

# Migration und Sicherheit

## Risiken und Chancen der Süd-Süd-Migration für Frieden und Entwicklung

Fachtagung 2. Dezember 2009 Berlin



## **Veranstalter**

Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ)

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – Deutsches Institut für internationale Politik und Sicherheit (SWP)

Internationale Organisation für Migration (IOM)

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**Foto auf dem Cover:** Internally displaced persons in a tent camp in Girdassen, Dahuk governorate in Iraq. © IOM 2007 (Photo: Livia Styp-Rekowska)

## Vorwort der Veranstalter

Der Zusammenhang zwischen Migration und Sicherheit ist ein Thema, das auch außerhalb Europas von großer Bedeutung ist. Noch immer wird kaum wahrgenommen, dass zahlreiche Entwicklungsländer bedeutende Aufnahme- und Transitländer für Arbeitsmigranten und Flüchtlinge sind. Nach Schätzungen der UN-Bevölkerungsabteilung machten im Jahr 2009 die Wanderungen zwischen den weniger entwickelten Staaten etwa 40 Prozent der weltweiten Wanderungsbewegungen aus.

Welche konkreten Auswirkungen hatte Migration bislang für die Sicherheit, den Frieden und die Entwicklungschancen beispielsweise in Regionen wie Irak/Syrien/Jordanien oder Westafrika? Wie kann Politik dazu beitragen, dass migrationsbedingte Konflikte und Risiken in diesen und anderen Entwicklungsregionen minimiert und potenzielle Chancen maximiert werden? Um diesen Fragen nachzugehen und damit das bislang noch wenig erforschte Thema „Süd-Süd-Migration“ für nationale und internationale Akteure in den Bereichen Entwicklungs-, Außen-, Sicherheits- und Flüchtlingspolitik zu erschließen, luden das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ), die Internationale Organisation für Migration (IOM) und die Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) am 2. Dezember 2009 zu einer gemeinsamen Fachtagung im Rahmen der Konferenzreihe „Migration im Kontext“ ein.

Insgesamt nahmen ca. 50 Vertreterinnen und Vertreter verschiedener Bundesministerien, internationaler Organisationen und der Wissenschaft daran teil. Als Diskussionsgrundlage dienten die drei im Auftrag des BMZ neu erstellten Studien: „Sicherheitspolitische Implikationen von Migration“ von Dr. Steffen Angenendt (SWP), „Sicherheitspolitische Auswirkungen der Migration aus dem Irak in die Nachbarländer Syrien und Jordanien“ von Sophia Hoffmann (School of Oriental and African Studies, London) und „Auswirkungen der Migration in Westafrika auf die regionale Stabilität“ von Paul-Simon Handy, Issaka Souaré und David Zounmenou (Institute for Security Studies, Südafrika).

Die zentrale Erkenntnis der Fachtagung war, dass Migration im Süd-Süd-Kontext einen wichtigen Einflussfaktor für Sicherheit und Entwicklung darstellt. Wanderungsbewegungen müssen jedoch nicht per se zu einem sicherheitspolitischen Risiko werden, sie können auch Chancen für die betreffenden Menschen und Länder bieten. Entscheidend ist die Gestaltung der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen. Eine Typologisierung von Migrationsszenarien ist kaum möglich, da die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Migrationskontexte immer einzigartig sind. Welche Schlussfolgerungen und politischen Handlungsempfehlungen daraus resultieren, wird im ersten Kapitel für die eiligen Leser und Leserinnen dokumentiert. Einen umfassenden Einblick in den Tagungsverlauf vermitteln die nachfolgenden Kapitel, die die wesentlichen Aussagen der Studien sowie die Diskussionen im Plenum

und in den Arbeitsgruppen wiedergeben. Die vollständigen Studien sind in englischer Sprache im Anhang zu finden.

An dieser Stelle möchten wir allen Referentinnen und Teilnehmern für ihre engagierten Beiträge danken und wünschen Erkenntnisgewinn und Inspiration bei der Lektüre!



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## **Grußwort von Prof. Dr. Rita Süßmuth, Bundestagspräsidentin a.D.**

Sehr geehrte Leserinnen und Leser,

mit dem Aufgreifen des Themas „Migration und Sicherheit“, sowie dem Austausch und der Einbindung der Perspektiven zahlreicher hochinteressanter Redner und Redebeiträge, hat diese Tagung mit Gewissheit Bewegung in die Debatte um dieses Thema gebracht. Obwohl schon in der Vergangenheit kontrovers, zum Teil sogar polemisch und ideologisch überladen diskutiert, verlangen gerade die Herausforderungen, die die wachsenden Wanderbewegungen aus den Krisengebieten dieser Welt darstellen, eine noch intensivere Auseinandersetzung mit Migration und Sicherheit.

Massenmigrationen und irreguläre Migration stellen seit Jahrzehnten ungelöste Probleme für viele Länder dar. Oft überfordern sie die Aufnahmestaaten, untergraben deren Souveränität und Rechtstaatlichkeit und begünstigen, in noch immer zunehmendem Maße, organisierte Kriminalität.

Bis heute sind und bleiben die Verminderung der Nachfrage nach illegaler Arbeit, der Schutz der Migranten sowie der Aufbau von Perspektiven für Migranten im Herkunfts- und Zielland einige der wichtigsten Maßnahmen. Wir sind aufgerufen über die Maßnahmen für morgen zu diskutieren und durch den Fokus auf Politik und Praxis, das Individuum nicht aus dem Blick zu verlieren.

Hinter jeder Zahl und hinter allen Statistiken verbergen sich menschliche Schicksale. Die Menschen fliehen vor Krieg, Gewalt, Hunger und Armut. Die allermeisten haben unfreiwillig ihre Heimat verlassen. Die Reduktion von Migranten und Flüchtlingen auf eine finanzielle Belastung und ein Sicherheitsrisiko greift zu kurz und verschiebt die Täter-Opfer Perspektive.

Diese Fachtagung bot eine hervorragende Gelegenheit für Wissenschaftler, Experten und Praktiker vor Ort, anregende Diskussionen zu führen und neue Ideen zu entwickeln, um Wege zu fruchtbaren und nachhaltigen Ergebnissen aufzuzeigen.

Mein Dank geht an BMZ, SWP und IOM, die diese Veranstaltung gemeinsam organisiert haben.



Ihre Rita Süßmuth



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# 1. Zusammenfassung

Migration bietet erhebliche Entwicklungschancen für Herkunfts- und Aufnahmeländer und die Migranten selbst. Gleichwohl können mit den Wanderungsbewegungen Risiken für staatliche, regionale und menschliche Sicherheit verbunden sein. Diese sollten in der Entwicklungspolitik künftig systematischer bedacht werden, weil nur dann die entwicklungspolitischen Potenziale von Wanderungsbewegungen voll genutzt werden können. Solche migrationspolitische Risiken lassen sich deutlich und exemplarisch an den Regionen Irak/Syrien/Jordanien und Westafrika aufzeigen.

## 1.1 Einschätzung migrationsbedingter Sicherheitsrisiken

### ➤ Staatliche Sicherheit der Aufnahmeländer

Die Migrationsforschung zeigt, dass es keine quantitativ bestimmbare „Grenze der Aufnahmefähigkeit“ gibt. Die Sicherheit eines Aufnahmelandes kann aber beispielsweise bedroht sein, wenn die Zuwanderung eine bestehende Ressourcenknappheit oder Konkurrenz um Arbeitsplätze verstärkt, oder wenn Migranten<sup>1</sup> Konflikte ihres Herkunftslandes in das Aufnahmeland importieren. Ob Zuwanderung zu Konflikten oder gar Gewalt führt, hängt von vielen sozialen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Faktoren ab. Dabei spielen die Stabilität und die Funktionsfähigkeit staatlicher Institutionen eine wichtige Rolle sowie die Fähigkeit von Regierungen, gesellschaftlichen Vorurteilen und Ängsten vor Zuwanderung entgegenzuwirken. Neben der wirtschaftlichen Lage des Aufnahmelandes und der Verfügbarkeit einer intakten Infrastruktur sind auch demografische Faktoren von Bedeutung. So kann z.B. eine überwiegend junge und männliche Bevölkerung („youth bulge“) ein größeres Destabilisierungspotential aufweisen als eine Bevölkerung mit einer ausgeglichenen Geschlechts- und Altersstruktur. Zuwanderer können auch ein Sicherheitsrisiko für das Aufnahmeland darstellen, wenn es dort gewaltbereite oder kriminelle Gruppen gibt, die Migranten für ihre Zwecke rekrutieren und ausbeuten.

### ➤ Staatliche Sicherheit der Herkunftsländer

Auswanderung kann die Stabilität und Sicherheit im Herkunftsland beeinträchtigen, wenn es zu einem massiven Verlust an qualifizierten Arbeitskräften kommt („Brain-drain“). Zudem können politische Aktivitäten einer Diaspora Konflikte verschärfen, wenn die Diaspora Oppositionsgruppen im Herkunftsland unterstützt oder versucht, die Regierung des Aufnahmelandes für eine Unterstützung ihrer politischen Ziele zu gewinnen (siehe z.B. die Unterstützung der Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka und von oppositionellen Kubanern durch Diaspora). Allerdings können Geld- und Wissenstransfer durch die Diaspora auch konfliktreduzierend wirken und die Sicherheit der Herkunftsländer stabilisieren. Darüber hinaus kann auch der öffentliche Diskurs im Aufnahmeland die Haltung der Diaspora zu einer Konfliktsituation im Herkunftsland beeinflussen.

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<sup>1</sup> Im gesamten Text wird zur Vereinfachung das Wort ‚Migranten‘ als stellvertretend für Migrantinnen und Migranten genutzt.

➤ **Regionale Sicherheit**

Global betrachtet findet der größte Teil von grenzüberschreitenden Wanderungen innerhalb der Herkunftsregionen statt. Grundsätzlich können unterschiedliche migrationspolitische Interessen zu Spannungen zwischen Nachbarländern und innerhalb der Region führen. Im Nahen Osten hat die unterschiedliche Aufnahmepolitik gegenüber irakischen Flüchtlingen zwar nicht zu direkten politischen Konflikten geführt, aber eine regionale Kooperation bezüglich der Flüchtlingskrise erschwert. Regionale Flüchtlingsprobleme können aber auch zu regionaler Kooperation beitragen, wie die Koordination der UNHCR-Programme zur Bewältigung der irakischen Zuwanderung nach Syrien, Jordanien und Libanon zeigt, in deren Rahmen z.B. regionale Jahresplanungen entwickelt wurden.

➤ **Menschliche Sicherheit der Migranten**

Besondere Aufmerksamkeit muss der menschlichen Sicherheit von Migranten und Flüchtlingen zukommen. Diese ist vor allem dann gefährdet, wenn die Migranten und Flüchtlinge Opfer von Menschenhandel werden oder wenn ihnen kein legaler Aufenthaltsstatus gewährt wird und sie von Verhaftung und Abschiebung bedroht sind. Fehlende Erwerbs- und Aufenthaltsmöglichkeiten gekoppelt mit schlechten wirtschaftlichen Perspektiven bei einer Rückkehr in das Heimatland verschlechtern die Sicherheit von Flüchtlingen und Migranten im Aufnahmeland. Außerdem herrschen in Flüchtlingslagern oft desolate Zustände, die von Milizen und Menschenhändlern ausgenutzt werden können. Es besteht die Gefahr, dass Migranten politisch instrumentalisiert oder als Sündenböcke für lokale Probleme missbraucht werden, um regionale Konflikte zu schüren (wie z.B. in der Côte d'Ivoire).

## 1.2 Rahmenbedingungen

➤ **Migrant oder Flüchtling?**

Ob und inwiefern in Wissenschaft und Praxis zwischen „Flüchtlingen“ und „Migranten“ unterschieden werden kann und soll, wird kontrovers diskutiert. Für den UNHCR ist diese Unterscheidung von großer Bedeutung, da Menschen mit Flüchtlingsstatus gemäß der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention – die diesen Status nur Menschen zuerkennt, die nachweisen können, dass sie aufgrund ihrer Rasse, Religion, Nationalität, politischen Überzeugung oder der Zugehörigkeit zu einer sozialen Gruppe verfolgt sind – weiterreichende Rechte zukommen. In der praktischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) und dem internationalen Migrationsmanagement hingegen wird diese rechtliche Unterscheidung zunehmend hinterfragt, da Menschen oft vor genereller Unsicherheit fliehen, wie z. B. im Irak, und damit nicht unter die Flüchtlingsdefinition der Genfer Konvention fallen. Ein Verständnis der rechtlichen Situation von Migranten – ob ihnen Aufenthalt und/oder Arbeitsrecht gewährt wird, ob sie UNHCR-Schutz genießen und ob sie legal an staatlichen Dienstleistungen wie Bildung und Gesundheit teilhaben können – ist unerlässlich für die Bewertung von Sicherheitsrisiken, die in einem spezifischen Kontext bestehen.

➤ **Schlechte Datenlage zu Migration**

Eine realistische Bewertung der Risiken von Wanderungsbewegungen verlangt erheblich mehr Theoriebildung und empirisches Wissen im Hinblick auf die Wirkungszusammenhänge zwischen Migration und Sicherheit als bisher vorhanden sind. Wegen mangelnder Kapazität, aber auch aus politischen Gründen, gibt es häufig keine verlässlichen Zahlen insbesondere über (Arbeits-)Migrationsbewegungen in Entwicklungsländern. Im Gegensatz dazu verfügt UNHCR über detaillierte Statistiken zu Flüchtlingen. Der Zugang zu unabhängigen Daten ist jedoch notwendig, um die internationale Kooperation effektiv zu gestalten.

### **1.3 Handlungsvorschläge für die internationale Zusammenarbeit**

Eine der wichtigsten Erkenntnisse der Fachtagung war: Migration stellt einen ernstzunehmenden Einflussfaktor auf die staatliche, regionale und menschliche Sicherheit dar, muss aber nicht per se zum Risikofaktor werden. Entscheidend ist die Gestaltung der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen in Aufnahme- und Herkunftsländern. Darauf kann die Entwicklungspolitik Einfluss nehmen. Die nachfolgenden Handlungsempfehlungen sind daher zum einen an Akteure der deutschen und internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sowie zum anderen an Partnerregierungen gerichtet.

➤ **Ressortübergreifende Zusammenarbeit in Bezug auf Migration und Sicherheit verstärken**

Die Vorträge und Diskussionen der Veranstaltung hoben in besonderem Maße die Bedeutung einer besseren Koordinierung des deutschen Engagements und einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit der betroffenen Ministerien im Bereich Migrations- und Sicherheitspolitik hervor. Ein möglichst enger Erfahrungsaustausch aller deutschen Akteure sei notwendig, um im multilateralen Kontext mit einer Stimme sprechen zu können. Die Fachtagung war ein erster Schritt in diese Richtung. Weitere Schritte könnten regelmäßige Austauschforen für Fachkräfte der Ressorts, der Durchführungsorganisationen sowie von zivilgesellschaftlichen und internationalen Organisationen sein, die sich mit Ländern beschäftigen, in denen Migration eine große Rolle spielt.

➤ **Migration und Sicherheit im Kontext von Armutsminderung berücksichtigen**

Länderspezifische Armutsminderungsstrategien sollten die Präsenz und Rolle von Migranten einbeziehen und dabei beachten, welche Beiträge Migranten und ihre Diasporagemeinden zur Armutsbekämpfung und zur Risikominderung leisten. Gleichzeitig muss berücksichtigt werden, welche zusätzlichen Konfliktpotenziale und Belastungen durch große Migrations- und Flüchtlingsbewegungen entstehen können.

➤ **Analyseinstrumente und Verfahren der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit überprüfen**

Die EZ verfügt mit Krisenfrühwarnsystem und Konfliktanalysen bereits über erprobte Instrumente, die Hinweise für die Programmentscheidungen und -gestaltungen liefern. So wird bei allen Konflikt- und Postkonfliktländern sowie bei Ländern mit erhöhtem oder akutem Präventionsbedarf eine Überprüfung des Handlungsansatzes hinsichtlich der konfliktsensiblen Gestaltung der bestehenden Programme gefordert. Es sollte geprüft werden, ob Migration und Flucht darin als sicherheitspolitische Risikofaktoren ausreichend berücksichtigt werden.

➤ **Rückkehr- und Reintegrationsprogramme konfliktsensibel und nachhaltig gestalten**

Im Fall von massenhafter, konfliktbedingter Flucht, in denen die langfristige, legale Integration von Flüchtlingen politisch oder wirtschaftlich nicht möglich bzw. auch von ihnen selbst nicht gewollt ist, ist die Rückkehr ins Herkunftsland meistens die einzige nachhaltige Lösung. Verschiedene Rückkehrhilfen für Migranten, die freiwillig in ihr Herkunftsland zurückkehren wollen, sind deshalb ein wichtiges Instrument der internationalen Kooperation in diesem Bereich. Neben den durch das Bundesministerium des Innern geförderten Rückkehrprogrammen, welche u.a. IOM durchführt, fördert auch das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) einige Rückkehr- und Reintegrationsprogramme (Süd-Süd und Nord-Süd), teilweise im Rahmen eines Partnerschaftsprogramms mit dem UNHCR.

In Zukunft sollte besondere Aufmerksamkeit auf eine langfristige, nachhaltige Gestaltung dieser Programme gelegt werden. Dabei wurde ein Ansatz empfohlen, der auf zwei Ebenen ansetzt: Einerseits sollten die Herkunftsländer beim Aufbau von Strukturen unterstützt werden, die eine Reintegration der Migranten erleichtern. Andererseits könnten Diasporas bei geplanten Investitionen in den Herkunftsländern unterstützt werden, und befristete oder dauerhafte Rückkehrer könnten organisatorisch, beratend oder auch finanziell gefördert werden, damit sie im Herkunftsland eine Existenz aufbauen können. Dabei ist eine besondere Herausforderung sicherzustellen, dass Maßnahmen der entwicklungsorientierten Not- und Übergangshilfe anschlussfähig an die reguläre EZ sind. Im Rahmen von internationalen Partnerschafts- und Kooperationsprogrammen sollten die Erfahrungswerte internationaler Akteure als Grundlage für diese Ansätze dienen, wie z.B. Lernerfahrungen aus dem „Programme for Human Security and Stabilization in Iraq“ (PHSS) der IOM. Eine wichtige Herausforderung dabei besteht in der konfliktsensiblen Gestaltung dieser Programme.

➤ **Diasporagemeinschaften unterstützen**

Die Ansätze der deutschen EZ sowie der zivilgesellschaftlichen und internationalen Akteure zur Förderung von gemeinnützigem Engagement von (in Deutschland ansässigen) Diasporagemeinschaften in ihren Herkunftsländern sollten konfliktsensibel gestaltet werden. Es sollte zudem geprüft werden, inwiefern auch Diasporagruppen in Entwicklungsländern in ihrem Engagement für ihre Herkunftsländer unterstützt werden können.

➤ **Bildung für Migranten und Flüchtlinge ermöglichen**

Der Zugang zu Bildung ist für Migranten und Flüchtlinge oft begrenzt, entweder wegen legaler oder wegen finanzieller Restriktionen. Der Bildungssektor (Grund- und Berufsbildung) ist ein entscheidender Bereich, um die Integration im Aufnahmeland und auch die zukünftige Reintegration im Herkunftsland zu erleichtern. Die EZ und die internationale Kooperation sollten deshalb in die Grund- und Berufsbildung von Migranten investieren und vor allem junge Menschen in Berufen ausbilden, die gerade im Falle von konfliktbedingter Flucht für den Wiederaufbau des Herkunftslandes nötig sind. Deutschland könnte z.B. die Bildungssituation durch Stipendienprogramme für irakische Schüler und Studenten, die sich zurzeit im Exil befinden, verbessern und somit einen Beitrag zum Wiederaufbau des Irak leisten (siehe dazu auch die vom DAAD und dem irakischen Bildungsministerium geschlossene Strategische Akademische Partnerschaft ([www.daad.de/irak](http://www.daad.de/irak))).

➤ **Regionales kooperatives Migrations- und Sicherheitsmanagement fördern**

Da größere Migrations- und Flüchtlingsbewegungen fast immer regional stattfinden, sollten nachhaltige regionale Organisations- und Lösungsansätze entwickelt werden, wo dies politisch möglich ist. Regionales Migrations- und Sicherheitsmanagement kann nur gemeinsam mit anderen Ressorts, den beteiligten Ländern und anderen Organisationen entwickelt werden.

In Westafrika werden regionale Ansätze teilweise bereits durch die Wirtschaftliche Gemeinschaft Westafrikanischer Staaten (ECOWAS) umgesetzt. ECOWAS hat seit den 70er Jahren in verschiedenen Verträgen zur freien Beweglichkeit von Personen den breiteren migrationspolitischen Rahmen in der Region abgesteckt und das positive Verständnis von Migration in der Region durch ihren normativen Diskurs unterstützt. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass die kürzlich von ECOWAS entwickelte „Common Position in Migration“ nur den Status einer Empfehlung ohne jegliche Verbindlichkeit hat, stellt für die Umsetzung der regionalen Strategien eine große Herausforderung dar. Hier könnten sich Ansatzpunkte für eine Unterstützung durch die EZ ergeben, falls von Seiten ECOWAS und den beteiligten Ländern Interesse an einer solchen Partnerschaft besteht. Als ersten Schritt in diese Richtung könnten das BMZ und andere Ressorts die Interessen von ECOWAS und den betroffenen Ländern ausloten.

Ein weiteres Beispiel bildet der sogenannte „Regional Consultative Processes“ (RCP), der, von Regierungen initiiert, Regierungsvertreter, Vertreter internationaler Organisationen und in einigen Fällen auch von Nichtregierungsorganisationen in einen gemeinsamen Dialog über migrationsrelevante Themen bringt. Der RCP Migration Dialogue for West Africa beispielsweise widmet sich u.a. der Friedens- und Stabilitätsförderung, dem Schutz der Rechte von Migranten und dem Entwicklungspotential durch die Diaspora. Neben den Regierungen von 15 Staaten des westlichen Afrika, sind u.a. ECOWAS, UN, IOM und OECD in diesem RCP involviert.

➤ **Kapazitäten der Partner im Bereich Migrations- und Sicherheitspolitik stärken**

Neben regionalen kooperativen Ansätzen gilt es auch, die Kapazitäten der Partnerregierungen im Bereich Migrations- und Sicherheitspolitik zu stärken. Dies heißt insbesondere Ansätze zu entwickeln, die die Förderung freiwilliger Rückkehr, die Rückkehr hochqualifizierter Migranten, die zirkuläre Migration, aber auch Grenzsicherung, Passsicherheit und Arbeitserlaubnisse für Migranten beinhalten und an bestehende Expertise, Programme und Projekte internationaler Akteure anknüpfen. Wenn relevant und nachgefragt, sollte Migrations- und Sicherheitsmanagement in EZ-Beratungen und in die internationale Kooperation aufgenommen werden bzw. sollten sicherheitspolitische Risiken aufgrund von Migrationsbewegungen in Konsultationen angesprochen werden.

