Opening Brief for Appellant/Cross-Appellee - Appellate.net
Opening Brief for Appellant/Cross-Appellee - Appellate.net
Opening Brief for Appellant/Cross-Appellee - Appellate.net
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United States Court of Appeals<br />
<strong>for</strong> the<br />
Third Circuit<br />
��� �<br />
Nos. 05-3409, 05-3586<br />
CGB OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY, INC., d/b/a CGB REHAB, INC.,<br />
– v. –<br />
<strong>Appellee</strong>/<strong>Cross</strong>-<strong>Appellant</strong>,<br />
RHA HEALTH SER INC.; SYMPHONY HEALTH SER; RHA PA NURSING HOMES,<br />
d/b/a PROSPECT PARK REHABILITATION CENTER d/b/a PROSPECT PARK<br />
NURSING CENTER d/b/a PROSPECT PARK HEALTH AND REHABILITATION<br />
RESIDENCE; RHA PENNSYLVANIA NURSING HOMES, INC., d/b/a PEMBROOKE<br />
NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER d/b/a PEMBROOKE NURSING<br />
AND REHABILITATION RESIDENCE f/k/a WEST CHESTER ARMS NURSING<br />
AND REHABILITATION CENTER;<br />
SUNRISE ASSISTED LIVING, INC.; SUNRISE ASSISTED LIVING<br />
MANAGEMENT, INC.,<br />
<strong>Appellant</strong>s/<strong>Cross</strong>-<strong>Appellee</strong>s.<br />
––––––––––––––––––––––––––<br />
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT<br />
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA<br />
OPENING BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES<br />
ANDREW L. FREY<br />
LAUREN R. GOLDMAN<br />
MAYER, BROWN, ROWE & MAW LLP<br />
1675 Broadway<br />
New York, New York 10019<br />
(212) 506-2500<br />
EVAN M. TAGER<br />
MAYER, BROWN, ROWE & MAW LLP<br />
1909 K Street, N.W.<br />
Washington, DC 20006<br />
(202) 263-3240<br />
Attorneys <strong>for</strong> <strong>Appellant</strong>s/<strong>Cross</strong>-<strong>Appellee</strong>s Sunrise Assisted Living, Inc.<br />
and Sunrise Assisted Living Management, Inc.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT<br />
Pursuant to Rule 26.1 and Third Circuit LAR 26.1, appellants/cross-<br />
appellees make the following disclosures:<br />
On May 30, 2003, the appellants/cross-appellees in this case, Sunrise<br />
Assisted Living, Inc. and Sunrise Assisted Living Management, Inc., changed their<br />
names to Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. and Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc.,<br />
respectively.<br />
1) For non-governmental corporate parties please<br />
list all parent corporations. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc.,<br />
a public company traded on the New York Stock<br />
Exchange, owns 100 percent of the stock of Sunrise<br />
Senior Living Management, Inc. Sunrise Senior Living,<br />
Inc. has no parent corporations.<br />
2) For non-governmental corporate parties, please<br />
list all publicly held corporations that hold 10% or more<br />
of the party’s stock. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc., a public<br />
company traded on the New York Stock Exchange, owns<br />
100 percent of the stock of Sunrise Senior Living<br />
Management, Inc.<br />
3) If there is a publicly held corporation which is not<br />
a party to the proceeding be<strong>for</strong>e this Court but which has<br />
a financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding,<br />
please identify all such parties and specify the nature of<br />
the financial interest or interests. Not applicable.<br />
4) This is not a bankruptcy appeal<br />
Dated: March 21, 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
ii<br />
Page<br />
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..........................................................i<br />
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...............................................................................1<br />
JURISDICTION.........................................................................................................2<br />
ISSUE PRESENTED.................................................................................................2<br />
RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS..............................................................2<br />
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................2<br />
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................5<br />
Facts Giving Rise To The Litigation ...............................................................5<br />
The Retrial .....................................................................................................11<br />
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................16<br />
STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................16<br />
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................17<br />
A. Sunrise’s Conduct Barely Registers On The Reprehensibility<br />
Scale ....................................................................................................18<br />
1. Sunrise’s conduct was barely even tortious..............................21<br />
2. None of the BMW factors is present .........................................22<br />
a. The first two factors are undisputed ...............................22<br />
b. Sunrise did not target CGB at all, much less because it<br />
was financially vulnerable..............................................22<br />
c. Sunrise’s tort was an isolated incident ...........................24<br />
d. There was no evidence of intentional malice, trickery,
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
iii<br />
Page<br />
or deceit ..........................................................................27<br />
3. The record contains substantial mitigating evidence................29<br />
a. The tortious conduct took place in the context of<br />
a socially valuable task ...................................................29<br />
b. Sunrise had a good-faith belief that its conduct was<br />
permissible......................................................................30<br />
B. The Ratio Guidepost Confirms The Gross Excessiveness Of<br />
A $2 Million Punishment ....................................................................32<br />
1. The ratio of more than 18:1 is a clear indicator<br />
of excessiveness ........................................................................34<br />
2. The maximum permissible ratio in this case is 1:1...................38<br />
3. The denominator of the ratio is $109,000.................................47<br />
C. The Third BMW Guidepost Confirms The Excessiveness Of The<br />
Award ..................................................................................................51<br />
D. The Punishment Cannot Be Sustained On The Basis Of Sunrise’s<br />
Finances...............................................................................................52<br />
E. The Fact That The Jury Returned A Large Award Has No<br />
Bearing On The Excessiveness Analysis ............................................55<br />
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................57
Cases<br />
TABLE OF CITATIONS<br />
iv<br />
Page<br />
Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc.,<br />
207 A.2d 768 (Pa. 1965) ........................................................................................21<br />
Bach v. First Union Nat’l Bank,<br />
2005 WL 2009272 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2005) ...................................................25, 37<br />
Bains LLC v. ARCO Prods. Co.,<br />
405 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2005) ...............................................................30, 36, 37, 53<br />
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,<br />
517 U.S. 559 (1996)....................................................................................... passim<br />
Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,<br />
394 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2005) .................................................................................42<br />
Cass v. Stephens,<br />
156 S.W.3d 38 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).....................................................................46<br />
Ceimo v. General Am. Life Ins. Co.,<br />
2005 WL 1523445 (9th Cir. June 29, 2005)..........................................................43<br />
CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc.,<br />
357 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2004)...................................................................4, 21, 39, 48<br />
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club,<br />
431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) ......... 50-51<br />
Collins Entm’t Corp. v. Coats & Coats Rental Amusement,<br />
584 S.E.2d 120 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).....................................................................38<br />
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc.,<br />
532 U.S. 424 (2001).........................................................................................16, 17<br />
Czarnik v. Illumina, Inc.,<br />
2004 WL 2757571 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2004)...................................................43
TABLE OF CITATIONS<br />
v<br />
Page<br />
Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co.,<br />
135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736 (Ct. App. 2003) ..................................................................46<br />
FDIC v. Hamilton,<br />
122 F.3d 854 (10th Cir. 1997) ...............................................................................52<br />
Fox v. Aced,<br />
317 P.2d 608 (Cal. 1957) .......................................................................................31<br />
Fresh v. Entertainment U.S.A. of Tennessee, Inc.,<br />
340 F. Supp. 2d 851 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) ...............................................................45<br />
Groom v. Safeway, Inc.,<br />
973 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Wash. 1997)....................................................................52<br />
Henderson v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co.,<br />
695 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1983) .................................................................................31<br />
Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exch.,<br />
842 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. 2004).............................................................................38<br />
In re Heghmann,<br />
316 B.R. 395 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004)......................................................................31<br />
Jones v. Sheahan,<br />
2003 WL 22508171 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003) ........................................................34<br />
Kemezy v. Peters,<br />
79 F.3d 33 (7th Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................54<br />
Kemp v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,<br />
393 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................23<br />
Kluczyk v. Tropicana Prods., Inc.,<br />
847 A.2d 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) ......................................................31
TABLE OF CITATIONS<br />
vi<br />
Page<br />
Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assocs.,<br />
538 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000).......................................................................31<br />
Landsberg v. Scrabble <strong>Cross</strong>word Game Players, Inc.,<br />
802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986) ...............................................................................55<br />
Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson,<br />
701 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 1997)....................................................................................24<br />
Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Co–op., Inc.,<br />
26 S.W.3d 151 (Mo. 2000) ....................................................................................31<br />
Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.,<br />
494 A.2d 1088 (1985) ............................................................................................20<br />
Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.,<br />
347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................34, 53<br />
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,<br />
477 U.S. 299 (1986)...............................................................................................44<br />
Munro v. Golden Rule Ins. Co.,<br />
393 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2004) .................................................................................37<br />
Neibel v. Trans World Assurance Co.,<br />
108 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) ...............................................................................24<br />
Park v. Mobil Oil Guam, Inc.,<br />
2004 WL 2595897 (Guam Nov. 16, 2004)......................................................25, 46<br />
Phelps v. Louisville Water Co.,<br />
103 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. 2003).....................................................................................38<br />
Pierce v. Penman,<br />
515 A.2d 948 (Pa. Super. 1986).............................................................................31
TABLE OF CITATIONS<br />
vii<br />
Page<br />
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American<br />
Coalition of Life Activists,<br />
422 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005) ........................................................................... 35-36<br />
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures,<br />
508 U.S. 49 (1993).................................................................................................29<br />
Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co.,<br />
667 N.W.2d 651 (S.D. 2003) .....................................................................34, 41, 53<br />
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,<br />
359 U.S. 236 (1959)...............................................................................................44<br />
Sheedy v. City of Philadelphia,<br />
2005 WL 375657 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2005) .....................................................50, 51<br />
Sheetz, Inc. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, PLLC,<br />
547 S.E.2d 256 (W. Va. 2001)...............................................................................31<br />
Shiner v. Moriarty,<br />
706 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. 1998)...........................................................................44<br />
Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co.,<br />
113 P.3d 63 (Cal. 2005) ................................................................................. passim<br />
Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp.,<br />
415 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2005) ...............................................................................36<br />
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,<br />
538 U.S. 408 (2003)....................................................................................... passim<br />
Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C.,<br />
377 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2004) .................................................................................46
TABLE OF CITATIONS<br />
viii<br />
Page<br />
Superior Fed. Bank v. Jones & Mackey Constr.Co.,<br />
2005 WL 3307074 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2005) ..................................................38<br />
Taylor Woodrow Homes, Inc. v. Acceptance Ins. Cos.,<br />
2003 WL 21224088 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2003)...............................................46<br />
Textron Fin. Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,<br />
13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Ct. App. 2004) ....................................................................46<br />
United States v. Bailey,<br />
288 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (M.D. Fla. 2003),<br />
aff’d, 419 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005)....................................................................44<br />
United States v. Jackson,<br />
390 U.S. 570 (1968)......................................................................................... 26-27<br />
Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc.,<br />
78 P.3d 570 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)............................................................................46<br />
Watson v. E.S. Sutton, Inc.,<br />
2005 WL 2170659 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005).........................................................43<br />
Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co.,<br />
378 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2004) ...........................................................................42, 43<br />
Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co.,<br />
399 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2004)...........................................................25, 26, 35, 49, 50<br />
Young v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,<br />
2004 WL 2538639 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2004) ........................................................45
Statutes<br />
TABLE OF CITATIONS<br />
ix<br />
Page<br />
28 U.S.C. § 1291........................................................................................................2<br />
28 U.S.C. § 1332........................................................................................................2<br />
Other Authorities<br />
Abraham & Jeffries, Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law:<br />
The Role of the Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415 (1989)....................54
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT<br />
This is an appeal from a retrial that was limited to the question of liability<br />
<strong>for</strong> and amount of punitive damages. Plaintiff’s only claim is that, in the course of<br />
a five-minute meeting, defendants tortiously interfered with the relationship<br />
between plaintiff and several independent contractors that it employed on an at-<br />
will basis. The first jury awarded $109,000 in compensatory damages, an amount<br />
that fully compensated the plaintiff <strong>for</strong> all losses associated with that tortious<br />
interference. The second jury, after hearing an enormous amount of irrelevant and<br />
inflammatory evidence, awarded $30 million in punitive damages. The district<br />
court reduced the award to $2 million – a sum nearly twenty times the amount of<br />
compensatory damages.<br />
Even as reduced, the award is grossly and unconstitutionally excessive. As<br />
this Court held when this case was last be<strong>for</strong>e it, the defendant’s conduct in this<br />
case was barely even tortious. It cannot support more than a very small award of<br />
punitive damages – and certainly does not justify an amount that the Supreme<br />
Court has characterized as “tantamount to a severe criminal penalty.” BMW of N.<br />
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996). The judgment below must be vacated<br />
and the punitive award reduced to no more than the amount of compensatory<br />
damages.
