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INTRODUCTION

The papers in this volume represent the fruits of the work done by the first "class" of the **Training Program for Latin American Junior Scholars of Public Policy Research and Analysis**, a competitive scholarship offered by the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center Scholars with the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The Junior Scholars Program is designed to enhance the research and analytic skills of junior or mid-level scholars or practitioners from Latin America and residing in Latin America involved in public policy issues through study at a public policy research or academic center in the United States, and thereby to contribute to the design and practice of public policy in Latin America. Individuals at private research institutions, universities, or public institutions are invited to apply.

Each recipient of the scholarship spends a semester at a US university or research institute under the tutelage of an expert in his or her field of study. Resources of the host institution are made available, as well as opportunities for the Junior Scholars to access the various research institutions and government bodies in Washington.

The authors of these papers are from Brazil, Cuba, and Argentina. Their research focuses on the nature and mechanisms of those countries' relations with the US and with the hemisphere as a whole. Rut Diamint, Ana Julia Faya, and Ricardo Sennes each spent considerable time in Washington, D.C. in addition to their period of university study. While in

Washington they met with officials from each branch of the US government involved in the formulation of policy toward Latin America, as well as with policy experts and regional specialists from a variety of institutes in the area. The insight they gained during those interviews and through their research at the Library of Congress, their respective host institutions and other research facilities in the US is reflected in the depth and thoughtfulness of these papers.

At present the second group of recipients have begun their semesters in residence, and we are receiving applications for 1998. As the Junior Scholars Training Program continues, the Latin American Program looks forward to continuing to support the energy and labors of this promising generation of Latin American scholars.

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars seeks to support advanced research and writing on national and international issues by scholars and practitioners from all over the world. The Center's mission is to bring together the realms of scholarship and public affairs that President Woodrow Wilson himself combined. The Center, created by the U.S. Congress in 1968, is non-partisan and does not take positions on policy issues in the United States or abroad.

EL GOBIERNO NORTEAMERICANO ANTE EL CASO DEL CONDOR II: SISTEMA BUROCRATICO Y TOMA DE DECISIONES¹

Rut Diamint²

Introducción

Este trabajo parte del interés por comprender un sistema de gobierno que se supone altamente racional y burocrático: el sistema de gobierno norteamericano, con la finalidad secundaria de entender los errores de percepción de los gobiernos de Argentina. En principio, esa estructura aparecía como un mapa de oficinas, agencias y normas definidas por reglamentos precisos y por una continuidad y consistencia asombrosa a los ojos de un latinoamericano. Es un sistema de gobierno complicado, extenso y superpuesto en el que se combinan una organización altamente lógica junto a un juego oculto de personalidades y estilos individuales.

Para poder recorrer ese laberinto institucional, el objetivo era relevar el proceso de toma de decisión en un asunto de seguridad internacional. El caso elegido fue las negociaciones por el desmantelamiento del misil Cóndor II³. Esta negociación había sido exitosa para el gobierno norteamericano, incluía la participación de numerosas agencias del gobierno, se vinculaba a varios países, desde los aliados del G7 hasta el área de tensiones mas sensitivas como es el Medio Oriente. Paralelamente se había constituido un nuevo régimen de seguridad

¹ La version completa de este trabajo sera publicada por The Latin American Program, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

² Quiero agradecer al Henry L. Stimson Center y al Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, desde donde realicé mi trabajo, por el soporte durante el período de mi investigación en Washington.

³ Asimismo, permitía analizar algunos de los procesos de toma de decisión del gobierno argentino.

internacional que estaba directamente vinculado a Cóndor II y cuya formulación y vigencia trascendían la situación creada por el misil argentino. El seguimiento del proceso de formulación de la política hacia la destrucción del misil recorría suficientes agencias del gobierno como para entender la lógica de su funcionamiento, las definiciones de su política y cruzaba dos períodos fundamentales: la época de la Guerra Fría y el comienzo de la post-Guerra Fría.

No hay una sola política de seguridad ni una sola prioridad del gobierno norteamericano, no hay una sola política de no proliferación, ni esta manejada exclusivamente por los actores de una rama del ejecutivo. La decisión es también una suma de intereses públicos y privados, de situaciones de coyuntura que cambian de país a país, de año a año. Las decisiones del gobierno norteamericano son tanto el resultado del interjuego de organismos, agencias y oficinas del poder ejecutivo, como de negociaciones del poder legislativo y se flexibilizan o se acentúan en gran parte debido al empuje o interés de algunos altos funcionarios y el empeñamiento de otros que desde posiciones de mayor capacidad de decisión o desde la pequeña oficina de un ministerio empujan sus creencias más arraigadas.

Para poder entender el sentido de esa negociación hay que tener en cuenta:

Primero, las preocupaciones y concepciones del gobierno norteamericano, que implican tanto sus políticas de largo plazo en temas de no proliferación y que son políticas globales, como asimismo la dinámica que surgía de la emergencia de un supuesto nuevo orden internacional. Las negociaciones se enmarcan por lo tanto, en una decisión global de la que Argentina es solo un capítulo.

En segundo término, la peculiaridad de las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y la Argentina fijaba condicionamientos para la toma de decisión norteamericana: debían intentar modificar una política que aparecía como peligrosa a la seguridad global evitando repetir una historia de desencuentros y malentendidos que dificultaban una solución consensuada.

En tercer lugar, la racionalidad del gobierno argentino es distinta a la norteamericana. En el primer caso la lógica que gobierna el proceso de toma de decisión es la acumulación de poder, en el segundo es la diseminación del poder. Aunque Halperin⁴ presenta una forma de acumulación de poder basada en la idea de mantener o incrementar la influencia -individual o institucional- la diferencia con el caso argentino radica en que tal como es descrita en su libro, Halperín la relaciona con la posibilidad de mantener un cargo, una agencia o una función, reproducir la misma burocracia, dentro de un esquema de normas prefijadas y respetando cierta transparencia en las decisiones. Por lo tanto no paunta a un ejercicio del poder para beneficio individual o sectorial. En cambio, la política argentina parece originarse en un juego por incrementar la influencia para aumentar la capacidad transitoria de un hombre y tal vez su equipo, de incidir en el proceso político. Esa extrema concentración de poder deriva en la fragilidad de las instituciones a favor del fortalecimiento de las personalidades.

La política internacional de seguridad norteamericana

Si bien en el ámbito académico se ha tratado de mantener una línea de división entre la política doméstica y la internacional, y se mantiene una fuerte creencia en la conveniencia de que los problemas internos no afecten la política

⁴ Halperin, *Burocratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1974.

exterior⁵, la realidad es que por lo menos para América Latina la política exterior fue siempre parte de la política interna de los Estados Unidos.⁶

El inicio de la post-guerra fría trajo las inevitables confusiones de un cambio de orden, sin embargo, con un énfasis distinto los temas de no proliferación y el aumento de las capacidades defensivas norteamericanas diseñadas por el gobierno de Reagan se continuaron en la administración Bush. Así, el control de armamentos y de transferencia de tecnología sensitiva fue uno de los ejes centrales de la política de seguridad nacional norteamericana, mostrando que pesar de la gravitación de las variables contextuales, hay una continuidad en los principios básicos. Esta política implicaba dos procesos: por un lado evitar la proliferación de armas nucleares, químicas y biológicas y los medios para su lanzamiento, especialmente para los países del Tercer Mundo -dado que con la ex-Unión Soviética existían acuerdos que se pensaban implementar a través de negociaciones bilaterales-. En segundo término, incluía el desarrollo de la capacidad de defensa propia y de las naciones aliadas a través del SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative). Esta política fue una iniciativa del Pentágono, resistida por el Departamento de Estado, bajo lo que se conoce como el "Nitze criteria". La posición era que un programa de este tipo, que suponía la continuidad de desarrollos estratégicos de alta tecnología, daría excusas a la URSS para dilatar sus acuerdos en el "Start Treaty".⁷ Esta oposición de criterios refleja una tendencia entre ambos ministerios que se reproduce con el caso del Cóndor II, hay

⁵ Halperin, op.cit, pg.63.

⁶... is certainly true that foreign policy in the United States is always closely tied to domestic politics- and has been since the founding of the Republic- en Joseph Tulchin, "The Formulation of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Caribbean", *The Annals of the American Academy*, AAPSS, 533, May 1994. pg.178.

⁷ Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace, Seven critical Years in the Pentagon*, Warner Books, New York, 1990.

una mirada más global, más política en la Cancillería, mientras que en Defensa se priorizan posiciones de mayor contenido técnico-económico.⁸

En lo referente a la proliferación, el gobierno se encontró con que era más fácil controlar un solo frente como era la Unión Soviética con sus armas nucleares y no varias naciones (alrededor de 13) que trataban de tener no solo armas nucleares, sino también químicas, biológicas y misiles. Estos cambios, sin embargo, no implicaron un cambio de política, pues el foco siguió siendo el mismo desde 1945⁹: la preocupación por la difusión de armas de alta efectividad militar que puedan actuar en contra de países amigos, los que tiene menor capacidad de defensa, o emplearse directamente en contra de Estados Unidos. Entonces en estos asuntos antes y después de la Guerra Fría se mantiene una coherencia política y una percepción de amenaza similar.¹⁰

Los vínculos de Argentina con los Estados Unidos

El proceso de negociación del programa Cóndor refleja simultáneamente la tradición de desentendimiento y equivocaciones comunes a una historia de relaciones, pero también anuncia el cambio de perfil de un gobierno que buscaba un nuevo modelo de inserción internacional. Como señala Joseph Tulchin, "La

⁸ Como lo señala Nolan, ver ha sido parte de la política de los Estados Unidos en el período post-guerra fría, ver como balancea los imperativos de la cooperación y la protección de los avances tecnológicos "es el leit motiv de controversias crónicas sobre como implementar mejor controles de exportaciones estratégicas en adversarios militares sin penalizar intereses económicos", en Jane Nolan, *Trappings of Power, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1991, pg.4.

⁹ Henry Sokolski, "Nonproliferation: The Last 50 years", The Non Proliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, 1996.

¹⁰ Nolan plantea que en el caso de los misiles balísticos lo que se produce es una nueva dimensión de política internacional, aunque esos programas se desarrollaron en algunos casos en años anteriores a la post-guerra fría, porque pueden alcanzar sus objetivos manteniéndose más invulnerables a la defensa, pueden adaptarse fácilmente a cargas diferentes en sus cabezas, alcanzan rápidamente sus objetivos, por lo que son más desestabilizantes. Ver Jane Nolan, op. cit, pg.8.

historia de las relaciones entre los Estados Unidos y la Argentina es la de repetidos malentendidos, extendidos períodos de tensión y oportunidades perdidas de cooperación y amistad."¹¹ La permanencia de estas tensiones a lo largo de diferentes gobiernos y regímenes es para Tulchin la clave de una base estructural que inhabilita a la Argentina y a los Estados Unidos a construir una relación de mutuos beneficios. En alguna medida, aunque el gobierno de Menem mantiene algunas de las tendencias de relacionamiento tradicional, la negociación por el desmantelamiento del Cóndor II parece constituirse en un cambio¹² en el tipo de inserción global y en especial, del tipo de vinculación que quiere establecerse con Estados Unidos. De ser así, se podría estar frente a la finalización de la situación de excepcionalismo argentino que presenta Tulchin. Desde esta perspectiva el desmantelamiento del misil tenía como resultado positivo asentar nuevas capacidades que serán una herramienta más válida para la inserción futura de la Argentina.

La visión tradicional de la Argentina poderosa, granero del mundo, que perdura en la mitología nacional, compitiendo de forma pareja y medible con Brasil por la preeminencia en la América del Sur y disputando mercados e intereses con los Estados Unidos, crearon el marco para justificar la sofisticación tecnológica del Cóndor. Señala Tulchin que esa creencia de ser un gran poder "...fue el error fundamental de la política exterior argentina en el siglo veinte: aspirar al ejercicio del poder en los asuntos mundiales e insistir en el reconocimiento de sus roles como una nación poderosa e influyente cuando tenía poco poder y limitada

¹¹ Joseph Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States, a Conflicted Relationship*, Twayne Publishers, Boston, 1990, pg.XV. Joseph Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States, a Conflicted Relationship*, Twayne Publishers, Boston, 1990, pg.XV.

¹² Rut Diamint, "Cambios en la política de seguridad. Argentina en busca de un perfil no conflictivo", *Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad*, Chile, enero-marzo de 1992.

influencia".¹³ Esta fue la fantasía de tener el misil más sofisticado del momento sin tener un poder equivalente y jugar a acumular prestigio sin evaluar los costos, mirar el mundo por los ojos de los que soñaban con la perdida potencialidad de la Argentina de inicios de siglo. Esta era una visión de realismo político al menos muy ingenua,¹⁴ y al contrario de lo buscado, Argentina no tenía los recursos políticos ni las herramientas militares para jugar un rol independiente. Estos gestos de desafío traían mas consecuencias negativas que crecimiento y poderío. Como señalaba un funcionario del Departamento de Estado, "Argentina no miraba al mundo, su perspectiva no llegaba mas allá de Latinoamérica y el Cóndor II es una consecuencia de como Argentina miraba al mundo."¹⁵

Esta política de poderío militar no nace con el Cóndor II pues los desarrollos nucleares habían sido la fuente de desconfianza más antigua e irritante para las grandes potencias. La Comisión de Energía Atómica fue creada en 1950 por el Presidente Perón, con el aporte de algunos científicos nazis emigrados después de la guerra, desarrollando un programa nuclear de uso civil, pero que paralelamente mantenía capacidades militares y una alta cuota de secreto y de autonomía que permitían especular sobre las intenciones dobles del proyecto. Desarrollos similares en Brasil justificaban la mantención del proyecto por las viejas antinomias entre las dos potencias del sur. Argentina destinó considerables recursos al programa nuclear, sosteniendo una política autónoma que no aceptaba ni Tlatelolco ni TNP, coherentemente llevada para desarrollar una capacidad nuclear autónoma y competitiva con la de las naciones mas desarrolladas. Como señala John Redick, "Cuando políticas restrictivas de exportación se juntaron con dificultades de gastos

¹³ Tulchin, op. cit. 1990, pg 27.

¹⁴ Carlos Escudé, *Realismo Periférico. Fundamentos para la nueva política exterior argentina*, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1992.

¹⁵ Entrevista de marzo 14 de 1996.

en los programas nucleares de Argentina y Brasil, se reforzó también la teología nacionalista nuclear de victimización de las naciones avanzadas."¹⁶

Cuando el gobierno radical decidió continuar el proyecto Cóndor II no tuvo en cuenta las condiciones globales y sostenía su política de poder en un delicado balance de fuerzas políticas internacionales asociándose a las más cuestionadas.¹⁷ Esto quedó reflejado en las opiniones del secretario de la Cancillería, Andrés Cisneros en una polémica con el ex-Ministro de Defensa Horacio Jaunarena. Cisneros dijo que el Cóndor II era el desarrollo de un arma estratégica militar de destrucción masiva, era sin duda, un proyecto militar, iniciado bajo un régimen militar y continuando bajo un gobierno civil para fines exclusivamente militares.¹⁸ Rompiendo con la tradición de realismo geopolítico y militar, agregaba que quedaba expuesto que "armas nucleares, bacteriológicas y químicas, y misiles de largo alcance no son instrumentos estratégicos de una política exterior que intenta insertar definitivamente a Argentina en la comunidad internacional de naciones avanzadas"¹⁹ y marcaba así otros de los puntos centrales de la posición de la Cancillería durante el gobierno de Menem: el Cóndor II era un proyecto que subordinaba la política exterior a las Fuerzas Armadas y esa administración intentaba desmilitarizar la política exterior.

¹⁶ John Redick, " Nuclear Illusions:Argentina and Brazil", The Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper 25, December 1995, pg 1.

¹⁷ Desde la perspectiva de los hombres que hicieron el Cóndor II, como el Comodoro Guerrero, la presión por terminar con el proyecto era parte de una campana internacional contra la Argentina "porque los Estados Unidos nunca nos perdonará haber transferido tecnología a Irak que le permitió a ese país construir sus propios misiles en un tiempo mucho más corto." Citado en *Iraq Involvement in Cóndor II/Badr: A Chronological History*, International Missile Proliferation Project, Monterey Institute of International Studies, pg.15.

¹⁸ *Clarín*, 20 de abril de 1993, pg.59. Esta referencia se vincula con el comentario realizado por el Dr. Tulchin. El se preguntaba si la militarización de asuntos no militares no respondía a la ausencia de instituciones confiables. En este caso, se comprueba que existía debilidad en las instituciones de la defensa.

¹⁹ Idem.

Resumiendo la historia del Cóndor II:

El Cóndor se concibió en Argentina a finales de los años 70 dentro de los desarrollos de la Fuerza Aérea, vinculado al deseo de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Fuerza Aérea en especial, de revertir la humillación por la guerra de Malvinas y adquirir autonomía tecnológica fuera de los grandes centros de poder. El "plan de satelización" firmado por el jefe de la Fuerza Aérea Rubens Graffigna diseñaba un desarrollo en etapas de lo que a futuro sería el Cóndor II.²⁰ El proyecto establecía una red de cooperación, inicialmente con la compañía alemana Messerschmidt-Bloekow-Blohm (MBB), en 1979, para el desarrollo de un cohete meteorológico. Una serie de laboratorios secretos se construyeron en Falda del Carmen, Córdoba, durante más de tres años. Los directores del proyecto eran alemanes²¹ y cerca de 150 técnicos alemanes, suizos, italianos y franceses estuvieron temporariamente en la zona.²² La financiación fue principalmente externa, pero se utilizaron recursos de la Fuerza Aérea Argentina y fondos reservados del presupuesto.

La forma en que se manejó el proyecto, el secreto con el cual se condujeron las diferentes etapas y el tipo de planta desarrollada, superaban las necesidades reales de un cohete meteorológico. Era sin duda un proyecto militar²³ y era también un

²⁰. Anabella Busso, "Alineamiento con los Estados Unidos y proceso de toma de decisiones en la política exterior argentina: el caso Condor II", tesis de Maestría, FLACSO, Rosario, septiembre de 1995, pg.6.

²¹ En 1981 llegaron los primeros ingenieros a Córdoba. Ver Iraq Involvement in Condor II/Badr: A Chronological History.

²² Ekkard Schrotz, ingeniero alemán que dirigía Consen en Múnaco era considerado el cerebro del Cóndor. Schrotz entrenaba a militares y técnicos argentinos en Múnaco. Sufrió un atentado en 1988, en una ciudad al sur de Francia que se atribuyó tanto a los servicios secretos israelíes como a musulmanes iraníes, pero el mensaje era el mismo: terminar con el Cóndor II. Schrotz sigue viviendo fuera de controles y persecuciones al sur de Francia.

²³ La cooperación con la firma alemana MBB y el consorcio que posteriormente forma, llamado Consen, no fue en realidad una determinación argentina, sino que encuadraron mutuamente las pretensiones de las empresas alemanas a través de los deseos de los coheteros de desarrollar el proyecto. El contacto con Egipto no lo hizo la Argentina sino que fue establecido por Consen y MBB quienes ya tenían conexiones industriales con ese país y con Irak.

salto tecnológico en los países del Tercer Mundo.²⁴ Los colaboradores de Argentina eran Irak y Egipto. Por ello, este misil se convirtió en una prioridad en la agenda occidental. Documentos obtenidos del Ministerio de Defensa de la República Árabe de Egipto, muestran que ese país entró en acuerdos con Irak y Argentina en 1984 para el desarrollo de un misil balístico de rango intermedio.²⁵

Tal vez no es tan importante detallar cuando el gobierno norteamericano tomó conocimiento de la existencia del programa.²⁶ La cuestión central es como se articuló una respuesta ante la evidencia de que a) países que aisladamente no tenían las condiciones para desarrollar un proyecto militar sofisticado, podían alcanzarlo si emprendían un desarrollo en conjunto, b) la preocupación compartida frente a la enorme dificultad para controlar la proliferación de componentes para la fabricación de armamento, incluso en los Estados Unidos, y c) que esa alianza tenía un potencial desestabilizador amplio y extendido a varias regiones del mundo.

Las primeras demandas del gobierno norteamericano para detener la proliferación misilística, llegaron al gobierno argentino en forma directa a las altas autoridades del ejecutivo en una visita del presidente Alfonsín a Estados Unidos. Durante esos años fue presentado como un arma defensiva que generaba mejores condiciones de negociación. En palabras del Canciller Caputo: "Creo que el conflicto por la posesión de las Islas Malvinas nunca podrá ser resuelto bélicamente, pero de

²⁴ Sin duda era un paso superior de los Scud rusos, que al mismo tiempo eran readaptación de los misiles nazis V-2 y de los iraquíes Al-Husseín (650 km) y Al-Abbas (860 km) que son Scud de más largo rango obtenido con cabezas menores y mayor combustible, o los chinos Saudi, que son también de una etapa.

²⁵ Presentación de los fiscales David F. Levi y Thomas E. Flynn, In the United States Court for the Eastern District of California, CR. No S-89-201-RAR, op. cit. 1.

²⁶ Iraq Involvement in Condor II/Badr: A Chronological History, International Missile Proliferation Project, Monterey Institute of International Studies, pg.9.

lo que se trata es de sentarse con más elementos a la mesa de negociación."²⁷ Y en ese sentido las aspiraciones militares coincidían con las radicales.

