

Senato della Repubblica
Servizio affari internazionali

XV legislatura

**2° Conferenza euro-mediterranea
sull'agricoltura**

Strasburgo
28-29 settembre 2006

Documentazione

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Servizio affari internazionali

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3418

Patrizia Mauracher

_3397

Claudio Olmeda

_3416

Cristina Sabatini

_2571

Angela Scaramuzzi

_3417

INDICE

I. CONFERENZA

- **Nota informativa e programma** 1
- **Elenco dei partecipanti (provvisorio)** 5
- **Composizione della delegazione parlamentare italiana** 21
- **La 1° Conferenza euro-mediterranea sull'agricoltura (14-15 giugno 2001)**
 - Sintesi delle conclusioni 22
 - Conclusioni del Vice-Presidente del Parlamento europeo Renzo Imbeni (in francese) 23

II. DOCUMENTAZIONE

Introduzione ai temi della Conferenza

Agriculture: a strategic sector in the Mediterranean. Relazione di Bertrand Hervieu - Segretario generale Ciheam (Centre international de haute études agronomiques méditerranéennes). 31

Schede introduttive (a cura della International Federation of Agricultural Producers)

- 1° sessione: "Sviluppo di una politica agricola euro-mediterranea nel contesto degli scambi commerciali WTO". 42
- 2° sessione: "Verso uno sviluppo rurale nel mediterraneo attraverso l'uso sostenibile delle risorse". 44
- 3° sessione: "L'identità mediterranea: prodotti agricoli e organizzazione dei mercati". 46

Documenti dell'Unione europea

- **Politica agricola comune: dal suo avvio all'attualità. Scheda.** 51
- **Sviluppo rurale 2007-2013. Comunicato della Commissione europea.** 58
- **Prima Conferenza euromediterranea dei Ministri dell'agricoltura . (Venezia 25-27 novembre 2003). Conclusioni.** 61
- **Comunicazione della Commissione al Consiglio e al Parlamento. 10° anniversario del partenariato mediterraneo. Piano di lavoro sulle prospettive dei prossimi cinque anni. Estratto. (12 aprile 2005).** 69

- Risoluzione del Parlamento europeo sul partenariato euromediterraneo (22/2/2005). 71
- Dichiarazione di Barcellona ed evoluzione del partenariato euro-mediterraneo. Scheda. 75
- *From quantity to quality: a Cap for the 21st century*. Intervento di Mariann Fischer Boel, Commissario europeo per l'agricoltura e lo sviluppo rurale. (27 ottobre 2005). 81

Documenti dell'Assemblea parlamentare del Consiglio d'Europa

- *New trends and challenges for Euro-Mediterranean migration policies*. Recommendation 1737 (2006). 89
- *Co-operation and sustainable development in the Adriatic Basin*. Resolution 1446 (2005). 91
- *The challenges for Mediterranean agriculture*. Resolution 1331 (2003). 93
- *Cultural co-operation between Europe and the south Mediterranean countries*. Resolution 1313 (2003). 95

Documenti IFAP (International Federation of Agricultural Producers)

- Scheda informativa sull'IFAP 101
- *Defining a common Mediterranean identity* (30 novembre 2005). Comunicato. 103
- *Towards a sustainable Mediterranean agricultural policy: Strengthening complementarities for overall development of the Mediterranean Basin*. A cura di Nora Ourabah (Commissione sul mediterraneo dell'Ifap). 104

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- Scheda informativa sul CIHEAM 109
- Jose Garcia Alvarez, *The Mediterranean in the WTO negotiations*. Estratto da: Rapporto annuale 2006 del CIHEAM. 113
- *Sustainable rural development policies in the Mediterranean countries in the context of the EU's neighbourhood policies (2007/2013)* – 8 and 9 February 2006, Cairo, Egypt. Conclusioni e raccomandazioni. 137


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- Luigi Costato, *La riforma della Pac del 2003 e le norme agrarie del Trattato*. In "Rivista di diritto agrario", 2005, fasc. 3, pp. 478-487. 152
- Paolo Borghi, *Il regolamento n. 178/2003 e le norme dell'organizzazione mondiale del commercio (OMC/WTO)*, in "Rivista di diritto agrario", 2005, fasc. 1, pp. 97-105. 162

Rassegna stampa

- *Les aides agricoles provoquent l'echec de la liberalisation du commerce*, "Le Monde", 26 luglio. 173
- *In the twilight of Doha. World trade*, "The Economist", 29 luglio 2006. 175
- *Uncle's Sam teat. Can American's farmers be weaned away from their subsidies?* "The Economist", 9 settembre 2006. 178
- *Agriculture discord stymies world trade talk's revival*, "The New York Times", 10 settembre 2006. 180
- *Cairns trade impasse "just another knockback" for PM*, "The Australian", 20 settembre 2006. 182
- Confagricoltura: *"L'Italia rilanci il negoziato WTO"*. "Il sole 24 ore", 3 agosto 2006. 184
- Paolo Guerrieri, *Il fallimento del Doha Round* tratto dal sito dell' "Istituto Affari internazionali". 185
- Riccardo Faini, *Il Doha round gira su se stesso*, tratto dal sito "La Voce.info", (21/8/2006). 187
- Pascal Lamy, *Amis ministres du commerce...* "Le Monde", 14 dicembre 2005. 189

I. CONFERENZA



2nd Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Agriculture 2^o Conférence euroméditerranéenne sur l'agriculture

Strasbourg, 28-29 September / septembre 2006



2nd Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Agriculture Strasbourg, 28-29 September 2006

Nota informativa

Il Parlamento europeo e l'Assemblea parlamentare del Consiglio d'Europa promuovono la seconda Conferenza euro-mediterranea sull'Agricoltura, in collaborazione con Ifap (International Federation of Agricultural Producers). Alla Conferenza parteciperanno parlamentari e rappresentanti delle organizzazioni agricole dei paesi mediterranei.

La Conferenza, che si pone in linea di continuità con la prima Conferenza tenutasi il 14 e 15 giugno 2001, avrà come oggetto l'evoluzione della cooperazione euro-mediterranea sulle materie agricole e di sviluppo rurale, nel contesto della recente riforma della PAC (Politica agricola comune), dell'evoluzione del multilateralismo commerciale e della politica europea di vicinato e partenariato verso i paesi del sud del mediterraneo sancita dalla Dichiarazione di Barcellona.

In particolare la Conferenza, si propone di:

- avviare una riflessione sulle politiche agricole e rurali mediterranee, con l'obiettivo di consolidare un approccio cooperativo tra l'Europa e i suoi partner meridionali e tra gli operatori delle due coste del mediterraneo.
- valutare gli effetti che le negoziazioni multilaterali sul commercio mondiale hanno sull'area commerciale euro-mediterranea, anche alla luce del recente fallimento del negoziato di Doha in sede WTO e della recente riforma della Politica agricola comune (Pac)
- analizzare gli strumenti per valorizzare l'identità mediterranea dei prodotti agricoli nei mercati sempre più aperti e "mondializzati"
- promuovere il dialogo tra i paesi europei e i paesi del sud del mediterraneo e in particolare tra i parlamentari e i rappresentanti professionali del settore agricolo.

Thursday 28 September 2006

Chamber of the Council of Europe

2 pm Registration

3- 4.15 pm OPENING SESSION

Mr René van der LINDEN, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Mr Gérard ONESTA, Vice-President of the European Parliament

Mr Jack WILKINSON, President of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP)

Addresses by:

Mr Hashem AD DABBAS, Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, Member of the Jordan Parliament

Mr Juha KORKEAOJA, Minister of Agriculture and Forests (Finland), President-in-Office of the Council of the European Union

Ms Mariann FISCHER BOEL, European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development

4.15-4.45 pm Coffee break

4.45 -6.30 pm

Introduction to the themes of the conference:

Mr Bertrand HERVIEU, Secretary General of the International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agricultural Studies (ICAMAS)

Discussion

At the end of the discussion: Greetings from Mr Giuseppe AVOLIO, Founder President of the Mediterranean Committee of IFAP

6.30 pm End of opening session

Reception given by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament

Friday, 29 September 2006

Chamber of the European Parliament

9 am SESSION 1

Theme: ***Developing a Euro-Mediterranean agriculture policy within the framework of WTO trade negotiations***

In the Chair: Mr Joseph DAUL, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Parliament

Speakers: Ms Anabel GONZALEZ, Director of the Commodities and Agriculture Division, World Trade Organisation

Mr Paolo DE CASTRO, Minister of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies (Italy)

Rapporteur: Mr José María GARCÍA ALVAREZ COQUE, Polytechnic University of Valencia (Spain)

Discussion

11 am SESSION 2

Theme: ***Rural development in the Mediterranean basin through sustainable management of resources***

In the Chair: Mr Walter SCHMIED, Chairman of the Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs of the Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly

Speakers: Mr Lucien CHABASON, President of the Blue Plan

Mr Abdesalem CHELGHOUM, Secretary General of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Algeria)

Rapporteur: Mr Mohamed AIT KADI, Advisor, Ministry of Agriculture (Morocco)

Discussion

1 pm Mediterranean Buffet offered by IFAP

3 pm SESSION 3

Theme: ***Developing a Mediterranean identity for agricultural products and market organisation***

In the Chair: Mr Guy GIVA, Chairman of the Mediterranean Committee of IFAP

Speakers: Mr Antoine CUVILLIER, Legal Affairs Director, European Food Safety Authority
 Mr Paolo BEDONI, President of COLDIRETTI (Italy)

Rapporteur : Mr Vincent DOLLÉ, Director of the Mediterranean Agronomic Institute of Montpellier (ICAMAS)

Discussion

5-6.30 pm CLOSING SESSION


Summary of discussions by the three rapporteurs

Closing speeches:

Mr Guy GIVA, Chairman of the Mediterranean Committee of IFAP

Mr Walter SCHMIED, Chairman of the Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs of the Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly

Mr Joseph DAUL, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Parliament



2nd Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Agriculture
2^e Conférence euroméditerranéenne sur l'agriculture

Strasbourg, 28-29 September / septembre 2006



LISTE PROVISOIRE DE PARTICIPANTS

PROVISIONAL LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1) **Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe (APCE) – membres de la Commission de l'environnement de l'agriculture et des questions territoriales**
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) – members of the Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs

	NOM/Prénom SURNAME/Name	PAYS / TITRE COUNTRY / POSITION
Mr	Van der LINDEN René	Président de l'Assemblée parlementaire / <i>President of the Parliamentary Assembly</i>
Mr	DEITTERT Hubert	Allemagne, Député / <i>Germany, Deputy</i>
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Mr	DUDZIŃSKI Tomasz	Pologne, Député / <i>Poland, Deputy</i>
M.	DUPRAZ John	Suisse, Député, Vice-Président de la Sous-commission de l'agriculture et de l'alimentation / <i>Switzerland, Deputy, Vice-Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Agriculture and Food</i>
Mr	ETHERINGTON Bill	Royaume-Uni, Député, Président de la Sous-commission du développement durable / <i>United Kingdom, MP, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Sustainable Development</i>
Mr	EVANS Nigel	Royaume-Uni, Député / <i>United Kingdom, MP</i>
M.	FERNÁNDEZ AGUILAR Adolfo	Espagne, Député / <i>Spain, Deputy</i>
M.	GIOVANELLI Fausto	Italie, Vce-Président de la Sous-commission du développement durable / <i>Italy, Vice-Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Sustainable Development</i>
M.	GOULET Daniel	France, Sénateur, Président de la Sous-commission de l'agriculture et de l'alimentation / <i>France, Senator, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Agriculture and Food</i>
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M.	HÖGMARK Anders G.	Suède, Député / <i>Sweden, Deputy</i>
M.	HUSS Jean	Luxembourg, Député / <i>Deputy</i>
Mrs	JAZŁOWIECKA Danuta	Pologne, Députée / <i>Poland, Deputy</i>
M.	LE GRAND Jean-François	France, Sénateur / <i>Senator</i>
Mr	MANIURA Eduard	Pologne, Député / <i>Poland, Deputy</i>
Mr	MEALE Alan	Royaume-Uni, Député, Vice-Président de la Commission / <i>United Kingdom, MP, Vice-Chairman of the Committee</i>
M.	NESSA Pasquale	Italie, Sénateur / <i>Italy, Senator</i>
M.	PADILLA Julio	Espagne, Député / <i>Spain, Deputy</i>
M.	PREDA Cezar	Roumanie, Député / <i>Romania, Deputy</i>
M.	PUCHE Gabino	Espagne, Député / <i>Spain, Deputy</i>
M.	SCHMIED Walter	Suisse, Député, Président de la Commission / <i>Switzerland, Deputy, Chairman of the Committee</i>
Mr	TIILIKAINEN Kimmo	Finlande, Député / <i>Finland, Deputy</i>
M.	TXUEKA Iñaki	Espagne, Député / <i>Spain, Deputy</i>
Mr	VIS Rudi	Royaume-Uni, Député / <i>United Kingdom, MP</i>
Mr	WITA Tadeusz	Pologne, Député / <i>Poland, Deputy</i>

2) Membres du Parlement Européen / Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)

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Mr	ARIF Kader	PSE	INTA
Mme	BATZELI Katerina	PSE	AGRI
Mr	BOURLANGES Jean-Louis	ALDE	INTA
Mme	BOURZAI Bernadette	PSE	REGI
Mr	CARNERO Carlos	PSE	APEM
Mr	CASTIGLIONE Giuseppe	PPE	AGRI
M.	CATANIA Giusto	GUE	Délégations
Mr	DAUL Joseph	PPE	Président COMAGRI
Mr	GOLIK Bogdan	PSE	AGRI
M.	LANGEN Werner	PPE	COM Industrie, Recherche et Energie
Mr	LAVARRA Vincenzo	PSE	AGRI
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Mr	OBIOLS Raimon	PSE	Délégations
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Mr	TITFORD Jeffrey	IND/DEM	AGRI
M.	VENETO Armando	PPE	TRANS/AGRI
Mme	VINCENZI Marta	PSE	TRANS

**3) Membres de l'Assemblée Parlementaire Euro-méditerranéenne (APEM)
Members of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (APEM)**

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Mr	CARNERO GONZALEZ Carlos	Membre de l'APEM et du Parlement européen / <i>Member of APEM and of the European Parliament</i>
Mr	HELAL Ismail	Membre de l'APEM et de l'Assemblée du Peuple Egyptien / <i>Member of APEM AND of the People's Assembly of Egypt</i>
Mr	OYAN Aguz	Membre de l'APEM et Vice-Président de la Commission économique, membre du Parlement turc / <i>Member of APEM and Vice-Chairman of the Economic Committee, Member of the Turkish Parliament</i>

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Mr	ŞTIUCĂ Alexandru	Roumanie, Député / <i>Romania, Deputy</i>
Mr	THOMA Yiannakis	Chypre, Député, Président de la Commission de l'agriculture et de ressources naturelles / <i>Cyprus, Deputy, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources</i>
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Mr	VACULÍK Josef	République Tchèque, Sénateur / <i>Czech Republic, Senator</i>
Mr	ZAWAIDEH Wadie M.	Jordanie, Député, Chambre des Députés de Jordanie / <i>Jordan, Deputy, Jordan House of Representatives</i>

**6) Fédération Internationale des producteurs agricoles (FIPA)
International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP)**

Mr.	ABU HELALEH Samir	Vice-Président de l'Union d'exploitants agricoles de Jordanie / <i>Vice-President of the Jordan Farmers Union, Jordan</i>
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La 1° Conferenza euro-mediterranea sull'agricoltura (Strasburgo, 14-15 giugno 2001)

Sintesi delle conclusioni

La prima Conferenza euro-mediterranea sull'agricoltura si è svolta a Strasburgo il 14 e il 15 giugno 2001, sotto l'egida del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio d'Europa, in collaborazione con IFAP (*International Federation of Agricultural Producers*). La Conferenza, che ha riunito parlamentari e rappresentanti professionali nell'ottica del coordinamento delle politiche mediterranee, è stata suddivisa in tre sessioni tematiche dedicate agli aspetti produttivi dell'agricoltura mediterranea, allo sviluppo agricolo e rurale, e alle scelte agricole nel mediterraneo di fronte alla liberalizzazione in ambito OMC e all'allargamento dell'Unione.

E' stata espressa la necessità di rafforzare il ruolo dell'agricoltura all'interno del processo di Barcellona sul partenariato euro-mediterraneo e di rinegoziare il programma MEDA, con l'obiettivo di istituire un programma specifico per l'agricoltura e la ruralità nel mediterraneo e di superare il metodo di intervento basato su concessioni commerciali a prodotti specifici, per affermare un approccio più globale che pensi l'agricoltura mediterranea in termini di filiera e complementarità. In questo contesto è apparso decisivo puntare sulla diversificazione produttiva e l'innalzamento della qualità.

In generale il settore agricolo segna un ritardo nel processo di integrazione dello spazio euro-mediterraneo, che ha come obiettivo finale la creazione di una zona di libero scambio entro il 2010. Nella prospettiva della liberalizzazione è stata proposta l'istituzione di fondi speciali per agevolare l'adattamento strutturale di zone esposte a forti dinamiche di concorrenza e per promuovere la diversificazione e lo sviluppo di zone rurali in ritardo.

Numerosi interventi hanno focalizzato l'attenzione sul tema della multifunzionalità dell'agricoltura mediterranea, ovvero dei legami esistenti tra la produzione agricola e un insieme di beni e servizi di interesse pubblico: ambiente, sicurezza alimentare, tutela del territorio, sostegno all'occupazione etc. La multifunzionalità è stata considerata come possibile asse portante di una nuova PAC (politica agricola comune), per sostenere nel processo di integrazione euro-mediterranea le esigenze sociali, ambientali e di sviluppo rurale legate all'attività agricola. E' stata inoltre da più parti sottolineata la necessità di gestire in maniera coordinata le risorse idriche.

Una particolare attenzione è stata data al rapporto tra agricoltura euro-mediterranea e dinamiche di liberalizzazione del commercio mondiale in relazione agli accordi in sede WTO/OMC, esprimendo in generale l'esigenza di rendere compatibile l'integrazione regionale con il multilateralismo, la protezione dello spazio mediterraneo con la globalizzazione degli scambi. Inoltre l'accento sulla multifunzionalità agricola può facilitare la modifica dell'Accordo OMC in tema di ostacoli tecnici al commercio, introdurre misure sanitarie e fitosanitarie che garantiscano il principio di precauzione, migliorare la protezione delle indicazioni d'origine dei prodotti mediterranei.

Sul tema dell'allargamento a est dell'Unione europea è stato rilevato che nel settore agricolo vi è maggiore integrazione piuttosto che concorrenza tra le due aree del mediterraneo e dell'est europeo. Un'altra questione affrontata dalla conferenza è stata la cooperazione in materia di gestione della mobilità e dell'immigrazione della manodopera verso i paesi dell'Europa del sud e la necessità di sviluppare anche forme di integrazione sud-sud.

CONCLUSIONS DE LA CONFÉRENCE EUROMÉDITERRANÉENNE SUR L'AGRICULTURE

Strasbourg, 14-15 juin 2001

Discours de M. Imbeni, vice-président du PE

Finalement, après deux jours de travail, vif et constructif, nous sommes arrivés au terme de la Conférence. Je crois que nous pouvons être satisfaits. L'objectif fixé au préalable a été atteint : parlementaires et représentants professionnels des deux côtés de la Méditerranée, avons entamé une réflexion commune en vue, d'une coordination des politiques agricoles méditerranéennes et, pour une consolidation d'une approche coopérative entre les opérateurs européens et des pays de la rive Sud participant au processus de Barcelone.

Nous avons tout d'abord fait le point de la **situation actuelle et de ses limites**, dans les trois séances thématiques, sur le volet productif, sur le volet du développement rural durable et sur les enjeux agro-commerciaux.

LES DEFIS

1. Première session

1.a) Dans la **première session**, dédiée à l'analyse des productions méditerranéennes, on a pu remarquer la **forte concurrence et la spécialisation accrue** qui règnent sur le marché pour certains produits régionaux types étant donné l'exportation de produits d'une composition très similaire par les pays méditerranéens.

Cette **spécialisation accrue** de l'agriculture d'exportation, renforcée par l'existence de la PAC et des Organisations Communes de Marché consolidées, s'est avérée dans le passé, un des obstacles majeurs pour le développement du volet agricole du processus de Barcelone et, en définitive, pour le degré de libéralisation du commerce agricole euro-méditerranéen.

1.b) Par ailleurs, on a relevé les **déséquilibres sectoriels** existants au sein de la PAC du point de vue du soutien à la production. Ils se matérialisent par une distribution inégale entre les Quinze, des sacrifices et bénéfices découlant de la consolidation d'un espace unique euro-méditerranéen.

Autrement dit, ce traitement différencié engendre deux réactions :

- D'une part, les productions des régions de l'Europe du Sud, notamment des fruits et des légumes, subissent - avec des Organisations Communes de Marché axés presque exclusivement sur la protection douanière - l'impact direct des concessions commerciales octroyées dans le cadre du processus de Barcelone sans avoir les compensations financières dont bénéficient les produits continentaux

- Et, d'autre part, il en résulte une dépendance accrue des pays du Sud de l'exportation des excédents de l'Europe du Nord.

2. Deuxième session

Dans la deuxième session, nous nous sommes penchés sur les possibilités de bâtir un **modèle de développement agricole et rural durable** dans le Bassin méditerranéen. Là, **deux conceptions** s'opposent :

2.a) D'une part, on peut croire que le renforcement des politiques de développement rural est juste une **conséquence directe de la libéralisation des échanges**. Cette affirmation peut être particulièrement exacte **pour la PAC** dans la mesure où les actions en faveur du développement rural sont par définition des mesures découplées de la production. Elles tombent dans le cadre de la Boîte verte de l'OMC et, dans ce contexte, une "*ruralisation*" progressive de la PAC devient une forme concrète, et pragmatique, de réforme compatible avec la libéralisation des marchés promue à partir de la signature de l'Accord agricole de Marrakech. De fait, l'Agenda 2000, approuvé dans le Sommet de Berlin de mars 1999, signifie un pari spécifique sur cette voie dans la mesure où l'on prévoit un renforcement progressif des mesures en faveur du développement rural, soit moyennant une modulation progressive des aides directes du premier pilier de la PAC (avec le transfert obligatoire des crédits modulés en faveur du deuxième pilier de la PAC, le développement rural), soit moyennant la consolidation financière directe du deuxième volet (qui représente aujourd'hui, il ne faut pas l'oublier, seulement 10,5% des crédits alloués en faveur de la PAC).

2.b) Mais, d'autre part, on peut **douter de la compatibilité d'une libéralisation** accrue de l'agriculture avec le **maintien d'un modèle rural durable** dans le Bassin méditerranéen dans la mesure où elle peut entraîner une intensification de l'exportation des produits qui met en danger une gestion raisonnée des ressources naturelles (sol et eau) ainsi que l'équilibre des zones rurales méditerranéennes. Dans ce contexte, il ne faut pas oublier que la plupart des populations des campagnes du Sud de la région méditerranéenne est largement dépendante d'une agriculture qui n'est pas exportatrice et qui, malgré ça, reste encore le cœur du monde rural. Ceci dit, le maintien de la viabilité des zones rurales périphériques dépend en grande partie des politiques visant à conserver l'ensemble de l'activité agricole et, au-delà de ça, on ne peut pas concevoir un modèle agricole soutenable

qui n'ait pas comme objectif principal la lutte contre la pauvreté rurale d'un côté, et de l'autre, la mise en œuvre d'une stratégie méditerranéenne, voire internationale, des ressources hydrauliques.

Cette éventuelle contradiction entre un libre-échange sans contrôle et les exigences d'un développement durable dans les régions où l'agriculture joue un rôle clé a été aussi mise en évidence par la consolidation de la nouvelle **notion de la multifonctionnalité de l'activité agricole** (formellement acceptée par l'UE et la plupart des pays membres du processus de Barcelone ainsi que par les pays candidats à l'adhésion).

3. Troisième session

Dans ce contexte, il faut reconnaître que, jusqu'à présent, ni les négociations en cours dans le cadre de l'OMC, ni la réforme de la PAC dans la perspective de l'élargissement, ni, non plus les expériences de régionalisme ouvert tel que le processus initié à Barcelone en 1995, n'ont été capables de **concrétiser la portée réelle de la multifonctionnalité**. Nous avons pu le remarquer dans la troisième session dédiée aux enjeux commerciaux.

3.a) D'une part, il est étonnant que le domaine agricole n'ait pas fait objet de plus d'intérêt au cours des trois conférences euro-méditerranéennes qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à présent. L'agriculture, estimée comme un secteur sensible, est de fait en retard par rapport au reste des secteurs économiques dans la perspective d'une intégration accrue de l'espace euro-méditerranéen qui a comme but final la création d'une zone de libre-échange en 2010. L'agriculture a, jusqu'aujourd'hui une approche strictement contingente et bilatérale qui ne répond pas aux exigences d'un vrai processus d'intégration et qui nourrit la confrontation entre les producteurs des deux rives de la Méditerranée, notamment des fruits et légumes.

3.b) D'autre part, le processus de libéralisation agricole entamé depuis l'Accord agricole de Marrakech débouche sur une **érosion progressive des préférences commerciales**, matérialisées en des contingents tarifaires en vigueur. En même temps, la mondialisation économique mène à la **délocalisation des cultures méditerranéennes** qui, passent des concurrents du bassin méditerranéen à des concurrents extérieurs (p.e vers l'hémisphère sud). Finalement, il faut tenir compte des **pertes fiscales et des impôts indirects** que la libéralisation des marchés agricoles peut entraîner. Cette libéralisation est spécialement grave pour les pays du Sud de la Méditerranée qui ont besoin de ressources financières accrues pour faire face aux frais d'adaptation et de changement structurel. Dans ce contexte, il existe un réel danger d'opposer les deux processus en cours, l'intégration régionale d'une part, et le renforcement du multilatéralisme de l'autre, et, à la limite, de demander d'opérer un choix à chaque pays entre une stratégie préférentielle et une

stratégie multilatérale. Mais ce choix relève **une fausse alternative**. Intégration régionale et multilatéralisme doivent aller de pair.

3.c) En troisième lieu, il est déjà évident que le **programme MEDA II** pour la période 2000-2006 est manifestement insuffisant. La question se pose de savoir si l'affectation future d'une partie de ces fonds à des **dépenses budgétaires spécifiques** pour l'ajustement agricole, pour la formation, pour les infrastructures hydrauliques et pour le développement rural, pourrait garantir le succès définitif de l'intégration euro-méditerranéenne.

3.d) En dernier lieu, il faut rappeler que l'intégration euro-méditerranéenne exige des pays du Sud trois choses : d'abord, la mise en œuvre d'un **environnement économique attractif** pour les investisseurs privés ; d'autre part, un **cadre législatif harmonisé** avec les standards de l'Union européenne; et finalement, un **renforcement de l'intégration Sud-Sud** en vue de la création et l'amplification des marchés destinataires des investissements.

DES CONCLUSIONS OPTIMISTES

Malgré les problèmes soulevés, ces deux journées nous ont permis de trouver quelques axes pour le **développement futur du volet agricole** du processus de Barcelone et, en définitive, pour instaurer une **approche coopérative** entre le Nord et le Sud du bassin méditerranéen :

- 1) D'abord, il faut une intégration plus poussée du volet agricole dans le partenariat euro-méditerranéen qui devrait faire l'objet d'une renégociation des programmes MEDA portant sur un **programme d'accompagnement spécifique** pour le secteur agricole et la ruralité. En fait, l'aide financière de l'UE à ses partenaires méditerranéens ne prévoit aucun budget spécifique pour l'agriculture et le développement rural. Ceci est clair dans le cas des programmes MEDA "*régionaux*" qui permettent seulement le lancement de projets couverts par une conférence ministérielle. Heureusement, on peut prévoir que l'année prochaine, avec la présidence espagnole du Conseil, une **conférence euro-méditerranéenne spéciale sur l'agriculture et le développement rural** aura lieu à Valence. Une telle conférence pourrait aider à élargir la portée de la **coopération agricole** dans le bassin méditerranéen en remplaçant le cercle étroit des négociations portant sur les concessions commerciales relatives à des produits spécifiques par une approche plus globale de développement rural dans la région qui favorise aussi l'intégration réelle des agricultures méditerranéennes dans une perspective de filière et, en définitive, de complémentarité.

2) Etant donné le nombre de processus de libéralisation commerciale auquel seront confrontés les pays méditerranéens dans les années à venir, il faut prévoir un

fonds spécial pour faciliter l'adaptation structurelle des zones rurales exposées à une concurrence accrue dans la phase d'application de la zone de libre-échange, en faveur du maintien des ressources naturelles (eau et sol) et, en définitive, de la diversification et le développement des zones rurales méditerranéennes en retard, dans la ligne du deuxième volet de la PAC appliqué dans l'UE.

- 3) Dans ce contexte, plusieurs interventions ont soulevé l'**intérêt de la notion de la multifonctionnalité** pour l'agriculture méditerranéenne dans la mesure où elle souligne les liens existants entre la production agricole et un ensemble de biens et services d'intérêt public (environnement, aménagement du territoire, conditions sociales, sécurité alimentaire, etc.). La notion de la multifonctionnalité peut devenir l'axe sur lequel on pourrait :

- **bâtir une nouvelle PAC** ;

- **introduire dans l'intégration euroméditerranéenne** les exigences du développement rural et l'amélioration des conditions sociales et environnementales liées à l'activité agricole ;

- et enfin, **modifier le cadre agricole multilatéral de l'OMC** avec une **stratégie commune euro-méditerranéenne** pour la prochaine Conférence Interministérielle qui se déroulera à Qatar fin de cette année.

- 4) Sur cette base, la multifonctionnalité peut nous servir à **réformer l'accord agricole de l'OMC *stricto sensu***, dans la perspective de trouver un nouveau modèle de soutien plus juste et de maintenir une protection douanière adaptée au milieu rural méditerranéen. Une option concrète au niveau de l'accès interne serait l'application d'un taux de réduction douanière pour chaque produit d'autant plus grand que le niveau du tarif est élevé. Dans l'UE, cette formule favoriserait le maintien des niveaux tarifaires actuels de nombreux produits méditerranéens qui sont normalement inférieurs aux tarifs appliqués aux produits continentaux. Les pays du Sud soutiendraient certainement cette option à condition qu'ils obtiennent un accès préférentiel plus élevé aux marchés européens en attendant l'instauration de la zone de libre-échange. La multifonctionnalité agricole peut aussi être utilisée pour **changer l'Accord sur les obstacles techniques au commerce** et intégrer dans son sein les modes de production utilisés et les exigences du bien-être des animaux. Elle peut aussi nous **faciliter un Accord des mesures sanitaires et phytosanitaires plus juste** qui garantisse l'application du principe de précaution et un standard sanitaire acceptable par nos citoyens. Et en dernier lieu, la multifonctionnalité est un atout pour l'**amélioration de la protection des indications d'origine méditerranéennes** dans le cadre de l'**Accord sur la propriété intellectuelle** de l'OMC.

- 5) Une autre conclusion des débats, est qu'on ne peut opposer, comme on le fait souvent de manière simplifiée, l'**élargissement de l'UE vers les pays de l'Est** à la

démarche euroméditerranéenne. Dans le domaine agricole (mais c'est aussi très probablement le cas pour d'autres secteurs économiques), il y a beaucoup plus de complémentarité entre l'Est et le Sud que de compétition sur les produits. Il y a davantage à attendre d'une amplification des débouchés commerciaux à bénéfice mutuel qu'une concurrence féroce dans ces mêmes secteurs. Dans ce contexte, l'élargissement peut devenir **le catalyseur attendu** qui permettra de faire réalité le libre-échange agricole euro-méditerranéen, voire consolider une approche coopérative entre les agricultures des deux rives de la mer.

- 6) Une quatrième conclusion de la Conférence a été, à mon avis, la nécessité d'une coopération étendue au domaine de la **mobilité de la main-d'œuvre**. Dans les pays d'Europe du Sud, l'immigration de travailleurs en provenance des pays tiers constituerait un moyen de mettre fin au conflit entre la solidarité et la compétitivité.

7) D'autre part, dans la mesure où les investisseurs européens peuvent ne pas trouver intéressant de s'installer dans le Sud, étant donné que les accords euroméditerranéens n'aboutissent pas à un vrai changement des conditions réglementaires en vigueur et à la création des marchés surs et plus étendus, il faut encourager **l'intégration Sud-Sud**. Dans ce contexte, nous devons nous féliciter de l'initiative d'instaurer une **Zone arabe de libre-échange** entre le Maroc, la Tunisie, l'Egypte et la Jordanie. Que son exemple soit répandu.

8) Finalement, dans la perspective d'assurer un suivi à cette extraordinaire initiative, on pourrait peut-être envisager pour le futur, **dans le cadre du Forum parlementaire euro-méditerranéen** qui s'est réuni pour la deuxième fois à Bruxelles les 8 et 9 février 2001, une rencontre bisannuelle ou trisannuelle avec la participation des organisations des producteurs agricoles.

Strasbourg, 15 juin 2001

II. DOCUMENTAZIONE



CIHEAM

International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies

2nd Euro-Mediterranean Conference on agriculture

Strasbourg 28-29 Septembre 2006

Agriculture: a strategic sector in the Mediterranean

Bertrand Hervieu

Secretary General of CIHEAM

Introduction

As international geopolitics grow more complex and new forms of socio-economic equilibrium take shape, the Mediterranean Region is once more giving cause for concern and demanding our attention. Ten years after the resounding Barcelona Declaration, establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), doubt now prevails over confidence and hope. The Mediterranean Region is still a place of tensions, beset with security problems, socio-political division and unequal distribution of wealth. In 2005, France, Italy and Spain alone accounted for 80% of its total GDP.

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The problems facing Euro-Mediterranean cooperation can be put down to a great many factors. One such is that insufficient account has been taken of certain strategic sectors. Agriculture is one area to which scant attention has been paid within the Euro-Mediterranean context and yet it occupies an essential and strategic place therein: *essential* because it is fundamental to the maintenance of economic, social and territorial equilibrium in the Mediterranean Region; *strategic* because important political and trade issues and the resolve to build a more cohesive Mediterranean Region depend upon the ways in which it develop and is dealt with.

In November 2005, the European Union (EU) finally decided to begin negotiations with Mediterranean Partners Countries¹ (MPCs) on the liberalisation of agricultural trade. This decision, an important one when all is said and done, nevertheless involves issues and risks that need to be properly managed.

If we can understand why agriculture is such a strategic factor in the Mediterranean Region and see just how the outlook for the liberalisation of agricultural trade is currently changing, we should be able to give some account of the future of the Mediterranean. Such is the modest ambition of this paper: to put forward reference points for the discussion, alert readers to future developments and put out a call for action.

1. An exploratory review of Mediterranean Agriculture

This first part² is not intended to give an exhaustive account of the agricultural situation in the Mediterranean Region but simply to alert the reader to unstoppable trends, emerging challenges and food security issues in the region.

Unstoppable trends

The Mediterranean region is an area without borders, an open territory, whose limits had long been traceable only from the presence of olive groves. Three main features epitomise the area's specific character: the peculiar nature of its climate and vegetation, the richness of its biodiversity and landscapes and at the same time the fragility of the land and its vulnerability to environmental factors (drought, hydric erosion, floods, salinisation, rugged mountains, etc.)

Another distinctive feature of the Mediterranean Region is the importance role of agriculture in the socio-territorial balance of the states that make it up. This is particularly evident in the large size of the rural population: at present, 36% of the 454 million inhabitants of the region³ live in a rural

¹ At present the partnership comprises 35 member states: the 25 states of the European Union and 10 Mediterranean Partner Countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority).

² The data given in this article is derived from various works produced by CIHEAM, including the work currently being carried out by the forward lanning group charged with preparing the *Mediterra 2008* annual report.

³ Information given in this article relates to 19 countries in the Mediterranean Basin: 8 countries on the northern shore (Albania, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta Portugal and Spain,) and 11 countries on the southern shore (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority). The population projections are based on analyses by the United Nations Organisation, presented in "*World population prospects: The 2004 revision population database*".



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environment. The figure is as high as 41% on the Southern shore, where rural populations in some countries (notably Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestinian Territories) are still rising, unlike those of the northern shore. This means that in 2020 a third of the Mediterranean population will still be living in the country, 48 million of them on the southern shore. However, the scale of the urban explosion is such that rural populations throughout the Region are declining in comparison with the urban ones. In this respect they are thus following the lead of the Maghreb, where two thirds of the population are now concentrated in cities compared with just half in 1990.

At the same time the number of agricultural workers remains high, with nearly 39 million people in the Mediterranean Region working in Agriculture (20% of the region's workforce or one member of the Mediterranean population in eleven). To the South of the Basin, there are 34 million people in the agricultural sector (compared with 30 million in 1990), or 25 to 30% of the active population. There are nevertheless stark contrasts between countries (43% in Turkey and 33% in Morocco as opposed to 5% in Libya and 3% in Lebanon) and it should also be underlined that Turkey and Egypt alone account for 23 million of the agricultural workers. On the Northern shore, on the other hand, we have witnessed a spectacular fall in the number of people employed in agriculture over the past three decades (the number of agricultural workers is currently 4 million - 5.5% of the active population).

Moreover, agriculture makes a considerable contribution to the national economies of the Mediterranean countries. The share of agriculture in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is admittedly very low in the Northern countries (2 to 3% on average) with the exception of Albania (25%). But in the South, economic growth often depends upon the dynamism of the agricultural sector. Agriculture there is vital to the economies and currently accounts for 10 to 15% of GDP (23% in Syria and 17% in Morocco). By the same token, agri-food products account for a significant proportion of Mediterranean trade. Agricultural products still account for 5 to 10% of total imports in the Northern countries (19% in Albania) and 10 to 20% in the Southern countries (23% in Algeria). Agricultural exports (15 to 25% of total exports) are also of strategic importance to the national economies of many countries (Greece, Lebanon, Cyprus, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories and, to a lesser extent, France, Spain, Morocco and Egypt).

Food, for its part, is a key Mediterranean asset on account of its quality and diversity. The diet is modest (2500 to 3000 calories per inhabitant per jour) with a special place allotted to certain products (fruit, vegetables, olive oil, spices and meat), and meals are organised in a formal manner and eaten in convivial surroundings. Moreover this consumption model is praised by the World Health Organisation (WHO) for its nutritional and organoleptic qualities. It must also be borne in mind that the average share of the household budget allocated to food is 15% to the North of the Mediterranean and 30 to 40% to the South. Diet therefore has an essential role in promoting a Mediterranean identity.

Emerging challenges

The first major challenge concerns the rural development policies being implemented in the Mediterranean countries. To the North of the Basin, we are currently faced with the challenge of maintaining the rural renaissance observed over the past fifteen years, which was prompted by the new directions stipulated under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and its radical reform in 1992. Awareness of the multi-functional nature of agriculture has led to a recognition of the range of services provided by the farmer or producer: guaranteeing food safety, maintaining the environment, contributing to the regional planning process and stimulating employment in the rural environment like any other economic operator. This renewal of the countryside is reflected in



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the increased attractiveness of rural environments, the diversification of the rural economy, the rise of agritourism, not to mention the influx of new country dwellers, who leave the city at the weekend for greener, more natural surroundings. Moreover, a new demand is growing up in society, stimulated by the quality of the life and the products offered by the countryside, which is giving the rural world a whole new function.

To the South of the Basin, the challenge is quite different: the focus is on the fight against poverty and the backwardness of rural areas. Typical of the latter is the lack of access to collective infrastructure (water, electricity, healthcare, etc.), underemployment and illiteracy. Notwithstanding the introduction of rural development policies⁴, the facts are figures speak for themselves: two thirds of the poor in the Maghreb live in rural areas; more and more farmers are having to supplement their agricultural work with an uncertain job in the city (building site, factory, etc.); and many country dwellers are only able to survive because a member of their family, who has emigrated to another country or moved to the capital, sends them money. The poverty index value in rural areas is always much higher than in urban ones: in Algeria the respective values are 17% and 7% and in Morocco they are 27% and 12%. Gender discrimination and the autonomy of women in rural areas are further issues of great concern (the share of agriculture in female employment as a whole is still 57% in Morocco and Turkey).

The Mediterranean is faced with a second challenge of managing the dual process of urbanisation and coastal development, which is proceeding far more rapidly there than anywhere else in the world. Around the Mediterranean rim, the number of cities with populations over a million is increasing (thirty today compared with ten in 1950), the coastline is being built upon at an ever increasing rate (half the coast line could be affected by 2025) and pressure on the coastline is all the more marked as the number of tourists increases (at present the region accounts for a third of the international tourism flow). This urbanisation-coastal development process is more marked to the South of the Mediterranean, where the cities are expected to show a population increase of 98% over the period 1990-2020, compared with 17% to the North. There is no question that this process is having a destabilising effect on territorial equilibrium, as it tends to create irreversible gulfs between the coastal areas and the hinterlands, while exposing the cities to chaos in terms of living space, sanitary conditions, ecology and social relations.

This brings us to the third major challenge: the choice of the ecological model underpinning public strategies and policies in the Mediterranean Region. An urgent response is needed to the environmental challenge presented by the sacrifice of agricultural land to the ongoing process of urbanisation, which overexploits resources and devastates regional biodiversity. Needless to say, water is at the heart of the issue⁵, given that half the people suffering from water shortage worldwide are concentrated in the Mediterranean Region. The number of those without access to an adequate water supply (ie less than 500 m³ per year) could rise to 63 million by 2025. Not only are water resources in short supply, they are also very unevenly distributed across the Region, with countries on the southern shore having only 13%, while Turkey has 20% and the northern shore has 67%.

⁴ These rural development policies normally have four components: improving living conditions, diversifying activity to stimulate employment, protecting natural resources and training local players in the management and implementation of these policies.

⁵ These figures are taken from the report "*Méditerranée, les perspectives du Plan Bleu sur l'environnement et le développement*", Editions de l'Aube, Octobre 2005, under the direction of Guillaume Benoit and Aline Comeau (chapter on water pp. 72-107).



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International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies

In most countries (but not France or the Balkans) agriculture is still the main consumer of water, used for irrigation. This "green water" accounts for nearly 65% of total demand for water in the Mediterranean Basin although the proportion varies considerably from one shore to the other (48% in the North and 82% in the South). Given its rarity, water is expected to present the first obstacle to the production of a sufficient quantity of food, since a shortage would lead to a fall in agricultural output. Water would inevitably be a root cause of the political and socio-economic tensions that are so difficult to resolve. This is why agriculture, rural development and sustainability are now more closely linked in the Mediterranean Region than ever before.

To complete this review of the main challenges now facing agriculture in the Mediterranean Region, we should mention the rapid growth in malnutrition. Food consumption patterns are changing in many Mediterranean countries, particularly those of the Maghreb, where they are mimicking those of the West, and more precisely those of North America. While food security in terms of quantity is by and large being maintained to the South of the Mediterranean, we are witnessing greater insecurity in terms of quality. Like the urbanisation of society and the increased presence of women in the labour market, the advent of major distribution channels (with the establishment of supermarkets on the edges of large cities) is destroying some of the old traditions. New dietary habits are reflected in the increasing number of young people who are overweight or obese. (In the Maghreb, obesity now affects 17% of children under five compared with 7% in 1995.)

Agricultural trade between Mediterranean Partner Countries

Comparatively speaking, the Mediterranean Region has been spared by the problem of under-nutrition, but food security nevertheless remains very uncertain. For nearly half a century, we have witnessed a decline in the agricultural trade balance of several Mediterranean countries, particularly those in the South. The uncertainty is due both to insufficient agricultural output and, more important, to the scale of the population explosion in these countries.

A review of demographic trends in the Region reveals considerable contrasts, the extent of which are not always adequately measured. Between 1970 and 2000 the population to the South of the Mediterranean doubled, while on the northern shore there was concern over falling population levels (particularly in Italy). The southern Mediterranean Region is admittedly undergoing rapid demographic change at the moment (particularly in the Maghreb countries), but it is less marked than in Latin America or South-East Asia. This means that the countries on the southern shore will be engulfed by the arrival of large numbers of young people in the labour market. A genuine generational imbalance is therefore emerging in the Mediterranean Region, where the under-twenties currently represent 45% of the population of the South but only 22% of the North. As a result of the population explosion, the demand for food products in the southern countries will eventually increase, with supply being either limited (meat) or, as now, insufficient (cereals, meat and sugar).

At present, Euro-Mediterranean trade is highly asymmetrical: the EU's trade with the MPCs accounts for only 2% of its agricultural imports and exports, whereas the MPC's trade is heavily focused on the EU (the latter receives 51% of their agricultural exports and provides 33% of their imports).

