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Overview of Secondary Surveillance Radar

(SSR) and Identification Friend/Foe (IFF)


Systems
Presented by Telephonics Chief Engineer
Frank Dominick Messina

www.telephonics.com
Part I – Outline

 Introduction to SSR/IFF
– Basic Terms and Definitions
– Overview
 History of SSR and IFF
 Governing Documents
 IFF System Architecture
– SSR/IFF System Block Diagram
– Scanning the Airspace
– Sidelobe Suppression
– Antenna Dwell Time
– 2-Channel vs 3-Channel Antenna Systems
– Azimuth Determination
– RF Link Budgets

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Part II – Outline

 Description of SSR/IFF Modes


– Overview of Modes
– SIF/ATCRBS Modes
– Mode S
– Mode 5
 SSR/IFF Processing Challenges
– False Replies Unsynchronized in Time (FRUIT)
– Garble
– Gain Time Control (GTC)
– Multi-Path
– Antenna Pattern Distortion
 New Initiatives in SSR and IFF

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Part I

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Introduction to SSR/IFF

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Basic Terms and Definitions

SSR: Secondary Surveillance Radar


Acronyms
IFF: Identification Friend or Foe
ATC: Air Traffic Control
ATCRBS: Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System
SIF: Selective Identification Feature
Mode S: Mode Select Beacon
Mark XA or Mk XA: System with IFF/SSR Modes 1, 2 and 3/A
Mark XII or Mk XII: Mark XA with the addition of Secure Mode 4
Mark XIIA: Mark XII with the addition of Secure Mode 5
AIMS: ATCRBS IFF Mark XII Systems
STANAG: NATO Standardization Agreement
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization
RTCA: Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
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Basic Terms and Definitions

Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF)

 A system using electromagnetic transmissions to which equipment


carried by friendly forces automatically responds, for example, by
emitting pulses, thereby distinguishing themselves from enemy
forces

 The Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) system used in modern


Air Traffic Control (ATC) is an outgrowth of the military IFF system
used during World War II

 The IFF equipment carried by modern military aircraft is compatible


with the transponder system used for civilian ATC

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Overview

IFF/SSR System

1030 MHz
Interrogations

Replies

1090 MHz

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Overview

IFF/SSR System (continued)

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Overview

Purpose
 Goal of the System – Locate, Separate and Identify Aircraft
 Radar-Like Techniques To Locate Aircraft
– Directional Antenna Used to Broadcast Interrogations and Receive Replies
– Time of Transmission-Return Used to Measure Aircraft Range
– Direction of Antenna Used to Measure Aircraft Azimuth
 Communications-Like Techniques to Identify and Separate Aircraft
– Aircraft Responses Include Identifying Data, Including Aircraft Altitude
– Cryptography used to identify military friends
 Cooperative System Requiring a Transponder on All Aircraft
– Communications Protocol Must Be Strictly Defined and Adhered to for Meeting
Interoperability

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Overview

Purpose (in other words)


To aid the Air Traffic Controller and
IFF Operator do their job to Identify,
Locate and Separate Aircraft

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Overview

Equipment – ATC and IFF Examples


Telephonics
Secondary Surveillance Radar: SkySearch
A radio direction system based on the 3000
System
comparison of reference signals with
radio signals retransmitted from the
position to be determined. An example
ATC
of Secondary Surveillance Radar is the Facility
transponder-based surveillance of
aircraft.

Telephonics
AeroTrac System

Transponder
The IFF/SSR beacon transmitter-
receiver receives signals from an Civil Aircraft
interrogator and selectively replies with Transponder
a specific pulse group (code) only to
those interrogations being received on
Military Aircraft Transponder &
the mode to which it is set. Crypto Computer

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Overview

Equipment – ATC and IFF Examples Cont:

KIV-77
IFF
Cryptographic
Computer

Telephonics SFF-44
Small Form Factor Telephonics AN/UPX-44
Interrogator Long Range Interrogator
for mobile applications for Ground Applications
KIV-78
IFF
Cryptographic
Computer

1. The Interrogator is the device that generates a transmission of a signal or


combination of signals intended to trigger a response from a Transponder.
2. A station or device that requests another station or device to identify itself or to give
its status.

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Overview

Multi-Band, Multi-Sector Passive IFF/SSR


Detection and Reporting System (PDRS)

USAF RC 135 Rivet Joint Aircraft Telephonics Telephonics M5OAS Active/Passive


AN/UPR-4(V) PDRS SSR/IFF (Transportable System
Passive SSR/IFF supports all SSR/IFF modes)

1. A device that passively receives Civil and/or Military transponder squitter transmissions and provides reports
aircraft 3D GPS position and other aircraft information.
2. ATC/IFF Modes Supported by PDRS: Mode S Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B),
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), Military Mode 5 Level 2/Level 2B
3. For ground systems, the PDRS provides multi-beam (six), multi-band (2) antenna elements within the Radom,
which are spaced 60 degrees apart in Azimuth. This multi-beam configuration provides superior detection
performance, greater surveillance range and anti-jam protection. In addition minimizes the interference issues
associated with Omni-directional antennas

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Overview

Air Traffic Control (ATC) and IFF Displays

The display that Air Traffic


Controllers or military IFF
operators use to show aircraft
information, identify aircraft and to
control the movement of aircraft.

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Overview

IFF/SSR Display
 The display that air traffic controllers or military IFF operators use to show target
information, identify targets, and to control the movement of aircraft

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History of SSR and IFF

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History of SSR/IFF

The Early Years


 Throughout time, it has always been important to know who one's
friends are.
 Nowhere has this been more obvious than in military conflicts, where
for centuries, flags, banners, insignia and uniforms have allowed
adversaries to distinguish their allies from others who might have less
friendly intentions.
 Visual identification was the IFF of the day for years as long as
conflicts were more or less face to face and visual identification was
possible.
 Just as World War II began, the widespread use of aircraft caused a
dramatic change.
 The threats were fast moving, so by the time the visual identification
was possible, it was often too late to prevent destruction.

