical to
that meted out to the woman if he used force. This seems to be a direct
contrast to the provisions in MAL A 12 and 23 which specify that there is
no punishment for the wife if she was forced. In MAL A 22 also, it seems
as though a wife who claims to have been raped is also punished. Again
there is the statement that the paramour shall be treated as the woman’s
husband treats his wife. In this law a man’s wife has been the traveling
companion of another man. The man has to compensate the woman’s hus-
band 7200 shekels of lead regardless of any sexual activity that may have
occurred. If the man swears that he did not have sex with the woman this is
to be the only penalty. If, however, the man’s wife contests his claim and
declares that the man did have sex with her he is to undergo the River Or-
deal. If he refuses to do so, we are then given the statement regarding the
identical penalties for the wife and paramour. It would be difficult to imag-
ine that any woman who knew of such a law in operation would claim this
sexual activity had taken place, even if it was rape. Knowledge of such a law
could not be presumed, and it would be even more difficult to explain the
wife’s statement if the sex was mutually entered into. It makes most sense if
rape was being claimed, but we cannot be certain. Lafont has offered a solu-
tion to the apparent contradiction between MAL A 16 and 22, and 12 and
23. 539 She sees within MAL A 16 a situation where the woman has enticed
537 The difficulty in seeing only the woman being punished in the second case
will be treated later.
538 i.e. the locations mentioned, an inn or the main thoroughfare, may have been
the typical haunts of prostitutes.
539 “Middle Assyrian Period,” 556. See also her Femmes, droit et justice dans l’anti-
COMPARISONS 157
the other man with an embrace or some such act and has subsequently been
forced to have sex with him. The woman’s willingness to become the travel-
ing partner of another man in MAL A 22 would amount to a similar en-
ticement, both acts perhaps making her somewhat responsible for the sub-
sequent rape in the eyes of the laws’ drafter. Though this reconstruction is
somewhat tenuous, it does make sense of the data here. This situation is
dealt with nowhere else in the ancient Near East.
Thus far then we have little problem in terms of contradictions
amongst these laws. In LH 129, MAL A 15 and HL 197 the laws simply
state that, if caught in the act of adultery, both partners could be killed. In
MAL A 15 and HL 197, the person who catches the offenders and kills
them is specifically said to be the husband. This is not the case in LH 129 in
which an unspecified plural subject, the ever present “they”, binds the cou-
ple and throws them into the water. The mention of the husband’s ability to
allow his wife to live (following directly after this statement) does cause one
to hesitate to make very much out of this difference. In general, the lack of
mention of the use of force or the knowledge of the paramour regarding
the woman’s marital status in these three laws could reflect a number of
different things. As both these aspects of the offence are regularly men-
tioned in MAL, their absence in MAL A 15 may be significant and imply
that they were not taken into account if the husband killed the couple. Per-
haps this was to allow for the rage of the husband at the sight before him. It
is also possible that these aspects were presumed to be present. For the
other two collections it is more difficult to say, especially given LH’s failure
to discuss the use of force, the location of the offence or the knowledge of
the paramour. There is nothing to suggest any real differences in this aspect
of these laws. There are some differences in the description of the process
that ensues if the husband chooses not to kill the couple on the spot.
This ensuing role of the husband and the king is described in LH 129,
MAL A 15 and HL 198. LH 129 declares that if the husband allows his wife
to live then the king will allow the paramour to live also. There is no de-
scription of the man bringing the couple for trial. MAL A 15 describes the
process in more detail. The husband seizes the man and brings him before
the king or the judges. If they find the paramour guilty he will be killed if
the husband kills his wife, turned into a eunuch 540 and have his face lacer-
quité orientale (Orbis biblicus et orientalis 165; Fribourg: Editions Universitaires,

1999), 163–64.
540 ša rešen. For a discussion of this title see Luis R. Siddall, “A Re-examination
of the Title ša reši in the Neo-Assyrian Period,” in Gilgameš and the World of Assyria:
ated if the husband cuts off his wife’s nose, and have nothing done to him
if the husband does nothing to his wife. It seems to be the husband who
carries out the penalty on both his wife and the paramour. HL 198 has no
mention of a trial or judges but does specify that the husband brings his
wife and her paramour to the palace gate. 541 If the husband declares that he
does not want his wife to die then the paramour’s life is also spared. There
is an extra statement that the husband shall also “SAG.DU-SU2 waššiyezzi”.
Most commentators have treated this as the husband carrying out some
action upon the paramour’s head whether that be some sort of blow, mark-
ing or something else. Tsevat 542 has made the suggestion that this phrase
actually refers to the (re-)veiling of the man’s wife, symbolic of the con-
tinuation of their marriage. This interpretation has been followed by Hoff-
ner in his critical edition. 543 Though this interpretation does seem a little
more neat and keeps the symmetry of punishment between the wife and
paramour, there is a difficulty in the possessive suffix used which is Ak-
kadian third person masculine singular. Though Hittite does not distinguish
gender, a practice which may have led to confusion here, they usually use
the correct gender for Akkadian suffixes in the laws. 544 It must be admitted,
however, that confusion is possible in this case as the textual witness for
this law, KBo 6.26, seems to use the ŠU suffix for the feminine on two
other occasions. 545 Following from this act upon someone’s head the law
describes a second option. If the husband has brought the couple to the
palace gate but wants both of them to die he declares as much and, the law
states, “they shall roll the wheel”. The import of this is similarly unclear but
seems to suggest some form of judicial ordeal. 546 After this action the king
Proceedings of the Conference Held at Mandelbaum House, The University of Sydney, 21–23
July 2004 (ed. J. J. Azize and N. K. Weeks; Ancient Near Eastern Studies Supple-
ment 21; Louvain: Peeters, 2007), 225–40.
541 Probably the location of the royal court.
542 M. Tsevat, “The Husband Veils a Wife,” Journal of Cuneiform Studies 27 (1975):
235–40.
543 Laws of the Hittites, 226. A change to his earlier position, in Roth, Law Collec-
tions, 237.
544 e.g. HL 20–21, 27, 31, 34, 43, 47b, 48, 50 (pl.), 51, 53, 74, 77 (feminine and
masculine singular used appropriately), 95, 99, 100, 106, 171 (feminine) etc. For a
more complete listing see Hoffner’s glossary in Laws of the Hittites, 333.There are
possibly several examples of the masculine singular suffix ŠU being used for the
feminine e.g. HL 27, 171, 175, 200a.
545 HL 171 and 175.
546 See also “Apology of H}attušili III,” trans. by Th. P. J. van den Hout (COS
COMPARISONS 159
is said to either have the couple killed or spared. Though it is a minor dif-
ference, it is worth noting that in MAL A 15 the husband had the responsi-
bility for his wife’s punishment with the king or judges only being responsi-
ble for the penalty given to the paramour in response to the husband’s deci-
sion regarding his wife’s punishment. Here in HL 198 the king is responsi-
ble for the punishment of both parties. As mentioned above, LH 129 does
not specify that the husband, or anyone else, brings the couple to court.
Though there is mention of the possibility that the offending couple are
killed on the spot if caught in flagrante delicto, and mention of a role for the
king in pardoning the paramour if the husband pardons the wife, there is no
mention of the husband bringing the case to anyone if he wants both to die.
As acknowledged by Westbrook, the king’s prerogative to pardon both of-
fenders regardless of the husband’s wishes is unique to the Hittite collec-
tion. 547
Westbrook explains the similarities in the laws treating the capture of
an adulterous couple in the act as due to the background of a common oral
discussion of this canonical legal problem, passed around with the spread of
cuneiform scribal schools. He sees three aspects: 1) the killing of the couple
on the spot by the husband, 2) bringing the couple to court for the death
penalty, and 3) in court again, the husband wanting to pardon only his wife.
LH 129, which does not mention any court proceedings, is said to cover the
second and third situations. This is a possibility, but is a little forced. It is
possible that the unspecified “they” in LH 129 who are to throw the of-
fending couple into the water, refers to whoever may catch the couple in
the act and is thus a slight variation from Westbrook’s situation 1). 548
Unlike MAL A 15 and HL 197, LH 129 does not specify that it is the hus-
band who catches the couple in the act. The continuing section of this law
does, in all likelihood, cover Westbrook’s situation 3). MAL A 15 and HL
197–198 cover all three situations with the differences enumerated above
regarding the role for the king and the husband in carrying out and deciding
upon the penalties. It should also be noted here that MAL A 15 alone en-
visages a corporal mutilation as punishment here. Given the differences
between these laws, slight though they may be, it is unwise to presume their
composers knew of original oral solutions to all three situations, let alone
1.77: 200, §4 and note 10).

547 Westbrook, “Adultery,” 556.
548 Though, of course, the husband could be the unspecified captor and execu-
tor of the couple, perhaps with a group of friends.

that they presumed knowledge of these in their reader. This is especially the
case when we come to LE 28.
LE 28 focuses on a different legal problem, namely, what it is that de-
fines a woman as a “wife”. The end of the law mentions that someone who
fits the specifications needed to be a wife “shall die, she shall not live” if
caught in the act of adultery. 549 This is another case of adulterers caught in
flagrante delicto. Given the fact Akkadian does not distinguish feminine and
masculine in the third person singular verb, there has been some debate as
to the subject of the verbs in the penalty clause. Yaron has argued that one
or both verbs could refer to the paramour rather than the woman. 550 This is
highly unlikely given the subject matter of the rest of the law and its sole
focus on the status of the woman. Though this law does not mention that
the paramour will also be killed, it should not be assumed that this was not
the case at Eshnunna. What is clear, and tacitly admitted by Westbrook, is
that this law does not stem from the supposed canonical legal problem he
sees as common to the laws treated above. 551 He does, however, think that
it refers to it in passing and presumes knowledge of its other aspects in its
readers. 552 Though this writer may agree that the drafters of the law collec-
tions may have assumed knowledge of local practice, he does not assent to
the notion that this practice was necessarily common to the entire ancient
Near East, nor even Mesopotamia. That the paramour would have been
killed in the situation mentioned in LE 28 is probable but not demonstra-
ble. To argue, as Szlechter does, 553 that this law definitely refers to the kill-
ing of the couple by the offended husband is to say more than the text al-
lows. To assume that the other situations, the husband bringing both to
court to be killed or in order to pardon his wife, were known at Eshnunna
is no more than that, an assumption. It is not certain that pardoning was
possible in the mind of the drafter of LE and it should not be assumed. 554
MAPD 19, set in the context of the harem, is even more severe than
those above in that the death penalty is specified for a palace woman and a
549 Literally, “in the lap of another man”.

550 Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna, 284–85.
551 Westbrook, “Adultery,” 553: “CE 28 strictly speaking belongs to a different
standard problem, concerning the validity of marriage”.
552 loc. cit.
553 Émile Szlechter, Les Lois d’Eshnunna (Publications de l’Institut de Droit Ro-
main 12; Paris: Université de Paris, 1954), 110, 123. As followed by Westbrook,
“Adultery,” 552.
554 The same is the case regarding the material in the Biblical law collections.
COMPARISONS 161
man who stand by themselves behaving “in a flirtatious manner”, or any

who do not report such an offence. 555
Let us now turn our attention to those other laws which only mention
the death of one offender. Several of these laws treat the rape of a married
woman. In these laws it is only the offending male who is punished while
the woman goes free. 556 LU 6, LH 130 and LE 26 share many similar details
though they are phrased differently. All treat the rape of a man’s inchoate
wife. 557 Her status is described in two different ways in the laws, 558 but the
same state is in view. The description of the penalty is also slightly different
but in all laws, death is prescribed for the offending male. LH 130 specifi-
cally states that the woman is to be released, and the lack of mention of any
penalty for the woman in LE 26 and LU 6, given the same focus of the
laws, implies that none was in view. 559 This may possibly reflect some back-
ground of borrowing amongst these three collections. The other collections
which mention the rape of a married woman do not specify her status as an
inchoate wife, perhaps implying that they did not share this practice, or that
their laws did not borrow from the others.
MAL A 12 prescribes that there is no punishment for a woman who is
seized along the main thoroughfare and forced to have sex with another
man as long as she offers some resistance. The man is to be killed, whether
on the spot or after the charges are proved in court. MAL A 23 treats a very
specific situation, that of a man’s wife who has been taken into the house of
a procuress and had sex with another man. If the woman did not know
what was intended by the procuress and declares that she was raped by the
man, she goes free and both the procuress and the other man are killed.
Again, MAL introduces an element of foreknowledge not expressed else-
where. If the woman knew what was intended her husband punishes her at
his discretion and the procuress and the other man receive the same pun-
ishment. If the woman did not know what was intended, but failed to de-
555 See Roth, Law Collections, 205.

556 See our earlier discussion regarding the apparent contradiction to this rule in
MAL A 16 and 22.
557 For a description of this state, considered as marriage, see Westbrook, Old
Babylonian Marriage Law (Archiv für Orientforschung, Beiheft 23; Horn: Ferdinand
Berger & sons, 1988), chs. 2–3.
558 With LU 6 and LH 130 sharing the description of her as a “virgin wife”.
559 The case here is different to that in LE 28 where the law focused solely on
the woman’s status as a wife and the concomitant implication that had for her if
she strayed. Here the focus is on the offence, not a particular party, thus the safety
in taking the lack of mention of a penalty for the woman as significant.
clare that she was raped, the husband punishes her at her discretion and the
procuress and the other man are killed. 560
HL 197 treats rape, though it is not certain that a married woman is in
view. Here is the law in full: “If a man seizes a woman in the mountains, it
is the man’s offence, but if he seizes her in her house, it is the woman’s of-
fence: the woman shall die. If the woman’s husband discovers them in the
act, he may kill them without committing a crime.” The latter part of the
law has been dealt with above. The first case implies that a rape has oc-
curred if the woman was seized in the mountains and that it is only the man
who is at fault. Interestingly there is no mention of any penalty for him. If
the woman is seized 561 in her house, she is seen to be at fault and will be
put to death. These two clauses leave much room for speculation. It is un-
clear if the woman is married though this seems most likely given the men-
tion of a husband in the final clause. The lack of a penalty specified for the
man in the first case is unhelpful. One can presume that the death penalty
was also in view for him, with its omission due to the focus of the law on
the problem of which party was guilty, but this cannot be proven. A similar
problem arises in the second case. The woman is said to be “seized” (epzi)
in her house, as she was in the mountains. If this verb implies she has been
taken against her will, then the mention of punishment for the woman
alone is very strange. It is difficult to explain even if the verb simply means
“to take” and does not imply the use of force. If the act was consensual and
the woman married, it would be hard to explain why there is no punishment
for the male specified, especially given the fact a husband is allowed to kill
both partners if he catches them in the act. There are a number of possible
solutions to this problem. The first is that in the first two cases, punishment
for the offending man is implied (most likely to be death) though not speci-
fied. The second is that, whether the woman is married or unmarried, the
first case treats rape and implies a penalty for the man and the second treats
a situation where the woman has seduced the man in some way so that only
she is punished. This would parallel LU 7. It is very unlikely that there is no
penalty for the man who rapes the woman in the mountains though he has
committed an offence, and only the woman was to be punished if the adul-
tery was committed in her house. As mentioned, this writer suspects that
the omission of these expected penalties is due to the focus of the law on
the problem of which party was guilty, rather than on the punishment due.
560 Not treated as the wife due to their added offence of deceit.
561 Using the same verb as the previous clause.
COMPARISONS 163
The law does not seem to aim to give a comprehensive ruling but to clarify
a particular issue.
Apart from HL 197, there are two other laws which mention punish-
ment for the married woman only, LU 7 and MAL A 14. MAL A 14 de-
clares that if a man should fornicate with a man’s wife at an inn or in the
main thoroughfare, without knowing that she was married, he is not pun-
ished. The husband has the right to punish his wife as he sees fit. The men-
tion of the location here is different to that in HL 197. It is not designed to
describe a situation where the woman could not have screamed for help in
contrast to one where she could, but to demonstrate a situation where the
offending male may have been confused as to the woman’s marital status. 562
This is explained more specifically later in the law. No other collection of
laws mentions this aspect of the offence of adultery. It is thus not safe to
assume it elsewhere. This is precisely what Westbrook does when he comes
to an interpretation of LU 7. The law reads: “If the wife of a young man, on
her own initiative, approaches a man and initiates sexual relations with him,
they shall kill that woman; that male shall be released.” Though this writer
may agree with Westbrook’s concern that such a law may have led to prob-
lems in practice, the man only having to claim he was seduced to get away
with adultery, he does not assent to Westbrook’s attempts to solve this
problem by importing the details of MAL A 14 into this law. LU 7 does not
specify, nor does it necessarily imply that the male in question did not know
that the woman was married; merely that it was she who initiated the en-
counter. Given the unique discussion of such matters in MAL, this writer
thinks this an unwise conclusion based on the desire to harmonize these
two laws. The laws do not contradict each other, but, on their simplest
reading, they do release the male from punishment for different reasons.
This would question their common background in an oral discussion of a
canonical legal problem. Interestingly though, the treating of LU 7 in this
way, does further the possibility that HL 197 deals with an analogous situa-
tion. HL 197 stands apart in its detailing of the location to assess the coer-
cive nature of the offence, 563 as MAL does in its unique assessment of the
man’s knowledge of the woman’s marital status or, in MAL A 23, the
woman’s knowledge of the procuress’ plans. LU, LH, LE, MAL and HL all
seem to punish only the male offender in the case of the rape of a married
562 The inn and main thoroughfare being popular places for prostitutes.
563 Note that MAL A 12’s detailing of a location within the city’s main thor-
oughfare is not used to imply that the woman is to be held responsible as it is in
Deut. 22:23–24 though both laws detail the woman’s duty to resist.
woman. 564 All these collections mention the use of force in their description
of the offence, except for HL which merely implies its use by detailing the
location. Only MAL A 12 mentions the onus on the woman to resist,
though it may be implied also in HL 197’s detailing of locations. 565
There is some debate regarding the circumstances which are described
in LH 142–143. Westbrook interprets them as referring to pre-marital infi-
delity, more specifically, infidelity during inchoate marriage. 566 This is based
mainly on the woman’s statement to “her husband”, ul tah}h}azanni, “you
shall not take me”. The verb ah}azu regularly means “to take in marriage, to
marry”. The background of inchoate marriage does explain how a woman
can tell her husband that he cannot marry her. Others have attempted to
take the verb as referring to the husband’s taking of his wife for sexual rela-
tions. 567 Adding to the likelihood of Westbrook’s interpretation is the use of
the term sinništum here for the woman in contrast to aššat awilim in LH 141,
which treats a situation where a wife wants to divorce her husband. This is
hardly definitive, however, given the interchangeability of the terms in LH
133a–b. In LH 141 there is specific mention of the fact that the wife resides
in her husband’s house, perhaps implying that this was not the case in LH
142–143. The statement that the woman mussa izerma, “hates her husband”,
is a common euphemism for divorce, furthering Westbrook’s argument
again. Roth’s translation of this phrase as repudiation of the husband is
somewhat circuitous. In LH 142, if the woman declares that she does not
want to go through with the marriage (it still being inchoate), the case goes
to court. 568 If she is without fault but her husband goes out and slanders her
she takes her dowry and goes to her father’s house. This last phrase seems
to go against the idea of inchoate marriage as the woman should not be
residing in her husband’s house during this state, and rules out this element
as the distinction between this law and LH 141. 569 The statement in LH 143
that she squanders her household possessions would be a strange inclusion
564 This statement needs to take into consideration the uncertain import of HL
197 as discussed above.
565 Compare the fuller description of the import of the location in Deut. 22:23–
27.
566 Westbrook, “Adultery,” 570.
567 Roth translates the phrase, “You will not have marital relations with me”,
perhaps hedging her bets, Law Collections, 108.

568 Westbrook’s translation of warkassa ina babtiša ipparrasma, “Adultery,” 572 is
preferred to Roth’s, Law Collections, 108.
569 See Westbrook, Marriage Law, 50–53.
COMPARISONS 165
if these were not the possessions of her husband’s household. The implica-
tion would then be that the circumstances being dealt with here concern a
married woman who wishes to divorce her husband. 570 Though this would
make LH 142–143 very similar to LH 141 there is one key difference: in LH
142–143 it is the wife who wishes to initiate the divorce. The strict regula-
tions regarding this in these laws mirror some of the clauses embedded in
Old Babylonian marriage contracts aimed at stopping the woman from di-
vorcing her husband. 571 If there are no circumstances to question the
woman’s motives for divorcing her husband and there are understandable
reasons for it, she takes her dowry and returns to her father’s house. This is
similar to the provision in LH 138 for a husband who divorces his wife, 572
though here she does not also take the bride wealth. LH 143, which pre-
scribes that the woman is to be cast into the water, treats a situation where
there is evidence to suggest questionable motives for the woman’s desire
for divorce. These include the possibility of promiscuous behavior, as inti-
mated by her description as la naṣratma waṣiat, “not chaste/circumspect 573
(but) wayward/going out”. It is unclear whether a sexual relationship with
another man has been established or is just expected. 574 The further men-
tion of squandering household goods or slandering her husband as criteria
for her drowning makes it likely that hard evidence of sexual misconduct
was not forthcoming, and her character in general was in question in order
to determine her likely motives in asking for the divorce. It is probable that
the suspicion of a relationship with another man as motivation for the di-
vorce lies at the heart of the penalty, thus paralleling the general punish-
ment within the ancient Near East for adultery.
570 Thus interpreting the phrase ul tah}h}azanni as the woman’s declaration to her
husband “you will not be married to me”. See a further possibility in note 573 be-
low.
571 Referred to by Westbrook, “Adultery,” 559–60.
572 For no particular reason.
573 The use of this verb, which can imply the preserving of virginity also gives
some backing to Westbrook’s position and would equally explain the harsh penalty.
It is however, difficult to reconcile with the dwelling of the woman in her hus-
band’s house unless it was consummation that she had denied her husband in LH
142 with her declaration ul tah}h}azanni. The use of the verb in LH 133b, referring to
an aššatu, questions a meaning limited to the preservation of virginity.
574 That it could have been established is possible given its use in LH 133b to
describe the entrance of a man’s wife into the house of another man. The same
penalty applies to the woman in that law as in LH 143.
A law which would be somewhat parallel to Westbrook’s interpreta-

tion of LH 142–143 is found in HL 28. It specifies that a man who runs off
with a betrothed woman without her parents’ co-operation will pay the man
she was betrothed to whatever he had paid as well as some compensation.
If her father and mother were involved they are to compensate the first
man. If they do not, they are to separate the girl from her new man. The
latter half of this law parallels LH 160–161 closer than 142–143. The first
situation where the betrothed woman seems to be the instigator of a new
relationship and the canceling of further marriage negotiations would paral-
lel what Westbrook thinks is happening in LH 142–143. The lack of any
punishment for the woman in HL 28 would then be a significant difference
to the drowning prescribed in LH 143 if there is evidence of another rela-
tionship. The calling off of proceedings towards the marriage on account of
interest in another man receives no punishment in HL 28 whereas proceed-
ings for divorce on the part of a woman for the same reason results in her
drowning in LH 143. The two laws do not directly contradict each other on
this understanding. 575 Upon our interpretation there would still be a differ-
ence in severity here, though perhaps lessened by the woman’s status as
betrothed rather than married. There may be a different attitude to the state
of betrothal in HL, as other collections do not feel the need to distinguish
between the rape of or adultery with a married or betrothed woman. 576
One more set of laws which should be treated here is that dealing with
the question of the wife’s obligations in the case of an absentee husband.
This question is dealt with in LH 133–136, LE 29–30 and MAL A 36, 45,
giving rise to more claims about canonical legal topics. Within these laws
one could even argue for a development of legal reasoning from earlier to
later. Many of the same elements and the same legal reasoning appear
within these laws. LE 29–30 state the case most simply:
LE 29 If a man should be captured or abducted during a raiding expedi-
tion or while on patrol(?), even should he reside in a foreign land for a
long time, should someone else marry his wife and even should she bear
a child, whenever he returns he shall take back his wife.
575 Nor would they even under Westbrook’s interpretation if it was thought il-
licit sexual activity was proven in LH 143 but not in HL 28.
576 Except Deuteronomy 22:22–29, which has the death penalty for both parties
in the case of adultery involving a married or a betrothed woman (stoning is speci-

fied for the latter) linking this offence to the penalty of fornication before marriage
in verse 21.
COMPARISONS 167
LE 30 If a man repudiates his city and his master and then flees, and
someone else then marries his wife, whenever he returns he will have no
claim to his wife.
LH 135–136 parallel these two laws very closely:
LH 135 If a man should be captured and there are not sufficient provi-
sions in his house, before his return his wife enters another’s house and
bears children, and afterwards her husband returns and gets back to his
city, that woman shall return to her first husband; the children shall in-
herit from their father.
LH 136 If a man deserts his city and flees, and after his departure his
wife enters another’s house-if that man then should return and seize his
wife, because he repudiated his city and fled, the wife of the deserter will
not return to her husband.
The drafter of LH has added another element to the question of
whether the husband has been detained against his will or has fled, namely;
the question of whether there were enough provisions in the man’s house
for the wife to survive. Thus in LH, two new laws are added in LH 133 and
134. LH 133 declares that if the man is captured and there are enough pro-
visions, his wife shall not enter another’s house, and prescribes that if she
does so she will be cast into the water; the common penalty for an adulter-
ess in LH. 577 LH 134 declares her right to enter another’s house if there are
not sufficient provisions. LH 135–136 then repeat the provisions of LE 29–
30, but specific to the situation where there were not enough provisions.
MAL A 36 and 45 introduce new elements to this situation and leave
others out. The formulation of the laws does not mirror those of LH or LE
and the rulings are slightly different. The new elements are the time she is
to wait for her husband: 5 years in MAL A 36 if she does not have sons to
support her, 578 2 years in MAL A 45 if her husband is taken as a POW and
she has no sons or father-in-law to support her, and the detailing of provi-
sions for her while she waits. In both laws it is mentioned that her husband
has not left provisions for her. In MAL A 36 she is free to marry in the
sixth year if her husband has not returned and she does not have sons to
support her. In this case, the husband has no claim to her upon his return if
she remarries, somewhat paralleling the husband who flees his city in LH
136 and LE 30. If the husband was not detained of his own intention he is
able to take his wife upon the presentation of a comparable woman to his
577 As seen in LH 129 and 143.

578 If she does it seems she is to remain unmarried indefinitely.
wife’s current husband (another new element). If her husband had been
sent on a mission of the king the wife is to wait indefinitely. Unlike in LH
133, however, the woman is not punished with death if she goes to a sec-
ond husband before the five years are up. The husband merely has the right
to take her and her children upon his return. It should be noted that this
situation does not directly parallel LH 133 as in that case the husband had
left provisions whereas here he has not done so. The treatment of this topic
in MAL then makes it more difficult for the woman to leave her husband,
adding further conditions and specifying ways of supporting her. MAL A 45
deals specifically with the situation where the woman’s husband has been
taken as a prisoner of war. The law demands that she remain loyal to him
for two years if she has no provisions from sons or father-in-law. The
shorter period is probably due to the lesser likelihood of the husband’s re-
turn. Most of the law details the various means of support available to her
during the two years. If the husband returns after the two years he can take
back his wife, but not the children she has with her new husband. Despite
the different framing of these laws within MAL, the many similarities
amongst these three laws and the ability to hypothesize a unilinear devel-
opment from LE to LH to MAL makes this writer, though usually skeptical
of such claims, admit the possibility that the drafters of these laws took the
earlier editions into account or were at least conversant with legal reasoning
similar to that contained within them which was furthered in each case. It
remains possible that MAL did not build on LE and LH, but it would be
harder to claim the independence of LH 135–136 from LE 29–30.
2.6.3.2 Offences Involving Unmarried Women

This topic was far less popular than those dealing with married women,
reflecting the primary concern for the laws to protect the rights of the hus-
band and head of the household rather than a woman’s. The only laws rele-
vant are found in MAL A 55–56 and SLEx 7'–8'. MAL A 55 is lengthy in its
description of offence, conditions and subsequent penalties. Put simply it
prescribes that a man who rapes an unmarried virgin 579 living in her father’s
house will have his wife raped and not returned. It also states that the man
will have to pay triple the value of the maiden 580 and will have to marry her
579 Also said to be unbetrothed, further demonstrating the lack of a common

canonical problem regarding rape of a married woman in the case of MAL i.e. its
law parallel to LH 130, LU 6 and LE 26 does not treat a betrothed woman, but a
married one.
580 This writer is unsure what payment this refers to. See Driver and Miles, As-
COMPARISONS 169
if her father so desires. 581 The principle of talion seems to apply here and a
physical punishment, so common in MAL, is again in view. The punish-
ment is beneath that regarding the rape of a married woman, as death is not
in view. The law specifies that these stipulations stand no matter where or
when the offence took place; specifically mentioning the city and the coun-
tryside, the main thoroughfare, a granary, along with night time or festival
time. The mention of the first two locations may imply knowledge of their
import regarding the girl’s resistance as in Deuteronomy 22:23–27. Each of
the elements listed could be seen to imply some circumstance bearing on
the relative faults of the two parties. 582 The import is that these are not to
be taken into account here.
MAL A 56 treats the opposite circumstance, where the maiden has
given herself willingly. It is not the case then that A 55 is solely interested in
the woman’s junior status to absolve her of guilt. The mention of forcible
seizure is of great importance in that law. Perhaps it is the establishment of
that fact that makes time and location of no importance. In MAL A 56 the
man is to swear that he did not force himself upon the maiden. He merely
pays triple the value of the maiden while the father treats his daughter as he
sees fit. This offence is certainly seen in a more lenient light than adultery.
The only possible parallels to these two laws are SLEx 7'–8'. There is
some debate over the meaning of these laws. 583 In both laws it is stated that
the deflowering offence was committed in the streets. There is a description
of someone’s ignorance of something in 7' combined with a declaration of
some sort and someone’s knowledge of something in 8'. It is the signifi-
cance of these sections which are debated. Finkelstein 584 argues that what is
in view is the parents’ contributory negligence to what has occurred and
that the laws centre on whether the parents had assented to their daughter’s
presence on the street. For Finkelstein then, in 7' the parents are ignorant of
the fact that their daughter was on the street and she claims to have been
syrian Laws, 60–65 for discussion.