El nuevo gobierno del presidente Menem comenzó desmintiendo la peligrosidad del misil. Cavallo, como ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, dijo que Argentina estaba desarrollando un vector que no tenía fines militares y que esa tecnología no sería diseminada a lo largo del mundo. Dijo que era un cohete y no un misil, diferenciado por la capacidad de guiado.²⁸ Tiempo después las autoridades del nuevo gobierno produjeron un cambio rotundo en sus decisiones políticas sobre el Cóndor II. Este cambio se relacionaba con el nuevo perfil de política exterior que desarrollaría el Canciller Cavallo, pero además teniendo como marco la política de vinculación de cuestiones que impuso el gobierno norteamericano al tratar de forma conjunta las negociaciones financieras y el desmantelamiento del Cóndor II.

El Ministro Cavallo primero y con el cambio de Ministros, el Canciller Di Tella y su asesor Cisneros y un reducido grupo alrededor de Menem, liderado por Bauzá, manejaron el desmantelamiento del Cóndor negociando en varios frentes adversos. Por una parte las presiones norteamericanas eran sistemáticas y sin tregua. En segunda instancia, y de forma más oculta y menos reconocida, la resistencia de la Fuerza Aérea para entregar las partes del Cóndor II, a través del ocultamiento y la distracción; y en tercer lugar la oposición política que la antecedió en el gobierno.

²⁷ Eduardo Barcelona y Julio Villaloonga, *Relaciones Carnales. La verdadera historia de la construcción y la destrucción del misil Cóndor II*, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1992, pg.35. También es cierto, como señaló el Dr. Russell que las variables contextuales eran diferentes y que la presión sobre el presidente Alfonsín era menor que las generadas al gobierno de Menem. La evidencia de que era un arma ofensiva se en el juicio realizado a Helms, consta que se intentaba comprar en empresas americanas K-karb para el cono de proa y químicos para el propellante sólido, de acuerdo a un informe elaborado por la NASA, lo que evidencia el interés en municiones de guerra. Ver David F. Levi y Thomas E. Flynn, op. cit, pg. 8.

²⁸ *Noticias Argentinas*, 26 de octubre de 1989.

La polémica con el gobierno radical tenía dos ejes: la negativa a aceptar el acuerdo de su gobierno con Irak y el cuestionamiento más global de *imput* tecnológico que dejaba el proyecto. El gobierno radical negó las negociaciones con Irak, aceptando solo el programa con Egipto, y señalando además que no revestía carácter secreto. Sin embargo, en una carta del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Domingo Cavallo, dirigida al ex-Ministro de Defensa radical, Horacio Jaunarena, este denunciaba que existían dos documentos secretos que aprobaban el desarrollo del Cóndor II. Estos decretos eran el Decreto No 604, firmado por el presidente Raúl Alfonsín; el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Dante Caputo; el Ministro de Economía, Juan Sourrouille y el Ministro de Defensa Raúl Borrás, el 9 de abril de 1985. Por el mismo, se autorizaba a la empresa Consen a actuar como manager del proyecto. El segundo era el Decreto 1315, firmado por el ministro Jaunarena y por el presidente Raúl Alfonsín, el 13 de agosto de 1987, en el que -según Cavallo- se autorizaba transferir tecnología misilística a Irak, quien financiaba el desarrollo del Cóndor.²⁹ Jaunarena negó que el gobierno radical hubiera tenido conexiones con Irak en el desarrollo del Cóndor II.³⁰ En realidad, aunque las conexiones están probadas,³¹ el gobierno argentino no trató directamente con Irak, si no con Egipto, mientras que el consorcio Consen era el intermediario entre los tres países.³² La

²⁹ FBIS-LAT-91-018, 28 de enero de 1991, pg. 26.

³⁰ Según la versión egipcia, el acuerdo inicial era por la construcción de 10 misiles, 5 quedarían en Egipto y 5 irían a Irak, quien proveía los fondos, mientras que Egipto aportaba conocimiento técnico y en Argentina se realizaría la construcción inicial y el testeado de los 10 misiles. Presentación de los fiscales David F. Levi y Thomas E. Flynn, op. cit, pg 2.

³¹ Las Naciones Unidas, luego de sus inspecciones en Irak a posteriori de la Guerra del Golfo, certificaron que el misil BDR -2000 es un producto del Cóndor II y que tres plantas similares a Falda del Carmen fueron construidas en Irak. Los expertos de la comisión de seguridad de las Naciones Unidas que estuvieron en la planta de Falda del Carmen, explicaron al Ministro de Defensa y al titular de la comisión civil de actividades espaciales, que las inspecciones in situ en ambos casos revelan la similitud de los desarrollos. Ellos mismos consideraron que la planta de Falda del Carmen, debería tener un costo de 200 a 300 millones de dólares. La visita de los expertos a Argentina estaba conectada con la necesidad de detallar el grado de desarrollo misilístico alcanzado por los iraquíes.

³² En un posterior informe clasificado de inteligencia se decía: "la fuente C reportó en 891208 que Irak había lanzado exitosamente un misil con 48 toneladas de carga útil. Científicos e ingenieros de Egipto y Argentina estaban presentes para el lanzamiento. El misil de tres etapas fue lanzado de Al Arbar. La

crítica de Cavallo se centraba en el desarrollo de misiles dentro del territorio argentino, actuando en contra de la no proliferación que Argentina sostenía en foros internacionales y cuestionando la propagación tecnológica de un proyecto dependiente de la importación de tecnología. El gobierno argentino no tenía espacios de opción para mejorar sus negociaciones diplomáticas y por la relativa irrelevancia estratégica frente a la potencia hegemónica, tuvo que actuar en concordancia con las presiones.

El sistema burocrático norteamericano y sus cuotas de poder

Se supone que cada agencia, secretaría u oficina tiene una función definida y delimitada que justifica su creación. Pero la complejidad del gobierno de Estados Unidos es creciente y no ha dejado de aumentar por la aparición de nuevos asuntos y por el fracaso de algunos organismos para llevar adelante sus políticas. Grupos *ad hoc* muchas veces se hacen permanentes, suplantando a otras agencias en sus tareas específicas, dejando en evidencia lo que podría considerarse una falencia del aparato burocrático. A esta maquinaria se le agrega en muchas oportunidades los aportes de especialistas independientes, tanto para enriquecer el conocimiento sobre un tema controvertido como para resolver repuestas inconciliables entre funcionarios.

Cuando la política incluye una preocupación central del gobierno, son más numerosas las agencias implicadas y más difícil el proceso de toma de decisión. El caso de no proliferación incluye a los departamentos de estado, defensa, energía, comercio, la comunidad de inteligencia, el estado mayor conjunto, las fuerzas

fuelle A en 891208 confirmó ese mismo lanzamiento y agregó que el misil Cóndor II es ahora prácticamente operacional y será capaz de poner un satélite en órbita en el futuro cercano con la colaboración de Egipto."Desclasificado por el National Security Archives, figura incompleto como DOI: (U) 891122-891200, Subj: IIR, pg. 0023. Sin fecha, aunque figura una referencia a 1989 en el mismo informe.

armadas, la agencia de control de armamentos y desarme y el consejo nacional de seguridad. Pero además, en cada uno de estos organismos pueden existir departamentos internos que tratan el mismo tema desde diferentes enfoques. La instancia de solución de las diferencias es el Inter-agency Working Group (IWG), que sostiene gran número de encuentros entre funcionarios de los diferentes departamentos tratando de ir acercando paulatinamente las posiciones antes de llegar a los niveles de decisión más altos, aunque ocasionalmente sea difícil distinguir a que intereses responden.

La política de no proliferación ha sido una preocupación prioritaria desde la pérdida de dominio absoluto a fines de los cuarenta. Pero si bien la amenaza nuclear soviética fue el centro de alarma, el mundo post-Guerra Fría no disminuyó las inquietudes. La política de control de armamentos se había centrado en las armas nucleares. Para ello se requería de técnicos entrenados, un proceso de desarrollo tecnológico y un tiempo prolongado. A principios de los ochenta se advirtió que un grupo de países, adquiriendo tecnología en varios estados, con técnicos entrenados en los centros desarrollados y con recursos financieros suficientes podían encarar la tarea de desarrollar misiles con bastante éxito y sofisticación. Estos misiles podían portar carga química o biológica de menor nivel tecnológico y menor período de desarrollo. Así fue reconocido por el vicepresidente Dan Quayle: "Y usted no solo tiene la capacidad misilística balística, pero agregue la cabeza química a eso -y los dos, desafortunadamente, han comenzado a emerger- y teniendo una capacidad química en la cabeza de un misil balístico, usted tiene un problema real y un potencial real de desestabilización regional así como global."³³ La facilidad de la producción de armas químicas, probadas en el caso de los kurdos, alertó sobre las consecuencias de la

³³ BBC Program on Condor Missile development, 10 de abril de 1989, en JPRS-TAC, 89-016, 18 de abril de 1989.

relación entre armas químicas y misiles en el Tercer Mundo y alentó a establecer una política más fuerte en el tema.

Inicialmente, la provisión de misiles balísticos de corto alcance por parte de los Estados Unidos, no fue evaluada como una situación de amenaza. Por otra parte se consideraba que de no ser provistos por Norteamérica, se adquirirían en otros mercados, perdiendo no solo una posibilidad de mercado, sino también la capacidad de mantener un control sobre su uso y mantenimiento. Sin embargo, estos mismos países comenzaron a desarrollar su producción nacional propia, más rápidamente de lo esperado por Estados Unidos y aprovechando las pocas ventajas que les otorgaban los misiles adquiridos, los modificaron o realizaron un *upgrade*.

Como señala el experto Henry Sokolski, a mitad de los '80 apareció con total claridad la idea de que "Por lo menos, cuando los misiles rusos que estaban apuntando a los niños americanos, nosotros sabíamos donde estaban. Ahora puede ser Irán, Irak, Siria, Corea del Norte o China, muchos lugares. No sabemos donde están. Pero sabemos que hay una docena de países que están desarrollando la tecnología y las capacidades para lanzar misiles hacia los Estados Unidos".³⁴

Las agencias centrales del gobierno norteamericano en política internacional de seguridad

El Departamento de Estado tiene el rol central en la decisión de la política exterior pero no tiene el monopolio. En la negociación del Cóndor II se vio

³⁴ Presentación de Henry Sokolski en la discusión referida a la implementación del ABM Treaty o su reemplazo por un instrumento más adecuado a las nuevas realidades y la revitalización del Strategic Anti-missile Revitalization and Security Act of 1996 (STARS Act), *Congressional Record*, S367, 25 de enero de 1996.

claramente ese liderazgo, pero también la participación de las otras agencias. Y en cada una de ellas se reitera el conflicto entre estrategias globales e intereses hemisféricos. Pese a que había una decisión firme de eliminar el peligro del Cóndor II, y que esta decisión era compartida por todas las agencias como objetivo común, los enfoques eran diferentes. La oficina regional quería preservar y mejorar las relaciones con el gobierno Argentino, que por primera vez estaba mostrando claramente su acercamiento a los Estados Unidos y una coincidencia de posiciones que beneficiaba las relaciones de los norteamericanos con los países del continente.

En primera instancia, la oficina regional consideraba una presión suficiente la vinculación entre cuestiones de seguridad y cuestiones financieras, sabiendo que los pedidos de ayuda económica eran esenciales para que el gobierno argentino pudiera recomponer su economía y aumentar la gobernabilidad. Aunque algunos funcionarios prefirieron minimizar la vinculación de temas, la condicionalidad impuesta fue confirmada por otros funcionarios del Departamento de Estado y el Pentágono y figura en algunos estudios.³⁵ Como señaló James Buchanan, no era que los Estados Unidos estuvieran pensando en cortar el financiamiento para la Argentina, ya que la recuperación económica y el fortalecimiento democrático eran también importantes objetivos de la política norteamericana (una muestra más de objetivos y actores mutuamente competitivos al interior de la administración), pero había ciertas facilidades que no estarían disponibles para el gobierno argentino. Para Cavallo como Canciller o Ministro de Economía y para Di Tella ya siendo Embajador en Washington o Canciller, quedó meridianamente claro que la

³⁵ Este mismo argumento es sostenido por dos estudios realizados en Argentina Barcelona y Villalonga lo dicen: cualquier intento de recomposicion economica con el apoyo de organismos internacioanles se vinculaba a la eliminacion del Cóndor II, en op cit.pg. 53, y lo mismo presenta Anabella Busso, op. cit., de acuerdo a sus entrevistas con funcionarios argentinos.

recomposición de relaciones con el mundo desarrollado y los EE.UU., no podía eludir una resolución de la cuestión del proyecto Cóndor II.

La oficina regional tenía un enfoque bilateral, pero en el caso del Cóndor II era claro que se trataba de un problema que trascendía a la Argentina. Por otra parte conectaba con las posiciones más clásicas en los temas de no proliferación. Como señaló un funcionario: "La presión por el Cóndor II se vincula a como se percibía a la Argentina en el tema nuclear, sin ninguna salvaguardia, era un país de antecedentes peligrosos."³⁶ Los funcionarios globalistas de no proliferación, una vez que los acuerdos comenzaron a efectivizarse, querían dar a publicidad el proceso, pues constituía una advertencia para otros estados proliferantes, mientras que el escritorio regional prefería mantener las negociaciones en discreción, para no complicar al gobierno argentino.³⁷ Los agentes funcionales ganaron. Su argumento era que Estados Unidos es un estado global con intereses globales y ese criterio debía dejarse en claro en cuestiones que repercuten en otras regiones. Además rebatían la posición de los regionalistas, considerando que hubiera sido muy difícil mantener en secreto el proceso de negociación, ya que muchas de estas oposiciones se dirimen a través de filtraciones a la prensa.

La decisión del Cóndor II, indudablemente se percibe como un triunfo de los globalistas frente a los regionalistas del Departamento de Estado y de los ideólogos post-Guerra Fría, que buscaban soluciones específicas para casos particulares,

³⁶ Entrevista de febrero 13 de 1996.

³⁷ Los funcionarios entrevistados coincidieron en que desde el gobierno de Estados Unidos no se temía que la presión pudiera generar un golpe de estado u otro tipo de inestabilidad institucional, pero uno de ellos indico que en el escritorio regional se preocupaba porque una excesiva presión llevara a un cambio de los Ministros con los que se entendían muy bien, entorpeciendo la negociación. Es cierto que para el Ministro Di Tella la interna política que desató este acuerdo fue difícil de sobrellevar y según la versión de un funcionario norteamericano, en algunos momentos el ministro presentó posiciones menos conciliadoras con los planteos norteamericanos. En Estados Unidos se evaluaban como un resultado de las presiones internas hacia el Canciller y no como un cambio de política exterior.

instrumentos ad hoc más que amplios tratados. Un funcionario de la oficina regional de no proliferación dijo: "Es un área en la que los regímenes no tienen un mecanismo para defenderse. En algunos temas de tráfico de material nuclear nosotros trabajamos con el G7 y no con la IAEA".³⁸ Pero aunque sus soluciones se evalúen como efectivas, las superposiciones generan tensiones y hostilidad en el sistema burocrático: nadie quiere perder espacio ni funciones.

El panorama de agencias tiene dos ejes centrales y varias ramificaciones. La oficina de Proliferación Regional depende del Bureau Político-Militar, que es una cadena funcional de direcciones. El PMB reporta al subsecretario de Control de Armas y Asuntos de Seguridad y un Secretario Adjunto de No proliferación. Paralelamente y sin cruzarse están las secciones regionales, en el caso de América Latina comandadas por un Bureau de Asuntos Interamericanos. Para acercar posiciones entre las diferentes ramas se intercambian cables y documentos de posición y las diferencias se tratan de resolver en el nivel más bajo de los funcionarios. Si el desacuerdo prosigue se va manejando a niveles mayores, en los IWG, y en última instancia es el National Security Council (NSC) quien establece la decisión final. En este esquema formal se trabajó en el Cóndor II, produciéndose una gran cantidad de documentos de posición y propuestas de políticas. Sin embargo, como sucede en general, la decisión individual termina inclinando la balanza. De allí la crítica de un funcionario del Pentágono, diciendo que "se pasa mucho tiempo negociando, mucho más entre nosotros que con los países extranjeros",³⁹ mientras que otro expresaba "es más difícil encontrar un acuerdo en el IWG que convencer a un país extranjero. Hay intereses económicos, intereses ambientales, intereses

³⁸ Entrevista de 19 de marzo de 1996.

³⁹ Entrevista de 8 marzo de 1996.

políticos, intereses comerciales, intereses nacionales, y no hay una política que satisfaga a todos".⁴⁰

Otro actor de este juego es el embajador. En el caso de las negociaciones del Cóndor II, el embajador norteamericano en Buenos Aires no fue solo un transmisor de las decisiones acordadas en Washington. Marcó su propio perfil ⁴¹ y su manera de entender como se llegaba más rápidamente a una solución adecuada. Alguna vez sus acciones no fueron las predilectas del Departamento de Estado. Esto también sucede por una dinámica generada por la propia acumulación de agencias. El embajador reporta a la oficina regional, que no se comunica con la funcional salvo en el más alto nivel de conducción. Los ejes de política, economía, administración y consulado de las embajadas, informan a los respectivos funcionarios centrales en el Departamento de Estado. No hay una comunicación horizontal y el filtrado de detalles desde los sectores más bajos hasta los funcionarios más altos va eliminando peculiaridades que son importantes al momento de tomar la decisión adecuada. En alguna medida esta pérdida de detalles ha sido una situación común en la política norteamericana hacia América Latina, tomando al continente como un región unificada y equivocándose reiteradamente al no percibir las diferencias sustantivas.⁴² Los IWG tratan de llenar esta falencia a través de un intercambio de informaciones, pero en alguna medida no pueden evitar que la toma de decisión siga reproduciendo el esquema vertical de circulación de enfoques. Uno de los objetivos de estos IWG es que logra establecer cual es el objetivo prioritario por agencia y en función de ellos se busca la solución de las pujas entre los funcionarios de estos grupos. Pero según advirtió un funcionario, esas definiciones no siempre

⁴⁰ Entrevista de 12 de marzo de 1996.

⁴¹ Cuatro funcionarios del Departamento de Estado coincidieron en esta afirmación y también tres del Departamento de Defensa.

⁴² Tulchin (1990), *op. cit.*

coincide con las decisiones políticas tomadas en el ejecutivo. "En todo caso salva la responsabilidad del funcionario de haber cumplido correctamente con su tarea, tenemos responsabilidad (accountability) frente al Congreso."⁴³ Y otro agente del ejecutivo expresaba, "el desk por países mira la relación bilateral, pero no lo mejor para Estados Unidos. No hay un desk Estados Unidos en el Departamento de Estado, por eso tiene que haber IWG, para que todos los aspectos de los intereses de Estados Unidos estén incluidos."⁴⁴

Pese a sus falencias, las reuniones de IWG son sin duda el estilo de concepcionar la política en Norteamérica. Las cadenas de informaciones y de discusiones permiten un proceso de toma de decisión lento, espaciado y autorreflexivo, en el que se contemplan las múltiples facetas de los intereses y se miden las consecuencias. No hay apresuramiento porque se espera que no haya necesidad de arrepentimiento. Las consecuencias de la falla en un actor global son demasiado amplias como para no dedicarle suficiente atención. Se debe tener también en cuenta que el IWG no es un cuerpo de toma de decisiones. Es un clearing house para que los decisores lleven correctas recomendaciones de política al presidente o los ejecutores.

El mapa del Departamento de Estado se completa con ACDA. En ambos se percibe una superposición de funciones y una diferenciación muy exquisita que no se justifica conceptualmente. Entre ACDA y No Proliferación hay diferencias de criterios y los deseos de la propia burocracia de liderar los temas. Se entiende que cuando hay tratados o instrumentos formales, la que interviene en general es ACDA, tanto sean bi o multilaterales. No Proliferación se ocupa de compromisos más informales y situaciones de coyuntura específicas, como quedó reflejado en la

⁴³ *Entrevista de 3 de abril de 1996.*

⁴⁴ *Entrevista de 12 de marzo de 1996.*

creación de una oficina regional de no proliferación. En los últimos años esta tensión ha revestido un carácter conceptual. La idea de control de armamentos es de la Guerra Fría y su respuesta fueron los tratados (tipo Start o Salt). A partir del fin de la Guerra Fría surge con mayor precisión la idea de la proliferación amplia e indiscriminada, muy relacionada con las transferencias ilegales y con la prevención. La oficina de No proliferación entiende que son amenazas más difusas que no se resuelven por medio de tratados (en el caso del Cóndor II los acuerdos no encuadraban en ningún tratado formal) y ven en este enfoque un incremento en su propio rol y una disminución de la utilidad de ACDA. En todo caso, ahora que no proliferación es un tema central de la agenda de política exterior, el Departamento de Estado parece no querer compartirlo y quisiera limitar a ACDA al control de armamentos. El predominio concentrado de la temática permite al DOS además asentar su liderazgo frente al Pentágono. No todos coinciden y mostrando el tradicional recelo del Congreso ante el DOS, un experto del Senado, apoyando los éxitos de ACDA, dijo que la agencia de desarme hace lo que el Departamento de Estado debería hacer y no hace: "A la diplomacia no le gusta decir no".⁴⁵

El Departamento de Defensa es el aparato burocrático más grande del gobierno norteamericano.⁴⁶ También existe la diferenciación entre las oficinas regional y funcional, pero sus contradicciones son menores que en Departamento de Estado. La política esta focalizada y la dirección del manejo de los asuntos es más funcional que regional.