Regierungen in Partnerländern können im Bezug auf Migration und Sicherheit konfliktvermeidend wirken, wenn etwa die Bevölkerung durch ausreichend Informationen auf den Zustrom von Migranten positiv vorbereitet wird, wie dies z.B. in Burkina Faso vor der Rückkehr der Burkinabé aus der Côte d'Ivoire der Fall war. Bei Beratungen im Bereich der Migrationspolitik ist es deshalb zentral, die Fähigkeit von Regierungen zu stärken, gesellschaftlichen Vorurteilen und Ängsten vor Zuwanderung entgegenzuwirken.

Die langfristige Unterbringung in Flüchtlingscamps und die damit einhergehende Trennung von der lokalen Bevölkerung wirken sich häufig konfliktverschärfend aus. Deshalb kann bei Flüchtlingskrisen eine stärkere Integration der Flüchtlinge in lokale Gemeinschaften dazu beitragen, Spannungen und Konkurrenzsituationen mit der lokalen Bevölkerung zu vermeiden.

➤ **Datenerhebungskapazitäten ausbauen**

Eine verlässliche Datenlage ist für ein effektives Migrationsmanagement unerlässlich, in vielen Entwicklungsländern allerdings aus Kapazitätsgründen nicht vorhanden. Als mögliches Betätigungsfeld der migrationsbezogenen EZ kommt hier die Unterstützung beim Kapazitätsausbau von statistischen Ämtern in Frage. Allerdings muss beachtet werden, dass die Anzahl von Migranten oftmals von politischer Bedeutung ist und eine Regierung unter Umständen Gründe hat, eine hohe Anzahl von Migranten zu verschleiern. Umso wichtiger ist eine gute Kenntnis über die Wirkungszusammenhänge von Migrationsbewegungen und Sicherheitsrisiken. EZ sollte deshalb weiter Erfahrungen in diesem Bereich auswerten.

## 2. Migration, Konflikt und Entwicklung: Fakten, Trends und Zusammenhänge im Süd-Süd-Kontext

In der Studie „Migration, Conflict and Development – Security Policy Implications of Migration Movements between Developing Countries“ (siehe Annex 3) sowie in seinem einführenden Vortrag erläuterte Steffen Angenendt, dass etwa ein Drittel der weltweiten Migration zwischen Entwicklungsländern stattfindet und dass nach Schätzungen der UN etwa 75 Millionen Menschen als Migranten oder Flüchtlinge in Entwicklungsländern leben. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurde Migration in den letzten Jahren vermehrt im entwicklungspolitischen Zusammenhang diskutiert, dabei wurde jedoch vornehmlich auf den positiven Beitrag hingewiesen, den Migranten zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung beitragen können. Die Risiken, die durch unregelmäßige Wanderungen für Staaten, Regionen und Menschen entstehen können, wurden in dieser Diskussion hingegen vernachlässigt. Herkunfts-, Transit- und Aufnahmeländer sind dabei mit jeweils unterschiedlichen Risiken konfrontiert.

In ärmeren Aufnahmeländern konkurrieren Migranten oft mit der einheimischen Bevölkerung um knappe Ressourcen. Aus solchen Konkurrenzsituationen können gewaltsame Konflikte entstehen. Unerwünschte Migration kann in Aufnahmeländern zusätzlich als Bedrohung der nationalen Identität oder der gesellschaftlichen Kohäsion empfunden werden. Diese Ängste können politisch ausgenutzt werden, indem vorhandene ethnische Konflikte geschürt werden. Dies kann die Beziehungen zu den Herkunftsländern der Migranten erheblich belasten.

In Bezug auf regionale Sicherheit stellen unterschiedliche migrationspolitische Zielsetzungen zwischen benachbarten Aufnahmeländern ein Risiko dar, aus dem Spannungen entstehen können, die die Suche nach regionalen Lösungen für bestehende Migrationsprobleme erschweren. Lange Zeit bestehende Flüchtlings- (und Migrations-)krisen („protracted refugee situations“) können die Wahrscheinlichkeit politischer oder militärischer Interventionen von außen erhöhen, etwa wenn durch Guerillaaktivitäten einer Migrantenbevölkerung die Destabilisierung der gesamten Region drohe.

Da Wanderungen vor allem individuelle Prozesse sind, müssen bei der Analyse migrationsbedingter Sicherheitsrisiken Aspekte der menschlichen Sicherheit im Mittelpunkt stehen. Obwohl Migration und Flucht meist eine Suche nach Sicherheit und Stabilität darstellen, sind Menschen in einer Migrationssituation oft erheblichen Sicherheitsrisiken ausgesetzt. Fehlende Rechtssicherheit und oft jahrelanges Warten, währenddessen weder eine Weiterwanderung noch eine Rückkehr in das Heimatland möglich sind, kann Perspektivlosigkeit und abweichendes Verhalten, gelegentlich auch Kriminalität, begünstigen. Die häufig mit dem Wanderungsprozess einhergehende Dequalifizierung kann zu Arbeitslosigkeit und erschwerter Integration führen. Zusätzlich können Fremdenfeindlichkeit und ausländerfeindliche Übergriffe die Zuwanderer physisch und psychisch gefährden. In dieser Situation stellt die Rekrutierung und Ausbeutung durch kriminelle oder gewalttätige Gruppen ein weiteres Risiko für die Sicherheit der Migranten dar.

Im Anschluss an den einführenden Vortrag wurden anhand von Regionalstudien zwei Fallbeispiele vorgestellt und im Plenum und in zwei Arbeitsgruppen diskutiert. Das erste Fallbeispiel behandelte die irakischen Flüchtlinge in Syrien und Jordanien als ein Beispiel für konfliktbedingte Flucht. Das zweite Fallbeispiel behandelte Westafrika als ein Beispiel für regionale Arbeitsmigration.

### 3. Fallbeispiel 1: Konfliktbedingte Flucht – Irakische Flüchtlinge in Syrien und Jordanien

Die Studie und der Vortrag „Migration and Security: The Iraqi Refugees in Jordan and Syria“ von Sophia Hoffmann (siehe Annex 4) schilderten, dass der Beginn des letzten Krieges im Irak 2003 und die darauffolgende Verschlechterung der allgemeinen Sicherheitslage im Irak dazu geführt haben, dass tausende Irakerinnen und Iraker in die Nachbarländer Syrien und Jordanien geflohen sind. Schätzungen über die Zahl der Flüchtlinge gehen weit auseinander. Die einzigen öffentlichen Statistiken liefert der UNHCR: Nach seinen Zahlen sind in Syrien ca. 215 000 Iraker als Flüchtlinge registriert, in Jordanien sind es ca. 50 000. Die Präsenz der irakischen Flüchtlinge hat weder in Jordanien noch in Syrien zu einer signifikanten Verschlechterung der allgemeinen Sicherheit geführt. Allerdings lassen sich mehrere Risikofaktoren sowie bestimmte Rahmenbedingungen beobachten, die diese Risiken schwächen oder verstärken.

Ein wichtiger Risikofaktor sei die Tatsache, dass weder Syrien noch Jordanien die Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention ratifiziert haben und dass beide keine geregelte Asylgesetzgebung haben. Dies bedeutet, dass Iraker keinen verlässlichen Rechtsschutz besitzen, der sie vor einer möglichen Abschiebung bewahrt. Obwohl Syrien und Jordanien zurzeit irakischen Flüchtlingen de facto Schutz gewähren, gibt es daher keine Garantie, dass dies so bleibt. Vor allem wird Irakern die langfristige, legale Integration verwehrt. Aufgrund eines offiziellen Arbeitsverbots für Iraker finden diese nur inoffiziell Beschäftigung z.B. in Gewerben wie dem Bau, der Gastronomie, Internetcafés, Fabriken und der Prostitution – oft nur als ungelernete Arbeitskräfte. Dies führe zu einer weitverbreiteten Perspektivlosigkeit der oft gut ausgebildeten irakischen Flüchtlinge. Sehr viele Iraker setzten daher ihre Hoffnung auf Aussiedlung nach Europa oder in die USA durch das UNHCR Resettlement Programm.

Das weitgehende Ausbleiben von sektiererischer Gewalt, ansteigender Kriminalität oder gar der Verbreitung von religiös-fundamentalistischen Ideen, die anfangs mit den irakischen Flüchtlingen in Verbindung gebracht wurden, lasse sich teilweise durch die Präsenz und Vorgehensweise der syrischen und jordanischen Sicherheitsdienste erklären. Beide Staaten verfügen über relativ funktionsfähige Polizei- und Geheimdienste, die die eigene Bevölkerung sowie die irakischen Flüchtlinge überwachten und im Fall von Gesetzesübertretungen verhaften und/oder abschieben.

Die darauffolgende Diskussion hob hervor, dass auch der soziale Hintergrund der irakischen Flüchtlingsbevölkerung, die zumeist aus Familien mit Bildungshintergrund besteht, ein weiterer, wichtiger risikominimierender Faktor sei. Zudem wurde betont, dass Flüchtlinge, die vor sektiererischer Gewalt geflohen sind, keine Motivation hätten, diese im Exil voranzutreiben. Doch trotz des bisher friedlichen Verlaufs der Flüchtlingskrise sei langfristig zu bedenken, dass es vor allem in Syrien verschiedene, gewaltbereite Gruppierungen gibt, die in der Zukunft eventuell versuchen könnten, Iraker für ihre Ziele zu gewinnen und zu rekrutieren.

Es wurde hervorgehoben, dass das Konfliktpotenzial einer Migrationssituation bei abnehmender Aufnahmefähigkeit steigt und daher auch abhängig von den Rahmenbedingungen sei. EZ könne hier bei der Unterstützung staatlicher Dienstleistungen ansetzen. Weiter wurde angemerkt, dass die Rückkehrhilfe ein wichtiges Instrument der internationalen Kooperation in diesem Bereich sei, da es unwahrscheinlich sei, dass Syrien und Jordanien die langfristige Integration der Iraker zulassen werden. Es müsse dabei auch vermehrt um Rein-

tegrationshilfen wie Wohnungsbau und Unterstützung für den Lebensunterhalt in den ersten Monaten gehen, wie sie zum Teil bereits von internationalen Akteuren angeboten werden.

Die Diskussion machte deutlich, dass fluchtbedingte Migration, die oft als plötzlicher Massenexodus auftritt, nur durch regionale, staatenübergreifende Maßnahmen effektiv organisiert und gelindert werden kann. Doch gerade hier mangelt es vielen Ländern aufgrund des drohenden Souveränitätsverlusts an Bereitschaft. Die irakische Migrationskrise ist ein gutes Beispiel hierfür, da alle Länder in der Region einen Anstieg an irakischen Migranten verzeichnen, regionale Kooperation in diesem – wie in vielen anderen – Bereichen aber aus politischen Gründen nicht stattfindet. Die Regierungen der drei Länder, die am stärksten von irakischer Migration betroffen sind (Jordanien, Syrien, Libanon), stehen sich aus historischen Gründen (z. B. Syriens Rolle im libanesischen Bürgerkrieg), aus strategischen Gründen (z.B. Jordaniens Friedensschluss mit Israel, während sich Syrien im offiziellen Krieg mit Israel befindet) sowie regionalpolitischen Gründen (z. B. die unterschiedliche Behandlung der palästinensischen Flüchtlinge und Syriens Unterstützung für diverse bewaffnete Gruppen in der Region) misstrauisch gegenüber. Es sei daher sinnvoll, auf diplomatischer Ebene Anregungen für eine regionale Kooperation im Bereich des Migrationsmanagements zu schaffen und regionale Kooperationen auch bei implementierenden Partnern einzufordern (z. B. hat der UNHCR einen explizit regionalen Plan für seine Operationen vorgelegt).

Diskutiert wurde auch, ob EZ-Unterstützung sowohl finanziell als auch durch die Anzahl neuer Programme von der Anzahl aufgenommener Flüchtlinge abhängig gemacht werden sollte, um so die Etablierung regionaler Auffangmechanismen durch Programme wie das „Temporary Protection Regime“ anzuregen oder durchzusetzen. Allerdings bestehe die Gefahr, dass solche Mechanismen, die mit finanzieller Unterstützung verbunden sind, zum Fälschen von Statistiken führen. Schon jetzt nutze Syrien die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen zur „Imageaufbesserung“ im Rahmen seiner internationalen Beziehungen. Das Land hat bereits viele hundert Millionen Euro für die Finanzierung von Projekten für irakische Flüchtlinge erhalten.

Insgesamt ist zu beachten, dass Migration aus dem Irak in Nachbarländer kein neues Phänomen darstellt, sondern ein seit vielen Jahren bestehender, dynamischer Prozess ist, der oft in Phasen und als zirkuläre Migration stattfindet. Heute arbeiten häufig einige Familienmitglieder im Irak und versorgen den Rest der Familie, der in Sicherheit in Syrien oder Jordanien lebt. Diese Situation reflektiert die Tatsache, dass die irakische Migration durch die bedrohliche Sicherheitslage im Irak erzwungen wurde und oft mit dem Verlust von Hab und Gut einherging; im Fall der Arbeitsmigration ist es dagegen oft der Migrant, der die daheim gebliebene Familie unterstützt.

Ein weiterer wichtiger Punkt der Diskussion in der Arbeitsgruppe betraf die allgemeine Schwäche des syrischen öffentlichen Sektors und die fehlende Erfahrung desselben im Umgang mit Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NRO) und multilateralen Organisationen. Ausländische NRO sind in Syrien eine Neuerscheinung, die es in ihrer jetzigen Größe und Anzahl erst seit etwa zwei Jahren gibt, (inzwischen hat etwa ein Dutzend ausländischer NRO eine Zulassungsgenehmigung). Auch den NRO fehlt es noch an Erfahrungen im Umgang mit den syrischen Ministerien. Diese Situation führe dazu, dass sich die internationale Kooperation im Bereich Flüchtlings- und Migrationsmanagement in Syrien zurzeit recht ineffektiv gestaltet. In der Arbeitsgruppe wurde zudem vorgebracht, war, dass Unterstützungsmaßnahmen im Migrationsbereich generell in Form einer Doppelstrategie erarbeitet werden sollten, bei der im Aufnahmeland die Grundrechte und die menschliche Sicherheit von Migranten gewahrt und gestärkt werden müssten, und im Herkunftsland die Pullfaktoren für die freiwillige

Rückkehr gefördert werden sollten. Zusätzlich bedeute so eine Doppelstrategie auch, Migranten im Aufnahmeland durch Ausbildungsprogramme auf eine bevorstehende Rückkehr vorzubereiten, während im Herkunftsland durch Infrastrukturmaßnahmen die freiwillige Rückkehr von Migranten gefördert werde.

Die großen Unterschiede zwischen verschiedenen Migrationsszenarien, die sehr stark von lokalen und regionalen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Faktoren geprägt sind, erschweren allerdings eine Typologisierung und die Entwicklung allgemeiner Handlungsempfehlungen. Trotzdem fand die Diskussion einige Punkte, die auf die irakische Flüchtlingssituation, wie auch auf andere Migrationskontexte zutreffen: So sei eine unabhängige Datenerhebung und der Zugang zu Daten notwendig, um die internationale Kooperation effektiv zu gestalten; doch gerade der Zugang zu Daten ist in Syrien und Jordanien nur teilweise möglich. Allgemein positiv und wichtig sei auch eine Förderung der regionalen Kooperation auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen, z.B. durch eine Koordinierung der EZ in benachbarten Ländern, die alle von einer Migrationswelle betroffen sind, und durch Anregungen auf diplomatischer Ebene, z.B. durch die Förderung von diplomatischem Dialog oder Ministerkonferenzen zum Thema Migration. Der Bildungssektor (Grund- und Berufsbildung) sei ein entscheidender Bereich, in den grundsätzlich investiert werden müsse, da Bildung für eine erfolgreiche Integration oder Rückkehr ins Heimatland zentral sei. EZ-Maßnahmen zur Friedenssicherung sollten prinzipiell das Ownership-Prinzip berücksichtigen.

## 4. Fallbeispiel 2: Arbeitsmigration in Westafrika

Der Vortrag und die Studie zum Thema „Security Implications and Development Opportunities of Migration. A regional study of West Africa“ von Paul-Simon Handy, Issaka Souaré und David Zounmenou (siehe Annex 5) bezogen sich auf die politisch definierte Region Westafrika (ECOWAS), die Region mit den größten Migrationsbewegungen weltweit. Afrikanische Migrationsrouten führen nicht, wie häufig vermutet, in erster Linie nach Europa, sondern bewegen sich zu 80 bis 90 Prozent innerhalb Afrikas. Die hohe Migrationsrate in Westafrika ist mit dem sehr hohen Bevölkerungszuwachs in den letzten Jahrzehnten zu erklären, sowie mit der Tatsache, dass es relativ einfach ist, in Westafrika zu migrieren, da die nötige Infrastruktur vorhanden und die Region von einem kulturellen Nomadentum geprägt ist. Der Hauptfaktor für Migration in Westafrika ist allerdings die Suche nach Arbeit. Aufgrund von wirtschaftlichen Möglichkeiten bilden sich Migrationsknotenpunkte, beispielsweise in der Ölproduktion in Nigeria und auf den Kaffee- und Kakaoplantagen in der Côte d'Ivoire.

Staatliche, individuelle und regionale Sicherheitsrisiken aus dieser regionalen Migration ergeben sich vor allem durch knappe wirtschaftliche Ressourcen, die zu fremdenfeindlichen Ausschreitungen führen können und Regierungen in der Vergangenheit dazu verleitet haben, Massendeportationen von Migranten durchzuführen. Die hohe Migrationsrate schafft in Westafrika außerdem einen Markt, der von Menschenhändlern missbraucht wird, die die prekäre Situation vieler Migranten ausnutzen. Bandenkriminalität und organisierter Betrug stellen weitere Risiken dar, da solche Gruppen verarmte Migranten ausbeuten oder rekrutieren würden. Problematisch ist auch, dass viele Flüchtlingscamps als Rekrutierungsbasis von *warlords* missbraucht werden.

Im Bezug auf staatliche Sicherheit lassen sich vor allem fehlendes Migrationsmanagement und die kriminellen Handlungen illegaler Migranten in Notsituationen als Risiken identifizieren. Risiken für die regionale Sicherheit entstehen ebenfalls durch einen Kampf um knappe Ressourcen und durch die Überforderung lokaler Infrastruktur. Ein Beispiel dafür sind die ausländerfeindlichen Ausbrüche in Côte d'Ivoire gegen Migranten aus Burkina Faso.

Insgesamt ist die Datenlage in Westafrika in Bezug auf Migration schlecht: Es gibt wenig Forschungseinrichtungen und keine wirklich funktionierenden Zensusysteme. Die nationalen Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten sind von Land zu Land sehr unterschiedlich. Vor allem fehlt es an Konzepten für ein mittel- und langfristiges Migrationsmanagement. In Ghana gibt es einige positive Ansätze hinsichtlich eines innovativen Migrationsmanagements. Zudem haben die Wahlen im Jahr 1996, die als Zeichen für eine politische Liberalisierung wahrgenommen wurden, zu einer massenhaften Rückkehr der Diaspora geführt, von der Ghana profitieren konnte. In Nigeria sind in den letzten zehn Jahren durch eine Verbesserung der Gehälter und Arbeitsbedingungen an den Universitäten erfolgreich Anreize für die Rückkehr hochqualifizierter Migranten geschaffen worden, mit der Folge, dass eine signifikante Anzahl an Akademikern, die nach Europa und in die USA ausgewandert waren, zurückgekehrt sind. Diese Beispiele zeigen, dass Entsendeländer, die es schaffen, Mitglieder der Diaspora durch wirtschaftliche und politische Anreize zur Rückkehr zu bewegen, durch einen ‚Brain Gain‘, also Wissens- und Leistungstransfer, von temporärer Migration profitieren können.

In der Kommentierung des Vortrages wurde hervorgehoben, dass die europäische Diskussion um Migration stark durch den Wunsch nach Kontrolle über staatliche Sicherheit definiert sei. Dagegen seien in Westafrika Migranten auf andere Art und Weise Teil des sozialen Ge-

füges. Allerdings mangle es in Westafrika bisher an einer kohärenten Migrationspolitik, obwohl Migration aus der Region Westafrika nicht wegzudenken sei. Migrationsmanagement sollte daher unbedingt in regionale EZ Beratungen und die internationale Kooperation aufgenommen werden. Auch sollte die Diskussion nicht nur den wirtschaftlichen, sondern auch den sozialen ‚Remittances‘, wie zum Beispiel Wissens- und Bildungstransfer, mehr Beachtung schenken.

In der darauffolgenden Arbeitsgruppensitzung wurde zunächst die These eingebracht, dass die Sicherheitsrisiken von Arbeitsmigration – trotz schwacher Migrationsregime – in Westafrika geringer seien als ihre Potentiale. Für Entsendeländer würde Migration eine Entlastung des Arbeitsmarktes und der Sozialsysteme sowie finanzielle ‚Remittances‘ bedeuten. Für Aufnahmeländer bedeute Migration die Möglichkeit, Arbeitskräfteengpässe auszugleichen und die regionale Integration voranzutreiben. Durch die Schaffung migrationsbedingter regionaler Identitäten könnten Konfliktpotentiale auch abgebaut werden.

In Westafrika sind 7 Prozent aller Menschen Migranten. In der Diskussion wurde deshalb auch hervorgehoben, dass nicht das Phänomen der Migration, sondern das Phänomen des Nationalstaates in der Region relativ neu sei. Schwerwiegende Sicherheitsrisiken – so die nicht unumstrittene These – träten nur dann auf, wenn Migration parallel zu staatlichen Zerfallsprozessen oder bereits bestehenden politischen Konflikten stattfände. So warf das Beispiel Côte d’Ivoire die Frage auf, ob Migration dort eine Ursache des Krieges gewesen sei oder lediglich politisiert und instrumentalisiert worden sei, um dem Konzept der „Ivoriété“ einen Sinn zu verleihen (siehe hierzu die Westafrika-Studie, Box 1). Fakt ist, dass es keinen empirisch nachvollziehbaren, linearen Zusammenhang zwischen transnationaler Kriminalität und Migration gibt. Die beiden Phänomene sollten daher im öffentlichen wie im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs unbedingt voneinander getrennt werden.

Als zweite These wurde eingebracht, dass sich mit der Herausbildung eines normativen Rahmens durch das ECOWAS „Protocol of Free Movement“ aus dem Jahre 1979 die positive Wahrnehmung von Migration und Freizügigkeit in der Region weiter durchgesetzt habe. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass die später entwickelte „Common Position in Migration“ nur den Status einer Empfehlung ohne jegliche Verbindlichkeit hat, stelle die Umsetzung jedoch eine große Herausforderung dar.

Obwohl durch das ECOWAS-Protokoll im Prinzip Bewegungsfreiheit für die Bevölkerung der Region gewährleistet wird, verfolgen viele ECOWAS Mitgliedsstaaten zusätzlich individuelle Migrationspolitiken. Einige bi- und multilaterale Abkommen in der Region ermöglichen freie Bewegung über ECOWAS Grenzen hinaus, was die Regulierung von Migration noch komplizierter macht. Generell stellen die schwachen administrativen Fähigkeiten der Staaten sowie die geringen Absorptionsfähigkeiten der Arbeitsmärkte ein Problem bei der politischen Umsetzung des Protokolls dar. Auch der Mangel an technischem Wissen bei der Grenzsicherung ist ein Problem.