581 He has the right to refuse this and give her to someone else.
582 The city versus countryside location and its possible import for the girl’s
ability to resist; the main thoroughfare and the heightened likelihood of the man
mistaking the girl for a prostitute; the granary as a place two mutual lovers may hide
in to conceal their activities; the girl’s being out at night time implying some fault
on her part; perhaps the festival atmosphere of loosened morals or extra alcohol
consumption.
583 Roth versus Finkelstein.
584 Finkelstein, “Sex Offenses in Sumerian Laws,” Journal of the American Oriental
Society 86 (1966): 358, 362–366.

raped. Roth treats the ignorance in 7' as an inability to identify the culprit
who then turns himself in and asks to marry the girl. Both agree that the
ruling is that the girl may be given to the man as a wife. In 8' Finkelstein has
the parents cognizant of the fact their daughter was on the street and the
offender declaring ignorance of the woman’s status. 585 Roth sees 8' treating
a situation where the parents do identify the culprit but he disputes their
identification. Both see the law ending with the culprit swearing an oath to
back up his statement with no penalty or obligation in view. It is very diffi-
cult to decide between these two interpretations on a linguistic basis given
the murkiness of the text. 586 This writer dislikes Finkelstein’s interpretation
that the law would hinge on the contributory negligence of the parents. One
would think that their lack of knowledge of the girl’s whereabouts may im-
ply bad motives on her part rather than the offending male. The idea that as
7' specifies an obligation for the man to marry the woman while 8' does not
that he was at fault in the first instance though not in the second is not a
necessary one. 587 Given the extreme difficulties in translating these two
laws, one is hard pressed to argue with any certainty that they parallel any
other.
Interestingly the Hittite Laws have no provisions dealing with offences
involving unmarried women, unless that is the topic of HL 197. 588 Simple
fornication, however, was not seen as an offence as is demonstrated in HL
191 and 194 which allow a man to sleep with sisters in different locations if
he doesn’t know of their relationship or if they are slaves. HL 194 also al-
lows brothers to sleep with the same woman and father and son to sleep
with the same slave or prostitute. It is difficult to know if this contrasts to
the laws treated above as they specifically treat occasions of deflowering.
2.6.3.3 Offences Involving Slaves

LE 31 and LU 8 treat the same offence; the deflowering of someone else’s
slave-woman.
LE 31 If a man should deflower the slave woman of another man, he
shall weigh and deliver 20 shekels of silver, but the slave woman re-
mains the property of her master.
585 Perhaps implying he thought she was a prostitute.

586 There are numerous problems with both translations, from the inanimate
object b which each treats as animate to the dispute in line 47 of 7' over the inclu-
sion or exclusion of nam ad-ni u3 ama-e.
587 e.g. see the translation of Clay, Miscellaneous Inscriptions, 22.
588 See discussion above.
COMPARISONS 171
LU 8 If a man acts in violation of the rights of another and deflowers

the virgin slave woman of a man, he shall weigh and deliver 5 shekels of
silver.
The laws read very similarly but one could not argue that LE had
merely translated the law in LU due to the difference in description. The
penalty in LE 31 is four times that in LU 8, perhaps implying the drafter of
LU saw this as a lesser offence, perhaps a rise in the price of slaves. 589 LE
31 specifies that the slave remains the property of her master, only implied
in LU 8. 590 There is no discussion in LU 8, in contrast to LU 7, regarding
the initiation of the liaison. Given the slave’s standing as her master’s prop-
erty rather than as a legal person this may have been considered unimpor-
tant. Elsewhere, however, there is specification regarding the punishment of
slaves, and detailing of offences committed or legal claims made by them. 591
There is a good possibility that the drafter of LE 31 knew of LU 8.
The only other laws dealing with sex offences involving slaves come in
HL 194, 196 concerning unpermitted sexual pairings. These will be treated
below.
2.6.3.4 Incest and Bestiality

Laws detailing unpermitted sexual pairings are rare in the ancient Near East
when compared to those dealing with sexual offences involving married
women. HL stands apart from the others in its detailed list of these. 592 This
mirrors the comparatively heightened concern in these laws about (ritual)
purity. Of the other collections, LH 154–158 are the only laws to treat this
topic. LH 155 punishes with drowning a father sleeping with his son’s wife
after their marriage has been consummated and in LH 157 a son and
mother who sleep together after the father is dead are to be burned. 593 LH
155 mirrors the general punishment for adultery in LH, whereas the pun-
589 The price of slaves is 10 shekels of silver (implied) in LU 24; 15 in LL 13; 20

in LH 116.
590 Surely the offender is not able to acquire a female slave for 5 shekels let
alone such an amount including the penalty for the offence.
591 e.g. LH s, 205, 282; LU 25–26; LL 14; HL 31–34, 93, 95, 97, 99, 101, 105,
121, 132–133, 142–143, 170, 172–173, 196.

592 There is of course the Biblical material also.
593 The specific mention “after his father’s death” in this law and in LH 158 is
used to distinguish the severity of offences in the Hittite incest laws i.e. it is more
offensive for a son to sleep with his father’s wives while his father is still alive. LH
only deals with those offences after the father has died.
ishment in LH 157 treats the offence as more heinous or polluting. Interest-

ingly, a father sleeping with his daughter is only to be banished in LH 154.
A father sleeping with his son’s wife before the marriage is consummated
has only to give the woman 30 shekels of silver, and restore the property
she brought with her from her father’s house. This law perhaps lends
weight to our interpretation of LH 142–143 above as referring to a com-
pleted marriage rather than inchoate status given the lenient penalty here
for an adulterous liaison during the inchoate state. It is possible, however,
that the committing of the offence by the girl’s father-in-law, perhaps hav-
ing legal responsibility for her at the time, was seen as a mitigating circum-
stance. The lack of any penalty for the girl is strange unless rape is envis-
aged. A son sleeping with his father’s principal wife (not his mother) is dis-
inherited in LH 158.
The Hittite Laws concerning unpermitted sexual pairings are more de-
tailed and different in a number of respects. In contrast to LH 154, sleeping
with your daughter was possibly punished with death in HL 189. The Hit-
tite Laws dealing with sexual offences are all grouped together. The laws
treating bestiality state their penalties specifically. Apart from having rela-
tions with a horse or a mule, or being set upon by an ox or pig, bestiality is
said to be punished with death. The process leading to this is further speci-
fied with the offender being brought to the king’s court where the king can
either kill him or spare his life. In every case of bestiality, including those
devoid of the death penalty, the offender cannot approach the king so as
not to defile him. HL 200a specifies that he who had sex with a horse or
mule cannot become a priest and HL 199 that a substitionary sacrifice of a
sheep must take place for a man who was leapt upon by an ox (in sexual
excitement) and the ox shall die. The concern is with purity. The incest of-
fences, however, merely state whether the situation detailed is unpermitted,
h}urkel, 594 or is not an offence. It is unclear whether the process is the same
for these offences as for the bestiality offences (also described as h}urkel).
This seems a likely interpretation.
There are some parallels between the laws in HL and LH. The only
law which has the same penalty is that concerning incest between a son and
his mother in HL 189 and LH 157. Both demand the death penalty; LH
specifically requires burning. Within LH 157 there is the specification that
this offence occurs warki abišu, “after his father”, implying that his father is
dead at the time of the offence. This statement also occurs in LH 158 re-
594 For a discussion of this term see Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 224 and the
references there.
COMPARISONS 173
garding the offence of a son sleeping with his father’s principal wife in the
case she is not his mother. Within LH there is no mention of the corre-
sponding penalty for these offences if the father was alive. Within HL there
are also statements regarding the import of whether certain persons were
alive at the time of the offence. In every case the offence is seen to be
worse if the person mentioned is still alive. HL 190 for example states that
it is not an offence for a man to sleep with his stepmother unless his father
is still living. HL 192 allows a man to marry his wife’s sister if his wife is
dead. It is an offence in HL 195 for a man to sleep with his brother’s wife
while his brother is alive, whereas he is ordered to take her as a wife if his
brother dies in HL 193. It may be presumed from this, and from what one
would expect anyway in the case of these offences, that the drafter of LH
would also have seen the offences laid out in LH 157–158 as being worse if
the man’s father were still alive. If this was the case, perhaps they needed no
mention, the penalty being obvious.
It should be noted here that, despite the relatively few parallel laws be-
tween LH and HL, there are at least two distinctions in penalty. The lenient
treatment of incest between a man and his daughter in LH contrasted to its
status as h}urkel in HL was mentioned above. Another contrast may be
found between LH 158 and HL 190. HL 190 sees no offence if a man
sleeps with his stepmother after his father’s death, whereas LH 158 orders
disinheritance. There are some differences in these laws, with LH 158 speci-
fying that the stepmother was the principal wife of the man’s father and had
borne him children. This merely shows the lack of dependence between the
two collections regarding this topic. One should not try to reconstruct the
ancient Near Eastern law of incest by postulating one penalty for the spe-
cific situation in LH 158 and another for stepmothers in general from HL
190. From its framing, HL 190 would cover the situation in LH 158 also
and the penalties are thus distinct.
Common again to the Hittite Laws is the more frequent mention of
offences committed by slaves 595 as is the case in laws concerning murder,
damage and theft. As with those laws, the penalty for offences committed
by slaves is less than that for others. In HL 196, slaves who do h}urkel, are
merely separated and require the sacrifice of a sheep. Within the Hittite
Laws also is a reflection of a more general phenomenon whereby offences
involving slaves are treated less severely. For example in HL 194 a man can
sleep with slave women with the same mother whereas this is h}urkel if done
595 HL 196. None are mentioned in LH regarding sexual offences.

with free women in HL 191. 596 In the same law a father and son can sleep
with the same female slave, whereas from HL 191 and 195 it is to be ex-
pected that this would have been h}urkel if a free woman was involved.
One final note regarding the sex laws found in these collections is that
prostitution does not seem to be an offence. Certain laws seem to imply its
validity e.g. HL 194; MAL A 40, 49, 52; LL 27. LL 30 does, however, men-
tion judges banning a young married man from visiting a prostitute and
forbids his marriage to the prostitute if he divorces his wife after such an
order. The circumstances which would lead to the judges’ banning of such a
man’s visits are unclear in this law, especially when compared to LL 27
which specifies the support of a prostitute who bears the child of a married
man. This act does not seem to amount to adultery in the eyes of LL’s
drafter, nor that of HL or MAL. 597
2.6.4 False Accusation

There are laws covering this offence only in collections from Mesopota-
mia. 598 Those who postulate a common law in the ancient Near East see in
the provisions in the law collections dealing with false accusation the rule,
set out a number of times in LH, that the false accuser bears the penalty
that the accused would have suffered were he found guilty. 599 A number of
laws follow this rule. The most significant exception to the rule in LH con-
cerns the accusation of sexual infidelity against a woman which is treated
with less severity. We will assess whether this was a general trend across
collections. There seem to be several exceptions to both rules.
LH 1 provides the death penalty for a false accusation of homicide, 600
witchcraft, 601 theft 602 or any other capital offence. 603 LH 126 declares that a
man who claims compensation for lost property from a city-quarter shall
pay back 2-fold if it is found he did not lose any property. This law should
596 Unless he does not know of the relationship.

597 Compare Lev. 19:29; 21:9.
598 LH, LU, LL, MAL.
599 Specifically stated in LH 3, 4, 13.
600 LH 1
601 LH 2
602 LH 11 and probably 13 also. LH 13 only states that the false accuser shall be
assessed the penalty for the case but as the case deals with theft and is but a con-
tinuation of the topic from law 11 it seems safe to assume that the death penalty
was in view.
603 LH 3
COMPARISONS 175
be read in conjunction with LH 23. LH 23 states that a man who has had
his property stolen can claim it back from the city-quarter where the theft
occurred if the thief is not apprehended. The man who falsely claims to
have had his property stolen in LH 126 is then possibly returning the com-
pensation given him and paying the same amount again. This would
amount to keeping the principle that the false accuser bears the penalty of
the case.
The statement of this principle in LH 3 and 4 is repeated in LU 29 and
in LL 17. Though these collections are those which are seen to be the most
alike, there are enough differences in the formulation of this principle to
deny that one had been copied or translated from the other. 604 Hammurabi
states the principle three times in different contexts. In LH 3 he states that
false testimony involving a capital offence receives the death penalty, while
LH 4 states that such an act involving an offence with a pecuniary punish-
ment will lead to the false witness bearing the penalty of the case. LU also
has two laws covering false witness in general. LU 28 deals with a witness
who is demonstrated to be a perjurer. He is fined 15 shekels of silver. In LU
29 a witness who refuses to take the oath pays the penalty that would be
involved in the case. It is difficult to understand the difference between
these two laws. The difficulty is heightened in that in the first case the
judges seem to be more certain that the man was a false witness as he is said
to have been “demonstrated” as such. Another problem is that it would
seem a more serious offence to have taken the oath and still borne false
witness than to have baulked at the point of swearing an oath, yet it is the
second offence which may have borne a higher penalty. 605 Whatever the
case, an Akkadian translation of either law would be quite different to the
two in LH, though the principle is the same in LU 29 as that outlined in
LH. LU 28 seems an exception to the principle in that a straight out penalty
is given rather than an amount equal to the penalty of the case. LL 17 also
states the principle outlined in LH 3 and 4 though it speaks of someone
who accuses without grounds rather than a false witness per se. The law
states that the false accuser will “bear the penalty of the matter for which he
made accusation.” Again, the principle seems to be the same, though the
wording would not necessarily lead one to assume significant borrowing of
604 This is not necessarily to imply that the scribes or authors of these collec-
tions were not aware of their predecessor/s.
605 e.g. if the witness accused someone of the offences outlined in LU 1, 2, 6, 19,
20.
this law by LH nor from LU. Of course, some form of stimulus, association
or knowledge cannot be ruled out.
LU 13 could be used to argue that the principle was not upheld in this
collection. The law describes an accusation proved false by completion of
the River Ordeal by the accused. The accuser only seems to be fined 3
shekels as punishment. 606 Given that we are not sure of either the offence
that the undergoer was accused of, 607 nor that the penalty for false accusa-
tion in this law was only 3 shekels, it would be unwise to make too much of
this law. If the offence were sorcery 608 and the fine only 3 shekels for false
accusation this would be a severe reduction of the penalty outlined in LH 2
where the false accuser receives both the death penalty and forfeits his es-
tate to the accused.
The MAL do not overtly state the general principle as do the other
collections. It is difficult to decide whether the laws to do with unsubstanti-
ated accusation in MAL are based on the same principle as those in the
other collections. The laws in MAL possibly deal with the offence of mali-
cious slander rather than false accusation or testimony regarding a criminal
case. MAL N 1 and N 2 deal with accusations of blasphemy and pilfering
the temple. They are too broken to comment on in any detail. As we do not
know the MAL’s penalty for blasphemy or pilfering a temple it would be
difficult to decide if the penalty meted for false accusation of such an of-
fence was the same as that for committing it. MAL A 19 deals with an un-
substantiated accusation during a quarrel that another man is sodomized by
others. Though MAL A 20 deals with the offence of sodomizing others and
penalizes the perpetrator with castration and undergoing sodomy himself,
there is no indication that undergoing sodomy was an offence. It is even
possible that homosexual rape is the offence which is in view in MAL A 20.
Another hint that malicious slander is the offence is to be found in the pen-
alty given for the false accusation in MAL A 19. Apart from receiving 50
blows and doing the king’s service for a month and paying 3600 shekels of
lead, the man has his hair cut off. This seems designed to humiliate the of-
fender as he has humiliated the man he has slandered. A similar offence
606 But see Roth’s notes as to the uncertainty of the text at this point, Law Collec-
tions, 21–22, n. 12. The law is retained only in source A and the penalty only in
source B. There is some doubt as to the correlation of the penalty in source B with
the law outlined in source A i.e. the penalty may belong to another law.
607 See Roth again Law Collections 21–22, n. 12 contra Tikva Frymer-Kensky,
“The Judicial Ordeal in the Ancient Near East” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University; Ann
Arbor: University Microfilms, 1977), 138–44.
608 As Frymer-Kensky supposes, “Judicial Ordeal,” 138–44.
COMPARISONS 177
seems to be in view in MAL A 18 where a man who slanders another by

claiming that he can prove that his wife has sex with everyone receives the
same set of punishments minus 10 blows.
It was mentioned earlier that a general exception to the rule that a false
accuser bears the penalty of the case is found when dealing with accusations
of female infidelity. This is seen even in LH which has the most consistent
application of this rule in other cases. In LH 127, the penalty for unfounded
accusation against an ugbabtu or a man’s wife is flogging and the shaving off
of half the accuser’s hair. This seems very similar to the combination of
punishments found in MAL A 18 and 19, and again, seems to imply that the
offence is one of slander. 609 Perhaps the reasoning behind the law does fit
with the general principle that the accuser suffers the ill-effects of their ac-
cusation, but it is only the ill-effects upon the husband which are in view i.e.
the humiliation resultant from the slander. If the woman was found guilty
of adultery she may have been put to death at the husband’s discretion. 610 It
is certainly not the case here that the accuser bears the penalty of the case.
One wonders whether this was designed as a way to ensure a vehicle for
society to enforce the faithfulness of wives to their husbands. Given that
there were no laws governing the infidelity of the husband, this is possibly
the case. 611 LH 131 supports this possibility as there is no penalty for a man
who accuses his own wife of adultery without proof. The woman is merely
required to clear her name by an oath. The husband’s slander of his wife
does not receive any punishment. LL 33 seems to be similar in that a false
accusation that a man’s virgin daughter had fornicated only receives a pen-
alty of 10 shekels. It is difficult to assess the relative leniency of this pun-
ishment in relation to that for the offence of fornication by a man’s daugh-
ter as we do not possess any other laws dealing with sex offences in LL.
The situation is demonstrably different, however, in the Laws of Ur-
Nammu. LU 14 prescribes the payment of 20 shekels for a man who ac-
cuses another’s wife of adultery if she is cleared by the River Ordeal. This is
actually a harsher penalty than that in LU 28 for demonstrable perjury. One
wonders, given the relative infrequency of capital punishment in LU,
whether it is possible to tell whether this offence was seen to be against the
woman or the husband. It would be difficult to state that this law upheld a
609 One assumes that the offence these women are being accused of is of a sex-
ual nature. This assumption is supported by the subject matter of following laws.
610 LH 129 or 133b.
611 The only time a man would be punished for adultery would be when he had
slept with another man’s wife.

general rule that false accusations against women regarding sexual offences
were treated less harshly than other false accusations. If the law is compared
to LU 29 this may be seen as the case, but not when compared to LU 28.
MAL A 17 may destroy the idea that it was a general rule that false ac-
cusations against women were treated less severely than other accusations
i.e. less than the penalty of the case. There is an apparent contradiction be-
tween it and MAL A 18, however. MAL A 17 seems to prescribe that in the
case where a man tells another man that everyone has sex with his wife but
has no witnesses, both the man and the other man’s wife will undergo the
River Ordeal. 612 MAL A 18 seems to cover exactly the same offence 613 but
prescribes a different penalty. One wonders how to explain this apparent
contradiction. Does it reflect the nature of MAL and perhaps imply that it
was a collection of judge’s decisions which may have included contradictory
ones or does it reflect the Assyrian reluctance to speak of change in law and
thus the compiler has presented both the old and new laws next to each
other? If so, how could one tell which law was older? It may be tempting to
try and explain the apparent differences in these two laws as a result of their
place in the structure of the laws. A 17 comes at the end of a series of laws
regarding sexual offences whereas A 18 is followed by a law possibly deal-
ing with malicious slander rather than false accusation of a punishable
act. 614 Perhaps A 17 was conceived as demonstrating the principles behind
sexual offences while A 18 was seen as having a similar role for offences of
slander. The inclusion in A 18 of a punishment designed to humiliate, the
shaving of hair, supports this contention. Given that the structure of MAL
is so loose that a law regarding injury causing miscarriage is interpolated
amongst these laws dealing with sexual offences 615 we would be hesitant to
argue too forcefully from the structure of the collection. One last possibility
is that the difference is to be found in the terms used for the offended
party. In MAL A 17 it is merely another man, “a’ilu”, whereas in A 18 it is a
friend/comrade, “tappa’u”. LH fits the rules stated above but one should
612 The “they” undergoing the ordeal is not specified and could theoretically be
the man and the other man he slandered or even the other man and his wife. See
the contrast between this law and LH 132, which only requires the accused woman
to undergo the ordeal, above.
613 Though worded slightly differently e.g. A 17 mentions no witnesses whereas
A 18 mentions that the man claimed he could prove the charges but was unable to.
We see little reason to distinguish these offences.
614 MAL A 19 deals with the unfounded accusation that a man is sodomised by
others.
615 i.e. MAL A 21.
COMPARISONS 179
hesitate before claiming that such principles underscored ancient Near

Eastern law in general. Both principles are demonstrably contradicted in at
least one law and two key laws are too difficult to use to assess the existence
of these principles.
2.6.5 Sorcery
Both LH and MAL prescribe the death penalty for sorcery. 616 MAL A 47
does so specifically whereas it is only inferred in LH 2 from the fact that
someone who falsely accused someone of sorcery would be killed. 617 When
this is combined with the following law that a false accuser will bear the
death penalty if he accuses someone of a capital crime the implication is
clear that in LH sorcery was a capital offence.
It is less clear what the penalty is for sorcery in HL. A number of laws
in HL specify that sorcery is a case for the king, as does ETel. 618 For schol-
ars who see a common law in the ancient Near East this referral to the
king’s court has been seen to imply that it is a capital offence. Analogy is
made with LE 48. 619 This is not necessarily the case here, however. As was
mentioned earlier, at least two of the Hittite Laws mention cases for the
king which were possibly not capital cases. 620 It is difficult to decide
whether the offence of sorcery described in these laws was considered a
capital offence. If a common ancient Near Eastern law is assumed then it
would be expected that this was the case. There are several more Hittite
Laws which complicate matters.
In what is possibly the late version of 44b, PT XXXIV does not order
the case to the king’s court. This law may not be the most useful, however,
as there is no statement that this is a case of sorcery, only the broken men-
tion of the need to make something pure again and to compensate for loss.
HL 163 only prescribes compensation in the case where a man’s animals die
as a result of contact with mud used by his neighbor in some sort of ritual.
Again, there is no statement that this is considered sorcery. HL 170 is per-
616 LH 2 and MAL A 47 (kišpum).

617 The falsity of the accusation is seen to be demonstrated if the accused sur-
vived the divine River Ordeal.
618 HL 44b, 111, ETel. 50 (alwanzatar).
619 Westbrook, “Character,” 30 (at least for HL 111).
620 HL 102 which prescribes the king’s court for a man who has stolen 3 talents
of wood and 176a which prescribes the same for a case where a bull has been kept
outside a corral. For the latter law see our discussion of the famous “goring ox”
later.
haps more useful. A free man who speaks another’s name while/after kill-
ing a snake is only fined 40 shekels. A slave who does so is killed (his mas-
ter is let off). These last laws, HL 170 especially, may lead us to question the
generality of the death penalty for sorcery in the ancient Near East. This
conclusion is somewhat tentative, however, as the composer of HL himself
saw a difference between HL 170 and those which were cases for the king’s
court so we should be careful in our equation of these offences. Again, in
HL 170 the statement that the offence is “sorcery” is missing. The fact that
the Hittite Laws tend to pecuniary penalties may lend support to the possi-
bility that sorcery was not considered a capital case.
The fact that other collections do not mention the offence of sorcery
may not tell us anything about their attitudes to this offence. Its absence
may be due to the purpose of the collections in the case of the decrees etc.
or the lack of comprehensivity in other cases.
2.6.6 Murder
Three of our collections begin with laws regarding homicide. 621 There is
fervent debate over the similarity, or lack thereof, of the penalties for mur-
der in the ancient Near East. Some laws prescribe some sort of compensa-
tion (monetary or otherwise), 622 some prescribe death as the punishment, 623
and some state that both are a possibility. 624 In his attempt to force the laws
of the ancient Near East into a monolithic common law, Westbrook states
on numerous occasions that the penalty for murder across the ancient Near
East was at the discretion of the next of kin and could be either compensa-
tion or the death of the offender. 625 This is most difficult when it comes to
an honest interpretation of Numbers 35:31, but has its own difficulties
within the Near East itself. One could only come to this conclusion by vig-
orously holding onto the assumption that the laws must be the same.
Though there are certainly distinctions made depending on the nature of
the homicide (i.e. what in modern courts would be broken into degrees of
murder or manslaughter), contrary to Westbrook’s assertions it is possible
that fixed payments are not only given when there are mitigating circum-
stances or a lesser degree of intent. Upon a face value reading of the laws,
621 LH, HL and LU.

622 HL 1–2, 5, 43, 44a.
623 LH (as implied by the combination of LH 1 and 3) and LU 1.
624 MAL A 10, B 2 and ETel. 49.
625 e.g. Westbrook and Woodard, “Tudhaliya IV,” 654–55; Westbrook, Studies in
Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 39–71 or “Cuneiform Law,” 204.

COMPARISONS 181
different punishments are in view for the same offences and compensation
is not always an option for murder. Many have previously taken Westbrook
and others to task over this issue 626 but it is worth doing so again, this time
purely from the perspective of the Near Eastern material itself, outside the
purview of debates regarding the biblical law/s of murder.
Two laws which support Westbrook’s position are found in the Middle
Assyrian Laws. MAL A 10 is slightly broken but seems to state that some-
one who enters someone else’s house and kills someone will be given over
to the victim’s household who have the opportunity to either kill the perpe-
trator or demand property from them. There is further mention of the
situation that would arise if the victim’s household chose to accept com-
pensation but the offender was unable to pay. Unfortunately this section of
the law is unreadable. MAL B 2 is very similar. There are some slight differ-
ences in that there is no mention of anyone entering a house and the of-
fender is specifically a man who has not yet received his inheritance share.
The victim’s household or next-of-kin have the right to either kill the of-
fender or to take his inheritance share. The law regarding murder found in
the Edict of Telepinu 49 states the case in a similar manner. In this law, the
murderer is to be given over to the victim’s heir who has the right to either
kill them or demand compensation. 627
These are the only three laws which fit Westbrook’s assumed ancient
Near Eastern law of murder. The Hittite text Instructions to Commanders of
Border Garrisons 628 orders that the auriyaš išhaš} (Akk. bel madgalti-“commander
of the border post”) was to decide serious crimes according to the local
practice of the border town. 629 Murder is not specifically mentioned but one
would presume it would be covered under “serious crimes”. The two possi-
ble penalties discussed for such crimes, however, are not the two West-
brook assumes to be applicable across the ancient Near East. In the Instruc-
tions Arnuwanda states: “In a city in which they are accustomed to execute,
let them continue to execute. In a city, however, in which they are accus-
tomed to exile, let them continue to exile.”
The Hittite material from HL is different again. In HL 1, the case
where someone kills (kuenzi) a man or woman in a quarrel 630 is outlined.
626 e.g. Malul’s review.

627 The option of ransom payment by a murderer is also witnessed in ETud. IV,
col. ii, lines 3–8.
628 Translated by Gregory McMahon (COS 1.84: 221–25).
629 Ibid., p. 224, Section 35.
630 As with Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 17; Fiorella Imparati, Le Leggi Ittite
The offender is to bring the body for burial 631 and give 4 persons as substi-
tution. 632 HL 2 describes the same offence in the case where a slave is
killed. The penalty is described in the same manner though it is likely only 2
persons are brought as substitution. 633 HL 3 and 4 describe the penalty in
the same manner but halve the penalties of 1 and 2 respectively. HL 3 and 4
deal with some kind of separate lesser offence than 1 and 2. Whereas the
offender was said to kill (kuen-) in laws 1 and 2, in 3 and 4 they merely strike
(walh}-) the victim who dies as a result. These laws are usually interpreted to
(Rome: Dell’Ateneo, 1964), 35; Johannes Friedrich, Die hethitischen Gesetze (2nd ed.;
Documenta et Monumenta Orientis Antiqui 7; Leiden: Brill, 1971), 17; but contra
Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 1 who has “in anger” and Frederic Hrozný, Code Hittite prove-
nant l’Asie mineure (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1922), 3 who has “d’intention”. The latter
may give the intended significance of the law but is not a direct translation from the
Hittite.
631 The most generally accepted interpretation of the import of the verb arnuzi
in this context. See Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 166–67 and his discussion there.
The verb generally has the simple sense of “to bring”. So apun arnuzi would mean
“he will bring that one (i.e. the dead person)”. This would only make sense if it was
implied that the dead body was being brought for burial. However the verb can
also mean “to replace”. In that case apun arnuzi could mean “he will replace that
one”. Some, such as Friedrich have adopted this meaning and have thus seen the
following statement Ù 4 SAG.DU pa-a-i (“he will pay 4 persons”, lit. heads) as
merely describing how it was that the offender was to replace the dead man. Thus
Friedrich’s translation, “und (zwar ?) gibt er 4 Personen”, Die hethitischen Gesetze, 17.
Hoffner objects to this interpretation stating that such a description of the re-
placement would need to be asyndetic (i.e. have no intervening conjunction), Laws
of the Hittites, 167. If we accept Hoffner’s claim then we are still left with two op-
tions: 1) that the dead body is being brought for burial, or 2) that some other resti-
tutive action is first described, whether the replacement of the dead person with
one person or some other kind of understood payment or punishment, as well as
the payment of four persons in addition (so perhaps the payment of 5 persons in
total). The first option does seem most likely and is perhaps confirmed by HL 5
where the dead merchant is to be brought/replaced only if killed in Hatti (perhaps
distance was an issue for burial if it happened elsewhere). This writer is loathe to
challenge a pre-eminent Hittitologist such as Hoffner on the intricacies of Hittite
syntax.
632 It is not stated what sort of persons were to be brought, but the most likely
interpretation is that slaves were here in view.
633 The text is broken at this point but on analogy with other punishments re-
garding offences against slaves in HL one would expect the penalty to be half that
of the offence against a free person.
COMPARISONS 183
refer to accidental death. 634 This is due to the lesser penalty and also the
phrase “keššaršiš waštai”, “his/her hand sins” which follows the mention of
the victim’s death. 635 The later version (PT II) of these two laws changes
the penalty to a monetary payment of 4(?) 636 and 2 minas.
HL 5 describes the murder of a Hittite merchant. If our text is correct
at this point, this offence is treated in a very severe manner in comparison
to the offences in HL 1–4. The offender is to pay 100 minas (4000 shekels)
of silver, 637 and is to replace the merchant’s goods. 638 The late version of
this law (PT III) prescribes some payment which is not preserved and the
threefold replacement of the merchant’s goods. It also adds a law regarding
the killing of a merchant (who did not have goods with him) in a quarrel.
There is no replacement of persons as in HL 1–4, only the payment of 240
shekels of silver. This is still a very large payment when one compares it to
other laws in the ancient Near East. The distinction seems to be between
murder for the purpose of theft in contrast to killing in a quarrel. If the kill-
ing of such a merchant was only an accident, 639 the penalty is further re-
duced to 80 shekels. HL 6 prescribes the taking of 3 acres of land from the
634 Thus Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 170; Hrozny, 4–5.