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History of SSR/IFF

The Early Years (continued)


 New battle zones quickly became chaotic mixtures of friendly and
hostile forces with many isolated units operating autonomously.
 Visual means were and still are an important method of discriminating
between friends and enemies. Some children of the late thirties and
early forties even studied aircraft identification handbooks and black
silhouettes enabling them to tell the difference between aircraft.
 During the 1940’s early forms of radar were emerging and, although it
seemed to offer a solution to the problem, a major drawback soon
became evident.
 Early radars could detect incoming aircraft at considerable distance,
but it could not tell what kind of aircraft had been spotted or what force
they belonged to. The tragic events at Pearl Harbor might have been
changed had the radar been able to identify as well as detect the
incoming Japanese aircraft.
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History of SSR/IFF

World War II
 Early in World War II, British airmen were puzzled by the strange behavior
of German fighter aircraft. Occasionally and without apparent reason, the
German planes would simultaneously roll over.
 The British eventually intercepted radio signals from the ground that
always preceded this maneuver. It was then realized that by rolling over at
a predetermined signal the Germans were changing the polarization of the
radar reflections picked up by their own ground radars. They created a
distinctive response on the radars that differed from others so German
radar operators could identify their friendly forces.
 As crude and simple as it was, this constituted the first attempt at an
electronic IFF system. It incorporated the basic structure of all cooperative
IFF systems that followed: a challenge or question (the coded radio
message) and a specific response (the roll over that caused a change in
the reflected radar signal).

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History of SSR/IFF

The First Active IFF Systems


 That first German IFF maneuver was considered a passive system in that
the returned signal was still just a reflection of the radar energy sent from
the ground.
 Around 1940, an active system, designated the Mk I, was put into service.
It used a receiver aboard each aircraft that broke into oscillation and acted
as a transmitter when it received a radar signal.
 The system was developed further by the addition of a separate
transmitter that was tuned through the radar bands simultaneously with
the receiver and was triggered by signals from the receiver. This greatly
increased the strength of the return signal and the return range.
 Known as Mk III, it also could be programmed to respond in one of six
different codes thus providing some further degree of identification.

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History of SSR/IFF

Further Refinements
 After the war, with rapid technical developments, the need for efficient and
reliable IFF systems led to a long series of further refinements that
eventually evolved into the modern IFF systems in use today.
 Modern IFF systems are basically Question/Answer systems.
 An interrogator system sends out a coded radio signal that asks any
number of queries, including: Who are you?
 The interrogation code or challenge, is received by an electronic system
known as a transponder located on the target aircraft.
 If the transponder receives the proper electronic code from an
interrogator, it automatically transmits the requested identification back to
the interrogating radar.
 The US Military fielded unsecure military IFF in the 1950s, which included
the SIF modes 1, 2, and 3.

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History of SSR/IFF

Introduction of SSR for Civilian ATC


 By the 1960's civilian air traffic in the United States had increased so
much that air traffic controllers began to have their own identity crisis.
 The radar screens in high traffic areas became so cluttered with primary
returns that it was becoming difficult to know which blip represented which
plane. In addition, the primary radar was not capable of determining
aircraft altitudes.
 A system similar to and compatible with, military IFF systems was
authorized and introduced by the civilian air traffic control authorities.
 Since civilian air traffic control deals only (hopefully) with friendly aircraft, it
is more properly called the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System
(ATCRBS).

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History of SSR/IFF

Introduction of Secure IFF


 The original reason for IFF systems was to identify friendly forces in a
battlefield environment.
 It is essential that hostile forces not be able to use the system to identify
themselves as friendly even if the physical IFF equipment should fall into
their hands.
 The secure mode is used exclusively for military purposes. This mode
uses special interrogation signals which contains information that tells the
transponder it is about to receive a secure message.
 A very high degree of security to the identification system is ensured
through the use of key codes and powerful cryptographic techniques.
 The initial cryptographically secure IFF mode used by the US military was
Mode 4, which was defined and fielded in the 1960s. Mode 4 required
properly keyed cryptographic computers for the interrogator and for all
friendly transponders.
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History of SSR/IFF

Improvements to Civilian SSR


 The SSR system used for Air Traffic Control (ATCRBS) has many inherent
weaknesses, largely in the area of self-interference.
 In the 1970s, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) began
work to define a new mode of operation for civilian SSR, called Mode S.
The S stands for the primary new feature of the new mode, the ability to
Selectively interrogate specific aircraft.
 While Mode S was defined in the 70s, full deployment has taken decades.
Europe adopted Mode S earlier than the US, and required that all aircraft,
including general aviation, be equipped with Mode S transponders by
2000.
 In the 1990s, an automatic mode was defined which used emerging GPS
technology to broadcast aircraft GPS position without interrogations. This
mode, ADS-B, was adopted by the US, with a mandate for all aircraft to be
equipped by 2020.

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History of SSR/IFF

Improvements to Military IFF


 In the 1990s, the US Military began work on a new secure mode of IFF, Mode 5.
Based on experiences with Mode 4, NATO was brought in as a full partner in the
development.
 An initial specification for the Mode 5 system was published in 1997, and an
updated version addressing significant issues in the original specification was
published in 2003. Manufacturers have been fielding equipment since that time
frame, with the US and its Allies targeting full operating capability in 2020.
 The new Mode 5 system addresses many of the inherent problems with Mode 4,
including resolution of closely spaced targets, and providing secure identification
data. Additionally, a sub-mode of Mode 5, Mode 5 Level 2, provides target GPS
position data, which can be retrieved via an interrogation, or automatically
broadcast.
 Recently, an extension of the Mode 5 Level 2 capability has been defined, Mode 5
Level 2 Bravo, which provides cryptographically secured services similar to ADS-
B. Transponders with this capability have been prototyped and flight tested.