JURISDICTION<br />
This is an appeal from a final judgment that disposes of all parties’ claims.<br />
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court had<br />
jurisdiction of this diversity action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Defendants’<br />
post-trial motion was denied in part and granted in part on July 7, 2004. They filed<br />
a timely notice of appeal on July 12, 2005.<br />
ISSUE PRESENTED<br />
Whether a $2 million punitive damages award – which is more than 18 times<br />
the $109,000 award of compensatory damages – is unconstitutionally excessive<br />
punishment <strong>for</strong> defendants’ tortious interference with plaintiff’s at-will<br />
relationships with its employees.<br />
RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS<br />
As discussed below (at pages 3-4), this case was be<strong>for</strong>e this Court in 2004.<br />
The Court’s opinion appears at 357 F.3d 375. Additionally, plaintiff has cross-<br />
appealed from the judgment below. The cross-appeal is docketed as No. 05-3586.<br />
STATEMENT OF THE CASE<br />
Plaintiff-appellee CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. (“CGB”), which is<br />
owned and operated by Cindy Brillman, provided therapy services to two nursing<br />
home facilities in Pennsylvania that were owned by RHA Pennsylvania Nursing<br />
Homes (“RHA”). Both facilities were managed by Sunrise Assisted Living<br />
2
Management, Inc., a subsidiary of Sunrise Assisted Living, Inc. 1 (Both Sunrise<br />
entities will be referred to collectively as “Sunrise.”) In 1998, RHA terminated<br />
CGB’s contract.<br />
CGB filed suit in the U.S. District Court <strong>for</strong> the Eastern District of<br />
Pennsylvania against both RHA and Sunrise. CGB alleged that (inter alia) Sunrise<br />
had tortiously interfered with its contractual relationships with (i) RHA and<br />
(ii) several of the therapists at the Prospect Park facility. RHA, which had by then<br />
gone bankrupt, settled with CGB prior to trial; the claims against Sunrise went<br />
<strong>for</strong>ward. In June 2002, a jury awarded CGB $685,000 in compensatory damages<br />
and $1.3 million in punitive damages – a ratio of less than 2:1. $576,000 of the<br />
compensatory award was attributed to the claim <strong>for</strong> tortious interference with the<br />
contract between RHA and CGB, and $109,000 was attributed to the claim <strong>for</strong><br />
tortious interference with the at-will employment relationship between CGB and<br />
its therapists. The district court entered judgment on the jury’s verdicts, and<br />
Sunrise appealed.<br />
This Court reversed the verdict <strong>for</strong> tortious interference with the contract<br />
between CGB and RHA. CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs.,<br />
1 On May 30, 2003, Sunrise Assisted Living, Inc. and Sunrise Assisted Living<br />
Management, Inc. changed their names to Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. and Sunrise<br />
Senior Living Management, Inc., respectively, to reflect the increased scope of<br />
their operations.<br />
3
Inc., 357 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2004). It held that, as a matter of law, Sunrise could<br />
not have tortiously interfered with that contract, because it was acting as RHA’s<br />
agent, and an agent cannot interfere with a contract between its principal and a<br />
third party. Id. at 385-88. The Court affirmed the $109,000 compensatory award<br />
<strong>for</strong> tortious interference with the relationship between CGB and its therapists<br />
(which Sunrise has paid). Because it was impossible to tell what portion of the<br />
$1.3 million punitive award was attributable to the invalid claim, the Court<br />
remanded <strong>for</strong> a new trial limited to the issues of liability <strong>for</strong> and amount of<br />
punitive damages. At the second trial, the jury awarded CGB $30 million in<br />
punitive damages.<br />
On January 28, 2005, Sunrise timely moved <strong>for</strong> a new trial, contending<br />
among other things, that the jury’s finding of liability <strong>for</strong> punitive damages was<br />
against the weight of the evidence and that the verdict was the product of passion<br />
and prejudice. In the alternative, Sunrise asked the court to reduce the award to a<br />
constitutionally permissible amount. The district court denied Sunrise’s motion <strong>for</strong><br />
a new trial but reduced the punitive damages from $30 million to $2 million. In<br />
the current appeal, Sunrise is challenging that $2 million judgment. The plaintiff<br />
has filed a cross-appeal, seeking reinstatement of the verdict or an enhancement of<br />
the existing $2 million figure.<br />
4
STATEMENT OF FACTS<br />
Facts Giving Rise To The Litigation<br />
RHA owned two nursing home facilities in Pennsylvania, one in West<br />
Chester (the “Pembrooke” facility) and the other in Prospect Park. During the<br />
relevant time period, both facilities were managed by Sunrise. Pursuant to its<br />
contracts with RHA, Sunrise was responsible <strong>for</strong>, inter alia, procuring and<br />
coordinating the therapy services that were provided to patients at the two<br />
facilities. JA320-322.<br />
On January 1, 1995, CGB entered into a contract with RHA to provide<br />
physical, occupational, and speech therapy services to the Pembrooke facility. The<br />
parties entered into a similar contract with regard to the Prospect Park facility on<br />
October 7, 1996. Under those contracts, RHA paid CGB an hourly billable rate <strong>for</strong><br />
the therapists’ services, not a flat monthly fee. JA435-439; JA440-444; JA339.<br />
Each agreement also included a “no-raiding” clause, which barred RHA from<br />
recruiting CGB’s therapists <strong>for</strong> a twelve-month period after termination of the<br />
contract. JA435-439; JA440-444. The therapists were independent contractors<br />
who were employed by CGB on an at-will basis.<br />
RHA and Sunrise were very happy with the quality of CGB’s therapists, and<br />
the contractual relationship proceeded smoothly <strong>for</strong> several years. During that<br />
time, the therapists <strong>for</strong>med close personal relationships with RHA’s patients, many<br />
5
of whom were elderly and frail. Marjorie Tomes, Sunrise’s executive director <strong>for</strong><br />
the Prospect Park facility, thought that the therapists “did an outstanding job” and<br />
were good <strong>for</strong> the facility. JA336. Michael Gasiewski, the head Prospect Park<br />
therapist, confirmed that “a close knit family-type environment existed between the<br />
patients and the [CGB] therapists.” 1/12/05 Tr. 100.<br />
In 1998, however, changes to the federal Medicare system altered RHA’s<br />
business dramatically. RHA’s CFO, John West, testified that under the old<br />
regulations, Medicare had simply reimbursed RHA <strong>for</strong> its costs. Under the new<br />
system, however, the government would “give us a flat rate <strong>for</strong> a specific type of<br />
service and what they deem [an appropriate] level of care at which point, whatever<br />
we spent on that level of service was our problem or our benefit. *** Based on<br />
our review of the PPS Regulations it appeared there was going to be a tighter<br />
payment schedule <strong>for</strong> overall nursing services including the therapy component.”<br />
JA340-342; see also JA207-208. RHA believed that CGB’s per-hour pricing<br />
structure was incompatible with the new regulations. Ibid. CGB, however, was<br />
unable or unwilling to modify its business practices or rates in light of the new<br />
regulations. JA210-211. Accordingly, on June 30, 1998, at RHA’s direction<br />
Sunrise notified CGB in writing that RHA had decided to terminate the Pembrooke<br />
and Prospect Park contracts effective September 30, 1998. JA446. The letter<br />
attributed the decision to “changes in the [Medicare reimbursement] system.” Id.<br />
6
On July 1, 1998, Sunrise executed an agreement on RHA’s behalf with Symphony<br />
Health Services, Inc. (“Symphony”), under which Symphony became the new<br />
therapy services provider at both the Pembrooke and Prospect Park facilities.<br />
John West instructed Tomes that she should make the transition to<br />
Symphony as smooth as possible <strong>for</strong> the patients and staff at Prospect Park, but<br />
that she should not recruit CGB staff members. JA209. In late July, Tomes<br />
learned from the Prospect Park director of nursing, Debbie Melella, that rumors<br />
were circulating among the therapists about the termination of CGB’s contract, and<br />
that those rumors were negatively affecting patient care: as Tomes explained it,<br />
the therapists “felt that they were not able to function effectively in caring <strong>for</strong> our<br />
residents because they may not be there tomorrow.” JA332; JA338. Tomes was<br />
concerned that these rumors would intensify over the following few weeks,<br />
because Symphony was preparing to take over therapy services and would soon<br />
begin making visits in order to “assess the facility <strong>for</strong> what equipment they needed<br />
to bring in.” JA330. Tomes was also worried that the patients would suffer stress<br />
and anxiety if they had to adjust to an entirely new set of therapists when<br />
Symphony took over. 1/12/05 Tr.101-102.<br />
Tomes testified that, with these concerns in mind, she sought legal and<br />
practical advice from Craig Knaup, RHA’s in-house counsel and Medicare expert,<br />
about exactly what she could tell the therapists. JA332-JA336. Knaup told her<br />
7
that she could not recruit the therapists, but that she could provide them with<br />
certain specific in<strong>for</strong>mation about the termination of CGB’s contract. After<br />
speaking to Knaup, Tomes’ understanding was<br />
JA335.<br />
[t]hat I could in<strong>for</strong>m the therapists that the contract had been canceled<br />
and the effective date. I could let them know that if they had an<br />
interest to be interviewed by Symphony, that they could sign a piece<br />
of paper with their name and phone number. And then, finally, that it<br />
was not at all to do with per<strong>for</strong>mance. It was absolutely an economic<br />
decision.<br />
Accordingly, on July 31, 1998, Tomes held a five-minute meeting with<br />
several of CGB’s therapists. The meeting took place in Tomes’ office, which had<br />
a glass door. She in<strong>for</strong>med the therapists that CGB’s contracts with RHA were<br />
being terminated because RHA believed that CGB’s pricing structure was<br />
incompatible with new Medicare regulations, and that Symphony would be<br />
retained as the new therapy service provider both at Prospect Park and at the<br />
Pembrooke facility. Tomes then provided the therapists with a “sign-up sheet” on<br />
which they could leave their names and contact in<strong>for</strong>mation if they wished to talk<br />
to Symphony. None of the therapists testified that Tomes attempted to persuade<br />
anyone to leave CGB. Rather, she simply relayed to them that (i) CGB’s contract<br />
had been terminated and (ii) employment opportunities might be available with<br />
Symphony. See JA457-JA460. Soon after the meeting, one of the therapists<br />
8
apparently in<strong>for</strong>med Brillman, who called Tomes less than two hours later to<br />
complain. JA340-341.<br />
Apart from that five-minute meeting, CGB alleged only two other acts of<br />
interference with its at-will relationship with the therapists: (i) Tomes’ provision<br />
of a conference room at the facility <strong>for</strong> Symphony to meet with the therapists when<br />
Symphony came to inspect the facility prior to the starting date of its contract, and<br />
(ii) Tomes’ statement to Symphony that one of the therapists, Michael Gasiewski,<br />
merited a higher salary than Symphony had offered him. JA47-48.<br />
On June 30, 1998, RHA’s in-house counsel Knaup sent a letter to CGB<br />
reiterating that RHA had decided to terminate the contracts as a result of the<br />
change in the Medicare regulations and that its decision was final. JA481-482. In<br />
response to Brillman’s complaint that Sunrise had been interfering with her<br />
employees, Knaup explained:<br />
[W]e did no such thing, but merely in<strong>for</strong>med your<br />
employees when it was more than apparent that you had<br />
not – that your contract was canceled effective<br />
September 30, 1998. We did so only because our new<br />
provider of services was scheduled to inspect the facility<br />
and discuss arrangements with administration and staff of<br />
the provision of services scheduled to begin on October<br />
1st, 1998.<br />
We asked you to do so and in<strong>for</strong>m your staff, realizing<br />
the new provider’s appearance would raise questions in<br />
your staff’s mind, and wanting only not to disrupt service<br />
to the residents. At no time did the facility expect to start<br />
9
their own therapy department, nor was any offer of<br />
employment ever extended.<br />
Id. 2 According to John West, the word “we” referred to RHA Pennsylvania and<br />
Sunrise, which “was acting as our agent.” JA403. Nevertheless, throughout<br />
August 1998 Brillman sent letters to and left telephone messages <strong>for</strong> various RHA<br />
and Sunrise employees. She complained about Tomes’ meeting with the<br />
therapists, sought more in<strong>for</strong>mation about the reasons <strong>for</strong> termination, and<br />
requested its reversal. CGB’s counsel, moreover, sent a letter to Tomes stating that<br />
her meeting with the therapists appeared to have constituted tortious interference<br />
and a breach of the contract between RHA and CGB. JA461-462.<br />
Several of CGB’s therapists signed contracts with Symphony during<br />
September 1998 but continued working <strong>for</strong> CGB until the RHA contracts were<br />
terminated. Without the RHA contracts, CGB simply did not have work <strong>for</strong> its<br />
therapists. 1/12/05 Tr.104; JA394-395. Although Brillman testified that she<br />