635 Comparisons are often made with the law of accidental death in Exodus
21:13 which similarly refers to the perpetrator’s hand to describe the accidental
nature of the death. It should be kept in mind that the mention of the perpetrator’s
hand and the preceding strike in 21:12 are the only similarities between the laws.
The interpretation of Ex. 21:13 is made easier due to the addition of another agent
(i.e. God) in (the description of) the death of the victim. The accidental nature of
the strike in a similar situation in LH 207 is also much more obvious due to the
declaration of the perpetrator (see LH 206).
636 Again, this section is broken.
637 It is possible, though unlikely, as suggested by Friedrich, Die hethitischen Ge-
setze, 17, n. 7, that the Old Hittite scribe here made a mistake writing ME (100) for
the similar sign for ½ (MAŠ-mišlum). This would give us a fine of 60 shekels which
would be equivalent to the payment for a life in LH. As Hoffner points out, Laws of
the Hittites, 170–71, this seems unlikely given the fact this mistake would have to
have been either made again or perpetuated in text B also. The same would be ap-
plicable for any argument that the scribe confused his minas and shekels (i.e. wrote
100 minas for 100 shekels). Unfortunately the late version of this law is of little
help (PT III) as this section is broken. PT III does record penalties of 240 and 80
shekels for what seem to be lesser offences though which would lead us to expect a
higher penalty for this offence.
638 On the assumption that the murder was for the purpose of theft which was
promptly carried out.
639 Again, “if his/her hand sins”.
owner of a property in a foreign/another city in which a kinsman died. PT

IV is slightly different in the situations that it covers. Rather than the dead
body being found in another city, it is found on another person’s property.
The owner of the property is to give his property, house and 60 shekels of
silver if the dead person is male. He gives only 120 shekels if the dead per-
son is female. If the body is found in open country then the dead person’s
heir is to take either persons or payments 640 from any village within a cer-
tain radius.
There are several more laws in HL which deal with murder. In two of
them there is no penalty in view for the murders committed. HL 37 seems
to allow a man who elopes with a woman to kill up to 3 “supporters”
(šardiya-) who may come after them. 641 HL 38 also allows murder of a
šardiya- who is struck due to some kind of argument arising from a lawsuit.
The status of the šardiya- is not abundantly clear in these two laws. It seems
that the situations envisaged are seen as having been instigated by the
šardiya- who is thus not protected. 642
HL 43 has a different punishment again. The law seems to involve two
men crossing a river, one of whom was on an ox. The man on the ox is
pushed off and swept away by the current while the other man is carried to
safety by holding onto the ox’s tail. The punishment for the surviving man
is that he is taken as a servant by the dead man’s heirs. 643 HL 44a prescribes
640 The law does not specify what is to be taken. It states that the heir shall take
apušpat, “those aforementioned”. It is unclear whether the aforementioned are the
payments or the village(rs). Both readings present difficulties. It would be strange if
the heir was to take all the villagers of the nearest village. It is equally difficult to see
how the heir could take the same payments (Which one/s? Both? From whom?
etc.).
641 A strange law indeed. It is possible that the action of the supporters is
viewed as vigilante, and thus the negative results which ensue need no legal redress.
For discussion of the import of the this law and the final phrase “you have become
a wolf” see Jos Weitenberg, “The Meaning of the Expression ‘To Become a Wolf’
in Hittite,” in Perspectives on Indo-European Language, Culture and Religion: Studies in
Honor of Edgar C. Polomé (ed. Roger Pearson; vol. 1; Journal of Indo-European Stud-
ies Monograph 7; McLean, Va.; Institute for the Study of Man, 1991), 189–98.
642 Perhaps a modern parallel for HL 38 would be a lesser penalty for an en-
raged driver killing another driver who had exited his car to start a road rage brawl.
HL 37 seems to be aimed against vigilante behaviour.
643 The most likely reading of the law as per Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 188. It
is less likely that the man was pushed off in order for the other man to steal the ox.
COMPARISONS 185
that a man who makes a man fall into a fire and kills him will give a son (or
a young man) in return. 644
The material in HL regarding homicide clearly covers more than just
the simple case of a man striking a man in order to kill him. Within HL
there seems to be a consistent avoidance of the death penalty for murder of
any kind. 645 This is in contrast to both ETel. 49 and the Instructions to Com-
manders of Border Garrisons 35. It is possible that Westbrook is correct and
that the laws regarding homicide in HL treat offences of a lesser order than
that in ETel. 49. 646 Upon a first reading HL 1 does seem to cover willful
homicide in contrast to accidental in HL 3. It is possible, however, that the
setting in a brawl does lessen the gravity of the offence. 647 HL 44a also
seems to be an act of willful murder where capital punishment was not con-
sidered, though it is conceivable that this crime was perpetrated accidentally
or with less intention to kill than that in ETel. It is more difficult to deal
with the law regarding the offence of murdering a merchant in order to
steal his goods. This law carries a penalty far above the killing of a man in a
brawl (if the text is to be read as it stands), surely deals with willful murder,
yet does not mention capital punishment as a possibility. It does seem
strange to postulate inconsistencies regarding laws to do with murder within
the one society, but this seems to be the simplest reading of the Hittite ma-
terial. The laws within HL which deal with homicide all seem to penalize
the offence with either the handing over of persons or property or with a
fixed monetary payment. It seems impossible to construe this difference
regarding the treatment of homicide in Hittite Law as some sort of legal
development within Hatti over time given the Old Kingdom dating for the
original collection and the fact that the laws seem to have been updated in
some New Kingdom copies, especially PT. That the death penalty was con-
sidered by Telepinu, a king from the Old Kingdom (seen by some to be the
author of the reform of the law reflected in the karu . . . kinuna passages)
644 Note that there is some debate as to who is given. In comparing Hoffner’s
translation of this law in Roth Law Collections, 223, to that in his critical edition, 52,
it seems he has changed his mind. In Law Collections he translated the law as, “he
shall give one person in return”, perhaps treating DUMU.NITA as “young man”
rather than “son”. The reading “son” is far from definite but seems harsh enough
to suit the crime committed. It would be strange for the penalty in this law to be
less than that in HL 1 unless an accident was in view.
645 Unless HL 37–38 are to be read differently. See discussion above.
646 See Westbrook and Woodard, “Tudhaliya IV,” 655.
647 The parallel law LH 207 would seem to support this conclusion but its rele-
vance can only be assumed not demonstrated.

but not by HL for which we have both Old Kingdom and New Kingdom
copies is difficult to explain, especially if one assumes that HL reflects ac-
tual practice as reflected in its updating. It is possible, given the subject mat-
ter of the edict, that Telepinu was considering murder within the royal fam-
ily, a more heinous offence than simple murder as treated in HL. This is
certainly the case in ETel. 31–33 where the death penalty as an option is
clearly linked to murder within the royal household. This relative severity of
laws to do with the person of the king is paralleled elsewhere at Hatti. 648
Within laws on homicide from Hittite collections there are penalties includ-
ing capital punishment, ransom fixed by the heir of the deceased, 649 fixed
monetary payment, payment of persons (including a son or the offender
himself), payment of property and perhaps even exile.
Evidence of a more conclusive nature for our argument against West-
brook’s claimed common law for willful murder in the ancient Near East is
found in LU 1. The law states: “If a man commits a homicide, they shall kill
that man.” There is no mention of the possibility of compensation here. To
read this law as though compensation or ransom was a possibility is difficult
and unnecessary unless one is attempting to construct a unitary common
law for the entire ancient Near East. This is not the goal of this writer and
so the law will not be read this way.
Though LH does not contain a law directly parallel to that of LU 1,
when LH 1 and 3 are read together they do give us enough information to
decide what the law of homicide was for Hammurabi. LH 1 states that a
man who accuses another man of homicide without proof will be killed. LH
3 states that a man who gives false testimony in a case involving a capital
offence will be killed. By implication then, homicide was a capital offence.
Of course this does not automatically rule out the possibility of ransom or
compensation in the Old Babylonian period, but it may make us question
whether that was what Hammurabi intended. The penalties contained
within LH are generally quite harsh in comparison to other law collections
and in comparison to the documents from practice from Babylonia itself.
This leaves open the possibility that, as ransom is not mentioned for him
who falsely accused someone of murder, perhaps it was not an option for
someone guilty of murder for LH either. LH 210 would seem to support
648 e.g. “Instructions for Palace Personnel to Insure the King’s Purity,” trans. by
Albrecht Goetze (ANET, 207) where the death penalty is handed out to a servant
who failed to strain a hair from the king’s drinking water.
649 The practice of paying ransom or compensation is possibly also reflected in
ETud. See note 625 above.

COMPARISONS 187
this view. If a man strikes a pregnant woman and kills her he is to be killed.
The same is the case in LL e and MAL A 50. None of these mention com-
pensation as an option. Perhaps the lack of the option of compensation for
this offence could be due to its more heinous nature given the strike would
have resulted in the death of the unborn child also and given the more vul-
nerable nature of the victim. This solution would be false if these laws cov-
ered accidental blows to the pregnant women 650 but it should be remem-
bered that elsewhere within MAL there is mention of the possibility of
compensation or the death penalty in the case of murder. If it is not men-
tioned in MAL A 50 is it to be implied as a possibility from A 10 or is its
absence significant? This is a more general question also. When we come to
LU 1, do we read the possibility of compensation into it from analogy with
MAL A 10 and ETel. 49 or not? Given that there is fairly good internal evi-
dence not to read it into MAL A 50 651 one should be hesitant to read it into
LH 210 or LL e, and perhaps also LU 1. It is certainly impossible to read
the possibility of compensation into MAL A 53. The woman who aborts
her own child is to be impaled dead or alive. The extremely harsh nature of
this penalty hardly lends itself to an interpretation which would posit com-
pensation as a possibility. The same is the case with LH 153 which demands
that a woman who has her husband killed on account of another man will
also be impaled.
Across a number of collections there is mention of killing someone in
a brawl or a quarrel. HL 1–2 have been treated above. LH 207 deals with a
similar situation i.e. the striking of a man in a brawl which causes his death.
LH 207 specifically tells us that the death was not caused intentionally. The
offender swears “ina idû la amh}assu”, 652 “I did not strike him knowingly (lit.
in/with knowing I did not strike him)”. Perhaps this implies that the blow
was unintentional 653 (unlikely in a brawl). More likely is the possibility that
the blow was struck without the intention to kill. In any case, the offender
is to pay 30 shekels. In LH 208, for the same offence against a muškenum,
the offender is to pay 20 shekels. LE 47A describes a similar situation. In
contrast to LH we are not told that the offender struck the man and killed
him unintentionally but that, in the course of a brawl (ina risbatim as in LH
650 See the discussion at 2.6.7.2.

651 Again, see the discussion at 2.6.7.2. where it is argued that MAL in general
displays a higher regard for the life of the unborn child than elsewhere in the an-
cient Near East.
652 As in LH 206.
653 As is implied in Roth’s translation of the law, Law Collections, 122.
206–207), the offender caused the other man to die (uštamit). How does one
decide whether this offence was intentional or not? The offender is fined 40
shekels in LE, very similar to the amount in LH. Two other cases of negli-
gent homicide receive a 40 shekel penalty in LE (LE 54 and 56) and another
is said to be a capital case (napištum) which at Eshnunna was then a case for
the king to decide. This would seem to imply that the offence in LE 47A
was not willful murder or at the least was seen to have occurred in mitigat-
ing circumstances. HL 174 is very similar to the situation set out in LE.
There is no mention that the blow is unintentional, just that death resulted
from men hitting each other. The surviving party is to supply a replacement
person (literally “one head”), probably a slave. When one comes back to
HL 1–2 can we then safely interpret these laws as dealing with a form of
homicide of a lesser gravity than murder? This seems quite likely. The dif-
ferences between the laws regarding death resulting from a brawl are fairly
minimal between LE and LH, with both most likely dealing with an offence
less than murder which is penalized by payment of 30 or 40 shekels of sil-
ver. HL 1–2 seem to carry a heavier penalty involving the payment of per-
sons, 4-fold for the death of a free man, 2-fold for killing a slave. Does this
reflect a different attitude towards this offence at Hatti than elsewhere?
There is a possible development within Hittite law as PT has only monetary
payment and not substitution.
Death caused by negligence will be dealt with in section 2.6.7.3.
2.6.7 Personal Injury

Within the laws dealing with personal injury in the ancient Near Eastern law
collections, there are only a few which do not have a direct parallel in at
least one other collection. This is not to say they are all formulated the same
way or contain the same penalty. There is a large degree of overlap between
the laws on this topic contained within LH, LE, LU and HL. Within this
overlap there are some similarities between the arrangement of topics. The
relevant laws within MAL are quite different in their focus. LH stands out
as the only collection to prescribe talionic or vicarious punishment rather
than some form of pecuniary restitution for the offences in view. HL is the
only collection to discuss accidental injury specifically, though several col-
lections set the offence within a context which seems to imply reduced guilt
e.g. a brawl. Some of the more commonly recurring motifs will be treated
separately i.e. blows causing a miscarriage and the goring ox laws.
COMPARISONS 189
2.6.7.1 General
The topics common to the largest number of collections regard the knock-
ing out of a tooth and the breaking of a bone. There are seven laws across
four collections dealing with the offence of knocking out someone’s tooth.
Interestingly there are no two collections with either the same formulation
or a matching penalty. For the knocking out of a free man’s tooth by a free
man LH 200 prescribes the knocking out of the offender’s tooth; LE 42,
the payment of 30 shekels of silver; LU 22, 2 shekels; HL 7 records that the
penalty used to be 40 shekels but is now 20 whereas the updated PT VII
takes it down even further to 12 shekels with the condition that at least 2
teeth have been knocked out. It is thus difficult to argue that the penalties
were borrowed, especially given that within the Hittite collection, none of
the three options mentioned match up with the penalty of any other collec-
tion. LU 22 stands out as being a particularly low penalty when compared
to the rest, far lower even than PT VII. LH stands out due to its talionic
punishment in contrast to the pecuniary measures of the others. Regarding
the knocking out of a slave’s tooth by a free man: LH 201 prescribes 20
shekels, HL 8, 10 and PT VII, 6. Again, none are the same.
There are paragraphs detailing offences involving the breaking of
bones in the same four collections. There is greater divergence in the de-
scription of the offence in this case. LH 197 states simply that the offence
of breaking (šeberum) the bone of a free man is punished by breaking (the
same?) bone of the offender. LH 198 details the penalty for the same of-
fence against a muškenum (very high at 60 shekels), and LH 199 against a
slave (half the slave’s value). LE 44–46 outline different offences which re-
sult in the breaking of different bones, each with their own penalty. All
three use the same verb (šeberum) to describe the breaking of the bone. LE
44 puts this in the context of a man knocking down the other man in the
street so that his hand is broken (30 shekels). LE 45 seems to continue this
same situation, but treats the offence if a foot is broken as a result (again 30
shekels). LE 46, however, deals with a case where the offender has struck
(imhaṣma) the other man and broken his collar-bone (20 shekels). It may be
that LE records specific details (which are unnecessary) due to the origin of
these laws from actual legal cases. LH, due to its talionic principles, may
have been able to wipe out the unnecessary details and put forth a much
simpler law. The process, if there was one, does not always work like this.
LE 42 covers offences resulting in the biting off of a nose, the blinding of
an eye, the knocking out of a tooth, taking an ear, and slapping a cheek
much more economically than the treatment of these offences elsewhere
(including in LH). 654 LU 19 also records some detail about the offence lead-
ing up to the breaking of some specific kind of bone. The offence involves
a club and thus the shattering of the bone seems to be in view. 655 There is
quite a high penalty here of 60 shekels (the same as the bone breaking of-
fence against a muškenum in LH 198). Given the extremely low penalty
within LU for the knocking out of a tooth and the fact that a club is men-
tioned, perhaps someone’s head is the presumed object of the offence. This
would make sense of the relatively high penalty. Similar to LE 44–45, HL
11 specifies that the offence regards the breaking of an arm or leg 656 (20
shekels if that of a free man). PT X further specifies that permanent dis-
ablement 657 requires the payment of 20 shekels, otherwise 10 shekels is suf-
ficient. HL 12 deals with the same offence against a slave (10 shekels).
Again PT XI halves the penalty if permanent disablement does not result.
There are a number of minor similarities between these laws but many
differences. There are only two laws which arguably share the same penalty
for the same offence, LH 198 and LU 19. LH 198 is specifically an offence
against a muškenum whereas LU 19 is not. Given the fact that the penalty of
LU 19 is 6 times that for the offence of cutting off someone’s foot in LU
18, it seems most likely that a particularly important bone must be in view
in LU 19. The bone is not specified in LH 198. The only other similarity is
found in the specification regarding the hand and feet in LE 44–45 and the
laws from HL. This is hardly surprising, these being the bones most often
broken to the present day. It would seem that each law is again formulated
differently with differing penalties (whether in amount or type i.e. LH’s tal-
ion again).
Regarding the offence of blinding someone, LH 196 of course penal-
izes the offender by talion, again with lesser monetary payments if the of-
fence is against a muškenum or a slave (LH 198- 60 shekels and LH 199- ½
his value respectively). LE 42 penalizes the offence against a free man with
60 shekels. HL 7 states that 40 shekels used to be paid for such an offence
but now only 20 is required. PT V states that if the offence is committed in
a quarrel 40 will be paid, if it is an accident, only 20. HL 8 prescribes the
payment of 10 shekels if the offence is against a slave. PT VI states that if
654 Nowhere else are all these offences treated in the same law. But do compare
HL 7–8 which combine blinding the eye and knocking out the tooth.
655 As indicated by Roth’s translation, Law Collections, 19.
656 Or “hand or foot”. See Hoffner’s note, Laws of the Hittites, 25, n. 33.
657 Perhaps. Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 25, expresses some doubt as to the im-
port of the phrase.

COMPARISONS 191
the offence is committed in a quarrel 20 will be paid, if it is an accident,

only 10. Note that the Hittite Laws originally combined this offence with
that of knocking out a tooth, each receiving the same penalty. In PT the
two offences are separated and receive very different penalties i.e. 12 shekels
for knocking out teeth of a free man, 40 for blinding him in PT in contrast
to 20 shekels for either offence in HL. The increase in the severity of the
penalty for the offence of blinding in PT mirrors its treatment as a more
serious offence than the knocking out of a tooth in LH and LE. 658 Again
we have differences of penalty and framing with these laws.
The biting or cutting off of a nose was also a law common to three
collections. LE 42 prescribed the payment of 60 shekels for biting it off, LU
20 40 shekels for cutting it off. HL 13 has the same as LU 20 for biting off
a nose. Strangely the updated version in PT XII increases the penalty to
1200 shekels! The offence against a slave is only mentioned in HL 14 (3
shekels) and its updated PT XIII (600 shekels). It has been conjectured that
the extremely high penalties in PT may be due to mistaken writings of mina
for shekel. 659 This would reduce the fines to 30 and 15 shekels respec-
tively. 660 Goetze has even suggested emending HL 14 to read 30 shekels
instead of 3 in order to see the penalty reduced in both cases. We think it
somewhat precarious to make conclusions about the Hittite attitude to such
an offence given the uncertainties about the text. It is interesting that the
penalty in HL 13 matches with LE 42 and that both specifically mention
biting the nose.
Damage to the ear of a free man receives a 30 shekel penalty in LE 42.
It is possible that LU 21 covers this offence but neither the object cut off
nor the amount of the penalty are preserved. Tearing off the ear of a free
person receives a 12 shekel penalty in HL 15 and PT XIV. The same of-
fence committed against a slave receives 3 shekels in HL 16, 6 in PT XV.
There are no similarities here between LE and HL bar the offence being
treated. Even then LE does not specify what has happened to the ear which
is merely listed as one of a number of objects which may be damaged in
658 LH 198, 60 shekels for the eye of a muškenum in contrast to LH 201, 20

shekels for the tooth of such a man. LE 42 prescribes 30 shekels for a tooth and 60
for an eye. It is worth mentioning here also the extremely low value put on the
tooth in LU 19, 2 shekels.
659 See discussion of Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 178 and his reference to
Goetze’s translation (ANET, 189).
660 Similar to the problem with the Hittite Laws regarding the murder of mer-
chants. See section 2.6.6.

some way within LE 42 whereas HL specifically mentions that it has been

torn off and treats the offence in a separate law.
There are several laws relevant here that are treated in only one collec-
tion. LU 18 has a 10 shekel fine for cutting of a man’s foot, LE 43 a 20
shekel penalty for cutting off someone’s finger and HL 9 a 3 shekel fine
(down from 6 when the palace used to take their share) for injuring some-
one’s head which is upheld in PT VIII.
HL 10 specifies that injury causing temporary incapacitation requires
the offender to provide medical care to the victim, a person to work in their
stead until they recover, the payment of 6 shekels of silver upon recovery
and the physician’s fees also. PT IX changes this law slightly. Rather than
the mention of incapacitation it specifies that the injury was to the free
man’s head (as in PT VIII). Again medical care and a substitute worker are
to be provided. Upon recovery the fee paid to the victim is to be 10 shekels
and the physician’s fee is specified as 3 shekels. There is also a statement
that “If it is a slave, he shall pay 2 shekels of silver”. Is this the only pun-
ishment, a lesser physician’s fee or a lesser fee upon recovery? It is difficult
to tell. LH 206 bears some relation to these Hittite Laws. It specifies that a
man who struck another man in a brawl and injured him unintentionally
shall pay the physician’s fees. The Hittite laws do not specify any lack of
intent on behalf of the offender. LE 47 is similar to LH 206 in that the set-
ting is in a brawl, 661 but the penalty for injuries caused in such a situation is
10 shekels.
Cheek slapping is treated briefly in LE 42 and more fully in LH 202–
205. LE 42 merely lists a slap to the cheek amongst its other offences and
prescribes a penalty of 10 shekels. LH distinguishes the cheek slapping of-
fence in the following ways: 202, an awilum who strikes the cheek of an
awilum of superior status receives 60 stripes in a public flogging; 203, an
awilum who strikes the cheek of an awilum of equal status pays 60 shekels;
204, a muškenum who strikes the cheek of another muškenum pays 10 shekels;
205, a slave who strikes the cheek of an awilum has his ear cut off. There is
consistency within LH that the striking of the cheek of a superior receives a
corporal punishment of some sort. That consistency applies to another law
regarding the striking of a superior in LH 195 also. Again we have a case
where the penalty for an offence by a muškenum is the same as the penalty in
LE. For a discussion of the import of the laws in LH see Roth’s enlighten-
661 Though a different term for brawl (šigištum) is used in LE 47 to that in LE

47A and LH 206 (risbatum). See Yaron’s comments on the uncertainty of the former
term’s restoration and import in LE 47, Laws of Eshnunna, 71.
COMPARISONS 193
ing analysis which suggests that, contrary to LE, the offence is treated as
insult rather than injury. 662
There are several laws from different collections which treat a blow of
some kind from a person of lower status upon someone their superior. LH
195 states that a child who struck his father will have his hand cut off. LU
26 mentions a slave striking her mistress but the penalty is broken away.
MAL A 8 prescribes that a woman who crushes a man’s testicle in a quarrel
will have a finger cut off. If she somehow damages 663 both testicles it seems
her eyes were to be gouged out. 664 In MAL A 7, a woman who lays a hand
upon a man is fined 1800 shekels of lead and is given 20 blows. The obvi-
ous similarity between the extant laws in LH and MAL on this topic is the
involvement of some kind of corporal punishment for this type of offence.
It may be, however, that the authors themselves would not have seen these
offences as being similar. This author does not think it is necessarily this
aspect of the offence which leads to corporal punishment in MAL. 665 Given
the preponderance of corporal punishments within LH, MAL and the
Egyptian collections when compared to others, perhaps we should look to
another explanation. One should certainly not feign the confidence to read
a corporal punishment into LU.
The MAL in general have a different focus than the other collections.
Most of the laws from this collection dealing with personal injury deal with
male/female relations. This has been seen in the two laws above. MAL A 9
then treats the case of a man attacking a woman “like a rutting bull”. He
also has one finger cut off, demonstrating that the corporal punishment was
not given out due to the nature of the previous offences in MAL A 7–8
being committed by an inferior against a superior i.e. woman against a man.
If the man forces the woman to kiss him, his lower lip is to be cut off. The
Middle Assyrian Laws seem to have a series of paragraphs (A 57–59) deal-
ing with abuse allowable from a husband to his wife. MAL A 59 is the only
one fairly well preserved. It allows the husband to whip his wife, pluck out
her hair, mutilate her ears or strike her without fear of punishment as well
662 Roth, “Mesopotamian Legal Traditions,” 24–36 contra Yaron, “Early Meso-
potamian Collections.”
663 Either in the quarrel or from subsequent infection.
664 The object of the verb is broken and could be either eyes or breasts. See
Roth, Law Collections, 193, n. 10.
665 Especially given MAL A 9 where a man who attacks a woman also receives
corporal punishment.
as meting out other punishments written on the tablet. 666 A similar law (A
44), not dealing with women specifically this time, but any Assyrian person
being held as a pledge, also allows the creditor to whip, pluck out the hair of
or mutilate the ears of the pledge if they are worth less than the value of the
loan. It seems that none of the laws from MAL have any parallels elsewhere
in the other collections under discussion here. 667
The laws regarding personal injury can thus be displayed in the table
on the following pages: 668
666 It is unclear what tablet is referred to here. Driver and Miles, Assyrian Laws,
292, assume that it refers to the tablet of the laws.
667 MAL A 8 of course exhibits parallels to Deut. 25:11–12.
668 Due to a lack of parallels, those in MAL have been left out.
COMPARISONS 195
Offence LH LE HL
Blinding:
Awilum Blinding 60 shekels 40 shekels (karu)
20 shekels (kinuna)
Muškenum 60 shekels n/a n/a
Slave ½ slave’s value n/a 10 shekels
Breaking bone:
Awilum Break bone 30 shekels 20 shekels (arm/leg)
(hand or foot)
20 shekels
(collarbone)
Slave ½ slave’s value n/a 10 shekels (arm/leg)
Knocking tooth:
Awilum Knock tooth 30 shekels 40 shekels (karu)
20 shekels (kinuna)
Slave n/a n/a 10 shekels
Cheek slap:
Awilum>superior 60 stripes n/a n/a
Awilum> Awilum 60 shekels 10 shekels n/a
Muškenum>Muškenum 10 shekels n/a n/a
Slave>Slave Cut off ear n/a n/a
Nose:
Awilum n/a 60 shekels 40 shekels
Ear:
Awilum n/a 30 shekels 12 shekels
Finger n/a 20 shekels n/a
Foot n/a n/a n/a
Head n/a n/a 6 shekels (karu)
3 shekels (kinuna)
Incapacitating injury:
Awilum Pay physician’s n/a medical care
fees (accidental) person to work
phys. fee
6 shekels
Slave n/a n/a n/a
PT LU Offence
Blinding:
40 shekels n/a Awilum
20 shekels (accidental)
n/a n/a Muškenum
20 shekels n/a Slave
10 shekels (accidental)
Breaking bone:
20 shekels (arm/leg-permanently 60 shekels (shatters x bone) Awilum
disabled)
10 shekels (otherwise)
n/a n/a Muškenum
10 shekels (arm/leg-permanently n/a Slave
disabled)
5 shekels (otherwise)
Knocking tooth:
12 shekels 2 shekels Awilum
n/a n/a Muškenum
6 shekels n/a Slave
Cheek slap:
n/a n/a Awilum>superior
n/a n/a Awilum> Awilum
n/a n/a Muškenum>Muškenum
n/a n/a Slave>Slave
Nose:
30 mina 669 (mistake for shekels?) 40 shekels Awilum
15 mina (mistake for shekels?) n/a Slave
Ear:
12 shekels unknown Awilum
6 shekels n/a Slave
n/a n/a Finger
n/a 10 shekels Foot
3 shekels n/a Head
Incapacitating injury:
medical care n/a Awilum
person to work
3 shkl phys. fee
6 shekels
2 shekels n/a Slave
Note that there are 40 shekels to a Hittite mina. 30 mina is then equivalent
669
to 1200 shekels.
COMPARISONS 197
Our comparison of the penalties found that they were the same on
only three occasions. Even then, 2 of those included cases where the pen-
alty in LE matched that in LH for an offence against a muškenum. This is
not surprising and implies little about borrowing. What appears more simi-
lar are the topics chosen for treatment within LH, LE, HL and to a lesser
extent LU. Even there, however, one would be hard pressed to see a consis-
tent pattern of borrowing. Though in each case, the laws of personal injury
are grouped together, it is extremely hard to find a common order to the
offences. The order of topics in the collections is as follows:
LU 18-foot, 19-shatter x bone, 20-cut off nose, 21-cut off x (ear?)
LH 196, 198–99-blinding, 197, 198–99-break bone, 200–201-knock
tooth, 206-incapacitate
LE 42-nose, eye, tooth, ear, cheek slap, 43-finger, 44-break arm, 45-
leg, 46-collarbone
HL 7–8-eye and tooth, 9-head, 10-incapacitate, 11–12-arm/leg, 13–14-
nose, 15–16-ear
PT V–VI-eye, VII-tooth, VIII-head, IX-incapacitate, X–XI-arm/leg,
XII–XIII-nose, XIV–XV-ear
As one can see, there are some minor similarities which would not in-
cline one to think any collection mirrored the ordering of any other (except
of course that of PT and HL for obvious reasons). 670 The similarity in top-
ics covered may just be a reflection of the limited number of body parts
which could be injured with those most likely to be injured appearing most
frequently. Apart from the difference in order there is also a difference in
which topics are combined into the one paragraph. LH combines blinding
and breaking bones, LE 42 combines many different body parts, HL com-
bines blinding and knocking teeth while PT and LU do not combine any-
thing. Again there seems to be no argument for borrowing here either. The
attempt to argue that certain topics were treated as a result of a common
international legal science or literary borrowing seems forced for this topic.
Given the lack of parallels in any other area of these laws, all that one could
argue was shared was a common interest in which particular body parts
should be discussed. Even there one can clearly see that this was by no
means uniform, nor could one argue for a consistent borrowing pattern
between any of these collections. 671 It is true that in both LH and HL the
miscarriage laws follow on from the laws about personal injury. Given the
lack of any other common ordering between the two collections this seems
670 Note that even here, where borrowing is certain, the ordering is not exact.
671 Again, the obvious exception is PT and HL.
insignificant, especially as the topic fits well amongst laws of personal in-
jury. Within MAL, the miscarriage laws are not found near those dealing
with personal injury. HL shares much subject matter with the lower Meso-
potamian codes, especially LH and LE. This does not necessarily imply bor-
rowing.
2.6.7.2 Miscarriage and Abortion