In der weiteren Diskussion der Arbeitsgruppe wurde die wichtige Frage aufgeworfen, wie Migration, die zunächst konfliktfrei abläuft, zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt zu einer sicherheitspolitischen Gefahr werden kann. Um dieser Gefahr entgegen wirken zu können, sollten die Indikatoren des in der EZ bereits erprobten Instruments der Krisenfrühwarnung auch Migration als konfliktauslösenden Faktor berücksichtigen.

Intensiv wurde in der Arbeitsgruppe darüber diskutiert, welche Ansätze notwendig sind, um die Chancen von Migration zu nutzen und deren Risiken zu minimieren. Dabei wurde die Entwicklung von umfassenden Ansätzen zur Migrationssteuerung im Aufnahmeland auf ver-

schiedenen Ebenen als notwendig angesehen. ECOWAS wurde als gute Plattform bewertet, um regionale Ansätze zur Migrationssteuerung zu fördern. Allerdings seien die Umsetzungskapazitäten von ECOWAS begrenzt. Auf nationaler Ebene wurden vor allem folgende Elemente einer Migrationspolitik als wichtig angesehen: Die Schaffung von klaren Rechtsgrundlagen für Migranten, die Klärung des Bedarfs an Migration, die Entwicklung von Integrationsmaßnahmen und Rückkehranreizen, ein interministerieller Dialog für eine kohärente Migrationspolitik und die Verbesserung der statistischen Grundlagen. Ferner wurde auch die kommunale Ebene als wichtiger Träger für migrationssteuernde Maßnahmen identifiziert. Denn in einigen Städten ballen sich ankommende Arbeitsmigranten, Transitmigranten und Flüchtlinge, was von der lokalen Bevölkerung manchmal als Bedrohung empfunden wird. In solchen Fällen könnten lokale Mediationsmaßnahmen, eventuell durch den Zivilen Friedensdienst sinnvoll sein. Die große Herausforderung für die Kommunen liegt darin, die Migranten in die Gesellschaft und vor allem in die Wirtschaft zu integrieren. EZ könnte den Aufbau einer modernen Verwaltung, z.B. von Einwanderungsbehörden oder Arbeitsvermittlungen, unterstützen.

Schließlich wurde auch zu bedenken gegeben, dass die Migrationsbewegungen auch die Sozialstruktur der Kommunen im Herkunftsland verändern, weil die oft junge Bevölkerung damit wichtige Arbeitskräfte verliere. EZ könne diese Kommunen dadurch unterstützen, dass die Zurückgebliebenen gezielt gefördert würden, z.B. durch Ausbildungsmaßnahmen.

## 5. Anhang

### **Migration, Conflict and Development – Security Implications of Migration between Developing Countries**

#### **Background paper prepared for BMZ and GTZ**

by Dr. Steffen Angenendt, Berlin, Germany

International migration has strongly increased in the past decades. A significant portion of contemporary migration occurs between developing countries (South-South migration). However, this factor usually receives only little political and public attention in the developed world. These countries are still mainly interested in the impacts of South-North migration on their own economies and societies, and if South-South migration is discussed, the debate often remains limited to remittances and Diaspora activities.

Of course, remittances and Diasporas may have important development impacts. Remittances represent an indispensable and vital revenue for many developing countries, and Diasporas may have a positive impact on local development. However, a restriction to these (positive) aspects of migration is insufficient, because migration not only offers a variety of opportunities, it also conceals significant risks for all countries involved – countries of origin, transit countries and receiving countries. In order to make full use of the positive effects of migration, also security implication of South-South migration must be identified, and there must be discussion of how the affected countries can be supported in overcoming such risks.

#### **Contents**

This study discusses the correlations between migration, development and conflict. The focus is on the risks migration could represent for development countries. These risks for the affected country (national security), for the stability of the region (regional security) and for the security of the migrants and refugees themselves (human security) will be considered for the countries of origin, transit and reception, respectively.

Four key questions will be investigated:

1. What security aspects are especially relevant in terms of development policy?
2. What are the correlations between migration and security, what violent conflicts could arise therefrom, and what factors drive or mitigate such conflicts? Can a typology of risks be developed from this?
3. What precedents are there in which major migration and refugee movements have led to violent conflicts, on the one hand between the population of the receiving country and the migrants or refugees, and on the other hand in the country of origin? Are there examples of regional conflicts caused by migration?
4. What insights does this provide for development policy, and especially for German development cooperation?

The analysis begins with a brief description of the most important trends in global migration. In a second step, the correlations between migration and development are examined. This is followed by an analysis of the security implications of migration, and then conclusions are drawn for future development policy.

### **South-South migration in the global context**

According to an estimate by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the number of migrants worldwide has increased from 154.8 million to over 200 million people since 1990.<sup>2</sup> This increase has affected all regions of the world, but in a variety of ways. In recent years, the growth has occurred primarily in developed countries: in 1990, 53.2 percent of all migrants and refugees lived there, but in 2005 it was already 60.5 percent. In this period, 33 million people migrated to these countries. The less developed states, on the other hand, lost shares in the international migration, their percentage dropping from 46.8 to 39.5 percent.<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless, also these countries recorded significant immigration. According to the UN Population Division, South-South movements in 2005 made up approximately one third of the global migration, a share as large as that of the South-North migration. In addition, there is substantial internal migration within developing countries, with large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Currently, their number is estimated at 24.5 million people. In total, in 2005, some 75 million migrants and refugees lived in the less developed states, 53 million of them in Asia, 17 million in Africa and 7 million in Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>4</sup>

It is to be expected that migration will continue to increase not only in the industrialised countries, but also in the developing nations. First, there will continue to be violent and refugee-producing conflicts in many of these countries. Second, the countries will be more strongly incorporated into the globalised economy. This will create new pressures, but also more incentives for migration. And third, the transnational networks between the countries of origin and destination – for example, the relationships between diasporas and the home communities – will become denser and support additional transnational mobility.

### **Migration and development**

With economic globalisation and the accompanying opening of borders for migration, a 'global demographic system'<sup>5</sup> has arisen, in which migration functions as a compensating factor for economic, demographic, social and political inequalities and a lack of development.<sup>6</sup>

Migration may represent an individual, family or group strategy in order to escape poor or unsatisfactory living conditions and improve perspectives. However, national migration re-

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. International Organization for Migration, World Migration 2008. Managing Labour Migration in the Evolving Global Economy, Geneva 2008, pp. 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. for this and the following data (unless otherwise indicated) UN DESA, International Migration Report 2006: A Global Assessment, New York 2009.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations General Assembly, International migration and development. Report of the Secretary-General, New York 2006, p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Eric Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, London (forthcoming).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Wenke Apt, Steffen Angenendt, Demografie – Einfluss auf die Sicherheit, in: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (eds.), Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen. Ergänzungsband II, 2009, pp. 275-307.

gimes significantly limit international mobility and freedom of movement. Although many countries are dependent on immigrants and have a substantial need for immigrants,<sup>7</sup> they invest significant resources in the control of their external borders and limiting migration movements, because they fear that large, uncontrolled immigration could cause internal conflicts.<sup>8</sup> Often, only very serious economic or political pressure causes people to seek migration or refuge, an important reason why migrants and refugees currently make up no more than 3 percent of the world's population. Because only those migrants and refugees who have the necessary resources emigrate to other countries, these people generally do not belong to the poorest and least educated sections of their homeland's population. All of these characteristics of migration movements have implications for development policy.

Since the publication of the Global Commission on International Migration's report in 2005,<sup>9</sup> the studies by the World Bank on the significance of remittances<sup>10</sup> and the recommendations by the OECD for development-oriented migration policies in 2007<sup>11</sup>, the scientific and political interest in the contribution of migrants to development has grown. This aspect of migration has also been emphasised in the 2009 Human Development Report.<sup>12</sup> In the meantime, there is frequently talk of 'triple win' situations, in which countries of origin, recipient countries and the migrants themselves benefit from migration. In addition, the World Bank regularly indicates that the scope of global remittances has exceeded public development aid (in some developing countries even the total of public development aid and direct foreign investment) and thus is possibly more important for development than traditional public-funded development aid.<sup>13</sup>

The activities of diasporas are occasionally helpful for the development of the countries of origin, but sometimes also irrelevant or even a hindrance, and the effect of return depends not only on how much and what capital the migrants bring back, but also on their successful reintegration in the local labour market.<sup>14</sup> Recently therefore, development policy instruments have been increasingly sought in order to make better use of the potential of return migrants.<sup>15</sup>

In the search for political instruments, it is useful to consider the connection between migration and development. In an ideal cycle of migration and development, three aspects or phases can be defined, which influence the developmental effect of migration in a variety of ways and in which specific political instruments can be used in order to improve the effect of development and to avoid conflicts caused by migration: the migration process, the conditions in the country of reception and the effect of migration on the migrants themselves.

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. UNFPA, Migration Wall Sheet, New York, 2008.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Steffen Angenendt, Irreguläre Migration als internationales Problem. Probleme, Risiken, Optionen, SWP-Studie, December 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Global Commission on International Migration, Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action, Berlin 2005.

<sup>10</sup> For example: Dilip Ratha, Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance, in: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2003: Striving for Stability in Development Finance, pp. 157-175.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. OECD, Policy Coherence for Development. Migration and Developing Countries, Paris 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2009 - Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development, 2009. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009>

<sup>13</sup> Cf. e.g. World Bank, Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group, Migration and Development Brief, No. 10, July 2009.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. OECD 2007, pp. 53-108

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Laura Chappell, Alex Glennie, Maximising the Development Outcomes Of Migration: A policy perspective, IPPR, London 2009, p. 5

In regard to the *first* aspect, the migration process, the promotion of circular migration, for example, can stimulate development, when the receiving countries fill the gaps in their labour markets and the countries of origin benefit from remittances and knowledge transfer from returnees.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, the fight against human trafficking can also back up development policy, because these migrants usually cannot use their knowledge and abilities due to their uncertain legal position and dire situation and, in this way, their potential development contribution remains unused.

With regard to the *second* area, the legal and integration policy conditions in the respective receiving country, the conditions of entry and residence determine what development contribution the migrants can afford. This affects the *de jure* and *de facto* immigration options, as well as access to the labour market. Also important is the legal protection, particularly in terms of labour law, which the migrants find, for this determines whether migrants can employ their knowledge. In addition to this, the education and training policies of the country of origin and thus the qualification of the migrants, as well as the training and further education policies of the country of reception represent important general parameters for the economic success of the migrants in the country of reception. The similar is true for the receiving country's cooperation with migrant organisations and the offers of political participation and the acquisition of citizenship. Support from their own organisations can improve the integration of migrants, as can an active integration policy in general, which aims to improve the opportunities for the participation of migrants in the core areas of integration (labour market, education, political participation), helping migrants to make better use of their potential.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, the *third* area, the results of the migration process, produces in many places opportunities for political action in order to improve the development effects of migrations and to avoid conflicts. Thus, remittances can be simplified and made less expensive, diasporas can be supported in planned investments in their countries of origin, and short-term or permanent returnees can be supported organisationally or even financially, so that they can set up their own business in their country of origin. Up to now, this approach has been practically implemented, for example, in the return programmes for refugees of UNHCR in Liberia, the Balkans and most recently in northern Iraq.

In general, it is important that migration might have security implications in all above-mentioned areas, and that development policy might at least partially influence whether these effects are positive or negative and whether national, regional or human security is endangered in the countries of origin, transit and reception. These risks are considered in more detail below.

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<sup>16</sup> Cf. Steffen Angenendt, *Zirkuläre Migration. Ein tragfähiges migrationspolitisches Konzept?*, SWP-Aktuell 2007/A 27, Berlin, April 2007, Fritjof Zerger, *Migrationssteuerung und Entwicklungseffekte durch zirkuläre Migration?*, in: *Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik*, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1-5.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration, *Migration und Integration – Erfahrungen nutzen, Neues wagen. Jahresgutachten des Sachverständigenrates*, Berlin 2004.

## Migration and security in developing countries

Some security risks of migration are obvious. Thus, a large-scale and unplanned immigration can overstretch the reception capacity of the destination countries and lead to internal tensions and violent conflicts. In addition, the emigration of qualified people (brain drain) can have harmful consequences for the local and national economy, and larger immigrations in structurally weak areas can weaken the local infrastructures so that competition for scarce goods increases and violent conflicts become more likely. These, in turn, can endanger the security of the affected countries and neighbouring states and cause third-party states to react politically or, in extreme cases, even militarily.

Such migration-related security risks have been dealt with repeatedly in recent decades.<sup>18</sup> However, the debate has exhibited three prominent weaknesses. *First*, it has been held predominantly from the view of security policy, but not development policy. The initiators were primarily security policy actors, whose main interests were the identification of potential new (military) risks, such as the challenges for border security or humanitarian interventions to avoid destabilisation.<sup>19</sup> *Second*, the analyses refer predominantly to the migration-related risks for the industrialised nations, i.e. to South-North migration. The security implications of South-South migration and the effects on developing countries received significantly less attention. *Third*, the focus of these analyses was mostly on the risks to national security, especially the question of the circumstances under which uncontrolled and irregular immigrations could endanger national sovereignty, the ability of national institutions to function and domestic stability. Less consideration was given to aspects of human security and the effects of migration on the opportunities for migrants and their families.<sup>20</sup>

As part of the analysis of migration-related security risks for developing countries, on the other hand, three dimensions are of particular importance. First, in the root cause analysis, migration should be considered as a consequence of insecurity. Furthermore, the security problems resulting from migration in the receiving countries and regions of the South must be investigated. Finally, the reintegration of refugees and migrants in the countries of origin can also lead to conflicts. In all three cases, particular attention must be given to the security of the migrants and refugees themselves.

Since the early 1990s, the concept of 'human security' has gained importance in the international security and international relations debate. In contrast to the traditional, state-focussed understanding of security, this view places the focus on individuals and population groups and, alongside military risks, also analyses non-military risks which could contribute to the insecurity of people. Such risks appear in extremely varying forms (poverty, oppression, environmental degradation, epidemics), and their causes are commensurately manifold (e.g. globalisation, population development or climate change). The concept is indispensable for the explanation and analysis of migration-caused security risks in three regards.

*First*, with the help of the term human security, migration and refuge can be conceptualised as a search for security and stability. Normally in the analysis of migration movements, push

<sup>18</sup> For an overview, cf. i.a. Myron Weiner, *International Migration and Security*, Boulder 1993; Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, London 1991; Nazli Choucri, *Migration and Security. Some Key Linkages*, in: *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1, 2002, pp. 98-122; Elspeeth Guild und Joanna van Selm (eds.), *International Migration and Security*, London 2005.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. also Yannis A. Stivachtis, *International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security*, in: *Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Br. 1, 2008, pp. 1-24

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Reinhard Drifte, *Migrants, Human Security and Military Security*, in: Harald Kleinschmidt (ed.), *Migration, Regional Integration and Human Security*, Aldershot 2006.

and pull factors of migration are taken into consideration, and the causes and consequences of migrations are distinguished according to corresponding categories. The fundamental problem in these differentiations is that the categories are only assumed to be precise. In practice, economic, political, environmental and other migration factors are intermingled. The difficulties are seen, among other things, in the differences – often vitally important to those affected – between refugees (who are under the protection of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and for whose protection the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is mandated) and migrants (for whom there is no comparable international legal standard or international responsibility). A similar problem is currently developing in the debate on climate refugees.<sup>21</sup>

As important as the difference between political and other motives for migration may be for the legal protection of those affected, for this examination of the connection between migration and security, it is more useful to conceptualise migration as a search for security. If migration in general is seen as an exit option out of an insecure situation, security receives a key significance for the explanation of migration movements and their associated risks.

*Second*, the term human security does not require a limitation to individual migration-triggering conflict situations, rather it allows the perception of a ‘conflict continuum’<sup>22</sup> in which the transitions between peaceful conflict solutions and violent conflicts are fluid. If the conflicts, which can occur in such varying forms as competition, rivalry, tension or violent conflicts, are solved peacefully, the ideal condition of a cooperative overcoming of conflict is achieved, and there is human security. On the other hand, if the actors involved are incapable of reaching a consensus through negotiation, there can be violent clashes and thus human insecurity.

This concept of a graduated conflict continuum is better suited to the compilation of migration-caused security risks than the commonly used dichotomy of war and peace. For one thing, empirical migration research shows again and again that migrants and refugees are driven primarily through subjectively perceived insecurity and less through objectively existing security deficits. People react to pressure factors individually and in groups in a variety of ways, which also explains why, in many violent conflicts, there are only a few refugees, although the pressure for displacement is great. On the other hand, migration-related conflicts are not static conditions, but rather they demonstrate a dynamic that is largely determined by the ability and will of the participants to settle such conflicts. Thus, there are numerous examples in which conflicts over the use of scarce water resources, aggravated by migration, have led to cooperative conflict solutions, but so far have led to violent conflict in water shortages only in very isolated cases.<sup>23</sup>

*Third*, by using the term human security, different levels on which this security can be threatened by migration-caused conflicts can be distinguished.

Thus on the *macro level* of nations, conflicts arise between countries of origin, transit and reception. This is the case, for example, when the governments cannot achieve a consensus on the form of border control or on their migration policy interests, such as when the countries of origin relieve their labour markets through emigration and their public revenues

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. Steffen Angenendt, Klimaflüchtlinge, in: Steffen Angenendt und Susanne Dröge (eds.), Klimawandel und Sicherheit, (forthcoming).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Ibrahim Sirkeci, Transnational mobility and conflict, in: Migration Letters, vol. 6, No. 1, April 2009, pp. 3-14

<sup>23</sup> F or this, cf. i.a. Dirk Messner, Klimawandel und Wasserkrise der Zukunft, in: Entwicklung und Frieden, No. 3, 2009, pp. 167-173.

through remittances from migrants, but the recipient countries are not interested in immigration and are not cooperative in this regard.

On the *meso level* of group relations, such conflicts can result when local population groups regard immigrants as competitors for scarce resources and infrastructure or feel their cultural identity threatened by them. Thus in Ghana in 2001, there were clashes between Liberian refugees and the local population due to the competition for scarce resources. Something similar can also be observed in Tanzania, where an estimated 320,000 refugees from neighbouring states have become long-term settlers. In Cote d'Ivoire, the hostility toward refugees based in the nationalistic concept of 'ivorité' even contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in September 2002.<sup>24</sup> In addition, immigrant groups can feel discriminated against by the majority population due to their origin, culture or religion, they can be socially marginalised and live geographically separated (so-called 'parallel societies'), and conflicts can break out, for example, over gender roles, religious behaviour or cultural practices. These problems are demonstrated, for example, in the difficult integration of Kurdish refugees from Iraq in northern Syria or even in Turkey. Migration-caused social tensions, as in Jordan, are aggravated by competition for overburdened infrastructure and scarce jobs.

On the *micro level* of individual contacts, conflicts arise primarily when immigrants become victims of xenophobic or racist violence, or when locals suffer from crime associated with immigration. The former, for example, could recently be observed in the treatment of immigrants in South Africa.

However, conflicts arise not only on the individual conflict levels, but also *between different conflict levels* when the individual parties have incompatibly different interests. Thus – with a view to the countries of origin – a governmental oppression of ethnic minorities can drive them out as a group (conflict between macro and meso levels) or gender-specific role concepts altered by the migration process can lead to conflicts in the families of origin (conflict between meso and micro levels).

Two conclusions can be drawn from these threats to human security caused by migration movements.

1. In the analysis of migration-related security risks, the focus must be on the risks for human security, for ultimately, migrations (independent of the form in which they occur) are processes in which the migrants and refugees must deal with a frequently difficult decision between staying and going. However, because migration also represents political challenges for the affected countries and neighbouring states, the risks for national and regional security must be analysed in addition to human security aspects.
2. The security consequences of migration vary widely depending on the focus of the analysis. In particular, there are significant differences between countries of origin and reception, as well as special conflict situations in the transit countries. As noted at the beginning, the security policy debate to date has dealt primarily with the consequences for the industrialised nations and less with the analysis of the consequences for developing nations. In addition, analyses for countries of transit are also lacking, which is problematic, because an increasing number of migrants are remaining there for a longer time or even permanently due to a lack of options for further migration. Some states in North Africa, for example, now house a significant number of (irregular) migrants, who want to migrate to

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24 Cf. Paul-Simon Handy, *Security Implications and Development Opportunities of Migration: A regional study of West Africa*. p. 6.

the EU, but find no opportunity to do so and can cause conflicts in the transit countries.

From these two aspects (dimensions of security and country types), a typology of migration-caused security risks in developing nations can be compiled, in which the individual security risks can be placed (Fig. 1). This typology – as with any attempt at categorisation in complex processes – cannot be selective. However, it can point out where countries of origin, transit and destination are confronted with similar migration-caused security risks, and which risks therefore require particular political attention in which countries.

In reference to this typology and the designation of individual conflict patterns, it must once again be emphasised that this study deals only with the identification of potential risks. The manifold chances which are associated with migrations and which outweigh the security risks in many cases, are evident, but – as noted at the outset – not the subject of this analysis.

**Fig. 1: A typology of migration-caused security risks**

	<b>National security</b>	<b>Regional security</b>	<b>Human security</b>
<b>Countries of origin</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mass migrations reveal a lack of prospects and state failures, call legitimacy and trust in the government and its ability to act into question, and threaten political stability</li> <li>• Emigrations alter ethnic and demographic structures and facilitate new clashes over income, resources, power and influence</li> <li>• The political control of diasporas polarises domestic clashes and creates new conflicts</li> <li>• Military or financial support of diasporas for forces which are critical of or hostile to the government facilitate violent conflicts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Long-lasting ('protracted') refugee crises increase the risk of political and military intervention from outside</li> <li>• Migration-caused tensions between states hinder cooperative conflict solutions and block regional integration processes</li> <li>• Guerrilla activities tolerated or even supported by neighbouring states destabilise the region</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A loss of human capital associated with brain drain impedes development</li> <li>• Migrations call traditional role allocations into question and create social and conflicts within families, particularly over gender-specific roles</li> <li>• Emigration destroys family structures and reduce social cohesion in communities of origin</li> <li>• Remittances promote social inequality</li> </ul>
<b>Transit Countries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unauthorised transit migrations are attended by illegal residence and irregular employment, avoid the legal system and strengthen the shadow economy</li> <li>• Restrictive reception policies of the destination countries of transit migrants result in inevitable tensions between the transit and destination country</li> <li>• Potential destination countries of transit migrants accuse transit countries of failing to control the borders and perceive larger numbers of transit migrants as a threat</li> <li>• Transit migration often facilitates human smuggling, trafficking and associated crime such as the smuggling of drugs and weapons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A larger number of transit migrants in a region aggravate the conflicts between countries of origin, transit and reception and complicate the search for cooperative solutions to regional migration problems</li> <li>• Transit migrants are often dependent on cross-border networks in order to enter the transit country and to be able to live there for a while. Such networks tend to evade legal controls in the countries of origin, transit and reception, and fuel external political conflicts between the countries involved</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transit migrations alter the population structure of the transit country and exacerbate the competition with natives for scarce resources and infrastructure</li> <li>• Irregular transit migrants lack protection and are especially exposed to human rights violations, often live under primitive conditions, suffer hunger, poverty and disease, and are susceptible to crime</li> <li>• Migrants often live in a provisional condition for years, because both further migration and return to the home country are not possible; lack of perspective and hopelessness frequently lead to disorientation and traumatisation</li> </ul>
<b>Receiving Countries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unplanned mass immigrations by migrants and refugees violate national sovereignty, reveal failures in border control, document political weaknesses by the government and provoke domestic conflicts over scarce resources and infrastructure</li> <li>• Inadequate use of the human capital of immigrants worsens the ability of the economy to innovate and compete</li> <li>• The acceptance of asylum seekers triggers diplomatic conflicts</li> <li>• Political activities by diasporas impact the foreign policy interests of the country of reception</li> <li>• Ethnic conflicts are imported through immigration</li> <li>• Political extremism and terrorism threaten the internal security of the country of reception</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different migration policy goals and interests between neighbouring countries of reception can trigger tensions between the countries involved, particularly in integrated economic regions; bi- and multilateral tensions and setbacks for ongoing integration projects can grow out of this.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Xenophobia and racism threaten immigrants physically and psychologically and lead to defensive reactions, possibly even to political radicalisation</li> <li>• Discrimination, marginalisation and geographical segregation facilitate isolation and retreat into parallel societies</li> <li>• Dequalification and underemployment prevent the achievement of the savings goals aspired to through migration and a planned return</li> <li>• Inadequate integration into the labour market and educational system and a lack of political participation hinder integration and facilitate conflicts with the majority society</li> <li>• Migration-related crime threatens the security of natives and immigrants</li> </ul>

## Examples of migration-caused security risks

The typology shows, among other things, where common migration-related security risks exist for countries of origin, transit and reception. There are five common problem areas, each with specific risks for national, regional and human security.