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Governing Documents

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Governing Documents

Military
 Since SSR and IFF are essentially communication systems, the electronic
protocol for the waveforms and data transmitted by the system must be strictly
adhered to, in order to ensure equipment interoperability. These protocols are
defined in several documents:
 DoD AIMS Program Office Provides US Military IFF Specifications:
– 65-1000 – Defined Mark XII (SIF and Mode 4)
– 97-1000 – Initial Definition of Mark XIIA (SIF, Mode 4, and Mode 5)
– 03-1000 – Updated Mode 5 Definition
– 17-1000 – Removed Mode 4 From Requirements
– Other Documents Provide Additional Requirements/Guidance
 NATO Provides STANAGs for Various Equipment Specification
– STANAG 4193 Defines IFF Specification
– Edition 2 Provided Initial Definition of Mark XIIA
– Edition 3 Provided Updated Definition, and Reconciled Differences between 4193 and
AIMS 03-1000.

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Governing Documents

Civil
 ICAO (International Civilian Aviation Organization) Provides Civilian SSR
Specifications:
– ICAO Annex X, Volumes 3 & 4 Define Civilian Mode 3/A, C, and S
– Other Documents Provide Additional Definitions (9871 Defines ADS-B)
 RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Provides Additional
Guidance For Transponders
– DO-260 Defines Transponder Minimum Operational Parameters (MOPS)
– DO-282 Defines Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Operation
 EUROCONTROL – European Civil Aviation Organization
– ASTERIX – Common Interface Specifications For Air Traffic Control Radars
– Mode S Ground Station – A Compete Specification for a Mode S ATC Radar
 Includes Mode S Clustering

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IFF System Architecture

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SSR/IFF System Block Diagram
Single or
Dual
Antenna
T/R or
Diplexer

Transmitter Receiver
1090 MHz 1030 MHz
Rotating or Aircraft
E-Scan Transponder
Antenna
System Reply Digital
Waveform Processing
Generator

Pilot
Encoder Control
T/R or Unit
Diplexer

Transmitter Receiver
1030 MHz 1090 MHz Ground, Ship or Aircraft
Interrogator System
Interrogation Reports
Digital I/O ATC/IFF
Waveform Tracking
Processing Processing Display
Generator

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Scanning the Airspace

Fan-Shaped Beam
 Definedfor a target with an azimuth angle, Φ (relative to north),
and a slant range, R

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Scanning the Airspace

Sweep vs. Scan


 In IFF/SSR systems, a Sweep is defined as the interim distance from zero range to
maximum range
– Sweep time or Pulse Repetition Interval (PRI) is the time between successive IFF/SSR
interrogations
 Typically 2.2 to 6.6 ms, depending on the system range requirements
 In IFF/SSR systems, a Scan is a 360 revolution of the antenna
– This is typically one (1) twelve to (12) seconds, depending on the system update requirements
 Note: For all those Primary Radar people who always get these terms “backwards” when
you SWEEP a floor, you don’t do it by swinging the broom in circles, you do it by moving the
broom with a straight line radial motion. When you SCAN the horizon you don’t keep your
head looking out in one direction, you scan azimuthally.

Hopefully this helps to


SWEEP clear up any confusion SCAN

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Scanning the Airspace

Range
 The range of a target is calculated by
measuring the time between the
interrogation reference pulse (P3 for SIF)
and time of receipt of the first framing
pulse (F1) of the reply minus the
turnaround time of the transponder
– One (1) Nautical Mile (NM) = 12.359 sec

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Scanning the Airspace

Azimuth
 The two ways of determining target
azimuth are the beamsplit method and
the monopulse method
– Monopulse azimuth determination is
about five (5) times more accurate
– Both methods will be covered in detail
later in the presentation
– Discussed in greater detail later

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Scanning the Airspace

Code (ABCD)/Altitude (x100 Ft) Reporting


 What the operator ultimately sees

Mode Code of Aircraft

Aircraft Position

Altitude in 100’s of Feet

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Sidelobe Suppression

Interrogation (P1, P3) Interrogation (P1, P3)


Main Lobe Difference Pattern Side/Rear Lobes
Area

Sum Pattern
Area
P1 P2 P3

P1 P2 P3

Suppression (P2)
Lobe

 ISLS: Interrogator SideLobe Suppression


 RSLS: Receiver SideLobe Suppression
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Sidelobe Suppression

Receiver Side Lobe Suppression (RSLS)

 Used to eliminate replies outside of the main beam


 The RSLS K factor (dB) is used to define the region of acceptable
replies
– RSLS K Factor = Sum (Σ) – Difference (Δ)
 As the K factor increases, the acceptable region decreases

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Sidelobe Suppression

Interrogation Antenna Pattern Beamwidth

3 dB

Σ
3 dB Beamwidth

Σ Crossover
Beamwidth

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Sidelobe Suppression

RSLS Processing – Example (K = 9 dB)


Transponder Must
Respond Zone

Δ RSLS K Factor = 9 dB

Σ- Δ = 9 dB
Σ

Δ = - 9 dB

Reject Replies Accept Replies Reject Replies

RSLS Pass

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Antenna Dwell Time

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2-Channel vs 3-Channel

2-Channel Antenna
 Transmit: Sum (Σ) and Difference (Δ) Receive: Σ and Δ
 Azimuth based on Σ and Δ RSLS applied to Σ and Δ
 Δ must provide ISLS coverage
– To provide higher power side lobes, the main lobe power is lower
– Lower Δ main lobe power leads to a wider effective beamwidth and poorer azimuth performance

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2-Channel vs 3-Channel

2-Channel Antenna (continued)


 To improve performance, increasing the Δ main lobe power will create a
narrower effective beamwidth
– The negative impact is that this will lower the Δ side lobe power
– Lower Δ side lobe power creates more punch through/false targets
 How to resolve this issue?