would have placed a second mortgage on her home in order to continue paying the<br />
therapists, and that she would have provided them with clerical work or manual<br />
labor in order to keep them busy, she did not have work <strong>for</strong> them that would be<br />
appropriate <strong>for</strong> their skill levels. JA174-178. Significantly, the therapists who<br />
2 See also JA460 (statement of CGB therapist Robin Ferrara) (“The reason<br />
Marjorie [Tomes] gave <strong>for</strong> meeting us in the first place was so that if/when we saw<br />
strange people coming through rehab dep’t we knew who they were.”).<br />
10
worked at the Pembrooke facility – who were not “solicited” in any way by<br />
Sunrise – also left CGB <strong>for</strong> other employment. JA175-176.<br />
The Retrial<br />
Sunrise is not seeking a new trial on this appeal because the expense of a<br />
third trial is likely to exceed the amount that this Court determines to be the<br />
maximum constitutionally permissible punishment. Nevertheless, we briefly<br />
discuss a number of evidentiary, instructional, and other errors that took place<br />
during the proceedings below, because those errors help explain the jury’s decision<br />
to return a punitive damages award of $30 million in this case involving a<br />
relatively minor tort that caused, at most, $109,000 worth of purely economic<br />
harm.<br />
Pursuant to this Court’s order, the only tortious conduct properly at issue in<br />
the retrial was Sunrise’s interference with CGB’s contractual relationships with its<br />
therapists – specifically, Marjorie Tomes’ five-minute meeting with the therapists;<br />
her conversation with Symphony regarding Michael Gasiewski’s salary; and her<br />
decision to allow Symphony to interview therapists at the facility. Notably,<br />
however, most of the evidence that CGB put be<strong>for</strong>e the jury (over the objections of<br />
defense counsel) had nothing to do with that conduct.<br />
First, plaintiff’s counsel elicited a great deal of irrelevant and prejudicial<br />
testimony about the wealth of Sunrise and its officers – though, notably, not the<br />
11
less well-compensated Marjorie Tomes, who was the only Sunrise employee<br />
accused of soliciting CGB’s therapists. Plaintiff’s counsel questioned Sunrise’s<br />
senior officers at length about the exercise of their stock options and about the<br />
amount that Sunrise spent <strong>for</strong> executives’ personal use of a corporate jet. JA292-<br />
293; JA266-271. Plaintiff’s counsel introduced and emphasized Sunrise’s<br />
corporate financial data – particularly its gross revenues. In his summation,<br />
counsel wove all this irrelevant in<strong>for</strong>mation into a rousing indictment of Sunrise<br />
<strong>for</strong> being a large and successful company:<br />
JA426-428.<br />
When you sit here deliberating <strong>for</strong> $40 and a sandwich<br />
and mileage, they are making $4.1 million [per day].<br />
*** We’re talking about big numbers here because we<br />
think you have to get up in the stratosphere that [Sunrise<br />
officers] fl[y] around in and make [them] understand that<br />
this was wrong. You have to show the other corporate<br />
executives out there in billion dollar companies that you<br />
cannot just squash a little company like an ant and keep<br />
right on rolling. You have to send a message that will be<br />
heard on Wall Street. *** You have to consider the<br />
wealth of the defendants. You also have to consider<br />
compensatory damages, but the Judge will tell you that’s<br />
just one small subset.<br />
Plaintiff’s counsel also repeatedly complained to the jury about how long it<br />
had taken CGB to collect the $109,000 in compensatory damages. He blamed<br />
Sunrise <strong>for</strong> that delay, arguing that Sunrise had done something wrong by choosing<br />
to defend itself in court. In his opening argument, he told the jury to “look at the<br />
12
way Sunrise has treated CGB since 1998. 1998. It is here 2005. *** We have<br />
fought years of litigation with this company. *** It’s not easy to be a party in<br />
litigation. It’s not cheap.” JA44; JA51. Counsel repeated the tactic during<br />
summation. “What matters is how much time, how much anxiety, stress, money, it<br />
took Cindy Brillman to fight <strong>for</strong> what was right, to get that little bit of money.”<br />
JA425.<br />
This emphasis on litigation conduct dovetailed with plaintiff’s resurrection<br />
of veil-piercing issues that were litigated in the first trial but had no legitimate role<br />
in this proceeding. During the trial, plaintiff’s counsel elicited extensive testimony<br />
about Sunrise’s corporate structure and insinuated that the structure had not<br />
“compl[ied] with the federal securities laws” (JA234) and had been established in<br />
order to “maintain [a] façade,” to deceive investors, and to “lie to the public.” See,<br />
e.g., JA215-252. Sunrise’s corporate structure, which is typical of a large<br />
corporation and which has never been shown to be wrongful in any way, had<br />
nothing whatsoever to do with the tortious interference claim at issue. Yet<br />
plaintiff’s counsel relied heavily upon it, contending in his opening argument that<br />
“not only did CGB have to pierce the corporate veil and break through that to get<br />
to the truth, but anybody else would as well. That is very, very important. When<br />
we talk about telling the truth and taking responsibility, keep that in mind.” JA52.<br />
He closed his summation by asking: “How are they going to be held responsible<br />
13
<strong>for</strong> their actions when they are allowed to assert all this and drag a little company<br />
like CGB through the muck <strong>for</strong> two and a half years and have a determination that<br />
Sunrise is responsible <strong>for</strong> [the] actions of Sunrise [Management]? One is just the<br />
alter ego of the other. It took two and a half years to prove that.” JA429.<br />
Finally, plaintiff’s counsel complained bitterly about Sunrise’s treatment of<br />
CGB in connection with the termination of the contracts – conduct <strong>for</strong> which this<br />
Court specifically held that Sunrise could not be punished. He claimed that<br />
Sunrise had acted wrongfully by failing to apprise Cindy Brillman of the true<br />
reasons <strong>for</strong> the termination and by refusing to allow her to cure any problems:<br />
JA421-422.<br />
In considering the conduct of Sunrise relating to that<br />
termination, the reason <strong>for</strong> the determination given to<br />
CGB was incorrect. Marjorie Tomes knew it was<br />
incorrect and she had known because back in April,<br />
Cindy Brillman told her she could comply with Medicare<br />
and PPS and in June, immediately after the termination<br />
letters were sent out, Cindy Brillman called and said<br />
what is this all about? What is this the [sic] basis <strong>for</strong> the<br />
termination? This is not proper cause. *** What was<br />
the one thing that Cindy Brillman was never told in June<br />
of 1998? *** You think maybe Marjorie Tomes should<br />
have told Cindy Brillman she had already signed a<br />
contract with Symphony be<strong>for</strong>e the termination letter<br />
went out?<br />
To compound the problems created by counsel’s flagrantly improper<br />
argument, the district court refused to give the jury instructions that Sunrise<br />
requested, which were drawn directly from State Farm Mutual Automobile<br />
14
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). Instead, the court simply<br />
instructed the jury that in assessing punitive damages, it should consider (i) the<br />
“character of the defendant’s act”; (ii) the “nature and the extent of the harm to the<br />
plaintiff,” including “the plaintiff’s trouble and expense in seeking to protect its<br />
interests in legal proceedings and in this suit”; and (iii) “the wealth of the<br />
defendants insofar as it is relevant in fixing an amount that will punish it and others<br />
from [sic] like conduct in the future.” JA430; see also JA45 (“Should you decide<br />
to punish Sunrise, you will also need to think about its wealth.”). The court<br />
specifically downplayed the importance of the amount of compensatory damages:<br />
“So long as it is reasonable, the amount you assess as punitive damages, if any,<br />
need not bear any relationship to the amount of compensatory damages. As I<br />
have just said, this is one of the factors that you must consider, should you choose<br />
to award punitive damages. Again, there is not some magical multiplier or divider<br />
that you should employ.” JA430-431; see also JA46 (“[Y]ou must remember that<br />
your award of punitive damages, if any, does not need to bear a proportional<br />
relationship to the award of compensatory damages.”).<br />
After hearing all of this irrelevant, inflammatory evidence and argument,<br />
and after being instructed to base its punitive award on Sunrise’s financial<br />
resources and to discount the importance of the amount of compensatory damages,<br />
the jury awarded CGB $30 million in punitive damages.<br />
15
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT<br />
The touchstone of the due process analysis is that “the measure of<br />
punishment [must be] both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to<br />
the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426.<br />
CGB’s compensatory damages <strong>for</strong> its injuries, which were entirely economic, were<br />
$109,000. Sunrise’s conduct was barely even tortious, and certainly cannot<br />
support more than a small amount of punitive damages. The award entered by the<br />
district court, however, is nearly 20 times the compensatory damages award.<br />
Under State Farm, in a case like this one – in which the compensatory damages are<br />
substantial and the defendant’s conduct was minimally reprehensible – the<br />
maximum constitutionally-permissible ratio of punitive to compensatory damages<br />
is no more than 1:1.<br />
STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW<br />
This Court reviews the district court’s application of the BMW guideposts de<br />
novo. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001). In<br />
so doing, the Court should review the evidence in an evenhanded manner and not<br />
take the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In Cooper Industries,<br />
the Court observed that “the level of punitive damages is not really a ‘fact’ ‘tried’<br />
by the jury,” but instead “is an expression of [the jury’s] moral condemnation.”<br />
532 U.S. at 432, 437 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the course of holding<br />
16
that appellate review of a trial court’s application of the BMW guideposts is de<br />
novo, the Court indicated that reviewing courts must accept “specific findings of<br />
fact” by the jury (id. at 439 n.12 (emphasis added)), thereby implying that, in the<br />
absence of such findings, reviewing courts must resolve <strong>for</strong> themselves factual<br />
issues bearing on the application of the three guideposts. As the Cali<strong>for</strong>nia<br />
Supreme Court recently explained, when the jury has made “no *** express<br />
finding” on a particular issue bearing on application of the BMW guideposts, “to<br />
infer one from the size of the award would be inconsistent with de novo review, <strong>for</strong><br />
the award’s size would thereby indirectly justify itself.” Simon v. San Paolo U.S.<br />
Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 70 (Cal. 2005). Accordingly, “[w]hile [courts must]<br />
defer to express jury findings supported by the evidence, in the absence of an<br />
express finding on the question [they] must independently decide” whether the fact<br />
at issue has been established. Id. at 72. There were no such findings in this case.<br />
ARGUMENT<br />
The Supreme Court has characterized a $2 million award as “tantamount to a<br />
severe criminal penalty” (BMW, 517 U.S. at 585), which can be warranted only in<br />
cases of “egregiously improper conduct” (id. at 580). This is not such a case. The<br />
conduct at issue here was, at worst, an isolated incident of non-iniquitous tortious<br />
interference with an at-will relationship that caused $109,000 in purely economic<br />
17
harm and that has no broader societal implications. Such conduct simply cannot<br />
support a $2 million punitive award.<br />
In BMW, the Supreme Court identified three “guideposts” <strong>for</strong> determining<br />
whether a punitive award is unconstitutionally excessive: (i) the degree of<br />
reprehensibility of the conduct; (ii) the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages;<br />
and (iii) the legislatively established fines <strong>for</strong> comparable conduct. In State Farm<br />
the Court refined and amplified the “guidepost” analysis. In this case, application<br />
of the guideposts confirms that a $2 million punishment is unconstitutionally<br />
excessive and that the maximum permissible punitive award is no more than the<br />
amount of the compensatory damages – $109,000.<br />
A. Sunrise’s Conduct Barely Registers On The Reprehensibility<br />
Scale.<br />
In gauging reprehensibility, it is necessary to limit the focus to the conduct<br />
that is legitimately at issue here – Sunrise’s interference with CGB’s at-will<br />
relationship with its therapists. Plaintiff’s counsel succeeded in convincing both<br />
the jury and the district court to impose punishment based on a host of irrelevant<br />
and improper factors: Sunrise’s finances; the circumstances surrounding the<br />
termination of CGB’s contracts with RHA (<strong>for</strong> which, this Court held, Sunrise is<br />
not liable at all, much less subject to punishment); Sunrise’s alleged refusal to<br />
respond to Cindy Brillman’s requests <strong>for</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation after the contracts had been<br />
terminated; and the discovery disputes that took place prior to the first trial. Those<br />