⁴⁵ Entrevista con un asesor del Congreso de 19 de febrero de 1996.

⁴⁶ El Secretario tiene dos subsecretarios, el de adquisiciones y el de Política, este tiene a su vez un Secretario Adjunto para Asuntos Internacionales que es como el Departamento de Estado dentro del Pentágono y es el que dicta los lineamientos de política internacional que tiende a seguir este departamento.

La posición del Departamento de Defensa era más drástica que la de Estado, su objetivo era destruir todo de manera que no pudiera readaptarse o reconstituirse el misil y ponían el acento en verificar todo el proceso porque después de las experiencias previas querían estar seguros que "el compromiso político se convirtiera en una realidad política".⁴⁷ Tenían la certeza de que "con los misiles no se hace dinero, por lo tanto el beneficio es militar."⁴⁸ El perfil que imprimía a la negociación la gente del Departamento de Defensa se entendía a través de un comentario en el que se minimizaban los efectos del MTCR: "El acuerdo de tecnología misilística es una promesa sin instituciones: Es una promesa sin leyes y por lo tanto, no coacciona."⁴⁹ Incluso, una de las diferencias más fuertes y sostenidas a lo largo de la negociación entre Departamento de Estado y Departamento de Defensa era que los diplomáticos, atendiendo a reclamos argentinos, querían dar algo a cambio. La Cancillería argentina buscaba una carta efectiva para mostrar los beneficios de la negociación y el DOS coincidía en ese punto. El Departamento de Defensa, en general, rechazaba la idea de un intercambio y la cooperación espacial que se estableció con la NASA, fue resistida por los hombres de las oficinas del Pentágono.

Las negociaciones se establecieron en medio de una coyuntura de cambio frente a las nuevas amenazas de la post-Guerra Fría y la difusión indiscriminada de armas de destrucción masiva y por ello, el Departamento de Defensa reforzó sus estructuras para detener ese peligro. Así es que en 1990, el secretario de Defensa Cheney creó una dirección de Medidas de Contraproliferación para neutralizar las amenazas misilísticas y de armas de destrucción masiva. Estableció luego un

⁴⁷ Entrevista en el Departamento de Defensa, marzo 15 de 1996.

⁴⁸ Este argumento fue repetido en entrevistas con un funcionarios del Departamento de Estado, del NSC y del Congreso.

⁴⁹ Dr. Steve Bryen, Departamento de Defensa, JPRS-TAC-89-016, 18 de abril de 1989, pg. 14, info BBC.

Department of Defense Proliferation Countermeasures Working Group con representantes de Defensa, DIA, la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional, Adquisiciones, Política, SDIO (Strategic Defense Initiative Organization), las fuerzas armadas y el Estado Mayor Conjunto.⁵⁰ Su objetivo era anticipar los posibles problemas de proliferación con suficiente antelación como para permitir a los *policy makers* y planificadores militares prepararse adecuadamente para enfrentarlos. Esta política es conocida como de contraproliferación.⁵¹ Es el recurso posterior al fracaso de los controles de exportación y puede intuirse una crítica a la debilidad del Departamento de Estado, a quien corresponde coordinar el IWG en proliferación. Este comité de coordinación interno se creó para perfeccionar la tarea del amplio grupo de trabajo de interagencias que muchas veces carece de adecuada coordinación y comunicación. El gobierno asimismo aceleró los procedimientos internos para reevaluar las exportaciones en casos que involucran misiles y desde principios de 1990 se creó la MTEC (Missile Technology Export Control Group) y la MTAG (Missile Trade Analysis Group).

La pregunta que genera este conjunto de organismos es si tanta superposición de agencias no interfiere en la solución de problemas. Algunos señalan que detrás de esta profusión hay un aumento artificial de la amenaza misilística extranjera para justificar el SDI, bajo los intereses del Pentágono y la industria militar. Un funcionario del Departamento de Estado señaló que durante el gobierno de Bush el Departamento de Defensa trabajaba fuertemente en no proliferación porque había paralelamente un interés en mantener un desarrollo en los sistemas tecnológicos de

⁵⁰ Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, one hundred first Congress, May 17 and July 11, 1990, pg. 172

⁵¹ Sokolski se pregunta si estas medidas de contraproliferación implican una contradicción del Departamento de Defensa con la política oficial de no proliferación, en H Sokolski, op. cit. p 41. Para el concepto de contraproliferación ver H. Muller y M. Reiss, "Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18, spring 1995.

defensa, mientras que durante el gobierno de Clinton, con los recortes al presupuesto militar, el Departamento de Defensa quedó dominado por los intereses comerciales e industriales pero sin coherencia en la política de no proliferación. Una interpretación independiente señala que el problema de los misiles se aumentó para sostener la racionalidad del *Star Wars*, que responde a la alianza entre el Pentágono y la industria militar, ocultando la tradicional idea de que Estados Unidos no puede perder liderazgo y competitividad tecnológica.⁵² En esta perspectiva, el único país que puede amenazar a Estados Unidos es Corea del Norte y no justifica los desarrollos del *Star Wars*.

El Consejo Nacional de Seguridad (NSC) es el mediador entre los diferentes departamentos. Es una "clearing house" en la que se trata de acumular la mayor cantidad de información para una toma de decisiones correcta. En la visión del Departamento de Estado, la ventaja del NSC es que tiene una relación muy directa con el presidente, un equipo de analistas muy entrenado y por lo menos formalmente, no tiene que tomar decisiones políticas, su rol es de aconsejar. Pero, dependiendo de quien sea el principal *adviser*, su rol puede ser cooperativo o competitivo con el Canciller, complicando el proceso de toma de decisión. Es la agencia en la que mayormente se percibe la cualidad personal de su secretario para establecer su capacidad de incidir en las decisiones.

En el caso del Cóndor II su rol fue mayormente el de mediador, sosteniendo infinitas reuniones para conciliar las posiciones entre globalistas y regionalistas de los diferentes ministerios. Según un funcionario, el NSC es un *broker* que tiene que conformar a sus dos principales clientes: el Departamento de Estado y el Departamento de Defensa. Si bien desde la percepción del NSC, Argentina había

⁵² Entrevista con la experta Lora Lumpe, febrero 21 de 1996.

realizado un cambio estratégico para ubicarse en los códigos de Occidente y se buscaba por lo tanto una solución cooperativa, también había que asegurar una respuesta aceptable a sus intereses globales que estaban por encima de mantener una buena relación con un país sudamericano.⁵³

En los temas de proliferación también interviene el Departamento de Energía y el Departamento de Comercio. Energía lo hace desde un perfil más técnico a través de los laboratorios de Los Alamos y Sandia. Según los estudios que realizaron, Argentina a través de una base técnica con la que contaba y con el aporte de *commodities* provistas por Alemania, Austria e Italia, constituyó la base de un desarrollo tecnológico para los proyectos con Egipto e Irak. Y en este caso la preocupación por el desarrollo del misil se acoplaba a la preocupación central de Energía: la tecnología nuclear. Argentina tenía un desarrollo nuclear importante y no daba suficientes garantías⁵⁴ por lo cual esa agencia se asociaba a los reclamos que hacía el Departamento de Defensa.

El Departamento de Comercio controla las licencias de exportación y su conexión es directamente con el Departamento de Estado. Las informaciones obtenidas en el juicio al Abdelkader Helmy, un científico egipcio radicado en California, que había trabajado como especialista en cohetes en la compañía norteamericana Aerojet y que participó de las transferencias para el Cóndor II, hicieron rever los controles de exportaciones de industrias americanas. Estas revisiones no eran suficientes pues según la versión de expertos del Congreso, muchas veces el Departamento de Comercio está más interesado en promover empresas que velar por la seguridad.

⁵³ Entrevista de 6 de marzo de 1996.

⁵⁴ Según otro funcionario de Defensa "Argentina tenía una conducta nuclear complicada, y luego desarrollos misilísticos, para nosotros estaba condenada". Entrevista de 22 de febrero de 1996.

En otro nivel, con una participación importante, está la comunidad de inteligencia. El sistema comprende centralmente a la Central de Inteligencia (CIA) y a la Agencia de Inteligencia de Defensa (DIA). Sin embargo tanto el Departamento de Estado como el NSC realizan tareas de inteligencia y tienen equipos de análisis propios.⁵⁵ La importancia de la inteligencia es diferente de un gobierno a otro y depende en gran medida de la relación del Director con el equipo presidencial. Formalmente, cada mañana el Presidente recibe a altos funcionario de inteligencia que presentan un panorama verbal, además de los reportes escritos. A pedido de las agencias pueden elaborar documentos sobre temas específicos, pero la producción de la CIA es para el presidente y la de DIA es para el presidente y el Secretario de Defensa.

Sin duda, las primeras informaciones que el gobierno norteamericano manejó en referencia al Cóndor II fue producto de las actividades de las agencias de inteligencia. Y la calidad de la información sorprendió más de una vez a los funcionarios argentinos, la precisión de datos que el propio gobierno desconocía, generó más de una situación de apremio para los representantes del gobierno de Buenos Aires. Las agencias de inteligencia participan de los IWG y también de reuniones cerradas de alto nivel. Sin embargo, ni los agentes del Departamento de Estado ni los del Departamento de Defensa⁵⁶ han hecho referencia a los aportes de la CIA o la DIA en el momento de tomar una decisión. La NRA y la NSA completan el cuadro de analistas de la información, pero se la mira como un instrumento técnico y no como formuladores de política.

⁵⁵ Lo mismo sucede con el Departamento de Energía, con las fuerzas armadas, y en menor medida en las otras dependencias que cuentan por lo menos con analistas propios para elaborar su propia perspectiva de una situación.

⁵⁶ Weinberg consideraba que la DIA era superior que la CIA. Ver Caspar Weinberger, op. cit., pg.405.

Las preocupaciones por la proliferación y la necesidad de establecer controles más efectivos llevaron a que el gobierno diseñara el Régimen de Control de Tecnología Misilística (MTCR). La negociación fue claramente una decisión de cúpulas. Primero una decisión de cúpulas al interior del gobierno norteamericano,⁵⁷ y eso se refleja en el manejo secreto del tema, y en la ausencia del Congreso en su debate. Al mismo tiempo fue un acuerdo de cúpulas en el debate entre países. Fue un acuerdo del G7, de las potencias occidentales, potenciales proveedores de estos materiales.

El Cóndor II fue el primer caso del MTCR y si bien los funcionarios prefieren señalar que no fue el *leit motiv* del régimen ni el modelo, por lo menos coinciden en que fue la primera vez que el régimen se aplicó, fue el primer producto del sistema y por ello se buscaba un efecto positivo, para que pudiera servir de medida para otros casos.⁵⁸ El interés prioritario era actuar sobre los proveedores y conocida la intervención Austria, Italia y Alemania, el régimen apuntaba a negociar con estos países los controles que limitaran la difusión de tecnología.

El papel del Congreso

Cuando el asunto del Cóndor II y la proliferación de misiles en Medio Oriente salió a publicidad en la prensa, el Congreso se interesó en esa política y comenzó a sostener una serie de audiencias como parte del control de la política exterior. El

⁵⁷ Richard Speier senala que la documentacion que se manejó en Defensa en los tiempos en que él trabajó para constituir el MTCR, era secreta. Ver Richard H. Speier, *The Missile Technology Control Regime*, op. cit., pg.iii.

⁵⁸ Aunque en las entrevistas se evitó decir que era un modelo, si aparecieron comentarios acerca de que lo que se aprendió con el Cóndor II se trató de usar para otros casos y que a USA le gustaría poder alcanzar en todo el mundo el mismo éxito que tuvo con la Argentina.

Congreso entró tardíamente a los temas de no proliferación ⁵⁹ y según la versión de un asesor, su ingreso se debió a la investigación de un periodista que con información provista por un agente de la CIA, pidió la desclasificación de documentos y la participación del Congreso para efectivizar los controles.

En 1990, la subcomisión de control de armas, seguridad internacional e inteligencia, del comité de asuntos exteriores de la Cámara de Representantes, convocó a especialistas académicos y funcionarios del gobierno para unas audiencias aclaratorias sobre la política de no proliferación, preocupados porque el colapso del muro de Berlín no había creado condiciones de seguridad. Allí Richard Clarke,⁶⁰ *Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs* del Departamento de Estado, afirmaba que en la política anti misiles se podrían contar logros en China, Unión Soviética, Argentina, Egipto y el régimen MTCR.⁶¹ Sin embargo los éxitos no habían sido parejos con todos los países y lo que se entiende a través de las entrevistas es que con Argentina se podía ejercer mayor presión que con otros estados, sin que el equilibrio de relaciones se complicara.⁶²

⁵⁹ Lisa Hartman, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation: the Role of Congress", presentado al 1990 AAAS -American Association for Advancement of Sciences- Annual Meeting, febrero 19, 1990, pg.1. Pero en 1986 el Congreso como respuesta a la creciente amenaza de misiles del Tercer Mundo aprobó recursos para el desarrollo de un sistema antibalístico. Viendo la importancia del tema en el 101 Congreso (1989) se aprobaron 16 leyes relacionadas con la proliferación de misiles, 5 estableciendo mecanismos para reforzar al MTCR, imponiendo sanciones a quienes transfirieran items relacionados con las listas incluidas en el régimen, 7 leyes para contrarrestar la proliferación de armas químicas o biológicas y sus sistemas de lanzamiento, 4 restringiendo la asistencia militar a China que transfería tecnología misilística a Medio Oriente.

⁶⁰ Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, one hundred first Congress, May 17 and July 11, 1990, pg. 133.

⁶¹ En esta presentación queda clara la idea de que las negociaciones con Argentina formaban parte de una política global del gobierno norteamericano vinculada a la proliferación de armas nucleares, química y biológicas y medios de lanzamiento, y que por otro lado este caso no era la que mayor preocupación generaba en el Congreso.

⁶² También se debe aclarar que el gobierno argentino, una vez que comprendió el efecto que tenía un proyecto de este tipo en las relaciones con Estados Unidos y con los países occidentales, y decidido a buscar un nuevo tipo de inserción internacional, colaboró ampliamente con las demandas externas, como parte de su política interna.

Las preocupaciones del Congreso se concentraron en cuatro iniciativas: 1) La posibilidad de que Libia utilice misiles contra las instalaciones de Estados Unidos en Italia; 2) La provisión de misiles de URSS a Irak y Siria; 3) La venta de misiles CSS-2 de China a Arabia Saudita; 4) la posibilidad de que el ambicioso programa de iraquí, egipcio y argentino tuviera resultados positivos y creara una situación de desbalance para Israel.⁶³

Una de las pocas herramientas que tiene el Congreso para actuar concretamente en política exterior son las regulaciones de comercio internacional, prerrogativa constitucional, y es por ese espacio que introdujeron su voz al imponer una política más fuerte y restrictiva en el MTCR. La Export Administration Act -1979- tiene un apartado (Sección 3) respecto a las limitaciones de exportaciones por cuestiones de seguridad, en las que el Congreso tiene repetidas diferencias con Comercio, Defensa y Estado. En palabras del Senador Glenn: "Estamos usando el secreto [de gobierno] para proteger culpables o para tapar una política fallida?".⁶⁴ Finalmente sugería que era ya tiempo que el gobierno norteamericano impusiera penas económicas a las compañías que traficaban materiales proliferantes. Y en una expresa crítica al Departamento de Estado, otro Senador decía: "Es una tentación constante darle prioridad al asunto diplomático del momento, para comprometerse y evitar controversia, y poner comercio antes que seguridad nacional.....no esta siempre claro que la política presidencial sea apoyada con la suficiente energía y fuerza en el nivel de trabajo dentro de la burocracia y los departamentos claves encargados de reforzar esta política y la ley."⁶⁵

⁶³ Lisa Hartman, *Ballistic Missile* pg.1

⁶⁴ *Congressional Record-Senate*, S5438, Mayo 16, 1989. El senador John Glenn, demócrata de Ohio, dirige una publicación llamada *Proliferation Watch* que realiza un seguimiento de los casos de proliferación alrededor del mundo y publica ciertos artículos de opinión. En la comisión participan 15 miembros del senado, entre demócratas y republicanos.

⁶⁵ *Idem*. Senador Warner.

Estos cuestionamientos se repetían también respecto a la mecánica utilizada por el Departamento de Comercio: "Nosotros entendemos que es una práctica del Departamento de Comercio no referir ningún caso relacionado con el MTCR para una revisión interagencias si la exportación esta dirigida para un nación del MTCR. Aparentemente, otras agencias han protestado esta práctica por años, temiendo que sin ese referato interagencias, Comercio puede automáticamente aprobar exportaciones que pueden resultar en retransferencias ilícitas (por ej. como en el caso Alemán hacia los países que nos preocupan). Si esta es una práctica del departamento de Comercio, una tolerancia del Departamento de Estado de esa práctica, y es su rol como director del MTAG y el MTEC, es mas problemático ya que el MTCR en si mismo requiere una revisión de exportaciones caso por caso."⁶⁶ En la misma tónica, el Senador Thurmond decía: "el Departamento de Estado no le gusta restricciones comerciales que enojen a nuestros [países] amigos."⁶⁷

La puja entre la autonomía del Congreso para implementar políticas y las restricciones del Ejecutivo para limitar interferencias han dado espacio a la generación de los nuevos mecanismos de control, que como el London Club de proveedores nucleares o el Australian Group de proveedores químicos da mayor libertad de movimiento a la administración central e incrementa las críticas del Congreso sobre una peligrosa flexibilidad política según intereses coyunturales.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ *Idem. Senador Glenn.*

⁶⁷ *Idem. Senador Thurmond.*

⁶⁸ Según la queja de un congresista "siempre se excusan diciendo que son negociaciones delicadas y no confían en la discreción del Congreso". Febrero 29 de 1996.

Sistema burocrático y decisiones de política

De este recorrido por agencias, personas, ideas, para entender los conceptos y las políticas que estuvieron por detrás de un proceso de toma de decisión, quedan el dibujo de una estructura burocrática eficiente, necesaria, pero al mismo tiempo, una construcción voluntaria cuyo objetivo no parece ser la toma de decisión conjunta, sino la reproducción del esquema de división de poder.⁶⁹ De este juego multiplicado de decisiones queda una política efectiva, que tanto pudo detener un proyecto armamentista nacido como alta prioridad del gobierno,⁷⁰ como también presionar a gobiernos de países desarrollados⁷¹ para que acompañaran su política.

Desde la perspectiva norteamericana, hubo una excesiva atención a los temas nucleares y un relativo descuido de otras formas de proliferación, a la que este mismo país contribuyó, lo que llevo a la exagerada sorpresa por el robo de los planos del Pershing II y el juego de los aliados en los desarrollos en el Tercer Mundo.⁷² Sin duda debió existir una evaluación errónea por parte de los agentes norteamericanos respecto de objetivos de algunos países europeos que no coincidían en concepto o en tiempos con los de Estados Unidos.

⁶⁹ Debo aclarar que este estudio se centró en los actores oficiales y que no registró las oposiciones internas. El sector privado, que suele tener mucha influencia en estos temas, no fue un actor importante, en parte, porque la mayoría de las acciones se realizaron en forma concentrada en el ejecutivo, e incluso hasta 1987 sin conocimiento del Congreso, que funciona como soporte de las demandas de las grandes empresas. El Congreso, como se ha visto, tenía considerable preocupación por la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva y los intereses empresariales se conectaban más con la continuidad del SDI.

⁷⁰ Un funcionario del Departamento de Estado dijo que hubo presiones similares en Egipto a las efectuadas con Argentina, pero los resultados no fueron similares. Pese a que en 1988 el proyecto egipcio se detuvo, y admitieron terminar su cooperación con Irak, los términos del acuerdo no se conocen. *The Washington Post*, septiembre 20 de 1989, pg. A-32.

⁷¹ "La decisión de Washington de dejar el pasado atrás en este caso puede crear un setting positivo con el cual continuar nuestros intereses del MTCR en Italia". *Department of State, Secret, Rome 14836 1815202, julio de 1989, embajada en Roma. Removido S/S-IRM/SRD under case 9203288, 12/24/92. AMB, pg.01.*

⁷² A estos ingenieros la BBC los llama tecno-mercenarios y Edward Luttwak, rocketters, fanáticos por el desarrollo de cohetes que venden su conocimiento al precio mas alto. Luttwak senalaba que hasta la decada del '80 no había ese tipo de proliferación porque no había cultura tecnológica trasnacional.