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2-Channel vs 3-Channel

3-Channel Antenna
 Transmit: Σ and Ω Receive: Σ, Δ, and Ω
 Azimuth based on Σ and Δ RSLS applied to Σ and Δ, Σ and Ω
– Must pass both RSLS thresholds to accept replies
 Ω must provide ISLS coverage
– Δ main lobes are higher to narrow the effective beamwidth for azimuth performance

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2-Channel vs 3-Channel

3-Channel LVA IFF Antenna with Backfill


 The Interrogator transmits on Sum and
Omni to provide ISLS and receives on
Sum, Difference and Omni
– Sum and Difference are used for
monopulse azimuth determination
 Difference and Omni RF level is
compared to Sum RF levels for RSLS
– The 3-channel antenna, and specifically
the Omni channel, provides a larger
suppression margin, over a 2-channel
antenna to protect against false
transponders replies in the antenna
sidelobe regions
 Poor sidelobe performance from
antenna pattern punch-through
conditions can be a problem for
ATC/IFF display operators and
additionally cause unwanted
transponder replies
– The 3-channel Large Vertical Aperture
(LVA) antenna greatly reduces false
sidelobe target conditions

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Azimuth Determination

Beamsplit vs Monopulse
 Beamsplit Azimuth Determination (Sliding Window Method)
– On a scanning beam system, the center azimuth between the first reply and the
last reply is the target azimuth
 Monopulse Azimuth Determination
– Interrogator has the main beam Sum (Σ) and Difference (Δ) pattern relationship
in the Off-Boresight Angle (OBA) table
– Utilizes the received Sum (Σ) and Difference (Δ) RF levels and OBA lookup to
calculate the target azimuth
– Calibration of the input RF signals is required to ensure proper antenna OBA
measurement of received replies
– Multiple azimuth samples are obtained from a target each scan and averaged
together to provide a more precise measurement
 The system should automatically revert to beamsplit if monopulse data is
deemed non-valid by the monopulse processing algorithm

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Azimuth Determination

 Beamsplit Azimuth Determination (Sliding Window Method)


Antenna Boresight
Antenna
Sum Beam

Antenna
Rotation
Leading Edge Reply θ1
Trailing Edge Reply θ2
First Reply to be detected
Last Reply to be detected
by the Interrogator
by the Interrogator

Aircraft Azimuth =
(θ2 + θ1)/2
Note:
Use Polar Coordinate Math

Antenna
Difference Beam

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Azimuth Determination

Monopulse
Antenna
Rotation
Antenna
Boresight

Off Boresight Angle


(OBA) Lookup Value for
Phase Right of Center

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Azimuth Determination

Monopulse, Right of Center

Off Boresight Angle (OBA) = x Right of Center

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Azimuth Determination

Monopulse at Boresight

Off Boresight Angle (OBA) = 0 (Center Boresight)

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Azimuth Determination

Monopulse, Left of Center

Off Boresight Angle (OBA) = x Left of Center

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RF Link Budgets

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RF Uplink Budget
Interrogator to Transponder
Free Space Atmospheric Lens
Radome Loss RF Loss Loss Loss Multipath Loss

Antenna Gain
with Elevation Transponder
And Scanning Antenna Gain
Loss Sum All RF
Gains and Losses

1. Free Space Loss=


Rotary Joint Transponder
RF Loss -37.8 - 20 x Log (1030 MHz) - 20 Log x (Rng NM) Pattern Loss

2. Lens Loss: See Chart

RF Cable/ 3. Atmospheric Ducting Loss: See Chart


Connector Transponder RF
Loss to Antenna Cable/Connector
Pedestal Loss

Up Link
Interrogator Transponder
Transmitter Receiver
Power Sensitivity

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RF Downlink Budget
Transponder to Interrogator

Free Space Atmospheric Lens


Radome Loss Loss Multipath Loss
RF Loss Loss

Antenna Gain
with Elevation Transponder
And Scanning Sum All RF Antenna Gain
Loss Gains and Losses

1. Free Space Loss=


-37.8-20 x Log (1090 MHz)- 20 Log x (Rng NM)
Rotary Joint Transponder
RF Loss Pattern Loss
2. Lens Loss: See Chart

3. Atmospheric Ducting Loss: See Chart


RF Cable/
Connector Transponder RF
Loss to Antenna Cable/Connector
Pedestal Loss

Down Link
Interrogator Transponder
Receiver Transmit
Sensitivity Power

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RF Link Budgets

Lens Loss & Atmospheric Absorption Loss

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RF Link Budgets

Up-Link Example
PARAMETER MAXIMUM
COMMENT UP-LINK PARAMETER VALUE RANGE (nmi)
2.8kw Interrogator Power Output (1030 MHz) 64.5 200
Cable & Rotary Joint Interrogator to Antenna Cable Loss (dB) -2.5
IFF Antenna Gain @ 1030Mhz (dBi) 20.0
Radome Loss @ 1030Mhz (dBi) 0.00
ICAO MAX Limit Interrogator Ant. ERP (recommended max = 82.5) 82.0
Azimuth Scanning Loss (dB) -2.0
Atmospheric/Lens Loss (approx. 0.0065 dB x range) -1.30
Free Space Loss (nmi) @ Max Range:
-37.8 - 20Log (1030) - 20Log (Rng nmi) -144.1
Power Level at Transponder Antenna (dBm) -65.4
Per STANAG & DoD AIMS Transponder Antenna Gain (dBi) 0.0
Transponder Pattern Loss (dB)
Per STANAG & DoD AIMS 0.0
Transponder Cabling Loss (dB)
Per STANAG & DoD AIMS -3.0
Interrogator Power Level at Transponder (dBm) -68.4
Transponder Sensitivity (dBm)
Per STANAG & DoD AIMS Note: -72 dBm = -102 dBW -72.0
Plus Value REQUIRED Total Uplink Margin (dB) 3.6
Using STANAG/DoD AIMS "M" value of 3dB for Long
Range Systems
Plus Value RECOMMENDED 0.6

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RF Link Budgets

Down-Link Example

PARAMETER MAXIMUM RANGE


COMMENT DOWN-LINK PARAMETER VALUE (nmi)
Per STANAG & DoD AIMS Transponder Power Output (dBm) 55.0 200
Per STANAG & DoD AIMS Transponder Cable Loss (dB) -3.0
Per STANAG & DoD AIMS Transponder Antenna Gain (dBi) 0.0
Per STANAG & DoD AIMS Transponder Pattern Loss (dB) 0.0
Atmospheric/Lens Loss(aprox. 0.0065 dB x range) -1.30
Free Space Loss @ Max Range:
-37.8-20Log (1090) - 20Log (Rng nmi) -144.6
Antenna to Interrogator Cable Loss -2.5
Radome Loss 0.0
Power Level at Interrogator Antenna -96.4
Interrogator Antenna Gain @ 1090Mhz (dBi) 20.0
Can be Lowered by Adjusting Azimuth Scanning Loss (dB)
RSLS K Factor -2.0
Transponder Power Level at Interrogator Input (dBm) -78.4
Interrogator Receiver Sensitivity -82.0
Plus Value REQUIRED Total Downlink Margin (dB) 3.6
Using STANAG/DoD AIMS "M" value of 3dBfor Long
Plus Value RECOMMENDED Range Systems 0.6