18
matters had nothing to do with the tortious conduct giving rise to punitive liability,<br />
and they there<strong>for</strong>e cannot <strong>for</strong>m the basis <strong>for</strong> punishment. “The reprehensibility<br />
guidepost does not permit courts to expand the scope of the case so that a<br />
defendant may be punished <strong>for</strong> any malfeasance.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424.<br />
Rather, evidence is pertinent to the “reprehensibility” of the tort only when it bears<br />
a specific nexus to the conduct underlying the plaintiff’s claim. See id. at 422-23<br />
(“A defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was<br />
premised, may not serve as the basis <strong>for</strong> punitive damages. A defendant should be<br />
punished <strong>for</strong> the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not <strong>for</strong> being an unsavory<br />
individual or business.”).<br />
The conduct that is properly at issue here is at most marginally<br />
reprehensible, and there<strong>for</strong>e cannot support a large award of punitive damages. As<br />
the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]hat conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to<br />
give rise to tort liability, and even a modest award of exemplary damages does not<br />
establish the high degree of culpability that warrants a substantial punitive<br />
damages award.” BMW, 517 U.S. at 580; see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419<br />
(“The most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award<br />
is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”) (internal quotation<br />
marks and alterations omitted). Thus, the reprehensibility inquiry examines how<br />
far in excess of the threshold <strong>for</strong> punitive damages the defendant’s conduct is.<br />
19
In State Farm, the Supreme Court identified five non-exclusive factors that<br />
bear on the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct: whether (i) “the<br />
harm caused was physical as opposed to economic”; (ii) “the tortious conduct<br />
evinced an indifference to or reckless disregard of the health or safety of others”;<br />
(iii) “the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability”; (iv) “the conduct<br />
involved repeated action or was an isolated incident”; and (v) “the harm was the<br />
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.” 538 U.S. at 419.<br />
Importantly, the Court added, “[t]he existence of any one of these factors weighing<br />
in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award;<br />
and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.” Id.<br />
Here, not a single one of the five reprehensibility factors is present. And<br />
there is much mitigating evidence on the other side of the ledger. Under<br />
Pennsylvania law, punitive damages are available only <strong>for</strong> conduct that was<br />
“outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to<br />
the rights of others.” Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096<br />
(1985). To the extent that Sunrise’s conduct crossed that threshold at all, it surely<br />
did so only by the thinnest of margins, and hence falls on the far low end of the<br />
reprehensibility spectrum.<br />
20
1. Sunrise’s conduct was barely even tortious.<br />
In the prior appeal in this case, this Court recognized that the facts alleged<br />
by CGB were barely sufficient to support a claim that Sunrise had tortiously<br />
interfered with the contracts between CGB and its therapists. Interference by a<br />
third party (here, Sunrise) in the relationship between an employer and its at-will<br />
employees is ordinarily not actionable unless “the purpose of such enticement is to<br />
cripple and destroy an integral part of a competitive business organization rather<br />
than to obtain the services of particularly gifted or skilled employees” or to have<br />
“the employees commit wrongs, such as disclosing their <strong>for</strong>mer employer’s trade<br />
secrets or enticing away his customers.” 357 F.3d at 388 (quoting Albee Homes,<br />
Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 207 A.2d 768, 771 (Pa. 1965)). CGB proved none of<br />
those things. This Court reasoned, however, that the claim could stand because by<br />
soliciting CGB’s therapists Sunrise breached its fiduciary duty to RHA. 357 F.3d<br />
at 388-89. As the Court saw it, because the breach of fiduciary duty to RHA made<br />
Sunrise’s solicitation of the therapists independently wrongful, it could support tort<br />
liability under Section 768 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.<br />
But the breach of fiduciary duty itself was not egregious; if it had been,<br />
surely RHA would have sought redress from Sunrise. And, contrary to the district<br />
court’s suggestion that Sunrise acted wrongfully by “exhibiting virtually total<br />
disregard <strong>for</strong> the instructions of its principal” (JA12), Sunrise cannot be punished<br />
21
<strong>for</strong> that breach in this litigation. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423 (“[d]ue process<br />
does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the<br />
merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of<br />
the reprehensibility analysis”). CGB could not and did not show that Sunrise’s<br />
conduct toward it was highly reprehensible.<br />
2. None of the BMW factors is present.<br />
None of the BMW reprehensibility factors is present in this case. As the<br />
Supreme Court observed in State Farm, the “absence of all of them renders any<br />
award” – and certainly an award that is nearly 20 times the substantial<br />
compensatory damages award – “suspect.” Id. at 419.<br />
a. The first two factors are undisputed.<br />
As the district court recognized, there can be no denying that Sunrise did not<br />
inflict physical injury on plaintiff (a corporation). See JA12. There similarly is no<br />
basis <strong>for</strong> finding that the defendant disregarded a risk to health or safety. Id.<br />
Indeed, the evidence demonstrated that Sunrise acted out of concern <strong>for</strong> the health<br />
and safety of its patients.<br />
b. Sunrise did not target CGB at all, much less because it<br />
was financially vulnerable.<br />
The district court’s determination that “[p]laintiff here was financially<br />
vulnerable” (JA12) is belied by the record: According to plaintiff, CGB was a<br />
successful, if small, company. JA142; JA424. And Brillman herself is an<br />
22
educated and sophisticated businessperson who was represented by competent<br />
legal counsel at all relevant times. See JA461-462. CGB clearly was not among<br />
“the weakest of the herd – the elderly, the poor, and other consumers who are least<br />
knowledgeable about their rights and thus most vulnerable to trickery or deceit.”<br />
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks<br />
omitted).<br />
Even if the district court had been correct that CGB was financially<br />
vulnerable, that circumstance would not tip this factor in plaintiff’s favor. The<br />
important inquiry <strong>for</strong> purposes of this factor is whether Sunrise intentionally<br />
targeted CGB because it was financially vulnerable. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 576<br />
(“infliction of economic injury, especially when *** the target is financially<br />
vulnerable, can warrant a substantial penalty”) (emphasis added). Unlike in other<br />
cases in which this factor has been invoked as a justification <strong>for</strong> a substantial<br />
punitive award, there is no evidence that Sunrise was motivated by CGB’s lack of<br />
resources. Cf. Kemp v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir.<br />
2004) (“We think the trial court was also justified in finding that AT&T intended<br />
to target financially vulnerable individuals given the jury’s finding of fraud.<br />
AT&T’s ef<strong>for</strong>ts to misleadingly represent gambling debts, which were illegal<br />
under Georgia law, as legitimate charges <strong>for</strong> long distance calls could be deemed<br />
by a jury to be designed to exploit customers who were unsophisticated and<br />
23
economically vulnerable.”) (emphasis added); Neibel v. Trans World Assurance<br />
Co., 108 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding scheme to prey on “Joe Lunch<br />
Buckets” sufficiently reprehensible to justify a $500,000 punitive award); Life Ins.<br />
Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 526-29 (Ala. 1997) (reducing what<br />
originally was a $15 million punishment to $3 million where defendant engaged in<br />
a pattern of selling worthless Medicare supplement policies to “elderly,<br />
uneducated, single black women”).<br />
c. Sunrise’s tort was an isolated incident.<br />
CGB presented no evidence of “repeated misconduct of the sort that injured<br />
[the plaintiff].” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. Nor could it. This was an isolated<br />
incident of tortious interference, which did not even extend to the other RHA<br />
facility that Sunrise was operating; there is not a shred of evidence that Sunrise has<br />
engaged in such conduct at any other time.<br />
The district court asserted that Sunrise was a recidivist because it allegedly<br />
“refused to be held responsible <strong>for</strong> its actions, ignoring and rebuffing Plaintiff and<br />
presenting countless obstacles to rapid resolution of Plaintiff’s claims.” JA9; see<br />
also JA7 (“There was also testimony on Defendant’s treatment of Plaintiff<br />
throughout the course of their relationship – and this testimony certainly was not<br />
favorable to Defendant.”); JA12 (“the evidence tells a tale of repeated stalling and<br />
dishonesty, starting from the initial interference with Plaintiff’s relationships with<br />
24
her therapists and extending to the eve of the first trial”). That analysis, however,<br />
misperceives what the BMW Court meant by “repeated misconduct.” As this Court<br />
recently explained, “[t]he ‘repeated conduct’ cited in [BMW] involved not merely a<br />
pattern of contemptible conduct within one extended transaction (i.e., the sale of<br />
one automobile to Dr. Gore), but rather specific instances of similar conduct by the<br />
defendant in relation to other parties.” Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins.<br />
Co., 399 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Bach v. First<br />
Union Nat’l Bank, 2005 WL 2009272, at *9 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2005) (“It appears<br />
that the Supreme Court has interpreted this factor to require that the similar<br />
reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than<br />
repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.”); Park<br />
v. Mobil Oil Guam, Inc., 2004 WL 2595897, at *12-*16 (Guam Nov. 16, 2004)<br />
(“T]he Supreme Court cases refer to the frequency of past similar conduct of the<br />
defendant in question, similar to a repeat offender status in a criminal case.”);<br />
Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 76 (Cal. 2005) (repeated-<br />
misconduct factor was not present because, even though “the evidence showed<br />
deceptive conduct *** spanning many weeks,” the tortious act was based on “a<br />
single false promise [with] no evidence [that the defendant] had acted similarly<br />
toward other potential buyers”).<br />
25
This case does not even involve the pattern of stonewalling that the Willow<br />
Inn Court viewed as “relevant, but with less <strong>for</strong>ce.” See 399 F.3d at 231. Willow<br />
Inn was a bad-faith insurance coverage action. The defendant insurer owed the<br />
plaintiff policyholder a fiduciary duty, and its refusal to respond to repeated<br />
demands <strong>for</strong> reimbursement constituted a breach of the insurance contract, a<br />
violation of Pennsylvania’s bad faith insurance statute, and a tort. Id. at 233. By<br />
contrast, there is nothing in the least bit wrongful about Sunrise’s refusal to<br />
respond to inquiries from CGB, a business with which it was engaged in an arm’s-<br />
length relationship. Sunrise owed no duty to CGB, and certainly had no obligation<br />
to discuss matters as to which CGB had already explicitly threatened litigation.<br />
See JA461-462 (August 3, 1998 letter from CGB’s counsel to Tomes, suggesting<br />
that the dispute would “go into litigation as, <strong>for</strong> example, a suit against you<br />
personally and Sunrise, your employer, <strong>for</strong> tortious interference with contract”).<br />
Thus, to the extent that the district court was referring to Sunrise’s alleged refusal<br />
to return Brillman’s calls, its reliance on that conduct as a basis <strong>for</strong> punishment<br />
was misplaced. Even if that refusal was impolite, it was not legally wrongful.<br />
Nor can Sunrise be punished <strong>for</strong> refusing to settle this case, as the district<br />
court implied (and as plaintiff’s counsel improperly argued to the jury). A party’s<br />
decision to defend itself in court cannot be characterized as “stonewalling,” and<br />
cannot <strong>for</strong>m the basis <strong>for</strong> punishment. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,<br />
26
583 (1968) (holding that it is unconstitutional to enhance punishment based on the<br />
defendant’s invocation of the right to trial by jury). Enhancing punishment<br />
because the defendant invoked its due process right to defend itself is particularly<br />
unjust when, as here, the defendant ultimately prevails as to the major part of the<br />
plaintiff’s claim. Sunrise was largely successful in its defense and appeal,<br />
knocking out one of two claims and reducing the compensatory damages to<br />
$109,000 – less than one-tenth of the amount alleged in the complaint. It was<br />
CGB’s dogged insistence on pursuing a disproportionate punitive award in a retrial<br />
that has accounted <strong>for</strong> the remaining delay.<br />
d. There was no evidence of intentional malice, trickery,<br />