1. First, *uncontrolled migration* represents a risk for all nations involved. The risks are greatest for poorer countries of reception. Here, refugees and migrants compete with the local population for especially scarce resources and infrastructure, and with extensive immigration, an initial willingness of the local population to assist the newcomers can turn into rejection, if they feel exploited. Examples of this are numerous; one current case is the refugee movement in recent years from Iraq to Syria and Jordan. It cannot be ruled out that violent conflicts may arise out of such competitive situations.<sup>25</sup>

There is much to indicate that, in future, the number of complex humanitarian catastrophes will increase in the least developed countries. Therefore, it is to be expected that these countries will have even greater difficulties than thus far in overcoming situations in which violent clashes, economic adversity, overpopulation and man-made environmental catastrophes coincide.

2. Additionally, many countries of origin, transit and reception commonly perceive *irregular immigration* as threatening.<sup>26</sup> Here, the perception of security is a social construct which influences the acceptance of immigration, depending on the economic situation, the already existant demographic heterogeneity, the scope and the ethnic-cultural affiliation of the immigrants.<sup>27</sup> Especially this form of uncontrolled immigration can exacerbate already existing pressures on infrastructure, supply systems and employment opportunities. In particular, there is a danger that there will be competition between migrants and the native population for jobs or scarce resources. Thus, for example, Nigeria deported approximately two million migrants in the mid-1980s due to a rapid deterioration in the supply situation.

In addition, there may be a threat – perceived by the population – to the cultural or national identity and social cohesion. Xenophobic acts of violence, such as were seen for the first time in South Africa in recent years, may be the result.<sup>28</sup> Migration will be perceived as a security risk, particularly when the immigration of a large number of refugees amplifies already extant latent interethnic conflicts and could have an effect on the political balance of power. Thus in 1999, Macedonia resisted the acceptance of Kosovar-Albanian civil war refugees and justified this resistance with a possible destabilisation of the ethnic balance in the country. Similar examples can be seen with Iraqi Kurds in Turkey or Syria and Afghan Sunnis in Shiite-influenced Pakistan. This can result in risks to internal stability, for example through an escalation of existing latent ethnic conflicts, such

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. Steffen Angenendt und Muriel Asseburg, Die irakische Flüchtlingskrise. Ein regionales Sicherheitsrisiko, in: Internationale Politik, January 2008, pp. 52-57.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. C. Rudolph, National Security and Immigration. Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe since 1945, Stanford 2006, p. 268.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration, in: id. (ed.), International Migration and Security, Boulder 1993, pp. 1-35; Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum, Political Demography, Demographic Engineering. New York, Oxford 2001, p. 146.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Barry Buzan, Societal Security, State Security and Internationalization, in: Ole Wæver et al. (ed.), Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London 1993, S. 41-57; Dave Coleman, Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition, in: Population and Development Review, No. 3, 2006, pp. 401-446.

as recently in Cote d'Ivoire.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, relations with the countries of origin and transit can be strained.

In general, immigration can have a variety of effects on the internal security of nations. It can impact this security if it is inadequately controlled, immigrants are not integrated, there is an increase in xenophobia and political extremism due to unresolved integration problems or irregular immigration and human trafficking lead to associated crime.

3. With respect to *immigrant-related crime*, the crime statistics of those states which have the appropriate documentation regularly show higher levels of crime for the immigrant population than the native population. However, because most statistics only record citizenship, they only allow a distinction between citizens and aliens. The 'crime by foreigners' thus determined is often assessed as an indicator for the threat to internal security by immigrants, and is the subject of domestic political debates in many countries. Thus, complaints by the Ghanaian population over increasing crime and prostitution led to restrictive measures against Liberian refugees.

In every country, the share of foreign suspects in organised crime and human trafficking is especially high. Both areas are frequently interlinked and the same organisations and personnel are involved, merely with other goods, namely not weapons or drugs, but human beings. Irregular immigrants are exposed to particular risks here, because they are vulnerable due to their lack of legal status. There are also many well-documented cases of exploitation and slavery in developing nations. For West Africa, for example, it is assumed that between 200,000 and 300,000 people annually are the victim of human trafficking.<sup>30</sup> Many countries are primarily concerned here by subsequent crime in connection with smuggling. Connections with organised crime are also frequently seen in the financing of weapons sales for rebel groups, as, for example, in Somalia.

4. Another risk of immigration is the *political extremism* of immigrants. This is usually understood as membership in organisations whose efforts are opposed to the security of the affected country or endanger the foreign interests of the country through acts of violence. Often, extremist-militant groups become involved as aides for people in refugee situations and attempt to mobilise them for their goals. This can extend up to the recruitment of people willing to engage in terror, such as with some violent Islamic groups in Pakistan. Generally, any immigration from areas of tension can aggravate the problems of political extremism.<sup>31</sup> It cannot be ruled out that extremists will use a stay as tourists or asylum seekers to prepare violent actions in their country of origin.

Finally, there is also the risk of home-grown terrorism. Kenya, for example, has for years considered itself exposed to a direct threat by Somali refugees, who have been in Kenya a long time, but are recruited again and again by Somali extremists for terror plans. In the Sahel, the terrorist group Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is active and try to recruit for their activities, particularly among refugees. Jordan suffered the painful experience that the open-door policy practised until 2006 first made attacks possible.

5. Finally, the *external security* of countries of origin, transit and reception can also be threatened by migration movements. In the case of mass and uncontrolled immigration,

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley 1985; Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, 2. ed., Boulder 2004.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Handy, op. cit. (n. 23), p. 6.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Juris Pupcenoks, *Migration of Violence*, Presentation at the 50th annual conference of the International Studies Association, New York, 15-18 Feb.2009 (unpublished MS)

the inability to control one's own borders means a loss of territorial sovereignty for the nation.<sup>32</sup> However, such a direct security risk is only conceivable in a crisis-laden mass refugee movement. Such refugee movements have occurred in past decades, for example, in eastern Africa, particularly in the Great Lakes region of East Africa. However, indirect effects are more frequent on the external security of reception countries. This includes, above all, three aspects.<sup>33</sup>

First, migrations can have indirect effects on the *relations between countries of origin and reception*. Thus, in August 2009, there was a sudden break in diplomatic relations between Iraq and Syria, after Iraq officially accused Syria of not adequately preventing attacks planned by Iraqi refugees living there.

The similar occurred between Tanzania and Burundi around the turn of the millennium. Because there were also many rebels among the many Burundian refugees in Tanzania, Burundi initially froze diplomatic relations from 2000 to 2002 and eventually even had troops march into western Tanzania, where most of the refugees were staying. There are also cases again and again in which countries of origin complain about discrimination against their migrants in countries of reception, for example, South-east Asian countries about human rights violations against their citizens in the Gulf states. Furthermore, refugees and migrants can be exploited for foreign policy or foreign trade goals by both the country of origin and destination. This is seen again in the example of the Iraqi refugees in Syria, who represent a foreign policy bargaining chip for both countries. While Syria demands financial aid from the country of origin Iraq, as well as the USA, Iraq uses the presence of the refugees in Syria as a tool of threat. Essentially, an acceptance of asylum-seekers and refugees and their recognition as politically persecuted strains the relationship between the countries of origin and reception.

Second, potential countries of reception of mass migrations may see themselves forced to intervene in the *internal interests of the countries of origin* in order to prevent unwanted immigration. In addition, a diaspora can attempt to promote support in the country of reception for 'their' side in an internal political conflict in the country of origin.<sup>34</sup> Here, too, the example of a possible militarisation or recruitment of rebels in refugee camps should be mentioned, such as with the Tuareg from Mali in Libya.

A significant risk to the country of reception can also arise if refugees or migrants turn against their country of reception, because it had previously supported their fight against the government of their homeland financially or organisationally, but then changed its position as part of a reorientation of foreign policy. Myron Weiner has described this case with the words, 'Guns can be pointed in both directions'. Examples of this have been provided again and again in past decades by Palestinian refugees in the Arab states; the activities of Afghani mujaheddin in Pakistan or Algerian fundamentalists in France in the 1990s could serve as further examples.

Occasionally, there are also tensions between returnees and the local population, particularly for access to resources. Unequal land distribution or polarising external aid meas-

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum, *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering*, New York 2001, p. 146.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Gil Loescher, *Beyond Charity, International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis*, Oxford 1993; Steffen Angenendt, *Deutsche Migrationspolitik im neuen Europa*, Opladen 1997.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Robin Cohen, *Diasporas and the Nation-State*, in: Nana K. Podu and David T. Graham (eds.), *Redefining Security*, New York 1998.

ures can exacerbate such conflicts. In many cases, the return strains the already stressed labour market situation and holds the potential for significant social conflict. One particularly prominent example of a mass return migration of migrant labourers occurred at the end of 2002 in Burkina Faso, which found itself confronted with the return of approximately 360,000 Burkinabè in the wake of a violent conflict in Cote d'Ivoire.

Third, unsolved migration-caused conflicts, above all long-lasting refugee situations, can represent a significant risk for *regional stability*. National conflict dynamics can extend to neighbouring countries or the entire region through refugee movements in terms of a spill-over effect. In the Great Lakes region of East Africa, the decades-long, unsolved refugee problems and the large number of refugees who have spent all or part of their lives in refugee camps have contributed to the escalation of domestic clashes and ultimately to the genocide of the mid-1990s. Similar security risks were and still are found in the long refugee crises in Central America and especially the unsolved Palestinian refugee problems.

With regard to migration movements within or between developing countries, the risks connected to a possible militarisation of refugee camps must particularly be pointed out here.<sup>35</sup> Rebel movements often operate out of large refugee camps, which can offer a starting point for the planning of attacks or offensives when they are in border regions. Refugee camps can also be misused for the planning of terrorist attacks. In addition, because of the precarious situation of the refugees, there are conflicts both within the camps and between the refugees and the population of the country of reception (crime, prostitution, illegal trade, etc.). There are numerous examples of this, such as foundation of the Sahrawi Polisario resistance movement in the Tindouf refugee camp in Algeria, which ultimately also attempted to fight for the independence of Western Sahara from Morocco using military means. In a similar context is also the extremist course of action by the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and later the LURD, which initiated attacks against the RUF in Liberia in the 1990s from Guinea and Sierra Leone, which in turn resulted in devastating attacks against those refugee camps.<sup>36</sup> Similar constellations were also observed in Asia, for example, the armed resistance of Burmese dissidents in Thailand. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also considers resistance movements which operate from refugee camps to be a significant threat to peace and security.

But unresolved migration problems can also affect regional stability and cooperation below the level of violent conflict, because deadlocks in such an important political field can by all means complicate cooperation in other political areas.

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35 Cf. Gil Loescher and James Milner, *Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and international security implications*. New York: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005 (Adelphi Paper 375).

36 Cf. Handy, *op.cit.* (n. 23), p. 6.

## Summary: Migration and security in development policy

The preceding analysis suggests the conclusion that the debate over development policy must address not only the opportunities, but also urgently the risks of migration. In view of the constant increase in global migrations, the growing hope of many poorer countries of benefiting from a temporary or permanent emigration of their citizens and the hope of at least some countries which donate development aid of using migration as a development policy impulse – possibly even as a substitute for development aid – a critical discussion involving the development policy opportunities and risks of migration movements is necessary.

A realistic evaluation of the risks of migration movements demands significantly more theory and empirical knowledge than has been available to date. Nevertheless, some theses on the connection between migration, conflict and development can be formulated with the current state of knowledge.

1. In future, migrations between developing nations will increase significantly. In recent decades, these countries have been ever more strongly involved in global migration. Even if the percentage of migrants between developing countries in global migration remains the same, the population growth of these countries (by 2050, 97 % of the global population growth will be in developing countries) alone would cause the number of migrants to increase.
2. This migration offers a wide variety of development opportunities for the countries of origin, transit and reception. Migration can promote development (e.g. through filling the need for labour, remittances, brain gain, etc.) and relieve the countries of origin (e.g. through the emigration of manpower which cannot be integrated into the labour market). Migration can also function as a balancing factor for economic, demographic, social and political inequalities and a lack of development. In some cases, even 'triple win' situations can result, in which all participants – countries of origin, countries of reception, migrants – benefit from migration.
3. At the same time, however, migrations between developing countries also hold significant risks for national, regional and human security.
  - National security can be affected when a country of reception loses control of its external borders as a result of uncontrolled mass immigration, when immigration is connected with a strengthening of organised crime and when extremist or terrorist networks or those oriented towards a regime change arise through immigration.
  - A threat to regional security is to be expected, among other things, when long-lasting, unresolved ('protracted') refugee situations in the region exist and when opposition forces use refugee camps as areas of retreat and recruitment for militias.
  - Human security for refugees and migrants can be threatened in a wide variety of ways, beginning with a lack of rights due to an insufficient or missing right of residence to discrimination and marginalisation in work, residence and education to the consequences of xenophobia and racism and acts of violence due to ethnic, religious or cultural persecution.
4. Many of the least developed countries will have difficulties dealing with increasing migration. Above all, there will be a lack of administrative capacity and financial means to accept and supply a larger number of refugees. But the immigration of migrants and a pos-

sibly exacerbated competition for scarce resources can also result in internal tensions up to and including violent conflicts.

5. However, migration-caused security risks are never inevitable, but can be influenced by general political and economic conditions. Migration research shows that there is no theoretically or empirically substantiable reception limit and no quantitatively measurable 'limit of capacity'. Whether countries of reception, transit or origin benefit from migration or suffer under its consequences depends crucially on the form of these general conditions. However, if there is a lack of political effort or ability to overcome the consequences of migration, migrations can become a security policy risk for the countries involved.

# **Migration and Security: The Iraqi Refugees in Jordan and Syria**

**A report prepared for BMZ and GTZ by Sophia Hoffmann  
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## 1. Introduction

The American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent civil warfare in the country created one of the largest refugee-crisis of recent times. Around 4 million Iraqis fled their homes to escape violence; of these, around 2 million currently reside abroad, according to estimates. Most Iraqi refugees have found a relatively, temporary safe haven in Syria and Jordan, a smaller number can be found in Lebanon, Egypt and Turkey. UNHCR resettlement programs and illegal migration have also brought a few thousand Iraqi refugees to Europe, the US and Latin America. According to the latest UNHCR figures, 33 000 Iraqis have been resettled to third countries from Syria in total and in 2009, around 3000 Iraqis were resettled from Jordan. Between 2007 and 2009, Germany received around 1,100 Iraqi refugees from Syria. UNHCR Jordan only started submitting resettlement cases to Germany in 2009, to date 637 cases have been submitted and 320 Iraqis have departed to Germany.<sup>37</sup>

In one sense, the Iraqi situation presents a classic refugee crisis: a sudden mass movement of people who flee a sudden and catastrophic decline in their home country's security. However, in many other ways, the situation has characteristics that set it apart from the kind of war-related refugee crises that have more or less regularly occurred in Africa and the Balkans in the past twenty years. The most notable of these differences is that it is an *urban* crisis: most of the refugees have fled from and to urban areas. The Iraqi refugees have not been housed in camps, but have sought private accommodation in Damascus and Amman. This implies an unfamiliar situation for UNHCR, which has much more experience dealing with refugees that are more easily approachable in camps.

Although many of the urban areas in which the Iraqis have settled are officially referred to as 'camps', and have a special administrative status, due to their origin as Palestinian refugee camps, in reality they are today permanent suburbs of major cities. (See for example the 'Mukhaim Yarmouk' [Yarmouk Camp], which started as a Palestinian camp and is today a largely Palestinian suburb of Damascus). I.e. these areas consist of proper, if generally lower quality housing, rather than tents, and public services are available. Three camps in the real sense of the word exist; these are located near the Iraq/Syria border in the north east of the country and host around 2300 Palestinians that fled Iraq after 2003.<sup>38</sup>

As this implies, many (but by no means all) of the refugees are at least modestly wealthy and well educated, indeed, because of the relative absence of UN-led efforts, only those Iraqis who, at least initially, had a modest amount of disposable wealth, were able to flee abroad. In Jordan, which for various reasons hosts the wealthiest Iraqi community, the UN estimates that around 35% of all Iraqi refugees hold university degrees.<sup>39</sup> This means that the needs of the Iraqi refugee population, the impact on the host countries and their social systems as well as the security-related risks that arise from their migration are different than those that UNHCR, other humanitarian and development agencies and the host countries were prepared for.<sup>40</sup>

This study will provide a brief overview of the migration-related security risks as they present themselves to the Iraqi refugees themselves and to the two states with the largest Iraqi refu-

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<sup>37</sup> Communication with UNHCR officers in Syria and Jordan in October 2009.

<sup>38</sup> The special case of the Palestinian refugees from Iraq and the situation in the camps goes beyond the scope of this study, however can be elaborated on request.

<sup>39</sup> Crisp J, Janz J, Riera J, et al.: *Surviving in the city* A review of UNHCR's operations for Iraqi refugees in urban areas of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009

<sup>40</sup> Reuters, 19 June 2007, *Iraqi refugees face poverty trap*.

gee communities: Syria and Jordan. Despite their proximity, these two countries present remarkably different political environments and their governments have thus approached the Iraqi refugee influx quite differently. By providing a brief comparison of the two environments, various security-related questions that can arise during a refugee crisis, and how states might answer them, are raised.

The first part of the study presents an overview of the key facts relating to the Iraqi refugee crisis. The second part characterizes the regional security concerns that Syria and Jordan share, in relation to the Iraqi migrants. Thirdly, the specific migration-related security risks that present themselves to the two receiving states and their answers to them are presented. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the human security of the Iraqi refugees is discussed and the risks and opportunities that migration has opened up for them, are presented.

## **2. The Iraqi refugee crisis: an overview**

The Iraqi refugee crisis, which kicked off fully in 2004, came in response to sectarian violence and organized crime, which targeted different Iraqis in different ways, depending on their wealth, religion and politics. This means that the migratory pattern of the crisis was uneven, as different groups fled their country at different times, in response to the particular political and security developments that affected people of their social identity.

Initially, after the beginning of the Iraq war in March 2003, only a small number of Iraqis fled the country, most of them wealthy members of the former regime or persons with significant ties to the Iraqi government. Such individuals found refuge in Syria or other Arab states and did not present a refugee problem as such. However, as the recent tension between Syria and Iraq over the extradition of former Saddam supporters have shown, this group of refugees presents a significant security risk to both host state (Syria) and state of origin (Iraq). Further details on this matter are presented below.

Significant outward migration from Iraq began in 2004, in response to fighting between American forces and Iraqi insurgents, growing religious fundamentalism and organized crime. These developments led to a huge decline in personal security, combined with sudden restrictions on personal freedoms due to the power of religious militias.

The first, large wave of refugees began in 2004 and largely consisted of thousands of relatively wealthy, urban, educated and secular Sunnis from Baghdad, as well as Christians and Sabians (a religious minority). These refugees were targeted by increasing religious fundamentalism, and a number of bomb attacks on churches, which occurred at this time in Baghdad and northern Iraq, as well as the general decline in security due to American-Iraqi fighting.

A seriously massive influx of refugees into Syria and Jordan began in 2006, after the bombing of an important Shi'a shrine in Samarra (Iraq). This attack resulted in a surge in sectarian warfare all across the country and outward migrations from all across southern Iraq, including large numbers of poorer, Shi'a Iraqis. As moving outside of Iraq remained more expensive than moving within the country, even the later refugees generally arrived with some modest savings or access to income. While there are no specific studies regarding the matter, it can be assumed that the Iraqi refugees represent a more wealthy population group than those who are internally displaced within Iraq. This is supported by reports that Iraqi IDPs frequently squat in public buildings (and have been evicted) and have very low education levels;

whereas abroad, most refugees have no other option but to find private accommodation and pay rent.

Additional religious minority groups, such as Mandeans and Yazidis also fled increasing religious fundamentalism and are today present among the Iraqi refugees. It was at this stage that Syria and Jordan were confronted with tens of thousands of Iraqis streaming across their borders every day and that UNHCR scrambled into action, setting up mass-registration facilities and beginning to organize health and community services.

Since then, migration between Iraq and Syria and Jordan respectively has largely stabilized. Jordan has closed its borders to further immigration and in the case of Syria, where migration from Iraq is easy and frequent, inward and outward movements are balanced, according to the government.<sup>41</sup> The actual number of Iraqi refugees in each country is heavily disputed and as documentation of Iraqi migration in both countries is extremely patchy, no estimate is reliable. Figures provided by each government are high, for Syria, it stands at around 1.2 million, for Jordan, at around 500,000. The numbers of refugees registered with UNHCR are much lower, for Syria around 206,000 in February 2009, for Jordan around 52,000. It is unknown how high the percentage is, although it is clear that many refugees choose not to register with UNHCR.<sup>42</sup> Scholars have disputed the methodology of various studies into this question, and answers therefore remain vague.

Overall, given its rapidity, size and context, post-2003 migration from Iraq to Syria and Jordan has proceeded remarkably peacefully and with few significant social disturbances for the host countries. While the primary and secondary education sector has been severely strained in some areas of Damascus, this has not led to a wholesale breakdown in services or crisis. UNHCR, initially not well prepared for the long-term nature of the migration, reacted quickly and received large-scale, short-term funding to scale up registration facilities and services. Unfortunately, longer term funding has not been forthcoming and it is unlikely that assistance on the current level can continue for long. According to one person active in the management of international aid projects to Syria, while in 2008 many Syrian officials, foreign donors and diplomats regularly raised the issue of Iraqi refugees, this year attention has moved on to other issues such as the water shortage in Syria's north-east and the Iraqis are only seldom referred to. On the other hand, at least one international NGO reported plans for doubling its education projects for Iraqi refugees in 2010 and significantly increasing its number of staff.<sup>43</sup> A reduction in UNHCR's budget would mostly affect the humanitarian situation of refugees currently relying on cash handouts; on the other hand, if significant numbers of refugees are in the mean time successfully resettled, the effect could be much less severe.