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RF Link Budgets

Line of Site (LOS) Coverage Due to Earth Curvature

Aircraft Transponder
Height (Ft)

Tangent The aircraft will be


Point visible to the Radar at or
above the LOS line and
will not be visible below
the LOS line.
Earth

Example:
Target Height =40,000ft
Radar Height = 100ft
LOS = 262.25 nm

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LOS Range (NM) ≈ 1.25 x Target Height(ft.) + 1.25 x (Radar Height(ft.)

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Part II

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Description of SSR/IFF Modes

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Overview of Modes

 IFF/SSR is a two-frequency system, with one frequency (1030 MHz) used for the
interrogating signals, and another (1090 MHz) for the reply
 The Military designated IFF Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
 The Civil ATC designated SSR Modes A, B, C, D and S
 Military Mode 3 and Civil Mode A are identical waveforms used by both Military IFF
and Civil ATC, and is designated as Mode 3/A
 The system is broken down into nine modes (1, 2, 3/A, B, D, C, S, 4 and 5) of
operation for military and civilian aircraft (Modes B and D are non-standard and will
not be discussed)
– Mode 4 is no longer approved for US/NATO Military use and will not be discussed
– Mode 5 is used as a military secure mode replacing Mode 4
 FAA regulations require all aircraft, military or civilian, flying at an altitude of 10,000
feet or higher in controlled airspace, must be equipped with an operating IFF/SSR
transponder system capable of automatic altitude reporting (Mode C)
 Each Interrogation Mode elicits specific information from the aircraft being challenged
 Non-Solicited Transponder Squitter Reports are provided by Mode S ADS-B, UAT,
Mode 5 Level 2 and Level 2B

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Overview of Modes

 Legacy Mode 1 uses 5 bits, provides 32 reply codes, and is traditionally used in
military air traffic control to determine the aircraft type, or mission type
– Currently an Extended Mode 1 is available providing 12 bits (4096 codes)

 Mode 2, also used by the military, and traditionally is used to identify a particular
aircraft
– There are 4096 possible reply codes in Mode 2

 Mode 3/A is the standard ATC/IFF mode and is used internationally, in conjunction
with Mode C altitude request to provide positive control of all aircraft flying under
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
– Aircraft are assigned unique Mode 3/A codes by the airport departure controller.
General aviation aircraft flying under visual flight rules are not under constant
positive control, and such aircraft use a common Mode 3/A code of 1200. In either
case, the assigned code number is manually entered into the transponder control
unit by the pilot or a crew member

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Overview of Modes

 Mode C is an automatic altitude reporting capability for aircraft

 Mode B and Mode D have limited or no use

 Details of Modes B and D will not be covered in this brief

 Mode 4 was the original cryptographic secure mode used by the military, and has
been replaced by Mark XIIA (Mode 5)

 Mode 5 or Mark XIIA is the new military IFF secure mode


– Mode 5 resolved many of the operational and performance issues with Mode
4

 The group of modes 1, 2, 3/A and C are referred to as Selective Identification


Feature (SIF) Modes

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SIF/ATCRBS Modes

Waveforms

P1-P3 Note: Mode B = 17µs and Mode D = 25µs

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SIF/ATCRBS Modes

Special Indicators
 Special Position Indicator (SPI)
– When requested by the air traffic controller to ‘ident’, the identity control is
activated and the SPI bit from that transponder is set for ≈18 seconds
– The transponder is then highlighted on the air traffic controller’s display for
identification confirmation
– Mode 1 SPI is 2-F1/F2 brackets separated by 24.65µs
– Mode 2 and 3/A SPI pulse is positioned 4.35 sec after the F2 pulse enabled by
the “identify control” on the transponder in the aircraft cockpit when requested by
air traffic control to “Squawk Ident”
– Mode S transponders also provide a SPI capability
 Emergency Codes and Conditions
– 7500 (Hijack), 7600 (Communication Failure) and 7700 (Emergency)
– 4-F1/F2 Bracket Military Emergency in Mode 2 & 3/A separated by 24.65µs
 X-Pulse (XP)
– Indication of special aircraft, may be used for drones
– Traditionally the X-Pulse was used to identify Bomarc missiles
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Mode S

Mode S Introduction
 Nearly 100 % of commercial traffic are currently using Mode S transponders

 Mode S Transponders are becoming a requirement for unrestricted air space

 Needed for Collision Avoidance

 Europe required basic surveillance

 Europe required enhanced surveillance

 US reviewing Home Security and Defense applications

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Mode S

Mode S Benefits and Strategy


■ Benefits of Mode S
− Roll-calls: Since each target can be individually (selectively) addressed,
there is less chance of garble
− All-Calls: Once acquired and lock-out is maintained, a Mode S target will
not reply to all-calls from that II code
■ Reduces “RF pollution”
■ Reduces “transponder occupancy” (improves transponder’s
availability to reply to others)
■ Additional Mode S Strategies (partial list)
− Stochastic Acquisition: Interrogations can be coded such that transponders
are asked to respond to all-calls at a lower probability-of-reply, helping to
reduce the chance of garble for closely spaced targets.
− Lockout Override: Interrogations can be coded such that transponders are
forced to respond to all-calls, even if they are locked out (Typically used
with II code 0)

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Mode S

Waveforms

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Mode S
Capabilities
 Mode S is an enhancement of the "classic" Secondary Surveillance Radar.
 Mode S overcomes many of the current limitations as well as offering additional
capabilities.
 Mode S permits selective addressing of individual Mode S transponder equipped targets.
 Each Mode S target is equipped with a unique ICAO 24–bit address that must be
acquired by the Mode S Interrogator prior to the Selective Addressing process.
 The Interrogator uses a Mode S All-Call (all target broadcast) Interrogations to acquire
Mode S addresses.
 Mode S adds a data link capability between a Mode S target and a Mode S Interrogator
once the Interrogator acquires the target:
 Selective Interrogations are sent from the Mode S Interrogator to the target of interest
 Downlink Aircraft Parameters (DAPS) are send from the target to the Interrogator
 Mode S Transponder data link capability and DAP support of an individual platform
 Must be determined by the Interrogator to initiate data link transfers
 The Mode S Interrogator uses Mode S Roll-Call interrogations to selectively address
targets and to set up the selective data link.