Laws dealing with miscarriage or premature birth are found across most of
the civilizations for which we have law collections in this period. 672 This
fact has often been seen as suggestive that there was widespread borrowing
of this legal problem throughout the region. Many trace this borrowing into
the biblical law in Exodus 21:22, some as far as the classical period. 673 While
this writer would not rule out the possibility of such widespread borrowing
of what may have been a popular literary/legal trope, one should be hesi-
tant as to what conclusions are drawn from such a possibility. As Tigay has
shown, literary borrowing does not necessarily imply that there has been
little change made to the material borrowed. 674 If indeed there was borrow-
ing in this case, it certainly cannot be taken to imply a similar attitude to-
wards the offence of causing a miscarriage across all these civilizations.
We will deal with these laws in separate sections. The most common
topic deals with the striking of a free woman with some resultant effect on
the unborn child. 675 The penalties for such an offence range from 5–30
shekels of silver in the collections other than MAL. In MAL the punish-
ments range from 7200 shekels of lead to 9000 shekels and 50 blows with a
month’s service for the king to the death penalty. The first two monetary
payments in MAL are possibly not too far removed from the 30 shekel
payment demanded in LL. It is difficult to assess the relative weight of these
punishments given that our evidence for the exchange rates of goods does
not allow us to be very precise. However, there is some material which en-
ables a rough estimate. LE 1 states that one shekel of silver was equivalent
672 LH 209–214, LL d–f (if accepted as part of LL), SLEx 1'–2', MAL A 21, 50–
53, HL 17–18, PT XVI–XVII.
673 Westbrook, “Adultery,” 548. Implied in the title of Haase, “De fetu abito
sive. Ne se immisceat mulier praegnans rixae inter viros. Vom ungewolten Abgang
der Leibesfrucht im altorientalischen und biblischen Bereich,” Zeitschrift für
altorientalische und biblische Rechtsgeschichte 7 (2001): 384–91.
674 Tigay, “On Evaluating,” with examples of Gilgamesh material from outlying
areas.
675 LH 209, LL d, SLEx 1'–2', MAL A 21, A 50–52, HL 17, PT XVI.
COMPARISONS 199
to 180 shekels of copper. It is generally accepted that lead 676 was worth less
than copper. 677 This then would leave us with fines with silver equivalences
of less than 40 and 50 shekels respectively, perhaps as low as the 30 shekel
fine of LL, though it should be remembered that blows and service are ad-
ditional to this fine. The death penalty does stand out from the others and
can possibly be related to a higher view of the value of the unborn child in
MAL.
There is some difficulty deciding upon the offence committed and its
results in the various laws. For example, there is some debate as to whether
LH 209–214 should be connected to the preceding laws 206–208 which
deal with unintentional injury caused when two men are fighting. Should we
interpret the laws regarding the striking of a pregnant woman as a continua-
tion of laws dealing with an offence in this situation or let them stand more
independently within the broader framework of personal injury laws begin-
ning at LH 195? 678 If we do decide on the latter, does that necessarily imply
that the strike by the man was intentional? 679 In the other collections there
is no indication at all that this offence occurred in the context of a brawl. In
HL for example, the mention of personal injury resultant in a brawl comes
some fifteen laws previous to those regarding the offence of causing a mis-
carriage. In others the former law is not present at all. 680 The hypothesis of
such a context for LH 209–214 may have been proposed on the basis of
assumed similarity with the law of Exodus 21:22.
676 The most likely interpretation of annuku in these laws. See Roth, Law Collec-
tions, 192, n. 8 and references. In contrast see Daniel C. Snell, “Methods of Ex-
change and Coinage in Ancient Western Asia,” in Civilizations of the Ancient Near
East (ed. Jack M. Sasson; vol. 3; New York: Hendrickson, 1995), 1493 and James
David Muhly, Copper and Tin: The Distribution of Mineral Resources and the Nature of the
Metals Trade in the Bronze Age (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1976), 241–47; repr. from
The Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences 43 (1973): 155–535 and
46 (1976): 77–136, who translate the word as “tin”. The latter interpretation would
amount to an enormous fine equivalent to somewhere between 225 and 900 shek-
els of silver according to Christopher M. Monroe’s exchange rates, “Money and
Trade,” in A Companion to the Ancient Near East (ed. Daniel C. Snell; Blackwell
Companions to the Ancient World; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2005), 161.
677 See Monroe “Money and Trade,” 160.
678 See the discussion of Haase “De fetu abito,” 385–388.
679 See Ibid., 387, n. 13 quoting B. Jacob, “who would purposely have struck a
pregnant woman?”
680 Unless one wished to see MAL A 8 as an example. This law bears only a
vague similarity dealing with a woman crushing a man’s testicle in a quarrel.

A question is raised by the laws contained in SLEx 1'–2' as to whether

the same offence has been committed across all collections. In SLEx 1' a
man who jostles (zag an-us2) the daughter of a man (dumu-munus lú) and
causes her to miscarry/give birth prematurely (nig-ša3-ga-ni a im-šub-šub) 681 is
fined 10 shekels of silver. In SLEx 2' a man who strikes (ba-an-sig3) such a
woman and causes the same results is fined 20 shekels of silver. This has led
commentators to wonder whether the first offence implies an accidental
injury whereas the second is intentional. 682 This seems the most likely con-
clusion. There is difficulty in interpreting the effects of the blows on the
woman and her unborn child also. It is unclear whether miscarriage or
merely premature birth is described. 683 In LL d another verb is used to refer
to the blow struck by the male offender (i-ni-in-ra) and a different expres-
sion used for the resultant effects on the woman (nig-ša3-ga-na šu mu-un-da-an-
la2). This makes it difficult to compare the slightly higher fine of 30 shekels
of silver. Perhaps a miscarriage is here envisaged whereas the slightly lower
fines for SLEx result from the lesser offences of unintentionally or inten-
tionally striking and causing premature birth. It is interesting that in our
three Sumerian laws regarding this topic we have three different verbs to
describe the offending blow by the man and two different verbs to describe
the resulting effects on the woman and her child. This does not seem to
support the idea that this law was passed on verbatim across the law collec-
tions of the ancient Near East.
The material in LH and HL is similarly unclear regarding the resulting
effects on the woman and her unborn child. LH describes a man who
struck (imh}aṣma) the daughter of a man (marat awilim) and caused her to mis-
carry/give birth prematurely (ša libbiša uštaddiši lit. he caused her to throw
that of her insides/womb/middle). By analogy with SLEx 1'–2' we would
expect this offence to be intentional. It is possible of course that the con-
text of these laws following LH 206–208 implies otherwise. The penalty
imposed in LH 209 is only 10 shekels. This is equivalent to the jostling of-
fence of SLEx 1' and far less than the striking of SLEx 2' and LL d. Though
it is possible to see the 10 shekel fine as matching an unintentional blow
resulting only in a premature birth, this is not necessarily the case. LH 209
may well describe an intentional blow resulting in miscarriage. If this were
681 The import of the law here is unclear. See Roth’s comment: “The Sumerian
expression seems to refer to premature rupture of the amniotic membrane.” Law
Collections, 45, n.1.
682 See Haase, “De fetu abito,” 384–85, esp. notes 3–4.
683 See note 681 above.
COMPARISONS 201
the case it could imply a lesser view of the value of the unborn child in LH
than the Sumerian material.
The term used in HL 17 is similarly ambivalent. The law possibly pre-
scribes that a man who causes a woman to miscarry (šarhuwanduššuš . . . pešši-
yazi lit. shoves/fells her unborn children/her insides) will pay 10 shekels if
she is in the 10th month of her pregnancy and 5 shekels if she is in the 5th. 684
The later versions of the law dispense with the provisions regarding the
gestation period of the pregnancy and double the fine to 20 shekels. 685 The
section of HL 17 regarding the 10 month gestation period and the payment
of 10 shekels is broken but readable. This aspect of the provision would
lead us to the conclusion that the offence in view resulted in a miscarriage.
It would make no sense for there to be a higher payment closer to full ges-
tation if premature birth were in view. The chances of the child’s survival in
the case of premature birth would be near impossible in the 5th month
whereas it would be much more likely in the final month of gestation. 686
There is some other external evidence regarding the terminology used
which supports the idea that a miscarriage is in view. 687
It is difficult again to decide whether the offence considered is inten-
tional or accidental. There is no setting in a brawl, not even the mention of
a separate blow which causes the resulting miscarriage as we have had in the
other comparable laws. There is only one verb used to describe the offence
in HL, i.e. peššiyazi. It is generally assumed that the miscarriage which re-
sulted was caused unintentionally and was the side-effect of an assault on
the woman. 688 Whether the assault was intentional or not is unclear. Given
the absence of any detail in the law mentioning an assault on the woman,
the first assumption may not even hold and we may have here a law con-
cerning willful abortion with a male assistant. This latter possibility is con-
sidered less likely by the present author as it is only the person who causes
the woman to miscarry who is punished, not both of them. 689 The lack of
684 KBo VI 3.
685 PT (KBo VI 4) and KBo 6.5 (seen as having the latest orthography and writ-
ing of all copies of the laws by Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 161, n. 378).
686 For discussion regarding the Hittite reckoning of a pregnancy at 10 months
see Hoffner Laws of the Hittites, 179 and references and Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 137–8.
687 See Hoffner Laws of the Hittites, 179 and the examples cited of the verb
meaning “to fell a deer” i.e. to kill a deer.
688 e.g. Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 137.
689 This suspicion is supported by the comparative material in other ancient
Near Eastern law collections which do not envisage such a situation. The one law
regarding abortion does not mention any third-party assistant, only the woman
mention of any blow to the woman is interesting as most law collections

dealing with this topic also have a law concerning the results of the assault
on the woman herself. 690
The rulings regarding this topic in MAL seem confusing. To begin
with, one of the laws regarding this offence is to be found 29 laws away
from the others. MAL A 21 prescribes the penalty of 9000 shekels of lead,
50 blows and one month’s performance of the king’s service for a man who
struck (imh}aṣma) the daughter of a man (marat a’ile) and caused her to mis-
carry/give birth prematurely (ša libbiša ušaṣliši lit. he caused her to throw/lay
down/fell(?) that of her insides/womb/middle). That the verb here implies
a miscarriage can be safely inferred from the extremely harsh penalty given
in MAL A 53 where the same verb is used for a woman who aborts her
own child. The wording of MAL A 21 is very similar to that of LH 209, but
far from identical. One wonders whether there is any significance in the
choice of verb which refers to the effects of the strike on the unborn child.
Both verbs, nadu and ṣala’u have the general sense “to throw”. It would be
strange if one was chosen to represent premature birth and the other mis-
carriage. If we assume that both verbs have the same connotation then it
would seem MAL A 21 carries a far harsher penalty for the offence covered
than does LH 209. The penalty would possibly be similar to that prescribed
by LL d.
Our task of comparison is made complex by the apparent contradic-
tion between MAL A 21 and A 50. The penalty outlined in MAL A 50 is
that the man shall be treated as he treated the woman (ki ša epušušini ep-
pušušu). 691 The law also states that he will kimu ša libbiša napšate umalla. The
import of this phrase is contested. Roth translates it as, “he shall make full
payment of a life for her fetus”. 692 Driver and Miles argued that the verb
malu could have the sense of “to fulfill”, “to make good” or “to compen-
sate” and thus interpreted the phrase to merely be a statement in apposition
to the preceding penalty stating that the penalty thus made good the offence
against the life or “(thereby) he compensates for the life”. 693 They even
mentioned the possibility that the phrase could refer to giving a person as
causing her own miscarriage: MAL A 53.

690 e.g. LH 210, LL e, MAL A 50. We will come to a discussion of these laws
presently.
691 Though this section is slightly broken the restoration seems fairly certain.
COMPARISONS 203
substitute for the life taken. 694 Their argument was basically that the phrase
only turned up after another punishment was already given i.e. MAL A 50,
52. They did not think it possible that it referred to another penalty. Their
arguments regarding this phrase can safely be ignored when one looks at
the parallel usage of the verb in MAL A 4 695 and the fact that it is the only
penalty for the last situation envisaged in law A 50. 696 There are also more
solid internal reasons to treat the phrase as Roth has done, as a separate
monetary payment for the life of the unborn child. In MAL A 50 it seems
ridiculous that talio would be seen to be carried out if the man was treated
as the woman was, i.e. struck. This would leave the death of the unborn
child unaccounted for, the man merely being repaid for the blow inflicted
on the woman. Driver and Miles were aware of this problem and attempted
to read the provision of the law as prescribing that the offender’s wife
would also be struck so as to cause a miscarriage. 697 There is a fair amount
of gymnastics involved in order to read the text this way. It would be ridicu-
lous to consider that the law envisaged no penalty for the death of the un-
born child given the harsh penalty for abortion in A 53. The simpler reading
of the text implies that two offences are in view: 1) the striking of the
woman for which the man is struck in return, 698 and 2) causing the death of
the unborn child for which payment of a life is made. In regards to the sec-
ond offence a distinction is made which depends on the gender of the un-
born child and the prior existence of a male heir for the woman’s husband.
If there is no male heir and the unborn child was male then the offender is
killed. If the unborn child was female, the penalty is merely the payment of
a life. 699
Can these two laws be reconciled? Both seem to cover the same of-
fence, the striking of a woman resulting in the miscarriage of her unborn
child. A 21 prescribes monetary penalty, blows and royal service whereas A
50 prescribes payment of a life or the death penalty as outlined above.
Though the laws are not extremely different, 9000 shekels may not be far
from the payment required for a life (especially if blows and service are
694 Though they rejected this interpretation. Ibid., 113.

695 The arguments of Driver and Miles, Assyrian Laws, 24–25 notwithstanding.
696 Extremely unlikely that the phrase refers back to the middle of the law
where the man was treated as he treated the other woman.
697 Assyrian Laws, 110.
698 Or killed if the blow caused the death of the woman. Discussion of this of-
fence follows presently.
699 See the earlier discussion of the import of this term.
added), one does feel that the laws do contradict each other. One possible
way to reconcile the two laws would be to make something of the fact that
the female victim is described as a marat a’ile in A 21 whereas she is possibly
described as an aššat a’ile in A 50. 700 Driver and Miles attempt to do just this,
even arguing that the first offence was seen to be a criminal offence (i.e.
against the state) due to the mention of blows and royal service whereas the
latter laws in A 50–52 were merely civil offences (i.e. against private per-
sons). One does not see how this argument can stand up and this writer
suspects that distinctions such as criminal versus civil offences are merely
modern importations into the text. Without using this slight difference to
reconstruct a scenario that would explain the apparent contradiction be-
tween these two laws we are left with no way of doing so. What the contra-
diction may imply about the nature of the MAL is a little unclear. Did the
compiler merely collect past legal decisions on these topics even if they
were contradictory? Does one represent an earlier law and one a later?
These questions are unanswerable for now. If the latter were the case, it is
interesting that the laws are kept separated from each other in the collection
and there is no mention that the law has been changed. This would support
our earlier contentions regarding the conceptualizations of law and kingship
influencing which cultures do and do not mention the updating of laws. 701
MAL A 51 is difficult to understand. Again we have a man who struck
the wife of a man and caused her to miscarry. 702 Here the woman is de-
scribed as a wife la murabbita. The import of the phrase is that the woman
does not raise her children. This offence against such a woman attracts the
lesser fine of 7200 shekels of lead. It is not abundantly clear why this
woman does not raise her children. Driver and Miles supposed that she was
physically unable to do so. 703 Others have argued that perhaps she adopted
her children out, that the phrase refers to the stage of her pregnancy or an
unsuccessful track record in previous pregnancies. 704 None of these seem
satisfactory to this writer who wonders whether the reference is to a woman
700 This possibility is based on the occurrence of the term aššassu in the laws, the
traces of the end of the DAM sign then a’ile halfway through the law, and the fact
that the following law deals with a type of aššat a’ile also. It seems quite likely that
this term was used at the beginning of the law, but given the fact that these lines are
broken, one should be hesitant in making too much from them.
701 See section 2.1.3.
702 Using the same terminology as in A 50.
704 See Ibid., 114–15.
COMPARISONS 205
from one of the classes of priestesses (qadiltu?) who were not supposed to
have their own children. This may explain the lesser penalty and the lack of
talionic retribution for the blow. 705
A 52 complicates matters even more. Here we are told that even if a
man strikes a prostitute and causes the miscarriage of her child he will be
struck blow for blow and make payment of a life as in the first half of A 50.
There is no further clause regarding the gender of the child and the exis-
tence of an heir as in A 50. This is to be expected given the fact that a pros-
titute would have no husband concerned with an heir. That this offence
against a prostitute and her unborn child is treated in this way may imply a
higher view of the unborn child (and perhaps women) in MAL than the
other collections under comparison. The difficulty with such an interpreta-
tion is of course A 51. A 53 seems to support such a conclusion, however.
In this law a woman (sinniltu) who aborts her own child (ina raminiša ša lib-
biša taṣṣili) will be impaled and not buried, even if she died in the process of
the abortion. This is the fiercest penalty in all of MAL, which is notorious
for severe corporal punishments. The attitude towards this offence should
surely be used to help interpret the other laws regarding caused miscarriages
in MAL, as we have done. Such an approach would lead one to see a dis-
tinction between the fine of 10 shekels in LH 209 for causing a miscarriage
and the possibility that the death penalty would ensue for the same offence
in MAL A 50. This is important in a number of respects, one of which con-
cerns the approach of Westbrook and others which postulates a common
law in the ancient Near East. As MAL A 53 is the only law which covers
the topic of abortion directly, one may be tempted to treat it as the law of
abortion in the ancient Near East. The distinction between MAL and the
other collections regarding the causing of miscarriages should cause one to
hesitate in adopting such a position.
The preceding analysis of the laws regarding the causing of a miscar-
riage should severely question the idea that this law was the same through-
out the ancient Near East. It may also question whether the law is found in
705 More about this in the next section. Driver and Miles use this as evidence
that the phrase napšati umalla was not a separate penalty, but a statement that talion
was exacted. Here there is no mention of talion, only a fine and the phrase is miss-
ing. From internal parallels however, it seems that the monetary payment is some
sort of reduced fine for the miscarriage of the unborn child and there is no mention
of any additional penalty for the blow on the woman. It can be asserted that the
mention of treating the man as he treated the woman in A 50 and of striking the
man blow for blow in A 52, rather than implying the existence of a talionic pun-
ishment in A 51 actually highlights its absence.
so many collections because of some form of borrowing. It is possible that

the topic could have been passed around in this way, but the variation in
formulation 706 and in penalty given should make it clear that this borrowing
did not even approach copying or mere translation. It is not even possible
in some cases to be sure that the same offence is in view. For example,
SLEx seems to make a distinction between what may be an accidental strike
and what may be an intentional one which results in the (presumably) unin-
tended consequence upon the unborn child. None of the other collections
give us enough information to decide whether the blow to the woman was
intentional or accidental; HL does not even mention such a blow. There is
also some confusion regarding the consequent effects on the unborn child.
In most cases the effect makes most sense as the death of the unborn child.
In HL and MAL this is fairly certain. The similarity of term between LH
and MAL seems to support such an interpretation there also. In SLEx it
seems most likely that the verb refers specifically to premature rupture of
the amniotic membrane. Whether this implies miscarriage or merely prema-
ture birth is difficult to tell. The lack of an extra clause specifying whether
there was any injury to the child, along with the relatively high fine of 20
shekels of silver 707 may imply that miscarriage was also in view here.
In theory there are no real obstacles to treating all these laws as of-
fences which led to miscarriages. What we are then left with is the variation
in penalties. 10 shekels is the most common fine for causing a miscarriage
being found in LH 209, SLEx 1' and HL 17. Most other penalties do not
stray too far from this amount, the Hittite Laws themselves containing pen-
alties from 5 to 20 shekels. LL is slightly higher at 30 shekels though we are
hesitant to make very much of this. Apart from MAL A 51, the Middle As-
syrian Laws contain higher penalties for this offence, including the death
penalty, and treat abortion as a most heinous crime.
All of the collections dealing with this topic except SLEx also mention
the same offence against women of lower status. LH 211 treats the offence
against a marat muškenim (variously translated as “the daughter of a
muškenum” or “a woman of the muškenum/commoner class”), and 212
against an amat awilim (a slave-woman of a man). The penalty for causing
the miscarriage in 211 is 5 shekels, whereas in 213 it is only 2. LL f penalizes
the man 5 shekels for causing the miscarriage of a slave woman. This is
706 e.g. the three different Sumerian verbs for striking and two for the resultant
miscarriage or premature birth, the lack of mention of the blow to the woman in
HL, the additional mention of the gestation period in HL etc.
707 Double that of LH 209 and HL 17 and close to that of LL d.
COMPARISONS 207
higher than that in LH but represents a similar ratio regarding the offences
against slaves with respect to free women as that in LH. The ratio is 1:6 in
LL and 1:5 in LH. In HL the ratio is 1:2 in both versions i.e. HL 18 pre-
scribes a penalty of 5 shekels in the tenth month as opposed to HL 17’s 10
shekels and PT XVII prescribes 10 shekels in comparison to PT XVI’s 20.
The MAL do not deal with the case of a man causing a slave to miscarry.
Interestingly though, MAL A 52 prescribes as harsh a penalty for the of-
fence against a prostitute as against a free woman whereas MAL A 51 pre-
scribes a reduced penalty for the offence against the woman who does not
raise her own children. These laws highlight some of the difficulties in as-
serting a common attitude towards legal topics in the ancient Near East.
Which of these laws do we say reflect similar attitudes? Both HL 18 and LL
f prescribe a penalty of 5 shekels for causing a female slave to miscarry but
the Hittite penalty is ½ that of the offence against a free woman whereas
that of LL is 1/6. The ratios of LL f and LH 213 are very similar but the
prices of their penalties are different. The most we could say is that the Hit-
tite laws consistently treat the slave’s child as closer to the worth of a free
woman’s child. The updated law in PT XVII is the highest penalty for such
an offence in the collections under consideration here. It is interesting to
note that the HL does not prescribe a penalty for the offence in the case
that the slave woman was in the 5th month of her pregnancy. This may be
due to a lesser status for the slave’s child.
In most of the collections dealing with this topic there is separate
treatment of the blow inflicted upon the woman which caused the miscar-
riage. This is not the case in HL or SLEx. LH, LL and MAL do deal with
this topic. Each collection deals with this topic in a slightly different man-
ner. LH 210 states that if the blow upon the woman results in her death, the
offender’s daughter will be killed. This is the only law on this topic where
vicarious talion is to be applied. LL e simply states that the man himself will
be killed. MAL A 50 states the same as LL. This law, as distinct from the
other two collections which only prescribe punishment in the case that the
woman is killed, also prescribes talionic retribution upon the offending man
whether the woman dies or not: “they shall treat him as he treated her”.
There is a general agreement that if the blow upon the woman causes her
death that a life should be taken in return. Perhaps this implies that the
strike in view was intentional. 708 The law from MAL is the only one to pre-
708 It may also have been designed to encourage extra care around women as in
the equivalent biblical law in Ex. 21:22. The lack of a context or statement that
would imply these blows were accidental makes it difficult to decide.
scribe punishment for striking the woman if she doesn’t die. What does that
imply? That it is only MAL that deals with an intentional strike? That MAL
has a higher penalty for physical injury (to women)? That the others expect
the offence against the woman to be covered by the laws regarding striking
others? The latter seems problematic as these other laws do not seem to
deal with striking women e.g. LH 206 if a man strike a man etc. The non-
comprehensive nature of the laws presented in the various collections
makes any conclusion tentative, as does the possibility that the term awilum
may be generic.
It is only LH which deals with the case of the death of a woman of
lower status resulting from the man’s blow. It would be unwise to make
much of this given the non-comprehensive nature of the law collections
and the fact that LH is by far the longest of the preserved collections. It
would be unwise to assume that the death of a slave woman was not treated
separately in LL because this situation was already covered in law e. The
fact that LL distinguishes the penalty for causing the miscarriage of a free
woman or a slave would lead us to expect a similar distinction when it came
to punishing the results of the blow on the woman herself. Though MAL
does not deal with the attack on a slave woman as a separate topic, it would
be similarly unwise to treat MAL A 50 as generally applicable to this situa-
tion also. 709
The fact that only HL 77 treats the offence of blows causing miscar-
riages in animals, making it unlikely to be a borrowing, supports this writer’s
suspicion that this topic (treating blows to women) exists in various collec-
tions possibly due to the fact that it was actually a problem in these societies
rather than some status as a canonical legal problem diffused through the
scribal schools.
2.6.7.3 Goring Ox/Bull and Negligence Causing Personal Injury

Due to its appearance in the legal material in the book of Exodus, in LH
and LE, the so-called “Goring Ox” laws have become a favorite for those
wishing to compare the laws of the ancient Near East. Undue focus has
been given to this series of laws as opposed to a more comprehensive
analysis of borrowing amongst the collections of the ancient Near East.
This can quite possibly be explained by the popular appeal of topics which
treat material paralleled in the Hebrew Bible. There is certainly a great
709 Though this may be a possibility, made more plausible by the severity of
punishment for the offence against a prostitute in law A 52, it is questionable upon
analogy with the lesser punishment for the offence in A 51.
COMPARISONS 209
amount of similarity between the laws as they appear in Exodus, LH and

LE. Westbrook has postulated this as another of his canonical legal prob-
lems common to ancient Near Eastern jurisprudence. He sees several as-
pects of the law which are to be dealt with, namely: distinctions as to
whether the ox gored for the first time or was a known gorer and distinc-
tions as to the object of the goring whether it be a man, a slave or another
ox. He presumes all aspects to be known by the drafters of each collection
though not all may appear. LH 250 treats the goring of a man, presumably
by an ox which was not a known gorer. LH 251 outlines the same case in a
situation where the owner knew the ox was prone to goring and had done
nothing about it. LH 252 treats the goring of a slave with no distinction
regarding the ox’s status as a known gorer. 710 LE 53 treats the goring of
another ox and LE 54, the same in the case of a known gorer. LE 55, like
LH 252, treats the goring of a slave with no distinction. Without the biblical
material used to hypothesize a common background for LH and LE, the
closest similarity is found between LE 55 and LH 252, with the different
prices paid for the slave reflecting the relative prices of slaves elsewhere in
the respective collections. The vocabulary used in these laws is not particu-
larly common. In LH 252, the goring of the slave is not mentioned, merely
implied from the preceding law, whereas LE 55 restates the goring and the
resultant death of the slave. Different verbs are also used for the payment
of the silver. LH 250–251 and LE 53–54 mirror each other in that the first
law treats a simple case of an ox goring, while the second treats a case in-
volving a negligent owner as the ox was known to be a gorer. In both LH
251 and LE 54, the owner has been notified of the ox’s threat by their bab-
tum 711 and has failed to do anything about it. There are some differences in
phrasing and the difference of the object of the ox’s goring between the
laws. None of these would discount the possibility that LH’s drafter used
LE 53–55 as a model of sorts for LH 250–252. However, this is not the
only possibility. Perhaps the treatment of the goring of a slave in LH 252, as
a direct continuation from LH 251, is meant to specify that this law only
treats the case of the goring of a slave by a known gorer. This would then
clarify the uncertainty on this point in LE 55 which could be read as cover-
ing either situation.
710 Though it does seem to continue on from LH 251 without a break, perhaps
implying it only covered the offence of a known gorer.
711 Roth’s inconsistency in translating this term (“city quarter” in LH 251,
“ward authorities” in LE 54) is again unhelpful, Law Collections, 67, 128.