En el caso de Italia hubo informaciones concretas de la repercusión de estos hechos. La "SNIA fue investigada por la CIA, el Pentágono y por otros departamentos del gobierno norteamericano que reconocieron una red internacional que iba desde Medio Oriente a través de Europa y Argentina. Esta red utilizaba dinero de Irak y Egipto para comprar tecnología misilística top-secret de subsidiarias de la FIAT (y también de Messerschmidt en Alemania). Esta tecnología fue enviada a Argentina donde el misil fue probado como el Cóndor II."⁷³ Luego de 6 años de investigaciones fueron detenidos los implicados en las transferencias. El Almirante Fulvio Martini director del Servicio de Seguridad Militar y de Inteligencia de Italia, había estado rastreando el tema desde 1985. Se pusieron en prisión a 9 jefes de compañías vinculadas al desarrollo del Cóndor II.⁷⁴ En estos comentarios previos se verifica que el gobierno norteamericano incidió directamente sobre el gobierno italiano para que modificara su política de exportación de materiales sensibles.

Algunas interpretaciones sobre la aparente presión menor en el caso de Egipto se sostienen en la idea de que el desarrollo era más dependiente, por eso al cortar la conexión argentina, el proyecto se hacía casi incontinuable. La idea de que Egipto es un tapón en la situación de Medio Oriente es fuente de otras hipótesis que explican la razón por la cual las presiones fueron encubiertas. Además, como señalaba un funcionario: "No pudimos lograr con Egipto lo que logramos con Argentina. No se tiene el mismo efecto en cada caso. Puedo presionar donde quiero, pero no siempre da resultado." Queda el interés por conocer las relaciones con otros actores de la

⁷³ Cable del consulado norteamericano en Milan, Milan 02082 26154OZ, ref: Rome 21954, para uso limitado, desclasificado IO50A, mayo 20 de 1993.

⁷⁴ Las compañías son Conser, Intes e Intea de Roma, Camma, Meg and Rata de Aprilia, todas vinculadas a SNIA BPD, subsidiaria de Fiat, en la que estos directivos cumplían anteriormente funciones. A ello se agregan Microtecnica de Turin y la IFAT Corporation de Zurich. L'Unita, Milan, 30 de julio de 1988, p.6, también presentado por el Sen. Bingaman, en Congressional Record-Senate, S10382, agosto 4 de 1989.

negociación pues creemos que los Estados Unidos pese a mantener ciertas pautas históricas de continuidad, practican la flexibilidad de propuestas y el ensayo de varias estrategias para obtener los resultados buscados. En ese sentido, un mapa más completo de los acuerdos con los otros países nos permitiría entender mejor el proceso de toma de decisión en el caso Cónдор.

Mirando la otra parte de la negociación, la Argentina durante cuarenta años fue una sociedad corporatista y patrimonialista en que las diferencias entre sectores se resolvían en última instancia a través de un golpe de estado. Esto generó una dinámica política de alta confrontación y escaso margen de negociación, una conceptualización de suma cero del manejo de los asuntos públicos y como resultado una obsesiva lucha por acumular poder. Por ello, en el caso argentino el proceso burocrático está altamente concentrado en las altas autoridades, evitando la difusión de la información y del control político. Ese proceso no es entonces el de un conjunto de instituciones en el que se establecen redes entre organismos y funcionarios, sino la reproducción en escalas menores de la lógica de realismo mágico de acumulación de poder.⁷⁵ Un recorrido por los diarios da la pauta de la exacerbación por la acumulación de espacios de poder que si bien se podría caracterizar como una situación de la actual coyuntura, es también el reflejo de un estilo histórico que ha alcanzado hoy su máxima expresión.

Ello explica asimismo la suposición de que los funcionarios civiles no sabían exactamente que era el Cónдор II ⁷⁶ y que la Fuerza Aérea retaceaba la información, no existiendo una vía formal de comunicación de acciones. No hay registros ni

⁷⁵ La noción de realismo mágico está tomada de la literatura que considera queY hace referencia a los conceptos de realismo periférico de Carlos Escudé cuando explica los márgenes de acción de un país con limitada capacidad de incidencia en los asuntos internacionales, ver op.cit.

⁷⁶ Esto se senalo en las entrevistas con funcionarios de y tambien lo presenta Nathaniel Nash, en New York Times, 13 de mayo de 1991, pg 1.

records de las políticas tanto del ejecutivo, como de otros organismos dependientes y el archivo de la historia política puede perfectamente quedar en la casa del ministro de turno.

El otro argumento que sorprendía a los funcionarios norteamericanos era la supuesta ingenuidad con la que se pensaba manejar en la Argentina el desarrollo del misil. En el mismo momento que URSS y Estados Unidos negociaban la destrucción de misiles, Argentina estaba desarrollando uno con un enorme potencial desestabilizador en la región y en Medio Oriente. Sin embargo parecía no haber un registro de las consecuencias de este desafío tecnológico, ni de que la relación entre Estados Unidos y Argentina era una relación asimétrica. Esa miopía política⁷⁷ respondía en parte, a la ausencia de información, en parte, a la forma en como la élite política administra el poder. Es también un registro de del tipo de inserción global que estos dirigentes proponían para la Argentina y de la elección de sus referentes externos. Por ello, en Argentina la negociación se percibió solamente como una presión, una imposición, sin rescatar los aspectos positivos de una negociación entre partes, aunque sean asimétricas y sin reconocer los efectos que las decisiones políticas propias producen en el contexto internacional.

Pese a que la Argentina no tiene reputación de un manejo profesional de sus relaciones exteriores y que la burocracia de algunos ministerios puede ser cuestionada por su limitada preparación, no es falta de información lo que da como resultado una incoherente política exterior sino, como dice Tulchin, la ausencia de canales burocráticos para que esa información llegue a los tomadores de decisión

⁷⁷ La reacción contra un proyecto de este tipo creció notablemente debido a un hecho que obviamente no estaba en las especulaciones políticas de nuestros dirigentes: la Guerra del Golfo, y el convencimiento de que sin en vez de Scud hubieran sido Cóndor II, los resultados hubieran sido diferentes para la coalición occidental. Nathaniel Nash, en *New York Times*, 13 de mayo de 1991, pg.1.

(decision-makers) y se constituyan en políticas analizadas. A esto contribuyen las fuerzas armadas que impulsan las políticas de su área fuera de los canales institucionales y sin utilizar las mediaciones que asimilen las diferencias y que indica otra de las características del sistema de toma de decisiones en Argentina: hay una notoria asimetría entre los agentes del poder ejecutivo. Esa desproporción se agudiza por la desconfianza entre los actores produciendo cortocircuitos en la circulación de la información. Finalmente, el rol de la prensa independiente no es legitimado -y en muchos casos no merece serlo- como un interprete independiente y crítico de las acciones de gobierno.

Las autoridades norteamericanas eligieron adecuadamente los canales de presión y decisión política en la Argentina. En lo que aun podía ser visto como una apuesta política, ya que pocos meses antes de la asunción de Menem, el gobierno norteamericano expresaba sus temores por el regreso del populismo peronista, fue rapidamente cambiado a la relación amistosa entre ambos estados. El desmantelamiento del misil se vinculó al interés norteamericano de apoyo a las democracias y a las iniciativas de desmilitarización de la vida política argentina y fortalecimiento de las instituciones, dando signos de estabilidad política a los inversores extranjeros.

La utilización de las presiones económicas para forzar una negociación, pueden no ser elegantes, pero sin duda son efectivas. Se usaron globalmente a través de la idea de condicionalidad para los préstamos de instituciones financieras internacionales y como dijo un funcionario "los bancos se fijan cuales son los aliados de USA."⁷⁸ La vinculación entre demandas económica y arreglos de

⁷⁸ Entrevista de marzo 5 de 1996.

seguridad tampoco eran novedosas. En 1949, se utilizó un préstamo del Exim Bank para forzar la ratificación del Tratado de Río (TIAR) al cual Perón se mostraba renuente y era visto como adverso a los intereses argentinos.⁷⁹ Debe resaltarse que varios funcionarios indicaron que el éxito mayor de la negociación no fue el desmantelamiento del Cóndor II, sino el ingreso de Argentina a los regímenes de control nuclear y misilístico y el pasaje a la desnuclearización de la política exterior del país.

Quedan numerosas cuestiones que merecen estudios detallados. Por ejemplo, que aprendió la burocracia argentina de las negociaciones por el desmantelamiento del Cóndor y que canales desarrolló -si es que los hubo- para mejorar la gestión pública. ¿Fue un incentivo para institucionalizar el proceso de la defensa? Para responder a esos interrogantes habría que evaluar, asimismo, que influencia tienen las presiones externas, en un país como Argentina, para ocasionar cambios en el sistema de toma de decisión nacional y si lleva a la incorporación de variables externas en el proceso decisorio. Otro punto pendiente es si hubo un cambio en la política de no proliferación entre fines de los ochenta e inicios de los noventa. La definición que realizó Clinton en 1993 ha sido tomada tanto como un viraje en los conceptos tradicionales de control (sobre todo por los funcionarios entrevistados del Departamento de Defensa y del Congreso) o como una continuidad de las políticas republicanas anteriores mantenidas como prioridad pese al cambio de partido (para funcionarios de DOS y ACDA). ¿La política de desmantelamiento del misil Cóndor II negociada con la Argentina produjo un replanteo en las concepciones globales de no proliferación? En la negociación por el Cóndor II y en la creación del MTCR se percibe que junto a esa fuerte decisión de los administradores políticos de avanzar para cumplir con los intereses tradicionales de Estados Unidos, también se busca la

⁷⁹ Tulchin, 1990, pg.110.

cooperación, el desarrollo de relaciones más cordiales, el compartir responsabilidades y no llevar a cabo las tareas de gendarme de forma aislada, corriente que surgiría como una forma clara y reconocible de la post-guerra fría. Si estas tendencias son tanto el inicio de una nueva modalidad de relación entre Estados Unidos y Argentina como el producto de un nuevo diseño de política de seguridad internacional, se produciría entonces la ruptura del antiguo paradigma de relaciones entre ambos países y las aventuras espaciales mostrarían que pueden tener finales muy terrenales.

THE CHANGES IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM IN THE 1990s

Ana Julia Faya

Introduction

To speak about the changes that are globally taking place has become a common occurrence in papers published in recent years. Some theoreticians have approached these phenomena from a conservative and immobilist point of view, as if they were witnessing "the end of history";¹ others, from an opposite outlook, have described the process that is taking place as the beginning of "the postmodern age," from which a new global civilization that would leave aside the cultures of modernity and demand new ones would emerge;² some have attempted an explanation proposing a "turbulence" model with which interpretations of present day political and social expressions would be provided³; while still others suggest the creation of universal models of international relations as the "cosmopolitan democratic community,"⁴ trying to encompass these changes that take place in the global level under new interrelation patterns. But these are only a few explanations for this period in world history we are now witnessing.

No matter what the explanations for these transformations may be or what point of view they may take, the truth of the matter is that we are living in a stage of transition and change at the global level. From the industrial age we have entered into the telecommunication era. "The shift towards a rapidly changing

¹ Fukuyama, Francis, "The End of History, *The National Interest*, no. 16, US, 1989.

² Blanco, Juan Antonio, *Tercer milenio. Una visión alternativa de la postmodernidad*, Ediciones Acuario, Havana, 1994.

³ Rosenau, James N. *Turbulence in World Politics*, Princeton University Press, US, 1990.

⁴ Held, David, *Democracy and the Global Order*, Stanford University Press, US, 1995.

society has deeply changed the former expectations and perceptions. It has placed traditional roles and institutions under a serious and incomprehensible stress. It has undone rituals and points of reference that had stabilized and sanctified life for generations. It has rendered useless the experiences of the elders for the tribulations of the youngsters. The acceleration of change forces us to see life as movement, not as order; the universe as something unfinished. Science and technology revolutionize our lives, but memory, tradition and myth condition our response."⁵

In this context, a resistance to what is new is evident even in the actors or subjects of these changes: the nation-states, the international organizations formed by them, the structures within societies—whether economic, political, organizational and among the individuals. The trauma caused by change is not always welcomed. Even those who attempt an explanation for these changes are very seldom able to forgo former interpretation schemes and are dominated, at least partially, by old concepts. The old order refuses to disappear and continues to regulate attitudes and forms of thought. The social being dominates social conscientiousness, said the old 19th century scholar, and our circumstances, our social being, are in a transitional stage—"continuity and change", the presence of what is old and of what is new, at times simultaneously, a period of "turbulence" in the global order.

The great technological revolution of recent decades has served as a guiding principle for the economic and intellectual development of the countries, both at the macroeconomic level as well as in the training of the work force, of the men and women of the world. In a short period of time, entire sectors of society were

⁵ Schlessinger Jr., Arthur, *The Cycles of American History*, Preface, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986, pp. XI-XII.

marginated from the economic life of their countries and almost complete continents were removed from the global economic activity, while transnational oligarchies reaped unsuspected wealth. Microcomputer systems were now what steam engines used to be when they were invented, and they contributed greatly to the speeding up of productive processes. There is now a new ontology and a new form of interrelation among countries, social and economic groups and individuals.⁶ Armies do not escape these dynamics and need to reelaborate their strategies,⁷ under a new concept of security. "Military security is accompanied by economic, ecological, financial and cultural security. The nation-state and the concept of 'national sovereignty' that accompanied its emergence during the industrial revolution are today threatened not only by the geopolitical designs of a unipolar world, but also by the new economic reality that fosters the globalization and compactation of historical development."⁸

At the same time, some phenomena have interconnected human groups and nations among the most diverse societies and contributed to challenging the old structures of the nation-state system. This interlinking occurred in an autonomous manner, not by the design of any of the existing international agencies nor of the world summits, which have thus far failed to address these developments until they were at an advanced stage. These phenomena include the onset of air pollution; the crisis of renewable natural resources; the alarming increase of poverty; the growing internationalization of capital flows beyond the authority of the states; the need for sustainable development; the transformation of

⁶ Rosenau, James N., "Global Affairs in an Epochal Transformation," paper submitted to the Conference on Information Revolution and International Security sponsored by Robert McCormick Tribune Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Wheaton, US, May 9, 1996.

⁷ Kaufman, William S. and Steinbrunner, John D., *Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New Order*, The Brookings Institution, US, pp. 68-69.

⁸ Blanco, Juan Antonio, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

civil society in the so-called Third World; and the global establishment of a significant number of non-governmental organizations.

However, the new economic policy of the post-cold war era prevents ecological and social problems from threatening mankind as a whole from being effectively included in governmental political agendas; at the most, this has taken place only partially. There is no genuine North-North, South-South cooperation, much less North-South, because the nature of the universally existing system prevents it. National or transnational oligarchic interests prevail over the interests of the communities. Old bilateral conflicts between nations reemerge—and new ones appear. The most powerful nations continue imposing their agendas at international organizations, including the United Nations system, and rivalries among powers, now for the preeminence of economic more than military blocks, govern international relations. Old hegemonic concepts still persist, if not as a product of the "spheres of influence," as a result of the frailty of the economic and political systems of peripheral countries, that have not been able to change their circumstances overnight, even when the end of the cold war was announced.

The new transnational oligarchies imposed their systems of relations and the model of liberal representative democracy became universal in a totalitarian, globalizing manner, leaving little space for other possible alternatives that could encompass situations that have not been resolved under the current models or the recently exhausted ones.

Hostages of this reality are to be found in the institutions of the inter-American system in the midst of the changes that have taken place in the last five years. Old schemes prevail in the attempt to advance new projects. Government

elites tend to maintain traditional models in interstate relations, even when the solution to some of the problems affecting societies crosses over national boundaries and when an awareness has emerged of the limitations of traditional states in the transformations that are taking place.

Because this is a transitional period in global relations of all types—economic, political, and social—to assert the existence of only one political or economic model at the exclusion of viewpoints that were adequate in previous periods of modern societies is tantamount to denying the present changing reality, this period of crisis, of transformation of what used to be. It would be like clinging to the system of relations that prevailed up to now, at moments when the weight of unresolved problems is weakening its foundations. Most importantly, it is equivalent to restricting the possibilities of striving for a better life for all.

Even if they wanted to, the determination to democratize the hemisphere would not be achieved without the genuine participation and better representation of the various components of society. Considering the new circumstances, this is fundamental. The free market formula cannot guarantee the satisfaction of the needs of the large majorities in the various countries. This will only be achieved through a profound transformation of the political and economic relations that have existed up to now in these societies, under political models that are yet to be tried. "Undoubtedly, this is a transitional period that develops in the midst of warlike confrontations and exacerbations of xenophobic and fundamentalist ideologies of various types. It seems that many years will pass before the waters

return to a relatively defined course. This should suggest a certain degree of cautiousness in the propositions."⁹

One of the successes displayed by the Organization of American States in the 90s is the adherence of all its member states to the system of liberal representative democracy. Several authors consider this an example of the advances that multilateral organizations should strive for under the new world circumstances. However, it is only the political expression of a new concept of global security that doesn't deny the philosophy under which the United States agreed to the creation of the system. It is not indicative of the transformations demanded by the new global and regional circumstances. Besides, the implementation of the model of representative democracy was not a sufficient solution to the demands of Latin American and Caribbean societies of other times, when it was tried, and much less so now given the complexity of present circumstances. There is a governance crisis, a crisis in the activity of traditional political parties, a crisis of representation in the various sectors comprising today's society, in this way it is possible to speak of a crisis in the democratic system as a whole.

From this point of view I will attempt to analyze the transformations that have taken place in the inter-American system after the cold war: what progress has been made and how much change is necessary?; what have been the parameters for this change?; and up to what extent does the philosophy that gives rise to the system still prevail in spite of the substantive changes in the conditions of hemispheric security and in the midst of urgent demands of the societies in the Americas and the world? We are free to decide — "terribly free to decide." We can

⁹ Vila, Carlos M., *Política y poder en el nuevo orden mundial. Una perspectiva desde América Latina* (mimeographed), February 1993, pp. 3-4.

choose to resign ourselves to seeing individuals, groups, social sectors and entire continents kept apart from civilization processes, suffer under ever greater famines, while the on-going stubborn economic policies deplete even more our natural resources and endanger our ecosystem. Or we can choose a new and genuine human solidarity, among all, while we try to develop effective social and ecological policies. "From a perspective point of view, an armed victory against oppression in any jungle in the world will be of little value if mankind is unable to conduct simultaneously a global fight to decelerate and revert the race towards a social and ecological catastrophe."¹⁰ Only three years ago, at an international meeting sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nation Development Program (UNDP), the then Secretary General of the OAS, perhaps speaking more from a personal standpoint than as a representative of that organization, expressed dramatically: "...for the task of improving social conditions in the Americas there is no grace period. The evidence is compelling and urgent: unless there is immediate, concerted action, the torrent of unmet demand, once released, will sweep before it all possibility of solving our problems."¹¹

I have divided this paper into three parts. In the first, the system and the objectives that gave rise to it are characterized and the background of the present situation is presented. There is an attempt to describe the ineffectiveness of the regional organization to offer a solution to the economic problems of the area, the relative implementation of the model of liberal democracy in Inter-American relations from the '50s to the '80s, and the sharpening in this stage of the differing perceptions between the two poles in the hemispheric relationship. In the second part I consider the scope and limits of the changes that have taken place; the new

¹⁰ Blanco, Juan A., *op. cit.*, p. 131.

¹¹ Baena Soares, Joan, "Sustainable Democracy" in *Social Reform and Poverty*, Inter-American Development Bank and United Nations Development Program, Washington, 1993, p. 67.

idea of security under the model of liberal representative democracy for the entire continent; and the characteristics of the new projects of the OAS General Secretariat. In the third, some conclusions are attempted with the purpose of evaluating the situation of the system, from the point of view of regional considerations, taking into account the world environment of today and the experiences of the inter-american system that have been described.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist block and, with it, the end of the East-West conflict, make more acute and urgent the problems caused by resource imbalances, the ever increasing gap in development, and the exclusion of important social sectors from policies affecting them. In Latin America and the Caribbean their solution will take more time than the dismantling of the global political polarization.

Section I: The Post-War Inter-American System

Characterization of the System

Some authors consider that the interamerican system is the oldest of the existing international organizations, dating back to the creation of the Pan-American Union towards the end of the 19th century. Although this may be an idea worthy of taking into account, in my paper I have preferred to consider the Pan-American Union and the meetings following its foundation as forerunners of the present system. It was not until the creation of the OAS and the adoption of its Charter, the establishment of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and the adoption of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) that relations between the government of the United States and those of Latin America and the Caribbean at the end of the World War acquired a systematic and legal nature in these institutions. Through the adoption of these agreements and treaties, some of a political nature and others with a military and security contents, the structures of these institutions became interrelated and there was an attempt at regulating the relations between the Latin American and Caribbean countries and the United States. All this with a gamut of interests that was much broader than customs, communication, transportation, patent or trade agreements which in general characterized the hemispheric gatherings during the first half of this century.

This regional system had a unique characteristic: the confluence of several countries with different levels of development including the unquestionably mightiest power in the world at the end of the Second World War. This circumstance was of the utmost importance for the development of these

institutions. The asymmetric nature of their members, between the two poles conforming these mechanisms or institutions, determined the prevailing agenda and thus the differences in underlying purposes and the difference in perceptions which characterized the rapprochements and encounters between the member states. The periods of concurrence to achieve some given purpose within the system have been more frequent than the crises. But even during the latter, the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean countries have shown an adequate capacity to manage conflicts so as to prevent breaches in a system characterized by an enormous asymmetry, but also by the need of a mutual relationship.