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Mode S

Capabilities (continued)
■ Interrogator Codes
− 15 II-codes; 63 SI codes; II = “0” typically reserved for mobile interrogators
■ Selective Addressing
− ICAO aircraft address is 24-bits (over 16 million possible codes)
■ Acquisition and Lockout
− IC field included as part of all interrogations and replies
− Interrogators typically perform “All-Calls” interrogations to accomplish
initial acquisition of targets
− Once acquired, surveillance is maintained by subsequent “roll-calls” that
individually address each Mode S target
• As each target is addressed, it can be “locked-out” from responding to
any subsequent “all-calls” from that specific Interrogator (based on its
Interrogator Code)
• Transponders keep track of which interrogators have locked them out
• Lock-out duration is 18 seconds

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Mode 5
Mode 5 Introduction
 Mode 5 provides significant operational and performance improvements over Mode 4

 Mode 5 defines four operational levels using two waveform classes:


− L1, Q&A: a synchronous (triggered by interrogations) mode with Processing
Gain
− Level 1 is similar to Mode 4 Q&A but is enhanced with an Aircraft Unique PIN
− L2, Position Reporting: an asynchronous (triggered and non-triggered) mode
with Processing Gain & includes additional information such as Aircraft
Position and Other Attributes
− L3, Selective Interrogation: a synchronous or asynchronous mode (Future
Use)
− L4, Extended Data: an asynchronous mode with High Data rate (Future Use)

 Mode 5 uses Enhanced Encryption, Spread Spectrum Modulation, and Time of Day
Authentication.

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Mode 5

Mode 5 Introduction (continued)

 Mode 5 is specified in NATO STANAG 4193 and DOD-AIMS 17-1000

 Assures interoperability between allies and coalition forces

 Mode 5 related COMSEC specification and interface control documents detail the new
cryptographic algorithm and the time-dependent authentication and data encryption
features

 The DoD AIMS Program Office Certifies IFF Systems to Ensure Interoperability

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Mode 5

Mode 5 Adresses Mode 4 Deficiencies


 Mode 5 has replaced Mode 4 as a new crypto-secure military identification system

 Mode 5 provides:
– High-confidence identification of friendly air, ground, and surface targets in
target-dense scenarios
– Situational awareness without latency using GPS/INS position reporting
– Secure data transfer between platforms

 Mode 5:
– Has private-channel capability
– Increases identification range
– Reduces operator work load
– Reduces interference to civil ATC

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Mode 5
Operational Objectives and Benefits
 Prevent fratricide through high confidence, accurate, continuous, friendly identification
 Provide Positive & Improved Identification at and Beyond Maximum Weapons
Engagement Range
– Extends effective coverage
– Reduces target drop outs
– Reduces track swaps
– Eliminates Mark XII weakness
 Increase reaction times by providing higher quality long range identification
 Separate closely spaced targets in a single scan
– Eliminates leader squawk procedures
– Eliminates related track swap
 Provide modern day security
 Be compatible with civil Air Traffic Control (ATC)
 Be interoperable with NATO/allies

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Mode 5

Interrogation Waveform

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Mode 5

Reply Waveform

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Mode 5

Formats
Level Format Data Requested Inputs Required
1 0 ID Valid Crypto Keys and Time
1 1 Mode 1, 2 Codes Valid Crypto Keys and Time
1 2 Mode 3/A, C Codes Valid Crypto Keys and Time
1 3 Lethal1 Valid Crypto Keys and Time
1 4 PIN and NO Valid Crypto Keys and Time
2 16 3D2, PIN and NO Valid Crypto Keys, Time, and Navigation Data
2 17 3D2 and Mode 1, 2 Codes Valid Crypto Keys, Time, and Navigation Data
2 18 3D2 and Mode 3/A, C Codes Valid Crypto Keys, Time, and Navigation Data
2 19 3D2 and Lethal1 Valid Crypto Keys, Time, and Navigation Data
2 20 3D2, PIN and High-Res PIN Valid Crypto Keys, Time, and Navigation Data

 1 Reserved for shooter platforms only


 2 3D = position (latitude, longitude, altitude)

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Mode 5

Mode 5 Level 1, Improved Q&A Identification


 Secure friend-from-friend ID
– 16k PIN codes plus 2048 National Origin (NO) Codes (11-bit)
– Mode 1, 2, 3/A , C, I/P, X and emergency data
– Lethal interrogation message included to indicate engagement intent

 High confidence ID in any scenario


– Provides higher P-id and increased system capacity
– Provides longer ID range with modest processing gain
– Eliminates most shortcomings of Mark XII including mutual interference, garbling,
exploitation and spoofing

 Reduces interference to civil ATC


– Message structure specifically designed to reduce interference
– Interrogation rates reduced to less than half of Mark XII

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Mode 5

Mode 5 Level 1 Operation


Mode 5 replies have a random
range delays to reduce
garble and mutual interference

Mark XII replies all have same


range delay and signal structure

Mode 5 replies have more


security bits to reduce Mode 5 reply spreading codes
exploitation and spoofing provide automatic de-Fruiting
and improved performance in
fading