The agricultural trading position of the southern countries seems increasingly vulnerable. Their agricultural trade balance has been negative for thirty years and continues to deteriorate (the 2004 trade deficit with the rest of the world amounted to nearly \$9,950 billion. We forget all too often that the balance of trade with the EU gives just as much cause for concern. Euro-Mediterranean agricultural trade on the whole is balanced: the volume of imports by the EU from the MPCs was worth \$6.5 billion in 2004, while the value of European exports to the MPCs was \$5.9 billion, giving



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the MPCs a surplus of \$600 million. But this result hides another more significant one, for if we take Turkey out of the equation, the MPCs have a trade deficit of \$1,500 million dollars. The fact is that Ankara currently accounts for nearly half the MPCs' agricultural exports both to the EU and to the rest of the world.

It is true that food security in these countries has on the whole improved in quantitative terms, but at the cost of greater internal disparity (urban/rural division) and greater dependence on others for supply. If we examine the rate of food coverage in the Maghreb between 1970 and 2000, we find that it fell by three quarters, from 116% to 23%. The place of cereals in this situation should be underlined: while the MPCs represent 4% of the world population, they accounted for 12% of the world's cereal imports in 2003.

2. The debate on agriculture within the Euro-Mediterranean partnership:

Here we offer an analysis of Euro-Mediterranean agricultural issues, breaking them down into simple terms and showing factors that lead to blockage, together with recent signs that trade is opening up.

A disappointing result

In the process of Euro-Mediterranean trade liberalisation, epitomised by the establishment of association agreements, the agricultural sector continues to be sacrificed. While preparations have been made for free trade in industrial goods, the liberalisation of agriculture is still a delicate matter, despite the importance of agriculture for the region. In the North, EU producers are afraid of having to confront greater competition with the disappearance of Community preference, while in the South, exporters are demanding wider access to the EU market. Part of the Euro-Mediterranean trade conflict arises from the risk of increased competition between the two shores over the same agricultural products (olive oil, fruit and vegetables). Agriculture has always been subject to controlled treatment within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and during the first decade of the EMP's existence, the idea of the "agricultural exception" clearly played a decisive role in the negotiation of the association agreements.

Generally speaking the MPCs are major importers of the EU's basic products, such as cereals sugar and milk. But in view of their poor performance in growing food crops, these states are disinclined to expose them to competition from abroad. Moreover, apart from its economic and social impact, such liberalisation would have important implications for food security policy. The MPCs have also held back in the negotiations on agricultural goods therefore, as the liberalisation process might have threatened some aspects of their internal equilibrium. It is also important to stress that there is intense competition between Mediterranean countries in agricultural trade. Four major rivalries can be distinguished: between the northern shore and the southern shore for certain products; between Mediterranean countries that are EU members, which often sell the same products to the rest of Europe; between farmers in the South, who are attempting to sell their products to the European market; and lastly between the world's major agricultural producers (the United States, Canada, Australia and Argentina, who provide nearly half the agricultural imports to the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

One last very sensitive point needs to be borne in mind, namely the two-tier nature of the agricultural sector to the South of the Mediterranean. Alongside the limited number of agrifood industries that have been drawn into the globalisation process and are performing very well, there



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are innumerable very small family farms, which are spread all over the rural environment and produce mainly for their own consumption. While the former may flourish under the Euro-Mediterranean economic integration scenario, the latter will inevitably be placed in a highly vulnerable position by the opening up of markets and the planned liberalisation of agricultural trade, being wholly unequipped to cope with the ensuing competition.

From Venice to Barcelona: signs that trade is opening up

As far as the agricultural sector is concerned, the merits of treating agriculture as an exception have therefore prevailed over those of the proposed liberalisation, even though the situation seems to have been changing recently. While the subject is still a controversial one, it has not only been revived but has actually been placed on the Euro-Mediterranean work programme. Discussion now focuses mainly on the pace and methodology of the process. Moreover, it has become apparent to decision-makers that agricultural matters can only be dealt with case by case, depending on the "sensitivity" of the product in the EU markets and the competitiveness of each MPC in the export market.

Accordingly, when the new European neighbourhood policy (ENP) was proposed by the Commission in march 2003 (its implementation being planned for 2007), the Euro-Mediterranean agricultural environment was found to have changed. It was necessary to wait until 27 November 2003 for the first Euro-Mediterranean agricultural conference to be organised in Venice, under an Italian presidency. The main recommendations had to do with extending rural development, promoting the quality of agricultural products and launching practical initiatives in the field of organic agriculture. Thanks to the good results achieved by the Venice conference, a more pragmatic, more constructive review of Euro-Mediterranean agriculture was initiated in the run up to the 10th anniversary of the EMP.

In 2005, named "Year of the Mediterranean" by the European forums, agriculture was an essential part of the programme set up to reform and relaunch the EMP. It is true that the EU had officially announced its decision to open agricultural relations with the MPCs in a letter dated 15 November 2005, stipulating that negotiations would take place from 2006 to provide for "steady liberalisation of trade in agricultural and fisheries products, both fresh and processed". This decision was taken up in the five-year work programme adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean summit of heads of state and government on 28 November 2005 in Barcelona. From then on a committee of experts was charged to pursue the question with a view to drawing up a Euro-Mediterranean "road map for agriculture" in 2006. The EU negotiations with the MPCs were therefore launched, on a bilateral basis in order to take account of the specific features of agriculture in the country in question and to comply with the new provisions of the ENP. Moreover it was planned that this road map would enter into force in 2007. It was to be based on a number of strategic directions: reciprocal liberalisation (the effort should be shared by the two shores), a progressive, gradual approach, two-speed implementation (the EU would have to accept that the MPC would take longer to open up their trade) and the drawing up of a list of exceptions for each country, showing the most sensitive products, which were not to be included in the liberalisation process. Moreover, under the terms of the road map, particular attention was to be paid to themes related to rural development, promotion of quality products, development of typical Mediterranean products, increased private investment in the agricultural sector and improved access to export markets.

The issues surrounding the liberalisation of agriculture in the Mediterranean context have clearly undergone significant change over the past three years. The opening up of trade should not however eclipse the many questions and concerns raised by the scenario.



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The likely impacts of total agricultural liberalisation

At the World Trade Organisation's multilateral trade negotiations, the paradox highlighted by most MPCs is that the rich countries, and therefore the EU countries, continue to support and protect their agriculture, whereas the poorer countries, and therefore some of the states in the South of the Mediterranean Basin⁶, have undertaken to reduce government support and to liberalise trade in agricultural goods. Leaving aside this area of confusion, uncertainty over the liberalisation of Euro-Mediterranean agricultural trade remains with regard to the feasibility of implementing such a process by 2010 and also to the sustainability of this free-trade zone, where economic imbalance always prevails over convergence.

As to the EU as a whole, the consequences would probably be limited, given the comparative insignificance of the MPCs in its external agricultural trade. The opening up of markets might on the other hand stimulate European exports to the southern shore of the Mediterranean, where there is a considerable and growing need for the basic products that Europe markets quite well (cereals, milk and meat). However, southern Europe taken in isolation would be seriously affected by sudden agricultural liberalisation: producers in the traditional sectors (fruit and vegetables), who are very widespread in Spain, the South of France, Italy and Greece, could well be damaged by the opening up of trade and will probably be set to oppose the policy if community protectionism is removed with no provision for transitional flanking measures.

For the MPCs, the impact would be far more serious: the repercussion of liberalisation would go far beyond agriculture, bringing socio-economic and political changes to peasant societies ill equipped to deal with the opening up of markets. The probable fall in prices might increase domestic consumption but would probably destabilise producers of food crops and small farmers. Trade rarely works to the benefit of the poorest. Moreover, the impoverishment of the farming population would have a whole series of effects, beginning with an explosion in unemployment and rural-urban drift. While the two-tier agriculture to the South of the Mediterranean promises large farmers and a few agribusinesses the opportunity to increase their exports to the EU (fruit, vegetables and fish products), we should be prepared to address the negative impact of opening up the Euro-Mediterranean markets on its small farmers. Moreover, analyses show that the traditional comparative advantages of the MPCs have been wearing away for some years as a result of demographic change: the rise in the population inevitably increases domestic food demand and thereby restricts the countries' export potential.

Other potentially harmful effects have been identified in the event of full implementation of the EMFTZ: greater vulnerability of poor households to fluctuations in the price of basic foods in the international markets, a diminished status and standard of living for women in rural areas, and greater pressure on the environment resulting from the decline in agricultural work and the mushrooming of the cities. Lastly, it is necessary to underscore the risks inherent in moving from a traditional type of agriculture aimed at the domestic market to a commercial type looking to the outside world at a time when food security in the countries to the South of the Mediterranean seems more uncertain than ever. It cannot be ecologically sound to force farmers to grow crops that may not be suited to local soils and resources in areas where water and arable land is already becoming dangerously scarce, just because they are not held back by trade barriers.

⁶ At present the following MPCs are members of the WTO: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority have observer status.



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Of course, the liberalisation of Euro-Mediterranean agricultural trade is subject to other factors, which interact with these issues, beginning with the current reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Doha round of the WTO negotiations, the rise of Brazil and India on the world agotrade scene, and not forgetting the United States strategy in the region, which is well illustrated by the free-trade agreement signed with Morocco in 2004.

3. Considering different prospects in the Mediterranean Region

In the light of the previous considerations and the many issues identified, attempts at forward planning may prompt us to sketch out three contrasting scenarios. The latter are not so much predictions as possible futures, which should lead us to reflect upon short- and medium-term developments in the Mediterranean Region.

The trend scenario

It is the direct outcome of current directions: a Mediterranean Region situated at the centre of international geopolitical disorder and still beset by numerous inequalities. At the same time, the Region is subject to distortions brought about by the globalisation of trade and it misses the pathway to growth and development, which globalisation theoretically provides.

As a result, Euro-Mediterranean relations stagnate. The map tends to show a multi-speed Mediterranean Region, where the only parts that matter are the useful globalised areas, ie the cities, the coastal areas and the tourist destinations.

The rural areas of the South are not taken into account as they deserve to be. These areas gradually lose their vitality because they are excluded and abandoned. The farming population is of course weakened by the steady opening up of markets. The local people are impoverished and have no other choice but to migrate to the cities or to foreign countries. And what if this useful, globalised Mediterranean Region had no further use for its countryside and its peasants?

The ruptures scenario

The second possible future: a ruptures scenario, in which the features referred to above are aggravated and the Mediterranean Region is even more divided. Instead of resolving themselves, traditional divisions widen. Certain phenomena grow more critical: overexploitation of natural resources, spread of poverty, increase in unemployment or economic sclerosis. Conflicts persist or intensify.

One of the most striking aspects of the situation in the South is the final severing of links between the urban and rural worlds. The hinterland is cut off from society, excluded from economic growth, abandoned by the public authorities and so doomed to poverty and isolation. With the onset of liberalisation, peasant communities disappear, swelling the numbers of migrants headed for shanty towns or a desperate exile further to the North of the Region.

Demographic growth and low agricultural productivity increases the risk of breakdown in the food supply and of social crisis. In addition to this agricultural discord, there is the threat of conflict over water, which is more coveted than ever. Political insurgency and the rise of fundamentalism cannot be ruled out in such a context.



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As a result, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation flounders. The Mediterranean Region, while being steadily wiped off the geo-economic landscape, sends out an echo of all the major ills afflicting the planet, exhibiting inequalities, divisions and radical movements in abundance

The alliance and convergence scenario

The scenario merely consists in establishing a more promising future for the Mediterranean and is subject to certain conditions. First, we need to strengthen the partnership aspect of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, which should be more visible and play a more concrete role in the development process in countries in the South, while allowing Europe to continue to act as a separate entity on the international economic and geopolitical scene. Second, we need to make a consistent, determined choice about strategic priorities in the Mediterranean Region, where we all face the same challenges and where opportunities for mutual development really exist.

From this standpoint, agriculture may bring people together in effective projects designed to stimulate Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, employing bold strategies and complementary arrangements, and taking account of the specific features of the region and the common challenges it presents. However, to realise this scenario, three conditions need to be fulfilled:

- It is necessary to mobilise all the players involved, with a more prominent role being allotted to private operators and local communities, not forgetting civil society.
- It is necessary to draw up a genuine strategic plan for rural development in the South of the Mediterranean Region, which is designed to diversify activity, restore social cohesion, re-establish links between countryside and cities and preserve the environment.
- There must be responsible management of natural resources to ensure sustainable development. It should not merely serve to correct the effects of globalisation, but should provide a powerful means of bringing rural societies out of their undeveloped situation.

Conclusion

Agricultural and rural issues in the Mediterranean Region seem more strategic than ever. In a structural context of high unemployment and rapid urbanisation, it is of the utmost importance to restrict rural-urban drift and therefore to apply adequate regional planning policies. The latter represent the only means of establishing varied, economically viable production systems, which will take the local populations out of their current state of destitution and vulnerability, while ensuring participatory management of natural resources to preserve the environment. This policy should involve rigorous monitoring of product quality and stringent procedures to ensure traceability. Making food safe is the final basic challenge. The Mediterranean Region must succeed in



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establishing itself in the world agrifood market by specialising in typical local products (labelled to show protected designation of origin), and thereby offset the cost of importing food products with which the Region is less favourably endowed. Lastly we cannot insist enough upon the importance of adapting the pace of liberalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean zone to suit the agricultural and rural policies of the majority of the southern partner countries.

The optimistic scenario thus strives for a Mediterranean Region in which development would be researched collectively and thought through strategically. Moreover, the region could become an excellent palace for exploring ways of mitigating the effects of globalisation and incorporating the need for progress and competitiveness into sustainable development projects. The latter would meet the region's own requirements and combine openness to the outside world with preservation of the diversity and richness of its heritage.

Because agriculture forms the basis of the Mediterranean identity and determines the structure of societies in the Region, there can be no doubt that joint action in pursuit of this strategic interest could arise from close cooperation, mobilising people and resources on the basis of solidarity, human sympathy and mutually benefit to both shores of the Mediterranean.

1 September 2006

Bertrand Hervieu
Secretary General of CIHEAM



SECOND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE ON AGRICULTURE
« For a Euro Mediterranean rural and agricultural policy in a global framework »
Strasbourg
September 28 and 29, 2006

SESSION 1 SPECIFIC THEME
« **Development of a Euro Mediterranean agricultural policy**
Within the framework of WTO's trade exchanges»

A new context is taking shape in the Mediterranean marked by uncertainties on the future of the Euro Mediterranean partnership and by the recent suspension of WTO negotiations.

The 10th anniversary, in 2005, of the Barcelona Declaration, was an opportunity for all signatory countries to take stock of a situation that has not turned out as well as it was expected. Nevertheless, this track record of a decade of existence has enabled us to breathe new life into this partnership, which is an essential framework to safeguard the equilibrium in the region. In fact, the decision to establish the Euro-Mediterranean partnership within a more global policy called « the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)¹, was done in a timely manner. It aims at deepening Euro-Mediterranean cooperation through the development of the huge potential offered by Association Agreements². It will come into force in 2007.

The ENP, however, does give rise to certain questions. First and foremost, there are fears about the weakening of the multilateral nature of the Barcelona Agreement to benefit an excessive bilateralism which governs relations between the European Union and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMC). Yet, the regional and transnational dialogue must not only be pursued but above all, it must be consolidated to offer better prospects for the economic development of the Mediterranean Basin.

In parallel, at the WTO, the Doha Round, launched enthusiastically in 2001 to develop multilateral trade to promote development, was suspended last July because no agreement was reached in the negotiations.

Faced with this troubled geopolitical situation, Europe and the SEMC Countries remain convinced of the strategic importance of their cooperation links. To avoid worsening the impact of the economic gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean on the disastrous socio-economic and political consequences, a new Euro-Mediterranean dynamics must necessarily see the light. In fact, opportunities do exist to encourage PEM to move around a major cooperation axis, such as agriculture. This represents, at the same time, having a strong identity foothold and an essential sector to maintain socio-economic and territorial equilibriums in the region. This Euro-

¹ The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was developed with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and neighboring countries and developing closer ties with Southern and Eastern neighbors.

² The key elements of the ENP are the bilateral **Action Plans** mutually agreed between the EU and each partner country. These set out an agenda of political and economic reforms, and heighten cooperation in relevant fields. They will be the key reference points for a specific programming, by country, of Community assistance. The **ENPI** shall be the main financial instrument to support the implementation of the ENP and it shall concentrate, basically, on supporting the implementation of ENP Action Plans. Its scope shall go beyond the promotion of objectives such as sustainable development or combating poverty to encompass significant support to be given to measures leading to a gradual participation in the European market.

Mediterranean partnership is a project that must come to life, for the geopolitical good and the stability in the entire Euro-Mediterranean area. Nevertheless, this stability cannot be achieved without the consolidation and modernization of Mediterranean farmers as well as the economic development of rural areas, keepers of the urban-rural balance, of the use and maintenance of the landscape.

In spite of the fact that the agricultural issue has continued to be a very sensitive issue for a long time not benefiting from the same treatment that other sectors of the economy have received in the negotiations, signs of openness have emerged in these last few years. On the one hand, when the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Agriculture was held in Venice in 2003, the European Union proposed the creation of a specific regional program. That program was made up of three sections: sustainable rural development, increase in the value of the quality of agricultural products and the development of organic agriculture. We can underscore, in particular, the will to develop the complementarities of Mediterranean farmers.

On the other hand, the EU made the decision in November 2005 to create « a road map for agriculture » whose provisional contents confirm the current will to expedite a mutual agricultural liberalization between the two Mediterranean shores, but in a progressive and asymmetric fashion³.

Bearing in mind the differences in the agricultural situation that exist in the various SEMC Countries, is it important to give rise to a multilateral Euro-Mediterranean discussion on agriculture taking into account the bilateral debate between the UE and each of the SEMC countries.

How to build and organize « a space for a structured multilateral dialogue » between farmers's organizations from the EU and the SEMC countries, government representatives of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership as well as representatives of the European institutions?

³ Thus, within the framework of these negotiations, a certain number of so-called sensitive products will be set aside and the timetables will be adapted on a case-by-case basis. Non-commercial issues, such as rural development, are also covered. Moreover, the « road map » recognizes the presence of risks linked to liberalization, which might be mitigated by accompanying measures.

SECOND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE ON AGRICULTURE
« For a Euro Mediterranean rural and agricultural policy in a global framework »
Strasbourg
September 28 and 29, 2006

SESSION 2 SPECIFIC THEME
« Towards a rural development in the Mediterranean
through sustainable management of resources »

Natural resources in the Mediterranean represent, at the same time, richness and a threat to sustainable development in the region even beyond the spillover effect on the agricultural sector. Richness, because the Mediterranean possesses an outstanding biological heritage: 10% of all known higher plant species of our biosphere. Let us add to this, high value man-made landscapes¹.

Nevertheless, many threats persist: the Mediterranean produces 8.3% of the world's CO₂ emissions (figure for 2000²); it is affected by a whimsical climate characterized by summer droughts, further accentuated by the ongoing climate change. Moreover, the moisture stress is accentuated within a Mediterranean space where water resources are limited and unequally distributed. Finally, the Mediterranean region is highly exposed to seismic and volcanic risks.

The Mediterranean rural space in general terms, is characterized by:

In the north, a dropping farmers' population. In spite of the introduction of rural development policies for the promotion of quality goods, agro-tourism... one witnesses degradation in the Mediterranean space and diet. The major progress made by urbanization particularly around the coasts simply worsens the Mediterranean landscape degradation process, the loss of biodiversity, and the vulnerability to floods and fires.

In the south and the east, the situation is also cause for concern but for different reasons. Farmers groups continue to increase in absolute value in spite of the migratory phenomena, essentially due to a more restricted access to public goods and infrastructures (health, education, freshwater), more restricted than in the cities. Agriculture continues to play a significant socio-economic role. However, the pressure exerted on natural resources as a result of population explosion, urbanization and westernization of consumption modes, further accentuate desertification phenomena, loss in biodiversity, deforestation...

Rural-urban Dichotomy

Now that the urban areas and the coasts are opening up to globalization, the rural hinterland states are threatened by marginalization. So, the gap is widening not only between the two Mediterranean shores, but also, the territorial split worsens inside each country.

The vital issue of water: a major issue for the Mediterranean

Water resources, even though they are unequally distributed, constitute a major concern for the whole area. Water availability, access to this rare resource as well as farmers' expenditures vary greatly from one country to the other. The Mediterranean has 3% of water resources for 7.3% of the world's population; furthermore, 60% of the water-short world's population is concentrated in the south of the Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East.³

Furthermore, water demand has doubled in the last 25 years. Irrigation represents 64%⁴ of this demand for the entire basin.

¹ The Blue Plan's environment and development outlook

² The Blue Plan's environment and development outlook

³ UNEP-WFP-Blue Plan (Ref data Map technical Reports series 158)

⁴ UNEP-WFP-Blue Plan (Ref data Map technical Reports series 158)

Consequently, faced with these supply and demand problems, a more efficient management, especially through demand driven water management as well as better access to this resource particularly in the south and the east of the basin must be developed in consultation with local stakeholders including farmers. To develop platforms for dialogues between the stakeholders and farmers, concerning the different uses of water (associations of water users) is essential for an efficient management of this resource in full respect for the needs of each user.

- The power of these associations before government authorities in each country, shouldn't it be strengthened, especially to have an impact on water policies? How to support setting up water management participatory systems in the different countries?
- Likewise, should we not develop the necessary instruments for dialogue between farmers and researchers in order to better define the knowledge and the needs of these and to facilitate the development of environmentally friendly agricultural techniques?

For a sustainable rural development policy

It seems necessary to create a **real sustainable rural development policy**. This must be built with the perspective of inducing economic development in the region and thus ensuring a better future.

Likewise, **diversification** of activities by introducing activities linked to agriculture must be under a global rural development strategy. This will enable to reduce dependency on agriculture with the aim of improving the conditions of rural communities. How do we build such a strategy? What design patterns must be envisaged?

This sustainable rural development policy needs, first and foremost, that the different roles of agriculture be recognized by the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, as well as the importance of territorial development and the integration of innovative research policies coupled with participatory methods. This presupposes the establishment of support measures for farmers and their organizations, for the conservation and sustainable management of natural resources.

This second Euro-Mediterranean conference on agriculture must review the terms and objectives of this new approach to rural development and the various support programs needed to attain sustainable development in agriculture in the south and the east of the basin especially within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Funding of said projects will be even more useful if they are proposed and pushed by Southern Mediterranean stakeholders.

Within this context, this conference must also insist on the need for allocating more funds for research and development in order to support the development of sustainable and innovative farming techniques, accessible to farmers.

Some major questions will call for further review and analysis at the conference:

- How can one promote a commercial agriculture and preserve food crops to reduce poverty in the rural areas?
- How to promote exchange of experiences among the various stakeholders in the agricultural world of that area?
- What measures must be implemented in order to facilitate access of appropriate technologies to farmers?
- How must the agricultural road map be developed⁵ to introduce the dimension of sustainable development? What support mechanisms must be established?

⁵ Within the framework of strengthening the Barcelona Process, Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers mandated the Commission to prepare at the level of high officials a road map on the trade liberalization process in agriculture. For that, one of the conclusions reached by Ministers of Foreign Affairs in The Hague (November 2004), after the Declaration of Dublin (May 2004) and the conclusions of the conference in Venice of Ministers of Agriculture (November 2003), was the following: « The strategy aimed at expediting trade liberalization in the agricultural sector was examined at the first meeting of high level experts, whose main objective was for Ministers to agree, at a later date, on a set of measures for mutual trade liberalization in the agricultural sector, including a specific road map and applying it, on equal footing, to trade of processed agricultural products and to non-agricultural aspects.



SECOND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE ON AGRICULTURE
« For a Euro Mediterranean rural and agricultural policy in a global framework »
Strasbourg
September 28 and 29, 2006

SESSION 3 SPECIFIC THEME
**«Recognition of the Mediterranean identity,
Agricultural products and markets organization»**

Mediterranean agricultures, as diverse as they are, are, a priori, characterized by strong geographic and climatic similarities but also and above all by a common cultural and historic heritage. All these common points have given rise to the strengthening of a Mediterranean identity. Likewise, the emergence of a sense of belonging to one same regional set transcends the few differences that make up the specificity and the richness of each nation that constitute this set. Moreover, there is a growing awareness regarding the importance of making this richness and diversity known through the appraisal of the assets offered by Mediterranean agricultural products whose organoleptic and nutritional qualities no longer need to be proven.

Consequently, the Mediterranean agriculture is a bearer of specificities and must be acknowledged as such.

The consequences of the bad food habits throughout the world, obesity, heart conditions, and different types of cancer... bear a weight on health budgets. In this regard, WHO (World Health Organization) took a stand on this by promoting the Mediterranean diet and acknowledged its benefits on human health.

How do we recognize the value of Mediterranean products?

The recognition of this agriculture starts with the promotion of quality products. For this, it is necessary to implement labeling systems, such as Appellations of Origin, Protected Geographical Indications, promoting organic agriculture, identifying niche products that are increasingly being sought in Europe (dates, dried fruits...), traceability, or even more, quality standards.

Enhancing local Mediterranean products must be done in conjunction with professional farmers organizations, national public authorities and European Institutions.

This work must also be pursued in multilateral negotiations, within WTO where these issues work hard to reach a consensus.

Nevertheless, the enhanced development of these Mediterranean productions essentially used for export, calls for significant progress in terms of improvement of the quality of the product exported, quality of the packaging and crating, crop packaging techniques, respect for rules and regulations (quality standards and phytosanitary conditions demanded by the EU), just-in-time supply of import products to destination markets and monitor the dynamics of change in consumption models in EU markets (new products, new varieties and ongoing changes in regulations and conditions). Therefore, it is necessary to think about

cooperation and support channels between the SEMC¹ and EU countries, within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). This will aim at facilitating these exchanges with a view to creating complementarities of Mediterranean productions by underscoring the « typical nature or typicity » of these products. This will contribute to reducing competition of products with similar aspects.

In order to give due value and recognition to their products and to modernize their agricultures, farmers need to reassemble as professional farmers organizations whose capacities must be strengthened, in marketing, in market organization and in the establishment of production channels.

Towards a Mediterranean label

Consolidation of the Mediterranean identity of agricultural productions in the region demands that we understand development as a form of « Mediterranean label » linked to the Mediterranean territory. Such a certification level would call for a thorough study of its characteristics and the feasibility of this project in an attempt to find added value to these products. In this case, it would be wise to envisage the creation of a Mediterranean body that would regulate the development of a Mediterranean label as well as arbitrate and regulate over demands for certification (AOC-PGI²...).

The conference could discuss the conditions to create this Mediterranean organization whose aim would be to define the outline of the Mediterranean identity of these products. What are the criteria that have to be established? How to use traditional and local techniques giving due value to local resources? What links could be established between this organization and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures?

¹ Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries

² AOC (Controlled Appellation of Origin), PGI (Protected Geographical Indications)

Documenti dell'Unione europea

Politica agricola comune: dal suo avvio all'attualità

L'agricoltura ha rappresentato da sempre uno degli obiettivi prioritari delle istanze politiche decisionali europee, in particolare ai tempi dei negoziati del trattato di Roma. A quell'epoca era ancora vivo il ricordo delle penurie alimentari dell'immediato dopoguerra e l'agricoltura ha costituito un elemento chiave delle politiche europee fin dagli esordi della Comunità.

Il Trattato di Roma definisce gli obiettivi generali della politica agraria comune. I principi della politica agraria comune (PAC) sono stati fissati durante la conferenza di Stresa del luglio 1958. Nel 1960, i sei membri fondatori della Comunità europea hanno adottato i meccanismi della PAC e due anni dopo, nel 1962, la PAC è entrata in vigore.

BASE GIURIDICA

La base giuridica della politica agraria comune è definita agli articoli da 32 a 38 del titolo II del Trattato CE. Il Trattato di Amsterdam ha soppresso gli articoli 44, 45 e 47, che sono quindi decaduti.

DEFINIZIONE E STRUMENTI

La politica agraria comune (PAC) consiste in una serie di norme e meccanismi che regolano la produzione, gli scambi e la lavorazione dei prodotti agricoli nell'ambito dell'Unione europea (UE), incentrando sempre maggiore interesse, in particolare, sullo sviluppo rurale.

Tra le politiche dell'Unione europea, la PAC è considerata una delle più importanti, non solo in ragione del suo peso a livello di bilancio comunitario (ne assorbe circa il 50%, a scalare nel corso degli anni), della parte consistente di popolazione che si dedica all'agricoltura e dell'estensione del territorio destinato alle colture, ma anche a causa del suo significato simbolico e del grado di sovranità che i singoli Stati membri hanno trasferito alla Comunità. L'importanza della PAC è confermata oggi anche dalla sua stretta correlazione con il mercato unico e l'Unione Monetaria Europea (UME), due settori chiave dell'integrazione europea.

Le **finalità** della PAC, secondo quanto stabilito dall'articolo 33 del Trattato CE, sono i seguenti:

- incrementare la produttività dell'agricoltura, sviluppando il progresso tecnico, assicurando lo sviluppo razionale della produzione agricola come pure un impiego migliore dei fattori di produzione, in particolare della manodopera;
- assicurare così un tenore di vita equo alla popolazione agricola, grazie, in particolare, al miglioramento del reddito individuale di coloro che lavorano nell'agricoltura;
- stabilizzare i mercati;
- garantire la sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti;
- assicurare prezzi ragionevoli nelle consegne ai consumatori.

Per raggiungere tali obiettivi, l'articolo 34 del Trattato CE prevede la creazione di una **Organizzazione comune dei mercati agricoli (OCM)** che, a seconda dei prodotti, assumerà una delle seguenti forme:

- regole comuni in materia di concorrenza;
- un coordinamento obbligatorio delle diverse organizzazioni nazionali del mercato;
- un'organizzazione europea del mercato.

Le organizzazioni comuni dei mercati sono state introdotte gradualmente; attualmente esse esistono per la maggior parte dei prodotti agricoli e costituiscono gli strumenti di base del mercato agricolo comune in quanto eliminano gli ostacoli agli scambi intracomunitari dei prodotti e mantengono barriere doganali comuni nei confronti dei paesi terzi.

Tre **principi** fondamentali, definiti nel 1962, caratterizzano il mercato agricolo comune e quindi le OCM:

- *un mercato unificato*, inteso come libera circolazione dei prodotti agricoli nell'ambito degli Stati membri; premessa per un'adeguata realizzazione del mercato interno è l'applicazione, nell'insieme dell'Unione, di strumenti e meccanismi comuni;
- *la preferenza comunitaria*: significa che i prodotti agricoli dell'Unione europea hanno la priorità negli scambi e sono avvantaggiati dal punto di vista prezzo rispetto ai prodotti importati; pertanto, il mercato interno è protetto nei confronti dei prodotti importati dai paesi terzi a basso prezzo e delle grandi fluttuazioni sul mercato mondiale;
- *la solidarietà finanziaria*: si intende con ciò che tutte le spese e i costi inerenti all'applicazione della PAC sono sostenuti dal bilancio comunitario.

IL FONDO EUROPEO AGRICOLO DI ORIENTAMENTO E DI GARANZIA (FEAOG)

Le risorse finanziarie della PAC sono messe a disposizione dal Fondo europeo agricolo d'orientamento e di garanzia (FEAOG) che rappresenta una parte sostanziale del bilancio comunitario. Il FEAOG è stato istituito nel 1962 e suddiviso nel 1964 in due sezioni:

- la sezione "orientamento", che fa parte dei fondi a finalità strutturali e che contribuisce alle riforme agricole strutturali e allo sviluppo delle zone rurali (ad esempio, tramite investimenti nelle nuove attrezzature e tecnologie);
- la sezione "garanzia", che finanzia le spese inerenti all'organizzazione comune dei mercati (ad esempio, tramite l'acquisto o lo stoccaggio delle eccedenze e la promozione delle esportazioni dei prodotti agricoli).

La sezione "garanzia" è di gran lunga la più importante e rientra tra le spese obbligatorie nel quadro del bilancio comunitario. La sezione "orientamento" fa parte dei fondi strutturali intesi a promuovere lo sviluppo regionale e a ridurre le disparità regionali in Europa.

La Commissione ha proposto la semplificazione del sistema di finanziamento con la creazione di un unico strumento di finanziamento e di programmazione: il Fondo europeo di sviluppo rurale (FESR). Tale proposta prevede un finanziamento comunitario più rilevante.

CRONISTORIA DELLA RIFORMA DELLA PAC

La PAC ha realizzato con successo i suoi obiettivi iniziali: è riuscita, infatti, a promuovere sia la produzione che la produttività, ha stabilizzato i mercati, ha assicurato l'approvvigionamento dei

prodotti e ha protetto gli agricoltori contro le fluttuazioni dei prezzi sui mercati mondiali. Tuttavia, tali risultati positivi sono stati offuscati da effetti secondari indesiderabili: gli agricoltori dell'UE hanno prodotto più di quanto il mercato potesse assorbire, creando così eccedenze e una crescita esponenziale delle spese agricole dell'UE. La PAC ha dovuto subire, nei quattro decenni della sua esistenza, numerose riforme.

Il primo tentativo di riforma risale a dieci anni dopo la sua istituzione. Nel 1968, la Commissione ha pubblicato un "Memorandum sulla riforma della PAC", comunemente detto "Piano Mansholt", dal nome del suo promotore, Sicco Mansholt, all'epoca vice presidente della Commissione e responsabile della PAC. Il piano prevedeva la riduzione della popolazione attiva in agricoltura e l'incoraggiamento alla formazione di unità di produzione agricola più grandi e più efficienti.

Nel 1972 sono state introdotte nella PAC misure strutturali intese a modernizzare l'agricoltura europea. Tuttavia, nonostante le modifiche a livello strutturale che si sono susseguite nel corso degli anni, non è stato possibile eliminare i problemi esistenti; persisteva, infatti, lo squilibrio tra l'offerta e la domanda di prodotti agricoli con la conseguente crescita delle eccedenze.

Nel 1983, la Commissione proponeva una riforma sostanziale, proposta che è stata formulata ufficialmente due anni dopo con la pubblicazione del libro verde "Prospettive della politica agraria comune" (1985). Con il libro verde si è cercato di ristabilire l'equilibrio tra l'offerta e la domanda, di formulare nuove soluzioni per ridurre la produzione nei settori in difficoltà e, in genere, di proporre possibili alternative per il futuro della PAC.

Nel 1988, il Consiglio europeo ha raggiunto un'intesa su un insieme di interventi riformatori, tra cui le linee direttive sulle spese agricole, che limitavano la percentuale della spesa della PAC nel quadro del bilancio generale.

Nel 1991, la Commissione e Ray MacSharry, membro responsabile per l'agricoltura, presentavano due documenti di riflessione sullo sviluppo e il futuro della PAC. Tali documenti costituivano la base per un'intesa politica sulla riforma della PAC raggiunta dal Consiglio il 21 maggio 1992. La riforma del 1992, che ha segnato un'importante svolta verso il cambiamento, consisteva essenzialmente nella riduzione dei prezzi agricoli per renderli più competitivi sul mercato interno e su quello mondiale, nell'assegnazione di importi compensativi per le perdite di reddito subite dagli agricoltori e in altre misure relative ai meccanismi di mercato e alla protezione dell'ambiente.

La riforma del 1992 è stata considerata in genere un successo e i suoi effetti sono stati giudicati favorevoli all'agricoltura europea. Tuttavia, gli sviluppi negli anni successivi - le evoluzioni internazionali, l'allargamento ai paesi dell'Europa centrale e orientale, i preparativi per l'introduzione della moneta unica, causa di restrizioni al bilancio, la concorrenza sempre maggiore dei prodotti provenienti dai paesi terzi e nuovi cicli di negoziati nel quadro dell'Organizzazione mondiale del commercio (OMC) - hanno imposto un'ulteriore adeguamento della PAC, vale a dire, una nuova riforma. Agenda 2000 ha costituito una tappa in tale direzione.

Agenda 2000

Nel luglio 1997, la Commissione ha proposto una riforma della PAC nel quadro di Agenda 2000, che costituiva un modello per il futuro della politica comunitaria nell'ottica del previsto allargamento. Le trattative nel quadro di Agenda 2000 si sono concluse nel Consiglio europeo del marzo 1999 a Berlino, e in quell'occasione si è decisa anche la riforma della PAC.

Agenda 2000 rappresenta la riforma più radicale e globale della politica agraria comune dalla sua istituzione ad oggi. Portando avanti il processo iniziato nel 1992, essa ha fornito una solida base per il futuro sviluppo dell'agricoltura nell'Unione, contemplando tutti gli ambiti di competenza della PAC (economico, ambientale e rurale).

La riforma comprende, in particolare, misure intese a:

- rafforzare la competitività delle materie prime agricole sui mercati interni e mondiali;
- promuovere un tenore di vita adeguato della comunità agricola;
- creare posti di lavoro sostitutivi e di altre fonti di reddito per i lavoratori agricoli;
- elaborare una nuova politica dello sviluppo rurale come secondo pilastro della PAC;
- integrare maggiormente nella PAC questioni ambientali e strutturali;
- migliorare la qualità dei prodotti alimentari e della loro sicurezza;
- semplificare la legislazione in materia agraria e decentralizzarne l'applicazione, in vista di una maggiore chiarezza, trasparenza e accessibilità di norme e regolamenti.

Con la riforma, quale prevista in Agenda 2000, si creano le condizioni per lo sviluppo nell'UE di un'agricoltura comunitaria multifunzionale, sostenibile e concorrenziale. Inoltre, i suoi obiettivi a lungo termine non incideranno positivamente solo sui paesi candidati all'adesione, ma ne beneficeranno anche le generazioni future.

Riforma del giugno 2003

La riforma del giugno 2003 consiste in una riforma della PAC e una revisione della politica di mercato di quest'ultima.

La riforma della PAC comprende gli aspetti seguenti:

1. Disaccoppiamento e pagamento unico per azienda

Questa grande riforma della PAC modifica le basi degli aiuti diretti alla produzione, concessi agli agricoltori o alle associazioni di produttori, eliminandoli progressivamente e scindendoli dalla produzione. Tale disaccoppiamento, che verrà applicato dal 1° gennaio 2005 per la maggior parte delle organizzazioni comuni di mercato (OCM), scinde gli aiuti ricevuti dalla produzione. Il nuovo sistema mira ad equilibrare meglio i redditi dei produttori attraverso il pagamento unico per azienda. L'agricoltore può decidere quale coltura produrre, pur continuando a ricevere aiuti (al reddito).

La riforma prevede un periodo transitorio per talune colture; tale periodo sarà applicato, a scelta di ciascuno Stato membro, a decorrere dal 2007.

I nuovi Stati membri costituiscono un'eccezione alla regola poiché continueranno ad applicare il regime di pagamento unico per superficie (vedi, infra, la rubrica «Modifiche per tener conto dei nuovi paesi membri»).

Mentre l'Agenda 2000 ha aumentato le compensazioni agli agricoltori per equilibrare la perdita di reddito a causa della progressiva eliminazione delle restituzioni all'esportazione, il disaccoppiamento mira ad eliminare la sovrapproduzione di eccedenze e ad equilibrare il rapporto tra domanda e offerta, mantenendo costanti i redditi degli agricoltori.

1. Assoggettamento dei rimanenti pagamenti diretti al rispetto di talune talune norme ambientali e di sicurezza alimentare ;
2. Riduzione graduale dei pagamenti diretti (la cosiddetta " modulazione ") per finanziare la nuova politica di sviluppo rurale.
3. Meccanismo di disciplina finanziaria per rispettare rigorosamente il bilancio agricolo fissato fino al 2013.

Revisione della politica di mercato della PAC. A parte il nuovo regime di aiuto unico per azienda, sono state modificate le seguenti organizzazioni di mercato: latte , riso , cereali , frumento duro , foraggi essiccati e aiuti per la frutta a guscio e la fecola di patate .

Continuazione della riforma della PAC nel 2004

La riforma del 2004 riguarda i «prodotti mediterranei» e lo zucchero.

Taluni settori agricoli mediterranei, come il cotone e il tabacco, sono più esposti alle conseguenze del passaggio al pagamento unico per azienda, per le caratteristiche delle coltivazioni o delle regioni interessate. Per aiutare tali regioni e colture è stato concesso un aiuto alla ristrutturazione (vedi la nuova OCM del tabacco e i nuovi aiuti al cotone).

Oltre agli aiuti al tabacco e al cotone, gli aiuti all'olio d'oliva e alle olive da tavola e al luppolo sono stati inclusi nel sistema di pagamento unico disaccoppiato. Tutti questi prodotti, poiché si tratta di colture sensibili, possono conservare una parte dei precedenti aiuti per superficie (cotone, luppolo) oppure usufruire di un lungo periodo di transizione durante il quale siano consentiti gli aiuti per superficie (tabacco).

D'altro canto, la Commissione ha presentato una riforma radicale dell'OCM dello zucchero. Tale riforma presuppone una ristrutturazione del settore che ridurrà le esportazioni di zucchero e le restituzioni alle esportazioni, eliminando l'intervento e limitando la produzione comunitaria dello zucchero e il prezzo interno di tale prodotto. La riforma prevede inoltre di concedere un aiuto disaccoppiato indipendente dalla produzione ai produttori di barbabietola da zucchero.

MODIFICHE PER TENER CONTO DEI NUOVI PAESI MEMBRI

La riforma della politica agricola comune (PAC) ha dovuto tener conto dell'adesione dei 10 nuovi paesi membri nell'UE il 1° maggio 2004 ed è stata incentrata su due punti:

- l'adeguamento degli allegati dell'atto di adesione relativi alla PAC (con una decisione del Consiglio) per includervi il risultato dei negoziati, integrandovi il nuovo acquis;
- l'adeguamento dei testi della riforma della PAC (con un nuovo regolamento) per poterli applicare ai nuovi Stati membri, integrandovi il risultato dei suddetti negoziati.

LA POLITICA AGRICOLA COMUNE E L'ORGANIZZAZIONE MONDIALE DEL COMMERCIO

Gli scambi commerciali in agricoltura rivestono per l'UE un'importanza particolare, in quanto essa è il maggiore importatore e il secondo esportatore di prodotti agricoli nel mondo.

L'UE è membro dell'Organizzazione mondiale del commercio (OMC). Nell'ottobre 1999, i ministri dell'agricoltura dell'UE hanno raggiunto un'intesa comune riguardo al futuro ciclo del millennio. Tali negoziati nel quadro dell'OMC hanno preso il via nel marzo 2000.

Gli obiettivi e gli interessi dell'UE in gioco in tali negoziati si basano sui seguenti elementi:

- l'esame degli aspetti non commerciali dell'agricoltura: l'agricoltura presenta molteplici funzioni nella misura in cui, oltre alla produzione alimentare, partecipa alla conservazione del paesaggio, alla protezione dell'ambiente, alla tutela della sicurezza e della qualità dei prodotti alimentari, al benessere degli animali, ecc...; pertanto, va ricercato un equilibrio tra le questioni prettamente commerciali e quelle non commerciali inerenti all'agricoltura;
- l'applicazione di un trattamento speciale e differenziato nei paesi in via di sviluppo, tenendo conto, in particolare, dell'importanza fondamentale dell'alimentazione e dell'agricoltura in tali paesi;
- il miglioramento dell'accesso alle opportunità di mercato: l'UE si impegna, in quanto massimo esportatore di prodotti alimentari, a migliorare gli sbocchi per i suoi esportatori e a ridurre ingiustificate barriere doganali. In tal modo l'Unione europea tenta di dare il suo contributo alla sperata espansione del commercio mondiale dei prodotti agricoli. .

In genere, la strategia comunitaria dei negoziati in campo agricolo si è basata sull'Agenda 2000.

Ciclo di Doha (Programma di Doha per lo sviluppo)

Il 14 novembre 2001 è iniziato a Doha (Qatar), con ambizioni dichiarate, un nuovo ciclo di negoziati nell'ambito dell'OMC, che però si è arenato nel 2003, a Cancun. Il 1° agosto 2004, i 147 membri dell'OMC hanno infine trovato un accordo. Oltre ad una più ampia liberalizzazione degli scambi, tali negoziati multilaterali hanno rivisto le regole commerciali esistenti includendovi nuovi settori, senza tralasciare di rafforzare la capacità commerciale dei paesi in via di sviluppo.