A number of structural difficulties that affect humanitarian assistance to the refugees remain. Firstly and most importantly, the legal framework governing the refugees is fuzzy and leaves both refugees, UNHCR and NGOs in a legal grey area. Further information on the legal situation is provided below in the section on the human security of Iraqi refugees.

Secondly, data on all aspects of the Iraqi refugees are unavailable, vague and disputed. The numbers game is of high importance to several involved parties, including the governments of Syria and Jordan (for different reasons), international NGOs, UNHCR and states targeted

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<sup>41</sup> UNHCR Syria: A round up of 2008. Damascus, UNHCR Syria, 2009

<sup>42</sup> Crisp J, Janz J, Riera J, et al.: Surviving in the city A review of UNHCR's operations for Iraqi refugees in urban areas of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009

<sup>43</sup> Interview conducted in Damascus in October 2009

for resettlement. In the case of Syria, the absence of firm(er) numbers on the Iraqi community is regarded by most observers as a political strategy of the government, so that its inflated estimates of Iraqi arrivals, used to attract foreign assistance and good will, cannot be questioned. The only thing that can be said for certain about the question of how many Iraqis live in Syria and Jordan is that the answer is unclear. It is likely that the government figures of 1.2 million in Syria and 650, 000 in Jordan are inflated. This assumption is supported by more reliable UNHCR statistics on refugee registrations and Iraqi children attending school. However given the absence of research and surveys, especially covering areas other than Damascus and Amman, there is simply no clear answer and the origin of the various figures published in different reports must be questioned.

Thirdly, in both countries, aid efforts are hampered by government reluctance to allow NGOs (both foreign and national) to operate and UNHCR initially had difficulties to identify implementing partners.

### **3. Regional security risks**

Since their foundation as independent states in the 1940s, the populations and governments of the Levant have continually experienced threats to the stability of their countries and societies. While both Jordan and Syria today have managed to obtain a significant degree of internal stability, the regional security situation remains fragile. The situation is exacerbated by the region's global strategic importance, which ensures the continuous involvement of foreign powers.

Iraq, which borders Syria and Jordan, faces a very uncertain political future. The 2006 Israeli war against Lebanon, a 2007 Israeli air raid on Syria and the 2009 bombing of Gaza, seemed to prove that Israel remains an important threat to Arab states in the region. Both Syria and Jordan have witnessed recent attacks by Islamic extremists and have to manage religiously and ethnically diverse populations. This section briefly mentions those regional security aspects that are of relevance when considering the impact of the Iraqi refugee crisis.

#### *Sectarianism*

Religious, national and ethnic diversity is as an important element of security considerations in the region. Sectarianism has regularly resulted in one or the other form of violence in Syria and Jordan in the past 50 years.

Syria's population of around 20 million is religiously and ethnically divided into various Muslim, Christian and other minority sects. Although no serious violence has occurred between the different groups for decades, inter-marriage is very rare and popular animosity between the different groups exists. The sectarian disintegration of Lebanon and Iraq are keen reminders to Syrians of the potential dangers posed by their own, religiously diverse, society.

Also, northern Syria is home to a significant Kurdish population of up to two million people, of which around 10 per cent are stateless, after the government revoked the citizenship of a number of Kurds in 1962. As elsewhere in the Middle East, the Syrian government fears Kurdish separatism and Kurds in Syria suffer state repression, and occasionally stage protests against their treatment.

This means that overall, sectarianism is perceived as a significant force and indeed a danger in Syria, reflected in the political and social taboos surrounding it. Government officials never address this issue openly (as mentioning it could imply a criticism of the government, which

is dominated by the Alawi sect); and even in private conversations it is a problematic issue to discuss. Generally, the Syrian state manages this security threat through immediate repression of any form of sectarian and separatist violence and by the provision of basic welfare to most citizens on an equal basis.

Jordan, with a population of around 5.5 million, has been far less affected by religious sectarianism and the vast majority of its population is Sunni Muslim. However, Jordan is also the country with the world's highest percentage of refugees, most of which are Palestinians, and the country hosts hundreds of thousands of foreign workers, from Egypt and South Asia.

In the past, Palestinians have been the source of civil-war like fighting and inter-state conflict between Syria and Jordan, and their future remains Jordan's most pressing, long-term political question. Because of its cosmopolitan population, Jordan also needs to find a way to retain a sense of national identity, and to manage public resentment against the newest wave of refugees to hit the country. These matters are complicated by changes to Jordan's rentier-style form of economic patronage, through economic liberalization.

As sectarianism remains such a highly sensitive and politicized issue in both host-countries, the impact of the Iraqi refugees on the sectarian dynamic has been carefully observed from the start. Government officials and observers expressed the fear that the influx of a largely Shi'a refugee population, along with several religious minorities, might import sectarian conflict into their societies. As outlined below, this has so far not happened, but the situation is and should be continuously monitored, particularly in the provision of development assistance. Any explicit or implicit preferential treatment of a particular religious or ethnic group should obviously be avoided.

### *Repercussions of the Iraq War*

The war that erupted in Iraq after the American-led invasion of the country in 2003 has had a significant impact on overall, regional security. The continued presence of American troops in the region and the fundamentally changed power dynamic in Iraq has opened opportunities and threats for all of Iraq's neighbouring states, which are now assessing and reacting to the new situation. Who holds power in Iraq, whether Iran will gain significant influence, whether the Kurdish region gains full independence, and how the Americans will continue to exert power will be huge determinants for regional security.

The large Iraqi refugee population plays a part in these geopolitical considerations, as the refugees can potentially be used as strategic trump cards by the host states to, for example, demand funds or other assistance from Iraq. Iraq, on the other hand, could potentially use its diaspora to destabilize the host societies or make demand on host states to better control those refugees opposed to the new Iraqi government. While until recently no such trend was discernable, the sudden deterioration of relations between Syria and Iraq in August 2009, when both countries recalled their ambassadors just days after the Iraqi prime minister visited Damascus, are signs of how quickly the regional dynamic can currently change, with potential significant effect for the Iraqi refugee populations. These considerations have to be kept in mind to understand certain government policy towards the refugees.

Also, since 2003 both Syria and Jordan have – voluntarily or involuntarily - hosted individuals seeking to enter Iraq as insurgents or carry out bomb attacks in their host states. Syria in particular has been accused by the American and the Iraqi governments of not curbing the influx of foreign fighters from its territory into Iraq. Both governments have therefore been

indirectly drawn into the Iraq conflict and have had to mobilize additional security forces to monitor Iraqi and other foreigners with possible interest in entering Iraq. According to a number of conflicting reports, insurgent and al-Qaeda style groups continue to plan attacks from Syria, and the Iraqi government is seeking more cooperation on this matter from Syria (this was also the background to the recent withdrawal of ambassadors).<sup>44</sup> Unlike Syria, Jordan has not been accused of facilitating or at least not preventing the entry of insurgents into Iraq.

### *Regional Migration*

War, economic pressures and social instability have meant that large-scale inward and outward migration has been a common feature in the Levant throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Even before independence the area was a destination for migrants, of which perhaps the largest group were Armenians, displaced to Syria from Ottoman Turkey in 1915.

The creation of Israel in 1948 resulted in the flight of around 700,000 Palestinians, a large number of which settled in rapidly built refugee camps in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan received the largest number and today, estimates consider that around one third of Jordan's population is Palestinian.<sup>45</sup> Iraq's tumultuous history has also meant that Iraq's neighbours have hosted tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees for decades, whose numbers have risen or fallen in line with the political situation in Iraq and the ebb and flow of positive or negative regional relations. Post-2003 Iraqi migration into Syria and Jordan (and elsewhere) has to be analysed within this history and is perhaps best understood as a turning-point, rather than a precedent, of Iraqi outward migration.<sup>46</sup>

In this sense Syria and Jordan are, to an extent, used to accommodating migrants and have a history of tolerance towards refugees. On the other hand it also means that governments and populations are wary of having to integrate yet another, large foreign community, which is perceived as draining public budgets and increasing the competition for resources.

While migrants have been allowed to live and work in Syria and Jordan, this does not mean that they enjoy citizenship. According to nationality, migrants receive varying degrees of residency rights. While citizens from Arab states have traditionally been allowed de facto free movement in and out of Syria and Jordan, the Iraqi refugee crisis has resulted in an unprecedented visa regime for Iraqi nationals entering both countries. On the other hand, the traditionally liberal attitude to Arab visitors has also meant that both governments are turning a blind eye to immigration violations by Iraqis, implementing a regime of tolerance, but also of legal uncertainty.

### *Relations with Israel*

While of no direct relevance to the Iraqi refugee crisis, Arab-Israeli relations are such a crucial regional security factor that they are briefly mentioned here. Of both countries, only Jordan has signed a peace treaty with Israel, and direct and indirect armed confrontation between Israel and Lebanon/Syria is possibly the most important regional security considera-

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<sup>44</sup> Reuters, 11 September 2009, Iraq says Syria must show will to stop militants.

<sup>45</sup> Migration Information Source: Jordan, a Refugee Haven. Available at: [www.migrationsource.org](http://www.migrationsource.org)

<sup>46</sup> Dorai, Mohamed K. 2008. "Le Renouveau de la Question de l'Asile au Proche-Orient: l'Exemple des Réfugiés Irakiens en Syrie." In *Migrants Craints et Espoirs*, Le Monde Diplomatique Carrefour de la Pensee, eds. Alain Chemin and Jean-Pierre Gelard: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

tion. While Syria channels support to various armed groups in Lebanon, which continue to mount regular attacks against Israel, the latter has conducted assassinations and air raids against targets in Syria as recent as 2007.

The 2006 Israeli war against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon led to a brief refugee crisis in Syria, when thousands of Lebanese fled across the border to escape Israeli bombing raids. The 2009 bombing of Gaza served to remind Arab states and populations of the continued force and threat of the Israeli army and resulted in large demonstrations across the Arab world. Indirectly, any Israeli military success can have detrimental effects on the social peace in the Levant, as it stirs up Palestinian communities and undermines government legitimacy (as governments are perceived to be failing in their duty to protect the Palestinians, which are considered as fellow Arabs).

#### **4. Migration related security risks in Jordan and Syria**

This section will provide an overview of the security risks related to Iraqi migration as they present themselves in Syria and Jordan, and an indication of how both states have responded.

Due to their differing immigration policies and economic situations, Syria and Jordan have attracted slightly different Iraqi refugee populations; overall the Iraqi community in Jordan is wealthier. One interesting, general question that arises is whether Syria and Jordan should be considered as host or transit states for the Iraqi refugees (indeed, the matter perhaps highlights the general problem with these categories). For all intents and purposes, at least Syria and Jordan have become *host* states for hundreds of thousands of refugees. However, while both governments are tolerating this situation, legally it remains defined as one of *transit*. The UNHCR in Jordan officially operates under a temporary protection regime, which allows every registered refugee a residency of six months.<sup>47</sup> Given the absence of resettlement options, most refugees have long exceeded this time. Both governments persistently refer to the Iraqis as 'guests' or 'temporary workers', indicating their unwillingness to integrate the Iraqis in the long-term. No plan or strategy exists on how to deal with this open question; refugees remain in a frustrating legal limbo. While the question of the Iraqi refugees' legal status is of some relevance, especially regarding the international resettlement procedures, it has to be kept in mind that neither Syria nor Jordan have an effective legal apparatus that Iraqi refugees can appeal to regarding their rights as refugees. Neither country is signatory to the Geneva Refugee Convention and in the Syrian case, the country is ruled by emergency law that suspends all regular constitutional proceedings. While UNHCR has signed an MOU with the Jordanian government, this MOU only guarantees Iraqis six months temporary protection, which in most cases has long run out. This means effectively, that the ultimate power of decision about the freedom and movement of an Iraqi refugee lies with the executive (this is no different for regular citizens of Syria and Jordan), which applies any 'official' rules and regulations randomly.

Further information on the legal status of Iraqi refugees is provided in the separate section on Iraqi human security below.

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<sup>47</sup> Olwan, Mohamed Y. 2009. "Iraqi Refugees in Jordan: Legal Perspective." In CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes 2009, ed. CARIM. Florence: EUI.

## Jordan

As mentioned above, no precise figures as to the number of Iraqis currently present in Jordan exist. The most systematic – but still unreliable – study conducted in May 2007 by the Norwegian NGO Fafo, places the estimate between 450, 000 and 500, 000 Iraqis resident in Jordan, of which 77% arrived after 2003.<sup>48</sup> This figure is believed to underestimate the true number, as the study most likely did not capture the poorest refugees. For a country with only 5.5 million inhabitants, this sudden influx of people has placed a huge strain on resources, social cohesion and the government's legitimacy.

Despite this, until January 2006, Jordan operated an open door policy for Iraqis, who were not required to obtain particular documentation, other than a passport, to enter. This open-door policy ended suddenly in November 2005, after three Iraqi suicide bombers attacked three hotels in Amman and killed 60 people, in addition to themselves. The attack led to severe entry restriction for Iraqis, and since May 2008, Iraqis have to apply for advance visas from Iraq. Visas are only provided for investors and businessmen, students and employees.

Jordan thus faces a number of security risks related to Iraqi immigration. Below is a summary of the most important.

### *Economy*

Jordan is a resource poor country, which has liberalized its economy in the past 20 years, along IMF policy lines. While this has led to an upswing in investment and jobs – Jordan hosts several hundred thousand migrant workers -, this process has also brought about rapid increases in social disparities and an erosion of the middle classes. Economic liberalization has also created a degree of social tension and a loss of legitimacy for the government, which partly bases its politics on equal provision to all its citizens, through a rentier-type economy.

The Jordanian government created a number of tax incentives to foreign investors in the 1990s, from which wealthy Iraqis continue to benefit. Through this, the Jordanian economy has seen a considerable, if not well documented, influx of Iraqi capital. Real estate prices in Amman have increased by 200-300%, benefiting Jordanian landlords, and the capitalization of Jordanian companies reportedly doubled in one year.<sup>49</sup> Businesses focused on Iraqi needs (transport, infrastructure, consumption, leisure), partly financed by Iraqi investors, have become a visible feature of Amman and this economic dynamism has clearly been a boom for Jordan's economy. Unlike in Syria, where Iraqi businesses remain concentrated in Iraqi neighbourhoods and have experienced harassment, Jordan has thus welcomed Iraqi investment and expertise and has been able to gain from it. This situation is helped by Jordan's infinitely more dynamic economic environment, compared to that of Syria.

The downside of the Iraqi investment is that, as across the region, it has been accompanied by a rise in inflation and increased pressure on public resources; in Jordan, the scarcity of water is the most pressing issue. Even though no firm link between immigration and inflation has been established, it is notable that inflation in Jordan rose from 1.6 % in 2003 to 13.8 % in 2008, and is predicted to rise further.<sup>50</sup> Money spent by Iraqis on consumption and an ex-

<sup>48</sup> Fafo. 2007. "Iraqis in Jordan 2007 Their Number and Characteristics." Amman: Fafo.

<sup>49</sup> Bel-Air, Françoise de. 2009. "Iraqis in Jordan since 2003: What Socio-Political Stakes?" In CARIM Research Reports 2009, ed. CARIM. Florence: EUI.

<sup>50</sup> Figures taken from the website of the Central Bank of Jordan: [www.cbj.gov.jo](http://www.cbj.gov.jo).

cessive focus on buying real estate could be explanations from this phenomenon, which has mostly hit poorer Jordanians, who blame the rise in living costs on the Iraqis.

Such popular grumbling is exacerbated by competition between Iraqis and Jordanians in the labour market, which has led to a reduction in wages, as Iraqis, who are often working and residing illegally, are willing to work for less. This matter, which is reflected in press reports about the growing poverty of ordinary Jordanians, combined with lower economic stability due to liberalization in general, reflects badly on the government and its ability to provide for its citizens. Most recently however, public discontent over the Iraqi presence has lessened. And while in 2007 there were several demonstrations against the high inflation, more recently there has been no evidence of such activity. Violent popular uprisings or even a destabilizing of the government are regarded as extremely unlikely events by local analysts.<sup>51</sup>

### *Domestic Politics*

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's is governed by a constitutional monarchy, in which executive power rests with the king. Multi-party parliamentary elections are held for the 80-member lower house of parliament (the senators of the upper house are selected by the king).

Jordan's sovereignty has suffered from a number of challenges in the past decades; the most notable and continuing is the presence of around 1.7 million Palestinian refugees on its territory, whose fate is largely in the hands of other governments and UN agencies. The Palestinian refugees, politically connected to events in Gaza and the West Bank, have in the past been the source of social unrest and war. The Jordanian government has therefore had to deal with a large population, whose behaviour, to an extent, has been directed from abroad or at least by events outside of Jordan's control. Also, Jordan's political standing in the region has to an extent depended on the hosting of the Palestinians, both negatively (when Jordan has been judged by the way it treats Palestinians) and positively (through resource transfers by other Arab states, wishing to compensate Jordan for hosting the Palestinians).

Iraqi immigration has raised fears that Jordan will face a similar issue with yet another refugee population that will remain in the country for decades, perhaps forever. This fear has translated into a political strategy, which is aimed to ensure that the Iraqis remain firmly under the control of the Jordanian government, rather than being governed by international agencies or agreements. Part of this strategy is the Jordanian government's persistent refusal to officially acknowledge the Iraqis as refugees, instead referring to them as 'guests' or 'visitors'. Although Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention in any case, by not acknowledging refugee status of the Iraqis, Jordan is not bound by international refugee law, which would prevent forcible returns and which would transfer governance of the Iraqi refugees largely to the UNHCR.

Despite this official rhetoric, it should be noted that to date, Jordan has generally extended protection to the Iraqis and allows UNHCR (which has only registered a small percentage of the Iraqis) to operate. However by leaving the Iraqis and UNHCR in a legal limbo, Jordan is keeping all its options open and is not relinquishing control.

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<sup>51</sup> Interview with an academic/political analyst in Amman in October 2009.

Despite the 'middle class' background of most Iraqi refugees in Jordan, the prolonged exile has resulted in a deteriorated financial position for many. The Jordanian government and UNHCR responded to the realisation that a growing number of refugees needed some form of assistance to prevent them from becoming destitute, by allowing more international NGOs to operate and by directly implementing aid programmes respectively. Despite their alleviation of threatening poverty, the increasingly visible aid programmes however also highlight to the public that the Iraqi presence indeed spells some sort of problem, which the government cannot solve without international help. The Jordanian government has therefore been reluctant to take or allow for any actions that highlight growing Iraqi poverty. Admitting that the Jordanian government indeed needs outside assistance to deal with the Iraqi refugees emphasizes that they are a burden on an already stretched economy, and makes the government's immigration policy appear unwise and questionable. The provision of aid for the Iraqis puts them into competition with other Jordanian poor, who also require or desire public assistance. Acknowledging any form of poverty reflects badly on the government and its ability to provide. While this would be the case in nearly any country, in Jordan, where state-citizen relations are based on patronage relations in which public consent is secured through the distribution of wealth, and in which public discontent cannot be freely expressed, poverty presents a particularly charged political issue. Finally, acknowledging Iraqi poverty also attracts potentially interventionist, foreign NGOs, whose activities could undermine government control over the refugees.

It is in this light that Jordan's immigration restrictions on poorer Iraqis and the country's reluctance to fund and promote aid programmes focused on the Iraqi refugees should be understood. While, as detailed below, Jordan now allows Iraqi access to basic health and education services, the government closely monitors international aid efforts and requires that they be extended to other needy communities in Jordan.

Last but not least, there remains the threat of al-Qaeda style organization and attacks emanating from the Iraqis in Jordan. It should be stressed that in general, Iraqi refugees have fled sectarian and random violence and have not shown interest in replicating these activities abroad. Nevertheless the above-described attacks from November 2005 demonstrate that such risk exists and the possibility of a repetition of such events cannot be excluded. A large scale attack by Iraqis within Jordan could also lead to a significant deterioration in relations between the Iraqi refugees and the rest of the population, which would spell a further threat for social unrest.

### *Foreign Relations*

The Iraqi refugees are also of importance to the security of Jordan's foreign relations, both regionally and globally. Globally, one positive effect has been that Jordan has received widespread, public praise for hosting such a large number of refugees.<sup>52</sup> The hosting of so many direct and indirect victims of the American-led invasion of Iraq also strengthens Jordan's relationship with the US, which provides USD 660 million in aid to Jordan annually. While, like Egypt, Jordan is a US ally, the Iraqi refugees provide Jordan with a potential lever, as it would reflect badly on the US if the plight of Iraqi refugees would drastically worsen. In this – and other ways – Jordan can also use the presence of so many Iraqi refugees as an argu-

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<sup>52</sup> UNHCR Press Release, 12 February 2008, *UNHCR chief discusses refugee crisis with Jordan's King Abdullah* and UNHCR Press Release, 8 February 2007, *UNHCR chief Guterres praises Syria for generosity to Iraqi refugees*.

ment for increased aid payments and other type of resource transfers, from the US, the Iraqi government and other Arab states.

It should be noted that the particularly numerous Iraqi migration into Jordan and Syria has not had a special effect on regional relations, especially compared to the huge effect that the American-led invasion of Iraq has had overall, of which the wider Iraqi migration into many countries of the region forms a small part. As noted before, Iraqi outward migration has been a feature of the region for decades and there are Iraqis scattered across the region, especially in Iraq's neighbouring countries including Turkey and Iran.

However, the Iraqis also present a number of challenges to the security of Jordan's foreign relations. Firstly, as mentioned above, the Iraqis remain a foreign presence and, while no indication of such developments are currently present, it is not unlikely that at some point Iraqis in Jordan could become politically active and threaten internal stability, as Palestinians have done in the past. As such activism could be influenced either directly by the governments of Jordan's neighbouring states, or indirectly result out of a lack of control and stability in a neighbouring state, Jordan's government is especially powerless in this regard.

This means that Jordan's security forces will continuously monitor the Iraqi community, which presents a further a burden on state finances and infrastructure.

Given the instability of Iraq's government and its need to divert publicity away from its own failings, Jordan could face accusations from Iraq in relations to the policies that it applies to the refugees. Such accusations could include failure to prevent terrorist activity among the Iraqis, or encouraging a brain drain from Iraq or failure to provide enough for the refugees.

### *Society*

As briefly mentioned above, Jordanian society is highly international and fragmented. On the one hand this has meant that the arrival of yet another foreign group – of which many thousands already resided in Jordan – did not present a radical shock to social relations. Especially given that fact that as Arabs, the Iraqis not only share the language, but also the religion and culture of most Jordanians, their presence has not radically altered Jordan's social make up. As was the case across the region, initially Jordanians felt compassion for the Iraqis and the disastrous developments in Iraq and welcomed them into their country. While this positive attitude changed, mainly due to the price hikes attributed to the Iraqis, significant hostility and xenophobia towards the Iraqis has not been reported and the common bond of being fellow Arabs remains.