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Mode 5

Mode 5 Level 1 Performance


Parameter Performance
Probability of ID - Significant improvement over Mode 4
Range Accuracy - 4 Times Improvement Over Mode 4
Azimuth Accuracy - Similar To Mode 4
- No lower limit unlike Mode 4
Range Resolution - Allows for separate ID of two (2or more) closely-spaced friendly
targets
- No lower limit unlike Mode 4
Azimuth Resolution
- Allows for separate ID of two (2) closely-spaced friendly targets
Link Margin - Processing gain provides ≈ 2X the range of Mode 4
Target Data - Non-garbled M1, M2, M3/A, MC, PIN, and NO
Security - Supports 360 continuous interrogation mode
ATC Compatibility - No impact to ATC transponders
- Driven by improved range/azimuth accuracy and target
Radar Correlation
resolution versus Mode 4

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Mode 5

Mode 5 Level 2 Situation Awareness


 Mode 5 Level 2 provides for passive detection and triggered detection

 Position reports convey secure position and ID


– GPS/INS position reporting by aircraft, ground and surface vehicles
– ID includes Mark XII data, platform pin, mission code
– Reports transmitted when interrogated and randomly as Squitters

 Identifies and locates friends with only one report


– Much higher Pd and system capacity
– Relative GPS accuracy between platforms

 Improves radar correlation


– Four orders of magnitude improvement in correlation volume

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Mode 5
Mode 5 Level 2 Situational Operation
A Non-Triggered M5L2 Position Report
is “Squittered” by L@ Transponders
at low rate for 360° situation awareness

A Triggered L2 Position Report is Triggered


by an Interrogator causing a Squittered M5L2
Level 1 Only response for long-range identification
Platforms respond
with L1 replies

M5 Level 1 Only Transponders Respond in Level 1 during Level 2 Interrogations

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Mode 5

Mode 5 Level 2 Passive Reception Performance

Parameter Performance
Situational Awareness
- ≈ 50 NM using typical Omni-directional receiving antennas
- Range can be significantly improved through the use of a
Range
multi-channel system using high-gain antennas such as the
Telephonics AN/UPR-4(V) PDRS
- Latitude: 250 ft.
Resolution - Longitude: 250 ft.
- Altitude: 50 ft.
Accuracy - Relative GPS
Probability of ID - > 99%

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SSR/IFF Processing Challenges

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FRUIT

 FRUIT: False Replies Unsynchronized In Time


– Replies received by an interrogator that were generated by a transponder in
response to a different interrogator interrogation
– Since multiple interrogators use asynchronous interrogations, the received range of
a FRUIT reply is not synchronous to the intended interrogator range timing
 Telephonics Interrogators incorporate:
– Pseudo-random interrogation stagger to minimize FRUIT replies from correlating in
range and causing a false target
– GTC: Used to help eliminate low level FRUIT replies
– A small PRI to PRI reply range correlation window: Used to accept real
synchronous replies while minimizing FRUIT replies from correlating in range like
real replies
– A small PRI to PRI antenna beam leading edge reply detection criteria and reply
confidence criteria are used to maximize probability of detection and minimize false
reports from FRUIT
 Targets must meet the leading edge and reply count confidence criteria to be
reported
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FRUIT

Ground Airborne
Interrogators Interrogators

Surface Ship
Mobile
Interrogators
Interrogators
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SIF Reply Pulses

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Garble

Garble Condition
 Garble conditions occur when two or more closely spaced replies overlap the 1.45 ±
0.40 sec pulse position boundary's
– Other closely spaced reply's that do not overlap the pulse positions but are between pulse
positions are referred to as “Interleaved” replies
 Garble: Replies overlap in time such that some individual code pulses are overlapped
and can not clearly be associated with one reply or the other
F1 F2

Reply Pulses from Reply 1 or Reply 2???

– Correct code cannot be determined (i.e. “garbled reply code”)


– Both replies when extracted are marked as garbled
– Multiple ungarbled reply codes for the same mode are required for “valid” code determination
– Internal SIF plot tracking may be used to aid in correct code determination on a scan to scan
basis
– The SIF code in target report will be marked as “valid” or “garbled” as appropriate

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Garble

Phantom Conditions
 Phantoms: Pulses from two or more closely spaced replies that align to
form false F1/F2 brackets spaced @ 20.3 sec
20.3 sec
20.3 sec Phantom
20.3 sec Replies

20.3 sec
20.3 sec
20.3 sec Phantom
20.3 sec Replies
20.3 sec

 Phantom 2: Garble caused by more than two (2) replies


 All Phantom conditions should be rejected by the reply extraction process

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Gain Time Control (GTC)

Replies from targets the are received after the interrogation period ends can look like
low range replies on the next interrogation period sometime considered
“Second-Time-Around” replies

The replies from targets just past maximum range can be received in the beginning
of the next interrogation period, and as such, can be declared a low range target.
When this occurs, the received reply power level of the replies are not consistent,
lower in RF power, with the expected interrogator reply range.

■ GTC is one way to prevent “Second-Time-Around” replies from generating


false targets
■ Interrogation to interrogation timing stagger is another way to prevent
“Second-Time-Around” replies from generating false targets

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Gain Time Control (GTC)

Weak Replies from Targets Past Max Interrogation Range


A target replying past the maximum interrogation range of a PRI interval may appear at
a low range during the next PRI interrogation interval. In this case, the high-range reply
will have a low RF power level not consistent with a real reply at that range and GTC is
used to eliminate it.

Reply Normal Reply


Normal Reply From PRI 1 Level to PRI 2
Level to PRI 1

Signal strength
decreases as
range increases.