The material covered in Exodus 21:28–36 certainly helps the case of

those who would see some form of borrowing. There are many similarities,
especially in terms of the aspects covered. The situations dealt with in LH
250–251, LE 53–54 and that in LH 252 and LE 55 are those treated in
Exodus, with the addition of a section treating the loss of an ox or donkey
which has fallen into an uncovered pit. The penalty in Exodus is the same
in the situations dealt with in LH 250 (no penalty) and LE 53 (value of both
oxen divided). The penalty for goring a slave is higher in Exodus (30 shek-
els), but, similar to LE 55, and perhaps LH 252, there is no specification as
to the bull’s status as a known gorer. Paralleling LH 252 is the position of
the provision regarding the goring of a slave in Exodus as a continuation of
the law regarding the goring of a man by a known gorer. There are a num-
ber of differences in the penalties in Exodus for the situations treated in LE
54 and, more particularly, that in LH 251. 712 It would be a braver man than
this writer who would rule out the possibility that the drafter of this passage
in Exodus was aware of the relevant laws in LH and LE. If borrowing was
involved, however, it certainly did not mean the wholesale adoption of the
rulings and the attitudes behind them, and seems to have only suggested
subject matter.
The biblical material has been mentioned here due to its heightened
pertinence for the debate regarding borrowing in the case of the goring ox
laws. Even if one accepts the possibility of some sort of borrowing from
earlier laws in the Exodus material, this does not imply some original mate-
rial which contained all topics, from which LH chose three, one in common
with LE, which chose another two, with Exodus treating all five. It seems
more likely that the borrowing went directly from LE to LH, with the pos-
sible clarification of the law regarding the goring of a slave in LH, and then
the drafter of Exodus treated the topics of both LH and LE. The specific
mention in Exodus 21:31 that the same penalty applies whether offence was
committed against a man or son or daughter seems to imply knowledge of
712 This writer would argue that the possibility of compensation in this case
does not prove Westbrook’s hypothesis of a more general rule that death penalties
could be exchanged for compensation at the discretion of the next of kin, but
rather, can be explained as specific to this case and resulting from the degree of
intent involved here i.e. the fact that this was negligence rather than intentional
homicide. The only opposition to such an interpretation involves the law treating
the causing of a miscarriage by an accidental blow in Exodus 21:22–25. The weak
and unprotected nature of the object/s of the offence in that case is what leads to
the harsher penalty in the opinion of this author.
COMPARISONS 211
talionic practice elsewhere and is perhaps a direct contradiction of the pro-

vision in LH 230, also treating death caused by negligence.
Given these many similarities it is difficult to rule out the possibility of
borrowing. There is some material which suggests that goring bulls or oxen
were an actual threat in the societies of the Near East and that this topic
was not merely academic. An example is found in HL 176a. The law states
that if anyone keeps a bull outside a corral it will be a case for the king’s
court and the bull will be sold. This may imply that capital punishment was
a possibility but this is unclear. 713 The law seems to legislate against a situa-
tion where a bull may have been free to roam the streets and harm people
or damage property. Another piece of evidence for this general problem in
Near Eastern societies is possibly found in a law suit from Nuzi. 714 Though
this is the only document from practice that deals with such a situation, this
should not necessarily be taken to imply its occurrence was rare. The state-
ment that the topic of the goring ox was, “The favorite textbook illustration
of negligence in the law collections of the ancient Near East”, 715 may turn
out to be true, but its background as a legal problem common to the Near
East has not been demonstrated. Though the many similarities between the
goring laws in LH, LE and Exodus make this writer very hesitant to rule
out some form of borrowing amongst them, the infrequency of such simi-
larity and the possibility that goring animals were a problem in the Near
East, as demonstrated in HL 176a and the document from Nuzi, also make
him hesitant to rule out the possibility that these laws are independent after
all. 716
The laws concerning the goring ox treat injury to persons, negligence
and damage to property. We shall deal with other laws involving negligence
leading to personal injury, then move onto other laws dealing with negli-
gence which leads to damage to property, and then onto any remaining laws
713 Refer back to the discussion of laws mentioning the king’s involvement in
2.2.
“The Goring Ox at Nuzi,” trans. William W. Hallo (COS 3.121, 270). This
714
law may not however deal with the case of an ox goring another ox. It is a lawsuit
by an ox’s owner against his ox herd, accusing him of having injured an ox. The
statement by the neatherd that “his fellow” injured the ox may refer to a fellow ox
of the one injured, or another man in some relation to the ox’s owner (e.g. another
worker or a friend). The former does seem more likely.
715 Hallo, (COS 3.121, 270).
716 Perhaps a situation parallel to the frequent attestation of common vocabu-
lary in unrelated languages (with no possibility of an etymological relationship or of
loaning from one to the other) is to be understood here.
treating damage of property. Apart from the laws dealing with a brawl, there
are not many other laws treating injury caused by negligence. This topic is
treated in LH 229–231 regarding the shoddy building of a house which col-
lapses and kills someone, and in LH 218–220 regarding the ill effects of a
negligent physician. LE 56–58 are also relevant, treating the negligence of
the owner of a vicious dog and of a buckling wall. LE 56–57, deal with the
vicious dog in exactly the same manner as 54–55 dealt with the goring ox.
Even the corresponding penalties are identical. LH 218–220’s treatment of
physicians is not paralleled anywhere else. It should be noted that the pun-
ishment in 218, cutting off the physician’s hand, is for either blinding or
causing the death of an awilum, whereas the punishment for the two of-
fences is distinguished in LH 219–220 when done to a slave. Perhaps the
stylistic value of having the offending hand being cut off overruled the
usual concern for symmetry. The purely economic offence in LH 219–220,
involving slaves, may also explain the difference.
It is worth comparing LE 58 and LH 229–231. Similar to LE 54 and
56, the owner of the buckling wall has been notified by his babtum that his
property is posing a threat and has done nothing about it. If the wall col-
lapses and causes the death of an awilum, the penalty is harsher than that for
the negligent owner of the goring ox or vicious dog. As noted by David,
perhaps this is because, in contrast to an animal, the wall does not have a
will of its own and the owner is thus more directly responsible for the dam-
age it does. 717 The penalty in LE 58 is stated to be napištum, “a capital case”,
“a case involving life” etc. It is up to the king to decide whether or not the
offender will be killed. 718 The penalty for the shoddy builder in LH 229–231
is similar but phrased differently, involving talionic and vicarious punish-
ment in contrast to LE 58. If a builder builds a house which collapses and
kills someone there are different punishments in LH depending on who is
killed. LH 229 prescribes death for the builder himself if the head of the
household was killed; 230 the death of the builder’s son if the son of the
head of the household was killed; 231 the replacement of the slave if a slave
was killed. This last law shows the attitude towards slaves in these laws i.e.
they are seen as property. 719
717 See the discussion of this law in Yaron, Laws of Eshnunna, 1988, 300–3.
718 The phrase s[imdat šarrim, I interpret as merely referring to the fact it is the
king’s decision rather than necessarily to some written edict to be referred to. See
the earlier discussion of this phrase in 2.1.4. and compare the statement in LE 48.
719 Compare LH 232 which determines that the builder shall replace any dam-
aged property.
COMPARISONS 213
2.6.8 Negligence Causing Loss of or Damage to Property

This topic seems to have been one of the more popular amongst the an-
cient Near Eastern law collections. This is especially true in regards to laws
treating injury to rented animals (particularly oxen) and those involving
boats. There are also parallel laws treating the negligent shepherd and negli-
gence leading to theft, as well as a host of laws unique to their collection
treating other situations where negligence has led to the loss of or damage
to property.
Several laws treating loss under the care of the shepherd are found in
LH 263–267. 720 Each law that determines negligence on the part of the
shepherd requires him to replace whatever was lost. 721 The only law which
excuses the shepherd and determines that the owner shall bear the loss is
LH 266 in the case of an outbreak of disease or a lion killing the sheep. The
shepherd must take some sort of oath clearing himself of any negligent be-
havior. 722 This last law has a parallel in HL 80, and, to a lesser extent, those
laws treating the killing of rented oxen by lions or disease. 723 HL 80 is for-
mulated very differently to LH 266 and is more concerned with the division
of the sheep’s carcass in the event it is killed by a lion. 724 It seems to assume
there is no negligence on the part of the shepherd. It is difficult to argue for
borrowing in this case.
The laws concerning damage to rented oxen are immense in number.
Their existence in the monumental law collections LH, LL and HL, as well
as three collections which are generally classed as “scholarly texts” (LOx,
SLEx and SLHF) has been the subject of debate. Many have used this as
evidence of the purely academic nature or scholarly origin of the monumen-
tal law collections, questioning their practical intent. 725 Though there may
be the likelihood that some of the material in the monumental collections is
720 LH 265 is really misappropriation or theft and is somewhat paralleled in

MAL F 1–2. See earlier discussion concerning theft laws.
721 LH 263–264, 267.
722 As contrasted to the outbreak of the preventable disease for which he is re-
sponsible in LH 267.
723 See below.
724 The shepherd keeps the wool, the owner the carcass.
725 e.g. Roth, “Scholastic Tradition and Mesopotamian Law: A Study of FLP
1287, a Prism in the Collection of the Free Library of Philadelphia” (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Pennsylvania, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1979) or “The
Scholastic Exercise ‘Laws about Rented Oxen’,” Journal of Cuneiform Studies 32/33
(1980): 142; Levinson, review of Roth, 119.
indeed mirrored in “scholarly texts”, this need not determine the function
of either set of texts. The possibility of some form of borrowing or com-
mon origin is heightened for this group of laws. They are to be found in LH
244–249, LL 34–37, all of LOx, SLEx 9'–10', i 37–ii 2, SLHF vi 11–36, and
HL 74–75, 77b–78. There are a number of common situations which recur
within these laws. One of these is the situation where a lion may have killed
the ox. In each case the law prescribes that it is the owner’s loss. 726 Each of
these laws prescribes a specific location for the ox when the attack oc-
curred. None of these are the same in any two laws. It is worth comparing
HL 75 at this point. This law states that an ox, mule or ass that dies, gets
lost or is eaten by a wolf shall be given according to the law. The import of
this last statement is a little unclear, as is the beginning statement that the
animal has been hitched up. 727 In HL 80, in the case where a shepherd al-
lowed a wolf to eat a sheep he was able to keep the wool and only had to
give the carcass to the owner. Is this what is in view here or did the man in
HL 75 have to actually replace the lost or dead animal? The latter seems
more probable given the fact that this penalty applies to a lost animal also.
This would contrast with every other case treating the killing of a hired
animal by a wild animal. There is an out clause in HL 75 which is reminis-
cent of LH 249. The man can swear an oath that the animal “died by the
hand of a god”. It is unclear what situation this would cover. The mention
of replacement of a lost animal in HL 75 is paralleled in SLEx 10' 728 and i
37–ii 2. In both cases the animal is to be replaced. An ox killed while cross-
ing a river is replaced with additional compensation for its hire in SLHF vi
23–31. This law is paralleled in LOx 6, where the value of the ox is paid in
silver. 729 The only other reference to a man killing an ox in his care is in LH
245. It prescribes replacement of the ox with a comparable one if the death
was caused by negligence or abuse.
There are a host of laws treating the penalty for injuring certain parts
of the ox. As was the case with the personal injury laws the same body parts
appear repeatedly, with very similar penalties. As was the case with those
726 LH 244, LOx 7–8, SLEx 9', SLHF vi 16–22, 32–36.

727 Do all these offences have to occur while the animal is hitched up? Compare
LOx 7.
728 Translated differently by Finkelstein, “Sumerian Laws YBC 2177” (ANET,
526). Appears to be an ox goring another ox there. This would make more sense,
otherwise the same situation seems to be covered in SLEx i 37–ii 2 (unless “lost”
does not necessarily mean he can’t find it, but can include loss to death etc. also,
then it perhaps also parallels LH 245 and HL 75 more generally).
729 LOx 9 may be relevant also but is too broken to tell.
COMPARISONS 215
laws, here again there are differences in the phrasing of the laws, the type of
penalty in HL and the body parts considered equal and/or treated in the
one law in the different collections. Again, this material is best presented as
a table. It must be remembered that two relevant laws are broken (LOx 5
and SLHF vi 11–15) and that LOx has a gap part way through.
Offence LH LL LOx HL
Break Leg Replace n/a ? replace ox or give
bad one and 2 shek-
els silver
Cut Neck Replace n/a ? n/a
Tendon
Blind Eye ½ value ½ value ½ value 6 shekels silver
Break/Cut ¼ value ¼ value 1/3 value replace ox or give
off Horn (break) (break) (cut off) bad one and 2 shek-
els silver
(break)
Cut Tail ¼ value ¼ value penalty n/a
broken
Cut Hoof ¼ value 1/3 value ¼ value n/a
Tendon
The case for borrowing is perhaps stronger here than in the laws of
personal injury given the greater similarity in penalties and the higher degree
of similarity regarding the body parts covered. HL 78 covers a situation not
dealt with in the other laws.
Negligent damage to boats was a popular topic in these law collections
also. 730 There is even one case where some form of borrowing or common
origin must be surmised. SLHF iv 42–v 11 and LL 5 seem to be identical
apart from minor orthographic variations and LL’s omission of one verb. 731
Either the scribe of SLHF copied the law from LL or each got it from some
other common source. Though it is possible this common source was con-
tracts from practice, given the other material in SLHF, the phraseology,
730 As was its hire or theft e.g. LE 4, 6; SLHF iii 10–12, v 37–44; LH 275–277
and 239 (hire of boatman).
731 Though LL 5 is broken at points, the commonality is so great that one is
able to treat them as the same law with a fair degree of certainty. The possibility
remains that the penalty in LL 5 was slightly different given the degree of damage
at this point.
beginning with tukum-bi, makes it likely that SLHF took it from a law collec-
tion. LL is the obvious candidate. The laws deal with a topic also dealt with
in SLEx 3'; the loss/sinking of a rented boat whose agreed upon route has
been violated. In SLHF the renter 732 is to replace the boat and pay its hire
in grain. The penalty in LL 5 is not preserved but can be safely assumed to
be that of SLHF. The penalty in SLEx 3' is very similar, but seems to only
ask for half the boat’s hire and this “until” the restoration of the boat, not
in addition to its replacement. 733
The simple sinking of a boat is mentioned in LH 236–238, LE 5,
SLHF v 21–26 and perhaps was preserved in the broken provisions of LL 4
and SLEx ii 7–8. In each case the boat is to be compensated for. LH 236
prescribes its replacement and 237 the replacement of any cargo that was
lost. 734 LH 238 alone treats a situation where the boat was sunk and is then
raised. In that case the offender pays half its value. LE 5 seems to cover the
possibility of both the boat and its cargo needing replacement stating that
the negligent boatman, “shall restore as much as he caused to sink.” SLHF
v 21–26 is similar again, specifying replacement of the boat and payment of
its hire. 735 The broken passages in SLEx ii 7–8 and LL 4 also seem to re-
quire replacement of the boat. The difference in penalty between LL 4 and
SLHF v 21–26 may lead us to expect a similar difference between SLHF iv
42–v 11 and LL 5, but the traces do not seem to fit this expectation. 736
The collision of two boats is treated in LH 240, SLHF v 27–36 and
MAL M 1–2. LH 240 assumes that an upstream boat will sink a down-
stream boat and determines that the master of the former shall replace the
boat and property lost of the latter. The latter is to detail his lost property
under oath. SLHF seems to assume negligence only on the part of an up-
stream boat also. If an upstream boat sinks a downstream boat it is to be
replaced but the reverse is not the case. Presumably this is due to the com-
parative speed and maneuverability of the two boats. The lack of mention
732 Or the boatman which the renter may also have had to hire. See Finkelstein,
“Sumerian Laws” (ANET, 525, n. 2) Compare the two different situations in LH
236–237 i.e. the boatman as the hirer, a third party hiring the boat and a boatman.
733 There is an amount of uncertainty regarding the translation of this penalty,
Finkelstein, “Sumerian Laws” (ANET, 525, n. 2). Roth displays more certainty in
her translation than Finkelstein, Law Collections, 43–44.
734 In this case a third party has hired boat and boatman with the boatman be-
ing at fault. The boatman thus has to replace the boat for its owner and the goods
to the man who hired him.
735 It seems this is assumed to be paid already in LH and LE.
736 It is possible that LL 4 and SLHF v 21–26 are not parallel after all.
COMPARISONS 217
of the property on board the boat is in contrast to LH and MAL. MAL M 1

is a little broken and thus difficult to reconstruct. Here there is mention of
replacement of the sunken boat and its property being replaced but the cir-
cumstances leading to the incident are unclear. This law may parallel those
treating the simple loss of the boat itself but the mention of someone’s
shout to clear a passage may imply that collision with another boat is in
view. Perhaps the situation envisaged is a boat drifting from upstream
whose captain has attempted to clear other boats out of the way. There is
difficulty in interpreting which boat has sunk and who is to pay the penalty.
The last statement that the boatman not swearing an oath need not restore
the goods confuses the issue further. 737 MAL M 2’s context is clearer but
part of the penalty is broken. An upstream boat or a boat crossing the river
sinks another boat. It seems likely that the boat and any property on board
would be replaced.
These laws again show a similarity of topic among the Mesopotamian
collections. Given the (almost) verbatim copying of LL 5 in SLHF, it is in-
teresting that other parallels are not of the same ilk. If there was widespread
borrowing, at least among the Mesopotamian collections, why do we not
get this word for word copying elsewhere? It is interesting that it occurs in a
“scholarly text”. Perhaps this was a scribe’s exercise. This would explain the
copying of a passage from LL 5, but not the variation from other parallel
laws, including others dealing with boats. SLHF v 12–20 also contains a
unique law dealing with some damage to the boat. It is possible that the
other sections of SLHF with parallels in LL which display variation from it,
were copied from elsewhere or involved a degree of invention on the part
of the scribe. The unique nature of this rare verbatim copying raises a num-
ber of questions concerning the discernment of borrowing and borrowing
practices without necessarily giving any answers. Tigay’s work regarding the
comparative method and his examples of loose copying of subject matter in
regards to the Gilgamesh epic are pertinent at this point. Here there is the
possibility that the drafter of SLHF could borrow topics from other docu-
ments in a number of different ways. The sections that are not copied ver-
batim 738 seem to defy attempts to classify them as borrowing or independ-
737 As does Roth’s translation, “the boatman against whom they do not swear
an oath by the life of the king shall not turn back (from taking the oath)”, Law Col-
lections, 189. Theophile J. Meek’s translation, “The Middle Assyrian Laws” (ANET,
188) is very different. There are a number of difficulties in translation here. Roth’s
translation implies the boatman is somehow the indirect object of the swearing.
738 At least not from any source available to us.
ent invention, let alone specifying the degree, direction or avenue of bor-
rowing. The similarity of subject matter is again worth noting.
Flooding of a neighbor’s field due to negligent behavior is treated in
LH 53–56, LU 31 and SLHF iv 35–41. There has been much debate sur-
rounding the laws in LH as they specify different methods for assessing the
relevant penalty i.e. replacement of lost grain, delivery of grain according to
nearby yields or a fixed measure of grain per area. Some commentators
have argued for different practices of assessing such agricultural offences,
whether due to different societal practice or development over time, which
have somehow been mixed together in LH. 739 There are possible ways to
harmonize these laws, as demonstrated by Westbrook. 740 It is possible that
LH 55–56 are merely explications of the general rules set out in LH 53–54.
There are then two systems of reckoning loss that make most sense as be-
ing dependent upon the agricultural season, with LH 55 occurring close to
harvest time and LH 56 just before or after planting. 741 If the flooding oc-
curs close to harvest time, it is possible to assess the damage by looking at
the comparative yields of nearby fields. If close to planting then this would
be a difficulty and a fixed measure is to be used instead. The two laws
which parallel these in LH each use one of these systems. LU 31 uses a
fixed measure and SLHF iv 35–41 the yield of neighbors. Interestingly,
SLHF seems to put the offence sometime after the harrowing of the land,
perhaps close to planting. 742 It is possible that the drafter of LH was aware
of these two possible means of assessment and drew on both of them to set
up a more comprehensive system that would make it easier to assess any
damage done a significant time before harvest, but after work had been
started on the fields. It is also possible that both methods were in operation.
Negligence in the upkeep of land could be seen as making it easier for
a thief to break into a neighbor’s house. This is seen in LH e and LL 11. In
LH e, the man who fails to reinforce a scalable wall (after a warning) over
which a thief breaks into his neighbor’s house, or who fails to work an un-
cultivated plot is to replace any stolen goods. LL 11 prescribes the same
compensation for the man who has neglected his fallow land after a warn-
ing, again resulting in his neighbor’s property being stolen. The mention of
739 Cardascia, “La reparation”.

740 “Cuneiform Law,” 206–13.
741 Indicated by the mention of the water carrying away the work the neighbour
had done.
742 Not ruling out some time near harvest either.
COMPARISONS 219
the neighbor’s request that the man do some sort of fortification work is
reminiscent of the wall in LH e.
There are a number of other laws, mainly in LH and HL, treating neg-
ligence leading to damage of property which are unique to their collec-
tion. 743
2.6.9 Non-Negligent Damage to Property

The Hittite Laws treat this topic far more extensively than any other collec-
tion and thus contain many laws unique to it. 744 There are two topics
treated in HL which are found elsewhere: the cutting down of another’s
tree, and damage caused to another’s produce by unlawfully grazing sheep.
LH 59 and LL 10 are almost identical:
LH 59 If a man cuts down a tree in another man’s date orchard without
the permission of the owner of the orchard, he shall weigh and deliver
30 shekels of silver.
LL 10 If a man cuts down a tree in another man’s orchard, he shall
weigh and deliver 20 shekels of silver.
The difference in price may represent the relative costs of trees in the
two periods. LH is slightly more detailed in its specific mention of the type
of orchard and the lack of permission from the owner but the latter is
surely assumed in LL. Borrowing is a definite possibility here. HL 104 and
113 treat quite similar offences. HL 104 specifies two tree types which may
have been cut down with some form of payment in silver demanded. HL
113 treats the cutting down of a vine. This is dealt with differently. The of-
fender keeps the cut-down vine and gives its owner a new vine. They seem
to swap when the old vine recovers. It is possible that HL 104 was some-
how inspired by LH 59 or LL 10. Little more can be said except to note
again the relatively more frequent tendency in the Hittite Laws for replace-
ment in kind rather than payment in silver or grain. Further highlighting the
similarity of topics across collections, RU mentions officials cutting down
the trees of the poor and carrying off the fruit.
LH 57–58 and HL 107 share in common a shepherd allowing sheep to
graze on another’s produce without permission and a penalty fixed by land
area. All other details are different. HL 107 adds a provision in a case where
743 LH 225, 227, 231–33; HL 106, 163–65 and 60–62 (the latter perhaps treating
ignorance more than negligence); LE 60.
744 HL 86–90, 98–100, 105, 109, 166–69.
the land the sheep were allowed into was bare. This offence only attracts a 3
shekel payment.
2.7 PENALTIES
It is the contention of this thesis that a comparison of these law collections
will serve to highlight some systematic differences. A comparison of the
penalties, especially those in laws treating what modern jurists may term
criminal law, enables these differences to be discerned more easily than is
the case from most other aspects of the laws. Apart from this comparison
across collections, an attempt will be made to analyze the diachronic
changes within HL in this section.
2.7.1 Corporal
What is most striking in a comparison of penalties across these collections
is the relative frequency of corporal punishments in Assyrian and Egyptian
collections. Around 30–40% of laws in MAL and MAPD contain a corporal
penalty. 745 In EH there are only three laws which record a corporal pun-
ishment. This may seem fairly minimal, but given that there is only one al-
ternative penalty actually recorded in part B, 746 and one more in part C (the
death penalty), 747 its occurrence is relatively frequent. This is also the case in
the Nauri Decree with 11 out of the 16 provisions containing corporal pun-
ishment. LH also contains a number of laws with corporal punishments,
but as a percentage it is a fairly infrequent penalty. There are only 15 such
laws out of the 282 recorded. Within the Sumerian material there are 1 or 2
745 This is a rough figure and would actually be higher if other variables were
taken into account such as laws in which the penalty is broken or the numerous
occasions within MAPD where it is simply stated that it is a punishable offence.
The number would be far higher if it were found that this also implied a corporal
punishment.
746 See the end of B.I where the official in the wrong is to do the work of the
underling he oppressed. Other laws have their penalty broken away, merely men-
tion that an inquiry shall be opened in the case of suspicion of an offence (B.VI),
state that no penalty is required, or contain the confusing phrase m mi.t.t (“accord-
ingly”, “in a fitting way”, or “likewise”). At times this seems to imply that the pen-
alty will be the same as that of the preceding provision, at others this is difficult to
tell. See Pflüger, “Haremhab,” 262, n. 41.
747 Part C mostly records administrative re-organisation rather than laws with
penalties attached.
COMPARISONS 221
laws with such a penalty. 748 In Hittite material there are only 5 laws with
such a penalty, each of which is reserved specifically for slaves. 749
The most obvious similarity between MAL, MAPD, EH, ND and LH
is that all were produced during a period of imperialism. Though one could
argue that the kingdoms of Ur, Isin and Eshnunna were also expansionary,
they do not approach the imperial nature of the societies behind the afore-
mentioned collections. The level of brutality in the Assyrian collections,
what has been termed their “calculated frightfulness”, 750 brings to mind the
gratuitous nature of many of the later Assyrian royal annals. For example,
take these passages from Aššur-naṣirpal II (883–859):
“I cut off their heads and formed (therewith) a pile. . . . I razed, de-
stroyed and burnt the cities which lay within the mighty highlands. . . .
Bubu, son of Babua, son of the city ruler of the city Ništun I flayed in
the city Arbail and draped his skin over the wall.” 751
“I erected a pile (of bodies) in front of his gate; I flayed as many nobles
as had rebelled against me and draped their skins over the pile; some I
spread out within the pile, some I erected on stakes upon the pile, and
some I placed on stakes around the pile. I flayed many right through my
land and draped their skins over the walls. I slashed the flesh of the
eunuchs.” 752
“I burnt many captives from them. I captured many troops alive: from
some I cut off their arms and hands; from others I cut off their noses,
ears and extremities. I gouged out the eyes of many troops. I made one
pile of the living and one of heads. I hung their heads on trees around
the city. I burnt their adolescent boys and girls.” 753
748 LU 25 which is fairly mild, only involving the scouring of a mouth with salt.
LU 26 may have contained a similar punishment given the similarity of subject mat-
ter, but it is broken.
749 This number excludes those references to corporal punishments in the karu .
. . kinuna sections of HL, and assumes that the final provision of ETud. IV has
theft by a slave in view. This last contention is based on an expectation of internal
consistency with the other laws within this collection (see Col. I, lines 11–18) and
may turn out to be incorrect. The others are HL 95, 99 and 173b.
750 Lafont, “Middle Assyrian Period,” 553.
751 Translation from Albert Kirk Grayson, Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Mil-
lennium BC (vol. 1; Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Assyrian Periods 2; To-

ronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), txt. A.0.101.1, pp. 197–98.
752 Ibid., 199.
753 Ibid., 201.
The gruesome nature of the Assyrian annals is, however, a develop-

ment around the end of the second, beginning of the first millennium B.C.
Some have explained its late appearance as due to the Assyrian campaigning
against the Aramaeans. 754 The existence of similarly gruesome penalties
within the Assyrian law collections makes it likely that the representation of
violent consequences punishing misbehavior was a common Assyrian prac-
tice. 755 The minimal evidence linking MAL to royalty makes it more difficult
to argue strongly for a link to the royal ideology of Assyria but some possi-
bilities present themselves. A formula at the end of MAL A dates our copy
to the reign of Tiglath-pileser I (1114–1079). The evidence for tracing this
and the other tablets back to the fourteenth century is inconclusive. 756 With
Tiglath-pileser I Assyrian imperialism and its representation in royal texts
develops significantly. It is possible that MAL do date to this period. The
collection of MAPD is firmly dated to his reign also though it clearly con-
tains decrees from the fourteenth century. Corporal punishments are as-
cribed to decrees from Aššur-uballit I onwards in this text so a date for
MAL in the fourteenth century is not impossible for MAL either. Given the
fragmentary nature of our evidence, it is difficult to judge whether this pre-
ponderance of corporal punishments reflects the actual legal practice of the
Assyrians or is specific to the law collections. Our inability to determine the
private or royal function of MAL also hinders such analysis. MAPD, how-
ever, are firmly linked to Assyrian royalty. The brutality of the penalties
contained within this collection is mirrored in MAL so is unlikely to be due
merely to its context within the running of the harem, so infamous for po-
litical intrigues. There is a firm link between the brutality in the Assyrian law
collections and the later representation of brutality in the annals. Perhaps
this Assyrian representation of violent punishment meted out for misbehav-
ior could only be voiced within the inscriptions once a certain level of impe-
rial power was achieved and the annalistic form had developed further
whereas internally this could happen earlier. Our evidence for such repre-
sentation in Assyria dates firmly during a long period of imperial expansion,
begun with Aššur-uballit I.
754 A. Leo Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia, 163. Similarly Postgate, Early Meso-
potamia, 287, notes an increased severity in the oaths used by the Assyrians after the
period of conflict with the Aramaeans.
755 Whether this was used as propaganda to deter such misbehaviour, whether
such rebelliousness was seen as deserving harsh penalties, or there was some other
explanation will not be explored here.
756 Based on attempts to date the script and language, neither of which are able
to give narrow dates.