For the United States, the creation of the system offered the possibility of establishing hemispheric security agreements in a moment when the rivalry with the Soviet Union required closing the hemisphere to its potential interference or even its influence. U.S. objectives in the regional forum had to do with its national security, which extended throughout a territory from Alaska to the Patagonia. Its perception of regional problems was based on a world power standpoint, which was distant from that of Latin American and Caribbean countries on this matter; in its relationship with them, what U.S. Senator William Fullbright called "the arrogance of power" would always prevail and it would establish political, economic, military and cultural gaps. "A first step in understanding U.S. policy toward the region is to recognize the parallel nature of perceptions and behavioral patterns. The U.S. not only fails to reciprocate the region's strong feelings, both positive and negative, it has difficulty understanding the basis of those feelings."¹²

¹² Pastor, Robert A. *Whirlpool. US Foreign Policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean*, Princeton University Press, US, 1922, pp. 217-8.

the topic of poverty has led to reforms of the OAS Charter and to a reassessment at the IDB of the implemented economic model.⁶⁸ The latter leads us to consider the possibility of a structural readjustment of the economic policies adopted, which may have non-programmed implications on the political model.

The Twentieth Special Session of the General Assembly on Inter-American Cooperation was held in Mexico in 1993, at the proposal of this country at the General Assembly held in Nassau. This was an old debt with the agreement adopted during the '70s and the result of the discussions at meetings for amending the Charter in 1992. On this occasion, it was considered that "Solidary Cooperation for Development" was a fundamental goal of the OAS, an ideal instrument in support of national efforts and especially "to contribute to overcoming extreme poverty in the Hemisphere"⁶⁹ At the same time, the amendments to the Charter made in 1992 contemplated an addition to Article 3: "The elimination of critical poverty forms an essential part of the promotion and consolidation of representative democracy and is the common and shared responsibility of the American states." The final wording of one of the sections of Article 116 was the following: "... The General Secretariat will promote economic, social, legal, educational, scientific and cultural relations among all the Member States of the Organization, with a special emphasis on cooperation for the eradication of critical poverty."⁷⁰

⁶⁸ See the reports from the Department for Strategic Planning and Operational Policies of the Inter-American Development Bank, *Marco de Referencia para la Acción del Banco en los Programas de Modernización del Estado y Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil*, March 11, 1996, and *Reforma Social y Pobreza. Hacia un Agenda Integrada de Desarrollo*, January 16, 1993.

⁶⁹ Montrouis Declaration, Twentieth Session of the General Assembly, June 7, 1995, OAS Files.

⁷⁰ Texts adopted by the General Assembly during its Sixteenth Special Session on Reforms to the Charter of the Organization, OAS Files, December 14, 1992.

However, all these declarations and resolutions are currently at a standstill and their implementation is still pending. The IDB is one of the institutions to broach the topic in its programs. Up to the moment, the OAS has not elaborated any such policy nor have the Summit of the Americas or the New Vision of the OAS included among their policies the issue of the eradication of poverty.

Figures on the poverty situation in the region fall below the so-called permissible poverty: nine out of every twenty citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to former OAS Secretary General, Joao Baena Soares; more than one third of the total population, according to the U.S. State Department; more than fifty percent of the population of Ecuador, according to the *Chicago Tribune*; fifty percent of the total population on the region do not have access to electricity; eighty percent of the children in Brazil do not conclude their elementary education, just to quote a few indicators.⁷¹

After the reforms adopted during the '80s through neoliberal policies, the macroeconomic indicators experienced a growth in most of the countries of the region, which allowed many to consider the possibility of a beginning of an economic recovery . However, the number of poor has increase compared with the figures for the beginning of the '80s. "More persons have an income below the poverty line and the percentage of those who are not able to satisfy their basic needs has increased."⁷²

⁷¹ Baena Soares, Joao, "Sustainable Democracy", and Iglesias, Enrique V. "Economic Reform and Social Reform: An Integrated View" in *Social Reform and Poverty*, Inter-American Development Bank and United Nations Program for Development, Washington, 1993; State Department, Briefing Book, report by the Inter-American Affairs Bureau, quoted by the *Washington Post*, February 29, 1996; *Chicago Tribune*, May 18, 1996.

⁷² Inter-American Development Bank, *Reforma Social y Pobreza. Hacia una Agenda Integrada de Desarrollo*. January 16, 1993.

On the other hand, the unequal distribution of income, the Latin American and Caribbean region ranks first in the world in this matter, continued to increase, with a concentration of income by the wealthiest sectors and considerable destabilization of the remaining social classes in the continent: "This is what makes the current crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean so different and makes the situation of the large masses of silent poor, with little experience in the struggle for solutions, so bleak. What's new are the unmistakable signs of an explosive situation based on the demands of a middle class without any hope of improvement in the foreseeable future. The members of this class have reacted with vigor and energy and have deployed an enormous capacity to flood public opinion with its claims. There is an on-going discussion regarding the new classes of poor in Latin America and the Caribbean: those who have little hope, the poor middle class which has already lost all its expectations, and the enormous mass of persons who have always been poor and lack the ability to speak for themselves."⁷³ They have never been represented by any of the various forms of government in Latin America, with the exception of the aborted attempts at popular governments. These new circumstances of the expansion of poverty to social classes which traditionally had not been affected by it, caused by the polarization of income distribution, forced the officials in the regional entities to consider the possibility of an imminent social explosion.

The analysis by the Bank at its Forum on Social Reform and Poverty, in coordination with the United Nations Program for Development, in 1993, was based on the aforementioned elements. It also warned that the viability of the economic reforms and of the proposed model were in clear jeopardy. The market alone could not resolve the problem but rather tended to worsen it. Consequently,

⁷³ Iglesias, Enrique V, *op. cit.* p. 83.

the roles allotted to the state in the privatization and adjustment processes and to the Latin American and Caribbean civil societies in what they called "a comprehensive strategy for development" were revised. This was to be achieved through the integration of social reform, and economic reform in an attempt to avoid limiting social policies to sectorial or relief programs, and to integrate them to the economic model.

The Bank proposed these reforms on ethical, economic and political grounds. From the ethical point of view, it argued, the maintenance of dual societies could not be justified. From the economic point of view, it was inefficient to maintain almost half of the population away from the consumption and productive processes, without any conditions for participation in more productive activities. From the political point of view, the exclusion of significant sectors of the population was considered to be incompatible with the consolidation of democratic systems.⁷⁴

This is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the current situation. The exclusion of social sectors from the economic activity as a result of the very dynamics of the system has had an impact on the state, its institutions, social groups and on the political model, although the latter is not admitted. "The deficiencies of the institutional and normative atmospheres limit the effectiveness of state institutions, restrain participation of the people and exert a negative impact on the credibility of the democratic institutions", insisted the Bank in a report submitted in March, 1996.⁷⁵ The proposed actions would have a threefold effect: First, the reassessment of the role of the state, its institutions, the management of

⁷⁴ Inter-American Development Bank, *Reforma Social*, pp. 5-13.

⁷⁵ Inter-American Development Bank, *Marco de Referencia* March 11, 1996.

the governance crisis and the reorientation of obsolete legal mechanisms. Second, the strengthening of civil society as a counterpart to the strengthening of the state based on a more intimate relation with the political and social economies which promote the incorporation of the most excluded sectors such as women and indigenous groups. Third, the implementation of social reforms integrated to the aforementioned objectives. All of these actions were adopted at the Eight Bank Capital Replacement and they are still to be implemented.⁷⁶

The lack of mechanisms for a true participation of sectors of the population in the government is an intrinsic deficiency of the current political model, consubstantial to its exclusion from the income distribution under the current political economy. However, the ideologization of liberal democracy, as an exclusive and universal model, does not admit this criticism, in the same manner that the state socialism or the "real" socialism tried in the extinct socialist block did not admit that it did not represent the interests of the broad masses. The strengthening of the state, based on the incorporation of those who "lack the ability to speak for themselves", as Iglesias, the President of the IDB expressed, would imply a radical transformation of the political model in force, towards new forms yet to be implemented, which surpassed the models that the modern era experimented. For the moment, the Inter-American Bank has warned against the governance crisis that the present economic model has brought to the Latin American and Caribbean societies, and, as a consequence, the ineffectiveness which this entails for the objects of this institution. In spite of the coordinations undertaken by the OAS, based on the General Policy Framework and Priorities of Solidary Cooperation and the Eradication of Extreme Poverty, adopted at the

⁷⁶ Jarquin, Edmundo, Department for Strategic Planning and Operational Policies at the Inter-American Development Bank. Interview granted to the author on May 8, 1996.

Twentieth Special Session of the General Assembly, there have been no concrete measures within the political entity to advance the actual transformations that the described situation demands. The Bank has been the one to step-up the necessary readjustments that will guarantee the stability of the power elites.

Hemispheric Security

The end of the Cold War imposed a reassessment of the concept of security for the Inter-American system as the *raison d'être* of its institutions had been affected. The absence of an extracontinental enemy, with the capacity to alter the prevailing peace and political ideology, led to the analysis of the constituent bases of the system and to a reconsideration of the topics that would be included in the inter-American agenda. The concept of collective defense, which had prevailed until then and to which the TIAR responded, was replaced with that of collective security, which encompassed political, economic and social issues and not only the defense against aggression or the threat of aggression or conflicts between states.⁷⁷

The concept of collective defense implies an action to be carried out by each of the states, or by a group of them, when summoned. However, collective security implies a common multilateral action with a legal or institutional apparatus created beforehand and geared at imposing measures which have been defined and agreed upon in a centralized manner. Thus the foresight expressed in the letter of the TIAR responds to collective defense actions, while the implementation of the other concept would require a different military mechanism. Thus, the relevance and objectives of the IADB were considered.

⁷⁷ We use the concepts stated by Hector Manuel Ezata in his article, "La inevitable (pero difícil) transición de la OEA", *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, no. 35, Mexico, Summer 1992.

On the other hand, the common perception of international changes, due to the disappearance of the communist "threat," and the establishment of liberal democratic regimes based on market economies by all the active members of the inter-American system have allowed for the dissemination of the concept of the so-called cooperative security, conceived as a new strategic philosophy, which besides incorporating values such as the defense of democracy and human rights, is geared at establishing the conditions for security based on mutual trust among the states, "the regulation of the military capacity and predictability of the actions of its participants"⁷⁸ Cooperative security would include the concept of expanded collective security, where the use or threat to resort to the use of force gave way to understanding and to the peaceful solution of disputes.

Perception of the need for changes is shared by all the member states, however, the philosophy, forms and mechanisms which will be implemented is not, nor is the vision of the challenges which should be given priority. One can conclude that the continent should confront the challenges of demographic growth, "of poverty, of the protection of the environment and of non-renewable resources, of proliferation (particularly the challenges posed to peace and security) in order to overcome in the next century the realities of this one, during which Man has annihilated more than 200 million of his fellow beings."⁷⁹ Or stress can also be placed on an area of security where the struggle against terrorism, drugs, illegal international activities, the deterioration of civil peace, refugees, illegal immigration and arms trafficking will replace the struggle against communism in

⁷⁸ Statement by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Cesar Gaviria, at the inception of the Regional Conference on Measures to Foster Confidence and Security, Santiago, Chile, November 8, 1995, OAS Files.

⁷⁹ Intervention by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. José Manuel Insulza in *Ibid*, Santiago, Chile, November 8-10, 1995.

inter-American relations, as was expressed in the report of the Special Commission on Hemispheric Security at the OAS Permanent Council in 1992.

There is a general consensus in terms of the diagnosis of the problems and on the need to transform the legal and institutional mechanisms which sustained the former notion during the Cold War. However, there is no real and effective articulation between the problems that were diagnosed and the measures or resolutions to be implemented by the relevant OAS Commissions.

The subordination of the military to civil power is an area that reflects a lack of consensus both in its national expression and in the relations between the international bodies of the system, namely, between the IADB and the OAS.

For several years, the OAS General Assemblies have examined the links between the IDB and this institution, with the view of transforming the Board into a consultative body subordinated to political decisions and with restraining functions on issues such as those expressed at the Special Commission on Security, which would deal with secondary issues if those for which the Board was created for are to be considered primary.

Although created during World War II under the concept of collective defense generated by the policy of the U.S., once the war was over, the Bogota Conference in 1948 refused the motion to include the Board among the organs of the OAS Council, based on the peaceful nature of this organization and on the inappropriateness of incorporating a military entity into its structure. Its functions were restricted to the preparation and maintenance of military planning for

common defense and to directly submit these plans to the consideration of the governments, as stipulated by the Fourth Consultative Meeting in 1951.

In 1961, a note by the Board to the Directive Council of the OAS informed that its budget should be added without adjustments to that of what was then the Pan-American Union, currently the General Secretariat. The note was based on the Board's reliance on the governments and on the fact that this relationship would be established through delegations to the Board. Furthermore, a paper prepared by the Special Commission for the Amendment to the Charter in 1966 expressed: "The IADB is a standing military planning entity for the defense of the continent.

It has no organic relationship with the OAS and its components, but is directly linked to the governments in the Americas."⁸⁰

If one bears in mind that the current concepts of security imply the use of multilateral intervention mechanisms, instead of unilateral intervention, and that they should be used in situations inherent to civil life, the discussion on the subordination of the Board to the political institution will gather strength; also the differences in perceptions among the member states of the system will increase. Still, no conclusions have been drawn on these issues which involve, on the one hand, the civil-military relations at the national level and the tasks that the military will undertake and, on the other, the new activities of the Board and its traditional direct links with U.S. aggressive or subversive policies. "Then there is a special panoply of problems associated with the U.S.. This disproportion of power between the U.S. and its neighbors, which feared for the historic use of that power

⁸⁰ "Seguridad Hemisferica, Junta Interamericana de Defensa", report by the rapporteur Didier Opperi to the Twentysecond Session of the OAS General Assembly on May 18,1992, OAS Files.

to intervene militarily, has blocked a clear subordination of the regional military instrument (the IADB) to the political body (the OAS). One extreme formulation of this fear is that, with democracy and human rights as excuses, the U.S. seeks to turn the OAS and the IADB into instruments to put Latin American armed forces under U.S. command as enforcers of U.S. intervention."⁸¹

There are two aspects, among others, which define the *raison d'être* of the military which this new condition has challenged. First, the expansion of their functions to activities traditionally undertaken by other bodies, such as the police or other entities created to this effect, like the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which would affect the armies of all the continent, including their structures, in order to carry out the new missions.⁸² Second, the different concerns of the Latin American and the U.S. armies. Under the current international situation there is no longer an extra continental threat and not even the uprisings or social revolts in the continent are considered significant, or at least they are not perceived as threats to continental security. However for several Latin American armies, the danger still exists, because not all armed incidents in their territories have come to an end.

The military alliance with the U.S. during the Cold War was seen by all them as a tactical measure in the event of a possible extracontinental threat. The true strategy for the Latin American armies was to ward off the threat posed by the U.S. itself, given its philosophy of domination and intervention which have

⁸¹ Einaudi, Luigi, "Security and Democracy in the Western Hemisphere", in *Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in America, What Role for the OAS?*, Inter-American Dialogue. A Conference Report, Washington D.C., May 1994, p. 67.

⁸² Serafino, Nina M. "US Military Activities in Latin America. Rationales and Perceptions" in *Security, Democracy and Development in US-Latin American Relations*, Schoultz *et al.*, comp.), North-South Center, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick,, 1994. pp. 64-5.

always characterized it, aside from the dangers posed by the obvious imbalance in terms of the development, size and technology of its armed forces.⁸³

In the eyes of the military, these different perceptions increased with the new international trends which barely outlined the contour of national sovereignty. To restrict the field of action of the nation-states and the concept of sovereignty inherent to them would be tantamount to damaging the very nature of the armies. In spite of acknowledging the new realities, they tend to defend their old conceptions. "The nation-state remains the principal actor in international relations. The armed forces are a logical consequence of the primacy of the nation-state, ensuring, guaranteeing the state's vital interests. As we contemplate the new scenarios to be generated by the changing international order, the armed forces fulfil both their traditional role of defending the nation-state and the new role in which the military is an instrument used by the state, operating through international organizations, to design and attain its political objectives."⁸⁴

In 1995, the tasks of the OAS Special Commission on Security gave way to the Hemispheric Security Commission; however, its activities have left aside, at least for the time being, the discussion of the preeminence of the political body over the military, based on the perceived disagreement. On the other hand, as the Secretary General of the OAS himself explained at the Regional Conference on Security held in Santiago, Chile "... the Hemisphere is still lacking a sufficiently refined security agenda capable of replacing, in practice and in an explicit manner, the orientations which were imposed during the Cold War. Although we have

⁸³ Varas, Augusto, "Post-Cold War Security Interests and Perceptions of the Threats in the Western Hemisphere, in *Ibid*, p. 6-7.

⁸⁴ Zabala, Carlos Maria, general intervention in *Political-Military Relations within International Organizations*, simposium at the Inter-American Defense College (Margaret Daly Hayes, Rapporteur) September 28, 1995, p.7.

advanced in the identification of the values and bases of a new strategic vision, it would be an exaggeration to assert that we have achieved a consensus accepted or acceptable by all." The Inter-American institutions are a reflection of the states that conform them and in the international arena, these issues have still to be resolved. The performance of the military in traditionally civil activities has been sporadic and plagued with opportunism.

The work of the OAS Security Commission has been addressed at the implementation of the so-called measures for fostering trust, based on the transparency of operations and recently, in cooperation with the United Nations, in the deactivation of anti-personal mines, based on agreements adopted at the Geneva Conference in 1995 and faced with the reality that there are practically one million of such mines in the Hemisphere which have not been deactivated. Among the measures adopted at the Regional Conference at Santiago for the promotion of trust were: the prior notice of military exercises, the exchange of information and participation in the Conventional Arms Register, consultations for advancing the limitation of conventional weapons, the invitations of observers to military exercises as well as the exchange of military and civil personnel for training, and the cooperation in case of natural disasters and specific studies on the security issues of small states.

The latter was advanced mainly by the Caribbean states, at the beginning of the decade, based on the fact that the fragility of their economies could not resist the challenges that for other nations represented a normal part of their daily problems, such as drug trafficking, natural disasters or damages to the environment.

International circumstances forced real transformations on the institutions of the system, since they disturbed the U.S. conception of security and would therefore have an impact on those institutions created as a result of its need for hemispheric security. This is why TIAR disappeared and the existence of the Board was questioned. However, the weight of the difference in perception, in the asymmetry and reasons for belonging to the system, among Latin American and Caribbean countries with respect to the U.S., hindered the true transformations which the old bureaucracies required in this respect.

Conclusions

"... Today's society, even more than its predecessor sixty years ago, confronts the task of reconciling technological and economic integration with traditional political structures, national awareness, social needs, institutional arrangements and habitual ways of doing things."⁸⁵

This statement by a U.S. historian is the result of the analysis of the complexity of this global transitional stage of societies, where problems related to the ecological and social crisis and the overpopulation of the world, together with the depletion of natural resources associated to them, are some of the most pressing and urgent examples. As was previously pointed out, in 1993, 9 out every 20 inhabitants in Latin America and the Caribbean lived below the poverty line and in a public appeal published in *The New York Times*, a group of Latin American intellectuals, headed by the Noble Prize laureate Gabriel Garcia Marquez, alerted that by the year 2000 — within 4 years — three fourths of the tropical rain forests will have been cut down and 50% of the species will have been lost forever. "What took Nature millions of years to create will have been destroyed by man in little less than 40 years."⁸⁶

One of the most difficult problems to resolve is precisely to rise the individual and social awareness on the need to change the current economic and political models, "to reconcile technological changes and economic integration with the traditional political structures", in order to be able to confront the

⁸⁵ Kennedy, Paul, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, Vintage Books, New York, 1993, p. 330.

⁸⁶ "A Latin American Ecological Alliance" (paid advertisement), *The New York Times*, July 22, 1991, quoted by Paul Kennedy, *op. cit.* p. 100.

challenges that mankind has before it. This post-Cold War period is not contributing to this aim, especially in the inter-American relations and among the institutions of the inter-American system.

The transition from industrial to cybernetic or telecommunication civilization, the change in the interconnection of human groups or nations, has had less impact on the OAS, IDB, IADB, or TIAR than the end of the Cold War. Transformations in these organizations have been advanced by the changes in the traditional perception of security instead of by the need for the historical consolidation we are experiencing. This process has followed similar parameters to the ones that took place after World War II, when the old concept of collective defense was adopted; the alliance of the Latin American and Caribbean power elites with the United States, who, with its hegemonic power, sets the paradigms. In this case the support of liberal democracy as a political model and to market economies, without any margin for alternatives, served as the basis for the new security of the continent.

This option leaves aside the typical practices of regional political and historical traditions, where caciquism, political leaders, nationalist governments, socialist governments, parliaments dominated by majority leftist coalitions, political parties emerged from revolutions or communist parties with a significant influence on the workers' movements and the governments, have enriched the Latin American and Caribbean political culture, not always with ominous results, in a way that the very different political history of the U.S. has not been enriched.⁸⁷ This is not only a case of the manichean binomial, liberal democracy

⁸⁷ Wiarda, Howard J., *The Democratic Revolution in Latin America. History, Politics and US Policy*, Holmes and Meir, New York, 1990, pp. 47-50.

vs. dictatorship, where we are of course aware of the side we choose. This is the case of a larger set of political possibilities and alternatives typical of the region, given the degree of external influences to which it has been exposed, for which there is no place under the current Inter-American consensus, nor under the present degree of intervention by the multilateral institutions. And this will be detrimental to the possibilities for resolving the current problems.