L'accordo si basa su 4 punti:

- riduzione degli aiuti agricoli che provocano distorsioni del commercio (ad esempio riduzione sostanziale degli aiuti nazionali e delle sovvenzioni);
- eliminazione delle pratiche di esportazione che provocano distorsioni del commercio. L'UE ha visto soddisfatta la sua rivendicazione di parità di trattamento per tutti questi tipi di pratiche;
- apertura dei mercati agricoli. Ciò implica una riduzione generale dei dazi doganali, con alcune eccezioni per i prodotti agricoli considerati sensibili per ciascuno Stato membro;
- trattamento speciale e differenziato per i paesi in via di sviluppo. L'UE raccomandava persino un accesso esente da dazi e contingenti per le merci dei paesi meno avanzati. Anche quest'ultimo punto è stato accolto, ma verrà applicato soltanto nei paesi che sono in grado di attuarlo.

SVILUPPO RURALE E PROSPETTIVE GENERALI

Da quando è stata istituita, la PAC ha subito un'enorme evoluzione, che è andata di pari passo con la politica di sviluppo rurale . Dal 2006 gli obiettivi di quest'ultima sono i seguenti:

- miglioramento della competitività dell'agricoltura col sostegno alla ristrutturazione attraverso alcune misure (ad esempio aiuti all'investimento per i giovani agricoltori, promozione dell'informazione, ecc.);
- miglioramento dell'ambiente e dello spazio rurale attraverso la gestione delle terre, comprese le azioni di sviluppo rurale relative ai siti Natura 2000: agroambiente, silvicoltura, ecc.;

- miglioramento della qualità della vita nelle zone rurali e diversificazione delle attività economiche, ad esempio ponendo l'accento sulla qualità dell'alimentazione.

La politica agraria comune costituisce l'ambito politico dalla portata più ampia, il quale ha dato adito alle maggiori controversie e al quale è stato destinato il bilancio più consistente rispetto agli altri settori della politica comunitaria. Nella politica agraria l'UE detiene maggiori poteri che in qualsiasi altro campo e in nessun altro ambito politico sono state approvate tante disposizioni legislative quante nella sola politica agricola.

Con l'entrata dei 10 nuovi Stati membri, il numero di agricoltori e di terreni coltivabili nell'UE è notevolmente aumentato. Attualmente, l'UE conta circa 11 milioni di agricoltori. I terreni destinati alla coltivazione sono aumentati del 30% dopo l'allargamento.

Ultima modifica: 21.10.2004

Bruxelles, 12 settembre 2006

Sviluppo rurale: la Commissione fissa definitivamente la dotazione annuale degli Stati membri per il periodo 2007-2013

La Commissione europea ha deciso oggi il bilancio annuale dello sviluppo rurale per i 25 Stati membri per il periodo 2007-2013. Questa decisione fa seguito all'accordo raggiunto dal Consiglio europeo sulle prospettive finanziarie nel dicembre 2005. L'importo che riceveranno i singoli Stati membri è stato fissato in base ai seguenti criteri: a) le somme riservate a determinate regioni nell'ambito dell'obiettivo di convergenza; b) la quota storica per Stato membro della dotazione della sezione Garanzia del FEAOG per lo sviluppo rurale e Leader+; c) le situazioni ed esigenze particolari giustificate da criteri obiettivi (il Consiglio europeo aveva assegnato importi specifici ad otto Stati membri). La decisione sarà modificata non appena la Romania e la Bulgaria aderiranno all'Unione. Per questi due Paesi sono disponibili stanziamenti supplementari.

"Ora che gli stanziamenti di bilancio sono decisi, tocca agli Stati membri presentare i loro programmi di sviluppo rurale!", ha commentato Mariann Fischer Boel, Commissaria all'Agricoltura e allo sviluppo rurale. "I fondi dello sviluppo rurale possono essere usati per migliorare la competitività della filiera agroalimentare e del settore forestale e sono essenziali per il sostegno di progetti ambientali in ambiente rurale. Ma questi soldi possono essere spesi anche al di fuori del settore agricolo tradizionale, ad esempio per contribuire alla creazione di nuovi posti di lavoro e nuove imprese nelle zone rurali. Gli obiettivi della crescita e dell'occupazione sono oggi di attualità: ecco un esempio concreto di come utilizzare il denaro dell'UE per realizzarli."

Principali novità della politica dello sviluppo rurale

- Un unico strumento di finanziamento e di programmazione: il Fondo europeo agricolo per lo sviluppo rurale (FEASR)
- Un nuovo approccio strategico allo sviluppo rurale, chiaramente imperniato sulle priorità dell'Unione europea
- Potenziamento delle attività di controllo, valutazione e rendicontazione, oltre che una più netta ripartizione di competenze tra gli Stati membri e la Commissione
- Un più marcato approccio dal basso verso l'alto. Stati membri, regioni e gruppi di azione locale disporranno di un maggior margine di manovra per adattare i programmi alle esigenze locali

I quattro obiettivi principali

Asse 1: miglioramento della competitività delle filiere agroalimentare e forestale

Esempi:

- la valorizzazione del capitale umano mediante la formazione e la consulenza offerte agli agricoltori e ai silvicoltori;
- il miglioramento e il potenziamento delle infrastrutture per lo sviluppo e l'adattamento dei settori agricolo e forestale;
- il sostegno agli agricoltori che partecipano a sistemi di qualità alimentare;
- l'insediamento di giovani agricoltori;
- il sostegno all'agricoltura di semisussistenza nei nuovi Stati membri in modo da renderla competitiva;
- il sostegno all'innovazione.

Il 10% almeno del contributo comunitario deve essere speso per l'asse 1. Il tasso massimo di cofinanziamento UE è del 50% (75% nelle regioni di convergenza).

Asse 2: ambiente e spazio rurale

Esempi:

- indennità a favore degli agricoltori delle zone montane, per compensare gli svantaggi naturali di queste zone;
- indennità nelle zone NATURA 2000;
- misure agroambientali;
- pagamenti per migliorare il benessere degli animali;
- misure a favore della silvicoltura sostenibile.

Il 25% almeno del contributo comunitario deve essere speso per l'asse 2. Il tasso massimo di cofinanziamento UE è del 55% (80% nelle regioni di convergenza).

Asse 3: migliorare la qualità di vita nelle zone rurali e promuovere la diversificazione delle attività economiche

Esempi:

- diversificazione in attività non agricole;
- aiuti per la costituzione di microimprese;
- incentivazione del turismo;
- rinnovamento dei paesaggi;
- servizi di base come strutture per la custodia dei bambini, per permettere alle donne di reinserirsi sul mercato del lavoro.

Il 10% almeno del contributo comunitario deve essere speso per l'asse 3. Il tasso massimo di cofinanziamento UE è del 50% (75% nelle regioni di convergenza).

Asse 4: l'approccio LEADER

Ogni programma deve contenere una componente Leader per realizzare per le strategie di sviluppo locale dei gruppi di azione locale secondo la prospettiva dal basso verso l'alto. Almeno il 5% del contributo comunitario è riservato a LEADER (2,5% nei nuovi Stati membri).



Ripartizione del sostegno comunitario dello sviluppo rurale per Stato membro nel periodo 2007-2013 (EUR)

Prezzi correnti	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	07-13 totale	di cui importo minimo per le regioni dell'obiettivo di convergenza
Belgio	63.991.299	63.957.784	60.238.083	59.683.509	59.267.519	56.995.480	54.476.632	418.610.306	40.744.223
Repubblica ceca	396.623.321	392.638.892	388.036.387	400.932.774	406.640.636	412.672.094	417.962.250	2.815.506.354	1.635.417.906
Danimarca	62.592.573	66.344.571	63.771.254	64.334.762	63.431.467	62.597.618	61.588.551	444.660.796	0
Germania	1.184.995.564	1.186.941.705	1.147.425.574	1.156.018.553	1.159.359.200	1.146.661.509	1.131.114.950	8.112.517.055	3.174.037.771
Estonia	95.608.462	95.569.377	95.696.594	100.929.353	104.639.066	108.913.401	113.302.602	714.658.855	387.221.654
Grecia	461.376.206	463.470.078	453.393.090	452.018.509	631.768.186	626.030.398	619.247.957	3.707.304.424	1.905.697.195
Spagna	1.012.456.383	1.030.880.527	1.006.845.141	1.013.903.294	1.057.772.000	1.050.937.191	1.041.123.263	7.213.917.799	3.178.127.204
Francia	931.041.833	942.359.146	898.672.939	909.225.155	933.778.147	921.205.557	905.682.332	6.441.965.109	568.263.981
Irlanda	373.683.516	355.014.220	329.171.422	333.372.252	324.698.528	316.771.063	307.203.589	2.339.914.590	0
Italia	1.142.143.461	1.135.428.298	1.101.390.921	1.116.626.236	1.271.659.589	1.266.602.382	1.258.158.996	8.292.009.883	3.341.091.825
Cipro	26.704.860	24.772.842	22.749.762	23.071.507	22.402.714	21.783.947	21.037.942	162.523.574	0
Lettonia	152.867.493	147.768.241	142.542.483	147.766.381	148.781.700	150.188.774	151.198.432	1.041.113.504	327.682.815
Lituania	260.974.835	248.836.020	236.928.998	244.741.536	248.002.433	250.278.098	253.598.173	1.743.360.093	679.189.192
Lussemburgo	14.421.997	13.661.411	12.655.487	12.818.190	12.487.289	12.181.368	11.812.084	90.037.826	0
Ungheria	570.811.818	537.525.661	498.635.432	509.252.494	547.603.625	563.304.619	578.709.743	3.805.843.392	2.496.094.593
Malta	12.434.359	11.527.788	10.656.597	10.544.212	10.347.884	10.459.190	10.663.325	76.633.355	18.077.067
Paesi Bassi	70.536.869	72.638.338	69.791.337	70.515.293	68.706.648	67.782.449	66.550.233	486.521.167	0
Austria	628.154.610	594.709.669	550.452.057	557.557.505	541.670.574	527.868.629	511.056.948	3.911.469.992	31.938.190
Polonia	1.989.717.841	1.932.933.351	1.872.739.817	1.866.782.838	1.860.573.543	1.857.244.519	1.850.046.247	13.230.038.156	6.997.976.121
Portogallo	562.210.832	562.491.944	551.196.824	559.018.566	565.142.601	565.192.105	564.072.156	3.929.325.028	2.180.735.857
Slovenia	149.549.387	139.868.094	129.728.049	128.304.946	123.026.091	117.808.866	111.981.296	900.266.729	287.815.759
Slovacchia	303.163.265	286.531.906	268.049.256	256.310.239	263.028.387	275.025.447	317.309.578	1.969.418.078	1.106.011.592
Finlandia	335.121.543	316.143.440	292.385.407	296.367.134	287.790.092	280.508.238	271.617.053	2.079.932.907	0
Svezia	292.133.703	277.225.207	256.996.031	260.397.463	252.975.513	246.760.755	239.159.282	1.825.647.954	0
Regno Unito	263.996.373	283.001.582	274.582.271	276.600.084	273.334.332	270.695.626	267.364.152	1.909.574.420	188.337.515
Totale	11.357.312.403	11.182.240.092	10.734.731.213	10.827.092.785	11.238.887.764	11.186.469.323	11.136.037.766	77.662.771.346	28.544.460.460

Nota: nell'accordo interistituzionale è stato assegnato allo Sviluppo rurale, per il periodo 2007-2013, un importo di 69,75 miliardi EUR (prezzi 2004), comprese Romania e Bulgaria. La tabella che precede riguarda l'UE-25 e include le somme trasferite dagli aiuti diretti per gli agricoltori allo Sviluppo rurale nell'ambito della cosiddetta "modulazione", nonché altri storni approvati (dai settori dello zucchero e del tabacco).



**MINISTERO POLITICHE
AGRICOLE E FORESTALI**



*Presidenza Italiana
del Consiglio dell'Unione Europea*

**Atti della Prima Conferenza
Euromediterranea
dei Ministri dell'Agricoltura**

Venezia, 27 Novembre 2003

a cura di

Cosimo LACIRIGNOLA e Vincenzo FERSINO

CONCLUSIONI

DELLA CONFERENZA MINISTERIALE EURO-MEDITERRANEA SULL'AGRICOLTURA

(Venezia, 27 Novembre 2003)

A. La Conferenza ha preso atto delle seguenti considerazioni inerenti la cooperazione agricola nel Mediterraneo:

1. La creazione di uno spazio euro-mediterraneo di prosperità condivisa, così come sancito dalla Dichiarazione di Barcellona del 28 novembre 1995, è uno degli obiettivi chiave del Processo di Barcellona. L'organizzazione di una Conferenza ministeriale euromediterranea sull'agricoltura rientra a pieno titolo tra questi obiettivi.
2. Inoltre, questo è il momento giusto per tenere una conferenza sull'agricoltura, alla luce della riforma della Politica Agricola Comune, dei dibattiti multilaterali in corso nell'ambito dell'Agenda di Doha e dell'allargamento dell'Unione europea a 10 nuovi stati membri che hanno un peso agricolo importante.
3. Di conseguenza, l'iniziativa della Presidenza dell'Unione Europea di tenere, per la prima volta dopo il lancio del Processo di Barcellona nel 1995, una Conferenza Ministeriale Euro-Mediterranea consacrata esclusivamente all'agricoltura è accolta con favore, nell'intento di dare nuovo slancio ad alcuni aspetti prioritari dei rapporti agricoli tra la comunità ed i paesi terzi del mediterraneo.
4. In questo contesto, è d'uopo sottolineare che il rafforzamento delle relazioni agricole tra i paesi rivieraschi del Mediterraneo e la creazione di una piattaforma comune per alcuni ambiti della politica agricola contribuirà alla nuova politica di "vicinanza" della Comunità Europea tesa a promuovere la cooperazione intra-regionale, sub-regionale e transfrontaliera.
5. E' inoltre necessario ricordare che gli Accordi Euro-Mediterranei contengono disposizioni relative agli ambiti della cooperazione bilaterale in materia agricola ed implicano la liberalizzazione progressiva e reciproca del commercio dei prodotti agricoli entro il 2010.
6. A tale scopo, e in conformità con le raccomandazioni del Piano d'azione, la

Conferenza Euro-Mediterranea di Valencia nell'aprile 2002, ha incaricato la Commissione di realizzare uno studio di impatto sulla liberalizzazione del commercio agricolo i cui risultati sono attesi per il 2004; la discussione su questi temi proseguirà a studio ultimato.

7. Pur riconoscendo che le due rive del Mediterraneo divergono in termini di sviluppo economico, i paesi terzi mediterranei ed alcune regioni mediterranee della comunità condividono sfide simili in campo agricolo.
8. Di conseguenza, la Dichiarazione di Barcellona e il programma di lavoro ad essa associato elencano alcune aree di cooperazione nel settore agricolo, tra cui l'ammodernamento e la ristrutturazione dell'agricoltura, lo sviluppo rurale integrato incluso il miglioramento dei servizi di base e lo sviluppo di attività economiche collegate, la promozione di un'agricoltura rispettosa dell'ambiente, le problematiche relative alla gestione dell'acqua e alla lotta alla desertificazione.
9. Nel contesto della Dichiarazione di Barcellona, lo scambio di esperienze e di know-how, nonché l'assistenza tecnica e la formazione saranno gli strumenti per la realizzazione di questa cooperazione.
10. Il legame tra agricoltura ed ambiente nel mediterraneo merita maggiore attenzione, soprattutto alla luce dei cambiamenti climatici attualmente in atto; di conseguenza, la gestione corretta delle risorse idriche deve essere uno degli obiettivi prioritari all'interno di programmi elaborati in comune. In questo ambito, la Dichiarazione di Torino adottata in occasione della Conferenza Ministeriale Euro-Mediterranea sulla Gestione Locale Integrata dell'Acqua svoltasi nell'ottobre 1999 riveste grande importanza.
11. Bisogna altresì sottolineare l'importanza delle misure agro-ambientali e della rete Natura 2000 per portare a termine gli impegni presi dal Consiglio Europeo di Goteborg inerente lo sviluppo sostenibile.
12. La maggiore attenzione della Comunità alle esigenze di sviluppo rurale sostenibile, alla tutela dell'agricoltura nelle zone marginali e montuose e alla multifunzionalità dell'agricoltura richiede una considerazione adeguata di tali temi da parte della Comunità nelle relazioni con i partner mediterranei.
13. Il miglioramento della qualità dei prodotti è un'altra priorità condivisa dalla Comunità con i suoi partner mediterranei e risponde, da un lato, alla domanda dei consumatori sempre più esigenti e, dall'altra, alla ricerca di nuove nicchie di mercato non solo nell'ambito del commercio tra Comunità e paesi terzi mediterranei ma anche nel contesto della ricerca di nuovi mercati mondiali.

14. Al di là degli aspetti tradizionalmente legati al commercio, esiste la volontà condivisa di porre l'enfasi sul miglioramento della qualità dei prodotti scambiati soprattutto per la promozione dei prodotti tipici locali e delle produzioni biologiche.
15. Lo sviluppo dei prodotti biologici così come la protezione delle denominazioni d'origine e delle indicazioni geografiche nel mediterraneo, e la promozione degli scambi commerciali potrebbero conferire valore aggiunto al commercio tra la comunità e i paesi partner di Barcellona.
16. La Comunità ha svolto un ruolo cardine nell'elaborazione degli aspetti legislativi sull'agricoltura biologica e nella protezione delle denominazioni di origine e delle indicazioni geografiche e potrebbe condividere il suo know-how e le sue esperienze in questo ambito con i partner mediterranei.

B. Alla luce delle succitate considerazioni, la Conferenza raccomanda le seguenti iniziative per lo sviluppo della cooperazione agricola tra le due rive del Mediterraneo:

17. Un programma di lavoro sarà elaborato ed avviato dalla Comunità europea in cooperazione con i paesi partner mediterranei la cui esecuzione potrebbe essere realizzata in associazione con gli organismi attivi nella regione mediterranea e che rappresentano la maggior parte dei paesi partner del mediterraneo.
18. Basandosi sulla complementarità delle varie forme dell'agricoltura mediterranea, questo programma potrebbe includere, tra l'altro, alcune misure destinate ad approfondire temi ritenuti prioritari per rafforzare la cooperazione euro-mediterranea in agricoltura, al fine di stabilire alcuni principi riguardanti vari aspetti della cooperazione agricola e la fattibilità di misure specifiche e promuovere posizioni comuni in sede di concertazione e negoziati internazionali.
19. Alla luce dell'esperienza acquisita attraverso la cooperazione in questo campo, tutti i temi che hanno un impatto sullo sviluppo rurale sostenibile, la qualità dei prodotti agricoli e l'agricoltura biologica potrebbero beneficiare di un programma regionale specifico, su fondi MEDA nei limiti delle risorse disponibili. Tale programma permetterebbe di assicurare compatibilità con la politica comunitaria in questi ambiti e darebbe maggiore supporto allo sviluppo nei paesi mediterranei facilitandone la transizione verso uno spazio economico liberalizzato in un settore importante in termini di peso economico, sociale, demografico e politico.
20. Il programma di lavoro potrebbe concernere i tre punti seguenti: lo sviluppo rurale sostenibile, la qualità dei prodotti agricoli e l'agricoltura biologica.

a) Valorizzare lo sviluppo rurale, in modo particolare rispetto all'agricoltura e all'ambiente

- Lanciare una piattaforma di dialogo euro-mediterraneo sullo sviluppo rurale sostenibile per discutere dei progressi in materia e delle esperienze acquisite in Europa, e di alcuni progetti già elaborati da organismi attivi nel settore. La piattaforma offrirebbe ai paesi terzi mediterranei la possibilità di esprimere le proprie preoccupazioni e presentare le strategie adottate.
- Lanciare un programma di scambio di esperti tra i paesi del sud della Comunità e i paesi terzi mediterranei al fine di trasferire il know-how e le esperienze acquisite nei programmi.
- Fare il punto ad intervalli regolari sui programmi esistenti in materia di sviluppo rurale ed esplorare l'opportunità di stabilire cooperazioni istituzionalizzate transfrontaliere nell'ambito dello sviluppo rurale ispirandosi all'iniziativa comunitaria Leader.
- Promuovere misure di sviluppo rurale atte a diversificare le attività agricole e a sviluppare attività alternative creatrici di occupazione e generatrici di reddito nelle aree rurali come il turismo rurale e il commercio di prodotti artigianali.
- Sviluppare attività inerenti l'uso razionale delle risorse idriche per l'irrigazione attraverso la gestione integrata dell'acqua e suoli, così come il programma di lotta alla desertificazione;
- Dare maggiore enfasi agli approcci partecipativi di gestione e alla valorizzazione del ruolo delle donne in questo processo.
- Tener conto, in queste attività, degli aspetti specifici, tecnici e socio-economici dei sistemi di produzione in aree ad agricoltura pluviale, in modo particolare la valutazione dei rischi legati all'erosione dei suoli e alla desertificazione e alla perdita di biodiversità negli ecosistemi agricoli naturali della regione mediterranea.
- Promuovere uno studio sui cambiamenti climatici e i fabbisogni idrici nel mediterraneo e sull'impatto di questi fattori sui metodi di produzione mediterranei.
- Inserire l'attuazione di queste attività nel programma regionale di misure per l'ambiente a breve e medio termine per il 2004. Inoltre, il programma regionale per la gestione locale dell'acqua, recentemente promosso, potrebbe finanziare seminari specifici sulla gestione locale dell'acqua per scopi agricoli, nell'ambito degli interventi già in finanziamento. La rete regionale euro-mediterranea in campo idrico potrebbe contribuire con la propria esperienza a questo processo.

b) Promuovere la qualità dei prodotti agricoli

- Migliorare la conoscenza della legislazione nella Comunità e nei paesi partner mediterranei in materia di denominazione di origine e indicazioni geografiche, nell'ottica di una definizione di standard identici o equivalenti per la denominazione attuale e futura, la protezione e il monitoraggio, onde assicurare la conformità agli accordi ADPIC, nonché la promozione a livello internazionale.
- Definire un piano d'azione di ricerche comuni su nuove tematiche quali etichettatura e uso di loghi specifici, creazione di condizioni minime di confezionamento nell'area, tracciabilità e controllo.
- Studiare la possibilità di creare una rete di esperti responsabili del settore nei paesi CE e nei paesi terzi mediterranei. Questa rete dovrebbe permettere tempestivi scambi di informazioni sulle modifiche dei regimi esistenti in questo ambito al fine di promuovere azioni coordinate.
- Prevedere azioni inerenti la trasformazione e commercializzazione al fine di massimizzare i profitti sui prodotti tipici mediterranei. Queste azioni dovrebbero concernere l'identificazione e la promozione di prodotti alimentari specifici e le iniziative per massimizzare la redditività dei prodotti agricoli ad alta qualità a denominazione d'origine o indicazione geografica, per promuovere la sicurezza degli alimenti e la protezione dei consumatori.
- Estendere alcune iniziative di partenariato tra gli imprenditori delle due rive al fine di assicurare la complementarità tra i sistemi produttivi, l'introduzione di standard comuni, migliorare la qualità dei prodotti e l'integrazione delle filiere agroalimentari, sulla scorta dell'esperienza positiva dei "Corridoi verdi" italiani.
- Promuovere la ricerca e l'introduzione di regole di identificazione dei prodotti alimentari ad elevata qualità originari della regione e l'uso di loghi che ne permettano l'identificazione; sviluppare partenariati tra le imprese della regione che desiderano promuovere i prodotti alimentari mediterranei tipici e che condividono le stesse opinioni sulle politiche di gestione della qualità e tracciabilità a sostegno di tali strategie;
- Per l'attuazione delle misure succitate, sviluppare attività nel programma regionale Euro-Med Mercato che incoraggino lo scambio di esperienze e cooperazione tra le amministrazioni per armonizzare e allineare i sistemi normativi, incluse le norme fitosanitarie ed agroalimentari. La cooperazione nell'ambito della qualità e degli standard dovrebbe permettere la realizzazione progressiva di un insieme più omogeneo di standard e norme per facilitare la specializzazione, il commercio e le

esportazioni dei nostri partner in alcuni segmenti di mercato a forte potenziale di crescita.

c) *Avviare azioni nell'ambito dell' agricoltura biologica*

- Organizzare un seminario informativo per presentare la legislazione comunitaria in materia, e la procedura comunitaria per riconoscere l'equivalenza dei prodotti biologici dei paesi terzi al fine di promuovere le esportazioni degli stessi verso la Comunità; i paesi terzi mediterranei potrebbero presentare la loro legislazione in agricoltura biologica.
- Creare, al termine di questo seminario, una rete di esperti competenti o di istituzioni attive nel settore sia nei paesi della Comunità che nei paesi terzi mediterranei. Questa rete dovrebbe assicurare uno scambio di informazioni tempestivo sulle modifiche dei regimi esistenti in materia, per promuovere azioni coordinate e lo sviluppo del settore biologico in tutti questi aspetti.
- Promuovere la partecipazione dei paesi terzi mediterranei alle fiere dei prodotti biologici.

Come per le azioni relative alle denominazioni di origine e alle indicazioni geografiche, attuare le misure succitate attraverso il finanziamento nell'ambito del programma regionale Euro-Med Mercato.



COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE

Bruxelles, 12.4.2005
COM(2005) 139 definitivo

**COMUNICAZIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE AL CONSIGLIO E AL
PARLAMENTO EUROPEO**

DECIMO ANNIVERSARIO DEL PARTENARIATO EUROMEDITERRANEO:

Un programma di lavoro per far fronte alle sfide dei prossimi cinque anni

**{SEC(2005) 482
SEC(2005) 483 }**

un qualsiasi settore. In cambio, ciascun paese partecipante aprirà i suoi settori agli altri e all'UE.

L'UE e i paesi mediterranei, pertanto, dovrebbero decidere di avviare negoziati sulla liberalizzazione e sull'integrazione degli scambi di servizi e dello stabilimento, in linea con gli impegni assunti a livello regionale e nel quadro dei piani d'azione della politica di prossimità. I negoziati saranno aperti a tutti i partner mediterranei che desiderino concludere un accordo regionale di questo tipo (tranne la Turchia, che ha uno status di paese candidato). La Commissione proporrà al Consiglio opportuni orientamenti affinché i negoziati con i paesi partner possano iniziare nel secondo semestre del 2005. I partner dovrebbero concordare di portare a termine i negoziati sulla liberalizzazione degli scambi di servizi e dello stabilimento con una forte dimensione regionale onde allineare questo processo con l'obiettivo della zona di libero scambio da creare entro il 2010.

Le iniziative suddette dovrebbero cercare di combinare lo sviluppo sociale con lo sviluppo economico. L'attuale valutazione dell'impatto sulla sostenibilità dovrebbe dare un contributo considerevole in tal senso, anche per garantire il rispetto dei diritti socioeconomici fondamentali, formulando raccomandazioni su cui ci si baserà per definire le politiche future.

b) Liberalizzazione del commercio e cooperazione per quanto riguarda i prodotti dell'agricoltura e della pesca

Prendendo spunto dal lavoro svolto durante le riunioni settoriali tra funzionari di alto livello competenti in materia di agricoltura, si dovrebbe elaborare una **road map per la liberalizzazione del commercio di prodotti agricoli, di prodotti agricoli trasformati e di prodotti della pesca, definendo un mandato regionale che preveda un notevole grado di liberalizzazione, con pochissime eccezioni, e un calendario di attuazione.** Al tempo stesso, ci si impegnerebbe a varare nel 2007 un **programma di cooperazione regionale per lo sviluppo rurale** e di ottimizzazione della produzione di qualità coerente con gli obiettivi della politica di prossimità. Basandosi sulle conclusioni della conferenza euromediterranea di Lussemburgo (maggio 2005), la Commissione proporrà orientamenti per i negoziati sulla liberalizzazione degli scambi di prodotti dell'agricoltura e della pesca che dovranno essere approvati dal Consiglio affinché i negoziati possano iniziare nel secondo semestre 2005. **I negoziati dovrebbero concludersi entro un anno onde allineare la liberalizzazione degli scambi di prodotti dell'agricoltura e della pesca con l'obiettivo di creare una zona di libero scambio entro il 2010.**

c) Garantire la convergenza delle normative tecniche onde agevolare gli scambi commerciali

Il ravvicinamento delle normative tecniche riguardanti gli standard e la valutazione della conformità può favorire considerevolmente il commercio, gli investimenti e, a termine, l'integrazione delle economie. L'obiettivo ricercato è quello di promuovere il commercio allineando gli standard e i requisiti tecnici, riducendo i costi dovuti alle ripetizioni delle prove e delle certificazioni e agevolando in tal modo l'accesso al mercato. L'armonizzazione della legislazione economica è già iniziata in base al programma di lavoro adottato dalla conferenza dei ministri del commercio

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Relazione tra l'Unione europea e i paesi della regione mediterranea

Risoluzione del Parlamento europeo sul partenariato euromediterraneo

Il Parlamento europeo,

- viste le sue precedenti risoluzioni sul partenariato euromediterraneo,
 - vista la dichiarazione di Barcellona del novembre 1995 e il relativo programma di lavoro,
 - viste le conclusioni delle dieci precedenti conferenze ministeriali euromediterranee,
 - vista la creazione dell'Assemblea parlamentare euromediterranea (APEM),
 - vista la comunicazione della Commissione al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio "Imprimere un nuovo impulso alle azioni dell'UE coi partner mediterranei nel campo dei diritti umani e della democratizzazione, Documento di orientamento strategico" (COM(2003)0294),
 - viste le conclusioni dei Forum civili che hanno accompagnato le riunioni ministeriali soprammenzionate,
 - visto l'articolo 103, paragrafo 4, del suo regolamento,
- A. considerando che negli ultimi dieci anni il processo di Barcellona ha fornito il quadro per un partenariato tra i paesi e i popoli delle due rive del Mediterraneo,
- B. considerando che il Mediterraneo riveste un'importanza strategica per l'Unione europea e che è necessaria una politica mediterranea solidale per affrontare le molteplici sfide comuni, quali la pace, la stabilità, il terrorismo e la sicurezza, la comprensione reciproca, la lotta contro la tratta degli esseri umani (inclusa l'immigrazione clandestina e illegale); considerando altresì l'obiettivo di stabilire una zona di prosperità condivisa,
- C. considerando che la dichiarazione di Barcellona impegna i paesi partecipanti ad instaurare tra loro un dialogo regolare sugli aspetti politici, economici e sociali, nonché sui diritti dell'uomo,
- D. considerando che l'Unione ha definito una nuova politica europea di vicinato volta a rinsaldare tale partenariato, a creare nuove opportunità per approfondire le relazioni, a rafforzare il dialogo politico, ad integrare i paesi partner nelle politiche dell'Unione per promuovere la pace, la stabilità e la democrazia nei paesi vicini,
- E. considerando che i primi piani d'azione conclusi con il Marocco, la Tunisia, la Giordania, Israele e l'Autorità nazionale palestinese, adottati dal Consiglio, impegnano l'Unione e i paesi partner in un dialogo stretto e non esclusivo, e che devono rispettare un approccio regionale coerente e comune,
- F. sottolineando che la ripresa del dialogo tra le parti coinvolte nel conflitto israelo-palestinese è un'occasione da cogliere per regolare tale questione in modo globale e duraturo, atta a stimolare tutto il processo euromediterraneo,

- G. considerando che il 19 ottobre 2004 la Commissione e la Siria hanno ufficialmente concluso i negoziati in vista di un accordo di associazione CE-Siria, mettendo così fine alla fase degli accordi bilaterali prevista nel partenariato euromediterraneo,
- H. prendendo atto della posizione comune 2004/698/PESC del Consiglio del 14 ottobre 2004¹, che revoca le misure restrittive e l'embargo sulle armi decretati nei confronti della Libia, aprendo così la strada ad una piena partecipazione di tale paese al processo di Barcellona,
- I. considerando che la trasformazione del Forum parlamentare euromediterraneo in Assemblea parlamentare euromediterranea (APEM), dotata di tre commissioni, rafforza la dimensione parlamentare del processo euromediterraneo, che è ormai investito di una responsabilità democratica maggiore; considerando inoltre che questo nuovo organo dovrebbe intensificare il dialogo generale tra le due regioni,
- J. indignato dinanzi all'assassinio di Rafic Hariri e preoccupato quanto alla situazione che questo atto criminale ha creato in Libano,
- K. preoccupato in relazione alla revoca dell'immunità parlamentare e alla carcerazione di Ayman Nour, presidente del partito egiziano al-Ghad,
1. si compiace della decisione presa dai ministri di fare del 2005 l'Anno del Mediterraneo e invita il Consiglio e la Commissione ad intensificare i loro sforzi per rafforzare la democrazia nei paesi mediterranei, contribuendo a promuovere le necessarie riforme politiche, economiche e sociali;
 2. ritiene che il dialogo politico previsto non abbia ancora dato realmente risultati tangibili ovunque nella regione; deplora che il capitolo del processo di Barcellona relativo ai diritti dell'uomo sia ancora insufficientemente sviluppato e che la situazione in taluni paesi non presenti alcun segno di miglioramento; deplora altresì che la clausola relativa ai diritti dell'uomo contenuta negli accordi euromediterranei non venga rispettata; ribadisce il suo invito alla Commissione di presentare una relazione annuale pubblica sui diritti dell'uomo nei paesi del Mediterraneo, che possa servire da base per sviluppare il partenariato;
 3. invita tutti i paesi della regione a cooperare strettamente per far fronte alle sfide crescenti dell'immigrazione in uno spirito di responsabilità condivisa;
 4. chiede alla Commissione di concepire il nuovo strumento finanziario "di vicinato" in modo trasparente, in concertazione con i paesi partner e con la partecipazione del Parlamento europeo e dell'APEM, cosicché tale strumento sia realmente atto a rilanciare lo sviluppo e ad incoraggiare gli investimenti;
 5. si compiace della creazione della piattaforma non governativa euromediterranea per il Forum civile, che terrà la sua riunione costitutiva a Lussemburgo nel mese di aprile 2005; sottolinea a tale riguardo che è importante sviluppare una cooperazione stretta con tale piattaforma, invitando regolarmente i suoi membri a presentare i loro punti di vista nel quadro dell'APEM;
 6. chiede a tale proposito alla Commissione di associarlo alla valutazione dell'esecuzione dei

¹ GU L 317 del 16.10.2004, pag. 40.

piani d'azione;

7. è del parere che l'Iniziativa europea per la democrazia e i diritti dell'uomo debba svolgere un ruolo centrale nella promozione dei valori fondatori dell'Unione nel quadro del processo di Barcellona; sollecita la Commissione ad assumere le proprie responsabilità insistendo sul rispetto della clausola dei diritti dell'uomo inserita negli accordi;
8. chiede alla Commissione e agli Stati membri di promuovere, nello spirito del rapporto del PNUD, il rispetto dei diritti delle donne nell'esecuzione degli aiuti finanziari e tecnici destinati ai paesi partner;
9. prende atto della firma ormai prossima dell'accordo di associazione CE-Siria, che impegna Damasco a procedere a riforme profonde e sostanziali allo scopo di avviare un autentico processo di democratizzazione delle sue strutture; esorta la Siria a non tollerare alcuna forma di terrorismo, incluso il sostegno alla componente militare di Hezbollah, nonché ad astenersi da ogni ingerenza negli affari interni del Libano; chiede il ritiro delle truppe siriane dal Libano, come indicato nelle risoluzioni del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, e considera tale condizione come un elemento essenziale della sua valutazione quando giungerà il momento della firma dell'Accordo di associazione CE-Siria;
10. chiede al Consiglio di prevedere l'invio di una delegazione di osservatori dell'Unione per le elezioni in Libano;
11. condanna con forza l'attentato che è costato la vita all'ex Primo ministro libanese Hariri e alle sue guardie del corpo, e dichiara che starà molto attento alle conclusioni dell'inchiesta internazionale in corso;
12. chiede che Ayman Nour sia rimesso in libertà; ritiene che la revoca dell'immunità e la detenzione di un membro del parlamento egiziano colpiscano lo spirito e la lettera dell'accordo di associazione tra la Comunità europea e l'Egitto; chiede alla Commissione, al Consiglio e all'Alto Rappresentante dell'Unione per la PESC di esercitare tutta l'influenza necessaria per ricordare alle autorità egiziane lo spirito di questo accordo;
13. chiede alla Libia di prendere le misure e gli impegni necessari – incluso il rilascio immediato del personale medico straniero incarcerato – per integrarsi pienamente nel partenariato euromediterraneo e contribuire così al rafforzamento del processo di Barcellona;
14. si compiace degli ultimi sviluppi positivi del conflitto mediorientale, poiché influiranno in modo decisivo sulla piena attuazione di tutto il partenariato euromediterraneo, e chiede a tutti i paesi partner di adoperarsi per sostenere la ripresa del dialogo e dare forma concreta alla Road Map;
15. chiede al Consiglio e alla Commissione, nelle loro relazioni con i partner mediterranei, di formulare proposte concrete per fare avanzare il dossier sicurezza, facendo ricorso agli elementi risultanti dalla Strategia europea in materia di sicurezza, nonché agli strumenti di gestione di crisi già predisposti alla Commissione;
16. rileva con soddisfazione il miglioramento netto e costante dei risultati dei finanziamenti MEDA;

17. sottolinea l'importanza che la promozione e l'estensione delle reti transeuropee, in particolare nei settori dell'energia e dei trasporti, rivestono per le relazioni e la cooperazione con i partner mediterranei;
18. sostiene la proposta volta ad istituire un sistema di allerta precoce nel Mediterraneo per la prevenzione delle catastrofi, tenuto conto dell'esperienza maturata con lo tsunami che ha colpito l'Asia sudorientale;
19. ritiene che la firma dell'accordo di Agadir tra Marocco, Tunisia, Egitto e Giordania nel febbraio 2004 sia il segnale positivo di un rafforzamento della cooperazione sud-sud, che completa la cooperazione nord-sud e incoraggia tutti i paesi della regione mediterranea a rafforzare le loro relazioni dirette, comprese quelle commerciali, e, all'occorrenza, a rimuovere gli eventuali ostacoli che vi si frappongono;
20. si auspica che il Consiglio adotti una decisione per organizzare un Summit euromediterraneo dei Capi di Stato o di Governo al fine di commemorare il decimo anniversario del processo di Barcellona; sottolinea l'importanza, in tale contesto, della dimensione parlamentare di tale processo e invita l'APEM, che si riunirà al Cairo dal 12 al 15 marzo 2005, a convocare una riunione straordinaria per celebrare tale decimo anniversario;
21. attende con interesse la sessione inaugurale della Fondazione euromediterranea Anna Lindh per il dialogo fra le culture, la cui azione può senz'altro contribuire ad accrescere la comprensione reciproca e consentire di trarre il massimo vantaggio da un'eredità comune;
22. incarica il suo Presidente di trasmettere la presente risoluzione al Consiglio e alla Commissione nonché ai governi e ai parlamenti degli Stati membri, a quelli dei paesi mediterranei firmatari della Dichiarazione di Barcellona e al Presidente dell'APEM.

Dichiarazione di Barcellona e partenariato euromediterraneo

La dichiarazione mira ad istituire un partenariato globale euromediterraneo al fine di trasformare il Mediterraneo in uno spazio comune di pace, di stabilità e di prosperità attraverso il rafforzamento del dialogo politico e sulla sicurezza, un partenariato economico e finanziario e un partenariato sociale, culturale ed umano.

ATTO

La Dichiarazione finale della Conferenza ministeriale euromediterranea di Barcellona del 27 e 28 novembre 1995 e il suo programma di lavoro.

SINTESI

Dando seguito agli orientamenti già definiti dai Consigli europei di Lisbona (giugno 1992), Corfù (giugno 1994) e Essen (dicembre 1994) e alle proposte della Commissione, l'Unione europea (UE) ha deciso di istituire un nuovo contesto per le sue relazioni con i paesi del bacino mediterraneo in vista di un progetto di partenariato. Questo progetto si è concretato in occasione della conferenza di Barcellona che ha riunito, il 27 e 28 novembre 1995, i quindici ministri degli Esteri degli Stati membri dell'UE e quelli dei seguenti dodici paesi terzi mediterranei (PTM): Algeria, Cipro, Egitto, Israele, Giordania, Libano, Malta, Marocco, Siria, Tunisia, Turchia e Autorità palestinese. La Lega degli Stati arabi e l'Unione del Maghreb arabo (UMA) sono state invitate così come la Mauritania (in qualità di membro dell'UMA).

La conferenza ha gettato le basi di un processo che avrebbe dovuto portare all'istituzione di un quadro multilaterale di dialogo e di cooperazione tra l'UE e i paesi terzi mediterranei. In occasione di questo incontro, i 27 paesi partecipanti hanno adottato all'unanimità una dichiarazione e un programma di lavoro. La dichiarazione euromediterranea definisce, infatti, un quadro multilaterale che associa strettamente gli aspetti economici e di sicurezza e comprende, inoltre, la dimensione sociale, umana e culturale.

Sin dal preambolo, i partecipanti affermano la loro volontà di superare il classico bilateralismo che ha contrassegnato a lungo le relazioni euromediterranee, investendole di una dimensione nuova, fondata su una cooperazione globale e solidale. Ne deriva un contesto multilaterale e durevole che poggia sullo spirito di partenariato, pur nel rispetto delle specificità proprie di ogni partecipante. Il nuovo contesto multilaterale è, comunque, complementare al consolidamento delle relazioni bilaterali.

D'altro canto, il partenariato euromediterraneo non intende sostituirsi alle altre azioni ed iniziative intraprese a favore della pace, della stabilità e dello sviluppo della regione. I partecipanti sostengono il conseguimento di una soluzione pacifica giusta, globale e durevole nel Medio Oriente basata sulle pertinenti risoluzioni del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite e sui principi menzionati nella lettera di invito alla conferenza di pace per il Medio Oriente tenutasi a Madrid, segnatamente il principio "terra in cambio di pace".

Il nuovo partenariato globale euromediterraneo si articola in tre assi principali:

- il partenariato politico e di sicurezza mira a realizzare uno spazio comune di pace e di stabilità;
- il partenariato economico e finanziario intende consentire la creazione di una zona di prosperità condivisa;
- il partenariato sociale, culturale e umano intende sviluppare le risorse umane, favorire la comprensione tra culture e gli scambi tra le società civili.

Il partenariato politico e di sicurezza

I partecipanti alla conferenza di Barcellona hanno deciso di istituire un dialogo politico globale e regolare, a complemento del dialogo bilaterale previsto dagli accordi di associazione. Inoltre, la dichiarazione definisce alcuni obiettivi comuni in materia di stabilità interna ed esterna. Le parti si impegnano ad agire in conformità della Carta delle Nazioni Unite e della Dichiarazione universale dei diritti dell'uomo, come pure di altri obblighi a norma del diritto internazionale, segnatamente quelli risultanti dagli strumenti regionali ed internazionali. Sono più volte ribaditi i diritti dell'uomo e le libertà fondamentali (comprese la libertà di espressione, la libertà di associazione, la libertà di pensiero, di coscienza e di religione). La dichiarazione precisa che occorre accogliere favorevolmente, mediante il dialogo tra le parti, gli scambi di informazioni su questioni attinenti ai diritti dell'uomo, alle libertà fondamentali, al razzismo ed alla xenofobia.

Le parti si impegnano ad introdurre lo Stato di diritto e la democrazia nei loro sistemi politici, riconoscendo in questo quadro il diritto di ciascun partecipante di scegliere e sviluppare liberamente il suo sistema politico, socioculturale, economico e giudiziario.

I firmatari si sono inoltre impegnati a rispettare la loro uguaglianza sovrana, l'uguaglianza di diritti dei popoli e il loro diritto all'autodeterminazione. I partecipanti hanno inoltre convenuto che le relazioni tra i loro paesi poggiano sul rispetto dell'integrità territoriale, sul principio di non intervento negli affari interni e sulla composizione pacifica delle controversie.

Le parti hanno inoltre convenuto di combattere il terrorismo, la criminalità organizzata e il flagello della droga in tutti i suoi aspetti.

Le parti si sono inoltre impegnate a promuovere la sicurezza regionale, adoperandosi, tra l'altro, a favore della non proliferazione chimica, biologica e nucleare mediante l'adesione e l'ottemperanza ai regimi di non proliferazione sia internazionali che regionali, nonché agli accordi sul disarmo e sul controllo degli armamenti. Le parti perseguono l'obiettivo di creare un'area mediorientale priva di armi di distruzione di massa.

Il partenariato economico e finanziario

La creazione di una zona di prosperità condivisa nel Mediterraneo presuppone necessariamente uno sviluppo socioeconomico sostenibile ed equilibrato nonché il miglioramento delle condizioni di vita delle popolazioni, l'aumento del livello di occupazione e la promozione della cooperazione e dell'integrazione regionale.