or deceit.<br />
There was no evidence that Sunrise’s actions in dealing with CGB or its<br />
therapists were characterized by “intentional malice, trickery, or deceit.” State<br />
Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. CGB’s theory as to motive involved no allegation of<br />
malice; its theory was that “Sunrise had a financial incentive to keep those<br />
therapists on.” JA423. According to CGB, Tomes believed that the CGB<br />
therapists were so talented that their continued employment was crucial to the<br />
financial health of the facility that she managed. JA49-50. Tomes, by contrast,<br />
testified that she was motivated by concern <strong>for</strong> RHA’s patients: she wanted to<br />
ensure continuity of care by the therapists on whom they had come to rely. See,<br />
27
e.g., JA323; JA324. But whether her motive was financial or altruistic, it is<br />
undisputed Tomes did not act out of ill will toward CGB.<br />
Nor did CGB present any evidence that Sunrise engaged in intentional<br />
trickery or deceit. Marjorie Tomes met with the therapists openly, as a group, in a<br />
room with a glass door. There is no allegation that she attempted to mislead them<br />
in any way. To the contrary, Tomes told the therapists only what, after speaking<br />
with RHA’s counsel, she believed she was permitted to tell them. She stuck to her<br />
script – a fact that is confirmed by the essentially identical recitations from all of<br />
the therapists as to what transpired at the five-minute meeting. See JA457-460.<br />
Nor was there any ef<strong>for</strong>t to conceal the meeting after the fact. RHA’s Knaup<br />
specifically told Brillman that Sunrise had “in<strong>for</strong>med your employees, when it was<br />
more than apparent that you had not, that your contract was cancelled effective<br />
September 30, 1998.” JA481-482.<br />
It is unclear what the district court meant when it made a passing reference<br />
to “repeated stalling and dishonesty.” See JA12. As noted, punitive damages<br />
cannot be imposed <strong>for</strong> Sunrise’s refusal to discuss the termination of the contract<br />
with Brillman in the summer and fall of 1998. To the extent that the court was<br />
referring to the discovery disputes that took place prior to “the eve of the first trial”<br />
(id.), its reliance is likewise misplaced, <strong>for</strong> at least two reasons. First, even if those<br />
disputes somehow prejudiced plaintiff in connection with the first trial, they<br />
28
certainly had no bearing on the retrial; by the time the case was remanded, all<br />
discovery issues had long been sorted out. Second, and more importantly, both<br />
State Farm’s nexus requirement and the First Amendment preclude the use of<br />
punitive damages to punish litigation conduct. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422-<br />
23; Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 62-<br />
63 (1993) (holding that antitrust liability cannot be based upon a reasonable<br />
litigation position, regardless of the litigant’s subjective beliefs or motives, and<br />
observing that a common-law claim <strong>for</strong> wrongful civil proceedings is barred by<br />
litigant’s “reasonable belief that there [was] a chance that a claim [might] be held<br />
valid upon adjudication”).<br />
3. The record contains substantial mitigating evidence.<br />
Sunrise presented a great deal of mitigating evidence – all of which the<br />
district court ignored.<br />
a. The tortious conduct took place in the context of a<br />
socially valuable task.<br />
Sunrise is a model corporate citizen that takes indisputably excellent care of<br />
the elderly patients who are entrusted to it. While we accept <strong>for</strong> purposes of this<br />
appeal that Sunrise’s employee Marjorie Tomes committed a tortious interference<br />
when she facilitated contact between Symphony and the therapists, there is no<br />
suggestion that she did so in order to hurt CGB. Tomes testified that she was<br />
trying to protect RHA’s patients. JA323; JA324. Even if, as CGB claims, her<br />
29
concern <strong>for</strong> continuity of therapy services arose instead from a desire to maintain<br />
the financial health of a facility responsible <strong>for</strong> the care of elderly and ill residents,<br />
that objective itself is one that militates against the imposition of a large punitive<br />
award. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that tortious conduct that takes place in<br />
the context of a “socially valuable task” is inherently less reprehensible than<br />
conduct that serves no defensible purpose at all, such as “intentional, repeated<br />
ethnic harassment.” Bains LLC v. ARCO Prods. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir.<br />
2005). That sensible observation fits this case like a glove.<br />
b. Sunrise had a good-faith belief that its conduct was<br />
permissible.<br />
As discussed above (at pages 7-9), the evidence at trial showed that Tomes<br />
specifically tried to avoid violating CGB’s contractual rights. Tomes was aware of<br />
the no-raiding clause in the contract between CGB and RHA; accordingly, she<br />
sought the advice of RHA’s lawyer prior to speaking with the therapists. When<br />
she met with them, she stayed on message and told them only what she had been<br />
advised was permissible; accordingly, she did not believe that she had done<br />
anything wrong. JA340; JA349. Nor did Tomes believe that she was doing<br />
anything wrong by allowing Symphony to use a Prospect Park conference room <strong>for</strong><br />
interviews, or by telling Symphony that, in her view, one of the CGB therapists<br />
was “well worth” his high salary. JA345-347; JA350-351. Tomes believed that<br />
there was a specific line that she had to walk in order to smooth the transition from<br />
30
CGB to Symphony and simultaneously comply with the contract between CGB<br />
and RHA, and she walked it. Plaintiff offered no evidence to rebut Tomes’<br />
testimony about her contemporaneous understanding of what she could do to<br />
achieve continuity of care without interfering with CGB’s rights. Nor did it<br />
adduce any evidence to suggest that she might have deliberately disregarded the<br />
instructions that she had received from RHA’s lawyer.<br />
Numerous courts have held that good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel<br />
is a complete defense to, or at least a mitigating factor in the assessment of,<br />
punitive damages. 3 Even though Knaup was not Sunrise’s lawyer at the time, it is<br />
clear that Tomes’ reliance on his advice, and her undisputed belief that her conduct<br />
was permissible, are factors that militate strongly against a finding of high<br />
reprehensibility.<br />
***<br />
By any measure, if Sunrise’s conduct crossed the threshold of<br />
reprehensibility necessary <strong>for</strong> the imposition of punitive damages, it did so only by<br />
3 See, e.g., Pierce v. Penman, 515 A.2d 948, 955 (Pa. Super. 1986); In re<br />
Heghmann, 316 B.R. 395, 406 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004); Henderson v. U. S. Fid. &<br />
Guar. Co., 695 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1983); Fox v. Aced, 317 P.2d 608, 610–611<br />
(Cal. 1957); Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Co–op., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Mo.<br />
2000); Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assocs., 538 S.E.2d 15, 32 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000); cf.<br />
Sheetz, Inc. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, PLLC, 547 S.E.2d 256 (W. Va.<br />
2001); Kluczyk v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 847 A.2d 23, 32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.<br />
Div. 2004).<br />
31
a whisker. There is there<strong>for</strong>e no doubt that the conduct does not warrant the<br />
imposition of $2 million in punitive damages – the very amount the Supreme Court<br />
analogized to a “severe criminal penalty” in BMW.<br />
B. The Ratio Guidepost Confirms The Gross Excessiveness Of A $2<br />
Million Punishment.<br />
In State Farm, the Supreme Court undertook to provide lower courts with<br />
more detailed guidance regarding the ratio guidepost than it had supplied in<br />
previous cases. Specifically, the Court stated that “few awards exceeding a single-<br />
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree,<br />
will satisfy due process”; reiterated its prior statement that a punitive award of four<br />
times compensatory damages was likely to “be close to the line of constitutional<br />
impropriety”; indicated that, though “not binding,” the 700-year-long history of<br />
double, treble, and quadruple damages remedies (i.e., ratios of 1:1 to 3:1) is<br />
“instructive”; and, most importantly <strong>for</strong> present purposes, explained that, although<br />
a higher ratio may be permissible when “a particularly egregious act has resulted in<br />
only a small amount of economic damages,” “[w]hen compensatory damages are<br />
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can<br />
reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.” 538 U.S. at 425.<br />
Applying these guidelines to the facts of the case be<strong>for</strong>e it, the Court observed that,<br />
even though State Farm’s conduct was “reprehensible” and “merit[ed] no praise”<br />
32
(id. at 419-20), “a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory<br />
damages” – i.e., a 1:1 ratio – was likely the constitutional maximum. Id. at 429.<br />
To be sure, State Farm did not impose a simple mathematical <strong>for</strong>mula <strong>for</strong><br />
the imposition of punitive damages. But the fact that there is no one-size-fits-all<br />
ratio does not mean that the Supreme Court intended the second BMW guidepost to<br />
be effectively a nullity. To the contrary, the State Farm opinion and the dozens of<br />
lower court decisions applying it clearly demonstrate that the maximum<br />
permissible ratio will vary from case to case based principally on two variables: the<br />
degree of reprehensibility of the conduct and the magnitude of the harm caused by<br />
the conduct (here, as in most cases, the amount of the compensatory damages). 4<br />
The maximum permissible ratio is directly related to the <strong>for</strong>mer and inversely<br />
related to the latter. In other words, <strong>for</strong> any particular degree of reprehensibility, as<br />
the compensatory damages increase, the maximum permissible ratio decreases.<br />
And <strong>for</strong> any particular amount of compensatory damages, the lower on the<br />
reprehensibility spectrum the conduct falls, the lower the constitutionally<br />
permissible ratio.<br />
4 In some cases, a third variable – the likelihood of avoiding detection – may<br />
also be relevant. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. Here, Sunrise’s conduct was<br />
open and obvious; accordingly, that variable cannot justify any enhancement of<br />
punishment.<br />
33
Application of these commonsense principles compels the conclusion not<br />
only that the 18:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages allowed by the<br />
district court is indicative of an unconstitutional punishment, but also that a 1:1<br />
ratio, or certainly no more than a 4:1 ratio, is the constitutional maximum under the<br />
specific circumstances of this case.<br />
1. The ratio of more than 18:1 is a clear indicator of<br />
excessiveness.<br />
To begin with, as indicated above, the State Farm Court expressly stated that<br />
“few awards” exceeding a single-digit ratio will satisfy due process. 538 U.S. at<br />
425. Such ratios generally will be permissible only if the defendant’s conduct is<br />
“particularly egregious” and the compensatory damages are “small.” 5 Id.<br />
5 Although the precise meaning of “small” is an open question, there can be<br />
little doubt that $109,000 is not “small.” It is most likely that by “small” the Court<br />
meant awards below $10,000. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582-83 (discussing exception<br />
<strong>for</strong> cases in which “a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount<br />
of economic damages,” while giving no indication that $4,000 compensatory<br />
award in case be<strong>for</strong>e it qualified <strong>for</strong> that exception); Bains, 405 F.3d at 776 (“[t]his<br />
is not a ‘small amount’ case because the economic damages were substantial –<br />
$50,000”); Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 669-70 (S.D. 2003)<br />
($25,000 award was not “small”), Jones v. Sheahan, 2003 WL 22508171, at *16<br />
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003) (same); cf. Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc. 347<br />
F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding 37:1 ratio in case in which two plaintiffs<br />
received $5,000 awards because the conduct “was outrageous but the compensable<br />
harm done was slight and at the same time difficult to quantify because a large<br />
element of it was emotional”); Simon, 113 P.3d at 75-78 (invoking State Farm<br />
exception where compensatory award was $5,000).<br />
34
The courts – including this Court – have with few exceptions adhered to the<br />
single-digit limit, particularly in cases involving compensatory awards in the range<br />
at issue here. See, e.g., Willow Inn, 399 F.3d at 233-34 (observing that State Farm<br />
generally sets single-digit limit on ratio of punitive to compensatory damages).<br />
The Ninth Circuit has patrolled this limit in a trilogy of recent decisions.<br />
In Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American<br />
Coalition of Life Activists, 422 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005), <strong>for</strong> example, a jury found<br />
that anti-abortion activists had made “true threats of violence” against abortion<br />
providers with the intent to intimidate them, and awarded $526,336 in<br />
compensatory damages and $108,500,000 in punitive damages. After reviewing<br />