Liberal democracy is a new creed in which even the system is trapped. However, it is also resorting to "traditional policies" whose implementation did not resolve the problems of the region, but rather contributed to their accumulation. The implementation of neo-liberal economic models face obstacles which will not be overcome unless neoliberalism and the political models that go with it are shattered to pieces. The history of the Latin American nations unfolds together with the history of modern era, after the devastating annihilation of indigenous cultures by the colonization process. The Latin American republics emerged when nation- states existed in Europe and in America, and they all were striving for preeminence in this part of the world. We all know about the sequence of world powers in various areas or countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, which lasted until the strength acquired by the U.S. left no alternative whatsoever. Representative democracy in American capitalist societies was the political model of the inter-American institutions and the negative consequences which stemmed from its implementation, which are currently undergoing a crisis, are not circumstantial but accumulative and historical. The developmental efforts of the Latin American republics were framed on the industrial civilization, however, not all reaped the same benefits, and for some development is still a goal to reach. The profound differences, not only between the North and the South, but within Latin America and the Caribbean, become more dramatic, particularly when some of the

nations still need sugar mills, that today should be computer controlled according to world demand and should not pollute the environment.

The liberal democratic model was adopted by the member states of the inter-American system basically as an option to state socialism, which represented a totally opposite economic, social and political system where state-owned property prevails *vis-a-vis* private property. Under the present circumstances, liberal democracy strives to resolve contradictions inherent to its very nature, such as the "defense of the wealthy against the poor, or of those who have against those who have not", *vis-a-vis* the issue posed by the absence of mechanisms for the participation of increasingly growing sectors of the population in the political, economic and civilization processes. According to the IDB report mentioned in the second part of this paper the rise of these marginalized groups represents an ethical, political and economic challenge for the very survival of the present model, and at the same time is a consequence of it.

The new hemispheric security is conceived mainly on the bases of liberal democracy. A number of problems are associated to the stability of these democracies. The characteristics of this stage are marked by the coexistence of the old problems of national and hemispheric security with the new problems which the state must face. Its specific manifestations are the lack of definition of the priorities of the regional political bodies under the umbrella of security, in other words, drug trafficking, the authority crisis of the states, the governance crisis, corruption, migrations, terrorism or poverty are seen as detrimental to security and receive the same level of treatment as the non-proliferation of conventional weapons, the need for a peaceful solution to disputes or the elimination of anti-

personal mines from specific areas. At times, some of these issues have received less attention than the latter.

The inter-American system still requires radical transformations, although changes may have been made to the charter of the political institution in response to the demands of the new security conditions. The decision to defend liberal democracy, as well as the relevant resolutions and amendments to the charter, represent a positive change in the performance of regional entities when compared to the situation under the military dictatorships of the '50s and the '80s. The establishment of the rule of law, the possibility of putting an end to disappearances, assassinations, torture and repression of individual freedoms represent a step forward. However, to supervise these issues in order to avoid their occurrence under the new democracies is the responsibility of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. As some experts have pointed out, the mere change of a regime does not necessarily imply the end to the violation of human rights. "Guatemala goes on being Guatemala."⁸⁸

This emphasis on the surveillance of the respect for human rights has implied a greater activity for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, although this does not necessarily represent a change of its objectives nor of its philosophy. A genuine transformation will occur when the concept of human rights is expanded to the right to education, food, access to health facilities, housing, which are all aspects of the basic needs of man that the narrow concepts of today have not included within the scope of the Inter-American Commission.

⁸⁸ Farer, Tom, "Collectively Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere. New Paradigm, Uncertain Steps" in *Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in the Americas..*, p. 87.

Eradication of poverty is the target of the organization and this has been reflected in the amendments to the Charter in the Washington Protocol of 1992. The policies which must be implemented in order to reach this target represent a serious problem for the system. Firstly, they will depend on the individual policies implemented by the states as well as on the support that the multilateral institutions of the system will offer to this effect, all in perfect harmony. The odds against this objective are posed by the extent of the problem which has accumulated for more than a century and the specific characteristics of the models promoted by the multilateral institutions. However, the crisis which has emerged as a result of this phenomenon may lead, at least at this stage of global transition, to a readjustment of the models and to new changes within the system. Consequently the groups that have been totally set aside could reap benefits. To imagine the possibility of transforming the system towards a more "liberating" one within this newly installed civilization, would be a lofty exercise of optimism and "faith in the improvement of man", however it is very unlikely under the present conditions.

Without doubt, a prerequisite for the radical structural transformations of the inter-American system is a revolution in the perceptions, assumptions and cosmovision of its power elites.

There is a prevalence in the system of different perceptions, an asymmetry, the self-defense of Latin American and Caribbean countries *vis-a-vis* the U.S. and the lack of understanding by the United States of the attitudes of its neighbors south of the border. In this respect, the tacit, non-explicit agreement of non-unilateral intervention during this stage is an achievement which time will have to confirm. Up to the moment, cases which replevy this assertion, Haiti for

example, have been preceded by a process of great OAS activity in coordination with the United Nations, in situations which have occurred in active member countries, which have been analyzed by all using similar parameters. Time will reaffirm this inter-American cooperation in cases which go beyond this scenario, under the domestic political pressure in the United States, as in the case of Cuba, the coming into power of a political party with a nationalistic program in any country of the region, or volatile situations of social crises, as has always been the case throughout the long history of our peoples in the Americas.

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BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980S: THE STRATEGIC OPTIONS OF A NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED MIDDLE POWER¹

Ricardo U. Sennes

While it is well-known that Brazil's international policy stance changed often and dramatically during the eighties, there is as yet no consensus regarding the scope and significance of these changes. In assessing Brazil's foreign policy behavior from the point of view of the needs of a "newly industrialized middle power," this paper assumes that changes in Brazilian foreign policy strategy reflect not only that country's diplomatic, operational, and tactical exigencies but also substantial shifts in internal perceptions about its position in the international political and economic arenas. Although many of the changes in Brazilian foreign policy during the eighties originated directly from conditions particular to Brazil, moreover, it is our contention that others can best be explained by the political pressures common to all newly industrialized middle powers.

Brazil's policy of progressive disengagement from the West and increased dealings with developing countries in the seventies and early eighties was, in fact, consistent with its position as a newly industrialized middle power of the period. But with the economic shocks and increased economic and political pressures of the late eighties, Brazil soon saw that its own position in the world had changed. With the advent of the nineties, it therefore began to implement new foreign policy

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strategies. First--in an effort to lessen U.S. dominance--it diversified its own dealings among the world's three major economic blocs. At the same time it worked to integrate--and lead--South America as a significant economic and strategic player on the world stage.

What Is a "Newly Industrialized Middle Power"?

Any definition of this category of state must consider two major features: a country's relative capabilities as ranked on an international scale and the historical role it has played--and continues to play--within its region. Such a definition entails both qualities that can be measured quantitatively and historical considerations, which are dynamic and therefore harder to assess.

To be a newly industrialized middle power, a country must have an outstanding presence--in terms of territory, population, economic importance, trade, or military capacity--within the international system. While it "cannot hope to affect the international system acting alone," moreover, it can certainly expect to "exert a significant impact on the system by working through small groups or alliances." For this reason, Keohane labels these nations as "system-affecting" (as opposed to "system-determining," "system-influence," or "system-ineffectual") states. Middle powers are also termed "secondary" or "intermediary" powers as ranked on the international scale.² Middle powers are also characterized as "regional" or "great regional" powers in that they play a significant historical role within a region and

²R. Keohane, "Lilliputian Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," International Organization 23 (1969):295.

have sufficient weight to play an important part in current disputes over regional hegemony.³

While some analysts use "middle power" to place countries in relation to the great powers,⁴ others use it to characterize the role these countries play within the international system. According to this latter view, middle powers are not simply smaller and weaker versions of the great powers but are in fact different in kind.⁵

During the seventies and eighties, international events created new restraints and barriers that severely limited the political and economic opportunities open to middle powers. While general patterns of behavior remained the same, the "menu of strategic options"⁶ available to emerging nations in almost all arenas became restricted. The changes in Brazil's foreign policy behavior during this period reflect one response to international pressures by a typical middle power.

³Although Hoolbrad, Osterud, and Myers emphasize this dual historic and political international role of middle powers, it is an aspect not fully accepted by some the major authors cited in this work.

⁴Ray Claine, World Power Assessment 1977: a Calculus of Strategic Drift (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977); Wayne Selcher, Brazil in the International System: the Rise of a Middle Power, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); D. Myers, ed., Regional Hegemons: Threat and Strategic Responses (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991); Iver Neumann, Iver, ed., Regional Great Powers in International Politics (Oslo: Saint Martin's Press, 1991).

⁵C. Holbraad, Middle Powers in the International System (New York: St. Martin Press, 1984); A. F. Cooper and R. Higgott, "Middle Powers Leadership and Coalition Building: The Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round," International Organization 44 (1990); R. Keohane, "Lilliputian Dilemmas,"; M. R. Soares-Lima, "The Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy, Trade and Itaipu," Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1986; B. Wood, Middle Powers in the International System: a Preliminary Assessment of Potential. (Helsinki: WIDER Publications, 1987; D. Mares, "Mexico's Foreign Policy as a Middle Power," Latin American Research Review 23 (1988) and "Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988); M. Hirst, As Relações dos EUA com as Potências Médias na América Latina: Brasil e México (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Relações Internacionais, 1995).

⁶I have found the "menu of strategic options," which I first encountered in Peter Smith, Talons of the Eagle: the Dynamic of U.S.-Latin American Relations (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), a good approach for assessing the constraints faced by different groups of states within the international economy.

The "international system," as Mares points out, "has an important independent effect on the behavior of the states in the system."⁷ This analysis therefore takes into account Brazil's relative capabilities and its standard patterns of behavior, both regional and global. It assumes that the behavior of a state not only accords with general patterns of relations among states but also varies in accordance with its position within the international system. Following Keohane and Nye,⁸ it assesses the effect of the international system with regard to the distribution of capabilities among nations (that is, structural effects) and to patterns of interaction among states within the system (procedural effects).

Any analysis of international politics must look into the present and potential capability of nation states (and of other relevant actors in the international arena) to alter other countries' behavior and prevent other actors from doing the same to them. While middle powers may share similar motivations, their behavior reflects their individual capabilities and patterns of interaction. The analyst must therefore consider how a country's individual capabilities and international position dictate the strategic options open to it. Finally, it must be assumed that nation states seek to maximize their relative advantage in terms of security and economic and technological development.

Is Brazil a Newly Industrialized Middle Power?

During the last two decades, Brazil's anomalous geopolitical characteristics and position have led to considerable disagreement among international policy analysts regarding the country's relative position in the world.

⁷D. Mares, "Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony."

⁸R. Keohane and J. Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization* 41 (1987):745.

Brazil is a huge and geopolitically well-positioned country (8.5 million square kilometers bordering on all South American countries except Ecuador and Chile). Its territory encompasses a large section of Atlantic coast and part of the Plata River basin. It has a large population (159 million), a growing industrial sector, and a GNP (US\$536.3 billion) that is only slightly lower than that of Canada (US\$569.9). Perhaps most importantly, it is not under the immediate influence area of any great power.⁹

Yet during the last few decades, Brazil has gone through several periods of political and economic instability and continues to suffer from inadequate infrastructure and technology and high levels of poverty and social inequality.


In the late seventies and early eighties, many respected analysts ranked Brazil high within the international community, despite the many obstacles preventing it from becoming a great power.¹⁰ Analysts who focused on the country's situation in the seventies and early eighties stressed Brazil's international relevance--a view that coincided with the Brazilian diplomatic corps' vision.¹¹ Those who focused on the

⁹World Bank Atlas 1996, p. 18. For an extensive analysis of Brazil's geopolitical position, see Leonel I. A. Ver Mello. (1991):212-13.

¹⁰That Brazil was an emergent power was first suggested by Norman Bailey, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: a Case Study in Upward Mobility," Inter-American Economic Affairs 27 (1974). Others who concurred include William Perry, Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy: the International Strategy of an Emerging Power (London: Sage Publications, 1976); Ronald Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977). See also Wayne Selcher, "Brazil in the World: a Ranking Analysis of Capability and Status Measures," in Brazil in the International System, 1981). "O Brasil no Sistema Mundial de Poder," Revista Política e Estratégia 1 (October-December 1983); "As Relações Brasil-América Latina: rumo a um padrão de cooperação bilateral," Revista Política e Estratégia 4 (October-December 1986); and "Brazil's Candidacy for a Major Power Status: Short-Term Problems and Long-Term Optimism," Intellect 105 (June 1977).

¹¹See José C. B. Aleixo, "Fundamentos e Linhas Gerais da Política Externa do Brasil," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, Belo Horizonte 67-68 (January 1989), and "Política Externa da Nova República: ruptura e continuidade," Revista Política e Estratégia, São Paulo, 3(1985). See also R. Saraiva-Guerreiro, "Linhas Básicas de Implementação da Política Externa Brasileira," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, Belo Horizonte 54 (January 1982); Antônio A. C. Trindade, "Posições Internacionais do Brasil no Plano Multilateral," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, Belo

late eighties, however, saw Brazil more as an underdeveloped country, limited by external pressures and with little access to power resources. In view of its heavy burden of external debt, poverty, political instability, and high rate of inflation, they classified Brazil as a marginal country located in a politically and economically marginal region of the world.¹²



This paper deals with a specific sub-group of middle powers--those that became industrialized following the expansion of the capitalist system after World War II. "Industrialization" here is measured mainly in terms of international trade, investments, and finance. A great part of the definition of a newly industrialized middle power therefore consists of economic growth and increasing participation in the international movement of capital, trade, and investments.

A small group of countries in this category--of which Brazil, Mexico, and India are the best examples¹³--can be characterized by their new access to economic clout. For these countries, "despite their still strong exposure to international

Horizonte 52 (January 1981); Luiz F. S. Correa, "A Política Externa de José Sarney" (Paper delivered at the 60 Anos de Política Externa Brasileira Conference, São Paulo, 1994).

¹²See Oliveiros Ferreira, "Política Externa e Defesa: o caso brasileiro," Revista de Política e EstratégiaSão Paulo 2 (1985).


¹³M. R. Soares-Lima, "Political Economy," p. 5.

circumstances, have partial autonomy in formulating their international strategies, since their greater integration in the international economy promoted an increase in their relative bargaining power."¹⁴ Adding this new economic power to their geopolitical position and patterns of regional behavior, some have reached the position of middle powers. But while they now behave as middle powers, their distinctive internal and historical situations (which may include political and economic instability, regional disparities, high levels of poverty, and technological inadequacies) remain. As a result, a group of countries has emerged that can be considered middle powers externally but that are internally more similar to developing countries.

Soares-Lima notes that most analyses of newly industrialized countries focus on internal politics and external pressures and that these countries are rarely studied from the point of view of their foreign policies or their role within the international system. (The most commonly used terms for this category of country are "semi-peripheral" or semi-industrialized countries, emerging powers, regional powers, great regional powers, intermediate countries, most developing countries, middle-size countries.)¹⁵ Studies that analyze middle or intermediary powers, on the other hand, usually focus on patterns of behavior in countries--such as Canada, Sweden, and Australia--that are developed yet not "great" powers. Such studies rarely mention medium-sized, Third World countries.

¹⁴Mirian G. Saraiva, "A Opção Européia nos Marcos do Pragmatismo Responsável: a Política Externa Brasileira para os Países Europeus de 1974 a 1979," M.A. thesis, PUC/RJ, 1990, p. 9.

¹⁵Soares-Lima, "Political Economy," p. 2.



The literature divides suggests that the strategic options open to middle powers can be divided among multilateral, bilateral, and regional options.

With regard to their multilateral relations, middle powers tend to act cooperatively, preferring collective action to individual conflict. Aware that they cannot influence the international order unilaterally middle and small powers also tend to support international organizations as a way to achieve formal equality with--and to restrain--the great powers.¹⁶

At the bilateral level, newly industrialized middle powers seek to restrain the power and influence of the great powers while increasing their own capacity to influence smaller powers, mainly within the regional context. This means that at

¹⁶See Wood, Middle Powers in the International System; Keohanem "Lilliputian Dilemmas,"; and Cooper and Higgot, "Middle Powers Leadership and Coalition Building. See also Rothstein, R, Alliances and Small Powers (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968).

the same time they seek to minimize bilateral relations with and dependency on great powers, they also try to take advantage of their bilateral relations with smaller powers.

Finally, at the regional level, newly industrialized middle powers tend to become deeply involved in regional disputes over hegemony in their efforts to extend their area of influence and diminish the influence of extra-regional powers.¹⁷

Having broadly defined the newly industrialized middle power, most analysts consider Brazil a prime example of the category. Even when considering nations from different perspectives, they include Brazil in the group--with the possible exception of Andrew Hurrell's classification of Brazil as an "ambiguous" power.¹⁸

Brazil's Foreign Policy of the Late Seventies and Early Eighties

Brazil's foreign policy of the eighties was firmly rooted in concepts and postures devised during the seventies--mainly during Geisel's (1974-78) and the beginning of Figueiredo's (1979-80) presidential terms.¹⁹ Thereafter until 1985-86 (the first part of Sarney's term), the country's major effort was to maintain these strategies in an adverse, even hostile, international environment. It was not, in fact, until 1987 that Brazilian foreign policy began to be radically revised, although some

¹⁷For modeling game and study cases of middle power regional behavior see Mares, D., "Mexico's foreign policy as a Middle Power," and in "Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony,". See also Neumann and Iver (ed.), Regional Great Powers.

¹⁸Andrew Hurrell, "Brazil as a Regional Great Power: a Study in Ambivalence," in Neumann and Iver (eds.), Regional Great Powers.

¹⁹See Soares-Lima, M. R. and Gerson Moura, "A Trajetória do Pragmatismo: uma análise da política externa brasileira," in DADOS - Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, Rio de Janeiro 25 (1982):349. See also Saraiva-Guerreiro "Linhas Básicas"; José C. B. Aleixo, "Fundamentos e Linhas Gerais"; and Trindade, "Posições Internacionais do Brasil."

signs of impending change were visible in earlier years. Brazilian foreign policy in 1974-86, moreover, was compatible with the external behavior of other newly industrialized middle powers in that period.

Brazil's external attitudes during this period were largely shaped by the notion of a North-South conflict (and a secondary East-West conflict) within the multilateral forums and arenas of the international system. Pragmatically--although some ideological considerations were taken up domestically during this period--Brazil's most fundamental external relations concern was its underdevelopment.

The international order was primarily oriented to freeze the political, economic, and technological status quo, and as such, its rules were essentially unfair. Brazil's strategy for fighting this "unfair" international power structure was to act multilaterally, forming alliances with other countries (that is, Third World countries) discriminated against by the international situation. Brazil therefore sought to achieve political and diplomatic advantages within the context of the multilateral forums provided by U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).²⁰ Such alliances were made more attractive by the fact that--in order to create the conditions conducive to faster development--it was common for developing countries to be (temporarily or partially) exempted from trade, nuclear, political, and other regulatory agreements. Because, however, such exemptions were rescinded once a country attained a certain level of development, Brazil's disputes during these years tended to be economic rather than political.²¹

²⁰For an extensive description of this position, see Trindade, "Posições Internacionais do Brasil."

²¹This was true for Brazil and for the rest of Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba. See Peter Smith, *Talons of the Eagle* (1996).

Following the statements of the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Brazil's policymakers generally believed that the structure of the international trade system--and the consequent international division of labor--were the main cause of international economic and political asymmetries. Brazil therefore sought to lead (mainly at the UNCTAD and at GATT) the call of Third World countries to reform the international economic system.

Nevertheless Brazil's involvement in North-South disputes, as well as its participation in international coalitions and negotiations, were selective and limited. The country took part in economic and technological negotiations only. It was, for instance, never affiliated with the Organization of Non-Allied States, which confronted political as well as economic issues.²² Brazil rather confined itself to keeping up informal contacts with other Third World countries and sending observers to international assemblies. In its external activities, Brazil always took into account the bilateral and unilateral implications of particular strategies--including participation in international forums.

Brazil therefore entered into Third World affiliations with the aim of achieving economic concessions or of establishing advantageous political connections. In no way did it forfeit, by these associations, its direct influence and bargaining power. Within the group of Third World countries, for instance, Brazil concentrated on improving economic and political relations with petroleum producers (such as Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq, and Angola). These countries offered both the possibility of providing a guaranteed supply of petroleum products

²²Peter H. Smith, The Talons of the Eagle (1996).

and of importing Brazilian-made goods that had not found ready markets in the industrialized world.²³

Selcher notes that Brazil tried to go along with the Group Consensus of 77 "in terms of rhetoric and defending group solidarity while separating, in practice, its national interest."²⁴ Roett and Perry stress that Brazil's present attitude toward the Third World, "as opposed to the trends in the Jânio-Jango years..., is tactical and not ideological. The intention now is not simply to become the leader of the Third World but to use the connections with these nations as a means of achieving, for Brazil, the conditions of a developed nation."²⁵

Brazil's multilateral attitudes during this period were not, therefore, nearly so linear or well-defined as its diplomatic activities may have implied. The country was, rather, pushed into various diplomatic stands by its desire to become more fully integrated into the closed circle of the western industrialized powers²⁶--a desire that had arisen in the Geisel government, when the country's "emerging" economic potential gave it the credibility to establish permanent bilateral relations with the great powers (as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding).²⁷ In later years, however, most of these formal arrangements were abandoned as

²³P. T. Flecha-Lima, "Diplomacia e Comércio: notas sobre a política externa brasileira nos anos 70," mimeographed (1994), pp. 14-15.