Per il conseguimento di tali obiettivi, i partecipanti convengono di stabilire un partenariato economico e finanziario che sia volto a:

- instaurare gradualmente una zona di libero scambio;

- attuare un'opportuna cooperazione e un'azione concertata a livello economico nei settori pertinenti;
- potenziare sostanzialmente l'assistenza finanziaria dell'Unione Europea ai suoi partner.

La **zona di libero scambio (ZLS)** sarà instaurata grazie ai nuovi accordi euromediterranei e agli accordi di libero scambio stipulati tra gli stessi paesi terzi mediterranei. Le parti hanno fissato la data del 2010 come meta per la graduale realizzazione di questa zona che coprirà la maggior parte degli scambi, nel rispetto degli obblighi risultanti dall'Organizzazione mondiale per il commercio (OMC). Saranno progressivamente eliminati gli ostacoli tariffari e non tariffari al commercio per quanto riguarda i prodotti manufatti, secondo scadenziari che saranno negoziati tra i partner. Il commercio dei prodotti agricoli e gli scambi in materia di servizi saranno progressivamente liberalizzati.

Per facilitare la realizzazione di questa zona di libero scambio euro-mediterranea, l'UE e i PTM hanno definito quattro settori prioritari:

- l'adozione di misure adeguate in materia di norme d'origine (introduzione progressiva del cumulo dell'origine), di certificazione, di tutela dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale, industriale e di concorrenza;
- il proseguimento e lo sviluppo di politiche fondate sui principi dell'economia di mercato e dell'integrazione delle loro economie, tenendo conto dei rispettivi bisogni e livelli di sviluppo;
- l'adattamento e l'ammodernamento delle strutture economiche e sociali, accordando priorità alla promozione ed allo sviluppo del settore privato, al miglioramento del settore produttivo e alla creazione di un opportuno quadro istituzionale e regolamentare per un'economia di mercato. Analogamente, ci si sforzerà di attenuare le conseguenze sociali negative che possono risultare da tale adattamento, incoraggiando programmi a favore delle popolazioni più povere;
- la promozione di meccanismi volti a sviluppare i trasferimenti di tecnologia.

Il programma di lavoro prevede alcune misure concrete destinate a promuovere il libero scambio, come l'armonizzazione delle norme e delle procedure doganali, l'armonizzazione delle norme e l'eliminazione degli ostacoli tecnici ingiustificati agli scambi di prodotti agricoli.

L'intensificazione della **cooperazione e della concertazione a livello economico** tra l'UE e i PTM riguarda in modo prioritario alcuni settori importanti:

- gli investimenti e il risparmio privato: i paesi terzi mediterranei dovranno eliminare gli ostacoli agli investimenti esteri diretti e incentivare il risparmio interno al fine di promuovere lo sviluppo economico. Secondo la dichiarazione di Barcellona, l'introduzione di un ambiente favorevole agli investimenti avrà come conseguenza il trasferimento di tecnologie e l'aumento della produzione e delle esportazioni. Il programma di lavoro prevede una riflessione volta ad individuare gli ostacoli agli investimenti così come gli strumenti necessari per favorire tali investimenti, compreso nel settore bancario.
- la cooperazione regionale come fattore chiave per favorire la creazione di una zona di libero scambio;
- la cooperazione industriale e il sostegno alle piccole e medie imprese (PMI);
- il rafforzamento della cooperazione ambientale;
- la promozione del ruolo della donna nello sviluppo;
- l'introduzione di strumenti comuni in materia di conservazione e di gestione razionale delle risorse ittiche;

- l'intensificazione del dialogo e della cooperazione nel settore dell'energia;
- lo sviluppo della cooperazione relativa alla gestione delle risorse idriche;
- l'ammodernamento e la ristrutturazione dell'agricoltura.

Le parti convengono inoltre di elaborare un programma di priorità riguardo ad altri settori, come le infrastrutture di trasporto, lo sviluppo delle tecnologie dell'informazione e l'ammodernamento delle telecomunicazioni. Si impegnano inoltre a rispettare i principi del diritto marittimo internazionale, ad incoraggiare la cooperazione tra collettività locali e a favore della pianificazione territoriale, nonché a promuovere la cooperazione nel settore statistico e riconoscono inoltre che la scienza e la tecnologia hanno un considerevole influsso sullo sviluppo socioeconomico.

La realizzazione di una zona di libero scambio e il successo globale del partenariato euromediterraneo poggiano su un **rafforzamento della cooperazione finanziaria** e su un potenziamento sostanziale dell'assistenza finanziaria fornita dall'UE. Il Consiglio europeo di Cannes ha convenuto di prevedere per tale assistenza finanziaria stanziamenti per un importo pari a 4.685 miliardi di euro per il periodo 1995-1999 sotto forma di fondi del bilancio comunitario. A ciò si aggiungono l'intervento della Banca europea per gli investimenti (BEI), sotto forma di prestiti di importo simile, e gli aiuti bilaterali degli Stati membri.

Il partenariato sociale, culturale e umano

Ai sensi della dichiarazione di Barcellona, le parti hanno convenuto di instaurare un partenariato in ambito sociale, culturale ed umano finalizzato al ravvicinamento e alla comprensione tra popoli e ad una migliore percezione reciproca. Il partenariato si fonda da un lato, sul delicato compromesso tra l'esistenza, il riconoscimento e il rispetto reciproco di tradizioni, di culture e di civiltà diverse su entrambe le sponde del Mediterraneo e dall'altro, sulla valorizzazione delle radici comuni.

In tale ottica, la dichiarazione di Barcellona e il suo programma di lavoro pongono l'accento su:

- l'importanza del dialogo interculturale e interreligioso;
- l'importanza del ruolo dei mezzi di comunicazione di massa ai fini della conoscenza e della comprensione reciproca tra culture;
- lo sviluppo delle risorse umane nel settore della cultura: scambi culturali, conoscenza di altre lingue, attuazione di programmi educativi e culturali rispettosi delle identità culturali;
- l'importanza del settore sanitario e dello sviluppo sociale e il rispetto dei diritti sociali fondamentali;
- la necessità di coinvolgere la società civile nel partenariato euromediterraneo e il rafforzamento degli strumenti della cooperazione decentrata per favorire gli scambi tra i diversi settori dello sviluppo;
- la cooperazione nel settore dell'immigrazione clandestina e della lotta al terrorismo, al traffico di droga, alla criminalità internazionale e alla corruzione;

Seguito della conferenza

Al fine di garantire un controllo della realizzazione degli obiettivi del partenariato, la dichiarazione prevede riunioni periodiche dei ministri degli Esteri dei partner mediterranei e dell'UE. Le riunioni sono preparate da un "Comitato euromediterraneo per il processo di Barcellona" che si riunisce periodicamente a livello di alti funzionari. Il comitato è incaricato inoltre di fare il punto della situazione, dare una valutazione del seguito del processo di Barcellona ed aggiornare il programma di lavoro.

Le diverse azioni decise nel quadro del partenariato saranno oggetto di verifica attraverso riunioni tematiche ad hoc di ministri, alti funzionari e esperti, scambi di esperienze e di informazioni, contatti tra i partecipanti della società civile o con qualsiasi altro mezzo appropriato.

Dopo l'ultimo allargamento, il 1° maggio 2004, due nuovi partner mediterranei (Cipro e Malta) hanno aderito all'Unione europea. Il partenariato euromediterraneo riunisce pertanto 35 membri, 25 Stati membri dell'UE e 10 partner mediterranei (Algeria, Egitto, Israele, Giordania, Libano, Marocco, Autorità palestinese, Siria, Tunisia e Turchia).

ATTI CONNESSI

Il programma MEDA

Il programma MEDA, avviato nel 1995, è il principale strumento finanziario per l'attuazione del partenariato euromediterraneo e delle sue attività. Il sostegno fornito consente ai paesi interessati di conseguire tre obiettivi: rafforzare la stabilità politica e la democrazia in uno spazio comune di pace e di sicurezza, creare una zona di prosperità economica condivisa e sostenere la creazione di una zona di libero scambio tra l'UE e i partner mediterranei entro il 2010; istituire legami più stretti fra i popoli di questi paesi tramite partenariati culturali, sociali ed umani.

Nel periodo 1995-2001, MEDA ha rappresentato 5.071 miliardi di euro dei 6,4 miliardi di risorse di bilancio assegnati alla cooperazione finanziaria tra l'UE e i suoi partner. Queste sovvenzioni del bilancio comunitario vanno di pari passo con prestiti consistenti concessi dalla BEI.

Nel periodo in questione, l'86% delle risorse assegnate a MEDA sono state assegnate in modo bilaterale ai partner ammissibili del finanziamento bilaterale: Algeria, Egitto, Giordania, Libano, Marocco, Siria, Tunisia, Turchia e Autorità palestinese, mentre il 12% è stato stanziato per attività regionali (delle quali possono beneficiare i 12 partner mediterranei e i 15 Stati membri dell'UE). Il restante 2% è andato agli uffici assistenza tecnica.

Integrando le iniziative nazionali con un programma MEDA a livello regionale, si potrà assicurare la realizzazione degli obiettivi del partenariato euro-mediterraneo. L'attuazione delle attività nell'ambito di un programma regionale contribuisce, infatti, ad ottenere notevoli benefici in termini di efficacia o di impatto rispetto ad una molteplicità di programmi nazionali. Inoltre, alcuni dei problemi individuati presentano una dimensione transnazionale e, per essere risolti correttamente, richiedono una cooperazione regionale (o subregionale), in particolare nella prospettiva di un'integrazione Sud-Sud.

Dal 2002, le attività di cooperazione con la Turchia sono finanziate con una dotazione finanziaria a parte e non più tramite MEDA. Le attività sono pianificate ed eseguite dalla DG Allargamento.

MEDA si trova attualmente nella seconda fase di programmazione (2000-2006) con una dotazione di 5.350 miliardi di euro.

Conferenze euromediterranee

Dalla conferenza di Barcellona del 1995, si sono tenute altre sette conferenze euro-mediterranee dei ministri degli Esteri: a Malta nell'aprile 1997, a Stoccarda nell'aprile 1999, a Marsiglia nel novembre 2000, a Bruxelles il 5 e 6 novembre 2001, a Valencia, il 22 e 23 aprile 2002, a Napoli, il 2 e 3 dicembre 2003 e a Lussemburgo il 30 e 31 maggio 2005. Inoltre, si sono tenute riunioni

informali di ministri degli Esteri a Palermo nel giugno 1998 e a Lisbona nel maggio 2000 (cosiddetti "think tank").

Nel corso della conferenza di Stoccarda, la Libia è stata accolta per la prima volta quale invitato speciale della presidenza e, successivamente, ha assistito alle conferenze di Marsiglia, Bruxelles e Valencia. La Libia ha attualmente uno statuto di osservatore.

La quinta conferenza euromediterranea dei ministri degli Esteri, svoltasi a Valencia il 22 e 23 aprile 2002, è stata considerata estremamente fruttuosa e ha impresso un nuovo slancio al processo di Barcellona.

I partecipanti alla conferenza di Valencia hanno adottato all'unanimità un piano d'azione da attuare quanto prima, il quale prevede diverse iniziative a breve e medio termine destinate a rafforzare i tre assi del processo di Barcellona:

- Riguardo agli **aspetti politici e di sicurezza** del piano d'azione, la conferenza ha adottato orientamenti in materia di dialogo politico e di cooperazione nel settore della lotta al terrorismo;
- Nell'ambito del **partenariato economico e finanziario**, la conferenza ha preso nota del fatto che quattro paesi coinvolti nel processo di Agadir erano in procinto di firmare un accordo di libero scambio che sarebbe entrato in vigore all'inizio del 2003. Anche il nuovo dispositivo di investimenti per la regione, attuato dalla BEI, ha suscitato un vivo interesse. Il piano d'azione esorta la Commissione europea a portare avanti i suoi lavori sulle questioni commerciali decise nella riunione ministeriale di Toledo, così come quelli nel settore dei trasporti, dell'energia, delle telecomunicazioni, e dell'armonizzazione del mercato interno. Il piano sottolinea inoltre la necessità di istituire un quadro strategico di sviluppo sostenibile per il partenariato.
- Riguardo al **partenariato sociale, culturale ed umano**, la conferenza ha suffragato il documento quadro relativo alla cooperazione nel settore della giustizia, della lotta alla droga, al crimine organizzato e al terrorismo e alla cooperazione nel trattamento delle questioni relative all'integrazione sociale dei migranti, alle migrazioni e alla circolazione delle persone. I ministri hanno espresso il loro accordo di principio nei confronti della creazione di una fondazione euro-mediterranea incaricata di promuovere il dialogo tra le culture e le civiltà. Hanno inoltre approvato un programma d'azione nello stesso settore, orientato verso la gioventù, l'istruzione e i mezzi di comunicazione.

La settima conferenza euromediterranea dei ministri degli Affari esteri, riunitisi a Lussemburgo il 30 e 31 maggio 2005 ("Barcellona VII"), ha permesso di valutare i risultati conseguiti e di discutere sugli orientamenti generali per il futuro del partenariato euromediterraneo. La riunione ha tra l'altro predisposto la riunione straordinaria ad alto livello che si terrà a Barcellona dal 27 al 29 novembre 2005 per celebrare il 10° anniversario del partenariato e definire una serie di azioni per il futuro. Questi due eventi costituiscono i punti culminanti dell'"Anno del Mediterraneo" 2005.

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Mariann Fischer Boel

Member of the European Commission responsible for Agriculture and Rural Development

From quantity to quality: a CAP for the 21st century

Check Against Delivery
Seul le texte prononcé fait foi
Es gilt das gesprochene Wort

Breakfast meeting at European Policy Centre

Brussels, 27 October 2005

Ladies and gentlemen,

I'm very grateful to the European Policy Centre for inviting me to speak to you today.

I would have been here a week earlier but for very pressing commitments in Geneva – and I'm not talking about afternoons of pleasant shopping, as you know.

In fact, the discussions taking place under the Doha Development Agenda give me the best starting-point that I could wish for with regard to my presentation this morning.

Expressed simply: the international pressure on the EU agricultural system is enormous.

Let me make my meaning clear. I am not giving a coded warning that we are about to surrender our position in the Doha Round and cave in to all the demands being fired at us. There will be no sell-out of EU farming: we know our "red lines" and we will stand firm on them. There must be a balanced deal within the agricultural section of the talks, and balance between that section and others.

What I am saying is that the Doha Round talks are simply focusing our attention on powerful currents which have been moving through global trade for several years, in agriculture as in other sectors.

These currents have seen the emergence of strong new players on the world scene. Players that particularly in bulk production set entirely new standards for productivity.

Competition in bulk trade is very fierce indeed, whether we are talking about poultry from Brazil or computers from China. This was true before the Doha Round and it will be true afterwards, whatever happens in Hong Kong this December.

What lesson do we draw? That competing on product quality is not an optional extra: it has to be essential to our strategy for the future. The "choice" between an overall emphasis on quantity or on quality is no choice at all in reality.

The good news is that we in the EU have what it takes to make a quality strategy work.

Perhaps this becomes clearer if we consider what people typically associate with European food and drink. They think of delicious things that almost everyone enjoys: perhaps the Irish steak which they enjoyed for dinner yesterday, the French cheese that followed it or the Spanish wine that completed the meal.

European products have a glowing reputation around the world. That reputation is built on our history, our culture, our expertise. These are all things which we can harness to make a quality-based strategy work for us in the future.

Changes to the core of the CAP

To take a firm hold on this agenda, we have rethought the very foundations of the CAP.

If you talk to many of our citizens about the CAP, they hardly link it with the products which I mentioned a moment ago. They think of bulk commodities sitting around for months in public warehouses – apparently unwanted. They think the CAP is about producing as much as possible, then disposing of the surplus by any means possible.

There is a historical root to this image. The CAP as conceived in the 1950s and 1960s did indeed lay a heavy emphasis on boosting production. That was the challenge back then. We wanted food security, as well as income security for farmers, and to get these we were prepared to intervene heavily in the market with large sums of public money.

Although many of our traditional objectives are still valid, we are now moving on from the methods of the past. In 2003 we agreed a new framework for the CAP which should help unleash the creative flair of farmers and the agrifood industry.

At the heart of the 2003 reforms is a new type of support payment to farmers, which is no longer linked to current production. We call it the “Single Farm Payment”.

In order to receive this money, farmers do not have to farm a given product. Instead, they must respect a number of demanding requirements related to environmentally friendly land management, and public and animal health.

This brings new freedom. In the past, farmers certainly had to think about the market, but they spent nearly as much time working out which subsidy combination would pay the most. Now they can stop worrying about their subsidy cheques and get on with listening closely to potential customers and coming up with new products.

The changes also have heavy implications for food safety, which many people associate with food quality. I shan't say much about food safety because it's the responsibility of my colleague, Markos Kyprianou. But I should underline the link with the new basis for paying subsidy to farmers. Farmers have to take account of food safety to get their payments. A strong incentive!

The many faces of quality, and their place in policy

The new framework of the CAP thus puts quality at the centre. And within that framework, there are also a number of individual instruments to support a quality-based strategy, many of which have developed over time.

Why several different instruments? Because the term “quality” covers a wide range of meanings. Among these I might include the following:

- what food and drink do for the senses – mainly in terms of taste;
- nutritional value and other health-giving attributes (beyond being basically safe);
- production method;
- origin; and
- relationship to the physical environment.

Frequently, a number of attributes come together to form a “story” for a given product – something that consumers often find very attractive.

So what policy instruments do we have available?

First, rural development schemes support both high-quality production and appropriate certification.

You may know that rural development has been quickly moving up our agenda. Once, “agricultural” policy was our only tool for achieving general rural goals. Then we started adding new tools - to meet rural objectives not directly related to agriculture. Over time, rural policy became the “second pillar” of the CAP. And now, this pillar is supporting more and more weight in the CAP's structure – partly because we agreed in 2003 to start transferring money to it from farmers' direct payments through “modulation”.

As rural policy has grown and strengthened, so has its relevance to food quality. For many years it has contained relevant elements, but in 2003 we added a specific chapter on food quality to our Rural Development Regulation. Under this chapter, there are financial incentives for farmers to get involved in EU or national schemes which improve product quality and production processes or which certify product quality for consumers.

This sort of support will still be on offer under a new Rural Development Regulation which EU farm ministers agreed a few weeks ago for the period 2007 to 2013. There will also be money to help the food chain co-operate in developing new products, processes and technologies.

And it almost goes without saying that our rural policy offers a range of ways of making farming more environmentally friendly – thus producing goods with the sound ecological credentials that many consumers value.

In the future, the role of rural policy can only grow. It is an excellent weapon with which to target quality rather than quantity, within the constraints set through the WTO.

When we make our planned review of the CAP in 2008, we may well look at ways of giving rural development a further boost. One idea that has been raised so far is to increase modulation – in other words, to channel more extra money into the rural budget from Single Farm Payments - and I am certainly open to this.

Closely linked to rural policy are systems of organic farming.

This sector has generally been making strong progress, posting annual growth of about 30% since 1998. But I believe we can give it an even more solid foundation than it has at present. We have adopted an action plan on organic farming that sets out 21 concrete actions to help fulfil the potential of this sector. These range from tackling the problems resulting from different national standards to improving the performance of inspection bodies.

But make no mistake. At the end of the day bolstering organic farming will have to be demand driven.

If I talk about labelling today, then of course I have to talk about geographical indications, or GIs. You may well know what these are: names of food and drink products which refer to a place, and thereby to some specific quality which is deemed to be worth a premium. “Parma ham” and “Rioja” are good examples.

The EU has a system for safeguarding GIs, which works fairly well within our borders. But in the wider world, GIs are at the centre of a fierce battle being fought in the arena of the Doha Round.

In a nutshell, we believe that GIs should be protected, whereas some of our trading partners do not. We believe that the inclusion of a place in the name of a food or drink product should mean something – and mean something clear. We believe that Champagne should come from the Champagne region. We believe that consumers want and deserve a transparent link between the name of a product and the reality of that product.

Some say that bringing others round to our way of thinking on this in the Doha Round is a lost battle. I say the prize is still worth fighting for, and I will continue to do just that.

In the meantime, some encouraging signs have appeared at industry level. Earlier this year, representatives of several wine producer groups in the EU, the US and Australia declared their support for protecting wine GIs. They said such names must not lose their “integrity” and their “relevance to consumers”. So it’s not only in the EU that the language of GIs makes sense.

GIs are not the only labels in use in the EU which try to tell consumers something about production location, methods and so forth: hundreds of schemes have been introduced over the last few years by local and regional authorities, retailers and the agrifood industry. France's "label rouge" is just one example.

The time is ripe to take a closer look at these. At the request of the European Parliament, the Commission has launched the Food Quality Schemes Project. Under this banner, we've already done some stock-taking in a number of member states, and we're going to follow that up with in-depth economic analysis.

We want to find out how effective the schemes are, and who benefits – especially, whether there's any gain for farmers. We plan to present and discuss our results at a conference next year.

New outlets for bulk production

Perhaps paradoxically, I would like to end my presentation with a few words on bulk production – because I would like to avoid giving the impression that the EU's involvement in bulk markets is coming to the end of the road.

Of course this is not true. The world will always need bulk products, and some of these will continue to come from Europe.

But even in this context, perhaps we can apply some of the principles of a quality-based strategy if we use one of the broadest possible definitions of quality: that quality is "whatever sells".

In other words, where new markets may be developing for bulk products, we need to seize our chance quickly, and produce exactly what these markets require.

I believe that bioenergy may offer one such emerging market.

Many things argue in favour of this. On the demand side, oil prices are telling us that our traditional energy resources are coming under strain. On the supply side, we can grow the necessary raw materials. And in environmental terms, we know that we have to do much, much more to scale back our emissions of greenhouse gases.

Certain targets already agreed for the EU set a stern challenge. By 2010, we want 21% of our electricity production and 12% of the total energy we consume to come from renewable sources. Also by 2010, 5.75% of our transport fuel should be biofuel.

Several teams within the European Commission are looking in detail at many aspects of the biomass sector and will report soon. I myself am focusing on biofuels in co-operation with the Commissioner for Energy, Mr. Piebalgs. If it becomes clear that we should provide extra money to help grow this market, I am open to the idea.

Conclusion

As you can see, then, quality is a strong thread running through many different parts of the CAP. But its breadth as a policy theme means that it commands our attention more, not less.

We in the Commission are working hard to give consumers accurate and useful information, and to help farmers and the agrifood industry compete on quality, within Europe and throughout the world.

This is a battle that they have to win. We can't turn the tide of globalisation. But we can swim with the momentum of the tide. This means aiming for top returns on top-quality items – making sure that consumers recognise and want our cheese in the US, our champagne in China – and making sure that our bulk products fit whatever markets may present themselves.

I trust that if we go ahead with our reforms started in 2003/2004 we will have a CAP fit for this purpose – a CAP for the twenty-first century.

Thank you for your attention.

**Documenti dell'Assemblea
parlamentare del Consiglio d'Europa**

Recommendation 1737 (2006)¹. New trends and challenges for Euro-Mediterranean migration policies

1. The traditional role of the Mediterranean as an economic and cultural crossroads has assumed even greater significance since the 1990s and its geopolitical situation has taken on even more importance. At the same time, the Mediterranean has seen a sharp rise in migration movements, both from the Balkans to the western parts of the continent and from North Africa to Europe.

2. Unfortunately, this increase in migration flows has also proved lucrative to criminal networks of traffickers and smugglers who exploit the hardship of potential migrants and cause human tragedies, which can lead to the death of migrants or modern slavery.

3. Such tragedies should not, however, make us lose sight of the fact that migration can also be seen in a positive light, as it also represents an opportunity. Typically, among the most recent migrants, we find women and young people who have taken this step voluntarily. They are no longer relocating under family reunification arrangements.

4. The immense economic gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean nonetheless continues to prompt illegal immigration which Council of Europe member states are attempting to halt in diverse ways: some opt for restrictive policies involving draconian and sometimes non-judicial deportation procedures which can give rise to human rights violations, others opt for regularisation policies.

5. For its part, the European Union is attempting to harmonise asylum procedures, in particular accelerated procedures, or to externalise or decentralise and even relocate such procedures to the countries on the southern shore, as has recently been seen with Libya. However, the European Parliament has warned that it would find it unacceptable for foreigners to be grouped together in external transit centres designed to process asylum applications.

6. It is undeniable that the demographic situation will mean that by the middle of the century, the number of people living on both shores will be roughly the same. Given the falling birth rate and ageing of the population in Europe, this should prompt a review of migration policies.

7. The Parliamentary Assembly welcomes the final declarations of the 1st and 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forums on Migration organised in Cyprus on 20 and 21 October 2003 and Rome on 23 and 24 May 2005, respectively, by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population. It believes that the Council of Europe and, in particular, its European Committee on Migration (CDMG) and the European Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity (North-South Centre) are invaluable forums for intergovernmental deliberation and discussion on new Euro-Mediterranean migration policies.

8. In the light of the foregoing, the Assembly calls on the governments of Council of Europe member states, in close co-operation with non-member Mediterranean countries, to:

8.1. frame their migration policies so that migration is viewed as a natural phenomenon and not a problem. This will help demystify migration and help ensure that it is no longer seen uniquely from a security point of view;

8.2. rationalise and manage more efficiently the available administrative resources for the reception of foreigners and for processing asylum and naturalisation applications;

8.3. comply to the letter with international human rights protection conventions in all operations to prevent or deal with illegal migration and, in particular:

8.3.1. guarantee the right to leave one's country;

- 8.3.2. guarantee unimpeded access to asylum procedures for people in need of international protection;
- 8.3.3. ensure that return measures are applied in keeping with human rights standards and with due regard for safety and dignity;
- 8.3.4. avoid returning irregular migrants to countries where they would be at risk of persecution or human rights violations;
- 8.3.5. avoid secondary migration movements by sending back migrants to non-European countries, whose nationality they do not have and by which they have merely transited;
- 8.3.6. examine and take account in all cases of the root causes of these migration movements.

9. The Assembly also calls on the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament to take the above considerations into account.

10. The Assembly calls on the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean which are not member states of the Council of Europe and which took part in the 1st and 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forums on Migration to consult and co-ordinate on migration at regional level and co-operate with Council of Europe member states in this field, by collaborating, for example, with its CDMG and continuing to work together with the North-South Centre.

11. The Assembly strongly urges the countries participating in the Barcelona Process to actively pursue their partnership practices and the co-development strategy in the Euro-Mediterranean area, in consultation with the countries from which migration flows originate, including through parliamentary dialogue and co-operation, so as to draw up and adopt as swiftly as possible a unified Euro-Mediterranean regulatory framework.

12. The Assembly also recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

12.1. encourage Council of Europe member states and the countries that attended the 1st and 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forums to sign and ratify the United Nations International Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and other international conventions on the protection of migrant women and young migrants and encourage Council of Europe member states to sign and ratify the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (ETS No. 93);

12.2. ask the CDMG to involve non-member Mediterranean countries in its activities;

12.3. call on the North-South Centre to enlarge the number of its member states to include all other Mediterranean countries whether or not they are members of the Council of Europe;

12.4. further develop political and cultural co-operation with the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean;

12.5. urge member states and the countries that attended the 1st and 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forums to encourage student and teacher mobility and training exchanges, in particular by setting up a Euro-Mediterranean university;

12.6. encourage further discussion on the setting up of a Euro-Mediterranean migration observatory and on a large-scale information programme on the risks associated with illegal immigration, bearing in mind the valuable experience of the CDMG and the North-South Centre and taking advantage, if appropriate, of the North-South Centre's facilities for setting up such an observatory;

12.7. help give fresh impetus to the Barcelona Process, begun in 1995, by emphasising in its closer contacts with the European Union the contribution which the Council of Europe and the North-South Centre could make to that process;

12.8. focus serious attention on, and give greater visibility to, the issue of migrant women by means of special initiatives involving all Euro-Mediterranean countries.

¹ Text adopted by the Standing Committee acting on behalf of the Assembly on 17 March 2006 (see Doc. 10763, report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, rapporteur: Mr Danieli).

Resolution 1446 (2005)¹. Co-operation and sustainable development in the Adriatic Basin

1. The Parliamentary Assembly stresses the importance of peace, democracy and stability in South-East Europe. It further emphasises the important role of regional and local authorities in achieving those objectives through co-operation in areas of common interest and concern such as sustainable development. The Adriatic region will greatly benefit from strengthened co-operation and partnerships on key issues, particularly those related to the protection and sustainable management of the Adriatic Sea Basin, as have other European regions and seas.
2. The Adriatic Sea, a semi-enclosed arm of the Mediterranean Sea, connects its bordering states, all of which are members of the Council of Europe. The Adriatic regions of these countries have historical links and a common cultural heritage as well as a common responsibility for the sea they share. Together, these coastal regions and countries form a distinct European region, which needs to achieve sustainable development and stability.
3. The Adriatic Sea is a highly sensitive marine area facing serious environment and development challenges such as pollution, the shipping of dangerous goods and hazardous materials, over-fishing, eutrophication, coastal development and tourism. All these issues, and the future of the region as a whole, need to be tackled in a comprehensive manner through transborder and interregional co-operation mechanisms.
4. The Adriatic region benefits from a range of programmes and tools of diverse nature to strengthen regional co-operation. Some have been set up at the initiative of the regions and countries concerned (for example, Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, the Trilateral Commission for the Protection of the Adriatic, etc.), while others have been set up by the European Union (for example, CARDS, INTERREG) or the United Nations (for example, the Barcelona Convention and the Mediterranean Action Plan).
5. One of the Council of Europe's significant contributions to the promotion of regional co-operation in Europe is the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (ETS No. 106). The Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe have all adopted texts on transfrontier co-operation, linking transborder co-operation, democratic stability and sustainable development in Europe.
6. The coastal states bordering the Adriatic Sea rely heavily on this semi-enclosed sea that they share. Marine, maritime and coastal issues are consequently key concerns for the future development of the Adriatic region. Accordingly, Adriatic countries and regions have identified five priority areas for co-operation for the activities of the future Euroregion: environment, fishing, tourism and culture, agriculture and transport.
7. The Assembly fully supports the initiative of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, together with local and regional authorities of Adriatic countries, to strengthen interregional co-operation and establish an Adriatic Euroregion. It will follow with interest the adoption process of the statute of this Euroregion, which foresees in particular the participation of the Assembly in the planned "Adriatic Council". The Assembly fully shares the ultimate objective of achieving sustainable development in the Adriatic region and improved quality of life for its population.
8. The Assembly considers that the Adriatic Sea should be managed in an integrated manner through the application of the ecosystem approach. It is therefore of the view that strengthened transfrontier co-operation, political will, co-ordinated action, adequate funding and partnerships between governments,

parliaments, local and regional authorities, the private sector and civil society in the Adriatic Euroregion, will be needed to make the future Adriatic Euroregion a successful pilot model for other European semi-enclosed seas.

9. Consequently, the Parliamentary Assembly recommends that local and regional authorities, as well as national parliaments and governments of the Adriatic region:

i. fully engage in the creation of an Adriatic Euroregion;

ii. address the following issues as a matter of urgency (together with relevant regional and international organisations):

a. over-fishing, illegal fishing, and sustainable fisheries management, including the need to co-ordinate the activities of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation's General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean; the European Union's Regional Advisory Council for the Mediterranean; the United Nations Environment Programme's Mediterranean Action Plan and the Sustainable Development Strategy for the Mediterranean;

b. the safety and control of oil tankers, and the treatment of ballast waters;

c. the tourism infrastructure and urban planning infrastructures;

d. the management of waste and waste water;

e. the use of nitrates in farming and management of water for agricultural uses.

10. The Assembly recognises the important role that the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe plays in the creation of the Adriatic Euroregion and calls for its continued and active involvement and support during both the founding and operational phases of the Adriatic Euroregion.

11. Finally, the Assembly notes that only four Adriatic countries (Albania, Croatia, Italy and Slovenia) are parties to the 1980 European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities. It urges Greece and Serbia and Montenegro to sign and to ratify it, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to ratify it. As only Albania and Slovenia have ratified the two protocols to that convention, the Assembly urges the other Adriatic countries to consider doing so as soon as possible.

1. *Text adopted by the Standing Committee acting on behalf of the Assembly on 6 June 2005 (see Doc. 10563, report of the Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs, rapporteur: Mr Crema).*

Resolution 1331 (2003)¹. The challenges for Mediterranean agriculture

1. The Parliamentary Assembly notes that agriculture in the Mediterranean region has an economic and social role that goes well beyond its primary function as a supplier of food products. In some Mediterranean countries agriculture accounts for a high proportion of GNP and employment, and helps to reduce poverty, restrict emigration and protect the environment.
2. It also notes that in a rapidly evolving international context, involving changes to the European agricultural model, new Euro-Mediterranean relations, enlargement of the European Union and the liberalisation of world trade, Mediterranean agriculture faces a number of serious challenges, to which it has to find answers, but for which closer co-operation with European countries is essential.
3. In particular, the Assembly hopes that the European Union, which is the Mediterranean countries' main trading partner, will pay particularly close attention to agricultural trade with these countries, particularly given the possible consequences of its forthcoming enlargement to ten new member states (including Cyprus and Malta) and the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.
4. It also welcomes the proposal in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration to establish a Euro-Mediterranean partnership leading to the gradual introduction of a free-trade area by 2010. In that connection it supports the new association agreements linking the European Union and the Mediterranean countries, while regretting the continuing lack of significant progress with regard to agricultural trade.
5. The Assembly has also noted that while there is still a considerable trade imbalance in agri-foodstuffs between Europe and the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, the equivalent trade between the Mediterranean countries themselves suffers from a form of compartmentalisation that prevents the emergence of a genuine Euro-Mediterranean market for food products.
6. The Assembly has identified three main ways of fostering the Mediterranean region's agricultural development: diversifying production, raising quality and improving water supplies. Efforts should also be made to encourage sustainable and multifunctional agriculture, balanced rural development and co-operation between Mediterranean countries, in order to develop an intra-regional market and avoid damaging competition between the countries concerned.
7. It also considers that agronomic research can make a substantial contribution to solving the specific problems of Mediterranean agriculture, particularly in relation to climate, water and soil conditions. It therefore welcomes the activities of the International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (Icamas) and encourages it to develop its work on new technologies (irrigation, genetically modified organisms, etc.). It also supports the awareness-raising and co-ordination initiatives of the Council of Europe's Hydrotechnological Euro-Mediterranean Institute, aimed at improving the management of water resources in the Mediterranean region.
8. The Assembly considers that the Mediterranean countries should consult each other on and harmonise their agricultural policies regarding both production and commercialisation, to avoid competition which is damaging to their individual and collective interests and encourage complementarity between their products and their produce seasons, diversification and higher quality.

9. Consequently, the Assembly recommends:

i. that the Mediterranean countries, particularly those in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, promote sustainable agriculture that makes sparing use of natural resources, based on the criteria of multifunctionality developed by European countries, encourage rural development, protect their fishing and forestry sectors, and develop their agri-foodstuffs industries, particularly with regard to food processing, marketing, distribution and exports;

ii. that the Mediterranean countries and the European Union expedite the application of the association agreements between them and of the measures to establish a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area encompassing agricultural products by 2010, and that direct European investment in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries be developed;

iii. that the European Union take all necessary steps to ensure that Mediterranean products are not penalised by the review of the Common Agricultural Policy and the incorporation of the ten acceding member states and to reduce the agricultural trade imbalance between itself and the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean;

iv. that the presidency of the European Union convene a meeting of the Mediterranean agricultural ministers, with a view to co-ordinating and harmonising the agricultural policies of the countries concerned and to promoting the transfer of new agronomic technology to the southern and eastern Mediterranean;

v. that the European Parliament consider the organisation of a second joint Euro-Mediterranean conference on agriculture, following the one it held in Strasbourg on 14 and 15 June 2001. This could focus on the liberalisation of agricultural trade in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area planned for 2010;

vi. that the Icamas organise the 4th Mediterranean Forum on Agriculture, focusing on new agronomic techniques and technology transfers, in co-operation with the Mediterranean Committee of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (Ifap) and the Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs of the Assembly;

vii. that the Council of Europe's Hydrotechnological Euro-Mediterranean Institute develop co-operation between hydrological research centres, in particular with regard to the transfer of know-how and findings in the field of desalination and the reuse of water intended for agriculture.

1. *Assembly debate* on 23 June 2003 (17th Sitting) (see Doc. 9807, report of the Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs, rapporteur: Mr Fernández Aguilar).

Text adopted by the Assembly on 23 June 2003 (17th Sitting).

Resolution 1313 (2003)^[1]. Cultural co-operation between Europe and the south Mediterranean countries

1. Europe is made up of countries of different cultures and traditions. The unifying factor for the forty-four Council of Europe countries is their adherence to a set of values, namely democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as well as their determination to co-operate on a project for a joint future, while preserving their individual cultural specificities.

2. The Parliamentary Assembly is convinced that the values defended by the Council of Europe are universal, and believes that the best reaction to globalisation is to use this phenomenon as a means of co-operating with non-European countries that share certain of these values, beginning with those which are closest to Europe.

3. Relations between Europe and the south Mediterranean countries – which have all signed the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – can and must be improved. Culture, including education, heritage and the arts, science, youth, sport and the media, is particularly suited to such co-operation.

4. There are economic, political, social and also cultural tensions in most parts of the world. Some incomprehension and misunderstandings exist. The Assembly rejects the facile explanation of such tensions as a clash of civilisations. Although there are indeed major cultural differences between different peoples, these differences should lead to dialogue, not confrontation.

5. Considering the secularisation of political institutions in Europe to be an achievement, the Assembly nevertheless recognises the positive contribution made to European civilisation by the various cultural and religious traditions, including Judaism, Islam and in particular Christianity.

6. The Council of Europe would not claim to have any final or comprehensive solutions to all of these problems. However, the Assembly is convinced that improved cultural relations between Europe and the south Mediterranean countries would provide the beginning of a solution to wider problems.

7. In order to be successful, the endeavour to improve relations must be backed with a strong political will in both Europe and the south Mediterranean countries. Many changes are still required.

8. For its part, the Assembly might conclude co-operation agreements with parliaments in south Mediterranean countries as a first step towards granting Observer status.

9. The Assembly resolves in particular:

i. to develop contacts between European countries and the south Mediterranean countries in the fields of education, heritage and the arts, science, youth, sport and the media;

ii. to enhance cultural co-operation, particularly with parliamentarians from the south Mediterranean countries and with international organisations such as the cultural organisations of the Arab League (Alecso) and of the Islamic Conference (Iesco);

iii. to promote dialogue and cultural co-operation with other countries and regions which are close to Europe and share its history, in particular Lebanon.

10. The Assembly would like at the same time and in parallel to request the competent authorities in the member states of the Council of Europe and in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia to give priority to cultural co-operation between Europe and the south Mediterranean countries, and particularly:

in the field of education:

i. to co-operate in eliminating reciprocal stereotypes, prejudices and untruths from the different education systems by jointly revising school textbooks, particularly history books;

ii. to promote the learning of the Arabic language in Europe and European languages in the south Mediterranean countries, at all educational levels;

iii. to encourage the setting up of Arabic language and culture departments in European universities, and of departments for European languages and cultures in south Mediterranean universities;

iv. to establish the requisite mechanisms for student and teacher exchanges by developing and enlarging the Erasmus concept and facilitating visa arrangements;

v. to implement the requisite systems for recognising qualifications, from the secondary level onwards, with particular reference, for higher education, to the principles, goals and methods of the Bologna Process as well as the Council of Europe/Unesco Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region (Lisbon Convention, ETS No. 165);

in the field of culture:

vi. to encourage the translation and publication of the fundamental works of Arab culture in Europe and of European cultural works in the south Mediterranean countries, including contemporary writers and studies on topical issues;

vii. to establish and develop contacts and exchanges among artists, with joint exhibitions and music, drama and film festivals;

viii. to facilitate contacts and encounters in the field of folk culture (folklore, gastronomy and traditional costumes);

ix. to co-operate in the field of migration policy in order to ensure that immigrants to Europe from south Mediterranean countries become genuine intermediaries between the cultures of the home and host countries;

in the field of religion:

x. to guarantee freedom of conscience and expression, exclude fundamentalism, promote respect for religious differences by providing all religions with equivalent conditions for development;

xi. to encourage encounters between different religious leaders by promoting ecumenism and opening the way to genuine inter-faith dialogue;

xii. foster the organisation of debates between intellectuals and theologians on the compatibility of religious practice with human rights, including the impact on women, as set out in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights;

xiii. to ensure that education systems provide basic knowledge of the various world religions;

in the field of the media:

xiv. to encourage public television corporations in the North and South to co-operate in developing television programmes and in the long term to study the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean television channel;

xv. to develop, in the public media, informative programmes on political, economic, social and cultural realities in order to ensure objective information in the North on Arab-Muslim societies and in the South on European societies;

xvi. to encourage co-operation between European and south Mediterranean journalists in the field of professional ethics;

xvii. to energise joint work on the Internet by creating shared sites and portals and virtual areas (universities, press rooms, enterprises, cultural fora) providing for immediate and ongoing exchange, and supporting the Galileo (satellite navigation) and Eumedis programmes, and expanding the Eureka programme;

in other fields:

xviii. to encourage co-operation and encounters between women from Europe and south Mediterranean countries on questions related to freedom, human rights and gender equality;

xix. to set up contact and co-operation networks between young people in various sectors of activity, such as parliamentarians, students from different levels and specialities, members of religious groups, artists, athletes, etc.;

xx. to study the possibilities for joint organisation of amateur or professional sports events, for example by restructuring and giving fresh impetus to the Mediterranean Games;

xxi. to encourage the involvement of southern countries in scientific research programmes run by governments, universities, laboratories, industries and enterprises, particularly those conducive to technology transfer;

xxii. to promote a twinning policy between European and south Mediterranean local authorities, with a view to close co-operation, particularly in the cultural fields;

xxiii. to encourage North-South tourist co-operation, with emphasis on cultural tourism, connect up the tourist promotion systems on both sides and foster the creation of cultural routes, programmes and exchanges;

xxiv. to support such Barcelona Process initiatives as Euro Med Heritage, Euro Med Audiovisual and Culture 2000, as well as the development of the Civil Forum, and set up broader co-operation bodies in this field by associating all Council of Europe countries with the south Mediterranean countries.

[1]. *Assembly debate* on 28 January 2003 (3rd Sitting) (see Doc. 9626, report of the Committee on Culture, Science and Education, rapporteur: Mr de Puig, Spain).

Text adopted by the Assembly on 28 January 2003 (3rd Sitting).

Documenti IFAP

International Federation of Agricultural Producers

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IFAP: A Worldwide Farmers' Organisation

The International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) is a world farmers' organisation. Founded in 1946, it currently represents more than 500 million family farms with a membership of 100 national farmers organisations in 71 countries around the world. IFAP has General Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Vision and Mission

IFAP's vision is a world free from hunger, in which farmers and their families are able to live decently from their work. IFAP's mission is to develop farmers' capacities to influence decisions that affect them at both the domestic and international levels. Through its action, IFAP helps to secure the fullest cooperation between organisations of agricultural producers in meeting the optimum nutritional and consumptive requirements of the peoples of the world, and helps to improve the economic and social status of all who live by and on the land.

Objectives

- To Act as a platform or forum in which leaders of national farmers' organisations can meet to:
 - highlight mutual interests and take co-ordinated action to further such interests;
 - develop an understanding of world problems; and
 - exchange information, experiences and ideas.
- Keep members informed about international events of concern to them as farmer organisations.
- Act as a recognized spokesperson for the world's farmers, bringing concerns of agricultural producers to the attention of international meetings of governments and other bodies.
- Promote the creation and strengthening of independent, representative organisations of farmers throughout the world.

Structure

IFAP's main event is the World Farmers' Congress which occurs every two years. It brings together all member organisations and operates by the principle of one vote per country. At this Congress, the Federation's President and the 24 members of the Executive Committee are elected and policy priorities are established. IFAP's secretariat, situated in Paris, France is in charge of the management of the organisation and the actual implementation of IFAP's members' decisions. IFAP is composed of numerous committees and working groups whose presidents are also elected at the World Farmers' Congress.

Specialized Committees

- **Commodity Groups:** Grains and Oilseeds, Sugar, Tropical Commodities (cocoa, coffee and cotton), Dairy Products, Meats and Feeds.
- **Regional Committees:** Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, the Mediterranean.
- **Standing Committees:** Developing Countries, Agricultural Cooperatives, Women in Agriculture, Young Farmers.
- **Development Cooperation Committee:** DCC is the main instrument of IFAP's development activities.