BMW, State Farm, and the Ninth Circuit’s post-State Farm cases, the court<br />
explained:<br />
In cases where there are significant economic damages<br />
and punitive damages are warranted but behavior is not<br />
particularly egregious, a ratio of up to 4 to 1 serves as a<br />
good proxy <strong>for</strong> the limits of constitutionality. In cases<br />
with significant economic damages and more egregious<br />
behavior, a single-digit ratio greater than 4 to 1 might be<br />
constitutional. And in cases where there are insignificant<br />
economic damages but the behavior was particularly<br />
egregious, the single-digit ratio may not be a good proxy<br />
<strong>for</strong> constitutionality.<br />
Id. at 962 (citations omitted). Agreeing with the district court that the defendants’<br />
conduct was “particularly reprehensible,” but observing that “[m]ost of the<br />
35
compensatory awards are substantial,” the court limited each punitive award to a<br />
9:1 ratio to the corresponding compensatory damages. Id. at 963.<br />
In Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 415 F.3d 1001, 1010 (9th<br />
Cir. 2005), a case involving a public official’s flagrant abuse of his office, the<br />
district court upheld a punitive damages award of $60 million, which represented a<br />
ratio of 153:1 to the compensatory damages award of $390,072. That decision was<br />
reversed by the Ninth Circuit, which agreed that the defendant’s conduct was<br />
highly reprehensible but held that “the ratio [of punitive to] actual damages is too<br />
high” and remanded <strong>for</strong> further consideration of a more appropriate ratio. 415 F.3d<br />
at 1011. In so holding, the court stated:<br />
[W]e have been reminded that, under established<br />
principles, few awards exceeding a single digit ratio to a<br />
significant degree will satisfy due process. Even an<br />
award more than four times the amount of compensatory<br />
damages might be close to the line of constitutional<br />
impropriety. History points to double, triple, or<br />
quadruple punitives; these ratios are instructive.”<br />
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 6<br />
Finally, in Bains, the defendant had engaged in racial discrimination and<br />
harassment that the court characterized as highly reprehensible: “the conduct was<br />
not an isolated incident but repeated, the target was highly vulnerable financially,<br />
6 In its brief opposing Sunrise’s post-trial motions, CGB relied heavily on the<br />
district court’s opinion in Southern Union. The reversal of that decision renders<br />
the district court’s opinion in this case even more of an outlier.<br />
36
and the harm resulted from intentional malicious conduct.” 405 F.3d at 775.<br />
No<strong>net</strong>heless, the court held that a ratio of between 6:1 and 9:1 was the<br />
constitutional maximum. Id. at 777. In explaining why a pre-State Farm case<br />
upholding a 28:1 ratio was no longer good law, the court stated: “State Farm<br />
emphasizes and supplements the BMW limitation by holding that when<br />
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to<br />
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process<br />
guarantee.” Bains, 405 F.3d at 776 (citations and internal quotation marks<br />
omitted).<br />
Other federal and state appellate courts have recognized the same limiting<br />
principles. See, e.g., Bach, 2005 WL 2009272, at *10 (noting that Supreme Court<br />
“has stated that awards exceeding a single-digit ratio will rarely be upheld against a<br />
constitutional challenge” and that a 1:1 ratio may be the limit when “the amount of<br />
compensatory damages is high,” and concluding that 6.6:1 ratio was “alarming”<br />
where compensatory damages were $400,000); Munro v. Golden Rule Ins. Co.,<br />
393 F.3d 720, 721-22 (7th Cir. 2004) (State Farm “set constitutional limits on the<br />
punitive damages multiplier in simple economic-loss cases” and created a<br />
“presumption against punitive damages that are a double-digit multiple of the<br />
compensatory injury”); Simon, 113 P.3d at 77 (reading State Farm as having<br />
established a “presumption [that] ratios *** significantly greater than nine or 10 to<br />
37
one are suspect and, absent special justification *** cannot survive appellate<br />
scrutiny”). 7<br />
Nothing about this case that warrants deviating from the overwhelming<br />
consensus that ratios in excess of single digits are reserved <strong>for</strong> truly exceptional<br />
cases in which the conduct is highly reprehensible and the compensatory damages<br />
are small. Accordingly, at a minimum, the conclusion is inescapable that the<br />
existing 18:1 ratio is indicative of a grossly excessive punishment.<br />
2. The maximum permissible ratio in this case is 1:1.<br />
What, then, is the constitutional maximum in this case? We submit that the<br />
answer to that question again is supplied by State Farm. The Court there indicated<br />
7 In an appendix to our post-trial brief in the district court, we showed that of<br />
the 37 decisions handed down between April 2003 (when State Farm was decided)<br />
and February 2005 (when we filed the brief) in which the actual or potential harm<br />
was between $100,000 and $300,000, only three cases upheld a ratio that exceeded<br />
single digits. In all of the other 34 cases, the award (after judicial review) was less<br />
than ten times the compensatory damages – in most cases far less. See Appendix<br />
A. And even the three outlier cases had post-review ratios of 10:1, 10:1 and 11:1,<br />
respectively. See Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 842 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. 2004);<br />
Collins Entm’t Corp. v. Coats & Coats Rental Amusement, 584 S.E.2d 120 (S.C.<br />
Ct. App. 2003); Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. 2003). The<br />
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in Hollock (878 A.2d 864 (Pa. June<br />
28, 2005)); the case was argued in December 2005.<br />
As of today, there have been 43 such decisions (excluding this case). And<br />
there has been only one additional case (<strong>for</strong> a total of four) upholding a ratio of<br />
greater than single digits. See Superior Fed. Bank v. Jones & Mackey Constr.Co.,<br />
2005 WL 3307074 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2005) (upholding ratio of 18:1 in case<br />
involving compensatory damages of $175,000).<br />
38
that punitive damages should not be awarded at all unless “the defendant’s<br />
culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to<br />
warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence”<br />
(538 U.S. at 419), that “[t]he existence of any one of [the reprehensibility]<br />
factors *** may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award” (id.), that<br />
“the absence of all of them renders any award suspect” (id. (emphasis added)), and<br />
that, even in cases of reprehensible misconduct (like State Farm itself), “[w]hen<br />
compensatory damages are substantial,” a 1:1 ratio “can reach the outermost limit<br />
of the due process guarantee” (id. at 425).<br />
Here, none of the reprehensibility factors was present (see Point A.2, supra),<br />
making “any [punitive] award suspect.” Moreover, the $109,000 compensatory<br />
award was “substantial” and constituted more than “complete compensation” <strong>for</strong><br />
the injury arising from Sunrise’s tort. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425, 426. Brillman<br />
herself admitted that she valued the loss of the six therapists in question at<br />
$109,000: one week be<strong>for</strong>e the therapists went to work <strong>for</strong> Symphony, she offered<br />
to waive her contractual rights to their services in exchange <strong>for</strong> a lump sum<br />
“buyout” of 25 percent of their salaries – or $109,000. See JA449-451.<br />
Indeed, most of that $109,000 loss was caused not by Sunrise’s tort, but<br />
rather by the termination of CGB’s contracts with RHA – a harm <strong>for</strong> which Sunrise<br />
cannot legitimately be punished. See CGB Occupational Therapy, 357 F.3d at 390<br />
39
(“Sunrise could not have interfered with the contracts between CGB and<br />
RHA/Pennsylvania.”). Both of the CGB therapists who testified at trial stated that,<br />
once CGB lost the RHA contracts at Prospect and Pembrooke, their departure was<br />
a <strong>for</strong>egone conclusion. Gasiewski, the head therapist, explained:<br />
Q: After you found out that she had lost the contract, you went to<br />
Miss Brillman and you asked her whether she had work <strong>for</strong> you as an<br />
occupational therapist, didn’t you?<br />
A: Yes.<br />
Q: She told you she didn’t, right?<br />
A: Right.<br />
***<br />
Q: So in your view, sir, you had a choice of either going to work<br />
<strong>for</strong> Symphony or, if you wanted to work as an [occupational<br />
therapist], working <strong>for</strong> someone other than CGB, isn’t that a fact?<br />
A: Yes.<br />
Q: Either way, no matter what happened, you were going to have<br />
to leave CGB once they lost that therapy provider contract, isn’t that<br />
true?<br />
A: I felt I was <strong>for</strong>ced to leave CGB.<br />
Q: Because of the loss of the contract?<br />
A: Yes.<br />
1/12/05 Tr. 105; JA89-90. Because the therapists would have left CGB even in the<br />
absence of Tomes’ actions, the $109,000 compensatory award far exceeds any<br />
40
minimal losses that CGB may have suffered as a result of Sunrise’s solicitation of<br />
the therapists, as distinguished from losses relating to termination of the contracts. 8<br />
In view of the ample size of the compensatory award, and the absence of any<br />
indicia of reprehensibility, a punitive award equal to the compensatory damages is<br />
the constitutional maximum – if indeed anything other than a nominal award is<br />
permissible. In Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651 (S.D. 2003), an<br />
employment case in which the defendant was found to have invaded the plaintiff’s<br />
privacy, the jury awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in<br />
punitive damages − a ratio of 20:1. The Supreme Court of South Dakota<br />
determined that only one of the BMW factors was present and that the<br />
compensatory award fully redressed the harm. Accordingly, it held that the 20:1<br />
ratio was indicative of a grossly excessive award, explaining:<br />
[T]he harm caused to Roth was economic as opposed to<br />
physical. Farner put no one’s health or safety at risk and<br />
the evidence indicates Farner’s conduct was limited to<br />
two isolated incidents. Although Farner’s fraudulent<br />
concealment indicates it engaged in conduct of trickery<br />
and deceit, Roth was fully compensated <strong>for</strong> the damages<br />
he suffered ***. *** [W]e find that in this case, the<br />
combination of the “shocking disparity” between<br />
compensatory and punitive damages awarded, combined<br />
with the lack of potential and actual harm and the low<br />
8 Although Brillman testified at trial that CGB’s true damages far exceeded<br />
the $109,000 award, every element of additional harm that she identified was<br />
either abandoned by her counsel during closing argument at the first trial or found<br />
to be non-compensable by this Court. See pages 47-48 infra.<br />
41
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,<br />
counsel against a substantial punitive award.<br />
Id. at 667-69 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The court<br />
concluded that “‘a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory<br />
damages’ is justified” and remanded <strong>for</strong> a new trial on punitive damages. Id. at<br />
671 (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429).<br />
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in a case involving conduct<br />
materially more egregious than that at issue here – racial harassment in the<br />
workplace. See Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2004). It<br />
held that a $6,063,750 punitive award that was just over ten times the plaintiff’s<br />
$600,000 compensatory award was unconstitutionally excessive and ordered a<br />
remittitur to the amount of compensatory damages, explaining:<br />
Mr. Williams’s large compensatory award *** militates against<br />
departing from the heartland of permissible exemplary damages. The<br />
Supreme Court has stated that “[w]hen compensatory damages are<br />
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory<br />
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”<br />
Mr. Williams received $600,000 to compensate him <strong>for</strong> his<br />
harassment. Six hundred thousand dollars is a lot of money.<br />
Accordingly, we find that due process requires that the punitive<br />
damages award on Mr. Williams’s harassment claim be remitted to<br />
$600,000.<br />
Id. at 799 (citation omitted); see also Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco<br />
Co., 394 F.3d 594, 602-603 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that “a ratio of approximately<br />
1:1 would comport with the requirements of due process” in case in which<br />
42
compensatory damages were “substantial” and conduct was deemed to be “highly<br />
reprehensible”); Ceimo v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 2005 WL 1523445 (9th Cir.<br />
June 29, 2005) (unpublished) (affirming district court’s remittitur of punitive<br />
award to a 1:1 ratio); Watson v. E.S. Sutton, Inc., 2005 WL 2170659, at *19<br />
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (reducing punitive damages from $2.5 million to<br />
$717,000 in employment discrimination case where compensatory damages were<br />
$1.5 million because “the Court does not believe this is a case with the most<br />
culpable conduct possible”); Czarnik v. Illumina, Inc., 2004 WL 2757571, at *11<br />
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2004) (unpublished) (reducing $5 million punitive award to<br />
$2.2 million and explaining that “the $2.2 million compensatory damage award<br />