²⁴Wayne Selcher, "O Brasil no Sistema Mundial de Poder," Revista de Política e Estratégia 1 (1983):27.

²⁵R. Roett and W. Perry, "Recent Trends in Brazilian Foreign Policy," The World Today (August 1977): pp. 303.

²⁶See Soares Lima, M.R. e Moura G., "A Trajetória do Pragmatismo - Uma Análise da Política Externa Brasileira," Revista Dados. Vol. 25, n. 3, (1982). pp. 352-353.

²⁷Maier, L. A. P. S. (1989: 5)

ineffective, with the exception of the Memorandum with the United States and part of one established with Germany.²⁸

Brazil's tendency to enter into alliances and coalitions, moreover, did not necessarily mean that the country was wholly committed to support the themes and policies agreed upon in these alliances. Such engagements with other countries were more often designed to keep channels of communication open rather than to signal a firm policy commitment. Given that its own resources did not enable it to operate unilaterally in the international arena, either to protect itself from and or to deal directly with the great powers, Brazil used participation in coalitions and international negotiating forums as a second-best strategy option to achieve its international ends. This political posture, which guided its foreign policy strategy and multilateral relations, first emerged during the 1960s, was consolidated only in the seventies under Ernesto Geisel,²⁹ and remained as the bedrock of Brazil's foreign policy until the late eighties.³⁰

Brazil's bilateral relations with the great powers had, during this period, two basic objectives: to reduce the country's dependency on these powers and to build up its relations within the Third World.

In practical terms this meant that Brazil sought ways to decrease its economic, technological, and political relations with the great powers and to maintain only those that were either profitable or irreplaceable. It paid particular attention to its

²⁸ See Saraiva, Míriam G., A Opção Européia nos Marcos do Pragmatismo Responsável: A Política Externa Brasileira para os Países Europeus de 1974 a 1979. Master Thesis, IRI-PUC/RJ, 1990, pp. 159.

²⁹ See Soares Lima and Moura (1982: 349)

³⁰ This can be seen in Brazilians' diplomatic postures and speeches during the 1980's. See Assessoria de Imprensa do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Repertório das Posturas Externas Brasileiras. Brasília, 1982-1987.

relations with the United States, which it saw as the greatest potential threat to Brazil's sovereignty and independence.³¹ It also followed the "diversity principle" of economics, seeking to distribute its external dealings equally among the industrialized nations of the world.³² By reducing and diversifying relations with the great powers, Brazil aimed to increase its own autonomy and independence and therefore to improve its bargaining power within the international system.

During the seventies and early eighties, moreover, Brazil stressed its bilateral relations with small, Third World powers as a potentially effective alternative to dealing with its "adversaries" (the great powers). This period therefore saw improved economic and political relation between Brazil and countries in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the former Soviet Bloc. And in offering these countries political support, services, and industrialized goods, Brazil significantly enlarged its own markets for external trade.

In 1960 approximately 84 percent of Brazilian exports went to developed countries, while by 1981, this percentage had reached an all-time low of roughly 54 percent. Where 10 percent of Brazilian exports had gone to developing countries in 1960, moreover, in 1981 that figure was approximately 40 percent. Brazil's 1981 exports to socialist countries also reached their highest point, topping out at 7 percent of total exports.³³

³¹ A very important event that illustrates this policy was the Brazilian unilateral crack of the 20 year old agreement of mutual military assistance with the United States of American in 1977.

³² For a detailed analysis of this principle see Lessa, Antônio C. M., Brasil, EUA e Europa Ocidental no Contexto do Nacional-Desenvolvimentismo: a estratégia de diversificação de parcerias (1974-1979), Master Thesis, UnB, Brasília, 1994.

³³ Datas from CACEX-Banco do Brasil and collected by Oliveira, op. cit., pp. 233.

From 1960 to 1975, Brazil's exports to the United States fell a dramatic 44 percent, levelling out from 1975-81 at around 15 percent of the total. By contrast the European Community received, on average, 25 percent of the country's total exports, and in 1970 this figure reached a high of 35 percent.³⁴

Significant changes also took place in the area of direct foreign investment in Brazil, which increased ten-fold, going from US\$1.7 in 1969 to \$17.5 million in 1980. Most of this investment originated in Europe, with a growing percentage also coming from Japan.³⁵ In 1971, moreover, 61 percent of Brazil's external debt was held by North American banks and 27 percent by European banks. But by 1980 the percentage with North American banks had dropped to 40 percent and that with European banks risen to 44 percent³⁶.

As Myers has pointed out, Brazil's relations with the United States were further determined by its role as a state with regional bargaining power and hegemony,³⁷ overlapping conditions that influenced both countries' political, economic, and military agendas. Beginning in the late seventies, for instance, Geisel sought to end his country's policy of automatic alignment with the United States, and in 1977, withdrew from the Mutual Military Assistance Agreement with the United States.

³⁴ Datas from CACEX-Banco do Brasil and collected Oliveira, op. cit., pp. 233.

³⁵ Datas from Goes, W., Brazil turns to Western Europe: changing perspectives, SAIS-Jonhs Hopkins University, May, 1981, cited by Hirst, M. 1985, op. cit., pp. 25.

³⁶ Datas from Goes, W. Brazil turns to Western Europe: changing perspectives, SAIS-Jonhs Hopkins University, maio, 1981, cited by Hirst, M. 1985, op. cit., pp. 25.

³⁷ See Myers, D., Regional Hegemons: Threat and Strategic Responses, Westview, San Francisco, 1991. This condition is analysed by Smith, P, (1996), op. cit.; Mares, D., "Middle Powers Under Regional Hegemony: to Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement", in International Studies Quarterly, nº 3, 1988; e Mello, L, I. A de, Brasil, Argentina e a Balança de Poder Regional: equilíbrio, preponderância ou hegemonia? (1969-1986), PhD These, Political Science Dep. - USP, 1991.

Not was United States' relative separation from Brazil restricted to the political arena. It also included--or perhaps was a result of--a certain degree of military and economic distance. During the Carter presidency, areas of disagreement between the United States and Brazil included nuclear questions, human rights, the armaments industry, and certain commercial issues. Once Reagan came to power, moreover, the new U.S. agenda produced an even tense relationship.³⁸ Under Reagan, Brazil strongly opposed new U.S. policies with regard to the East-West military conflicts and alliances and resisted the economic and commercial reorganization of the West.

Relations between Brazil and the United States throughout the 1970s and early 1980s were therefore strained. Ultimately Brazil came to see the United States as its principal Western ally and the central pole of the alliance to which Brazil belonged. Yet it also saw the great power as its central adversary among the developed countries who were constraining the development of their Southern counterparts. Finally, Brazil came to see the United States as the chief power with hegemony over the region, and as such, a country that would never view the attempts to achieve autonomy within the American hemisphere in a favorable light.

Despite ambiguous political relations, however, Brazil managed to carry on its disengagement from direct North American influence without any overt breach in its intense bilateral and multilateral relations with the great powers. As Lessa

³⁸ According to Camargo, after the political transition and Brazil's financial crises, the relevance of Human Rights and the Nuclear Energy issues was significantly reduced. Camargo, S. e Ocampo, J.M.V., (1988), *op. cit.*, pp. 170.

points out, Brazil sought rather to maintain its interaction with the West in order to give itself greater room to manoeuvre within the international system.³⁹

During this same period, the direction of Brazil's foreign policy direction was also strongly influenced by its regional aspirations. Seeking to establish itself as the dominant country in South America, Brazil engaged in a dispute with Argentina regarding hegemony over the Plata River basin. Throughout the seventies this dispute centered concentrated on control of Itaipú-Corpus, but Brazil also expressed interest in the Northern Tier region.⁴⁰ The succession of bilateral agreements Brazil made with Peru, Columbia, Venezuela, and Surinam culminated with the signing of the 1976 Amazon Pact, which was followed in turn by the 1978 Cooperation Treaty. The Figueiredo government consolidated this strategy of linking strategic and geographic proximity with a series of presidential visits to almost every country in South America. Figueiredo was the first sitting Brazilian president to visit Peru, Columbia, and Venezuela, and the first to visit Argentina in forty-five years.⁴¹ The eighties offered Brazil the opportunity to increase its involvement in regional matters significantly.

³⁹ Lessa, A. C. M., Brasil, Estado Unidos e Europa Ocidental no Contexto do Nacional-Desenvolvimentismo: Estratégia de Diversificação de Parcerias: 1974 - 1979, master these, UnB, 1994, pp. 37-38.

⁴⁰ See Ferreira (1984) op. cit. Also Mello, L. I. A., Brasil, Argentina e a Balança de Poder Regional: equilíbrio, preponderância ou hegemonia? (1969-1986), Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Sao Paulo, 1991. Also about the Brazilian involvement in the military coup at Bolivia, Uruguay e Chile, Bandeira, M, Estado Nacional e Política Internacional na América Latina, Edunb, Brasília, 1993 (cap. XVII and XVIII).

⁴¹ Mac Cann, F. D., "Brazilian Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century", in Selcher, W. (ed.), Brazil in the International System: the rise of a Middle Power, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981. pp. 21.

Table 1. Brazil's growing regional presence

(percentage of total for South America)

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Year</i>		
	1960	1970	1980
Inhabitants	48.8	50.2	50.3
Gross National Product	38.8	41.9	53.3
Industrial Output	42.9	45.9	58.9
Investments	38.6	43.5	50.4
Exports	20.3	23.2	31.4

Source: BID's Economic and Social Development Report, 1984 and W. Selcher, Actual y Perspectivas Futuras en las Relaciones de Brasil con America Latina: hacia un patron de cooperacion bilateral, (Prospel, Documento de Trabajo 10, 1987).

During this period Brazil was also troubled by the increasing influence of the great powers, especially regarding the regulation of nuclear technologies and military buildup. The industrialized world aimed chiefly to exclude South America (and the South Atlantic) from cold war political and strategic disputes.⁴² By contrast, Brazil's main objective goal during this period was to neutralize growing U.S. influence in the region, but regional policy was not generally high on Brazil's external policy agenda. It entered into such alliances as the Amazon Pact,⁴³ ALADI,⁴⁴ and the Contadora Group more to avoid isolation within the international community than to invest in and develop strong regional cooperation. And it allocated far more resources to other policy areas of multilateral and bilateral concern.⁴⁵

⁴² For an extensive analysis of Brazilian policy toward South Atlantic see: Decuadra, Daniel R., Geopolítica, Política Externa e Pensamento Militar Brasileiro e Relação ao Atlântico Sul (1964-1990), Master Thesis, PUC/RJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1991.

⁴³ See Camargo, S. e Ocampo, (1988), op. cit. cap. 7; e Maior, L.A.P.S., (1989), op. cit., part 4-b.

⁴⁴ For an analyses about Brazilian interest in practicing the ALADI principles see Machado, J.B.M. e Araújo Jr., J. T., Impactos das Políticas Comercial e Cambial sobre o Padrão de Comércio Internacional dos Países da ALADI: o caso do Brasil, Working Paper, IE-UNICAMP, mimeo, 1992.

⁴⁵ Hurrell, A., "Brazil as a Regional Great Power: a study in ambivalence" in Neumann, I. (ed.), Regional Great Powers in the International System, Saint Martin's Press, Oslo, 1991.

With the advent of the eighties, multi- and bilateral relations within the region began to change dramatically. Brazil moved from a policy stance of geopolitical domination to one of cooperation and integration--a shift that had several marked consequences. For one, once Brazil came to see integration with South America as a stepping stone to international integration, relations within South America became a major foreign policy priority. At the same time, Brazil did not relax its efforts to prevent the growth of U.S. influence in the region.⁴⁶

Even with this shift in Brazil's regional policies from the seventies to the eighties, therefore, the country's two major regional goals remained the same: to reinforce the Brazilian presence in the region while diminishing the regional influence of external powers. What had changed was the strategy deemed best to achieve these goals.

It is worth noting that despite all of the contradictions in Third World attitudes, limits to various South American countries' involvement in alliances and multinational cooperative efforts, different countries' complex relations with the United States, and rather loose political links, the South American region generally exhibited a high degree of compatibility in terms of its members' political, economic, and commercial interests and concerns over national security.

In these key areas the region generally followed strategies consistent with behavior patterns and policies that would be expected of middle powers. While each country, moreover, acted from a different set of conditions deriving from its

⁴⁶ Example of this was the Brazilian refusal of the US proposal to create a South Atlantic Defense Agreement (including Argentina and South-Africa) in the mid-1980 and as a result the creation of "Peace Zone" in 1986 by UNO resolution. See Decuadra, D., op. cit. (p. 209-211). Brazil have also insisted in a regional agreement related to the Nuclear Energy issue instead of accepting the monitoring of the Nuclear International Agencies in the region.

individual situation, the consistency of the region's foreign policy goals and strategies--dictated by an external matrix--reflect the efforts of newly industrialized middle powers to increase their international presence with the power resources available to them.

In Brazil, moderation became the guiding principle of all external affairs, which resulted in certain apparent contradictions. The country's move to achieve greater economic autonomy and acquire greater geopolitical weight within the region, for instance, did not include any move to break with the existing political order. The objective was rather to obtain the political and economic space necessary for the country's continued development. To the extent that political and diplomatic rhetoric designed to achieve autonomy might overstate the actual degree of political conflict, therefore, it was counterproductive. But in the 1980s, the foreign policies of a country like Brazil were bound to run up against the significant changes taking place in the international arena.

The New International Order of the 1980s

The 1970s and 1980s were characterized by a sequence of crises within the international system. In 1971 Nixon's break with the gold standard led to a period of financial instability. In 1974 and again in 1978, the world suffered a series of petroleum shocks. At the same time several international economic blocks emerged; countries began to embrace policies of commercial protectionism; and economic globalization and the technological transformation of communications and other key spheres proceeded apace.

During this period, too, the global hegemony of the United States decreased and the cold war ended. As a result, the importance of autonomous regional economic and political systems began to reemerge. All of these well-known events--and perhaps most of all the crisis of the Bretton Woods economic system of the 1970s--had profound economic and political consequences for the newly industrialized middle powers during the eighties.

According to Ludwon,⁴⁷ during the last two decades trade and much other economic activity has been transformed from a stable, widely accepted order to a system continually in flux and dominated by intensive and continuous negotiations.⁴⁸ The greater part of these negotiations, moreover, has taken place not in international forums but bilaterally--showing the weakness of the international economic organizations created at Bretton Woods. Increasing world competition resulted in defensive, uncooperative behavior by the great powers, which raised so-called "neoprotectionism" barriers.⁴⁹ This protectionist movement, moreover, affected relations between developed and developing countries more than those within the industrialized world.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Ludwon, P., "The Future of the International Trade System", in US foreign policy After the Cold War, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992 (p. 223).

⁴⁸ The Super 301 act in the USA, the Common Agricultural Policy by the European Community, and the Basic Agricultural Law in Japan, can be taken as examples of this process.

⁴⁹ The period 1981-1985 was the only one after the World War II in which the volume of world merchandise grew less than the global output. Meanwhile the rate between the global trade grow and the global production were 1.63 between 1953-1973, 4.6 between 1973-1980, 1.52 between 1986-1990, and 0.92 between 1980-1985. Silber, S, Transformações no Comércio Internacional, paper, Instituto de Estudos Avançados/USP, Sao Paulo, 1995.

⁵⁰ According to Ricupero, the trade relation between the developed countries were affected in 16% of their items, and the trade relations between developed countries and developing countries were affected in 21% of their items. See, Ricupero, R. "O Brasil e o Futuro do Comércio Internacional" in Temas de Política Externa Brasileira, IPRI, Brasília, 1994.

Some states showed themselves more capable than others of protecting themselves during this period of economic flux. The new international atmosphere was particularly hard on the small and middle powers, which needed to act collectively, often through the international organizations, to influence international order. Economic globalization and the technological "revolution" of the seventies and eighties also combined to reduced the international competitiveness of the developing countries significantly.⁵¹ As a result, the developing countries's share of world trade actually decreased during this period. After their trading year of 1981, the developing countries participation in international commerce regressed, so that by 1988, their position was similar to that of 1970.

Table 2. Developing countries' share of world trade

(percentage of total volume)

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Year</i>										
	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
<i>Exports</i>	18	24	28	28	27	25	25	24	20	20	20
<i>Imports</i>	17	21	22	25	25	24	22	21	19	18	19

Source: UNO, International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1990, pp. 994-995

The value of raw materials, moreover--which are the bedrock of most developing economies--decreased sharply on the international market. Economic growth in developing countries was further hampered because their work forces were generally unskilled and developed countries had become largely self-sufficient in providing food supplies. For the large proportion of the developing countries

⁵¹ The exception was the New Industrialized Countries in the South-East Asia.

that depended on labor and the production of raw materials and food stuffs, therefore, the new economic order reduced their economic possibilities and alternatives significantly.

The economic crisis of the eighties that marginalized developing countries within the international economic system also affected the newly industrialized middle powers, politically and economically. One consequence of the new economic order was to decrease the middle powers' bargaining ability, since in the international arena, economic vulnerability usually means political vulnerability as well.

Table 3. Per capita income in developing and industrialized countries

Per capita GNP	Year										
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Percentage proportion between Per Capita Income of Developing and Developed Countries	8	8	8	8	7	7	6	6	5	5	5

* Shows ratio of industrialized countries' per capita GNP to that in developing countries. In 1980, for instance, the individual production of citizens of industrialized countries was worth, on average, eight times as much as that of citizens in the developing world. *Source: UNO International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1990, pp. 4-5.*

Economic marginalization also reduced the ability of middle powers to mobilize politically as a group. After having significantly improved their bargaining position during the 1960s and 1970s, rising "to prominence if not to power,"⁵² the Third World and Non-Aligned movements and the Group of 77 all experienced a significant decrease in their political and economic effectiveness in the eighties. Historically, newly industrialized middle powers have exerted influence over the Third World, which offers a political and economic alternative to the industrialized world. The economic crisis and instability Third World countries affected these newly-forged political and economic links adversely, reducing the newly industrialized middle powers' ability to maneuver in the international system. The new conditions severely undercut the demands of such partially industrialized (or more-developed) states as Brazil, Mexico, and India--which had only just begun to be distinguished from their less-developed counterparts--to receive more reciprocal treatment and consideration in international trading agreements.

But if the economic crisis significantly affected the Third World Movement, the emergence of the "graduation principle" also helped to break down the notion of an undifferentiatedly needy Third World. Clearly, several developing nations that had been granted special international privileges had now achieved notable international competitiveness. These countries, it was argued, should now be expected to contribute to the maintenance of international trade agreements, and their future deals with industrialized countries should be based on reciprocity and without privilege. As the Third World movement (non-alignment movement) declined and developing countries became more marginal economically, therefore, the newly industrialized middle powers--including Brazil--were pressured by the industrialized nations to participate fully in international agreements in such areas

⁵² Keohane, R. (1969), *op. cit.* (p.291).

as human rights, drug control, illegal immigration, environmental protection, trade, foreign investment, nuclear control, and copyright law.

Yet the political costs of this new internationalism were high, because unity within the Third World had been broken. In earlier years, newly industrialized middle powers had banded together with the Third World Movement in multilateral forums. But after two decades of increasing political presence by the small and middle powers, the great powers had taken the political offensive, and the United States with Ronald Reagan at its helm led the way. In addition to his resuming the United States' strategic conflict with the Soviet Union, Reagan's Third World policies meant a turning-point for the developing world.⁵³

The literature has recorded many of the consequences of these policies, and some authors have pointed out that the middle powers have borne more than their proportional share of the cost of reorganizing the international economic system. This has arisen in part because the great powers, when obliged to make internal changes to conform with changes in the international system, are able to transfer any additional costs incurred on to other states. Smaller powers not only cannot pass on costs, they frequently lack the resources to sustain the cost of retooling to meet international demands.

⁵³ See Tucker, Robert, "Reagan's foreign policy" in Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, n°1; Smith, P. H. (1996), op. cit.; Tulchin, J. "Os EUA e a América Latina no Mundo" in Revista de Política Externa, vol. 2, n°1, 1993; Tavares, M.C., "A Retomada da Hegemonia Norte-Americana e seu Impacto sobre a América Latina" in Hirst, M., Brasil-Estados Unidos na Transição Democrática, Paz e Terra, 1986; Baer, W. and Coes, D., "As Políticas Norte-Americanas, Dívida e Comércio na América Latina" in Revista de Economia Política, vol. 10, n° 3, 1990; Barros, A., " O Futuro das Relações Brasil-USA" in Revista de Política e Estratégia, Vol. 4, n° 1, São Paulo, 1986; Lima, M.R.S. and Hirst, M., Particularidades e Dilemas das Relações EUA-Brasil sob o Impacto de Novas Conjunturas, Cadernos IPRI, Brasília, 1993. .