IFAP in Action

The focus of IFAP's policy work is to improve the position of farmers in a rapidly changing world-wide environment, characterized by globalization, liberalization and changes in what is expected from the agricultural sector. IFAP's policy priorities are the following:

- Increasing recognition for farming as a profession, and recognition of farmers' contributions to the well-being of mankind.
- Supporting the family farm as the basis of a sustainable system of agriculture, for today and in the future.
- Promoting farmer-to-farmer cooperation for strengthening farmers' organisations to participate in self-help development.
- Pressing for farm policies to achieve food security, poverty eradication and the opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable income from farming.
- Promoting the best farming practices resulting from scientific and technological progress, in order to achieve high levels of food safety and food quality throughout the food chain, and conservation of the natural resource base.
- Maintaining and enhancing the vitality of rural communities.
- Strengthening the situation of the farmer faced with substantial industry concentration in the food chain.

Through its actions to promote mutual understanding and dialogue among farmers of different countries, IFAP plays an essential role in world agriculture.

Financing

IFAP is financed by contributions from its member organisations, which are granted on a voluntary basis. IFAP also receives development assistance to fund its developing countries activities.

Membership

Africa	The Americas	Asia and Oceania	Europe
Algeria	Argentina	Australia	Austria
Arab Republic of Egypt	Belize	Bangladesh	Belgium
Benin	Brazil	Cambodia	Cyprus
Burkina Faso	Canada	India	Denmark
Comores	Chile	Indonesia	Finland
Dem. Republic of Congo	Colombia	Japan	France
Côte d'Ivoire	Costa Rica	Jordan	Georgia
Ghana	El Salvador	Nepal	Germany
Guinea	Haiti	New Zealand	Iceland
Kenya	Mexico	Pakistan	Ireland
Madagascar	Nicaragua	Palestine	Italy
Mali	Paraguay	Philippines	Luxembourg
Mauritius	Peru	Rep. of Korea	Malta
Nigeria	Trinidad and Tobago	Sri Lanka	Moldavia
Rwanda	United States of America	Syria	Netherlands
Senegal	Uruguay	Taiwan	Norway
South Africa		Thailand	Poland
Tanzania		Turkey	Portugal
Tunisia		Vietnam	Spain
Uganda			Sweden
Zambie			Switzerland
Zimbabwe			United Kingdom



International Federation of Agricultural Producers

IFAP was established in 1946 to secure the fullest cooperation between organisations of agricultural producers in meeting the food needs of the peoples of the world and to improve the economic and social status of all who live by and on the land.

IFAP Mediterranean Farmers

Defining a common Mediterranean identity. 30 november 2005. Press release.

Antalya, 30 November 2005 – Governments were not successful in re-launching a meaningful partnership in agriculture in the Mediterranean when they met in Barcelona, but farmers are taking up the challenge. In a study launched by IFAP on the occasion of the 9th Session of the Mediterranean Farmers' Committee of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP), held in Antalya on 28-29 November, farmers said that they are unwilling to accept the EMAA (the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement) which favours agriculture in one part of the Mediterranean over another. This study called "Sustainable agricultures in the Mediterranean basin: constraints and perspectives" will contribute to better identify farmers' needs and to draw strategies to face the free trade euro-med agreement in 2010.

The study shows that most farmers lack information about the Euro-Med Partnership Agreement. The study is very clear about the problems that farmers face on national food markets and with international competition. Markets are not well structured and farmers do not have enough power of negotiation. This leads to a drop in farmers' incomes. "I believe that this issue of the Mediterranean is one of the most challenging. It is a region of huge potential, but governments have to facilitate its development and make sure that markets work for farmers" said the IFAP President Jack Wilkinson. Conducted over the last two years by the IFAP in collaboration with CIHEAM, this study is a unique portrait of agricultures in the Mediterranean and will serve as base to build stronger awareness and better partnership.

The meeting was also the occasion for farm leaders to reaffirm the need for a common identity with the establishment of a Mediterranean label. Under the theme "The Barcelona Process: ten years later", participants also discussed strategies for strengthening the capacities of farmers' organisations from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean; the Euro-Mediterranean policy and partnership; European Union institutions; trade negotiations; collaboration between researchers and farmers; as well as enhancing the quality identification of the Mediterranean products. The event was hosted by the Union of Turkish Chambers of Agriculture (TZOB). The Committee elected a new Chairman, Guy Giva (France), and four vice-chairs: Cherif Ould Hocine (Algeria), Alican Kabakci (Cyprus), Francesco Serra Carraciolo (Italy), and Mabrouk Bahri (Tunisia).

IFAP Mediterranean Committee: The Committee advocates the strengthening of regional integration between the countries of Southern Europe, North Africa and Middle East. It particularly supports an integrated approach to Mediterranean agriculture aimed at sustainable development and the establishment of a coherent policy. Member Countries: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Palestine, Portugal, Tunisia and Turkey.



International Federation of Agricultural Producers

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Towards a sustainable Mediterranean agricultural policy: Strengthening complementarities for overall development of the Mediterranean Basin. Elaborated by Nora Ourabah, Coordinator of the IFAP Mediterranean Committee.

However varied Mediterranean agricultural systems may be, in principle they are characterised not only by strong geographic and climatic similarities but above all, by a common historical and cultural heritage. All these common points have given rise to a reinforced Mediterranean identity. Therefore the emergence of a sense of belonging to the same regional aggregate transcends the few differences that make up the specificity and strength of each of the nations forming this aggregate.

“Mediterranean” food products are increasingly recognised as being beneficial to health. Farmers in both the north and the south of the Mediterranean Basin have accordingly decided to group together within IFAP to develop the benefits of their products. Based on the observation that there is a lack of consideration for the needs of the Mediterranean region in international development policies, the CIA , together with other member organisations on both sides of the Basin, have pleaded the urgency of creating a Mediterranean structure within IFAP. It is interesting to note that IFAP was a precursor in its decision to create such a structure. This decision was made in 1990 , even before the Ministers of the European Union and the partner third countries in the south of the Basin had signed the Barcelona Agreement which resulted in the famous Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

The main mission of the IFAP Mediterranean Committee is to get out of this competitive situation confronting farmers on both sides of the Mediterranean. It is of the utmost importance to solve this problem of competition, which is the main source of concern to farmers in the run-up to the creation of a free trade area in 2010. How does it translate into practice and what are its origins?

These tensions between the two sides of the Mediterranean are the result of similar products (vegetables, fruit, oil, wine) which come to maturity and are traded at the same times and on the same markets. This conflict situation results mainly from disparities in development levels between the North and the South of the basin (the five Mediterranean countries of Southern Europe benefit from better technical knowhow and together produce 80% of the GDP of all the Mediterranean countries), and from various environmental factors and conflictual demands on water. The countries in the south of the basin are therefore often accused of flooding southern Europe’s markets with similar low-cost products, this being detrimental to local products and the incomes of the local European farmers.

All these disparities are made worse by the fact that despite association agreements signed between most of the Mediterranean third countries and the European Union, trade remains subjected to tariff concessions and quota systems. These take little or no account of the role of agriculture in the Mediterranean region, or the importance of introducing an overall agricultural and rural development policy. Yet this lack of consideration of the agricultural aspect of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is liable to undermine the implementation of the future largest free trade area in the world.

Faced with this alarming situation, the IFAP Mediterranean Committee is firmly convinced that beyond these conflicts which are impeding North-South Mediterranean trading, elements must be defined that will develop the complementarities of these agricultural systems. It is only on this condition that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will be beneficial to both sides and that sustainable development of agriculture will come about in the Mediterranean area.

To develop the strengths of the region, the Committee has considered it urgent to resolve three closely interrelated priorities, consisting mainly in:

- seeking out forms of diversification for Mediterranean crops
- improving the quality and typicality of local products
- and undertaking to make water available.

The idea of developing complementarities in production between both sides of the basin will first of all require an inventory of these complementarities, based on a study of reliable, up-to-date data. The aim of this analysis will be to find ways to achieve complementarity in agricultural trade on both sides of the basin. To do this, it is essential to precisely identify the farmers' situation by providing data on the types of products imported and exported, the sowing calendar and the European export periods. It is also important to identify factors that are sources of competition such as: prices, production costs, quality and regional typicality, grants, conservation, transport, matching production to demand, searching for specific outlets according to demand, orientation towards appropriate markets, particularly in the context of European Union enlargement.

This new approach to balanced sustainable development on both sides of the Mediterranean cannot be conceived without the help of European partner organisations, research institutions, alongside Mediterranean farmers' organisations. Therefore for the first time in the history of the European Union, farmers and parliamentarians met together within the European parliament itself to discuss the agricultural issues at stake in the Mediterranean area. The first Euro-Mediterranean conference on agriculture revolutionised the customs of the EU bodies since it brought together parliamentarians and farmers in the same room. The main aim of this activity was thus to recognise the specificity of Mediterranean agriculture by raising it to the rank of priority sector in European policy. Who other than the farmers themselves are the best placed to put forward and analyse the everyday problems of Mediterranean agriculture? This kind of dialogue between IFAP farmers and the EU bodies appears to be strengthening.

It is essential that to promote Mediterranean agriculture, this awareness-raising of the EU bodies, or the "marketing of the profession" to them, should become reality through the development of concrete projects, particularly under the MEDA programme. Yet this programme does not give much importance to the agricultural sector. The situation must change.

All the proposals suggested by this Committee, consisting in reducing economic disparities, solving water problems, diversifying production for the region's agricultural development, cannot emerge without maintaining regional and inter-regional conditions of peace and stability.

The IFAP Mediterranean Committee has always pleaded for peace and stability in the Mediterranean region and advocated strengthening regional integration between the southern European countries, North Africa and the Middle East.

Moreover, the Committee has never hesitated to meet in conflictual areas. Some historic meetings have thus marked the attempt to build peace and develop dialogue between farmers in the region.

A highly symbolical meeting that brought together Palestinians and Israelis took place in the Israeli parliament itself (CNETSET) in Jerusalem (1994), thus gathering Israeli and Palestinian farmers around the same table, together with other agricultural representatives of Arab countries.

Another meeting in Nicosia, Cyprus (1998), was of utmost importance for peacekeeping and the recommencement of dialogue between the Cypriot, Turkish and Greek Cypriot farmers' organisations.

Consultation between farmers on both sides of the Mediterranean, participatory policy, awareness-raising of EU and international bodies to the issues at stake in Mediterranean agriculture, collaboration between farmers and researchers – such are the steps to be followed so that Mediterranean farmers can make a dignified living from their products in the future enlarged regional area.

Documenti CIHEAM

Scheda informativa

Historique



Réunion des
ministres en 1999,
Rome

Le Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes, CIHEAM, a été créé, à l'initiative conjointe de l'OCDE et du Conseil de l'Europe, le 21 mai 1962 par un accord entre les gouvernements de sept pays du sud de l'Europe : **Espagne, France, Grèce, Italie, Portugal, Turquie, Yougoslavie.**

L'accord de création stipule que le CIHEAM a pour mission de « *donner un enseignement complémentaire tant économique que technique et de développer l'esprit de coopération internationale parmi les cadres de l'agriculture des pays méditerranéens.* »

À partir de 1983, le CIHEAM confirme sa vocation et s'ouvre progressivement aux pays de la rive sud et est du Bassin méditerranéen. Cette ouverture s'est concrétisée avec l'adhésion de la **Tunisie (1985)**, de l'**Égypte** et de l'**Algérie (1986)**, de **Malte (1989)**, du **Maroc (1991)**, de l'**Albanie (1992)** et du **Liban (1994)**.

Le mot de la présidence

Treize pays membres, en route vers l'élargissement

Le CIHEAM s'est élargi ; il compte aujourd'hui treize pays membres et plusieurs autres États demandent à adhérer au Centre. Le paysage économique et politique de la Méditerranée, qui verra d'ici quelques années sa population doubler par rapport à 1962, s'est profondément modifié. Les sciences, de leur côté, ont accompli des progrès accélérés et pourtant l'intuition qui a présidé à l'édification du CIHEAM reste d'une pertinence intacte.

>>> **Le CIHEAM, une volonté méditerranéenne**

Trois composantes fondent la vision du CIHEAM :

- développer une culture scientifique commune sur l'agriculture et l'alimentation ;
- travailler en réseaux avec les instituts nationaux de formation et de recherche agronomique ;
- être un lien d'échange entre les gouvernements des pays méditerranéens sur les perspectives agricoles et alimentaires.

Le CIHEAM se veut un outil de coopération méditerranéenne, un point de référence et d'appui aux initiatives liant l'Europe et la Méditerranée. Il vise à être un lieu d'analyse que la Méditerranée contemporaine ouvre sur elle-même pour affirmer son identité.

Mouïñ Hamzé
Président

Bertrand Hervieu
Secrétaire général


13 pays, une ambition commune

Pour tous les pays membres, le CIHEAM incarne une triple ambition :

- partager un espace de connaissances et de savoir-faire agronomiques en s'appuyant notamment sur les nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication ;
- contribuer à la vitalité des échanges sur les questions majeures liées au développement agricole ;
- promouvoir de nouvelles approches en matière de sécurité alimentaire et de nutrition ; faire émerger une culture et une conscience communes en Méditerranée.

>>> Le CIHEAM, une institution ouverte

Le CIHEAM réunit treize États membres. Il rassemble avec les mêmes droits et devoirs des États de l'Union européenne, des pays du Maghreb ou du Proche-Orient. Selon l'article 15 de l'Accord de 1962, tout État riverain de la Méditerranée est potentiellement habilité à devenir membre du CIHEAM. Des contacts sont en cours avec d'autres pays méditerranéens qui souhaitent rejoindre le CIHEAM.



Population totale (en millions d'habitants) en 1965 et en 2002

La population totale du Bassin méditerranéen était de 280 millions d'habitants en 1965. De 523 millions en 2002, elle est projetée à 700 millions en 2025.

La région Méditerranée

Depuis sa création en 1962, le CIHEAM forme les responsables de l'agriculture et des industries agroalimentaires en Méditerranée. Ils vont devoir travailler dans un environnement fragile, soumis à une intense pression démographique.



>>> Méditerranée



La région Méditerranée représente 8,4% de la population mondiale

. Avec 523 millions d'habitants, la population de l'ensemble des pays méditerranéens représente 8,4 % de la population mondiale mais avec des croissances annuelles moyennes contrastées entre les pays du Nord (inférieures à 1 %) et les pays du Sud (supérieures à 2 %). Vers 2010, la zone Sud regroupera plus de la moitié de la population méditerranéenne.

Les progrès de l'urbanisation ont conduit deux méditerranéens sur trois à vivre aujourd'hui dans les villes avec une croissance des populations urbaines au Sud (3,8 %) supérieure à celle des pays du Nord (1,6 %).

>>> Des ressources inégalement réparties



Le PIB par habitant au Nord est 5 fois celui du Sud

- Globalement le PIB par habitant au Nord est aujourd'hui près de 5 fois celui du Sud.
- La richesse agricole de la Méditerranée se trouve, comme sa richesse globale, pour une large part dans les pays du Nord. Ces derniers assurent plus de 75 % de la production agricole sur 66% des terres cultivées.
- Les terres aptes à l'agriculture sont déjà exploitées à 87% au Proche-Orient et dans les pays du Maghreb alors même que les pays du Nord bénéficient d'une réserve en terres agricoles plus importante.

L'utilisation de l'eau soulève un problème majeur pour les années à venir, celui de la pénurie d'eau et notamment de l'approvisionnement des agglomérations urbaines.

PART I

The Mediterranean in the WTO negotiations

José María GARCIA ALVAREZ-COQUE, ETSIA Universidad Politécnica de Valencia (Spain)

1 The multilateral trade negotiations and their implications for Mediterranean countries

1.1 - The Agriculture Agreement and the Mediterranean countries

Most countries in the Mediterranean region have shared a strong interest in taking part in the multilateral trading system. This is expressed by (i) the number of Mediterranean Countries (MCs) that took part in the founding of the WTO in 1995 (the EU, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Slovenia, Tunisia and Turkey); (ii) the list of MCs that joined the organisation after 1995 (Albania, Croatia and Jordan); and (iii) the MCs that are applying for WTO membership (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, Serbia and Montenegro, Algeria, Libya and Syria).

The willingness to participate in the WTO reflects a common growth strategy based on an open economy. No government in the region is currently against taking part in the globalisation process. All MCs are taking steps to implement the WTO Agreements at various stages. This includes the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Commitments to reduce export subsidies, domestic support and import duties on agricultural products have been seen as significant steps towards reforming agricultural trade. This goal is shared by most countries in the region.

MCs present clear common characteristics. Agricultural systems are heterogeneous in the region, but they share similar patterns of product specialisation where the preponderance of the so-called Mediterranean products (olive oil, wine, fruit and vegetables) is manifest. Farm structures usually have historical links, and structural adjustment remains an unsolved issue in many Mediterranean agricultural areas. Moreover, these countries share environmental problems, mainly related to the pressure on water and the relatively poor soil resource. Mediterranean populations also share common patterns regarding their diet, based on a traditionally healthy combination of food products. Finally, agricultural landscapes are directly linked to a cultural heritage, which is the outcome of many generations of farmers.

In spite of the long list of shared values, MCs have not followed a single approach with regard to integrating their agricultural and rural areas into the world trading system. Differences in domestic and trade policies have been the result of the considerable leeway permitted by the AoA for countries to design their own agricultural policies. This leeway has been interpreted differently by the MCs which are WTO members, and this has resulted in a variety of commitments adopted after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (UR).

Box 1.1 presents a summary of the commitments undertaken by MCs after the signature of the AoA. Developed MCs (basically the EU and Israel) have chosen to keep their options to grant support to agriculture in the three main negotiating

pillars – namely export subsidies, market access and domestic support. Slovenia and Cyprus are now EU member states.

Domestic support is an area where differences between developing and developed MCs are marked. In the current situation, developed MCs wish to keep the Blue Box (subsidies that require farmers to limit production, see Article 6.5 of the AoA), at least to a certain degree, because they see it as a tool for facilitating transition away from distorting subsidies and preventing high social costs in rural areas.

The rest of the Mediterranean countries which are WTO members have used less generous farm support options. Apart from the EU and Israel, the only country in the region authorised to grant export subsidies is Turkey, but this country has resorted to special safeguards and trade-distorting domestic support beyond the *de minimis* level (10% of the production value for developing countries). Tunisia and Morocco can use some trade-distorting domestic support and special safeguards but no export subsidies. Jordan is not invoking special safeguards or export subsidies and has only kept an option on trade-distorting domestic support. Egypt has no rights beyond the *de minimis* trade-distorting support.

Developing MCs enjoy Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for a number of AoA provisions. As for domestic support, for example, SDT allows for some flexibility for developing countries to provide trade-distorting support to farmers such as the extension of the *de minimis* clause and the provisions of Article 6.2 of the AoA (they can grant investment and input subsidies that are generally available and are integral parts of development programmes, and they can provide domestic support to help farmers shift away from producing illicit crops). Developing MCs can also subsidise transport and marketing (Article 9.4 of the AoA).

Box 1.1 - Mediterranean countries: summary of commitments

WTO members: Albania (2000), EU, Croatia (2000), Egypt, Jordan (2000), Slovenia, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey.

WTO observers: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, Montenegro, Serbia, Algeria, Libya.

Within the countries around the Mediterranean basin, the commitments undertaken in the Uruguay Round are summarised in the following paragraphs:

Export competition

Export subsidies: Mediterranean countries which can subsidise exports, but only for products on which they have commitments to reduce the subsidies. The number of products is shown in brackets: EU15 (20), Cyprus (9), Israel (6), Turkey (44).

Market access

Right to tariff quotas: 43 WTO members currently have a combined total of 1,425 tariff quotas in their commitments. The numbers in brackets show how many quotas each country has: Croatia (9), EU15 (87), Israel (12), Morocco (18), Slovenia (20), Tunisia (13).

Right to special safeguards: 39 WTO members have currently reserved the right to use a combined total of 6 156 special safeguards on agricultural products. The numbers in brackets show how many products are involved: EU (539), Israel (41), Morocco (374), Tunisia (32).

Domestic support

Amber Box: 34 WTO members have commitments to reduce their trade-distorting domestic supports in the Amber Box: Croatia, EU, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Slovenia, Tunisia.

However, in practice, developing MCs have fewer possibilities of supporting their farming sectors than have developed countries. Having the option to keep the *de minimis* trade-distorting support, the SDT measures and the Green Box policies listed in Annex 2 to the AoA is not sufficiently encouraging when financial resources are scarce. The AgriMed reports in past years have stressed the complaints by some developing MCs that many of the currently permitted subsidies, affordable by richer countries, could cause trade distortion. Among the subsidies under discussion here are the direct payments to producers, including decoupled income support adopted in the implementation of the Agenda 2000's Mid-Term Review (MTR). This has been seen by developing MCs as a sign of the double standard in the interpretation of the world trading system by developed countries. According to this idea, the "playing field" resulting from the UR would be easier for EU farmers than for those living in the rest of the Mediterranean region.

A question which emerges from the accumulated experience of implementation of the UR Agreements is whether the current round of negotiations will replicate the unbalanced trading situation or will instead create some correcting measures. It is

true that rural development appears to be a shared concern by developing and developed countries in the Mediterranean region. This would call for a certain degree of flexibility in order to take better account of non-trade concerns such as environmental protection. However, while the EU countries still have financial resources for funding agricultural and rural policies, despite the progressive cuts in the CAP budget, developing MCs lack budget and can only use border protection to support sensitive and special products. This is why the present debate is developing into a discussion of two major questions (a) the extent to which the current leeway granted by the AoA for domestic and trade policies might be revised; and (b) the extent to which the revised provisions should give differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries in the region.

1.2 - Groups and positions

The current multilateral trade negotiations began under Article 20 of the (AoA). MCs which are WTO members took part in the negotiations aimed at achieving “substantial progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform”. The Doha Declaration (November 2001) confirmed this goal pointing to efforts to “establish a fair and market-oriented trading system” inserted into a comprehensive Development Agenda. After the Cancún deadlock in September 2003 and until March 2004, negotiations were stalled. In July 2004, the situation moved on and a new deal was agreed in Geneva (the ‘July Package’), which included an outline (or “Framework”) to be used to complete the “modalities” on agriculture. It was agreed that the eventual modalities would finally address the three pillars of agricultural reform – domestic support, export competition and market access – in a balanced and equitable manner. While the July Package was useful in preventing the negotiations from sudden failure, many aspects remained to be agreed (see following sections).

The previous section showed that a variety of commitments were made by MCs after the conclusion of the UR. There are still divergences in the present round of WTO negotiations. In the next paragraphs, a review of the main stances defended by MCs is presented with a view to identifying differences and similarities. At the end of the day, the question is whether MCs could adopt a common approach to the last part of the Doha Round and integrate their agricultural sectors into the multilateral trading system.

The high transaction costs involved in such complex negotiations (the WTO has 148 members, and decisions are taken by consensus) have been reduced to some extent through the grouping of countries. In fact, although the multilateral trade negotiations are no longer a matter of a Quad (US, EU, Japan and Canada), the so-called “five interested parties” comprising the US, the EU, Brazil, India and Australia currently constitute the core negotiating group for the Doha Round.

Brazil and India are at the high table as they are leaders of the developing world, and they are deeply involved in this negotiation process.

A number of exporting countries form the Cairns Group, which calls for comprehensive and substantial liberalisation of agricultural trade. However, the emergence of the G-20 (including major actors within the developing world), just before the Cancún Conference, has provided the negotiations with a more balanced picture. Other groupings with significant activity are the G-10 (the so-called ‘friends of multifunctionality’), the G-90 (African Union countries plus Asian-Caribbean-Pacific group plus least-developed countries [LDCs]), the countries of the “Cotton Initiative” (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali) and the G-33 (vulnerable economies with small farmers).

Table 1.1 - Country groups and participation of MCs in the WTO

Group	Main goal	Examples of members	Mediterranean membership
Cairns Group (exporters)	Market access and reduction of domestic support	Australia	No
G-10 (net importers)	Non-trade concerns	Norway, Japan	Israel
G-20 (developing countries)	Reduction of industrial countries' farm subsidies and domestic support; lower focus on market access	Brazil, India and China	Egypt
G-33 (developing countries)	Special products and Special safeguards to support small farmers	Indonesia	Turkey
G-90 (LDCs, African Union & ACP)	Preservation of preferential treatment	Botswana and Mauritius	Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt
European Communities	Preservation of the European Agricultural Model	EU Member States	Spain, Greece, France, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus
Five Interested Parties	Main parties involved in the WTO agricultural negotiations	EU, US, Brazil, India, and Australia	

Note: Annex I shows a list of groups and their members.

Where are the MCs inserted? Note that membership in a particular group does not prevent a country from taking part in other groups or from disseminating individual opinions. Moreover, some MCs have been joining the EU in the last few years, so their position is embedded in the EU and can now slightly influence that block. Other MCs are still excluded from the multilateral trade negotiations because of their status as non-WTO Members. Despite the existence of negotiating

groups, the analysis of positions in the agricultural negotiations remains complex as shown in the following paragraphs.

- Most developed MCs (Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) are part of the European Union, and they have coordinated their position in the WTO with the rest of the EU member states (but do not necessarily share the same view as that of Northern European countries).
- Israel belongs to the G-10, a group of mostly developed countries which attach substantial importance to the role of the agricultural sector in meeting non-trade concerns.
- Egypt takes part in the G-20 group, which played a significant role in the Cancún Conference and devotes effort to the goal of pressing the EU and the US on agricultural liberalisation and the reduction of farm support, although some countries in the group believe that improvement in market access should be more cautious in the poorer countries.
- Turkey is a member of another group, the G-33, led by Indonesia, which focuses on proposals for special and differential treatment for developing countries and special products.
- As for Morocco and Tunisia, they share some of the objectives of the G-20 and the G-33. However, they have only participated in country groupings through the African Union (which also included Egypt) and through the G-90. This is an alliance including most members of the African Union, ACP and LDCs.

The G-90 shares with the G-20 and the G-33 the idea that agriculture plays a crucial role in economic development and poverty alleviation. Like the G-20, the G-90 opposed the attempts in Cancún by the US and the EU to include the so-called Singapore issues – investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation – in the Doha Agenda. The most vocal amongst them has been Kenya in the African Group, Uganda or Tanzania on behalf of LDCs and sometimes the Caribbean countries – Guyana or Jamaica. Politically however, many in this group are vulnerable to US and EU pressures since most have some kind of preferential trading arrangement with the US (e.g. the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act) or EU (e.g. Cotonou, Association Agreements) and are dependent on those powers for aid and loans.

In fact, there is currently no clear definition of who the G-90 are and even the EU Commission has not made it clear if the treatment to be granted to the “most vulnerable” economies should include countries such as Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia, which might be considered with less “moral authority” than the LDCs. Since African Mediterranean countries are more developed than LDCs and have signed or are negotiating bilateral agreements with the EU and the US, they don’t have the same opportunities as LDCs to invoke free market access to developed countries’ markets.

In summary, past experience of agricultural negotiations suggests a lack of consensus among MCs in their negotiating strategies with regard to the Doha Agenda. While developed MCs argue the need to ease farm reform through support measures, but of a less distorting nature, developing MCs seem to be resisting farm subsidies in OECD countries. However, Egypt seems to be pressing more on this aspect, while Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco are more cautious with respect to a multilateral opening of their domestic markets. And preference erosion is still a concern in African MCs.

A point in common in the Mediterranean basin is that no country in the region belongs to the Cairns Group and that MCs are far from pushing for a comprehensive liberalisation of agricultural markets. Instead, the issue of sensitive and special products is raised by many countries in the region. All MCs use border measures, to differing degrees, to protect their farming sectors. Most countries in the region have vulnerable agricultural regions. There is a development concern involved in developing MCs and it is related to the fact that a significant part of the labour force lives in rural areas, is often illiterate and cannot possibly be converted overnight to other activities. The highest priority for developing MCs in the agricultural negotiations is to avoid unduly accelerating the pace of the liberalisation of agricultural imports.

Most MCs are under pressure in this respect, but many developing MCs also want to export and therefore would like to see the EU market open up. Moreover, developing MCs are more 'offensive' towards the removal of trade-distorting support in OECD countries. As for the defensive interests, the EU focus is not only on controlling market liberalisation but also on softening the transition to less distorting subsidies, and on keeping the Amber or Blue Box domestic supports.

1.3 - Issues and progress

The reference document for checking the progress of the negotiations is the July 2004 Framework (or, to be more precise, *'Annex A to the Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004'*). That paper was endorsed by WTO members and, by summer 2005, was representing the '*acquis*' of the agriculture negotiations. The July Framework established overall guidelines for modalities in each one of the three pillars; these guidelines will be specified during the last part of the round. However, a great deal of work had still to be done on the definition of "modalities" for the reform of the AoA to be agreed in the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference planned for December 2005. On many points, the Framework is too general, preventing the WTO members from reaching deadlock

in the agricultural negotiations simply by leaving eventual agreement on specific sections for later¹.

1.3.1 - Domestic support

The July Framework foresees:

- Substantial reductions in distorting supports. Those countries with higher levels are to make deeper cuts from “bound” rates.
- Amber Box (“final bound total AMS”) supports will also be cut using a tiered formula, so that higher supports have steeper cuts.
- The *de minimis* support will be reduced by an amount to be negotiated.
- Blue Box supports will be capped at 5% of the agricultural production value.
- Reductions in the **overall** level of trade-distorting support – Amber Box, *de minimis* and Blue Box combined – using a “tiered formula” to be designed so that higher levels of support will have steeper cuts. This joint category is called Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS).
- The new ceiling for the OTDS at the end of the implementation period will be the lower of the values of trade-distorting support resulting from (i) the overall cut and (ii) the sum of the reductions/caps of the three components.
- Product-specific AMS caps will be developed.
- The criteria for defining supports as Green Box will be reviewed and clarified to ensure that the supports really do not distort trade, or do so minimally. At the same time, the exercise will preserve the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of the Green Box and will take account of non-trade concerns such as environmental protection and rural development.

The EU has the largest AMS amongst the WTO members, amounting to US\$35.3 billion in 2002, yet this amount is significantly lower than the committed AMS (US\$61 billion). The accession of Slovenia will not change the EU figures significantly. In 2001, Israel had an applied AMS of US\$248.2 million and a committed AMS of US\$586.0 million. Current and committed AMSs are substantially lower in Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia. The latter country reported a figure of zero for non-exempted trade-distorting domestic support in 2001. Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan have the right to Special and Differential Treatment exceptions and will probably keep them after an eventual agreement in the current round.

The proposed discipline regarding the OTDS in the current Round are very significant because they have the potential to exert greater pressure on the actual support provided by individual countries than did the Uruguay Round disciplines. The Uruguay Round only disciplined some of the individual components, and not

¹ We discuss the proposals made by the US and the EU in October 2005 in the last section of the present chapter.

the sum of those components. The question is whether to harmonise at the absolute or the relative levels of OTDS. Some small countries, such as Norway and Switzerland, have a high AMS in relation to the value of their domestic agricultural production. However, if measured in absolute terms, the pressure is on the EU, which will probably be situated in the upper tier of the overall trade-distorting domestic support. Japan and the United States would be in a second tier. Other developed countries could be in a third tier, with developing countries in a final tier, in line with the principle of SDT.

However, the Framework recognised the “role of the Blue Box in promoting agricultural reforms”, which can be considered a victory for the EU and a way of gaining time. It is true that, according to the Framework, Blue Box payments should not be larger than €12 billion (this is about 5% of the value of agricultural production for the EU in 2003). However, as discussed in the next section, the recent CAP reforms allow sufficient leeway for the EU to perform new reductions in the AMS, the Blue Box, the *de minimis*, and the OTDS. The key operation in the next seasons, after the Mid-Term Review, will be the conversion of trade-distorting payments into decoupled single payments, which the EU considers to be in the Green Box. From a US perspective there is a clear advantage in expanding the Blue Box definition to include its Counter-Cyclical Payments (these are made on “fixed and unchanging” areas or number of animals). Otherwise they would have to be accommodated within the total AMS ceiling. At 5% of the value of production, the separate Blue Box provision adds an additional \$9.5 billion of support entitlement for the United States (IPC, 2005).

Table 1.2 - Notified domestic support: Amber Box, Blue Box and SDT (million US\$)

	Year	AMS applied	AMS bound	Special Differential Treatment	Blue Box
EU	2001/2002	35 710.3	61 053.6		21 569.0
Slovenia	2003	11.7	56.2		39.5
Tunisia	2001	0.0	43.1	60.5	
Israel	2001	248.2	585.9		
Morocco	2002	24.7	64.1	129.9	
Jordan	2002	1.0	2.0	0.6	

Source: Submissions by WTO members and author's presentation.

The rest of the MCs which have kept some AMS support have undertaken significant cuts on applied AMS (see Table 1). This means that further reductions on bound AMS will probably not involve constraints. All developing MCs will be affected by the *de minimis* or, given their absolute levels of Final Bound Total AMS, would seem to fall into any of the lowest tiers. Furthermore, the Framework

establishes that developing countries will be allowed gentler cuts over longer periods and will continue to be allowed exemptions under Article 6.2 of the AoA. Moreover, the *de minimis* will be reduced by an amount to be negotiated, with special treatment for developing countries, which will be exempt if they “allocate almost all *de minimis* support to subsistence and resource-poor farmers”. According to the G-20 proposal, developing countries without AMS entitlements (such as Egypt) should not be obliged to make cuts.

Most developing MCs want current negotiations to involve stricter control of developed countries' subsidisation, which also affects the Green Box. However, once it has been shown that Green Box support is minimally distorting, there could be a consensus of interests among the countries of the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean:

- Southern MCs would like to introduce provisions which take account of the types of programmes suited to the realities of their poor rural areas and which could stand the fundamental test of, at most, minimal trade-distorting support.
- Northern developed countries, basically the EU, have embarked on far-reaching reform of coupled support policies and are deeply concerned that any change in the existing language might have the perverse effect of undermining their reforms.

Whether the Green Box is an example of the EU's “double standard” or an “appropriate avenue for policies, targeted at their social, political and other non-trade concerns” will continue to be a question for future discussion. It seems that constraints on the Amber Box, Blue Box and *de minimis* in developed economies will add arguments in favour of developing countries' accepting the Green Box as a guideline for agricultural policies in the coming years. We elaborate on this issue at the end of this chapter.

1.3.2 - Export competition

As for **export competition**, the Framework includes an agreed target for this pillar: elimination of export subsidies by a ‘credible’ date. The Framework Agreement refers to “all forms of export subsidies” which means parallel elimination of the subsidy component of government-supported export credit (with the phasing-out of credits and insurance of over 180 days), food aid, and State-sanctioned exporting monopolies. The negotiations will also develop disciplines on all export measures whose effects are equivalent to subsidies. The final stage of the negotiations has to finalise the identification of policies with equivalent effect within the scope of export credits with repayment terms of 180 days or below, certain types of Food Aid, and certain practices of exporting State Trading Enterprises (STEs).

Within the WTO membership, the EU accounts for 92% of export subsidies in value, with an expenditure of \$29.3 billion over the 1995–2000 period. However,

in 2000-2001, the EU granted export subsidies by €2.6 billion, well below the value committed of €7.5 billion. The value ceilings for export subsidies have not involved constraints for the EU. By contrast, quantity bindings have involved more constraints for export flows for certain products (rice, poultry, eggs, pork, fruit and vegetables and dairy products).

On the offensive side, the EU focuses on other types of export subsidies. This will hardly affect most MCs, with the exception of Israel and Turkey, but export subsidy elimination can take longer for Turkey as a developing country. The remaining developing MCs will be entitled to subsidise transport and marketing (Article 9.4 of the AoA) “for a reasonable period, to be negotiated”, beyond the date for ending the main subsidies.

Another issue concerning export subsidies for some MCs can be the operating methods of exporting STEs. In fact, discussions are looking at the conditions for preventing State trading activities from being used to circumvent commitments on export subsidies. This could bring stronger monitoring of institutions such as the Tunisian National Edible Oils Board (ONH) which was created and is maintained to guarantee a minimum income to olive oil producers, a sector of great social and economic importance to Tunisia. However, according to the Framework, STEs in developing countries will enjoy special provisions to preserve domestic price stability.

1.3.3 - Market access

The July Framework commits members to “substantial improvements in market access for all products” by developing a “single approach”: everyone except least-developed countries has to contribute by improving market access for all products. This means that all WTO members in the Mediterranean region will have to make concessions in this pillar.

The Framework refers to tariff reductions that are subject to two principles: (a) ‘progressiveness’, that is, deeper cuts in higher tariffs; and (b) flexibility, to address “sensitive products” and “special products” based on the criteria of ‘food security, livelihood security and rural development needs’.

Market access seems to be the most sensitive pillar. While concessions in the first two pillars will mainly affect industrial economies, in particular the EU and the US, the market access pillar affects everyone, with the probable exception of LDCs. Immediately after the July Framework, progress in the negotiation was needed on: (a) the type of tariff reduction formula that would produce “substantial improvements in market access”, with a progressive approach; (b) how all countries’ sensitive products can be treated and how developing countries can be given further flexibility for their “special products” and be able to use “special safeguard” actions to deal with surges in imports or falls in prices; and (c) how to

deal with conflicting interests among developing countries over preferential access to developed countries' markets.

The choice of formulas for tariff reductions is critical to the ambition of the Round (see Box 1.2). Many countries maintain bound tariffs high above applied tariffs. Because tariff cuts in the WTO are made from bound levels, substantial tariff cuts will be needed in order to have any impact on trade. The basic idea derived from the Framework is that developed and developing countries' tariff lines would be divided into different sets of tariff bands according to the level of duties currently levied, with each band subject to different percentage cuts. For developing countries, the percentage cuts for each of the bands would be smaller – less than two thirds of what developed countries would make in comparable bands. As for the method of tariff reduction, the US and agricultural exporters have generally preferred using a harmonising "Swiss formula" for the cuts, which would cut higher tariffs more steeply even within each tariff band. However, there is an increasing consensus on the use of linear cuts of progressively higher percentages for each band, or the "tiered approach". The actual percentages of reduction are left for negotiation.

As for the flexibility instruments contained in the Framework, the first concerns all countries, which may designate 'an appropriate number' of sensitive products to which the reduction formula will not apply, although tariff cuts will still be required, and market access must be improved through tariff-quota expansion. While this provision responds mainly to the concerns of the G-10 group, it will also benefit highly protected sectors, such as sugar, in the EU. If one assumes that products with tariffs above 100% are "sensitive", then the European Union may claim that more than 5% of the total tariff lines should be considered sensitive products.


A short paragraph on least-developed countries says that they will not have to make reduction commitments. Developed countries should provide duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs' exports, and so should developing countries "in a position to do so".

A second element, which is of interest for developed and developing countries, concerns the special safeguard mechanism. While its continuation for developed countries remains under negotiation, the Framework introduces its use by developing countries.

Box 1.2 - Approaches to tariff reduction formulas

These are simplified visualisations of the various approaches, presented here **merely symbolically** to give an idea of the difference between the approaches. Each line represents a hypothetical cut from a single representative starting tariff. In reality there are a range of starting tariffs in each category.


'Banded approach' (draft modalities, March 2003)



Products categorised by height of starting tariff.


Higher bands: steeper cuts. In the March 2003 draft modalities, the formulas in each band use the Uruguay Round (UR) approach (average cuts subject to minimums).

'Blended approach' (Cancún draft frameworks)




Products categorised by sensitivity.

Used in the Cancún draft frameworks, the approach "blends" three formulas. A Uruguay Round approach applies to one category, a Swiss formula to another, and a third is duty-free.

Box 1.2 (contd.)*'Tiered approach' (July Framework)***Products categorised by height of starting tariff.**

Higher tiers (or bands): steeper cuts. Type of formula and number of tiers? This is still to be negotiated in the framework.

'Swiss Formula' (Harmonising reduction method)**Steeper cuts for higher tariffs.**

The Swiss formula is a special kind of harmonising method. It uses one single mathematical formula to produce:

- a narrow range of final tariff rates from a wide set of initial tariffs
- a maximum final rate, no matter how high the original tariff was.

Source: WTO (2004): "WTO Agriculture negotiations. The issues and where we are now", 1 December 2004.

The third instrument is the SDT measure that will allow developing countries to designate 'an appropriate number' of Special Products (SPs), based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. The criteria and treatment of these products will be specified through negotiations, which are likely to centre on the number of products (which the G-33 group of developing countries says should be self-selected) and whether any tariff cuts will be required.

The G-33 developing country proponents of SP status are working on indicators for such products. However, certain developing countries with export interests express concern that reduced liberalisation for SPs could dampen South-South trade.

While convergence on the issue of the subsidy removal in the EU is relatively easy to achieve among developing MCs, it is more difficult when it comes to the question of which countries' markets will be targeted for tariff reduction and which can be protected. Most developing MCs will probably argue in favour of exemptions from agricultural tariff reductions, while this position will not be followed by most countries in the G-20 group. This will probably weaken the position of developing countries in the final part of the negotiating round.

The Framework establishes that tariff negotiations will also address the erosion of trade preferences due to MFN liberalisation, although there is no guideline for how this is to be tackled. Some countries in the G-20 doubt whether preferences are truly beneficial because they encourage small countries to be dependent on a reduced number of uncompetitive products, discourage diversification and prevent other countries from supplying those products. According to this argument, the countries currently depending on preferences would be better off if major markets liberalised and eliminated subsidies.

The progress in the negotiations for intra-Arab integration and the signature of bilateral agreements with the US can be considered as a tactical response of MCs to the lack of progress in the Euro-Mediterranean Associations as well as to the timid steps taken by the multilateral system towards agricultural liberalisation. Failure in multilateral negotiations will open the door to regionalism, as discussed below.

Regionalism would present certain advantages if it were seen as "deep integration". This would happen in the case where regional integration arrangements offered a mechanism for harmonisation of regulatory regimes and administrative procedures and also involved transfers from the "richer" partners to the "poorer". However, the regional approach presents the problem of a hub-and-spoke pattern where a number of small countries seek bilateral agreements with a large one and the bargaining power lies with the hub.

1.4 - CAP reform and agricultural trade negotiations

1.4.1 - Decoupling support

The two influential powers, the US and the EU, appear to be quite reluctant to eliminate domestic support for agriculture. In the EU, the CAP has moved slowly along three lines. First, income support has increasingly relied on direct payments with less emphasis on market intervention. Secondly, EU agriculture is now significantly more open to foreign competition than it was in the past, although

border protection remains relatively high for certain products. Thirdly, farm support is more dependent on compliance with modern social demands related to quality, food safety and environmental concerns. The MacSharry Reform and the Agenda 2000 constituted major milestones along this path of reform. The package adopted by the Council of Ministers in June 2003 maintains the same orientations. This reform is widely known as the MTR of the Agenda 2000 and was discussed in the 2004 AgriMed report.

The MTR is managing an apparently new policy instrument known as “single-payment”, which is supposed to be “decoupled” from production. One point of discussion is the actual meaning of ‘decoupling’ and its influence on trade. Within the MTR framework, decoupling involves the conversion of direct payments under the different schemes into a single farm payment, which is kept constant over time and is not dependent on land allocation to various crops.

One of the aims of the MTR is to reduce production that is carried out merely in order to ‘harvest’ a subsidy. In theory this should reduce the amount of produce coming from European farms which either has to be protected from cheaper imports or is likely to be dumped on world markets, with export subsidies. Decoupling means that income support will depend less on price interventions; from the political point of view, this opens the door, to the further opening of the EU markets to foreign competition. Thus, the EU aims to obtain international recognition for its decoupled payments as Green Box payments, that is to say, as public budget transfers which are not restricted by the WTO rules. Public budget expenditure through ‘apparently’ decoupled payments is the means chosen by the EU and the US to facilitate transition to a more open agricultural market.

However, several remarks can be made regarding the EU decoupling concept. First, decoupling has been only partial, and some products (e.g. durum wheat and rice) will continue to receive specific crop payments. Second, EU member states will be allowed to maintain a certain percentage of the current direct payments (that is to say, the Agenda 2000 payments) as specific payments linked to production until 2007. This was defended by certain member states which were afraid of possible land abandonment impacts as a result of full decoupling. Third, it is not clear to what extent the new single payments will be recognised by other WTO members as a convincing shift from the Blue Box to the Green Box. As a matter of fact, the full direct payments will stabilise an unbalanced pattern of income support not only within EU territories but also between the EU and third countries, which do not have the same financial possibilities for funding such payments. In a sense, the globalisation process is pushing for greater integration of the agro-food markets, but the playing field is far from level. The CAP reform will not correct the current international asymmetries in the levels of agricultural support.

A line of argument that has frequently been used in favour of direct payments in the EU is that they can address non-trade concerns (NTCs), such as preservation of the landscape, the environment, and other cultural aspects linked to agricultural

activities. Direct payments are at the core of the CAP, which officially aims to preserve the European agricultural model. But links between the new single payment and NTCs are not clear. It is true that requirements to be met by farmers in order to collect these payments are increasingly linked to environmental and land use conditions (cross-compliance). But the single payment is more likely to be an income support measure rather than a rural policy specifically targeted at NTCs.