Despite some news articles in the Arab press that crime rates are rising in Jordan, there are no indications that Iraqi immigration is connected with this.<sup>53</sup> Petty crime is not a wide spread phenomena in Jordan, where security is tightly maintained and Iraqis, who are arrested for any violations face immediate deportation. Interestingly, the Jordanian government passed a law against human trafficking in January 2009, but not in response to the Iraqi situation, but to protect south Asian migrant workers.<sup>54</sup>

On the other hand, the already disparate nature of Jordanian society meant that the Iraqis have exacerbated an already existing problem, especially, and this is of importance, as the Iraqis themselves are not a socially cohesive group. The Iraqis have further reduced social

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<sup>53</sup> Maraya News, 9 September 2009, *Crime rates rise in Jordan*.

<sup>54</sup> IRIN, 27 January 2009, *Jordan: Government adopts anti-human trafficking law*

cohesion and homogeneity in Jordan and have highlighted the lack of a 'national base' upon which Jordanian citizenship could be based, further complicating already difficult government-citizenship relations in the country. To retain legitimacy and control, the Jordanian government needs to find strategies to balance the interests and needs of all the various social groups in the country and the Iraqis have contributed to this challenge.

## **Syria**

Despite its geographical proximity to Jordan, Syria's political and economic environment differs significantly. The country's economy is much less dynamic and liberalized, and is dominated by a large public sector and state-owned enterprises. Emergency law, which suspends most articles of Syria's republican constitution, has been in effect since 1963 and all executive power rests on the president and his inner circle of relatives and advisors. In practice and as a short hand, Syria can be described as an oppressive police state, in which any form of opposition to the president is severely punished and in which the pervasive security forces can imprison and torture with near impunity.

However, Syria's government also enjoys an important degree of consent and support among the population, and provides citizens with (relatively) functioning public services, such as education, health care and subsidized goods. The government has managed to maintain social stability, which, given Syria's location between Lebanon and Iraq, is regarded as supremely important. Popular consent therefore rests on the provision of at least minimum living standards and it should be noted that public tolerance of visible poverty, such as homelessness, begging or child labour is relatively low in Syria; it is regarded as relatively shameful and offensive. This matter is of relevance when considering Syria's treatment of the Iraqis.

Finally, the availability of data and information on the Iraqi refugees in Syria is even worse than in Jordan. This is due to Syria's weaker state bureaucracy, a lower involvement of foreign NGOs in the country and the Syrian state's general avoidance of public information regarding the highly politicized matter of Iraqi refugees.

Syria maintained an open door policy towards the Iraqis until October 2007, when a visa regime was introduced, to curb what was seen as unacceptably large and uncontrolled numbers of migrants. Officially, Iraqis can obtain a 3 months tourist visa on the border, which can be renewed at the Syrian immigration ministry. In practice, immigration matters are more vague and as long as Iraqis do not commit any crimes in Syria it is unlikely that they are deported.<sup>55</sup>

### *Economy and Infrastructure*

Syria faces a number of serious economic challenges, some of which have most certainly been exacerbated by the arrival of up to 1.5 million refugees from Iraq since 2003. However, the Iraqis have also brought economic opportunities to Syria, many of which the state fails to realize due to restrictive policies.

It should be noted that Syria's economy remains heavily state-controlled, despite recent attempts and efforts to de-regulate, which to date have only had a limited effect. The official

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<sup>55</sup> Weiss Fagen, Patricia. 2007. "Iraqi Refugees: Seeking Stability in Syria and Jordan." ed. Georgetown University Institute for the Study of International Migration. Washington DC: Georgetown University.

state control and ownership of many means of production is compounded by the fact that a number of important industry sectors are controlled by individuals close to the president, which also means that normal competition and market conditions are not prevalent. This means that the state of Syria's public finances is of large importance when it comes to the economic development prospects of the country. Due to its – now diminishing – oil reserves, Syria has never been enrolled in an IMF programme and has thus not had to radically slash subsidies, open its capital markets or reduce its trade barriers (all of these aspects have seen some deregulation in the past few years, to limited effect).

According to the Syrian government, the largest drain on public finances attributed to the Iraqi refugees, has been the sharp rise in the consumption of subsidized goods, such as grain, diesel, water and electricity, which has, according to its own figures, cost the government millions of dollars.<sup>56</sup> The increased demand for education and health provision are costing the public purse, as Syria from the start allowed all Iraqi children to attend school and initially allowed Iraqis access to the public health system (this later changed, and Iraqis now receive health care through the Red Crescent).

While the accuracy of the proclaimed figures should be treated with caution, it is clear that the increase of the urban population is placing a strain on city infrastructure and public services. The growth of illicit and unregulated housing into areas of Damascus without flowing water and electricity is visible to any visitor to the city. While not all of this can be attributed to the Iraqis, their arrival has no doubt exacerbated the problem, which the government and city administration do not appear able to address. The long-term risks of these developments, especially at a time when Syria is attempting economic liberalization, are a rise in urban poverty and social tension.

As in Jordan, the Iraqis have had an impact on Syria's labour market. As they can only work illegally, Iraqi workers have reportedly driven down wages and desperate women and children are working in factories at very low rates. While the overall, national economic effect of such changes is very difficult to measure or even estimate the related, greater visibility of poverty, such as children working in the streets, present a broader social security risk that the government has to manage. The Syria government, for economic, bureaucratic and political reasons, is not in a good position to do this.

The Syrian public sector suffers from a lack of experience and education, as well as from low pay and heavily inefficient organisation and work methods. The reasons for this are numerous – partly to be found in Syria's semi-socialist history, in decades of lack of reform and the government's priority to allocate public sector posts according to patronage and loyalty. Combined with the overruling power of political connection and random application of power, this has resulted in a disastrously ineffective public management that extends to all areas of public services.

Iraqi migration has also had a limited positive economic effect in Syria, although its exact impact is not known.<sup>57</sup> The influx and dynamism of Iraqi capital is visible in Iraqi areas of Damascus, where restaurants, travel companies, internet and clothes shops have sprung up, operating in a legal grey area. Unlike Jordan, Syria does not have explicit incentives for Iraqi

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<sup>56</sup> Unpublished paper presented by the Syria Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a 2007 conference in Geneva on the plight of the Iraqi refugees.

<sup>57</sup> According to a local observer, who attended a meeting with the most recent IMF delegation, even this delegation was not able to obtain firm numbers or information about the economic impact of the Iraqi refugees and whether it had had an overall net positive or negative effect.

investment and indeed, Iraqi businesses have suffered intimidation, such as being requested by local authorities to cover up the explicitly Iraqi names on their shop signs.

There is also evidence of a growth in trade with consumer goods between Syria and Iraq, with new markets opening for Syrian products and medium sized trading businesses and jobs being created in the transport sector.<sup>58</sup> As in Jordan, Iraqi migration has led to a tripling of real estate and rental prices, benefiting Syrian landlords – but damaging Syrians who rent or who are looking to buy their first home. Price inflation has been visible in all areas of life in Syria since 2003, and has been attributed to Iraqis, however it is unclear whether other factors, such as the phasing out of subsidies, are to blame.

Given the desolate state of Syria's higher education system, the country could also stand to benefit from an influx of highly educated Iraqis. Individual instances, in which Iraqi teachers, doctors or academics have been employed, have been reported, however overall, a blanket employment ban affects all Iraqis, limiting the possible 'brain gain' effect they might bring to Syria.

### *Domestic Politics*

The Syrian government's grip on domestic security remains tight. The Iraqi influx has placed pressure on several security-related areas: crime, fear of sectarianism and political activism and the activities of foreign NGOs, a few of which have been permitted to operate since the Iraqi immigration crisis.

With regards to crime, while no hard figures are available, numerous research reports and press articles report on the rise of prostitution, often of minors, linked to the Iraqi refugee community in Syria. Prostitution is illegal in Syria, and women conducting it are imprisoned and deported. Given the pervasiveness of the phenomena and the wide public knowledge about the location of street prostitution and clubs that offer it, a significant degree of tolerance or collusion from Syrian authorities is evident.<sup>59</sup> Popular commentary that links the Iraqis to an increase in street crime, such as pick pocketing, burglary and kidnapping, also exists, with the government claiming a 20% rise in crime rates in Iraqi-dominated neighbourhoods.<sup>60</sup> One story, for example, making the rounds in 2007 was that a group of Iraqis had injected HIV into the sauce bottles that stand on restaurant tables in Damascus, so that anyone who would use them would catch the disease. Such stories, while appearing ludicrous to outside observers, increase public fear of the refugees and places pressure on the government to 'control' the situation.

The fear that Iraqis would import sectarian violence and political activism into Syria existed from the start but has been, to an extent, dispelled. It quickly became clear that the vast majority of refugees were not interested in replicating the violence from which they had fled. Notably, Iraqis in Syria have settled in mixed neighbourhoods and apart from one area, which has always been favoured by Shi'a due to the presence of a particular shrine, no significant sectarian segregation among the Iraqis has been visible. The heavy security surveillance present in Iraqi areas also means that any signs of such developments would be quickly suppressed.

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<sup>58</sup> The Syria Report, 4 August 2008, *Iraqi Refugees: A Boon to the Syrian Economy?*

<sup>59</sup> New York Times, 29 May 2007, *Desperate Iraqi Refugees Turn to Sex Trade in Syria.*

<sup>60</sup> Forced Migration Review, *Iraqi Refugees in Syria*, article by Faisal al-Miqdad, Syria's deputy foreign minister.

Several Iraqi political and religious organizations have offices in Syria, and it can be assumed that they are known to the authorities and cooperate with them. It should be noted that in September 2009, Syria was accused of harbouring terrorist training camps from which Baathist insurgents sent suicide bombers to Baghdad. These reports, elaborated on below, have not been corroborated but show the real and perceived security risk that political activism among the refugees could have for Syria. To deal with these threats, the Syria government is pursuing a policy of surveillance and control of the Iraqis, combined with the provision of welfare and public services. Even relatively wealthy Iraqis, in a stricter way than in Jordan, are firmly maintained as 'outsiders', in the sense that they cannot access the labour market and are referred to as 'guests', indicating that Syria does not expect them to stay permanently. Faced with these restrictions, Iraqis adopt a wide range of coping mechanisms. These include working illegally in low level jobs (waiters, delivery, factories, prostitution), more rarely working illegally in better jobs according to their skills, registering a business through a Syrian partner and to-and-fro migration from Iraq. Some families are supported by a breadwinner residing in Iraq and/or receive occasional support from family members residing in other countries.

Most UNHR-registered Iraqis qualify for food assistance, which is distributed every two months in bulk. Those classified as 'most vulnerable' by UNHCR also receive monthly cash assistance of SYP 7 000 (around USD 150), plus SYP 700 (around USD 15) for each dependent. As of September 2009, around 13 000 Iraqi families received financial assistance from UNHCR in Syria. In Jordan, between January and June 2009, around 6780 Iraqi families received cash assistance.<sup>61</sup>

Historically, the Syrian government has been highly suspicious of allowing Western NGOs to operate on its territory; the Iraqi crisis has led to a moderate change in this matter. The Danish Refugee Council, the Italian NGO Movimondo and Caritas have scaled up operations to aid Iraqis and a number of other NGOs have applied for permits. Most notably, NGOs have helped in the primary and secondary education sector, building schools. Others provide vocational training to Iraqi refugees and organize youth activities.<sup>62</sup> The presence of these NGOs, whose remit extends only to Iraqi refugees and which have to date not been permitted to provide services to destitute Syrians (a notable difference from Jordan, where they are *required* to extend services to all poor), threatens the government's control of information about Syrian internal issues, which is perceived as a loss of sovereignty. By minimizing the contact between NGOs and Syrian citizens, the government attempts to control this danger.

### *Foreign Relations*

Syria's relations with Iraq suffered a sharp turn for the worse in August 2009, after Iraq accused Syria of harbouring members of Iraq's former regime and of training suicide bombers, who consequently killed dozens of people in Baghdad. The accusations came after a publicly televised confession by an Iraqi terrorist, that he and others had received training from Syrian intelligence officials near the Syrian town of Lattakia. Syria dismissed the accusations as

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<sup>61</sup> UNHCR Syria Update Autumn 2009 and UNHCR Jordan, Assistance and Protection 2009 Mid-Year Report

<sup>62</sup> For a list of NGOs working with UNHCR Syria see: UNHCR Syria. 2009. "A round up of 2008." In UNHCR Syria Updates, ed. UNHCR. Damascus: UNHCR Syria.

ludicrous, pointing towards its care for hundreds and thousands of Iraqis on its soil – but also refused to hand over the former regime figures Iraq wished to arrest.<sup>63</sup>

Which government is speaking the truth on this matter is not known, but the episode highlights the complex ways in which the Iraqi refugees can be used as a strategic trump card in Iraqi-Syrian relations. Should any maltreatment of Iraqis by Syrian authorities be published, the Iraqi government could use this for complaints. Should Syria on the other hand allow Iraqis to work and invest, Syria could be accused of facilitating a brain drain from Iraq. Should security again deteriorate in Iraq with Syria holding the blame, various negative out-falls are imaginable, such as an escalation of assassinations and bomb attacks against Iraqis in Syria, conducted either by Iraqi government agents or the various factions vying for power in Iraq.

Regarding the relations between Syria and the West – which are generally difficult - the effect of the Iraqi refugees is equally mixed. Like Jordan, Syria has received wide-spread praise from the UN, NGOs and Western governments for supporting so many refugees; this has enhanced the country's standing. Syria has even been regarded as indirectly helping the US by receiving so many refugees, which were uprooted due to an US-led war, and has been regarded as an indirect victim of the invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, the US has also repeatedly accused Syria of not monitoring the Iraqi refugees closely enough and allowing Iraqi insurgents entry into Iraq. This is partly the reason why the Iraqi accusations, described above, carry weight. Describing Syria as a safe haven for terrorists could give ammunition to those US officials, who still wish for regime change in Syria.

Although the Syrian government remains deeply sceptical about foreign NGOs, cooperation with a selected number presents an opportunity for Syrian foreign relations and public services. To a small extent, Syria is pursuing this strategy, although the number of NGOs that the government works with remains very limited.<sup>64</sup> Building a positive relationship with European NGOs could ultimately have a beneficial effect on, for example, Syria's desire to sign the trade agreement with the EU, which is in the pipeline. In this sense, Syria's all in all generous treatment of the Iraqi refugees remains an under exploited, foreign relations dossier and, notably, Syria has not taken much initiative to 'market' the issue in a beneficial way.<sup>65</sup>

### *Society*

Despite their similar cultural and linguistic background, the Iraqis in Syria remain relatively segregated. Iraqis have settled all over Syria, but certain areas of Damascus have visibly become 'Iraqi towns', a development that has been greeted with public scepticism and open dislike. The initial welcoming and compassionate attitude of Syrians towards Iraqis has long changed to one of annoyance and suspicion.<sup>66</sup> As in Jordan, Syrians are aware that their country already hosts a very large Palestinian refugee population and there are fears that yet again, Syria will have to take on refugees from a conflict for which it was not responsible.

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<sup>63</sup> BBC News, 25 August 2009, *Iraq and Syria recall ambassadors*.

<sup>64</sup> UNHCR Press Release, 8 May 2008, *UNHCR signs landmark accord in Syria with international NGO*.

<sup>65</sup> As usual, it is unclear whether this is due to oversight, or intent. Should parts of the Syrian security truly be involved with Iraqi criminal elements, the suppression of any unnecessary attention to the Iraqi refugees would be understandable.

<sup>66</sup> Washington Post, 3 February 2005, *Iraqi refugees overwhelm Syria*.

In the Syrian popular discourse, Iraqis are often associated with poverty, crime and prostitution, or suspected of links with the Saddam regime or other unwanted political activity. Iraqi children have reported open hostility from teachers and other students; however it is difficult at this stage to evaluate how widespread this phenomenon is. The lack of integration is worsened by the employment prohibition and unclear residence status of Iraqis, which remain in legal limbo. It is also due to the fact that the Iraqis themselves would most often prefer not to be in Syria, either hoping to return or wishing to be resettled in a third country, and therefore many are not making efforts to permanently settle and integrate.

There are numerous reports about an increase in human trafficking between Iraq and Syria, linked to prostitution. Given that these developments have to occur with the collusion of Syrian criminals and indeed authorities, which turn a blind eye, the destitution of Iraqi migrants presents an opportunity for growing organized crime and corruption in Syria. No apparent plan or programme to counter such developments on behalf of the authorities is currently in place.

So while overall, the arrival of the Iraqis in Syria has proceeded remarkably peacefully and without any major public disruptions, on a more subtle social level more significant social changes are taking place, which are linked to the arrival of the Iraqi refugees. These come at a time, when the already inefficient Syrian state has to manage other difficult transitions, such as the liberalization of the economy and dealing with the effects of a 2-year drought, which has uprooted nearly 1 million farmers.

What about Iraqis travelling back and forth? Have there been instances of social tension in Iraq? As mentioned above, there is very frequent to and fro migration between Iraq and Syria, much less between Iraq and Jordan, due to Jordanian entry restrictions. Iraq is currently racked by social tensions, none of which have been attributed to outward or to and for migration to date.

## **5. The Human Security of the Iraqi Refugees**

As pointed out above, the diversity of life circumstances among the Iraqi refugees is enormous. They range from very wealthy individuals living in luxurious housing and driving expensive cars, to teenage girls engaged in forced prostitution to survive. For a rough guideline, as to how many persons fall into the poorest category, it should be noted that in Syria, the UNHCR has registered around 206,000 Iraqi refugees, of which 91% are eligible for food aid (given that not all Iraqis, in particular the most vulnerable, are necessarily aware of UNHCR operations, this number should only be taken as a rough guideline).<sup>67</sup>

Human security is a broad concept, which, in addition to traditional security matters such as military violence and crime, covers social, economic and domestic issues, which contribute to human feelings of (in)security. The comments below are designed to give an idea of some of the security considerations applying to middle-class and poorer Iraqis who have fled Iraq to escape physical harm. Nevertheless, within the scope of this study, some generalizations are unavoidable (just as an example, it is not possible here to elaborate individually on the situation of the various minority groups, the special situation of Palestinian refugees from Iraq, or analyse properly gender-specific security aspects etc).

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<sup>67</sup> Crisp, Jeff, Jane Janz, Jose Riera and Shahira Samy. 2009. "Surviving in the city A review of UNHCR's operations for Iraqi refugees in urban areas of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria." Geneva: UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service.

### *Physical Security*

Security of life and limb, as well as of their property, was, of course, the primary reason for Iraqi flight to Syria and Jordan. Both countries continue to offer most Iraqis safety from military action, kidnapping, sectarian murders and violence. Lack of security remains a crucial determinant for the decision about whether to return to Iraq and refugees monitor security developments in Iraq closely, including through periodic return visits to Iraq. While the situation has vastly improved since 2007, when even the travel by road from Baghdad to the Syrian border was a mortal risk, bomb attacks and organized, violent crime still occur regularly across Iraq, making a return unattractive. It should be noted that UNHCR is not promoting voluntary returns at this stage, due to the continuing insecurity in Iraq.

Also, a number of refugees face the problem of not being able to return to their houses when these have been taken over by other displaced persons, or sometimes sectarian shifts in their old neighbourhood prevent a return. Overall, there appears to be an overwhelming distrust that life could ever become tolerable again in Iraq amongst the refugees and many do not wish to return.<sup>68</sup>

Syria and Jordan also offer access to a relatively functioning health care system, something which is not available in Iraq. Refugees registered with UNHCR receive substantial financial help to pay for larger operations and smaller health needs are cared for directly by the Red Crescent. Those Iraqis, who can afford private health care, also find a larger range of good quality clinics and doctors in Syria and Jordan, unlike in Iraq, where many doctors had to flee and urban travel can present risks.

Nevertheless, some Iraqi refugees still face significant physical threats in their host country, due to poverty and crime. Serious illness is a major threat, as expensive and long-term treatments are difficult to obtain even for middle-class Syrians and UN funding is gradually running out.<sup>69</sup> Certain, specialist treatments for cancer and other complicated diseases are only available abroad and thus not accessible to refugees. Also, as has been reported frequently, psychological and psychiatric treatments are not easily available in either Syria or Jordan, where psychological illness remains a taboo. Many Iraqis, who have witnessed traumatic events or simply experienced a violent uprooting suffer mental problems, remain untreated, or indeed experience further traumatising and re-traumatising in exile. Continued stress and frustration has led to an increase of domestic violence and sexual harassment of women.<sup>70</sup>

Poverty among Iraqi refugees has an impact on physical security when it leads to exploitative labour and prostitution, especially in the case of children. Reports on these matters, including on human trafficking, abound, however in the absence of systematic research, it is very difficult to estimate how many refugees are affected. Significantly, victims of such exploitation are criminalized in both Jordan and Syria, and therefore have no legal recourse. The number of NGOs providing aid or shelter for such victims is extremely small.

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<sup>68</sup> Riller, Frauke. 2009. "On the resettlement expectations of Iraqi refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria." ed. UNHCR ICMC. Beirut.

<sup>69</sup> AFP, 21 July 2009, *UN suspends medical aid to 600 Iraqi families in Jordan*.

<sup>70</sup> Chatelard G, El-Abed O, Washington K: Protection, mobility and livelihood challenges of displaced Iraqis in urban settings in Jordan. Geneva, ICMC, 2009 and IRIN, 6 April 2009, SYRIA: Fears over gender-based violence in Iraqi community.

### *Legal (In)security*

As is frequently mentioned by reports and local observers, the main issue currently facing the Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan with regards to their long-term security is their lack of secure legal status. As neither country is signatory to the Geneva Refugee Convention, refugees, even when recognised as legitimate asylum seekers by UNHCR, do not enjoy special protection. Jordan has implemented strong visa and residency restrictions to any Iraqi person wanting to enter its territory, regardless of whether this person is fleeing persecution or not. The six months temporary protection offered to Iraqis under an MOU signed between UNHCR and the government of Jordan has run out for most Iraqis residing in Jordan, leaving most of them with no residency rights and liable for deportation.

Syria on the other hand still allows Iraqis into its territory and allocates various residency permits, according to a person's situation and according to random application of the law. UNHCR reports that the current official line is that Iraqis are given permits for one or three months, which are renewable. However even UNHCR officials admit that the application of the regulations is unclear and that permits are sometimes renewable and sometimes not.<sup>71</sup> It should be noted that this randomness of residency rules also extends to Western foreigners residing in Syria, where often one's luck depends on which official is in charge on a particular day. It should also be noted, that unlike in Jordan, where UNHCR registration at least affords six months temporary protection from deportation, in Syria any Iraqi can legally be deported at any time, regardless of whether this person is recognized by UNHCR or not. UNHCR registration does therefore not afford residency rights (however gives access to certain aid benefits and possible resettlement). As mentioned above, Syria is governed by emergency law, which gives the state nearly unlimited powers vis-à-vis any person residing on its territory (be they Syrian or not).

Despite these legal uncertainties, the governments of both Jordan and Syria have exercised a regime of tolerance towards illegally residing Iraqis and deportations remains exceptional. Some Iraqis, like those working in the sex industry, are more likely to be deported than others. Occasional arrests and deportations of Iraqis working illegally in restaurants have been reported. In the absence of any legal basis for residency, no one knows how long this regime of tolerance will last, of course.