1st PRI 2nd PRI


PRI 1 PRI 1 PRI 2 PRI 2
Zero range Max range Zero range Max range
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Gain Time Control (GTC)

GTC Curve
Gray
A rea
Nominal and expected
reply strength as
Accepted a function of target range
Reply Area

RF Power
Level

Deleted
Reply Area

Typical GTC threshold is typically set Range


10-12dB below the expected reply RF level
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Gain Time Control (GTC)

GTC Curve (continued)

Valid replies above the Nominal reply strength


GTC threshold are accepted
GTC Threshold

1st PRI 2nd PRI

Weak reply's below the


GTC threshold are rejected

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Multi-Path

Multipath Basics
 The multi-path phenomena is, by far, one of the largest contributors to
poor or degraded SSR system performance
 Multi-path interference can occur when a transmitted signal from a single
source reaches its destination receiver from a direct path and at least one
(1) reflected path
– Interference can be constructive or destructive
 RF energy arriving at an antenna via two (2) different paths combines to
add (constructive) or cancel (destructive), according to the relative phase
between the two (2) signals
 The amount of signal interference is a function of:
– Path delay between the incident and the reflected signal
– Relative phase and power levels of the two (2) signals

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Multi-Path

Horizontal/Vertical, Uplink/Downlink
Multi-path
 Horizontal plane multi-path:
– Generates azimuthal reflections that cause false reports
– Is usually caused by one (1) or more structures acting as a radar reflector
 Vertical plane multi-path:
– Generates radial reflections that cause false reports and signal fading
– Is usually caused by the earth acting as the radar reflector
 Uplink vertical plane multi-path:
– May cause interrogation pulses to be misinterpreted by transponders
– May result in the transponder replying in a wrong mode and at an incorrect range (mode
conversion)
 Downlink multi-path:
– May produce false (extra) replies, which, when received at the interrogator, are slightly
delayed in time and may garble the real transponder code or could cause pulse
cancelations or pulse additions, which would change the transponder code

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Multi-Path

Vertical Multi-Path
 Radar multi-path (or radar echo) is a:
– Physical phenomena
– Function of:
 Height of the radar antenna above the earth
 Height of the target aircraft above the earth
 Range between the target and the radar
 In vertical multi-path cases, the earth acts as a reflector to radar signals
and provides a second path for the radar signals to reach the receiving
antenna
 Since the two (2) signal paths, one (1) direct and one (1) reflected, are
different lengths, the signals reach the receiving antenna at different times
 Multi-path is deterministic in that once the geometry for the radar and the
target is known, the “theoretical” multi-path delay can be calculated

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Multi-Path

Vertical Multi-Path (continued)


 Inpractice, the theoretical multi-path delay value is usually close to
the actual or measured value
– Differences are a function of:
 Atmospheric conditions
 Altitude measurement accuracies
 Other factors
 SSR radar signals travel at approximately 12.359 sec per NM
(round trip)
– As an example, a path length difference of 0.5 NM produces a multi-
path delay of 6.1795 sec
 Multi-path can occur on the:
– Interrogation signal (called uplink multi-path)
– Transponder reply signal (called downlink multi-path)

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Multi-Path

Vertical Multi-Path (continued)


 Combinations of uplink and downlink multi-path at certain geometries can
produce four (4) or more reports in one (1) beam dwell from a single target
– Two (2) or more reports can be generated from uplink multi-path conditions
– Two (2) replies can be generated from each downlink reply
 Uplink multi-path occurs when the real and reflected interrogation signals
reach the transponder at such a delay that the transponder decodes an
incorrect pulse spacing, and therefore replies to the wrong mode
– This is called Mode Conversion
 Reply mode does not match the intended interrogation mode
– In addition, an uplink multi-path reply will in most cases be generated at an
incorrect range and may be reported above or below the real target range
 The range offset of an uplink multi-path reply is a function of target and
platform geometry and the modes of interrogation

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Multi-Path

Ground Interrogator – Vertical Multi-Path Geometry

Note: Ground reflections also produce Up-link Multi-Path interference on the interrogation signals
Telephonics Interrogators identify and eliminate false replies due to vertical multi-path based on target geometry.

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Multi-Path

Lobbing due to Vertical Multi-Path

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Multi-Path

Lobbing as seen on Radar Display

Elapsed time image radar display showing an aircraft flying


through antenna minima caused by ground reflection

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Multi-Path

Horizontal Multi-Path Reflections

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Antenna Pattern Distortion

Overview
 Antenna patterns in free space can be distorted once installed at a ground site, on
a ship, or on an airborne platform

 SSR antenna pattern distortion from platform structures and other causes
performance degradation such as:
– Azimuth accuracy
– Code accuracy
– False targets
– Reduced Target detection

 Antenna pattern anomalies and Multi-path conditions can result in RF phase


interference (constructive or destructive) that can alter the intended antenna
pattern

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Antenna Pattern Distortion

Overview (continued)
 For airborne platforms (interrogators and transponders), a number of different
factors can interfere with RF energy to cause very different antenna patterns
from those intended
– These include, but are not limited to:
 Antenna installation
 Aircraft skin effects
 Wheels/Struts
 Tail
 Wings
 Stores
 Other appendages
 For ground systems the height of the antenna above the ground and other
near by structures can alter the intended antenna patterns causing
performance degradation
 Installed system performance must be a key requirement to SSR/IFF designs

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Antenna Pattern Distortion

Examples

Normal Antenna Patterns Distorted Antenna Patterns

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New Initiatives in SSR and IFF

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New Initiatives in SSR and IFF

 New IFF Systems must be Lighter, Smaller and Require Less Prime Power to
meet new Platform Requirements

 UAVs will require IFF/ATC transponders to share airspace with all other aircraft

 Transponder squitter capability in ADS-B, UAT and Mode 5 Level 2 will aid current
ATC and IFF operations by providing accurate GPS position of air targets

 Passive Squitter Detection Systems will provide situational awareness to ATC and
IFF end users

 GPS Denial and Jamming Protection coupled with GPS Denial/Jamming Detection
and Reporting will be required to insure the GPS system is accurate and
operational

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References

 Secondary Surveillance Radar by Michael Stevens Published by Artech House


1988

 https://www.radartutorial.eu

 https://www.eurocontrol.int

 ICAO Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications - Volume IV- Surveillance


Radar and Collision Avoidance Systems (Amendment no. 90 dated 16/7/18)

 Electronic Warfare and Radar Systems Engineering Handbook by Scott O'Neil


Published by Military Book Shop 2012

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Thank You!

 If you have any questions on this material or other SSR, IFF or ATC topics you can
always email me at: messina@telephonics.com

 Thanks for the opportunity to brief you on SSR/IFF Systems

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