COMPARISONS 223
The brutality within EH and ND is also firmly fixed within a period of

imperial expansion, and again, finds striking parallels with Egyptian royal
inscriptions. Though the Egyptian inscriptions do not record acts of brutal-
ity as regularly as the later Assyrian ones, there is much similar material e.g.
Thutmose III and Amenhotep III record the collecting of the severed
hands of the enemy in their inscriptions; 757 Amenhotep II the hanging of
defeated princes on the walls of cities, 758 and the cutting off of the heads of
enemy chiefs. 759 Seti I’s inscriptions contain gruesome descriptions of battle
also: “making them carcasses in their valleys, overturned in their blood”; 760
“his heart is satisfied at seeing blood, he cuts off the heads of the rebellious-
hearted, he loves an hour of battle more than a day of rejoicing . . . He
leaves not a limb among them.” 761
Merneptah and Ramesses III speak of carrying off the hands and phalli
of defeated chiefs, 762 and Ramesses III of killing the wife and children of
his enemies. 763 There is little surprise that these references occur during the
peaks of imperial expansion in the Egyptian New Kingdom period. The
increasing militarization of Egypt, and in particular, the throne, seems a
likely catalyst for this element of the inscriptions of this period. It parallels
the brutality of the punishments in EH and ND quite well. Several docu-
ments from practice record brutal measures being used more generally in
Egyptian legal proceedings e.g. the beating of witnesses. 764 It must be re-
membered that these sources are generally written by royal officials and
often involved the king himself. 765
757 James Henry Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt (vol. 2; Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1906; repr., Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 185, 187,
216, 341.
758 Ibid., 313
759 Ibid., 319. See also Seti I in Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt (vol. 3; Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1906; repr., Urbana: University of Illinois, 2001), 79.

760 Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, vol. 3, 47.
761 Ibid., 52.
762 Ibid., 248–49, 255–56. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt (vol. 4; Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago, 1906; repr., Urbana: University of Illinois, 2001), 23, 30, 31, 66.
763 Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, vol. 4, 61.
764 See Ellen Dailey Bedell, “Criminal Law in the Egyptian Ramesside Period”
(Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1973), 82–83.
765 e.g. the trials regarding harem conspiracy (though Ramesses III boasts of not
being involved in these trials-see Bedell, “Criminal Law,” 23–24) and tomb robber-
ies. See John A. Wilson’s translation, “Results of a Trial for Conspiracy” (ANET,
214–16) or Robert K. Ritner’s, “The Turin Judicial Papyrus” (COS 3.8: 28–30) for
LH is also written during a period of imperial expansion. The relative

infrequency of corporal punishments within LH is mirrored by the lack of
brutality within the historical inscriptions of the period. This writer postu-
lates that the relative infrequency of these punishments is due to a different
conception and justification of kingship in Southern Mesopotamia as op-
posed to that in Assyria. The existence of some corporal penalties within
LH does reflect the more severe nature of LH’s penalties in general when
compared to other Southern Mesopotamian collections and may be, at the
least, partly due to the imperial context. 766
It is thus possible to explain the uneven distribution of corporal pun-
ishment within the law collections of the ancient Near East as due to more
general cultural differences combined with the influence of an imperial con-
text.
2.7.2 Capital
The data regarding the death penalty is a little harder to compare if one
merely looks at the percentage of such punishments within each collection.
Though even here, the Hittite, and to a lesser extent the Sumerian, collec-
tions, contain a smaller percentage of capital cases than those written in
Akkadian. The Hittite laws stand out containing only 10 cases out of 200
laws. Out of these 10 cases, 6 treat unpermitted sexual pairings, a topic
treated rarely and briefly elsewhere. The Egyptian collections posit the
death penalty on far fewer occasions than corporal: once in EH out of the 5
extant penalties and twice in ND’s 16. Though the comparison of these
percentages yields only minor differences apart from HL, it is worth com-
paring the offences which warrant the death penalty in the various collec-
tions. The Egyptian material is difficult to compare. Out of the three penal-
ties, the offence for one is broken. The two extant offences treated are the
offering of animals dedicated to the foundation of Osiris to another temple
and the violation of justice by an official acting as a judge. Only the latter
has any parallel in other collections. The penalty here in EH is harsher than
that in LH 5 where the judge loses his position and pays twelvefold the
claim of the case.
the former and T. Eric Peet, The Great Tomb-Robberies of the Twentieth Egyptian Dy-
nasty: Being a Critical Study, with Translations and Commentaries, of the Papyri in which these
are Recorded (2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1930) for the latter.
766 There are some parallels in Hammurabi’s inscriptions. For example, see his
mention of breaking necks in the inscription referred to by Van De Mieroop, King
Hammurabi, 124–27.
COMPARISONS 225
A comparison of the remaining material is slightly easier. There are

some general similarities. Among the collections capital punishment is gen-
erally reserved for sexual offences involving married women, 767 murder, 768
robbery/burglary, 769 witchcraft 770 and incest. 771 This is not to say that these
offences were treated in the same way across all collections. For example we
discussed earlier that, though burglary/robbery received the death penalty
in LH and LU, it only attracts a small fine in HL 94–95; murder is similarly
treated more leniently in HL, being penalized with replacement or monetary
fines; 772 MAL includes an unborn child as a possible victim of murder in
opposition to the other collections; witchcraft is only mentioned in two
collections and within HL the death penalty is clearly given only for
slaves: 773 incest laws appear only in LH and HL and contradict at points.
LH, being the longest of the collections, unsurprisingly contains a number
of offences that attract the death penalty that are not dealt with elsewhere
e.g. kidnap, 774 abuse of juniors by a military officer, 775 a tavern woman not
dealing with criminals 776 and a violation by a naditu. 777 Similarly unique is
MAPD’s prescription of the death penalty for swearing abuses on three
occasions, 778 LE 60’s death penalty for a negligent guard, MAL A 47 and
MAPD 19’s punishment for not reporting certain capital offences, and HL
173a’s for rejecting the judgment of a magistrate. In these cases there is
nothing to compare across collections. The theft laws are different how-
ever. LH and AE have the death penalty for theft-related offences 779 in con-
767 LH 129–30, 133b, 143, 153, 155; LE 26, 28; LU 6–7; MAL A 12–16, 22–23;
MAPD 19; HL 195a, 197–98.

768 LH 1 (by extension), 153, 229; LE 24, 58; LU 1; MAL A 10, 50, 53, B 2.
769 LH 21–22; LE 12–13; LU 2 (see earlier discussion of this law).
770 LH 2 (by extension); MAL A 47; HL 170.
771 LH 157; HL 189, 191, 195.
772 ETel. 49 does envisage the death penalty but this is likely due to the specific
context of the edict which implies that the victim would be from the royal line.
773 HL 170. If a free man commits the same offence he is merely fined 40 shek-
els.
774 LH 14
775 LH 26, 33–34.
776 LH 109
777 LH 110
778 MAPD 10–12.
779 Including misappropriation, contractual fraud etc.
trast to all other collections. 780 Much of the material in HL covers theft-
related offences yet the death penalty occurs only once and seems to be
connected to the threat of assassination rather than the theft itself. 781
A comparison of the death penalty across these collections shows LH
and AE, the two Old Babylonian collections, to be more severe than the
other Mesopotamian collections and HL. The relative frequency of the
death penalty within Akkadian collections more generally needs to be tem-
pered by the fact of MAL’s focus on women and thus on sex offences in-
volving married women. Though it is difficult to posit an explanation for
this difference, it does correlate with the precarious economic set up of Old
Babylonian society. This would tie in to the special treatment of merchants
observed elsewhere in this study. 782
Adding to LH’s prevalence in regards to the death penalty is a similar
frequency in the specification of the mode of execution. Such specificity
adds to the harsh nature of the laws of Hammurabi. Eleven times LH de-
tails the mode of execution e.g. being cast into the water; 783 being dragged
through a field; burning; 784 hanging; 785 and impalement. 786 Four of these are
connected to theft-related offences. 787 None of the capital cases in the
Sumerian collections are so specific. LE 60 mentions that the negligent
guard will be buried without a grave and HL 173a specifies the decapitation
of one who rejects a magistrate’s judgment. 788 Four of the twenty Assyrian
capital cases contain specific descriptions as do two out of the three Egyp-
tian ones. The prevalence of these specific descriptions roughly reflects the
distribution of corporal and capital punishment within the collections but it
780 With the following exceptions: robbery/burglary offences as mentioned

above; MAL A 3 which uniquely treats theft by a wife from her sick husband and
HL 126 which deals with theft of a spear from a palace (which was earlier posited
to be linked to treason of some form).
781 HL 126-see notes 483-4 above and discussion amongst section 2.6.
782 2.5 and 2.6.1.
783 LH 108, 129, 133b, 143, 155, 256.
784 LH 25 (where a looter is cast into the fire which he was supposed to help
put out), 110, 157.

785 LH 21. From the root alalum meaning “to suspend” rather than hanging with
a noose in the modern sense. See CDA, 11.
786 LH 153
787 LH 21, 25, 108 and 256.
788 HL 121 and 166 also specify modes of execution but these are part of a karu
. . . kinuna clause and will be dealt with later.

COMPARISONS 227
seems unwise to press this point too far. On the whole it seems to reflect
the methods of the drafter of LH in general as will be discussed presently.
2.7.3 Talionic, Vicarious, and Equivalent

LH, MAL and ND stand alone in their use of vicarious penalties, 789 LH and
MAL in the employment of talion. 790 The status of LH and MAL is similar
in regards to penalties framed so as to fit the crime (this last category will be
easier to grasp when examples are given below). This heightened concern to
“make the punishment fit the crime” is most prevalent in LH, 791 though it
is certainly reflected in MAL.
The laws of talion are famously expressed within the personal injury
laws of LH treating offences against an awilum by an awilum. 792 In contrast
to all other collections treating this topic, 793 LH has the injury returned
upon the offending party e.g. LH 196 “If an awilum should blind the eye of
another awilum, they shall blind his eye.” 794 As with the contrast between
capital punishment and compensation, Westbrook contends that the differ-
ence between a talionic penalty and payment is not real. 795 Though this may
have been remotely possible in practice, the difference in framing is both
real and explainable, as it was in the case of capital punishment. This tali-
789 For the purposes of this work more general vicarious laws such as those in
which a family member can be sold into slavery or given over as a result of the
head of the household’s transgression will not be treated here. This section will
focus on those vicarious penalties in which some form of corporal or capital pun-
ishment is in view as it is here that cultural differences are discernable.
790 Except perhaps for LU 3 which seems to order imprisonment for some kind
of illegal detainment. Under talion we will not treat laws with the death penalty for
murder or laws which punish property offences with replacement or twofold re-
turn. Talion is here treated only in the cases where the penalty prescribed is to have
the offence meted out to the offender in return. Though the death penalty for
murder may fit this definition, this aspect of the laws has been treated in detail
elsewhere.
791 This practice of Hammurabi’s is witnessed in a comment by Rim-Sin of
Larsa, “You throw the slave into a kiln, because he threw a boy into the oven.”
AbB 9.197. Translation follows Van De Mieroop’s in Hammurabi, 109.
792 This writer includes LH 127, which prescribes the shaming of someone
guilty of baseless slander, among the talionic laws.
793 Which prescribe some form of monetary payment. See above. Note that
MAL does not treat this topic.
794 See also LH 197 and 200.
795 Westbrook, “Cuneiform Law,” 204 and Studies, 45–77.
onic approach to injury laws within LH seems to be the reasoning behind

some of the vicarious laws also e.g.
116 If the distrainee should die from the effects of a beating or other
physical abuse while in the house of her or his distrainer, the owner of
the distrainee shall charge and convict his merchant, and if (the dis-
trainee is) the man’s son, they shall kill his (the distrainer’s) son; if the
man’s slave, he shall weigh and deliver 20 shekels of silver; moreover, he
shall forfeit whatever he originally gave as the loan.
210 If that woman (a pregnant woman struck in a brawl) should die,
they shall kill his daughter.
230 If it should cause the death of a son of the householder, they shall
kill a son of that builder.
There are several laws in MAL which are talionic also. In MAL A 50
and 52 a man who strikes a pregnant woman is struck in return. MAL A
18–19 prescribe the shaming of an offender who slanders his companion.
MAL A 20 particularly adds to the violent penalties depicted within these
laws:
A20 If a man sodomizes his comrade and they prove the charges against
him and find him guilty, they shall sodomize him and they shall turn
him into a eunuch. 796
As in LH, there is also a law that combines a vicarious penalty with the
principle of talion; MAL A 55 prescribes that a man who rapes the daughter
of another man will marry her (if her father allows it) and will have his wife
raped and taken by the girl’s father. 797
Amongst the vicarious laws of LH and MAL it is fairly clear that the
family and slaves of the head of the household could pay for his offence but
the reverse was not the case. 798 That the whole household of the offending
head could be punished is evidenced also in ND. On two occasions an of-
fence by an official includes the giving of his family to the work of the tem-
ple estate. 799 On another the offending official is to have Osiris hunt down
and destroy both him and his family. 800
796 Again, for a discussion of the term ša reši see Siddall, “A Re-examination of
the Title ša reši in the Neo-Assyrian Period.”
797 It is possible that MAL A 24 involves vicarious punishment but this author
thinks it more likely that the offender’s wife is seen to be complicit in the offence.
798 See especially MAL A 2 and 32. See also LH 117–119, 151–152.
799 As serfs. ND II.B.2.b, II.B.3.b.
800 ND VI B.
COMPARISONS 229
Interestingly, ETel. denies the possibility of vicarious punishment. 801

Though it is in the specific case of treasonous offences by a prince, the
statement that the prince’s family are not to be punished for his crime is
opposed to the principle behind those vicarious laws of LH, MAL and ND.
It is also consistent with the Hittite tendency to avoid the more gratuitous
framing of their penalties as opposed to LH, MAL and Egypt, as can be
seen from the above comparison of corporal and capital punishment.
The bane of many a legal historian in the decades following LH’s re-
discovery and one of the favorite pieces of evidence for those who argue
for LH’s propagandistic rather than legal purposes, has been those laws in
which the penalty seems specifically formulated to fit the crime. Numerous
are the historians who have ruminated over the problem of applying LH 25
if the fire in the house from which the offender had looted had gone out,
just as they struggled with the application of the vicarious laws, for example,
in the case that the offender in LH 116 or 230 had no son, or he in 210 no
daughter. 802 From this some have moved towards the opinion that such
laws were not intended to have actual application to the practice of law in
Old Babylonia. 803 Though this author would not go so far, one must admit
that the most these laws could do in such a situation would be to serve as a
guide to encourage an equitable punishment. This is not to say that we ig-
nore the fact that LH frames its laws in such ways far more prominently
than other collections, with MAL trailing just behind. In contrast with all
the other collections treated in this study HL only contains two such laws
and these are mentions of punishments which have been done away with. 804
LU and LE each have one such law, with LU’s far from severe: 805
LU 25 If a slave woman curses someone acting with the authority of her
mistress, they shall scour her mouth with one sila of salt.
LE 60 [If] a guard is negligent in guarding [a house], and a burglar
[breaks into the house], they shall kill the guard of the house that was
broken into [ ... ], and he shall be buried [at] the breach without a grave.
801 e.g. §§ 31–32.

802 See section 2.1.4., note 303.
803 See the earlier discussion in chapter 1.
804 Part of karu . . . kinuna clauses in HL 92 (exposure to bee sting for theft of
bee hives) and 166 (torn apart by ploughing oxen for impure agricultural practice).
More will be said about the diachronic changes with HL shortly.
805 Compare the treatment of offences against those in superior position in LH
192–93, 205 and 282.

Within the Assyrian material there are four such penalties: 806
MAL A 8 If a woman should crush a man’s testicle during a quarrel,
they shall cut off one of her fingers. And even if the physician should
bandage it, but the second testicle then becomes infected(?) along with it
and becomes .... or if she should crush the second testicle during the
quarrel-they shall gouge out both her [ ... ]-s.
MAL A 9 If a man lays a hand upon a woman, attacking her like a rut-
ting bull(?), and they prove the charges against him and find him guilty,
they shall cut off one of his fingers. If he should kiss her, they shall draw
his lower lip across the blade(?) of an ax and cut it off.
MAPD 10 [Ninurta-apil-Ekur, overseer,] son of Eriba-Adad, himself
also overseer, issued a decree for his palace: (Any royal women), either
the king’s wives or other women [of the palace, who ... ] fight among
themselves and in their quarrel blasphemously swear by the name of
god, he shall [(not)] enter; they shall cut the throat of the one who
cursed,(?)] the god Ashur; in their quarrel she shall not satisfy the claim.
Within LH there are 9:
21 If a man breaks into a house, they shall kill him and hang(?) him in
front of that very breach.
25 If a fire breaks out in a man’s house, and a man who came to help
put it out covets the household furnishings belonging to the house-
holder, and takes household furnishings belonging to the householder,
that man shall be cast into that very fire.
192 If the child of (i.e., reared by) a courtier or the child of (i.e., reared
by) a sekretu should say to the father who raised him or to the mother
who raised him, “You are not my father,” or “You are not my mother,”
they shall cut out his tongue.
193 If the child of (i.e., reared by) a courtier or the child of (i.e., reared
by) a sekretu identifies with his father’s house and repudiates the father
who raised him or the mother who raised him and departs for his fa-
ther’s house, they shall pluck out his eye.
194 If a man gives his son to a wet nurse and that child then dies while
in the care of the wet nurse, and the wet nurse then contracts to care for
another child without the consent of his (the dead child’s) father and
mother, they shall charge and convict her, and, because she contracted
806 Two in MAL A 9. That in MAPD may only reflect the offence by coinci-
dence given the differing penalties for similar offences in the following decrees.
COMPARISONS 231
to care for another child without the consent of his father and mother,
they shall cut off her breast.
195 If a child should strike his father, they shall cut off his hand.
218 If a physician performs major surgery with a bronze lancet upon an
awilu and thus causes the awilu’s death, or opens an awilu’s temple with
a bronze lancet and thus blinds the awilu’s eye, they shall cut off his
hand.
253 If a man hires another man to care for his field, that is, he entrusts
to him the stored grain, hands over to him care of the cattle, and con-
tracts with him for the cultivation of the field-if that man steals the seed
or fodder and it is then discovered in his possession, they shall cut off
his hand.
256 If he (one who had hired out cattle or stolen seed so that crops
were not produced in the field) is not able to satisfy his obligation, they
shall have him dragged around through that field by the cattle.
Again this distribution is roughly equivalent to that found regarding
corporal punishments and this author postulates that such framing is linked
to a more general severity within MAL and LH. Given the small amount of
material from Egypt, the difference in subject matter and audience, little
harm is done to the theory presented here by the absence of such a framing
within ND or EH though the possibility is raised that this was a peculiarly
Mesopotamian phenomenon.
This author does not think it worthwhile attempting to compare the
other penalty types in such a systematic fashion given the mass of material.
In skirting this topic difficult issues such as the compensatory or punitive
nature of such penalties will be avoided, as will issues regarding the textual
certainty of the enormously high fines regarding offences against merchants
in HL. It may be worth noting that the extremely high manifold replace-
ments prescribed in ND (up to one-hundred-fold) are seen nowhere else,
the closest parallel being the thirty-fold of LH 8. This may say something
about the nature of ND and its purpose and envisaged implementation but
it would be unwise to push this argument too far. An observation which is
worth noting is that HL has the highest percentage of laws with simple re-
placement or substitution; laws which often attract higher penalties in other
collections. This supports the contention made here that HL were less se-
vere with their punishments in general. Another general difference to note
is the distinction in penalty for offences dependent on the victim’s gender
in HL in contrast to all other collections.
2.7.4 Diachronic Analysis of HL

The diachronic analysis of HL is complicated by the debates surrounding
the usefulness of typological analyses of both the Hittite language and script
for dating texts. 807 The lack of any firm evidence for dating the collection
makes conclusions as to the reasons for the changes within it somewhat
speculative. There are at least three stages reflected within HL, namely the
two represented by the karu . . . kinuna clauses and that of PT. Korošec
adds three stages prior to the karu . . . kinuna changes according to his as-
sumptions about legal development. 808 This writer does not adhere to these
assumptions. It is, however, possible to note differences between manu-
scripts of HL itself. An analysis of these differences is most useful in the
first series (i.e. laws 1–100) given the lengthier textual witnesses in KBo
6.2, 809 which Hoffner argues is in Hittite Old Script, 810 and KBo 6.3, 811
which he argues is in a New Kingdom script. The existence of text C for
this series, argued to exhibit the latest script, and its relation to HL and PT
can also be discussed. Some mention will be made of differences in the sec-
ond series 812 but the more fragmentary nature of the textual witnesses, PT’s
restriction to material from the first series, and the errors contained within
manuscript ‘p’, make such an undertaking more difficult.
The karu . . . kinuna clause appears 22 times within HL. 813 On two oc-
casions the provision in the kinuna clause is too broken to reconstruct the
difference to that in the karu clause. 814 For the most part there is a reduc-
tion of penalty from the karu clause to the kinuna. Hoffner displays this
adequately in Table 1 of his critical edition. 815 The reader is referred to this
807 Especially the case concerning the historical texts linked to an Arnuwanda or
Tudhaliya placed by some in the early fourteenth century BC (for archaisms in lan-
guage) and others to the thirteenth (for neat historical progression). See the discus-
sion of Weeks, Admonition and Curse, 57; Trevor Bryce, The Kingdom of the Hittites
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 414–15 and references therein.
808 See Haase, “The Hittite Kingdom,” 623.
809 Hereafter termed ‘A’ following Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 160.
810 Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 160.
811 Hereafter termed ‘B’ following Hoffner. All textual witnesses to HL will
hereafter be referred to by their sigla apud Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 160–64.
812 Certainly those including karu . . . kinuna clauses.
813 Across 24 different laws according to Hoffner’s numbering system due to
the continuation of the clause over 54–55 and 166–167.
814 HL 91, 122.
COMPARISONS 233
table. In most cases the reduction is fifty percent, though four reflect a sev-
enty percent reduction and one a reduction of one-third. 816 In two cases,
HL 9 and 25, the reduction is specifically linked to the king’s palace waiving
its share of the fine:
HL 9 If anyone injures a person’s head, they used to pay 6 shekels of
silver: the injured party took 3 shekels of silver, and they used to take 3
shekels of silver for the palace. But now the king has waived the palace
share, so that only the injured party takes 3 shekels of silver.
HL 25a [If] a person is impure in a vessel or a vat, they used to pay 6
shekels of silver: the one who is impure pays 3 shekels of silver, and
they used to take 3 shekels for the [king]’s house. 25b But now the king
has [waived] the palace’s share. The one who is impure only pays 3
shekels of silver. The claimant shall look to his/her house for it.
It is unclear whether the other reductions were due to the same re-
form. Some may reflect a change in the value of silver or other commodities
but this is unclear. 817 They seem to reflect a more general reduction in the
severity of penalties from previous times as seen in the abandonment of
several penalties involving corporal/capital punishment. In three cases theft
laws, once penalized with corporal or capital punishments, are reduced to
mere fines:
92 [If] anyone steals [2] or 3 bee hives, formerly (the offender) would
have been exposed to bee-sting. But now he shall pay 6 shekels of silver.
If anyone steals a bee-hive, if there are no bees in the hive, he shall pay 3
shekels of silver.
101 If anyone steals a vine, a vine branch, a..., or garlic, formerly [they
paid] one shekel of silver for one vine, one shekel of silver for one vine
branch, one shekel of silver [for one karpina-, one] shekel of silver for
one clove of garlic. And they shall strike a spear [ ... ] …. [Formerly]
they proceeded so. But now if he is a free man, he shall pay 6 shekels [of
silver]. But if he is a slave, he shall pay 3 shekels of silver.
121 If some free man steals a plow, and its owner finds it, he (the
owner) shall put [(the offender’s) neck] upon the … (a part of the
plow?), and [he shall be put to death(?)] by the oxen. This is how they
816 Hoffner’s table includes one law, HL 119, as reflecting a fifty-two percent
reduction but this is an error. The table lists a reduction from “25?:12,” Ibid., 6. In
his transliteration and translation of this law however, Hoffner has “40 shekels” as
the most likely penalty in the karu clause, Ibid., 109–110. This is then a seventy per-
cent reduction.
817 See Hoffner’s comments, Ibid., 6–7.
proceeded formerly. But now he shall pay 6 shekels of silver, and he

shall look to his house for it. If it is a slave, [he shall pay] 3 shekels of
silver.
There is another law, incidentally one which highlights the peculiarly
Hittite concern with ritual purity in its law collection, 818 where capital pun-
ishment has been reduced:
HL 166 If anyone sows (his own) seed on top of (another man’s) seed,
they shall place his neck on a plow. They shall hitch up [tw]o teams of
oxen: they shall turn the face of one in one direction and of the other in
the other direction. The man will be put to death, and the oxen will be
put to death. The party who first sowed the field shall reap it for him-
self. This is the way they used to proceed. HL 167 But now they shall
substitute one sheep for the man and 2 sheep for the oxen. He shall give
30 loaves of bread and 3 jugs of ... beer, and re-consecrate (the land?).
And he who sowed the field first shall reap it.
Though it is unclear exactly what the penalty was in former times in
HL 101 and 121, the punishments are clearly corporal or capital in nature,
in contrast to all other Hittite theft laws. Laws 92, 121 and 166 fit into the
category discussed above of laws in which a harsh punishment is made to
fit the crime. It was argued that the prevalence of corporal and capital pun-
ishment and the framing of harsh punishments made to fit the crime, were
most prevalent within Assyria, Egypt and LH. It was proposed that the im-
perial and centralized nature of these societies may have contributed to this.
The penalties of HL were contrasted to these more gruesome punishments.
What then to do about these laws? The fact that they have been done away
with in HL supports the theory presented here that the presentation of
harsh punishments in law collections can be generally connected with more
centralized and imperial societies. However, the mention of its earlier exis-
tence makes it difficult to push that theory in this case. It was noted in re-
gards to the Assyrian material, that MAL is not necessarily connected to
Assyrian kings, and that it may, and MAPD certainly does, date to a period
before imperialism has progressed very far (though centralization may
have). This raises the possibility that there may be a more general cultural
difference that lies beneath the prevalence of Assyria’s depiction of brutal-
ity. This may possibly be the explanation here also.
818 MAPD 7 is the one exception. The lack of its expression in law collections
does not imply that ritual purity per se was not of concern within other ancient Near
Eastern societies.
COMPARISONS 235
There is some debate as to the dating of the promulgation of the Old