As hopefully this section clarifies, the legal uncertainty facing Iraqis in Jordan and Syria is a main obstacle to their local integration. As those Iraqis who are residing illegally fear any form of interaction with authorities, it also limits their access to justice more generally (in the case an Iraqi becomes a victim of crime, for example), to schooling, to health care and other forms of protection.

### *Economic Situation*

Generally, Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan face a much less fortunate economic situation in their host country than in their previous life in Iraq. Indeed, a significant proportion of Iraqis left a relatively positive economic situation behind; in Jordan, 35% of Iraqi refugees hold a university degree and professionals outnumber manual workers by three to one.<sup>72</sup> In addition

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<sup>71</sup> Interview with UNHCR official in October 2009

<sup>72</sup> Crisp J, Janz J, Riera J, et al.: *Surviving in the city. A review of UNHCR's operations for Iraqi refugees in urban areas of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.* Geneva, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009

to having held good jobs, Iraqis also benefited from their home states' system of welfare payments and subsidized access to education, health care and other public services. Many Iraqi refugees continue to draw on such pensions from abroad, either during return visits or through means of transferring the money. Still, many refugees have seen their economic and social standing deteriorate rapidly abroad, with no hope of improvement, due to the blanket employment ban, no resettlement in a further country and continuing violence in Iraq.

The most significant risk to the economic security of Iraqi refugees is the continuing lack of clarity regarding their legal status, and lack of integration, in Syria and Jordan. Both governments exercise a regime of tolerance and 'blind eye' towards informal Iraqi employment and business, but without a firm residency status, Iraqis cannot develop any long-term livelihood strategies, and cannot build on their professional skills. Indeed, although NGOs in both countries provide vocational training, they are highly aware of its limited value, as Iraqis cannot legally make use of it.<sup>73</sup>

In Jordan, this problem is further exacerbated by the impossibility of most refugees to conduct brief return visits to Iraq, due to immigration restrictions. From Syria, Iraqis can easily travel to and from Iraq, which allows them to continue to engage in business or work. Indeed, a common survival strategy for Iraqi families in Syria is to send one or more breadwinners to Iraq, while dependants remain in Damascus for safety. Increasing the regional mobility of refugees is therefore one recommendation that has been put forward to allow them better economic prospects.<sup>74</sup>

The most destitute Iraqis receive assistance from UNHCR and other agencies in cash and kind, however as it is likely that funding will be severely reduced in the coming years, and as inflation rises, refugees cannot indefinitely rely on handouts.<sup>75</sup> A regional, long-term strategy for Iraqi integration and/or returns is needed, but unlikely to emerge given the difficult interstate relations between the host countries and between them and Western donors. The strategic importance of the Levant and the political sensitivities surrounding the fall-out from the US-led Iraq invasion mean that any high-level political planning in the region is laden with complicated and contradicting agendas.

### *Education*

Access to education is a further, salient matter in the lives of Iraqi refugees. Before the war, Iraq benefited from a relatively well-developed education sector and the country was regarded as having one of the most educated populations in the Middle East. Expectations among the refugees concerning education are thus high and for many, securing a good education for their children is the prime motivator for seeking resettlement abroad.<sup>76</sup>

However, in most cases, Iraqi refugees have no hope of accessing good quality, higher education in either Syria or Jordan. Although Iraqi children are allowed to attend public primary and secondary schools in Syria and Jordan, various economic and bureaucratic hurdles have been identified as explanations for why school attendance remains low among Iraqi children. Currently available percentages of Iraqi children attending or not attending school should be

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<sup>73</sup> IRIN, 26 March 2009, *Controversial training for Iraqi refugees*.

<sup>74</sup> Chatelard, G. 2009. Mobility Opportunities and Strategies for Iraqi Refugees in Syria and Jordan. Paper presented at UNCR Annual Consultation with NGOs, Geneva

<sup>75</sup> IRIN, 6 July 2009, *Jordan-Syria: UNHCR funding shortfall for Iraqi refugees*.

<sup>76</sup> Riller, Frauke 2009. "On the resettlement expectations of Iraqi refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria." ed. UNHCR ICMC. Beirut.

treated with caution, especially as these figures are closely linked to how much donor support to the governments, UNHCR and international NGOs is forthcoming. According to an international NGO providing education assistance to Iraqi children, 60% of Iraqi children do not attend school. However, in a group of around 40 Iraqi children aged 9-12 attending a Caritas-funded sports event in October 2009, each one was found to be attending school.<sup>77</sup> Sometimes it is difficult to obtain the right documentation, sometimes money for stationary and school uniforms is missing and more frequently, children have work to contribute to household earnings. While UNHCR in Syria provides material assistance to help children attend school and even covers the university fees for a small number of Iraqi students, the agency is by no means reaching all potential pupils.

Access to university places is more complicated, and in Jordan, Iraqis are only allowed to attend prohibitively expensive private institutions. In Syria, Iraqis are in principle allowed to attend state universities, however have to pay fees. Also, as entry into university in Syria is extremely competitive and narrowly determined by final school grades, Iraqi youth who have suffered years of disruption to their study are severely disadvantaged in this competition for places.

## **6. Conclusion**

As presented throughout this brief report on security concerns related to post-2003 Iraqi migration into Syria and Jordan, this large-scale movement of people has to date resulted in only one major incident; the three suicide attacks carried out by Iraqi nationals in Amman in November 2005. In the current situation, the most severe threat presents itself to the human security of the Iraqi migrants. Syria and Jordan, which are both not party to the Geneva Refugee Convention, do not extend meaningful protection to Iraqis, regardless of whether they are recognised as legitimate refugees by UNHCR or not. While both governments currently exercise a regime of tolerance to illegally residing Iraqis, without firm residency rights this tolerance can end at any moment. Combined with a blanket employment ban (Syria) or heavily restricted employment options (Jordan), Iraqis can currently only exist precariously in both states.

Data and statistics available on the Iraqi presence in Syria and Jordan are patchy and disputed. UNHCR produces reliable figures on how many persons have registered at its centres (ca 215 000 for Syria, ca 52 000 for Jordan), these stand in marked contrast to the figures claimed by the respective governments (1.2 million for Syria, around 500 000 for Jordan).

Nevertheless, both countries face a number of mid to long term security risks that arise out of Iraqi immigration, which is reflected in the stricter controls that both countries have begun to place on Iraqis since 2006. Increased inflation, at least partially linked to the influx of Iraqi capital has already had an economic and social impact on growing poverty and widening income gaps. Both Syria and Jordan face difficult economic conditions in the next years and the question of how to integrate and/or feed the Iraqis during this time remains unsolved. Regionally, the Iraqi presence could become a destabilizing factor in both Syria and Jordan, should the diaspora be manipulated by outside players and become politically active.

Events in Iraq will play an important role in the development of Iraqi migration into the region. The currently greatest and possibly most likely risk is an outbreak of war between the central Iraqi government and the Kurdish regional government (or at least Kurdish forces) in the

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<sup>77</sup> Interviews/observations in Damascus, October 2009

north, as high tensions have been reported and the US has been required to continue its presence in cities in the north, to prevent clashes. Any increase in violence is likely to lead to an upsurge of migration into all of Iraq's neighbouring states.

To promote regional security and ameliorate the situation of Iraqi refugees, the international community should continue to fund UNHCR operations, which, particularly in Syria, have shown great flexibility and creativity in their approach. Governments in Europe and the US should speed up the resettlement process for Iraqis that have been referred to them for resettlement by UNHCR and provide them with sufficient assistance and support to make integration possible. Finally, diplomatic efforts to urge the governments of Syria and Jordan to sign the Geneva Refugee Convention should continue, as should efforts to find a regional settlement solution for those Iraqis who cannot be resettled further and who cannot return to Iraq.

The worst effect of the crisis has been on the Iraqi refugees themselves, who continue to live in a legal limbo and without residency or work permit in any country, while Iraq remains too unstable for them to return. Most of them appear to survive by 'muddling through': by circumventing work prohibitions, taking on menial jobs, sacrificing their children's education to send them to work or by attempting to smuggle themselves to Europe. Without a legal resettlement in the region or abroad and in the absence of stability in Iraq, this, in all likelihood, will continue to be their dominant survival strategy for years to come.

# **Security Implications and Development Opportunities of Migration**

## **A regional study of West Africa**

**A report prepared for BMZ and GTZ by  
Paul-Simon Handy (with Issaka Souaré and David Zounmenou)  
Institute for Security Studies  
November 2009**

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## **Abstract**

*The debate on African migration is disproportionately dominated by extra-continental flows, mainly to OECD countries, and generally informed by the latter's security concerns. Yet the bulk of African migration in general and West African in particular is internal (within and beyond national borders) and these population movements pose a multitude of security challenges at individual, national and regional levels. Migration in West Africa is characterised by a complex web of movements that reflect both social mobility and the pressure of political, economic and environmental factors. They can be divided into voluntary and forced movements of people. Whereas voluntary movements are motivated mainly by economic considerations, family links and studies, forced movements can generally be attributed to political factors (persecution and armed conflicts), natural disasters and, to a lesser extent, human trafficking. Migration patterns in the region indicate a non-linear dynamic between sending, transit and receiving countries, indicating the capacity of migrants to assess new opportunities and the insertion of West African migration in the global migration system. The main security challenges associated with migration in West Africa are to be found at individual, national and regional levels. Individual migrants sometimes face exploitation and see their basic rights violated in transit and receiving countries. A shortage in production capacities and loss of skilled manpower with implications for food and human security constitute some security consequences of migration for sending communities or countries. At the national) and regional levels, security risks of migration include tensions between migrants and locals, rising rates of crime, and diplomatic tensions between the sending and receiving countries in case of the latter offering political asylum to migrants from the former. But migration also presents some development and even security opportunities in the region, such as remittances and brain gain.*

## Introduction

As a result of various internal and external factors, migration flows have dramatically increased in Africa in the last two decades. Although this surge in population movement follows a rather worldwide trend, the nature of migration in Africa has its own dynamics and specificities. The bulk of migration flows in Africa is internal, either within national boundaries or towards various countries of the continent; often in the same region. A recent World Bank-funded study released in 2007 on the South-South migration found that of the estimated 14.5 million Sub-Saharan Africans living outside their home countries, 10.2 million of them are residing in other Sub-Saharan African countries, with only 4 million in High-income OECD countries (Ratha & Shaw, 2007:6). Of all Africans, West Africans are among the most mobile populations. This is the result of the combined effects of history (colonialism), geography, culture, politics (persecution, conflicts and displacement due to natural disasters) and economy in a region, which has adopted and is striving to fully implement the principle of free movement of goods and persons.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) released in late 2007 some data indicating that an estimated 3% of the West African population reside in other countries of the region with some major hikes in countries like Côte d'Ivoire (ECOWAS/SWAC, 2006). The current debate on African migration has disproportionately been focused on extra-continental flows, mainly to OECD countries, and in the context of security threats posed to these countries. Yet the generally neglected intra-African movements do pose some security challenges to the national and regional authorities that request the increased attention of policy-makers. But beyond the risks posed by migration in West Africa, population movements also provide some development opportunities for the region by allowing a circulation of talents and remittances.

The aim of this study is to provide a general overview of the nexus between migration and security as well as its implications for development in the West African region. To do so, it reviews the state of research on this issue and looks at the challenges that migration poses at regional, national and human/individual levels. Particularly, the study focuses on risks but also on opportunities generated by migration to receiving, transit and sending countries. Policies of national governments in the region as well as those of the ECOWAS are mentioned in their capacity to address the phenomenon.

Migration in the region is characterised by both voluntary and forced movements of people. Although this is true for both the colonial era and since independence in the early 1960s, the study focuses on the latter period. Voluntary movements are motivated mainly by economic considerations (i.e. trade and search for greener pastures), family links and studies, while the forced ones can generally be attributed to political factors (persecution and armed conflicts), natural disasters and, to a lesser extent, human trafficking. In the post-colonial era the generalisation of refugee movements in the region began with the Liberian civil war that started in 1990 even though there were isolated refugee movements and internally displaced persons prior to 1990, such as during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970). The three-year period from 1997 to 1999 constitutes the peak of these movements, with the refugee population reaching a high of 2,886,799 in 1998 (UNHCR, 2000).

West African countries can be divided into five main categories in terms of their migration status. They are either net sending countries (e.g. Burkina Faso and Niger), net receiving countries (i.e. Côte d'Ivoire and The Gambia), both sending and receiving countries (e.g. Guinea and Benin), sending and transit countries (e.g. Guinea-Bissau and Mali), or countries that encompass all these categories such as Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal (see Table 1 below)<sup>78</sup>.

The security challenges posed by migration in the region are considered at three levels: individual, national and regional. It appears that the main security challenge of migration revolves around the risks posed to individual migrants, who are sometimes exploited and their basic rights violated. With regard to sending communities or countries, the main security consequences of migration can be seen in the shortage in production capacities and loss of skilled manpower with implications for food and human security. At the national (receiving) and regional levels, security risks of migration include tensions between migrants and locals around scarce resources, rising rates of crime, including political and religious extremism, as well as diplomatic tensions between the sending and receiving countries in case of the latter offering political asylum to migrants from the former.

But migration also presents some development and even security opportunities in the region. For example, knowing that a significant number of its citizens reside in a neighbouring country might dissuade such a country from engaging in any hostile activity with this country, thereby preventing any soaring of relations between the two countries. Development opportunities include remittances and brain gain.

## **I. Overview of migration in West Africa**

This section provides a brief historical overview of migration in West Africa since independence, looking at the national and regional dynamics that may be said to account for the phenomenon, the nature of migration and the state of research in this regard.

### *1.1. A brief historical overview on migration*

Judged by a long history of mobility that dates back to pre-colonial times but which was amplified by the latter, West African populations seem to have a 'culture of mobility' (De Bruijn et al, 2001). Most West African populations are connected through ethnic/linguistic linkages. A number of large ethnic groups, such as the Fulani/Peul, Mandinka/Dioula/Mandingo, Yoruba and Hausa can be found in more than five countries (Adepoju, 2005). Some of those still have strong family links, with multiple nationalities being found among the members of a single extended family. Even though colonial borders have created strong national identities, formal and informal trans-border links characterise the daily life of West-African populations (Fall, 2004; SWAC/OECD, 2006).



Recent history of migration in West Africa can be divided into three main periods: the colonial period; the period from independence to around 1989; and since the 1990s. In addition to creating new forms of authority, space, identity and production, colonisation also generated a wide range of population movements. The most important were in the form of forced labour

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<sup>78</sup> This finding is based on the analysis of general trends as reflected in the existing literature

for construction projects plantations as well as gold and diamond mines (Ki-Zerbo, 1978: 445-46; Suret-Canale & Boahen, 1999). There were also significant movements from the Sahel to the much richer coastal regions (Konseiga, 2005). The creation of a colonial civil and military service, and the extensive farming of cash crops (particularly in coastal areas like Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana), created a regime of migration that heavily impacted on the composition of population groups within the region even after independence (Clark, 1994:403).

**Table 1:** Main sending, transit and destination countries of migrants within West Africa

To 	Destination*		Origin/ Destination			Orgin/ transit**			All encompassing ± (Origin/transit/destination)					Notes	
From 	Côte d'Ivoire (26%)	Gambia (14%)	Guinea	Benin	Togo	Niger	G. Bissau	Mali	Ghana	Liberia	Nigeria	S. Leone	Senegal		
B. Faso ***	92%					X		X	X		X				Net sending countries
Niger	71%										X				
Mali	74%	X	X										X		
Cape Verde		X					X						X		
Ghana	X											X			
Guinea	X							X		X		X	X		
Nigeria				X								X			
Benin	X														
Liberia	X	X	X								X	X			
S. Leone		X	X							X	X				
Togo	X			X											
G. Bissau		X											X		
Senegal	X	X	X					X							

**Note:** The mark X signifies the presence of important migrant stocks in a country from a particular one in the region. Also, there are no figures in the table due to lack in uniform format of reliable data for all the countries in all the years. The categorisation is based on data provided in some case studies, but also on the authors' own data on Niger and Mali.

\* These two countries can be considered as net destination countries within the region. The Gambia is indeed a sending country of migrants, but rather to the UK and a few thousands in Senegal and Nigeria. Yet, migrants represented 14% of its population in 2000 (UNDP, 2000). Côte d'Ivoire is a net receiving country in absolute terms. Figures about migrants from the CI to neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger represent more migrant returnees from these countries than original Ivorian immigrants (Konseiga, 2005).

\*\* Niger and Mali come close to net exporters of migrants, particularly to Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. A significant number of Malians go out of the region, particularly to France. Of course there are Guineans that head for Mali, and Malian Tuaregs for Niger. But the two countries have for long constituted major transit routes for regional migrants heading to North Africa or to Europe via the Maghreb. Guinea-Bissau has joined the two, alongside Senegal, in constituting transit routes for migrants to Europe through the Canary Islands via Mauritania and Western Sahara (Souaré, 2007).

\*\*\* These countries are net exporters of migrants in the region and beyond. In addition to its migrant population in Senegal, The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde exports a significant number of its population to Portugal and the US, in addition to other European countries.

± Up to the mid-1960s, Ghana was an immigration country, but when it was hit by economic and political crisis from 1965, it became an emigration country. Thus, migrant stock in the country (compared to its population) fell from 12.3% in 1960 to 6.6% in 1970. But the economic difficulties of 1980s made the country unattractive to both foreigners and nationals, leading to massive emigration waves to neighbouring countries and beyond (Anafri et al., 2003). While a good number of Nigerians move to neighbouring Benin and Togo and more outside the region (UK, US, Italy, Germany, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, etc.), the country has received significant number of migrants from the region. This has been *generally* constant throughout the years since the 1970s and despite waves of expulsion of migrants in the 1980s (Arthur, 1991; de Haas, 2006). Senegal is in the same situation. But all the three countries constitute also transit routes for migrants heading for the Maghreb or Europe.


**Sources:** *Compiled by the authors, based on sources indicated in the table*

At independence in the early 1960s, the new sovereign states had different levels of economic development and opportunities as well as varying degrees of tolerance for political dissent. The combined effect of localised economic hardship and political repression spurred other waves of population movements in the region that were favoured by voluntaristic policies. Two other factors added to this. One is the 1979 ECOWAS' Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment, which somehow formalised the existing patterns of population movements in the region. The other factor is the series of droughts that affected the Sahel region (particularly northern Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) in the 1970s and the outbreaks of armed conflicts in the region, starting especially from the late 1980s.

As it can be seen from Table 1 above, the combined effects of these factors led to waves of migration in the region and beyond. Usually, countries with a certain economic potential tend to attract more migrants than others. Thus, Côte d'Ivoire, one of the most prosperous countries in the region, is by far the largest immigrant hosting country in West Africa in proportion to its population. Migrants represented about 26 per cent of its total population by the time the civil war broke out in September 2002 (UN, 2001:8). The economic and financial crisis that the country faced in the 1980s (Fauré, 1995) led to return movements of many migrants from Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea, but most returned in the 1990s. Nigeria, Africa's most

populous country with one of the most significant economies, also hosts a substantial number of migrants from the region even though the country also exports a significant amount of migrants both within and outside the region.

The data provided in Table 1 above represent generally voluntary migration or migration due to political persecution. The Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) and the severe droughts of the early 1970s in northern Mali and Niger did lead to refugee and IDP flows in the region. But it is only in the 1990s that migration of this nature became systematic in the region. This is mainly due to the outbreak of armed conflicts in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Northern Mali and Niger, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire (see Souaré, 2006:129-136).



**Figure 1** Refugee populations in WA, 1994-2008. *Sources: UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks, 1994-2008*

As it can be seen in Figure 1 (on right) and Table 2 below, these conflicts led to massive internal displacements and cross border refugee flows in the region. With about 1.5 million refugees in the region at the end of 1994, this peaked to almost 3 million in 1998. Thanks to a temporary resolution of the Liberian conflict and those of northern Mali and Niger towards the end of the decade, the refugee populations decreased as more people returned to their countries or were resettled in other countries outside the region, particularly in developed countries. But with the Ivorian conflict that broke out in September 2002 and the recurrence of the Liberian one from 1999, refugee populations peaked again in 2002, reaching a high of 1,043,717, according to UNHCR statistics. The figures have however been decreasing since 2005 (UNHCR, 1994, 2002, 2005, 2008).

Table 2 provides more detailed figures about refugee flows in the region from the 1990s. Regarding Mali, it has to be noted that the table does not reflect all the refugee populations from the country. This is explained by the fact that the table is only concerned with migration flows from and within the West African region; yet the bulk of Malian Tuaregs that fled the country in the early 1990s headed to Mauritania and Algeria, which are located outside West Africa.<sup>79</sup> Niger is not reflected in the Table because almost all its Tuareg refugees headed to Algeria, which is located outside the region.

<sup>79</sup> Our conception of West Africa is informed by membership in the regional grouping, ECOWAS. Thus, even though Mauritania is geographically located in the region, we do not consider it here because it withdrew from ECOWAS in December 2000.

**Table 2:** Main originating and hosting countries of refugees from and in the region since the 1990s

Country of origin	Hosting country	1994	1998	2003	2007
Liberia	Sierra Leone	15,900	9,900	61,200	8,738
	Guinea	398,300	183,000	149,600	14,489
	Nigeria	4,100	1,700	3,700	5,528
	Ghana	15,900	12,600	42,500	26,967
	Côte d'Ivoire	359,400	148,900	74,200	24,146
Sierra Leone	Guinea	154,900	279,200	25,000	6,394
	Liberia	120,000	96,300	13,900	---
	Gambia	---	5,400	6,100	6,465
Mali	Algeria	28,000	100	---	---
	Burkina Faso	49,500	---	---	---
	Mauritania	82,200	---	---	---
	Niger	13,000	3,300	---	---
Senegal	Gambia	2,000	---	---	7,546
	G. Bissau	23,600	5,900	7,300	7,488
G. Bissau	Senegal	5,000	4,690	---	---
	Guinea	---	2,144	---	---
	Gambia	---	1,160	---	---
Togo	Benin	70,000	1,300	1,200	6,208
	Ghana	97,700	1,100	500	7,243
Côte d'Ivoire	Guinea	---	---	9,600	---
	Liberia	---	---	20,000	6,865

**Source:** UNHCHR Statistical Year Books, 1994-2008

## 1.2. Dynamics of West African migration

This section deals with two intertwined factors that help explain the nature and dynamics of migration in West Africa: the types of migration and the factors that contribute to it.

### *Types of migration*

Apart from refugee flows that rather follow an imperative of urgency, migration in West Africa is said to be circular and generally motivated by demand for labour and other economic opportunities (Boesen, Marfaing, 2007). Types of population movements in the region can gen-

erally be classified in three main forms: a) internal (rural-urban, rural-rural, urban-rural movements as well as internal displacements within the same country); b) regional mobility; and c) extra-regional (continental and transcontinental) migration. The latter type falls beyond the purview of this paper.

Movements within national borders of the same country have taken different forms and trajectories that reflect both the strategies of migrants and the availability of resources in the transit and receiving area. The most important feature of this form of population movement is the “rural-urban movement” that can be defined as the movement of rural populations to the big cities in the same country with a view to settling there temporarily or permanently for various reasons. As evidenced by various studies, West Africa – like the rest of the continent – is urbanising at a very fast rate, confronting states and local governments with enormous challenges around the provision of basic services.