According to Holbraad, "being weaker and more exposed than the great powers, the newly industrialized middle powers are less able to override the law in their dealings with other states and more dependent on a system of rules and protective conventions..., [and] being richer and less dependent on others than most small states, the newly industrialized middle powers have more to lose from a state of international lawlessness."⁵⁴ Riddel adds, moreover, that "in a predatory world, the newly industrialized middle powers are more vulnerable than their smaller neighbors and less able to protect themselves than their larger ones."⁵⁵

Krasner and Gilpin argue that the major powers--in addition to being the main prime beneficiaries of international conventions--have also been able to force other states to contribute to maintaining them, even where these states do not benefit in the same proportion.⁵⁶ Such arguments clearly run counter to the dominant notion that newly industrialized countries were largely "freeloaders" in the areas of trade, foreign investment, the regulation of nuclear energy and other areas of international concern.

While the economic disorder and globalization of the eighties created an adverse international environment for all newly industrialized middle powers, the strategic détente that arose with the end of the cold war also benefitted this group of countries. The withdrawal of the influence of the super-powers worldwide, and the end of the bipolar rivalries they had fostered, opened up new possibilities for regional growth.

⁵⁴ Holbraad, (1984), op. cit. (p. 209).

⁵⁵ Riddel, R. G. cited in Wood (1987) op. cit. (p. 11).

⁵⁶ Krasner, S., "State Power and the Structure of International Trade" in World Politics, n° 28, 1976; and Gilpin, R, US Power and the Multilateral Cooperation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment, Basic Books, New York, 1975.

Regions are by definition middle powers' major foreign policy sphere. Improved regional relations therefore offered these countries an avenue for development that promised to be far more fruitful than the multi- and bilateral channels open to them before. According to Osterud, "the end of the cold war would mean even greater opportunities for regional <great> powers. The multipolarity"--that is, the fortification of regional interstate power relationships--"of the last decades would be fortified with the declining role of global great powers."⁵⁷ Myers similarly notes how "the relative decline in efforts by the United States and Soviet Union since the middle 1970s ... to project power simultaneously into several major geopolitical arenas has permitted governments desirous of special local influence to pursue long-suppressed aspirations."⁵⁸

But whether they gained or lost in the international reordering of the eighties, all of the newly industrialized middle powers repositioned their external policies dramatically. In Brazil the new strategies that emerged largely reflected the changing external pressures imposed on the country and on South America as a whole.

Being a South American Middle Power in the Eighties

In the 1980s Brazil suffered much the same fate as other newly industrialized middle powers, with a few notable exceptions. From the late seventies on, Brazil--like other newly industrialized countries--was subject to a series of external economic shocks. Yet the country's strong industrial development of the preceding decade gave it the strength to weather these shocks and to resist a number of

⁵⁷ Osterud, O, (1990), op. cit. (p. 11).

⁵⁸ Myers, D.(1991), op. cit. (p. 7).

crippling external constraints. Compared with other newly industrialized middle powers, therefore, Brazil appeared relatively strong. Politically, too, Brazil was able to capitalize on its dominant position to lead a dynamic process of regional integration.

Chief among the external shocks that rocked Brazil's economy was the petroleum shortages of the seventies, which affected Brazil's core energy matrix during a period of intense economic growth. In just a few years, Brazil became the largest petroleum importer in the Third World. But the cost of keeping up the country's ambitious economic development program while at the same time paying for massive petroleum imports proved high. By 1982, petroleum products accounted for half of Brazil's total imports.⁵⁹

The sharp rise in international interest rates that occurred at the beginning of the 1980s, moreover, vastly increased the cost of servicing Brazil's large external debt. By 1985, in fact, interest on the debt amounted to 48 percent of Brazil's total exports.⁶⁰

Finally, the industrialized world at this time began to exert pressure on Brazil to institute economic reforms, primarily in the area of trade. This pressure--exerted by Brazil's multi- and bilateral partners, most particularly the United States--began in the seventies and reached its peak in the GATT Uruguay Round of the mid-eighties. Since the beginning of the eighties, for example, the United States Trade Representative has consistently characterized Brazil in its annual reports as an

⁵⁹ FUNCEX, *Desempenho do Comércio Exterior Brasileiro*, Rio de Janeiro, 1983.

⁶⁰ See *Brasil: Programa Econômico*, Banco Central do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 1992.

economy. "with persistent and significant restrictions on North American products."⁶¹

Brazil's vulnerability in international negotiations became clear when its external debt position was used to obtain concessions from the country regarding trade and vice versa. But while Brazil has been changing its trade and industrial policies since the beginning of the eighties, only in 1987 did it finally change its approach to embrace the principles underlying the GATT negotiations.⁶²

Before that policy shift occurred, however, Brazil had managed to resolve its petroleum problems in the short run and yet maintain its existing foreign policy framework. The major petroleum exporters were Third World countries that had established relations with Brazil, which meant that Brazil could increase its trade flow with them in accordance with its principle of fostering South-South cooperation. The problem of the country's growing external debt burden and vulnerability to trade shocks, however, highlighted Brazil's delicate relations with the great powers and multilateral agencies--relations that ran counter to its principle of disengagement from the sphere of influence of the industrialized world.

The external shocks of the eighties, particularly when combined with internal social and economic crises, challenged Brazil's traditional foreign policy priorities, alliances, and political orientation. Its international bargaining power in the mid-eighties was sadly reduced from what it had been in the seventies, and--in stark contrast to the situation a decade before--it shared the economic vulnerability to external shocks felt by all of the newly industrialized middle powers.

⁶¹ See Office of the United States Trade Representative, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, Washington, anos 1984-1991.

⁶² Fritsch e Batista (1994), Flecha Lima (1989) e Abreu (1994)

But if Brazil's bargaining capacity differed little from that of other middle powers in relative terms, in absolute terms the country exhibited an almost unique ability to resist and even deal successfully with external pressures. This strength was evidenced by the fact that change in Brazil--economic, political, military, or with regard to its nuclear regulation policies--was achieved relatively slowly and was therefore both selective and ably administered.

By the 1980s Brazil had reached a significant level of international competitiveness. Its economy and industrial base were developed enough to allow it to mount temporary responses to external shocks. The country was therefore spared having to undertake reforms on an ad hoc basis. Even when obliged to send its exports to traditional markets in the industrialized countries during a period of increasing trade conflicts, Brazil was able not only to maintain but to increase its export volume and its international reserves. Remarkably, the Brazilian trade balance, which had recorded a US\$4 billion deficit in 1980, presented a US\$19 billion surplus in 1988.⁶³ In addition to its success in trade, moreover, Brazil was also strong enough to pursue a policy of regional economic leadership and integration.

Politically, Brazil's policy in the 1970s of seeking to lessen foreign influence in the region, particularly to counterbalance U.S. influence legitimated its thrust to become a regional pole. After resolving its dispute with Argentina in 1979, Brazil aligned itself closely in political matters with other South American countries. In the first half of eighties, Brazil proposed and led a cooperative regional program.

⁶³ See Banco Central do Brasil, Brasil: Programa Econômico, Rio de Janeiro, 1992.

Economically, Brazil's impressive domestic market volume, capital base, and more developed infrastructure had allowed it to negotiate several economic agreements in the Southern Cone. Its diversified economic links with the main economic blocs (European Community, Japan, United States), moreover, allowed it to build up regional alternatives as well. Brazil began to focus on building a regional economic base in 1986, when it entered into the Economic Cooperation and Integration Program (PICE) with Argentina. It soon became the dominant economic power in South America,⁶⁴ having replaced Argentina as the largest supplier of manufactured goods in the region (an area that accounted for approximately 80 percent of its own exports). It even exported a significant amount (70 percent of which was industrial products) to Argentina itself.⁶⁵

In the late eighties South America began practicing a new type of regionalism that posed no direct opposition to the influence of the United States. Myers, for instance, notes that the existence of a great power that maintains certain interests in specific regions is not incompatible with the reemergence of regional systems. He suggests that states aspiring to hegemony within such systems will see the activities of a great power as no hindrance to the emergence and consolidation of leadership within the region. In the case of South America, Myers notes that the existing regional system in which participant states--including the lead nations--do not put themselves into direct conflict with the interests of the United States.⁶⁶

Particularly in the Southern Cone, South American relations in the past few decades have moved swiftly through successive stages of hostility (mainly between

⁶⁴ Ver Mello, L. I. A., (1991), op. cit., pp. 212-213.

⁶⁵ Camargo, S., (1993), op. cit., pp. 43.

⁶⁶ Myers, D., "Brazil: The Quest for South American Leadership" in Myers, D. (ed.), Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Responses (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991): pp. 226 and 262.

Brazil and Argentina), indifference, and formal diplomatic agreements to reach its present state of political cooperation and economic integration. This positive evolution of regional attitudes has strongly influenced the course of Brazil's foreign policy.

From Third World Champion to First World Player

Responding to international, regional, and internal developments, therefore, Brazil entered the nineties with a foreign policy stance that had been almost totally revamped. Changes begun in the mid-eighties had become general policies by 1987-88. At this time, Brazil also began the slow process of economic liberalization required for regional integration. It had also altered its position in the GATT negotiations. In the nineties these new attitudes were reaffirmed, moreover, by the Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco governments.

But if Brazil reformulated its foreign policy strategies, it also kept its general goals, preferences, and ambitions intact. Brazil's flexibility with regard to foreign relations therefore accords with patterns established for newly industrialized middle powers.

On the world stage. In its multilateral dealings, Brazil abandoned its strategy of disagreeing on principle with international claims for rules that met accepted standards of "fairness." It abandoned the Third World stance that a struggle between North and South is basic to international relations. It no longer saw negotiations as tools to freeze world power in the North but rather assessed each negotiation by its own logic. Brazil's current view of the international order seems to be multipolar and diverse.

New models--such as that of emerging markets and a diversified and industry-based economy--have replaced old notions of "developing countries" and "emergent powers." Rather than seeking special privileges and concessions from the developed world, Brazil now seeks to encourage foreign investment and to enter into trade agreements that will open up new markets for export. The new winners in this ideological shift are international organizations and forums, whose value is becoming increasingly clear.

On the regional stage. At the same time the idea of regional economic leadership and the importance of having an effective spokesperson for South America have replaced the old ideal of leading a Third World movement. That Brazil has, indeed, fully accepted the international order can be seen in its shift from traditional foreign policy positions--not only with respect to economic issues--but also with regard to human rights, the environment, and nuclear regulation and control.

When he was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Itamar, Cardoso stated that his government's "opening of markets, attracting overseas investment, approving the Copyright Law, stabilizing relations with the international financial community, and taking the decision to protect the environment and human rights are all impressive policies that place Brazil in a positive light on the international scene."⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Cardoso, F. H., "Política Externa: fatos e perspectivas", in Revista de Política Externa, vol. 2, nº 1, 1993, pp. 10.

Brazil's multilateral activities, moreover, were not restricted to improving its position within the international market. As a country whose economic power had grown well beyond that of the typical middle power, it continued to use its international dealings as a means to achieve its strategy objectives--that is, to increase its regional presence and strengthen its negotiating power. Brazil has insisted, for example, that representation with the UNO be adjusted to reflect the new post-cold war conditions.⁶⁸ Since the end of the Sarney government in September 1989, moreover, Brazil has requested that it be given a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Brazil has also tried to strengthen its international bargaining power through alliances. It has insisted, for instance, on negotiating with the United States regarding "4 + 1 agreements" on hemispheric integration only through Mercado Commun del Sul (MERCOSUL)⁶⁹ or in forums that include all of the countries affected. Brazil is also active in the "Group of Fifteen," an organization of the world's more advanced developing countries. In this way Brazil's foreign policy stance has merged slowly with that of other major emerging markets--that is, obviously attractive areas for investment. It now reflects, therefore, goals more appropriate to a middle power, including the maximization of its international negotiating powers through collective action within the context of multilateral forums.

Once having accepted the international order, Brazil also came to accept political and economic links with the great powers as essential to its development.

⁶⁸ Sardemberg, R. M., "Diplomacia Brasileira tem Participação Ativa na ONU" in Folha de São Paulo, December, 18, 1994, pp. 6-9.

⁶⁹ Soares Lima, M. R. e Hirst, M., "O Brasil e os EUA: os dilemas e dasafios de uma relação complexa" in Fonseca Jr., G. e Castro, S. H. N., Temas de Política Externa Brasileira II, vol 2., Paz e Terra, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 59.

At no time, however, did it abandon the imperative of preserving political and economic autonomy. It continued to distribute its political and economic dealings among the European Community, United States, and Japan.

While dealings with the United States continue to offer the highest probability of conflict, moreover, such conflicts are now far more likely to be handled through diplomatic channels. The open antagonism of the seventies and early eighties is a thing of the past.⁷⁰ In negotiations regarding the establishment of a free trade zone in the Americas, for instance, Brazil and the United States have diverged on matters of timing and scope rather than on the ultimate goal of the proposed agreement. Brazil's aim was to postpone the deadline for this process in order to consolidate its position in MERCOSUL and SAFTA and, thereby, to strengthen its bargaining power.

The United States, however, follows its own agenda, which may or may not accord with that of Brazil. "It is true that the United States," writes Cardoso, "is [Brazil's] single major [trading] partner. Yet a privileged integration [agreement] with it is not impossible, given the dynamism and vitality of our exports to the North American market. We confront there not infrequently, [moreover], a variety of restrictions ... The United States has not opened its market to Brazil. The Bush initiative went no further than discussions with an ex-president ... It is not Brazil that has the key to the North American market..."⁷¹

Another potential area of conflict with the United States is Brazil's decision to diversify the directors of MERCOSUL, which has sought out the European Union

⁷⁰ See Fauriol, G. and Weitrumb, S. "US Policy, Brazil and the Southern Cone" in The Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, n° 3, 1995.

⁷¹ Cardoso, F. H., (1993), op. cit., pp. 8.

and Japan as political and economic partners in an attempt to counterbalance U.S. influence in the region. Under Brazil's influence, in fact, MERCOSUL entered into certain commercial agreements with Europe before negotiating for hemispheric integration with the United States, causing one high-level U.S. official to accuse Brazil of having had a "substantial relapse" in its foreign policy position and of exhibiting "tactical bad faith and procedural irresponsibility."⁷²

Brazil's bilateral relations also changed dramatically in the nineties, and the agreements it made then with small South American states suggest that it was conducting a regional policy independent of its multilateral efforts to achieve hemispheric and international integration. In addition to entering into a cooperation program with the Southern Cone states, for example, Brazil also improved bilateral relations with countries along its northern border. In addition to and parallel with its negotiations for a South American Free Trade Agreement, moreover (and before taking part in the move toward hemispheric integration), Brazil entered into economic and cooperative agreements with Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela.

MERCOSUL. But in contrast to Brazil's regional activities of earlier decades, these more recent regional dealings have had the effect of widening and expanding Brazil's economic integration. From their original cooperation program, for instance, Argentina and Brazil have now forged a common market agreement involving Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In recent years, moreover, Brazil has also been involved in intense negotiations with Bolivia and Chile to devise a plan to establish a common market throughout South America. The

⁷² Citado em Silva, C. E. L., "Comércio Exterior é Foco de Tensão com os EUA", in Folha de São Paulo, March, 29, 1996.

SAFTA project was presented to the MERCOSUL Group by Brazil's President Itamar Franco in 1993 and was subsequently approved by all MERCOSUL countries. Clearly, while Brazil may have abandoned its attempts to dominate the region politically, the goal of expanding its area of influence in the region remains.⁷³

In addition to serving as a regional forum for the discussion of political and economic issues, MERCOSUL has also offered countries of the region a means for reaching consensus in matters of defense. Through MERCOSUL, therefore, several regional agreements have been reached in such security areas as nuclear energy uses and regulation, nuclear submarines, military modernization, etc.⁷⁴

Recent negotiations have shown that South America is a region within, but distinct from, the Latin America. For while Latin America is defined as a unit by similarities in ideology and culture, South America is bound together by a solidarity of political and economic interests.

Until recently the strong U.S. presence there has prevented Brazil from achieving hegemony over the region. But the United States' direct strategic interest in the region declined sharply with the end of the cold war. Nor has it been able to effect--at least in the short term--the preferential linkages needed to integrate the hemisphere into a single economic bloc. In the vacuum created by this diminished U.S. presence, Brazil has managed to expand its own integration program for South America. Today, practically as well as in the context of international negotiations, Brazil is South America's virtual economic and political leader.

⁷³ See Cavagnari, Col. Geraldo, *Estratégia e Defesa (1960-1990)* in *Premissas - Caderno 7, Nucleo de Estudos Estratégicos*, UNICAMP, 1994.

⁷⁴ For a brief analysis of this consensus between the military and the economic areas, see Gonçalves, Colonel Ivan C., *Segurança Hemisférica: Posições e Reflexões*, paper, Inter-American Defense College, 1995; and also *Latin America and Caribbean*, paper, Inter-American Defense College, 1995.

As Cardoso puts it, "When the United States invites Chile to enter NAFTA while Chile is discussing with MERCOSUL ways [for South America] to work together, it is obvious that the United States [does so with the] intention to interfere. It was for this very reason that Brazil created the SAFTA."⁷⁵

Brazil has advanced gradually to its present position of regional leadership. It began by integrating its foreign policy aims and actions with those of Argentina--a partnership that would prove to be the nucleus of its strategy for regional integration. It then helped forge the constitution of MERCOSUL, bringing Uruguay and Paraguay into the policymaking circle. In 1992 Brazil proposed the Amazon Initiative for increased economic cooperation between Brazil and the other countries in the Amazon basin. With Venezuela, for instance, it signed a bilateral agreement for the exploitation of oil. It went on to sign similar cooperative agreements with Bolivia and Peru and in 1993 presented its proposal for a South American Free Trade Agreement. This agreement, which had the support of all MERCOSUL members, consolidated Brazil's plan for continental economic integration.

In this way Brazil--with fewer incentives to offer than the United States and little capacity to influence the decisions of neighboring South American countries--has created a climate in which those countries choose to cooperate with each other rather than to risk entering into uncertain agreements with the United States. Through its determined policy to attract and work with neighboring countries, therefore, Brazil has substantially increased its own international bargaining power in the international arena. According to one European Community report,

⁷⁵ Interview with Fernando H. Cardoso in Folha de São Paulo, December 18, 1994, pp. 6-5.

"MERCOSUL is already showing itself to be a pole of attraction for the other Latin American countries. It is worth noting that Chile and Bolivia have expressed their intention to join MERCOSUL in the near future."⁷⁶

Brazil's strategy to achieve regional economic integration, moreover, parallels its national security strategy. Most of the subregional economic agreements it has helped to design, therefore, include some provision for mutual military cooperation. It also holds out the prospect of South American expansion as a course parallel to those proposed by SAFTA. As such, Brazil would have to assume its "role as a 'moderate power' which its unquestionable position in the make up of the sub-continent confers on it."⁷⁷ "For Brazil," according to Cavagnari, " regional integration is necessary to the extent that it produces political and strategic stability in South America, [and] to the extent that--by reducing Brazil's military commitments in the region--it frees Brazil to shift its priorities and develop the nonmilitary components of its strategic capacity."⁷⁸

Conclusion

Brazil's tendency to seek cooperative arrangements with its neighbors, to act collectively with them in its multilateral dealings, and to support international organizations as forums for both action and debate conform to the general pattern of behavior expected from a newly industrialized middle power. In order to increase its international bargaining power in the late seventies and early eighties, Brazil

⁷⁶ Executive Commission of EEC in the European Parliament, Pour un Renforcement de la Politique de L'Union Européenne a L'égard du MERCOSUR, Working Report, Bruxelles, 1994, pp. 3.

⁷⁷ Col. Gonsalvez, I. C., Segurança Hemisférica: posições e reflexões, mimeo, *Inter-American Defense College* (Washington, D.C.), 1995, pp. 9.

⁷⁸ Cavagnari, G. L., "Proposições para Futura Concepção Estratégica", in Cadernos Premissas, NEE-UNICAMP, n° 1, 1992, pp. 57.

aligned itself with the Third World movement. In late eighties--faced with repeated economic shocks and increasing pressure from the great powers and international markets--Brazil switched its foreign policy focus to achieving South American economic integration.

Brazil's bilateral relations have also followed the basic pattern established for the newly industrialized middle powers. Having accepted that it was necessary to maintain relations with the great powers, Brazil has consistently diversified its dealings among the three major economic blocs to ensure its continued economic, technological, and political autonomy. It has successfully managed its indirect conflict with the United States in part by this diversification strategy and in part by cooperative action with its South American neighbors. In recent years, therefore, Brazil has concentrated its bilateral relations to the South American region in order to keep the great powers at a distance while building a strong negotiating bloc.

Regional relations have therefore played a key role in Brazil's foreign policy strategy. In its attempt to establish South America as an area of international influence, Brazil has devised audacious programs for regional integration. It has been equally active in efforts to reduce the influence of foreign powers within the region.

The shift that took place in Brazil's foreign policy focus during the eighties in response to extraordinary pressures applied by the international system was remarkable enough to be classified as strategic. Yet Brazil managed to make this shift without disturbing its stance as a newly industrialized middle power.