Hittite version of HL. Many have ascribed this to Telepinu on little more
basis than the fact that there is other evidence of his initiation of reform. 819
Others have concluded that the mention of the “father of the king” in HL
55 and the colophon to D, 820 combined with the geographic references
within the laws, 821 must date the text to the reign of Mursilis I. The argu-
ment is not decided but the weight of evidence seems to be on the side of
those who would date the reforms of karu . . . kinuna, and most likely the
collection/promulgation of the rest of HL, to the reign of Mursilis I. If this
is the case, then it is most likely that the stage of law reflected by the karu
clause refers to that in place before the beginning of the Hittite Old King-
dom. A different cultural origin for these more gruesome laws would then
be a possibility. This makes more sense of the changes, given our ability to
link such gruesome penalties to specific cultures elsewhere, than hypothe-
sizing an early Hittite practice which changed over time. Whether this ear-
lier practice is to be attributed to the Hattic culture or elsewhere is specula-
tive. Given the links which can be made between this lack of gruesomeness
and severity within HL and the different way in which the Hittites ruled
their empire, 822 this author thinks it unlikely that this earlier stage of law
dates back to the Kussaran dynasty as Anitta already rules his empire in a
manner similar to that of the later New Kingdom. 823 The references to the
“palace share” in HL 9 and 25 and to exemptions in 51, 54–55 are not
problematic for the contention regarding the date of the karu stage as there
are numerous references to pre-Old Kingdom Anatolian palaces. 824
819 Namely the Edict of Telepinu. This is Hoffner’s argument in Roth, Law Collec-
tions, 214, and Haase’s, in “The Hittite Kingdom,” 623.
820 e.g. Archi, “Sulla formazione,” 58–59 and Pecchioli Daddi, “Il re,” 75–91.
821 B. J. Collins, “§ 54 of the Hittite Laws and the Old Kingdom Periphery,”
Orientalia 56 (1987): 136–41.
822 Weeks observed a similar correlation between their use of history within
their treaties and their imperial practice as compared to general Assyrian practice,
Admonition and Curse.
823 i.e. through independent vassals, which he claims to have helped. See “The
Proclamation of Anitta of Kuššar,” trans. Hoffner (COS 1.72: 182–84) and the de-
scription of Bryce, Hittites, 38–41.
824 For example see Bryce, Hittites, 29 or Mogens Trolle Larsen, The Old Assyrian
City-State and its Colonies (Copenhagen Studies in Assyriology 4; Copenhagen:
Akademisk, 1976), 154–56, 245.
Another aspect of change from karu to kinuna seems to be the reduc-

tion of exemptions from some form of corvée e.g. HL 51, 54–55. This merely
reflects a change in policy which has been incorporated into the collection.
The karu period here, like that for the reduced fines (as opposed to the
scrapped corporal/capital penalties), may possibly refer to an earlier period
of the Old Kingdom rather than the period before it. 825 Nevertheless, the
latter is also feasible, especially given the possibility that such exemptions
are now being revoked due to the incorporation of territory into the Hittite
realm. One law which seems problematic for the theory presented here, at
least in Hoffner’s translation, is HL 54. Here there is mention of “chariot
warriors” in a karu clause. 826 The ideogram which Hoffner translates as
chariot warrior is KUŠ7 in Hoffner’s transliteration. 827 This ideogram stands
for Akkadian kizu, “animal trainer” 828 which cannot be ruled out in this
context. “Chariot warrior” is a possible meaning for this ideogram accord-
ing to Rüster and Neu, 829 however, they also give “squire”, “groom” or
“servant” as possibilities. 830 Given the options available for this ideogram
and the likelihood karu refers to a pre-Hittite period, it is not necessary to
translate it with “chariot warriors”.
825 Hoffner, in Roth, Law Collections, 214 argues that the karu period definitely
refers to the early Old Kingdom. This is based on his dating of the reforms to the
reign of Telepinu.
827 Ibid., 65.
828 René Labat, Manuel d’épigraphie Akkadienne (6th ed.; Libraire Orientaliste Paul
Geuthner: Paris, 1988), sign 212 on page 121 and CDA, 163.
829 Christel Rüster and Erich Neu, Hethitisches Zeichenlexikon: Inventar und
Interpretation der Keilschriftzeichen aus den Boğazköy-Texten (Studien zu den Boğazköy-
Texten 2; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1989), 333: “Wagenlenker”.
830 “Knappe”, “Pferdeknecht” and “Diener”. Ibid., 333.
COMPARISONS 237
KBo 6.4, Hoffner’s Parallel Text (PT), supposedly dates to the New
Kingdom period and reflects a later stage of Hittite Law than the OH ver-
sion of HL. The most common difference between HL and PT is an in-
creased fine in the latter:
PT II-80 shekels HL 4-bringing for burial and one

person
PT IV-all the offender’s land and HL 6-100 gipeššar land
40 shekels
PT V-40 shekels HL 7-20 shekels
PT VI-20 shekels HL 8-10 shekels
PT IX-medical care, replacement HL 10- medical care, replacement
person to work, 3 shekel physician person to work, 6 shekel physician
fee, extra 6 shekel payment fee
PT XV-6 shekels HL 16-3 shekels
PT XVI-20 shekels HL 17-10 shekels
PT XVII-10 shekels HL 18-5 shekels
There is at least one law which lessens the penalty, 831 and four in
which it is the same. 832 There are many provisions within PT that are too
broken to compare meaningfully, and one which is difficult to place as a
parallel to HL. 833 These changes seem to merely be updates which are pos-
sibly due to economic circumstances of some sort and are similar to the
price-fixing changes one would expect to happen over time. There are other
changes which occur with these however.
There is not merely a change of price in the development from HL to
PT. For example, in the personal injury laws, an extra element is added. A
distinction is made in PT X and XI as to whether the injury inflicted had
permanent or temporary results. This distinction was obviously not helpful
831 The penalties in PT VII are less than those in HL 7–8. That in PT III may
be less than HL 5 but this author hesitates to admit such given the ridiculously high
penalties in the latter law i.e. 4000 shekels of silver for killing a merchant. The op-
posite is the case for PT XII–XIII and HL 13–14 where the penalties in the former
seem to high i.e. 30 and 15 mina may be a mistake for shekels in which case the
penalty would be slightly lower. For discussion see Hoffner’s commentary, Laws of
the Hittites, 170–71.
832 PT VIII and HL 9; PT X and HL 11; PT XI and HL 12; PT XIII and HL
14.
833 i.e. it is not certain that PT XXXIV parallels HL 44b.
in many of the other personal injury laws covered by PT e.g. the cutting off
of an ear/nose or the knocking of a tooth is obviously permanent. In a
number of laws the distinction, made in several laws in HL, between acci-
dental and intentional injury, is extended to other topics. 834 The distinction
made in HL 17–18 as to the gestation period of the unborn child which is
killed is done away with in PT XVI–XVII. The arrangement of the topics is
slightly different. For example, in HL 7–8 the blinding and knocking out
the teeth of a free man are treated together, followed by the same offences
against a slave. The two offences share the same penalty when against a
victim of the same status whereas in PT V–VII these topics are separated,
treating the blinding of a free man and slave and then the knocking out of
their teeth, with separate penalties for the two offences. The topics parallel
to those treated in PT XXXII–XXXIII are treated before those in PT
XXX–XXXI in HL. The same is the case for those in PT XXXVIII and
XXXVI–XXXVII. Within PT there is more consistency regarding the ratio
of punishment for offences against slaves in relation to those against free
men e.g. PT XII–XV create a ratio of 1:2 for these offences as against the
uneven ratios in HL 13–16. There is also a case where a clause is added re-
garding the penalty for an offence committed against a slave, where HL
discussed only its perpetration against a free person e.g. PT IX vs HL 10.
There are also two cases where a distinction is made in PT between of-
fences against free women in contrast to men when they had been treated
equally in HL. 835 On another occasion PT specifies an extra condition and a
threefold compensation for theft while HL had merely stated that the of-
fender was “considered a thief”. The laws regarding luzzi and šahhan are also
covered by PT. There is little change within these laws apart from the sub-
stitution of the terms luzzi and šahhan, 836 and free man and TUKUL-man. 837
This may reflect a change in policy towards these holdings or a looseness of
terminology. There is also one case, similar to the changes from karu to
kinuna, of cancellation of exemption. 838 This author does not think it wise
to offer an explanation for these changes other than to point out that they
seem to include more than mere price fixing, and less than the changes
from corporal/capital punishment to mere fines reflected in the karu . . .
kinuna clauses of HL.
834 PT V–VI.
835 PT II and IV in contrast to HL 3–4 and 6.
836 PT XXXVII–XXXIX
837 PT XXX
838 PT XXXVI
COMPARISONS 239
The same can be said for the differences within the various texts of
HL itself. To begin, it seems wise to analyze Hoffner’s claim that text C
reflects the same stage of law as PT. 839 The material from C covers only 20
laws. It is only possible to compare it to PT for 9 of these. 840 Out of these 9
laws, there are only two occasions where C agrees with PT in contrast to
the earlier recension of HL. 841 There are 5 occasions where the opposite is
true i.e. C agrees with the earlier recension witnessed in A and B in contrast
to PT. 842 There is one occasion where all three are the same, 843 and one
where C agrees with neither recension. 844 This evidence would seem to sug-
gest that C represents a stage of law somewhere between that represented in
B and PT. There are two occasions where C, along with B, adds material to
A, 845 two where C adds material to both, 846 and one where the material pre-
sented is fairly different to both. 847 There are also some other minor textual
variants within C that contrast to A and B. 848
C is not the only witness to HL (apart from PT) which exhibits differ-
ences to the Old Hittite version represented by A. There are a number of
occasions where the supposedly New Kingdom witness B displays variants
to A. Two were mentioned above regarding cases where B reflects the up-
dates of C in contrast to A. Some changes are minor vocabulary differences

840 HL 9, 11 or 12, 13–18, 45. The other material covered in C: HL 10, 26–30,
41–44 and 46, is broken for either PT or C, or is not covered by PT.
841 HL 17–18 in contrast to PT XVI and XVII (as witnessed in B as A does not
cover these sections due to breakage).
842 HL 9, 13–14, 16 and 45.
843 HL 15
844 Col. I, lines 10–11. This seems to be a parallel variant of HL 11. C has a
penalty of 6 shekels in contrast to A and B which have 20 and PT X which has 20
if the injury is permanent, 10 if it is temporary. Hoffner thinks the first section of
this part of C is a parallel to HL 11 but the penalty of 6 shekels he sees as a variant
of the penalty in HL 12, the scribe of C having skipped a line, Laws of the Hittites,
25, n. 32. This is possible given the fact C is missing a law here. In HL 12, A and
B’s penalties are broken but seem to be 10 shekels, PT XI has 10 if the injury is
permanent, 5 if it is not.
845 HL 42 and 44b.
846 HL 28a and 43. See Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 37–38 (esp. nn. 93–97) and
52 (esp. nn. 160–61).
847 HL 26
848 For example, see HL 28a. For references see note 841 above.
e.g. HL 39. 849 Others, such as HL 24 seem to reflect an updated approach to

a topic. HL 24 specifies a penalty of one month’s wages (12 shekels for a
male, 6 for a female) for someone who harbors a fugitive slave. In B, this
penalty is raised to one year’s wages (100 shekels for a male, 50 for a fe-
male). Though it is possible both may reflect per diem rates, lessening the
difference between them, the monetary amounts have still changed slightly.
In HL 56, B has changed the duties required as part of public service. 850 In
HL 98, A records compensation for the goods destroyed after a house is set
on fire. B declares that there is no compensation for the goods, only the
house. 851 With B, as with L, there are some minor changes amongst the real
estate laws relating to šahhan, luzzi and TUKUL which again, as in the case
of PT, may reflect looseness of terminology or changes in policy. 852 There
are some occasions in which L agrees with A in contrast to B. 853 These
changes are fairly minimal, generally reflecting the addition of details to
avoid uncertainty 854 and perhaps some slight changes in a few laws. The last
variant worth mentioning is that in witness X for HL 7. It is worth display-
ing all variant versions of this law:
HL 7 (A and B) If anyone blinds a free person or knocks out his tooth,
they used to pay 40 shekels of silver. But now he shall pay 20 shekels of
silver, and he shall look to his house for it.
PT V (=late version of 7) If anyone blinds a free man in a quarrel, he
shall pay 40 shekels of silver. If it is an accident, he shall pay 20 shekels
of silver.
HL 7 (X) 855 . . . [No]w [he shall pay] 10 shekels of si[lver…]
Within this law then there is a difference between karu and kinuna, dis-
playing the common 50% reduction, an increase in PT as well as the addi-
tion of extra criteria. X stands out as a reduction of the fine represented by
the kinuna stage. The possible mention of kinuna in X, in contrast to PT,
makes one suspect that X either represents a stage in between B and C/PT,
or reflects a scribal error. In the two following laws, HL 8–9, the only other
849 See Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 46, n. 140. See also HL 71.
850 i.e. it has left out the ice procurement recorded in A.
851 Of course this may be a scribal error.
852 B: HL 47a. L: HL 40
853 e.g. HL 39.
854 e.g. HL 42 and 44b.
855 See Hoffner, Laws of the Hittites, 21 and Haase, “Regelt § 9 der hethitischen
Rechtssammlung eine leichte Leibesverletzung?” Bibliotheca Orientalis 19 (1962): 115.

COMPARISONS 241
material available from X, the penalty is not preserved for this witness. This
makes any conclusions as to the date or nature of this text speculative.
The variants among the witnesses to the second series of laws, HL
101–200, are fairly minor being mainly slight differences of detail e.g. types
of animals listed in HL 180. There is little that can be said about these dif-
ferences given the fragmentary nature of most of the witnesses and the fact
that p, exhibiting the bulk of the variants, seems to contain errors. 856 For
the purposes of this study we are little interested in grammatical and ortho-
graphic variants. The reader is referred to the relevant sections of Hoffner’s
critical edition.
The differences reflected within the various witnesses to HL demon-
strate the uniquely Hittite tendency to reflect the updating of laws within its
law collections. This updating is reflected in the differences between karu
and kinuna and those from the earlier recension of the laws to PT. There are
some general trends discernible in the changes within each stage supporting
the idea that the latter also reflect more than mere textual variants. 857
Within other witnesses it is also possible to discern actual differences of law
most probably also reflecting changes of law between the period of writing
the Old Hittite copy in A, and the Parallel Text (PT). This is most clearly
seen in witnesses B and C. Unfortunately, given our lack of external or in-
ternal evidence to date these texts or the changes recorded by them, any
attempted explanation for them is no more than an educated speculation.
This writer suspects that the stage of law reflected by the corporal and capi-
tal punishments of former times, done away with by the Old Hittite version,
reflects a period before the onset of the Old Kingdom or the Kussaran dy-
nasty and thus the practice of a culture with a different worldview. The dif-
ficulties involved in explaining the changes within HL due to the lack of
evidence are also found in attempts at diachronic analysis of other collec-
tions, especially those in the Hebrew Bible.
856 e.g. HL 191, after the definition of an offence as hurkel, p adds “it is not an
offence”.
857 This fact is accepted generally for the changes between karu and kinuna
given the clear mention of change within the laws.

3 CONCLUSION
This thesis set out to compare the pre-first millennium B.C. ancient Near
Eastern law collections. The application of the method for this comparison,
as set forth in the opening chapter, has yielded a number of new conclu-
sions and questioned some widely held views regarding these collections.
The comprehensive and systematic comparison undertaken here has high-
lighted how overstated is the position that there is good evidence for wide-
spread borrowing amongst the ancient Near Eastern law collections. It has
also drawn attention to some of the limitations of form and genre criticism.
One of the goals of this thesis was to act as a corrective to the theory of a
common ancient Near Eastern culture, specifically in regards to the area of
law. The detailed comparisons of numerous aspects of these collections
have amply demonstrated the fallacy of this assumption. More than that,
this study has described and explained many of the differences between the
collections on the basis of differing contexts, be they cultural, political or
otherwise. The comparative nature of this thesis also enabled a broader per-
spective from which to analyze the vexed question of the nature, function
and purpose of these law collections. The following will briefly set out some
of these results. This will be followed by the implications these results and
the method used here have for future research, specifically that regarding
the subjects of ancient Near Eastern or biblical law, or comparative studies
in the field of ancient Near Eastern history in general.
3.1 WAS THERE A COMMON LEGAL CULTURE AND/OR WIDE-

SPREAD BORROWING?
In the opening chapter we discussed some of the difficulties faced in trying
to answer a question such as this. Given the fact that this thesis has focused
solely on the written law collections from the ancient Near East to the ex-
clusion of the documents from practice, the answer given here to the first
question is not necessarily applicable to the actual practice of law within the
societies of the ancient Near East. The many differences between the law
collections and the suspicion that they are related to actual legal practice to
some extent make it possible that some of the conclusions found could be
applicable to actual practice also. Within this focus there are difficulties of
explanation when similarity is found. Studies such as those of Tigay have
243
shown that borrowing does not necessarily lead to wholesale adoption,

mere copying or translation. 1 This makes the task of identification of bor-
rowings quite difficult when it comes to law collections as, theoretically, a
law collection may have borrowed a law from another collection yet have
changed the framing, phrasing, form and the penalty. 2 All one would be left
with would be a vaguely similar subject matter. This difficulty was encoun-
tered numerous times. For example, in the laws treating injury, whether to
people or animals, there was a great similarity of topic in terms of the ob-
jects of injury. It was impossible to decide whether this was simply due to
the nature of the offences being described i.e. there are only a certain num-
ber of body parts which could be injured and only a finite number of ways
to injure them in the societies producing the collections. The similarity of
the animals mentioned in these laws could be explained as due to the simi-
larity of the agricultural societies producing the collections which covered
this topic. The same problems arise in an attempt to treat the overlap across
collections in terms of which items were mentioned in theft laws. Similar
societies have similar things which could be stolen. The general correspon-
dence across collections concerning what was seen to be an offence, espe-
cially in the section on “criminal law”, may be explained as due to a com-
mon culture, a similar societal make-up, a common human nature or natural
law etc. There seems to be no objective way to decide upon such things.
Due to limitations in space, this work has not attempted to formulate a
methodology for exploring the issues of whether stimulus diffusion is more
likely in these specific examples, as opposed to independent invention in
similar societies. One suspects that it is the modern focus on intertextuality
and genre, arising out of structuralism, which has led some scholars to start
from the basis of such surface similarities and argue for literary borrowing.
Others have been influenced in another direction and have taken the posi-
tion that a common “scientific” legal culture spread with the cuneiform
language. These assumptions have been criticized in this thesis as unneces-
sary starting points.
The comparison of the distribution of forms within these collections
raised a number of problems for those who would wish to use these as an
aid to the origin of various sections of a text. The biggest problem was
caused by EH which included conditional clauses which were phrased as
first person commands. This argued against the Sitze im Leben scholars have
proposed for conditional, relative and/or apodictic clauses. A number of
1 Tigay, “On Evaluating”.

2 As Westbrook, “Character,” 17, in fact argues to some extent.
CONCLUSION 245
collections demonstrated the possibility of using a number of different

forms within the one document. If the drafters of these collections were
happy to do so, the onus is on the form critic to demonstrate that the origi-
nal drafter of an unwitnessed text would have composed a text with a pure,
original form. There was a general similarity in that a casuistic framing, in-
cluding conditional and relative clauses, was most common. LH demon-
strated the possibility of framing almost any topic within a casuistic clause.
The evidence did not seem to fit well with the assertion of some that an
apodictic framing was linked to a higher view of morality. This writer finds
it highly unlikely that a similarity of form is needed across two collections
for borrowing to have occurred, and even less likely that the widespread use
of various casuistic forms must be explained as due to any form of borrow-
ing. This can only be done through the hyper-diffusionist model of West-
brook and others who would postulate the spread of such a form from
Mesopotamia to Greece and Rome and onwards to later Western civiliza-
tions. It seems simpler to acknowledge the fact that there are a finite num-
ber of ways for any culture to express their laws.
There were some parallels among these collections which bear outlin-
ing. It must be admitted that among the cuneiform collections there was a
greater degree of similarity in terms of subject matter. This similarity was
heightened if one excluded the Hittite and Assyrian material and those col-
lections deemed to be edicts or decrees. Is this so surprising that one needs
to posit direct borrowing amongst these collections? Though it is a possibil-
ity, the similarity of the cultures and societies of Lower Mesopotamia in
general may well give a background to explain many of the supposed paral-
lels. This said, the geographic, linguistic and cultural closeness of these so-
cieties also makes borrowing of some kind an altogether more likely possi-
bility.
A greater number of parallels were found amongst the so-called “for-
mal law collections” than across all. It was difficult to assign this to an ex-
planation based on genre. It was also difficult to pin-point systematic com-
monalities in the usage of form or structure within these “formal” collec-
tions or to divine systematic differences to other collections such as edicts
and decrees. The main difference between edicts/decrees on the one hand
and the “formal collections” on the other, seemed to be subject matter, and
even here there was much overlap e.g. price fixing in formal collections such
as LH and LE, annulment of economic duties in HL, criminal topics in
ETel. and ETud. etc.
Within the Lower Mesopotamian collections containing non-legal sec-
tions there was much thematic overlap, some overlap in phrasing, but few
parallels in regard to ordering. A structural development within Lower

Mesopotamia from RU to LU to LL to LH was posited as a possibility. LH
stood out from these other collections in its emphasis on his military
achievements. This was seen to fit nicely within the context of his imperial
conquests. Of the themes shared amongst these collections the concern that
a future ruler not efface the inscription is a general one in ancient Near
Eastern inscriptions and cannot be seen as due to borrowing specifically
from any other law collection. The other themes which are shared, such as
divine election, the establishment of freedom etc. may be due in part to liter-
ary borrowing, but all reflect a similarity in worldview common to southern
Mesopotamia. The non-legal sections of other collections were very differ-
ent to these and displayed the possibility of diversity. For example, LE’s
superscription shares some themes with the non-legal sections of the
monumental law collections above, but also shared similarities with the su-
perscriptions common to Old Babylonian edicts. There were some general
parallels across collections which contained a non-legal section, including
those in Egypt. The lengthier non-legal portions, often termed prologues
and epilogues, were uniformly connected to the actions of the king who
boasted of his achievements.
A very high degree of similarity was found amongst the laws on the
topics of damage to rented oxen and boats. This heightened evidence for
parallel material coincided with some of the subject matter of the so-called
“scholarly” or “school texts”. Despite the parallels in topic, body parts of
the oxen to be injured, and even penalties in some cases, it is hard to decide
whether a common practice or literary borrowing is more likely, or even
whether this is again, merely a topic with finite possibilities treated by simi-
lar societies. There is a fair amount of difference in phrasing across all the
collections outlining this topic, and HL shows a lower degree of similarity
than the Lower Mesopotamian collections display amongst themselves. 3 In
the case of damage to boats, treated in LL, SLHF, SLEx, LH and MAL, the
laws in MAL stood apart from the others, again displaying the higher degree
of similarity amongst the Lower Mesopotamian collections. One set of laws
in LL and SLHF seemed to be identical, almost word for word. There was
only one other case of such verbatim similarity. 4 This is somewhat prob-
lematic. If this word for word copying was possible, why is it not more fre-
quent? Perhaps its existence in a school text from almost the same period as
the more formal collection, in close geographical proximity and in the same
3 LH, LL, LOx, SLEx, SLHF.

4 LX l and LH 111.
CONCLUSION 247
language goes some way to explaining its existence here. However, there are
no other word for word borrowings from LL in SLHF apart from this one.
The other example, that of LX l and LH 111, again occurs between two
texts close in proximity both geographically and temporally. It is possible
that the existence of such direct borrowings, though few in number, should
make one more open to the possibility of stimulus diffusion, or lesser bor-
rowings, seen in such things as similarity of subject matter.
Numerous other topics showed a degree of similarity. For the most
part this was fairly general and related only to the topic treated. In many
cases, though the general topic was similar, the focus of the “parallel” laws
or the exact situation treated were quite different, let alone the particular
phrasing used or the penalty given. As mentioned above, most of the closer
parallels that were found were amongst Lower Mesopotamian collections,
and very few of these were close enough to demand an explanation on the
basis of borrowing. This is not to say that exact parallels were rife even
here. There were numerous differences amongst these collections on every
topic. Though the parallels were most common here, there was not so
much material common between any two collections to be able to firmly
state that any collection had borrowed from any other to any great extent.
Rather there were isolated cases of similarity across a number of these col-
lections. In most cases, this similarity was only found across two or three
collections. MAL displayed significant differences to rulings within Lower
Mesopotamian collections on many occasions e.g. marriage law concerning
the need for a contract, divorce, inheritance, the absentee husband, miscar-
riage and abortion etc. HL displayed a number of minor similarities to other
collections e.g. a vague similarity in topic, but regularly contained laws with
very contradictory rulings to other collections and was rarely treating exactly
the same topic. Some of the differences that were found amongst these col-
lections will be outlined below. The prevalence of similarity within Lower
Mesopotamia as opposed to Assyrian, Hittite or Egyptian collections fits
with this writer’s initial suspicion that cultural differences would permeate
the law collections. There is good evidence for the spread of cuneiform
learning to Egypt e.g. the Amarna archive, yet few argue for wide scale bor-
rowing by Egypt from Mesopotamia. One wonders why this is claimed so
quickly when it comes to other cultures, especially ancient Israel and Judah,
for whom there is little concrete evidence of cuneiform scribal schools.
3.2 SYSTEMATIC DIFFERENCES AND THEIR EXPLANATION

Apart from the many different rulings, the differences in arrangement,
phraseology and vocabulary, and the unique topics (or at least focuses
within a topic) covered, within the framing and penalties of these collec-
tions there were a number of consistent differences. Contextual explana-
tions for these differences are possible and their acceptability is bolstered by
similar differences in other text types e.g. historical texts and treaties. The
main contexts which can be used to explain these differences are culture
and society/politics. Personal contexts are also a possibility.
The Hittite collections exhibit a number of peculiarities which can be
associated with the culture and make-up of Hittite society and their political
practice. These have parallels in the way the Hittites wrote history and
framed treaties. The Hittite law collections, more than any other, stood
apart in that they acknowledged change in the law. This was seen in HL
both within individual texts e.g. karu. . . kinuna clauses, the publication of
PT, and also across the various copies of the text. These changes involved
more than mere price fixing and included changes from corporal punish-
ments to monetary ones as well as the addition of new aspects to laws. This
acknowledgement of change was also seen in ETel. with its outlining of
past practice and the new implementation of succession rules. Along with
this willingness to acknowledge change, in the Hittite collections there was a
willingness, not found elsewhere, to give details of the situation leading up
to the giving of a specific law or to give an explanation of the purpose of
the law. 5 This was seen in HL 49 and 55, ETel. and ETud. All of this paral-
lels nicely with the Hittite use of history elsewhere. The Hittites, in contrast
to most, acknowledge mistakes by previous and current kings and mention
bad things which happen to them. This seems to be part of their general
approach to historiography in which they use history to teach lessons and to
motivate obedience. The long prologues to their treaties, outlining the good
the Hittite king had done for the vassal in an attempt to motivate obedience
is almost without parallel in the ancient Near East. 6 Weeks has argued that
this particular use of history which needs to include positive and negative
details in order to teach lessons, can be seen to be linked to the lesser de-
gree of centralization at Hatti. 7 This aspect of Hittite kingship is also re-
flected in ETud.’s and HL 55’s description of the process leading up to the
giving of laws. Each of these details subjects of the king coming to him as a
delegation and being involved in the production of the law set forth. Con-
trast this to centralized Egypt and EH’s description of Haremhab consult-
5 The “because clauses” of LH do not compare at all as discussed earlier.

6 Apart from the prologues to covenants in the Hebrew Bible and the treaties
of Esarhaddon and Aššur-banipal. See Weeks, Admonition and Curse.
7 Ibid., e.g. 176–77.
CONCLUSION 249
ing with his own heart to produce the laws he sets forth. The lack of any
specific attribution of HL to a king may be of significance here also, but
that is not certain.
Another aspect of HL which sets it apart from other collections is its
concern with ritual purity, especially in regards to the person of the king.
This is seen in a number of laws and is reflected in the king’s great role in
the cult at Hatti. 8 Interestingly, in regard to purity laws, HL has far harsher
penalties for incest than LH. This is in contrast to a comparison of penalties
in HL and LH regarding criminal law topics, with HL usually containing
penalties far beneath its Mesopotamian counterparts. Perhaps this high-
lights the relative import of ritual purity at Hatti. 9 MAL displays a difference
to all other collections in its higher view of the value of the unborn child in
its laws concerning miscarriages and abortion.
The only other collection to acknowledge change in the law was RU. It
is worth noting that Lagash, like the Hittites, employed a historiography to
teach lessons. In Admonition and Curse Weeks has also made some links be-
tween the existence of treaties involving Lagash, and those of the Hittites in
contrast to Assyria and Egypt. 10 This supports the argument presented here
that such acknowledgement reflects a difference in historiography and per-
haps society or culture.
The differences in punishment within these collections were also
found to parallel certain aspects of the cultures behind them. This was seen
most clearly in the use of corporal punishment in the Assyrian and Egyptian
collections. 11 The brutal punishments in MAL, MAPD, EH, ND and ED
very much parallel the uniquely gruesome nature of the historical inscrip-
tions of Assyrian and Egyptian imperialism. LH also contained a number of
corporal and brutal punishments, though far fewer on average than the As-
syrian and Egyptian collections. This was possibly due to Hammurabi’s im-
perial context and associative brutalization. It parallels the emphasis on the
curse in Hammurabi’s treaty negotiations with Mari. 12 The Lower Mesopo-
8 For example Mursilis II mentions taking care of religious festivals before go-
ing on campaign, “The Ten Year Annals of Great King Muršili II of H}atti,” trans.
Richard H. Beal (COS 2.16: 82–90), Year 4, page 86.
9 This is paralleled in the harsh penalties found in “Instructions for Palace Per-
sonnel to Insure the King’s Purity,” trans. by Albrecht Goetze (ANET, 207).
10 Weeks, Admonition and Curse, ch. 1 and conclusion.
11 It should be remembered that the corporal and brutal punishments within
HL have been argued to be from a pre-Hittite period as all of them, apart from
those to be meted out upon slaves, are within karu clauses.
12 See Van De Mieroop, King Hammurabi, 21. As opposed to historical argument
tamian cultural background perhaps tempered this somewhat in the case of

LH. Vicarious punishments were found in LH, MAL and ND, talionic ones
in LH and MAL, the mode of death was graphically specified mostly in LH
and MAL and capital punishment was most rife in these same collections
also. In terms of capital punishment, the Old Babylonian collections, LH
and AE, were the only two to punish theft with the death penalty. This par-
alleled the great concern within these collections in regards to economic
matters, including the activities of merchants. This correlates with the na-
ture and structure of Old Babylonian society, specifically its economic
structure.
This greater degree of brutality in the punishments of Egypt and As-
syria parallels their historical inscriptions as mentioned above. It is difficult
to decide whether this is to be connected with Assyrian culture in general or
specifically with the period of empire. In Egypt this is also difficult to de-
cide given our meager evidence for law in any period other than the New
Kingdom. Given the changes in historiography which accompany the first
intermediate period in Egypt e.g. acknowledgement of problems and failure,
one would suspect that the severity of punishments would also change.
There seems to be a loose correlation between centralization and brutality
of punishments. This is seen most clearly when contrasting the Hittite col-
lections with those of Assyria and Egypt. This contrast again fits a contrast
in historiography and in the use of treaties. It is rare for the Assyrians to
motivate obedience through history in their treaties. In most periods they
tend to avoid treaties. Motivation to obedience is on the basis of fear rather
than benefit in most extant treaties as seen in the emphasis on curses rather
than the historical prologues of the Hittites. Egypt in almost all periods also
eschews the use of treaties and does not motivate obedience through his-
tory of deeds done for the benefit of their allies. The one Egyptian treaty
which is extant portrays the might of the Egyptian king forcing the Hittite
king to plead for mercy. 13 Assyrian and Egyptian foreign relations are much
more authoritarian and motivated by fear rather than thankfulness or the
discernment of benefit. This parallels the lack of explication within Assyrian
and Egyptian laws and the harsh nature of the penalties. LH shares some of
these aspects with Assyria and Egypt but to a far lesser degree. The brutality
used for motivation.