was without question ‘substantial’ and, in light of the fact that [the defendant’s]<br />
conduct was not highly reprehensible *** we conclude that a 1:1 ratio of punitive<br />
to compensatory damages is the maximum award that is sustainable against a due<br />
process challenge”).<br />
Here, as in Williams, the compensatory award “is a lot of money.” That is<br />
especially so because the $109,000 in compensatory damages that Sunrise had to<br />
pay did not represent the return of ill-gotten gain, but instead, from Sunrise’s<br />
standpoint, was entirely an out-of-pocket loss. In State Farm, the Supreme Court<br />
recognized that compensatory damages have a deterrent effect in their own right,<br />
admonishing that “punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s<br />
43
culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to<br />
warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.”<br />
538 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added). 9 We respectfully submit that this case does not<br />
fall in the category thus described, making even a 1:1 ratio constitutionally<br />
questionable. 10<br />
Even <strong>for</strong> cases of higher reprehensibility, both the Supreme Court and most<br />
lower courts have regarded a 4:1 ratio as marking “the line of constitutional<br />
impropriety” (State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425) when the compensatory damages have<br />
exceeded $100,000. For example, one court reduced a punitive award of $2<br />
9 Prior and subsequent cases have made the same point. See, e.g., Memphis<br />
Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (“[d]eterrence *** operates<br />
through the mechanism of damages that are compensatory”) (emphasis in original);<br />
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (“The<br />
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method<br />
of governing conduct and controlling policy.”); United States v. Bailey, 288 F.<br />
Supp. 2d 1261, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (setting aside $3,000,000 punitive award “in<br />
its entirety” because, among other things, the compensatory damages exceeded the<br />
gain to the defendant, making “the imposition of further sanctions to achieve<br />
punishment or deterrence” unnecessary), aff’d, 419 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005).<br />
Because the award of compensatory damages already has rendered Sunrise’s<br />
tortious interference with CGB’s relationship with its at-will employees completely<br />
unprofitable, those damages are themselves fully sufficient to deter any repetition<br />
of that conduct, making it unnecessary to allow a punitive/compensatory ratio in<br />
excess of 1:1.<br />
10 The same result is required as a matter of Pennsylvania law, which holds<br />
that the “size of a punitive damages award must be reasonably related to the State’s<br />
interest in punishing and deterring the particular behavior of the defendant and not<br />
the product of arbitrariness or unfettered discretion.” Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d<br />
1228, 1241 (Pa. Super. 1998).<br />
44
million to $717,610, in a case in which the plaintiff had received $179,402 in<br />
compensatory damages and medical expenses incurred as a result of an assault<br />
committed by the defendant’s employees. Fresh v. Entertainment U.S.A. of<br />
Tennessee, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 851 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). Heeding State Farm’s<br />
discussion of the ratio guidepost, the court found “[t]he award in this case [to be]<br />
excessive when viewed as either a deterrent or punitive measure” (id.) at 860) and<br />
concluded that, given “the substantial amount of compensatory damages and<br />
medical expenses awarded in this case, a single-digit multiplier of four (4)<br />
appropriately complies with the constitutional limitations most recently set <strong>for</strong>th in<br />
Campbell ***.” Id. In a case involving discrimination against a disabled worker,<br />
another court reduced a punitive award of $4.5 million to $300,000. Young v.<br />
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2004 WL 2538639, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2004). The<br />
compensatory damages were $100,000, and the court concluded that, despite the<br />
relatively high reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, a 3:1 ratio was the<br />
constitutional maximum. 11<br />
Most notably, the Eighth Circuit held that a 4:1 ratio was the “due process<br />
maximum” in a wrongful death case against the operators of a nursing home whose<br />
employees “failed to treat [the decedent’s] lengthy constipation and ignored their<br />
11 As a result of a $300,000 statutory cap on total damages, the plaintiff in<br />
Young ultimately received only $200,000 in punitive damages.<br />
45
duty to contact her treating physician despite numerous requests that they do so”<br />
and who were engaged in “a practice of careless and at times fraudulent charting of<br />
residents’ condition[s].” Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, L.L.C., 377 F.3d 827,<br />
832 (8th Cir. 2004) (ordering remittitur of $5 million punitive award to $2 million).<br />
Needless to say, if a 4:1 ratio (and $2 million punishment) is the limit in a case in<br />
which a nursing home’s conduct caused the death of a patient, nothing close to that<br />
is warranted when a similar business’s conduct injured another company, but<br />
affirmatively benefited the patients. 12<br />
12 Many state courts have likewise viewed 4:1 as the maximum permissible<br />
ratio when the compensatory damages are in the six-figure range, even where the<br />
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct is greater than it is in this case. See,<br />
e.g., Cass v. Stephens, 156 S.W.3d 38, 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding, in fraud<br />
and malicious conversion case involving $200,082 in compensatory damages, that<br />
“because there were sizable economic damages” and discovery sanctions against<br />
the defendant, “the circumstances and context of this case do not merit a ratio that<br />
exceeds four to one”); Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Insurance Co. 135<br />
Cal. Rptr. 2d 736 (Ct. App. 2003) (reducing a punitive award that was 33 times the<br />
$258,570 in compensatory damages to slightly less than four times those damages<br />
even while determining that the defendant’s conduct exhibited four of the five<br />
indicia of reprehensibility identified in State Farm); Textron Fin. Corp. v. National<br />
Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Ct. App. 2004) (ratio of 4:1 was<br />
constitutional maximum in case involving compensatory award of $90,000);<br />
Taylor Woodrow Homes, Inc. v. Acceptance Ins. Cos., 2003 WL 21224088, at *4<br />
(Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2003) (unpublished) (reducing $5 million punitive award to<br />
$1 million, where compensatory damages were $293,000); Waddill v. Anchor<br />
Hocking, Inc., 78 P.3d 570, 576 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding in product liability<br />
action that, because “there is no evidence that [the defendant] acted with<br />
intentional malice or engage[d] in trickery or deceit[,] *** the maximum<br />
constitutionally permissible [punitive] award in this case is four times the<br />
[$100,854 in] compensatory damages <strong>for</strong> which defendant is responsible”); Park,<br />
2004 WL 2595897, at *12-*16 (upholding reduction of 56:1 ratio to 3:1 where<br />
46
In sum, if, contrary to our arguments above, the Court concludes that the<br />
reprehensibility of Sunrise’s tort significantly exceeds the threshold between<br />
punishable and merely tortious conduct, a ratio of 4:1 would mark the outer limit<br />
of permissible punishment. If, on the other hand, the Court agrees with us that few<br />
if any of the reprehensibility factors are present here, a 1:1 ratio would “reach the<br />
outermost limit of the due process guarantee” (State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425).<br />
3. The denominator of the ratio is $109,000<br />
In attempting to justify setting the punitive damages at more than 18 times<br />
the compensatory damages, the district court asserted, with no concrete reference<br />
to the record, that “the $109,000 was not the only conduct that both Juries were<br />
allowed to punish. *** [G]iven the hardships Defendant imposed on Plaintiff in its<br />
treatment of Plaintiff after the interference took place, and given defendant’s antics<br />
leading up to the first trial, the true ratio, could the harm by Defendant be<br />
expressed as a simple dollar value, would be closer to three to one.” JA13-14.<br />
That conclusion finds no support in the record or in the law; it is contradicted both<br />
by the history of this case and by Circuit precedent.<br />
The procedural history of this case compels the conclusion that $109,000 is<br />
the only appropriate denominator <strong>for</strong> the punitive/compensatory ratio. The jury in<br />
compensatory damages were $50,000 and defendant’s “conduct was not ‘a<br />
particularly egregious act’”) (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425).<br />
47
the first trial found that the loss of the six therapists harmed CGB by exactly<br />
$109,000, and this Court held that that injury was the only claim <strong>for</strong> which CGB<br />
can recover punitive damages. CGB, 357 F.3d at 387-88. All of the other<br />
economic losses that CGB asserted in its briefs below were either rejected by the<br />
jury at the first trial or attributable to the claim on which Sunrise prevailed. For<br />
example, CGB claimed that it lost revenue arising from its inability to assign its<br />
therapists to other facilities after the RHA contracts were terminated – but in the<br />
first trial it did not request compensation <strong>for</strong> such lost revenues (which is<br />
unsurprising because it had no work <strong>for</strong> the therapists after it lost RHA’s business<br />
(see JA174-178)). Similarly, CGB argued that the $109,000 did not compensate it<br />
<strong>for</strong> the costs associated with training new therapists. The first jury, however, was<br />
authorized to award damages <strong>for</strong> all such losses that CGB proved; if it did not<br />
include costs associated with training replacements, it was because CGB did not<br />
prove any such losses. JA433-434. CGB further claimed that it had not been<br />
compensated <strong>for</strong> losses arising from Sunrise’s alleged use of its proprietary<br />
treatment techniques, but this Court specifically held that there was no evidence to<br />
support such a claim. CGB, 357 F.3d at 388-90. In sum, none of these unproven<br />
losses can be included in the denominator of the ratio. See, e.g., Simon, 113 P.3d<br />
at 74 (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to inflate the denominator by “characteriz[ing]<br />
48
damages he might have obtained on another cause of action, one on which he did<br />
not prevail, as potential damages <strong>for</strong> the cause of action on which he did prevail”).<br />
Willow Inn, which the district court cited but apparently misread, in no way<br />
stands <strong>for</strong> the proposition that district courts are free to tinker with the denominator<br />
of the ratio. To the contrary, this Court focused almost entirely on the dollar<br />
amount that, pursuant to the Pennsylvania bad-faith statute, the defendant was<br />
required to pay to the plaintiff as a result of its tortious conduct. As the Court<br />
explained it:<br />
[B]ecause the $2,000 award on the contract claim was<br />
only incidental to the bad faith thrust of this litigation, we<br />
conclude that the attorney fees and costs awarded as part<br />
of the § 8371 claim is the proper term to compare to the<br />
punitive damages award <strong>for</strong> ratio purposes. These<br />
awards totaled $135,000, resulting in approximately a 1:1<br />
ratio, which is indicative of constitutionality under Gore<br />
and Campbell.<br />
399 F.3d at 235. By any measure, the defendant in Willow Inn behaved far more<br />
reprehensibly than Sunrise: it intentionally took advantage of a vulnerable<br />
policyholder to whom it owed a heightened duty of care. And the harm to Willow<br />
Inn, as measured by the applicable Pennsylvania statute, was comparable to that at<br />
issue here – $137,000 in Willow Inn, as compared with $109,000 in this case.<br />
Under those circumstances, this Court twice stated that a 1:1 ratio approached the<br />
limit of constitutionality. See id. at 230 (“[W]e consider the $150,000 punitive<br />
damages to approach but not cross the constitutional line.”); id. at 235 (“[W]e<br />
49
elieve the $150,000 punitive damages award approaches the constitutional limit<br />
given the reprehensibility of PSM’s conduct.”). If a 1:1 ratio was the constitutional<br />
limit in Willow Inn, it per<strong>for</strong>ce exceeds the constitutional limit in this case, in<br />
which the defendant’s conduct implicated none of the five BMW reprehensibility<br />
factors.<br />
The district court’s reliance on Sheedy v. City of Philadelphia, 2005 WL<br />
375657 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2005), is similarly misplaced. First, the compensatory<br />
damages in Sheedy were $3,075. Cases involving small compensatory awards are<br />
simply not relevant <strong>for</strong> purposes of ratio analysis in this case, in which the<br />
compensatory award was orders of magnitude greater. The State Farm Court<br />
specifically noted that its single-digit-ratio presumption is inapplicable when “a<br />
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic<br />
damages.” 538 U.S. 408 at 425. Intentionally and maliciously causing one’s<br />
<strong>for</strong>mer spouse to be arrested and thrown into jail <strong>for</strong> a crime that she did not<br />
commit is, of course, “particularly egregious” misconduct, and $3,075 is a “small<br />