1.4.2 - National constraints on CAP reform

Experience in the Agenda 2000 negotiations on CAP reform suggests that international factors were powerful enough to exert real pressure for reform. In the MTR negotiations, international pressures appear to have increased their influence on CAP reform. However, national interests appear to remain a major obstacle to far-reaching CAP reform towards non-trade-distorting methods of agricultural support.

An appropriate approach for understanding policy-making in the CAP might be to consider the interaction between the Commission, as an 'entrepreneurial leader', and the national preferences reflected in the Council of Ministers. Widespread concern over food quality and safety as well as environmental concerns currently appear to be shifting the Commission's focus away from farmers' interests to more general interests reflected in the 'rural development' approach. Non-agricultural interests are allowing the Commission to play its role in maintaining the initiative for the promotion of CAP reforms. However, national interests may exert influence which slows down the rate of reforms. Thus, the maintaining of agricultural support is a probable scenario in each reform because some countries, such as France, have chosen to advocate it and other countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), have chosen not to prioritise the reform of this support, even if they are in favour of it. In other words, reform opponents assign a higher priority to the CAP than reform supporters. It is also clear that the way vested interests affect the CAP process varies from one country to another. In the countries that prioritise the CAP the official vote of their Ministry in the Council appears to reflect the national interest. In other countries with less interest in the CAP, national interests generally influence the Commission directly through farmers' unions or non-agricultural lobbies. The direction and speed of the reform process must come from changes in the national policy preferences of key member states.

In recent years, several EU member states including Denmark, Sweden and the UK (and more recently Germany and the Netherlands) have been advocating agricultural reform. The opposite stance has been adopted by France and Ireland, normally followed by Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal and Spain. The Italian position has more in common with the last group of countries but has had its own typical proposals over the past few years, often concentrating on food quality issues or asking for a "southern" shift for the CAP. This variety of national interests has led to much inertia in the CAP.

Three dominant forces explain reluctance to effect agricultural reform in the EU. The first factor is the typical significance attached to agriculture, which has been largely considered essential for the European farming model. It is also connected with the international trade negotiations, where not only an efficient agricultural policy is at stake but also an independent agricultural policy is pursued, protected from US interference. A second pressure comes from the financial benefits received by some member states from the EAGGF funds. While agricultural policy is expensive for European taxpayers, the significant weight of agriculture in some members states means a large amount of transfers from Brussels and a positive net financial balance. And the final factor concerns the scepticism regarding the ability of the market system to provide an efficient allocation of resources to the farming sector.

By contrast, the UK has generally been in favour of the Commission's proposals for CAP reform, except for the introduction of ceilings on direct payments, which is not surprising given the greater average size of British farms. Full decoupling and the establishment of a system for agro-environmental and rural development policies have been advocated by the British government and parliament. In the British view, the Commission's proposals address the requirements arising from the WTO round. This is supported by the attitude of the non-farming population, which is generally sceptical of agricultural support. Moreover, there is growing pressure regarding the impact of farming activities on the environment and animal welfare.

German preferences in relation to CAP reform have also shifted in recent years. Traditionally, German policy on the CAP has been in favour of farm support through high prices, which is consistent with the inefficient farm structures characterising the German farming sector, at least before unification. The core of the conflict for Germany has been the contradiction between the necessary cut in the agricultural budget (likely to grow after Enlargement) and the continuation of high levels of farm support. The intention of the German government to improve the net financial balance in the EU has given support to proponents of a far-reaching CAP reform in Germany. Under a Green Party farm minister, Germany has become a strong advocate of environmental protection, organic farming and animal welfare. This involves a positive attitude to second pillar policies. Since Germany has departed from the reluctance to shift away from the status quo (which was also observed during the Agenda 2000 discussions), the balance of the three models quoted has been a more favourable setting for CAP reform. This has allowed the Commission to take a certain degree of initiative for the MTR proposals, which included decoupling and modulation of direct payments.

In the present restrictive budgetary framework, the German government has favoured partial renationalisation of agricultural subsidies. The UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, amongst others, appear more willing to favour the progressive removal of the CAP subsidies and the integration of agricultural policies into their own rural development strategies. However, southern European member states are not very keen to accept a radical CAP shift to rural development projects, because

these countries would probably have to co-finance a significant proportion of the projects. France's position seems to be complex because it is both a fund contributor and a fund receiver. Though the debate has a lot to do with the allocation of limited financial resources, it is quite usual to find among southern European and French farmers the view that the CAP is a reflection of the EU backbone. This means that any move towards renationalising farm policies is seen as a "betrayal" of the ideals which inspired the EU.

The leeway for the EU to reach a domestic consensus to undertake further steps towards agricultural trade liberalisation will be further reduced after Enlargement as support payments become a property right for millions of farmers in the new member states. However, as farmer influence in Europe becomes eroded over the next few decades with the decline in the number of farmers, public choice theory would predict that the CAP will tend to move to a more market-oriented approach.

This was reflected by the Council deal on the EU budget reached in Brussels in December 2005. Income support expenditure will respect the spending plan reached in October 2002, before the EU Enlargement, thus preserving direct payments corresponding to those agreed with the CAP reform. However, an overall budget review by 2008-2009 was agreed; it will include examination of the Common Agricultural Policy and the British rebate. Rural development remains the main loser in budget cuts. However, the share of the "natural resource" axis in the EU budget (containing the CAP expenditure) will decrease from 47% in 2006 to 40% in 2013. At their discretion, Member States may transfer additional sums from within this ceiling to rural development programmes up to a maximum of 20% of the amounts that accrue to them from market-related expenditure and direct payments. Sums transferred to support rural development measures pursuant to such arrangements will not be subject to the national co-financing rules. Thus, a modulation scheme has been foreseen, which gives EU member states the chance to approve fundamental shifts from income support to rural development.

1.4.3 - Will the WTO involve constraints for the CAP?

Future changes in the CAP will be determined by international trade negotiations. However, with the agreed Framework, it is unlikely that a reform of the WTO AoA will involve major needs for CAP reform. Changes will come about in the future through internal pressures, such as Enlargement (see CIHEAM, 2004) and the political debates in the Council on the future budget. The CAP will also be pressed by the Dispute Settlement Body's rulings, as has happened with the banana and sugar cases (see below). Trade disputes constitute an influence which is related to the interpretation of international law and will probably frame the CAP in the years that lie ahead. However, the July Framework, per se, does not appear to be a source of major constraints for the future CAP.

The fact that a new agreement will not involve constraints for the CAP is, to a large extent, the result of the reforms undertaken in recent years:

- The “*Everything But Arms*” initiative, which will provide least developed countries with full access to EU markets.
- The extension of preferential arrangements, which affect 64% of the EU’s total agricultural imports.
- The fact that the EU is the largest agro-food importer in the world, with imports amounting to €69.8 billion compared to the US, with €61.6 billion.
- Price reform after the completion of Agenda 2000 and the MTR will facilitate substantial reductions in export subsidies. The question is whether CAP reforms and the schedule for eliminating export subsidies by a “credible date” are consistent. The Hong-Kong Ministerial draft seems quite comfortable for the EU. Agreement has been reached on parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect, to be completed by the end of 2013.
- The MTR allows for a considerable reduction of the AMS and the OTDS. Even in the conservative hypothesis of partial decoupling (see Velazquez, 2004), both bound AMS and OTDS can be reduced by over 60%. And the Blue Box will actually be below the binding level of 5% of the value of EU agricultural production. As the European Union adds more member countries, without increasing its Blue Box spending, the percentage of spending compared to the overall value of production will naturally decline.

Using market price projections developed by the US Department of Agriculture, Brink (2005) concludes that the European Union and the United States could absorb 72% and 61% cuts respectively in their total AMS commitment without a significant change in policy. Brink’s projections take into account the changes in the EU agricultural programmes under the MTR, in particular the shift from Blue Box to Green Box payments, and the continuation of the current US Farm Act beyond 2007 (with the inclusion of CCPs in the Blue Box). These results support the conclusion that very large reduction percentages in the total AMS and OTDS would be required in order to generate the need for significant changes in support policies in these countries.

1.5 – Looking ahead: the future of the multilateral trading system

Just before the present document went to press, a number of proposals, meetings and events were taking place in the Doha Round negotiations. While many of them could be highlighted, it might be of interest to elaborate on the US proposal on agriculture and the subsequent EU proposal.

In October 2005, the US launched an ambitious plan to unlock the negotiations on the modalities for the new AoA. In fact, until that time progress in multilateral trade negotiations seemed to be blocked by the rigid stances of the main trading

partners in the agricultural chapter. However, the US made a proposal on the three main pillars with a view to redefining the Farm Bill for 2007. In summary, the US proposal was as follows:

- With regard to export competition, complete elimination of export subsidies by 2010, in line with the G-20 proposal.
- With regard to domestic support, the US would reduce its total OTDS by 53%. Within this category of measures, it proposed that its total AMS would be reduced by 60 percentage points, whereas the *de minimis* support and the Blue Box could each amount to 2.5% of the value of agricultural production. Similarly, other countries such as the EU and Japan should also make a substantial reduction effort in proportion to their higher levels of distorting support. The US proposal advocated an 83% reduction in the AMS of both Japan and the EU, while in the case of total OTDS the EU should reduce this support by 75% and Japan by 53%.
- With regard to market access, the maximum tariff level after reductions would be 75%, with a reduction rate of between 55 and 90 percentage points, depending on the initial tariff. In addition to the cap level and the reduction rates, a maximum of 1% of tariff lines would be permitted as sensitive products.
- The Special and Differential Treatment will be ensured through slightly smaller cuts and longer phase-in periods for the market access measures.

Whereas the proposal seemed unacceptable to many other countries – such as the G-10 – it helped to re-launch the discussions on technical matters again. The EU thus tabled a new counterproposal in late October, which clearly showed its redlines as discussed in previous sections.

The EU proposal gave rise to lively internal debate, since it was close to exhausting the Council's mandate to the Commission – if not exceeding it, according to several member states' reactions. It consisted of the following aspects:

- In export competition, the EU also advocates the total elimination of all its agricultural export support, if other countries also discipline their export support. This would come about '*by an agreed date*'.
- With regard to domestic support, the EU would reduce its OTDS by 70%, in line with the maximum reductions that the MTR could permit according to the quantitative estimates shown above. Also, tighter discipline on Blue Box spending was proposed.
- Regarding market access, a 46% reduction of the EU average agricultural tariff, from the current 22.8% to 12.2%. Altogether, a 60 percentage point reduction in its highest tariffs and a range of tariff cuts between 35% and 60% for lower tariffs. The number of sensitive products designated by the EU would be reduced, while for all countries the maximum agricultural tariff would be 100%. The tariffs for sensitive products should also be reduced with simultaneous expansion of the TRQs for these products.

- With regard to SDT, developing countries would be granted higher tariff bands, lower tariff cuts and a tariff cap of 150%. The LDCs should not reduce their agricultural tariffs (a “round for free” approach).
- The EU also specified a number of conditions pertaining to this proposal and, with regard to agricultural products, mentioned disciplining US counter-cyclical payments, a commitment on reforming STEs and food aid concerning other developed countries. Similarly, the EU asks for the protection of Geographical Indications through an international register.

If both proposals are compared, they seem to be similar in substance except with regard to the percentage reduction values and capping of boxes and tariffs. While it could be seen as an improvement compared to the previous situation of deadlock, the expectations with regard to reaching an agreement for the December meeting in Hong Kong were disappointed by the reactions of the WTO partners regarding each one of the proposals and the declarations made by the Director-General of the WTO requiring members to “recalibrate” their expectations for the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. He stressed the need to maintain the ambition of the Round and for Hong Kong to mark a step forward in successfully completing the talks next year.

As expected, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration did not contain specific numbers and formula structures for cutting subsidies and tariffs. The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference's most concrete achievement was to establish 2013 as the end-date for eliminating agricultural export subsidies, contingent “upon the completion of the modalities.” Members are expected to finalise full modalities by April, they must also submit comprehensive draft schedules of commitments based on them by 31 July 2006 (see Annex III).

There will thus be no agreement in the WTO until mid 2006. This opens the door to two outcomes in the near future: a) a “Uruguay Round-type” agreement on agriculture, less ambitious than the desirable outcome for the developing countries, or b) no agreement with an open door to regionalism.

In this context, several developments concerning trade policy reforms are likely to occur in the years that lie ahead.

First, once the “Peace Clause” (Article 13) of the AoA is exhausted, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will probably have increasing influence on the policy reform process. Thus, policy reform will be affected by the DSB rulings rather than by a process of multilateral negotiations, as has been the case with the recent rulings on cotton, sugar and bananas. For example, the future of the Green Box payments is currently uncertain because of the recent WTO ruling under the Cotton Case. In that case, Brazil brought a complaint against certain aspects of the cotton policies of the United States. A key aspect of the complaint, for the purposes of the current discussion, was the panel's finding that US direct payments and the legislative and regulatory provisions which establish and maintain the direct

payments programme do not fully conform to the conditions set out in Annex 2 of the AoA (the Green Box). The panel concluded that since the payments were conditional on producers not planting certain commodities (more specifically fruits and vegetables) on the land on which payments were based, the payments cannot be considered to be totally “decoupled”. A further shift to decoupling is required. This is an important decision not only for the United States, but also for the European Union, whose single farm payment involves a similar requirement.

Second, as has already been mentioned, the multilateral trade reform is expected to be lengthy and much less ambitious than what many developing countries have been expecting. The EU and the US could finally reach a consensus on the use of the adjusted Blue Box and the Green Box payments as a way of facilitating trade reform. In this context, two features will contribute to assessing the real success or failure of the Doha Round, at least from the agricultural point of view in developing countries. The first is the extent of concessions in the market access pillar, especially for so-called sensitive products. The second is the ability of the US and the EU to accept tighter discipline on the Green Box payments, as recently proposed by the G-20 (June 2005).

1.6 – Concluding remarks

Since MCs do not have a common position or interest within the WTO negotiations on agriculture, it is not easy to conclude a similar outcome for all of them if negotiations fail. In general terms, the EU can emerge better off under this new scenario, whereas developing MCs can find themselves in a weaker position.

Clearly, it can be said that the failure to achieve substantial progress in multilateral trade negotiations is connected with the pace of bilateral liberalisation. North-South and South-South regional liberalisation processes are being enhanced as alternative strategies for trade reform. The Moroccan-US bilateral agreement can be placed in this framework. Trade liberalisation will probably be the result of open regionalism rather than of multilateral liberalisation. A problem of this approach is the “hub and spokes” relationship between big trading powers and small developing economies. One outcome is the increased dependency of many developing areas on the market opportunities granted by the big trading powers in exchange for comprehensive trade liberalisation in the poorer economies. Another immediate result is the inconsistency of tariff elimination in developing countries with the incomplete phasing-out of domestic subsidies in developed economies. When negotiations are bilateral, the big trading powers tend to condition subsidy removal on the WTO negotiations. When this removal does not take place, as is in fact happening, the playing field of the North-South free trade areas is far from balanced.



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International Seminar

Sustainable Rural Development Policies in the Mediterranean countries in the context of the EU's neighbourhood policies (2007 / 2013)

8 / 9 February 2006 – Cairo, Egypt

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ¹

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Secretary General of CIHEAM

¹ These conclusions and recommendations were drawn up in collaboration with Jean-Paul Pellissier, Assistant Director of the Mediterranean Agronomic Institute of Montpellier.

If we were to make just one point upon the completion of the work of this seminar, it would be to **reaffirm that civil society** and its different organisational bodies (associative, communal, consultative and administrative) **must play a central role in the management of the rural development process**, if the process is to be sustainable and balanced. It is therefore necessary to create conditions that favour mobilisation and good local governance and enable civil society, with the collaboration of all stakeholders, to **devise strategies** for territorial development and see to their implementation.

How are we to mobilise and organise ourselves to facilitate and bring about this development? With this question in mind, participants at the seminar wish to put the following sets of recommendations to five of our partners in the field of Euro-Mediterranean rural development.

1. RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS AND MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE:

- 1) **Promote a legislative framework**, which gives civil society greater legitimacy to take charge of local development issues;
- 2) **Promote national rural development policies** based on genuine participation by civil society and designed to ensure balanced sustainable development of territories;
- 3) **Ensure that these policies are consistent** with the principles enunciated by Mediterranean institutions such as the Mediterranean Action Plan (United Nations Environment Plan) or those set forth in the Mediterranean Sustainable Development (MSDS), and reaffirm the importance of these principles in Euro-Mediterranean and international negotiating forums. Responsibility for rural development **as a territorial, participative venture** falls first and foremost to the government of each of the Mediterranean countries;
- 4) **Implement the necessary adjustments:**
 - a) The **principle of sharing responsibility** between national government, local government and civil society should lead to a redefinition of each of their roles, ensuring complementarity between public and private players, and to a readjustment of project support services and implementation procedures (in line with decentralisation, subsidiarity and recognition of civil organisations);
 - b) **Coordination between rural development policies and agricultural policies** should be heightened so that each territory, with its own particular assets and constraints, might benefit from the opening up of markets and the globalisation of economies.
 - c) **The right of peoples to feed themselves**, the principle underlying food security strategies, needs to be reaffirmed at national and even Euro-Mediterranean level; the winning-back of internal markets must be a stated goal of national socio-economic development policies.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION:

- 5) **Carefully examine rural development projects implemented as part of member states' territorial development policy** and projects mobilising cross-border cooperation instruments (whether under the **Leader** community initiative programme or the **Interreg** programme), with a view to identifying new avenues for cooperation in the context of the neighbourhood policy;
- 6) **Ensure proper coordination between the different instruments mobilised in the fields of cooperation, education and research** in order to optimise their effectiveness in the rural development process;
- 7) **Do not underestimate the benefits of multilateral policies** for the establishment of regional areas that are capable of making their mark on the international scene. The EU neighbourhood policy should both enhance bilateral relations between the Union and its partners in the South and ensure that the multilateral work of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership continues.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ALL INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ORGANISATIONS:

- 8) **Help governments set rural development policies** and reform administrative arrangements for providing the requisite management and support, insofar that conditions and actions have radically changed;
- 9) **Pay particular attention to educational programmes** and programmes designed to build the capacities of local players (promote innovative forms of education and introduce popular education);
- 10) **Encourage the pooling and capitalisation of experiences** by setting up observatories of rural development dynamics and organising the different players into networks;
- 11) **Adapt financial instruments to the capacities of local organisations** so that project management teams support the professionalisation of these players and do not hamper their initiatives.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS:

- 12) **Work together to propagate the idea that local authorities represent an appropriate level for the implementation of development policies;**
- 13) **Take steps to ensure that rural development** is not simply a means of correcting the negative effects of trade liberalisation but a source of **innovation, knowledge, opportunity to try out new, more equitable and sustainable practices**, and social cohesion;
- 14) **Develop partnerships between local authorities on both shores of the Mediterranean to provide support for local actors** as they take up their new responsibilities, thus bringing mutual benefits to the parties and creating new complementarities between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

5. CIHEAM, FOR ITS PART, INTENDS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS DYNAMIC BY:

- 15) continuing its research and teaching work with a view to establishing common references and new concepts;
- 16) continuing its prospective studies on the future of agricultural areas in the Mediterranean Region, with a view to furnishing the keys to understanding the challenges facing the Mediterranean in the coming years, providing help in decision-making, and establishing a collective think-tank in the Region;
- 17) helping to identify new educational needs and to develop new curricula, both for continuous education and post-graduate studies; new skills and new rural elites need to be promoted and new forms of training for front-line operatives need to be devised;
- 18) promoting the establishment of a Mediterranean network on rural development, to be used for pooling knowledge, coordinating action and consolidating a common Mediterranean approach to sustainable rural development (linkage of websites and discussion forums);
- 19) ensuring that the meetings of the CIHEAM member countries' ministers of agriculture continue, by launching new cooperation initiatives (for the Mediterranean regions in collaboration with the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, for example), by moving ahead with our project on the quality of Mediterranean products, and by implementing the university reforms called for under the Bologna Process (B/M/D).

In conclusion, **we need to be vigilant and even proactive for three reasons:**

- Now more than ever in the Mediterranean Region, the **rural and urban worlds need to be interconnected**: there is an intimate, essential, strategic correlation between them;
- Whatever anybody may think, **the Mediterranean Region is part of the wider world** and is caught up in the current of globalisation: it must move on from its present position as passive victim of global trends and distortions arising from globalisation and assume an active role as sponsor of its own rural development project, combining openness to the outside world with preservation of its rich, diverse heritage.
- Precisely because of their differences, it is imperative that Mediterranean peoples **come together and join forces**, so that they can develop collectively and assert their common identity.

Contributi recenti



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RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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It is a great honour and pleasure for me to join you at this important conference and I should like to thank the CIHEAM for their kind invitation. Rural development clearly is a field of common interest, a field in which we can exchange and learn from each other's expertise and experience. It is in this sense that I should like to present you now the rural development policy of the EU.

I shall start with a few words of explanation why rural development is important for the EU and try to give you an idea of the diversity of rural situations and development problems we face. After that, I will speak briefly about the history of our rural development policy and give you an outline of its main principles. Then I shall introduce you into our rural development policy programme for the period 2007-2013, its core objectives and support measures, dwell a moment on the so called "Leader" bottom-up concept for local development and, finally, say a few words about the programming process.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT AS A MAJOR POLICY PREOCCUPATION

Although the EU has reached a high level of economic development and the economic importance of agriculture has declined significantly over time, rural development remains a major policy concern. I think there are at least three reasons for this:

First, rural society continues to play a very important role in demographic social and economic terms. Rural areas and communities are spread across the whole of Europe. They exist in every Member State. Indeed, according to the OECD definition of rural regions – which is mainly based on population densities, predominantly and significantly rural regions cover around 90% of the territory of the EU. More than half of our population lives in these regions and over 40% of our domestic product (our wealth) is produced there. Average population densities vary from 38 inhabitants per square kilometre in predominantly rural regions to 125 in significantly rural regions and 614 in predominantly urban regions.

Second, partly because they cover such a large part of the territory, rural areas fulfil a number of vital functions, not only for the population that lives there, but for society as a whole. They provide the land base for the production of food and other renewable raw materials. They offer living space for flora and fauna and thus are a key to the preservation of an ecological balance. Depending on their geographical situation, they have more or less close inter-relationships with urban areas and fulfil important buffer, recreation and amenity functions. Last, but not least, they represent in many cases a cultural and natural heritage which society increasingly wants to be preserved.

Rural areas have their own specific economic, social and community structures, in which farming and forestry, handicraft, small, medium and large companies produce and trade, where services from the most local to the most international such as tourism are provided. These interact, compete, create and evolve.

Here, however, comes the third reason, why rural development is a policy preoccupation. In fact, as compared to the overall economy, many rural areas are lagging behind in their economic development. On average, per capita income is significantly lower than in urban areas; unemployment rates are higher and there is, of course, a relatively stronger reliance on primary sectors like agriculture and forestry.

Now, as you certainly know, the agricultural support policy of the EU has undergone deep reforms over the last decade. This process still continues and generates increasing adjustment pressures for agriculture. And major adjustments of the farm sector do, of course, have an impact on the rest of the rural economy. Even though, in Europe,

agriculture is in many cases no longer the motor of rural economies, it remains an important sector to which many other activities are linked, directly or indirectly.

I – THE DIVERSITY OF RURAL AREAS IN THE EU

Behind the general picture of rural regions having lower incomes, higher unemployment rates and a relatively stronger dependency on the primary sector than urban regions, lies a wide diversity of situations in rural regions between and also within the different Member States of the EU. There are indeed rural regions of the EU which would appear to contradict the picture I have given completely, with impressive economic growth and significant job creation. It would therefore be wrong to equate rural areas automatically with disadvantages in economic development and the labour market.

In more qualitative terms and somewhat stylized, we can distinguish in the EU between remote, intermediate and peri-urban rural areas.

Remote rural areas are in general characterised by particularly low population densities. Here, we find the lowest incomes, the highest unemployment rates, weak infrastructures and a limited and sometimes even declining provision of services of general interest. Altogether, these handicaps make it difficult to keep the younger and more qualified people attracted to the area, and we observe in a number of cases out-migration and depopulation.

The intermediate rural areas and communities are still relatively distant from large urban centres. However, the overall economic situation is generally better than in the remote rural areas with a varying mix of economic activities. Some of these areas are characterised by large scale farming.

Finally, the peri-urban rural areas and communities would tend to be well integrated with the urban centres. But land use – which is still largely characterised by farming – comes increasingly under pressure from competing activities, be they industrial, residential or recreational. As a consequence, the environmental, social and cultural heritage of these rural areas is increasingly under threat of being lost.

This qualitative and somewhat stylised presentation gives a broad idea of the diversity of situations and developments rural development policy in the EU has to address. The diversity has even been accentuated over time by the different enlargements of the EU.

II – SOME WORDS ON THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Against this background, rural development policy has evolved as part of the historical development of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy. It started off as an agricultural structural policy dealing with problems of the farm sector. But progressively, this purely sectoral approach was complemented by territorial elements. The policy looked more and more at the multiple roles of farming in society and placed the farm sector in the wider context of the rural economy. Today, it relies much more than in the past on a territorial and environmental approach, based on multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral concepts of rural development. But it is also true that, despite these developments, its agricultural base still remains dominant. This explains why the EU's rural development policy is often presented as the second pillar of its Common Agricultural Policy, the first pillar consisting of agricultural market and income support policies.

III – GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE EU’S RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Partnership and shared responsibility.

After some experiments in the first half of the 1980s, our rural development policy is implemented systematically, since 1988, in the framework of multi-annual programmes. These are prepared and implemented in close partnership between regional, national and European levels. Both the EU and Member States provide part of the funding for the different support measures. This “co-financing” is the basis of shared responsibilities.

Programmes can be established at the national or the regional level. It is up to each Member State to decide which approach is more appropriate in its specific situation. Member States that opt for a national programme often include at least some regional chapters in their programme in order to account of the diversity of rural areas within their territory.

During the preparation and implementation of the programme, it is essential, according to our experience, that everybody who has a stake in the programme is involved through adequate consultation procedures, including local authorities, farmers and other rural people or their representatives. This helps to ensure that programmes really meet local needs and that there is a certain feeling of ownership by the local actors which, in many cases, is a key to success.

The contribution of European policy in this context is not only in terms of financial resources, but also in terms of governance. Thus, we try to promote the interaction of public partners together with non governmental organisations and civil society. We encourage the adoption of best practice in systems of finance and management. We disseminate information about successful development initiatives and we promote the exchange of experience as well as cooperation projects between regions and countries.

Strategic approach.

Partnerships and shared responsibility are one of the core principles of the EU’s rural development policy. Another principle is that rural development programmes should be “strategy led”. This means they should be built on long term development strategies reflecting real needs and based on clearly defined objectives with corresponding monitoring and evaluation systems. In the EU, rural development policy and programmed for a period of 7 years. The amount of money available for support during this period is limited and determined in advance. It is therefore essential to have from the beginning a clear idea of what can and what should be achieved. Problems, needs and opportunities have to be identified on the basis of an in-depth analysis and progress has to be evaluated.

Our experience shows that it is important to foresee sufficient time for analysis and evaluation. Ex-ante and ex-post evaluation are a legal requirement for all EU expenditure. In the case of rural development, we have in addition, after three years, a mid-term evaluation which allows a first in-depth stocktaking of developments and serves as a basis for review of the programme strategy.

Complementarity and cohesion.

A third principle of our rural development policy, which I should mention, is its complementarity with other policies. The European Union intervenes in some policy areas and not in others. At the conception, programming, implementation and evaluation stage, care is taken to ensure that EU level policies which are closely related in rural areas such

as environmental, regional, employment and rural development policies complement each other as far as possible. At the same time, each Member State should seek to ensure that rural development policy is complemented by other national policies such as education, health or social security.

A particular case of complementarity is, of course, the balance between rural development policy and the classical agricultural market and income support policy. As I already mentioned, the EU has undergone and continues to undertake significant reforms of its market and income support policy. Rural development policy plays an essential role in helping agriculture and rural areas to the new situations generated by successive reforms.

IV – THE CORE OBJECTIVES OF THE POLICY

This is what I wanted to say about the main principles of our rural development policy. Now, how does all this work in practice? We are currently preparing the fourth generation of rural development programmes for the period 2007-2013. Let me take this as an example to explain how things are put into place.

Last June, our Member States adopted on the basis of a proposal from the European Commission and after consultation of the European Parliament and other EU institutions, a legal framework for the new period. It defines what the core objectives are, which support measures are available to reach these objectives and how the process of programme preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation shall be organised. Let me now highlight some of these aspects.

As regards the objectives, our rural development policy post 2006 will be centred on three core objectives:

First: It shall contribute to increase the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry through support for restructuring, modernisation, innovation and quality production.

Second: It shall help improve the environment through support for sustainable land management and the remuneration of environmental services.

Third: It shall contribute to enhance the quality of life in rural areas and to promote the diversification of economic activities. This includes an improved access for the rural population to basic services and infrastructures as well as the promotion of new employment opportunities outside agriculture.

Under each of these broad objectives, Member States or regions can choose from a range of pre-defined support measures to build their programmes. They should, of course, select those measures which are most suited for the purpose of their rural development strategy and combine them in a way that mobilises a maximum of synergies.

V – THE MAIN SUPPORT MEASURES

Let us now have a rapid glance at these different support measures:

Objective 1: Improving competitiveness.

Under the first objective, “improving competitiveness”, we find mainly measures to promote structural change, modernisation and innovation, and to facilitate restructuring following the CAP reform and the enlargement of the EU. They concern both human and physical capital in agriculture and forestry. Support for vocational training, for the use of management and advisory services, for early retirement and for the setting up of young farmers can be found here as well as investment aids for the improvement of production, processing and marketing structures and for agricultural infrastructures.

Increasing competitiveness also means taking advantage of the opportunities offered through diversification. In this context, there is a focus on quality and value added productions for which markets exist or are emerging, as well as on cleaner and more environmentally friendly production techniques. Growing opportunities are also expected to emerge for non-food or biomass production as a renewable raw material for industrial or energy purposes.

Let me draw your attention in this context to a new measure which we have introduced for the period 2007-2013. We call it the “cooperation for innovation” measure. It allows for support to be granted to promote cooperation between farmers, foresters, the processing industry and third parties to develop new products, processes and technologies in the agriculture, food and forestry sectors.

Objective 2: Improvement of the environment.

So much for the support measures linked to the competitiveness objective, Ladies and Gentlemen. Let me now come to the main measures under the second objective, “improvement of the environment”. They aim at the protection of natural resources, at the preservation of traditional rural landscapes and at the enhancement of biodiversity. Adequate land management, which takes account of the specific environmental conditions in a given area or region, is the key in this context. In order to prevent the abandonment of agricultural land use under difficult conditions, specific payments are foreseen to compensate handicaps in mountain and other less favoured areas or so-called Natura 2000 areas where particular environmental restrictions are imposed on farming and forestry. In the framework of specific agri-environmental measures, farmers and foresters can receive payments for the provision of environmental services that go beyond their legal obligations and generate extra costs or income losses for them.

Altogether, support measures under the environment objective should contribute to sustainable rural development by encouraging farmers and foresters as the main land occupiers in rural areas to keep up land management so as to preserve the natural space and landscapes. This is important not only for environmental reasons, but also as a basis for the development of economic activities like rural tourism a sector that continues to have quite a promising development in Europe.

Objective 3: Quality of life and diversification.

This leads me to the third objective, the improvement of quality of life and the diversification of economic activities in rural areas. Under this objective have been grouped support measures which should help to maintain and, where needed, to develop and improve the social and economic fabric in rural areas. Investment in the broader rural

economy and rural communities would, in many cases, appear to be vital to enhance the quality of life in rural areas, via improved access to basic services and infrastructures and a better living environment through village renewal.

Making rural areas more attractive also requires promoting sustainable growth and generating new employment possibilities. Facilitating access to up-to-date information and communication technologies, including training, can be a key factor in this context. Diversification of the economic activities in rural areas includes the development of non-agricultural activities on the farm as well as the promotion of off-farm activities and strengthening the links between agriculture and other sectors of the rural economy.

Non-agricultural activities on the farm are for example the creation and the management of camping grounds, bed and breakfast facilities, holidays on the farm, horse riding, the processing and direct sale of farm products as well as on-farm restaurants.

Off-farm diversification includes support for the development of rural tourism as well as for the creation and development of micro-enterprises with a view to promoting entrepreneurship and strengthening the economic fabric. Micro-enterprises are enterprises with up to 9 employees and a yearly turnover of up to 2 Mio €. They are often a motor for job creation in rural areas.

Although many support measures under the third objective would not appear to affect agriculture directly, we should not underestimate their importance for farmers and their families. Our experience in Europe clearly shows that agriculture generally develops and prospers when the overall economic environment in the rural areas does well. We would be ill-advised to overlook these interdependencies.

This, Ladies and Gentlemen, is what I wanted to say about the three core objectives for rural development in the EU and the main support measures linked to them. The core objectives have to be addressed as thematic priorities in each rural development programme. To use a picture, the three core objectives represent the main axes around which Member States or regions build their rural development programmes. And the pre-defined support measures represent the building blocks among which they can choose for their programme construction. Once the programme is finalised and approved, farmers, foresters and other rural actors, including public authorities, can ask for support for their projects or activities under each of the measures which has been retained in the programme as a building block. The support under each measure is subject to certain conditions and is "co-financed" by the EU and the Member States concerned. In some Member States the national part of the co-financing is shared between the national and the regional level.

VI – THE "LEADER" CONCEPT

Now, so far I have not yet spoken about one other core element which has to be included in each rural development programme. It is what we call the "Leader concept". Whereas classical rural development support policy is based on a top-down approach – although in a number of cases a quite decentralised one – the Leader approach works bottom-up and is centred on local development.

Public and private partners at the local level form a local action group. This public-private partnership consists in general of one or several municipalities together with local entrepreneurs, farmers, foresters and other people interested in the development of their communities and the improvement of the local environment. At least half of the partners in a local action group have to come from the private sector.

The local action groups prepare their local development plans and introduce them into a selection procedure. The best plans are then selected by the regional or national authorities for support. They must refer to well-identified sub-regional rural territories and should contain an integrated multi-sectoral approach based on the interaction between actors and projects of different sectors of the local economy.

The local development plans must contribute to achieve the three core objectives of the rural development policy. But in order to leave room for innovative ideas and approaches, they do not have to use the pre-defined support measures. Support can be granted for the implementation of the local development strategies, for the operational costs of the local action groups, for cooperation projects between them as well as for capacity building and animation necessary for the preparation of local development strategies.

When one looks at the independent evaluation studies we have commissioned on our rural development policy instruments, the results for the Leader approach are quite positive. Of course, there have been failures. But altogether, Leader is judged to be efficient because it is adaptable to very different socio-economic contexts in rural areas, brings key actors together, mobilises voluntary effort and is responsive to small scale activities and projects to promote local development. It is judged effective because it closes the gap between a top-down programme and the local people, conveys responsibility to local actors and links public authorities with the local economy and society. It contributes to capacity building in rural areas and there are many examples where Leader has contributed to the creation of new jobs and to the improvement of incomes in rural areas. In one sentence: the Leader approach, if well implemented, can provide a lot of local mobilisation and development for little money.

The local action groups under Leader and other actors of rural development are linked together and assisted in their work through a national rural network. A European network will bring together the national networks as well as organisations and administrations in the field of rural development at the EU level.

According to our experience, this networking is essential to bring rural development actors together, to exchange expertise and experience, to promote and diffuse best practice, to generate new ideas and to build new partnerships for cooperation projects. It clearly has a strong mobilising and multiplying effect and is key to success.

VII – SUMMARY; THE OVERALL ARCHITECTURE OF THE POLICY

Here we are, Ladies and Gentlemen. The following slide summarises once more the overall architecture and the core elements of our rural development policy. Rural development support is co-financed by the EU, through a European fund for rural development, and by each Member State, through a national co-financing of the support measures retained in its national or regional rural development programmes. The policy is centred on three core objectives. To each of them corresponds, in each programme, a thematic priority or axis, as we call it. These three thematic priorities are complemented by a horizontal – or I should better say a methodological priority dedicated to the Leader bottom-up concept of local development. So, in simple terms, the overall message to our Member States and regions for their programme building can be summarised as follows: use the available funds in the most efficient way by concentrating your programme building on the three core objectives and by using, where it makes sense, the Leader approach.

VIII – THE MAIN PROGRAMMING STEPS

Let me still say a few sentences about the main programming steps. Directly after the adoption of the legal framework for rural development support last June, the European Commission proposed a number of common strategic guidelines for the period from 2007 to 2013. These guidelines define specific priorities – or perhaps should I better say: specific accents – with respect to the three core objectives, accents which all Member States and regions should respect in their programmes. For example, in the case of the competitiveness objective, particular attention should be paid to the transfer of “Know-How” to and the formation of human capital in rural areas through training and the diffusion of information. As regards the environment objective, particular attention should be paid to the preservation of biodiversity and, in this context, to the maintenance of agricultural and forestry systems with high nature value, to the protection of water and to climate change mitigation. Finally, concerning the objective of economic diversification and improved quality of life in rural areas, a particular accent should be put on the creation of new employment opportunities.

We believe that it is important to have a broad and transparent policy debate on these guidelines and to reach a common agreement, early in the programming, on what the priorities are for the next period and on where we want to focus the EU money.

Although the strategic guidelines have not yet been formally adopted, the discussions so far indicate that there is a broad consensus around the suggestions made by the European Commission.

The EU strategic guidelines are the basis for the elaboration and discussion of national strategies. How can the common EU priorities be best translated to the national situation with its specific strengths and weaknesses, problems and opportunities? Which other priorities are important from a national point of view? How can the agreed objectives be reached in the most efficient way and how should progress be measured? How will the intervention of the rural development fund best be combined with interventions from other funds and policy instruments?

All these questions have to be addressed in the national strategy plan. The preparation of this plan should be based on a broad consultation of stakeholders at the national and regional level. Once it is finalised and adopted, the national strategy plan forms the basis for the third step, the programme preparation. The programmes have then to be approved by the European Commission, after the consultation of all Member States in a specific Committee for rural development. We hope that the programming process including programme approval can be completed by the end of 2006, so that Member States and regions can start with the programme implementation early 2007.

CLOSING

Let me stop here, Ladies and Gentlemen. I hope I have been able to give you both an overview of and an insight in our rural development policy. Of course, I am at your disposal for any questions you may have. And I look forward to listen to you, to exchange with you and to learn from you about your concepts and approaches. I hope this conference is only a first contact and that we shall still have many other opportunities to deepen and extend our exchange. And if you are interested to learn more about this or that aspect of our policy, please do not hesitate to contact me in Brussels. You are always welcome. There are so many things we can do together.

Thank you very much for your attention.

LEGISLAZIONE COMUNITARIA

LUIGI COSTATO

LA RIFORMA DELLA PAC DEL 2003 E LE NORME AGRARIE DEL TRATTATO

SOMMARIO: 1. La formazione del mercato comune agricolo. — 2. Le quote di produzione e la riforma MacSharry. — 3. Il reg. n. 1782/2003; inversione o eversione? — 4. Prospettive.

1. È noto a tutti i cultori di diritto agrario che l'avvento della politica agricola comune (PAC) è stato un evento che ha trasformato radicalmente, unitamente allo sviluppo tecnologico che ha caratterizzato gli ultimi decenni del XX secolo, l'agricoltura degli Stati membri (1).

Dal 1962, infatti, si è proceduto ad una progressiva sostituzione delle svariate forme di intervento sui mercati dei prodotti agricoli esistenti nei singoli Stati membri della Comunità con regole uniche, introdotte sin dai primi regolamenti che avviavano la formazione del mercato comune agricolo (2); le scelte adottate in quella circostanza furono caratterizzate dal tentativo di creare un libero mercato che desse garanzie di prezzo e, di conseguenza, di reddito agli agricoltori, specie a quelli produttori delle grandi *commodities* agricole quali cereali, barbabietole da zucchero, latte e derivati, carni bovine e simili.

È evidente qualche intima possibile contraddittorietà delle finalità perseguite e dei mezzi utilizzati; infatti creare un libero mercato « protetto » per i venditori è, sostanzialmente, una contraddizione in termini. Vista, tuttavia, da altro punto di vista, la soluzione può dirsi rappresentare il massimo di « liberismo » in un settore nel quale questa dottrina econo-

(1) In questo breve lavoro si indicheranno gli articoli del trattato CE secondo la numerazione odierna, anche quando essi vengano citati con riferimento a periodi anteriori al cambiamento della numerazione stessa.

(2) Sull'arg. v. S. VENTURA, *Principes de droit agricole communautaire*, Bruxelles, 1967, ove bibliografia; mi permetto anche di rinviare a L. COSTATO, *L'evoluzione dell'intervento pubblico nel mercato del grano (in Italia e negli altri Paesi del MEC)*, Milano, 1968, ove anche bibliografia.

mico-politica non ha mai dato frutti sufficientemente positivi, per l'instabilità e imprevedibilità dell'offerta e la sua periodicità. In definitiva, la CEE si caratterizzava, certo più di quanto non accada oggi alla CE, per una generale ispirazione liberista, che aveva posto al centro dell'economia le regole volte a garantire il funzionamento del meccanismo della concorrenza, considerato il solo capace di selezionare i produttori più efficienti e di realizzare così la massima protezione dei consumatori e del benessere collettivo grazie anche al conseguente sviluppo dell'economia. Prescindendo dalle difficoltà che si dovettero superare per cercare di raggiungere questi scopi — basti al proposito pensare al prosperare ed accrescersi delle industrie di Stato, tecnostutture affrancate spesso dalle regole del mercato, e ciò non solo in Italia, anche se il nostro Paese fu capo in testa in questo — e osservando, invece, il mercato agricolo, si deve ricordare che il trattato stesso prevedeva, come ancora fa, la sottrazione di esso dal rispetto delle regole della concorrenza, secondo quanto affermato dall'art. 36, ma il diritto derivato ha cercato di mantenere la deroga entro limiti ben definiti, che comunque hanno consentito di originare una OCM nella quale il mercato libero era, come detto, fortemente « pilotato » dall'intervento pubblico.

Il prezzo minimo assicurato dall'intervento (non sempre e non per tutti i prodotti) era, in ogni caso, bilanciato da una sorta di prezzo massimo ottenuto ancora in forma per quanto possibile « liberale », dovuto all'applicazione di prelievi all'importazione (dazi) mobili, e cioè crescenti se il prezzo mondiale calava, e calanti se il prezzo mondiale cresceva, in modo da assicurare ai consumatori che le derrate non avrebbero potuto crescere a dismisura anche in caso di carenze produttive contingenti, poiché il prezzo sarebbe stato, comunque, « controllato » all'in su dall'entrata di prodotti di origine extracomunitaria (3).

Si erano così formalmente rispettate le finalità della PAC quali definite dall'art. 33, par. 1, del trattato (4); infatti la politica dei prezzi remunerativi per i prodotti agricoli ha provocato un miglioramento delle condizioni dei redditi degli agricoltori, i progressi tecnologici consentivano un aumento

(3) Questa certezza partiva dal presupposto che i prezzi mondiali dei prodotti in questione fossero sempre — come accadde per decine d'anni, salvo l'eccezione del 1974, in conseguenza degli eccezionali acquisti di cereali effettuati dall'UESS, che causarono un temporaneo intervento correttivo comunitario volto ad impedire le esportazioni dei corrispondenti prodotti comunitari — molto più bassi a livello mondiale rispetto a quelli comunitari.

(4) Sulle norme del trattato in materia di agricoltura v., per tutti, G. SGARBANTI, *Le fonti del diritto agrario. I, Le fonti costituzionali e comunitarie*, Padova, 1988.

della produttività del lavoro in agricoltura, i meccanismi posti in atto assicuravano il regolare approvvigionamento dei mercati mentre l'aumento dei redditi in tutti i comparti produttivi che si verificava nel territorio comunitario assicurava la sostenibilità dei prezzi da parte dei consumatori, anche se quest'ultima finalità venne raggiunta più a causa dello sviluppo complessivo del sistema economico che per l'attività normativa prevista per la realizzazione della PAC, e cioè, appunto, grazie all'aumento dei redditi dei consumatori. Occorre, tuttavia, notare che i prezzi, elevati rispetto al resto del mondo, dei prodotti agricoli non lo erano, come non lo sono, se comparati con quelli di molti prodotti industriali, poiché l'iniezione vigorosa di tecnologia ha consentito all'agricoltura di produrre a prezzi decrescenti, e gli stessi prezzi d'intervento sono stati fissati considerando questo *trend* (5).