13 Treaty between Hattušiliš III and Ramesses II. For English translation of the
two versions see John A. Wilson, “Treaty Between the Hittites and Egypt”
(ANET, 199–201) and Albrecht Goetze, “Treaty between Hattusilis and Ramses
II” (ANET, 201–3) or Beckman, Diplomatic Texts, 96–100 (which only treats the
Egyptian version of the treaty i.e. that found in Hatti and written in Akkadian).
CONCLUSION 251
of some of the punishments within LH is not paralleled in Hammurabi’s

inscriptions which fit well into the typical Mesopotamian inscriptions of the
time.
The Egyptian centralization in the person of the king is seen in the
framing of its law collections as the first person commands of the Pharaoh.
This writer thinks, despite the anecdotal evidence for some form of written
law in Egypt, that this sole focus of power in the person of the Pharaoh
combined with his divine status and the unwillingness of Egyptian royal
historiography to acknowledge change or defeat may explain the non-
existence of a law collection in Egypt on par with those cuneiform collec-
tions from elsewhere. Though this writer finds a number of points of dis-
agreement with the intuitive method of Wilson and Speiser, he believes that
their focus on the framing of Egyptian kingship may well be the way to be-
gin an explanation for this anomaly, particularly the possibility that the idea
of a law independent from Pharaoh was anathema. 14 This would neatly par-
allel the almost complete non-existence of evidence for Egyptian vassal
treaties.
The harsh nature of MAL may be due in part to the isolated nature of
the Assyrian king. 15 This may have led him to project the devious nature of
the harem, the seat of many a conspiracy, and the perceived need for harsh
discipline within it to the broader society. Some would argue for a geo-
graphic determination of the harshness of Assyrian culture and point to the
later empires of the Abbasids and Saddam Hussein. 16 This writer thinks it
more likely to be the similar context of empire rather than the geography
which was a factor here.
These systematic differences between the law collections of the ancient
Near East and the ability to connect them to differences in regards to histo-
riography, treaty framing and existence and conceptions of kingship should
certainly make one hesitate before ascribing a common culture to the an-
cient Near East. Questions of the priority of contexts do arise, however.
Within this thesis it has been noted repeatedly that there is a higher level of
similarity within Mesopotamia, particularly Lower Mesopotamia. This is
borne out in a number of different aspects of these collections as outlined
above. Within Mesopotamia, however, Assyria stands out as different quite
often. LH also displayed a number of differences e.g. focus on economic
14 Wilson, “Authority and Law,” esp. p. 6; Speiser, “Cuneiform Law,” 540.

15 See N. K. Weeks, “Assyrian Imperialism and the Walls of Uruk.”
16 This writer has only had this theory communicated to him verbally, not seen
it in print.
factors, harsher framing including its treating of theft as a capital offence,

the particular framing of its drafter in terms of equivalent penalties etc. The
material written in Sumerian, if RU is excepted, displayed very few differ-
ences in terms of framing or penalties and shared much without necessarily
having borrowed from each other regularly. This is not necessarily due to a
difference of Sumerian culture, however. LL for example is often seen as
part of the Old Babylonian rather than Early Dynastic or Ur III periods of
Sumerian rule. Many have written on the dangers and difficulties of at-
tempting to distinguish Sumerian from Akkadian culture. 17 This writer will
not attempt such a program either. The distinctions that have been discov-
ered in this work lend themselves to explanation on the basis of culture,
society, politics and personality, but not race. The hopelessly mixed nature
of the population of Mesopotamia would make such an approach to the
material untenable. There are firm links between the Lower Mesopotamian
collections which may be due to their situation within the same cultural
sphere. There are differences within this which are associated with factors
such as societal make up and the context of empire in the case of LH, and
the different use of history at Lagash for RU. MAL share more aspects
within broader Mesopotamia than do HL or Egypt, which shares almost
nothing with the other collections.
3.3 REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE, FUNCTION AND PURPOSE OF

THE COLLECTIONS
The analysis of the evidence used to decide upon the nature, function and
purpose of these law collections demonstrated its inconclusive nature. It
was argued that the most useful material to attempt to decide on such issues
was the stated intentions within the collections themselves. This was par-
ticularly applicable to LH which contained numerous statements regarding
Hammurabi’s desired outcomes which were to result from the setting up of
his stele. Addresses within the text, whether those of LH to the future ruler
or the awilum h}ablum, or those in the Egyptian collections or MAPD to royal
officials, were also quite useful. Other than this material the actual content
of the collections, whether the boasting of the non-legal sections or the
17 e.g. those collected in the various articles collected in E. Sollberger, ed., “As-
pects du Contact Suméro-Akkadien,” Genava 8 (1960): 241–314. See especially
Kraus’ famous article “Ein zentrales Problem,” and the comments made in conclu-
sion pp. 294–96 or his Sumerer und Akkader, ein Problem der altmesopotamischen
Geschichte (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1970). Similar problems are mentioned by
Tigay, “On Evaluating,” 253.
CONCLUSION 253
laws themselves, and superscriptions, colophons etc. gave some clues. Most
of the evidence brought to bear to decide these issues e.g. documents from
practice, form, genre, connection to scribal schools, the existence of copies
etc., was found impotent, despite the forced arguments of some.
In general, most internal contradictions which scholars had seen within
individual collections were found to be non-existent or explainable. 18 MAL
A 21 and A 50 were perhaps exceptions. The distance kept between these
two laws gave a possible link to the contention of this writer that the Meso-
potamian collections, and especially the Assyrian ones, were not happy to
acknowledge change within the law. The proximity of MAL A 17 and 18
which also seem to disagree would temper this conclusion somewhat.
LH’s undue influence on scholar’s opinions 19 regarding the topic of
the nature, function and purpose of other collections was noted. Given the
ability of this thesis to demonstrate significant cultural differences in the
framing of law collections in the ancient Near East it is hoped that this will
be avoided in the future.
This writer contends that an attempt to reconstruct the societies which
would result from the application of the laws within each collection would
be a useful aid to understanding their purposes. 20 This approach was un-
derutilized in this study due to limitations of space. The Old Babylonian
economic focus in LH and AE was noted, however.
3.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study has a number of implications for the study of ancient Near East-
ern law (including that of the Hebrew Bible) and comparative approaches to
ancient Near Eastern and biblical studies. The most important conclusion
to come out of the research presented here is that similar societies can ex-
hibit a fair degree of similarity while allowing room for significant differ-
ences. These differences cannot be uniformly explained as due to just one
context whether cultural, historical, political or personal. The focus of the
present thesis was the laying out of differences accompanying both cultural
and historico-political contexts. It is hoped that this will act as a corrective
18 e.g. the agricultural laws of LH.

19 Especially considering the indeterminate nature of most of the evidence used
to construct its nature, function and purpose.
20 Or at least the aspects of the societies reconstructable from the topics cov-
ered in the collections. For an example of this approach as applied to the economic
implications of the laws in the Hebrew Bible see Neil M. Soss, “Old Testament
Law and Economic Society,” Journal of the History of Ideas 34 (1973): 323–44.
to the theory that there was a uniform culture in the ancient Near East
which developed at the same rate everywhere.
Another possibility raised by the material here presented is that the
comparison of texts with similar content but different genre can be fruitful.
It is also hoped that the approach adopted here with its greater focus on
content as opposed to form or genre will be found useful elsewhere. It was
found difficult to explain the diachronic changes within HL without any
specific statements regarding the date or purpose of such changes within
the text itself. This problem was exacerbated by the lack of any objective
criteria to firmly date the various copies of the text. I hope to test the con-
clusion reached in this work that similar content within different genre can
be fruitfully compared by comparing the collections of the Hebrew Bible
within their various formulations, including those within a covenant, to
those presented here.
There are a number of more specific implications that this study has
for future research. Many of the cultural specificities attributed to the Hit-
tite law collections e.g. the including of more historical information and ex-
planation, the ability to acknowledge change, the concern with purity within
law collections treating other topics etc., find parallels with the law within
the Hebrew Bible. Weeks has fruitfully compared Hittite treaties and the
covenants of the Hebrew Bible on the basis of other similarities. Rather
than postulating borrowing one way or the other, his explanation for the
similarity rested partly on the lesser degree of centralization in the two so-
cieties. In the future this writer hopes to bring the law collections of the
Hebrew Bible into this discussion and apply the method used here to see
what conclusions can be made. One difference which comes to mind be-
tween the Hittite and Israelite collections is the relative prevalence of cor-
poral and capital punishments in the latter. In this thesis it has been argued
that this may be related to the lack of centralization at Hatti as compared to
the collections of Assyria and Egypt. This writer suspects that a phenome-
non similar to that found in the one area in which the Hittites did outstrip
their Near Eastern counterparts in the severity of punishment, laws regard-
ing purity, may explain this oddity when it comes to Israel also. This would
confirm the suspicion presented here that focus on a sole context, in this
case political structure, is too simplistic to account for the complexity of the
evidence. 21 It is thought that by leaving Israel out of this discussion thus far
this work has managed to demonstrate the falsity of many of the ap-
21 In this vein, see Kuper’s critique of the similarly deterministic approach to

social constructivism, Culture.
CONCLUSION 255
proaches taken to the study of ancient Near Eastern and biblical law, and
comparison in general, and that it has freed the way for a new approach to
these topics. Perhaps this will aid Kitchen’s hope that methods which are
demonstrably false when applied to areas other than Israel will not be ap-
plied to Israel. 22 This study has shown that an attempt to explain phenom-
ena from within a text’s context before appeal to comparative material is
both workable and productive. The method of trying to understand laws
within their own cultural connections before imposing understandings de-
rived from other cultures should be applied to biblical law also.
Two particular areas which I think could benefit from comprehensive
comparative studies using the method employed here, and that of Weeks
regarding treaties, are the historiography and the kingship of the ancient
Near Eastern cultures. 23 Such studies would also offer an alternative to cur-
rent research which imports modern typological models to explain the
data. 24 A more subjective study, which may be of use, would include a com-
parison of the relationship of the differences found between societies in
these diverse areas of their civilization with their general religious and moral
conceptions, or what may be termed their “worldviews”. This would need
to include openness to the influence of other contexts upon the operation
of these societies.
22 Kitchen, Ancient Orient and Old Testament, 28.

23 Some work has been done in these areas already, but not in the comprehen-
sive, systematic and comparative way envisaged by this writer.
24 e.g. models drawn from anthropology or ethnography regarding the operation
of complex societies, or the importation of models drawn from modern textual
propaganda to interpret ancient texts.
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INDEX OF REFERENCES
AE ETud.: 37, 42, 60, 10: 189, 192, 197,

3: 47 144, 181, 186, 237, 238, 239
4: 47, 138 221, 245, 248 11: 190, 197, 237,
5: 138 Exodus 239
6: 47, 138 18: 114 12: 190, 197, 237,
7: 138 21:12-13: 183 239
8: 138 21:22: 198, 199, 13: 191, 197, 237,
18: 138 207 238, 239
Deuteronomy 21:22-25: 210 14: 191, 197, 237,
22:22-29: 166 21:28-36: 210 238, 239
22:23-24: 163 21:31: 210 15: 191, 197, 238,
22:23-27: 169 22:2-3: 151, 152 239
25:11-12: 194 Hittite Instruction 16: 191, 197, 237,
ED: 37, 72, 73, 80, for Border 238, 239
249 Officials 17: 198, 201, 206,
EH: 37, 42, 46, 49, 36: 114 207, 237, 238,
53, 55, 60, 66, 69, HL 239
72, 80, 81, 91, 95, 1: 180, 181, 183, 18: 198, 207, 237,
97, 102, 113, 128, 185, 187, 188 238, 239
144, 145, 154, 2: 180, 182, 183, 19: 153
220, 221, 223, 187, 188 20: 149, 153, 158
224, 231, 244, 3: 182, 183, 185, 21: 149, 153, 158
248, 249 238 24: 149, 150, 240
ETel. 4: 182, 183, 237, 25: 233, 235
21: 144 238 26: 118, 239
28: 48 5: 180, 182, 183, 27: 117, 119, 158,
29: 48, 53 237 239
31: 144, 186, 229 6: 183, 237, 238 28: 116, 166, 239
32: 144, 186, 229 7: 189, 190, 197, 29: 116, 239
33: 144, 186 237, 238, 240 30: 116, 239
49: 73, 114, 180, 8: 189, 190, 197, 31: 158, 171
181, 185, 187, 237, 238, 240 32: 121, 171
225 9: 192, 197, 233, 33: 171
50: 73, 114, 179 235, 237, 239, 34: 158, 171
240 37: 184, 185
277
38: 184, 185 77b: 214 128: 147

39: 119, 240 78: 214, 215 129: 144
40: 119, 240 80: 213, 214 132: 171
41: 119, 239 81: 143, 144, 146 133: 171
42: 119, 239, 240 81-85: 143 142: 171
43: 158, 180, 184, 82: 144, 146 143: 171
239 83: 146 163: 179, 219
44a: 180, 184, 85: 146 164: 219
185, 239 86: 144, 146, 219 165: 219
44b: 114, 179, 87: 219 166: 147, 219,
237, 239, 240 88: 219 226, 229, 232,
45: 144, 239 89: 219 234
46: 239 90: 219 167: 219, 232, 234
46-56: 119 91: 143, 232 168: 118, 219
47a: 240 92: 143, 144, 229, 169: 118, 219
47b: 158 233, 234 170: 171, 179,
48: 48, 158 93: 143, 151, 152, 180, 225
49: 60, 248 171 171: 122, 158
50: 48, 158 94: 144, 150, 225 172: 171
51: 48, 158, 235, 95: 143, 150, 151, 173: 171
236 158, 171, 221, 173a: 225, 226
52: 48 225 173b: 221
53: 158 97: 143, 171 174: 188
54: 48, 232, 235, 98: 219, 240 175: 158
236 99: 143, 158, 171, 176a: 114, 179,
55: 48, 60, 106, 219, 221 211
115, 232, 235, 100: 158, 219 178: 48
236, 248 101: 144, 171, 179: 48
56: 48, 240 233, 234 180: 48, 241
57: 143, 144 102: 114, 143, 179 181: 48
57-70: 143 104: 219 182: 48
58: 144, 146 105: 171, 219 183: 48
59: 144, 146 106: 158, 219 184: 48
60: 219 107: 219 186: 48
61: 219 109: 219 187: 114
62: 219 111: 114, 179 188: 114
63: 144, 146 113: 219 189: 172, 225
64: 144, 146 119: 144, 233 190: 173
69: 146 121: 144, 147, 191: 170, 174,
70: 144, 146 171, 226, 233, 225, 241
71: 146, 240 234 192: 173
74: 158, 214 122: 232 193: 117, 173
75: 214 126: 114, 143, 194: 170, 171,
77: 158, 208 148, 226 173, 174
INDEX 279
195: 173, 174, 225 29: 166, 167, 168 4: 174, 175
195a: 225 30: 166, 167, 168 5: 224
196: 171, 173 31: 170, 171 6: 128, 129, 130,
197: 155, 157, 32: 122, 123 131, 137, 139,
159, 162, 163, 32-35: 122 148
164, 170, 225 36: 126, 139 7: 129, 131, 134
198: 114, 155, 37: 126 8: 129, 130, 131,
157, 158, 159, 40: 139, 149, 152 136, 137, 138,
225 42: 189, 190, 191, 139, 145, 146,
199: 114, 172 192, 197 147, 148, 231
200a: 114, 158, 43: 192, 197 9: 129, 131, 132,
172 44: 189, 190, 197 152, 153
200b: 122, 123 45: 189, 190, 197 9-13: 131
Instructions to 46: 189, 197 10: 129, 132, 152
Commanders of 47: 192 11: 129, 131, 132,
Border Garrisons: 47A: 187, 188, 133, 152, 174
113, 114, 181 192 12: 131, 132, 152
35: 185 48: 113, 115, 179, 13: 129, 132, 133,
LE 212 152, 174
1: 198 49: 139, 149 14: 129, 153, 225
4: 215 50: 139, 146, 148, 15: 129, 133, 148,
5: 216 149 149
6: 139, 146, 215 51: 47 16: 129, 133, 148,
12: 47, 139, 151, 52: 47 149
152, 225 53: 209, 210 19: 129, 133, 148
13: 47, 139, 151, 54: 188, 209, 210, 21: 129, 133, 150,
152, 225 212 225, 226, 230
15: 47 55: 209, 210, 212 22: 129, 133, 150,
16: 47 56: 188, 212 225
17: 116 57: 212 23: 126, 137, 175
18: 116, 117 58: 114, 212, 225 24: 142
18A: 124 59: 117 25: 94, 129, 133,
19: 47, 124 60: 139, 219, 225, 226, 229, 230
20: 124 226, 229 26: 119, 225
21: 124 Leviticus 27-41: 119
22: 125 19:29: 174 33: 73, 119, 225
23: 125 21:9: 174 34: 73, 225
24: 125, 225 LH 36: 47
25: 116 1: 174, 180, 186, 38: 47
26: 155, 161, 168, 225 39: 47
225 2: 174, 176, 179, 40: 47
27: 115 225 41-48: 127
28: 115, 155, 160, 3: 174, 175, 180, 49: 124
161, 225 186 50: 124
52: 127 129: 114, 155, 166: 121

53: 218 157, 159, 167, 167: 119, 120
54: 218 177, 225, 226 168: 121
55: 218 130: 155, 161, 169: 121
56: 218 168, 225 170: 120, 121, 122
57: 219 131: 177 171: 120, 121
58: 219 132: 178 172: 119, 120
59: 219 133: 93, 155, 166, 173: 119, 120
61-65: 127 167, 168 174: 119, 120
62: 127 133a: 164 175: 121
63: 127 133b: 164, 165, 176: 121
d: 118 177, 225, 226 177: 120
e: 218, 219 134: 93, 166, 167 180: 121
s: 171 135: 93, 166, 167, 185: 122
t: 124 168 185-94: 122
u: 124 136: 93, 166, 167, 187: 47
x: 134, 138, 139 168 188: 123
y: 135, 138 138: 117, 165 189: 123
bb: 134 139: 117 190: 123
106: 135 141: 117, 164, 165 191: 123
107: 135, 138 142: 117, 164, 192: 123, 229, 230
108: 134, 135, 226 165, 166, 172 193: 123, 229, 230
109: 225 143: 117, 164, 194: 137, 230
110: 225, 226 165, 166, 167, 195: 192, 193,
111: 124, 246, 247 172, 225, 226 199, 231
112: 135 149: 118 196: 190, 197, 227
114: 125 150: 120 197: 189, 197, 227
115: 125 151: 228 198: 142, 189,
116: 125, 171, 152: 228 190, 191, 197
228, 229 153: 187, 225, 226 199: 189, 190, 197
117: 228 154: 171, 172 200: 189, 197, 227
118: 228 155: 171, 225, 226 201: 189, 191, 197
119: 228 156: 171 202: 192
120: 125, 135 157: 171, 172, 203: 192
122: 127 173, 225, 226 204: 192
123: 127 158: 121, 171, 205: 171, 192, 229
124: 127, 135 172, 173 206: 183, 187,
125: 126 159: 116 188, 192, 197,
126: 126, 137, 160: 116, 166 199, 200, 208
174, 175 161: 116, 166 207: 183, 185,
127: 177, 227 162: 119 187, 188, 199,
128: 115, 116 163: 116, 119 200
164: 116, 119 208: 187, 199, 200
165: 121
INDEX 281
209: 198, 199, 260: 136, 147 36: 214

200, 202, 205, 263: 213 37: 214
206 264: 213 LOx: 214
210: 94, 186, 187, 265: 137, 146, 213 5: 215
198, 199, 202, 266: 213 6: 214
207, 228, 229 267: 213 7: 214
211: 198, 199, 206 268-277: 108 8: 214
212: 198, 199, 206 275: 215 9: 214
213: 198, 199, 276: 215 LU
206, 207 277: 215 1: 175, 180, 186,
214: 198, 199 282: 171, 229 187, 225
218: 212, 231 LL 2: 139, 148, 150,
219: 212 d: 198, 200, 202, 175, 225
220: 212 206 3: 153, 227
225: 219 e: 187, 198, 202, 5: 121
226: 137, 149 207 6: 155, 161, 168,
227: 129, 149, 219 f: 198, 206, 207 175, 225
229: 212, 225 4: 216 7: 155, 162, 163,
230: 93, 211, 212, 5: 140, 215, 216, 171, 225
228, 229 217 8: 170, 171
231: 212, 219 8: 127 9: 117
232: 212, 219 9: 140, 151, 152 10: 117
233: 219 10: 219 11: 115
236: 216 11: 218 13: 176
237: 216 12: 140, 149 14: 177
238: 216 13: 140, 149, 150, 15: 116
239: 215 171 18: 190, 192, 197
240: 216 14: 171 19: 175, 190, 191,
244: 214 17: 175 197
245: 214 20: 122 20: 175, 191, 197
246: 214 20b: 123 21: 191, 197
247: 214 22: 121 22: 189
248: 214 23: 121 24: 171
249: 214 24: 119 25: 171, 221, 229
250: 209, 210 25: 120, 121 26: 171, 193, 221
251: 209, 210 26: 120, 121, 122 28: 175, 177, 178
252: 209, 210 27: 174 29: 175, 178
253: 135, 136, 231 29: 116 30: 118
254: 135, 136 30: 174 31: 218
255: 135, 136 31: 121 32: 127
256: 135, 136, 32: 121 LX
137, 138, 226, 33: 177 j: 46
231 34: 214 k: 46
259: 136, 147 35: 214 l: 124, 246, 247
m: 124 A 25: 120 B 9: 118

n: 124 A 26: 120 B 10: 118
MAL A 28: 120, 122 B 12: 118
A 1: 140, 143 A 29: 119 B 13: 118
A 2: 228 A 30: 117 B 14: 118, 147
A 3: 140, 141, A 31: 117 B 15: 118, 147
143, 150, 226 A 32: 228 B 17: 119
A 4: 140, 143, A 33: 120 B 18: 119
150, 203 A 34: 115 B 19: 118
A 5: 141, 143 A 36: 59, 166, 167 B 20: 118
A 6: 141, 143 A 37: 117 C 2: 141, 142
A 7: 193 A 38: 117 C 3: 141, 142
A 8: 193, 194, A 40: 47, 174 C 4: 142, 146, 152
199, 230 A 41: 47 C 5: 142, 146, 152
A 9: 193, 230 A 44: 125, 194 C 6: 142, 153
A 10: 180, 181, A 45: 166, 167, C 8: 113, 142
187, 225 168 C 9: 141, 143
A 12: 155, 156, A 46: 120 C 10: 114, 142,
161, 163, 164, A 47: 114, 179, 143
225 225 C 11: 142
A 13: 155, 225 A 49: 174 F 1: 142, 146, 213
A 14: 140, 155, A 50: 187, 198, F 2: 47, 142, 213
156, 163, 225 202, 203, 204, M 1: 216, 217
A 15: 115, 140, 205, 207, 208, M 2: 216, 217
142, 155, 157, 225, 228, 253 N 1: 176
159, 225 A 51: 198, 204, N 2: 176
A 16: 155, 156, 205, 206, 207, O 5: 119
161, 225 208 O 6: 142
A 17: 178, 253 A 52: 174, 198, MAPD
A 18: 177, 178, 203, 204, 205, 1: 48
228, 253 207, 208, 228 3: 48
A 19: 176, 177, A 53: 187, 198, 5: 48
178, 228 202, 203, 205, 6: 48
A 20: 176, 228 225 7: 48, 234
A 21: 178, 198, A 55: 168, 169, 8: 48
202, 203, 204, 228 10: 48, 225, 230
253 A 56: 168, 169 11: 225
A 22: 140, 155, A 57: 47, 193 12: 225
156, 157, 161, A 58: 47, 193 19: 160, 225
225 A 59: 47, 193 20: 48
A 23: 140, 155, B 1: 122 21: 48
156, 161, 163, B 2: 180, 181, 225 23: 48
225 B 3: 114 ND: 5, 37, 43, 49, 53,
A 24: 228 B 8: 118 60, 66, 67, 69, 72,
INDEX 283
73, 80, 81, 91, XVI: 198, 207, iii 10-12: 146, 215
102, 145, 151, 237, 238, 239 iii 10-15: 140, 147
154, 220, 221, XVII: 198, 207, iii 13-15: 146
223, 224, 227, 237, 238, 239 iii 18-19: 119
228, 229, 231, XVIII: 198 iv 12-14: 46, 117
249, 259 XXX: 238 iv 31-34: 46
Numbers XXXI: 238 iv 35-41: 218
35:31: 180 XXXII: 238 iv 42-v 11: 215,
PT XXXIII: 238 216
II: 183, 237, 238 XXXIV: 179, 237 v 12-20: 217
III: 183, 237 XXXIX: 238 v 21-26: 216
IV: 184, 237, 238 XXXV: 144, 146 v 27-31: 216
IX: 192, 197, 237, XXXVI: 238 v 32-36: 216
238 XXXVII: 238 v 37-44: 215
V: 190, 197, 237, XXXVIII: 238 v 45: 46
238, 240 RU: 37, 46, 49, 55, vi 11-15: 214, 215
VI: 190, 197, 237, 57, 58, 64, 65, 66, vi 16-22: 214
238 69, 72, 73, 74, 80, vi 23-31: 214
VII: 189, 197, 82, 115, 219, 246, vi 32-36: 214
237, 238 249, 252 vii 34-36: 46
VIII: 192, 197, SLEx viii 3-10: 125
237 i 37-ii 2: 214 viii 11-15: 46
X: 190, 197, 237, ii 7-8: 216 The Hittite
239 1: 198, 200, 206 Instruction for
XI: 190, 197, 237, 2: 198, 200 the Royal
239 3: 216 Bodyguard
XII: 191, 197, 4: 46, 122, 123 2: 144
237, 238 5: 46, 122, 123 10: 144
XIII: 191, 197, 6: 122, 123 42: 144
237, 238 7: 168, 169, 170 53: 144
XIV: 191, 197, 8: 168, 169, 170 58: 144
238 9: 214 59: 144
XL: 48 10: 214
XV: 191, 197, SLHF
237, 238 ii 26-31: 46

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A Comparison of Ancient Near

Eastern Law Collections Prior to the

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Printed in the United States of America

2.6.7 Personal Injury ..................................................................................188

This work grew out of an interest in the application of the comparative

I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr Noel Weeks, without whom this book

1 All dates referred to hereafter are B.C. unless otherwise stated.

terest in comparative method 7 and the lingering notion of a common an-

ancient Near East (particularly in the area of law collections) is given an

10 e.g. Westbrook, “Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes,” Revue Biblique 92

systems (especially Egypt).

with both is a viable possibility.

21 e.g. Tremper Longman III, “Form Criticism, Recent Developments in Genre

the laws into modern or Roman legal categories. 24 An attempt to under-

be considered during comparisons. It will be best then to attempt to keep

1.2 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW

of the American Oriental Society, 17 (1954): 1–33.

33 Most famously seen in the multi-volume Hammurabi’s Gesetz project. J. Kohler

After some decades scholars began to realize that Hammurabi’s collec-

card, 2000), 17.

ist der Codex Hammurapi?,” Genava 8 (1960): 283–96; Bottéro, “‘Code’”.

Perse 4; Paris: Libraire Ernest LeRoux, 1902).

47 Allgemeines Burgerliches Gestezbuch

also comes from continental Europe.

sion/judgment/verdict in the apodosis e.g. If a man does x, then y.

them in the documents from practice. 55 It is interesting that John Miles, an

55 And the lack of legislative influence reflected in the documents.

76 e.g. Eckart Otto uses all three.

or subject matter to forever retain the most important position in scholar-

1.3 THE COMPARATIVE METHOD

(Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft 26/3; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich,

Often comparative studies have become an excuse for parallel hunting

Anthropology 7 (1978): 483–532.

Before Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1949).

selves deeper into specialization, these others (Frankfort et al.) picked up

110 Frazer, Golden Bough.

smaller scale comparison at hand. There are some unresolved tensions in

115 Or at least the Hebrew Bible.

124 Ibid., 328.

141 The issue of the relationship of Sumerian culture to that of Mesopotamia

best to leave final conclusions on these matters to a discussion a posteriori

compensation. Rather than explain the differences culturally or developmentally, he

more general question of Israelite distinctiveness see Machinist, “The Question of

157 Hallo, “Contextual Method,” 2. But do see Malul’s comments, Comparative

173 This approach is criticised, from an anthropological point of view by A. Ku-

totle. (New York: Random House; 1941), section 9.

181 While holding to positions such as the following: “strict presentation of

Texts/Copies: 1 Six copies. Five on clay nails/cones, one on an oval

1 For English translations and bibliographical information regarding the cunei-

Ammiṣaduqa’s Edict (AE)

18 For an English translation “The Edicts of Samsu-iluna and his Successors,”

Author/Date: Haremhab, last ruler of the eighteenth or first of the

though its usefulness can be questioned, especially through an analysis of

44 Which, as we have mentioned earlier, is seen by some as the end of LU.

52 See the discussion of Mackenzie, “Formal Aspect,” 34 and note 8.

goes on to a relative clause followed by a conditional one. Many of the laws

The Edict of Haremhab is traditionally divided into two legal sections:

73 See Pflüger’s translation, “Haremhab”.

81 Daube, Forms of Roman Legislation.

ownership of state land and the services to be rendered in return, to be

estate laws in HL which use all three forms.

an example. Many of these are framed as apodictic commands. They merely

is supported by Westbrook who, acknowledging the formal differences