Even though population growth in cities is today mainly due to increase in urban birth rates (70-80%) and less to “rural exodus”, the biggest security implication of the rural-urban movement has been an increase in urban crime (Lagos, Abidjan) and the steady shortage of food production in the villages, which may have increased many countries’ food insecurity (Linares, 2003).<sup>80</sup> Also, patterns of urban-rural movements appear either in the form of return of traders from the cities to the village or following an economic crisis that sees a narrowing of the labour market in cities. Such movements are quite common in mining and agricultural regions that attract migrants from both cities and smaller agglomerations in search of job opportunities, as is the case in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone (Jarrett, 1990).

For the purpose of this paper, “regional migration” refers to the movement of nationals of one country of the sub-region (West Africa) to another with the aim of settling there temporarily or permanently for purposes other than studies. Due to the varying degrees of development and the different types of legislation in the region, the dynamics between sending, transit and receiving countries appear to be fluid, interchangeable and not linear. In fact, the deterioration of economic conditions in receiving countries since the end of the 1980s has not led to a decrease of migration flows but rather to their diversification and their inclusion in a wider global migration system. One of the major consequences of this complex development is the increased significance of transit countries (e.g. Senegal, Niger and Mali) which might turn out to be receiving countries. Transit countries are central to understand the strategies of candidates for extra-regional migration, which involves the movement of nationals of the region to destinations outside the region, be those in Africa or outside the continent (Souaré, 2007).

In summary, available data indicate that the bulk of population movements in West Africa take place within individual countries. According to some recent reports (e.g. SWAC/OECD, 2006:18; ECOWAS/SWAC, 2006:9), over the last 45 years, more than 80 million West Africans have migrated from rural areas to the cities. This creates security challenges for individuals in both cities (service delivery) and villages (food security) even though the latter are not necessarily depopulating but rather abandoning agricultural forms of living.

#### *Looking at the motives: Push and pull factors?*

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<sup>80</sup> Countries like Senegal and Burkina Faso were hit by a number of food riots in 2008, following an increase in international food prices that show the vulnerability of internal agricultural production systems.

Even though push and pull factors have dominated the migration debate in the last two decades, recent findings of empirical migration research suggest their limitations (Ibrahim 2008). In a sense, it could be argued that “push” and “pull” factors are hardly to be differentiated, for the decision to leave a place for another is not necessarily or solely dictated by objective and external pressures (i.e. poverty, conflict). The driving forces for migration are the issues or goals that the migrant perceives are lacking or not sufficient enough – in quantity or quality – at home. Thus, considering the agency of the migrant, his or her perception of a better life is important in understanding the causes of migration in West Africa. In fact, the decision is generally made according to a complex web of individual and community pressures but always with the aim of improving one’s life. In certain population groups in West Africa, a migration project (generally to the city) is as part of the culture as wedding and birth (Linares, 2003). While internal population movements are important in looking at migration issues in West Africa, the focus in this section is on inter-state migration in the region. In this regard, one may identify three main direct forces: a) economic considerations; b) armed conflicts and natural disasters;<sup>81</sup> c) political considerations.

- Economic considerations: The search for economic opportunities and greener pasture is arguably the main factor that explains the intra-regional mobility in West Africa. This can be observed by the concentration of migrant populations in countries of relatively good economic activities (see Table 1). In the 1960s, Ghana was an attraction for West African migrants coming to work on cocoa plantations and gold mines. However, from the 1970s, with the economic boom in Côte d’Ivoire (in coffee and cocoa plantations) and Nigeria (thanks to the soaring oil production), these two countries became the preferred destination for thousands of migrants from neighbouring countries. In particular, migrants from Mali, Guinea, Ghana and Burkina Faso went in huge numbers to Côte d’Ivoire, while Nigeria received a significant number of migrants from Ghana, Niger, Togo and Benin. In the 1980s, mining areas in Liberia and Sierra Leone attracted significant migrant populations from other countries in the region. In addition to the aforementioned ECOWAS’ protocol on free movement of people, family links across the region greatly facilitate this pattern of mobility. Generally, the West African worker planning to migrate to another country in the region first thinks about who is going to accommodate him, guide him and advise him about his host country (Igue, 2004). This factor also explains why a substantial number of individuals from Nigeria do migrate to poorer countries like Benin.
- Armed conflicts and natural disasters: Massive refugee flows across the borders are an inevitable consequence and a common feature of armed conflicts anywhere in the world. Hundreds of thousands are also displaced in the different regions of their own country as a result of armed conflicts. Many instances of violent conflicts in West Africa during the 1990s have led to huge refugee flows that particularly strained the capacities of neighbouring countries. Statistics show that most of the movements resulting from such events are concentrated in neighbouring states and do not go beyond (see Figure 1 and Table 2 above). According to de Haas (2005:4), Olsen (2002:125-150), and Martin & Taylor (1996), very poor people generally do not migrate far from their homes since a certain threshold of wealth is necessary to enable people to assume the costs and risks of migrating, and people fleeing wars from poor countries are generally very poor, having left

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<sup>81</sup> We combine these two given that they lead to ‘forced’ migration. We do acknowledge the different security implications that they sometimes have, as we do below.

their already modest livelihoods behind. For this reason, Guinea became the main destination country of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees in the 1990s, so much that an estimated 10 per cent of its population were refugees from these two neighbouring countries by the turn of the decade (Annan, 1998).

- Natural disasters and climate change are an increasing factor of forced migration in the Sahel region (northern Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso). But unlike for armed conflicts, there is no international regime that regulates the type of migration that emerges from natural disaster. Partially because it is difficult to establish a causal link between climate change and migration but also because it appears to be a relatively small phenomenon that is concentrated in specific areas. As illustrated by waves of flood in August/September 2009, aid agencies estimated that between 400,000 and 600,000 people were affected by flooding, which resulted in the forced displacement of a significant number of persons within the region (OCHA, 2009). Climate degradation also profoundly changes the life style of affected populations either by forcing them to sedentarise or migrate to find other forms of living including urbanisation (Boesen and Marfaing 2007). The type of movement generated by the latter is rather long-term and involves a small number of migrants on a regular basis.
- Political considerations: It is a fact that people tend to leave countries where they fear political oppression. In the heydays of one-party regimes from the 1960s-1980s, many people with dissident political views had no other choice but to migrate. For example, a high number of Guineans left for neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Liberia in this period for fear of repressive policies of the Sékou Touré regime. An important number of Togolese nationals also sought refuge in neighbouring Benin in the 1990s in order to flee oppression of the Eyadéma regime at home. However, the opening up of political space in the 1990s has substantially reduced the number of political refugees in West Africa. For example, significant number of Guineans voluntarily returned home after the death of Sékou Touré in 1984 (Bah, Keita and Lootvoet, 1989), and so did Beninois after the historical "Conférence Nationale Souveraine" in 1991 that set the ground for the democratisation process in the country. Countries like Nigeria under Obasanjo (1999-2006) have created a wide range of incentives aimed at enticing skilled Nigerian from the diaspora to return home.

### 1.3. *The state of research on West African migration*

Although migration has significantly shaped the social fabric of West African states, it remains a relatively less studied phenomenon. Compared to other issues such as armed conflicts and poverty or economic development, very few universities or research organisations in the region are *dedicated* to the study of migration. As a result, migration is generally analysed in reference to other phenomena such as violent conflicts, economic development and transnational crime. In recent years, however, a number of universities and research centres in the region have created units with a migration focus, and some systematic studies have also been conducted on African migration in general and West Africa in particular. These studies are undertaken by both individual researchers and international organisations such as the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) as well as some independent research institutions, such as the Paris-based Sahel and West Africa Club, the Human Resources Development Centre of the University of Lagos and the Department of Forced Migration at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.

As empirical research in this area is still in its infancy the main challenge facing researchers is the fact that existing data on migration in the region only contain rough estimates, as do most documents and studies on this subject. Official statistics are hardly reliable or accurate. This is due to the fact that population surveys are either not carried out regularly or do not use the same criteria to differentiate nationals, migrants and foreigners. However, extensive research efforts have been made that help to unpack the complexities of migration in West Africa. As a consequence, the majority of West African states do not have a clear idea of the number of immigrants in their country. Poor administrative capacities at local and national levels as well as the presence of nomadic communities (such as the Tuaregs and some Fulani communities) account for the fact that local authorities managed to register only a few migrants or even nationals. It is therefore very difficult sometimes to distinguish between nationals and immigrants in many West African countries. In certain instances, the multiplication of nationalities has led to the violent contestation of citizenship and identity with serious implications for the stability of the country, as is the case now in Côte d'Ivoire (see Box 1 below).

**Box 1: The case of Côte d'Ivoire: resources, identity and conflict**

Owing to a multitude of factors including the dramatic deterioration of exchange terms in the 1980s, the country experienced economic and financial difficulties in the early 1980s, causing major discontent and popular protests by some strata of society, especially the civil servants, teachers and secondary and university students. When President Houphouët Boigny appointed Alassane Ouattara as Prime Minister in 1990, he introduced work permits for foreign nationals from the region in a bid to fill state coffers with the proceeds from processing fees of this document. But one of the unintended political ramifications of this policy was to sour relations between real or perceived foreign nationals and law enforcement agents in the country and, by extension, the former and the local populations. Political instrumentalisation of this policy and the discriminatory character of its application by successive leaders of the country led to the emergence of the xenophobic concept of *ivoirité* that is partly blamed for the civil war that broke out in the country in September 2002. Created by former President Bedié, the concept of *ivoirité* was an attempt to exclude his challenger Alassane Ouattara from a presidential election on the basis of his alleged foreign citizenship. The use of identity and belonging as a political tool of exclusion in Cote d'Ivoire is representative of a North-South divide that is present in many African countries.

**Sources:** Fauré (1995); UN (2001:8-10); Akindes (2004).

Another problem with the available data or quantitative studies is that they tend to skip some interesting and developing patterns of migration and population movements in Africa. For example, the proportion of female migrants has steadily increased over the last few decades, but there is no systematic attempt to study and analyse those, yet the impact of female migration on families might be different from that of male migration.

## II. Security risks of migration movements

As a social, economic and human phenomenon, migration has both risks and opportunities for the stakeholders, including the migrant and his/her family, the home and host countries (Grant, 2005:5, Adepoju, 2005:12, UNECA, 2006:87, de Haas, 2007:12, Charriere & Fresia, 2008:25). Security implications are considered here at three main levels: individual, national and regional. However, the boundaries between these three are somehow blurred and not clearly demarcated.

### 2.1. *Security risks posed to individual migrants*

Easy prey for human trafficking: Given their vulnerability, migrants, such as refugees, can be victims of human trafficking. Those of them who engage in prostitution are often exploited and or abused with little protection from the local authorities, given the criminal label attached to this activity in almost all West African countries. Young migrants are sometimes forced into exploitative labour, including prostitution, with the onerous terms usually determined by the traffickers with heavy repayment bondage (Olateru-Olagbegi, 2004: 2). There are reports of young workers in cocoa plantations in Côte d'Ivoire being exploited by their employers and/or human traffickers that brought them to the country (Bangre, 2007; IOM, 2009). Although it is mentioned below, xenophobia is a constant feature of migration that is experienced mostly at individual level. Be it within national boundaries or beyond, experiencing otherness can sometimes come with violent manifestations of undesirability, particularly in times of economic hardship as was the case between Northerners (considered as foreigners) and Southerners (allegedly real autochthones) in Cote d'Ivoire in the 1990s.

### 2.2. *Risks to national security*

Candidates for Criminal Networking: Given their generally tough living conditions, some migrants, particularly the unemployed youth, engage in criminal activities, including drug trafficking, money laundering or financial scams, and armed robberies. The dramatic incidents involving a fundamentalist group called Boko Haram (Western Education Forbidden) in Nigeria in July 2009 highlights the danger of youth unemployment and unfulfilled dream of migrants. Nigerian authorities deported a great number of citizens from neighbouring Niger and Ghana who had been recruited by the group. The impact of migrants' crime on national security is exacerbated by poor controlling state capacities of the migration phenomenon.

### 2.3. *Regional security risks*

- a) Competition over resources: The presence of a high number of migrants (including refugees) might contribute to manifestations of xenophobia and outbursts of violent competitions between migrants and local communities in the region. Locals often use migrants as scapegoats and blame them for "snatching" their jobs and for crime (Adepoju, 2005:11). In order to cover themselves and secure popular support, some governments have resorted to mass expulsions of migrants, in contradiction of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of people (Adepoju, 2005:5; Okoro, 2004:21-27). With regard to refu-

gees, clashes were reported between Liberian refugees and local populations in early 2001 in Ghana. After refugees in the Buduburam camp – at some 40 km from Accra – clashed with Ghanaian police during a dispute, local residents attempted to retaliate which then erupted into violence. Local populations complained about rising crime and prostitution activities in the vicinity of the camp, which they blamed on the refugees. This led the Ghanaian authorities to take some restrictive measures against Liberian refugees and asylum seekers, particularly new comers (UNHCR, 2001). Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea also came close to being targeted by local populations in September 2000 because of armed attacks on Guinea from Charles Taylor's Liberia.<sup>82</sup>

- b) Refugee camps as recruitment bases: Warlords tend to use refugee camps as recruitment bases for their rebellions back home, thereby contributing to further destabilisation of the country. For example, most of the fighters of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) were recruited in refugee camps in Guinea and Sierra Leone in early 1990. Likewise, most of the Tuareg fighters that launched rebellions in northern Mali and Niger in the early to mid-1990s were refugees that had fled their countries following the droughts of the 1970s and then received military training in host countries, particularly Libya, that enlisted them in its revolutionary brigades that were sent to battle fronts in Chad, Lebanon and Palestine (Souaré & Zounmenou, 2008).

#### **Box 2: Tuareg Community in Mali and Niger**

The Tuaregs are a group of nomadic people living in the region that now overlaps with the modern nations of Mali, Niger, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Libya. As traders and pastoralists, migration is part of their culture. Their regions in northern Mali and Niger were hit by severe droughts in the 1970s, which led a significant number of them to migrate to neighbouring countries, particularly Algeria and Libya. Their return accompanied an armed struggle in the two countries in the early 1990s. Temporarily resolved in the mid-1990s, some dissatisfied Tuareg elements in both countries took up arms again in 2006 and 2008. An alliance between the rebel movements in both Mali and Niger has provided reciprocal support for the their respective insurgencies. Given the proximity of their regions to the uncontrolled southern desert region of Algeria and the presence of the so-called AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Maghreb) in this region, there are reports that the community may have been infiltrated by this terrorist group.

**Sources:** Burgeot (1995); Baro (2008); UNODC (2009)

### **III. Opportunities of migration in West Africa**

As noted earlier, migration also bears opportunities both at the individual and the community levels. For many citizens in West Africa, apart from those who are uprooted by armed conflicts, migration helps to escape from poverty and to seek for better opportunities abroad. Migration – both regional and international – has contributed to the improvement of living

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<sup>82</sup> The major consequence of these expulsions for the individual migrants is the lost of their economic activity and forced return to a country of origin where lack of opportunities leads to a deterioration of their living standards.

standards of millions in West Africa through remittances (Cerstin and Maimbo, 2003:12, Bakewell, 2009:31; Quartey, 2006: 7; IOM, 2008:414; Harsch, 2003: 3, Konseiga, 2005). Many Burkinabe and Malians found better socio-economic opportunities in Côte d'Ivoire while intra-regional trading activities uplift many others from poverty. Receiving countries stand to gain from the expertise and skills brought by professional migrants. This is particularly noticeable in the educational sector, where some countries have a relative advantage over others in the region.<sup>83</sup>

Additionally, sending countries can also gain through the transfer of knowledge, skills and social capital. Normally, migrants (both skilled and unskilled) who acquire new skills while abroad might possibly return home with these, resulting in brain gain and better job prospects. Thus migration has become one source for the acquisition of knowledge and skills, which in itself is an investment in human resources. There is no general statistical evidence of such migration movements as this is generally dependant on the capacity of the country of origin to attract its "diaspora" by creating a set of incentives. Countries like Ghana have largely benefited from massive returns of migrants after the general elections of December 1996, which were seen as a clear sign of political liberalisation in the country. This indicates the links between the availability of opportunities in one country and the readiness of the diaspora community to invest or go back home. Also, by raising the salaries of state university lecturers and improving their working conditions, Nigeria under Obasanjo managed to repatriate a substantial amount of academics leaving in the West.

However, migration of a family member does not automatically result in improved living conditions for the migrant and the household in the country of origin. This depends greatly on a number of factors including the time spent abroad, legal status of the migrant and the relationship between the migrant and his or her family back home (Tiemoko, 2003:5). It might even occur that the migrant's dream for better life abroad turn into a nightmare. Having failed to secure a job or integrate properly, migrants might live in fear (Abdou and Rokhaya, 2007:3).

### **Box 3: Regional cooperation and national government policies**

ECOWAS has, since its creation in 1975, striven to achieve greater regional integration, including the free movement of persons and goods in the region. It has done so through the adoption of a number of treaties and protocols to this effect. But national politics have generally prevailed over regional policies. This has meant a lack of effective implementation of ECOWAS policies or their breach by national governments whenever they see them to be incompatible with their national interests. But most national governments in the region do not have any coherent migration policy. The actions, such as massive expulsions of migrants are therefore informed by circumstances rather than by well-designed policies, as illustrated by some of the aforementioned actions to expel migrant workers from the region.

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<sup>83</sup> This was for example the case of Beninois teachers in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1960s, Ghanaian ones in Liberia and Nigeria in the 1980s.

## Conclusion

The study provided an overview of migration in West Africa with the aim of assessing security risks associated with it. This entailed looking at the dynamics of migration in terms of its major patterns and dynamics as well as security challenges that various types of migration pose to individuals, sending and receiving communities and countries. But given that migration is not only a pervasive phenomenon, the study also highlighted, if only in passing, some opportunities and positive effects associated with it.

West Africans are amongst the most mobile people in the world but the majority of population movements are within countries or other countries of the region, with only a few – in comparative terms – migrating to other African or OECD countries. Internal migration within the same country takes a turnaround or cyclical form involving rural-urban, rural-rural, and urban-rural movements of people. Family links and search for economic and educational opportunities, amongst other considerations, account for this type of migration. And although we term this “voluntary”, it should be noted that the migrant is often compelled to move and is subjected to a variety of social pressures including prestige.

With regard to regional migration, West African countries can be classified into five main categories in terms of their status in the migration cycle/chain. There are net sending countries (i.e. Côte d'Ivoire and the Gambia), net receiving countries (e.g. Burkina Faso and Niger), both origin and destination countries (e.g. Guinea and Liberia), both origin and transit countries (e.g. Mali), and countries with multiple hats, constituting origin, transit and destination countries, such as Nigeria and Senegal. Various factors account for this type of migration, particularly the search of employment and trade opportunities, family links, political persecution, armed conflicts and natural disasters. These movements date back to the colonial era, some policies of which amplified it, such as forced labour, military service and colonial administration. The period from the early independence in the 1960s to the end of the Cold War saw a continuation of migration flows, particularly as post-colonial states had varying degrees of economic development and political tolerance. While there were massive displacements of people due to the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) and severe droughts in northern Mali and Niger in the early 1970s, armed conflicts that broke out in the region from 1990 account for the majority of refugee and IDP flows in the region. This flows have however seen a decrease since 2005.

The main security threats of migration in the region concern the individual migrants, particularly those embarked on forced migration. Due to their vulnerability, they are often exploited and their human rights violated. But migration poses also security risks for both sending and receiving communities/countries, and this is true for both in-country and regional migrations. It constitutes a loss of manpower and skills for certain sending communities, with important human security implications. As for receiving countries, it sometimes leads to competition over increasingly limited resources between locals and migrants, resulting in manifestations of xenophobic attacks or massive expulsions of migrants who appear to be ideal scapegoats for all sorts of social ills. The instrumentalisation of migrants and refugee populations by rebel movements and criminal networks constitutes a significant risk for stability in the region. This was illustrated by recruitment in Liberian refugee camps in Guinea and Sierra Leone to

fight in their country, as well as the presence of migrants from Niger and Ghana in the so-called Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

Some gaps in research on migration in the region, particularly with regard to the availability of systematic quantitative and reliable data are also discussed. But the lacuna regarding research are being filled by a growing research community on the phenomenon with specialised research units being created at universities and research centres. Adequate policy responses to either manage the risks or capitalise on the opportunities of migration are also needed. But although significant efforts are being made, particularly from the regional grouping ECOWAS. The main challenge consists in getting national governments to develop their capacities and fully implement the various instruments that have been devised by the ECOWAS and other international organisations. Finally, the study indicates that improved governance and democratic records of certain countries not only prevents conflicts and forced displacements in the region but also has the potential of attracting migrants back home.

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## Tagungsprogramm

Moderation: *Dr. Christiane Bögemann-Hagedorn, BMZ*

- ab 08:30 Uhr           Ankunft der Teilnehmer / Kaffee
- 09:00 – 09:30 Uhr    **Begrüßung durch die Veranstalter**  
*Dr. Stefan Mair, SWP*  
*Peter von Bethlenfalvy, IOM*  
*Dr. Christiane Bögemann-Hagedorn, BMZ*
- 09:30 – 10:15 Uhr    **Einführungsvortrag und Diskussion**  
„Sicherheitspolitische Implikationen von Migration“  
*Dr. Steffen Angenendt, SWP*  
Kommentar von *Dr. Hans Werner Mundt, GTZ*
- 10:15 – 10:30 Uhr    Kaffeepause
- 10:30 – 11:30 Uhr    **Vortrag, Kommentierung und Diskussion**  
„Sicherheitspolitische Auswirkungen der Migration aus dem Irak in die Nachbarländer Syrien und Jordanien“  
*Sophia Hoffmann, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) London*  
Kommentar von *Heiko Wimmen, SWP*
- 11:30 – 12:30 Uhr    **Vortrag, Kommentierung und Diskussion**  
„Auswirkungen der Migration in Westafrika auf die regionale Stabilität“  
*Paul-Simon Handy, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Pretoria*  
Kommentar von *Dr. Laurence Marfaing, GIGA*
- 12:30 – 14:00 Uhr    Mittagessen
- 14:00 – 15:45 Uhr    **Diskussion in zwei thematischen Arbeitsgruppen**  
a) Arbeitsmigration  
  Input: *David Nii Addy, GTZ Berater am KAIPTC Ghana*  
  Moderation: *Dr. Irina Kausch, GTZ*  
b) Konfliktbedingte Flucht  
  Input: *Dr. Friederike Stolleis, Universität Damaskus*  
  Moderation: *Dr. Klaus Schreiner, GTZ*
- 15:45 – 16:15 Uhr    Kaffeepause
- 16:15 – 18:00Uhr    **Abschluss-Panel und Präsentation der Ergebnisse aus den Arbeitsgruppen**  
*Dr. Andreas Goetze, Auswärtiges Amt*  
*Christine Toetzke, BMZ*  
*Rafiq Tschannen, Chief of Mission IOM Irak*  
*Urs Frühauf, Berater der EU, Damaskus, Syrien*  
*Stefan Telöken, UNHCR Berlin*  
  
Moderation: *Dr. Steffen Angenendt, SWP*