La PAC, comunque, si sviluppò secondo il programma flessibile (relativamente ai mezzi utilizzabili) previsto dall'art. 34, par. 1 del trattato, e le Istituzioni comunitarie scelsero, in grande prevalenza fra le soluzioni proposte, quella dell'organizzazione europea del mercato (OCM, acronimo di organizzazione comune di mercato), comprendendo in essa molti degli strumenti suggeriti in forma non vincolante dal par. 2 dello stesso articolo.

Ovviamente il trattato non poteva stabilire i livelli concreti di prezzo da garantire agli agricoltori, e questa fu una attività tipica del Consiglio che, molte volte, costrinse la Commissione a modificare le sue proposte, stabilendo in definitiva prezzi molto remunerativi per le imprese agricole situate in zone vocate per le produzioni in questione.

2. Quest'orientamento ha avuto come conseguenza non solamente il rapido raggiungimento dell'autosufficienza comunitaria nell'approvvigionamento di molti prodotti di base, quali i cereali, la carne, i latticini ecc., ma addirittura il formarsi di forti eccedenze che andavano accumulandosi all'intervento (in particolare, ancora, cereali, carni bovine, latticini). Il fenomeno, anche a livello di previsione, fu colto dalla Commissione molto rapidamente, come attesta il c.d. secondo piano Mansholt, del 1968, che invitava il Consiglio a trasformare in parte la PAC mettendo maggiore

(5) La Corte di giustizia ha affermato che non necessariamente tutte le finalità dell'art. 33, par. 1, del trattato debbano essere contemporaneamente perseguite nel medesimo atto, bastando che esse risultino garantite dal complesso delle norme del diritto derivato. Per la giurisprudenza della Corte sul punto v. F. GENCARELLI, *La politica agricola comune nella giurisprudenza comunitaria*, Padova, 2000, p. 47 ss.

attenzione sull'efficienza delle strutture produttive al fine di poter realizzare una politica di prezzi contenuta (6).

Il tentativo del Commissario all'agricoltura fallì, poiché le direttive del 1972 non possono che definirsi una men che mediocre attuazione delle proposte di Mansholt, sicché si verificò la formazione di eccedenze enormi, per fronteggiare le quali si adottarono provvedimenti palliativi quali i prelievi di corresponsabilità che, nella sostanza, finivano per essere delle riduzioni di prezzo mascherate, tanto piccole da essere sostanzialmente inefficaci.

Tali prelievi furono riconosciuti dalla Corte come strumenti dell'OCM, ed in quanto tali di natura non tributaria, legittimati e trovati conformi alle regole del trattato (7).

Fallito questo tentativo, nel settore del latte vaccino si introdusse — ispirandosi al modello da tempo posto in essere nel settore dello zucchero — il sistema delle quote di produzione, attribuite individualmente, il superamento delle quali dava, all'origine come ora, luogo ad una sanzione gravosissima per ogni quantità di eccedenza prodotta (8). Malgrado i problemi che questo sistema procurò per la mancata assegnazione di quote ai produttori SLOM (9) e il suo mal funzionamento in Italia, esso ottenne i risultati voluti, sicché venne più volte prorogato ed è tutt'ora esistente.

Successivamente, con tecniche differenti, si arrivò, per attuare il piano MacSharry, ad introdurre sostanziali quote di produzione nei settori ad esempio, dei seminativi e del tabacco e a vietare il reimpianto di viti, interventi per altro differenti strutturalmente ai quantitativi di riferimento fissati per il latte.

(6) Sul punto v., per primo, E. ROMAGNOLI, *Dispense per gli studenti* (dattiloscritte), Firenze, 1972; ove anche la trattazione della nozione di struttura, più ampiamente analizzata da A. GERMANO, voce *Strutture in agricoltura*, in *Digesto, IV edizione, Discipline privatistiche, sezione civile*, vol. XIX, Torino, 1999, p. 60 ss.; mi permetto, inoltre, di rinviare a L. COSTATO, *Compendio di diritto agrario italiano e comunitario*, Padova, 1989, p. 367 ss.

(7) Sul punto v. le sentenze in causa 265/87, *Schroeder*, in *Raccolta*, p. 2257; in causa C-203/89, *Van Landschoot*, in *Raccolta* p. I, 22; e in causa C8/89, *Zardi*, in *Raccolta*, p. I, 2515.

(8) Sul punto v. per tutti A. DI LAURO, in *Trattato breve di diritto agrario italiano e comunitario*, diretto da L. Costato, III edizione, Padova, 2003, p. 603 ss., ove bibliografia.

(9) Sul punto vedi ancora A. DI LAURO, *op. loc. cit.* Per una rassegna di giurisprudenza relativa all'OCM del settore lattiero caseario v. F. GENCARELLI, *op. cit.*, p. 156 ss. V. anche A. GERMANO, *Le quote di produzione nel diritto comunitario dell'agricoltura*, in *Dir. giur. agr. amb.*, 1996, p. 604 ss.

Il ricordato piano MacSharry, proposto al Consiglio per adeguare, almeno transitoriamente, l'intervento comunitario sul mercato dei prodotti agricoli a quanto richiesto in sede di negoziato per il rinnovo del GATT '47 (Uruguay Round) (10), pur non modificando l'assetto formale dell'OCM ed agendo sui prezzi e sugli incentivi, trasformò l'atteggiamento comunitario nel sostegno all'agricoltura: infatti, alla riduzione dei prezzi dei seminativi e di altri prodotti si diede compensazione con dei pagamenti ad ettaro o a capo, legati alla coltivazione o, rispettivamente, all'allevamento degli esseri in questione. Tali pagamenti compensativi erano, inoltre, legati all'obbligo di ritirare certe superfici dalla coltivazione e, rispettivamente, al rispetto di determinati obblighi per l'allevatore, ed erano erogati, per lo più, sulla base del dato storico individuato in un periodo di riferimento.

I regolamenti adottati nel 1992, come detto, modificavano certi orientamenti sostanzialmente stabilizzati nell'attuazione della PAC, ma non necessariamente dovevano considerarsi « rivoluzionari ». In buona sostanza essi garantivano il rispetto degli artt. 33 e 34 del trattato attraverso uno spostamento dei sostegni dal prezzo al pagamento ad ettaro, garantendo così, come per l'avanti, i redditi agricoli e i prezzi ragionevoli ai consumatori, sostanzialmente prevedendo un modo parzialmente diverso di sostenere il settore primario, in parte maggiore posto a carico delle finanze pubbliche e scaricato dai pagamenti effettuati dai consumatori con i prezzi dei prodotti agricoli e dei loro derivati. Questo, almeno, in teoria, mentre nella pratica la spesa comunitaria per il sostegno del mercato agricolo non subì sostanziali modificazioni attraverso le minori erogazioni per il sostegno delle esportazioni.

Assai incisiva fu, subito dopo, la « riforma della riforma MacSharry », adottata alla fine del 1994, per adattare la prima, e anche i settori dell'OCM non ancora da essa investiti, a quanto pattuito per la conclusione dell'Accordo agricolo. Infatti, la Commissione, con la riforma del 1992, aveva ottenuto dal Consiglio solo un parziale adattamento della PAC a quanto richiesto in sede di negoziato con gli USA, e dovette successivamente affermare che le ulteriori modificazioni non stravolgevano il suo piano, che restava, nella sostanza, intatto; pur accolta dal Consiglio, questa posizione della Commissione non era suffragata da dati di fatto che la confermassero,

(10) Il negoziato USA-CE si concluse con l'accordo di Blair House, che poi fu la base dell'Accordo agricolo contenuto nel trattato di Marrakech del 1994, istitutivo dell'Organizzazione mondiale del commercio (OMC o, all'inglese, WTO). Sull'arg. v., per tutti, P. BORGHI, *L'agricoltura nel trattato di Marrakech* (in Collana IDAIC), Milano, 2004, ove anche bibliografia.

dato che si dovette eliminare il prezzo indicativo, il prezzo di soglia e, di conseguenza, sostituire i prelievi con dazi fissi e contenere le restituzioni all'esportazione all'interno di limiti di spesa decrescenti, al di là del criterio di calcolo delle restituzioni utilizzato fino ad allora.

Il reg. n. 3290/94 (11) prevede, dunque, all'adattamento dei differenti settori dell'OCM al ricordato Accordo agricolo, ma le variazioni introdotte mettevano in dubbio, nei fatti, la possibilità di fornire una « difesa proporzionata » ai mercati agricoli eliminando i dazi mobili, che avevano garantito il mercato comunitario contro le possibili forti oscillazioni in basso del mercato mondiale e, di conseguenza, i redditi degli agricoltori, e limitando quantitativamente e qualitativamente, le restituzioni all'esportazione, che erano state lo strumento decisivo per contenere i *surplus* accumulati.

L'OCM ne usciva in certa misura disarticolata, e le finalità dell'art. 33 del trattato non erano più perseguite in modo integrale e conclusivo, come in precedenza (12), poiché i redditi degli agricoltori potevano subire oscillazioni molto forti, in caso di grandi ribassi dei prezzi del mercato mondiale; tuttavia una protezione restava sempre, costituita dai prezzi d'intervento (ove erano fissati), sempre più bassi e tendenti a diventare solo una « rete di protezione » contro i possibili crolli drammatici dei corsi.

La « piccola riforma » del 1999 incrementava le riduzioni di prezzo, ma non le compensava integralmente con l'erogazione di aiuti effettivamente compensativi delle perdite, talché i nuovi vocaboli usati facevano riferimento a « pagamenti ad ettaro », proprio per indicare il distacco del loro calcolo da una compensazione integrale; si attenuava, dunque, la protezione al reddito degli agricoltori, anche se la permanenza di un prezzo di intervento poteva permettere di affermare, sotto il profilo formale, che esso era, comunque, tutelato, benché a un livello più basso di quanto stabilito in precedenza, nei confronti dei rischi derivanti dalle oscillazioni del mercato mondiale.

Naturalmente, poiché il « tenore di vita equo » garantito agli agricoltori è concetto abbastanza indeterminato, le variazioni nei sostegni potreb-

(11) Il reg. n. 3290/94 del Consiglio del 22 dicembre 1994, è pubblicato in *GUCÉ* L 349 del 31 dicembre 1994; sul punto mi permetto di rinviare al mio contributo al *Trattato breve, ecc.*, cit., p. 773 ss.

(12) Naturalmente la capacità di protezione dei prodotti europei dai prezzi mondiali era differenziata a seconda dei prodotti, e da ciò, ad esempio, le proteste italiane per la minore tutela apprestata a una buona parte dei cc.dd. prodotti mediterranei.

bero essere considerate sufficienti o meno, a seconda degli orientamenti, da chi voglia valutare le conseguenze delle dette mutazioni.

3. L'Accordo agricolo del 1994 doveva essere rinegoziato, poiché la sua validità era sessennale e i sostegni contenuti nella c.d. scatola blu (nella quale erano contenuti i pagamenti ad ettaro) dovevano, comunque, scomparire al più tardi, proprio per spingere a conclusione il negoziato, al più tardi alla fine del 2003.

Per predisporre a presentarsi con le « carte in regola » al tavolo delle trattative, la Commissione produsse documenti di preparazione alla revisione delle politiche di sostegno collegate alla produzione, che sfociarono — non mette conto qui di ripercorrere le tappe dell'*iter* seguito, al termine del quale, comunque, il Consiglio ottenne significative modificazioni all'impianto originale, sì da stravolgerlo in parte — nel reg. n. 1782/2003 (13), uno degli ormai consueti regolamenti « *à la carte* », e cioè strutturati in modo da riservare agli Stati membri la possibilità di scegliere fra regimi differenti (14).

Probabilmente la Commissione, nel modificare le sue originarie proposte, ha ceduto alle insistenze del Consiglio, che ha preteso di riconoscere agli Stati la possibilità di scegliere un regime parzialmente disaccoppiato — rispetto a quello più fortemente ispirato al *decoupling*, quale risultava dall'originaria proposta — conscia del fatto che se il negoziato richiedesse adattamenti in direzione della sua idea iniziale, il Consiglio non potrebbe opporsi, sicché si arriverebbe al disaccoppiamento quale voluto all'inizio.

Occorre tuttavia osservare che le nuove forme di sostegno al reddito dell'agricoltore potrebbero non essere coerenti con le disposizioni degli artt. 33 e 34 del trattato; infatti, gli aiuti previsti — in particolare quelli del *decoupling* completo, ma anche, seppure in misura minore, quelli parzialmente non disaccoppiati — non rispettano tutte le prescrizioni contenute nelle citate norme, in quanto non mirano affatto all'aumento della produttività in agricoltura, né a garantire la stabilità dei mercati, dato che il sistema provvede a « sprogrammare » l'agricoltura, assegnando al pagamento unico una funzione « neutra », nel senso che lascia liberi gli

(13) Sull'arg. non sono abbondanti i contributi dottrinari italiani; rinvio, comunque, a F. ALBISINNI, *Profili di diritto europeo per l'impresa agricola. Il regime unico e le attività dei privati*, Viterbo, 2005; mi permetto anche di segnalare alcuni contributi di L. COSTATO in *Riv. dir. agr., Dir. giur. agr. amb. e Agr. istit. mercati*, 2003 e 2004.

(14) Meno flessibilità è prevista per i nuovi 10 Stati membri, per il cui ingresso il reg. n. 1782/2003 è stato aggiornato con i regg. nn. 583/2004 e 864/2004, pubblicati rispettivamente in *GUUE* L 91 e L 206 (in quest'ultimo caso si tratta di ripubblicazione per emendare alcuni errori presenti nella prima pubblicazione) del 2004.

agricoltori di produrre ciò che ritengono più conveniente — fatte salve le produzioni orticole sino al 15 agosto di ogni anno, limite che non si propone per i nuovi membri — in un sistema ove l'intervento appare già molto attenuato e destinato a scemare ancora di importanza, diventando una « rete di protezione » solo nei confronti della caduta libera dei prezzi del mercato mondiale. Inoltre l'agricoltore potrà godere del sostegno anche se non coltiva, potendo percepire il pagamento alle sole condizioni di avere nella disponibilità « terreni ammissibili », quali già indicati, e di rispettare alcune norme ambientali e di protezione degli animali che sono del tutto sganciate da qualsivoglia forma di produzione.

La Corte di giustizia, nel valutare l'art. 33, ha da tempo consolidato un orientamento secondo il quale « le Istituzioni comunitarie devono garantire la conciliazione permanente che può essere richiesta da eventuali contraddizioni » tra gli scopi previsti dall'art. 33, « considerati separatamente e se del caso, dare all'uno o all'altro di essi la preminenza temporanea resa necessaria dai fatti o dalle circostanze economiche in vista delle quali esse adottano le loro decisioni » (15). Se non esiste, infatti, un ordine di preferenza nell'applicazione delle differenti finalità della PAC, come descritte dall'art. 33, e se le Istituzioni godono di ampia discrezionalità nel adottare le norme di attuazione della PAC — anche questa riconosciuta dalla costante giurisprudenza della Corte — non sembra dovrebbe essere ammissibile scostarsi in modo netto da molte degli scopi che il trattato prescrive alla PAC senza incorrere nella violazione dell'art. 33, come pare essere il caso della riforma del 2003.

Infatti, se sono vere le considerazioni fatte poco innanzi, la riforma non orienta la produzione né in direzione della sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti né della stabilità dei mercati; sembra, poi, che essa non assicuri un reddito equo agli agricoltori, dato che sembra eccessivo considerare agricoltori coloro che si disinteressano della coltivazione e che divengono percettori di un reddito legato a terreno anche incolto, purché mantenuto a livelli minimi di recuperabilità all'agricoltura, notando che ben difficilmente questi soggetti inoperanti potranno avere problemi di benessere degli animali, che evidentemente non allevano.

Inoltre, se è pur vero che da tempo la dottrina ha ritenuto che il fatto di mettere a riposo incentivato i terreni può essere considerato una forma diversa di coltivare, in questo caso ci si trova di fronte a norme che autorizzano il sistematico abbandono della coltivazione con un atteggiamento

(15) Sul punto ampia è la giurisprudenza; per una sua analisi e per le citazioni delle sentenze che hanno quest'orientamento v. F. GENCARELLI, *op. cit.*, p. 47 ss.

mento assolutamente indifferente — salvo le ricordate condizionalità — nei confronti dell'agricoltura, sicché diviene difficile, addirittura, riconoscere la correttezza del ricondurre il sistema al Titolo II della parte III del trattato e, di conseguenza, considerare applicabili gli artt. 33, 34 e 37. In sostanza, cioè, si potrebbe arrivare a sostenere che i sostegni e gli interventi previsti dal reg. n. 1782/2003 non sono riferiti all'agricoltura ma a soggetti che hanno la ventura di essere stati agricoltori e che mantengono la disponibilità di terreni. A questa estrema conclusione, naturalmente, non si può giungere per gli allevatori di bovini, ovini e caprini che, com'è noto, possono, secondo il reg. n. 1782/2003, godere della partecipazione al regime unico di pagamento a condizione che continuino ad allevare almeno parte degli animali che un tempo detenevano.

Per chiarire quanto affermato occorre soffermarsi sulle definizioni di agricoltore e di attività agricola, oltre che sugli elementi identificativi della c.d. « condizionalità », forniti dal reg. n. 1782/2003: per l'art. 2 del detto regolamento è agricoltore « una persona fisica o giuridica o una associazione di persone fisiche o giuridiche, indipendentemente dalla personalità giuridica conferita dal diritto nazionale all'associazione e ai suoi membri, la cui azienda si trovi nel territorio della Comunità ai sensi dell'articolo 299 del trattato e che esercita una attività agricola »; l'attività agricola consiste nella produzione, nell'allevamento o nella coltivazione « di prodotti agricoli comprese la raccolta, la mungitura, l'allevamento e la custodia degli animali per fini agricoli, nonché il mantenimento della terra in buone condizioni agronomiche e ambientali ai sensi dell' articolo 5 » (16). Poiché l'art. 3 stabilisce che « ogni agricoltore beneficiario di pagamenti diretti è tenuto a rispettare i criteri di gestione obbligatori di cui all'allegato III (...) e a mantenere la terra in buone condizioni agronomiche e ambientali » e l'art. 5 che « gli Stati membri provvedono affinché tutte le terre, specialmente le terre non più utilizzate a fini di produzione, siano mantenute in buone condizioni agronomiche e ambientali », sembra evidente che l'attività agricola non è individuata come lo è nell'art. 32 del trattato, poiché può considerarsi agricola la sola attività di manutenzione del terreno, e non in relazione ad una azione sostanzialmente eccezionale come con i primi *set aside* incentivati del penultimo decennio del secolo scorso, mirati a finalità nell'un tempo ambientali e antiproduttivistiche, ma quale « professione » ampiamente sostenuta e diffusa in grandi parti del territorio comunitario, indipendentemente da scopi antiproduttivistici, ma come scelta mirante a realizzare la « globalizzazione » del mercato dei prodotti agricoli.

(16) Così le lett. a) e c) dell'art. 2 del reg. n. 1782/2003.

Tuttavia è lecito il sospetto che la Corte ben difficilmente si risolverebbe a dichiarare contrario al trattato il reg. n. 1782/2003; ma sarebbe interessante vedere a quali acrobazie logiche dovrebbe adattarsi per arrivare a conclusioni diverse da quelle qui, sinteticamente, esposte.

4. Il pagamento unico previsto dal reg. n. 1782/2003 è, per dichiarazione dello stesso legislatore comunitario, « a termine », poiché sicuramente concluderà la sua attuazione nel prossimo decennio — salvo che non sopraggiungano altre problematiche, come prevede ancora il regolamento in questione all'art. 30.

Nel frattempo gli agricoltori delle zone difficili, marginali, siccitose o, comunque, interessate da difficoltà strutturali, potrebbero avere abbandonato l'attività, restando solo « manutentori » probabilmente distratti e « cittadini », del terreno al fine di godere del sistema di pagamento.

I terreni migliori, invece, saranno, probabilmente caratterizzati, se caratterizzati dal minifondo o, comunque, da strutture produttive di mediocre dimensione, dalla conduzione sostanziale da parte dei contoterzisti, come già avviene, quanto all'Italia, in molte zone del centro. Infatti, l'agriturismo sta, in quei territori, affermandosi come importante fonte di reddito delle popolazioni rurali; in questi casi, al fine di mantenere la qualifica di agricoltore per potere godere dei vantaggi tributari assicurati all'agriturismo, continua la formale conduzione del terreno, mentre nella sostanza essa è svolta da « non agricoltori » che vengono compensati con percentuali del raccolto — e lo saranno anche con percentuali del pagamento unico, per svolgere tutte le operazioni colturali quali arature, semine, concimazioni e sarchiature, trebbiature o estirpazioni, con l'uso di macchinari potenti che i conduttori di piccole strutture non possono permettersi di acquistare. Si realizzerà, così, come in effetti si sta già realizzando, una specie di riforma agraria quale quella suggerita dal secondo piano Mansholt, anche se ottenuta in modo indiretto e con strumenti ai margini della legalità.

Più problematico appare il futuro delle zone marginali mantenuta sino ad oggi a coltivazione con sostegni quali quelli erogati ai produttori di grano duro; a fronte dei rischi di siccità e dell'arrivo di vento caldo africano gli « agricoltori » preferiranno abbandonare le colture e diventare « rentiers », e cioè raggiungere la condizione contro la quale il legislatore repubblicano italiano si è battuto per circa un quarantennio, salvo poi trovarsi senza il pagamento unico, alla sua scadenza, e senza agricoltori, messi anzitempo in pensione.

RICERCHE E DOCUMENTAZIONI

PAOLO BORGHI

IL REGOLAMENTO N. 1782/2003 E LE NORME DELL'ORGANIZZAZIONE MONDIALE DEL COMMERCIO (OMC/WTO)

SOMMARIO: 1. Il reg. n. 1782/03 e le norme WTO. — PAC, *decoupling* e condizionalità. — 3. Scatola verde e pagamento unico. — 4. Riforma della PAC e « riforma » della WTO. — 5. La revisione della politica agricola statunitense davanti alle regole WTO.

1. Prima che la *World Trade Organization* esistesse, l'agricoltura era una materia sostanzialmente non regolata (o, meglio, disciplinata da norme prive di effettività) dalle norme pattizie sul commercio internazionale, salvo che per alcuni accordi conclusi con lo scopo di regolare i flussi di mercato dei cereali, e alcune convenzioni settoriali (ad esempio, l'Accordo USA-CEE sulla soia, risalente agli anni '60). Peraltro, proprio questi ultimi, talora, erano sorti proprio con lo scopo di compensare i vantaggi daziari derivati dalla primissima attuazione della PAC in Europa, con l'eliminazione dei dazi intracomunitari e l'istituzione di una tariffa doganale comune (1).

Ebbene, nel regolamento (CE) n. 1782/2003, riferimenti espliciti alle norme WTO non ce ne sono. È possibile rinvenire un riferimento indiretto nel *considerando* n. 33, laddove esso prevede che la Commissione debba poter adottare le misure necessarie in caso di gravi distorsioni di concorrenza nel corso del periodo transitorio (che ciascuno Stato può chiedere ai fini dell'applicazione del regime di pagamento unico) e per garantire il rispetto degli obblighi internazionali della Comunità, e nell'art. 71 (2).

(1) Sul punto, sia consentito rinviare a BORGHI, *L'agricoltura nel Trattato di Marrakech*, Milano, 2004.

(2) Art. 71 (Periodo transitorio facoltativo). — 1. Qualora le specifiche condizioni agricole lo giustifichino, uno Stato membro può decidere, entro il 1° agosto 2004, di applicare il regime di pagamento unico dopo un periodo transitorio che termina il 31 dicembre 2005 o il 31 dicembre 2006. (...) 4. La Commissione, secondo la procedura di cui all'articolo 144, paragrafo 2, adotta le misure necessarie nel caso in cui

Qualche richiamo esplicito alle disposizioni del Trattato WTO è forse rinvenibile, piuttosto, nelle norme di settore (come, del resto, avvenne in occasione della riforma della PAC del 1992-1994): nel regolamento (CE) n. 1785/2003 in tema di OCM del riso, ad esempio, si prevede la creazione di « dispositivi supplementari » rispetto al dazio comune, al fine di coordinare il funzionamento dell'OCM al regime speciale che il riso ha nell'Accordo agricolo (3): è il caso dell'art. 12, che consente l'introduzione di dazi addizionali all'importazione in caso di squilibri causati dalle riduzioni daziarie. Si tratta, peraltro, di misure eccezionali contemplate già dallo stesso Accordo agricolo, così come, in tema di restituzioni all'esportazione, sono previsti da quei regolamenti di settore alcuni limiti a tutela della concorrenza internazionale, funzionali alle previsioni del Trattato di Marrakech.

Ma l'esempio più eclatante rimane quello dell'OCM cereali (riformata dal regolamento (CE) n. 1784/2003), per la quale il dazio della tariffa doganale comune rimane ancora calcolato in modo da consentire la variazione del livello di protezione daziaria in funzione del variare del prezzo cif all'importazione. Il meccanismo si traduce, in definitiva, in un vero e proprio prelievo variabile, previsto dall'Accordo agricolo, il quale ne fa addirittura una eccezione al generale e fondamentale principio di tarifficazione (ovvero, di conversione di tutti i prelievi variabili in dazi fissi).

2. Ma è l'intero regolamento 1782/2003, nella sua ispirazione di fondo, a risentire delle norme internazionali: esso — si potrebbe dire — rappresenta (anche) il tentativo di adeguare la PAC agli estremi ed attuali sviluppi applicativi dell'Accordo sull'agricoltura, quando ormai la c.d. « clausola di pace » sembrerebbe aver esaurito la sua efficacia, e il *decoupling* parrebbe ormai il primo comandamento del mercato agricolo.

D'altra parte, ciò non costituisce una novità sul piano storico: la riforma della PAC del 1992 fu concepita proprio per adeguarne i meccanismi agli obblighi della nascente WTO, dal momento che le norme agricole fondamentali del Trattato di Marrakech videro la luce ben prima della firma del 15 aprile 1994 (l'intesa fu sottoscritta da USA e Commissione CE nel novembre 1992 a Blair House).

l'applicazione di detto periodo transitorio provochi gravi distorsioni di concorrenza nel mercato comunitario e *al fine di garantire il rispetto degli obblighi internazionali della Comunità* [corsivo nostro, NdR].

(3) Il c.d. trattamento speciale di cui all'Allegato 5, sezioni A e B dell'Accordo agricolo, voluto soprattutto da Giappone e Corea, e che ha condotto alcuni commentatori a parlare di « *rice clause* », o « clausola del riso ».

Da qui derivano alcuni dei punti chiave della riforma, e soprattutto la condizionalità e il pagamento unico. Qui, allo scopo di sondare i rapporti fra PAC e WTO, bastino pochissimi esempi.

Quanto alla condizionalità (o, come qualcuno preferisce, con espressione forse ingiustamente limitativa, alla « eco-condizionalità ») occorre avere riguardo all'art. 3 del regolamento. Alla sua stregua, ogni agricoltore beneficiario di pagamenti diretti è tenuto:

- a rispettare i criteri di gestione obbligatori di cui all'allegato III, conformemente al calendario fissato in tale allegato, e
- a mantenere la terra in buone condizioni agronomiche e ambientali ai sensi dell'art. 5.

I « criteri di gestione obbligatori » sono, sì, elencati nell'allegato III, ma sono introdotti dall'art. 4 del regolamento, il quale si riferisce a condotte produttive prescritte dalla normativa comunitaria in una serie di campi « sensibili », fra i quali meritano di essere evidenziati:

- sanità pubblica;
- salute delle piante;
- salute degli animali;
- ambiente;
- benessere degli animali.

A parte l'ultimo profilo (certo lodevole, ma forse il meno compatibile con gli Accordi WTO, che non mostrano troppa sensibilità sul punto, e non ne fanno un valore dotato di rilevanza giuridica), i criteri a tutela della sanità pubblica includono — fra l'altro — il rispetto della direttiva n. 92/102/CEE sulla registrazione e identificazione degli animali, le norme sulla rintracciabilità delle carni bovine (basti ricordare il regolamento (CE) n. 1760/2000), la direttiva del 1991 sull'immissione in commercio dei prodotti fitosanitari (91/414/CEE), le norme sull'eradicazione della BSE e il regolamento n. 178/2002, ecc.

La previsione del regolamento n. 178/2002 fra i criteri di gestione obbligatori in agricoltura ha una ragione di coerenza sistematica, poiché tale regolamento — è noto — ha fatto rientrare a pieno titolo l'impresa agricola nella nozione giuridica di « impresa alimentare », sicché l'aver previsto il rispetto dei principi di tale settore normativo fra le condizioni per poter accedere agli aiuti comunitari costituisce senza dubbio un forte incentivo (4).

(4) Peraltro, la norma oggi appare già incompleta poiché, se è vero che la direttiva n. 93/43/CEE sull'igiene dei prodotti alimentari — detta anche « sull'HACCP » — testualmente non imponeva obblighi all'impresa agricola, ma solo alle « industrie

Quanto alle c.d. « buone condizioni agronomiche e ambientali » (cfr. l'art. 5) l'allegato IV del regolamento fornisce solo lo schema (ossia gli obiettivi, e gli strumenti che dovranno essere utilizzati per la realizzazione di ciascuno di questi) secondo il quale, a livello nazionale o regionale, dovranno essere definiti i requisiti minimi delle imprese.

Tutto, però, assume un significato vero e pregnante solo con la lettura dell'art. 6, per il quale l'eventuale inosservanza dei criteri di gestione obbligatori o il mancato rispetto delle buone condizioni agronomiche e ambientali (per azione od omissione direttamente attribuibile al singolo agricoltore) porterà a ridurre o, finanche, ad annullare l'ammontare progressivo dei pagamenti diretti corrisposti nell'anno civile in cui si è verificata l'inosservanza.

È il solito sistema con cui la Comunità guida l'azione dei soggetti economici: il ridursi o il venir meno dell'aiuto significherebbe, per le imprese, difficoltà estrema o impossibilità, in pratica, di sopravvivere.

3. Dunque, condizionare il pagamento vuol dire finalizzarlo, e il criterio finalistico è proprio quello usato dall'Accordo agricolo della WTO per individuare le misure ammesse, e distinguerle da quelle vietate, di cui è prescritta la progressiva eliminazione.

L'Accordo di Marrakech, infatti, ammette il sostegno ai produttori, purché esso non abbia alcun effetto (o, al più, abbia un effetto minimo) di distorsione del commercio, o sulla produzione (Allegato 2, punto 1), sia finanziato con risorse pubbliche (non provenienti da trasferimenti di denaro dai consumatori), e sia tale da non potersi tradurre in sostegno dei prezzi a favore dei produttori.

Esso deve, infine, essere caratterizzato da finalità ben precise individuate dallo stesso Allegato 2 dell'Accordo; fra esse: sostegno alla ricerca; lotta alle malattie, parassiti e simili; stoccaggi pubblici per sicurezza

alimentari » (ma la dottrina aveva evidenziato come ciò non potesse non avere ricadute immediate sulla selezione dei fornitori da parte delle imprese di trasformazione, con conseguente necessità degli imprenditori agricoli di avvicinarsi notevolmente ai principi dell'HACCP), il regolamento (CE) n. 852/2004 ha dettato una nuova integrale disciplina della materia « igiene degli alimenti », imponendo il rispetto di una serie di norme e principi (fra cui quelli dell'HACCP) a tutte le imprese alimentari come definite dal regolamento n. 178, incluse tutte le imprese agricole ed escluse solo quelle che si dedicano a produzione primaria per uso domestico. Dunque, la condizionalità appare oggi monca, e si potrebbe forse addirittura prevedere che la CE, malgrado la previsione dell'art. 8 del regolamento n. 1782, integrerà, forse, in futuro l'elenco di cui all'allegato III del regolamento n. 1782, aggiungendovi le nuove disposizioni.

approvvigionamento alimentare; pagamenti concessi nel quadro di programmi ambientali; assicurazione e garanzia del reddito in caso di sua perdita rilevante (almeno il 30% del reddito agricolo), che non deve, comunque, essere del tutto compensata, o in caso di grave calamità naturale; assistenza al ritiro dei produttori (previsione già contenuta nel regolamento (CE) n. 1257/99, e oggi mantenuta dal regolamento n. 1783/2003); aggiustamenti strutturali.

Da ultimo — *last but not least* — può trattarsi di pagamenti diretti agli agricoltori senza effetti diretti sul prezzo dei prodotti (ad esempio, sostegno a redditi su base fissa, sganciato dalla produzione dell'anno in corso ed erogato in modo che non sia richiesta alcuna produzione per ricevere i pagamenti).

Si tratta della cosiddetta « scatola verde », espressione figurata che vuole rimandare non tanto a un carattere ambientale delle finalità (le quali spaziano anche oltre il tema della tutela dell'ambiente), quanto piuttosto a una simbologia cromatica a sé (5).

Ora, le assonanze fra questa previsione e il regime del pagamento unico appaiono abbastanza evidenti: quest'ultimo è commisurato unicamente *a)* agli importi percepiti in un periodo storico di riferimento; e *b)* agli ettari ammissibili all'aiuto ai sensi dell'art. 44, regolamento n. 1782/2003. Si tratta, cioè, di un aiuto svincolato sia dal prezzo che dalla produzione (e siamo, quindi, nel pieno del concetto di *decoupling*), per quanto il disaccoppiamento non possa mai essere totale e netto: esso costituisce piuttosto un obiettivo, l'oggetto di una tendenza, poiché sempre influenza in qualche modo la produzione, al limite in senso negativo (ossia: rallentando la scomparsa di alcune colture, o di alcune imprese non convertibili, per ragioni naturali, a colture diverse).

In definitiva, però, può dirsi che con la riforma del 2003 il regime comunitario di sostegno è divenuto tendenzialmente disaccoppiato, e « verde » ai fini delle norme WTO.

Tutto questo ha, senza dubbio, delle ragioni anche interne alla Comunità (soprattutto l'allargamento, e la prospettiva di estensione della PAC a economie agrarie largamente bisognose di aiuti: dunque, preoccu-

(5) E in tale simbologia si collocano la cosiddetta « scatola gialla », ossia le misure non disaccoppiate, che le norme della WTO) assoggettano a divieto, includendole nel calcolo nella misura aggregata del sostegno, di cui è obbligatoriamente prevista la progressiva riduzione, fino alla totale eliminazione nel tempo; e la « scatola blu », la quale raccoglie le misure parzialmente disaccoppiate, di cui era prevista l'eliminazione al termine della c.d. clausola di pace.

pazioni di bilancio). Ma dal punto di vista degli obblighi internazionali — e specialmente delle norme della WTO — il sospetto è che tutto ciò si sia tradotto in un « eccesso di zelo », soprattutto se confrontato con l'atteggiamento oggi tenuto dagli altri attori fondamentali del commercio internazionale.

4. Le finalità della riforma della PAC, ai fini del ruolo dell'Europa nella WTO, sono di duplice natura, diretta e indiretta.

Diretta (e storicamente, per ora, superata) era la finalità di presentarsi alla Conferenza ministeriale di Cancùn del settembre 2003 con una PAC meno attaccabile dal punto di vista degli obblighi commerciali internazionali: l'Europa ha voluto, cioè, recarsi al vertice con la coscienza tranquilla di avere adempiuto, nel massimo grado possibile, agli impegni presi nove anni prima a Marrakech.

Indiretto e non apertamente confessato era, invece, un altro scopo: quello di poter difendere in sede di negoziato sulla revisione degli Accordi — e proprio facendosi forte del fatto di aver adempiuto agli altri obblighi — alcuni valori sensibili, attraverso la riscrittura di norme oggi piuttosto insoddisfacenti per le esigenze europee:

— ad esempio, la tutela della proprietà intellettuale, del c.d. « made in Italy », che proprio nel settore agroalimentare soffre le maggiori « clonazioni », e che l'attuale Accordo TRIPS non tutela adeguatamente (soprattutto per quanto concerne DOP e IGP) (6);

— ad esempio, ed ancora, la tutela di istanze verso cui il consumatore europeo (e dunque anche il governante europeo, che dal voto del consumatore dipende) si mostra, in media, assai più sensibile che non i consumatori di altri Paesi; istanze, quali la assenza (non soltanto di rischi, come è ovvio, ma anche) di qualsiasi incertezza scientifica sul rischio alimentare, da cui emergono disparità di vedute fra USA e CE, anch'esse sfociate in contenziosi ormai noti (è il caso del *Panel* sulla carne agli ormoni) o incipienti (quello sui prodotti biotecnologici).

Di fronte a una riforma che — quanto meno sul piano internazionale — si giustificava strategicamente in vista di una Conferenza ministeriale

(6) Vedasi il recente contenzioso davanti al Panel della WTO: USA e Australia accusano l'Europa di violare l'accordo TRIPS, poiché la legislazione europea richiede (quale condizione per proteggere una indicazione geografica straniera) la c.d. « condizione di reciprocità ». Per tale motivo — sostengono quegli Stati — l'Europa non tutela le loro indicazioni geografiche alla pari delle proprie, così violando il principio di non discriminazione previsto dal GATT e dal TRIPS, che non consentirebbero di imporre la condizione aggiuntiva della reciprocità.

poi, sostanzialmente, fallita, il dubbio che assale l'osservatore è che alcuni dei sacrifici e delle scelte della nuova PAC potessero essere evitate, o quanto meno non rappresentassero l'unica soluzione.

Vien da chiedersi: quello di presentarsi a Cancun con i « compiti » ben fatti era il solo modo di regolarsi? A tale proposito, uno sguardo agli altri Paesi (e soprattutto a quelli che più contestano le scelte europee) non pare, forse, l'approccio sbagliato.

5. Tra gli Stati della WTO, il più interessante da analizzare perché più ricco di soluzioni normative in tema di produzione e mercato agricolo è costituito, evidentemente, dagli Stati Uniti d'America.

Negli USA la misura aggregata di sostegno totale (la c.d. MAS totale) è diminuita, in media semplice, dai 23,1 miliardi di dollari del 1995 ai 19,1 miliardi del 2001: dunque, gli USA in quegli anni (il c.d. periodo di implementazione) hanno ridotto la media totale del loro sostegno del 17,39%, a fronte di un obbligo del 20%, imposto a tutti gli Stati membri della WTO tranne i Paesi in via di sviluppo (7) e i Paesi meno sviluppati (8).

Dunque, si è trattato di una riduzione inferiore al dovuto? Probabilmente no. Fermo restando che il concetto di MAS è talmente complesso da porre serie difficoltà di focalizzazione agli stessi economisti (e da lasciare comunque spazio a diverse letture, che facilitano agli Stati l'adozione di soluzioni di calcolo diverse, e una più facile difesa del proprio comportamento commerciale in sede WTO), occorre precisare che la riduzione del 17,39% è solo una media semplice su tutti i prodotti oggetto dell'Accordo agricolo.

Essa, quindi, risente delle quantità dei prodotti su cui ciascuna riduzione è stata effettivamente operata (potendovi essere riduzioni minime applicate, però, a grandi quantità di certe *commodities*, e viceversa riduzioni enormi applicate su piccole quantità di produzioni « di nicchia »); e risente altresì dell'esenzione prevista dalla clausola *de minimis* (che accorda una franchigia pari al 5% del valore della produzione totale annua di un prodotto agricolo di base).

Il *Farm Bill 2002* (la legge che periodicamente riforma la politica agricola statunitense, e che ha rivisto integralmente la grande riforma del *Farm Bill* del 1995) prevede espressamente che il livello di sostegno dei 19,1 miliardi di dollari venga mantenuto fino alla conclusione di un nuovo accordo in sede WTO (il che equivale a dire: a tempo indeterminato e

(7) Per i quali si prevedeva una riduzione del 13,5%.

(8) Che sono esentati da obblighi di riduzione della MAS.

probabilmente lunghissimo, giacché una intesa fra tutti i Paesi membri non sembra cosa imminente).

La legislazione nordamericana contempla, poi, degli aiuti sostanzialmente disaccoppiati (i cosiddetti *direct payments*, basati su un *historical acreage* e sulle *historical yields* di tali estensioni); e altre forme di aiuto, che gli esperti dell'Economic Research Service dell'Us Department of Agriculture sostengono essere *decoupled*, perché basate su estensioni e rese storiche, e svincolate dalla produzione corrente, ma che non mancano di lasciare perplessi.

Si prendano i *Counter-Cyclical Loans* (o *Counter-Cyclical payments*): introdotti dal 1998, ed estesi dal Farm Bill 2002, essi sono costituiti da pagamenti che colmano le differenze fra un valore A (il più alto fra *loan rate*, sorta di prezzo di intervento, e il prezzo medio stagionale, integrato con l'aiuto diretto), e un valore B (il *target price*, o prezzo-obiettivo, fissato dal legislatore).

Di fatto, si tratta di un aiuto che viene concesso quando il prezzo medio stagionale non compensa a sufficienza l'agricoltore, bilanciando gli squilibri di mercato a lui sfavorevoli.

Sovente, il problema di una compatibilità di questi aiuti con l'Accordo agricolo non si pone neppure, poiché essi rientrano nella clausola *de minimis*. In linea di principio, però, è difficile sostenere che si tratti di misure disaccoppiate, poiché — quand'anche il prezzo-obiettivo fosse fissato sulla base di un dato storico — è il meccanismo in sé che è destinato a funzionare quando il prezzo medio stagionale non è remunerativo: dunque, un collegamento al prezzo esiste.

Ancor più chiaro è il sostegno indiretto al prezzo nel caso dei *Marketing Assistance Loans* (o *Marketing Loan Deficiency Payments*).

Grazie ad essi, l'agricoltore, invece di vendere tutto il prodotto all'epoca del raccolto, può accumularlo sotto forma di scorte, ricevendo dal governo una somma calcolata in base alla quantità dichiarata, moltiplicata per il *loan rate* fissato dalla legge.

Se, al momento di (eventualmente) rimborsare la somma allo Stato, il prezzo di mercato del prodotto è cresciuto al di sopra del *loan rate* (maggiorato con il tasso di interesse), l'agricoltore avrà ogni convenienza a restituire il prestito vendendo sul mercato il prodotto stoccato e guadagnando la differenza (il *marketing loan gain*). Se, viceversa, in quel momento il prezzo di mercato del prodotto fosse inferiore, l'agricoltore potrà optare per la restituzione dell'aiuto ricevuto a un tasso addirittura negativo, il *loan repayment rate* (calcolato giornalmente dal Dipartimento;

per alcuni prodotti il calcolo è settimanale), lucrando comunque un *marketing loan gain*.

Siamo di fronte ad aiuti disaccoppiati? Non parrebbe proprio: v'è incidenza sul prezzo; vi sono perciò aiuti tanto più remunerativi quanto più l'agricoltore ha prodotto; vi è, infine, un evidente incentivo alla accumulazione di scorte ogniqualvolta il prezzo di mercato scende.

Il fatto che anche il sistema americano preveda una condizionalità, di stampo marcatamente ambientale (*conservation plans*), spesso legata alla tutela di particolari territori (*wetland provisions*), non sconfigge tale opinione, ed è troppo poco e troppo marginale per poterne fare un vero e proprio programma ambientale che si giustifichi ai sensi della « scatola verde » dell'Accordo agricolo.

Si aggiungano alla lista i sussidi governativi federali al pagamento delle Crop Insurance (polizze che proteggono contro le rese inferiori alla media, *yield losses*, a qualsiasi motivo siano dovute), già previsti dal *Farm Bill 1995*, e incrementati notevolmente (con lo stanziamento di 8,2 miliardi di dollari) dall'*Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000* (ARPA), fino all'annata agraria 2005-2006.

È vero che il *Farm Bill 2002* dà al Segretario all'agricoltura il potere di apportare aggiustamenti straordinari alla spesa, previa relazione al Congresso, qualora il sistema superasse i tetti fissati dall'Accordo agricolo. Ma sembra altrettanto innegabile che le regole, quelle destinate a fare da lubrificante (o da propellente) del settore agricolo statunitense nei prossimi 5-6 anni, sono state pensate in un'ottica meno liberista di quanto non apparisse l'ispirazione di fondo dell'Accordo di Marrakech; anzi, in un'ottica decisamente « interventista ». Ed è vero che la preoccupazione di presentarsi con le « carte in regola » all'appuntamento dei negoziati è stata molto più sentita dal legislatore europeo che non da quello d'oltreoceano. Vi è sufficiente motivo di riflessione.