amount of economic damages.” Second, in reviewing the award in Sheedy, Judge<br />
Fullam plainly erred in assuming that “the jury’s $500,000 punitive award actually<br />
included a substantial amount of compensatory damages,” an amount that he<br />
estimated to be $100,000. 2005 WL 375657, at *5. Courts have no power to<br />
speculate in this way. See Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F.<br />
50
Supp. 254, 270 n.27 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (courts should not engage in “speculation on<br />
[the jury’s] method of computing punitive damages”), aff’d, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d<br />
Cir. 1979). Even accepting that it was appropriate <strong>for</strong> Judge Fullam to assume that<br />
the jury smuggled compensatory damages into its punitive award, however, a<br />
similar approach is impermissible in this case. It is clear from the record that the<br />
jury awarded the highest amount of compensatory damages that CGB possibly<br />
could have suffered from the tortious interference with its relationship with the<br />
therapists. See pages 48-49, supra. And third, after estimating the true<br />
compensatory award to be $100,000, Judge Fullam reduced the punitive award to<br />
$200,000. Ultimately, then, Sheedy stands <strong>for</strong> the proposition that, when the<br />
defendant’s conduct is highly reprehensible and the compensatory damages are<br />
$100,000, the appropriate ratio of punitive damages to compensable harm is 2:1.<br />
The conduct of the defendant in Sheedy was, of course, substantially more<br />
reprehensible than the tortious interference attributed to Sunrise in this case.<br />
Accordingly, Sheedy strongly supports our argument that, if any award of punitive<br />
damages is appropriate here, the maximum permissible ratio of punitive to<br />
compensatory damages is 1:1.<br />
C. The Third BMW Guidepost Confirms The Excessiveness Of The<br />
Award.<br />
The third BMW guidepost requires a comparison between “the punitive<br />
damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed <strong>for</strong><br />
51
comparable misconduct.” BMW, 517 U.S. at 583. There is no legislatively<br />
established penalty <strong>for</strong> the conduct at issue here – i.e., a third party’s decision to<br />
inject itself into the relationship between an employer and its at-will employees.<br />
The absence of any penal provisions covering the conduct is itself a clear<br />
indication that a punitive award “tantamount to a severe criminal penalty” (BMW,<br />
517 U.S. at 575) is excessive. See, e.g., FDIC v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854, 862<br />
(10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the fact that the conduct is not subject to criminal or<br />
civil fines suggests that defendant was not on notice that its conduct could give rise<br />
to substantial punitive damages, and reducing $1.2 million punitive award to<br />
$264,000 – six times the $44,000 compensatory award); Groom v. Safeway, Inc.,<br />
973 F. Supp. 987, 995 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (“the fact that apparently there is no law<br />
imposing civil or criminal penalties <strong>for</strong> comparable conduct strongly suggests that<br />
an enormous punitive damages award is not warranted here”; reducing $750,000<br />
punitive award to $50,000 – 10 times the $5,000 compensatory award).<br />
D. The Punishment Cannot Be Sustained On The Basis Of Sunrise’s<br />
Finances.<br />
A defendant’s wealth “bear[s] no relationship to the [punitive] award’s<br />
reasonableness or proportionality to the harm,” and <strong>for</strong> that reason “[t]he wealth of<br />
a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.”<br />
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427. Indeed, reliance on corporate financial condition to<br />
uphold a high punitive award constitutes “a departure from well-established<br />
52
constraints on punitive damages.” Id.; see also Bains, 405 F.3d at 777 (“A<br />
punitive damages award is supposed to sting so as to deter a defendant’s<br />
reprehensible conduct ***. But there are limits,” and evidence of wealth cannot<br />
“cannot make up <strong>for</strong> the failure of other factors, such as reprehensibility, to<br />
constrain significantly an award that purports to punish a defendant’s conduct.”)<br />
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Roth, 667 N.W.2d at 670 (where<br />
“the reprehensibility and harm guideposts counsel in favor of a lower punitive<br />
damages award,” court “need not address the wrongdoer’s financial condition and<br />
the effect of the punitive damages award on” the defendant). Thus, the district<br />
court clearly erred in suggesting repeatedly that “the tremendous wealth of<br />
Defendant” supports a larger award in this case. JA9; see also JA10.<br />
That is because, contrary to the district court’s belief, corporate financial<br />
condition sheds no light on either of the legitimate purposes of punitive damages:<br />
retribution and deterrence. As to the <strong>for</strong>mer, “the core of the Aristotelian notion of<br />
corrective justice, and more broadly of the principle of the rule of law, is that<br />
sanctions should be based on the wrong done rather than the status of the<br />
defendant; a person is punished <strong>for</strong> what he does, not who he is, even if the who is<br />
a huge corporation.” Mathias, 347 F.3d at 676 (7th Cir. 2003). Put another way,<br />
retributive principles are not advanced by punishing Wal-Mart more heavily than<br />
53
Target <strong>for</strong> the same conduct merely because Wal-Mart has greater financial<br />
resources.<br />
Wealth is equally irrelevant to Pennsylvania’s interest in deterrence. True,<br />
the wealth of an individual charged with committing a non-economically-<br />
motivated tort − e.g., assault, defamation, or vandalism − is relevant to the amount<br />
of punishment necessary to impart deterrence. See Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33,<br />
35 (7th Cir. 1996) (“To a very rich person, the pain of having to pay a heavy award<br />
of damages may be a mere pinprick and so not deter him (or people like him) from<br />
continuing to engage in the same type of wrongdoing.”); Abraham & Jeffries,<br />
Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of the Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J.<br />
LEGAL STUD. 415, 418 (1989) (wealth of individual may be relevant to setting<br />
punitive damages sufficient to “sting” individuals “who cause harm out of spite or<br />
malice”).<br />
But “[t]his point *** does not apply to institutions as distinct from natural<br />
persons.” Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 35. The reason is that “[a] potentially liable<br />
[organizational] defendant will compare the benefits it will derive from an action<br />
that risks tort liability against the discounted present expected value of the liability<br />
that will be imposed if the risk occurs. Whether a[n organizational] defendant is<br />
wealthy or poor, this cost-benefit calculation is the same.” Abraham & Jeffries,<br />
supra, at 417.<br />
54
In sum, because Sunrise’s financial resources bear no relationship to<br />
Pennsylvania’s interest in punishment or deterrence, this Court should not consider<br />
that evidence in determining the maximum constitutionally-permissible award of<br />
punitive damages.<br />
E. The Fact That The Jury Returned A Large Award Has No<br />
Bearing On The Excessiveness Analysis.<br />
The district court’s determination that a “very substantial punitive award”<br />
(JA9-10) is appropriate here was based in part on the size of the jury’s verdict.<br />
“Both juries decided that Plaintiff’s evidence called <strong>for</strong> a substantial award, and<br />
this Court will not blindly discard both Juries’ conclusions.” Id. That analysis was<br />
wrong in several respects.<br />
First of all, the first jury awarded $1.3 million in punitive damages <strong>for</strong> both<br />
torts, and the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was approximately 2:1.<br />
Moreover, the compensatory damages attributable to the valid cause of action −<br />
$109,000 – were only 16 percent of the first jury’s total compensatory award.<br />
Accordingly, it is plain that, by imposing a $2 million award <strong>for</strong> that single cause<br />
of action, the district court did “blindly discard” the first jury’s conclusion. 13<br />
13 Moreover, even putting aside State Farm’s limitations on ratios in excess of<br />
single digits, to allow a punishment of more than the $1.3 million awarded by the<br />
first jury as punishment <strong>for</strong> both torts found by it effectively punishes Sunrise <strong>for</strong><br />
successfully appealing, in violation of its due process rights. See Landsberg v.<br />
Scrabble <strong>Cross</strong>word Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 1986)<br />
(finding that trial court, on remand, “imposed a chilling impediment to the right to<br />
55
Moreover, the second jury’s award does not – despite its enormous size –<br />
provide a basis to infer that the jury made a factual finding of high reprehensibility.<br />
As discussed above (at pages 11-15), plaintiff’s counsel engaged in a systematic<br />
ef<strong>for</strong>t to inflame the jury and distract it from its narrow task of setting punishment<br />
<strong>for</strong> the limited tort of interfering with CGB’s relationships with its staff. He<br />
particularly focused on Sunrise’s substantial financial resources, telling the jury<br />
that it would take a very large number to get Sunrise’s attention. The jury was then<br />
instructed by the court that it must consider Sunrise’s wealth in setting punishment,<br />
and that it should not feel constrained by the size of the compensatory award –<br />
exactly the reverse of the teaching of State Farm. The fact that it returned a $30<br />
million verdict demonstrates only that plaintiff’s counsel succeeded in influencing<br />
the jury with his inflammatory tactics and his emphasis on wealth. It indicates<br />
absolutely nothing about the jury’s views regarding the reprehensibility of<br />
Marjorie Tomes’ five-minute meeting with CGB’s therapists. As the Cali<strong>for</strong>nia<br />
Supreme Court recently explained, when the jury has made “no *** express<br />
finding” on a particular issue bearing on application of the BMW guideposts, “to<br />
infer one from the size of the award would be inconsistent with de novo review, <strong>for</strong><br />
appeal by increasing its initial punitive damage award merely because defendants<br />
successfully appealed” one of two claims against them).<br />
56
the award’s size would thereby indirectly justify itself.” Simon, 113 P.3d at 70.<br />
The district court’s contrary assumption was profoundly misguided.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
For all of the <strong>for</strong>egoing reasons, the $2 million punitive award entered by the<br />
district court is grossly and unconstitutionally excessive. This Court should reduce<br />
the award to an amount no greater than the compensatory damages – $109,000.<br />
Respectfully submitted.<br />
/s/ Lauren R. Goldman<br />
Evan M. Tager<br />
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP<br />
1909 K Street N.W.<br />
Washington, D.C. 20006<br />
(202) 263-3240<br />
Andrew L. Frey<br />
Lauren R. Goldman<br />
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP<br />
1675 Broadway<br />
New York, NY 10019<br />
(212) 506-2500<br />
Richard G. Mann, Jr.<br />
C. William Groscup<br />
Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, L.L.P.<br />
8405 Greensboro Dr., Suite 100<br />
McLean, VA<br />
(703) 749-1000<br />
Counsel to Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. and<br />
Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc.<br />
57
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE<br />
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C), I hereby certify that this brief was<br />
produced in Times New Roman (a proportionally-spaced typeface), 14-point type<br />
and contains 13,844 words (based on the Microsoft Word word processing system<br />
word count function).<br />
I further certify that the electronic copy of this brief filed with the Court is<br />
identical in all respects except the signature to the hard copy filed with the Court,<br />
and that a virus check was per<strong>for</strong>med on the electronic version using the Norton<br />
Anti-Virus software program.<br />
58<br />
/s/ Lauren R. Goldman<br />
Lauren R. Goldman<br />
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP<br />
Counsel to Sunrise Senior Living, Inc.<br />
and Sunrise Senior Living<br />
Management, Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE<br />
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of March, 2006, I served the <strong>for</strong>egoing<br />
document by causing a true and correct copy thereof to be delivered via electronic<br />
and U.S. mail to the following:<br />
David G. Concannon<br />
Law Offices of David G. Concannon, LLC<br />
Straf<strong>for</strong>d Building One, Suite 112<br />
150 Straf<strong>for</strong>d Avenue<br />
Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087<br />
59<br />
/s/ Lauren R. Goldman<br />
Lauren R. Goldman<br />
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP<br />
Counsel to Sunrise Senior Living, Inc.<br />
and Sunrise Senior Living<br />
Management, Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF BAR MEMBERSHIP<br />
I hereby certify pursuant to LAR 46.1 that I was admitted to the Bar of the<br />
United States Court of Appeals <strong>for</strong> the Third Circuit on January 14, 2005 and<br />
remain a member in good standing of the Bar of this Court.<br />
Dated: March 21, 2006<br />
60<br />
/s/ Lauren R. Goldman<br />
Lauren R. Goldman<br />
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP<br />
Counsel to Sunrise Senior Living, Inc.<br />
and Sunrise Senior Living<br />
Management, Inc.