Rassegna stampa

OMC

Les aides agricoles provoquent l'échec de la libéralisation du commerce

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les négociations lancées en 2001 sont suspendues. Nul ne sait quand et même si elles reprendront

Depuis quelques semaines, Pascal Lamy, directeur général de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) tentait de jouer les « catalyseurs » pour débloquer in extremis les pourparlers engagés pour libéraliser les échanges mondiaux. Faute de trouver la bonne formule sur les questions agricoles, M. Lamy a dû se résoudre lundi 24 juillet à suspendre sine die le cycle de Doha, lancé au Qatar en 2001. Sans constituer une réelle surprise, l'échec des 149 membres de l'OMC est d'autant plus retentissant que les dirigeants des principales forces commerciales de la planète avaient appelé, en marge du sommet du G8 à Saint-Pétersbourg (Russie) une semaine plus tôt, à fixer les grandes lignes d'un compromis d'ici à la mi-août, afin de boucler les négociations avant la fin de l'année.

Ce calendrier a volé en éclats. M. Lamy n'ose même plus parler d'une reprise des pourparlers : « Le temps sera venu seulement quand les pays membres seront prêts à jouer le jeu », a-t-il constaté lundi après-midi à Genève. Quelques heures plus tôt, lors d'une réunion avec les représentants des six principales parties en lice - Etats-Unis, Europe, Japon, Inde, Brésil et Australie - le patron de l'OMC n'avait rien pu faire pour débloquer les trois dossiers au centre des négociations depuis l'échec du sommet de Cancún, au Mexique en 2003.

LES ETATS-UNIS INFLEXIBLES

Dans son esprit, les Etats-Unis devaient s'engager à baisser les subventions versées à leurs agriculteurs, les Européens à réduire les droits de douane sur les importations agricoles, et les pays émergents, comme le Brésil, l'Inde et la Chine, à faire de même sur les produits industriels. Dimanche, les discussions semblaient progresser sur la baisse des droits de douane agricoles. Elles ont buté sur les soutiens à l'agriculture, la négociatrice américaine, Susan Schwab, refusant de faire le moindre geste.

Chaque délégation a rejeté la responsabilité de l'échec sur les autres. « Les Etats-Unis se sont montrés incapables de faire preuve de flexibilité », a jugé Peter Mandelson, en faisant part de « la profonde déception » de l'Union européenne (UE). Le commissaire au commerce, chargé de négocier au nom des Vingt-Cinq, avait répété ces dernières semaines sa volonté de faire preuve de « flexibilité ». En cas de mouvement général, il s'apprêtait à ignorer les avertissements de la France qui, très soucieuse elle aussi du sort de ses agriculteurs, estimait que le négociateur de l'UE était allé aux limites extrêmes de son mandat.

Les Européens avaient réussi ces derniers mois à rompre leur relatif isolement sur l'agriculture, en se rapprochant des positions des pays émergents. « C'est aux Etats-Unis qu'il revenait de faire le geste le plus important », a renchéri Celso Amorim, le ministre des affaires étrangères brésilien. Son pays espérait, en cas d'accord, développer ses exportations agricoles.

Mais Washington refuse de porter la responsabilité de l'échec : « Le président Bush a signifié clairement au G8 que les Etats-Unis étaient prêts à faire des concessions si certains de nos autres alliés étaient également prêts à en faire. Ils ne l'ont pas fait », a indiqué la Maison Blanche.

Tandis que des élections se profilent au Congrès, l'administration est soumise à d'intenses pressions protectionnistes de la part de l'opposition. Elle n'est pas en mesure de lancer la **173**e négociation agricole qui lui permettrait de tenir d'éventuels engagements auprès de l'OMC.

Critiqué par les Organisations non gouvernementales, le cycle de Doha devait permettre quelques progrès en faveur des pays les plus pauvres, comme l'élimination des subventions aux exportations agricoles à l'horizon de 2013. Ils auraient par ailleurs pu exporter vers les pays développés 97 % de leurs produits à tarif zéro et sans quotas. M. Mandelson, a proposé lundi d'appliquer les dispositions déjà décidées à l'OMC en faveur des pays en développement, en dépit de l'échec des négociations.

Les négociateurs espéraient un compromis avant que n'expire, mi 2007, le mandat permettant au gouvernement américain de négocier en bloc pour le compte du Congrès. Il n'est pas acquis qu'une telle autorisation soit renouvelée.

Personne ne s'aventure à pronostiquer une relance rapide des négociations. « C'est une vraie crise, pas une simple pause », indique-t-on du côté européen. D'après Kamal Nath, le ministre indien du commerce, la relance des pourparlers pourrait prendre « des mois ou des années ». Certains considèrent en effet que les échéances électorales attendues aux Etats-Unis (Congrès fin octobre), au Brésil et en France (présidentielle et législatives) compliquent toute sortie de crise rapide.

Philippe Ricard

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The global trade talks have collapsed because the world's biggest economies prefer failure to compromise. What comes next?

AT LAST it is official. After stumbling on for months, the Doha trade talks have collapsed. On July 24th, at the end of yet another futile gathering of trade ministers in Geneva, Pascal Lamy, the World Trade Organisation's director general, formally suspended the negotiations. He set no date for their resumption. As Kamal Nath, India's trade minister put it, the Doha round "is definitely between intensive care and the crematorium."

Launched in the Qatari capital in 2001, soon after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the Doha round was to be an "ambitious" effort to make globalisation more inclusive and help the world's poor, particularly by slashing barriers and subsidies in farming, the rich-world's most molly-coddled industry.

For almost five years, negotiators haggled over just what such an "ambitious" effort should look like—and made scant progress. Technically there was nothing inevitable about this week's collapse. Yet, despite their grand rhetoric, the world's big economies have long appeared unwilling to make the political compromises that a Doha deal requires.

The big question is what happens next? Previous trade rounds have stumbled, only to rise again a few years later. In 1990 the Uruguay round (predecessor to the Doha talks) was suspended thanks to seemingly insoluble differences between Washington and Brussels over **Europe's** farm subsidies. Trade experts declared the trade talks dead and fretted about the future of the multilateral system. But three years later came the Uruguay Agreement—the most ambitious and comprehensive trade deal to date.

Judging whether Geneva 2006 is a replay of Brussels 1990 means answering two questions: why will today's negotiators not compromise? And what, if anything, could change their mind?

The fault lines in the Doha round are deep. America wants to slash tariffs, arguing (rightly) that the best way to help poor countries is through more open markets. Since America's tariffs are already low, that puts the onus on the European Union (EU) to cut farm tariffs and on big emerging economies to reduce barriers on farm goods and industrial products. Emerging economies, in contrast, want fewer farm subsidies and lower tariffs in rich countries, but are loth to reduce their own barriers much. Countries such as India argue that in a pro-poor Doha round they need do little. The EU chides America both for demanding unrealistically large tariff cuts from others and for offering too little farm-subsidy reform of its own.

In principle, a compromise was there for the taking. Indeed, Mr Lamy has informally laid out its contours: more subsidy cuts than America has offered and more ambitious tariff

cuts by the EU and big emerging economies. So why has nothing happened? One reason is genuine differences over whether the interests of poor people are best served by lower tariffs or more special protection. But the explanation lies chiefly in the failure of countries to face down their own powerful protectionist lobbies, particularly farmers.

Curiously, this political cowardice has pushed negotiators in opposite directions. **Europe** and the big emerging economies are inclined towards a timid deal. America wants a big Doha deal, where its farmers see real gains in their access to foreign markets, or no deal at all.

The tension between these approaches was the immediate cause of this week's collapse. Susan Schwab, America's trade representative, decided that the EU and the emerging economies were not offering enough liberalisation to justify big cuts in America's farm subsidies. "Doha lite" as Ms Schwab put it, was riddled with loopholes and not worth having. This is why America has received much of the blame for Doha's demise. But at home, Ms Schwab's hard line was hailed. Virtually everyone in Washington agrees that no Doha deal was better than a weak deal.

America may be exaggerating. By most calculations, the kind of compromise Mr Lamy envisaged would have brought real, albeit modest, reductions in rich countries' farm barriers and big emerging economies' industrial tariffs. What is more, rich countries promised to give the poorest duty- and quota-free access for most goods. Rich and poor were working on rules to streamline customs procedures so that it no longer takes 20 days to unload and clear a container in Eritrea compared with two hours in Liverpool. Trade in services might have been freed a bit. Because global trade talks work on the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, these gains are all at risk.

Nothing will change until the big economies, and Washington in particular, decide that a Doha deal is worth having. The lesson of the Uruguay round is that domestic calculations can change quickly. Carla Hills, then America's top trade negotiator, said she would rather see the Uruguay round fail than cave in to **Europe's** refusal to take on its farmers. Yet three years later, that round was concluded as all sides compromised.

Optimists argue that much the same will happen again. As Jeffrey Schott of the Institute for International Economics puts it, leaders need to "stew in their own juices" until they realise that a Doha deal is worth doing. Some argue a turnaround could come quickly. Jagdish Bhagwati, a prominent trade expert, still hopes that George Bush will realise within weeks that a Doha compromise is better than no deal at all. "He needs a multilateralist triumph," argues Mr Bhagwati.

Unfortunately, there are several reasons for pessimism. In 1990 the only obstacle to a deal was the deadlock between Brussels and Washington. Today, several other big economies, including Brazil, India and China, also need to be on board. India, in particular, shows remarkably little interest in doing a Doha deal.

The political landscape in America is less hospitable today, too. This week's collapse means the administration cannot get a Doha agreement through Congress before June next year, the date for the expiry of George Bush's trade-promotion authority—which prevents the deal from being destroyed by legislators' amendments. Although some in the White House want him to ask Congress for an extension, Mr Bush may be unwilling to take on a political fight he may not win. America's lawmakers are more sceptical of trade deals these days. Trade-promotion authority—and by extension a Doha deal—will probably have to wait until after the 2008 presidential election.

America's political calculus could yet change if the real costs of a Doha failure became clear. In the short term, however, that seems unlikely. Although, Doha's failure makes rich-country promises to help the poorest sound hollow, the rich could salvage some credibility. Peter Mandelson, **Europe's** top negotiator, has already suggested a separate development package for the poorest, which would include trade-related aid as well as promises on duty- and quota-free access to rich markets.

Moreover, America's farm bill is to be reauthorised next year. With Doha in abeyance, farm-friendly lawmakers will do little to cut subsidies and Mr Bush will do little to force

them. Another fat farm bill will make it even harder to restart the Doha talks.

In the years ahead other things may revive Doha—although they might equally poison the trade system still further. Some analysts argue that this week's breakdown will bring a mass of trade disputes, particularly over rich countries' farm subsidies. The WTO has already declared many of America's cotton subsidies to be illegal. Future cases might attack subsidies for rice and soybeans. The disputes could convince politicians that farm trade really needs reform. Then again, it might make America's Congress even more sceptical of multilateral trade.

A bleaker economic climate could also change the political equation. In the early 1990s a recession focused minds on the importance of getting the Uruguay round done. Today, the thriving world economy has bred complacency. Trade has grown briskly and many types of protectionism have waned. The number of new anti-dumping cases, for instance, has fallen sharply in the past couple of years. If the economy slows, tariffs—and the risk of trade spats—may rise. Slower growth will make it harder to take on special interests, such as farmers. A global slowdown will also raise countries' fear of Chinese competition. And that fear may make a Doha deal less likely.

In America, where Sino phobia is strongest, many politicians equate China's entry into the WTO with the beginning of America's "problems" with Chinese trade. In emerging economies the fear of China already lies behind a reluctance to cut multilateral tariffs. Many countries, including India, Egypt and Nigeria have been unilaterally slashing tariffs, even as they refuse to offer big tariff cuts in the Doha round. The reason is that Doha commitments are irrevocable and they want to keep the ability to raise tariffs, partly for fear of China.

The most likely route to a reinvigorated Doha is the failure of an alternative—a greater focus on regionalism. Regional and bilateral trade deals have mushroomed (see chart). All but one WTO member, Mongolia, is now involved in some sort of preferential trade deal.

America is often touted as a champion of regionalism. The Bush administration has signed 14 free-trade deals and is negotiating another 11. Many people assume America would lose little from Doha's demise, in part because it could wield power in regional deals.

Yet the opposite may prove true. Without trade-promotion authority, the president will find it difficult to negotiate bilateral, regional or multilateral deals. The ability to push a regional agenda could be stymied just as others step up the pace. The EU has made no secret that its Plan B after Doha's demise is a shift towards bilateral deals, particularly in Asia.

Within Asia, the number of trade deals is exploding. The ten ASEAN countries have bilateral deals with each other; all have, in effect, individual bilateral deals with China. Others are being negotiated with India, South Korea and, in several cases, Japan. By one estimate, East Asia alone will have around 70 free-trade deals by the end of 2006.

This noodle bowl of Asian regionalism could be the catalyst for restarting the Doha round. As Richard Baldwin, an expert on regionalism at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, has pointed out, Asian-style regionalism may prove more pernicious than other regional deals. The sheer number of agreements, all of which cover slightly different products and contain different rules, will dramatically complicate logistics in a region that epitomises the global trend towards decentralised production.

As these agreements gradually reduce bilateral tariffs, Asia will be riven by trade discrimination between different countries. That may push nations back to the Doha table. None more so than America, especially if it is left out of the regional rush. But how far must Asian regionalism go and how much damage will be done before the multilateral trading system can put this week's disaster behind it?

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BODY:

Can America's farmers be weaned from their government money?

JUST over four years ago, in May 2002, Congress passed the farm bill, a gargantuan, five-year giveaway to America's farmers. And in one of the more spineless moments of his presidency George Bush, a self-professed free-trader, signed it. Over the next year, Congress will produce a new farm bill. Conventional wisdom holds that it will be much like the last, particularly since the Doha trade talks (which would have required subsidy reform) have collapsed. The American Farm Bureau, a big farmers' lobby group, is pushing for a simple extension of today's subsidies. With the 2008 presidential election looming, it is argued, no politician dare disagree.

That logic may be wrong. America's system of supporting farmers may well change next year, though it will not necessarily get much better. Mike Johanns, Mr Bush's farm minister, says he wants reform and has promised to come up with specific proposals by January 2007. Individual congressmen are drawing up their own visions for change. Ron Kind, a Democrat from Wisconsin, will introduce the first such bill next week. He wants more cash for conservation, bigger subsidies for biofuels and coupons to allow old folk and the poor to shop at farmers' markets.

Even some of the biggest recipients of federal cash say today's system won't do. The Iowa Corn Growers Association, for instance, recently voted against extending the 2002 farm bill. It claims to want a safety net for farmers that is more "trade compatible" and "market-oriented". Given that corn farmers got 46% of the subsidies under the farm bill, and that Iowa farmers, thanks to the state's early presidential caucus, wield disproportionate political clout, this sounds too good to be true.

It is. America's farmers have not been seized by sudden guilt. Instead, they are pre-empting pressure to change a system that is increasingly viewed as unfair, expensive and against the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

The federal government spent over \$20 billion on farm subsidies last year: much less than the European Union lavishes on its mollycoddled farmers, but more than Washington spent on foreign aid and almost twice what it spends on subsidising college for poor children. And America's farm subsidies, unlike **Europe's**, have become more, rather than less, trade-distorting. Most of the direct cash is lavished on crops, particularly corn (maize), soybeans, rice, cotton and wheat, often depressing world prices. Farmers who grow these crops got 93% of the subsidies between 2002 and 2005 (see chart). As a result, six out ten American farmers get no federal money, while 10% of farmers get 72% of it. Nor are these small, struggling family farmers. Over half the subsidies go to

large commercial farms.

Fear of litigation at the WTO is one reason for reform's momentum. Brazil has already won a case against American cotton subsidies. It argues that America has not complied with the WTO's ruling and, on September 1st, made the first move towards retaliating. American farmers are worried that other crop subsidies, especially rice, soyabeans and even corn, could be vulnerable to a WTO case. They want the new farm bill to be WTO-proof.

For others, especially corn farmers, greed is a powerful motive. Although these farmers get the lion's share of today's subsidies, they are unlikely to in future, thanks to America's obsession with ethanol. The amount of corn used for ethanol production has soared. In 2005 the ethanol industry used 1.5 billion bushels of grain to make 4 billion gallons of ethanol, more than double the output of 2001. Ethanol production, the farmers reckon, will raise corn prices and thus, under the current system, cause their subsidies to decline. Hence the corn growers' call for a new support system based on a "revenue insurance model"—perhaps slightly less trade-distorting than today's subsidies, but not necessarily much cheaper.

Jealousy will be the third driver of change. Public awareness of the subsidies' scale, and their inequity, has been rising. And the 60% of farmers who get no cash from Washington, particularly fruit and vegetable producers, are increasingly cross. Politically, these farmers could make a difference. Over 50% of today's farm subsidies are concentrated in 25 of America's 435 congressional districts. In California, which has 53 congressional districts, the vast majority of farm subsidies today go to three districts in the Central Valley. But speciality farmers seem to be organising more effectively than they did in 2002.

Add to these farm lobbies a cacophony of environmentalists, nutritionists and others, and it is unclear what will come out of the legislative sausage machine. The smart money is on more emphasis on alternative energy and the environment, more subsidies for conservation and less money for trade-distorting crop support. Since wheat, corn and soyabean farmers can jump on the energy bandwagon, the real losers may be rice and cotton farmers.

From a trade perspective, the new farm bill could be a modest improvement. America may well be heading for more green subsidies and fewer trade-distorting ones. But despite Washington's budget crunch, few expect Uncle Sam's generosity to farmers to abate much.

GRAPHIC: The road to riches

LOAD-DATE: September 7, 2006

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The **New York Times**

September 11, 2006 Monday
Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Column 1; Foreign Desk; Pg. 6

LENGTH: 670 words

HEADLINE: **Agriculture** Discord Stymies World Trade Talks' Revival

BYLINE: By LARRY ROHTER

DATELINE: RIO DE JANEIRO, Sept. 10

BODY:

Despite repeated declarations of their desire to resuscitate suspended global trade negotiations, representatives of leading industrial and developing nations meeting here this weekend were unable to agree on a resumption date.

The talks were suspended in July, and much of the blame over an impasse in resuming them has been directed at the United States.

"What happened in July was a serious accident" that could lead to litigation and "protectionist surges" that would damage global trade, Pascal Lamy, director general of the World Trade Organization, said at a news conference here on Sunday. "We want the negotiations to resume," he continued, "but I'm not sure we have all the elements in line" to do so.

As was the case in July, the sticking point is **agriculture**. Developing nations have been demanding that in return for opening their markets to more manufactured goods and services, the United States and other rich industrialized countries eliminate farm subsidies and related measures that inhibit exports of agricultural products from poorer nations.

The meeting here was sponsored by the Group of 20, or G-20, a coalition led by large fast-developing countries from Asia, Latin America and Africa. After meeting on Saturday to form their common position, the G-20 emissaries were joined Sunday by representatives of the United States, the European Union and Japan, as well as Mr. Lamy.

Taking the offensive, the European Union said it was willing to make new concessions on **agriculture** and called on the Bush administration to do the same. "The U.S. needs to make a fresh proposal during this time to reduce in real terms what it spends on trade-distorting subsidies and to discipline the programs it uses," said Peter Mandelson of Britain, the trade commissioner for the European Union.

But the United States trade representative, Susan C. Schwab, said Washington had already agreed to "very real and very dramatic cuts" with a proposal that was "not a take-it-or-leave-it offer." She rejected suggestions that the Bush administration was acting primarily to protect powerful farm groups in Republican or swing states. "Being a champion of small family farms cuts across party lines," she said.

The breakdown of talks in July stemmed from "a collective effort and a collective failure," she continued. "The Doha round is in serious trouble, there is no question," she said, referring to the global trade talks that began five years ago in Doha, the capital of Qatar. She said the United States was committed to a successful outcome "if one can be found."

Several emissaries expressed hope that negotiations could resume after the American midterm elections in November, when the Bush administration will presumably be less

subject to pressure from the farm lobby. They spoke of a "window of opportunity" that would extend until the middle of next year, when Congress would be drafting the next farm bill and President Bush's authority to negotiate trade pacts that Congress could not amend would expire.

"It seems to me so patently obvious that farmers have votes and write checks," Mr. Mandelson said at a news conference on Sunday afternoon. While the United States electoral calendar is not the only factor that will determine the date of any resumption of talks, said Celso Amorim, Brazil's foreign minister, "the fact the elections are over can help" break the logjam.

Brazil itself has a presidential election in three weeks, and the meeting here, a joint initiative of Brazil and India, allowed Brazil's left-wing government, whose own foreign policy has been criticized by opposition parties, to play the role of champion of the developing world. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will meet in Brasilia this week with his counterparts from India and South Africa to fine-tune the G-20's position.

"We saw signs of flexibility and a preparedness to move," Mr. Amorim said, in summarizing the meetings between the camps. "We didn't have any sign of blockages."

URL: <http://www.nytimes.com>

GRAPHIC: Photo: Susan C. Schwab, center, the trade representative for the United States, at economic talks in Rio de Janeiro. (Photo by Sergio Moraes/Reuters)

LOAD-DATE: September 11, 2006

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The **Australian** (Australia)

September 20, 2006 Wednesday
All-round First Edition

SECTION: LOCAL; Pg. 2

LENGTH: 448 words

HEADLINE: Cairns trade impasse 'just another knockback' for PM

Additional reporting: AAP

BYLINE: Joseph Kerr, Ian Gerard

BODY:

A KEY international trade gathering in Queensland today is unlikely to reach a solution on agricultural subsidies, John Howard conceded last night.

The 18-nation, Australian-led **Cairns Group** meeting is seen as one of the last chances to revive the stalled Doha round of World Trade Organisation talks.

WTO chief Pascal Lamy, who will attend the meeting, suspended the round indefinitely in July when six key nations -- including Australia -- failed to agree on ways to slash protection of agricultural and industrial goods. But the European Union's Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson has reportedly already rejected Australia's new trade proposal as "undoable".

Asked if the meeting would go ahead now Australia's plan was dead in the water, Mr Howard said he was used to knockbacks.

"The **Cairns Group** initiative will still go ahead -- we are used to rejection by the Europeans," the Prime Minister told ABC television last night.

"Nothing is ever dead in the area of trade and negotiations. You've got to keep at it ... but we have been used to being knocked back in the past, and I'm sure that will continue to be the case, but eventually there will be a breakthrough."

Farm **group** leaders from Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, Paraguay, South Africa and Uruguay yesterday met in **Cairns** and warned the world could not afford to be denied broad trade reform.

Their argument was strengthened last night with the release by Trade Minister Mark Vaile of an Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics report showing a successful result on trade talks could by 2016 boost the value of exports from the **Cairns Group** by \$US20billion (\$27 billion).

Mr Vaile said American, European and Japanese politicians needed to ignore the demands of their domestic lobby **groups** and push for ambitious liberalisation.

Meeting ahead of the conference, **Cairns Group** farm leaders said they would not settle for anything less from the talks than an agreement for the removal of trade barriers and restrictions on market access for developing nations.

National Farmers Federation president David Crombie said he would today tell trade ministers from the **Cairns Group** that reform could be achieved. "It's just too comfortable to say they are suspended. In our view it is just not good enough and that's what we will say to the ministers," he said.

"I hope that we can create some space ... the space to regenerate it."

US trade representative Susan Schwab and Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns will be in **Cairns** along with EC ambassador to the WTO Carlo Trojan, with the major stumbling blocks to the Doha round seen as US and EU intransigence on further cuts to subsidies and tariffs.

LOAD-DATE: September 19, 2006

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IMPRESE



Pag. 13

Confagricoltura. Parla Vecchioni
«L'Italia rilanci il negoziato Wto»

Secondo la confederazione le istituzioni nazionali ed europee possono procedere anche in assenza di un'intesa globale

Alessandro Merli

Alessandro Merli
ROMA

Un ruolo più attivo del l'Europa anche nella ricerca di accordi commerciali bilaterali, una maggiore attenzione all'internazionalizzazione del settore agricolo con tre linee d'azione concreta a livello nazionale. Il congelamento del negoziato del Wto sulla liberalizzazione del commercio internazionale non deve bloccare l'iniziativa europea e italiana in agricoltura, sostiene Federico Vecchioni, presidente di Confagricoltura.

«Come organizzazione sindacale - dice Vecchioni - abbiamo seguito da vicino gli sviluppi del negoziato. Credo fosse prevedibile che ognuno avrebbe mantenuto le proprie posizioni. Ricordo che noi europei, attraverso le riforme della Pac, stiamo riducendo dal 50 al 30% del bilancio comunitario i fondi destinati all'agricoltura e ricordo anche che l'Europa è il primo importatore alimentare del mondo. Altri, a partire dagli Stati Uniti, non hanno mostrato alcuna flessibilità».

Il presidente di Conf agricoltura è convinto che si debba utilizzare questo stallo nei negoziati multilaterali per muoversi sul fronte delle intese bilaterali. «Queste - afferma - ci possono consentire tra l'altro, con negoziati che comunque vanno condotti attraverso l'Unione europea, di rimuovere barriere che danneggiano il nostro export. Penso a quelle che bloccano i nostri vini. È molto positiva, per esempio, l'intenzione dichiarata di voler far ripartire le trattativa fra la Ue e il Mercosur». Gli accordi bilaterali dovranno comunque tener presente, secondo Vecchioni, «il capitolo delle regole, dalla sicurezza alimentare, alla tutela del consumatore, alla tracciabilità. Credo che il consumatore europeo non voglia andare incontro a rischi su questi temi».

Anche se i negoziati commerciali sono affidati alla Commissione europea, resta un ruolo importante per le istituzioni nazionali, per le quali Confagricoltura propone tre aree d'intervento. «C'è bisogno - sostiene Vecchioni - di un'offensiva commerciale del Paese per affiancare il sistema produttivo: iniziative sia sul piano delle regole, sia dell'impegno finanziario, ma soprattutto un coordinamento delle varie strutture. Per questo proponiamo che venga realizzato un rafforzamento ambizioso dell'ufficio Affari internazionali al ministero delle Politiche agricole».

La seconda proposta dell'organizzazione degli agricoltori è di intensificare le intese cosiddette dei "corridoi verdi", già utilizzate nei casi dell'Egitto e del Libano. Queste consistono nell'individuare le produzioni che possono essere oggetto di scambi e nel definirne quantitativi e standard. «Ci sono per noi delle aree prioritarie - dice il presidente di Confagricoltura - che sono soprattutto il bacino del Mediterraneo, i Balcani e l'Asia, a partire dall'India».

Confagricoltura chiede infine che il "tavolo verde", dove per ogni singolo prodotto si riuniscono i rappresentanti della filiera produttiva, affronti in ciascun caso le questioni dell'internazionalizzazione e in particolare, dice Vecchioni, le problematiche del nostro export sui diversi mercati internazionali.

Stampa



Commercio mondiale

Il fallimento del Doha Round

Paolo Guerrieri



Il Doha Round della World Trade Organization è miseramente fallito, travolto dalla voglia inarrestabile di protezionismo di molti paesi più o meno sviluppati. Ci vorranno anni per poterlo rilanciare. Nel frattempo tenderanno a proliferare gli accordi bilaterali e preferenziali tra paesi, con una conseguente forte politicizzazione del commercio mondiale. Una prospettiva che è gravida di rischi, anche per le aperture dei mercati e

le liberalizzazioni fin qui realizzate.

I tanti padri del fallimento

Nel novembre 2001, a soli due mesi dai tragici attentati dell'11 settembre, il Doha Round era stato lanciato con grande enfasi come il primo grande negoziato commerciale multilaterale a favore dello sviluppo. Ma l'andamento delle trattative si è rivelato in salita fin dall'inizio, mostrando come per molti paesi gli impegni sottoscritti avessero davvero scarso valore. Forti contrasti sono sorti in tutte le più importanti aree negoziali. Tanto da poter parlare di un fallimento del negoziato che ha molti padri.

Sulla rimozione delle barriere agli scambi di prodotti industriali e servizi non si è riusciti a fare passi avanti di rilievo per le responsabilità in questo caso dei paesi più influenti dell'area in via di sviluppo, in particolare India e Brasile. Anche se la posizione intransigente e/o comunque eccessivamente rigida degli Stati Uniti (sussidi) e dell'Unione europea (tariffe) sui temi agricoli ha finito per condizionare negativamente, ancora una volta, l'esito dell'intero negoziato.

Una serie di insuccessi (Conferenze di Cancun nel 2003 e poi di Hong Kong lo scorso anno) ha così costellato l'evoluzione delle trattative fino al triste epilogo di questi giorni e alla sospensione del Round decretata dal direttore generale della Wto, Pascal Lamy, costretto a prendere atto delle posizioni inconciliabili dei maggiori paesi.

Non è una crisi temporanea

Il 'congelamento' del Doha Round è destinato a protrarsi a lungo, per svariati anni. A metà del 2007 scadrà il mandato a negoziare del presidente Bush (la cosiddetta Trade Promotion Authority) e tutto dovrà essere rinviato almeno a dopo le elezioni presidenziali americane del 2008. In realtà l'attesa di un rilancio delle trattative potrebbe essere ancora più lunga.

Il fatto è che in questi anni sono venuti meno gli equilibri che hanno assicurato in passato il successo di pressoché tutti i precedenti Round commerciali, svoltisi in sede Gatt (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) e Wto, ovvero il modello negoziale imperniato sulla leadership indiscussa e sull'accordo tra Stati Uniti ed Europa. Un duopolio che ha cominciato a non funzionare più già negli anni Novanta, portando al clamoroso fallimento di Seattle. L'ascesa di nuovi potenti attori negoziali - basti pensare al Brasile, all'India e alla Cina - ha trasformato la scena commerciale in un contesto multilaterale e oligopolistico, in cui più soggetti hanno il potere di condizionare l'esito finale del negoziato. Nel nuovo regime commerciale, in analogia con quanto avviene in un mercato oligopolistico, favorire soluzioni cooperative non è facile. E un gioco non cooperativo, fatto di azioni e reazioni autonome degli attori principali, finisce per generare tensioni e contrasti crescenti. È proprio quanto si è verificato nel periodo più recente spingendo il Doha Round ad arenarsi nel gioco perverso dei veti incrociati tra paesi.

Riformare e rinnovare tali meccanismi negoziali è il problema da affrontare per rilanciare il quadro multilaterale e evitare che la Wto, al pari di altre organizzazioni internazionali, veda drasticamente ridimensionarsi la sua capacità di decisione e

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Politica estera
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Democrazia e
sviluppo

Mediterraneo e
Medio Oriente

Rapporti Si
transatlantici

Economia
internazionale

Resto del
mondo

Gli

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Agenda transatlantica

Atlante geo-economico

Mediterraneo e Medio

Documenti

18 settembre 2006 - 5
antiterrorismo

Risoluzione del Consiglio
delle Nazioni Unite dell'8
sulla strategia ant...

6 settembre 2006 - Tr
Trends 2006

Transatlantic Trends 2
progetto del German Ma
United States e della...

6 settembre 2006 - Et
Survey

European Elite Survey
del CIRCaP (Centro di Ri
Cambiamento Politico) a

rischi una crescente marginalità.

I rischi di un bilateralismo à la carte

Ma è un problema che è divenuto oggi ancora più difficile da affrontare. Così nel futuro più immediato la crisi del Doha Round rischia di offrire nuovi forti incentivi alla crescita del bilateralismo commerciale tra paesi. Va altresì ricordato che in questi ultimi anni il numero di accordi bilaterali e regionali è cresciuto in modo spettacolare, divenendo uno strumento largamente utilizzato dalla quasi totalità dei paesi membri della Wto. Una minaccia di proliferazione tanto più seria allorché si consideri che la febbre bilaterale sta investendo anche l'intero continente asiatico, ove si stanno moltiplicando i progetti di creazione di blocchi preferenziali a geometrie variabili.

Con quali conseguenze? A questo riguardo anche la letteratura teorica ed empirica più recente dimostra che a determinate condizioni il bilateralismo-regionalismo può rappresentare un importante laboratorio di sperimentazione delle modalità di "integrazione profonda" tra paesi (deep integration) consentendo di affrontare i "nuovi temi del commercio", dai servizi agli investimenti e alla mobilità dei lavoratori temporanei. A condizione, però, che gli accordi preferenziali si muovano nell'ambito di obiettivi compatibili con il contesto multilaterale e costituiscano così una sorta di ponte tra i regimi nazionali e quelli globali. Altrimenti gli accordi preferenziali possono rapidamente trasformarsi in un bilateralismo à la carte, ovvero in forme di integrazione antagoniste al sistema globale, con costi pesanti per tutti, e in particolare per i paesi più poveri e meno sviluppati, privi di un reale potere negoziale.

Uno scenario di incontrollata frammentazione (bilateralismo) delle relazioni commerciali finirebbe così per divenire foriero di rischi per lo stesso sistema globale, arrivando a minacciare la vitalità di quel regime commerciale multilaterale che ha offerto, in tutti questi anni, un contributo decisivo alla crescita dell'economia mondiale.

Paolo Guerrieri è professore ordinario e direttore del Centro di Ricerca sull'Economia Internazionale all'Università di Roma 'La Sapienza'. Vice-presidente dello Iai e Visiting Professor al College of Europe di Bruges e all'Università di San Diego, California.

Invia ad un amico - Stampa

Lo sviluppo straordinario dell'economia mondiale negli ultimi 50 anni è stato in larga misura sostenuto dalla crescita degli scambi internazionali di beni e servizi. Lo sradicamento della povertà in Cina, il miracolo economico in Italia e in Spagna, l'industrializzazione delle tigri asiatiche, il balzo dell'economia dell'India non si sarebbero verificati se questi paesi non avessero potuto contare sulla rapida crescita delle proprie esportazioni. A sua volta, l'aumento del commercio internazionale deve molto alla riduzione delle barriere agli scambi sponsorizzata prima dal GATT e, a partire dal 1994, dall'Organizzazione Mondiale per il Commercio. Anche la crescita degli investimenti diretti all'estero, che ha contribuito non poco a stimolare l'economia mondiale, è in buona parte attribuibile alla riduzione dei costi del commercio.

Il Doha Round gira su se stesso

Riccardo Faini
21-08-2006

Lo sviluppo straordinario dell'**economia mondiale** negli ultimi 50 anni è stato in larga misura sostenuto dalla crescita degli scambi internazionali di beni e servizi. Lo sradicamento della povertà in Cina, il miracolo economico in Italia e in Spagna, l'industrializzazione delle tigri asiatiche, il balzo dell'economia dell'India non si sarebbero verificati se questi paesi non avessero potuto contare sulla rapida crescita delle proprie esportazioni. A sua volta, l'aumento del commercio internazionale deve molto alla riduzione delle **barriere agli scambi** sponsorizzata prima dal GATT e, a partire dal 1994, dall'**Organizzazione Mondiale per il Commercio**. Anche la crescita degli investimenti diretti all'estero, che ha contribuito non poco a stimolare l'economia mondiale, è in buona parte attribuibile alla riduzione dei costi del commercio.

Il fallimento

Date queste premesse, si potrebbe pensare che i governi di tutto il mondo, dalle democrazie del G7 ai paesi emergenti, si sarebbero strenuamente impegnati per garantire il pieno successo della nuova tornata di **negoziati commerciali**. Così non è stato. La complessità stessa dei temi trattati, l'incapacità dei governi di far fronte alle **lobbies settoriali** che si opponevano a nuove concessioni, l'indebolimento dei gruppi di pressione a favore della liberalizzazione (come ben rilevava Giorgio Barba Navaretti in un suo intervento sulle colonne del Sole 24 Ore qualche giorno fa) sono tutti fattori che hanno reso assai più difficile il negoziato del **Doha Round** e avrebbero richiesto un impegno ben maggiore da parte dei governi per garantirne il successo. E' accaduto invece il contrario. I negoziati si sono trascinati stancamente nel colpevole disinteresse dei capi di governo, alimentato forse dalla convinzione che, come era sempre successo nel passato, si sarebbe raggiunto un accordo all'ultima ora. Così non è stato. E oggi i governi si ritrovano a dovere raccogliere i cocci di un negoziato frantumato da troppi egoismi e troppa miopia, che molto probabilmente neppure la meritevole ma tardiva iniziativa di Bush e Blair riuscirà a ricomporre.

I rischi

I pericoli per il sistema multilaterale degli scambi sono numerosi. I negoziati commerciali sono stati giustamente paragonati a una bicicletta. Una volta in sella è necessario continuare a correre. E' vero, ci si potrebbe fermare, come alcuni sostengono, ponendo un piede a terra e facendo tesoro dei risultati già acquisiti. Ma non è possibile o, perlomeno, è molto pericoloso farlo. Il problema non è solo, come osservano giustamente Fabrizio Onida e Renato Ruggiero sul Sole 24 Ore, la diffusione a macchia degli accordi regionali che minerebbero il principio ispiratore dell'OMC, il **multilateralismo**. Vi è un altro rischio, altrettanto grave: l'aumento delle controversie e l'indebolimento del sistema di risoluzione delle **dispute commerciali**. Grazie a quest'ultimo meccanismo, le controversie commerciali trovano oggi una soluzione, efficace nei tempi e condivisa nelle procedure, in grado di frenare una crescita incontrollata di ritorsioni e contro ritorsioni. Ogni anno però insorgono in campo commerciale nuovi problemi, che si cumulano a quelli irrisolti; si creano nuovi contenziosi su materie non sempre previste dagli accordi esistenti. I negoziati commerciali servono per evitare che questi problemi, vecchi

o nuovi che siano, causino un aumento delle controversie fra paesi che rallenterebbe, e non di poco, la crescita degli scambi e finirebbe per ingolfare proprio il sistema di risoluzione delle dispute commerciali.

Le opportunità mancate

Per l'Italia, il costo di un fallimento del Doha Round ricadrebbe soprattutto sul **settore industriale**. Si spegnerebbero anzitutto le speranze di riforma del bilancio comunitario. Una riduzione più decisa del peso del settore agricolo nel bilancio europeo, come proposto a suo tempo dal **Rapporto Sapir**, avrebbe aperto spazi rilevanti per politiche di sostegno all'industria in attività cruciali quali la ricerca e lo sviluppo e la formazione. Soprattutto, la mancata apertura dei mercati dei paesi emergenti danneggerà le nostre esportazioni che saranno meno in grado, in assenza di una liberalizzazione degli scambi, di trarre vantaggio dalla domanda crescente in quei paesi sia per **beni di investimento** sia per **beni di qualità** nei cosiddetti **settori tradizionali**, tessile, abbigliamento, calzaturiero, mobilifici. Un rilancio della competitività del settore industriale passa quindi anche attraverso un'azione più decisa a favore del processo di liberalizzazione degli scambi internazionali.

Amis ministres du commerce...

Article paru dans l'édition du 14.12.05

A l'occasion de l'ouverture de Hongkong de la conférence de l'OMC, son directeur général incite les représentants des 148 pays membres à faire preuve de courage politique

Cher(ère) ministre,

J'espère que vous êtes bien arrivé(e) à Hongkong et que vous êtes plein(e) d'énergie. J'ai pour ma part constitué d'importantes réserves de pain complet et de bananes pour tenir jusqu'à la fin de la semaine. Il nous faudra certainement travailler dur.

Tous les ministres ont la même carte et le même compas, la déclaration de Doha signée en 2001 : ouvrir davantage les échanges et adapter les règles commerciales à l'économie du XXI^e siècle en s'assurant que les intérêts et besoins des pays en développement seront au coeur des résultats. Ce n'est pas une responsabilité à prendre à la légère. Il y va non seulement de l'avenir de cette négociation, mais aussi de l'avenir du système commercial mondial lui-même.

Comme vous le savez bien, après les nombreuses heures que nous avons passées ensemble, il s'agit probablement de la série la plus complexe de négociations commerciales internationales jamais entreprise. Englobant l'agriculture, les droits applicables aux produits industriels, le commerce des services, le commerce et l'environnement, et bien d'autres questions, ces négociations peuvent produire le supplément de croissance dont on a bien besoin pour encourager le développement en Afrique, en Asie, en Amérique latine et soutenir une économie mondiale plus stable. C'est un résultat qui ne sera pas facile à obtenir.

Vous aurez besoin de courage politique au cours des prochains jours. Tous ceux qui sont appelés à bénéficier d'une plus grande ouverture du commerce resteront silencieux, alors que le petit nombre de ceux qui pâtissent de l'ajustement de votre tissu économique et social sera dans les rues, battant le tambour et vous demandant avec insistance de ne pas céder et de préserver le statu quo.

C'est pourquoi nous avons eu tant de mal à trouver un accord au cours de ces négociations. Nous étions d'abord censés les terminer en janvier dernier. Nous avons ensuite voulu utiliser cette réunion de Hongkong pour arriver dans les domaines du commerce des produits agricoles et de la réduction des droits applicables aux produits industriels aux deux tiers du chemin. Nous n'avons pas été en mesure de franchir ces obstacles.

Pour éviter les conséquences catastrophiques qu'ont les réunions ministérielles de l'OMC lorsqu'elles échouent, nous avons décidé de limiter nos objectifs pour cette réunion. Les négociations menées en juillet 2004 nous ont fait franchir environ 50 % du chemin menant à un accord final. Ces dernières semaines, un travail considérable et une volonté relativement nouvelle de parvenir à un compromis nous ont permis d'avancer encore de 5 % sur cette voie. Ici, à Hongkong, nous ne ménagerons aucun effort pour aller plus loin en cherchant à réduire les divergences concernant l'agriculture, les produits industriels et un ensemble d'accords pour les pays les plus pauvres. Ne vous y trompez pas, cette réunion devra consister en de réelles négociations. Si nous ne saisissons pas cette occasion de faire de véritables efforts pour surmonter nos divergences, vos concitoyens voudront savoir pourquoi.

Ainsi, soit nous achevons le Cycle à la fin de 2006, soit nous risquons de voir le système commercial mondial perdre de sa pertinence. Les règles commerciales internationales ont été actualisées pour la dernière fois en 1994, époque où les ordinateurs, sans parler des téléphones portables, étaient considérés comme extrêmement exotiques, où la messagerie électronique était utilisée uniquement par quelques rares privilégiés et où la Chine, l'Inde et le Brésil commençaient juste à trouver leurs marques en tant que puissances commerciales mondiales. Imaginez ce que nous réserve la prochaine décennie. Des gouvernements frustrés par l'absence de progrès à

l'OMC opteraient alors pour des négociations bilatérales ou régionales dans lesquelles, à l'évidence, les petits pays pauvres auraient moins d'influence. Et l'OMC deviendrait une grosse machine chargée des contentieux où le rôle de législateur serait réduit à peu de chose.

Cela serait particulièrement fâcheux si je songe à ce qui a déjà été réalisé au cours des quatre années qui se sont écoulées depuis le lancement de cette négociation. Les engagements déjà pris par les pays riches permettraient de réduire les subventions agricoles qui faussent le commerce selon des marges beaucoup plus importantes que lors des précédentes négociations internationales connues sous le nom de Cycle d'Uruguay. Le subventionnement des exportations serait éliminé.

Il y aurait également une baisse plus forte des droits sur les produits agricoles et sur les produits industriels, non seulement en raison des offres déjà présentées, y compris par les pays en développement, mais du fait que les gouvernements sont proches d'un accord sur des formules qui réduiraient les droits les plus élevés selon les marges les plus importantes. Des progrès ont déjà été accomplis pour rendre le système commercial international plus compatible avec les règles environnementales mondiales et pour réduire les subventions qui entraînent l'épuisement des réserves halieutiques mondiales.

Voulons-nous vraiment renoncer à tout cela ?

Ces dernières semaines, l'ambiance au siège de l'OMC à Genève s'est améliorée. Tous les membres de l'OMC sont convenus par consensus que le projet de document de négociation que nous vous avons présenté devrait être la base des négociations - c'est la première fois que cela arrive avant une conférence ministérielle. Et, mardi dernier, nous sommes enfin convenus d'adapter nos règles pour faire en sorte que les pays pauvres ne disposant pas de capacités de fabrication puissent avoir accès aux médicaments génériques en cas de crise sanitaire. Grâce à ce bon travail, nous arrivons à Hongkong en ayant pris un peu d'élan. J'espère que je peux compter sur vous pour poursuivre sur cette lancée dans les jours à venir.

Une dernière chose, n'oubliez pas de vous munir de votre carnet de chèques politique. Tous les membres devront apporter une contribution à la négociation, même si certains inscriront plus de zéros que d'autres. Mais rappelez-vous que c'est un bon investissement parce que, dans des négociations comme celles-ci où tout le monde gagne, le rendement sera élevé pour chacun d'entre vous.

P.-S . : Je vous rappelle que, à Hongkong, nous accueillerons deux nouveaux membres : l'Arabie saoudite et les Tonga.

PASCAL LAMY

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